    [Senate Hearing 116-508, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                  S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                       APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND
                       THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1790

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY
          ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
          STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
              ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
              SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                              U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                 U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

                U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

             U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

                U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  ARMY POSTURE

             DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                                   ----------

         FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
             YEAR 2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1

          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  b  U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN
      COMMAND b  U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA b  U.S.
      SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND b  U.S. STRATEGIC
     COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND  b  U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S.
      TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  b  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE  b
    ARMY POSTURE  b  DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
                     b  AIR FORCE POSTURE  b  NAVY POSTURE

                                                    S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                       APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND
                       THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1790

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY
          ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
          STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
              ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
              SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                              U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

                 U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

                U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

             U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

                U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  ARMY POSTURE

             DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

                                   ----------

         FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    46-152 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman

    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		JACK REED, Rhode Island
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    RICK SCOTT, Florida			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                	DOUG JONES, Alabama

       		John Bonsell, Staff Director
    		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                                February 5, 2019

                                                                       Page

    United States Central Command....................................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Votel, General Joseph L., USA, Commander, United States Central
      Command........................................................     8

    Questions for the Record.........................................    66

                                February 7, 2019

    United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command..    71

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Mike Rounds.................................    71

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................    72

                               Witness Statements

    Waldhauser, General Thomas D., USMC, Commander, United States        73
      Africa Command.

    Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
      Command........................................................    89

    Questions for the Record.........................................   145

                               February 12, 2019

    United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea   165

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   165

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   166

                               Witness Statements

    Davidson, Admiral Philip S., USN, Commander, United States Indo-    168
      Pacific Command.

    Abrams, General Robert B., USA Commander, United Nations Command/   188
      Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   230

                                     (iii)

                               February 14, 2019

                                                                       Page
    United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber    243
      Command.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   243

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   244

                               Witness Statements

    West, The Honorable Owen O., Assistant Secretary of Defense,        246
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

    Thomas, General Raymond A., III, USA, Commander, United States      250
      Special Operations Command.

    Nakasone, General Paul M., USA, Commander, United States Cyber      256
      Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central
      Security Service.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   293

                               February 26, 2019

    United States Strategic Command and United States Northern
      Command........................................................   309

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   309

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   310

                               Witness Statements

    Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
      Command........................................................   312

    O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United         327
      States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   378

                                 March 5, 2019

    United States European Command and United States Transportation     403
      Command.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   403

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   404

                               Witness Statements

    Scaparrotti, General Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States       406
      European Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
      Allied Commander Europe.

    Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States            415
      Transportation Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   453

                                      (iv)

                                 March 14, 2019

                                                                       Page
    Budget Posture...................................................   473

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   473

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   474

                               Witness Statements

    Shanahan, The Honorable Patrick M., Acting Secretary of Defense;    476
      Accompanied by The Honorable David L. Norquist, Under Secretary
      of Defense (Comptroller).

    Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint        490
      Chiefs of Staff.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   538

    Appendix A.......................................................   560

                                 March 26, 2019

    Army Posture.....................................................   581

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   581

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   582

                               Witness Statements

    Esper, The Honorable Mark T., Secretary of the Army..............   587

    Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.........   590

    Questions for the Record.........................................   639

                                 March 28, 2019

    The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Programs........   653

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   653

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   656

                               Witness Statements

    Perry, The Honorable J. Richard, Secretary of Energy.............   658

    Gordon-Hagerty, The Honorable Lisa E., Under Secretary of Energy
      for
      Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security     667
      Administration.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   688

                                      (v)

                                 April 4, 2019

                                                                       Page
    Air Force Posture................................................   705

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   705

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   706

                               Witness Statements

    Wilson, The Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force.....   708

    Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force   709

    Questions for the Record.........................................   759

    Appendix A.......................................................   776

                                 April 9, 2019

    Navy Posture.....................................................   779

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   779

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   782

                               Witness Statements

    Spencer, The Honorable Richard V., Secretary of the Navy.........   783

    Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations......   787

    Neller, General Robert B., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..   800

    Questions for the Record.........................................   846

                                      (vi)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                         UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Good morning.
        The Committee today will receive testimony from the United
    States Central Command (CENTCOM).
        I would like to welcome our witness, General Joseph Votel,
    Commander of the United States Central Command. Welcome.
        General Votel will hand over the Central Command at the end
    of March, and I want to thank him for his outstanding service
    to our country over his 38-year career. General, you have had a
    tough job at CENTCOM, and with the rise of ISIS [the Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria] and the spread of Iran's proxies and
    the return of Russia to the Middle East, you and the President
    have grappled with some of the very hard decisions. Thank you
    for all you have done to keep America safe.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
    ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS), which identifies competition with China and
    Russia as, quote, the central challenge to the United States'
    prosperity and security. Clearly, we do not want to be the
    world's policeman, but without any United States presence, our
    strategic competitors will rush to fill the void. We have seen
    this repeatedly in the Middle East. When we step away from
    partners, Russia steps in. When our military pulls back, Russia
    pulls forward. When we do not enforce our redlines, Russia
    tries to create its own.
        The NDS also makes countering terrorist threats a top
    priority. Part of this strategy has been achieved. The ISIS
    caliphate has been defeated, but ISIS and al Qaeda are still
    active in the region and threaten our Homeland.
        Both priorities, competing with Russia and countering
    terrorists, are at stake in Syria. As we draw down in Syria, we
    must continue to support our partners and friends. I am also
    interested in how we are going to prevent ISIS resurging. It is
    one thing to come out, but then, of course, to stop them from
    coming back up. We believe that is going to happen, and the
    right person is here to explain that to us. We welcome you
    General Votel.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, welcome back, which will likely be your last
    hearing before the Committee. Let me thank you for 39 years of
    exemplary service to the Nation. We owe you and your family an
    incredible debt of gratitude for the contributions you have
    made to our national security throughout your career, but
    especially during your leadership of the Joint Special
    Operations Command, the Special Operations Command, and now
    Central Command. We sincerely thank you, General.
        The focus of the National Defense Strategy is, rightly, a
    return to great power competition and a more resource
    sustainable approach to counterterrorism. However, this has led
    to some uncertainty about the United States Military's
    continued role in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. As we
    consider this question, it is important that we remain clear-
    eyed about the continued threat to the Homeland posed by ISIS,
    al Qaeda, and other extremist groups; the malign behavior of
    Iran; and the objectives of Russia and China in the region.
        Each of these issues are relevant to current discussions
    about our military presence in Afghanistan and Syria. In
    addition to a complicated military situation, resolutions to
    broader stabilization, diplomatic, and political challenges
    have been far more difficult to come by.
        Bringing our troops home should always be our objective,
    but it must be done in a deliberate and well-thought-out manner
    in concert with our partners and allies. In the case of Syrian
    withdrawal, contradictory statements by the President, his
    National Security Advisor, and other administration officials
    have only served to underscore that this decision was anything
    but thoughtful and deliberate. If public reports are accurate,
    the President may be about to make similar quick decisions with
    respect to Afghanistan.
        The conflict in Afghanistan has occurred at great cost in
    terms of both lives and resources. However, in considering the
    prospect of conflict termination, we must also weigh the cost
    of getting it wrong. ISIS, al Qaeda, and an estimated 18 other
    terrorist groups are still present in the region, and some
    within the intelligence community assess that external plotting
    would surge upon our withdrawal.
        We must also consider our allies and partners that have
    fought alongside us. As former Secretary Mattis said, ``our
    strength as a Nation is inexorably linked to the strength of
    our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and
    partnerships.'' The allies and partners who joined us after 9/
    11 and have sacrificed with us in Afghanistan deserve to be
    included in conversations with respect to the future of the
    conflict.
        Regarding the decision in Syria, the President's statement
    that ISIS is defeated may be premature. According to the
    intelligence community assessment released last week, ISIS in
    their words, ``very likely will continue to pursue external
    attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional and Western
    adversaries, including the United States.'' General McKenzie
    made a similar point in December when he said ``ISIS probably
    still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its peak,
    suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure on the
    group is relieved.''
        The security and stability of key partners in the region,
    most notably, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan, is bolstered by our
    continued presence. While our deployed forces do not have a
    military mission to counter Iran, I agree with our military
    leaders that there is a derivative benefit associated with
    their presence and the reassurance it provides. We should not
    take these partners for granted. If we were to withdraw
    precipitously from the region, we would risk the reemergence of
    ISIS, squandering gains made in Iraq, destabilizing Jordan and
    increasing the pressure on King Abdullah, and allowing Iran and
    its proxies to become further entrenched, thereby posing a
    greater threat to Israel.
        No one, myself included, is in favor of endless wars or
    indefinite deployments of United States troops to dangerous
    parts of the world. Far too often, we view the use of the
    United States Military as the solution to every problem. I
    share the frustration of Americans that we have, thus far, been
    unable to fully achieve our foreign policy objectives in
    Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere.
        However, just as decisions to employ the U.S. Military must
    be given great consideration, so too must decisions to
    disengage military, with particular attention paid to the
    second and third order effects such a decision will have on our
    security and foreign policy interests. I do not think
    sufficient consideration has been given to these issues to
    date.
        General Votel, we look forward to hearing your views on
    these and other issues.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Now that a quorum is present, I would ask the Committee to
    consider and approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding
    for our Committee from March 1st through February 28th. The
    funding resolution is completely consistent with the minority
    and majority leader in the January 9th agreement.
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Senator Wicker. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. I would entertain a motion. Is there a
    motion?
        Senator Reed. So moved, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no?
        [No response.]
        Chairman Inhofe. The ayes have it.

        [The Senate resolution approved by the Committee follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        All right. General Votel, you are recognized for your
    opening statements.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                         STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Votel. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee today. I come before you representing the
    over 80,000 men and women working tirelessly across the Central
    Command area of responsibility. They represent the very best of
    our Nation, and I am proud to stand among them as their
    commander. All of these great Americans have families in
    communities across our country that support their
    servicemembers from near and far, and we are equally proud and
    appreciative of their service and sacrifice.
        I am honored to be joined today by the CENTCOM senior
    enlisted leader, United States Army Command Sergeant Major Bill
    Thetford. Command Sergeant Major Thetford has been with me my
    entire tour at CENTCOM and for the 5 years we served together
    in other commands before that. He is the most experienced
    soldier in our outfit, and his support and steady leadership
    helped us navigate very treacherous waters over the years. He
    is representative of the people we have across this command
    and, indeed, throughout the Armed Forces of our Nation. Command
    Sergeant Major Thetford and his wife Allie will retire after 38
    years of service later this spring, and our Nation owes them an
    incredible debt of gratitude. We could not have been served
    better.
        There is no other region in the world as dynamic, hopeful,
    challenging, and dangerous as the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility, made up of the areas we typically refer to as
    the Levant, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. It is
    an area of great contrast and contradiction. It is an area rich
    in history, culture, and resources, but also an area pulsing
    with sectarianism, violence, poor governance, corruption,
    disenfranchisement, profound human suffering, and economic
    disparity. It is also an area where we retain vital interests,
    preventing the tax on our Homeland, countering malign and
    destabilizing influence, containing the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring freedom of navigation
    and commerce through critical international waterways. It is
    worth noting that four of the five major competitors or threats
    identified in the National Defense Strategy, China, Russia,
    Iran, and violent extremist organizations, reside or are
    contested in the CENTCOM area of responsibility every day.
        In the final 2 weeks of 2018, CENTCOM supported the UN
    [United Nations] Special Envoy in the establishment of a
    nascent ceasefire in Yemen, enabled the efforts of the United
    States Special Representative for Afghanistan, Reconciliation,
    began planning for the orderly and professional withdrawal
    under pressure of United States Forces in Syria, while
    maintaining our coalition efforts to support the Government of
    Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces in addressing the remnants
    of ISIS in that country. We monitored and mitigated the
    unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces in international
    waters and observed the professional mature actions of the
    United States-advised Lebanese armed forces as they maintained
    stability along the border with Israel. Those 2 weeks were not
    an aberration for the command. They were business as usual, as
    they have been in CENTCOM nearly every day since its inception
    in the early 1980s.
        Today in Afghanistan, the conditions-based South Asia
    Strategy is working, and we continue to use military ways and
    means to advance our end state of reconciliation. We recognize
    this conflict will not be resolved solely by military force,
    but our military pressure serves as an enabler to a whole-of-
    government process and more directly supports diplomatic
    efforts led by Ambassador Khalilzad. While these efforts have
    had recent promise, our mission has not changed. We will
    continue our military pressure in support of our national
    objectives until they are met.
        In Syria and Iraq, the unrelenting work of the 79-member
    Defeat ISIS coalition, the determination and bravery of our
    Iraqi Security Force and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF)
    partners, and the support of multiple international government
    organizations has largely liberated the so-called physical
    caliphate of ISIS. An area of 34,000 square miles of territory
    which they once controlled is now reduced to an area less than
    20 square miles. The successful partnership with the Syrian
    Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces was
    instrumental in these gains against ISIS.
        But it is important to understand that even though this
    territory has been reclaimed, the fight against ISIS and
    violent extremists is not over, and our mission has not
    changed. The coalition's hard-won battlefield gains can only be
    secured by maintaining a vigilant offensive against the now
    largely dispersed and disaggregated ISIS that retains leaders,
    fighters, facilitators, resources, and the profane ideology
    that fuels their efforts.
        As the Defeat ISIS campaign in Syria transitions from
    liberating territory to enabling local security and addressing
    the ISIS clandestine insurgency, United States ground forces
    will depart Syria in a deliberate and coordinated manner while
    we concurrently consult with allies and partners to implement
    stabilization efforts. These details are being developed now
    and will ensure campaign continuity and capitalize on the
    contributions of the international community to prevent a
    resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
        Today in Yemen, a fragile ceasefire in the Port of
    Houdeidah is a promising, albeit challenging-to-implement step
    demonstrating the willingness by both sides to negotiate, and
    which will, hopefully, allow the United Nations to expand
    efforts to end this humanitarian disaster. Towards this end,
    CENTCOM supports the international diplomatic efforts and the
    work of the UN Special Envoy to facilitate the peace process by
    providing advice and assistance and serving as an interlocutor
    through our trusted relationships in the region to help ensure
    transparency, cohesion, and positive momentum. We also remain
    steadfast in reminding the Saudi-led coalition partners of
    their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict and ensuring
    that the fight in Yemen does not spread across the region
    sowing more instability and threatening critical infrastructure
    and United States lives and interests.
        It is in the Central Region today and every day: great
    promise and opportunity mixed with contradiction and conflict.
        Let me conclude my remarks where I started with our people
    and their families. In an era of great change when we
    consistently ask our people to do more with less, the service
    and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in
    support of our Nation is both humbling and inspirational. For
    over 17 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
    guardsmen, and civilians have answered the call with an
    unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the families
    who support them. We could not have accomplished what we do
    without all of them, and they deserve the very best
    capabilities and support we can provide from weapons and
    communication systems to health care and housing. I ask for
    continued strong support from Congress and from the American
    people to provide our service men and women everything they
    need to accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy,
    fulfilling lives in continued service to our Nation.
        Thank you again for allowing me to represent the men and
    women of CENTCOM before you today. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel
                                  introduction
        As 2018 came to a close, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was engaged
    in critical events and catalysts for change across its area of
    responsibility (AOR). In the final two weeks of December, CENTCOM
    supported the UN Special Envoy in the establishment of a fragile cease-
    fire in Yemen, and enabled the efforts of the United States Special
    Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation through military pressure
    on the Taliban. We began planning for the safe, professional withdrawal
    under pressure of United States Forces from Syria, while maintaining
    our Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) efforts and
    accounting for the formation of a new governmental cabinet in Iraq. We
    monitored and mitigated the unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces
    in international waters that threaten the global commons; which stood
    in stark contrast to the professional, mature actions of the United
    States-advised Lebanese Armed Forces as it de-escalated tensions along
    the border with Israel. While these events appear unconnected, they
    represent the swirling dynamics of the AOR--each event marking a
    pivotal point with the potential to impact the stability of the entire
    region.
        Since 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, CENTCOM has been charged with
    the responsibility of commanding multiple, often simultaneous combat
    missions in the Central Region. During that time, confronting terrorism
    and defeating violent extremist groups was the primary objective of
    U.S. national military power. Seventeen years later, CENTCOM is still
    the only geographic combatant command conducting multiple, active
    combat operations, but the strategic imperatives of a changing world
    have compelled us to rethink our priorities and assess our readiness
    for new challenges.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognized a
    return to competition between the great powers that now poses a greater
    long-term challenge to our Nation than the violence of terrorism. We
    also noted that the National Security Strategy (NSS) directs that ``The
    United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding
    ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to
    the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy
    market,'' and that ``We will retain the necessary American military
    presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from
    terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.''
    We at CENTCOM understand how global disorder has created a security
    environment more complex and volatile than we have faced in our
    Nation's history. This assessment demands a clear-eyed appraisal of the
    threats, an acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and
    an understanding that challenges to our national interests will largely
    be transregional versus regional.
        We approach our evolving role at CENTCOM with both humility and
    agility, acknowledging the priorities outlined in the NSS and NDS, and
    the fact that we will not be the main effort of our Nation's scarce
    resources in perpetuity. We must, therefore, posture ourselves as both
    the supported and supporting effort toward securing our national
    interests--many of which are still heavily impacted by activities in
    the CENTCOM AOR. While CENTCOM has been the primary focus of military
    assets for nearly two decades, we recognize maintaining an agile
    posture in the Central Region doesn't necessarily require large
    concentrations of military personnel and equipment. Our strategic
    strength has never rested solely on the volume of materiel we bring to
    the fight, but rather on the partnerships, alliances and whole-of-
    government efforts no other country in the world could recreate.
        Looking forward, our challenge will be to secure our hard-fought
    gains, and those of our allies and partners, while posturing for
    continuing change in the Central Region. We must be ready to compete
    with China, Russia, and Iran as they challenge us for regional
    influence and threaten our vital national interests. We must continue
    disrupting violent extremist organizations and preventing the
    acquisition or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so they
    cannot be used against the U.S. or our allies. Regardless of the
    challenge or level of resources, CENTCOM is committed to defending the
    national interests of the U.S., and those of its partners and allies.
                             operating environment
        Resolute Support (RS). Our current military efforts in Afghanistan
    in support of the South Asia Strategy are conditions-based and focused
    on two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through
    Operation Freedom's Sentinel, United States Forces conduct counter-
    terror missions against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
    Khorasan (ISIS-K), and associated groups to prevent their resurgence
    and ability to plan and execute external attacks. Second, in
    partnership with NATO allies and operational partner Nations in the
    Resolute Support Mission, United States Forces advise and assist the
    Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight
    against the Taliban. The ANDSF have demonstrated exceptional resilience
    through a difficult and sustained fight.
        The conditions-based South Asia Strategy is working. We continue to
    use military ways and means to achieve our end state of reconciliation,
    recognizing this conflict will not be resolved solely by military
    force. Our military and enabling missions in Afghanistan are designed
    to set conditions that will convince the Taliban to negotiate for a
    lasting peace, and allow Afghans to own the political and diplomatic
    solutions that will eventually bring an end to the conflict.
    Consistent, offensive military pressure helped bring about the first
    cease fires--local and national--between the Taliban and Government of
    the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in 17 years, illustrating
    the Afghan people's weariness of war, and representing our first real
    opportunity for peace and reconciliation since the war began. While the
    Taliban continue to demonstrate the capability to mount spectacular
    attacks and inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the 2018
    fighting season confirmed that the Taliban cannot win militarily. We
    recognize it will take a combination of sustained military pressure and
    diplomacy to bring an end to the hostilities. Our military pressure
    serves as an enabler to a whole-of-government process, and supports
    diplomatic efforts led by United States Special Representative for
    Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
        Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The unrelenting work of the 74-
    nation D-ISIS Coalition, determination and bravery of our Iraqi
    Security Force (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) partners, and
    support of multiple international governmental organizations has pushed
    the physical caliphate of ISIS to the verge of collapse. As a result,
    we are adjusting our military posture in Syria, planning and executing
    a deliberate, safe, and professional withdrawal of personnel and
    equipment while preserving sufficient power in the region to ensure
    that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and ensure it
    does not return. In Iraq, we work with the ISF to consolidate their
    gains, improve their security capability and help them evolve into the
    professional and representative force that the Iraqi people deserve.
        We are grateful for the partnership of the SDF throughout our D-
    ISIS mission. A reliable partner since 2014, the SDF suffered tens of
    thousands of killed and wounded, and its leadership, sacrifice, and
    determination to drive ISIS from SDF homelands was instrumental in the
    liberation of the vast majority of ISIS' so-called physical caliphate.
    Of paramount importance now, the Coalition's hard-won battlefield gains
    must be secured by continued interagency efforts and mobilizing the
    international community to prevent a return of the conditions that
    allowed ISIS to arise.
        Yemen. Conflict between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Republic of
    Yemen Government (ROYG) forces, supported by the Saudi-led Coalition
    (SLC), led to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen. The UN
    noted in August 2018 that the Houthis--trained, funded and armed in
    part by Iran--exacerbated the crisis by restricting food and aid access
    to civilian populations by controlling or threatening transportation
    and logistical routes to the city of Ta'izz, and the Ports of Aden and
    Hudaydah. The impact of conflict on the country and its people is
    catastrophic, despite best efforts by our own U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID), and other UN agencies and
    international aid organizations to mitigate humanitarian suffering. UN-
    brokered consultations in Sweden in December 2018, and the resulting
    agreement on a prisoner exchange, ceasefire and redeployment of forces
    in the city and port of Hudaydah, and humanitarian access to Taiz
    demonstrated promising steps and a willingness on both sides to seek a
    negotiated settlement. Toward this end, CENTCOM supports the
    international diplomatic efforts and the work of UN Special Envoy
    (UNSE) Martin Griffiths to facilitate an end to the conflict, providing
    knowledge, advice, and serving as an interlocutor through our trusted
    relationships in the region to help ensure transparency, cohesion, and
    positive momentum. We will continue to support our regional partners
    developing processes and procedures to counter ballistic missiles (CBM)
    and counter unmanned armed aerial systems (C-UAS) to help mitigate
    threats to civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
        Iran exerts its malign influence throughout the region, through its
    increased--often unprofessional--activities in the Arabian Gulf and
    Strait of Hormuz, engaging in proxy warfare through its sponsorship of
    violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and proliferating advanced
    conventional weapons, including theater ballistic missiles and
    weaponized unmanned aerial and maritime systems. Operating in the gray
    zone of competition below open conflict, Iran conducts unfettered
    information and cyber campaigns against its adversaries and actively
    attempts to influence or obstruct the mechanisms of effective
    governance and domestic policies of several of its sovereign regional
    neighbors.
        Prolonged conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan have
    produced instability and large-scale humanitarian crises within and
    beyond the CENTCOM AOR, creating millions of displaced persons,
    stressing fragile economies, opening space for the spread of extremism
    among disenfranchised peoples, and providing opportunities for
    adversaries to cultivate influence. Countering instability requires an
    alliance-based and whole-of-government approach that CENTCOM is
    uniquely positioned to support. The Department of State, USAID and
    CENTCOM are partnering to counter the influence of competitors and
    malign actors by addressing the drivers of instability and creating the
    economic, political, and security conditions required to reverse these
    trends. To alleviate suffering, CENTCOM, in partnership with USAID,
    provides targeted foreign humanitarian assistance to internally
    displaced persons using our Overseas Disaster, Humanitarian, and Civic
    Aid appropriated funds. Stabilization and humanitarian assistance
    activities provide a significant tool to reduce human suffering,
    promote stability, sustain fragile governmental institutions, and
    provide critical support countering our competitors' gray zone
    activities.
        While we maintain a strong, cooperative presence with our regional
    partners in the traditional warfighting domains, there is room for
    improvement in cooperative ventures with our regional partners in the
    information and cyber domains. Our competitors do not play by the same
    rules as the U.S. They have developed and employed asymmetric
    strategies to use in the information and cyber environment to weaken
    the U.S. to achieve their strategic objectives. The unconstrained and
    unregulated nature of their capabilities puts the United States at a
    disadvantage, while great power competitors like China and Russia, as
    well as adversarial regimes like Iran, operationalize these
    strategies--including information theft, media manipulation, and cyber-
    attack--to strike vulnerable United States assets, disrupt our
    information systems and those of our allies, and undermine the image of
    the U.S. in the region and around the world.
        Our CENTCOM Partner Network, a secure coalition computer network,
    improves our capability to exchange crucial cyberspace threat
    intelligence and operational data with coalition and regional partners.
    We will pursue more opportunities to enable real-time exchanges of
    classified information to meet critical coalition collaboration and
    mission needs. The ability to dynamically share information with
    mission partners at the speed of relevance provides us a greater
    advantage against our adversaries.
        Across the interagency, CENTCOM pursues whole-of-government
    solutions to address transregional threats. CENTCOM places increased
    command emphasis on an organizational approach to ensure interagency
    integration is a high priority in all planning. For example, CENTCOM
    supports National Security Council-convened threat finance fusion cells
    to counter ISIS and Iran. We also provide personnel to support
    interagency efforts in our Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell.
        The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised
    Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) provides a best-in-class example of a
    successful, nimble, and responsive capability in support of the
    warfighter. CENTCOM relies heavily on the critical, life-saving
    training, technology, and expertise JIDO provides to safeguard U.S. and
    allied forces from many of the most dangerous, emerging threats on the
    battlefield, including improvised explosive devices; unmanned, armed
    aerial and maritime vehicles; and other improvised threats. JIDO's
    functions are not replicated in any of the Services, demonstrate
    enormous value, and are worthy of continued resourcing through DTRA.
                              strategic importance
        The CENTCOM AOR is one of the most complex, diverse regions in the
    world. Composed of nearly 600 million people dispersed among 20
    countries, it is home to three of the world's five major religions, is
    the most energy-rich region in the world, and contains three strategic
    maritime choke points. The Suez Canal, the Bab al Mandeb, and the
    Strait of Hormuz are major transit points for energy and trade; the
    ability of commerce to transit these global commons freely being vital
    for the global economy.
        Much like the rest of the world, almost 90 percent of businesses in
    the Central Region are small-to-medium-size enterprises. They are the
    key drivers of job creation, employ nearly 66 percent of the labor
    force, and help diversify their respective country's economies.
    Contrary to popular belief, not every country in the CENTCOM AOR is
    rich with oil and natural gas resources, and for those that are, their
    economies are highly susceptible to changes in the energy market.
    Strong economies, vibrant commerce, low unemployment rates, and decent
    standards of living are ``must-haves'' to promote and maintain
    stability. Military force cannot create strong economies. It can only
    help provide safe, secure conditions for them to develop.
        There are multiple drivers of instability in the region, ranging
    from the toxic narrative of sectarianism, to brittle political and
    economic systems, to disenfranchised and disillusioned peoples. While
    drivers of instability can be addressed and mitigated through the
    application of elements of national power, many have roots spanning
    several generations. In our strategic approach, it is important to
    acknowledge with a degree of humility that there are some things that
    are beyond our power to change. Despite those challenges, we recognize
    the strategic importance of the Central Region to our national
    interests, and four key reasons why we must remain engaged here to
    preserve them.
        First, we must not allow another attack on our Homeland. The
    CENTCOM AOR is the world's epicenter for terrorism and VEOs. The 9/11
    attacks were based from al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan and served
    as a wake-up call that terrorism could be exported from anywhere in the
    world.
        Second, we cannot allow VEOs or rogue nations to acquire weapons of
    mass destruction (WMDs). Our active presence in this region prevents
    VEOs from coming together toward that purpose and helps prevent the
    proliferation of WMD materials.
        Third, instability is contagious. It does not respect national
    borders and grows and spreads if left unchecked. A stable Middle East
    underpins a stable world. In an already volatile region, our steady
    commitment to our allies and partners provides a force for stability.
    As the President's National Security Strategy states, we must also
    ``work with partners to neutralize Iran's malign activities in the
    region.''
        The fourth is the reemergence of great power competition, the main
    challenge highlighted in the NDS. China and Russia seek to dominate and
    influence not just their own geographic regions, but the Central Region
    as well. Just as great power competitors looked to influence energy and
    trade in the Middle East following the first World War, China and
    Russia are working very hard today to reshuffle the balance of power in
    the CENTCOM AOR, trying to displace the United States from its position
    of influence. The President's National Security Strategy directs that
    the United States seeks a Middle East that is ``not dominated by any
    power hostile to the United States.''
        This is the reality of our world, and of the regional and
    transregional challenges we have to address in CENTCOM. We recognize
    the United States is rightly shifting its resources toward Europe and
    East Asia to balance great power competition, but remain mindful that
    the CENTCOM AOR represents a geopolitical crossroads and a principal
    zone for that competition as well. Of the five major threats identified
    in the NDS, four--competition with China; competition with Russia;
    Iran's rogue, malign activities; and combatting VEOs--reside or are
    contested on a significant scale in the CENTCOM AOR every day.
        Many observers, and many of our partners and allies as well, hold
    misperceptions of the focus on great power competition in the NDS. They
    view the prioritization and alignment of efforts for long-term
    competition with China and Russia as a wholesale shift in emphasis away
    from the Middle East and Central Asia regions. However, that view fails
    to account for the global context of the NDS and how great power
    competition is not isolated to Europe or Asia, but often takes place in
    other strategically important regions like the CENTCOM AOR.
        Currently, CENTCOM is conducting or supporting military operations
    with Coalition partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and limited
    counter-terror operations in Yemen. We represent a United States
    presence with military basing and support in seven countries, have
    bilateral or multilateral military engagements with nearly a dozen
    countries, and security cooperation agreements with 16 countries.
    Across much of the AOR, however, where there is a United States
    presence, there is almost always an existing or developing presence by
    China, Russia, or both.
        China uses its ``One Belt-One Road'' initiative as an economic
    lever to provide access and influence across the Central Region. China
    invested in Suez Canal development, the port of Haifa in Israel, and
    Jordan to provide access, relationships and leverage on the other side
    of the continent. In the United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
    Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
    Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
    Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
    and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
    Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
    conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
    energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
    tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
    Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
    Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
    Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
    and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
    Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
    conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
    energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
    tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
    Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
    Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
    Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
    and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
    Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
    conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
    energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
    tool, and while many ``
        Russia is focusing increasing attention to the Middle East, in part
    due to its geographical proximity, but also to reestablish its image as
    an influential global power. Russia invests in the Suez Canal
    development and is a co-member with China in the Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization. Russia has increased its engagement with and investment
    in Egypt, including construction of a 48 megawatt nuclear power plant
    in El Dabba, as well as development of a major trade and investment
    zone in east Port Said. Russia conducts bilateral and multilateral
    military exercises and provides economic and security support in more
    than half a dozen countries in the Central and South Asia (CASA)
    region, most of whom were part of the former Soviet Union and who
    remain reliant on Russia for their economic and security needs. Russia
    seeks to increase its own influence while limiting the influence of
    others, monopolize energy transit and pipeline routes, and provide a
    buffer zone against NATO enlargement. In Syria, Russia is establishing
    a permanent military and economic presence, with the goal of dominating
    infrastructure and energy commerce there in the coming years.
        We also note the important role that nuclear deterrence plays
    within U.S. strategy, as the number one priority mission of the
    Department of Defense. It backstops all U.S. military operations and
    diplomacy across the globe. A robust and modern United States nuclear
    deterrent helps ensure competition with Russia and China, regardless of
    where it originates, does not escalate to large-scale war.
        The U.S. is able to exercise a great deal of control over its own
    economy because we exercise a great deal of political, military, and
    economic power around the world. Where we lose that power and
    influence, our competitors gain--and we will be more vulnerable at home
    because of it. Less than 100 years ago the Middle East puzzle came
    together with the United States influencing key pieces. Today, the
    puzzle is being remade and China and Russia are seeking new strategic
    pieces. We must recognize our old pieces may no longer fit, and stay
    engaged and agile enough to maintain our position as the dominant
    influence once this new puzzle comes together. In the CASA region, for
    example, our partner nations lie in close proximity to or share borders
    with Russia or China. We must realistically acknowledge this tyranny of
    distance, but continue to engage and compete in innovative ways that
    help build partnerships, grow our influence, and serve as a balance to
    the other great powers. The bottom line is simple: If left unchecked,
    the expanding global reach of China's economic and military
    initiatives, as well as Russia's objective to weaken or subvert Western
    security structures in the CENTCOM AOR will pose a significant
    challenge to United States prosperity, security, and regional
    stability.
        As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Central Region
    remains a global supplier of energy, as long as we have allies and
    partners to whom we are committed, the U.S. cannot afford to cede our
    role as the dominant regional power. Without a continued strong
    presence and consistent engagement in the region, we risk our ability
    to secure the global commons, weaken our network of allies and partners
    necessary to eliminate potential safe havens for jihadist terrorists,
    and diminish our ability to maintain a stable global energy market.
                               strategic approach
        CENTCOM's mission is to direct and enable military operations and
    activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and
    stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. Our strategic approach
    is founded in three principles: Prepare, Pursue, and Prevail. This
    approach drives our thinking, gives direction and intent to every level
    in the command, provides capabilities to our commanders, and creates
    decision space for military and civilian leadership. Each aspect of our
    approach enables the next, and collectively contributes to the
    successful achievement of our goals and objectives. CENTCOM uses these
    aspects as the cornerstone to advance our operational approach of ``by,
    with, and through.''
        We prepare by forming enduring coalitions, cultivating
    relationships with partners and allies, and maintaining security,
    basing, and overflight agreements, or paving the way for those
    agreements to be established. It means we deepen our interoperability
    and expand our regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative
    planning with our partners, so we can increase their capabilities and
    our collective capabilities to operate more effectively in a joint and
    combined environment. We communicate the winning narrative of a free
    and open international order, national sovereignty, individual freedom
    and dignity, and the rule of law. We foster meaningful, sustainable,
    two-way relationships with people who share common interests and common
    values instead of engaging in the transactional relationships and
    predatory economic practices of our great power competitors. The
    alliances and partnerships we forge, rooted in mutual respect, reduce
    the price we pay for our position of leadership, and provide
    significant asymmetrical advantages over our geopolitical rivals. These
    aspects of preparation are crucial, and perhaps even more important
    than maintaining a large military footprint in the region. While
    personnel and equipment can be surged in a time of crisis, one cannot
    surge partnerships, trust, understanding, agreements, and commitment.
        Pursuing opportunities means we are proactive, always alert for
    chances to seize the initiative and dictate events on favorable terms.
    Regardless of whether we are investigating a new partnership or
    considering a different operational approach, pursuing those openings
    requires empowerment at the lowest levels, transparency, flat
    communications, understanding and trust. Surrounding circumstances and
    shortened decision cycles for action may induce greater risk, which we
    must underwrite and manage through strong feedback loops between all
    levels of leadership, including our interagency partners and allies.
    Not every opportunity pans out, but an opportunity not explored is a
    potential advantage lost.
        Prevailing takes on a meaning different than raising a banner or
    marching in a victory parade. It entails consolidating our gains,
    securing and stabilizing what we and our partners have fought for. We
    recognize there are no easy victories to be had in the CENTCOM AOR as
    ours is a region of historical, protracted struggle. In CENTCOM,
    prevailing means retaining flexibility and decision space for our
    leaders, preserving our national interests and those of our allies and
    partners, and maintaining a favorable balance of power for the U.S.
        We operationalize this principle using a ``by, with, and through''
    approach. We conduct operations primarily by indigenous partner forces,
    with enabling support from the U.S. and our coalition partners, working
    through U.S. and international authorities and partner agreements.
    While not yet a doctrine, a strategy, or a formal military program, it
    is a proven, successful, operational approach that pursues culturally
    acceptable and durable solutions. It is a way of conducting military
    activities and operations with reduced direct combat employment of U.S.
    Forces, while developing and supporting partner capacity and
    participation. While indigenous forces may not conduct operations
    according to U.S. pace and doctrine, they take ownership of the fight.
    Their wins are not only theirs, but ours as well; and fighting for
    those wins builds legitimacy and resiliency. Currently, CENTCOM
    successfully applies the ``by, with and through'' operational approach
    in Operation Inherent Resolve, assisting our partners to defeat ISIS;
    in Yemen, using a multilayered Arab/United States approach to counter
    VEOs; and with Operation Freedom's Sentinel and the NATO-led Resolute
    Support Mission to defeat VEOs and pressure the Taliban in Afghanistan.
    This approach is not limited to combat operations, however, as CENTCOM
    fulfills many peacetime objectives working ``by, with, and through''
    other partner nations.
        Employing a ``by, with, and through'' operational strategy supports
    the objectives and intent of the NSS and NDS--promoting regional
    stability and security, defeating terrorist threats to the U.S., and
    ensuring that common domains remain free and open--while addressing
    these challenges through a resource-sustainable approach, including
    strengthening the indigenous capacities of, and improving
    interoperability with, our regional partners and allies.
        While this approach provides CENTCOM the ability to do ``more with
    less,'' our ability to act decisively in the region becomes more
    contingent upon the full commitment of regional partners. We must
    therefore ensure transparent and contextual communication across our
    own Government, and among our allies and partners. If we mistakenly or
    inadvertently signal we are ``pulling back'' or ``refocusing''
    priorities to address great power competition elsewhere in the world,
    we risk undermining our trust and credibility with long-standing
    partners here.
                   regional overview--central and south asia
        Afghanistan remains home to numerous terrorist organizations that
    threaten our interests. ISIS-K, in particular, maintains both the
    intent and the capability to inspire, direct, and conduct external
    operations, and if left unchecked, will continue to grow as a threat to
    our Homeland. In support of the South Asia Strategy, Afghanistan became
    CENTCOM's main effort. United States support for the mission in
    Afghanistan evolved into a ``by, with and through'' operational
    approach as recognition of the need for domestic legitimacy and
    ownership increased. This ultimately strengthens the GIROA's
    negotiating position toward reconciliation and reintegration.
        Key Challenges: Years of conflict in Afghanistan have caused large-
    scale humanitarian crises exacerbated by porous national borders, and
    provided Iran, Russia, and China opportunities to expand their
    influence in the region. Russia has attempted to challenge United
    States influence in Afghanistan under the false pretense of supporting
    the Taliban's fight against ISIS-K, while Iran continues to use the
    Taliban to secure its own interests and to counter the ANDSF's attempts
    to improve security conditions across the country. Militants operating
    out of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to threaten Afghan stability
    as well as stoke tensions between Pakistan and India. We look to
    regional actors such as Pakistan to cease behavior undermining regional
    stability and play constructive roles in achieving peace in Afghanistan
    as well as the whole of South Asia. Kabul's uncertain political
    situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the GIROA prepares
    for the 2019 presidential elections, and continues to suffer from weak
    institutions and a political environment marked by a lack of unity on
    core issues.
        Key Opportunities: The potential for a political settlement in
    Afghanistan is promising. In June, following GIROA's call for a
    national ceasefire over Eid al Fitr, the Taliban responded with their
    own ceasefire, giving Afghans a glimpse of a future without conflict.
    October's parliamentary elections were the first run entirely by
    Afghans, with only limited logistical and security support from the
    Coalition. Despite Taliban and ISIS-K threats against voters and
    polling centers, the ANDSF oversaw a significant reduction in violence
    compared to previous election periods, with over 4 million Afghans
    participating in the parliamentary elections. Applying lessons learned
    will be critical to enabling successful presidential elections in 2019.
        The Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriation has enabled us to
    increase the combat capabilities in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Our
    security cooperation funds are used for procuring aircraft, training
    aircrews and maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian
    platforms to modern United States aircraft. We are assisting the ANDSF
    in doubling the size of the Afghan Army's Special Operations Force,
    currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban and
    terrorist organizations. In an effort to promote responsible
    development, we closely monitor ANDSF capability growth to ensure it is
    necessary, affordable, and sustainable. We continue to pursue
    opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with CASA nations to
    promote regional stability and encourage them, and our NATO allies, to
    contribute financial and advisory support to the GIROA.
        2019 Prognosis: The South Asia Strategy is working. While the
    Taliban continue to demonstrate resilience and the capability to
    inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the Coalition's sustained
    military, diplomatic, and social pressure will be instrumental in
    convincing the Taliban that reconciliation is the only path forward.
        Pakistan presents the United States with challenges and
    opportunities in the execution of our South Asia Strategy. As a state
    possessing nuclear weapons that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese,
    Indian, Iranian, and United States geopolitical interests, Pakistan
    will always be a country of importance to the United States. However,
    Pakistan's actions are often a source of frustration to United States
    regional efforts in Afghanistan. Our posture with Pakistan involves
    supporting our colleagues at the Department of State as they pursue a
    diplomatic solution with Islamabad to end the conflict in Afghanistan
    while ensuring that Pakistan's equities are acknowledged and addressed
    in any future agreement.
        Key Challenges: Pakistan has not taken concrete actions against the
    safe havens of VEOs inside its borders. Similarly, VEOs located in
    Afghanistan conduct attacks inside Pakistan. This cross-border
    instability and violence generates tension along both sides of the
    border. The suspension of United States security assistance funds to
    Pakistan remains in place. Meanwhile, some United States Pakistan
    military cooperation activities have continued, demonstrating the
    importance of military cooperation, despite challenges in the bilateral
    relationship.
        Key Opportunities: Pakistan has taken positive steps to assist SRAR
    Ambassador Khalilzad in support of Afghanistan reconciliation by
    facilitating talks with the Taliban but has avoided taking any concrete
    or irreversible steps such as arresting or expelling Taliban leaders
    who do not cooperate with reconciliation efforts. With our strategic
    focus on reconciliation and regional security, Pakistan has a unique
    opportunity to make good on its promises of support to United States
    efforts focused on finding a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan
    conflict. If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement
    to the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States will have opportunity
    and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region
    is the most important mutual priority for the United States and
    Pakistan.
        2019 Prognosis: A peaceful resolution in Afghanistan and improved
    cross-border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan would strengthen
    the opportunity for mutual trade and increased economic flows not only
    between them, but also potentially with India and the Central Asian
    states. China is already partnering with Pakistan for the China-
    Pakistan Economic Corridor as a central piece of China's ``One Belt-One
    Road'' initiative. Central and South Asia cooperation between the
    United States and China offers opportunities for peaceful dialogue and
    a chance for the United States to balance China's economic rise and
    reinforce its commitment to global norms for the benefit all.
        Uzbekistan and United States partnerships continue to improve, and
    we are increasingly optimistic that the Government of Uzbekistan is
    promoting a constructive foreign policy, improving relations with its
    neighbors and becoming more involved in multilateral exchanges and
    exercises. Uzbekistan is fully supportive of our South Asia Strategy
    and a constructive partner in the Afghanistan peace process. Given its
    large population, strong security forces, central location, and a
    shared border with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan's willingness to partner
    with us and its neighbors can help promote stability in the region.
        Key Challenges: Russia remains the dominant power in Central Asia,
    and Uzbekistan must balance cooperation with the United States
    carefully to avoid actions Moscow deems provocative. As we strengthen
    our partnership with Uzbekistan we must respect this balance, mindful
    of Uzbekistan's absorptive capacity.
        Key Opportunities: Uzbekistan is hosting the Central and South
    Asian armed forces Chief of Staff conference in February, demonstrating
    its growing role as a regional leader. Our mil-to-mil efforts are
    focused on improving border security capacity, enhancing counter-
    narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and assisting the Uzbeks
    with the potential return of domestic terrorist fighters returning from
    Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The Uzbeks expressed interest in
    diversifying their military equipment and provided lists of U.S.
    systems and equipment they are interested in purchasing. This interest
    represents a unique opportunity to off-ramp Uzbekistan from Russian
    equipment and deepen our relationship as we negotiate increased air and
    land access through the Northern Access corridor.
        2019 Prognosis: Uzbekistan will continue efforts to increase its
    capacity, using United States security assistance to maintain a balance
    between Russian and Chinese influences and to boost its professionalism
    in the areas of border security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism
    and defense institution building. United States security assistance
    will help maintain and potentially enhance access in support of United
    States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
        Tajikistan remains a target of both Russian and Chinese overtures.
    We continue to build our military relationship with Tajikistan, even as
    Moscow deepens its influence and increases its military posture at its
    base outside the capital. China's increased security cooperation,
    focused on border security, is coupled with an aggressive economic
    lending program. China seeks to minimize instability along their shared
    border, in its eastern provinces, and protect its economic investment
    in Tajikistan.
        Key Challenges: The Government of Tajikistan is concerned with
    stability in northern Afghanistan and security along the mountainous,
    800-mile Afghan border. The inability to secure their border encourages
    smuggling and has a destabilizing effect on both Tajikistan and
    Afghanistan. These border concerns provide a strong nexus of mutual
    interests and we support development of Tajik counter-terrorism,
    counter-narcotics, and border security capabilities. We are also
    assisting Tajikistan to counter trans-national threats that impact both
    Tajikistan and the broader Central Asia region.
        Key Opportunities: Tajikistan is eager for United States assistance
    and its modest funding for security services presents an opportunity
    for CENTCOM to help Tajikistan develop its capabilities and
    relationships to balance Russian influence. Exercise Regional
    Cooperation, a multilateral exercise Tajikistan expressed interest
    hosting in August 2019, will address border security and counter terror
    issues. Moving forward, CENTCOM will assist Tajikistan's efforts to
    counter violent extremism and emphasize the need for building stronger
    defense institutions.
        2019 Prognosis: Economic investment and border security will
    continue to characterize China's relationship with Tajikistan. It is
    likely that both Russia and China will continue to exaggerate the
    terrorist threat to further entrench and justify their respective
    security relationships with Tajikistan. Russia will seek to continue to
    safeguard what it considers its ``sphere of influence'' in the region
    and China will continue to take actions it deems necessary to secure
    its border. United States security assistance for Tajikistan can
    provide a counter to this great power competition by enabling the
    Tajiks to maintain their border integrity with Afghanistan while
    supporting regional stability.
        Kazakhstan and United States relations continue to be the most
    mature and forward-thinking in Central Asia, although Russia's
    proximity influences Kazakhstan's posture. Kazakhstan remains the most
    significant Central Asian contributor to Afghan stability, engaging in
    trade, providing electrical power, donating money to the ANDSF fund,
    providing educational opportunities, supporting programs for Afghan
    women, and offering technical support and services to the Afghans.
        Key Challenges: Kazakhstan, like most CASA nations, must carefully
    balance cooperation with the United States to avoid actions Russia
    interprets as threatening. As we strengthen our partnership with
    Kazakhstan, we must respect this balance. The United States should
    continue assisting the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense as it focuses on
    the necessary institutional reforms of its non-commissioned officer
    corps, training management, human resources administration, and its
    professional military education system. As we look to off-ramp Central
    Asian countries from Russian defense equipment, the higher price of
    United States systems will remain a challenge for nations like
    Kazakhstan.
        Key Opportunities: Kazakhstan has expressed interest in working
    with the United States to improve its logistical, medical, and
    engineering branches. We will also continue our engagement with the
    Kazakhstani Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) training center to improve
    Kazakhstani PKO capabilities and foster regional integration by opening
    the center to Kazakhstan's neighbors. Exercise Steppe Eagle, an annual
    trilateral peacekeeping exercise sponsored by the United States, United
    Kingdom and Kazakhstan, has expanded to include Tajikistan and
    Uzbekistan. In November 2018, with United States assistance, Kazakhstan
    deployed a company-level unit to Lebanon on a UN peacekeeping
    operations mission--a first for any CASA nation.
        2019 Prognosis: Kazakhstan will continue to use United States
    security assistance to balance Russian and Chinese influences. United
    States security assistance enables access for sustainment of United
    States and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Maintaining mil-to-mil
    programs, with a focus on defense institution building and professional
    military education, will position us to maintain our comparative
    advantage with a country situated on the doorsteps of Russia and China.
        The Kyrgyz Republic and United States' strained bilateral relations
    impede security cooperation that would otherwise further military our
    objectives in Central Asia.
        Key Challenges: The lack of a status of forces agreement with the
    Kyrgyz Republic severely limits CENTCOM's level of engagement. Until
    steps are taken to extend diplomatic protections for United States
    Military operating in the Kyrgyz Republic, mil-mil exchanges and
    training are suspended.
        Key Opportunities: The Office of Military Cooperation in Bishkek
    and the Montana National Guard through the National Guard State
    Partnership Program remain postured to renew programs aimed at
    developing military capabilities specifically in the areas of Field
    Medicine and Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance as soon as
    political conditions permit.
        2019 Prognosis: Any United States security assistance for the
    Kyrgyz Republic will help the Kyrgyz to maintain their national
    sovereignty in the face of Russian and Chinese jockeying for influence.
        Turkmenistan has a UN-recognized policy of ``positive neutrality''
    by which the government balances the demands of the regional powers by
    not taking sides in international conflict and not entering into
    alliances or economic organizations, necessitating a subtle and agile
    approach to Security Cooperation to be successful.
        Key Challenges: A struggling economy, a rigid political system, and
    the Turkmen policy of positive neutrality largely limits international
    cooperation and Turkmenistan's security services.
        Key Opportunities: We have focused our efforts on English language
    training, medical engagements and the development of Special Forces
    with Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense (MOD). We are encouraged by MOD's
    increased participation in our exchanges and conferences. Turkmenistan
    has expressed interest in enhancing its disaster response capability
    and border security, providing additional opportunities for CENTCOM.
        2019 Prognosis: Turkmenistan remains concerned with the instability
    in Afghanistan and the potential for the flow of foreign terrorist
    fighters, therefore assistance will focus on enhancing border security.
    Maintaining a small, consistent security cooperation portfolio in
    Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian and
    Chinese influence.
                       regional overview--greater levant
        Iraq's mil-to-mil relationship with the United States is as strong
    as it has ever been, and Iraq has both the potential and desire to
    become a formidable ally in combatting terrorism. The Office of
    Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is conducting programs to enhance
    professionalization of the ISF, coupled with prudent implementation and
    oversight of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Transforming OSC-I
    into a permanent Title 22 Security Cooperation Office is key. Our
    authority for OSC-I to conduct training activities with ISF is more
    important than ever in the evolution of an ISF that is effective,
    inclusive, sustainable, affordable, and cements our long-term bilateral
    partnership.
        Key Challenges: Reform of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to
    achieve the goal of ``One ISF'' remains a challenge. Iraq's Popular
    Mobilization Forces (PMF) are officially part of the ISF, however, the
    forces are comprised of disparate groups, some of which are not totally
    responsive to the direction of the Government of Iraq (GOI), the worst
    of which are affiliated with Shiite militia groups directed by Iran.
    Iraq's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) is largely treated as a
    less-than-equal organization by the government. While some tensions
    between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad have eased,
    challenges with revenue sharing, disputed territory and control of oil
    resources remain problematic. It is critical the ISF consolidate its
    gains against ISIS and evolve from a war footing to a steady state,
    which must be effective, affordable, and protect Iraqi people and their
    infrastructure from terrorism.
        As ISIS continues to build a clandestine insurgency, the GoI must
    form an effective cabinet and government entities to manage the country
    and improve economic resilience and quality of life for its people.
    This includes meeting the needs of Iraq's youthful population who
    demand better economic opportunities, access to essential services, and
    an end to endemic corruption in the GoI. Failure by the newly formed
    government to address the basic needs of Iraqi citizens may facilitate
    the reemergence of ISIS or other VEOs, which capitalize on public
    dissatisfaction to increase their support. Iran's meddling in the
    selection of Iraqi cabinet members, notably the Minister of Defense and
    the Minister of Interior, has prevented the GoI from addressing
    pressing national security issues.
        Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, through OSC-I, is working with our
    Iraqi partners to re-integrate the GoI with its Arab neighbors. These
    efforts have paid dividends in reinitiating cooperation between Iraq
    and countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Qatar;
    illustrated by the reopening of shared borders. OSC-I can leverage its
    authorities to support the ISF's evolution into an effective,
    sustainable, and affordable force through mil-to-mil relations,
    security sector reform, security cooperation, while coordinating broad-
    based reform with regional partners. Key objectives include the further
    professionalization of the ISF, rebalancing the ISF's force structure
    to meet future threats, and reforming the ISF's human resources and
    professional military education systems with increased emphasis on
    force design, force management, and policy development.
        2019 Prognosis: Iraq's May 2018 elections resulted in the formation
    of a new, generally representative government. Newly elected Prime
    Minister Abd al-Mahdi vowed to improve public services and prioritize
    reconstruction of areas devastated by the conflict with ISIS. It is
    likely that Iraq will retool its budget to focus on government goals
    however, Iraq must also rebuild its security forces, which are
    exhausted by four years of operations against ISIS.
        Syria's President Bashar al Assad remains in power with the
    military support of Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). Despite
    significant advances, the Syrian regime has insufficient forces to
    adequately secure recaptured territory. The United States withdrawal
    from Syria represents the most dynamic shift in the environment since
    ISIS lost its ability to govern major population centers and fight as a
    conventional force and could trigger a renewed race for influence,
    control, and for some, survival. Turkey's strong national security
    concerns in Syria and standing as a NATO ally further complicates the
    battlespace. Israel's legitimate concerns about Iran's increasingly
    provocative actions in Syria, particularly the transshipment of
    advanced weapons systems into and through Syria, are driving
    increasingly forward leaning Israeli military actions. If the major
    actors and their proxies become embroiled in a competition for
    influence in Syria, this may create space for ISIS remnants or other
    terrorist groups to reform or reconstitute. Because the regime was
    incapable or unwilling to fight ISIS, the responsibility for D-ISIS
    fighting has been borne by the Coalition and our partnered force, the
    SDF, whose bravery and determination have been crucial to rolling back
    ISIS. The intervention of the Coalition in the Syrian conflict blocked
    Assad's ability to recapture all of northern Syria. As the United
    States executes a safe, professional withdrawal, we seek to help
    negotiate a secure future for the people of northeast Syria liberated
    from ISIS and our partners in the D-ISIS fight.
        The international humanitarian community has achieved some success,
    but the Syrian regime's resistance to allow aid deliveries is largely
    driven by Assad's use of starvation as a weapon of war. As a result,
    there are more than 13 million Syrians who require humanitarian
    assistance, including 5.7 million internally displaced persons and 5.7
    million refugees in neighboring countries. While United States
    humanitarian assistance reaches four million people throughout Syria
    monthly, security concerns and access constraints limit the reach of
    aid in some locations. Vulnerable populations in Syria will continue to
    require humanitarian aid until parties to the conflict reach a
    political solution.
        Key Challenges: The civil war, combined with ISIS occupation and
    the subsequent fight to displace and destroy ISIS has led to vast
    destruction of infrastructure, degradation of government, lack of basic
    services, and other humanitarian challenges. Assad's reluctance to
    negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow's reluctance
    to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges ahead in
    forging a political resolution to the conflict and ending this
    humanitarian crisis. A political resolution is key to the lasting
    defeat of ISIS, because unless fundamental drivers of domestic
    instability are addressed, conditions will remain for a resurgence of
    ISIS, or ISIS-like VEOs.
        While CENTCOM's ``by, with, and through'' partnership with the SDF
    has been critical to the defeat of ISIS, it has created friction with
    Turkey, which views the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG)
    elements within the SDF as a terrorist group. Our assistance to the SDF
    focuses on defeating ISIS, as we have simultaneously sought to include
    measures to reassure our Turkish allies. In October 2018 the United
    States and Turkey began conducting combined joint patrols in key
    locations. CENTCOM will continue to assist the Turkish military in
    countering VEOs that threaten their border, maintaining our emphasis on
    the D-ISIS campaign.
        The repatriation of ISIS foreign fighters to their home countries
    to face justice remains a challenge. Both SDF and Iraqi forces are
    holding hundreds of foreign fighters in prisons or temporary detention
    facilities, with no single process for prosecution or repatriation.
    This requires a concerted international effort involving law
    enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy.
        Key Opportunities: The conflict in Syria has led to an increased
    demand from our regional allies and partners for improved border
    security as well as improved domestic counter-terrorism capabilities.
    CENTCOM is able to manage the development of these capabilities which
    supports our objectives of promoting stability and countering VEOs in
    the region. The United States withdrawal provides an opportunity to
    reset our relationship with our Turkish allies as well as an
    opportunity for us to focus on reinforcing Iraq's consolidation of its
    gains against ISIS. A strong, enduring partnership with Iraq will serve
    as stabilizing factor, helping mitigate concerns about long-term United
    States intentions in the region.
        Jordan is one of our most committed partners in the Middle East and
    one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in the region. We
    must be careful to not to take their partnership for granted. Jordan's
    civilian and military leadership exemplifies professionalism and
    modernization within a region in crisis. Jordan is the only country in
    the Levant to provide a platform for operations, in addition to
    unhindered access and overflight essential to United States interests.
    The Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) are a key contributor to the D-ISIS
    Coalition and OIR and is a major contributor to efforts to stabilize
    the region. Continued support to the Government of Jordan (GOJ) and the
    JAF is critical to ongoing D-ISIS efforts, and preventing the spread of
    instability in the region.
        Key Challenges: Jordan currently hosts over 750,000 registered
    refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, straining government
    resources, services, and infrastructure. The GOJ and the JAF have
    effectively balanced legitimate security concerns with the humanitarian
    imperative to care for these refugees, despite the strain on Jordan's
    resources. Simultaneously, regional turmoil, falling remittances, and
    declining tourism have led to rising unemployment and high national
    debt creating a volatile environment that threatens political
    stability.
        Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, in conjunction with interagency
    partners, uses section 333 and other title 10 funds provided by
    Congress to build partner capacity and capability in Jordan. These
    funds and activities are in addition to the total assistance budget of
    $1.275 billion annually from the State Department, as agreed upon with
    the Government of Jordan, that includes at least $750 million dollars
    in Economic Support Funds and $350 million dollars in FMF. In August
    2019, Jordan will host nearly two dozen countries, including regional
    and NATO partners, for exercise Eager Lion, focusing on counter-terror,
    border security and humanitarian assistance missions.
        2019 Prognosis: Jordan will face domestic pressure to move towards
    normalized relations and trade with Syria, but also seeks to avoid the
    risk of triggering the extensive United States sanctions on Syria.
    Russia will likely seek to capitalize on its role as a Syrian
    intermediary to increase its influence in Jordan and the region. Both
    domestic and external VEOs will remain a security threat, but continued
    funding from title 10 programs, in addition to FMF and economic
    support, will enable Jordan to develop critical capabilities and remain
    a key contributor to coalition efforts.
        Egypt lies on the western edge of the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility, an anchor state for the region. The country is an
    important strategic partner whose location, size, enduring peace treaty
    with Israel, control of the Suez Canal, and moderate religious and
    cultural Pan-Arab influences are significant elements that support
    regional stability. Egypt is geographically positioned to counter the
    flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists
    transiting from Libya through Egypt into the Central Region. The United
    States-Egypt security relationship is resilient and growing,
    exemplified by Egypt's formal request to participate in the National
    Guard State Partnership Program. Egypt supports our overflight
    requests, provides Suez Canal access affording short notice transits,
    and trains and deploys peacekeeping troops worldwide. In the spirit of
    our strong mil-to-mil partnership, in September 2018 we held a joint
    Defense Resourcing Conference to increase the orientation of United
    States security assistance to Egypt toward a counter-terrorism and
    sustainment focus.
        Key Challenges: ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct attacks against the
    Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) to bolster its influence over the local
    populace through intimidation. The EAF has contained most of the
    violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula and has begun to address
    societal and economic reforms to defeat ISIS-Sinai and prevent its
    spread to the Nile Valley.
        Key Opportunities: Through our collaborative approach with the EAF
    we continue to see improvement in the security of their maritime and
    land borders. The EAF have improved their efforts to stem the flow of
    fighters and illicit material transiting from Libya through Egypt into
    Israel and the Central Region. Mindful of the complex environment of
    the Sinai, we continue our support to the Multinational Force and
    Observers in order to ensure the safety of these forces, allowing this
    crucial mission in support of the 1979 peace treaty to continue. We see
    the beginnings of improved interoperability between the EAF, United
    States, and other partner nations, exemplified in more Egyptian
    participation in multi-lateral exercises and strategic forums including
    exercise Bright Star 2018, the second joint military exercise held
    since 2009. Egypt has expressed plans to broaden its participation in
    coalition operations and has signed the Communications Interoperability
    and Security Memorandum of Agreement, allowing Egypt improved access to
    interoperability enabling acquisitions. We look to strengthen our
    security cooperation partnership through continued engagement and FMS
    programs.
        2019 Prognosis: Our military assistance ensures that the United
    States remains a military partner of choice and counters Russia's
    efforts to expand its influence in the region. United States Government
    aid and support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership.
    CENTCOM will continue to support the EAF's efforts in the Sinai, and
    assist them with implementing a whole-of-government strategy that
    addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions
    that give rise to extremist elements.
        Lebanon is a multi-confessional democracy that occupies a pivotal
    geostrategic position in terms of U.S. national security interests.
    Wedged between a key ally in the region, Israel, and a corridor of
    Iranian influence running from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon
    has managed to remain relatively stable. Nevertheless, Hezbollah's
    manipulation of the Lebanese political process thwarts needed reforms
    while exacerbating sectarian tensions inside Lebanon.
        Key Challenges: Lebanon faces a confluence of problems. The
    stagnant economy is worsened by regional conflict and exacerbated by
    the fact that nearly a quarter of the total population are refugees.
    Additionally, both Russia and China are increasing their efforts to
    gain access and influence in the country because of its key location on
    the Mediterranean and proximity to Syria. Hezbollah holds political
    clout which gives it a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions,
    fields an armed militia that does not act on the behest of an elected
    government and builds popular support by acting as a social service
    provider--all undermining the role of the legitimate Lebanese
    Government and armed forces. Hezbollah has also engaged in provocative
    actions with Israel, risking unpredictable escalatory actions that
    threaten Israeli security and could undermine Lebanon's stability.
    Through its Hezbollah proxy, Iran continues to meddle in Lebanon's
    internal affairs. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to
    drive ISIS from all Lebanese territory in 2017, the threat from
    remnants of ISIS and other extremists crossing into Lebanon from Syria
    remains present.
        Key Opportunities: Our efforts to strengthen the LAF are a critical
    aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and security. The
    U.S. is the LAF's top security assistance partner. Our modest,
    consistent, long-term commitment and investments has led to the LAF
    becoming a successfully modernized, legitimate fighting force. The LAF
    is innovative, professional, and have proven their capabilities to
    protect the Lebanese people from internal and external threats through
    successful counter-VEO operations. It established itself as the most
    trusted and respected institution in the country, undercutting
    Hezbollah's claim that its armed militia is necessary to protect
    Lebanon, while providing a mature, apolitical, stabilizing influence.
    The even-handed, professional response of the LAF, assisted by the
    professional mediation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
    was key in de-escalating the Israeli counter-tunnel operation in
    December 2018.
        2019 Prognosis: Successful, consistent partnership with the LAF
    forms the backbone of United States influence in Lebanon, providing a
    bulwark against growing Russian and Chinese interest in the country, a
    reliable partner capable of fighting and defeating remnants of ISIS and
    other extremist groups attempting to regroup in Lebanon. The LAF has
    the potential to eventually form a deterrent to increased Iranian
    activity, and a vital counterbalance to Hezbollah influence. While
    Lebanese security and sovereignty is enhanced every day through our
    robust relationship with the LAF, Hezbollah continues to risk the
    stability and security of Lebanon by maintaining an armed militia and
    advanced weapons outside the authority of the State.
                        regional overview--central gulf
        Iran's unpredictable and reckless behavior remains a threat to our
    partners, global commerce, and United States vital interests in the
    Middle East. While supporting the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria,
    Iran foments instability and chaos in the region through the
    proliferation of advanced weapon technology and a destabilizing
    ideology. To conceal its culpability, the Iranian regime masks its
    malign activities through proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran
    Threat Network (ITN) in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran is also
    attempting to build ground lines of communication through Iraq and
    Syria into Lebanon to support its proxy Hezbollah. Iran has gained
    influence within Iraq's armed forces with the formalization of the
    Popular Mobilization Forces, and also exerted influence in Lebanon,
    Iraq, and Yemen, oftentimes affecting established sovereign governance.
        Key Challenges: Iran's military is composed of approximately
    700,000 personnel, the largest in the region. Both of its military
    arms, the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, and the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are improving their abilities to
    quickly mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external
    threats. Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten--or
    be able to threaten--strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb and the
    Strait of Hormuz. With little warning, Iran could impede commercial
    traffic in these key maritime chokepoints. Iran seeks to gain hegemonic
    influence through the resulting chaos of its proxies and the threat of
    force. Iranian surface to air missiles pose a significant threat to
    United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
    operating in international airspace. Iran also has the region's largest
    ballistic missile force, which continues to increase in capability,
    range, and lethality. In November 2018, Iran demonstrated its ballistic
    missile capability, striking ISIS targets in Syria and Kurdish militant
    targets in Iraq.
        Key Opportunities: Since the United States withdrawal from the
    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent re-
    imposition of pre-JCPOA nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has sought to
    demonstrate its resolve and counter United States pressure while trying
    to mitigate the impact of sanctions. However, longstanding
    vulnerabilities in Tehran's fiscal policy are reducing its ability to
    alleviate the impact of United States sanctions and Iran's already
    fragile domestic economy will likely further decline. While Iran's
    strategy is to sow chaos through its malign activities, CENTCOM will
    continue to develop means of maintaining order to combat Iran's chaos.
    Our mil-to-mil relationships help build local credibility in many
    partner nations, while bi- and multi-lateral efforts--such as maritime
    exercises and developing integrated ballistic defense--with our
    regional partners helps create baffles to stifle Iranian ambitions.
        2019 Prognosis: Iran will continue to seek to expand its political
    influence and military presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and
    to threaten international trade and regional stability throughout the
    Central Region. Leaders in the IRGC-Qods Force will continue to use
    surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct
    action, intelligence, influence building, terrorism, and cyber
    operations against the United States. and our partner nations. Iran
    intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia,
    threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten strategic
    maritime transit routes. Iran will continue to acquire and develop
    increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military
    conflict, and seek to pursue policies that threaten United States
    strategic interests and goals throughout the region.
        The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) suffered challenges to its
    international reputation over the past year but remains a key strategic
    partner. The ambitious reform agenda set forth by Mohammed bin Salman
    is meant to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy and encourage
    foreign direct investment. To date, however, these reforms have met
    with mixed success.
        Key Challenges: The conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya have
    challenged Saudi Arabia's partners in the region, beset by malign
    influence driven by experienced and well-funded Iranian proxies. The
    Gulf Rift, pitting KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar,
    complicates unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity. The
    ballistic missile threat and armed UASs emanating from Yemeni territory
    continue to pose a significant risk, as the Houthi's consider civil
    infrastructure as legitimate military targets. High-profile civilian
    casualty incidents on behalf of the Coalition in Yemen and
    international backlash resulting from the murder of Saudi dissident
    Jamal Kashoggi have damaged Saudi Arabia's international standing.
        Key Opportunities: The Yemen conflict provided lessons learned on
    military operations and tactics, adding greater urgency to
    institutional defense transformation efforts. We continue to share our
    own experiences and processes in an effort to improve Saudi Arabia's
    operational performance and reduce civilian casualties. CENTCOM's
    security cooperation with Saudi Arabia remains a critical link in our
    efforts to strengthen partners in the region and meet current and
    future challenges. The work of United States advisors is essential to
    the success of our mission, and Saudi Arabia underwrites the lion's
    share of their presence. Helping build Saudi Arabia's security forces
    reflects our commitment to increase partner capacity, sustain effective
    defense institutions, increase professionalism, interoperability, and
    capability in order to deter aggression in the region and protect
    critical infrastructure.
        2019 Prognosis: Saudi Arabia plays an important role ensuring
    regional stability. Despite recent strains, the United States--Saudi
    Arabia security relationship is resilient and this strategic
    partnership with the Kingdom is a foundational point of CENTCOM's
    ability to execute our national defense strategy. Our ongoing
    relationship with the Kingdom regarding regional basing and access,
    interoperability, freedom of movement--exemplified by Saudi support for
    CENTCOM's expansion of the Trans-Arabian Network as a primary
    distribution route across the Arabian Peninsula--remains critical, and
    our defense institution-building endeavors represents the
    operationalization of our ``by, with, and through'' approach.
        Yemen is beset by strife and riven with internal fractures. The
    civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in
    the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead the coalition
    supporting the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). While some elements
    of the ROYG are reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, including
    President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis retain
    control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG,
    including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis
    retain control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG,
    including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis
    retain control over Yemen'
        Key Challenges: Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue
    to maintain a presence in Yemen and focus on attacks against ROYG, SLC,
    and Houthi targets. The conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for
    Iran, which continues to provide support to the Houthis aimed at
    building a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC and expand Iranian
    regional influence. This support enables Houthis to launch missiles at
    its neighbors and target ships in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea;
    threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader
    regional conflict. The prolonged conflict deepened the humanitarian
    crisis, and much of the population faces severe food shortages, a
    cholera epidemic and other outbreaks of disease.
        Key Opportunities: Following years of fighting, security sector
    reconstitution will be a priority, and any peace agreement will require
    functioning, unified Yemeni security forces in which both the ROYG and
    Houthis work together to maintain Yemen's stability. Leveraging
    existing mil-to-mil ties with the ROYG and a supportive relationship
    with the UNSE, CENTCOM is positioning itself to provide the necessary
    assistance to conduct security cooperation in Yemen while continuing
    not to engage in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the
    Houthis. The Yemeni Coast Guard resumed control of six ports from the
    SLC in late 2018, with training provided through the Department of
    State's Export Controls and Related Border Security program.
    Implementing the existing 505 agreement with Yemen will allow CENTCOM
    to significantly deepen and broaden assistance and training
    opportunities.
        2019 Prognosis: The United States and ROYG will continue to
    maintain a nascent but increasingly productive mil-to-mil relationship
    with the goal of enabling Yemeni security forces to secure national
    borders, defeat VEOs, and respond to existing and emerging threats in
    order to provide an environment that facilitates the reconstruction of
    a stable economy and reconstitution of Yemen's Government institutions
    and civil functions.
        Kuwait is a key strategic partner for regional security,
    indispensable facilitator of the D-ISIS campaign, multinational partner
    on United Nation Security Council, and linchpin of the region in
    humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic stability. The Government of
    Kuwait provides tremendous support for United States and Coalition
    operations. Kuwait hosts the fourth largest presence of United States
    troops overseas--including CENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central.
    The United States Military presence is viewed as essential to the
    defense of Kuwait, and Kuwait reimburses the United States for its
    presence.
        Key Challenges: Given the large military United States presence in
    Kuwait, the implementation of the NDS, the evolution of missions in
    Syria and Afghanistan, and the unknown of potential missions to come,
    we must ensure we maintain flexibility and clear communications with
    our strategic Kuwaiti partner.
        Key Opportunities: Vigilant to numerous regional threats, Kuwait
    sought resolution to the Gulf Rift dispute, while promoting a regional
    response to the crises emanating from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Kuwait
    continues to play an important role for Iraq's future. Kuwait hosted
    the International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq last
    February, raising $30 billion toward Iraq's reconstruction--including
    $2 billion dollars in Kuwaiti loans and investments.
        2019 Prognosis: Kuwait remains a key partner, combat support and
    logistical hub, and enabler for CENTCOM. Our strong mil-mil
    relationships with the Kuwaiti military underscores our commitment to
    the defense of Kuwait. This will also allow United States access to
    Kuwait ranges and training facilities and enable the United States to
    realign to the NDS, while simultaneously providing flexibility to surge
    forces into Kuwait as needed to preserve regional stability and United
    States interests.
        Bahrain is a strong security partner and a major non-NATO ally. The
    Government of Bahrain (GOB) has welcomed the broader effort to confront
    Iran's destabilization activities in the region. Bahrain is a strong
    partner in countering threat financing, especially helping curtail
    Iran's efforts to circumvent financial sanctions. Bahrain has also been
    part of the GCC-wide effort to rebuild ties with Iraq and provide a
    counterweight to Iran's influence. Bahrain's strong partnership with
    the United States is most evident by its hosting of the U.S. Fifth
    Fleet, the only operating U.S. naval base in the Central Region, and
    multiple United States command and control facilities located at the
    Naval Support Activity in Bahrain.
        Key Challenges: Changes in oil prices have posed a formidable
    challenge to Bahrain's economy, as over 75 percent of government
    revenue comes from hydrocarbon sales. Despite the GOB's attempts to
    shore up its fiscal position by cutting public spending and increasing
    non-oil revenues, the country continues to confront significant annual
    fiscal deficits and will consequently continue to rely on its neighbors
    to provide financial lifelines.
        Key Opportunities: Bahrain's access, basing, and overflight support
    to United States and Coalition forces in the region are essential to
    our force posture. Its contribution to regional security, maritime
    patrols, intelligence sharing, counter-mine, and counter-piracy efforts
    are an integral part of the region's overall security. Bahrain
    continues to pursue military modernization initiatives that will result
    in a Bahrain Defense Force more able to contribute to and lead regional
    coalition military operations. Bahraini Land Force, SOF, and Air Force
    support to the SLC campaign in Yemen is providing Bahraini forces with
    experience in expeditionary operations, while ongoing efforts to
    improve the BDF's capabilities will enable Bahrain to play a more
    critical role in regional security.
        2019 Prognosis: The mil-to-mil relationship between Bahrain and the
    United States remains strong.
        Qatar is a critical partner in the Arabian Peninsula, providing
    CENTCOM with invaluable regional access, and hosting approximately
    10,000 United States servicemembers and aircraft, and is home to the
    Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Special Operations Command Central
    Forward Headquarters, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. The access,
    basing, and overflight that Qatar provides would be costly to replicate
    anywhere else in the region. The Gulf Rift has a detrimental effect on
    joint training and interoperability between the U.S. and its Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. Qatar's recent withdrawal from OPEC
    and lower-level attendance at the December 2018 GCC Summit indicate
    Qatar is pursuing economic and political policies more independent of
    Saudi Arabia.
        Key Challenges: While the Gulf Rift had little direct impact on
    CENTCOM operations, it has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar's
    freedom of movement through the closure of land borders and air space.
    It impacted Qatar's participation in GCC-hosted multilateral exercises,
    eroded coalition building efforts, and increased Qatari reliance on
    Iran to overcome the economic and commercial shipping constraints--
    specifically, Qatar relies heavily on Iranian land, sea, and airspace
    for transshipment of foodstuffs.
        Key Opportunities: The Gulf Rift reaffirmed Qatar's commitment to
    make the United States its primary defense partner. While Qatar has one
    of the smallest militaries in the region, it is also, per capita, the
    richest country in the world. Despite its relatively small size, Qatar
    has been a major contributor to coalition operations throughout the
    region and against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other
    regional coalitions. Qatar is the second largest FMS customer in the
    world with $26 billion dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass
    $40 billion dollars in the next five years with additional FMS
    purchases. This investment demonstrates a clear desire to partner
    exclusively with U.S. and NATO allies and become a reliable contributor
    to coalition operations.
        2019 Prognosis: Qatar's efforts to expand their military both in
    size and capacity will result in increased bilateral military
    engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Armed Forces. This will give
    the U.S. an opportunity to make a positive impact on the military
    development of a key partner in a turbulent region. Qatar will continue
    to play a vital and necessary role in the region and has spent nearly
    $9 billion dollars on United States-led Coalition basing
    infrastructure.
        United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the United States' staunchest
    partners and non-NATO allies in the Central Region. The UAE's strategic
    location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage VEOs, proven
    expeditionary capabilities of its military, and drive to be at the
    forefront of military innovations makes them an ideal partner. The UAE
    has repeatedly supported United States objectives in both Syria and
    Afghanistan and has taken a leading role in the fight against
    terrorism--being among the first countries to join the D-ISIS
    coalition. It remains active in pursuing many of the coalition's lines
    of effort, including D-ISIS messaging, stabilization, and assisting in
    stemming the flow of foreign fighters.
        Key Challenges: Yemen is the UAE's top near-term security concern.
    The UAE sees the Huthis as Iranian proxies, paving the way for a new
    and unwelcome Iranian role in southern Arabia and in the seas
    surrounding the peninsula. The UAE is a key partner in the SLC in
    Yemen, conducting offensive operations in cooperation with Yemeni
    forces around Hudaydah since May 2018.
        Key Opportunities: The United States and UAE cooperate under a
    strong bilateral framework to prevent and respond to conflicts and
    crises, and the UAE has clearly indicated a desire to forge even
    stronger military relationships with the U.S. The UAE is active in an
    operational partnership to disrupt terrorist networks and reduce
    terrorist attacks and is the only member of the Saudi-led Coalition in
    Yemen to expand its military objectives to include counter-terrorism
    alongside the U.S. Robust training and exercise programs with the UAE
    increase the level and quality of cooperation between our nations. The
    UAE also provides substantial access and is willing to burden-share the
    costs of basing and infrastructure.
        2019 Prognosis: The UAE expressed a desire to strengthen our
    relationship through a nine-point Defense Cooperation Roadmap, which
    supports our NDS through increased burden sharing in its own defense. A
    continued robust exercise and engagement program will strengthen our
    military-to-military relationships, and UAE's purchase of U.S. produced
    weapon systems will help secur433iuytrewqe interoperability with U.S.
    units. We expect the UAE to continue their partnership to United States
    efforts in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, in addition to supporting
    freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
        Oman is a bastion of stability in the Central Region. The long-
    standing relationship between the United States and Oman, based on
    shared security and stability interests, remains strong--each Service
    Chief of the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces a graduate of United States
    military schools via our International Military Education and Training
    program. Oman serves as an interlocutor with other GCC members,
    factions in Yemen, and Iran. Oman faces some political and economic
    uncertainty due to the eventual leadership transition from Sultan
    Qaboos, and the continued budgetary dependence on limited hydrocarbon
    revenues to fuel Omani development and employment.
        Key Challenges: Oman's economy continues to experience recurring
    fiscal deficits, growing unemployment, and stagnant growth. Economic
    diversification is increasingly seen as a national security priority
    for Oman, as reliance on the hydrocarbon sector and a growing
    population result in rising unemployment, growing debt, and a
    diminishing capacity to pay for the costly security apparatus that
    keeps Oman safe and secure. Progress toward achieving the goal of
    diversification has been slow. This economic insecurity combined with
    an untested succession plan to follow Sultan Qaboos' decades of stable
    rule represent significant challenges.
        Key Opportunities: Oman's strategic location, outside of the
    maritime chokepoints of the Bab el Mandeb and Straits of Hormuz,
    provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency
    capabilities. The United States and Oman have shared interests in
    allowing increased Untied States access to Oman's military and
    commercial ports and bases as the country looks to modernize its
    infrastructure and diversify from an oil-based economy.
        2019 Prognosis: A stronger economy in the Sultanate of Oman will
    ensure a politically stable country with adequate employment
    opportunities for its citizens. The United States and Oman will
    continue to maintain a strong mil-to-mil relationship and Oman will
    provide crucial access in the form of thousands of aircraft
    overflights, landings, and dozens of port-calls in Oman. Negotiations
    for enhanced access to Duqm port offer the prospect of deeper military
    cooperation. Oman will participate in numerous bi-lateral exercises and
    training events with U.S. Forces. Oman will continue to develop an FMS
    portfolio that already includes over $2.7 billion in open FMS cases,
    though Omani budgetary constraints may significantly slow new
    acquisitions in coming years.
                                   conclusion
        Maintaining our competitive advantage in the Central Region relies
    on more than simply overmatching those who would challenge us with a
    higher volume of forces and equipment. CENTCOM's strategic approach has
    never relied on physical overmatch, but on our people, our strategic
    partnerships, and the ability to creatively leverage our combined
    capabilities to achieve our mission. As we operate more and more in the
    gray zone of competition short of combat, our people and partnerships--
    based on foundations of respect, trust, and shared values--will
    continue to be our source of strategic strength and key to maintaining
    our edge in the region.
        The CENTCOM team--our component commands, our combined and joint
    task forces, our country teams, and all of our interagency partners--
    more than 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong, is the engine
    that drives everything we do toward securing our national interests.
    They represent America's greatest treasure. In an era of austerity and
    change when we consistently ask our people to do more with less, the
    service and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in
    support of their nation is both humbling and inspirational. For nearly
    18 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM AOR, our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians have answered
    the call with an unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the
    families who support them. We could not accomplish what we do without
    all of them and they deserve the very best capabilities and support we
    can provide them, from weapons and communications systems, to
    healthcare and housing. As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its current
    missions and evolves to face new challenges, we appreciate the efforts
    of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, the
    interagency, and especially Members of Congress and their staffs, who
    work tirelessly to provide our people everything they need to
    accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy, fulfilling lives in
    continued service to our Nation.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much, General Votel.
        I want to bring up three things that have grown into some
    controversy, and they should not have, and just very briefly
    get your opinion on that.
        First of all, as we draw down, I had made some statement
    characterizing what the President's position was in Syria. I
    was challenged by some not too friendly media on this. I would
    like to quote what the President actually said initially. He
    said we will have a slow and highly coordinated drawdown--this
    is all a quote--and we will be leaving at a proper pace while
    at the same time continuing to fight ISIS and doing all else
    that is prudent and necessary. Do you think these are the
    proper conditions and this is your understanding also of his
    position?
        General Votel. In the instructions that I have been given
    and that we issued down to our organizations in Syria, that
    represents our approach, a very deliberate approach to how we
    depart Syria.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I think that was certainly our
    understanding.
        Do you believe that the territorial state of ISIS will be
    eliminated by the time the United States withdrawal is done?
        General Votel. I do, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. What is being done to prevent ISIS from
    reemerging at this time?
        General Votel. Well, we continue to work with our Iraqi
    Security Force partners and international coalition here to
    continue to keep pressure on ISIS, and we continue our efforts
    by, with, and through our partners in Syria and in some cases
    for them to keep pressure on ISIS as they continue to present
    threats to us. We should expect that they will attempt to
    attack us and continue to regenerate themselves, and we will
    continue to put pressure on them to prevent that.
        Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
        The second area that could be subject to some
    misinterpretation has to do with Yemen. I am concerned that
    disengaging our partners in Yemen will undermine Israel,
    bolster Iran, and increase human suffering. In your assessment,
    what are the costs of disengagement from our partners in Yemen?
        General Votel. Certainly it is a very significant
    humanitarian disaster in Yemen. But I do believe departing from
    our partners there removes the leverage that we have to
    continue to influence them, which I think we have used in a
    positive manner, and I think it further endangers Americans in
    the region.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I appreciate that.
        Then the third one has to do with the IMET [International
    Military Education and Training] program. I have always been
    very partial to that. Primarily my activity has been in Africa.
    It has been so successful not just in Africa but around the
    world that we see China and Russia both, particularly China,
    trying to beat us to the punch in the IMET program, recognizing
    that some of what are middle officers are getting training in a
    country that they are wed forever. We have seen this happen.
    But the thing that is disturbing right now is China is starting
    to do the same thing. What do you see as far as the benefits of
    IMET? Is China moving in on us?
        General Votel. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I think China is opportunistic, and they are
    going to look for places that they can step in where we or
    others may create voids.
        To your comments on IMET, I think IMET, International
    Military Education Training, funding dollar for dollar is
    perhaps one of the best tools that the Department of Defense,
    Department of State can wield in building our partnerships
    throughout the region. Typically the people who take advantage
    of these resources and come to our schools in the United States
    often rise to positions of leadership in their countries. They
    do not forget the experience they had in our military schools,
    and most importantly, they do not forget the American people. I
    think this is an extraordinarily wise investment for us to
    continue to make.
        Chairman Inhofe. I sure agree with that. You are probably
    aware that in Africa, China has invited at one meeting 50 of
    the leaders of the 52 nations in Africa to China, wining,
    dining, and all this trying to move in on that program. It is
    one we have to all be very sensitive to because they realize
    the benefits that we have received from that program.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General Votel, let me join you in recognizing the
    Sergeant Major. Thank you for your service, Sergeant Major.
    Generals only become generals if they listen to their first
    sergeants and sergeant majors.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. General Votel, thank you again for your
    extraordinary service in so many different ways.
        When General McKenzie was here, he stated that ISIS
    probably still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its
    peak, suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure
    on the group is relieved. You point out a staged withdrawal
    from Syria almost, in effect, lessens some of the pressure that
    is on ISIS.
        Do you concur with the General that there will be some
    renewed vigor with respect to ISIS?
        General Votel. I do agree, Senator.
        Senator Reed. We are trying as an alternative approach to
    at least posit the idea that we can conduct air strikes from
    Iraq and we can have forces in Iraq. Is that the fallback
    position?
        General Votel. Senator, right now, we are working through a
    variety of planning scenarios for how we would potentially
    continue to maintain pressure on ISIS as we withdraw out of
    Syria. I think that is probably a discussion more appropriate
    for the closed session, but we certainly are looking at all
    options for how we might do that.
        Senator Reed. Again, this might be something that you can
    touch upon later, but there have been some indications that the
    SDF, given the announcement, which was rather sudden, of our
    plans to pull out, have made approaches to the Assad regime to
    work out kind of an understanding of how they might cooperate
    or at least tolerate each other. Is that something that has
    been----
        General Votel. Senator, I think something we have learned
    in our experience there, certainly in my experience there, that
    all these parties talk to each other all the time. We do expect
    that that is occurring.
        Senator Reed. Turning to Afghanistan, there are two major
    functions. One is train and equip the Afghan forces and
    counterterrorism. If we withdraw, presumably the first elements
    that will go are the train and equip, and the last elements
    would be counterterrorism because we have threats in the
    region. Is that a fair summary of sort of the process?
        General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is probably
    that would be better discussed in a closed session. But I think
    we have a more sophisticated way of looking at that. We
    understand the importance of both of those missions.
        Senator Reed. Turning then to the situation of Afghanistan
    again, if we were to withdraw--and there is mounting pressure
    and mounting evidence that that is a path that might be
    pursued--we still provide the Afghan Security Forces about $4
    billion a year in sustenance. If we were to withdraw our
    forces, we would still have to maintain the $4 billion a year
    contribution or those Afghan forces would disintegrate. Is that
    an accurate assessment?
        General Votel. There certainly would need to be continued
    support to the Afghan forces. The amounts certainly we would
    have to look at. But, yes, I think that is accurate, Senator.
    Again, that money there without us I think does make it
    challenging.
        Senator Reed. Indeed, because I think one of the things we
    provide with the presence is to a degree at least the money is
    being spent appropriately. I think the experience we have had
    elsewhere is if we just send money, it gets to places that we
    do not want it to go. Again, I think as you are withdrawing,
    this has to be a very, very careful thought out second order
    effects, third order effects. Indeed, the issue is such a
    complicated multinational, multifactor and analysis. We have
    not yet gotten the Government of Afghanistan in the
    negotiations. They are still on the sidelines. That is correct?
        General Votel. That is what Ambassador Khalilzad has
    reported, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Long term, I think our instincts--and we have
    been dealing with this for 17 years--is that unless there is
    some type of regional buy-in, which would include Pakistan,
    Iran to a degree, China because of its influence, Russia
    because of its influence, the Stans because of their influence,
    the likelihood of something stable is probably minimal. Is that
    accurate?
        General Votel. Absolutely. A key part of the strategy has
    been the regionalization. I would add, Senator, that Pakistan
    in my estimation has played a more helpful role, a more
    constructive role in helping us move forward towards this
    objective.
        Senator Reed. Just one quick question. We were able to
    identify through great staff work by both sides that the
    Governments of Saudi Arabia and UAE [United Arab Emirates] owe
    the United States $331 million for refueling. Have you received
    a definite commitment that they are going to repay that money
    they owe us?
        General Votel. Senator, we are working through that. Both
    those governments have acknowledged the bills that we have
    provided to them, have indicated to us that they will meet the
    payment schedule in accordance with the ACSA [Acquisition and
    Cross-Serving Agreement], and we have teams from CENTCOM, from
    AFCENT [United States Air Forces Central Comand], from DLA
    [Defense Logistics Agency] that are working to resolve that
    satisfactorily.
        Senator Reed. You have looked at other beneficiaries in
    your command to ensure that there are not other areas where
    they are deficient in paying?
        General Votel. We have, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself
    not only with your opening statement but with the very fine
    opening statement of the ranking Democrat on this Committee and
    particularly thank Senator Reed for pointing out the cost of
    getting it wrong as we withdraw from both Syria and
    Afghanistan.
        I want to enter into the record at this point, Mr.
    Chairman, an op-ed that appeared in the ``Washington Post'' on
    January 29 by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, entitled ``I Was
    Ambassador to Afghanistan. This Deal is a Surrender.''
        Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

          ``i was ambassador to afghanistan. this deal is surrender.''
        January 2002. I arrive in Kabul to reopen the United States
    Embassy. Destruction is everywhere. Kabul airport is closed, its
    runways cratered and littered with destroyed aircraft. The drive south
    from the military base at Bagram is through a wasteland. Nothing grows.
    No structures stand. In the city itself, entire blocks have been
    reduced to rubble, recalling images of Berlin in 1945.
        More than two decades of almost constant war left a terrible
    legacy. The damage was not only to the physical infrastructure. The
    Afghan people had suffered enormously through the civil war that began
    in the late 1970s and the tyranny of the Taliban that followed. None
    had suffered more than Afghan women and girls.
        After the United States invasion in October 2001 ousted the Taliban
    for harboring the al Qaeda planners of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the
    human toll from the Taliban rule is why the United States' initial
    assistance efforts focused on people rather than things.
        I remember taking our first congressional visitor, Joe Biden (D-
    Del.), who was then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
    to visit a girls school that we had helped to open. A first-grade class
    that Biden visited had students in a range of ages, from 6 to 12. The
    older girls had reached school age when the Taliban was in power, so
    they had been denied an education. They weren't embarrassed now to be
    in a class with children half their age--they were just happy to be
    learning.
        At the end of Taliban rule, roughly 900,000 children were in
    school, all of them boys. When I left Afghanistan as ambassador in
    2012, there were 8 million students, 40 percent of them girls.
        We also encouraged Afghan women to play their rightful roles in
    business, in the legislature, elsewhere in government and in the
    military, and they did. The implicit message was that if you step
    forward, we've got your back. It was a time when American interests and
    American values were in harmony. I hosted receptions to recognize
    Afghan women of courage. Through the U.S. Agency for International
    Development, we funded efforts to establish shelters for women fleeing
    spousal or other familial abuse--a reminder that in Afghanistan's male-
    dominated society, it wasn't only the Taliban who threatened women's
    safety.
        Now the United States is negotiating directly with the Taliban. A
    framework agreement was announced on Monday calling for a cease-fire
    that could lead to the full withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban
    would commit to not harboring terrorist organizations that could
    threaten United States security. In other words, the Taliban promised
    no 9/11 replay.
        The framework was reached without the involvement of the Afghan
    Government. The Taliban has said all along that it refuses to negotiate
    with the government, considering the government the illegitimate puppet
    of the United States occupation. By acceding to this Taliban demand, we
    have ourselves delegitimized the government we claim to support.
        This current process bears an unfortunate resemblance to the Paris
    peace talks during the Vietnam War. Then, as now, it was clear that by
    going to the table we were surrendering; we were just negotiating the
    terms of our surrender. The Taliban will offer any number of
    commitments, knowing that when we are gone and the Taliban is back, we
    will have no means of enforcing any of them.
        It does not have to go like this. The United States could announce
    that talks won't proceed beyond the framework, to matters of substance,
    without the full inclusion of the Afghan Government. Right now, the
    inclusion of the Afghans is only theoretical. We could also note that
    unless some other solution is found, United States troops will remain
    in Afghanistan as long as the current government wants them, protecting
    the United States' national security interests and defending core
    values, such as women's rights, that we have fostered there since 2001.
        President Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot
    end a war by withdrawing its forces--the battle space is simply left to
    our adversaries. In Afghanistan, President Trump has a choice.

        Senator Wicker. General, thank you for your service.
        Just to follow up on a couple points that Senator Reed
    made. With regard to the $4 billion a year contribution, you
    are not quite sure that it would still be that amount, but it
    is close to that amount that we would still be obligated to
    pay. We would still need to contribute, and we would not have
    the oversight on the ground that we have now.
        General Votel. That would be correct if we departed,
    Senator.
        Senator Wicker. I think also Senator Reed pointed out that
    this agreement with regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan has
    been made without the participation of the Government of
    Afghanistan. That is correct. Is it not?
        General Votel. Senator, the work of Ambassador Khalilzad--
    first of all, there have been no agreements that have actually
    been finalized.
        Senator Wicker. There has been a framework agreement.
        General Votel. His work is creating a framework for
    continuing discussions moving forward here. Ambassador
    Khalilzad's efforts are done with the knowledge of the
    Government of Afghanistan. They are aware that we are doing
    this, and they have supported our efforts to get this process
    started. Ultimately, we need to get to a Taliban-Afghanistan
    discussion. Only they will be able to resolve the key issues
    involved in the dispute.
        Senator Wicker. In the op-ed that I have entered into the
    record, Ambassador Crocker points out the framework was reached
    without the involvement of the Afghan Government. He goes on to
    say that the Taliban has said all along that it refuses to
    negotiate with the government, considering the government the
    illegitimate puppet of the United States occupation. His
    opinion is by acceding to this Taliban demand, we have
    ourselves de-legitimized the government we claim to support.
        He goes on to say this current process bears an unfortunate
    resemblance to the Paris Peace Talks during the Vietnam War.
    Then, as now, it was clear that by going to the table, we were
    surrendering.
        Further, Ambassador Crocker says the United States could
    announce that talks will not proceed beyond the framework to
    matters of substance without the full inclusion of the Afghan
    Government. Right now, the inclusion of the Afghans is only
    theoretical. I think you have touched on that, General.
        We could also note that unless some other solution is
    found, the United States troops will remain in Afghanistan as
    long as the current government wants them. The current
    Government of Afghanistan wants us to continue our presence
    there. Is that right, General Votel?
        General Votel. That is my understanding, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Then the Ambassador concludes, President
    Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot end a
    war by withdrawing its forces. The battle space is simply left
    to our adversaries.
        I have asked you a question or two about specifics. Have
    you read this op-ed before? I have read to you extensively from
    it. Would you respond to that for the benefit of the Committee?
        General Votel. Senator, I have read Ambassador Crocker's
    editorial. I know Ambassador Crocker. I deeply respect him. He
    is certainly one of our leading experts on the region here and
    a keen observer of what is happening out there.
        From my position as the CENTCOM Commander, in my
    discussions with Ambassador Khalilzad and with General Miller
    on the ground here, I would characterize where we are in the
    process as very, very early in the process. As I said,
    Ambassador Khalilzad has attempted to create a framework by
    which we can move forward with discussions that would certainly
    involve the Government of Afghanistan. We clearly recognize
    that they have to be part of the solution and must be in the
    negotiation aspects of this. We cannot do that on their behalf.
    But, I do recognize also that the Government of Afghanistan is
    being consulted as Ambassador Khalilzad does his work. They are
    being kept informed of this and are aware of the work that we
    are doing to move forward on these talks.
        Senator Wicker. Well, let me just say I appreciate your
    answer. I hope that turns out to be true.
        I just want it to be said that the concerns in this city
    are bipartisan concerns based on advice and counsel that we
    receive from people who have been involved in this for a long,
    long time and who understand how important it is for us to get
    this right.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Reed is presiding for the next 20 minutes or so.
        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Votel, for your many years of service to
    this country.
        I heard former Afghanistan Commander Nicholson being
    interviewed this morning, and he was asked about the
    circumstances under which we should withdraw from Afghanistan.
    He talked about the fact that it should be conditions-based. It
    should not be based on an arbitrary timeline or numbers of
    troops that we want to leave there.
        Have you and General Miller been given conditions whereby
    we should withdraw troops from Afghanistan? If so, what are
    those conditions?
        General Votel. Senator, I think some of that discussion is
    best left for a different forum here. But, certainly General
    Miller and I speak very frequently about the ongoing situation
    in Afghanistan and the circumstances that we are trying to
    create to support Ambassador Khalilzad and to move forward with
    the reconciliation process.
        Senator Shaheen. I share the concerns that have been raised
    by Senators Reed and Wicker about what is happening right now
    in Afghanistan and particularly the framework that is being put
    in place without the engagement of the Afghan Government.
        Can you tell me how the framework addresses the rights of
    women in Afghanistan, given the horrific treatment by the
    Taliban of women during the years in which they were in
    control?
        General Votel. Senator, I think that perhaps is a question
    best posed for Ambassador Khalilzad at this particular point. I
    do agree that the progress that has been made in Afghanistan
    with women and improving their ability to be part of the fabric
    of life in Afghanistan is an important one that has to be
    incorporated in this, and I would envision that this would be
    part of the more detailed discussions that will take place
    between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. But,
    certainly we acknowledge that, and we see the goodness that has
    brought to the country of Afghanistan.
        Senator Shaheen. I would point out that we have actually
    passed legislation in this Congress that says women should be
    at the negotiating table when conflicts are being resolved
    around the world. Is it your understanding that is a basis on
    which we are looking at negotiations?
        General Votel. Certainly, again, as Ambassador Khalilzad
    and our diplomats work with the Government of Afghanistan on
    that, I would imagine they are emphasizing that legislation.
        Senator Shaheen. To move to Syria, there is the report of a
    new DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General report
    relative to ISIS. The report says that the command organization
    for ISIS is intact, and its fighters are battle-hardened. That
    is a quote from the report. It goes on to say that within a
    year, United States military commanders told the IG [Inspector
    General] that ISIS would be resurgent in Syria.
        Can you talk about how we can prevent ISIS from becoming
    resurgent if we have no troops in Syria and if Iran and Russia
    and Assad are in control in Syria?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, as I mentioned in my opening
    comments, that is an aspect of the ongoing planning that we are
    pursuing right now. The answer to the question is that we do
    have to keep pressure on this network. It is a resilient
    network. It does have certain components that are still left in
    it. Although they are dispersed and disaggregated, they have
    the capability of coming back together if we do not. There are
    a variety of different things that I would be happy to talk
    about, some of the things under consideration as we get into
    the closed session here. I will not speculate publicly here
    about things that we might do, but there certainly are
    different ways that we could do this working with partners,
    working with our own capabilities to continue to keep pressure
    on this network, which I think is absolutely vital.
        Senator Shaheen. You do agree with the Inspector General
    that ISIS is a scourge that is latent in both Syria and Iraq
    and it has the potential to resurge if not addressed.
        General Votel. I do agree.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        As I know you are aware, when we provide or sell United
    States weapons to end users, there are requirements which
    prohibit the transfer of any of those weapons to third parties
    without prior authorization from the United States Government.
    In legislation that we passed relative to Yemen, there are
    requirements for us to certify how the Saudis are using
    weapons. So far, we have not gotten authoritative certification
    of how those weapons are being used. There is, again, a recent
    CNN report that suggests that weapons that have been provided
    to UAE and to Saudi Arabia have wound up in the hands of
    Houthis, that they have been traded and been used on both sides
    of that conflict.
        Can you talk about what DOD is doing to address that?
        General Votel. Senator, I am aware of the references that
    you are making to that. We have not authorized Saudi Arabia or
    the Emirates to retransfer any of this equipment to other
    parties on the ground in Yemen. As you are well aware, when we
    do provide equipment, whether it comes government to government
    or commercially provided, that the recipients do have to agree
    to certain stipulations on the use of those. We do have
    monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that sometimes go through
    the Department of State if it is commercially provided, through
    the Department of Defense if it is government to government
    provided and requires us to conduct surveys. It requires us to
    conduct inventories of this type of equipment so we know where
    it is. There are processes in place with this.
        I would also highlight that in some of these cases, again,
    I think we have to look more closely at the allegations in this
    particular situation to find out what happened. As we have seen
    in Iraq in the past where we saw our partners overrun, we have
    seen American equipment provided to them lost in the course of
    a fight end up in the hands of our adversaries out there. I
    think we will have to examine that better.
        But, to your point of our responsibilities in terms of
    ensuring proper end use of the materials, we absolutely get
    that and emphasize that with our partners all the time.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me
    recognize Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General, for appearing to
    testify one last time. I know it breaks your heart that this
    will be your last time to testify. Most importantly, thank you
    for your many years of service and thanks to your whole team
    for their service as well.
        We have heard a lot about what might happen in the future
    against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but I do not think
    we have heard yet just a simple answer about how the fight is
    going. Can you tell us how the fight is going against the
    Islamic State right now?
        General Votel. In Syria, as you know, we are focused on
    completing the liberation of the physical caliphate.
        Senator Cotton. Where in Syria are you doing that right
    now?
        General Votel. In the southern Euphrates Valley, up against
    the border with Iraq right now. That fight is progressing as we
    envisioned it. As I mentioned in my opening comments, it is
    limited to a relatively small area. It is very dense. It is
    dense urban terrain. Certainly there is a lot of pressure on
    ISIS in there. The area is laden with extreme explosive hazards
    that pose significant threats to our partners on the ground.
    They are having to proceed very closely.
        I would add, Senator, that there is a civilian component to
    this. There are families of fighters. There are civilians left
    in the town. There are refugees that are attempting to depart
    this area. What we have seen, as we have kind of closed into
    this last area here, is our Syrian Democratic Force partners
    with coalition assistance moving very deliberately, fully
    recognizing the situation on the ground and making sure they do
    not exacerbate this any more than it is. But we remain
    confident that we will finish this aspect of it.
        When we get done with this, we should expect that we will
    do what you would remember as back clearance, going back and
    reclearing areas, removing explosive hazards, instituting local
    security, and then continuing to keep pressure on the remnants
    of the network that have gone to ground and are operating in a
    much more insurgent aspect.
        In Iraq, that is the case. We do see ISIS operating in a
    guerilla or an insurgent fashion. They are at a level where,
    for the most part, the Iraqi Security Forces with the
    assistance of the coalition are able to address those threats.
    That will be important to continue to do that in the future.
        In Iraq and Syria, that is where we are with the current
    fight right now, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. In Syria, I have heard it said that we have
    taken back about 99 percent of what was once the territorial
    caliphate. Is that number correct?
        General Votel. That is right. We are down to about 20
    square miles that they still control.
        Senator Cotton. I have also heard estimates of about 20,000
    to 30,000 Islamic State fighters remain. Do they remain in that
    1 percent of territory, or is that only a fraction----
        General Votel. No. Those fighters are geographically
    dispersed across Syria, across the open areas of----
        Senator Cotton. Just some are dug in in the defense in that
    1 percent. Others, as you say, are spread out conducting
    insurgency or guerilla type attacks.
        General Votel. There are 1,000 to 1,500 fighters that are
    left down in this small area right now that we are fighting
    over, but the remainder have dispersed and are disaggregated in
    a variety of different areas and for the most part have gone to
    ground.
        Senator Cotton. In Iraq and very soon, we hope, throughout
    Syria as well, as you talk about countering that insurgency or
    the guerilla tactics, the back clearance, could you give the
    American people a little bit of a sense of what our troops in
    Iraq are doing? Is it more like the Rangers that you once led,
    kicking down the doors and shooting bad guys? Are we providing
    them intelligence, logistic aerial support?
        General Votel. The technique that we have used in both Iraq
    and Syria is what we refer to as by, with, and through. We have
    relied on our partners, the Iraqi Security Force and the Syrian
    Democratic Force, to do the fighting. Our job has been to
    enable them with our fires, with our ISR [Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], with our advice. Sometimes
    we do employ our fighters in support of them and directly
    engage the enemy, but our people are not actually, as you
    suggest, kicking in doors in this case.
        By, with, and through puts the emphasis on our partners to
    do this, and then we enable them with our capabilities to do
    this. This has been, I think, a very effective approach over
    the last several years. I think in the end, our partners own
    what is left behind. We do not. They own it. They own the
    security. They own the responsibility for this. This has been a
    different approach for us, but it is one that I think has
    worked very well for us.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        One final question about the implications for the future.
    Syrian Democratic Forces currently are detaining several
    hundred ISIS fighters. Is that correct?
        General Votel. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. We will not get into any more details in
    the open setting here about the exact numbers or locations. But
    is it safe to assume that some of those are what ISIS leaders
    would call just cannon fodder, troops to be thrown into the
    maw, but some are like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, terrorist
    masterminds, or Ibrahim al Asiri, master bomb makers, who pose
    a serious threat to the United States?
        General Votel. I think that is accurate, Senator. They come
    from all aspects of ISIS.
        Senator Cotton. What is going to happen to those detainees,
    especially those extremely dangerous detainees, in the future
    if the United States is not present in Syria?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, for those that we
    characterize as foreign terrorist fighters, our focus needs to
    be on returning them to the countries of origin. That is the
    work of our partners in the Department of State, Department of
    Justice, and others who are working with their counterparts in
    these countries of origin to make sure they have the evidence,
    the details, and we can make arrangements. Our responsibility
    at this time is to make sure that the Syrian Democratic Forces
    continue to treat detainees in accordance with our values, with
    the Law of Armed Conflict, and then to facilitate the movement
    of these fighters back to their countries.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I hope we can do that
    with most of them. I would observe there is a lot of empty bed
    space at Guantanamo Bay.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, let me recognize Senator
    Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Welcome, General Votel.
        A moment ago, in describing by, with, and through, you
    mentioned partners left behind, and I want to ask about one of
    those partners. As our troops withdraw from Syria, what efforts
    are being made to ensure the safety and security of our Kurdish
    allies?
        General Votel. Well, certainly this is a key aspect of the
    ongoing planning right now, Senator. Of the many tasks that we
    have of defeating ISIS and withdrawing our forces, certainly we
    add to that list the protection of Turkey and making sure that
    they do not have threats that would emanate from them and, I
    would say, the added task of making sure that we protect those
    who have fought with us. A key aspect of our ongoing planning
    efforts right now, both at the diplomatic and military level,
    is to address that very issue and make sure that those that
    have fought with us, that have helped us accomplish our mission
    are safeguarded as we depart Syria.
        Senator Heinrich. I agree with you that that should be a
    priority. I am asking what are those specific plans.
        General Votel. Senator, I think it would probably be more
    appropriate for us to talk about what is under consideration in
    a closed session right now. But we certainly are looking at a
    variety of different options.
        Senator Heinrich. I would be happy to do that.
        I worry that there is a lot of lip service right now about
    making good on our promises to the Kurds, and it seems that we
    are short on plans. I hope that that is not accurate. I
    certainly hope that we have a plan for how to deconflict Turkey
    and the Kurds because I think the consequences could be morally
    terrible if we do not.
        Do you believe that currently the efforts in this area are
    adequate?
        General Votel. I do right now. I think we have the
    leadership up and down the chain of command both in the
    Department of Defense and the Department of State fully aligned
    in our approach as we work through what is arguably a very
    complex problem here. But I think we are very well aligned and
    we are very focused on exactly the challenge that you have
    outlined, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. I look forward to hearing more about that
    in a closed setting.
        General Votel, on February 3rd, President Trump announced
    that we would keep troops in Iraq to, quote, watch over Iran.
    Has our military focus there shifted from ISIS to Iran?
        General Votel. It has not, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. Glad to hear that.
        I am concerned with the response in Iraq. As you probably
    know, Iraqi President Salih responded very quickly saying that
    the President and the United States did not ask Iraq about
    this. Are you at all concerned that Iraq will now be skeptical
    of our motivations for being there, and how will that
    perception affect our ability to relocate United States troops
    from Syria to Iraq?
        General Votel. Senator, this is not particularly newfound.
    I think the Government of Iraq understands the relationship or
    the view that we have on Iran and understands our concerns with
    Iran and the variety of destabilizing activities that they
    conduct around the region. But having said that, our military
    mission on the ground remains very focused on the reason that
    the Government of Iraq asked us to come there, and that is
    focusing on the defeat of ISIS and now preventing the
    resurgence of that particular organization.
        Senator Heinrich. Let me pivot just a little bit to Russia.
    General Votel, as you know, on January 30th, Russia pledged to
    support Iraq in its fight against ISIS in preparation for the
    United States' withdrawal from Syria. What is your current
    perception of Russian influence in Iraq?
        General Votel. I think right now, Russia has limited
    influence in the country of Iraq.
        Senator Heinrich. Do we have plans or a strategy for
    countering that Russian influence once withdrawal from Syria is
    complete?
        General Votel. Well, I do not have any specific military
    tasks that are related to that, Senator. But what I would
    highlight is that one of the most effective tools that we have
    is being good, reliable partners on the ground, and that is
    what we intend to do and that has always been our approach with
    the country of Iraq, focused on what they have asked us to do
    and then being very reliable partners to them.
        Senator Heinrich. Chairman, I am going to yield the
    remainder of my time.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thanks for all your hard work. Thank you for
    your service.
        I met the other day with some opposition leaders from
    Syria, and while they expressed some concern about exactly how
    the withdrawal would happen, they did ask what the ability
    would be to do a no-fly zone afterwards which they thought
    would have a positive impact of keeping Turkey in place. Have
    you considered that as a doable?
        General Votel. Again, we are looking at a variety of
    options that I will be happy to talk about in a closed session
    right here. I would not characterize what we are looking at
    right now as a no-fly zone.
        Senator Scott. Why do you believe Russia has continued to
    be involved in Syria? What is their strategic advantage for
    them to be involved? Is it just to cause problems for us, or is
    there a strategic interest they have?
        General Votel. Russia does have some long-term interests
    that they have had in Syria that go back some ways. But
    certainly part of their motivation is by making sure they have
    warm water access into the Mediterranean and the access that
    that provides. They are interested in preserving that. They are
    interested in preserving a regime that is friendly and
    supportive to their motives and interests. I also believe that
    they share an interest in trying to subvert our influence and
    interests in the region. I do think they see that as an
    opportunity for them, and I think they are attempting to
    exploit that.
        Senator Scott. After President Trump made the announcement
    that we would do a withdrawal, have you seen Turkey take
    different action on the ground? Is there anything they are
    doing that causes you concern?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, I think we probably can talk
    a little bit more about that in the closed session. But in
    general, what I would tell you is we have seen all actors begin
    to posture themselves for what might come, and we have seen
    that on all sides.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        I am finished, Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. We are not used to
    such subtle and penetrating questions. Thank you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Senator Jones, on behalf of Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Thank you, General, for your service. I echo that and also
    for all of the team that is behind you. I am well aware that
    your success is only as good as the success of those that serve
    with you. I use that term appropriately as opposed to the chain
    of command below you. They serve with you. I appreciate all the
    folks sitting behind you and all of those that are still over
    there.
        I want to follow up briefly with kind of a question that
    Senator Shaheen asked about the CNN report of our military
    equipment somehow getting into the hands of others, but I want
    to come at it in a little bit different way.
        Last year, you stated that due to political considerations,
    cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking
    alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer
    competitors like Russia and China. When our partners go
    elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our
    ability to incorporate their contributions into theater
    efforts.
        I think it is critical that we align our practices with
    what is necessary to achieve these goals, as you alluded to,
    and we want our partners to come to us. Particularly I am
    concerned when they are going to communist China, communist
    Russia to get that because we are seeing around the world the
    influence of those countries.
        My question is, does this challenge persist today, and if
    so, could you please talk a little bit more about those
    challenges or barriers that exist to our partners coming to us
    for equipment and what steps you believe we need to take in
    order to keep them coming to us rather than communist Russia
    and communist China?
        General Votel. Senator, thank you.
        To some extent, they do continue to exist today. I
    certainly recognize that our foreign military sales, foreign
    military funding process must be a deliberative one. We should
    make very deliberate decisions about the things that we sell to
    people, and that has to go through a process.
        I am concerned that the process is lengthy and is not as
    responsive as our partners require on the ground. I am very
    much in support of trying to look at how we make those
    processes more responsive to the needs that they have on the
    ground. I think we should always strive for that. There are a
    lot of steps that we go through to provide equipment to people.
    Some of them are within the Department of Defense, some of them
    within the Department of State, and certainly some over here in
    Congress. To the extent that we can have a more rapid process
    to answer the requirements of our partners, I think that would
    be beneficial. In some cases, if we are not going to provide
    things to them, we should be very honest with them up front and
    tell them we are not going to. I think it is always better to
    give them a yes or a no answer than it is to string them along
    because I think that leads to more frustration for our partners
    and it does cause them to go do other things.
        I also think a key part of this is our work on the ground
    beforehand with our partners. This is within the military here,
    is making sure that the things that they are asking meet the
    needs of each of their countries in their own defense. We
    should try to steer them away from just buying things that they
    cannot maintain, they cannot sustain, they cannot man long
    term, and we should be focused on the equipment that they can
    and equipment that can be integrated with us and other partners
    in the region to provide a more formidable deterrent effect or
    a defense, if needed.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, sir.
        With regard to the Iran nuclear deal, it looks like we are
    out. How will United States withdrawal from the Iran nuclear
    deal affect our posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
        General Votel. Well, I do not know that withdrawal from the
    Iran deal will specifically impact our posture. Our posture
    will be more driven by the National Defense Strategy than it
    will be by a decision to depart from the JCPOA [Joint Common
    Plan of Action].
        I would just add that as I look across the region, Iran
    does continue to present concerns to me. It is the major
    destabilizing factor in the region. While the nuclear weapons
    program is one aspect of the threat that they presented, their
    facilitation of ballistic missiles, of unmanned aerial systems,
    of other lethal materials to their proxies in Yemen, in Syria,
    in Iraq, other places here, I think this should give us very,
    very significant cause. Their continued efforts to exercise
    control over critical waterways I think should give us
    continued cause here.
        Iran continues to present threats to us across the region,
    and as we look at implementing the National Defense Strategy--
    and I agree with the focus on great power competition--my best
    advice back up through my chain of command will be to ensure
    that we do retain sufficient capabilities and sufficient
    response capabilities to deal with the threats that remain in
    the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you, sir. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Hawley please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        General, thank you for being here. Thank you again for your
    service.
        I want to stay on that same topic about the National
    Defense Strategy and Iran and just explore some of the tensions
    that the National Defense Strategy creates for your area of
    operation.
        Can I just ask you, in your judgment, are we in a position
    to remove, draw down forces, move forces from your area of
    operation to Asia or Europe in accord with the National Defense
    Strategy's priorities on great power competition with China and
    Russia? Are we in a position to do that and also engage, if
    necessary, Iran should that nation provoke a conflict with us
    or should they continue to accelerate further their uranium
    enrichment program?
        General Votel. Senator, the National Defense Strategy
    necessarily puts focus on the United States regaining its
    competitive advantage against great powers, Russia and China in
    this particular case. I agree with that, and we are absolutely
    supportive of that from a CENTCOM standpoint. We do recognize
    that that will necessitate some change in our posture in the
    region. As we go through the discussions and the planning
    aspects of that with the Joint Staff, with OSD [Office of the
    Secretary of Defense], and certainly with the services, we will
    seek to maintain the capabilities that we need to and then
    ensure that we have the right response capabilities to address
    threats as they present themselves in this area.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you a little bit more about
    that. The National Defense Strategy calls for more efficient
    ways of operating in the greater Middle East, in your area of
    operational authority, the idea being again to enable us to
    maintain the focus on Iran and terrorists there and also to
    shift attention towards a great power conflict.
        Can you tell me about your plans to make operations in your
    area of responsibility more efficient? What does that mean?
    What does that look like? Can you give us a tangible sense of
    it?
        General Votel. Certainly. One of the areas where we can
    continue to be more efficient is how we operate along our
    bureaucratic combatant commander seams. With me, I share a
    boundary with EUCOM to the north. I share one with AFRICOM to
    the west, and with INDOPACOM to the east. I think it is
    extraordinarily important as we look at managing resources that
    we look at positioning and employing these resources in a way
    that they can be of the maximum utility to multiple combatant
    commands. Today we actually do that with some of our resources
    in the region.
        You might be aware, for example, that AFRICOM supports us
    with basing that we require for our activities in the Arabian
    Peninsula, and the resources that we have there benefit both
    General Waldhauser in his command and they benefit me. I think
    there are some smarter ways of doing this.
        Certainly the Department's focus on dynamic force
    employment where we exercise strategic predictability but
    operational unpredictability I think is a good concept of this
    where we are able to move resources in a more agile fashion
    into areas where we see opportunities with this. I think this
    is another area that we need to continue to focus on.
        Senator Hawley. In this same vein, we have heard some and I
    have read some about light attack aircraft and security force
    assistance brigades. Can you give me your sense about the
    progress on those initiatives and what else you might propose
    in that vein?
        General Votel. On both of those initiatives, the security
    force assistance brigades--you know, my service, the Army, I
    think did us a significant service by establishing this
    organization. What this essentially did--we talked about by,
    with, and through, but what this really allowed us to do is it
    gave us a purpose-built organization that was specifically
    focused on this type of advising and the type of relationship
    we wanted to have with our indigenous partners on the ground.
    Over the deployment of the first security force assistance
    brigade last year in Afghanistan, we saw significant
    improvement in our ability to do that, a higher level of
    capability, a much more focused organization, and I think we
    helped the Army preserve its readiness frankly. We did not take
    a brigade, break it apart just to pull the leaders out to do
    advise and assist. We actually had a purpose-built organization
    that did that. I think this is a very positive thing.
        The light attack aircraft. Being able to train our partners
    in terms of employing those things I think reduces the burden
    on us, and it provides self-sufficiency for them. It does it
    without creating a significant logistical burden. Whether it is
    A-29's that we see with the Lebanese armed forces or A-29's we
    see with the Afghan security air force, these I think are good
    investments. In both cases we have seen those resources be
    directly responsible to their forces on the ground. It is
    nascent. It is growing. We have to continue to support this,
    but I think this is exactly the direction we need to go to
    really enable our partners.
        Senator Hawley. Last question. You are satisfied, General.
    I mean, you think that those programs, for example, are on
    track. You think that we are making good progress in both of
    those initiatives.
        General Votel. I do. I think both of those are excellent
    programs.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Thank you, General Votel. Thank you for your testimony here
    today and your many years of distinguished service.
        General, in your written testimony, you described Jordan
    as, quote, one of our most committed partners in the Middle
    East and one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in
    the region. Your testimony goes on to discuss the role that
    Jordan plays in hosting over 750,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq,
    and elsewhere and Jordan's contributions to the fight against
    ISIS and Jordan's role in hosting Exercise Eagle Lion, which
    includes nearly 2 dozen countries training in the
    counterterrorism mission.
        Today in the Senate, we are debating S. 1, Strengthening
    America's Security in the Middle East. It includes a United
    States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act. The premise of
    the legislation is that Jordan is playing a critical role in
    addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the fight
    against ISIS and, therefore, extends our defense cooperation
    agreement.
        Could you describe and talk a little bit more about the
    contributions that Jordan is making, what are some of the
    challenges Jordan faces in making these contributions, and why
    this extension is important?
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I would just share
    everything that you just said there about what a great partner
    they are.
        Certainly Jordan is not a rich country. They face economic
    challenges by virtue of where they are. His Majesty is working
    through that aspect with his parliament right now and with the
    international community, and I think we should continue to be
    supportive of that.
        As you have said, given the chance to say no, they say yes
    every time to everything that we seek.
        I would share with you, Senator, the last week I was in
    Jordan. I had an opportunity to visit the border, up along the
    border between Jordan and Syria, and I had an opportunity to
    witness the investments that our country has made in their
    border security initiatives: equipment, training, command and
    control for this. What I witnessed there I think would make any
    Member of Congress or, indeed, any American very proud to see.
    It was extraordinarily professional. It was very effective.
    They had very good situational awareness and understanding of
    what was happening along their border, and everything that they
    were doing was sustainable. They have been doing it for several
    years and with the prospect of continuing to do it in the
    future. These are the kinds of investments that we need to be
    making in these very good partners right here like Jordan.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
        Today in this bill, it also includes the Caesar Syria
    Civilian Protection Act. It is a bill named after a defector
    from the Syrian army who shed light on Assad's atrocities,
    revealing photographs of torture and significant human rights
    abuses that I know you are very aware of. The legislation
    imposes sanctions on individuals who support Assad's regime in
    Syria by providing financial and material or technological
    support. This includes sanctions on those who provide aircraft
    or spare aircraft parts for military purposes, sanctions on
    those who collaborate with mercenaries, military contractors,
    paramilitary forces operating on behalf of Syria, Russia, or
    Iran, and sanctions those who help the Government of Syria
    maintain or expand its production of natural gas and petroleum.
        Your written testimony describes the Assad regime's use of
    starvation as a weapon of war by denying humanitarian aid to be
    delivered where it is critically needed.
        My question to you, General, is to what extent do you
    believe that imposing additional sanctions on the Assad regime,
    including limiting access to aircraft and aircraft spare parts,
    will degrade Assad's ability to attack innocent civilians and
    exert pressure in a positive direction towards improving the
    horrible humanitarian situation that we have there.
        General Votel. Senator, my belief is history speaks for
    itself here with the Assad regime, and we should continue to
    keep the maximum amount of pressure on them to prevent them
    from appropriating the atrocities that they have in the past on
    their own people. I am supportive of all measures in that
    regard.
        Senator Peters. The last question, General. Last week, the
    Committee held a hearing on the threats posed by Russia and
    China. You have answered some questions related to what we
    heard, as to how we need to have more efficient use of
    resources in the Middle East. What came up was the possibility
    of a review of the use of aircraft like the B-1 and the F-22 in
    Afghanistan where those platforms might be better focused on
    dealing with our near-peer competitors.
        My question to you is--I have worked to extend and support
    A-10's operating and to make sure that they have the wing
    replacements so that A-10 aircraft can continue to operate. To
    what extent is the A-10 necessary for you to conduct your
    mission in places particularly if we look at moving B-1's and
    F-22's out of theater?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, I do not think you are going
    to find any Army guys or infantrymen that are going to argue
    against the A-10. It is an incredibly responsive capability
    that has, I think, served us extraordinarily well in the past.
    I know it is an old airplane, and so I share some concerns
    about its sustainability. But certainly it has definitely
    proven its worth to us, and we will continue to require that
    type of support, some type of very responsive, close air
    support capability well into the future.
        Senator Peters. So you believe Congress should continue to
    support that program in your estimation?
        General Votel. I think we should continue to support that
    program, and then we should be looking at other programs that
    would provide those capabilities in the future.
        Senator Peters. Appreciate it. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, first of all, thank you for your service. Thank
    you to your team as well.
        The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the
    Department's focus is preparing to deter and win, if necessary,
    great power conflict with China and Russia. But we have also
    got several partners in the region as I think Senator Peters
    has just mentioned. Jordan is a great ally. So is Israel.
        Israel has reportedly agreed to allow a Chinese Government-
    connected firm, Shanghai International Port Group, to run
    commercial operations at the Israeli Port of Haifa. This port
    reportedly periodically hosts joint United States-Israeli naval
    drills and visits from American vessels. From a U.S. military
    perspective, do you have concerns regarding this deal? If this
    deal goes forward, might it impact decisions to have the U.S.
    Navy vessels visit the port?
        General Votel. Senator, Israel resides outside of the
    CENTCOM area of responsibility. So with regard to that, General
    Scaparrotti would probably be the best one to answer that
    question.
        But I would share with you, as I look at the region in
    which I do have military responsibilities, in the Gulf, in and
    around the straits, particularly the Bab-el-Mandeb and these
    areas, I am concerned about the increasing presence of Chinese
    maritime activity in the region and their continued outreach to
    different partners there to secure military access that is
    likely linked to their economic objectives, their One Belt One
    Road aspects that they propagate around the world but, in
    particular, in the area in which I have military
    responsibility. I deeply share your concern.
        The United States and a number of our partners have long
    provided maritime security in this area. Frankly, I think China
    has been a free rider in this and taken advantage of that, and
    now we see them beginning to develop their own infrastructure
    in here principally for their own purposes, not for the
    purposes of broader regional security in the region. I am
    concerned about that.
        Senator Rounds. In terms of how we separate out the
    different areas of responsibility--and I respect the fact that
    you have specific areas. Most certainly activity communication
    with our ally Israel is a part of that responsibility, though.
    Can you share with regard to how this impacts your ability and
    does it? Or is it simply a matter of we are aware of it and we
    will allow other individuals responsible in other areas of
    responsibility to handle it?
        General Votel. Senator, as I remarked earlier, we pay
    particular attention to our bureaucratic, geographic seams out
    here. General Scaparrotti and myself and our respective staffs
    are very closely aligned with this. With his support, we
    maintain a close relationship with Israel. As we have
    recognized, many of their security threats reside within the
    military area in which I have responsibility. I think this is
    another aspect of how we cooperate across our combatant command
    boundaries here, sharing responsibility. I absolutely
    understand what you are saying, and I am very confident that
    the mechanisms that we have in place are helping us address the
    concerns that all parties have in the region.
        Senator Rounds. Let me go to another area of bureaucracy.
    Much has been written and said about the need to streamline
    DOD's acquisition processes. Can you comment on the process and
    the amount of time that it takes to fill validated requirements
    in the CENTCOM area of operations? Do you believe that we must
    reform the acquisition process to more quickly fill the urgent
    and operational needs of our warfighters?
        General Votel. Senator, I absolutely agree we should
    continue to do everything that we can to address the needs of
    the warfighters and try to do it as fast as we can. I am aware
    of a number of initiatives that are underway to address that,
    whether it is rapid prototyping or other things that we can do.
    Our view in CENTCOM, as we confront emerging threats here, is
    that we have tried to be supportive of the services bringing in
    capabilities, trying them out, recognizing some of these will
    fail. They will not succeed the way they are. But in the hands
    of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground,
    they will begin to provide very direct feedback that will help
    these programs move along quicker.
        From a CENTCOM standpoint, what we are principally
    concerned about is making sure that we have a system in place
    where we can bring things forward. We can rapidly test them. We
    can get them in the hands of our people. They can provide
    feedback. That goes back into the commercial or the industrial
    base. They make the improvements and then bring us the improved
    product out there that we can use. That to me is
    extraordinarily important in an area like CENTCOM.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, were you aware of the President's intention to
    order the withdrawal of our troops from Syria before that was
    publicly announced?
        General Votel. I was not aware of the specific
    announcement. Certainly we are aware that he had expressed a
    desire and intent in the past to depart Syria.
        Senator King. You were not consulted before that decision
    was announced.
        General Votel. We were not. I was not consulted.
        Senator King. You mentioned in your testimony that--you
    used the word ``remnant'' with regard to ISIS. Can you give us
    a better number than remnant? What are we talking about here?
    Senator Cotton mentioned 20,000 to 30,000 fighters scattered in
    various places around the world. Is that accurate?
        General Votel. I think that is approximately what the
    intelligence community has estimated that is left behind. I
    think we would generally share with that. That includes people
    of a variety of different characters. It includes fighters. It
    includes supporters. It includes facilitators within that.
        Senator King. How about in Syria and Iraq? What number
    would you put that?
        General Votel. I think in general from what I have seen,
    that is about the number that I have seen.
        Senator King. Twenty to thirty thousand.
        General Votel. Yes, but Senator, this is probably a low to
    moderate confidence number.
        Senator King. Is it a low estimate? I am sorry. You threw
    me with that. Do you think it is a higher number?
        General Votel. I think we do not fully know.
        Senator King. You do not have a precise number.
        General Votel. We do not have it with any specific
    accuracy. It is always going to be a range. The number is
    always going to be a range.
        Senator King. One of my concerns about the withdrawal with
    that many ISIS fighters still in the area is that they will
    just wait us out. The President announces a withdrawal. The
    saying I have heard is the Americans have the watches, but we
    have the time. Are they just going to wait and hunker down for
    a couple years or a couple of months and then resuscitate their
    efforts? If you were their military commander, would that not
    be what you would do, say these guys are leaving, we will just
    bide our time?
        General Votel. Well, certainly, Senator. But our approach
    here, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is as we look to
    withdraw from Syria, we are in a very deliberate planning
    process for how we will work with the international community,
    with our partners on the ground with the rest of the coalition
    to ensure that we can keep pressure on this organization to
    prevent exactly what you are talking about.
        Senator King. I think it is very important. Perhaps you can
    share with the Committee in closed session what the strategy is
    for maintaining that pressure and how success is defined that
    will allow us to withdraw.
        Let me move on with regard to, again, the withdrawal.
    Senator Heinrich mentioned the danger to the Kurds. I sincerely
    hope that in your exit interview with your successor, which
    will take place very soon if not already, that you emphasize
    the importance of protecting the Kurds. If they are slaughtered
    by the Turks within the reasonable proximity of our leaving, it
    will be a stain on the honor of this country that will persist
    not only in terms of honor but also in terms of our ability to
    attract allies to assist us in future projects of this kind.
    That is my biggest fear about what is going on now, and I
    believe the Turks are waiting.
        General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is a key task
    that we are looking at right now and that is the protection of
    those who have fought valiantly with us and ensuring that they
    remain safe as our diplomats and United Nations and others
    pursue a political solution here in Syria.
        Senator King. I certainly hope that is of the highest
    priority.
        You mentioned Iran and listed a whole series of malign
    activities in the region. Which would you prefer? The current
    malign Iran or a malign Iran with nuclear weapons?
        General Votel. Certainly I think an Iran with nuclear
    weapons poses a more enduring and serious threat to us long
    term. Our approach to them does need to make sure that we deny
    all paths for them to get to a nuclear weapon.
        Senator King. Well, unfortunately, we have just abrogated
    an agreement that did just that, but we can discuss that in
    another setting.
        Final question on Afghanistan. I do not understand that we
    are negotiating unilaterally with the Taliban and not involving
    the Government of Afghanistan. I do not understand how that is
    going to get us to a final result of the Government of
    Afghanistan if we give away things they are not willing to give
    away.
        General Votel. Again, Senator, I think the way I would
    characterize Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts is he is at the
    beginning of process here to put together a framework that will
    allow the Afghans and Taliban to come together at some
    particular point to conduct some negotiations. All of this is
    being done with the knowledge of the Government of Afghanistan.
    They understand what he is doing. I cannot speak for the exact
    process itself since that is Ambassador Khalilzad's. But I do
    know that he is in frequent consultation with the Government of
    Afghanistan to ensure that they are best informed on the
    approaches that he is taking to continue to get this framework
    in place.
        Senator King. Good. I hope that is the case. Thank you. I
    appreciate it. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        As a reminder, you made several references as to a
    different setting for some of the answers to your questions. We
    will be having a closed meeting at 2:15 in the Visitor Center.
    So you have that opportunity.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, good to see you again. I want to thank you and
    Sergeant Major for your outstanding service to our Nation and
    very, very much appreciated.
        I wanted to dive in a little bit more. We have had this
    discussion I think on both sides of this idea as we are
    refining our force posture in the region, this notion of having
    a robust counterterrorism force that can still focus on U.S.
    interests, whether it is the rise of ISIS, whether it is the
    rise again of al Qaeda, whether it is the malign activities of
    Iran. I think, unfortunately, some of my colleagues like to
    look a blind eye. I am going to ask you a couple questions
    about that.
        But what is that concept of--you know, this is something
    the President has talked about, but your predecessor, a general
    who I happen to have a lot of respect for, General Abizaid, has
    talked a lot about this idea of a raid force component, robust
    CT [Counter Terrorism] element in the Middle East that can
    continue to focus on our key strategic interests. How would
    that work, and are you thinking through that, whether it is in
    Iraq, whether it is in other parts of the Middle East? Do we
    have the capability not only to go after our counterterrorism
    goals but, say, for example, control the airspace in northern
    Syria, which a number of us think is important even if we are
    not on the ground there?
        General Votel. Senator, I believe that we do, and we are in
    fact thinking through the different ways that we would continue
    to address our enduring concern about violent extremist
    organizations operating in this region who harbor interests in
    coming against the Homeland.
        Senator Sullivan. That is our overriding national interest.
        General Votel. It is. As we look at all of the activities
    that we are conducting across the region, I think safeguarding
    that particular national interest has to be among the very top
    things that we are doing. There are a variety of different
    approaches that we can take to this. Certainly the by, with,
    and through approach using partners on the ground, enabling
    them to keep pressure on them is one way of doing this. In some
    instances, it may require us to have some of our capabilities
    forward in different locations to ensure that we can do that.
        Senator Sullivan. Are we looking at those options right now
    to make sure----
        General Votel. We actually are looking at a variety of
    different options for how we might address this.
        Senator Sullivan. Are you confident we can address this,
    not only given your role as CENTCOM Commander, but your
    previous role as SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command]
    Commander?
        General Votel. I am supremely confident in both our SOF
    [U.S. Special Operations Forces] and conventional forces in the
    ability to meet the missions that our Nation has in this area
    and in others.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me talk about Iran a little bit. You
    know, my colleague from Maine, who I consider a good friend and
    deeply respect--he mentioned the Iran nuclear deal. The Iran
    nuclear deal essentially gave Iran the freedom to be on the
    verge of becoming a nuclear nation within 10 years anyway. We
    always forget that. That is a short time span in the Middle
    East. That was the agreement.
        You know, General Dempsey, when he was Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs, testified in front of this Committee that when
    the Iranians were supplying--the Quds Force and others were
    supplying sophisticated IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] to
    the Iraqi Shitte militias, they were responsible for the
    killing and wounding of over 2,000 American soldiers, airmen,
    and marines. Do you agree with that assessment?
        General Votel. I do agree that Iran facilitated equipment
    to organizations that caused casualties on Americans.
        Senator Sullivan. Massive casualties.
        General Votel. Massive casualties.
        Senator Sullivan. It often gets forgotten that Iranians
    were, in my view, directly responsible for killing and wounding
    over 2,000 American soldiers and other military members on the
    ground in Iraq. Is that not correct?
        General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. One of the big selling points of the Iran
    nuclear deal was that it was going to moderate Iranian
    activities. This was sold by Secretary of State John Kerry and
    even President Obama. Have they moderated their malign
    activities in Syria?
        General Votel. Senator, they have not.
        Senator Sullivan. No. It has gotten worse. Is that not
    true, General?
        General Votel. It is my observation that during the time
    that the agreement was in place, we did not see a modification
    to their behavior.
        Senator Sullivan. How about with regard to Yemen? A lot of
    my colleagues on both sides of the aisle forget who started the
    war in Yemen. It was not the Saudis. Was it?
        General Votel. Well----
        Senator Sullivan. The Houthis backed by the Iranians?
        General Votel. The Saudis were concerned about the presence
    of an Iranian-backed organization along their southern border.
        Senator Sullivan. With regard to Israel, they [Iran]
    certainly have not moderated their malign activities. Have
    they? Iran?
        General Votel. I think if you talk to the Israelis, they
    certainly would agree with that.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question with regard
    to--Secretary Pompeo gave a speech in Cairo that was laying out
    what I thought was a very well articulated, robust counter-Iran
    strategy. How are you looking as the CENTCOM Commander to
    execute this strategy, which I think is one of the most
    important things we can be doing in the Middle East?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, I have responsibility for
    helping put together the military global campaign plan for
    Iran. As I look at that, I look at a variety of different
    things that we have to do as part of that. We have to assure
    our partners. We have to challenge Iran in the areas where they
    are trying to exert their malign influence. We have to be
    prepared to deter them. We have to be prepared to delay and
    respond to their activities in the region. As I look at the
    planning that we are doing against that, those are the types of
    things that I am trying to incorporate into a comprehensive
    plan to address the threat of Iran.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Duckworth?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for being here. I also want to
    recognize that your Command Sergeant Major is here. Sergeant
    Major Thetford, thank you for all of your years of work as well
    on behalf of our Nation.
        General, I want to go back to a theme that you have talked
    about a lot in terms of relationship building and setting the
    groundwork with our partners beforehand in the region and the
    like. You and I touched a little bit on some of the programs
    that exist that allow us to do that, to build these habitual
    relationships. I know that the Ranking Member had talked about
    IMET programs.
        I would like to touch on the State Partnership for Peace
    programs. This is a program where, when I was serving, from the
    time I was a second lieutenant, I had a partner nation in
    Illinois' case, Poland, that we trained and worked with. I grew
    up in the military along with my Polish counterpart from being
    young second lieutenants all the way up through our command
    time. That developed a relationship and an understanding of how
    that worked.
        Can you speak a little bit about the different types of
    U.S.-funded military exchange programs that you see implemented
    in the CENTCOM region? Talk about the values of those programs
    contributing to our warfighting capabilities.
        General Votel. Thank you. Senator, let me just start and
    talk about the State Partnership program. This is an excellent
    program. We have four or five States that are partnered with
    countries across our region, and in almost every case, these
    are deeply valued programs by our partners in the region and I
    believe by the States that orchestrate them. We get a lot of
    benefit out of that, not just in the countries in the region,
    but again by people from those countries coming back to America
    to participate in exercises to build the relationships back
    here. I think this is an extraordinary program. It is long-
    term. It is enduring, and I think it serves us particularly
    well.
        You have already talked about the impact of IMET. This is
    an extraordinarily important program. I will not belabor that.
        I also think that the program of exercises that we continue
    to orchestrate across the region are extraordinarily important
    in terms of building interoperability, in terms of building
    readiness, and in terms of building reliability in our
    partners. As we have continued to move forward, I think this
    will be again continuing investments that we will want to make.
        For example, with Egypt, we have restarted the Bright Star
    exercise, but we have changed it more to deal with the
    contemporary threats that we are dealing with and that Egypt is
    dealing with in the terrorism realm as opposed to perhaps the
    sweeping tank battles of the past. That is not what we are
    doing.
        I think through our exercise programs, we have the ability
    to make these very specific to the needs of the region and
    address it.
        I would add one final program that I think is
    extraordinarily valuable, and it is our combined maritime force
    where we invite different partners in the region, some from
    outside of the region to come in and participate as part of our
    combined maritime forces operating in the Gulf and in the
    waters of the region. These are extraordinarily important. We
    see countries like Pakistan who step forward, provide
    significant resources in this, and provide leadership to these
    organizations. This allows us to make sure that we share the
    burden, we leverage the capabilities that everybody brings, and
    it adds to a much more collective approach to security in the
    region.
        Those are just four key programs of probably several others
    that could be discussed as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        That last point speaks a little bit to my logistical
    officer heart. When I look at a map of the CENTCOM region, I
    cannot help but wonder how your J-4 is able to transport
    people, equipment, and supplies throughout the theater
    especially in light of great power competition and the changing
    environment as it is. It becomes even more salient when I think
    about the potential for Iranians to close the Strait of Hormuz
    and restrict movement in the Arabian Gulf.
        Going back to the exercises you just mentioned, do you
    regularly exercise against this threat, and how confident are
    you that our logistical supply chain will not be gravely
    impacted, should conflict with the Iranians escalate in the
    region?
        General Votel. Certainly we do. I mean, one of the
    principal concerns we have is the mining of the straits and the
    impact that that would have. We do regular mining exercises and
    counter-mining exercises in the maritime environment here. We
    have a big exercise planned later this fall with a number of
    different countries that will come in. But this is certainly
    something that we are focused on.
        You are really hitting on the resiliency of our logistics
    networks in the region, and I do think that our command, our
    components out there, and our partners have really begun to
    address this. Certainly you are familiar with the northern
    distribution network that kind of goes up through the Central
    Asian states. That has been important for us. We continue to
    exercise that. It certainly does have some influence from
    Russia and that. It is a more difficult network to orchestrate,
    but it is not impossible. We do continue to move materials
    across that area.
        Across the Arabian Peninsula, we have what we refer to as
    the Trans-Arabian Network that links a variety of ports and
    cities and airports not only in the Arabian Gulf but down in
    the Gulf of Oman and over to the Red Sea. It gives us extreme
    resiliency in terms of how we can move material, men, forces
    into the region to respond to capabilities.
        We are very much focused on that. In fact, as we look at
    implementing the National Defense Strategy, what that might
    mean for CENTCOM, our focus on these logistic networks and our
    ability to have agreements, basing, and other things in here I
    think become even more important than they already have. We
    have tried to prioritize that and we will continue to do that
    as we move forward.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Vitally important, indeed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        First, Sergeant Major, thank you for your wonderful years
    of service and commitment to our great United States. We
    certainly appreciate that.
        Major Votel--Major Votel--many years ago, a number of your
    colleagues and your soldiers believed that you would become a
    great leader. I have to say, General, that they were correct
    all those years ago. Thank you so much for your wonderful
    service. I appreciate that.
        One of our most effective resources for building
    partnerships and capacity, while maintaining the pressure that
    we have on those violent extremist organizations, is done
    obviously through our special operators, and you are intimately
    familiar with that. How do you see the role of our special
    operators evolving across the CENTCOM AOR [Area of
    Responsibility] with regard to counterterrorism and capacity
    building, as well as the role more broadly nested within the
    National Defense Strategy? If you can talk a little bit about
    that role, how we are developing them.
        General Votel. Thank you.
        So, Senator, as you suggest, the special operations forces
    will continue to play a key role in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility as we confront violent extremism here. They have
    developed a level of expertise and proficiency in this that is
    certainly unmatched anywhere else. We will depend on that.
        I would add this, that one of the things I am most proud of
    as CENTCOM Commander and as a former SOCOM Commander, is how
    well our special operations forces and our conventional forces
    are integrated in the areas in which we operate. In many cases,
    it is almost indistinguishable. There is very little concern
    with who gets the credit or who is calling the shots here. It
    is an extraordinarily collaborative environment between all of
    our forces on the ground.
        This will be essential as we move forward. As you know, our
    special operations capabilities are limited. They are in great
    demand not just in CENTCOM but in other areas. That will be
    brought out as we fully implement the National Defense
    Strategy. Reliance on our conventional forces beginning to do
    some of these things and to develop the same methodologies that
    our special operators have developed over the course of many
    years will become very, very important as we move forward.
        Senator Ernst. General, as we are drawing down the number
    of troops that we have, whether it is Syria, Afghanistan,
    elsewhere, we do continue to maintain, train, advise, assist,
    and at times accompany missions. Do you see that continuing
    forward as a force multiplier with partners in that region?
    What more can we do in that area?
        General Votel. I do, Senator. I think this idea, by, with
    and through, and focused on training, advising, assisting,
    enabling our partners is a proven method for us, and I think it
    works extraordinarily well in this particular region. I do see
    that moving forward.
        Going forward, it will be important for us to maintain
    these relationships. The relationships that we depend on in
    this region are not those that can be put together in the
    course of a crisis. They have to be developed and they have to
    be nurtured over time. As Admiral McRaven often reminded us
    when he was the SOCOM Commander, you cannot surge trust in
    times of crisis. That has to be done in advance. I think the
    lifeblood of what we do out here will be the development of
    resilient, trustful relationships across our region.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. I appreciate the comments
    made by my colleagues as well about the State Partnership
    programs, the IMET programs, and so on. Those are very, very
    important in developing that level of trust.
        Just very briefly, because I am running out of time,
    General, of course, we do have some other big players in the
    region. We see Russia, of course, in Syria. We see China's
    investments in Pakistan. Where else do you assess that China
    and Russia are involved in that AOR, and what is the extent of
    that and what are their intentions from your perspective?
        General Votel. Thanks.
        Well, starting with Russia, certainly Russia has
    extraordinary interests in the Central Asian states, these
    being former Soviet republics. They maintain a long-term
    relationship there. This will always continue to be something
    that we will have to contend with in this particular region. We
    have seen in the past Russia working with countries like Egypt
    and others to potentially fill in voids there. We have to be
    mindful of those relationships as well.
        When you look at China, I think their motivations are
    principally driven by their economic objectives, again really
    driven by the One Belt One Road approach that they are taking
    to link trade routes back to China. I think the thing we have
    to continue to be watchful of is their developing relationships
    with other partners across the region, particularly in the
    maritime environment, in the countries that are along the
    waterways in the region, whether they are some of the Gulf
    states or whether they are some that are on the African
    continent, but which certainly give them very good access into
    the CENTCOM waters here. These are the areas I think that we
    will have to pay attention to in the future.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. They have a long game, and we do
    need to pay attention.
        My time has expired, but General, my best to you and your
    beautiful family. Thank you so very much.
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service and
    thanks for your very forthright and helpful answers today.
        I want to come back to a line of questioning that Senator
    Reed began about the $331 million that we are owed by the
    Saudis for aerial refueling. Have we made a demand to the
    Saudis that they pay that money?
        General Votel. Senator, we have presented all those bills
    to the Saudi-led coalition. They have them there, in receipt of
    them. They acknowledge that. We are working through to ensure
    that the products that we have given to them are--they
    understand what that is and they will be able to respond to us.
    They have given us every indication that they intend to meet
    the requirements for reimbursement that we have asked for.
        Senator Blumenthal. There is no question in your mind, is
    there, that that $331 million is owed to our country?
        General Votel. That is reimbursement for fuel that we have
    provided for them, and it is reimbursement for the flight hours
    associated with the aircraft that provided that fuel.
        Senator Blumenthal. When will they make that payment of
    reimbursement?
        General Votel. We expect that, in terms of the flying
    hours--bills have been presented to both Saudi Arabia and to
    the Emirates--for flying hours we will see responses as early
    as March and then likely for the fuel, by the May time frame.
    The ACSA requires that they provide reimbursement within 90
    days of notification.
        Senator Blumenthal. These are U.S. taxpayer dollars that
    they owe us, to put it most simply. Correct?
        General Votel. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. You mentioned--I may have misheard
    you--that there is the possibility of other instances where
    they or other countries owe us for similar kinds of expenses?
        General Votel. I do not think we have identified any other
    than that. I think the question was have we looked more broadly
    across the region to ensure that we do not have this problem
    with others, and we are in the process of doing that, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. You are reviewing----
        General Votel. Exactly to make sure that we have not had an
    oversight on this.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you found any indications that
    there have been other failures to repay?
        General Votel. I have not been notified of any thus far,
    Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would like to ask you about the
    special operators, and Senator Ernst asked you a number of
    questions. Can they operate as effectively from bases in Iraq
    as they can from where they are located now?
        General Votel. Senator, I think our special operators are
    extraordinarily capable. You know, in the beginning of our
    operations in both Iraq and Syria, there was a time when we did
    not have anybody on the ground, and yet we were able to have a
    relationship with our partners on the ground in Syria and we
    were able to do that from remote locations. We do that in other
    places. They are extraordinarily innovative, and so we will
    look at all options that we can use here.
        Senator Blumenthal. I guess my question, just to rephrase
    it, was not whether they can operate at all, but whether they
    can operate as effectively if they are based remotely. Are they
    not more effective if they are, in effect, in the combat area
    where they are supposed to operate?
        General Votel. Well, Senator, I would agree with you that
    it is always best to be with your partner and to be sharing
    everything that they are experiencing. I think that is optimum.
    But certainly I think we have demonstrated in a variety of
    different areas here that through a remote location, we can
    achieve the objectives that we are focused on.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, knowing how skilled and effective
    our special operators are, I have no doubt that they can
    operate from very remote locations. But I take it you would
    agree with me that the optimum situation, from the standpoint
    of military impact, would be to have them actually on the
    ground where they are supposed to do their work.
        General Votel. Yes, Senator, I would agree. I think it is
    always best to be with your partners.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thanks very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for your career and dedication and
    sacrifices. Sergeant Major, thank you for 38 years. Do not ever
    think it was ever taken for granted. It will never be
    forgotten. God bless you.
        General, in your AOR, you have all five threats, if you
    assume and believe that North Korea and Iran have a
    particularly good relationship, in across at least three
    domains, probably four domains. The question I have is relative
    to what China and Russia are doing longer term, particularly as
    we think about our future in Afghanistan, what China has done
    in the China-Pakistan economic corridor is basically
    handcuffing Pakistan. As you said earlier, Pakistan is a major
    player in determining the long-term future of Afghanistan. I
    would argue that India, as well as the Stans and other players
    in the region, are because of the Pashtun problem. But this
    debt problem is up to--I think it is $23 billion now. It could
    go to $62 billion, and there are $90 billion committed there in
    that effort. That is huge in terms of Pakistan.
        What I am concerned about is what Pakistan is also
    representing to China with regard to what China has done with
    their BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] across that area. You just
    mentioned the maritime interest with Gwadar and Hambantota.
    Hambantota is just south of Colombo in Sri Lanka, and they have
    already foreclosed on their partner there. It is a proprietary
    debt situation. They have done the same thing in Gwadar and 31
    other places around the coast of Africa. You just mentioned
    that.
        The question is, how are we as a military--I understand
    this is a diplomatic issue as well. How are you in the military
    dealing with China's effort to develop this string of pearls,
    particularly in the perspective that Russia with Vladiky and
    Tartus, with China in Djibouti, in this area as we consider our
    future in both Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan? How are we
    addressing that China and Russia threat relative to their
    permanent strategy in that area as it relates to our NDS?
        General Votel. Thanks, Senator. I think you highlighted a
    real challenge for us. I think as we look at great power
    competition, I think we have to recognize--and I believe we
    do--that the threat of Russia or that China poses to us is not
    limited to a particular geographic area but, in fact, it is
    global with these partners. As we look at our plans to compete
    with these partners to pursue our national interests, we have
    to look in all areas where we do this, to include the CENTCOM
    area of responsibility. There will be things that we can do in
    CENTCOM that can contribute to a broader campaign to compete
    with China and Russia. I think as we look at this, we have to
    look for opportunities where we can do that and how we
    integrate into a broader plan.
        More specifically though, what I would tell you--I think
    one of the most important things--and I mentioned this a little
    bit earlier--for us to do is to continue to be seen by our
    partners in the region as a valued partner. You know, as I look
    at the recent Iraqi elections, I have noted the presence of
    United States and coalition forces on the ground was not an
    election issue there. I think that is because of the manner in
    which we presented ourselves. It was the manner in which we
    conducted our activities there. I think preserving our
    relationships and continuing to be seen as reliable partners is
    perhaps one of the best defenses that we have against the
    influence of great power actors, particularly in the CENTCOM
    region. To the extent that we can continue to do that in the
    future, I think that will continue to be a key factor in
    CENTCOM as we move forward.
        Senator Perdue. Well, I think after 17 years, we have
    certainly earned that right, and I hope we will continue to do
    that relative to getting our allies to help us in that region.
    Specifically, you mentioned the parliament there in Iraq.
        I have a question about a specific garrison, the al-Tanf
    Garrison in southern Syria. We have had a request from Prime
    Minister Netanyahu to consider keeping a permanent presence
    there because of where it is strategically located on the
    supply route between Iran and Hezbollah. There is a 34-mile
    exclusion area there. What are the rules of engagement that we
    currently have with our garrison there, and is this currently
    being considered as a longer-term installation?
        General Votel. Well, this is a key part of the ongoing
    planning that we have going here. I will not comment publicly
    about what we might do there. But we certainly understand the
    impact of that.
        Our reason for being at al-Tanf is principally driven by
    our Defeat ISIS mission. That is what brought us there. That is
    what kept us there. We continue to confront it. It is located
    in an area where we do see routine traffic from ISIS as they
    move from the middle of the Euphrates Valley to the western
    part of the country. It is a very good operational location
    from that standpoint.
        It does have the derivative value of being along a
    principal line of access, line of communication that Iran and
    her proxies would like to exploit. While that is not our
    mission, we do recognize the indirect impact that we have with
    that.
        As we move forward, Senator, the disposition of al-Tanf
    will certainly be something that we will consider very, very
    carefully as we look at our overall withdrawal plans from
    Syria.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Votel, for being here. I appreciated the
    chance to meet with you last week.
        As you know, I have serious concerns about our support to
    the Saudi-led coalition and its military campaign in Yemen. At
    a hearing like this last year, I asked you if the United States
    Government knew where the coalition jets went and what targets
    they bombed after receiving fuel from U.S. tankers. You said
    that CENTCOM does not track that information.
        In late December, ``The New York Times'' reported that
    American military personnel assigned to the coalition's
    headquarters in Saudi Arabia readily had access to a, quote,
    database that detailed every air strike, warplane target,
    munitions used, and a brief description of the attack. End
    quote.
        Let me just ask you, does this database exist?
        General Votel. Today we do have a database that does have
    that information, and we have the ability to see that.
        Senator Warren. CENTCOM has access to this database?
        General Votel. We do have access to it today.
        Senator Warren. Okay. You know, this is troubling
    information because it suggests that we could determine
    retroactively if coalition warplanes that bombed civilians did
    so with American assistance. You know, there is clear evidence
    that we enable and support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
    Until recently, we refueled their jets. We provide military
    advice and intelligence support. We continue to sell them
    American-made bombs, bombs that public reports indicate kill
    Yemeni civilians. We provide their air force with sustainment
    and logistics support for their American-made fighters.
        I am asking you questions. I want to ask some questions
    about the details of the help we give the Saudis because they
    continue to conduct bombing runs. They continue to perpetuate
    one of the worst manmade humanitarian disasters in the modern
    era. During this civil war, more than 85,000 children under the
    age of 5 have starved to death, and tens of thousands of
    civilians have been killed. This military engagement is not
    authorized. We need to end U.S. support for this war now.
        Let me ask you about detainee abuse. Section 1274 of the
    Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to
    review whether members of the armed forces or coalition
    partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of
    detainees during operations in Yemen. DOD submitted this report
    to Congress last month and in the unclassified summary
    concluded that, quote, DOD has determined that DOD personnel
    have neither observed nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman,
    or degrading treatment of detainees in Yemen. End quote.
        Can you just say a brief word--I just have a little bit of
    time--about how DOD reached this conclusion?
        General Votel. We principally derived that based on
    discussions and reports from the people that we do have on the
    ground and what they have seen. We, obviously, take this very
    seriously, Senator, and our individuals that are in positions
    where they might see some of this are under the obligation to
    report this. I do routinely receive reports, many of them
    unsubstantiated, not just linked to Yemen but to other areas in
    which we operate where our people have received a report of
    abuse and we have a reporting mechanism for that. We do take
    that extraordinarily seriously.
        Senator Warren. Okay, but this report says neither observed
    nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman, or degrading
    treatment.
        The Associated Press, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
    International, and the United Nations all conducted their own
    investigations and came to a very different conclusion. They
    determined that our Emirati partners oversaw a network of
    detention centers that regularly engaged in torture and other
    abuse.
        Now, does DOD find these independent investigations
    credible?
        General Votel. Well, we certainly take all of these
    independent investigations seriously, Senator. But I think what
    I am saying to you is that we have no observations of our own
    from our people that have actually seen this.
        Senator Warren. Fair enough. Then let me ask it this way.
    Has DOD reached any conclusions about whether or not our
    Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when DOD
    personnel are not present?
        General Votel. I have not reached any kind of conclusion
    that they are conducting these activities. Certainly in our
    interaction with all of our partners, in this conflict and
    across the region, we continue to emphasize the obligations
    under the Law of Armed Conflict and the proper detention and
    treatment of detainees across the board.
        Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate your walking me through
    your assessment of these independent reports, but I remain very
    concerned about abuses in the region. Turning a blind eye is
    not acceptable, and I am going to keep asking questions on
    this. Thank you.
        General Votel. Senator, I am in receipt of your letter, and
    we will provide a response to you. Thank you.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your time and to your team who is
    with you. We appreciate your service and your time.
        I do have some questions I want to ask you this afternoon
    when we are in closed session dealing with the NDS and the
    competition with Russia and China and maintaining the right
    balance in the Middle East, but also being aware of the
    competition that is there. I think you are so right. As you
    have said in your comments, this is something we cannot lose
    sight of.
        Let me go to Syria. I will tell you that I think the
    administration really has sent some mixed messages about the
    terms of United States withdrawal from Syria and whether there
    is protection for the Syrian Kurds, whether there is the total
    defeat of ISIS or the establishment of a safe zone with Turkey,
    and what is a prerequisite.
        Senator Duckworth and I just recently sent a letter
    pertaining to the Kurds because Nashville has the largest
    Kurdish population in the United States. It is for this reason,
    in addition to their partnership in the global coalition to
    defeat ISIS, that protection of the Kurds is very important to
    me and to a lot of Tennesseans. I believe that any withdrawal
    from Syria must be conditions-based, and clearly there has to
    be a plan to protect the Kurds. Any plan to protect the Kurds
    must clearly outline our expectations of Turkey.
        I would like to just hear from you. The withdrawal from
    Syria--is it calendar-based? Is it conditions-based? If it is
    conditions-based, what are those conditions going to be there
    on the ground? What has been communicated to the Turks, and
    what has been communicated to the Kurds?
        General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to
    talking a little bit more about this with you in the closed
    session.
        But I would just say I do not consider this to be either
    time-based or conditions-based. The fact is the President made
    a decision and we are going to execute his orders here to
    withdraw forces from Syria. As we do that, we are going to do
    that in a very deliberate manner. We are going to do that in
    conjunction with our campaign plan, and we are going to
    consider things like protection of our partners, the Kurds. We
    are going to consider the concerns that Turkey has along their
    border. We are going to consider how we keep pressure on ISIS.
    All of that is taking place right now. I am not under pressure
    to be out by a specific date, and I have not had any specific
    conditions put upon me. I look at this as an additional task
    within the confines of the current campaign plan that we are
    operating, and that is how we are approaching it.
        Senator Blackburn. In the January 16th attack, we lost a
    chief warrant officer, Jonathan Farmer, who was a Fort Campbell
    soldier. I will tell you in Montgomery County, Tennessee and
    Clarksville, Fort Campbell, it was noted with great sorrow by
    so many that are there at the post.
        One of the questions that comes up from Tennesseans who are
    involved in defense of our Nation is did we underestimate the
    power and the threat of ISIS in Syria.
        General Votel. Senator, I do not think we do. I think those
    of us who have had the opportunity to be involved in this for a
    long time develop a respect for our enemies. We do not agree
    with the things that they are doing, but we certainly have to
    respect the capabilities that they bring. We have always
    recognized that ISIS is a savvy organization and they will look
    for ways to harm us, to hurt us in the conduct of our normal
    operations or certainly in the conduct of operations that we
    have coming up as we get ready to depart Syria. I do not think
    we underestimate their capabilities to exact a toll against us.
        Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that.
        I have got a couple of questions on Yemen. I will save
    those for the afternoon. I yield back my time.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Chair, am I to interpret after 6 years on the Committee
    anything negative from the fact that I have been moved to a
    chair without my own microphone?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Kaine. General Votel, thank you for your great
    service. You are a wonderful public servant, and we are going
    to miss you on the Committee.
        I want to ask you about an interview that President Trump
    gave on Face the Nation on February 3rd, a couple of comments
    that he made dealing with Iran. He indicated one of the reasons
    I want to keep it--``it'' referring to an airbase in Iran--is
    because I want to be looking a little bit--I am sorry--an
    airbase in Iraq--is because I want to be looking a little bit
    at Iran because Iran is a real problem. He was asked a question
    by Margaret Brennan. He said, no, because I want to be able to
    watch Iran.
        I am on the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations
    Committee, and I have not had a briefing either in open or
    classified in either committee during my time in the Senate
    suggesting that we are currently in Iraq primarily to watch
    Iran. My understanding is that we are in Iraq right now to help
    Iraq defeat ISIS. Is that your understanding as well?
        General Votel. That is exactly my understanding, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. As far as you know, there is not a change in
    the definition of the mission, at least as far as the Pentagon
    is concerned?
        General Votel. I have no additional tasks that have been
    given to me with regard to that.
        Senator Kaine. If the United States were to change its
    definition of the mission in Iraq to be a mission about
    watching Iran, would it not be pretty important to have Iraq
    agree that that would be the focus of the mission if we were to
    be having troops in their country to carry out such a mission?
        General Votel. Senator, we are in Iraq at the invitation of
    the government. So, yes, I agree.
        Senator Kaine. We were invited in in the summer of 2014 to
    help them defeat ISIS. Correct?
        General Votel. That is right, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I would like to put into the
    record an article from the ``New York Times'' this morning,
    ``Trump's Plan for United States Forces in Iraq Met with
    Unified Rejection in Baghdad.'' General Votel mentioned that
    one of the great things about the recent elections in Iraq was
    United States presence was not a political issue, but the
    recent statements of the President, quote, the problem for Mr.
    Trump was that the unity was a collective rejection of his
    proposal and added momentum to propose legislation that could
    hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. I would
    like to put this in the record.
        Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        trump's plan for united states forces in iraq met with unified
                              rejection in baghdad
        President Trump's unexpected announcement that he wanted American
    troops in Iraq to stay there to ``watch Iran'' achieved a previously
    unattainable goal on Monday: unity in the Iraqi political
    establishment.
        The problem for Mr. Trump was that the unity was a collective
    rejection of his proposal, and added momentum to proposed legislation
    that could hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. The
    measure, which is now being drafted, would limit American troop
    movements and activities in Iraq.
        Mr. Trump's remarks, made in an interview that aired Sunday on
    CBS's ``Face the Nation,'' reverberated through Iraq late Sunday and
    were rejected by all corners of the government, even by some of the
    United States' staunchest allies, including President Barham Salih, a
    Kurd.
        ``Don't overburden Iraq with your own issues,'' said Mr. Salih, who
    was speaking Monday in Baghdad at the Al Rafidain Forum, which brings
    to get her Iraqis, regional figures and international experts to
    discuss policy challenges.
        ``The U.S. is a major power, but do not pursue your own policy
    priorities, we live here,'' Mr. Salih said, addressing his comments to
    the American administration.
        Mr. Salih's comments were mild compared with those from Iraqi
    Parliament members and political leaders who have long felt that the
    United States has been disrespectful of Iraq's sovereignty.
        On Monday, some called on Parliament to act quickly to push out the
    Americans. One of the more extreme statements came from the military
    spokesman for the Hezbollah Brigades, an Iraqi armed group that now has
    a political arm (and which is not directly connected to Lebanon's
    Hezbollah), who said that Mr. Trump's comments made the ``American
    forces legitimate targets for the Iraqi resistance.'' Over all, the
    incident lays bare that the American presence in Iraq is on thin ice
    and that United States military and political leaders have little room
    to maneuver.
        American diplomats and military officials in Washington and in
    Baghdad scrambled on Monday to contain the political fallout in Iraq
    from Mr. Trump's assertion that American troops would remain there to
    monitor any nefarious activities by neighboring Iran.
        One saving grace that might have helped mitigate the Iraqi outrage,
    one American official said, was that the Iraqi Parliament was not in
    session, perhaps sparing Washington even greater fury.
        ``Our troops are in Iraq to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS,'' a
    senior administration official said on Monday, in a conference call
    with reporters ahead of a meeting this week in Washington with
    representatives of the nearly 80 countries that belong to the coalition
    fighting the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and several other countries
    where the organization has offshoots.
        Mr. Trump seemed to have stepped on a diplomatic hornet's nest
    inadvertently, American diplomats and military experts said, when he
    discussed the nature of the sprawling Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq,
    which he visited in late December and referred to on Sunday, and where
    American troops operate with Iraqi permission. He suggested Americans
    could use the base to carry out surveillance of Iran.
        ``We have a base in Iraq and the base is a fantastic edifice,'' Mr.
    Trump said in the CBS interview. ``I was there recently, and I couldn't
    believe the money that was spent on these massive runways.''
        American military and intelligence officials expressed bafflement
    at Mr. Trump's claim that United States forces at Al Asad, or at most
    any other Iraqi base, could take a leading role in monitoring Iran's
    nuclear program or other suspicious activities.
        Such intelligence collection is typically conducted by a
    combination of American spy satellites, electronic intercepts collected
    by the National Security Agency and possibly covert operations by
    C.I.A. spies.
        Mr. Trump's visit to Al Asad in December provoked similar anger
    from Iraqi politicians, some of whom called it an arrogant affront that
    recalled American behavior dating back to the 2003 invasion and what
    followed: the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; incidents with civilian
    casualties; and widespread sectarian violence.
        The decision that upset the broadest spectrum of Iraqis was the
    departure of American troops from the country once the status of forces
    agreement, which set the terms for United States forces in Iraq,
    expired in 2011. Although American troops had little choice but to
    leave the country after the expiration--and though Iraq's leaders
    played a large role in their exit--many Iraqis now describe the
    departure as an abandonment and part of what led to the growth of the
    Islamic State and continued fighting on Iraqi soil.
        ``It will not be forgotten what happened after the American
    withdrawal ,'' said Jowad al-Musawi, a member of Parliament from the
    bloc allied with Moktada al-Sadr, a Shiite leader. ``It will not be
    forgotten that America would at any moment leave you alone to confront
    war or terrorism.''
        With the Islamic State's territory in Iraq and Syria dwindling to
    just a sliver, many Iraqis are not sure what American forces are doing
    and where they are now based. They are fearful that Iraq will become
    the turf for a conflict between the United States and Iran, and they
    recognize that many Iraqis rely on Iran, which in recent years has been
    an ally, supplying some of southern Iraq's electricity and supporting
    Iraq when the Islamic State invaded in 2014.
        ``We strongly reject having Iraq be a place for settling regional
    or international scores or a place to provoke neighboring states,''
    said a Twitter statement from Ammar al-Hakim, a Shiite leader in
    Parliament and part of a revered religious family in Iraq.
        ``Making our land into a place to attack neighboring states is a
    threat to our national interests and our Iraqi security,'' he added.
    ``Iraq will not allow this.''
        There are about 5,200 American troops in Iraq, training and
    advising Iraqi troops and helping them carry out counterterrorism
    missions inside the country. But the United States military has a fluid
    number of soldiers and military contractors in the country, and for
    security reasons it does not give exact numbers or acknowledge all the
    locations where those forces are stationed.
        The United States has quietly been negotiating with Iraq for weeks
    to allow American Special Forces and support troops now operating in
    Syria to shift to bases in Iraq and strike the Islamic State from
    there.
        In just the last two weeks, an unverified incident has worsened
    fears of those who would rather not see the American military return to
    Iraq: a Kurdish politician announced he had just come back from a trip
    with an American colonel to see three bases previously used by American
    troops near the Iranian border and that the plan was for troops to
    return to them.
        The Iraqi authorities have not confirmed the politician's story.
    But those close to the Iranians were alarmed and concluded that either
    it was a form of psychological warfare, designed to unnerve Iran, or
    that the Americans really were coming back with the goal of using Iraq
    as a base for monitoring or even attacking Iran.
        Some senior American officers and diplomats expressed fears on
    Monday that Mr. Trump's comments could undercut the delicate
    negotiations in Iraq and weaken the United States' ability to respond
    to the Islamic State's remnants in Syria and Iraq, where they remain a
    dangerous presence--although far smaller and less lethal than in the
    past.
        But other analysts, both Iraqi and Western, said that the often
    tumultuous relationship--between Baghdad and Washington would survive
    this upset.
        ``The Iraqis know that ISIS will take years to defeat, so they also
    know the United States-Iraq military partnership will probably outlast
    this United States presidency,'' said Michael Knights, a senior fellow
    at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
        Wathiq al-Hashimi, head of the Iraqi Strategic Studies Group, a
    think tank in Baghdad, noted that despite all the heated statements,
    ``my analysis is that this will not escalate into a confrontation,'' he
    said.
        ``Iran will not risk hitting the American forces and America does
    not want to hit Iran because both sides understand that Iraq's role is
    to calm the situation and bridge relations,'' between the United States
    and Iran, Mr. al-Hashimi added.

        Senator Kaine. Second, General Votel, President Trump said
    as follows: I am going to trust the intelligence that I am
    putting there, but I will say this. My intelligence people, if
    they said, in fact, Iran is a wonderful kindergarten, I
    disagree with them 100 percent.
        Are you aware of a single United States intelligence
    official of any position who has told President Trump that Iran
    is a kindergarten?
        General Votel. No, Senator, I am not aware of that.
        Senator Kaine. Nor am I. I have been, again, on this
    Committee and the Foreign Relations. Over the last years, we
    have heard open and classified testimony again and again and
    again about dangers that Iran poses. We have not heard a single
    intelligence official say Iran is a kindergarten. We have had
    General Dunford and Secretary Mattis before us saying that the
    Iran nuclear deal was in America's national interests and that
    Iran was complying with the deal. The House heard testimony in
    open session last week from a variety of intelligence officials
    saying that Iran was still complying with the nuclear deal that
    the United States unilaterally withdrew from.
        I worry--and I am not asking you this question--that the
    President hears testimony like that and equates it with
    officials saying Iran is like a kindergarten, which I find
    completely illogical.
        Third, President Trump said this. When I came in as
    President of the United States, my first year, I went to the
    Pentagon 2 weeks after I came in, a short time after, because I
    wanted to know what is going on with Iran. We were in so many
    locations in the Middle East in huge difficulty. Every single
    one of them was caused by the number one terrorist nation in
    the world, which is Iran.
        We did not go into Afghanistan with United States military
    forces in 2001 because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
        General Votel. No, Senator, we did not.
        Senator Kaine. We did not go into in Iraq in March of 2002
    because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
        General Votel. We did not, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. We did not go into Iraq in August of 2014
    because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
        General Votel. We did not, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. In terms of where our troops are positioned
    in the Middle East overwhelming now, there are some in Syria
    also fighting ISIS, not Iran. The places where United States
    troops are in your AOR--we are not there because of Iran.
        When the President says this, we are in the Middle East
    because of Iran, it causes me great concern. Together with
    other statements made by this President, other members of the
    administration, I worry that the President is thinking about
    military action against Iran is something that would be a good
    idea.
        Let me just put this on the record. In the current state of
    affairs, I think it would be a horrible idea. I think it would
    be a horrible idea. In classified, I am going to ask you a few
    questions about, what planning has been done and what could
    potentially be a legal rationale for such a thing. But to think
    that we are in the Middle East because of Iran when in these
    three areas we are clearly not there because of Iran causes me
    grave concern.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator McSally?
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you, General Votel. Thanks to you for your
    service and your sacrifice over the years.
        A very extensive testimony on a lot of issues. As someone,
    like many of you and those with you today, who has been to your
    region many times, six deployments in my time in uniform, it is
    a very complex region, as you have talked about. I appreciate
    in your testimony with the National Defense Strategy bringing
    us back home as to why are we there and what are our vital
    national interests in the region because our longer-term
    threats per the NDS are more of the great state competition and
    potential conflict.
        But many of us--many of you--we have spent our entire
    military careers deploying to the Middle East. This is all we
    know. Right? This is all we know, is dealing with Desert Storm
    and Northern Watch and Southern Watch and then OEF [Operation
    Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]. We have
    invested so much into this, as you know, a lot of blood and
    treasure, a lot of sacrifice.
        It is part of our nature I think to just give us a little
    more time, just give us a little more resources and we can fix
    the situation. I am particularly thinking about Afghanistan. It
    is just our nature--right--that we want to just--we are almost
    there. We are almost going to have this where we want it to be.
        But I think it is very important--and I appreciate that the
    administration and as you testified today--we kind of come back
    to what are we doing there. What are our vital national
    interests in the Middle East? There has been tremendous drain
    on our military over the last 30 years in that region, and we
    got to get back to the core of we have to make sure there is no
    safe haven for jihadists and terrorists that are going to kill
    Americans, and we have got to make sure that there is not a
    hostile power in the region. That is in your testimony. Right?
        That is a generational fight against terrorism. It started
    before us. It is going to continue on. We have got to make sure
    there is no safe haven in any of these countries. You squeeze
    them in one place, they will go to another place. We will find
    them in other regions, as you know. Then we want to make sure
    there is not a hostile power, which is Iran right now.
        I just want to bring it kind of back home. I think it is
    hard for us, those who serve, because we are like what are we
    doing there. We want to make sure--we got to build more
    schools. I think there have been a lot of mistakes over the
    years. We got to build more schools in America. We do not
    necessarily need to bring some of these countries to be
    thriving 21st century democracies. We may hope that happens for
    them, but that is not our vital national interest. It is to
    keep America safe.
        As we are thinking of that and as you have testified about
    that, when you look at Afghanistan and when you look at still
    the safe haven they have in Pakistan--last time I was there, 3
    years ago, there were 12 different terrorist organizations
    there. Our military's hands were tied. They were not able to go
    after a lot of the terrorist organizations. How can we now,
    moving forward with everything you have talked about today, in
    accordance with the National Defense Strategy, make sure that
    we achieve that mission in Afghanistan? What does that look
    like to keep America safe and focusing on our drawdown there
    while we still make sure that we keep America safe and it is
    not a safe haven for terrorism?
        General Votel. Senator, thank you very much.
        I think when I look at what winning or what prevailing in
    Afghanistan looks like, it looks like two things to me. It
    looks like a negotiated settlement, and it looks like
    safeguarding our national interests. I think as you have very
    clearly said here, we have to stay focused on those particular
    things. All our efforts at this point need to be focused on
    those particular objectives and passed to those objectives. I
    think that is certainly my approach on this, and I believe it
    is the approach of General Miller, our commander on the ground
    as well, as we try to support this.
        I think the strategy that we have in place is the right one
    focused on this. We have got to stay focused on that. I think
    we will meet our requirements if we can get a negotiated
    settlement that addresses the instability of that region, and
    we can continue to safeguard our national interests.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
        Then on to Iran, again this is the largest state sponsor of
    terror. This is the one that has malign activity in the region,
    great destabilization, killing of American troops. What is the
    focus there as we are keeping our eye on the ball of this
    region and the National Defense Strategy? Because this is the
    biggest threat. You talked a lot about working with
    partnerships, but what else can we do and what else are you
    doing in order to counter that threat?
        General Votel. Certainly I think one of the most important
    things we do is continue to build partnerships and begin to
    build interoperability across the region. You know, whether we
    look at integrated air and missile defense to ensure that we
    can address the increasing ballistic missile capability that is
    coming out of Iran, that is an important aspect that we do or
    whether we address maritime security issues that allow not just
    the United States but the countries of the region to better
    patrol their own waters and prevent the movement of illicit
    goods and weapons and other things through there, I think these
    are the types of things that we can do. They are very
    attainable to us as we move forward to not only optimize the
    capabilities that we remain in place, but more importantly make
    sure that our partners are bearing the burden and taking
    responsibility for their own security as well.
        Senator McSally. Exactly. Thanks.
        I am out of time. I want to say I am grateful for Senator
    Peters' statements about the A-10 warthog as well. I do not
    think we should be using fifth generation fighters to chase
    around jihadists on Mopeds. We got to make sure that we have
    the right tools for that mission while we are using our next
    generation to deal with the larger threats that are out there.
    I found a new wingman here for fighting for the A-10.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it. I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        We will recess the meeting till we get back together at
    2:15. That is going to be in the Visitor Center, room 217.
    Thank you very much for a long meeting and for your answers. We
    will reconvene at 2:15 in the Visitor Center, and we will
    recess this meeting. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                       israel move from eucom to centcom
        1. Senator Cotton. General Votel, what are the possible benefits
    and challenges with a move of Israel from EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR?
        General Votel. Were the Department to review moving Israel from
    EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR, we would DOD need to assess the effect on:
    existing United States-Israel security cooperation architecture;
    adequacy of resources and posture to assist in Israel in Israel
    defense; and opportunities as well challenges in DOD support to
    diplomacy.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                  special federal aviation regulations (sfars)
        2. Senator Rounds. General Votel, has the DOD studied how SFARs
    might be restricting the DOD's ability to acquire qualified aviation
    support services in the CENTCOM AOR?
        General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

        3. Senator Rounds. General Votel, how do SFAR restrictions affect
    competition for aviation support services contracts within the CENTCOM
    AOR?
        General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

        4. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the inability of foreign
    pilots and air crews to obtain security clearances increase the
    operational risk of sensitive DOD missions?
        General Votel. No, our command and control structure has
    flexibility which allows us to compartmentalize sensitive information
    when joint flight operations are required.

        5. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the DOD have a central point
    of contact to engage with the FAA on the SFAR issue?
        General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

        6. Senator Rounds. General Votel, what is the current process for
    applying a DOD ``state use'' designation to aircraft operated by
    commercial U.S. air carriers and would applying ``state use''
    designations more frequently be more advantageous than relying on
    foreign air carriers?
        General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                     yemen
        7. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, exactly what types of support
    are we providing to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, how would you characterize the
    focus of United States intelligence support and military advice? Would
    you characterize that support as defensive in nature?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, if the United States ceased
    providing intelligence support and military advice to the Saudi-led
    coalition, how do you assess that this might affect the Saudi-led
    campaign in Yemen? How do you assess that this would impact Saudi and
    Emirati cooperation against terrorist threats more broadly?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, to what extent have the Saudi
    and Emiratis assisted us against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
    ISIS in Yemen up until this point? To what extent have the Emiratis
    assisted us in Afghanistan? Can you update us on overall progress?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
               effect of operations in the area of responsibility
        11. Senator Hirono. General Votel, you testified before the SASC in
    2018 regarding the situation in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and
    stated that ``Our success over the last year is largely due to the
    unyielding support of our allies, tremendous cooperation with our
    interagency partners, provision of additional authorities, and the
    continued faith of the American people in our military. However,
    despite the great strides we have made, there is much work left to
    do.'' At that time, you identified regional challenges to include:
    terrorism, violent conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile threats,
    humanitarian crisis, and radical violent ideologies. Where do you feel
    the U.S. stands today with regards to those ``strides'' and the
    remaining work that you mentioned in your 2018 testimony?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
                          removal of troops from syria
        12. Senator Hirono. General Votel, on December 18, 2018, President
    Trump ordered the withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from Syria,
    seemingly marking the end of the United States campaign aimed at
    vanquishing the Islamic State (ISIS). This decision has received
    criticism from both parties as well as from many U.S. Military leaders.
    Former Defense Secretary Mattis and other top national security
    officials argued that a withdrawal would, essentially, surrender
    Western influence in Syria to Russia and Iran who are the chief
    benefactors of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. What is your
    assessment of the impact of this decision both currently and in the
    future?
        General Votel. United States military forces in Syria are working
    by, with, and through our coalition and Syrian Democratic Force
    partners to defeat ISIS. The withdrawal of United States Forces does
    not change that mission. We will continue to work with allies and
    partners to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS's so-called physical
    caliphate; however, the decision does create difficulties in
    maintaining our relationship in its current form with the Coalition.
    President Bashar-al Assad will remain in power with the support of
    Russia and Iran but has insufficient forces to secure Syrian territory
    once held by ISIS. As we execute the safe and professional withdrawal
    of United States military forces from Northeast Syria, a multi-lateral
    whole-of-government approach supporting stabilization efforts in
    Northeast Syria will help prevent an ISIS resurgence. We are cognizant
    that military efforts alone are insufficient to enable stabilization,
    but the military does have unique capabilities that can be brought to
    bear during stabilization. Only through the United Nations Security
    Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 process can a political settlement to
    the Syrian Civil War be accomplished, resulting in a Syrian Government
    that is representative of the will of the Syrian people and can address
    the underlying issues that allowed ISIS to rise.

        13. Senator Hirono. General Votel, since President Trump's
    withdrawal announcement, what actions have the Syrian regime, Russian,
    and Iranian-backed forces taken?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        14. Senator Hirono. General Votel, what are the strategic
    implications of these moves regarding the stability of Syria and the
    larger Middle East?
        General Votel. Syria is a microcosm of the region where several
    state and non-state actors, with different objectives, are vying for
    access and influence to achieve their desired end states. Without a
    sustained effort put behind United Nations Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCR) 2254, there will not be a political resolution to the Syrian
    Civil War and the establishment of a government representative of the
    will of the Syrian people that is able to address the underlying issues
    leading to the rise of violent extremist organizations. Lack of
    security and stability in Syria will result in a safe haven for Violent
    Extremist Organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda, and the continued
    humanitarian crisis that will further impact Syria's neighbors as
    refugees continue to surge across uncontrolled borders, thereby
    stressing their limited resources. Syria as a safe haven for Violent
    Extremist Organizations drives a deeper need for continued support to
    the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure security and stability of Iraq.

        15. Senator Hirono. General Votel, with the President's stated
    objectives of permanently destroying ISIS, ensuring our Kurdish allies
    are protected and containing Iran, what would be an appropriate
    timeline for withdrawal of United States troops from Syria?
        General Votel. The withdrawal of United States Forces must be
    conditions based. We will need to continue providing training and
    advice to our local counterterrorism partners, including the Syrian
    Defense Force/Syrian Arab Coalition (SDF/SAC), as they deal with the
    remnants of ISIS that have organized into smaller cells, as the SDF/SAC
    transitions from the conventional fight to defeat ISIS to one of
    Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism. There is also the requirement
    for a negotiated policy with Turkey to help prevent North Eastern Syria
    from becoming an ISIS safe haven.
                    framework for agreement with the taliban
        16. Senator Hirono. General Votel, in your opinion, has the proper
    groundwork for withdrawal of United States Forces been established in
    Afghanistan to ensure that the gains that have been made in the past 17
    years will not be put in jeopardy?
        General Votel. The Department of State has the lead for
    negotiations with the Taliban. The Department of Defense continues to
    support the United States Special Representative for Afghan
    Reconciliation. USCENTCOM also continues to conduct prudent planning to
    address all eventualities in Afghanistan. That being said, United
    States Force presence remains conditions-based, and no force
    withdrawals will occur until the Government of Afghanistan and the
    Taliban have reconciled and agreed to measurable steps to govern and
    provide security for the Afghan people and are committed to preventing
    attacks against the United States Homeland.
                     effects of the great power competitors
        17. Senator Hirono. General Votel, we continue to hear of the
    resurgence of the great power competition in your area of
    responsibility. Specifically, with China developing long-term, steady
    economic growth and increased military posture and Russia continuing to
    cultivate its relationship with the regime of Syrian President Bashar
    Assad. What are the risks that increased Russian and Chinese investment
    and influence have in your area of responsibility, both in the short-
    and long-term?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]

        18. Senator Hirono. General Votel, last year, President Trump
    suspended nearly $3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan for
    failing to rein in terrorist groups there. As a result, Pakistan has
    turned to China to bolster their Navy and improve local Pakistani
    infrastructure through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
    valued at $62 billion. Has the decision to withdraw United States
    assistance impacted your operations in the region? If so, how?
        General Votel. No, the withdrawal of security assistance money has
    not impacted USCENTCOM's operations in the region.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                                use of 2002 aumf
        19. Senator Kaine. During your testimony you said that United
    States Forces are in Iraq at the ``invitation of the Government of
    Iraq.'' Is the Administration relying upon the 2002 AUMF--which was a
    war declaration against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein--as the sole
    legal authority for any United States Military operations in Iraq or
    elsewhere in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility?
        General Votel. No. The authority for our presence in Iraq and our
    continued military operations against ISIS remains unchanged from that
    as articulated by the previous and current Administration. As we are
    conducting military activities in Iraq with the consent and at the
    invitation of the Government of Iraq and as a matter of domestic law,
    pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs (among other authorities).
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                                 isis in syria
        20. Senator Jones. Previously, you've stated ``given the many
    forces driving change and uncertainty in the region, United States
    commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important now
    than ever. Recent experience has shown that a precipitous withdrawal of
    support, before conditions for stabilization have been set, can lead to
    catastrophic results.'' Do you believe we have definitively defeated
    ISIS in Syria, and how do we go about ensuring that victory over ISIS
    is enduring?
        General Votel. The territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria is a
    significant milestone in the global effort to defeat ISIS, but it does
    not represent the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.
    In Syria, this cannot be achieved unless the underlying conditions that
    allowed ISIS to rise in the first place are addressed and resolved. The
    mechanism to address those issues is United Nations Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. This process was designed to bring about a
    political settlement to the Syrian Civil War and establish a government
    that is representative of the will of the Syrian people. Supporting
    local efforts, through a Global Coalition, that sustain the military
    gains and promote regional security and stability is an approach to
    ensuring victory over ISIS is enduring. A sustained relationship with
    Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and continuing to build up the capacity
    of the Iraqi Security Forces are two ways we can militarily support the
    enduring defeat of ISIS regionally. This cannot be overstated; we must
    address the disposition and de-radicalization of the thousands of ISIS
    fighters in the custody of the SDF and the tens of thousands of
    unrepentant ISIS family members segregated in camps. This massive at-
    risk population could easily become the core of a resurgent ISIS or
    other violent extremist organization with global reach. Dealing with
    this industrial-scale issue requires a non-military led interagency
    approach and extensive participation by countries of origin.
                           negotiations with taliban
        21. Senator Jones. Last week, Special Representative for
    Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced an agreement in
    principle with the Taliban on 2 major points; 1) the Taliban promises
    Afghanistan's territory will not be used by international terrorist
    groups, and 2) the United States agrees to withdraw its forces. How do
    you think the Taliban can go about fulfilling this agreement?
        General Votel. [Deleted.]
                           negotiations with taliban
        22. Senator Jones. Do you believe the United States should wait for
    successful negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban
    before withdrawing?
        General Votel. Our primary focus of operations in Afghanistan is to
    support Ambassador Khalizaid's negotiation efforts for a Peace
    Settlement. Therefore, any force withdrawal should support that
    process. The primary objective of the South Asia Strategy is to seek a
    political settlement to the Afghanistan War. The negotiations are in
    the nascent stage of framework development and it is my judgement that
    the U.S. should allow the negotiations to mature before a large-scale
    withdrawal.
                             u.s. weapons tracking
        23. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, there was a report that
    American-made weapons have made their way into the hands of al Qaeda-
    linked fighters and Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen. It's my
    understanding that legitimate purchasers of United States weapons must
    seek U.S. permission before transferring those weapons to third
    parties. The news report says that there is a Defense Department
    investigation into the issue. When and how did the Defense Department
    learn about this situation and what can you tell us about the status of
    the investigation?
        General Votel. We have seen the news report in question, and we
    take allegations of unauthorized transfers of U.S.-origin military
    equipment seriously. My understanding is that the Department of State
    is leading an investigation to determine whether United States weapons
    or other defense articles have been transferred to unauthorized end
    users in Yemen and has reached out to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in
    order to obtain more information regarding these allegations. As such,
    USCENTCOM stands ready to assist, but I would refer you to the State
    Department for the status of their inquiries into the validity of the
    news report's claims.
                               detainees in syria
        24. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, it was reported that the
    number of foreign terrorist fighters detained by the Syrian Defense
    Force is now more than 800, and that on February 4 the State Department
    called on other nations to repatriate and prosecute their citizens. So
    far, very few countries have been willing to do so. What is the plan
    for these detainees after the U.S. withdraws, in the event their home
    countries refuse to take them back?
        General Votel. We continue working to support the Department of
    State is lead effort on this difficult challenge. The key to the long
    term stability of the region is ensuring these fighters do not get
    unexpectedly released only to return to the battlefield in Iraq or
    Syria or slip back into their home countries. We are working closely
    with the Syrian Democratic Forces to support their efforts to have
    nations repatriate and prosecute their citizens. While we continue to
    face challenges there has been some progress but more is needed. This
    situation would be further complicated if a military incursion by
    Turkey occurred.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m. in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
    Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, McSally, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King,
    Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS

        Senator Rounds. The Committee will come to order.
        Good morning. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, he has
    indicated that he wants to start these on time, and asked if we
    would begin with opening statements. He should be here shortly.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on United
    States Africa Command and Southern Command. I welcome our
    witnesses and thank them for their service: General Thomas
    Waldhauser, Commander, United States Africa Command; Admiral
    Craig Faller, Commander of United States Southern Command.
        General Waldhauser, this is likely your last hearing before
    this Committee. I want to thank you for your nearly 43 years of
    dedicated service to this Nation.
        It's also fitting to note that 12 years ago yesterday,
    February 6th, 2007, President George W. Bush directed the
    creation of United States Africa Command. It was the right
    decision, and AFRICOM continues to play a vital role in the
    defense of our Nation.
        This Committee's top priority is to ensure the effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which
    identifies competition with China and Russia as the central
    challenge to United States prosperity and security. Both
    AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM should be viewed as key fronts in our
    global campaign to compete with China and Russia. In both of
    your areas of responsibility, China and Russia are increasingly
    active, using economic and military means to expand their
    influence and challenge United States interests.
        While, on behalf of the Chairman, we agree with the need to
    prioritize our efforts against China and Russia, we cannot take
    pressure off of terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda.
    Despite operational setbacks, these groups continue to control
    territory in Africa and still pose a very real threat to United
    States interests and our partners.
        Lastly, while the challenges in your areas of
    responsibility are on the rise, both of your commands have long
    suffered from resource shortfalls. We look forward to you to
    explain how these shortfalls increase risk to your forces and
    impact your ability to execute the National Defense Strategy.
        Want to remind our Members that Admiral Faller and General
    Waldhauser will be available at SVC-217, immediately following
    the open hearing that we're in today, to discuss any classified
    matters that may come up today.
        With that, Ranking Member.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
        Let me join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing
    today to provide an update on our security situation and the
    U.S. military activities in your respected areas of
    responsibility. Both of you are leading commands during very
    challenging times, and we thank you for your continued service.
    Please also extend our gratitude to the men and women under
    your command for their outstanding service and dedication. Let
    me join Senator Rounds, General Waldhauser, in thanking you for
    your distinguished service to the Nation in the Marine Corps.
        I'm very concerned about the growing Chinese and Russian
    influence in both Latin America and Africa. China is leveraging
    its economic might and influence to gain access to ports and
    loaning large sums of money for infrastructure projects, many
    of which are not economically viable and will leave these
    countries beholden to Beijing. Russia is engaging in massive
    disinformation campaigns to undermine United States influence
    and propping up authoritarian regimes in both regions. Both of
    you are tasked to counter Russia and Chinese influence with
    limited funds, equipment, and people, as many of the
    Department's resources are being diverted to the INDOPACOM and
    EUCOM AORs [Areas of Responsbility]. I would like to hear how
    this implementation of the National Defense Strategy has
    affected the resources that you have to counter Russian and
    Chinese influence in these critical regions, as well as any
    additional resources you might need for this vital task.
        In Africa, as in South and Central America, we are working
    with local and international partners to advance our shared
    security goals. However, the complex and often interlocking
    challenges to stability will not be solved by military means
    alone. Indeed, many significant issues, including rapid
    population growth, demographic changes, famine, and migration,
    are long term and multidimensional in nature and require whole-
    of-government policies that take an equally long-term view of
    investment and engagement in the region.
        In December, the administration announced a new United
    States strategy for Africa that highlighted the importance of
    the region to the United States economic interests and the
    growing competition with China and Russia throughout the
    continent. However, the administration has repeatedly submitted
    budgets that slash critical aid dollars and reduced engagement
    across the AOR. General Waldhauser, I hope you will discuss the
    importance of long-term engagement in Africa and the types of
    investment we should be prioritizing to best position ourselves
    for strategic competition in your AOR.
        Admiral Faller, you also have a difficult problem set.
    Narcotrafficking has flooded central and South America with
    illicit funds that exacerbate rampant corruption, especially
    among police forces. Poor economic conditions and a lack of
    citizen security has led to a humanitarian crisis that forces
    families to flee to look for better living conditions.
    Authoritarian governments propped up with Russian and Chinese
    support are undermining democratic values and destabilizing the
    region.
        Despite all of these problems, I do want to note that there
    are some bright spots. We have several capable partners in the
    region, such as Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, who are willing
    to work with us and are now net exporters of peace and
    security.
        On a final note, Venezuela is an unfolding crisis. I am
    hopeful that there will be a peaceful and democratic transition
    in Venezuela led by the Venezuelan people and supported by the
    international community. It has been terrible to watch the
    starvation of the Venezuelan people and the destruction of the
    Venezuelan economy by Maduro and his regime. Current efforts to
    support interim President Juan Guaido are being led by the
    State Department and Treasury. Congress must be consulted if
    there is any military planning action beyond the current
    planning for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and embassy
    personnel. I know the events on the ground are changing day by
    day, and it is impossible to tell what event or set of events
    will trigger Maduro's departure. I'd like to hear any updates
    you might have on what you expect in the weeks to come.
        Again, thank you, to our witnesses.
        Senator Rounds, thank you.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        General Waldhauser, would you care to begin with your
    opening statement? Your full statement will be made a part of
    the record.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER,
                      UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        General Waldhauser. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. I
    appreciate it.
        Senator Rounds, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members
    of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you
    on the efforts of United States Africa Command. I am honored to
    be here this morning with Admiral Faller to discuss many of the
    similar challenges we face in both the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM
    areas of responsibility.
        I would like to begin this morning by remembering the
    soldier we lost on the continent during operations in Somalia
    this past year. I offer my sincere condolences to the family of
    Staff Sergeant Alexander Conrad, United States Army. We honor
    his commitment, service, dedication to duty, and dedication to
    our country.
        We also honor the sacrifice of our African partners, who
    paid the ultimate price across the continent this year, as
    well, to bring security, stability, and prosperity to Africa.
        Additionally this morning, I would like to thank our
    families, servicemembers, and civilian workforce, especially
    those who serve on the continent, oftentimes in remote
    locations, for their professionalism and commitment to
    AFRICOM's mission.
        2019 marks the beginning of AFRICOM's second decade as a
    combatant command. As we enter this period, we have adapted our
    strategy for Africa based on updated national guidance, which
    includes the President's 2017 National Security Strategy and
    the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Defense Strategy. These
    documents have shaped the focus of the armed services,
    outlining broad guidance to enhance readiness for high-end
    combat while instructing the combatant commands, among other
    things, to strengthen alliances and attract new partners.
        The recently released United States Strategy Towards
    Africa, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and the
    National Strategy for Counterterrorism refocused our whole-of-
    government approach in the era of great-power competition to
    advance United States influence and maintain strategic access
    not only in Africa, but around the globe.
        Taken comprehensively, the overall United States strategic
    interests in Africa are very clear: prevent the undermining of
    our alliances or destabilization of African nations, counter
    violent extremist organizations, decrease the potential for
    Africa to become a failed continent, protect United States
    citizens and the Homeland, and advance American influence,
    including economic opportunities and transactions.
        To underscore the strategy for disrupting extremists, we
    remain committed to synchronizing our kinetic authorities.
    Persistent pressure on al-Shabaab, ISIS, and al Qaeda-
    associated groups remains necessary to prevent this
    destabilization of African nations. United States strategic
    interests on the continent cannot be solely advanced through
    the use of military force alone. As such, AFRICOM utilizes the
    military tool, in concert with diplomacy and development
    efforts, to help negate the drivers of conflict and create
    opportunity.
        In Somalia, we work closely with the Ambassador, now
    permanently stationed in Mogadishu alongside with the USAID
    Mission Director, to help the Somalis assume responsibility for
    their own security and own prosperity.
        In Libya, our counterterrorism commitment supports the
    United States Charge, who works closely with the international
    community to prevent civil conflict and facilitate the
    political reconciliation process.
        Additionally, our engagements, exercises, and activities
    throughout Africa are designed to increase United States
    influence, strengthen local security, and ensure our status as
    the preferred security partner. For example, in East Africa,
    our programs continue to modernize partner security forces, as
    in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, who also export security and
    contribute forces to the African Union mission in Somalia.
        In North Africa, we have seen significant return on
    investment with Tunisia and Morocco, demonstrating the capacity
    to absorb advanced United States programs and to lead security-
    related exercises and operations.
        In the Western Sahel and Lake Chad region, AFRICOM provides
    training, advice, and assistance to the western African
    nations, which make up the G5 Sahel organization, as well as
    those who make up the Multinational Joint Task Force, working
    to contain violent extremism and secure the borders of the Lake
    Chad Basin countries.
        Our partner networks and influence ensure U.S. access for
    United States Forces in times of crisis to protect our
    personnel and facilities on the continent, such as in Djibouti,
    a location which has strategic significance to multiple
    combatant commands.
        In conclusion, the most important use of the military tool
    on the African continent is where our engagements emphasize
    relationships and capacity-building. I am proud to lead a team
    of professionals who have built a--strong and trusting
    relationships with our African partners, United States
    interagency, and the international community to foster
    security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
        On behalf of the servicemembers, the civilian employees,
    and families of United States Africa Command, thank you for
    your support. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you here
    this morning. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Thomas D. Waldhauser
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, I am honored to represent the men and women of United
    States Africa Command and share with you their accomplishments over the
    past year. Since I last updated the Committee, the new National
    Security, Defense, and Military Strategies, the United States Strategy
    Toward Africa, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the
    Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and a new United States
    Africa Command Strategy and Campaign Plan have shaped our efforts on
    the continent. Each of these foundational documents acknowledges and
    underscores the strategic importance of Africa and the command's
    mission: United States Africa Command, with partners, strengthens
    security forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis
    response in order to advance United States national interests and
    promote security, stability, and prosperity.
        Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and security
    is a pre-requisite for economic growth and development. As a partner-
    based command, United States Africa Command assists African nations in
    building capable and professional militaries subordinate to elected
    civilian authority and respectful of human rights, the laws of armed
    conflict, and international humanitarian law. By making deliberate
    investments in defense institutions, the United States can assist
    African partners in meeting the basic conditions needed for good
    governance, economic development, and stability.
        During 2018, United States Africa Command commemorated its tenth
    year as a geographic combatant command, reaffirming Africa's importance
    to the United States global strategy for defending and ensuring the
    economic well-being of the U.S. Homeland. Our network continues to
    focus on shared goals of a secure, stable, and prosperous Africa, which
    benefits not only our African partners and the United States, but also
    the international community.
        Headquarters United States Africa Command employs a team of
    military, civilian, interagency, and contract professionals to fulfill
    the mission. Moreover, United States Africa Command is supported by
    families who bring with them the spirit of community and teamwork,
    without which the command could not succeed. United States Africa
    Command has partnerships with the Department of State, United States
    Agency for International Development (USAID), and other interagency
    organizations who all work towards providing stability and prosperity
    on the continent. Globally, we collaborate with our European allies,
    the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms, the
    European Union, non-governmental organizations, and other groups to
    pursue stability and security in Africa.
        By employing a partner-centric approach, United States Africa
    Command complies with the specific direction in the National Defense
    Strategy to ``support relationships to address significant terrorist
    threats in Africa.'' To address this directive, United States Africa
    Command builds on two strategic principles. First, very few, if any, of
    Africa's challenges can be resolved using only military force.
    Consequently, United States Africa Command emphasizes military support
    to diplomacy and development efforts. Our activities directly
    complement Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread
    of harmful ideologies, strengthen governments who protect their
    citizens and foster security and economic successes.
        Second, persistent pressure on terrorist networks--whether it be
    operational, financial, or political--is necessary to prevent the
    destabilization of our African partner nations. Our principal means for
    applying pressure is working through our African and with our
    international partners, increasing their security capabilities and,
    only when necessary, using kinetic force. Ultimately, our use of
    military force in Africa, for example in Libya and Somalia, supports
    the host government's effort to provide the security and economic
    growth required for long-term stability and prosperity.
        By design, United States Africa Command military assistance and
    activities occur in partnership with the host government and within
    overlapping regional and global mandates. In Somalia, the command
    supports the Federal Government of Somalia, while operating in support
    of African Union and United Nations mandates. In the fight against Boko
    Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA), we operate with partners in the
    African Union-endorsed Multinational Joint Task Force, which was
    established under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. In
    the Sahel, we partner with five national governments and within the
    overlapping mandates of the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations. In Libya,
    our activities support the UN-led political reconciliation process and
    the UN-recognized Government of National Accord. Even when we operate
    unilaterally, those actions are firmly embedded in international law
    and international legitimacy.
        United States Africa Command also plays a significant role in
    advancing the priorities outlined in the National Security and Defense
    Strategies, which emphasize the rise of China and Russia as key
    competitors. United States Africa Command has also observed increased
    engagement of non-traditional security actors, such as Qatar, Saudi
    Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as both challenges and
    opportunities to our mission. United States Africa Command strives to
    ensure the United States remains the partner of choice, in Africa, by
    maintaining our high standards of professionalism, demonstrating
    commitment to addressing their security needs, and providing high-
    quality equipment.
        Targeted investments in innovative, cost-effective, and sustainable
    approaches are common practices within Africa, and United States Africa
    Command endeavors to maximize the returns on our investments. For
    example, our strategy in Somalia features a distinct set of Advise,
    Assist, and Accompany authorities in support of the Federal Government
    of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to provide
    the opportunity for the Somali National Security Forces to successfully
    assume security responsibilities. This carefully tailored level of
    operational support reduces risk to U.S. personnel and is a cost-
    effective way to further advance U.S. security interests.
        Each day, we have approximately 7,000 personnel conducting their
    assigned tasks on the African continent. These include U.S. uniformed
    personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors of all
    Services, career fields, and specialties working to address global
    security challenges and maintain strategic access and influence. These
    personnel perform duties in countries such as Cameroon, Djibouti,
    Kenya, Niger, and Somalia. Over the course of 2018, the command and our
    component commands conducted numerous engagements, exercises, security
    cooperation events, and operations across the continent. These
    activities strengthen mutually beneficial networks between the U.S. and
    partners and enhance the capability of partner nation defense forces to
    provide effective and legitimate security.
                             strategic environment
        For scale, Africa is over three times larger than the United States
    The United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility encompasses 53
    countries with a population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, this figure is
    forecasted to almost double to over 2.54 billion, with one out of every
    four people on the planet living on the African continent.
    Additionally, the continent faces a large and growing youth population
    as Africa is home to 21 of the 22 countries in the world with the
    youngest average populations. Forty-one percent of Africans are under
    the age of 15, while 60 percent of the total population is under the
    age of 24. Economic development, leading to employment, is necessary in
    order to assist in preventing conflict, as Africa needs to add
    approximately 20 million jobs each year to keep pace with the growing
    population.
        The lack of economic and educational opportunities, a large,
    disenfranchised youth population, and inadequate natural resources are
    potential drivers of extremism, which, when coupled with authoritarian,
    corrupt, or ineffective governments, contribute to persistent
    instability. According to the Fund For Peace's 2018 Fragility State
    Index, 33 of the 50 countries most at risk of becoming unstable are in
    Africa. This includes seven of the top ten most fragile states.
    According to the United Nations Development Programme's Human
    Development Index, 32 African countries are listed in the ``Low Human
    Development'' categories of health, education, security, and
    employment.
        United States Africa Command employs the broad-reaching Diplomacy,
    Development, and Defense approach to foster interagency efforts and
    help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism. With the Department
    of State and USAID, United States Africa Command supports programs and
    initiatives fostering political reconciliation and elections in
    countries such as Libya. Our diplomatic and development partners work
    with African partners to provide jobs, food, clean water, and
    education, such as in Ethiopia and Nigeria, helping to counter
    incentives offered by violent extremists organizations (VEOs) or
    criminal networks.
        In Africa, VEOs remain a serious threat to the shared interests of
    our partners, allies, and the United States These VEOs and criminal
    networks prey upon disenfranchised populations, creating a cycle of
    recruitment and allowing extremist ideology to fester. Extremist
    networks also exploit criminal networks for the illicit transport of
    narcotics, weapons, and persons. VEOs cultivate and encourage an
    environment of distrust, despair, and hopelessness to undermine
    governments, allowing for the expansion of their radical ideology.
        Over the next decade, Africa will be shaped by the increased
    presence of external actors and the effects of environmental change.
    The United States welcomes those partners pursuing helpful and
    constructive interests in Africa to develop its economic,
    infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors. However, with
    emerging markets and a growing consumer class, external actors often
    employ exploitative tactics and ``debt trap'' diplomacy to garner undue
    influence.
        Over the past decade, China has injected considerable amounts of
    financing into the continent, including offering key loans to
    strategically-located countries, like Djibouti, Senegal, and Angola.
    Chinese interests include gaining greater access to Africa's mineral
    and other natural resources, opening markets, and accessing naval
    ports. In the short term, the complete financial packages can make
    China appear to be an attractive partner for African nations. For
    example, African nations who become signatories to China's Belt and
    Road Initiative (the BRI) receive promises of development, defense, and
    cultural investments in their countries, further enhancing China's
    influence while challenging our own partnerships in Africa.
        African leaders are growing increasingly wary of their business
    ventures with China. For example, the Nairobi-Mombasa Railway in Kenya
    has met with criticism for its high price and the relatively low number
    of African workers in dispatcher and locomotive driver positions,
    relative to Chinese workers. While Chinese officials say their business
    agreements come with no strings attached, construction work on the
    continent is often carried out by Chinese companies and Chinese workers
    failing to boost local employment. African countries, which can access
    financing through China's state-owned banks, often commit to contracts
    that can lead to debt-equity swap arrangements when debt obligations
    are unfulfilled. For Kenya, which financed 90 percent of the total $3.6
    billion railway project from China in 2014, loan repayment rates are
    scheduled to triple in 2019 per the conditions of the loan agreement
    risking this scenario.
        Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more
    militaristic approach in Africa. By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-
    mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders
    seek unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to
    natural resources on favorable terms. Some African leaders readily
    embrace this type of support and use it to consolidate their power and
    authority. This is occurring in the Central African Republic where
    elected leaders mortgage mineral rights--for a fraction of their
    worth--to secure Russian weapons. Russia also garners additional
    support at the United Nations and gains more customers for its military
    arms sales.
        Russia is more deliberate in Libya as they invoke Qaddafi-era
    relationships and debts to obtain economic and military contracts.
    These agreements are aimed at accessing Libya's vast oil market,
    reviving arms sales, and gaining access to coastal territories on the
    Mediterranean Sea, providing Russia closer access to Europe's southern
    border.
        Consequently, the cross-border and global nature of Chinese and
    Russian actions and influence in Africa necessitates collaboration
    between United States Africa Command, United States European Command,
    United States Central Command, and United States Indo-Pacific Command,
    amplifying the global complexity of this issue.
        The second emergent challenge in Africa is the effect of
    environmental change on African security. A large number of Africans
    make their living on the land, whether they grow crops or raise
    livestock, and many live at a subsistence level. Settled farmers and
    nomadic herdsmen are increasingly engaged in land-use disputes, which
    are emerging as major driver of conflict in central Mali, through the
    Middle Belt Region of Nigeria, in South Sudan, and into the Central
    African Republic. More people are competing for less arable land, while
    both modern state institutions and customary institutions are failing
    or have failed to regulate this competition.
        Poor land-use policies, changing weather patterns, rising
    temperatures, and dramatic shifts in rainfall contribute to drought,
    famine, migration, and resource competition. In the greater Sahel
    region, the Sahara Desert has expanded southward by over 10 percent
    since the 1920s, reducing the amount of productive land. Due to changes
    in weather patterns aggravated by poor resource management, Lake Chad
    has contracted 90 percent since the 1960s, significantly decreasing the
    region's largest source of fresh water. The reduction in arable land
    for crops and grazing land for livestock has created strong competition
    between the region's farmers and herders who migrate across borders
    searching for usable land. As each group seeks land for its own
    purposes, violent conflict can ensue. Armed groups and criminal
    networks exploit this situation, leading to human trafficking, slavery,
    and more violence.
        Environmental degradation and the overuse of natural resources
    exacerbate weak or ineffective governments who are unable to respond
    and cope with their already serious, on-going political, economic, and
    social challenges. United States Africa Command and our partners are
    investing to build the capability and capacity of governance,
    infrastructure, and defense institutions, so African Governments can
    mitigate the effects of environmental degradation. This can be
    accomplished with, for example, sustainable electric grids, viable
    water treatment facilities, environmentally-sound agricultural
    developments, and professional security forces.
        Despite the challenges on the continent, Africans are eager and
    receptive to work with the United States to advance common strategic
    interests. Africa's future depends on urgent action to address the
    needs of growing populations, mitigate the influence of harmful
    activities, and combat the effects of environmental change. United
    States Africa Command's role within the Diplomacy, Development, and
    Defense construct supports partner efforts to enable economic growth
    and prosperity by providing a stable security environment.
                united states africa command strategic approach
        The successful advancement of United States interests in Africa is
    best achieved with stable nations on the continent. Accountable
    governments, well-trained and disciplined militaries with a respect for
    the rule of law and human rights, and growing economies are
    cornerstones to this stability. Over the past year, consistent with the
    updated national strategies, United States Africa Command revised our
    strategic approach to effectively strengthen our African partners by
    evolving our security cooperation from a focus on crisis response to
    capability and capacity building against our new strategic priorities:
    state fragility, increased involvement of China and Russia, VEO
    expansion, and threats to United States access and influence.
        The United States Africa Command strategy prioritizes five
    objectives: 1) African Partners contribute to regional security, 2)
    threats from VEOs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are
    reduced to a level manageable by internal security forces, 3) U.S.
    access and influence are ensured, 4) United States Africa Command sets
    the theater by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints,
    and agreements, and 5) U.S. personnel and facilities are protected.
    These objectives nest within the foundational strategies and provide
    the framework for the revised five-year focus in the United States
    Africa Command Campaign Plan and the United States Africa Command
    Theater Posture Plan.
    Foundational Strategies
        For United States Africa Command, the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy underscore the importance of our African Partners, European,
    and international alliances to build partner capabilities and capacity
    in order to create a more secure, stable, and prosperous continent.
    Furthermore, the strategies emphasize the protection of the American
    people, Homeland, and the American way of life.
        The National Defense Strategy focuses on Great Power Competition
    and expanding the use of lethality, partnering, and process reform.
    Additionally, the National Defense Strategy continues to emphasize the
    threat posed by VEOs to the United States Homeland, our allies, and our
    African Partners. Much like the National Defense Strategy, United
    States Africa Command links VEOs to instability in Africa. Hence, the
    importance of alliances and partnerships is amplified in the command's
    strategy and campaign plan and in the command's response to regional
    crises, whether humanitarian or security related.
        Two other key foundational documents provide the policy guidance to
    synchronize United States Africa Command efforts with that of the whole
    of the United States Government. First, the Department of Defense
    Strategy for Africa mandates United States Africa Command strengthen
    African security forces and develop institutions at the national and
    regional levels. United States Africa Command's focus on security
    cooperation is a key component in the United States whole-of-government
    approach. Moreover, by seeking low-cost and resource-sustainable
    security solutions, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa
    framework sets the conditions for United States Africa Command to adapt
    to current and emergent challenges in Africa.
        Next, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism emphasizes the use
    of all instruments of American power, with a focus on non-military
    capabilities. The strategy's framework encourages working with a wide-
    range of partners in both the public and private sectors (e.g.,
    technology, financial institutions) and allied governments to encourage
    counterterrorism burden-sharing. Information sharing, counter-finance,
    reintegration of returning foreign fighters, and counter-messaging
    promote positive narratives to increase partner awareness and
    strengthen partner capability to address the broader counterterrorism
    challenges within Africa. These foundational strategies are
    synchronized with the United States Africa Command Strategy and
    Campaign Plan, promoting a consistent approach, over time, to
    strengthen relationships and enhance the capability of our African
    partners.
        In December 2018, the President signed the United States Strategy
    Toward Africa, which focuses on economic partnerships to build self-
    reliance among our African partners in the era of great power
    competition with external actors, such as China and Russia. This
    strategy aims to advance trade and commercial ties with key African
    states to increase United States and African prosperity. Doing so helps
    to protect the United States from cross-border health and security
    threats, and supports African states' progress toward stability and
    citizen-responsive governance. The strategy also prioritizes foreign
    assistance to help our African partners achieve sustained economic
    growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats. Ultimately,
    the United States Africa Command Strategy seeks to strengthen
    partnerships to increase United States influence, protect United States
    personnel and facilities, and ensure access, as specifically directed
    in the United States Strategy Toward Africa.
    United States Africa Command Campaign Plan
        Based on the National Security and Defense Strategies, and as
    indicated in our mission statement, the revised United States Africa
    Command Campaign Plan provides the command, and our component commands,
    strategic direction to advance our strategic goals on the continent. It
    does so in a burden-sharing and balanced approach, accounting for the
    increased presence of external actors, namely China and Russia, and the
    continued threat posed by VEOs.
        To achieve the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan
    objectives, the command emphasizes six approaches: 1) Strengthen
    Partner Networks; 2) Enhance Partner Capability; 3) Develop Security in
    Somalia; 4) Contain Instability in Libya; 5) Support Partners in Sahel
    and the Lake Chad Region; and 6) Set the Theater to facilitate United
    States Africa Command day-to-day activities, crisis response, and
    contingency operations.
                Strengthen Partner Networks
        United States Africa Command strives to further United States,
    allied, and partner interests and access to mitigate destabilizing
    influences on the continent. The Strengthen Partner Network approach is
    the primary effort in which the command seeks to establish new
    partnerships with countries and organizations, strengthen existing
    relationships through enhanced communication and synchronization, and
    counter the activities of external actors such as China and Russia.
    This approach focuses on maintaining the United States as the preferred
    security partner in Africa.
        For example, in April 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa
    conducted Exercise Lightning Handshake with the Royal Moroccan Navy and
    Air Force. This was the most sophisticated bilateral exercise the
    United States conducted with an African partner. It included a United
    States Carrier Strike Group executing close air support and naval
    surface fire support missions at the Tan Tan live fire range in
    Morocco.
                Enhance Partner Capability
        This approach is applied continent-wide and includes building
    African partner capability focused on defense institution building,
    countering illicit trafficking, maritime security, counter-improvised
    explosive devices (IED) efforts, humanitarian assistance, infectious
    disease control, and counter-VEO efforts. Engagements and exercises,
    managed by United States Africa Command and its component commands,
    strengthen key partnerships and improve partner capabilities. Since
    challenges in Africa intersect the activities of a multitude of United
    States Government agencies and international organizations, United
    States Africa Command maintains a broad group of federal, allied, and
    partner command liaisons to coordinate our capability-building efforts.
    One of those mechanisms is our Multilateral Planning Group, tri-chaired
    by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, where we are able
    to discuss and synchronize our efforts on the continent.
                Develop Security in Somalia
        This approach supports not only AMISOM and Somali Security Forces,
    but also the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and other
    allies and partners contributing to the international effort to counter
    al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. Anchored by the AMISOM Troop Contributing
    Countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, this
    approach allows for creating the opportunity to build the capability,
    capacity, and willingness of the Somali Security Forces. The approach
    centers on security cooperation, engagements, and exercises, as well as
    Advise, Assist, and Accompany authorities, to strengthen the Somali
    Security Forces. Taken in concert with the Enhance Partner Capability
    approach, the effort also addresses the capacity-building needs of the
    Troop Contributing Countries. The cumulative effects of the two
    approaches aim to support Somalia and the Somali Security Forces as
    they work to achieve regional stability and to support the vision of
    the Federal Government of Somalia.
                Contain Instability in Libya
        This approach guides the command's efforts to contain instability
    brought on by the lack of a unifying government and the presence of
    VEOs in Libya, which include ISIS-Libya and al-Qaeda in the Lands of
    the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The approach is focused on using the
    military tool to advance diplomacy, conduct operations to degrade VEOs,
    improve the security architecture of the Libyan Government of National
    Accord, and, once a political reconciliation is achieved, strengthen
    the national security forces of a recognized Libyan Government. United
    States Africa Command, working with the Libya External Office of the
    United States Embassy to Libya, conducts engagements with Libyan
    political and military leaders to bolster relationships and maintain
    progress toward reconciliation. United States Africa Command stands
    firmly with and supports the efforts of the United Nations as it leads
    the political reconciliation process, the immediate next step for
    Libyan stability.
                Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
        In West Africa, roughly the size of the continental United States,
    this approach provides capabilities and support to counter-VEO
    operations, primarily against Boko Haram, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal
    Muslimin (JNIM), ISIS-Greater Sahara, and ISIS-West Africa. The
    command's efforts support the Multinational Joint Task Force countries
    of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and the G5 Sahel Joint
    Force countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. To
    support the Multinational Joint Task Force, the G5 Sahel Joint Force,
    and their individual member states, the command conducts engagements,
    exercises, and limited operations, and provides appropriate security
    assistance to increase the partners' willingness and capabilities in
    counter-VEO efforts.
                Set the Theater
        The logistics challenges of supporting our engagements on the
    continent necessitate the command align with a whole-of-government
    approach to support national security interests. This whole-of-
    government approach ensures we have the authorities, capabilities,
    footprint, agreements, and understandings in place to maintain access
    and accomplish our missions. The United States Africa Command Theater
    Posture Plan details the command's footprint of forces and agreements
    on the continent. Posture initiatives focus on expanding strategic
    access to enable day-to-day activities, contingency operations, and
    crisis response. The backbone of access in Africa is our network of
    enduring contingency locations and agreements with key African
    partners, which provides freedom of action and status protection for
    United States personnel.
        Ensuring strategic access requires complementary defense,
    diplomatic, and development efforts across the interagency and with our
    allied and African partners. An enduring mission of the command is to
    support the Department of State-led mission to protect U.S. personnel
    and facilities on the continent. We maintain defense cooperation
    agreements with several African nations allowing for forward staging
    locations to enable more efficient recovery and evacuation. As such, we
    maintain enduring locations and contingency locations throughout
    Africa, which provide a flexible and diverse posture for operational
    needs and the protection of United States personnel and facilities.
        Our capable posture network also allows forward staging of forces
    to provide flexible and timely responses to crises involving U.S.
    personnel or interests. At Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, the only forward
    and enduring United States military installation in Africa, United
    States Forces engaged in security cooperation activities, contingency
    operations, and logistics support to five combatant commands: United
    States Africa Command, United States Central Command, United States
    European Command, United States Special Operations Command, and United
    States Transportation Command. Camp Lemonnier is our hub in East Africa
    and remains a vital link to build stability in this key region.
        One of United States Africa Command's newest and most important
    posture initiatives is the development of the West Africa Logistics
    Network. The West Africa Logistics Network provides and positions
    right-sized aircraft throughout West and Central Africa to facilitate
    the distribution of supplies, personnel, and equipment to support
    locations.
        implementing the united states africa command strategic approach
    Achieving and Maintaining Influence
        United States Africa Command continues to advance United States
    strategic objectives through the execution of activities and the
    expenditure of resources to respond to both regional crises and
    instability, while prioritizing Great Power Competition efforts across
    the continent. This approach requires the United States to continue
    with our authorities to counter transnational threats, including
    terrorism and infectious diseases, which threaten African Governments
    and the United States and its interests in Africa. It also strives to
    enhance security cooperation with our African partners, so they may
    become more stable, well-governed, and self-reliant, thereby setting
    the conditions for economic growth and development.
        United States Africa Command aspires to achieve and maintain
    influence with our allies and African partners through security
    cooperation, exercises, engagements, operations, and efforts to mature
    the theater. This requires the synchronization of emerging policy and
    guidance from the National Defense Strategy and other strategic
    documents to drive United States Government activities and engagements
    across Africa, reinforced by the importance of capturing a return on
    investment. As such, the command and its component commands have a firm
    understanding of the necessity to coordinate a whole-of-government
    approach toward strengthening relationships and building partner
    capability in support of national defense objectives.
        Consistency in resources is the most effective method for
    implementing our strategic approach in Africa, as United States Africa
    Command does not have an abundance of dedicated assigned forces. These
    resources include the authorities, capabilities, funding, and allocated
    personnel to further our international and interagency relationships
    and provide appropriate military support and security cooperation to
    diplomatic and development efforts with our African partners. This
    consistency allows for the planned execution and delivery of senior
    leader engagements, security capabilities, and multinational exercises
    necessary to bring about a secure environment for the advancement of
    U.S. national interests and sustainment of military advantages.
        Additionally, various programs and funding allow United States
    Africa Command to further its campaign objectives. At its headquarters,
    United States Africa Command imbeds fifteen military personnel from
    allied and partner nations in the Multinational Coordination Center
    fostering an enduring relationships and increasing interoperability
    with allies and partners. The foreign military personnel do not command
    United States Forces or make final determinations on plans or
    directives but do assist in coordinating military engagement efforts
    and exercises to further U.S. multinational partnerships. Additionally,
    United States Africa Command leads and participates in multilateral
    planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel region.
    Likewise, our component commands host senior leader staff talks with
    their respective component equivalents. The U.S. Army Regionally
    Aligned Force also assists with the United States Africa Command
    mission. Working within the security cooperation framework, the
    Regionally Aligned Force executes a significant share of the military-
    to-military activities in Africa. Sustained access to the Regionally
    Aligned Force is critical to mission success.
        The U.S. National Guard's State Partnership Program is by far one
    of United States Africa Command's most valuable implementing programs.
    The State Partnership Program pairs 14 African nations with 11 United
    States states and the District of Columbia and creates enduring
    relationships with their African partners to build and improve
    peacekeeping capacity, disaster management competency, and overall
    partner readiness. United States Africa Command continues to see a
    great return on investment with the State Partnership Program,
    conducting 120 events this past year and engaging over 3,000 partner
    nation personnel at a cost of four million dollars. We look forward to
    expanding this outreach as several more African countries have
    requested partnerships, which are currently under consideration.
        Other programs mitigating the lack of dedicated forces and, in
    turn, building partner capability include the Department of State
    Global Peace Operations Initiative, the African Peacekeeping Rapid
    Response Partnership, and the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative.
    The Department of Defense also coordinates closely with the Department
    of State on programs in Africa including the Partnership for Regional
    East Africa Counterterrorism, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
    Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and Africa Maritime
    Security Initiative to support critical counterterrorism, maritime
    security and overall military professionalization efforts.
        These programs continue to professionalize partner militaries and
    security forces through training and institution building, and their
    concepts are integrated into military-to-military engagements; training
    on human rights, rule of law, and prevention of gender-based violence;
    and exercises.
    East Africa
        In 1991, the United States closed the Embassy in Somalia as the
    country descended into rampant violence and insecurity. Al-Shabaab and
    al-Qaeda eventually filled the security vacuum and, with Mogadishu
    firmly under their control, used this safe haven to plan and launch
    terror attacks not only inside Somalia, but also regionally throughout
    East Africa. Since al-Shabaab's first external attack in 2010, the
    group has killed hundreds through external operations, with the most
    lethal attacks occurring in Kenya and Uganda. Somali pirates have also
    disrupted commercial shipping lanes, reaching as far north as the
    Arabian Sea and as far south as Tanzania, while attacking and hijacking
    sea vessels for ransom.
        By 2007, AMISOM was activated in Somalia, with Burundi, Djibouti,
    Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda contributing troops and conducting military
    operations, which eventually led to the return of the capital city to a
    newly formed Somali Federal Government. Today, a United States
    Ambassador is permanently located in Mogadishu and, along with the
    USAID Mission Director, is working with the Federal Government of
    Somalia to improve the security environment and promote stability. As
    such, U.S. military operations and activities are part of a whole-of-
    government approach working in support of diplomatic and development
    efforts.
        Somalia remains key to the security environment of East Africa, and
    its long-term stability is important to advancing United States
    interests in the region. When assessing Somalia, it is important to
    understand incremental progress has been made over the last decade as
    the result of a truly international effort inside the country. The
    United States works closely with our international partners, which
    include the United Nations, European Union, African Union, AMISOM and
    the troop contributing countries, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and
    others, on security sector development efforts. Together, we remain
    committed to Somali-led progress on improving conditions for a well-
    trained Somali National Security Forces that can assume and sustain
    security within the country.
        The United States also continues to target al-Shabaab and ISIS-
    Somalia. United States military activities in Somalia include remote or
    accompanied advise and assist missions, the building, training, and
    equipping of Somali combat units, and when necessary, kinetic action.
    The effects of our kinetic activities serve to disperse al-Shabaab and
    ISIS-Somalia leadership, disrupt how they communicate, and further
    decentralize how they conduct operations. Ultimately, our kinetic
    activities, encouraged and supported by the Federal Government of
    Somalia, create opportunities for governance to take hold.
        Our actions are synchronized with AMISOM's mandate to reduce
    threats and support stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding.
    We are supporting the AMISOM transition plan, which envisions
    conditions for an effective, responsible, and gradual handover of
    security responsibilities from AMISOM by 2021. Recent efforts by Somali
    security forces, working with AMISOM, to stabilize the area in and
    around Merka, is a positive step. However, the Federal Government of
    Somalia must continue to demonstrate sustained progress in implementing
    the federated security model, within its national security
    architecture, and increase coordination and cooperation with the
    Federal Member States.
        The United States brings leadership and influence to Somalia, led
    by the United States Ambassador, to synchronize and support the
    international community's ongoing security and stability efforts. While
    United States military training and operations alone cannot defeat al-
    Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, alongside United States diplomatic and
    development efforts, they provide legitimacy to the Federal Government
    of Somalia and create opportunity for political and economic growth,
    and security and stability in the broader region.
        United States Africa Command's security cooperation is closely
    linked with the United States Mission to Somalia's political and
    economic initiatives targeting the root cause of instability. The
    Department of State and USAID provide effective tools to build and
    reinforce stabilization, democratic institution building, education,
    and health development programs. Somalia has held a credible federal
    presidential selection process, and political leaders have formed four
    Federal Member States and selected regional presidents and parliaments.
    While Somalia remains a fragile state, the gross domestic product has
    moderately increased over the past two years and, combined with other
    positive economic indicators, has the potential to lead to debt relief
    and additional international financing and investments.
        While there have been signs of improvement in Somalia, progress is
    not irreversible and sustained international engagement will be
    necessary to keep the country on a positive trajectory. The United
    States, by virtue of our capabilities, influence, and credibility, is
    uniquely postured to support Somali efforts, including to help
    coordinate other international partner engagement. As such, the Federal
    Government of Somalia must now take advantage of the opportunities
    before them, with a clear understanding future assistance will depend
    on demonstrated progress.
        In Djibouti, the United States remains a steadfast partner. In May
    2018, members of the Djiboutian Army's first ever Rapid Intervention
    Battalion graduated from training. The Texas National Guard, assigned
    to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, provided the Rapid
    Intervention Battalion with comprehensive individual and collective
    training in support of the unit's mission as a multi-purpose reaction
    force responsible to the leadership of the Djiboutian Army.
        However, Djibouti's increasing partnership with China across
    defense, trade, and financial sectors encroaches on and, at times,
    diminishes United States access and influence. In 2018, Djibouti
    nationalized the Doraleh Container Port. Despite the increased presence
    of China within the port complex, Djibouti has retained control of the
    container port, increasing shipping volume and through-put since
    removing Dubai Ports World. Our continued access and unimpeded usage to
    this facility is critical to our logistical efforts in East Africa.
        Additionally, China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti, only a
    few miles from Camp Lemonnier, creates air space and coordination
    challenges for all international partners. United States Africa Command
    considers access to Djibouti and to critical global shipping lanes
    through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait an imperative to ensure United States
    strategic interests are not compromised. We work closely with the
    United States Ambassador to Djibouti and his initiative to coordinate
    with the host nation, the Chinese, and other countries based in
    Djibouti to de-conflict operations, ensure the safety of forces, and
    maintain appropriate access for our military activities.
        In Ethiopia last April, Abiy Ahmed Ali became Prime Minister, and
    his commitment to political reform, human rights, and unity has been a
    positive contribution to peace and stability in the region. By June,
    Abiy's Government made significant progress implementing the 2000
    Algiers Accord to end the war with its neighbor, Eritrea. Since then,
    both countries have taken numerous positive actions to conclude
    Africa's longest running border conflict. Commercial flights between
    the capitals of Addis Adaba and Asmara now occur daily, Ethiopian
    commercial vessels operate through Eritrean ports, communication
    channels are open between the populations reuniting families and
    friends, and military forces are withdrawing from contested territory.
        Prime Minister Abiy's reform agenda represents an unprecedented
    attempt to comprehensively reset Ethiopian governance. The Government
    of Ethiopia is working with various ethnic factions inside the country
    to address root causes of conflict and expand the political discourse.
    Prime Minister Abiy restructured his cabinet, establishing a Ministry
    of Peace and appointed women to 50 percent of the positions, to include
    the Minister of Defense, a first for Ethiopia.
        In partnership with the Government of Ethiopia and in support of
    our diplomatic mission, United States Africa Command is developing
    additional support options to improve security cooperation with this
    key partner. Ethiopia is already benefiting from security cooperation
    programs, including intelligence sharing initiatives, and we will
    identify avenues to enroll more personnel in United States military
    education and training programs. In July 2019, Ethiopia will host
    United States Africa Command Exercise Justified Accord in order to
    enhance AMISOM's Troop Contributing Countries' ability to conduct peace
    operations. Ethiopia is the largest contributor of United Nations
    peacekeeping forces and provides approximately 4,200 troops to AMISOM.
        United States Africa Command will seek to expand our military-to-
    military relationship in support of Prime Minister Abiy's fast-paced
    internal reform efforts and regional outreach.
    North Africa
        Since 2011, with the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muhammar Qaddafi
    and the rise of the Arab Spring, Libya has been in a constant state of
    turmoil. In 2014, Libyan militants began pledging allegiance to the
    Islamic State and its cause. By 2015, the Islamic State had infiltrated
    the coastal city of Sirte, shifted aspirations of the militia members
    there, and declared it a part of the caliphate. Soon militants from
    outside Libya joined the organization, now branded as ISIS-Libya, and
    their numbers swelled into the thousands.
        In 2016, the Libyan Government of National Accord requested
    assistance from the United States and our European allies to rid the
    country of ISIS-Libya. Together, we assisted Libyan forces aligned to
    the Government of National Accord and conducted hundreds of kinetic
    strikes in support of its ground operations in Sirte. Within months,
    Sirte was liberated. Since then, the United States has remained engaged
    in the international efforts to stabilize Libya.
        United States Africa Command focuses on three objectives for Libya.
    First, United States Africa Command assists in degrading terrorist
    groups, such as AQIM and ISIS-Libya, who pose threats to United States
    and Western interests and destabilize Libya and its neighbors. Second,
    every effort is made to prevent widespread civil conflict that would
    threaten security and stability. Finally, United States Africa Command
    supports the political reconciliation process by providing security to
    facilitate diplomatic engagements in Libya.
        United States Africa Command continues to support the United States
    Libya External Office's diplomatic efforts to promote the United
    Nations-facilitated Libyan political reconciliation process. The recent
    return of a former Ambassador to Libya as the Charge d'Affaires of the
    Libya External Office offers a seasoned diplomat, who is familiar with
    the multi-layered problem set. The U.S. is now better positioned to
    manage the diplomatic and counterterrorism strategy. In 2018, United
    States Africa Command conducted kinetic strikes targeting the
    leadership and operational commanders of both ISIS-Libya and AQIM
    providing the opportunity for the Libyan Government of National Accord
    to continue its efforts to improve security and work towards political
    reconciliation.
        Tunisia is one of our most capable and willing partners. In May
    2018, United States Marine Corps Forces Africa conducted Exercise
    African Lion in Tunisia and Morocco. This annual, multinational
    exercise enabled United States Forces and our African partners to
    increase interoperability and further refine tactics, techniques, and
    procedures for countering VEOs.
        Furthermore, United States Africa Command-managed security
    cooperation programs work to develop Tunisian counterterrorism and
    border security capabilities. Through fiscal years 2017 to 2019, over
    $165 million in title 10 and title 22 funding will be invested in
    developing maritime and rotary-wing capabilities to bolster Tunisian
    border control forces. Tunisia is also developing its counter-IED
    awareness program through training provided by United States Army
    Africa and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. With this
    state-of-the-art training, Tunisian special operations forces will be
    better trained and equipped to counter IED attacks.
        Tunisia is also capable of managing more advanced logistics
    training and maintaining increasingly complex intelligence,
    reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. For example, United States Air
    Forces Africa completed proof-of-principle flights with the Tunisian
    Air Force as part of an initiative to leverage their transport
    capability for rapid mobility requirements across the theater.
    Continued flights over time will serve as an opportunity to enhance the
    capability of the Tunisian Air Force, while reducing the stress on U.S.
    airlift assets and personnel. Tunisia remains a political and military
    leader in the region and a net exporter of security.
        The Kingdom of Morocco remains a vital United States security
    partner and ranks in the top five of African countries providing
    peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa. Additionally, Morocco is a key
    exercise integrator serving as the permanent host of Exercise African
    Lion which focuses on counter-VEO, interoperability, and strengthening
    regional relationships. In 2019, Morocco will also host Exercise
    Phoenix Express, the premier United States Naval Forces Africa exercise
    emphasizing maritime security and counter-illicit trafficking.
        Algeria is a capable partner in the fight against extremism. With
    the largest army in Africa, Algeria conducts frequent military-to-
    military engagements to build its border protection and
    counterterrorism forces. United States relations with Algeria continue
    to foster cooperation and further regional stability.
    Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
        Within the Sahel region of northern and western Africa, dangerous
    pockets of extremists control numerous under-governed spaces. The
    African-led, French-assisted, and United States-supported G5 Sahel
    Joint Force, comprised of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
    Mauritania, and Niger, is a successful example of burden sharing. The
    U.S. is providing bilateral security assistance for the countries of
    the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and United States Africa Command contributes
    operational planning support to compliment the funding and operational
    assistance provided by our European allies to the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
    United States Africa Command remains committed to assisting the
    African-led operations to degrade VEOs and to build the defense
    capabilities within the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, in turn, build the
    capabilities of individual countries within the joint force.
        Mali remains the epicenter of instability and a haven for many
    terror groups to stage and launch attacks across the region. The United
    Nations Mission in Mali continues to support the stabilization of the
    country and implementation of the Algiers Accord for Peace and
    Reconciliation in Mali. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and
    Togo are the leading African nations contributing to United Nations
    Mission in Mali, which has more than 11,000 military personnel. Our
    European allies provide military education, advice, and training to the
    Malian Armed Forces through the European Training Mission-Mali. This
    mission has trained over 12,000 personnel in an effort to strengthen
    the Malian Armed Forces to defend its territory and protect its people.
        United States Africa Command lends critical support to partner
    counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. This primarily takes the form of
    providing key enabling capabilities to the French and members of the G5
    Sahel Joint Force. Furthermore, we continue to build military
    operational and defense institutional capabilities through measured
    security cooperation coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies'
    diplomacy and development efforts. Through these actions, we complement
    the international effort to maintain persistent pressure on terror
    networks and increase security and stability in Mali.
        In Burkina Faso, United States Africa Command finds a willing and
    capable partner in West Africa. With almost $40 million in U.S. title
    10 expenditures, the Burkinabe armed forces remain dependable exporters
    of security with trained security forces capable of contributing to the
    G5 Sahel Joint Force. Despite manpower and equipment challenges, the
    Burkinabe security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism
    operations in both the North and Eastern regions.
        In Niger, serious governance and development issues are exacerbated
    by rapid population growth, environmental degradation, economic
    stagnation, and stressed infrastructure. Moreover, regional VEOs, such
    as ISIS-Greater Sahara, JNIM, Boko Haram, and ISIS-West Africa, overlap
    within Niger. As such, our policy goals aim to assist Niger's continued
    development as a stable democracy with accountable governance, become
    an increasingly capable partner against regional threats, and achieve
    social and institutional development and broad-based economic growth,
    which will further strengthen the population against VEO recruitment
    efforts. In spite of these challenges, Niger is an increasingly capable
    regional partner.
        Over a three year period, United States Africa Command-managed
    title 10 support has increased Nigerien counter-IED capability, as well
    as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset sustainment,
    maintenance, and operations. This includes the Government of Niger-
    requested development of an expeditionary, contingency support location
    in Agadez, scheduled to be initially operationally capable in the
    summer of 2019.
        In April 2018, Niger hosted Exercise Flintlock, the annual United
    States Special Operations Command-Africa exercise to develop capacity
    and interoperability among African, allied, and United States Forces.
    Exercise Flintlock was entirely facilitated by the special operations
    force units of more than 20 African nations with the support of western
    nations. This successful multilateral event enhances coordination among
    partners and improves special operations force capabilities to combat
    violent extremist organizations.
        Within the Lake Chad Region, the Multinational Joint Task Force
    comprises forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and
    remains a strategically significant organization in the efforts to
    counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Boko Haram and ISIS-West
    Africa attack military and civilian targets throughout Northeast
    Nigeria and the Lake Chad Border areas of Niger, Chad and Cameroon,
    thus dominating large swaths of territory and displacing millions from
    their homes, contributing to a multi-border displaced persons crisis.
    United States Africa Command and USAID work with the Multinational
    Joint Task Force to deliver humanitarian support and facilitate
    international relief efforts to bring basic health care, clean drinking
    water, adequate sanitation, and food supplies to the hardest hit areas.
    However, the persistent violence and the growing number of displaced
    persons impact the ability for organizations to deliver the required
    assistance.
        Nigeria has faced multiple setbacks in the volatile Northeast Borno
    State as ISIS-West Africa has seized military bases and materiel,
    including armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. This series of
    ISIS-West Africa high-profile attacks has placed tremendous strain on
    the Nigerian military's readiness and capabilities. The attacks also
    underscore the need for the contributing countries to the Multinational
    Joint Task Force to increase their commitments, resources, troop
    deployments, and regional operational coordination to counter ISIS-West
    Africa's momentum.
        Nigeria also faces instability over the violent herder-farmer
    conflicts in the middle belt region, as these groups fight over the
    scarcity of resources and usable land required to feed the growing and,
    often due to conflict, displaced and transient population. By 2050,
    Nigeria will overtake the United States as the third most populous
    country in the world, further compounding the strain on natural
    resources and risking the disenfranchisement of a population
    increasingly dissatisfied by the lack of security and basic services.
        United States Africa Command is working to assist the Nigerian
    military through a variety of security cooperation efforts. In April
    2018, forty African senior military leaders represented their countries
    at the sixth annual African Land Forces Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. Co-
    hosted by the Nigerian Army and United States Army Africa, the African
    Land Forces Summit provided a forum to develop cooperative solutions
    for improved trans-regional security and stability.
        Over the past year, we have expanded our intelligence support and
    are currently working with the Nigerian Air Force to increase their
    effectiveness in line with international standards. In the upcoming
    years, utilizing title 10 and title 22 funding, United States Africa
    Command will execute tailored programs to expand Nigerian intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance; intelligence; counter-IED; and air-
    ground integration capabilities. United States Africa Command will
    continue to work with Nigeria and seek additional partnership
    opportunities following Nigeria's planned presidential election in
    early 2019.
        Cameroon has been the focus of long-term United States Department
    of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and United States Africa Command
    security cooperation efforts to boost the country's capacity to counter
    Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon has
    been an effective partner within the Multinational Joint Task Force.
    Cameroon also ensures security in the Gulf of Guinea and in neighboring
    Central African Republic, where it plays a valuable role in the UN
    Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
    African Republic.
        The United States has urged the Cameroonian Government to address
    human rights concerns, investigate allegations thoroughly, hold
    accountable perpetrators of abuse, and disclose the outcome of its
    investigations to the people of Cameroon. In accordance with the Leahy
    law, the U.S. Government does not provide assistance to security force
    units or individuals against whom credible allegations of gross
    violations of human rights have been lodged.
        The crisis and credible allegations of gross violations of human
    rights in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon is
    a concern. The violence stem from a long-term sense of marginalization
    and political disenfranchisement among Anglophone Cameroonians,
    compounded by government suppression of moderates, and the government
    and separatists inability to enter into any constructive dialogue to
    resolve the conflict. The Government of Cameroon has assured the United
    States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram
    and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.
    Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa
        In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security remains crackdown a
    strategic priority due to its role in global oil markets, trade routes,
    and the residence of approximately 75,000 U.S. citizens. Piracy and
    other illicit maritime activities threaten development efforts, weaken
    state security, and rob states of precious resources required for
    greater economic growth and effective governance. In 2018, piracy
    incidents trended lower as cooperation increased among the Gulf of
    Guinea partners.
        For example, last summer, United States Naval Forces Africa
    conducted Operation Junction Rain as part of the African Maritime Law
    Enforcement Partnership Program. Under this framework, United States
    Coast Guard law enforcement personnel partnered with Cabo Verdeans and
    Senegalese on board their naval vessels countering illicit trade and
    criminal activities. Capacity building remains paramount to continue
    the downward trend in piracy and address the growing threat of illicit
    trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons in the region.
        In Central Africa, the most visible nontraditional threat this past
    year was an Ebola outbreak in an unstable region in eastern Democratic
    Republic of the Congo. The outbreak, which began in August 2018, is
    presently the second most lethal in history. Furthermore, the medical
    response has been hampered by armed conflict in the region.
        External actors in Central Africa, such as Russia, have also
    undermined security and countered United States interests. For example,
    in the Central African Republic, Russia has bolstered its influence
    with increased military cooperation including donations of arms, with
    which it has gained access to markets and mineral extraction rights.
    With minimal investment, Russia leverages private military contractors,
    such as the Wagner Group, and in return receive political and economic
    influence beneficial to them.
        Recently, the President of the Central African Republic installed a
    Russian civilian as his National Security Advisor. The President also
    promised the armed forces would be deployed nationwide to return peace
    to the country by forces likely trained, equipped, and in some cases,
    accompanied by Russian military contractors. Russia's ability to import
    harsh security practices, in a region already marred by threats to
    security, while systematically extracting minerals, is concerning. As
    Russia potentially looks to export their security model regionally,
    other African leaders facing similar instability and unrest could find
    the model attractive.
    Southern Africa
        In comparison to a large portion of Africa, many countries in
    Southern Africa have suffered fewer consequences from terrorism and
    violent conflict. However, it still struggles with economic, societal,
    governance, and environmental challenges, including poverty, crime,
    social inequality, corruption, and lack of water and is influenced by
    China's growing presence in the region. The majority of United States
    Africa Command's engagements with Southern Africa aim to strengthen
    partnerships and build partner capacity for peacekeeping and crisis
    response, including infectious disease outbreaks.
        We work closely with our diplomatic and development partners to
    support and complement their efforts across Southern Africa. For
    example, the largest exporters of security in the region are Zambia,
    Malawi, and South Africa. Our primary investment in these countries is
    through title 22, through such programs as the International Military
    Education and Training program and Global Peace Operations Initiative,
    which are designed to improve interoperability and develop long-term,
    sustainable peacekeeping capability and capacity.
        Finally, in addition to our title 22 commitments, the South Africa-
    New York State Partnership Program is the oldest on the continent and
    offers the most meaningful United States mil-to-mil [military-to-
    military] engagements in South Africa. In 2018, South Africa hosted
    Africa's largest air show, the Aerospace and Defense Exposition, and
    the New York Air National Guard supported with two cargo airplanes, an
    unmanned aerial vehicle system, and 38 soldiers and airmen. Such
    engagements offer a low-cost solution to improve U.S. partnerships,
    particularly in a relatively accessible and neutral ground where our
    competitors seek influence in both the military and economic spheres.
    Ensuring Strategic Access
        Our efforts to ensure strategic access must also be viewed through
    the lens of competitor influence and coercive activities, which seek to
    gain advantages over the U.S. by moving faster in economic and security
    markets where we are constrained by our values and law. China is a
    strategic competitor which uses economic and security outreach to
    foster investment incentives, jobs, and infrastructure growth in return
    for access to Africa's strategic locations, natural resources, and
    markets. China has most successfully employed this model in Djibouti,
    holding 80 percent of the Government of Djibouti's debt, where access
    through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal
    remains a United States strategic imperative.
        Today, on the African side of the Red Sea and in the Bab-el-Mandeb
    strait, which encompasses Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt,
    the Great Powers and the Gulf States both cooperate and compete for
    real estate and port facilities.
        Along Somalia's northern coast, the semi-autonomous region of
    Somaliland is working with Dubai Ports World on developing its Gulf of
    Aden port city of Berbera. When development is complete, Berbera's
    location, close to the entry and exit point of the Bab-el-Mandeb
    strait, will be strategically valuable for both Somaliland and with
    whomever they choose to partner.
        Djibouti, a nation about the size of New Jersey, remains congested
    with a preponderance of foreign forces from the United States, France,
    Germany, Japan, and China maintaining bases and competing for access
    and airspace. Currently, the Djiboutians operate the Doraleh Port
    facility, through which passes 90 percent of all logistics and materiel
    for United States operations in East Africa. Continued access to the
    Doraleh Port Facility remains a U.S. strategic imperative.
        Just north of Djibouti, other geopolitical developments have had
    ramifications on the future of the Red Sea. With the normalization of
    relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Security
    Council lifting sanctions on Eritrea, other nations will undoubtedly
    look to Eritrea to unlock its coastline for Red Sea port access.
        Given its strategic location, coupled with its already developed
    infrastructure, Sudan is also looking to develop its Red Sea coast. In
    fact, Sudan recently entered into an agreement to allow Russia to
    explore natural gas fields off Port Sudan.
        Along with U.S. Central Command, the strategic evolution of the Red
    Sea remains a command priority, as we consider how Red Sea access can
    be maintained and expanded on the continent. It is imperative for the
    U.S. to not only maintain our status as the preferred security partner
    of choice, but also look to diversify our strategic access to the Red
    Sea.
        In 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa continued its annual
    exercise series, which consisted of Exercises Phoenix Express, Cutlass
    Express, and Obangame Express. These exercises aim to build the
    maritime capabilities of African partner nations, and Exercise Obangame
    Express this past year included participation from the Somali Maritime
    Police. Their participation marked the first time in nearly 30 years
    Somalia has participated in a security event outside its borders.
        United States Africa Command seeks to build partner networks and
    assist in establishing the security environment required for economic
    opportunity and trade to flourish. Through a whole-of-government
    approach, enhanced security fosters development and investment with
    initiatives such as The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
    Development (BUILD) Act. The BUILD Act facilitates private-sector
    investments and institutional engagements with low and lower-middle
    income countries. It also opens the door for United States companies to
    compete overseas and respond to China's increased economic engagement
    in Africa, most notably the $60 billion, largely in loans with some
    security and development funding, recently promised during the 2018
    Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
        Additionally, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, established by
    the U.S. Congress in 2004 to apply a new philosophy toward foreign aid,
    works with partner nations to promote growth in agriculture and
    irrigation, power and energy, and transportation infrastructure. In
    November 2018, the Millennium Challenge Corporation provided a $550
    million investment into the Senegal Power Compact to increase
    electricity access and reliability for one of Africa's fastest growing
    economies.
        The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) delivers skills training,
    education, grants, and research through local and international
    partnerships. USIP also serves as a conduit for various non-
    governmental organizations to interface with the broader diplomatic and
    development stakeholders in Africa. During 2019, USIP and United States
    Africa Command will host a symposium to discuss how non-governmental
    organizations can support and, when appropriate, integrate into the
    United States whole-of-government approach.
        United States Africa Command's component commands engage every day
    on the continent to enhance partner capability, where an important
    aspect of maintaining relationships is continued engagement between
    senior leaders. In 2018, senior leaders from United States Africa
    Command and its components conducted numerous key leader engagements,
    including visits to Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
    Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda.
        United States-facilitated exercises and conferences offer the best
    return on investment for our security assistance efforts and provide
    our African partners with access to American values, expertise, and
    professionalism. In October 2018, senior military leaders from 28
    African air forces and United States Air Forces Africa met in Morocco
    for the African Air Chiefs Symposium. This annual symposium provides a
    forum to discuss common defense issues, increase cooperation, and
    improve command and control of air operations.
        Throughout 2018, United States Army Africa continued its annual
    exercise series, which included Exercise Unified Focus in Cameroon,
    Exercise Justified Accord in Uganda, Exercise United Accord in Ghana,
    and Exercise Shared Accord in Rwanda. These exercises provided
    integrated training opportunities, with a focus on respecting the rule
    of law and human rights, integrating women into peacekeeping
    operations, and responding to allegations of abuse.
        Finally, in October 2018, led by the Command Senior Enlisted
    Leader, United States Africa Command hosted its second annual African
    Senior Enlisted Leader Conference with over 50 Africa enlisted leaders
    from 25 countries. African enlisted leaders engaged with senior United
    States and NATO enlisted leaders on professional development, civilian
    control of the military, respect for human rights, and caring for
    soldiers and their families. The conference advanced key
    professionalism concepts and training opportunities vital to sustaining
    African security and peacekeeping forces.
    Conclusion
        In summary, United States Africa Command remains poised to meet
    Africa's current and future challenges. The men and women of the
    command, our partners on the continent, and our collection of
    stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy
    and security environments. The National Defense Strategy and its
    supporting foundational documents have outlined the importance of long-
    term Great Power Competition with China and Russia and the need to
    limit the harmful influence of non-African powers on the continent.
        As the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan guides the
    command into the next decade, our partner-centric approach remains
    central to advancing United States interests in Africa. Much work
    remains, as United States Africa Command continues to contribute to the
    broad-reaching Diplomacy, Development, and Defense approach for further
    economic growth and prosperity in Africa.
        Finally, it remains an honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, contractors, and families of
    United States Africa Command. Together, their efforts have made the
    United States safer and kept Africa on the road towards prosperity.

        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Waldhauser.
        Admiral Faller.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Faller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify before you today with my
    shipmate, General Waldhauser. Thank you for the steadfast
    support you provide our men and women every day.
        I'm joined today by my wife, Martha, who is passionately
    committed to serving our military families and ensuring their
    readiness and welfare. Also with me are SOUTHCOM's Command
    Sergeant Major Brian Zickefoose, my eyes and ears, representing
    the backbone of our military, our noncommissioned officers, and
    Master Chief Stacie U'Ren, our dedicated gender advisor.
    Sergeant Major, Master Chief, and our human rights team work
    together to build professionalism both within our SOUTHCOM team
    and with our partners. Professional forces have legitimacy
    within their ranks and their populations. Professional ready
    forces build trust.
        The Western Hemisphere is our shared home. It's our
    neighborhood. We're connected to the nations in Latin America
    and the Caribbean by history, culture, and geography. From my
    headquarters in Dural, Florida, it takes me longer to travel to
    DC than it does to many of the countries in our area of
    responsibility. We're connected in every domain: sea, air,
    space, cyber and land. Our security and prosperity are
    inextricably linked. When our neighbors succeed, we succeed.
    When our neighbors are threatened, we are threatened. Our
    partnerships in this region are critical to the layered defense
    of our Homeland and to our collective ability to meet complex
    global challenges. Ultimately, we want enemies to fear us,
    friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to shine
    as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
        To ensure the security of the Homeland, SOUTHCOM works
    closely with interagency teammates: the Department of State,
    USAID, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
    Justice. Teamwork within the Defense Department, especially
    with Northern Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, is also
    critical to mission accomplishment.
        Over the past 2 months, I've traveled to Colombia, Trinidad
    and Tobago, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to get a
    firsthand view of the opportunities and challenges that
    directly impact the security of this Hemisphere. Criminal
    organizations, narcotraffickers, illegal immigration, violent
    extremists, corruption, and weak governments are principal
    among those challenges.
        The most disturbing insight, however, has been the degree
    to which external state actors, especially Russia, China, and
    Iran, are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere.
    Russia, in particular, enables actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua,
    and Cuba that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity. As
    a leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran's
    activities in this hemisphere are concerning.
        Venezuela. The situation in Venezuela is dire. Maduro's
    illegitimate government starves its people by using food as a
    weapon, while corrupt generals are rewarded with money from
    illegal drug trafficking, oil profits, and businesses, all at
    the expense of the population and other--and the rank-and-file
    military. Migration out of Venezuela is now over 300 million,
    creating a crisis for our friends in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador,
    and Peru. While Russia and Cuba and China prop up the Maduro
    dictatorship, the remainder of the world has united. SOUTHCOM
    is supporting diplomatic efforts, and we are prepared to
    protect U.S. personnel and diplomatic facilities, if necessary.
        I saw, firsthand, the impacts of this humanitarian crisis
    in Venezuela when I visited the United States naval ship
    Comfort. The solidarity and compassion displayed by Comfort's
    international medical team made a lasting difference in the
    lives of thousands. The United States of America provided
    Comfort as part of our enduring promise to the Hemisphere,
    while Russia flew nuclear-capable bombers. Who would you want
    as your friend? Who would you trust?
        Building strong partnerships is the best way to counter
    threats and turn the challenges of our hemisphere into
    opportunities. In this hemisphere, our neighborhood, a little
    goes a long way. We need the right, focused, consistent
    military, education, and presence. We cannot achieve positive
    results and influence outcomes without being on the playing
    field.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the
    opportunity to testify today. SOUTHCOM team--our civilians,
    military members, and our families--appreciate the support
    Congress has provided us. We will continue to honor the trust
    you and our fellow citizens have placed in us. I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
                                  introduction
        I want to thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for
    your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The men
    and women of our team work every day to earn the trust of partners in
    Latin America and the Caribbean. We are friends and neighbors, bound
    together by shared values and a shared stake in our common future. The
    nations of this neighborhood are connected in every domain--sea, air,
    land, space, and cyberspace. Our partnerships are vital to security and
    prosperity in this hemisphere, and to our collective ability to meet
    complex global challenges. We recognize that the success and security
    of future generations depend on how effectively we build trust with
    allies and partners in the hemisphere today, working with and through
    interagency partners like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Ultimately, we want enemies to
    fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to
    shine as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
        The strengths and opportunities of our hemisphere--democracy,
    respect for human rights and rule of law, and military-to-military
    relationships rooted in education, culture, and values--are matched
    with a troubling array of challenges and threats to global security and
    to our Homeland. These include natural and man-made disasters, weak
    government institutions, corruption, under-resourced security
    organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent
    extremist cells. China has accelerated expansion of its Belt and Road
    Initiative at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in
    Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports multiple information outlets
    spreading its false narrative of world events and United States
    intentions. Iran has deepened its anti-United States Spanish language
    media coverage and has exported its state support for terrorism into
    our hemisphere. Russia and China also support the autocratic regimes in
    Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which are counter to democracy and
    United States interests. We are monitoring the latest events in
    Venezuela and look forward to welcoming that country back into the
    hemisphere's community of democracies. Where threats are transregional,
    multi-domain, and global, the United States must renew focus on our
    neighbors and our shared Western Hemisphere neighborhood.
                                  partnerships
        Modest, smart, and focused investments in U.S. Forces and security
    assistance continue to yield meaningful returns in the form of partners
    who are ready to address threats shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
    Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of everything we do.
    USSOUTHCOM's mission is about the smart, focused use of force--not
    economy of force.
        Working from a foundation of mutual respect and shared interests in
    regional cooperation and interoperability, we are enhancing our
    partnerships with Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, which are forces for
    regional and global security. Argentina has reinvigorated military-to-
    military interaction, and co-hosted our annual South American Defense
    Conference. Peru continues a tradition of strong liaison officer
    exchanges with USSOUTHCOM and recently conducted training with a
    Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). We reinitiated
    security cooperation with Ecuador, and are moving forward with a
    renewed military-to-military partnership.
        In Central America, partners like El Salvador and Panama have
    stepped up cooperation in the area of counter-narcotics (CN); in
    addition, El Salvador co-hosted our Central American Security
    Conference last year. Honduras hosts our Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo
    at Soto Cano, providing a regionally-based security cooperation
    platform, the presence of which allows a rapid response capability. Our
    support to Guatemala's defense institution building efforts has helped
    its Ministry of Defense increase efficiency, transparency, and
    sustainability of its investments.
        Across the Caribbean, our partners continue to look at USSOUTHCOM
    as their security partner of choice. Trinidad and Tobago co-hosted our
    annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference, and thwarted a terror
    attack with the support of United States special operations forces
    (USSOF). Jamaica has stepped up its CN efforts, recently purchasing a
    maritime patrol aircraft that will support regional drug interdiction
    operations.
        We continue to expand our cooperation with allies and partners in
    humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions and counter-
    threat efforts, such as drug detection and monitoring, and support to
    interdiction operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Allies
    and partners contributed to nearly half of the successful drug seizures
    credited to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) last year. In
    addition to continuing cooperation in traditional areas like
    peacekeeping and drug interdiction, we are building interoperability
    for high-end expeditionary operations and in the space and cyber
    mission sets. In the past year, Brazil became the first Latin American
    country to sign a Space Situational Awareness Agreement, Colombia
    became NATO's first global partner in Latin America, and Chile led the
    maritime component of the world's largest international naval exercise,
    Rim of the Pacific--a first for a Latin American sea power. Later this
    year, Brazil will send a Major General to serve as United States Army
    South's next Deputy Commander for Interoperability, the first Brazilian
    officer to serve in this role.
        The majority of nations in this hemisphere share democratic
    values--including respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of
    law--and interests in advancing democracy and countering radical
    ideologies. These shared values and interests are the foundation of our
    military-to-military relationships. We reinforce and build on these
    shared values and interests through institutional capacity building
    efforts, information and intelligence sharing, education, personnel
    exchanges, and exercises. In the past year, we have improved the
    quality, depth, and frequency of information and intelligence exchanges
    with partners, producing joint products on transnational issues of
    mutual concern.
        We also build on those shared values by working with our partners
    to elevate and integrate all elements of professionalism as a
    foundational component of every security conference we conduct. The
    professionalism of U.S. Armed Forces is the bedrock of our legitimacy,
    both as a fighting force and in our ability to build trust with our own
    people. Professionalism encompasses human rights, jointness, gender
    integration, and non-commissioned officer development.
        Education and training--funded by the Department of Defense's
    William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the
    Department of State's International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) program--and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases made
    possible by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are force
    multipliers. Our partners prefer U.S. education and training, and these
    exchanges facilitate mutual understanding of values, doctrine, and
    culture that enable us to operate together more effectively. Our
    participation in multinational exercises like UNITAS (a naval
    integration exercise), PANAMAX (defense of the Panama Canal), and
    Brazil's CRUZEIRO DO SUL (regional air exercise) is another important
    way we increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective
    readiness.
        In the absence of an enduring United States military presence in
    most of Latin America and the Caribbean, recurring rotations of small
    teams of USSOF, soldiers, marines, and National Guard personnel \1\
    play central roles in building trust and enabling the exchange of
    critical expertise. By carefully tailoring these rotations, we ensure
    they build the readiness of U.S. Forces as well as building partner
    nations' capabilities. On any given day, small USSOF teams conduct over
    30 missions in support of about 12 partner nations throughout Latin
    America and the Caribbean. Many live and work alongside regional
    forces, building the trust, confidence, and lasting relationships that
    reinforce our status as the partner of choice and enhance our ability
    to respond quickly to contingencies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The State Partnership Program (SPP) links a unique component of
    the Department of Defense--a state's National Guard--with the armed
    forces or equivalent of a partner nation, leveraging National Guard
    capabilities for engagements that build enduring relationships and
    advance mutual defense and security goals. Twenty-four of the SPP's 75
    partnerships worldwide are in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
    including a partnership with Venezuela that is currently inactive.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Humanitarian support efforts like medical engagements, civil
    affairs activities, and the recent deployment of the hospital ship USNS
    Comfort demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with
    neighbors, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations.
    The international medical team aboard Comfort treated more than 26,000
    patients in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. This team conducted
    more than 100 training engagements, relieving pressure on regional
    health systems caused by the Venezuelan migration crisis and giving
    local medical providers more flexibility to deliver care. The
    integration of more than 100 military and non-governmental organization
    (NGO) personnel from 10 other nations helped us build trust, tell our
    story effectively, and enhance regional perceptions of the United
    States. The U.S. military medical and command staff also returned from
    the deployment more ready, able to operate with foreign partners, and
    prepared to provide critical care to U.S. warfighters. These impacts
    will far outlast Comfort's 70-day deployment.
        Strengthening our partnerships is our best bid for addressing
    regional and global threats. We work by, with, and through partners to
    enhance the security of both the United States and our partners, and to
    help grow bilateral security relationships into regional and global
    security initiatives. Our networked approach to countering threats
    recognizes that nothing happens without robust and enduring
    partnerships across the U.S. interagency, region, and civil society.
    Our ultimate advantage is using the power of our ideals, ideas, and
    people to build trust with friends and create dilemmas for competitor
    nations. This is the primary dimension in which we expand the
    competitive space.
                                    threats
        Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian
    allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated
    threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats
    like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel
    drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty,
    corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires
    whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can
    sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic
    opportunity. Often, improving security is the first step.
    Nation State Competition and Malign Actors.
        Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western
    Hemisphere, often at the expense of United States interests. Both
    enable--and are enabled by--actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba
    that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of
    those three states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress
    across the region. As the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the
    world, Iran's activities in the region are also concerning.
        Russia continues to use Latin America and the Caribbean to spread
    disinformation, collect intelligence on the United States, and project
    power. Russia's deployment of two nuclear capable bombers to the
    Western Hemisphere was intended as a demonstration of support for the
    Maduro regime and as a show of force to the United States. Russia has
    also deployed intelligence collection ships to the region, as well as
    an underwater research ship to Latin America capable of mapping
    undersea cables--information it could use to cut critical lines of
    communication during a future crisis. Additionally, Russia is
    establishing joint space projects with partners in the region, which it
    could eventually leverage for counter-space purposes in the event of a
    global conflict.
        China utilizes the same predatory, non-transparent foreign lending
    practices it has implemented around the world to exert political and
    economic leverage in certain countries. China has pledged at least $150
    billion in loans to countries in the hemisphere, \2\ and 16 nations now
    participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, many countries
    are beginning to recognize the long-term consequences of mortgaging
    their future to China, as we've seen in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Sierra
    Leone, Djibouti, and the Maldives. In the future, China could use its
    control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its
    global operational posture. Particularly concerning is China's effort
    to exert control over key infrastructure associated with the Panama
    Canal.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) ``China-Latin
    America Finance Database.'' Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China's presence and activities at Argentina's deep space tracking
    facility is also concerning. Beijing could be in violation of the terms
    of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities,
    and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target United
    States, Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese
    firms like Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region,
    placing intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at
    risk. If governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to
    gravitate toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and
    willingness to share information over compromised networks is likely to
    suffer.
        Russia and China aggressively court students from Latin America and
    the Caribbean to attend their military schools, offering free training
    in cyber, policing, and CN. Since 2012, security officials from nearly
    all Central American countries and nearly half of South American
    countries have received Russian CN training. These engagements,
    combined with Russia's Counter Transnational Organized Crime Training
    Center (CTOC) in Nicaragua, potentially provide Moscow with a regional
    platform to recruit intelligence sources and collect information.
        Russia and China also support their authoritarian partners in Cuba,
    Venezuela, and Nicaragua, often through propaganda and other
    information-related tools. Moscow, for example, provides positive media
    coverage of its authoritarian allies, papering over repression and
    socioeconomic inequity in Nicaragua. Moscow also seeks to undercut
    United States policies and regional relationships through information
    operations and intelligence collection, and by influencing political
    systems, public opinion, and decision makers. Russia published hundreds
    of articles last year in its Spanish and Portuguese-language media that
    deliberately distorted our defense engagements.
        The linkages between these malign actors are negatively
    reinforcing. Emboldened by Russian and Chinese \3\ support, Venezuela
    is engaging in increasingly provocative actions, threatening Guyana's
    sovereign rights and jurisdiction and providing sanctuary for National
    Liberation Army (ELN) fighters that threaten Colombian stability.
    Russia and Cuba are both complicit in Venezuela's descent into
    dictatorship, but Cuba is particularly influential in supporting
    Maduro. Following the Cuban Government's advice and assisted by its
    intelligence machinery, Maduro is adhering to the autocratic blueprint
    Cuban leaders have ruthlessly executed for over six decades. Nicaragua
    appears to be going down a similar path following Cuba's playbook, with
    Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela enabling President Ortega's repression of
    his political opposition. These relationships give Russia, in
    particular, a foothold close to our Homeland. As tensions increase with
    Russia in Europe, Moscow may leverage these longstanding regional
    partners to maintain asymmetric options, to include forward deploying
    military personnel or assets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ For example, China is Venezuela's single largest state
    creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than $50 billion in
    debt, even as their democracy vanishes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Iran is also looking to reenergize its outreach after reducing its
    efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. It has
    deepened its anti-United States influence campaign in Spanish-language
    media, and its proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks
    throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via
    drug trafficking and money laundering. Last September, Brazil arrested
    a Hezbollah financier in the tri-border area near Paraguay and
    Argentina, and in recent years Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia have
    arrested multiple Hezbollah-linked suspects.
    What we're doing.
        We are increasing cooperation with partners to better understand,
    expose, and counter the malign activities of Russia, China, and their
    authoritarian allies. We are also working more closely with other U.S.
    combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure that globally
    integrated plans and operations are informed by threats and
    opportunities in this hemisphere. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff's globally integrated planning is exactly the right approach for
    addressing the transregional, transnational nature of today's threat
    environment.
        Within the region, we have to be on the playing field to compete.
    The same presence that strengthens our partnerships sends a powerful
    signal to Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (the six
    negative state actors) that the United States is committed to the
    region and to the security of our neighborhood.
        Strong partnerships--founded in effective and transparent
    institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, institutional
    capacity building, education, exercises, and presence--are our primary
    bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and
    are bolstered by our work together on military professionalism. Our
    work with partners to reinforce the hemisphere's substantial, but
    incomplete, progress in human rights is even more critical in light of
    Russia and China's own disregard for human rights. USSOUTHCOM's Human
    Rights Initiative--which just celebrated its 20th anniversary--has
    conducted more than 200 human rights engagements that have enhanced the
    ability of partner nations to build professional forces that have
    legitimacy in the eyes of their populations.
        As I told this Committee during my confirmation hearing, the
    Department of State's security assistance programs--like IMET and FMF--
    are strategic game changers. Since 2009, IMET has provided
    opportunities for over 55,000 students from the region to attend
    schools like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
    (WHINSEC), the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Inter-
    American Defense College (IADC). These numbers aren't just seats in a
    classroom. They represent lifelong relationships with future leaders
    \4\ who trust us, understand our culture and doctrine, and are prepared
    to work with us on a range of challenges.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ IMET has trained numerous individuals who have gone onto serve
    in key leadership positions, including the former President of Chile,
    Trinidad and Tobago's Chief of the Defense Staff, and Argentina's
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who helped foster our
    reengagement with the Argentine military after the political dynamics
    changed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to strengthening partnerships, we support interagency
    efforts to hold individuals accountable for supporting the activities
    of negative actors. For example, in collaboration with the Department
    of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), we provided
    information that supported the development of sanctions against
    Venezuelan Government officials involved in drug smuggling, money
    laundering, corruption, and serious human rights abuses.
    Drugs and Transnational Criminal Organizations.
        Drug trafficking threatens our national security and that of our
    regional partners. Drug overdoses killed more than 70,000 Americans
    last year, and nearly half a million people across the world in 2017.
    \5\ Fueled by drug demand--especially ours--drug traffickers
    transported enough metric tons of cocaine (that we know of) from South
    America by air, land, and sea last year to cover four football fields--
    and the majority of it was headed for our streets. Upon landfall, this
    bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller loads and smuggled
    into the United States, making large interdictions exponentially more
    difficult. In addition to cocaine, traffickers also transport heroin,
    synthetic opioids like fentanyl, and precursor chemicals from China.
    While Mexico remains the primary source for heroin smuggled into the
    United States (and China the prime source of fentanyl), the Dominican
    Republic is emerging as a regional transit point for opioid trafficking
    into major United States cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Centers for Disease Control, National Health Statistics; United
    Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018 World Drug Report.
    Geneva.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Established drug trafficking routes and techniques provide
    opportunities for the illegal movement of other commodities and
    people--including terrorists. Several years ago, the Islamic State in
    Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dedicated an article to a scenario in which its
    followers could leverage established trafficking networks to make their
    way to our border. This remains a potential vulnerability we watch as
    closely as we can.
        Drug trafficking comes with significant costs, in more ways than
    one. After marijuana, cocaine remains the second most valuable
    commodity in the global drug trade, \6\ generating dirty money that
    flows directly into the hands of criminal groups. In many cases, these
    groups are better funded than the security organizations confronting
    them. Dirty money fosters corruption and insecurity that tear at the
    fabric of communities, erode institutions of governance, and drain the
    region's potential. The vicious side effects of illicit trade also cost
    American taxpayers billions of dollars every year. This is more than a
    national security threat; it's also an economic one that affects every
    nation in our neighborhood.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Global Financial Integrity, ``Transnational Crime and the
    Developing World.'' March 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What we're doing.
        Leveraging capabilities like information-sharing, network analysis,
    and the Department of Defense Rewards Program, we support operations by
    DHS and the DOJ's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
    and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to interdict drug shipments
    and disrupt transnational criminal networks. For example, our
    intelligence support--enabled by our Army Military Intelligence
    Brigade--to operations by Homeland Security Investigations and other
    interagency partners helped dismantle one of the largest maritime
    illicit smuggling networks in Central America last year.
        At the tactical level, JIATF-S continues to deliver steady returns
    on investment and improve its efficiency in targeting drug movements.
    Last year, it helped keep the equivalent of 600 minivans full of
    cocaine off U.S. streets. But even this isn't enough to keep pace with
    the increasing demand and the volume of drugs flowing north through the
    Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. While improving efficiency, we still
    only successfully interdicted about six percent of known drug
    movements. \7\ Doing more would require additional ships and maritime
    patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and
    international partners that form the backbone of JIATF-S. The U.S.
    Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provide
    the bulk of JIATF-S's maritime and air capabilities. The United
    Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands lead multiple interdiction
    operations in the Caribbean, while we focus U.S. assets on the Eastern
    Pacific. Last year, 17 international partners conducted nearly half of
    the interdictions supported by JIATF-S. U.S. Northern Command remains
    our closest and best Department of Defense partner and we continuously
    look for ways to enhance our teamwork, recognizing that threats exploit
    our geographic combatant command boundaries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Figure based on JIATF South utilization of Consolidated
    Counterdrug DataBase (CCDB) data.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our capacity-building activities, whether at the tactical,
    operational, or institutional level, play a key role in this fight. For
    example, after years of USSOF training, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales
    Navales (FEN) is now among Central America's most competent and
    responsive maritime interdiction units. U.S. training, equipment, and
    interagency teamwork have also enabled Costa Rican and Panamanian
    forces to partner seamlessly with the USCG in interdiction operations.
    Partners are also working with us to address their ability to sustain
    capabilities that we have developed together. For example, Colombia has
    increased its eradication and interdiction efforts while also
    conducting increased operations against the ELN.
    Drivers of Migration.
        Violence, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and impunity for gangs
    and transnational criminal organizations are some of the main drivers
    of insecurity that fuel migration to our southern border. Fourteen of
    the top 20 most violent countries in the world are in Latin America and
    the Caribbean. \8\ Migration challenges are exacerbated by weak
    institutions, corruption, violence and instability wrought by
    authoritarian governments. Migration from Venezuela is on track to
    approach the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, straining the capacity
    and resources of its neighbors. The United Nations estimates that 5.3
    million Venezuelans will have fled their country by the end of 2019--
    with over 2 million leaving this year alone. \9\ Last year, thousands
    of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica and other neighboring countries to
    seek protection, a number that will likely grow as President Ortega
    keeps a tight grip on power. Many Haitians continue to leave their
    country in hopes of finding economic opportunity elsewhere.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Igarape Institute (Regional think tank), ``The World's Most
    Dangerous Cities.'' March 31, 2017 (available at https://
    igarape.org.br/en/the-worlds-most-dangerous-cities/)
        \9\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 14, 2018.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What we're doing.
        We are working closely with Central American and other partners to
    share information and provide training and equipment that enhance their
    ability to secure their borders. We assist partners in developing
    strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, and
    sustainable defense sectors through organizations like the William J.
    Perry Center, \10\ the Center for Civil Military Relations, and the
    Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, which help our
    partners build trust and confidence with their citizens. Through
    collaboration with the Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental
    partners, our civil affairs teams execute low cost, high impact civic
    action projects that help partner nations and extend governance to
    vulnerable communities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ The Washington, DC-based William J. Perry Center for
    Hemispheric Defense Studies, one of DOD's five regional centers,
    develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and
    security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common
    challenges in order to develop effective and sustainable institutional
    capacity, and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   terrorism.
        As Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan recently noted,
    transnational terrorism poses an immediate threat to the Western
    Hemisphere. \11\ Groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Qaida
    operate wherever they can garner support, raise funds, and pursue their
    terrorist agendas. ISIS and other groups have demonstrated their
    ability to inspire and recruit violent extremists to plan attacks in
    South America and the Caribbean. While the travel of foreign fighters
    from Latin America and the Caribbean to Iraq and Syria has diminished,
    the potential return of battle-trained extremists remains a threat.
    Another potential threat is posed by smuggling networks that move
    Special Interest Aliens from East Africa, the Middle East, and
    Southeast Asia through the hemisphere to attempt entry into the United
    States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Remarks at the Western Hemisphere Ministerial on
    Counterterrorism, December 11, 2018.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What we're doing.
        USSOUTHCOM leads several annual exercises with interagency partners
    and partner nations to improve interoperability, preparedness, and
    response for a possible terrorist attack. Our neighbors are taking
    increasing steps to address the threat of terrorism in the hemisphere,
    as evidenced by the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) development of a
    regional counter terrorism strategy in collaboration with the United
    States Department of State and USSOUTHCOM. In addition to these
    efforts, we work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help
    regional partners build their capacity to combat weapons of mass
    destruction, another issue of growing interest to several partners.
        We work closely with lead federal agencies and regional partners to
    detect and disrupt terrorist activity and strengthen counter-terrorism
    (CT) legislation. Trinidad and Tobago recently strengthened its CT
    legislation (including the creation of several new terrorism-related
    criminal offenses), and other countries are also updating theirs. In
    collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and
    other interagency partners, we work with Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
    Chile, and others to share information and strengthen regional capacity
    to manage extremist threats. United States training and biometrics
    equipment are improving the ability of partners to control their
    borders, and in the past two years, we've helped interagency partners
    stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism.
    Additionally, our small civil affairs teams work closely with U.S.
    embassies and USAID to counter radicalization and recruitment and
    amplify moderate voices in local communities.
        Detention operations also play an important role in the global
    fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the
    battlefield. The medical and guard teams at Joint Task Force Guantanamo
    (JTF-GTMO) continue to conduct safe, legal, and humane detention
    operations. In line with Executive Order 13823, we are examining ways
    to address medical support, capacity, and infrastructure issues
    associated with continued detention operations.
    Natural disasters.
        Our ability to respond rapidly in crisis is an important aspect of
    USSOUTHCOM's mission. Our neighborhood experiences approximately 50
    natural disasters every year, of almost every type--from hurricanes to
    earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, mudslides, and more.
    Protecting citizens before and after disaster strikes is a core mission
    for every military in our hemisphere. The question is not whether, but
    when, we will face the next disaster, and we must be ready.
    What we're doing.
        Last October at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas
    in Cancun, Mexico, the United States Secretary of Defense and his
    counterparts from across the hemisphere committed to strengthening
    regional military cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief in support of lead civilian agencies. In support, USSOUTHCOM
    works closely with partner nations, Department of State, USAID, NGOs,
    and multinational organizations like CARICOM's Caribbean Disaster
    Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Regional Security System
    (RSS) to build national and regional response capacities. Our training,
    exercises, and low-cost humanitarian projects have helped our partners
    to be more prepared to respond to emergencies in their own countries,
    and more able to assist their neighbors in crisis. As an example, last
    year the Jamaican Defense Force deployed a team to Dominica for 60 days
    to provide medical aid and other emergency assistance in the wake of
    Hurricane Maria. We are assessing our authorities to ensure we can
    provide the necessary support for our partners to take on increasing
    responsibility for disaster responses.
        When United States military support is required, our forward-
    deployed JTF-Bravo in Honduras, along with our annual SPMAGTF
    deployment, provide operational flexibility and agility. I'm proud to
    note that last year we integrated Chilean and Colombian officers into
    the SPMAGTF leadership team for the first time. Brazil will join the
    SPMAGTF this year, in addition to co-leading our UNITAS AMPHIB
    multinational naval exercise. This iteration of UNITAS will practice
    the establishment of a multinational task force to support humanitarian
    response, a capability we haven't employed since the Haiti earthquake
    in 2010. Building on this initiative, we are working with allies and
    partners to develop a concept for a scalable multinational task force
    that works within existing security cooperation frameworks to enhance
    our collective ability to respond rapidly to crises.
     congressional support for ussouthcom's mission and this neighborhood.
        I invite you to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that
    we value this region--the only region that is tied to our Homeland by
    all domains--and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood
    safe.
        I also thank the Congress for providing the Department's fiscal
    year 2019 appropriations prior to the start of fiscal year 2019, which
    minimized the impacts of the current partial government shutdown to the
    Department of Defense. As we look ahead, confidence in stable budgets
    and ensuring all of our U.S. Government security partners, like our
    USCG, are open for business will reassure friendly nations that we are
    reliable security partners.
    Support for our people.
        After several years of running the detention facility at JTF-GTMO
    as a temporary mission, we have been directed to keep the facility
    open. Much of the current infrastructure used by the JTF has long
    outlived its useful lifespan. We are undertaking a comprehensive review
    of the existing facilities to determine requirements for mission
    success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. Closer
    to home, we are working to find ways to better support our personnel,
    including exploring ways to mitigate the limited military support
    services in the Miami area. I will keep this Committee informed of our
    progress.
    Capabilities to defend our Homeland.
        We appreciate the support of the Congress to ensure the continued
    operations of the USCG, which provides the majority of U.S. maritime
    assets supporting JIATF-S operations. The new National Security Cutters
    have proven very effective in the drug detection and monitoring
    mission, leveraging increased intelligence collection capability and
    on-scene endurance. Maritime patrol aircraft are also crucial to
    detection, monitoring, and interdiction by the USCG and partner
    nations. Continued congressional support for the new Offshore Patrol
    Cutter will enable the USCG to maintain its capacity in the hemisphere.
    While those new ships are beginning construction, maintenance funding
    is essential to keep the aging Medium Endurance Cutters--some of which
    are close to doubling their planned 30-year service lives--hard at work
    supporting JIATF-S. We also appreciate the support of the Congress to
    resource our intelligence capabilities like human intelligence (HUMINT)
    and innovative analytic tools utilized by the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) that
    allow us to exploit publicly available information and intelligence.
        Thanks to congressional support, we contracted a Multi Mission
    Support Vessel (MMSV) to help fill capability gaps. True to its name,
    the MMSV was used for SOF training exercises and will now be employed
    to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement in CN and CT
    operations. Increased U.S. joint and naval presence in regional
    operations and exercises will encourage partner forces, to include
    navies, to participate in regional security efforts such as HA/DR, CN,
    and CT. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is mission fit for this region
    and we welcome its deployment this year. We are also leveraging our
    growing science and technology portfolio--including innovative projects
    like small-satellite and aerostat surveillance programs--to mitigate
    our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps, and help the
    Services to test new capabilities that hone the U.S. military's
    technological advantage.
    Capabilities to strengthen our partnerships.
        We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that streamline
    security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security
    partner of choice. Your continued support to programs and capabilities
    that help build trust and long-term relationships with partners
    enhances our ability to defend the Homeland by providing more capacity
    for defeating threats and sending a visible signal to our partners (and
    our competitors) about the depth of our commitment.
                                  conclusion.
        Partnership goes a long way in this part of the world. The right
    focused and modest investments in this hemisphere yield a solid rate of
    return for the United States and our partners. Our competitors benefit
    when we don't invest in our neighborhood.
        Our partners share our vision of a hemisphere that is a beacon of
    peace, prosperity, and opportunity. They want to work with us to
    achieve this vision. It is in our national interest to work with them.
    Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. All right. Thank you very
    much.
        First of all, let me apologize for being late. I had a very
    small part to play in the National Prayer Breakfast, so I had
    to choose Jesus over you guys.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. But, that's behind us now, so we're ready
    to get back to work.
        First of all, let me just go ahead and--with the areas that
    you're working so hard in. I've been concerned about China for
    a long time, because we saw it coming. In fact, in Djibouti,
    that was the first time--it's my information, anyway--that
    China actually did devote its attention to starting a function
    in a country outside its city limits. That happened in
    Djibouti. Now they're as far south in Africa as Tanzania.
    They're making things happen. I mean, everywhere you go, the
    same thing, they say, ``America tells us what we need, and
    they--China--gives us what we need.'' They have also--you know,
    I--we're all committed to the IMET program. They actually, in
    China, as you and I discussed in my office, for the first time,
    they've invited 50--50 of their leaders showed up in China, in
    Beijing, out of 52 nations, talking about--how close they want
    to be with them and trying--what they're trying to do is expand
    the IMET program, that we've been so successful in, into China.
    So, anyway, that's something that is there, and I'm sure you're
    feeling some of the effects of that.
        I'd ask both of you--because it's happening also in
    SOUTHCOM, what are the effects right now that you're seeing
    from China that weren't there until recently? Starting with
    you, General.
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        You know, it's interesting about Djibouti. It is the first
    overseas base that China has developed.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, the first one. Now, people are not
    aware of that, that this is the first base that they've
    established outside of their city limits.
        General Waldhauser. That's correct. You know, it puts us in
    a very unique position, because we have a Chinese base roughly
    several miles from the front gate of our location in Djibouti.
    We have some interesting engagements with safety flight,
    weapons training on the ranges, and so forth. We have a
    requirement to work with them to work through some of those
    issues.
        But, that said, overall on the continent, China has been
    there for quite some time, and they have worked at this
    relationship. What we try to do, from the AFRICOM or DOD
    perspective, is try to show that we are the best partner--the
    type of training we give them, the weapons, perhaps, that are
    sold by the United States of high quality--and try to make sure
    that our influence remains. It's a difficult task.
        You mentioned the issue of all the security chiefs into
    Beijing. You know, as an anecdote--I have no way to prove this,
    but in April of 2017, we, in AFRICOM, invited all the chiefs of
    defense to Stuttgart for a conference. We had about 40 or so
    turn up. I believe the Chinese read our playbook, and I
    believe, after that particular engagement, they saw it, and
    they wanted to make sure that they were on the same playing
    field as we were.
        But, moreover, I would say that, in addition to the Chinese
    defense--or their defense group, in September of this year,
    China had a forum for cooperation between China and Africa,
    where over 50 of the heads of state of Africa went to Beijing,
    and where President Xi rolled out $60 billion or so of loans
    and grants and programs.
        The Chinese work at the relationship, and that's one of the
    things that we try to combat in AFRICOM by just being good
    partners.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. It's been my experience in the
    continent that China never comes in unless there's something
    they can gain from it. Of course, they use their own labor, and
    they're not doing that much of a benefit. Nonetheless, they
    have resources. I can't figure out where it all comes from, but
    much more than we seem to.
        The same thing, you don't hear so much in SOUTHCOM about
    the activity of China. Briefly, what are your thoughts on that?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, in SOUTHCOM, they're invested in
    over 56 ports. I recently returned from a trip to Central
    America, and my small team, the entire hotel floor right below
    ours was completely booked by Chinese people. They're offering
    schools, all expense paid, 13 days for a half-day school, no
    strings attached, and cash for the countries to do what they
    want. Again, they're there, and they're there in force, and
    they have a long-term vision, economically and militarily. Our
    best counter is education and being there. The IMET program is
    huge for our partners. They want to come to the United States.
    They want to go to our schools. Our schools remain the world's
    best and something to emulate.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. This is my own opinion, but I think
    some up here agrees with this. Of all the coms [combatant
    commanders] that we have, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are the two that
    are the most under-resourced. I'd like to have you be very
    blunt--just very briefly--do you agree with that? What do we
    need to do to correct it?
        General Waldhauser. Senator Inhofe, I do agree that we're
    under-resourced. However, we do make the best and the most of
    what we have.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I know that.
        General Waldhauser. Certainly, with reconnaissance assets,
    ISR assets, Medevac assets, and also non-episodic, but where we
    can count on----
        Chairman Inhofe. Of those you just named, which are the
    least resourced right now? ISR----
        General Waldhauser. As any COCOM would say here, we would
    prefer more ISR for our counter-VEO [violent extremist
    organizations] fight.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Yeah.
        Do you agree with that, Admiral?
        Admiral Faller. I would agree with that. We could also use
    some naval assets, as well, Senator. I know our Navy needs a
    bigger navy. We need some of that.
        Chairman Inhofe. I understand that. You're doing great
    work.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        Admiral Faller, with respect to Venezuela, your views would
    be very much appreciated, but there's a presumption that the
    military, at this point, is the key, sort of, power base for
    Maduro, and that, as long as they stay with him, he will be
    incentivized to stay in Venezuela. Is that accurate, from your
    perspective? What are we doing to try--and what are the
    Venezuelans--the legitimate President, what is he trying to do
    to pull the military away?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, Venezuela has about 2,000
    generals, more than all of NATO combined. A majority of them
    are on the payroll of Maduro via illicit drug trafficking and
    corrupt businesses. That's what he's using to buy their loyalty
    and their protection. In addition, Cuba, as I mentioned in my
    opening statement, pretty much owns the security around Maduro,
    and is deeply entrenched in the intelligence service. We can go
    into more detail in closed session. That remains the center of
    gravity for Maduro.
        The legitimate government of President Guaido has offered
    amnesty and a place for the military forces, most of which we
    think would be loyal to the constitution, not to a dictator, a
    place to go. I think the diplomacy path is that path that we're
    trying to support.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Over many, many years, I have had complaints about the
    human rights abuses in America--Honduras and Guatemala,
    particularly. In fact, there's a report, regionally, that--
    provided by the Sisters of Mercy, that a former member of the
    Honduran Congress who's been in prison for suggesting in a
    press conference, who might have been involved in the killing
    of Berta Caseras, who was a prominent environmentalist in
    Honduras. This is one example. How are we conditioning our
    security assistance and our human rights training in these
    countries to promote the rule of law?
        Admiral Faller. During my recent trip, Senator, I
    emphasized professionalism as the key to being a legitimate
    force. Professionalism, a big part of that is human rights.
    It's like blood running through your veins. If you're not
    legitimate to your people, you're not going to have a force
    that is going to, ultimately, secure that population. We had
    those discussions with all the leaders of those countries, the
    chiefs of their defense. We have a human rights team that goes
    in there and performs workshops. Part of the steps that must be
    taken by the embassy and our country teams to certify the
    deliverance of those aides includes a certification that
    they're going to go to vetted forces and forces that have
    complied. We're looking at that every day, Senator. It's very
    important to our efforts.
        Senator Reed. Let me turn to General Waldhauser. But,
    there's a--I think, an issue that both of your AORs share. It's
    under-resourcing, both military, but also on the--the AID,
    State Department, et cetera. When you talk about capacity-
    building, both of you are very eloquent and very focused, but
    I've traveled through AFRICOM, as you know, General Waldhauser.
    You were hosted when I returned. In Somalia, one of the reasons
    al-Shabaab is so influential is that they're able to collect
    taxes, administer justice, provide basic public services, the
    civilian capacity. The question here now is even with all the
    military effort we put in, if we don't have the civilian
    capacity component, I don't think your mission is going to
    succeed. Can--you can start and--you have similar problems, I
    think, in South America, also.
        General Waldhauser. Senator, thank you.
        To just provide some context, you know, today, the first
    time since 1991, we have a USAID Mission Director in Mogadishu
    with the Ambassador. Now, this is a very important step,
    because, in December of 2017, USAID signed a--over $300 million
    compact with the country of Djibouti. This is very significant.
    There are issues of education, agriculture, of government
    business, and so forth. It's very important now that we have an
    Ambassador in the country, alongside with a senior USAID rep,
    who can oversee and synchronize those development efforts and
    make sure that the return on investment of that $300 million is
    well spent.
        Senator Reed. But, that is a good example of how it's
    working, but there are many more examples where we don't have
    the resources, we don't have Ambassadors. The Ambassador in
    Mogadishu arrived, what, a few months ago, finally, after
    years? So, I mean, there is this complementary civilian-
    capacity issue that, if we don't get right, you can do your
    jobs very well, and we will not succeed.
        Admiral Faller, your points? Because there are many of the
    same situations in South America and Latin America.
        Admiral Faller. Exactly the same situation. The military
    needs to be the small ``m'' in support of the big diplomacy and
    the big economic ``e.'' I see that, where it's working. An
    example would be in El Salvador. We've made some significant
    progress in the reduction of violence. This has been done by
    targeting in really bad neighborhoods, some 50 locations, where
    USAID comes in with public and private partnerships and
    partnership with the Government. We're there in small presence
    to connect those vetted police force with the military.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        I think we're all aware that we're going to have a closed
    session after this. Anything that gets into an area that's more
    appropriate in a closed session, you can pass that on to that
    one.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Waldhauser, I'm just curious. In your opening
    statement for the record regarding Djibouti, you note that our
    continued access and the ability to use, in an unimpeded basis,
    the Doraleh Container Port is critical to our logistical
    efforts in and around East Africa. Given China's increased
    presence within the port complex, do you have any concerns that
    our access and usage could be at risk, short or long term?
        General Waldhauser. Senator Rounds, thank you.
        You know, last year at this time when I testified, Djibouti
    had just taken that port over from the UAE. Now, there's been
    some international court issues of adjudication. I won't get
    into that today. But, the Djiboutians have run that port now
    for over a year. Based on data that we get from the Embassy,
    the Djiboutians have, quite frankly, done a better job, been
    more efficient and have had better throughput than when the
    Emirates ran the port. I have spent time directly with
    President Guelleh, talked with him and with the Ambassador--our
    Ambassador there, and spoke with him about our concern that we
    need unimpeded access. Because it's no secret that roughly 98
    percent of the logistics support for Djibouti, as well as
    Somalia and East Africa, come through that port. That port is
    one of five entities in the overall Djiboutian port. Our access
    there is necessary and required.
        We have the word from President Guelleh that we will always
    have access there. They have no intention of selling out to
    China. Those are his words. His actions, thus far, have backed
    that up, so I have no reason not to believe that.
        But, the bottom line is, I still remain concerned about our
    access there, because if we were denied access or had limited
    access, it would have a significant impact on our activities in
    East Africa.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        I'm also curious. I want to just change subjects a little
    bit. You made a comment in your statement for the record
    pertaining to Algeria. You note that United States relations
    with Algeria continue to foster cooperation and further
    regional stability. Can you give us some examples of what
    AFRICOM can do to foster the United States-Algerian security
    relationship?
        I just want your thoughts, also, with regard to the
    security implications of the Tindouf refugee camps for Algeria.
    That refugee camp has been there for 40 years, and there
    clearly is an issue there. I've been there once, and I plan on
    being there again. I'm just curious, what are your thoughts
    about that situation? How big of an issue is that for security
    for Algeria, who is clearly allowing these folks to be there,
    and they're providing humanitarian aid at this time? I'm
    presuming that we're offering some assistance there, as well.
        General Waldhauser. Let me start by talking a little bit
    about our relationship with Algeria. First of all, I would say
    that the Russians' weapon sales on the continent, that's one of
    their number-one customers. They sell high-end weapons to
    them--ships, submarines, that type of thing. The Russians, who
    sell the majority of equipment on the continent, Algeria
    remains a big partner of theirs.
        That said, I've personally visited Algeria, met with senior
    officials there, and the AFRICOM relationship is one that is--a
    crawl-walk-run stage. We have limited engagements, but we work
    some issues with equipment and repairs, we have visits
    periodically. We've participated in some of these D-Day
    activities, and so forth. So, although it's an arm's-length
    relationship, we do all we can to continue to foster that.
        Now, with regard to the refugee camps, you know, there are
    12.3 million internally displaced people all over the
    continent. This has a lot to do with conflict, it has a lot to
    do with famine, drought, and the like. All these particular
    camps require a lot of care and the ability for our
    nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to work there freely.
    This has been a significant issue over the last few years,
    because some of the terrorist groups don't adhere to the rules
    of war or the laws of war with regards to NGOs. So, these
    camps, they're perpetuated all over the continent, and the one
    in Algeria, though, I'm not directly familiar with.
        Senator Rounds. Okay. Well, I understand that it has to do
    with relationships between Algeria and Morocco, challenges for
    the group of people that have been literally out of their--what
    they consider to be--their homeland for nearly 40 years now. It
    seems to me that, at some stage of the game, some additional
    attention to that would be appropriate. I'm not sure whether it
    starts with you or with the State Department, but most
    certainly it's an item that I think should be of interest.
        Admiral Faller, I'm just curious. You mentioned that, most
    certainly, the U.S. Navy could use some additional assets. On
    your wish list, if you were to request additional resources,
    specifically what would be the resource that would be number
    one on your list of requested items or equipment?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, the additional ISR, maritime
    patrol aircraft, helicopters, coupled with ships. The Navy
    plans to deploy a littoral combat ship later this year. That's
    mission fit for the kind of missions that we'd have down there,
    which would involve partnering with nations, training,
    humanitarian assistance, possibly, but also the drug
    interdiction. So, that would be number one, top of my list,
    sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both very much for your many years of service.
        General Waldhauser, we will miss you. I'm sure you won't
    necessarily miss coming before this Committee, however.
        You reference, in your written statement, General
    Waldhauser, the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative. In the
    2019 Defense budget, we included $4 million in funding for
    full-time gender advisors. I was pleased, Admiral Faller, that
    you introduced your gender advisor, who is here this morning.
    AFRICOM has been commended as a leader in implementing the
    Woman, Peace, and Security Initiative. Can you talk about what
    you have seen, and the success of this initiative, and how
    you've seen it be helpful in Africa?
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Shaheen--I think the
    strategy we've applied over the last few years is just: take
    little things and keep moving forward. For example, out of the
    AFRICOM headquarters, we run a program every year where we
    bring about 15 to 20 females from the African continent and
    take them all over the United States to talk to various
    military leaders, and so forth, to give them, basically, a
    leadership seminar. We also have seen growth--for example, we
    run communications seminars in Capo Verde, which is an island
    off of western Africa. The number of females who have come to
    those particular engagements has increased significantly over
    the last few years.
        You also have an example of--we have a Flintlock Operation,
    which is a Special Operations main exercise of the year, which,
    by the way, will start here later this month in Burkina Faso.
    Last year, when it was in Niger, USAID was able to bring
    together leaders--women leaders, business leaders, bring them
    to this exercise, and have a discussion, in a forum with
    military members, about women and peace and what women can
    contribute.
        The bottom line is, we kept chipping away at small
    programs. We think they're having an impact. We're pretty proud
    of how well we do.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I agree. I think you're to be
    commended. Can you talk about what kind of impact you see? Why
    does this make a difference?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think, first of all, it's just
    exposure. I mean, to see that, you know, a mixed-gender
    military is a better military. With various--you know, we have
    a large continent, with different countries and different
    cultures, and so forth, and it exposes them to our leadership,
    it exposes the African military male leaders to what the female
    can bring, if you will, to the military. So, I think, from that
    perspective--it's really a bottoms-up approach.
        Senator Shaheen. Great.
        Admiral Faller, I want to switch topics, because we are
    still struggling with the opioid epidemic here in America. New
    Hampshire has had, consistently, unfortunately, one of the
    highest overdose death rates in the country from opioids. Much
    of what we're seeing in New Hampshire is heroin that has been
    produced in Mexico, but also in a number of Central American
    countries. It comes in by boat and by air into the United
    States. At one point, we had a--before you became the head of
    SOUTHCOM, we had a briefing with then-head of SOUTHCOM, who
    said that we interdict a very small percentage--my recollection
    was about 20 percent of what we see that we could interdict--
    because we are lacking in resources. Can you update us on
    whether you're seeing an improvement in those numbers and what
    you need to have in order for us to do a better job with
    interdicting those drugs coming into the country?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, it's a national security crisis.
    Over 70,000 deaths, as you're well aware, from your home State.
    While I'd say we've made progress--2017-2018 were record
    interdiction years--we've got a lot of work to do. We're not
    there. We're focused on our partners. El Salvador stepped up.
    Guatemala, Panama. But, there are other partners that need to
    do more. We need some additional assets--some ships, some
    force--we call them force packages from the ISR that we would
    need to detect what you'd need to interdict. More work to be
    done, for sure, in this problem, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm glad you mentioned El
    Salvador, because New Hampshire's National Guard has a State
    Partnership Program with El Salvador. Can you talk about the
    difference that those partnership programs make in a country
    like El Salvador?
        Admiral Faller. It's one of our main efforts. They bring a
    lasting, long relationship to the State. Before I went to El
    Salvador, I had a videoconference with your general, and we
    shared--he shared more with me than I was able to share with
    him. I sent him my trip report afterwards. It really helps us
    build capacity. They go in there, and they work on that
    military-to-military engagement. They also work on civil
    affairs projects, where they'll go out, build a school, dig a
    well, and other things that we need to help stabilize the
    conditions for the citizens. It's very important, Senator.
    Thank you for the support.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I'm out of time, but, General Waldhauser, the last time you
    were here, I asked you about the girls who had been kidnapped
    by Boko Haram, and what we're doing in AFRICOM to help the
    Nigerians, in particular, address that issue. Do you have any
    update for us?
        General Waldhauser. Ma'am, I really have no update. I would
    just tell you that, of the 276 girls who were kidnapped in
    April of 2014, I think the number of 163 have been recovered.
    There's 113, or thereabouts that still are unaccounted for. I
    could talk in more detail in a classified session. But, the
    bottom line is----
        Senator Shaheen. Okay.
        General Waldhauser.--there has not been much progress, from
    what I can see, in terms of getting any of those remainder
    back.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator McSally.
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, gentlemen, for your leadership.
        General Waldhauser, it was about 12 years ago that I was
    sent to Stuttgart as part of the AFRICOM transition team to
    stand up your Command. We had just a handful of us, no
    resources, no facilities, no assets at the time. We were going
    to be the kinder, gentler command, without a whole lot of
    operational focus. I was the J-33, Chief of Current Operations.
    We very quickly realized, you know, Africa continues to be a
    potential hotspot for terrorist activity, both on the east
    coast and the west coast and other areas in ungoverned spaces.
    We had to ramp up very fast to be able to take on that task.
    However, you know--and I see, in your testimony, you're talking
    about al-Shabaab and the challenges in Somalia. At the time,
    when we were running the time-sensitive targeting operations,
    we watched--literally watched, with our ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance], hundreds and hundreds and
    hundreds of al-Shabaab-trained militants out there in the
    middle of nowhere, with no collateral-damage concerns, being
    trained at training camps, and then being released, because
    the--at the time, the civilian political leadership in our
    country didn't want to--didn't feel needed to do anything about
    it. Like a cancer growing and metastasizing, we continued to
    see their strength grow, and their capabilities grow, but we
    just didn't do anything about it. Do you have the authorities
    you need to address the terrorist threat in your area of
    responsibility now, unlike back when I was there? I've got bad
    memories about all that. Also, you know, how does that fit
    within our vital national interests and the National Defense
    Strategy?
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator. There's a lot
    there, and I hope we are living up to your expectations of how
    AFRICOM is performing. It's a little bit better than when you
    were there, starting things up.
        Senator McSally. I know.
        General Waldhauser. Look, let me just take the strikes on.
    I'll try to be brief, but I think it's important to provide
    some context.
        In April of 2017 we were given authorities, from the
    national security apparatus, to initiate, to be able to have
    offensive capabilities inside of Somalia. That, combined with
    the legitimacy of a federal government there, our strikes are
    tied to their strategy. Our legitimacy comes from our
    authorities as well as the Federal Government that we're tied
    in with. We had strikes for 7 months in the year of 2017, where
    we had 35 strikes. Last year, in 2018, we had 47 strikes for
    the overall 12-month period. Thus far this year, we've had, I
    think, 12, so far. The point I want to make is that the strikes
    are tied to the transition strategy that the federal government
    of Somalia and the Somalian National Army are trying to
    execute. In other words, we're trying to support their plan.
        Senator McSally. Right.
        General Waldhauser. President Farmajo has indicated that
    his main effort for security is Mogadishu. His transitional
    strategy has that in mind.
        Finally, I would just say that, at the end of the day,
    these strikes are not going to defeat al-Shabaab, but they're
    going to provide the opportunity for the Federal Government and
    the Somali National Army to grow and assume the security of
    that country.
        I would just say that my bottom line is, the strikes won't
    defeat. We know that they are causing problems. We know that
    they are deterring. It's an open question as to how much, but
    we know it's causing al-Shabaab problems, giving this
    opportunity for the government. But, the bottom line is that
    the Somali National Army needs to grow, it needs to step up,
    and it needs to take responsibility for their own security, not
    only for our strikes, but the overall international community
    that's tied there. We're talking about the European Union,
    we're talking about the United Nations, the U.K., Turkey. We
    all have pieces of the puzzle down there, and one of our pieces
    is the strike aspect.
        The bottom line is, the Somali National Army needs to grow,
    needs to step up. We have made this point very clear, both the
    new Ambassador and myself, on numerous occasions to President
    Farmajo and Prime Minister Khayre. They know this. They've got
    to step up. It's up to them to take advantage of the
    opportunity that they have right now.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller, I just have a little bit of time left, but
    I want to get back on to the counterdrug and the drug flow in
    your AOR. I know you're short of resources that you need. What
    are you seeing, as far as the trends of the cartel activity
    over water, over land, submarines, light aircraft? I mean,
    they're nimble, and they're innovative. What are the trends?
    Are they still going, kind of, over water, up until then--over
    land, from Mexico up, or, like, what are you seeing the trends,
    and what else do we need to combat it?
        Admiral Faller. They are very nimble, and they're agile and
    in many cases, better funded than the security forces they
    face. They adapt. We're seeing them go further out to sea, as
    far out into the Pacific as around the Galapagos and up. We're
    seeing them integrate with fishing vessels in a different
    manner. We're seeing them with lower-profile vessels, including
    some submerged vessels. In the air, we're seeing them use
    Venezuela as a launch point to fly out of Venezuela. Cross-
    border traffic, if you will, using Venezuela's current state as
    a launch point up through the middle of the Caribbean and then
    into remote airfields throughout Central America. As they
    adapt, we adapt. But, they adapt faster, and they have more
    flexible resources. We're trying to get after it. But, it's a
    challenge.
        Senator McSally. Thanks.
        I'm out of time. I appreciate it.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator McSally.
        Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and your
    distinguished service over many years.
        Admiral Faller, last year, I asked Admiral Tidd about the
    situation in Venezuela, including the role of military advisors
    from Cuba. Certainly, a lot has changed since that meeting. I
    want to follow up on the question that Senator Reed asked that,
    basically, related to the military. Your response was that
    there are more generals in Venezuela than there are in NATO. My
    question is: If Maduro's going to be really relying on this
    military to prop him up, what is the extent, to the everyday
    soldiers, the enlisted folks, the discipline in the military?
    Do those generals really have command over that military?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, the leaders, including the Cuban
    guards that completely surround the illegitimate Government of
    Maduro, seem to have a grip on the top level. What we read in--
    at this level, that we can talk about more in a classified
    session--that the rank-and-file are starving, just like their
    population. I had the opportunity to go on the Colombian-
    Venezuela border to one of our medical camps--that was
    operating off the Comfort, and see some of these kids that had
    lost 25-30 pounds in a year. They were stick thin. They had
    never had medical attention. We think that condition affects a
    large swath of the population. We think that that population is
    ready for a new leader, Senator.
        Senator Peters. Admiral Faller, you also mentioned some of
    the additional assets that you need: ISR and ships. You
    mentioned the littoral combat ship coming online, and how
    that's going to contribute to the fulfillment of your mission.
    Could you give us some sense of the status and timing of that,
    and how you see that being fully developed in the months and
    years ahead?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, we expect to have a littoral
    combat ship this year, and that will be a big benefit for our
    exercise program, for our engagement with partners, and because
    of the flexibility it brings for counternarcotic interdiction.
    Counternarcotic will be its first mission. Then we forward to
    continuous presence, moving forward.
        We're working with our Navy. They have readiness
    challenges, and they don't have enough ships. I think that's
    been discussed well before this Committee. We have the support
    we need. We look forward to the assets.
        Senator Peters. In addition to those assets, I know your
    predecessors have talked about the fact that the Navy and the
    Southern Command has white hulls. That's the U.S. Coast Guard.
    That performs brilliantly in those counternarcotics missions,
    as well as other missions related to your task. You know, I
    visited Coast Guard units in Michigan who were incredibly
    stressed as a result of the Government shutdown. They're
    concerned about their families, particularly junior enlisted,
    that were living on the edge. You have men and women in the
    Coast Guard being deployed away from home, worrying about their
    families. Could you talk a little bit about the impact of the
    shutdown on morale and the ability to execute the mission?
        Admiral Faller. Sir, Monday morning, I had the opportunity
    to stand on the deck of the Coast Guard cutter Ford with
    Admiral Schultz, the Commandant of the Coast Guard. This crew
    of 110 of America's finest had deployed over Christmas with
    record-number seizures. Seventeen metric tons of cocaine, which
    is hundreds of lives saved in the U.S. They did that deployment
    in large part, without pay and without adequate parts, because
    that was affected by contracting. It was difficult for Admiral
    Schultz and I to address some of their questions. They had
    remarkable resiliency and a remarkable attitude. They are our
    main battery. During that period, there was nine Coast Guard
    cutters deployed, counternarcotics missions, some 1600 Coast
    Guard men and women working for United States Southern Command,
    and it did have an impact. We're thankful that the shutdown's
    over, Senator.
        Senator Peters. That's why we can't have any more
    shutdowns, for that very reason, to make sure that our men and
    women of the Coast Guard are getting paid, like every other
    member of the military out there defending us. I appreciate
    those comments.
        General Waldhauser, we have talked in this Committee quite
    a bit about China's influence in Africa and how it continues to
    increase. You mentioned, in your opening comments, that Russia
    is also increasing its involvement. Would you please elaborate
    on that involvement to the Committee, and why we should be
    concerned about Russian involvement on the continent?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the issue with Russia
    has to do with influence. I think, in recent months over the
    past year, they perhaps got more involved in mineral
    extraction, but, to a large degree, it's still a matter of
    influence, especially in areas we're not or especially in areas
    where they can say that the United States or the U.K. or
    Western partners are perhaps backing away from Africa. It's, I
    think, clear that their strategy along the northern part of
    Africa, southern part of NATO, if you will, in the
    Mediterranean, to have influence inside Libya, for example, the
    relationships across that country, they want to have--across
    the continent--they want to have influence on the continent.
        I would just point to the Central African Republic right
    now, where the Wagner group has about 175 trainers, where some
    individuals are actually in the President's cabinet, and
    they're influencing the training, as well as, at the same time,
    having access to minerals in that part of the country. We're
    concerned that that model might be looked at or viewed
    positively by other countries, in terms of their ability to
    train and their ability to influence the government at the
    presidential level, as well as then getting involved in
    extraction of minerals.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Faller, can you talk about Cuba's intelligence,
    security, military influence in Latin America, and what they're
    doing, and how we can combat it?
        Admiral Faller. I Can't talk about Cuba without talking
    about Russia. Russia is entrenched in Cuba, weapons systems and
    support. Looking across Latin America, we see Cuba
    inextricably, intertwined in all elements of Venezuela. In
    fact, the National Security Advisor called it ``Cubazuela''
    yesterday. I would agree with that characterization. We see
    that in Nicaragua, as well. It's not helpful to democracy, and
    it's an autocratic way of life that runs counter to, really,
    the principles of the hemisphere, which are very much a
    democratic hemisphere.
        Senator Scott. The sanctions that we've imposed on
    nationals in both Cuba and Venezuela, have you seen them have
    any impact? Have you seen anybody change their action as a
    result of them?
        Admiral Faller. We're watching that closely. We're watching
    the intelligence. There's a discussion of the impact. We are
    seeing impacts. But, we haven't seen the desired result, which
    is a peaceful, democratic transition to a legitimate
    government, yet, Senator.
        Senator Scott. The sanctions we've done against individuals
    in Cuba--and we've done that over a period of time. Have you
    seen--has anything happened?
        Admiral Faller. It doesn't seem to have affected the
    overall calculus of the Cuban regime, other than harden it,
    solidify it, and tie it more closely to Russia. But, I think
    it's almost like deterrence: you don't know what happens when
    you don't have them, Senator. It probably has an impact. We
    don't see it. I would recommend--full-court pressure works.
        Senator Scott. Okay. In the Venezuelan military, have you
    seen any cracking, from the standpoint of what we've been doing
    over the last--especially the last 2 weeks? Has anything
    changed?
        Admiral Faller. Certainly, there's been readiness aspects
    of their military that we've watched very closely. It's a
    degraded force. But, it's still a force that remains loyal to
    Maduro, and that makes it dangerous. We're looking for signs of
    those cracking, and we can talk, in the closed session, on some
    more details and trends we're seeing.
        Senator Scott. Okay.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I'd like to ask you about a question----
        Well, first of all, thank you both for not only your--being
    here today, but for your service and all you do for this
    country.
        General, I'd like to ask you about an article yesterday by
    Reuters concerning the cutoff of assistance to Cameroon because
    of concerns about human rights abuses by the Cameroon
    Government. That program halted--included C-130 aircraft, a
    number of different things. That report indicated there was a
    2017 report by the U.S. State Department that listed a number
    of significant human rights violations and abuses that were
    observed in the Cameroon Government. Could you comment on what
    we're doing there, other than just this halt? Are we making
    progress on trying to get that government to stem the tide of
    their human rights violations?
        [The article referred to follows:]

        U.S. Halts Some Cameroon Military Assistance Over Human Rights:
                                    Official

    Lesley Wroughton

        WASHINGTON (Reuters)--The United States said on Wednesday
    it was halting some military assistance to Cameroon over
    allegations of gross human rights violations by its security
    forces in the northwest, southwest and far north regions.
        A State Department official said the United States had
    terminated a C-130 aircraft training program, and halted
    deliveries of four defender boats, nine armored vehicles and an
    upgrade of a Cessna aircraft for Cameroon's rapid intervention
    battalion.
        Furthermore, the United States had withdrawn its offer for
    Cameroon to be part of the State Partnership Program, a
    military cooperation program, the official said.
        ``We do not take these measures lightly, but we will not
    shirk from reducing assistance further if evolving conditions
    require it,'' the official said. ``For the time being, other
    programs will continue.''
        Cameroon has cooperated closely with the United States in
    the fight against Islamist militant group Boko Haram in West
    and Central Africa. But rights groups have accused authorities
    of using the fight against Boko Haram to crack down on
    political opponents, and make arbitrary arrests and torture
    people.
        Authorities arrested opposition leader Maurice Kamto in
    January, accusing him of mobilizing dissent against President
    Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982.
        Biya has been accused by the opposition and rights groups
    of cracking down in the Anglophone Southwest region to root out
    armed separatists trying to end his grip on power.
        Tens of thousands of people have been displaced in Nigeria
    and neighboring Chad, Niger and Cameroon during Boko Haram's
    campaign to carve out an Islamic caliphate in northeast
    Nigeria.
        ``We emphasize that it is in Cameroon's interest to show
    greater transparency in investigating credible allegations of
    gross violations of human rights security forces,'' the State
    Department official said.

        Admiral Faller. Senator, thank you. Let me try to explain
    this. I'll start by why we're in Cameroon and what we're doing
    there.
        We talked this morning about the Chibok girls from a couple
    of years ago, but Boko Haram is the issue there. In 2015, they
    were the number-one terrorist group on the planet. Depending on
    what you read, they have killed over 20,000 people, some
    estimates quite higher than that, over this timeframe, the
    Chibok-girls issue, all kind of atrocities. They are an
    extremely volatile group that needs to be dealt with. So, in
    that region, our mission is to train the counterterrorism
    forces in northern Cameroon that deal with Boko Haram. We have
    been doing that for several years, and, quite frankly, the BIR,
    the brigade of rapid intervention, is the top-shelf
    counterterrorism unit inside Cameroon. They have performed
    well, and they--and that training, by the way, has, certainly,
    law-of-war and battlefield ethics. So, that's why we're there.
        The issue on the Anglophone piece, I won't go into detail
    on that. I think the article, plus the video this morning, did
    a very good job of explaining the history of how it got to the
    point where we are today. In October of 2017, when it came,
    kind of, to a head, the Anglophone states said, ``We want to
    actually form our own state, the Ambazonia state.'' There have
    been issues there with atrocities, issues with allegations of
    law-of-war issues. This is something that brings all this to a
    head.
        Over the last several months or so, the State Department
    has put on hold several security force assistance programs.
    Right before the election in October, I, with the Ambassador,
    went and paid a visit with President Biya, and we had a very
    direct conversation with him with regards to investigation into
    these atrocities, transparencies of these atrocities, and
    appropriate battlefield behavior. Since that time, the State
    Department has made the decision not to allocate significant
    money, but, at the same time, they've released some money
    that's been on hold to things like ScanEagle and Cessna
    aircraft that assist in the Boko Haram fight in the north. We
    still have programs that we continue with them, all kind of
    small engagements, as well as exercises. We did have the--we
    talked about the State Partnership Program with Nebraska. We
    put that on hold. In conjunction with the Ambassador, AFRICOM,
    we decided not to pursue that, because it wouldn't have been a
    good place for that particular group to be, so we put a halt to
    that.
        The bottom line is, right now in Cameroon, they have been a
    good partner with us, counterterrorism-wise, but you can't
    neglect the fact that they have--there are alleged atrocities
    in what's going on there. We continue to take our cues from the
    State Department and from the Ambassador, and our level of
    engagement will continue, but not get out ahead of what the
    State Department would say if we have to take other actions. We
    were very emphatic with President Biya that the behavior of his
    troops, the lack of transparency, could have a significant
    impact on our ability to work with them.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that.
        Admiral, I was struck by a couple of things with your
    testimony. Number one, I was struck by the charts that you
    provided. Because I think people are not paying as much
    attention. We've always heard of--since the Cold War--the
    influence of Russia, but the Chinese influence in our backyard
    is just incredible to me. I was struck by your initial comments
    about our shared responsibilities, our shared security with our
    neighbors, and how we share so many things together. I'm new to
    this Committee, and so I've been reading a lot, and I've seen
    that there are initiatives for the Pacific and in Europe. Would
    some similar initiative to that be appropriate for Central
    America or for SOUTHCOM?
        [The charts provided to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Admiral Faller. Senator, I think a big idea, an initiative
    that recognizes the importance of our neighborhood, recognizes
    what goes on right here in areas connected by sea, land, air,
    space, cyber, is important to our shared security and our
    future, would be of great benefit. I worry, Senator, that we're
    not going to be present on the field in enough numbers to play
    the game. We've got to be there to influence the outcome and
    the results.
        Senator Jones. All right. Well, thank you, sir. We'll send
    you some more Mobile-built LCSs.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    today and your service to our Nation, for all those men and
    women who serve underneath you in Africa Command and Southern
    Command.
        Admiral Faller, I want to return to your comments about the
    presence of Cuba and Russia in Venezuela. You said, earlier,
    Cuban guards completely surround the Maduro Government. Does
    that mean that Maduro is dependent on the Cuban security and
    intelligence forces for his continuation in office?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I think it's a good sense of where
    the loyalty of the Venezuelan people are that his immediate
    security force is made up of Cubans.
        Senator Cotton. So, the men that surround Maduro, like our
    Secret Service, are Cubans, not Venezuelans.
        Admiral Faller. That is my understanding and assessment of
    the situation.
        Senator Cotton. So, Venezuela's intelligence security
    services are so corrupt, so incompetent, so disloyal, so
    sclerotic that Maduro cannot even count on his own personal
    safety in his bed at night, on his own people.
        Admiral Faller. That's a fair assessment, as I understand,
    Senator.
        Senator Cotton. How far does that go throughout the
    Venezuelan security and intelligence services? Does Nicolas
    Maduro have to depend on Cubans and Russians on the streets to
    beat his own people to keep them in line?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I'm not--beyond the--what I
    characterize--I'm not aware of the details, but we watch that
    closely. We've seen reporting of Russian security forces being
    flown in. We're looking for evidence of how that will play out.
    Certainly this is an area that has our focus, as well as all
    our partners in the interagency.
        Senator Cotton. That was another point. You mentioned
    that--you said you can't speak of Cuba's presence in
    Venezuela--let me stop myself.
        Can you estimate, in this setting, how many Cuban security
    and intelligence officers there are in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Sir, I don't have that number. I'd take
    that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We estimate the number of Cuban security and intelligence
    personnel in Venezuela is somewhere in the thousands; this
    number is in addition to the over 20,000 medical personnel Cuba
    provides to Venezuela.]

        Senator Cotton. Is it fair to----
        Admiral Faller. I'm----
        Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say there are lots?
        Admiral Faller. I'd say there's--there are many, sir.
        Senator Cotton. And----
        Admiral Faller. I also would mention, Senator, the presence
    of China has not been helpful in a diplomatic way. I'll leave
    that to the diplomats. China's in there, and they're involved
    in cyber in ways that are absolutely not helpful to a
    democratic outcome.
        Senator Cotton. You talk about Russians traveling into the
    country. Have we seen an increase in Russian presence in
    Venezuela in the last 2 months as the National Assembly began
    to take its seat and President Guaido declared himself as
    interim President, and the United States and so many other
    nations around the world have recognized his legitimacy?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, it's hard, with Russia, to figure
    out what they're really up to. I----
        Senator Cotton. You don't say.
        Senator Cotton. There was reports last week by Russian
    official TASS news agency that I was actually on the Colombian-
    Venezuela border, and they rolled that with B-roll footage of
    amphibious landings and helicopter assaults. I was actually
    walking out of Senator Rubio's office at the time. I don't
    think the truth goes very far when it comes to their media,
    sir.
        Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you for those comments, Admiral
    Faller, about Venezuela.
        You mentioned China's activity in Venezuela in the cyber
    domain. They obviously are very active, as well, in what you
    might call debt diplomacy through their Belt and Road
    Initiative. Secretary of State Pompeo was in Panama last
    October cautioning that nation, and all nations who are
    participants in China's Belt and Road Initiative, about what it
    could mean for their sovereignty. Obviously, China has
    foreclosed in the port outside Colombo, in Sri Lanka. Malaysia
    recently left the Initiative because of China trying to throw
    its weight around. What's been the results of Secretary
    Pompeo's visit in the region? What feedback are you getting
    from some of these Belt and Road Initiative members?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, the states in the region, the
    countries, they want to continue to partner us, but I've
    cautioned the leaders that I've met with that, ``While you
    might want to do that, if you leverage your ports and many of
    your businesses, including your IT infrastructure, to Chinese
    companies, with no strings attached and limited understanding
    of what the internal workings are, that you've actually put
    yourself in jeopardy of having a meaningful security
    relationship with us. It gets to a point where I won't be
    allowed or authorized to share information, because I just
    don't know where that information is going.'' So, I've been
    very emphatic about that, in terms of how it would affect us
    being a partner of choice. This is my concern to other
    questions that have been asked about what this hemisphere looks
    like, 10, 15, 25 years from now, and who the partner of choice
    is. We've got to be present, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Faller.
        General Waldhauser, one question for Africa. This is a
    little bit outside the warfighting domain, but the American
    military is called upon to do a lot outside that domain around
    the world, especially in your area of operations. Nigeria has
    its elections next weekend. Nigeria is the seventh-largest
    country in the world, way larger than Russia or Mexico or
    Japan. An important ally of ours. What are the prospects for
    that election? Does it appear that it will be free and fair,
    and that either party, should they win, will continue to be a
    partner of the United States?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, we're very much aware of the
    elections on February 16th. From the military perspective, we
    will watch that from the standpoint of actions leading up to
    and what will happen afterwards. We are--on the intelligence
    reports, we hope it'll be a peaceful election, but I think our
    sights are set on forward, and not in the rearview mirror,
    meaning that whoever would win, that now, okay, let's sit down
    and talk about where we are and how we can best help, whether
    it be the displaced people and the issues with--humanitarian
    issues in northern Nigeria, whether it's their army and their
    work against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. So, my answer to
    that question is, let's get the election over. They're watching
    this today, by the way. I mean, my comments are going to be
    watched in Nigeria, and it's very important that I don't sway,
    either way.
        Senator Cotton. Sure. Well----
        General Waldhauser. The bottom line is, whoever wins, we
    want to sit down with them and now, how do we move forward and
    improve the situation?
        Senator Cotton. Good. Well, I appreciate that answer. Of
    course, their election is a choice for the Nigerian people, and
    we want to have a good, stable relationship with whoever wins,
    to help continue that partnership.
        Thank you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
        We've already discussed and gotten a good idea of how
    complex your missions are in both of your areas of operation.
    Our own vital national interests are threatened by violent
    extremists, by great-power competition, and all of multifaceted
    challenges that you face. As I looked at recent reporting on
    SOUTHCOM, much attention has been on the dictator's effort to
    cling to power; in AFRICOM, the persistent presence of violent
    extremists. Are these events merely symptoms of a larger
    systemic problem in both regions? What, in your assessment, are
    the prime drivers of instability in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM? How
    are your commands postured to deal with the root causes? It's
    one thing to deal with the symptoms, but what are we doing to
    really get to the root causes that are occurring in both of
    your regions?
        General Waldhauser. I'll go first, Senator. Thank you very
    much.
        I'll use Niger as an example. Niger has a population of
    about 19 million. About 50 percent of those are under the age
    of 15. They certainly are in a very difficult area of Africa,
    meaning that they have a pressing from all sides, whether it be
    ISIS-West Africa, JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin], in
    the west; whether it be AQ [al Qaeda] coming down through the
    Algeria-Nigerian border on the way to Mali; they have ISIS-West
    Africa on their eastern flank. They're in a tough situation.
    What goes unnoticed sometimes is the whole-of-government
    approach that is used in Niger. For example, USAID has about
    $150 million a year that they use for things like education,
    especially for young girls, for government, and--government
    infrastructure, and so forth. Moreover, the Millennium
    Challenge Corporation--they're on the--I think, second year of
    a 5-year compact down there which has to do with agriculture,
    watering crops, and so forth. If you look at the security
    assistance that we're providing, and you add to that USAID's
    effort and the Millennium Challenge compact, that's, I think, a
    good example of a whole-of-government approach of how we're
    trying to deal with a country that has some very significant
    security challenges.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller?
        Admiral Faller. We do have some bright spots. I'd like to
    point out, Brazil has been a exporter of security in our
    history, same with Colombia. The trajectory of both our mil-to-
    mil relations with those countries is very positive. In the
    current Venezuela situation, we're sharing a lot of
    information, we're looking at this as a regional solution.
    Chile commanded, in our largest exercise, the Rim of the
    Pacific. But, around the region, corruption, weak governance,
    lack of jobs, these are things that are of effect. The military
    is a part of this whole government solution.
        I saw this in Honduras. I was in an outreach center run by
    USAID. It was right next to a partnered police station. We had
    a few Army civil affairs people there meeting with some young
    men and women that had been supplied jobs. I asked the one
    individual--he had gone all the way to the United States-Mexico
    border, and turned around and came all the way back. He walked,
    as part of the caravan, but he came back. I said, ``Well, why
    did you come back?'' He said, ``It was pretty scary for me. I
    felt that I should come home.'' I said, ``Well, why did you
    go?'' He goes, ``The family next to us was starving--or we were
    starving, and the family next to them was starving, but across
    the street, they had some food because their father had made it
    to the United States and was sending remittance back.'' So, at
    the heart of this is the want of a better life and economy, and
    the want to have your kids go to school. All citizens of all
    the world deserve that.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Looking at this whole-of-government approach, how easy has
    it been--or, for you each, to work with other executive branch
    agencies to provide a coordinated whole-of-government approach?
    Is this happening--for example, you may be happening in Niger,
    but is it happening in other parts of Africa? How are we--are
    we consistent in applying this approach? What can we do to
    really help you be part of this, this team, so that we can get
    at the root causes?
        General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, I would say that the
    AFRICOM staff has individuals from those agencies that work
    very closely with us on a daily basis. Moreover, as dollars
    become tight, our return on investment needs to be
    demonstrated. As a consequence, we have to be better stewards
    of our efforts, in terms of where we want to place our
    emphasis. We need to coordinate that and synchronize that with
    this agency, because, really, it gets, I think, to the larger
    issue of influence, and the China influence, as well. We need
    to demonstrate that we can compete with them. We may not be
    building soccer stadiums or government buildings, but, at the
    same time, we're teaching them how to be better farmers, we're
    showing them what education can do for them. So, the bottom
    line for us is, we need to continue to work with our partners,
    which we have good relationships with, by the way. This
    development, diplomacy, and defense effort in the AFRICOM--at
    State Department and with AFRICOM is very, very positive
    experience.
        Senator Duckworth. Admiral?
        Admiral Faller. We have representatives from every
    interagency at my headquarters, and they sit in at every
    meeting. We're working this problem set hard, and we're work it
    in conjunction with country teams in the Embassy. A consistent
    level of resourcing is important, and recognizing this is a
    problem that will take years to solve, not months or days.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and, of course,
    to the men and women in your commands. We thank them for what
    they do for all of us. To the family members that are here,
    thank you so much for the support that you give to your loved
    one. So, thank you.
        Admiral Faller, I'll start with you. We've talked about a
    lot of different groups that are engaged in SOUTHCOM, but what
    I'd like to do is dive in a little bit to Hezbollah. They do
    have a notable presence in South America. As we saw last year,
    Argentina and Brazil, they both took action against Hezbollah
    assets in their respective countries. We've heard, from
    regional authorities, that they are aware of Hezbollah's
    presence in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and
    Paraguay. Can you go a bit further into the threat that
    Hezbollah presents in SOUTHCOM? What are our interests in
    making sure that they are not affecting us? What are those
    national security interests for us and our partners?
        Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is present. We watch them
    closely. It points to the importance of partnerships in the
    intelligence-sharing relationships that we are keen to develop
    and strengthen even further, because a lot of what's required
    to monitor them is human intelligence, and those nations know
    their terrain best.
        Hezbollah's connection to Iran can never be understated.
    Iran is the largest sponsor of state terrorism in the world.
    There is a nexus there that goes back. We watch that working,
    in partnership with the other combatant commands, Defense
    Intelligence Agency, very, very closely. We look for trends,
    indications, and warnings. A terror threat anywhere around the
    world could be a threat of our Homeland.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate you highlighting how Iran is
    interconnected here. We talk about some of those near-peer
    threats with China and Russia in the SOUTHCOM AOR, but we also
    need to recognize that Iran is a player, as well. So, thank you
    for making that connection.
        Do we have sufficient information-sharing authorities in
    place, then? You've mentioned the need to communicate with
    friends and allies. Do we have the right authorities available?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, we have to work that on a country-
    by-country basis. It's a key thing that we look at when we do
    our country engagements. So, the answer is, we never have
    enough. We have countries where we want to sign additional
    agreements. We have to get assurances with them about what
    they'll share and who they'll share it with. It goes back to my
    concern about who owns the IT infrastructure in a given city or
    a given fusion center. We're constantly looking at this. I fly,
    Sunday, to Brazil for my meeting with their new military
    leadership. This will be one of our top areas of discussion. I
    would say that's a very healthy intel-sharing relationship
    that's growing, and we've been able to really work with our
    partners, because sharing information intelligence builds
    trust, frankly. Building trust is what is going to ensure our
    long-term interests in this hemisphere are safeguarded.
        Senator Ernst. That is very good. We've also talked about
    the role that Special Operations plays in achieving your
    objectives in SOUTHCOM. Part of that ties back into Hezbollah
    and others. What are some of the biggest challenges that you'll
    face with regard to resources or authorities when it comes to
    our Special Operations and how we employ them in SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. We have very small numbers of Special
    Operations teams that are engaged with partners, building their
    security forces, and building it very effectively. Those need
    to be habitual relationships that are keyed off of what the
    partner needs. It's also good for our training, as well, as our
    partners train in jungles and a tough kind of terrain.
        I would say our challenge is maintaining that. Our SOF
    forces are under pressure worldwide. As we look at what their
    deployment ratio is, the amount of time they're spending away
    from home to the time they spend at home, making certain that
    we get that balance right, making certain that we don't
    decremate the small presence that we have, which would break
    trust and really break the training and stability of our
    partner nation security forces.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. Yes, our dwell time is very
    small. We need to work on that.
        Before I move on to the General, we have also talked about
    GITMO, Guantanamo Bay. Right now, we do have Iowa National
    Guard soldiers deployed there as a security force. What can we
    do to ensure that the troops we have that are stationed or a
    rotational force at GITMO, that they are being cared for, that
    they are safe? Not only do we want to make sure that those that
    are held there are kept in a safe environment, but also for our
    troops. What more can we be doing? Can you explain some of the
    challenges that we have at Guantanamo Bay right now?
        Admiral Faller. I had the honor to visit with some of your
    Iowa Guard prisoner guards, detainee guards----
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller.--just last weekend, Senator. They're doing
    fabulous work. So, thanks----
        Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller.--for the--to the State for that.
        The facilities were built with about a 5-year lifespan, and
    that's been 15-20 years ago. Our responsibility is the safe,
    humane treatment of the detainees, but also the safety of that
    Guard force. We have facilities that were beyond the ability to
    repair the roofs, where the alarm systems are questionable,
    based on the water intrusion. When the President's budget is
    released, I expect it to include money that would be put for
    some long-term facility upgrades in development. We need that
    for the safety of the Guard force and for the future of safe
    detainees.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        In the few seconds I have remaining, General, as well,
    Special Operations Forces in Africa, do we need to maintain our
    Special Operators in Africa and the work that they are doing?
        General Waldhauser. Well, we certainly need to maintain
    them, and we certainly have to take a close look at how we
    employ and deploy them, and what their schedules are. We do--we
    continually reevaluate that all the time. The bottom line is,
    yes. But, I would say, what we really need in AFRICOM are some
    predictable general-purpose forces that can do things with
    regular armies on a somewhat episodic, but yet predictable,
    basis.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you, General. I appreciate
    it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, to our witnesses.
        The Chair and Ranking indicated that a unifier in your two
    regions is that you're under-resourced. I think another unifier
    is, in both your regions, you have a real cross-disciplinary,
    non-siloed focus, not just military assets, but the entire
    spectrum of what the U.S. can do. I think that's a--something
    about SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM that I really appreciate.
        Admiral Faller, let me start with you. The discussion about
    Venezuela is a really important one. If the world wants to see
    a democracy-versus-dictatorship challenge, Venezuela is just,
    like, the perfect test case for circa 2019. What do democracies
    care for, and what do dictatorship care for? The Venezuelan
    Government of Maduro is supported by Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
    They're enabling him to do all kinds of horrible things,
    economically and in violation of human rights, et cetera. The
    Guaido interim government, which has a constitutional claim
    that, in the vacancy of a President, the Speaker of the
    legislative assembly becomes an interim President, is supported
    by the United States and the EU. You really can see what the
    difference between democracy and the aspirations of democratic
    governments and dictatorships, and what they care about, writ
    very clearly in the Venezuelan circumstance now.
        But, here's a reality. We're dealing with regional
    institutions, like the Organization of American States (OAS),
    for example. In the OAS, every nation has one vote. The United
    States has a hard time getting the OAS to firmly come out
    against the Maduro Government, because many Caribbean nations
    still support the Maduro Government. They have been bribed to
    do so, with low-price oil. It's very hard for us to do
    something like this on our own. When a principal regional
    institution like the OAS isn't completely with us, it's hard to
    put the appropriate pressure on.
        I guess the point that I want to make is: Hard to beat
    something with nothing. The Chinese and Russians have been
    investing so heavily in Venezuela, tens of billions of dollars,
    over and over and over again. These Caribbean nations, they
    might feel culturally closer to the United States, but they're
    getting something from Venezuela that they need.
        Your point about ``We need to be on the field'' is really,
    really, important. As I talk to leaders in this region, they
    say, ``We would so much more like to do work with you guys. We
    are culturally connected, and we're all Americans, you know,
    but the other guys are there and present and investing. Even if
    we have suspicions, they're there with resources, and you
    aren't.'' I think that's an important lesson.
        Want to ask about the Northern Triangle. It's a resource
    question, as well. The Alliance for Progress has been an
    initiative in the last few years to invest money and security
    and economic development assistance in the three nations in the
    Northern Triangle. Would it be your recommendation--so long as
    we can make those investments smart, would it be your
    recommendation that, if we can improve the security and
    economic development arc in those three countries, that that
    would help us deal with some of the challenges that SOUTHCOM
    has to deal with?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, the week before last, I visited
    projects, in all three countries, that were a direct result of
    the investments that you just cited. Those projects were USAID,
    State, INL, and a small footprint of Department of Defense
    working side by side to bring security, with local policing,
    and jobs, and host-nation investment in a way that stabilized
    some of the worst neighborhoods and showed hope. We talked to
    citizens that live there. We saw the results. I think
    consistent investment, in accordance with our laws, is a good
    thing in that area. Investment, a dollar there is going to save
    lives and result in better security here at home.
        Senator Kaine. That's really important. The funds for those
    initiatives have been pretty dramatically slashed, the last 2
    years. We don't know what the budget submission will be that
    we'll get, hopefully, by the end of the month. But, I think
    it's penny wise and pound foolish to cut development and
    security assistance and then complain about people coming to
    our border. We need to help build and support economies there,
    and security there, if we want people to not leave their own
    countries.
        Let me quickly--General Waldhauser, to you--on page 5 of
    your submitted statement, you write, ``In the fight against
    Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, we operate with partners in
    the Africa Union-enforced Multinational Task Force.'' The
    fiscal year '18 NDAA included a provision, in section 1264,
    that required the administration to provide an initial report
    and subsequent updates on the legal and policy frameworks for
    use of military force. I'm interested in the initial report,
    which was submitted in March of 2018. I'd like to put that in
    the record, if I could. It makes no----
        Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Kaine. It makes no mention of ISIS-West Africa or
    Boko Haram as an associated force. As far as I know, there's
    not been an updated report submitted to this Committee, as
    would be required if any new determination were made. Has Boko
    Haram or ISIS-West Africa been determined to be an associated
    force within the--either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, first of all, we do not have
    offensive strike capabilities or authorities in those
    countries. So, we can't strike. We can strike in Somalia, we
    can strike in Libya, but not in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and
    the like. We don't have authorities there.
        Now, ISIS-West Africa has grown--they go by different names
    every once in a while, but they have grown in numbers. They're
    now probably in the neighborhood of around 3 to 4,000. That's
    the best estimate that we have. They have been very aggressive
    over the summer, into this year. They now have taken large
    pieces of real estate in northern Nigeria. I think, of the two,
    right now they're the one that we have the most concern about,
    because we're not sure what their intentions would be with
    regards to outside the region. Boko Haram, probably around
    1,000. Bottom line, though, Senator, I can't say for sure
    whether they have been designated or not. I know that we don't
    strike them.
        Senator Kaine. When you say you ``don't strike,'' you also
    include don't strike under a collective self-defense doctrine?
        General Waldhauser. No. Collective--we--if we are
    accompanying--that's the whole key here, now--if we are
    accompanying, we have the right of self-defense and collective
    self-defense. If we are not accompanying, which we have not
    done at all in Nigeria, and we haven't accompanied inside other
    places for quite some time--we do not have collective self-
    defense, because I haven't designated it, and we don't use it.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being
    here. Thank you again for your exemplary service, and for all
    those under your command.
        General, let me start with you. The National Defense
    Strategy, of course, reemphasizes great-power competition that
    we've talked a lot about today and you mentioned, to great
    degree, in your testimony. I want to ask you about China, in
    particular, in your AOR. What could you tell us--to what degree
    and in what ways are we continuing to shift focus and resources
    to engage in this great-power competition and counter Chinese
    influence in your AOR? I'm thinking, in particular, of China's
    growing influence. Its base in Djibouti. I've seen estimates
    that there may be as many as 25-27 Chinese bases across the
    continent. What can you tell us about that and what we're doing
    to counter this growing influence there?
        General Waldhauser. Well, thank you, Senator. Let me try to
    take that from the 50,000-foot level. First of all, just to
    emphasize, China has one overseas base in Djibouti. They
    participate in UN peacekeeping operations, places like Mali,
    places like Sudan, but they do not have other bases. Is that in
    their future? That's perhaps.
        What I would say is--from the African perspective, is,
    China has been there for quite some time. They're in the
    process of building over 300 miles worth of railroads,
    railroads tied primarily to areas of mineral extraction, which,
    again, then take this goods to a port somewhere. So, they're
    heavily invested and heavily involved.
        From the African perspective, they, the Africans, do not
    want to be in the middle of this. They don't view it as, ``We
    either choose the United States or we choose China.'' They
    don't want to be in the middle of that particular engagement.
        I think that one of the things that we do, from the DOD
    perspective, is, we try to just show--just be good partners.
    When Secretary Tillerson was there, a year or so ago--or
    whenever the visit took place, I believe it was a year or so
    ago--you know, he talked about, ``We need to work with the
    governments of those countries to make sure the arrangements
    they make are in their best interests.'' You had leaders from
    the African Union, you've had--Paul Kagame is another one
    that--you know, that--the African Governments will make their
    decisions based on their best interests, and they're capable of
    doing that.
        On the other hand, Chinese efforts, in terms of selling of
    equipment and some of the arrangements that have been made,
    there has been some blowback from various countries. Sierra
    Leone, for example, is walking away from an airport agreement
    that was supposed to be built by the Chinese. The Kenyans, for
    example, have problems with the Chinese equipment that's been
    sent to them. So, again, the bottom line is, in the AFRICOM
    AOR, China is there.
        The final thing I would say, in order that--this issue of
    influence and how we want to be the best partners--the Chinese
    work hard at developing and maintaining the relationship with
    the senior officials of the governments inside the African
    continent. We are very grateful, for example, of Senator Inhofe
    and his team and his visits that they make there, but I read an
    article the other day that talked about, in the last decade, 80
    senior-level--we're talking Minister and above, to include the
    President of China--visits on the African continent. That's a
    lot. Moreover, since 1990, their Foreign Minister, his first
    trip is--every year, in January, is to a country in Africa,
    just to see how they're doing.
        So, I would just say, the whole-of-government approach, if
    we want to maintain influence, we have to kind of up our
    engagement, and develop and work at the relationship part of
    this.
        Senator Hawley. You testified, I think, last March--to a
    House committee, March of 2018--that you expected China would--
    we should expect an increasing number of bases--outright
    military bases. Is that still your assessment?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think first of all, the Belt
    and Road Initiative is what is driving all of this. I think
    what the Chinese are doing is, they're taking a lot of lessons
    learned, and they are learning a lot from their first overseas
    base that they have in Djibouti. This is not an easy thing to
    do. The United States is very good at it. They watch what we
    do. But, they're learning this. They certainly have their eyes
    on other facilities. Ports, for example, are a key to what
    would facilitate their, not only mineral extraction, but their
    markets for their goods to come into the continent, as well. I
    mean, they view this large youth bulge, the population
    demographics, which we haven't talked about today, but it's in
    the testimony--they view a large consumer class as a place
    where they can sell their goods sometime in the future. So,
    although Djibouti is the only base, they certainly are looking
    at other options.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, more generally, about
    our European allies and their help, or lack thereof, in your
    AOR. What things should we be doing in order to encourage our
    European allies to--in this era of renewed great-power
    competition, to be helping us with our strategic objectives in
    your--in the area under your command?
        General Waldhauser. From the AFRICOM perspective, the
    European Union does a lot on the continent with regards to
    training, so there are European Union training missions in
    Mali, there are European training missions inside Somalia.
    Those are just two examples. We work closely with them, because
    we are one--for example, I've indicated, in Somalia, we are one
    of a group of in--of organizations and countries that is trying
    to, you know, make things right there. The European Union is a
    big player, and we coordinate with them. I talk with their
    leadership all the time. Our effort to coordinate the training
    activities in a place like Somalia, the European Union is a big
    player. They do a lot. They, by the way, are the ones who pay
    the stipends for the Somali National Army. They've put a lot of
    money into Somalia, no doubt about it.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        It's Senator Reed, presiding.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and for being here today in
    critical commands that are perhaps less in the spotlight, but
    no less important than any of the others that we oversee, both
    of them absolutely critical to our national security. Thank you
    and the men and women who serve with you, for your service to
    our Nation.
        I want to begin on the topic of military partnership
    programs, also perhaps less visible to the public, but very
    important. Both of you, I think, have endorsed the State
    Partnership Programs. The International Military Education and
    Training Program, as General Votel testified on Tuesday, are,
    he said, ``dollar for dollar, the most effective funding that
    CENTCOM receives, from a strategic perspective.'' The
    Connecticut National Guard, as a matter of fact, is an active
    participant in the State Partnership Program, and currently
    partners with Uruguay. Next year is the 20th anniversary of
    this partnership. To date, the Connecticut National Guard has
    conducted over 110 mutually beneficial exchanges with their
    Uruguayan partners. In April, the Connecticut National Guard
    will send 40 soldiers and airmen on a Connecticut Air National
    Guard C-130H to Uruguay, marking our last--largest contingent
    to Uruguay to date. This is an enormously educational,
    beneficial experience for them, for the Uruguayans, and it is
    repeated again and again and again all around the world. This
    kind of relationship, I think, is extremely important to both
    countries, to us and other countries around the world. So,
    thank you for your support. General Evon, our TAG, was here
    this morning, and we had a chance to meet with him.
        I want to ask you, General Waldhauser. I was searching for
    the exact statement you made, about a year before the Niger
    tragedy, if I may put it that way, about the lack of sufficient
    intelligence resources devoted to your command, particularly to
    that area of your command. I note, in your testimony, you say,
    ``Over a 3-year period, United States Africa Command has
    increased Nigerian counter-IED capability, as well as
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
    sustainment maintenance, and operation.'' Your estimate as to
    the dearth and deficit of intelligence in that part of the
    world was striking to me before the Niger incident. How much
    improvement has there been in the investment in intelligence in
    that part of the world?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the best way to answer
    that question is, you know, our mission there really is to work
    with our partners. In this case, it's the French. I would say,
    over the last year, that our relationship with the French, to
    include intelligence-sharing, has really gone to as good as
    I've seen it. The French have the lead in that area. We support
    partners, and, in that particular case, in the Sahel area of
    northern Mali, Niger area, they have the lead, and it's our job
    to support them. So, we kind of use the phrase, ``It's African-
    led, French-assisted, and United States-supported.'' What I
    would say is that our intelligence professionals, as they
    synchronize what we bring and what they bring, is something
    that has really added to our ability to understand the
    situation there over the last year.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you think, now, that it is
    satisfactory? Adequate? Excellent? How would you characterize
    it? You said ``as good as you've seen,'' but that was not very
    good in the year before the Niger incident.
        General Waldhauser. So, I would use the words, as you said,
    ``satisfactory and adequate.'' We're never going to have the
    ISR total that we need, to include the human intelligence that
    goes into places like that, but, for our support and for what
    our mission is, it's adequate ISR now as we utilize our
    partners, and how we train and how we assist the Nigerian
    forces, as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you say, Admiral Faller, that
    that's true in your command, as well, that you're satisfied
    that there are sufficient ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance--resources devoted?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, we're constantly looking at this.
    I think we do have gaps. We mitigate those gaps with different
    sources of intelligence. We are deficient in our ISR for the
    counternarcotics mission.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe,
    Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you for being here today. We look
    forward to a closed session with you.
        I want to come back to something each of you have mentioned
    but we've really not talked that much about, and that is the
    telcom issues that are in each of your AOR, and the
    participation of China--Huawei, ZTE--and their relationship
    with the Russians. The Chairman mentioned, earlier, his concern
    about how China is putting their fingers into every area when
    it comes to not only the ISR, but the communications component,
    building out these networks. He mentioned he didn't know where
    the money came from. General, I'd be interested to hear from
    you. When you talk about China and how they are advancing, how
    much of the bankrolling of this comes from Russia? Or do you
    all know?
        General Waldhauser. Well, ma'am, the best way to answer
    that is, I think that when the Chinese come to a country with a
    plan, whether it's to build railroad, infrastructure, bridges,
    and the like, they come with a full plan. They come with the
    charts to do it, they come with the money to do it, they'll
    bring the workers to do it. It's just kind of a one-stop-one---
    --
        Senator Blackburn. Does the money come from Russia,
    primarily?
        General Waldhauser. This is Chinese, now. I would--in fact,
    how I would answer that is, in kind of a--not to be--in a kind
    of anecdotal way, but recently in the elections in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Joseph Kabila just
    was--went out of office, one of his opponents said that the
    Chinese bring the money, and the Russians bring the muscle.
        Senator Blackburn. Got it.
        General Waldhauser. So, I think that's a good way to try to
    illustrate, kind of, where these two different countries are
    when it comes to their engagement.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Let me ask you this. When we look at what has happened with
    the Chinese and with their access into the telcom area, and as
    we look at artificial intelligence and 5G, how do you see
    Huawei and their participation? How is that going to affect the
    buildout in your AORs?
        Admiral, if you want to go at it first, and then the
    General.
        Admiral Faller. It's concerning. The extent to which China
    would own the IT infrastructure of a country, their
    intelligence or fusion centers would affect our relationship
    and our ability to----
        Senator Blackburn. Do they understand that you will not
    share information with them if it is going over Huawei or ZTE?
    Or----
        Admiral Faller. We've had frank discussions----
        Senator Blackburn. Very frank discussions.
        Admiral Faller.--Senator, about this.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        General Waldhauser. Senator, the way I would answer that
    is, we obviously have some unique challenges in Djibouti. I
    mean, the Chinese bases have several miles away from where
    we're located. The Djibouti base services not only AFRICOM, but
    it does CENTCOM and SOCOM, I believe, as General Votel
    testified the other day. We'd be naive to think that the
    counterintelligence and the communication issues, and the fact
    that they have actually built the system inside Djibouti,
    they're not trying to get after what we're trying to do.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. How do you make certain--what is
    your best effort in making certain that we remain the partner
    of choice?
        General Waldhauser. Well, again, as I said several times
    this morning, from our military perspective, we want to be
    sincere in our efforts, we want to deliver what we say we can
    do, we want to be role models when our troops train with
    African troops, we want our equipment to be quality equipment,
    and we just--we, essentially, want to be good partners. I think
    that, when you bring in the agencies that we talked about--
    USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and so forth, their
    projects--I mean, we've got to make sure we elevate those,
    because, in places like Senegal, for example, they're--the
    Chinese will build a wrestling stadium, but, at the same time,
    we have all kind of compacts ongoing that don't get the
    publicity that some of these things do. So, it's--bottom line
    for us is, we have to make sure that we're really doing an--
    overall whole-of-government approach, and we're synchronizing
    our efforts, and we make sure that--we take credit for some of
    these programs that may not get the visibility that a brand-new
    infrastructure would.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you for the comments. We hope that
    that whole-of-government approach continues to include making
    certain that we're paying attention to those telcom and
    wireless networks.
        Yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
        Let me just announce--it looks like we're down to the most
    important one, of course--last, we say for--we are going to
    have--I say to the staff of those who are not here right now,
    we're going to have a closed session immediately following
    this, in S---in Visitors Center, 217, for those who would like
    to come and ask some of the questions that were not appropriate
    to be asked in an open session.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Faller, you're not going to be surprised by this
    question. The question is, interdiction of drug shipments--and
    I understand it's already been discussed, to some extent--what
    do you need? If you were given a blank sheet of paper--or not
    a--what do you--what does the Coast Guard need? What do you
    need? What do we need to do a better job of interdicting those
    drug shipments that we know about? I just--it just is in--it's
    so frustrating that we are only interdicting about 25 percent
    of what we know about. So, do we need 18 more cutters, 12 more
    Zodiacs? What's on your list of assets?
        Admiral Faller. It's all of our responsibility, and we've
    got to start at the source. So, very encouraged by the
    Colombian Government getting back into--seriously back into the
    eradication game. They've met their goals for 2018, and we're
    seeing progress in 2019. So, record cocaine is going to mean
    record drug flows, and we've got to stop it along the way. That
    requires ISR, intelligence and surveillance assets, maritime
    patrol aircraft, helicopters----
        Senator King. No, I understand that, but I'm asking you for
    some specifics. Do we need eight more Global Hawks? Do we need
    14 more cutters? What is it we need?
        Admiral Faller. We need more Navy ships.
        Senator King. Okay.
        Admiral Faller. More U.S. Navy----
        Senator King. Of what nature?
        Admiral Faller. Sir, the littoral combat ship is fit for
    purpose for this type a mission, Senator. We need multiple
    force packages. We need the Coast Guard, a sustained presence.
    They've stepped up in a big way, from five to eight cutters
    over the holiday. Then we need the partners in the game. We're
    seeing improvements in some of the partners. I'll credit El
    Salvador, Guatemala. We need others to step up. That requires
    pressure from our government and myself to get that to happen.
    So, a lot of work to be done, Senator.
        Senator King. Do you feel we are moving the needle? Are we
    moving forward on these multiple fronts?
        Admiral Faller. We had record interdiction in 2017, 2018,
    but it's insufficient. We're nudging, but we're not moving the
    needle enough, Senator. One of the areas you asked me to look
    at previously, I need to get back to you on, is the authority
    piece and whether we have artificial seams between the air-land
    boundary, and how we can better utilize and work across that
    boundary. We've stepped up our partnership, within the last
    year, with Drug Enforcement Agency and fusion centers here in
    the United States. Again, more needs to be done to stay ahead
    of the threat.
        Senator King. I just hope, if there are assets, in terms of
    either budgetary resources, authorities, you will let us know,
    because these drugs are killing our people, and--one a day, in
    Maine. This is a--it seems to me, a high-return opportunity,
    here, given the fact that we know of the shipments that we
    can't interdict.
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree 100 percent. It's a threat
    to our Nation, killing our citizens. It's killing citizens of
    our partner nations, as well. The money from this is fueling
    those drug and criminal organizations, which is driving
    instability, it's contributing to the other factors we see,
    like the illegal migration. So, it's important, for many
    reasons, that we have to get after this.
        Senator King. Well, keep--stay with us on this, Admiral.
    Thank you.
        On the issue of--and you mentioned in your testimony, I
    think, in answer to Senator Kaine, about progress you're seeing
    in the northern triangle countries based upon American
    investments. I would point out that there was a huge refugee
    problem in the world in 1945. There were about 10 million
    refugees in western Europe after World War II. One of the
    responses of this country was the Marshall Plan, which was
    designed to stabilize the economies of those of that region. It
    was very controversial at the time, but it--I think all would
    agree now, it was immensely successful. I think we need a
    similar kind of approach to stabilizing those countries so
    people don't have to flee. The best way to stop someone coming
    to our border is that they never start on the journey. That
    means--I believe you agree that that means work, AID,
    agriculture, all of those programs in those countries, again,
    dealing with the issue of corruption, but to try to do that
    effectively. Do you agree that that's a--should be a priority?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree. That should be a
    priority.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Quick question, General. By the way, these graphics are
    terrific on the--on Chinese and Russian influence in Latin
    America. I compliment your staff, whoever presented them.
    They're very dramatic and sobering.
        General, in Africa, China's doing similar kinds of things:
    investing, blending, developing infrastructure, all those
    things. Is there a concern that this is a precursor to a
    military presence? I mean, is Djibouti a beginning of a
    militarization process that presents a kind of global threat or
    an expansion of a threat from China?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I think, at this point in
    time, it's too early to make that leap at this point. I mean,
    they obviously want to--one of the reasons for their engagement
    there is, they've got, you know, 2,000 or so peacekeepers,
    they've got 300,000 or so civilians there. They want to be able
    to protect their interests in their projects that they're
    working on. So, whether that leads to a militarization of the
    continent, it's still early to tell. But, I would say that one
    of the areas of concern that we have there is, in the
    Djibouti--the Straits of Bab al-Mandab area, where the Red Sea
    comes down, where we've had really open access for quite some
    time, that is an area of concern, because not only the Chinese,
    but the Russians, the Emiratis, the Saudis are all interested
    in real estate on the Red Sea, on the African side--Sudan,
    Eritrea----
        Senator King. They're using an interesting technique of
    lending money and then calling it. It's a kind of debt
    colonialism.
        General Waldhauser. Well, they have leverage in some--in
    many of their situations. As I said, I mean, the--these are
    decisions these governments have to make, but Djibouti's a--
    really a classic example, where the Chinese own over 80 percent
    of their overseas debt. This is a--certainly a concern.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Before Senator Perdue is recognized, I want to repeat to
    the staff that's here that there will a closed session after
    this. Hate to ask you to go over, because there may be nobody
    there when you get there. But, nonetheless, there will be this
    opportunity. All right?
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you both for your careers and for being here today.
        I want to beat a dead horse, because I don't think we've
    gotten to the essence of the issue yet. We're all concerned
    about what China and Russia are doing in your AORs. General
    Votel was in this week. We had the same conversation about
    China's Belt-Road Initiative in harbors like Hambantota, in Sri
    Lanka, Gwadar, in Pakistan. We've just seen the first
    foreclosure in Sri Lanka, obviously, but what Russia is also
    doing in Kaliningrad and Sebastopol and Latakia and Tartus--
    Americans have always projected power based on our Navy and
    based on our allies, who allow us to service our military
    through their geography. Russia and China are both now--because
    we have such an advantage on--in the sea, it seems to me that
    they are setting the stage across three continents that are of
    tremendous strategic importance. I'd like us to talk about what
    the NDS does or doesn't do, and what you both need in your AORs
    to deal with what we naturally have to assume is an effort that
    is an economic, if not military, involvement that is beyond
    anybody's expectation 5 years ago. When I look at what Huawei
    is doing in some of these Latin American cities, I'm very
    concerned. So, I'd love both of you to address the question
    specifically.
        Before I ask you both--General, first of all, in Africa, we
    know now--Admiral, you've just told us--there are 56 port
    investments in South America. In Africa, General, do we have a
    similar estimate of the ports that they've made these--what I
    call ``debt-trap diplomacy loans'' in the specific port
    infrastructure?
        General Waldhauser. Senator, I'm not an expert in that
    area, and we can take that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Waldhauser. China has invested in ports in 23 of
    Africa's 33 coastal nations. We currently have no indications
    Beijing made these investments with the prior intent to create
    leverage over the host nation or port operators. However, it is
    possible China could use these investments in the future to
    apply pressure to those African states or seize port control.

        General Waldhauser. But, what I will say, the Chinese are
    involved in port operations all around the world.
        Senator Perdue. Yeah.
        General Waldhauser. So, it's not unique that perhaps you
    have a Chinese company that has equities in a port on the
    African continent.
        Senator Perdue. Right. So, what we saw in the South China
    Sea, though, is where they had, quote, ``nonmilitary
    interests'' have now--we've got plenty of evidence that they've
    converted those to military bases. I have no doubt that they're
    going to have some of the same interests in--particularly in
    Hambantota, right there. That's such a strategic thing--
    location.
        The question I have is--I don't think the NDS actually
    addresses this growing potential threat, because we haven't
    been able to confirm it, as you just said, General. So, my
    concern is--in these two AORs, you and General Votel are three
    guys that sit right in the middle of what China and Russia are
    both doing. I'm worried, because of the effort and the focus we
    have on the current crisis today around the world, where we're
    taking our assets and spreading them very, very thinly, what
    are we doing now to preclude the potential that we won't be
    able to show up, it'll be too late once we recognize that
    they've actually done what we were worried they were going to
    do? Would you both address that in--as it relates to the NDS?
        General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, let me just kind of
    clarify. You know, I don't have a crystal ball to predict what
    the Chinese will do militarily on----
        Senator Perdue. Understood.
        General Waldhauser.--African continent. But, what I do know
    is that they've made a conscious decision to put their military
    on the world stage in an area where the United States is not
    necessarily engaged to a large degree.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
        General Waldhauser. So, they work in areas where they don't
    really have any competition from us. We're not in countries
    where they are. We're not at places where ports on the western
    side of Africa, which is my big concern, by the way--on the
    western side of Africa, we're not really located there. So,
    there's no doubt about the fact that they have long---a long-
    term vision, and, by 2049, the 100-year anniversary, part of
    this Belt and Road Initiative, this is not--Djibouti is not the
    first, and it won't be the last port. The growth of their
    military on the continent, I don't know what it'll turn out to
    be, but I do know that the Chinese--they made a conscious
    decision to start there, and they're not going to get smaller.
        Senator Perdue. Other than Djibouti, do we have any other
    access ports in Africa?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think I would say Capo Verde,
    Senegal. These are places that we've talked about before that
    are--you know, they're good locations for the Chinese. They
    want to have a government that's relatively stable. They don't
    want to have to deal with problems and so forth. You look where
    you--where the military geography--meaning deepwater ports are
    there. So, I mean, they certainly want other ports on the
    eastern--and I could--you know, there's all kind of speculation
    about what those other ports might be on the eastern side. But,
    I do know they're looking on the western side, and that's a
    concern for us, because----
        Senator Perdue. Yes.
        General Waldhauser.--they can be in the Atlantic Ocean
    rather quickly.
        Senator Perdue. Admiral, the Ambassador in El Salvador
    actually warned, last August, about what the Chinese military
    is planning to do in La Union, that commercial port, where they
    do have a proprietary loan there. Can you speak to how the NDS
    will affect this in your AOR?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I think the NDS rightly shined a
    light on this as a biggest challenge that will confront us
    perhaps in the next generation----
        Senator Perdue. But, we haven't resourced it yet.
        Admiral Faller. We're working on the resourcing. It's not--
    as I've mentioned in previous questions, we need that
    consistent level of resourcing in this AOR. In addition to the
    ports you mentioned, I will also point out the space stations
    that the Chinese are investing in and partnering in in this
    AOR. They--and again, back to the education, some of the basic
    military building blocks, they're taking a page from our
    playbook. The Peace Ark deployed to South America and the
    Caribbean this past year, they're trying to replicate our
    playbook to win both access and influence, and our counter has
    to be to remain present. We have the ability to have the
    winning hand, based on our values, our democratic principles,
    and the shared interests that we have in this hemisphere.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        All right. It seems this has come to a conclusion.
        We appreciate your attention very much. It has been very
    significant. Also appreciate the time both of you have spent
    with me and other Members of this Committee.
        If it's not an inconvenience to do so, we will now go to
    the Senate Visitors, number 217, and we'll see how many people
    want to conclude this with some questions that may not have
    been appropriate for open session.
        So, with that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                    colombia
        1. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, with the re-emergence of the
    FARC and the net production of drugs still rising, do you foresee the
    reduction in United States monetary support to Colombia (counter-
    terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational organized crime)
    causing any issue for the SOUTHCOM mission?
        Admiral Faller. A reduction in United States monetary support to
    Colombia would negatively impact the SOUTHCOM mission. The United
    States funding that goes to Colombia is not only used for
    counternarcotics and counterterrorism within Colombia, but it also
    partly funds the United States-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), in which
    Colombia exports security throughout the region by training other
    partner nations to address these challenges to regional security. As an
    example, in 2019 the Colombian Military will train over 2,100 security
    force personnel from Central America and the Caribbean to strengthen
    their capability to provide security, support the rule of law, and
    enhance their ability to participate in regional security and
    humanitarian response operations. The Colombian Military and Police
    exporting security capacity under USCAP is a shining example of the
    return on investment from the United States support to Plan Colombia.
    It shows that the U.S. military can rely on its partners to share their
    expertise to address common regional security challenges. In addition,
    the Colombian Military is currently providing extensive support in
    responding to the Venezuelan migration crisis requiring them to divert
    funding and manpower from security operations. Any cuts in U.S. funds
    would further strain their national security budget.
                         foreign influence in venezuela
        2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Cuba has sent military envoys
    Venezuela since early 2000's. As early as 2010, Iranian Quz force were
    patriated as Cuban citizens and joined these military envoys. In recent
    years, Russia has continued this trend both overtly and covertly. How
    many Cuban, Russian and Iranian actors are currently in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. We have limited information on the number of Cuban,
    Russian, and Iranian security personnel supporting the Maduro regime.
    We estimate the number of Cuban security personnel in Venezuela is
    somewhere in the thousands; this number is in addition to the over
    20,000 medical personnel Cuba provides to Venezuela. Russia maintains a
    diplomatic defense presence in Venezuela, and at times likely sends
    teams of military technical experts to guide Venezuela in the use and
    maintenance of acquired weapons systems. Iranian entities maintain a
    small, limited presence in Venezuela, but we remain concerned that the
    world's leading state sponsor of terrorism could take advantage of
    turmoil in Venezuela to expand its presence.

        3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in
    security?
        Admiral Faller. Cuba: Cuban military personnel serve as security
    and military advisors who assist Venezuelan security services'
    monitoring of both the population and military for signs of dissent,
    are part of Maduro's personal security detail, and help collect
    intelligence. Russia: Moscow provides the Maduro regime with security
    materiel, training, and disinformation assistance. Russia is
    Venezuela's largest supplier of weapons to include surface- to-air
    missile systems, combat and fixed wing aircraft, tanks, and artillery,
    with Moscow selling Caracas $9 billion in military equipment from 2008
    to 2018. The two countries regularly conduct combined military
    exercises; their most recent exercise in December 2018 included the
    deployment of two long-range bombers (Tu-160 Blackjacks) capable of
    carrying nuclear weapons. Also, in mid-March, two Russian aircraft
    arrived in Venezuela carrying a reported 100 Russian military personnel
    that Moscow officially said were in Venezuela to fulfill existing
    military contracts. Separate, Maduro-affiliated Venezuelan sources said
    the troops would assist with cyber security and air defenses. Iran:
    While Iran's relationship with Caracas in the past few years has
    largely centered on economic cooperation, Iran and Venezuela have
    officially been cooperating on defense issues for almost a decade.
    Given this longstanding relationship, it is possible that Tehran may be
    providing the Maduro regime with security advice, and potentially
    assisting with military equipment maintenance. Last year, the Iranian
    naval deputy commander, Rear Admiral Touraj Hassani Moqaddam, relayed
    Iran's intent to deploy naval vessels with helicopters to Venezuela.
    China: Additionally, China remains the top provider of sovereign loans
    to Venezuela, with Caracas owing $20 billion. Beijing also has sold
    Venezuela over $1 billion in military equipment, including assorted
    missile variants, fixed wing transport and combat aircraft, light
    tanks, mortar systems, and radars.

        4. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in
    controlling or influencing Policy?
        Admiral Faller. Cuba: Havana is the Maduro regime's principal
    foreign supporter, and is the external actor with the most influence
    over Maduro's decision-making. Cuba helps to prop up the regime by
    backing Maduro in international forums, helping to rally support for
    the regime, and supporting information operations to discredit the U.S.
    It is likely that Maduro is turning to Havana for advice on how to
    handle mounting social unrest and an emboldened opposition. Russia:
    Moscow plays a key role in providing financial support and access to
    the Maduro regime, probably affording Russia some sway over Venezuela's
    policy decisions. Venezuela is likely to increasingly rely on Russian
    banks to move financial assets in ways that skirt sanctions and secure
    cash flow. Additionally, Russia is one of the top providers of
    Venezuela's sovereign loans, with Caracas owing Moscow over $3 billion.
    Iran: We assess Iran holds less influence over the Maduro regime's
    policies, given that Caracas's relationship with Tehran has not been as
    essential to the regime's survival. China: Separately, China remains a
    key financial backer of the Maduro regime, and appears to be supporting
    the regime's efforts to monitor the population. Beijing is the top
    provider of sovereign loans to Venezuela, with Caracas owning $20
    billion. Since 2016, Chinese telecommunications company ZTE embedded a
    special unit within Venezuela's telecommunication company to support
    national ID cards that have the potential to monitor citizens'
    behavior. Beijing also has sold Venezuela over $1 billion in military
    equipment, including assorted missile variants, fixed wing transport
    and combat aircraft, light tanks, mortar systems, and radars.
                        venezuelan military composition
        5. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Venezuela has more Generals than
    the United States and NATO combined. Additionally, Maduro's regime,
    described as a mafia state, retains only 20-25 percent support across
    the nation. What is the actual composition and force structure of the
    military, loyal to Maduro?
        Admiral Faller. Venezuelan armed forces branches include the
    Bolivarian Air Force, Navy, Army, and National Guard. The commanders
    and top-ranking military officers in each of these services remain
    loyal to the Maduro regime. Of the over 1,000 defections since Interim
    President Guaido took office, only two of the defectors have been
    general officers, indicative of senior military leaders' commitment to
    the regime and the benefits they receive. The President is the
    commander-in-chief of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, and appoints the
    Minister of Defense, Commander of the Operational Strategic Command
    (akin to the U.S. Joint Staff), and the commanders of each of the
    services. The Maduro regime also relies on the National Militia and
    armed gangs, known as colectivos, as force multipliers for conventional
    forces.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                threats posed by african terrorist organizations
        6. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, you stated that Boko Haram
    and ISIS-West Africa focus on attacking military and civilian targets
    throughout numerous areas in Africa and contribute to a multi-border
    displaced persons crisis. Can you expand on your assessment of the
    global threat posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-West? Do they currently pose
    a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland? If so, to what extent? If not,
    when are they expected to pose a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland?
        General Waldhauser. We do not currently assess Boko Haram and ISIS-
    West Africa are threats to the Homeland. Africa-based ISIS groups and
    Boko Haram have neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against
    the United States Homeland. However, their diffuse extremist networks
    enable or inspire attacks against United States and other Western
    interests in Africa and in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe
    havens in North Africa, the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring
    threat to stability, and United States, allied, and host-nation
    interests within those regions.

        7. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, what do you see as the
    greatest threat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa poses to the United
    States Homeland in the near-term, mid-term, and long-term?
        General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups and Boko Haram have
    neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against the United
    States Homeland, and are not projected to pose a threat to the Homeland
    in the mid or long term. Due to their diffuse extremist networks Boko
    Haram and ISIS-West Africa are capable of enabling or inspiring attacks
    against United States and other Western interests in Africa and in
    Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al-Qaeda safe havens in North Africa,
    the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to stability, and
    United States, allied, and host-nation interests within those regions.
             sof's role in supporting the national defense strategy
        8. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, the recently released
    National Defense Strategy clearly identifies great power competition
    between the United States and China and Russia as the highest priority
    threats to our national security. Are we over-utilizing out elite
    special operations forces on low-intensity threats in AFRICOM?
        General Waldhauser. Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess
    unique capabilities and we continue to evaluate how we employ and
    deploy them. USAFRICOM aligns forces and resources on the continent to
    best support the National Defense Strategy. In addition to SOF that
    provide heightened capability, USAFRICOM also needs predictable general
    purpose forces that can conduct those missions that do not require SOF
    unique capabilities.

        9. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how do you intend to
    balance the competing requirements of continuing the counterterrorism
    fight while also supporting the new primary lines of effort in
    countering China and Russia? Are security force assistance brigades
    (SFABs) the right solution?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM is currently in our first year of a
    five-year campaign plan specifically designed to balance requirements
    that address VEOs and global competitors. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
    applies a balanced approach to account for the increased presence of
    external actors, namely China and Russia, and the continued threat
    posed by VEOs. Our ability to balance efforts to address those
    challenges relies on our ability to effectively work with a wide range
    of able and willing partners-United States interagency partners, other
    combatant commands, European allies, the United Nations, European
    Union, the African Union, and most importantly African partners.
    USAFRICOM would make full use of the range of organic capabilities
    within a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), as that unit is
    specifically designed with many of our partner-centric objectives in
    mind. We would welcome the assignment of an SFAB to USAFRICOM.

        10. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how does AFRICOM envision
    supporting an enduring counter-Violent Extremist Organization (VEO)
    effort while supporting efforts to deter Russian and Chinese aggression
    in other theaters?
        General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced
    approach to account for the increased presence of external actors,
    namely China and Russia, and the continued threat posed by VEOs. Our
    ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our
    ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing
    partners-United States interagency partners, other combatant commands,
    European allies, the United Nations, the European Union, the African
    Union, and African partners. The United States Security Force
    Assistance (SFA) programs to African partners also increase our ability
    not only to counter violent extremist groups but also influence great
    power competitors. Through Sec 333 authorities, many of our SFA
    programs enhance our relationships with partners while improving their
    ability to conduct their own C-VEO operations. These SFA programs are
    fundamental to our effort to remain the partner of choice by
    reinforcing the sincerity of our partnerships and the high quality of
    our products, which African nations largely view as superior to those
    offered by the Chinese and Russians. Our efforts to foster positive
    relationships further support our goal of ensuring a stable and
    prosperous Africa, which inherently-assists to deter Chinese and
    Russian malign action. To the extent that we enable deterrence of China
    and Russia in the USAFRICOM AOR, we are engaged with USINDOPACOM and
    USEUCOM Globally Integrated Planning efforts in their capacity as
    Coordinating Authorities to the China and Russia global campaign plans.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          russian influence in africa
        11. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you state in your
    testimony that the Central African Republic has recently installed a
    Russian civilian as the country's national security advisor. What does
    this appointment signal in terms of Russian influence in the Central
    African Republic? How does this further Russian strategic interests?
        General Waldhauser. As of this time this individual has stepped
    down as the national security advisor. Should this individual remain
    involved in Central African Republic (CAR) policy-making, he would be
    able to facilitate agreements between the CAR and Russia. We are unware
    of efforts to replace him, or to leverage his relationship to CAR for
    future Russian efforts. CAR provides Russia three key opportunities:
    First, it is a chance for Russia to publically supplant French and
    Western influence with Bangui's support. Second, CAR represents an
    opportunity for the Russian Oligarchs (including those the United
    States has sanctioned) to generate profit by exchanging security
    services for mining contracts, demonstrate private military
    capabilities, and supplement limited Russian state resources. Lastly,
    CAR provides an operating environment with little to no governmental
    oversight, considerable freedom of movement to militarily strong
    actors, and limited regulation or Rule of Law that could inhibit
    unilateral action.

        12. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you mention that Russia
    is importing ``harsh security practices'' into the Central African
    Republic. In addition to the murder of Russian journalists, what other
    harsh security practices are being employed?
        General Waldhauser. Russian private military contractors (PMC) are
    reportedly abusing locals who approach Russian mining interests,
    investigating crimes committed against Russian personnel or property,
    physically abusing host nation security trainees, and intimidating
    foreign and local travelers. The Russian contractors also reportedly
    cooperate with local armed militias and turn a blind eye to human
    rights violations committed by those groups. The UN is currently
    investigating at least one alleged incident of abuse and has asked the
    CAR government to take actions against the PMCs. In 2018 three
    independent Russian journalists were murdered in the CAR while
    investigating the activities of the Russian PMCs.

        13. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your testimony, you
    also state that other countries could find the Russian model of harsh
    security practices attractive. What countries in the African
    subcontinent are you concerned about being most susceptible to Russian
    influence, and what can AFRICOM do to thwart Russian efforts?
        General Waldhauser. Several African nations are susceptible to
    continued or increasing Russian influence, particularly where Russia
    already has extensive ties. Russia's influence in Algeria and Angola
    stems from legacy Soviet relationships, though Algeria has largely
    restricted the relationship to arms sales transactions. Russia is
    providing support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), who is increasing
    pressure on Tripoli. Russia already has extensive influence in CAR,
    embedding private military contractors in the country in return for
    mining rights and influencing the government. Mauritania's and
    Tunisia's nascent economies and desire to improve defense capabilities
    may provide Moscow with opportunities to expand its influence there.
    Russia is increasing its influence in Sudan; the Sudanese Parliament
    recently advanced plans to create a Russian military base in the
    country, and Russian private military contractors are reportedly
    operating in the Darfur region. In West Africa, Mali, Guinea, and
    Guinea-Bissau are probably most susceptible to Russian influence, due
    to longstanding Russian military sales and training programs. Russia
    has economic interests in these countries, usually centered on mining,
    and the local leaders are likely interested in military aid, without
    preconditions, that would help them to remain in power. To thwart
    Russian exploitative efforts, USAFRICOM continues to work with a host
    of partners to be the military partner of choice in Africa and advance
    our shared values.
                                   hezbollah
        14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, how would you characterize
    the threat from Hezbollah in your area of operation? Which countries
    are most susceptible to influence from Hezbollah?
        Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is the most capable Violent Extremist
    Organization (VEO) in the region. Since 1992, LH has successfully
    conducted three major terrorist attacks in Central and South America,
    killing 135 people and wounding hundreds more. The majority of
    countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR do not recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist
    organization, which enables Hezbollah to maintain an operational
    presence in the area. This operational presence includes well-developed
    networks of businesses owned and operated by Hezbollah associates and
    networks that are used to facilitate criminal activities, conduct
    fundraising in support of Hezbollah, and perform international
    financial remittances. Through a vast array of political, religious,
    and social networks, Hezbollah leverages influence over vulnerable
    populations in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay and
    Argentina. Most of this influence is political and social in nature,
    with some loosely affiliated elements engaged in criminal and illicit
    activities, primarily in the TBA and other Free Trade Zones in Central
    and South America. Countries such as Venezuela and Paraguay, with high
    levels of institutional corruption, insufficient Anti-Money Laundering
    regulations, and unproven judicial ability to prosecute individuals
    involved in the facilitation of terrorism, or narcotics are most
    susceptible to influence from Hezbollah.

        15. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, what are you doing to
    address the threat--including Hezbollah's terrorist activities, money
    laundering, and drug trafficking?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM collaborates with the Interagency and Law
    Enforcement to share intelligence and information and support
    operations and activities to degrade Hezbollah's ability to conduct
    illicit activities throughout the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
    ultimately denying funds to Hezbollah. Our analytical and operational
    support to Department of Treasury sanctions, Law Enforcement
    investigations, and the detection and monitoring mission are at the
    forefront of our efforts to address the Hezbollah threat.

        16. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, your predecessor, ADM Tidd,
    has testified that Venezuela has long provided a haven for narco-
    terrorist groups and Lebanese Hezbollah supporters. What is your
    understanding of the current links between Hezbollah and the Government
    of Venezuela? What support, if any, is Hezbollah providing the Maduro
    regime in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Venezuela is home to well over a million people of
    Lebanese ancestry. Some of the members of the Lebanese diaspora
    community in Venezuela have been linked to illicit business, money
    laundering, narcotic sales, and document forgery. The Government of
    Venezuela has been employing and providing safe haven to Hezbollah
    associated facilitators and financiers since at the least the mid-
    2000's. There have been multiple reported links between prominent
    Venezuelan businessmen and politicians and Hezbollah-associated
    individuals. Most notably, former Venezuelan Vice President and current
    Minister of Industries and National Production, Tarek El Aissami, may
    have been involved in a number of illicit financial transactions and
    been leveraged by other corrupt Venezuelan officials to provide travel
    documentation to benefit associates of Hezbollah over a period of
    years. Hezbollah openly expresses support for the Maduro regime.
    Hezbollah likely wants Maduro to remain in place, as Hezbollah has
    operated throughout Venezuela with minimal scrutiny during Maduro's
    regime. Hezbollah likely perceives that the United States-recognized
    president, Juan Guaido will work to deter Hezbollah-associated activity
    within the country.

        17. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, are you working to build
    the capacity of regional allies to address Hezbollah's malign
    activities? How can Congress support SOUTHCOM in this effort?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM routinely engages with partner nations to
    share information, provide training, and encourage actions to counter
    threat networks throughout the region. Our staff coordinates with
    Interagency, Law Enforcement and Global Organizations, such as the
    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enable operations by
    Partner Nation Law Enforcement to disrupt, degrade, and deny Hezbollah
    activities. Congressional support over the years has enabled SOUTHCOM
    to build our partners' capacity to counter Hezbollah's malign
    activities. Continued support of the Department's security cooperation
    activities in this region, as well as programs throughout the
    Interagency that strengthen our relationships with our partner nations,
    such as State Department's International Military Education and
    Training program, would be helpful.

        18. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, in your testimony, you note
    that groups like Hezbollah operate wherever they can garner support and
    raise funds to pursue their agendas. Where do you see them gaining
    support and funding, and how is SOUTHCOM confronting them?
        Admiral Faller. Hezbollah receives significant and continuous
    financial support from the Lebanese expatriate, Shi'a Muslim diaspora
    in Latin America. Lebanese expatriate remittances are a pillar of the
    Lebanese economy--their familial and sustainable structure makes them
    an economic and social services backstop in the absence of a state
    entity capable of providing basic security and social services. Free
    Trade Zones provide illicit financial networks with plentiful
    opportunities to leverage existing conditions to enable money
    laundering activities and the import/export of illicit goods.
    Characteristics of Free Trade Zones that enable these activities
    include: high volume of goods being imported/exported through the area,
    the high use of cash, and greater profitability due to tax benefits.
                                africom mission
        19. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your written
    testimony, you justify the current AFRICOM posture by emphasizing the
    need to ``address significant terrorist threats and apply persistent
    pressure on terrorist networks.'' Based on your testimony and the
    current force posture, is it fair to say the primary mission in Africa
    is defeating Violent Extremist Organizations?
        General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced
    approach that accounts for the increased presence of external actors,
    namely China and Russia, and the continued threat faced by VEOs. Our
    ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our
    ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing
    partners; United States interagency partners, other combatant commands,
    European allies, the United Nations, European Union, the African Union,
    and African partners. The USAFRICOM mission strikes a balance between
    countering VEOs and great power competition. The three mission areas
    called out in our mission statement are strengthen security forces,
    counter transnational threats, and conduct crisis response.

        20. Senator Blumenthal. . General Waldhauser, do you think that the
    National Defense Strategy appropriately prioritizes the threats to
    American interests that we face in your area of operations?
        General Waldhauser. From a USAFRICOM perspective, the NDS
    accurately characterizes the global challenges and threats. We are in a
    dynamic environment with great power competitors, constant competition,
    and an array of state and non-state actors. All five threats detailed
    in the NDS manifest in Africa to varying degrees, representing an
    important cross section in a globalized world.

        21. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, despite the apparent
    focus on counterterrorism efforts in Africa, in your testimony, you
    state AFRICOM plays a ``significant role'' in fulfilling National
    Defense Strategy priorities towards Russia and China. Why is your role
    in great power competition so significant and how are you fulfilling
    this role?
        General Waldhauser. Great Power competitors, China and Russia, are
    increasing engagements in Africa and enhancing their access and
    influence. China's expanding engagements in Africa are probably
    intended to protect China's citizens and investments, and project the
    image of being a responsible global power while growing its influence
    on the continent and internationally. For its part, Russia seeks to
    counter United States influence and interests while bolstering its own
    influence through security cooperation, arms sales, and energy
    partnerships. Our proximity to Chinese forces in Djibouti offers us a
    unique opportunity to demonstrate our resolve to counter China outside
    of Asia. Our interaction with key partners such as Morocco, Tunisia,
    Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia help secure geostrategic locations
    necessary for stability on the continent. Working in close cooperation
    with nations such as Ghana and Senegal, we help to ensure Chinese
    compliance with international norms by exposing illicit activity such
    as illegal fishing or other resource extraction sanctioned by the
    Chinese Government. By working with other nations such as Uganda, Cabo
    Verde, Seychelles, Botswana and Gabon, we may be able to ensure that
    when China or Russia do gain military access to ports, bases or
    airspace, that they are unable to take full advantage of that access to
    threaten United States freedom of maneuver in and around Africa.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, the Authorization for
    Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2018 lists two known African terrorist
    organizations, al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Al Shabaab as
    ``associated forces'' included in the authorization. Have you, or will
    you, use military force against any other Violent Extremist
    Organizations in your area of operation?
        General Waldhauser. Under my authority, as directed by the
    Secretary of Defense, we have used military force against violent
    extremist organizations, in the USAFRICOM AOR, associated with those
    included in the 2001 AUMF. The Secretary based that direction on a
    thorough vetting of their function, connection to the organizations
    included in the 2001 AUMF, and threat to the United States. In the
    future, we will continue to target violent extremist organizations
    using this authority. These designated organizations remain classified
    and the information can be provided to your staff. Additionally, we
    have used military force under our collective self-defense authorities
    to defend our designated partners, and we will continue to use force to
    defend ourselves, regardless of who is attacking us. If attacked, we
    will defend ourselves and our partners.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                       political uncertainty in venezuela
        23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, on January 23, 2019, the
    elected leader of Venezuela's National Assembly, Juan Gerardo Guaido,
    declared his position as the interim president of Venezuela based on
    constitutional authority. He has since been internationally recognized
    as the true President of Venezuela by Spain, France, Germany, the UN,
    Kosovo and the United States. From your perspective, what effect have
    the sanctions established by the United States had on Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
    has aggressively employed its Venezuela sanctions authorities to target
    nearly 150 individuals and entities, including regime insiders and
    their support networks involved in corrupt activities, in an effort to
    hold the Maduro regime accountable. As a result of OFAC actions, all
    property and interests in property of these entities and individuals,
    and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent
    or more by these blocked entities and individuals that are in the
    United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are
    blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC's regulations generally
    prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the
    United States that involve any property or interests in property of
    blocked or designated persons. These actions furthered international
    efforts to deny Maduro and his supporters of their revenue sources and
    continue pressure on the regime. For additional insights into the
    effect of United States sanctions on Venezuela, I defer to the
    Department of State and the Department of the Treasury.

        24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, we have heard of the grave
    humanitarian crisis in the area with the displacement of more than 3.3
    million people. What impact will this have in your AOR and what role,
    if any, does CENTCOM have in mitigating this crisis?
        Admiral Faller. The current number of Venezuelan migrants since
    2014 is 3.4 million, or over 10 percent of Venezuela's population. The
    UN is projecting 2 million more Venezuelans will emigrate in 2019, with
    most of these migrants staying in Latin America. Most Venezuelan
    migrants have settled in Colombia, with over one million migrants in
    Colombia so far. The second-largest Venezuelan migrant recipient is
    Peru, which hosts about 500,000 migrants, followed by Chile with over
    280,000 and Ecuador with over 200,000 migrants. The displacement of
    millions of Venezuelans has had a profound effect throughout the region
    across nearly every spectrum of society. In the area of defense,
    neighboring countries like Colombia and Peru have had to divert
    resources that were otherwise appropriated for important security
    initiatives. In Colombia for example, resources that could have been
    used to fund peace accord consolidation efforts have been diverted to
    help ease the suffering of Venezuelan migrants. We are also seeing some
    transnational organized crime groups, such as Colombia's National
    Liberation Army (ELN), are taking advantage of these conditions to
    recruit desperate Venezuelan migrants, increasing criminality along the
    border between the two countries. SOUTHCOM certainly has played a role
    in mitigating the crisis. We have provided direct support with air lift
    to deliver humanitarian assistance supplies on behalf of USAID. We also
    deployed the USNS Comfort to the region, providing medical care to over
    26,000 patients--relieving some of the burden placed on these
    neighboring countries to provide medical care. In addition to direct
    support, SOUTHCOM plays an important role in reducing tensions and
    encouraging collaboration among regional military leaders.
                    great power players and influence in aor
        25. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, China is
    making aggressive investments in both of your areas of responsibility
    with the ``Belt and Road Initiative'' (BRI). At the Senate Intelligence
    Committees' worldwide threats hearing, the Director of National
    Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated that ``Traditional adversaries will
    continue to attempt to gain and assert influence, taking advantage of
    changing conditions in the international environment increasingly
    isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global
    economy.'' With the increased economic competition with the United
    States from China, have you experienced, or do you expect to
    experience, deterioration of United States partnerships in your area of
    responsibility?
        General Waldhauser. This is probably our biggest challenge in
    Africa, because Africa's issues will not be solved militarily. Although
    security is important, it will not ultimately be the deciding factor in
    how Africans choose to partner with the United States. African states
    are seeking to diversify economic and security relationships in order
    to bolster development, investment, and economic growth. China
    understands this and is using its investment in infrastructure and
    other development programs to buy leverage with African countries. We
    have seen this pattern play out in Asia and are now seeing it begin to
    play out in Africa. China increasingly funds both incumbent politicians
    and opposition leaders within our AOR, as well as decision makers
    within ministries related to their commercial or posture objectives.
    This illicit individual funding, combined with legitimate investment
    that nevertheless causes heavy debt burdens, has slowed and complicated
    governance reform and our engagement in some partner states.
    Additionally, we have seen China adopt tactics of political involvement
    where their economic interests are concerned. To counter China's
    advance, both Department of State and Department of Defense have
    invested in programs such Defense Institution Building and the Security
    Governance Initiative as ways to deepen long standing United States
    support to security sector reform, governance, and rule of law within
    our AOR. As we encourage governments to become more transparent and
    provide them the means to fight corruption, we can then potentially
    ensure that Chinese investment on the continent complies with
    international norms and does not provide China undue influence.
        Admiral Faller. Latin America and the Caribbean is our neighborhood
    and we do have very strong partnerships in this region. However, China
    is seeking to inch out the United States as the preferred partner.
    China uses predatory economic policies to exert political leverage and
    gain access to key infrastructure, ranging from ports to
    telecommunications architecture. Greater Chinese involvement in
    regional governments' IT and telecommunications will limit our ability
    to share information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence
    concerns. For example, Chinese telecommunications firms, such as Huawei
    and ZTE, as of 2014 were the purveyors of 32 percent of all phone
    connections in Latin America, and are expected to reach 68 percent or
    605 million smartphones by the year 2020. China also has increased the
    tempo of its key leader engagements in the region, and frequently
    provides all-expenses paid security training as a way to further
    ingratiate itself with partners. While most countries in the region
    continue to view the United States as their preferred partner, we
    remain concerned that China's charm offensive and the accompanying
    indebtedness it promotes could increase countries' exposure to Chinese
    coercion.

        26. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how are
    you working with the Department of State, other government entities and
    our allies within your AOR? Are there areas of improvement that should
    be examined? If so, what are these areas?
        General Waldhauser. We work very closely together with the
    Department of State (DOS) and USAID on these issues daily and at many
    levels. In what we refer to as a 3D approach: Diplomacy, Development,
    and Defense. DOS political advisors, USAID development advisors, and
    representatives from other government agencies are embedded throughout
    USAFRICOM, and we have regular synchronization meetings with both our
    United States Embassies and DOS. USAFRICOM also hosts an annual Africa
    Strategic Dialogue, which brings together senior stakeholders from the
    Departments of State, Defense, and USAID to coordinate strategic
    approaches and harmonize guidance for Africa. In addition, the Africa
    Strategic Integration Conference brings together officials from across
    the United States Government, including many from Africa, to discuss
    regional issues facing the United States in Africa and to help us to
    develop unified responses. Our allies are integrated into our work in
    similar ways. Through our Multinational Coordination Cell, we host
    Liaison Officers from 17 partners and jointly plan our assistance and
    operations through regionally-focused multinational working groups.
        Admiral Faller. We have a robust relationship with the Department
    of State positioning the U.S. as the partner of choice throughout the
    region with very few exceptions. It starts at the ground level in the
    embassies where DOD members form an important part of the country
    teams. We integrate our operational and capacity building activities in
    the region in direct support of--and aligned with--Department of State
    Integrated Country Strategies. SOUTHCOM implements several key State
    security assistance programs such as International Military Education
    and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and the Global Peacekeeping
    Operations Initiative to build our partners' capacity to counter mutual
    threats and enhance global security in a way that other powers cannot.
    The gold standard for Interagency cooperation and coordination is the
    Joint Interagency Task Force-South where DOD, as the lead federal
    agency for detection and monitoring of air and maritime narcotics
    trafficking, provides a vital coordination link for alignment with the
    various federal agencies that carry out the other phases of the
    interdiction continuum. The close coordination between SOUTHCOM and our
    State and USAID partners manifests itself nearly every year during
    hurricane season and for other disasters that strike. Also, we work
    closely with regional partners to expose Chinese malign influence,
    ensure our partners understand the dangers of China's predatory
    financial practices, and have the complete picture concerning so-called
    promises of Chinese IT and cyber cooperation. Given their bleak fiscal
    outlook, most countries in the region feel pressure to pursue economic
    cooperation with Beijing. Many of these countries lack the expertise
    and experience to scrutinize fully Chinese bids and safeguard against
    unfavorable terms; our regional partners would likely benefit from
    access to experts who can help them discern bad deals.
                                 climate change
        27. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, while
    some dispute the existence of climate change and the extent of its
    global impact, climate-related events provide a significant risk to our
    national security and that of our allies. What steps are you taking
    within your areas of responsibility to address the security risks
    associated with climate change?
        General Waldhauser. In addition to complying with responsibilities
    set forth in DOD Directive 4715.21, ``Climate Change Adaptation and
    Resilience'', USAFRICOM supports environmental security engagements
    with partner nations, interagency, and non-governmental organizations
    across the area of responsibility. The effects of climate change
    threaten environmental security by degrading natural resources and the
    environment. Environmental issues can easily manifest into human
    conflict, increasing competition and tension between populations.
    Environmental security engagements are a tool in abating these concerns
    - advancing cooperation amongst nations and regions while promoting
    security and stability. Some examples of these engagements are water
    security initiatives and mangrove forest management. Ultimately,
    solutions to climate change and environmental problems contribute to
    national security objectives.
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM does consider climate change in its
    strategic planning. During environmental compliance and assessments,
    climate change is incorporated into learning objectives in order to
    mitigate impacts of natural disasters to include frequency and
    severity. Additionally, to ensure our own personnel and families are
    ready, SOUTHCOM conducts annual hurricane preparedness training for all
    personnel assigned to our headquarters. The threat of instability
    caused by climate change has led to the inclusion of climate change
    scenarios in some of SOUTHCOM's major exercise scenarios like
    TRADEWINDS. During the TRADEWINDS annual exercise, national agencies
    and partner agencies practice collaboration and coordination to limit
    the impacts and severity of the weather systems often attributed to
    climate change. These efforts attempt to reduce the risks of local,
    regional, and international instability during crisis and disasters in
    our AOR. The associated risks include, but are not limited to,
    immigration, cultural property protection, and environmental impacts.
    Lastly, we conduct environmental subject matter expert engagements that
    are often related to pre- and post-natural disaster planning, such as a
    recent engagement on post disaster waste management.

        28. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have
    United States Forces been trained and equipped to respond to natural
    disasters in your AOR?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM routinely conducts deliberate
    planning to prepare for contingencies to respond to crises which may
    result from natural disasters including, instability, pandemic
    influenza/infectious disease, and non-combatant evacuation. Currently,
    we are conducting disaster relief support in response to the flooding
    in Mozambique. These efforts take into account a whole-of-government
    approach to include how we will coordinate with and support interagency
    partners such as DOS and USAID. In addition, we provide guidance to
    USAFRICOM service components, so they can forecast necessary recourses
    and training to support mission requirements. For example, United
    States Army Africa developed and approved a plan to support Foreign
    Humanitarian Assistance which involved its Headquarters and staff
    working with both DOS and USAID. Along with service components,
    USAFRICOM relies heavily on other capabilities like the State
    Partnership Program to increase partner readiness. Currently, Africa
    has 14 State Partnership Programs. These programs bring unique
    capabilities as many of the National Guard units consist of first
    responders and emergency personnel who bring this expertise when they
    conduct emergency management and natural disaster response training and
    exercises.
        Admiral Faller. The Services are responsible for training and
    equipping forces, providing ready forces for the combatant commands. At
    the combatant command level, we help the Services maintain and build
    readiness by tailoring bilateral and regional exercises and training
    events to increase the readiness of U.S. Forces for a range of
    missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The
    countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR experience approximately 50 natural
    disasters every year ranging from wild fires, to volcanic erruptions,
    to hurricanes, and earthquakes. We work closely with our partner
    nations and regional coordination mechanisms such as the Caribbean
    Disaster Emergency Management Agency and the Coordination Center for
    the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America to build our
    collective capacity to respond to and/or coordinate disaster relief
    efforts. We've seen a decrease in requests for assistance following
    these disasters because our partners are increasingly prepared to
    handle the responses themselves.

        29. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have
    United States Forces been equipped and prepared to help address the
    growing health crises associated with climate change?
        General Waldhauser. Climate change creates a number of challenges
    within the USAFRICOM operational environment. Increasing spread of
    infectious diseases (e.g. malaria and cholera), fresh water loss (e.g.
    Lake Chad Basin), desertification, sea level change, and extreme
    weather (e.g. flooding and heat waves) are significant concerns. These
    issues lead to increasing risks for complex humanitarian disasters,
    exacerbation of conflicts, and instability in fragile states. Although
    primary responsibility for training and equipping United States Forces
    lies with each individual service, USAFRICOM supplements the services
    in multiple ways. First, we educate our forces on the health threats
    posed by climate change through programs such as the Africa Today
    course, the USAFRICOM Newcomer's Course, and the Joint Humanitarian
    Operations Course. Second, we execute several health engagement
    programs designed to build the capability of our African Partners to
    manage health risks worsened by climate change. Two examples are the
    Africa Malaria Task Force (AMTF) and the African Partner Outbreak
    Response Alliance (APORA). Finally, the USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
    includes objectives focused on preparation to respond to all types of
    disaster as well as increasing African Partner capability to prevent
    and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Numerous humanitarian and
    security force assistance activities support these objectives and
    ultimately build awareness and preparation for both the United States
    and our African Partners.
        Admiral Faller. United States Forces have expeditionary units with
    capabilities in disease surveillance, vector control, preventative
    medicine services, dental services, damage control resuscitation and
    surgery, as well as veterinary services and medical logistics
    capabilities. These capabilities are primarily designed to support
    organic DOD forces to allow DOD security forces, engineers, and
    logisticians to bolster State and local government response
    capabilities. Historically, the DOD has supported USAID's Office of
    Foreign Disaster Assistance in responding to natural disasters,
    including extreme weather events. Often, this support includes
    capabilities that account for adverse health outcomes that may result
    from a natural disaster. To illustrate this, in 2010 SOUTHCOM stood up
    a joint task force to assist in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
    SOUTHCOM, in support of USAID, conducted Foreign Disaster Relief
    operations in support of the Government of Haiti and the United Nations
    Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by providing localized
    security, facilitating the distribution and restoration of basic human
    services, providing medical support, and conducting critical
    engineering operations in order to alleviate human suffering and
    provide the foundation for the long term recovery of Haiti.
       withdrawal of united states troops and the war in the middle east
        30. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, despite
    the announcement of the defeat of ISIS and the immediate withdrawal of
    troops from Syria and the framework for peace with the Taliban in
    Afghanistan, ISIS continues to be an active and legitimate threat that
    is likely to pursue external attacks. What kind of threat does the
    Islamic State pose in your Areas of Responsibility?
        General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups have neither conducted
    nor inspired external attacks against the United States Homeland.
    However, their diffuse extremist networks allow enabled or inspired
    attacks against United States and other Western interests in Africa and
    in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe havens in North Africa,
    the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to regional
    stability and a continued threat to United States, allied, and host-
    nation interests within those regions.
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM views self-radicalizing individuals
    responding to ISIS's messaging as one of the principal violent
    extremist organization threats in the region. Currently, ISIS lacks
    operational capacity in the AOR, but does have many sympathizers who
    have left this region to fight on behalf of ISIS. ISIS has used the
    story of a Trinidadian fighter in their magazine Dabiq to recruit and
    radicalize other westerners. An alleged terrorist plot in Trinidad was
    thwarted in early 2018 with the help of United States authorities. The
    disruption led to the arrests of 14 Trinidadian ISIS sympathizers who
    were subsequently released. SOUTHCOM is concerned with the possible
    return of many Trinidadians and other South Americans who may possess
    combat experience in Iraq and Syria.

        31. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, what
    concerns do you have in terms of the withdrawal of troops from Syria as
    well as the potential agreement with the Taliban?
        General Waldhauser. Both the withdrawal of troops from Syria and
    the potential agreement with the Taliban could provide propaganda
    fodder for both the Islamic State and al Qaida to rally extremist
    support within Africa. The narrative that the Taliban 'won' a
    protracted war against the United States and its allies would very
    likely be used in extremist circles to recruit new members and garner
    materiel or financial support for Islamic State or al Qaida networks on
    the continent. The withdrawal of troops from Syria could also allow
    remnant ISIS networks to rebuild connectivity with its provinces or
    aspiring networks in Africa, although are currently not seeing this at
    this time.
        Admiral Faller. ISIS remains a resilient enemy with many loyal
    fighters and supporters throughout the world including Latin America
    and the Caribbean. I defer to OSD and United States Central Command on
    the specific implications of the withdrawal from Syria and the
    potential agreement with the Taliban.
                         operations of u.s. coast guard
        32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the Joint Interagency Task
    Force South (JIATF-S) executes detection and monitoring of illicit
    trafficking across all domains, and facilitates international and
    interagency interdiction to enable the disruption and dismantlement of
    illicit and converging threat networks in support of national and
    regional security. Despite its effectiveness, last year, only 6 percent
    of known drug movements were interdicted. What would you require in
    your AOR to increase the overall effectiveness of the Joint Interagency
    Task Force South (JIATF-S)?
        Admiral Faller. More Maritime Patrol Aircraft to detect drug
    trafficking movements and provide overwatch in support of interdiction
    operations would enable our partners to increase drug seizures.
    Currently, partners conduct nearly 40 percent of interdictions
    supported by JIATF-South. To increase the effectiveness of United
    States interdiction operations, JIATF-S requires integrated force
    packages that include a ship with an on board Law Enforcement
    Detachment (LEDET), helicopters (with airborne use of force
    capability), small boats for boardings, and supporting maritime patrol
    aircraft (MPA). Annually, every additional force package allotted to
    JIATF-S projects to seize and/or disrupt 33 metric tons (MT) of
    cocaine. The greater the number of fully integrated packages--the more
    drugs can be taken off the high seas.

        33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, what effect, if any, did the
    recent government shutdown have on the readiness of the U.S. Coast
    Guard and their effectiveness to perform these essential operations in
    your AOR?
        Admiral Faller. While operations continued during the lapse in
    appropriations, the Coast Guard was forced to defer or delay
    maintenance on 75 cutters, many of which routinely deploy in support of
    SOUTHCOM counter-narcotics missions. Similarly, deferred aviation
    maintenance and a shortage of nearly 500 spare parts caused by the
    lapse in appropriations will impact the availability of armed Coast
    Guard helicopters crucial to drug interdiction efforts in the Western
    Hemisphere. In spite of not being paid during the partial government
    shutdown, approximately 1600 Coast Guard personnel deployed throughout
    the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility continued to protect the Homeland
    from drug traffickers and provide force protection to our personnel at
    JTF-Guantanamo. This is the first time on record that members of the
    U.S. military were not paid during a lapse in appropriations. Finally,
    and most importantly, the shutdown had a detrimental effect on the
    morale of these servicemembers and placed an undue burden on their
    families. The professionalism and resiliency shown by our Coast Guard
    brothers and sisters and their families during this time was truly
    impressive.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                               associated forces
        34. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, during testimony you stated
    that you could not say for sure whether Boko Haram or ISIS-West Africa
    had been designated an Associated Force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.
    Could you provide me a list of what groups have been deemed Associated
    Forces under the 2001 AUMF within the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility?
        General Waldhauser. The names of groups in the USAFRICOM AOR
    designated as associated forces under the 2001 AUMF are classified.
    Those designated organizations were thoroughly vetted by the Secretary
    of Defense, connected to the organizations listed in the AUMF, and
    demonstrated a threat to the U.S. This classified information can be
    provided to your staff.
                            collective self defense
        35. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, in response to my question
    about collective self-defense you stated ``if we are not accompanying .
    . . we do not have collective self-defense because I haven't designated
    it and we don't use it.'' While you may have applied restrictions to
    accompany missions and the use of collective self-defense, do you have
    the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a partner force
    when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened themselves?
        General Waldhauser. Let me clarify the remarks I made during
    testimony. While I have, in certain situations, applied restrictions to
    accompany missions in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility, I do have
    the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a designated
    partner force when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened
    themselves. Under authorities granted to CDR USAFRICOM by the Secretary
    of Defense, transmitted in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Execution Orders, we retain the ability to provide assistance to
    designated partner forces during counterterrorism operations where we
    do not accompany them on the mission. Through our remote advise and
    assist efforts, we observe the partner force and enemy activity through
    visual means, typically the employment of Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Achieving this visual perspective
    enables the conduct-based characterization of the enemy activity,
    meaning that once the attacking force has committed a hostile act or
    has demonstrated hostile intent towards the designated partner force
    our use of lethal force may be authorized.

        36. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, has the Department of
    Defense provided you any legal framework regarding the use of
    collective self-defense? If so, could you please provide us a copy of
    that framework? If not, what are the standing guidelines and Rules of
    Engagement you have disseminated to your commanders regarding the legal
    use of collective self-defense?
        General Waldhauser. The collective self-defense authority is
    discussed in the Chairman's Directive on the Standing Rules of
    Engagement and, in some cases, within operational orders provided by
    the Secretary to CDR USAFRICOM. These resources do not specifically
    discuss the legal framework surrounding the collective self-defense
    authority. USAFRICOM executes its collective self-defense authorities
    in compliance with domestic and international law as articulated in
    orders issued by the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM. Additionally, although
    classified, CDR USAFRICOM has provided restrictions and standing
    guidelines on the use of collective self-defense, which are also
    outlined in USAFRICOM orders.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                              military defections
        37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, on February 2, 2019, Air
    Force General Francisco Yanez announced his departure from Mr. Maduro's
    military and declared his support for Mr. Guaido. He is the highest-
    ranking military officer to defect, thus far. Do you know how many
    troops have defected?
        Admiral Faller. We assess based on regional partners' migration
    figures that over 1000 Venezuelan troops have defected between mid-
    January and mid-March 2019. Most defectors are junior officers and
    enlisted personnel. Only two general officers have defected, and they
    lack the sufficient influence to cause a groundswell of high-ranking
    officials to defect.

        38. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, is there any safe haven for
    troops once they defect?
        Admiral Faller. Most Venezuelan military defectors seek refuge in
    Colombia and Brazil after pledging their allegiance to Guaido. Both of
    these partners are playing pivotal roles in resettling the defectors
    and their families. Interim President Guaido has publicly promised to
    extend amnesty to members of the armed forces who assist in reinstating
    the constitutional order. To date, most high-ranking officials appear
    to remain skeptical of the amnesty offer.

        39. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, if Guaido succeeds, what
    would the Venezuelan military look like, and what do you envision would
    be the role of the United States?
        Admiral Faller. While Venezuela has a longstanding military
    culture, we assess it will take some time for Interim President Guaido
    to rebuild the military to eliminate longstanding corruption; root out
    officials who remain loyal to the ideology of Chavismo (which is the
    only ideology many of the junior officers and enlisted have ever
    known), Cuba and other external state actors; and regain military
    interoperability with West. There are many military officials who under
    Maduro have used their position to profit from the drug trade, and have
    allowed transnational criminal groups access to Venezuelan air space.
    Cuba, in particularly, has deep inroads into Venezuela's military and
    overall security apparatus, and it will take some time to undo that
    influence. Additionally, for almost 20 years, the Venezuelan military
    has been more aligned with Russia and China, receiving military
    training from those nations and using their equipment and weapons.
    Further, criticism of Maduro often stems from the rank-and-file
    believing he has betrayed Chavismo, and the prevalence of true
    believers within the military's ranks will complicate Guaido's efforts
    to build a cohesive, unified military. The Venezuelan military's senior
    ranks will probably suffer the greatest reductions due to the
    predominance of corrupt supporters of Chavez and their close
    relationship with Cuba and Russia. This will leave a critical gap in
    leadership. SOUTHCOM engagement will depend on policy decisions that
    must explore funding from Department of Defense and Department of State
    for areas such as military professionalization and institution
    building. A security cooperation relationship will need to be rebuilt
    from the ground up following years of severed ties.
                           blinding lasers--djibouti
        40. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, there have been reports
    of China using blinding lasers against our pilots in Djibouti. Have you
    raised this issue with your Chinese counterparts?
        General Waldhauser. In this particular incident, the United States
    has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not tolerate any
    deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. United States
    responses have included: issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that
    outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of
    Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue
    through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism;
    requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army
    investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible
    for the incident. To date, we have not had another such incident.
    USAFRICOM has a policy in place directing aircrews to utilize laser eye
    protection in Djibouti. USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA track and report
    suspected lasing incidents; certain lasing events have been assessed as
    originating from the Chinese People's Liberation Army Naval facility in
    Djibouti. USAFRICOM works closely with our Department of State
    counterparts to ensure that China is aware of the hazard these lasers
    present and the specific threat it poses to pilots flying in Djiboutian
    air space pursuant to the permission of the Djiboutian Government.

        41. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, do you believe there has
    been sufficient consequences for China's breach of the Protocol on
    Blinding Laser Weapons in Djibouti?
        General Waldhauser. It remains in our interest to deter aggressive
    acts that violate international safety conventions by raising the costs
    of such behavior. Actions like the lasing incident are part of China's
    strategy of operating below the United States threshold for military
    engagement and in a protracted state of hostility attempting to weaken
    U.S. Forces in incremental steps. In this particular incident, the
    United States has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not
    tolerate any deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. Our
    responses have included issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that
    outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of
    Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue
    through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism;
    requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army
    investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible
    for the incident. We believe China has gotten the message. To date, we
    have not had another such incident.
                           china and russia in africa
        42. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, in 2018, the Trump
    Administration signaled plans to reduce forces in Africa by nearly 10
    percent over the next several years, citing the need for greater
    emphasis on China and Russia. You are saying that China and Russia are
    threatening our influence in Africa. Is a drawdown of resources in
    Africa appropriate, given what you describe?
        General Waldhauser. The ten percent reduction of forces in Africa
    only applies to counter-VEO Special Operations Forces. As a result, the
    reductions USAFRICOM has proposed to meet the Administration's guidance
    will not adversely affect USAFRICOM's ability to counter China or
    Russia in Africa. This is because we have carefully chosen the
    reductions so as to minimize its impact on missions outside of the
    counter-VEO fight. For example, we will continue a robust exercise
    program and significant Security Force assistance with our African
    partners.

        43. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, would a drawdown of
    resources in Africa threaten United States interests, and allow for
    unchecked Chinese and Russian influence?
        General Waldhauser. Yes, a further reduction of resources in Africa
    carries increased risk that our African partners may begin to view us
    as a less reliable partner. Should this occur African nations are
    likely to turn to those whom they perceive as most capable of meeting
    their needs. A successful approach to protecting United States
    interests in Africa against Chinese and Russian expansion requires a
    whole-of-government response. DOD plays a unique role within that
    response and a reduction of already sparse resources allocated to the
    USAFRICOM AOR would ignore the importance of Africa's role in China's
    global ambitions and Russia's desire to enhance their access and
    influence. If ordered to further reduce our forces and funding for
    activities in Africa, we will work to minimize the potential impact to
    our counter-China and counter-Russia efforts.
                        debt diplomacy in latin america
        44. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, more and more countries are
    discovering the pitfalls of signing onto China's investment strategy.
    Are you taking any efforts to warn countries in Latin America against
    accepting financial assistance from China? If so, how?
        Admiral Faller. We work closely with partners in the region to
    expose Chinese malign influence and ensure they understand the dangers
    of China's predatory, opaque, and corrupt financial practices and
    promises of IT and cyber cooperation. This includes sharing case
    studies of China's activities in other regions, including China's
    efforts to purchase long term control of strategic infrastructure, such
    as in Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. There are security considerations
    to allowing the Chinese to build and operate infrastructure with little
    host nation oversight such as the satellite facility in Argentina.
    Highlighting the inherent danger in these agreements is a consistent
    focus area for myself as well as SOUTHCOM component commanders and
    senior staff during engagements with partner nation leadership. We
    closely coordinate with interagency partners to ensure messaging
    alignment and consistency.

        45. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, are you taking any
    efforts to warn countries in Africa against accepting financial
    assistance from China? If so, how?
        General Waldhauser. United States Africa Command follows the lead
    of the Departments of State and Commerce for debt issues in Africa and
    respects our African partners' rights to manage their political,
    military, and economic relations according to their interests. The
    Departments of State and Commerce, with the International Monetary
    Fund, World Bank, and broader international community, may advise
    countries in Africa on the perils--and benefits--of Chinese financial
    assistance. United States Africa Command advocates for the United
    States to remain the partner of choice by maintaining our high
    standards of professionalism, demonstrating our commitment to
    addressing partner security needs, and providing high-quality
    equipment, in comparison to peer and near-peer competitors. Further, we
    offer comprehensive training and equipping programs to meet the long-
    term military requirements of our partners, under conditions
    sustainable by the partner's budget and resource availability.
                         russian influence in venezuela
        46. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, Russia just sent 400 military
    contractors to Venezuela, in support of Mr. Maduro. This is on top of
    Russian-made surface-to-air-missiles, and periodic visits of nuclear
    capable aircraft. What other Russian assets are in Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Russia is Venezuela's top arms supplier. From 2008
    to 2018, Moscow sold to Caracas over $9 billion in military equipment
    to include combat aircraft, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, tanks,
    armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launch systems, artillery,
    mortar systems, and assorted missile variants. It is likely that
    technicians, training personnel, and other associated materials/
    equipment are provided through provisions negotiated during these
    sales. We have no information to corroborate the claim that 400 Russian
    private military contractors arrived in Venezuela in January 2019.
    Additionally, Russia will periodically deploy naval assets to
    Venezuela, such as naval surface actions groups.
                              venezuela and turkey
        47. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, President Trump signed an
    executive order banning United States persons from engaging in
    Venezuela's gold trade. That could be extended to third parties such as
    Turkey, who imported roughly 23 tons last year. What is your
    understanding of this trade relationship?
        Admiral Faller. Turkey's relationship with Venezuela has deepened
    in part by an affinity between the two presidents. In the past two
    years, Ankara has expanded its trade with Venezuela, importing about
    $900 million in gold in 2018. The Maduro regime last year began
    refining its gold in Turkey as a way to bypass United States sanctions.

        48. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, are you monitoring movement
    of gold outside of Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. Yes, we are monitoring movement of gold outside of
    Venezuela and collaborate closely with interagency partners to
    determine the effect these gold movements are having on internal and
    regional security. The Maduro regime continues to avoid penalty from
    United States sanctions, pursuant to E.O. 13850, by selling gold to
    African and Middle Eastern countries such as Uganda and United Arab
    Emirates, respectively. Russia remains Maduro's principle partner in
    helping move the gold via a Boeing 777 belonging to Russian-airline
    Norwind.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          venezuelan refugee situation
        49. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, according to the United
    Nations, over 3 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants have already
    fled their homes. A Brookings study published in December estimates
    that this number could grow to 8 million people if economic conditions
    remain dire, which would be even larger than number of persons
    displaced by the Syria crisis. In an interview with the Miami Herald,
    the study's author said the number could grow this large within only 2-
    3 years. What is your assessment of the consequences of millions of
    people leaving Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. The UN projects that by the end of 2019
    approximately 5 million Venezuelans will have left the country since
    2014. Most Venezuelan migrants resettle within Latin America, taxing
    regional partners' social, humanitarian, and security services,
    particularly in towns along the border with Venezuela. Every country in
    South America and parts of Central America and the Caribbean are
    hosting Venezuelan migrants. Some of the notable figures are: over one
    million Venezuelan migrants have relocated to Colombia; 700,000 to
    Peru; over 280,000 to Chile; 200,000 to Ecuador; 130,000 to Argentina;
    and close to 100,000 in both Brazil and Panama. The sudden influx of
    Venezuelan migrants has strained health and education services and has
    outpaced the ability of some governments, such as Colombia, to provide
    shelter and resources. Along the border between Colombia and Venezuela,
    the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC) dissidents, and other Colombian criminal organizations
    exploit Venezuelan migrants crossing the border. For example, the ELN
    has recruited Venezuelans as young as 15 to join their ranks for
    unspecified illegal activities, according to the Colombian Army and
    local non-governmental organizations. Finally as this tragedy grows,
    the neighboring countries, especially Colombia, will have fewer and
    fewer security forces to devote to counterdrugs missions as they shift
    forces to help refugees in dire need of food and medical care.

        50. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, are Venezuela's neighbors
    prepared to deal with a crisis of this magnitude?
        Admiral Faller. The exodus from Venezuela is producing the largest
    mass migration in Latin American history with an estimated 2.7 million
    migrants and refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean and 3.4
    million globally as of February 2019. Neighbors, particularly those
    sharing borders or close to Venezuela are experiencing severe strains
    on social services, including their ability to provide sanitation,
    housing, feeding, and dealing with outbreaks of infectious disease.
    Both Brazil with 96,000 and Colombia 1.1 million have well organized
    governmental responses to deal with border crossings, but Colombia's
    challenge is complicated but much larger numbers of migrants and
    increased violence, primarily from terrorist activity by the National
    Liberation Army (ELN) which uses Venezuela as a safe haven and is
    taking advantage of the Colombian military being stretched thin to
    support the humanitarian effort. Although all of South America and the
    small neighboring Caribbean Islands such as Trinidad and Tobago,
    Curacao, and Aruba are particularly short of resources to handle the
    influx of migrants, other more distant, larger countries are also
    significantly impacted with over 700,000 in Peru, 288,000 in Chile, and
    130,000 in Argentina which is simultaneously in the throes of a
    significant financial crisis undermining its ability to deal with a
    large influx of migrants. With the outpouring into the region expected
    to continue unabated, most of the impacted countries will require
    significant international assistance to avoid a greater catastrophe
    than it currently is. Relief supplies are currently staged in both
    Colombia and Brazil, ready to distribute within Venezuelan as soon as
    the Venezuelan military will allow it.

        51. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, is SOUTHCOM
    or your partner agencies doing to assist Venezuela's neighbors and
    these refugees?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM's assistance to the Venezuelan migrants
    and those neighboring countries impacted by the crisis has largely been
    the support provided by the deployment of the USNS Comfort in the fall
    of 2018 and the air lift used to deliver humanitarian aid to the region
    this year. From October to December 2018, the USNS Comfort visited
    Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras. The Comfort deployment improved
    interoperability with partner nation, non-governmental organization,
    and U.S. medical providers. The physicians from the USNS Comfort
    treated 14,554 medical patients, 3203 dental patients, 8335 optometry
    patients, and conducted 599 surgeries. They conducted 53 tours and
    engagements and 120 subject matter exchanges. Comfort had an engagement
    with the Ecuadorian President, Peruvian Congress, and Honduran
    President. The deployment of the Comfort highlighted the Venezuelan
    migrant crisis, with news coverage reached an estimated 222 million
    people. In February and March, DOD transported over 126 metric tons of
    USAID-provided humanitarian relief commodities, including water
    treatment equipment, hygiene kits, non-pharmaceutical medical supplies,
    ready-to-use supplementary food, and bulk rice, on 7 United States
    military flights to Cucuta, Colombia.
                        drug smuggling and interdiction
        52. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, Southern Command works hard
    every day to deter criminal networks that try to smuggle drugs into the
    United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are devastating the
    health and safety of Americans across our country. The United States
    Customs and Border Protection recently seized over 250 pounds of
    fentanyl at a legal port of entry on our border with Mexico. It was the
    largest bust ever of this opioid. Where do most of the illegal drugs
    shipped from your area of responsibility enter the United States?
        Admiral Faller. The majority of illegal drugs shipped from the
    SOUTHCOM area of responsibility enter the United States through Mexico.
    More than 80 percent of United States-bound cocaine shipments departing
    South America transited the eastern Pacific Ocean last year, mostly
    aboard noncommercial maritime vessels. The vast majority of cocaine
    seizures occur on the high seas, or in South America, before the drug
    ever reaches Central America, Mexico, or the Caribbean Islands.
    Colombia remains the primary source for the majority of cocaine seized
    and tested in the United States. In 2018, at least 84 percent of the
    documented cocaine departing South America transited the Eastern
    Pacific and 9 percent through the Western Caribbean, totaling 93
    percent of the known flow through the Central American corridor to
    Mexico.

        53. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, of the drugs that are
    interdicted, how many of these are intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard?
        Admiral Faller. In fiscal year 2018, the Joint Interagency Task
    Force-South (JIATF-S) supported the interdiction of 273 metric tons of
    cocaine in 287 maritime events. The U.S. Coast Guard played a critical
    role in those interdictions, participating in 171 events (60 percent).
    Also note that our partner nations play a critical role in maritime
    interdictions, participating in 116 events (40 percent). JIATF-S does
    not execute actual law enforcement interdiction but directly supports
    the U.S. Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, and partner
    nations.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                                   venezuela
        54. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, with the increased complexity
    of foreign defense partnerships within the Venezuelan Government such
    as Russian bomber visits and military equipment sales, Cuban
    intelligence and security forces, and the presence of Hezbollah, do you
    foresee dangers in an open conflict with Venezuela bleeding over into
    direct conflict with another foreign power or of a conflict in
    Venezuela devolving into a proxy war?
        Admiral Faller. Although Russia, Cuba, and Hezbollah do have
    varying degrees of presence and involvement in Venezuela, at this time,
    there is no indication that any open conflict would occur nor that it
    would devolve into a proxy war.
                         chinese investment in soutchom
        55. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, base on continuing Chinese
    investment in multiple areas such as infrastructure, port projects, and
    canal construction, are we as the United States at risk of losing
    access or influence with our allies either through physical barriers to
    operation or through risk of compromise of information networks?
        Admiral Faller. China is seeking to inch out the United States as
    the preferred partner in the region. China uses predatory economic
    policies to exert political leverage and gain access to key
    infrastructure, ranging from ports to telecommunications architecture.
    For example, Beijing's offers to Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El
    Salvador of greater economic engagement likely played a key role in
    these countries' decisions to diplomatically recognize China. Shortly
    after El Salvador recognized China, Beijing tried to develop a
    commercial port there (La Union), a move the United States ambassador
    said demonstrated China's intentions to turn the port into a military
    base. Greater Chinese involvement in regional security services' IT and
    telecommunications may mean we need to reassess how we share
    information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence concerns. A
    reduced ability to share information with these partners likely would
    affect our ability to pass actionable intelligence that allows partners
    to detect, monitor, and disrupt narcotraffickers.
                                 guantanamo bay
        56. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, if the requested funds are
    authorized and appropriated for recapitalization of Joint Task Force
    Guantanamo Bay facilities, how long until additional funds will be
    required for further repairs or updates? What is the long term cost
    estimate of housing the 40 current detainees indefinitely?
        Admiral Faller. Recapitalizing the infrastructure at Joint Task
    Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) will require a phased approach. The
    majority of facilities at JTF-GTMO were designed to expeditionary (one
    year design life) or temporary standards (five year design life) and
    constructed between 2004 and 2008, putting them long past their life
    spans. Not only is the infrastructure failing, but the various systems
    within those buildings are also starting to fail, such as plumbing,
    electrical, and IT systems. With the signing of Executive Order 13823
    and subsequent policy guidance, the JTF has been directed to plan for
    continued operations for at least 25 years. The JTF is currently
    assessing all of its infrastructure requirements to meet this mission
    and I will be reviewing it carefully to ensure a balance of troop
    safety, security of detainees, and good stewardship of taxpayer funds.
              combatting violent extremist organizations in africa
        57. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, with the limited ability
    to conduct kinetic strikes with United States assets against militants
    and extremist organizations in many regions of Africa, what efforts are
    currently being undertaken on the security cooperation and governance
    fronts to contain or combat the rapidly growing extremist threats in
    many of Africa's ungoverned areas?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM has a limited authority to conduct
    kinetic strikes with United States assets; however, the USAFRICOM
    Campaign Plan (ACP) supports the broader U.S. whole-of-government
    policy and strategy implementation to defeat priority VEOs globally.
    Defeating VEOs in Africa requires a synchronized, sustained, and multi-
    year regional campaign that leverages African, international, and
    interagency partners. In East Africa, USAFRICOM continues to build upon
    the focus and of over a decade of investments, both directly with the
    Somalis as well as with the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
    troop contributing countries (TCCs), Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
    Kenya, and Uganda, to consolidate gains and accelerate towards long-
    term recovery and stability in Somalia. These efforts allow our
    partners in Somalia to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United
    States and other regional partners and international organizations.
    USAFRICOM achieves USAFRICOM Campaign Plan North African Counter-VEO
    (C-VEO) Build Partner Capacity (BPC) effects and fulfills its security
    cooperation obligations by engaging with key partner nations to develop
    capabilities to detect/disrupt/degrade VEO operations, lines of
    communication, and safe havens. These BPC efforts allow our partners in
    the Maghreb to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United States and
    other regional partners and international organizations. The two
    primary countries USAFRICOM partners with in the North African region
    are Morocco and Tunisia. USAFRICOM supports and executes operations and
    activities in the West African Sahel Region to enable French counter-
    terrorism operations, enable the African led GS Sahel Joint Force to
    execute independent C-VEO operations, and assist Sahel partner forces
    to execute independent operations that apply pressure to VEO networks
    in West Africa. In the Lake Chad Region (LCR), USAFRICOM supports and
    executes operations and activities to assist partner forces in applying
    pressure to the Baka Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA) networks and
    enable local LCR Government officials to promote and process defectors
    from Baka Haram and ISIS-WA. USAFRICOM's defense efforts must be
    executed in parallel with comprehensive diplomacy and development
    measures to address the underlying political, societal, and development
    grievances that often contribute to violent extremism in Africa. To
    address these issues, the United States Government (USG) and
    international partners conduct diplomatic and development engagements
    with African partners to underscore the importance of human rights
    standards and civilian control of the military. These efforts, which
    will strengthen the perceived legitimacy of our African partner
    governments and militaries, are essential to long-term prosperity and
    stability on the continent.
                          chinese expansion in africom
        58. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, does Chinese military
    expansion in Africa such as their naval base in Djibouti and security
    cooperation efforts tied to their investments currently have the
    potential to inhibit our operations to secure a more stable African
    continent?
        General Waldhauser. Current Chinese military efforts in Africa are
    unlikely to inhibit our operations and access in the region. However,
    if current trends continue, China could gain that capability within the
    next decade. China is actively working with African partners to open
    new bases in several locations across the continent. Additionally,
    China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) links existing and planned dual-
    use ports across the continent to Chinese facilities in Asia. Some of
    these ports are entirely operated by Chinese commercial entities and
    other ports only have a section controlled by Chinese firms. These
    ports are often connected to BRI rail, road, and pipeline
    infrastructure built with Chinese loans. We have seen instances in
    which China has leveraged infrastructure debt to pressure Africa
    leaders to take actions against American interests. If Chinese control
    over African infrastructure continues to expand, our operations will
    likely start to encounter reduced access in several theaters.
                         russian involvement in africom
        59. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, what efforts or strategy
    are we currently undertaking to combat or counterbalance the
    destabilizing effects of Russian sanctioned and supported arms sales
    and quasi-military personnel support to autocratic regimes in Africa
    such as the government in the Central African Republic?
        General Waldhauser. Our efforts across Africa are designed to
    demonstrate that the United States and its Allies are superior security
    partners. Our military to military engagements throughout the region
    support broader U.S. Government objectives of fostering more
    transparent and responsive governments, which in turn leads to more
    resilient government institutions. As governments become more
    resilient, they are able to withstand Russian coercive actions that
    could lead to instability. In addition to supporting other government
    agencies in their mission of helping Africans develop more resilient
    governments, USAFRICOM is also working with our Allies to directly
    address specific Russian actions in countries where our Allies have
    shared interest with us such as in CAR. Due to long-standing and deep
    ties our Allies have with many African nations, it may be more
    appropriate for them to take the lead in countering Russian
    destabilizing activities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                                    cameroon
        60. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, in response to my question
    regarding Cameroon you testified that: `` they have been a good partner
    with us counterterrorism wise, but you can't neglect the fact that they
    have--there are alleged atrocities and what's going on there. We
    continue to take our cues from the State Department and from the
    ambassador and our level of engagement will continue but not get out
    ahead of what they do State Department would say is if we have to take
    other actions. We were very emphatic with President Biya that the
    behavior of his troops, the lack of transparency could have a
    significant impact on our ability to work with them.'' In your written
    testimony you said ``The government of Cameroon has assured the United
    States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram
    and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.'' Has the Cameroonian
    Government shown a willingness to hold human rights violators within
    their military accountable?
        General Waldhauser. Cameroonian officials have stated they have
    taken steps to investigate allegations of human rights violations by
    the security forces. We continue to urge the government to share
    information with us about military prosecutions and have informed the
    government that lack of progress and clarity on this issue could result
    in a broader suspension of U.S. assistance.

        61. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, what type of assurances have
    we received from the Cameroonian Government and, considering what you
    referred to as a ``lack of transparency'' what type of monitoring and
    verification regime to we have in place to ensure our aid is not
    diverted to the Anglophone states where these atrocities are alleged to
    have taken place?
        General Waldhauser. We have expressed grave concern over the crisis
    in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions and have urged
    the Cameroonian government and the separatists to end the violence. In
    accordance with the Leahy law, assistance to those Cameroonian security
    force units that are credibly accused of committing gross human rights
    violations has been suspended. In addition, separate cuts have been
    made to our security assistance to Cameroon to reflect our concern.
    Also, we have requested Cameroon to be more transparent about
    investigating credible allegations of human rights abuse. We have made
    it clear to the government of Cameroon that our security assistance is
    only to reinforce their capability to fight against Boko Haram and
    ISIS-WA, ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea, and help secure
    neighboring Central African Republic through participation in the UN
    Stabilization Mission in Central Africa.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin,
    Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM) and United States Forces Korea. I'd like to welcome
    our witnesses, Admiral Phil Davidson and General Robert Abrams.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
    ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS). That means we need urgent change at a
    significant scale to address the challenges of strategic
    competition with China. Our military advantage and deterrent
    edge in the Indo-Pacific is eroding. The Chinese Communist
    Party leadership in Beijing senses weaknesses. They are testing
    our resolve, and if we do not act urgently, they may soon
    conclude that they can achieve their goals through force. We
    can't take peace for granted.
        Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing from you about
    the strengthening of the deterrence in the Indo-Pacific; in
    other words, how we and our allies can achieve the
    capabilities, capacity, and posture necessary to prevent a war
    by convincing Beijing that it cannot win.
        General Abrams, as another United States-North Korea summit
    approaches, I look forward to hearing from you on how we ensure
    that our military is prepared to add strength to our diplomacy
    to deter conflict and win, if necessary.
        Finally, I hope today's hearing will serve as a reminder
    that the greatest sources of American power are our alliances
    and our partnerships. Whether it's strategic competition with
    China or addressing the threat posed by North Korea, America
    cannot do this alone. Strategic success in the Indo-Pacific
    simply is not possible without allies who share our values and
    our interests and who share our burden of our common security.
    I think those of us that are together in the South China Sea
    know exactly what this means.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join
    you in welcoming our witnesses today and thank them for their
    distinguished service to the Nation. You are both leading
    commands during very challenging times. We thank you for your
    continued service, and also, we would ask that you'd extend our
    thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your commands
    who each day sacrifice and serve the Nation, and their
    families, also.
        I'd first like to address the current situation on the
    Korean Peninsula. General Abrams, you've been in command now
    for approximately 90 days. I look forward to hearing from you
    about the readiness of our forces and how you are mitigating
    the effects of the modification and suspension and cancellation
    of our joint exercises with the Republic of Korea's forces. I
    am concerned that if we continue in this vein, we will begin to
    experience a serious deterioration of the readiness of the
    joint forces. While I acknowledge the suspension of exercises
    has created diplomatic space for negotiations with North Korea,
    I do not believe there has been sufficient progress on the
    denuclearization front to justify the reduction in readiness.
        I'm also not optimistic that the upcoming second summit
    between President Trump and Kim Jong-un will yield substantial
    gains in the denuclearization of North Korea. For example,
    without a declaration of all nuclear and missile sites and
    programs, I do not think there will be a sufficient roadmap to
    move toward complete and verifiable, irreversible
    denuclearization.
        I'm also concerned that President Trump may consider
    withdrawing troops on the Korean Peninsula as a result of some
    agreement he reaches with North Korea. That action would
    significantly undermine regional security and our ability to
    fulfill our treaty obligations to South Korea.
        The United States and South Korea (ROK) recently concluded
    negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement in which South
    Korea agreed to substantially increase its financial support
    for our troops. The Special Measures Agreement reflects how
    much of a share South Korea pays for the burden of housing our
    troops on the peninsula. In addition to the Special Measures
    Agreement, South Korea has also spent approximately $10 billion
    to build Camp Humphreys, the largest overseas United States
    military base. We need to acknowledge the extraordinary
    financial support South Korea provides to the alliance and
    continue to recognize that our alliances with Japan and South
    Korea are the cornerstone of regional security in the INDOPACOM
    region. At the end of the day, the preservation of our
    alliances is critical in countering the very real threats that
    we face from North Korea and to counter Chinese coercive
    activities in the region.
        Now, Admiral Davidson, while North Korea presents the
    immediate challenge to our forces in the region, China presents
    the most significant long-term strategic threat that this
    country has faced in many, many years. China's Belt and Road
    Initiative has left several countries, notably Sri Lanka and
    Malaysia, severely indebted to China. Beijing often targets
    corrupt local governments that personally profit from inflated
    loans but leave their state treasuries bankrupt and beholden to
    President Xi's administration. It is an economic initiative
    with significant national security implications for the United
    States.
        Countering Chinese aggression globally will require us to
    rely on our partners and allies to a greater degree in the
    decades to come. Funding for programs like International
    Military Education and Training, or IMET, and Foreign Military
    Finance, or FMF, are crucial in the INDOPACOM area. Bolstering
    the ability of team partners like Vietnam and the Philippines
    to monitor and defend their territorial waters through funding
    from the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative will create
    more regional security and stability and protect freedom of
    navigation for all nations in the region, regardless of size.
        The United States needs to recognize the work of allies
    like Australia who are enabling small Pacific nation states in
    Oceania so they can counter China's predatory economic
    behavior. The United States must also continue its support of
    the states represented in the Compact of Free Association
    (COFA) between United States and Micronesia, Palau, and the
    Marshall Islands. It's clear that China is targeting these
    Pacific islands in an effort to increase its influence and
    diminish ours.
        Admiral Davidson, we have not yet seen the President's
    budget request, but I hope that it will align with the National
    Defense Strategy and reflect real DOD [Department of Defense]
    investments in the Indo-Pacific region. I also hope it reflects
    the resources needed for the whole-of-government approach that
    we need to counter China in the long run. As the Commission on
    the National Defense Strategy noted, if we don't ensure
    adequate funding for critical national security functions
    beyond the Department of Defense, in their words the ``United
    States will be at a competitive disadvantage and will remain
    ill-equipped to preserve its security and its global interests
    amid intensifying challenges.''
        One other point I'd like to make is that we're all, I
    think, alarmed by President Xi's brutal crackdown on the
    Uighurs in the west and the bellicose statements about Taiwan.
    These present serious human rights problems for the
    international community, and as a global leader for human
    rights, we have to call out China on these issues. We must also
    never lose focus on the fact that it is our values, especially
    our devotion to human rights and democratic principles, that
    resonates so well around the globe and enhances our military
    power.
        Again, thank you to our witnesses for their service. I look
    forward to your testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Admiral Davidson, we'll start with you for an opening
    statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of the
    record, but give us your overview.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN COMMANDER, UNITED
                      STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Davidson. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
    Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank
    you for the opportunity to appear with General Abrams before
    you today to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. I am joined by
    Sergeant Major Anthony Spadaro, my senior enlisted advisor who
    represents the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the
    Indo-Pacific area of operations. I'm most grateful for his
    service in the headquarters.
        First, let me say thank you for the significant support we
    have received from Congress over the last 2 years. The
    temporary relief from the Budget Control Act (BCA) and an on-
    time fiscal year 2019 budget has helped to relieve pressure to
    military readiness and has added to the lethality necessary to
    safeguard United States vital national interests in the Indo-
    Pacific. But there is indeed more work to do.
        When I took command of INDOPACOM nearly 9 months ago, I
    said that for more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been
    largely peaceful. This was made possible by two things: the
    willingness and commitment of free nations to work together for
    a free and open Indo-Pacific and the credibility of the combat
    power within United States Indo-Pacific Command. This
    commitment and this credibility have worked to liberate
    hundreds of millions of people and lift billions out of poverty
    in those seven decades, all to a level of prosperity previously
    unseen in human history. Today, the concept of a free and open
    Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the
    region and includes economic, political, and security
    dimensions, and it demonstrates our commitment to a safe,
    secure, and prosperous region that benefits all nations, large
    and small.
        As the primary military component of the United States'
    efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, USINDOPACOM
    works with the rest of the United States Government and a
    constellation of like-minded allies and partners to advance our
    shared vision. When we say ``free,'' we mean free both in terms
    of security--free from coercion by other nations and in terms
    of values and political systems. Free to choose trading
    partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
        An open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should
    enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all
    nations' economies depend. Open includes open investment
    environments, transparent agreements between nations,
    protection of intellectual property rights, and fair and
    reciprocal trade, all of which are essential for people, goods,
    and capital to move across borders for the benefit of all.
        While the term ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the
    underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks to
    are not. In fact, this is how the United States has approached
    the region throughout our 240-plus-year history. But there are
    indeed challenges to this shared vision of a free and open
    Indo-Pacific. There are five key challenges that I believe
    challenge our national interest and the rules-based
    international order.
        While we have made significant progress over the past year,
    North Korea remains the most immediate challenge. I'm
    optimistic about the upcoming United States-North Korea summit
    later this month as we work toward identifying the path to
    final, fully-verifiable denuclearization as agreed upon by
    President Trump and Chairman Kim at their 2018 Singapore
    summit.
        Our military combat readiness and combined lethality are
    the best deterrents against any threat from North Korea, so I
    will continue to emphasize military readiness while
    simultaneously supporting the United States Department of
    State-led pressure campaign. I should add, the United States
    and Republic of Korea alliance has become the linchpin of peace
    and security in Northeast Asia and for the long-term in the
    Pacific region and demonstrates what great democracies can
    accomplish when we work together.
        Back to our challenges. China represents our greatest long-
    term strategic threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to
    the United States. Those who believe this is reflective of an
    intensifying competition between an established power in the
    United States and a rising power in China are not seeing the
    whole picture. Rather, I believe we are facing something even
    more serious: a fundamental divergence in values that leads to
    two incompatible visions of the future. Through fear and
    coercion, Beijing is working to expand its form of ideology in
    order to bend, break, and replace the existing rules-based
    international order. In its place, Beijing seeks to create a
    new order, one with Chinese characteristics, led by China, an
    outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-
    Pacific that has endured for over 70 years.
        I'm also concerned about the growing malign influence of
    Russia throughout the region. Moscow regularly plays the role
    of spoiler, seeking to undermine United States interests and
    impose additional costs on the United States and our allies
    whenever and wherever possible. Terrorism and other non-state
    actors also pose threats to our vision of a free and open Indo-
    Pacific as they seek to impose their views and radicalize
    people across the region, as evidenced in 2017 when ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] captured the southern
    Philippine city of Marawi, a city of more than 200,000 people.
        Lastly, the Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone
    region in the world. It contains 75 percent of the Earth's
    volcanoes, and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the Ring of
    Fire that surround the Pacific Basin. The UN [United Nations]
    estimates economic losses in the region due to disasters could
    exceed $160 billion annually by 2030, and many countries across
    the region lack sufficient capability and the capacity to
    manage natural and man-made disasters.
        To address all of the challenges I mentioned, USINDOPACOM
    is focused on regaining our competitive military advantage over
    the short- and long-term. We must field and sustain a joint
    force that is postured for two distinct security rules: to win
    before fighting and, if necessary, to be ready to fight and
    win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed conflict is the
    foundation of combat-credible deterrence. By fielding and
    maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, we reduce the
    likelihood that any adversary will resort to military
    aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based
    international order.
        This deterrence is absolutely necessary to prevent
    conflict, but deterrence alone cannot ensure a free and open
    Indo-Pacific. Our adversaries are pursuing their objectives in
    the space between peace and war, using fear and coercive
    actions across all of their instruments of national power to
    revise the rules-based international order without resorting to
    armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and partners,
    USINDOPACOM, and the whole of the United States Government, we
    must compete in the gray zone between peace and war to win
    before fighting. These deliberate actions will ensure a free
    and open Indo-Pacific against those malign actors that seek to
    accomplish their political objectives short of armed conflict.
        I want to thank this Committee for your continued support
    of the men and women of USINDOPACOM and for your efforts in
    helping us ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Thank you, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Philip S. Davidson
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. First, let me say thank you for the
    significant support we have received from Congress over the last two
    years. The temporary relief from the Budget Control Act and an on-time
    fiscal year 2019 budget helped to restore the military readiness and
    lethality necessary to safeguard U.S. vital national interests in the
    Indo-Pacific.
                                    overview
        For more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been largely peaceful.
    This was made possible by three things: the willingness and commitment
    of free nations to work together for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific; the
    credibility of the combat power of United States Indo-Pacific Command;
    and a robust and modern United States nuclear deterrent. This
    commitment, and this credibility, have worked to liberate hundreds of
    millions of people, as well as lift billions out of poverty, all to a
    level of prosperity previously unseen in human history. It has also
    ensured that tensions, regardless of how or where they arise, do not
    escalate into large-scale war.
        Our nation's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, announced in
    2017 at the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) summit in Vietnam,
    demonstrates our commitment to a safe, secure, and prosperous region
    that benefits all nations, large and small. The concept of a Free and
    Open Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the
    region and includes economic, governance, and security dimensions. The
    vast majority of nations across the region share similar values,
    including the core beliefs that governments should be accountable to
    their people. We must stand together in support of our shared values
    and be unambiguous in condemning those who attempt to undermine those
    values.
        USINDOPACOM is the primary military component of our government's
    efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Every day we work with
    a constellation of like-minded allies and partners and the rest of the
    United States Government to advance our shared vision for a Free and
    Open Indo-Pacific.
        When we say Free we mean Free both in terms of security--free from
    coercion by other nations--and in terms of values and political
    systems. Free to choose trading partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
        An Open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should enjoy
    unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all nations'
    economies depend. Open includes open investment environments,
    transparent agreements between nations, protection of intellectual
    property rights, and fair and reciprocal trade--all of which are
    essential for people, goods, and capital to move across borders for the
    benefit of all.
        While the term ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the
    underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks are not. In
    fact, this is how the United States has approached the region
    throughout our 240-plus year history. We are now seeing a general
    convergence around the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific
    across the region--as Japan, Australia, France, New Zealand, and India
    have all put forth similar concepts or visions.
        The United States is an enduring Pacific power. Our historical,
    structural, economic, and institutional ties to the Indo-Pacific are
    indelible.
        U.S. power underpins the post-WWII international system that helps
    strengthen the essential foundation of a rules-based international
    order for economic growth and prosperity in the region for everyone.
    Furthermore, USINDOPACOM's role as a guarantor of security in the
    region has enabled our economic power and allowed our partners and
    allies to focus on their economic development, which in turn has
    increased opportunities for U.S. economic engagement and prevented
    costly conflict. A peaceful, free, and open Indo-Pacific is especially
    vital to our economy in the 21st century when you consider the
    following:

          The United States conducted more than $1.8 trillion in
    two-way goods trade with Indo-Pacific nations in 2017, and more than
    $1.3 trillion by the third quarter of 2018.

          In 2017, U.S. foreign direct investment in the region
    reached $940 billion--more than doubling since 2007.

          The Indo-Pacific is home to half of the 20 fastest
    growing economies.

          The Indo-Pacific currently contains over a third of
    global GDP and 60 percent of the global GDP growth.

          By 2030, 65 percent of the world's middle class will
    reside in the Indo-Pacific, representing an unrivaled amount of
    purchasing power.

        As the above statistics portend, this dynamic and economically
    robust region will continue to play a vital role in our economic future
    throughout the 21st century.
                              five key challenges
        In my view, five key challenges threaten our vital national
    interest in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. While we have made
    significant progress over the last year, North Korea will remain the
    most immediate challenge until we achieve the final, fully verifiable
    denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the summit
    in June 2018. China, however, represents the greatest long-term
    strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United
    States. Through fear and economic pressure, Beijing is working to
    expand its form of Communist-Socialist ideology in order to bend,
    break, and replace the existing rules-based international order. In its
    place, Beijing seeks to create a new international order led by China
    and with ``Chinese characteristics''--an outcome that displaces the
    stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that has endured for over 70
    years. Russia is also active throughout the region. Moscow regularly
    plays the role of a spoiler, seeking to undermine United States
    interests and impose additional costs on the United States and our
    allies whenever and wherever possible. I am also concerned about the
    threat posed by non-state actors. Violent Extremist Organizations
    (VEOs) seek to impose their views and radicalize people across the
    region, as evidenced by the capture of Marawi City in the southern
    Philippines in 2017--a city of over 200,000 people--by ISIS extremists.
    Lastly, natural and manmade disasters are an ever present danger in the
    region. Let me describe these five key challenges in more detail.
    North Korea:
        Denuclearization. USINDOPACOM's assessment on North Korean
    denuclearization is consistent with the Intelligence Community
    position. That is, we think it is unlikely that North Korea will give
    up all of its nuclear weapons or production capabilities, but seeks to
    negotiate partial denuclearization in exchange for United States and
    international concessions.
        Following a rapid series of nuclear and missile tests into 2017,
    tensions declined; North Korea halted nuclear testing in September 2017
    and ICBM testing in November 2017. President Trump's meeting with
    Chairman Kim in Singapore in June 2018 was a significant milestone, and
    I am optimistic about another United States-North Korea summit. North
    Korea has taken some steps in the direction of denuclearization, most
    notably the reversible dismantlement of tunnels at the Punggye nuclear
    test site, yet much needs to be done to make meaningful progress.
        In early 2018, the two Koreas initiated a season of rapprochement,
    beginning with the Winter Olympics in February 2018, and continuing
    through three subsequent Korean summits between President Moon and
    Chairman Kim and multiple lower-level meetings. More recently, North
    Korea has undertaken measures in accordance with the Comprehensive
    Military Agreement it signed with South Korea in September 2018, to
    include dismantling guard posts within the demilitarized zone and
    removing land mines near Panmunjom. North Korea also returned remains
    of United States servicemembers from the Korean War, which provided
    great comfort to mourning families.
        I welcome these steps, but we must remain vigilant to the threat
    North Korea still poses to the United States and the international
    community. North Korea has demanded ``corresponding measures'' from the
    United States in return for these above actions. Kim warned in his 2019
    New Year's speech of a potential ``new path,'' which could indicate an
    eventual return to missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    testing if he is not satisfied with the pace of negotiations and
    potential benefits. Our military combat readiness and combined
    lethality remain the best deterrent and the best leverage against any
    threat from North Korea.
        Sanctions. North Korea is continuing efforts to mitigate the
    effects of international sanctions and the United States-led pressure
    campaign through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the
    sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion. USINDOPACOM will
    continue to support the President's pressure campaign by ensuring the
    military readiness of the combined force and supporting sanctions
    enforcement as directed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    (UNSCR). UNSCR sanctions resulted in a decline in North Korea's export
    earnings and cut off key cash flow sources. However, recent calls from
    Russia and China to change the sanctions against North Korea threaten
    to undo these positive developments.
        Additionally, North Korea has a long history of flouting
    international sanctions, and Pyongyang regularly attempts to circumvent
    them. Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on
    refined petroleum imports through illicit ship-to-ship transfers.
    USINDOPACOM is working with partners and allies to disrupt illicit
    ship-to-ship transfers that occur primarily in the East China Sea,
    often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow Sea.
    North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and
    cyber-enabled theft to generate revenue, while simultaneously
    circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions on coal
    exports.
    China:
        Military Modernization. Over the last 20 years, Beijing has
    undertaken a massive effort to grow and modernize the People's
    Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the principal threat to U.S.
    interests, United States citizens, and our allies inside the First
    Island Chain--a term that refers to the islands that run from northern
    Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia--and the PLA is
    quickly increasing its ability to project power and influence beyond
    the First Island Chain. Beijing pursues both qualitative and
    quantitative efforts to transform its military, modernizing its
    military platforms while simultaneously increasing the number of
    platforms in service. Newly-fielded systems include:

          Beijing's first aircraft carrier group, centered around
    its refurbished Soviet-built carrier, reached initial operational
    capability in mid-2018.

          Beijing's first domestically-built aircraft carrier, has
    completed four sets of sea trials since May 2018 and will likely join
    the PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet in 2019.

          The Renhai-class guided missile cruiser, was launched in
    2017; three additional vessels were added to the PLA Navy's inventory
    in 2018. This class of vessels will be a key component of PLA Navy
    carrier strike groups.

          The Fuyu-class fast combat support ship, developed
    specifically to support aircraft carrier task group operations, was
    commissioned less than a year ago.

          The J-20, the PLA's first 5th-generation stealth fighter,
    entered service in February 2018; plans are underway to research a
    sixth-generation fighter.

          The Y-20, a domestically-produced heavy-lift aircraft,
    entered military service in 2016; the Y-20 has a significantly larger
    payload capacity and range than the PLA's previous heavy and medium-
    lift aircraft, which advances Beijing's strategic airlift capability.

          The S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system,
    received from Russia in April, 2018; the S-400 has a 250-mile range,
    which could expand the PLA's air coverage over the Taiwan Strait and
    other high priority facilities.

        The PLA maintains a high operations tempo, primarily in and near
    China, but is quickly expanding its operating areas beyond the region.
    The PLA's Naval Escort Task Force (NETF)--now in its 31st iteration--
    follows its anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa by conducting
    naval diplomacy deployments to Europe, Africa, and the South Pacific.
    From May-July 2018, the 28th NETF completed a three-month naval
    diplomacy tour conducting port visits and bilateral exercises in Spain,
    Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, South Africa, and Indonesia before
    returning to China. Beijing regularly conducts joint military exercises
    across its ground, sea, air, and space forces, including amphibious
    assault training that is designed and specifically timed to intimidate
    Taiwan. This spring, approximately 10,000 PLA marines traveled more
    than 1,200 miles as part of a large-scale exercise designed to improve
    long-range maneuverability. In April, Beijing conducted a live-fire
    exercise into the Taiwan Strait with coastal artillery, and PLA Air
    Force (PLAAF) bombers regularly circumnavigate Taiwan.
        Beijing continues pursuing next-generation technologies and
    advanced weapons systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles, directed
    energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and
    unmanned and artificial intelligence-equipped weapons. The PLA has also
    made significant technological, game-changing developments in its
    ability to defeat, or drastically reduce, the effectiveness of U.S.
    sensors and defensive weapons. The PLA has tested hypersonic missiles
    since 2014, including the WU-14, with speeds approaching Mach 10. In
    August 2018, Beijing claimed to have successfully tested its first
    hypersonic aircraft.
        Beijing is also modernizing and adding new capabilities across its
    nuclear forces. China's third generation Type 096 nuclear-powered
    Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) will be armed with JL-3 sea-launched
    ballistic missiles and will likely begin construction in the early-
    2020s. In April, Beijing confirmed the DF-26 entered service--a road-
    mobile, nuclear, and conventional capable Intermediate-Range Ballistic
    Missile (IRBM), expanding Beijing's near-precision strike capability as
    far as the Second Island Chain (a term that refers to the southern part
    of the Aleutian Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands,
    Guam, the Republic of Palau, and northern Papua New Guinea). Beijing
    continues testing its DF-41 road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM), which carries multiple independently targetable re-
    entry vehicles and has a range of up to 9,300 miles.
        South China Sea. Beijing maintains maritime claims in the South
    China Sea that are contrary to international law and pose a substantial
    long-term threat to the rules-based international order. Beijing
    ignored the 2016 ruling of an Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex
    VII of the Law of the Sea Convention, which concluded that China's
    claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction,
    with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed
    by the ``nine-dash line'' are contrary to UNCLOS and without legal
    effect. In April 2018, Beijing continued militarizing outposts by
    deploying advanced military systems that further enhance the PLA's
    power projection capabilities, including missiles and electronic
    jammers. These actions run directly counter to President Xi's 2015
    commitment not to militarize these features. On multiple occasions,
    Beijing has landed military transport aircraft on the Spratly Islands
    and long-range bombers on the Paracel Islands. Additionally, Chinese
    Coast Guard vessels now fall under the command of the Central Military
    Commission and regularly harass and intimidate fishing vessels from our
    treaty ally, the Philippines, operating near Scarborough Reef, as well
    as the fishing fleets of other regional nations.
        East China Sea. Beijing continues using its military forces to
    advance its territorial claims in the East China Sea. Beijing maintains
    a high level of surface combat patrols in the East China Sea.
    Additionally, Chinese Coast Guard vessels frequently enter the
    territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, which the United States
    recognizes as being under the administrative control of the Japanese.
    In 2017, these incursions occurred on an average of once every ten
    days, and continued in 2018 at about two per month. Additionally, while
    Beijing mostly implements United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    against North Korea, in a number of cases, illicit ship to ship
    transfers continue to occur within Chinese territorial waters.
        Economic Pressure. While the United States strives to promote a
    Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Beijing is leveraging its economic
    instrument of power in ways that can undermine the autonomy of
    countries across the region. Beijing offers easy money in the short
    term, but these funds come with strings attached: unsustainable debt,
    decreased transparency, restrictions on market economies, and the
    potential loss of control of natural resources. Beijing's actions in
    this regard have potential military ramifications as well. Beijing
    touts its need to safeguard its citizens abroad and defend its
    expanding global interests in order to justify increased permanent PLA
    overseas basing and presence. Beijing is also exploiting growing debt
    burdens to access strategic infrastructure in the region. In December
    2017, Sri Lanka handed over control of the newly-built Hambantota
    seaport to Beijing with a 99-year lease because Sri Lanka could no
    longer afford its debt payments to China.
        Over the last year, we have seen that countries across the region
    are becoming more aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose.
    Malaysia announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion
    in August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects,
    decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and
    criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.'' The
    Maldives' former president described Beijing's investments as a ``land
    grab'' under the guise of development. In contrast, the United States'
    vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strives to preserve the
    autonomy of independent nations in the Indo-Pacific region. We must
    continue to support countries that stand up to Beijing's coercive
    economic policies whenever possible and help those countries offset any
    economic blowback from Beijing. Our engagement in the Indo-Pacific must
    truly be a whole-of-government undertaking, in partnership with the
    private sector and civil society, to counter China's economic coercion.
        Arctic and Antarctic. Beijing recognizes the growing strategic
    significance of the Arctic and Antarctic and has signaled its plans to
    assert a greater role in these regions. Despite not being an Arctic
    nation, Beijing published its first Arctic policy paper in 2018, which
    defends Beijing's role in the region and outlines Beijing's vision of a
    ``Polar Silk Road'' to complement its other economic initiatives.
    Beijing launched its first domestically built icebreaking research
    vessel in September 2018, and Beijing plans to launch its second in
    2019. Beijing also opened bidding for construction of its first
    nuclear-powered icebreaker. Beijing wants to boost its polar research
    and expedition capabilities and recently announced plans to double the
    frequency of its Arctic expeditions to once a year. Beijing has also
    expressed increasing interest in Antarctic operations and establishing
    logistics stations to supply them. This is of increasing concern to our
    ally Australia, as well as New Zealand, as Beijing seeks positional
    advantage and control of territory and natural resources in these vital
    regions.
        Fentanyl and Pre-Cursors Chemicals. Another challenge that affects
    the security environment indirectly is the continuing fentanyl and
    opioid crisis in the United States. Illicit fentanyl, as well as legal
    pre-cursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs primarily
    originate from China. Moreover, technological advancements in e-
    commerce and commercial shipping present a different business model
    from the traditional methods used by transnational criminal
    organizations for drug trafficking. These innovations represent a new
    level of complexity for U.S. law enforcement agencies and policymakers
    alike. I welcome the PRC's decision to designate and regulate fentanyl
    as a controlled substance after President Xi's meeting with President
    Trump in Argentina in December of last year, and we look forward to
    seeing tangible progress.
    Russia:
        Military modernization. Moscow continues to modernize its military
    forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic
    objectives and global influence. Nuclear weapons remain an important
    component of Russia's power projection and deterrence capabilities, and
    the Russian military conducts regular nuclear-capable Tu-95 Bear bomber
    long-range aviation flights off the coasts of Japan, Korea, Canada, and
    Alaska. For the past decade Russian military planning has emphasized
    the development of modernized platforms and weapons systems, and Moscow
    is pushing these platforms to the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years,
    the Eastern Military District has become increasingly important for
    Russian security interests. Russia has invested in military
    infrastructure, improved its command-and-control capabilities, deployed
    anti-ship missile systems, and modernized its anti-air capabilities in
    the region. For example, Russian units in the Eastern Military District
    expect to take delivery of thirty-seven new vessels by 2024, which is a
    major increase compared to the twenty-eight new units received in the
    region over the last decade. Moscow recently announced plans to expand
    its combat forces in the Eastern Military District and to substantially
    reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Despite the threat of U.S. sanctions
    through the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
    (CAATSA), Russia continues to export weapons to the Indo-Pacific
    region.
        Furthermore, Russia hosted its largest military exercise since
    1981, Exercise VOSTOK 2018, simulating land, sea, and air operations in
    the Eastern Military District and mobilizing forces from across Russia
    to engage in multiple live-fire missile launches. Of note, Chinese
    forces participated in Exercise VOSTOK for the first time. While
    Beijing's military cooperation was largely symbolic, because the forces
    remained segregated with separate command posts, Vostok 2018 was still
    a significant first step in forging a closer military partnership.
        Japan-Russia Relations. Japan and Russia have a long-standing
    territorial dispute since the Second World War over the Northern
    Territories/Kuril Islands, which are strategically important for
    Russia's access to the Pacific Ocean. Russia has further entrenched
    itself in this contested territory by reestablishing an airfield on
    Matua Island, located in what it calls the central Kuril Islands, to
    accommodate light military transport aircraft and helicopters. Russia
    has also deployed coastal defense cruise missile systems and SU-35
    multirole fighters to the islands and also announced plans to build a
    naval base. This more assertive approach to its eastern front reflects
    growing focus in Moscow of the vital importance of the broader Indo-
    Pacific for Russia's long-term security. Although Prime Minister Abe
    and President Putin have met on several occasions to negotiate a peace
    treaty that could, in part, resolve this territorial dispute, they have
    not reached an agreement. Russia remains concerned that the United
    States could establish military facilities under Article VI of the
    Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the Northern Territories
    if they are returned to Japan
    Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs):
        In the wake of the 2017 siege of the southern Philippine city of
    Marawi, Philippine security forces have maintained consistent pressure
    on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) networks in the Philippines,
    conducting a number of arrests in 2018. Additionally, counterterrorism
    operations on the Philippine island of Jolo against ISIS-supporting
    elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group succeeded in disrupting kidnap-for-
    ransom operations. ISIS claimed credit for multiple small-scale attacks
    in the Philippines, including a mid-2018 vehicle-borne improvised
    explosive device attack at a military checkpoint in the southern
    Philippines. Outside of the Philippines, we saw a number of small-scale
    attacks in 2018, and I remain concerned about the growth of ISIS in the
    region. Over 1,000 foreign terrorist fighters have traveled to Iraq and
    Syria from the Indo-Pacific region, and at least 170 have returned. We
    expect the number of returnees to increase with the persistent loss of
    ISIS-held territory. ISIS' Amaq News claimed responsibility for a
    series of mid-May 2018 bombings against churches and a police
    headquarters in Surabaya, Indonesia. Other countries across the region
    remain concerned about the potential for disenfranchised and vulnerable
    populations to become recruitment targets. Self-radicalized violent
    extremists who are influenced or inspired by ISIS or other extremists
    are another cause for concern. The recent attack on a local Catholic
    parish in Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago is evidence of continued
    concern.
    Natural and Man-made Disasters:
        The Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone region in the
    world. It contains 75 percent of the earth's volcanoes and 90 percent
    of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring of Fire'' surrounding the Pacific
    Basin. Since 2008 the Indo-Pacific has lost half a million lives and
    suffered over $500 million in damages, with over one and a half billion
    people affected by natural and manmade disasters overall. The UN
    estimates that economic losses in the region due to disasters could
    exceed $160 billion annually by 2030. Many countries across the region
    lack sufficient capability and capacity to manage natural and man-made
    disasters.
        A key element of USINDOPACOM's engagement strategy in the region is
    building capacity with our allies, partners, and friends to improve
    their resilience and capability to conduct their own humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
        USINDOPACOM directly supports HA/DR efforts across the region, as
    well. In July 2018, we sent special operations forces to help the
    international effort to rescue twelve Thai boys and their coach from a
    flooded cave. USINDOPACOM also assisted relief efforts in Sulawesi,
    Indonesia last year with sixty-four personnel and three C-130 aircraft
    after an earthquake and tsunami hit the country. Another recent example
    of USINDOPACOM's support continues today after the Super Typhoon Yutu
    hit Tinian and Saipan. USINDOPACOM responded quickly by providing joint
    forces, equipment, and fresh drinking water, and by building temporary
    shelters and assisting with clearing debris from roads and homes.
                usindopacom's security role in the indo-pacific
        The most important security development in the Indo-Pacific has
    been the rapid modernization of the PLA. The scope and scale of that
    modernization has caused USINDOPACOM's relative competitive military
    advantage to erode in recent years. With the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy as a guide, USINDOPACOM is focused on regaining our
    competitive military advantage and ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific over the short- and long-term.
        My strategy centers around fielding and sustaining a force capable
    of combat-credible deterrence that is postured for two distinct
    security roles: to win before fighting and, if necessary, be ready to
    fight and win.
        Ready to Fight and Win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed
    conflict is the foundation of combat credible deterrence. By fielding
    and maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, USINDOPACOM
    reduces the likelihood that any adversary will resort to military
    aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based international
    order.
        Win Before Fighting. Deterrence is necessary to prevent conflict,
    but deterrence alone cannot ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Our
    adversaries are pursuing their objectives in the space between peace
    and war, using fear and coercive actions across the instruments of
    national power to revise the rules-based international order and
    without resorting to armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and
    partners, USINDOPACOM must compete in the ``gray zone'' between peace
    and war. These deliberate actions will ensure a Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific against those malign actors that seek to accomplish their
    political objectives short of armed conflict.
                            usindopacom focus areas
        Given the challenges in the region, ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific requires that USINDOPACOM remain ready to execute high-end/
    high-tech wartime missions on short notice. USINDOPACOM must be
    postured to achieve a more advantageous security environment without
    the lethal use of military force. The following four focus areas guide
    the command's efforts toward meeting both of the aforementioned
    security roles:

          Focus Area 1. Increase joint force lethality. We must
    continue to develop and field capabilities necessary to deter
    aggression and prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail.

          Focus Area 2. Enhance our design and posture. We will
    adapt from our historic service-centric focus on Northeast Asia only to
    a more integrated joint force blueprint that is informed by the
    changing threat environment and challenges of the 21st century across
    the entire Indo-Pacific region.

          Focus Area 3. Exercise, experiment, innovate. Targeted
    innovation and experimentation will evolve the joint force while
    developing asymmetric capability to counter adversary capabilities.

          Focus Area 4. Strengthen our allies and partners. Through
    increased interoperability, information-sharing, and expanded access
    across the region, we will present a compatible and interoperable
    coalition to our adversaries in crisis and armed conflict.
    Focus Area 1: Increase Joint Force Lethality
        Over the last two decades, adversaries have rapidly closed the gap
    in many of the areas that used to be clear asymmetric advantages for
    the United States, encroaching upon USINDOPACOM's ability to deter
    conflict or prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail. Our
    adversaries are fielding advanced Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD)
    systems, advanced aircraft, ships, space, and cyber capabilities that
    threaten the U.S. ability to project power and influence into the
    region. Increasing joint force lethality means developing and fielding
    systems and capabilities to preserve our key asymmetric advantages in
    order to prevent any potential adversary from thinking it can achieve
    its political or military objectives through armed conflict. Increasing
    our joint force lethality means joint and combined interoperability, an
    integrated fires network that enables long-range strike, and advanced
    missile defense systems capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging
    advanced air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats from all
    azimuths. In short, we must be able to defend our forces and project
    power so that no adversary can achieve sustained dominance in the Indo-
    Pacific and threaten our key allies and partners.
        Air Superiority. The United States cannot assume that it will have
    air superiority in the Indo-Pacific. For over fifteen years, the
    predominant employment of United States armed forces has been in the
    ongoing fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where
    our ability to dominate in the air domain was unchallenged. In
    contrast, the United States faces peer competitors in the Indo-Pacific.
    Beijing has invested heavily in systems that challenge the United
    States' ability to achieve air superiority. The U.S. Government must
    continue to pursue multi-domain capabilities to counter anti-air
    capabilities and we continue to prioritize 5th generation fighter
    capabilities to the Indo-Pacific.
        Undersea Warfare. The United States must maintain its advantage in
    undersea warfare--an asymmetric advantage that our adversaries are
    focused on eroding. There are four-hundred foreign submarines in the
    world, of which roughly 75 percent reside in the Indo-Pacific region.
    One-hundred and sixty of these submarines belong to China, Russia, and
    North Korea. While these three countries increase their capacity, the
    United States retires attack submarines (SSNs) faster than they are
    replaced. USINDOPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in
    undersea warfare capability, which includes not just attack submarines,
    but also munitions and other anti-submarine warfare systems such as the
    P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne anti-submarine systems. Potential adversary
    submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, which requires at
    least a corresponding increase on the part of the United States to
    maintain superiority.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The Indo-Pacific's
    dynamic security environment requires persistent and intrusive
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide
    indications, warning, and situational awareness across over half the
    world. USINDOPACOM supports a re-allocation of DOD ISR assets to better
    satisfy intelligence needs in line with National Defense Strategy-
    priorities. USINDOPACOM relies on a mix of Airborne ISR (AISR) assets
    to provide a dedicated and flexible ISR capability across the entire
    region.
        USINDOPACOM supports efforts to re-capitalize critical AISR
    capabilities and the continued development of future ISR platforms,
    such as the MQ-4C Triton, as well as our interoperable Processing,
    Exploitation, and Dissemination architectures.
        Space. Space is a vital strategic domain. U.S. adversaries are
    militarizing space; USINDOPACOM must have access to resilient and
    defensible space systems that can operate in a contested environment.
    USINDOPACOM relies on space-based assets for satellite communications
    (SATCOM), ISR, missile warning, and Positioning, Navigation, Timing
    (PNT) capabilities, which support missions across the range of military
    operations. The command's vast geographic expanse increases the strain
    on USINDOPACOM's requirements and our reliance on low-density space-
    based assets that are in high-demand.
        As Beijing's and Moscow's military modernization continues, they
    are pursuing broad and robust counter-space capabilities. While not as
    advanced, North Korea remains a threat through its employment of SATCOM
    and PNT jammers. The threat to the electromagnetic spectrum continues
    as our adversaries develop means to deny our space-enabled
    capabilities. As Space Command (SPACECOM) transitions responsibilities
    from United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) into the future Space
    Force, USINDOPACOM looks forward to continued collaboration in this
    critical domain as we work to further integrate space-based
    capabilities into our daily operations and contingency planning.
        Cyber. USINDOPACOM is heavily reliant on cyber capabilities and
    faces increasing threats in the cyber domain from both state and non-
    state actors, such as Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and criminal actors.
    The United States must ensure it has a robust and capable cyber force
    with all required equipment and a common network operational structure
    necessary to ensure command and control. Moreover, USINDOPACOM requires
    an agile and defensible mission command network infrastructure to
    ensure adequate command and control, and enable interoperability with
    our allies and partners to fully leverage our combined capacities.
    Furthermore, the DOD must prevent and, if necessary, respond to cyber-
    attacks against non-military critical infrastructure in both Homeland
    defense and in support of civil authorities.
        The U.S. military's offensive cyber capabilities provide additional
    tools to leverage as part of multi-domain operations to compete and
    win, but these tools must become more responsive to the operational
    requirements of the combatant commands. The growth in these offensive
    capabilities is not limited to equipment--we need talent and
    innovation. The development and retention of personnel with subject-
    matter expertise is a critical component for our Nation's success.
        My staff coordinates extensively with USCYBERCOM to integrate
    effective offensive, defensive, and network operations into my multi-
    domain plans and operations. Our staffs collaborate daily on current
    operations through our respective operations centers, at least weekly
    on future operations planning, and at least quarterly on future
    capability requirements.
        Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations. As adversary military
    forces grow in both quantity and quality, USINDOPACOM must integrate
    operations in all domains to be successful in the 21st century. The
    Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts of the services
    incorporate the capabilities of the physical domains and place greater
    emphasis on space, cyberspace, and other contested areas including the
    electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment, and the
    cognitive dimension of warfare. Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations
    allow U.S. Forces to outmaneuver adversaries physically and
    cognitively, advancing the 20th Century concept of combined arms into
    the 21st century's requirement to operate across all domains, at all
    times.
        I fully support all services and functional commands efforts to
    operationalize Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts. In
    2018, USINDOPACOM successfully demonstrated Multi-Domain and
    Distributed Operations capabilities in major exercises while also
    integrating new technologies and approaches across the joint force. In
    the years ahead, USINDOPACOM will progress from experimentation to
    validation of concepts, culminating in an overall increase in the
    lethality of the joint force.
        Advanced Munitions. Developing and fielding advanced munitions is a
    critical component to increasing joint force lethality. The following
    are some of the more pressing munitions upgrades based on the
    challenges we face in the region:

          Improvements to Missile Defense--Patriot Missile Segment
    Enhanced (MSE), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) upgrades,
    and other capabilities to defend against maneuvering and hypersonic
    missiles.

          Innovations in heavy weight torpedo technology provide
    force-multiplying effects that currently do not exist, including long
    range in-port or at-sea attack and shallow water covert mine laying.

          The immediate resourcing and integration of ATACMS system
    and/or the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile with HIMARS/MLRS to support
    Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) units conducting Multi-
    Domain Operations and sea control missions.

          Continued investments in Hard Target Munitions (HTM).
    There is a significant increase in the number of hard and deeply buried
    targets in the theater requiring HTM.

          Hypersonic long-range strike (H-LRS)--these emerging
    weapons dramatically improve probability of engaging time sensitive
    targets and have increased survivability and thus higher probability of
    success.

          Effective counters to the expanding asymmetric unmanned
    aerial system (UAS) threat including potential for multiple swarms of
    small UAS.
    Focus Area 2: Enhance Design and Posture
        To effectively defend U.S. interests, USINDOPACOM must update its
    existing design and posture to compete with our adversaries across the
    entire Indo-Pacific. At present, USINDOPACOM forces west of the
    International Date Line are focused in Northeast Asia--an historical
    legacy of the Second World War and Korean War. We must update our
    design and posture to preserve strength in this key region, but also
    ensure that the United States is ready to compete and win before
    fighting across all of the Indo-Pacific. By recalibrating theater
    posture to balance capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
    Oceania, USINDOPACOM will be able to respond to aggression more
    effectively throughout the Indo-Pacific.
        Similarly, the USINDOPACOM Joint Logistics Enterprise must be
    capable of supporting joint warfighting requirements across the entire
    theater in a more dynamic and distributed posture. Posture and pre-
    positioning are essential to overcome the region's tyranny of distance.
    Ship sailing times are upwards of ten days from the U.S. west coast,
    and it takes significant lead-time to reposition strategic airlift and
    tanker support to enable major force flow.
        The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes
    the global security environment even more unpredictable. It's dangerous
    and unforgiving. Time and decision space have collapsed, so our
    approach to warfare must adapt to keep pace; with the speed and
    multiple avenues that our adversaries are able to pursue. We require a
    force posture that enables the United States to undertake a spectrum of
    missions. These missions include: capacity building for partners that
    face internal and external vulnerabilities, cooperation on
    transnational threats, and joint and combined training. Our
    enhancements to interoperability make for more effective coalitions in
    crisis.
        USINDOPACOM will ``regain the advantage'' by positioning theater
    infrastructure that supports:

          Expeditionary capability that is agile and resilient.

          Dynamic basing for our maritime and air forces.

          Special operations forces capable of irregular and
    unconventional warfare.

          Anti-submarine warfare capabilities unmatched by any
    adversary.

          Land forces equipped with weapons systems that hold an
    adversary's air, sea, and land forces at risk.

          Cyber and space teams integrated into Multi-Domain and
    Distributed Operations.

          Unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities.

        Global Force Management (GFM) and Posture. The Indo-Pacific is a
    theater that requires short response timelines across a vast region.
    Regional threats require U.S. Forces to maintain a high level of
    readiness to respond rapidly to crises. USINDOPACOM's readiness is
    evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency
    plans. The plans place a premium on ready and immediately responsive
    forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations'
    militaries. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date
    Line decrease response times, bolster the confidence of allies and
    partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential
    adversaries. Contingency response times require that I have the
    essential conventional and strategic forces assigned to USINDOPACOM.
        In line with the National Defense Strategy, USINDOPACOM prioritizes
    stationing and deployment of 5th generation aircraft in the Indo-
    Pacific. Additionally, the United States has deployed some of our
    newest and most advanced aviation platforms to the region, such as the
    P-8 Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MV-22 Osprey, EA-18G Growler, E-2D
    Hawkeye, and C-130J Super Hercules.
        In addition to forward stationed forces, the ability of the United
    States to surge, rotate, and globally maneuver ready forces is an
    asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. The high operational
    demands, delayed maintenance, training pipeline shortfalls, and
    shortage of ready surge forces limit USINDOPACOM's responsiveness to
    emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. The challenges grow
    each year as our forces continue to deploy at unprecedented rates while
    the DOD grapples with fiscal uncertainty.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense. USINDOPACOM faces unique
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) challenges in the Indo-
    Pacific to protect our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific
    Territories are part of our Homeland and must be defended. Hawaii is
    currently protected from North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missiles (ICBMs) by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. This
    system includes Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California;
    ground, sea, and space-based sensors; and redundant command, control,
    and communications systems.
        For the defense of Hawaii, the planned Homeland Defense Radar
    Hawaii (HDRH) will improve U.S. capabilities. A Notice of Intent to
    Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement was released in June 2018,
    and the radar is projected to be operational by late 2023. The HDRH
    will provide an enhanced ballistic missile sensing and discrimination
    capability in the Indo-Pacific, and it increases the capability of the
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to defend Hawaii.
        Meanwhile, our adversaries continue to improve their capabilities
    in ways that challenge the United States' strategic, operational, and
    tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. Beijing and Moscow continue
    to develop and field advanced counter-intervention technologies, which
    include highly maneuverable reentry vehicle and warheads (hypersonic
    weapons). Beijing and Russia possess cruise missiles and small-unmanned
    aerial systems (sUAS) that fly different trajectories, making them hard
    to detect, acquire, track, and intercept due to unpredictable low-
    flight profiles and sophisticated countermeasures. North Korea retains
    its nuclear and ICBM capabilities.
        USINDOPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible,
    and sustainable ballistic missile defense by forward deploying the
    latest missile defense technologies to the Indo-Pacific. Through
    forward and persistent presence, these active missile defense
    capabilities would help mitigate the risk to missile threats faced in
    the region and to the Homeland. USINDOPACOM addresses this IAMD
    priority in the following ways:

          USINDOPACOM works with the DOD, Missile Defense Agency,
    the services, academic institutions, and industry to deploy
    capabilities that counter the advanced missile threats in the region.

          USINDOPACOM maintains an active Terminal High Altitude
    Area Defense (THAAD) battery on Guam to protect United States citizens
    and strategic military capabilities from North Korean intermediate-
    range ballistic missiles (KN-17 and MUSUDAN).

          USINDOPACOM employs additional radars across the theater
    supporting Homeland and regional missile defense, as well as continued
    testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

          In 2017, USINDOPACOM and USFK, with support from the MDA
    and the DOD, deployed a THAAD battery to the Korean Peninsula that is
    fully operational. The MDA and the services deliver improved BMDS
    capability to the Korean Peninsula, including integration of existing
    Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) assets to improve engagement options
    and coverage area.

          The United States Navy completed its forward deployment
    of the USS Milius from San Diego, CA to Yokosuka, Japan in Spring 2018.
    This port shift provides the U.S. Seventh Fleet improved capability to
    support the United States-Japan Alliance.

          USINDOPACOM continues working with Japan, South Korea,
    and Australia toward creating a fully-integrated BMD architecture that
    addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.

          USINDOPACOM supports MDA and the services to develop and
    test emerging missile and counter-small UAS defense capabilities
    through modeling and simulation, as well as live-fire testing conducted
    at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, the Ronald Reagan Test Center at
    Kwajalein Island, Point Mugu, and other testing ranges located in the
    continental United States and Alaska.

        I support all efforts that improve the capability and capacity of
    ballistic missile, cruise missile, and UAS defense technologies to
    further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional
    locations. The development of a credible and effective defense against
    advanced and future missile and UAS threats remains vital to our
    operational plans and critical to the continued defense of the United
    States.
        Logistics and Supply. Driven by budgetary pressure, our logistics
    system has become a more efficient business process, and a less
    effective warfighting function over the last 20 years. Efficiency has
    come at the cost of increased vulnerability and decreased redundancy.
    While this arrangement is sufficient for peacetime operations, it is
    insufficient for combat. Congress' Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative
    could significantly help reverse the current trend toward a less
    resilient Joint Logistics Enterprise in the Pacific.
        As adversary capabilities improve, joint operations will
    increasingly rely on distributed supply chains in order to fight and
    win against a peer adversary. The joint logistics enterprise must be
    postured with the right capability and capacity at the right locations
    in order to effectively support multi-domain and distributed
    operations. This means developing infrastructure at both enduring and
    contingency operating locations; identifying and sourcing
    transportation, distribution, and maintenance requirements; and
    developing the processes to enable logistics decisions at the speed of
    war. USINDOPACOM is critically dependent on tactical airlift and sea
    lift capacity, which expands options for force design and maneuver.
    Increased tactical airlift and sealift capacity further increase
    survivability as it becomes more difficult for an adversary to counter
    a highly maneuverable joint force. These tactical lift assets play just
    as important a role as strategic lift assets in ensuring our ability to
    create a resilient and agile logistics network.
        Significant and sustained investment in munitions is needed to
    reduce risk to current and future strategic readiness. Services must
    fund and continue investment in munitions research and development,
    while setting relatively steady requirements to maintain a healthy
    production capability for current and new munitions. I appreciate
    Congress' action to enhance munitions funding in fiscal year 2018 and
    fiscal year 2019, but shortfalls remain. USINDOPACOM's top priorities
    for increased procurement are Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, SM-6, MK-
    48 torpedoes, AIM-9X, BGM-109 Block IV (Maritime Strike Tomahawk), and
    AIM-120D. The Services must also upgrade storage facilities and
    reassess prepositioning based on the new security environment.
        Fuel supply agility and resilience are central to our success in
    being competitive, responsive, and lethal. The changing threat
    environment, energy security risks, and adversarial geopolitical and
    economic influences are driving longer supply lines, necessitating a
    flexible resupply chain and more resilient, agile, and interoperable
    petroleum distribution capabilities. Continued investment in next
    generation petroleum distribution systems is required to mitigate
    sustainment risk in austere, contested, and denied environments. Access
    and positioning of fuel remains a key pillar of our logistics posture
    and is vital to USINDOPACOM's ability to ensure operational freedom of
    maneuver throughout the theater.
    Focus Area 3: Exercise, Experimentation, and Innovation
        Our exercise, experimentation and innovation program is key to
    maintaining readiness while also developing and integrating new
    capabilities and concepts. This program also highlights our
    capabilities and capacity to deter competitors while simultaneously
    reassuring allies, partners, and friends.
        Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability
    (PMTEC) Initiative. USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program has
    traditionally monitored the operational and warfighting readiness of
    assigned theater and partner nation forces for crises, contingency
    operations, and HA/DR. Exercises have advanced key objectives including
    strengthening regional alliances and partnerships, while deepening
    interoperability through combined training. The current Joint Exercise
    Program has been useful for enhancing the readiness of USINDOPACOM's
    assigned forward deployed forces; I am now looking to move to the next
    level of integration.
        Scarce resources have reinforced the need to integrate all major
    test and training ranges in the Pacific region through a Pacific Multi-
    Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) initiative. This
    USINDOPACOM initiative combines the existing Air Force Joint Pacific
    Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), the Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility
    (PMRF) and the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) in Hawaii, the
    Delamere Air Weapons Range in Northern Australia, and the Marine Corps'
    future Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military
    Training (CJMT) range into a fully networked and integrated training
    constellation that supports joint, combined, multi-domain training.
    PMTEC will also ensure USINDOPACOM has the ability to prioritize
    training, readiness, and experimentation to achieve a more integrated
    and lethal joint force that can both deter and when necessary, fight
    and win. As the next layer of integration, PMTEC will also link test-
    ranges (e.g., the Ronald Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein) to enable
    experimentation with developing technologies to create new, more
    effective, joint operating concepts that will ensure future warfighting
    success.
        The PMTEC initiative also integrates cyber and space capabilities
    to enable joint and combined experimentation and testing that is truly
    multi-domain. Currently, many of these ranges restrict operations to
    just air and land capabilities or just air, land, and maritime
    capabilities. As a result, our forces often have to simulate or provide
    exercise injects that replicate space and cyber effects. We are working
    to fully incorporate space and cyber into our exercises.
        Experimentation and Innovation. USINDOPACOM relies on innovation
    and experimentation, underpinned by strong partnerships, to address our
    capability gaps in the region. This includes testing and integrating
    new technologies, developing new capabilities, and exploring new
    concepts of operation and employment. USINDOPACOM makes extensive use
    of OSD's Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, Coalition Warfare
    Program, and other rapid prototyping programs to focus cutting edge
    technology-based capabilities and innovation to enhance our readiness.
        Innovation is crucial to increasing logistics agility and
    resilience. USINDOPACOM will continue utilizing the Joint Capability
    Technology Demonstration program to identify technological solutions to
    our critical logistics capability gaps. To facilitate greater
    resilience, USINDOPACOM will protect and harden our critical logistics
    infrastructure, information systems, and enablers. For example,
    USINDOPACOM is developing the capability to rapidly repair damage to
    critical seaports and airfields.
        As part of our innovation and experimentation efforts, USINDOPACOM
    maintains robust engagement with a variety of partners to identify,
    promote, and incorporate research and development to address key
    capability gaps. USINDOPACOM has worked with some of the best DOD
    industry partners on advancing man and machine teaming, artificial
    intelligence, machine-learning, hypersonic technology, autonomy,
    command and control, and block chain technology. USINDOPACOM benefits
    from engineers, operations analysts, and theater-experienced operators
    from Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) and
    University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) partners. These partners
    perform robust military utility assessments of emerging technology in
    the context of theater plans. The ability to harness the knowledge and
    experience of the individuals from these organizations is vital to
    advancing key capabilities for targeting, cyberspace operations,
    undersea warfare, electronic warfare, and ISR.
    Focus Area 4: Strengthen Allies and Partners:
        The United States' network of allies and partners is our principal
    advantage against any adversary. USINDOPACOM depends upon the
    collective capabilities of our allies and partners to address the
    challenges to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The most obvious point--one
    made abundantly clear in the National Security Strategy--is that
    whatever we do, we must do it with our allies and partners. The keys to
    our bilateral and multilateral relationships are communication,
    information-sharing, and interoperability.
        Agile Communications. Agile communications are crucial--not only
    for our readiness, but for our relationships in the region. USINDOPACOM
    works with allies and partners in order to enhance our interoperability
    throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, USINDOPACOM is not fully
    postured with the latest technology to operate in cyberspace with
    dynamic multiple-partner combinations in all phases of military
    operations. Furthermore, our Nation is still developing the
    communication capacity and sharable encryption capability necessary to
    support most modern warfighting platforms and weapon systems with our
    allies and partners. Although USINDOPACOM does not have formal
    agreements for exchanging information with many of the nations or
    organizations within the region, there is continued progress. The
    recently concluded Communications, Compatibility, and Security
    Agreement (COMCASA) with India is a step in the right direction.
    COMCASA is a bilateral agreement that allows the Indian military to
    procure United States cryptological equipment to enable secure voice
    and data exchange for enhanced interoperability. There will be similar
    efforts undertaken with others in the Indo-Pacific. As we continue to
    improve our agility in coalition information-sharing environments, our
    future capabilities will allow ally and partner forces alongside of our
    forces to adequately respond to natural disasters and contingencies. We
    will have agile, secure, dynamic information technology capabilities to
    support the full spectrum of military operations with our partners and
    allies in order to enhance interoperability.
        Security Cooperation and Capacity Building. Security cooperation
    and capacity-building engagements in the region help build ally and
    partner capabilities, information-sharing, and interoperability.
    Addressing maritime security and maritime domain awareness challenges
    remains a key priority for nations across the region. The 2019 National
    Defense Authorization Act extended the fiscal year 2016 NDAA section
    1263 ``Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)'' for another
    five years (fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025), and expanded
    MSI to encompass portions of South Asia. The MSI authority, along with
    other DOD authorities such as the title 10 section 333 Global Train and
    Equip, and Department of State authorities such as Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training
    (IMET), in addition to the new Asia Reassurance Initiative Act,
    represent weighty tools available for building partner readiness,
    reducing capability gaps, and building capacity. The Department of
    State's one-time reprogramming of $290.5 million of FMF to the Indo-
    Pacific in 2018 is a clear effort to assist our region, for which
    USINDOPACOM is grateful.
     addressing the indo-pacific together: enhancing partnerships with our
                              allies and partners
        The Indo-Pacific is one of the largest and most diverse regions on
    earth. These differences are our strength, and the thousands of miles
    of ocean and sky between us do not divide us, they are the connective
    elements that bind us together. As I look at the depth and breadth of
    the Indo-Pacific, I see opportunities in each of the regions to advance
    our shared values in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Throughout
    the Indo-Pacific, the most effective way to address the challenges I
    have described is through collective action of multiple nations.
        The security landscape mirrors the diversity of the Indo-Pacific.
    In Northeast Asia, the security environment where our strong alliances
    with Japan and South Korea dominate, I am focused on the immediate
    threat presented by North Korea and the long-term threat posed by
    Beijing's and Moscow's aggressive policies. In Southeast Asia, I am
    focused on working with our allies, Thailand and the Philippines, and
    our strong partners, Singapore and Vietnam, to strengthen ASEAN, expand
    multilateralism, and improve their combined capacity to stand up to the
    malign influence of state and non-state actors, especially in the South
    China Sea. In South Asia, I am focused on expanding cooperation with
    the world's largest democracy, India, and working with all South Asia
    countries to increase air and maritime domain awareness across the
    Indian Ocean. Finally, in Oceania, I am encouraged by the opportunities
    to partner with our strong allies, Australia and France, and strong
    friend, New Zealand, to improve information sharing and maritime
    cooperation as the Pacific Island Countries address the challenges
    associated with Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing,
    natural disasters, narcotics trafficking, and economic coercion from
    Beijing.
        Northeast Asia. The command's goal is to stabilize Northeast Asia
    and leverage our strong alliances with Japan and South Korea to improve
    stability across the broader Indo-Pacific. In order to achieve this,
    USINDOPACOM needs a security environment that is secure from coercion
    from Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow. As the region becomes more stable,
    we will encourage Japan and South Korea to take a greater role in the
    alliances related to their own security and contribute to security in
    the broader Indo-Pacific region.
        Japan. The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our
    efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The government of Japan
    released its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2017, and Japan
    is looking to become more involved across the broader Indo-Pacific
    region. Additionally, Japan is a key supporter of UNSCR enforcement
    operations and hosts the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) in
    Yokosuka, Japan. Tokyo intends to procure high-tech United States
    platforms that will increase interoperability, including F-35A, E-2D
    Hawkeye, Global Hawk UAS, MV-22, and Advanced Electronic Guides
    Interceptor System (AEGIS) Ashore. Furthermore, Japan's 2018 National
    Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) call for strengthening the United
    States-Japan alliance, and expanding their international security
    cooperation with like-minded partners in the region. They also
    prioritize advancements in Japan's space, cyberspace, and electro-
    magnetic capabilities.
        USINDOPACOM and Japan's Self Defense Force have transformed the way
    military alliances plan and campaign together. Our approaches for a
    Free and Open Indo-Pacific are synchronized in our national policies
    and defense strategies, and communication mechanisms exist at every
    level of our governments to ensure we are synchronized on key issues.
    The United States-Japan alliance is committed to supporting countries
    that respect and adhere to the rule-of-law, and our alliance seeks to
    enable opportunities for economic prosperity throughout the region.
        South Korea. The United States-South Korea alliance remains
    ironclad, and we are both committed to the final, fully verified
    denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea is also a key supporter of
    UNSCR Enforcement activities against North Korea. USINDOPACOM works
    closely with Seoul in obtaining capabilities required under the
    Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP)--the
    ongoing plan to transfer Combined Forces Command (CFC) to South Korean
    leadership. Seoul has future procurement plans for the P-8, advanced
    munitions, upgrades to PAC-3 missiles, and F-16 fighters. All these
    assets will increase interoperability with the United States.
        Taiwan. In accordance with our One China Policy, based on the
    Taiwan Relations Act and three United States-China Joint Communiques,
    the United States and Taipei maintain a substantive and robust
    unofficial relationship with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act
    (TRA). Taiwan's values reflect our own--it features an open economy
    with a free and democratic society that respects human rights and the
    rule of law. The United States opposes any unilateral change to the
    status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The United States continues to support
    the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and
    pace acceptable to the people on both sides. USINDOPACOM's engagement
    focuses on improving joint interoperability within Taiwan's military,
    improving Taiwan training and readiness, and supporting Taiwan's
    military and professional development.
        Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate and
    economically constrain Taiwan. Taiwan has only seventeen diplomatic
    partners left after losing El Salvador, Burkina Faso, and the Dominican
    Republic as diplomatic partners in 2018. Beijing continues to press the
    international community and private businesses to remove or modify any
    references to Taiwan on websites and publications and is attempting to
    deny Taiwan's participation in international fora.
        As evidenced in President Xi Jinping's New Year's speech, China is
    focused on achieving reunification as a part of the PRC's national plan
    of rejuvenation by ``reserving the option of taking all necessary
    measures and not renouncing the use of force.'' We continue to be
    concerned with China's military buildup across the Strait, Beijing's
    opaqueness about its military capability and capacity, and its
    unwillingness to preclude the use of force to resolve the cross-strait
    issue. The United States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and
    stability in the Taiwan Strait and welcomes steps by both sides to
    reduce tensions and improve cross-Strait relations. President Xi's
    solution of a one country, two systems approach to reunification does
    not reflect the wishes of both sides. We hope that there will be
    continued high-level communications and interactions going forward
    through which both sides can continue their constructive dialogue on
    the basis of dignity and respect. Although President Tsai and her
    party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have committed to
    ``avoid confrontation and prevent surprises'' with China, the cross-
    Strait situation is of increasing concern given the harsh rhetoric from
    Beijing toward the leadership in Taipei.
        Taiwan recently passed its 2019 defense budget, which will fund
    foreign and indigenous acquisition programs as well as near-term
    training and readiness. Consistent with the TRA, USINDOPACOM engages
    with the Taiwan military to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
    self-defense capability that is credible, resilient, and cost-
    effective.
        Mongolia. Mongolia is a strong partner and contributor to the
    United States' regional and global policy objectives. Mongolia supports
    missions in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations,
    making Mongolia a model for emerging democratic countries that want to
    be more active globally. Ulaanbaatar's ``Third Neighbor Policy''
    intends to balance Russian and Chinese influence by developing
    relationships with the United States and other like-minded countries.
    USINDOPACOM and Mongolia have had inaugural land forces talks,
    developed a five-year security cooperation plan, and laid the
    groundwork for Airman-to-Airman Talks. The United States is helping
    Mongolia improve their special operations forces, peacekeeping
    operations, and Air Forces.
        Southeast Asia. USINDOPACOM's objective in Southeast Asia is to
    strengthen the sub-region's ability to deny adversaries' attempts to
    dominate or disrupt the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
    while enabling the region to promote their sovereign interests, resist
    economic pressure from others, and preserve conditions for continued
    economic growth. USINDOPACOM is setting conditions in the security
    environment that support this goal, which ensures that all nations can
    freely access shared domains. Adversary militaries will be unable to
    dominate the global commons that enable trade and the global economy.
    The command's efforts will improve the region's awareness and
    capability to enforce their borders, territorial waters, and exclusive
    economic zones. USINDOPACOM will advocate for multilateral venues like
    the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to advance
    collaboration, settle disputes equitably, and strengthen resolve
    against the malign influence of state and non-state actors. We are very
    grateful to Congress for its continued support for the $425 million
    Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia which enables Thailand,
    Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and India to increase their capability
    and capacity in continued maritime domain awareness over the next five
    years.
        ASEAN. The United States and ASEAN share the common principles of a
    rules-based international order, respect for international law, and the
    peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the
    chairmanship of Singapore in 2018 and Thailand in 2019, continue to
    seek ways to improve multilateral security engagements and advance
    stability in the Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM is committed to
    strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense
    Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. USINDOPACOM
    participates in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements, and
    multilateral cooperation on a number of shared transnational
    challenges, and will host an ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise in 2019.
    USINDOPACOM co-chairs the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus
    Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
    with Malaysia through the end of 2019. USINDOPACOM's engagements with
    ASEAN, and with the respective ASEAN member states, build and
    strengthen relationships, and convey the United States' steadfast
    commitment to the region.
        Cambodia. USINDOPACOM reduced the number of engagements with
    Cambodia. During these limited engagements the command reaffirms the
    importance of strengthening democratic institutions and maintaining an
    independent foreign policy. The United States and other countries in
    the region are concerned about the possible construction by a Chinese
    state-owned enterprise of a facility in Cambodia. USINDOPACOM
    appreciates the statements by the Prime Minister noting that foreign
    military facilities are prohibited under their constitution. However,
    the command remains concerned about the possible militarization of
    Cambodia's coast including the prepositioning of military equipment,
    the stationing of military units on long term rotations, and the
    construction of dual use facilities.
        Indonesia. This year, the United States and Indonesia celebrate our
    70th anniversary of bilateral relations, which provides an opportunity
    to highlight our growing strategic relationship. USINDOPACOM is
    committed to a strategic partnership with Indonesia. Indonesia's
    strategic location, its status as the third largest democracy, fourth
    most populous country, and its expanding economy all underscore its
    essential role in the regional security architecture. Indonesia is the
    largest recipient of United States training and education programs in
    the region. We continue to support the Indonesian military's focus on
    external threats and national defense, particularly maritime domain
    awareness and maritime security.
        Laos. After decades of stagnation in the United States-Lao
    relationship following the Vietnam War, we have seen some significant
    advancements over the last two years. In 2016, the United States and
    the Lao People's Democratic Republic signed a Comprehensive Partnership
    that resulted in a surge of bilateral military engagements. The
    command's engagement goals are to partner and assist Laos in becoming a
    stable, prosperous, and independent member of ASEAN that is willing and
    able to promote its sovereign interests and respect international law.
    These engagements focus around unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance,
    POW/MIA recovery, and military medicine. Laos actively supports the
    Defense Personnel Accounting Agency (DPAA) in the search for 290
    missing United States servicemembers with an aim to honorably conclude
    war legacy issues (UXO and POW/MIA recovery missions) by 2030.
    USINDOPACOM is expanding engagements with the Lao military.
        Malaysia. Malaysia remains a critical partner of increasing
    importance in the region ever since the United States elevated the
    relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2014. USINDOPACOM is
    exploring expanded collaboration in the areas of maritime security,
    counterterrorism, information-sharing, and defense institutional
    reform. Malaysian Armed Forces have demonstrated the professionalism,
    capacity, and resolve to contribute to regional security, and we
    continue to evolve our defense relationship on mutual areas of
    interest.
        Philippines. The Philippines is a treaty ally and a partner in
    preserving a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and our military-to-military
    relationship has never been stronger. USINDOAPCOM has increased the
    number and scope of exercises in recent years, to include the
    resumption of live-fire exercises. Terrorism continues to pose a
    security challenge in the Philippines, and USINDOPACOM is committed to
    helping the Philippines ensure that the southern Philippines does not
    become a safe-haven for terrorists that would threaten the entire
    region. I am also focused on helping to develop the territorial defense
    capability of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) and look forward to
    re-engaging with the Philippines National Police Maritime Group to
    continue improving their ability to protect their sovereign interests.
        Singapore. Singapore remains a steadfast security cooperation
    partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promoting a Free
    and Open Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal ally, Singapore provides
    valuable access to the strategically-located entrance of the Malacca
    Straits and South China Sea. Singapore supports a strong United States
    presence in the region as well as a deep and broad defense relationship
    between our two countries. Singapore supports our objectives on North
    Korea, and in 2018, Singapore hosted the historic United States-North
    Korea summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un.
    Singapore also hosted the transit and rotational deployment of more
    than 1,500 U.S. military aircraft and vessels (2015-2018), making the
    United States the heaviest foreign user of Singapore's facilities at
    Sembawang Port, Paya Lebar Air Base, and Changi Naval Base. Singapore
    maintains training facilities at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona (F-
    16); Mountain Home AFB, Idaho (F-15SG); Marana, Arizona (Apache AH-
    64D); and Fort Sill, Oklahoma (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS). Moreover, USINDOPACOM and Singapore steadily increased
    interoperability through increasingly complex exercises, and we
    continue to strengthen cooperation in counterterrorism and maritime
    security. Singapore annually sends 1000 students to training and
    education courses in the United States, representing the largest
    training presence in the United States from any foreign military.
        Thailand. Last year marked 200 years of friendly United States-Thai
    relations, and Thailand remains a key ally and security partner. In
    2019, I am focused on advancing our alliance and restoring elements of
    our military-to-military relationship following the restoration of a
    democratic government after elections in March. Thai facilities provide
    vital training opportunities for USINDOPACOM personnel, and logistical
    nodes that are essential to operate throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
    Thailand assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2019 and continues to
    play a vital leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region.
        Vietnam. Vietnam has emerged as a key partner in promoting a secure
    and rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region.
    USINDOPACOM's defense partnership with the Vietnamese military is among
    the strongest aspects of our growing bilateral relationship. As a
    symbol of closer ties between the United States and Vietnam, the
    aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made a port call in March 2018 to
    Vietnam, the first of its kind since the end of the war in 1975.
    Vietnam shares many of the United States' principles on issues such as
    international rule of law and freedom of navigation, and Vietnam is one
    of the loudest voices on South China Sea disputes. USINDOPACOM's and
    the Vietnamese military's military-to-military engagements prioritize
    enhancing Vietnam's maritime capacity, which will be bolstered by
    Vietnam's acquisition of Scan Eagle UAVs, T-6 trainer aircraft, and a
    second U.S. Coast Guard cutter. I look forward to Vietnam assuming the
    ASEAN Chairmanship in 2020 and increasing its leadership across the
    region.
        Burma (Myanmar). Ongoing human rights abuses, including growing
    restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the
    press, and atrocities [including ethnic cleansing], and instability in
    some ethnic minority areas comprise threats to Burma's democratic
    transition. Due to credible information of serious human rights
    violations and abuses, especially in relation to Rohingya, as well as
    restrictions that remain in place based on decades of military rule,
    United States-Burma security cooperation is minimal. The United States-
    Burma security relationship is limited to lower-level engagements at
    select regional security events and conferences, and participation in
    multilateral exercises focused on HA/DR. Burma military personnel are
    not attending academic exchanges, including at the region's DOD
    academic institute, despite the importance of engaging the next
    generation of officers.
        South Asia. USINDOPACOM's goal in South Asia is to create and seize
    opportunities to broaden critical partnerships to ensure shared domains
    remain open to all. In conjunction with India's contributions to
    regional security, these actions will prevent adversaries from
    establishing an effective military presence in the Indian Ocean that
    threaten the security of vital commerce and continued economic growth
    and development. As a result, the regional states will be able to
    reduce internal conflicts, respond to regional security challenges, and
    resist adversaries' military and economic coercion.
        India. The United States-India strategic partnership continues to
    advance at an historic pace as we continue to increase our
    interoperability and information-sharing capabilities. The inaugural
    2+2 Ministerial and signing of the COMCASA in 2018 were pivotal moments
    in our relationship. USINDOPACOM expects this trajectory to continue
    and that 2019 will be a significant year in bilateral relations. The
    United States and India are natural partners on a range of political,
    economic, and security issues. With a mutual desire for global
    stability, support for the rules-based international order, and a Free-
    and-Open Indo-Pacific region, the United States and India have an
    increased agreement on interests, including maritime security and
    maritime domain awareness, counter-piracy, counterterrorism,
    humanitarian assistance, and coordinated responses to natural disasters
    and transnational threats. Over the past year, the United States and
    Indian militaries participated in five major exercises, executed more
    than fifty other military exchanges, and further operationalized the
    2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). The LEMOA
    enables the United States Navy to replenish supplies from Indian navy
    logistics platforms. USINDOPACOM is working with the Indian military to
    operationalize the COMCASA, which will boost interoperability between
    our militaries. Defense sales are at an all-time high, with India
    operating United States sourced platforms such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s,
    AH-64s, CH-47s, and M777 howitzers. Additionally, India recently agreed
    to a $2.1-billion purchase of MH-60R multi-role sea-based helicopters
    and is considering a number of additional U.S. systems for purchase.
    USINDOPACOM fully supports the purchase of U.S. systems, F-16 and F/A-
    18E aircraft, a reorder of 12-15 P-8Is, and a potential purchase of Sea
    Guardian UASs.
        Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an important security partner with strong
    potential to enhance regional stability and advance United States
    interests in South Asia on counter-terrorism, Muslim outreach,
    countering violent extremism, supporting humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief, and supporting United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
    (UNPKO). The humanitarian crisis caused by the presence of more than
    700,000 Rohingya refugees from Burma (Myanmar) in Bangladesh has
    strained the government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh's December 30
    elections point to concerning trend of consolidation of power by the
    ruling Awami League and raise fears that PM Hasina is aiming to achieve
    a de facto one-party state. Military-to-military engagement with
    Bangladesh fits into a broader strategy and commitment to uphold an
    international, rules-based order in the vital Indo-Pacific region and
    contributes to building a regional security framework.
        Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka remains a significant strategic opportunity in
    the Indian Ocean, and our military-to-military relationship continues
    to strengthen. However, political turmoil and ethnic tension between
    the Tamil and Sinhalese populations remain drivers of instability and
    potential obstacles to continued growth in our partnership. Moreover,
    Sri Lanka has handed over the deep water port of Hambantota to China on
    a 99-year lease due to its mounting debts to China, which has caused
    international concern. Despite the political upheaval, it is in our
    interests to continue military collaboration and cooperation with Sri
    Lankan Forces. USINDOPACOM cooperation with the Sri Lankan Military
    centers on building capacity in maritime security and maritime domain
    awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as
    humanitarian de-mining, medical assistance, and peacekeeping
    operations. Increasing navy-to-navy engagement with Sri Lanka will be a
    USINDOPACOM focus in 2019. The Sri Lankan Navy is a well-trained and
    professional force with the potential to contribute to multi-lateral
    maritime interoperability in the Indian Ocean. The recent transfer of
    an excess United States Coast Guard cutter to Sri Lanka in August 2018,
    along with additional platforms from Japan and India, provide the Sri
    Lankan Navy greater capabilities to contribute to regional maritime
    domain awareness initiatives. Going forward, it is necessary to sustain
    engagement with Sri Lanka, particularly the navy, and construct a
    multi-lateral approach to capacity building with like-minded partners
    to rapidly enhance the Sri Lankan Navy's capabilities.
        Oceania. USINDOPACOM is deepening engagement with the Pacific
    Island Countries (PICs) of Oceania to preserve a Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific region, and we are committed to strengthening the region's
    future security and prosperity with our partners and allies. In close
    coordination with Australia, Japan, France, and New Zealand,
    USINDOPACOM is working to strengthen the resilience of the PICs by
    tackling common challenges: drug trafficking; Illegal, Unreported,
    Unregulated (IUU) fishing; the existential threat of rising ocean
    levels; natural disasters; and the heavy debt burdens that threaten
    their sovereign interests.
        Australia. Our alliance with Australia underpins our relations
    across Oceania, and Canberra plays a leading role in regional security
    and capacity-building efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
    Australia is increasing its diplomatic presence, military and economic
    assistance, and infrastructure investments in Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
    and the other PICs to enhance security in the region. Australia is a
    key supporter of UNSCR enforcement operations against North Korea as
    well. The U.S. Marine Corps completed its sixth successful Marine
    Rotational Force-Darwin deployment, and we expect to reach the full
    authorized strength of 2,500 marines later this year. These deployments
    maintain significant combat power west of the International Date Line
    with an ally. Moreover, Australia is procuring high-tech United States
    platforms, such as the F-35, that will increase interoperability.
        Compact of Free Association (COFA) States. The Republic of Palau,
    Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands (RMI), collectively referred to as the ``Compact'' states, are
    threatened by external pressures including the pernicious use of
    Beijing's economic leverage. The Republic of Palau, FSM, and RMI
    entered into a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United
    States more than 25 years ago, allowing the United States to foreclose
    access or use of those countries by third-country militaries. Under the
    COFAs, the Compact States receive economic assistance, including
    grants, access to various U.S. Federal programs, and for many citizens
    of the Compact States, visa-free travel to the United States. U.S.
    contributions to the trust funds established by the COFA are scheduled
    to end after 2023. Moreover, these island nations are under increasing
    pressure from Beijing's economic strategy. Additionally, the changing
    climate represents an existential threat to these nations as they
    urgently seek to mitigate damage from higher tides and rising sea
    levels, shifting patterns of fishing populations essential to economic
    livelihood, and greater intensity of natural disasters such as tropical
    storms and droughts. The continued support that the COFA has engendered
    also benefits the United States. We provide support to these countries
    and they support the United States. The patriotic citizens of these
    nations join the U.S. Armed Forces in larger numbers per capita than
    most U.S. states, and I value their service. The Compact states rely on
    continued support from the United States to mitigate these threats and
    the United States would like to continue to benefit from the good will
    of these Pacific Island Countries to further our strategic interests in
    Indo-Pacific region.
        Fiji. USINDOPACOM's relationship with the Republic of Fiji is
    thriving and robust, and we were pleased to see a credible election
    process there in 2018. Australia's decision to invest in the Black Rock
    International Peacekeeping Center was welcomed, and will ensure that
    Fiji continues to play an important role in peacekeeping missions
    around the world. USINDOPACOM is postured to provide engineering
    support for improvements and new construction to the Ground Forces
    Training Center and to assist Australian engineers with the Black Rock
    International Peacekeeping Center. In 2018, Fiji signed a United States
    ship-rider agreement, opening up new opportunities for maritime
    security cooperation between our two countries. Additionally, the
    establishment of Fiji as a partner in the National Guard's State
    Partnership Program opens up another door for our two militaries to
    train and work together. The $5 million plus-up in foreign military
    sales (FMS) allows USINDOPACOM to deepen our military relationship with
    the Fijian military.
        France. France, a NATO ally with significant territory in the Indo-
    Pacific, is increasing its operational activities in the region and is
    a key contributor to the multilateral efforts. The United States,
    Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and France coordinate operational
    support and capacity-building with the PICs. The primary operational
    engagement provides support to the Forum Fisheries Agency to address
    IUU fishing. France is also becoming increasingly active across the
    broader Indo-Pacific region, and I welcome both French support to UNSCR
    sanction enforcement activities against North Korea, and increased
    French activity in the South China Sea.
        New Zealand. New Zealand remains a steadfast and key partner who,
    in 2018, increased investment, foreign assistance, and infrastructure
    support to the South Pacific. USINDOPACOM greatly appreciates this
    commitment of additional resources to the PICs. For the last six years,
    the United States and New Zealand, through bilateral defense dialogues,
    have increased interoperability collaboration headlined in 2018 by New
    Zealand's purchase of P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to replace
    aging P-3 Orion aircraft. Additionally, New Zealand has provided key
    support to UNSCR sanctions enforcement against North Korea.
        Papua New Guinea (PNG). USINDOPACOM's engagement with PNG improves
    regional posture and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the region.
    With security support from Australia and the United States, PNG hosted
    the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2018. During
    APEC, Vice President Pence announced that Australia and the United
    States would partner with Papua New Guinea to develop the Lombrum Naval
    Base on Manus Island in the northern part of PNG. USINDOPACOM looks
    forward to assisting Australia and PNG in developing options for this
    base.
    Additional Allies
        Canada. Like the United States, Canada is a member of NATO and a
    Pacific nation. Canadian policy in the Indo-Pacific focuses on
    cooperation and building partnerships as they increase operational
    activities in the region. By focusing on consistent engagement with all
    willing parties, Canada hopes to deepen its relationship with
    Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Canada wants to provide
    a continued presence in the Pacific to enhance regional stability,
    specifically citing tensions on the Korean Peninsula in their National
    Defence Policy. Ottawa provides support to ongoing North Korea UNSCR
    sanctions enforcement as well.
        United Kingdom (UK). The UK, another NATO ally, remains one of the
    strongest defenders of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and sees
    prosperity and security in the Indo-Pacific as an essential driver of
    global economic growth. The UK recently established three new
    diplomatic posts in the Pacific and increased foreign aid to the
    Pacific by 6 percent in 2018. The recently concluded cooperative
    deployment with the HMS Argyll and USS McCampbell in the South China
    Sea highlights the value of multinational operations and, more
    importantly, the international message to those who seek to infringe on
    the ability to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
    allows.
                                   conclusion
        In the 21st century, U.S. security and prosperity will increasingly
    depend upon a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region--one that
    features respect for states' sovereignty, freedom of the seas and
    skies, and adherence to international norms, rules, and behavior. In
    short, it is in our vital national interests to ensure a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific over the short- and long-term. As the Commander of
    USINDOPACOM, my focus is first and foremost on preserving and advancing
    the security and stability of the region, over the short- and long-
    term.
        I will ensure the 375,000 men and women of USINDOPACOM remain ready
    to fight and win, if necessary, while also focusing on competing and
    winning below the level of armed conflict. It is in this so-called
    ``gray zone'' between peace and war where many of our adversaries
    currently operate, and we must be equally prepared to compete with our
    adversaries before and after the initiation of hostilities. To do this,
    we need a comprehensive approach across multiple U.S. Governmental
    departments, and partnerships with civil society and the private
    sector, to engage in areas that transcend traditional military core
    competencies. Our armed services must be manned, trained, and equipped
    to overcome the full spectrum of challenges presented by state and non-
    state actors. With the continued support of Congress, and together with
    our allies and partners, I believe we will be successful at this
    important mission.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Davidson.
        General Abrams.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. ABRAMS, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
     NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES
                                 KOREA

        General Abrams. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you today.
        I've had the privilege to serve in this position for just
    over 90 days. In that short time, I have assessed the ROK-
    United States military alliance to be stronger than ever. Our
    combined force is a strategic deterrent, postured to respond to
    potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready to
    defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in the region.
        Today in Korea, we have tremendous opportunities before us
    as well as some great challenges. Ongoing diplomatic engagement
    between the Republic of Korea, the DPRK, and the United States
    has led to a significant reduction in tension compared to the
    recent past marked by missile launches and nuclear tests.
    Diplomacy is creating the opportunity for North Korea to choose
    the path of denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and build
    a better future for its people.
        The first steps towards realizing that future have already
    begun. We have witnessed multiple presidential summits, inter-
    Korean dialogue, and international support to sanctions. The
    steps agreed to at Panmunjom and specified in the Comprehensive
    Military Agreement, combined with the aforementioned diplomatic
    efforts, have all contributed to a marked reduction in tensions
    on the peninsula and created mechanisms for the development of
    cooperation and confidence building, central ingredients to the
    incremental process of making history on the peninsula.
        Still, I remain clear-eyed about the fact that, despite a
    reduction in tensions along the DMZ [Korean Demilitarized Zone]
    and a cessation of strategic provocations, coupled with public
    statements of intent to denuclearize, little to no verifiable
    change has occurred in North Korea's military capabilities.
        For instance, we are watching the ongoing Korean People's
    Army Winter Training Cycle, including a slate of full-spectrum
    exercises, which is progressing along at historic norms,
    meaning that we have observed no significant changes to size,
    scope, or timing of their ongoing exercises compared to the
    same time period over the last 4 years. Further, North Korea's
    conventional and asymmetric military capabilities, along with
    their continued development of advanced conventional systems,
    remains unchecked. These capabilities continue to hold the
    United States, the Republic of Korea, and our regional allies
    at risk. As such, I believe it is necessary to maintain a
    postured and ready force to deter any possible aggressive
    actions.
        Fielding our force in Korea requires a foundation of
    support and sustainment to meet our war-fighters' needs. Today,
    that foundation is sound. It serves as the bedrock from which
    we deter aggression and ensure stability, not only on the
    Korean Peninsula, but in Northeast Asia. Our posture allows our
    diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength as
    they work to achieve enduring peace and final full
    denuclearization of the DPRK.
        I want to thank you for the support we have received from
    the Congress over the last 2 years, as we have significantly
    improved the posture and readiness of our forces on the
    peninsula, from munition stocks to additional ballistic missile
    defense capabilities and more. I can't underscore enough the
    importance of the on-time appropriation in 2019, as it has
    enabled us for the first time in many years to make smarter
    investments, improve our planning, and provide predictability
    to our commanders in the field so they can sustain the hard-
    earned readiness that is essential to being a fight tonight
    force.
        The readiness required to be a credible deterrent is
    perishable. We must continue to exercise the core competencies
    necessary to the planning and execution of joint and combined
    operations under the strain of crisis. However, we must also
    strike a balance between the need to train and the requirement
    to create space for diplomacy to flourish. As such, we are
    innovating our approach to training and exercises by tuning
    four dials that modify exercise design and conduct: size,
    scope, volume, and timing. Adjustments to these dials enable us
    to remain in harmony with diplomatic and political requirements
    without sacrificing war-fighting readiness to unacceptable
    levels.
        Our combined forces, the Republic of Korea and United
    States, continue to train using this new construct so they can
    be ready should the call come for them to respond to crisis,
    defend the Republic of Korea, and prevail against any threat.
    The ROK-United States alliance remains ironclad. It has been
    tested multiple times over the last 65 years and has only
    become stronger. Our military partnership continues to deepen
    and broaden the long-standing relationships that exist at every
    echelon. On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians,
    contractors, and their families on the peninsula, we thank you
    for your unwavering support. I am extremely proud to be their
    commander and to work hand-in-hand with the Republic of Korea
    to protect our great nations. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Abrams follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Abrams
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Senators of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture
    and readiness of our forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Thank you
    as well to the Congress, and in particular this Committee's leadership,
    for delivering the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
    and related Appropriations on time. Predictable, stable resourcing,
    more than any other factor, allows us to sustain the military readiness
    we have rebuilt over the last few years. In 2018, the Services, under
    the leadership of Chairman Dunford and former Secretary Mattis, made
    significant strides to improve the overall readiness posture of Unites
    States Forces Korea (USFK) and our ability to ``fight tonight.'' We are
    grateful for their continued support.
        I have had the distinct honor to command the United Nations Command
    (UNC), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and USFK for nearly 90 days.
    During that short time, I have prioritized firsthand visits and a
    personal review of the posture, readiness, and character of the
    warriors and organizations of these three commands. My assessment is
    that the ROK-United States military Alliance is stronger than ever, and
    that our combined force stands as a strategic deterrent, postured to
    respond to potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready
    to ``fight tonight'' in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The
    alliance between South Korean and American forces is ironclad--forged
    in blood, shaped over 65 years of combined military operations and
    training, and hardened by the crucible of war. Shared sacrifice and
    mutually agreed principles underpin our Alliance and ensure it endures
    the winds of change.
        This posture statement, along with my testimony before the
    Committee in open and closed session, is my first opportunity to
    provide you my personal assessment and measurement of progress within
    our four enduring priorities: sustain and strengthen the Alliance,
    maintain the armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force.
    To that end, this statement provides a summary of the changes in our
    operating environment, an assessment of our posture and readiness, an
    overview of our exercise planning and conduct, a discussion of how we
    take care of our warriors and their families, and a review of our
    current resourcing priorities. The continued support of this Committee
    for the incredible men and women of UNC/CFC/USFK is appreciated. We are
    a better postured force because of your unwavering commitment to
    military readiness on the Korean peninsula.
                             operating environment
        Ongoing diplomatic engagement and summitry among the leaders of the
    ROK, United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
    in 2018 led to a palpable reduction in tension when compared to the
    recent years of missile launches and nuclear tests. The inter-Korean
    Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) has produced a number of nascent
    confidence-building measures: demilitarization of the Joint Security
    Area (JSA), demining small areas of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in
    preparation for ROK-DPRK joint remains recovery operations this spring,
    mutually-verified removal of select guard posts along the DMZ, and
    increased interaction between UNC forces and Korean People's Army (KPA)
    forces operating within the JSA. All of these measures support improved
    military-to-military communications among the ROK, DPRK, and UNC, and
    some have sparked limited cooperation. These steps, regardless of size
    or scope, are positive indicators of the impact sustained diplomatic
    efforts have begun to bring about. Current modifications in
    atmospherics, however, do not represent a substantive change in North
    Korea's military posture or readiness. The North Korean military
    remains formidable and dangerous, with no discernable differences in
    the assessed force structure, readiness, or lethality my predecessor
    reported in 2018.
        While Kim Jong-un's (KJU) 2019 New Year's speech called for South
    Korea to halt joint military exercises with the United States, the
    KPA's Winter Training Cycle this year commenced as it has for the past
    five years--with a force of over one million engaged in individual and
    unit-level training throughout the country. Notably, the size, scope,
    and timing of training events are consistent with recent years. The
    only observable change has been a reduction in the attention and
    bellicosity the regime layers onto its military activities. Since the
    end of 2017, Pyongyang has reduced its hostile rhetoric and halted
    media coverage of KJU attending capstone events such as large-scale,
    live-fire training or special operations raids on mock-up Alliance
    targets. It is, however, too soon to conclude that a lower profile is
    indicative of lesser risk.
        The hard work of diplomacy continues to reduce tensions and create
    the environment necessary for North Korea to choose the path of
    denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and create a brighter future
    for its people. Still, I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no
    verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional and
    asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United States, South
    Korea, and our regional allies at risk. For these reasons, the security
    situation continues to demand an appropriately postured and ready
    force.
        Amid shifting atmospherics, 2018 was also a seminal period for all
    three commands as initiatives for setting the force matured,
    dramatically changing the geography of three headquarters. The USFK and
    UNC Headquarters relocated to Camp Humphreys, joining Eighth Army and
    2nd Infantry Division in new state-of-the-art facilities on the largest
    U.S. Army facility outside of continental United States. The
    headquarters for CFC remains in Seoul at Yongsan and the combined ROK-
    United States staff is redefining normal operations based upon this
    change in geography. While distance will not erode the strength of the
    Alliance, it has forced, and will continue to require, deeper thought
    about how to sustain operational readiness across the components and at
    each echelon. For any member of Congress who has not been to Korea in
    the past 24 months, we have reset the force significantly and
    consolidated tremendous capability in Pyeongtaek--the conditions for
    the development and sustainment of combat readiness have changed.
    The Armistice Agreement and United Nations Command
        The significantly changing environment along the DMZ, and within
    the JSA specifically, is proving the inherent utility, adaptability,
    and importance of the UNC. Over the past 14 months, we have evolved as
    the CMA and inter-Korean dialogue birthed several of the confidence-
    building measures summarized above. CMA-related activities are
    important to the development of the confidence and trust necessary to
    diplomatic progress and are proving to be value-added reinforcements to
    the tools which have helped ensure the security of Korean peninsula for
    the last 65 years--the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the command that
    fulfills it. UNC was formed to organize and operationalize the
    international community's defense of South Korea during the war and
    has, since 1978 when South Korea assumed armistice operational control,
    endured as the body explicitly tasked with ``ensur[ing] a complete
    cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until
    a final peace settlement is achieved.'' The events of 2018 highlight
    UNC's critical role as the home for international commitments on the
    Korean peninsula while simultaneously driving the command toward a
    marked increase in activity, exposure, and international engagement.
        While enforcing the Armistice Agreement, securing the JSA as a
    place for diplomacy, and acting as a principal partner with ROK and KPA
    in the trilateral military talks, the UNC Military Armistice Commission
    (UNCMAC) approved 13,066 border crossings in 2018 (compared with five
    in 2017), passed 152 official messages (56 in 2017), and participated
    in several staff-level and General Officer-level negotiations. UNC
    staff met the dramatic increase in requirements while simultaneously
    continuing the work of evolving the command by increasing UN Sending
    State staff and senior officers and simultaneously executing the move
    from the legacy facilities at Yongsan to a new facility on Camp
    Humphreys. Today, UNCMAC is a vital participant in the ongoing
    negotiations and it provides international legitimacy and validation to
    all of the ongoing confidence building measures. UNCMAC has adapted to
    new conditions and remains the vital tool envisioned in the 1953
    agreement. UNC as a command, enabled during armistice by the UNCMAC,
    the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and UNC-Rear in Japan, also
    remains prepared to be the critical link between the international
    community and the other two commands during periods of crisis or
    contingency as the home for Sending State force contributions.
                     posturing and sustaining a ready force
        Fielding a ready force requires establishing a foundation of
    support and sustainment capable of meeting the warfighters' needs in
    the dynamic and uncertain environment of the 21st century. On the
    Korean peninsula, we operate at the distant edge of our military's
    global logistics chain. Our position requires tight integration with
    our South Korean ally, meticulous planning, and organized efforts to
    forward-position adequate capabilities and the materiel essential to
    power projection and contingency response. Today, that foundation is
    sound and serves as the bedrock from which we deter aggression and are
    prepared to defeat, if necessary, any adversary. Moreover, our posture
    supports this period of detente and negotiation by permitting our
    diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength and
    capability.
        Sustaining a combat-ready force requires focused investments, and
    South Korea is an exemplary ally in that regard. President Moon's
    administration is committed to resourcing the Republic of Korea's
    defense and has increased annual spending by bringing total outlays to
    2.7 percent of GDP. Further, the Moon administration has pledged to
    raise ROK defense spending to 2.9 percent of its GDP by 2022. South
    Korea's 2019 Defense Budget increased 8.2 percent from the previous
    year and it apportions funds to programs necessary to advance the
    Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan and the Defense Reform 2.0
    initiative. The ROK has invested more in its defense over the past 15
    years than it had in the previous 50, increasing foreign military
    procurements from the United States such as the KF-16 and PATRIOT
    battery upgrades, AH-64E Apaches, the F-15K, RQ-4 Global Hawk variants,
    and the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. This level of investment funding
    traditionally exceeds the commitment of other allies and regional
    partners. In 2018 alone, the ROK signed $2.160 billion in Foreign
    Military Sales cases (including a purchase of P-8A aircraft) in support
    of our shared security commitments as allies.
        Since 1991, a key element of sustaining the force has been the
    Special Measures Agreement (SMA), whereby the South Korean Government
    shares the cost of sustaining the USFK force posture. The SMA assures
    essential readiness-related personnel and activities, such as the
    contributions of 9,000 Korean National employees serving in crucial
    roles of public safety, health care, emergency response, and quality-
    of-life delivery operations. The most current SMA expired on December
    31, 2018; as of this writing, the United States and the Republic of
    Korea have reached an agreement, in principle, on a new SMA. Both sides
    are committed to resolving remaining technical issues as quickly as
    possible. The United States appreciates the considerable resources our
    ROK ally provides, including SMA contributions toward the cost of
    maintaining United States Forces in Korea.
        Similarly, South Korea's continued investment in military
    construction and modernization helps ensure our forces are postured,
    prepared, and properly set for the future. The Land Partnership Plan
    (LPP) and the associated Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) are two
    bilateral agreements that provide the foundation for streamlining
    USFK's footprint while returning facilities and valuable land to the
    South Korean Government for future development. USFK and UNC took a
    major step forward in 2018 by relocating both commands from United
    States Army Garrison Yongsan, a legacy cantonment in the heart of
    Seoul, to Camp Humphreys, a large, modern base, which serves as the
    fulcrum for the enduring United States presence in Korea. In total,
    USFK has returned 49 sites to the ROK since 2003 while simultaneously
    moving the majority of our forces and families away from the DMZ and
    closer to centralized support hubs located near major air and sea
    ports.
        With the support of this Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and
    INDOPACOM, in 2018, USFK improved its posture by forward-locating onto
    the peninsula certain capabilities, improving others, and increasing
    the capacity of the most crucial warfighting functions. Significant
    gains in posture during 2018 include essential munitions, ballistic
    missile defense systems, and pre-positioned wartime stocks. Our
    efforts, with assistance from the Services, have reduced stocks of
    forward-positioned, outdated munitions by over 214,000 tons. We are on
    track to complete the required retrograde by December 2019. The
    Department continues to apply the $784 million appropriated since 2017
    towards resolving our joint emergent operational need statement related
    to improving the posture, sustainment, and integration of our missile
    defense systems. The recent draw, operational testing, and turn-in of
    14 M1A2 tanks from our prepositioned stocks was the first in a series
    of exercises validating the concept and improving our preparedness to
    rapidly execute similar activities during contingency conditions.
    Additionally, rotational forces augment the 28,500 member baseline,
    bringing with them high-end systems and leaving with invaluable
    experience in the theater operating environment and combined
    interoperability.
        The aggregate result of seven decades of committed partnership
    under our Mutual Defense Treaty is our ironclad Alliance and capable
    forward presence, the elements directly responsible for creating and
    sustaining an environment conducive to both deterrence and diplomacy.
    As we sustain readiness for any potential provocation or conflict, we
    support those working toward enduring peace and denuclearization.
             exercising the force for joint and combined competency
        Last year we commemorated the 40th Anniversary of the establishment
    of the CFC, which has played a central role in deterring war on the
    Korean peninsula and defending the ROK since November 7, 1978. During
    2018, the CFC made significant advances to ensure the long term
    relevance of our combined warfighting capability. The Alliance Guiding
    Principles, a framework to ensure a unified, ready defense posture
    following OPCON transition, was bilaterally developed and endorsed by
    our two governments. Progress in operational concept refinement,
    military plans, and strategic documents has further enhanced our
    combined defense capabilities. Advances across CFC, the heart of the
    ROK-United States Alliance, serve as evidence of the ironclad nature of
    the ROK-United States Alliance and reinforce my view that our combined
    force relationship is stronger than ever.
        Planning is regarded as an indispensable element of military
    readiness, and in 2018 the Joint Staff and INDOPACOM worked diligently
    with USFK to assess and refine plans for potential contingency
    operations on the Korean Peninsula. A bottom-up review of force
    requirements, unit-level readiness, and global mission impact has been
    accomplished. In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, we
    stand prepared to rapidly receive and integrate the personnel and
    materiel necessary to buttress the forward-deployed force in Korea
    during periods of crisis or conflict.
        Combat readiness is perishable. This fact is especially true of
    forces in Korea due to the high-turnover among our servicemembers,
    American and Korean alike, across the spectrum of missions and roles.
    The benchmark for readiness is demonstrating the competencies necessary
    to plan and execute joint and combined operations under the strain of
    crisis or wartime conditions. Tactical training sharpens the baseline
    skills essential to success on the modern battlefield for our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines. Exercises provide the venue to coordinate
    and synchronize operational-level headquarters like CFC (the
    warfighting command on the peninsula) and the service Components across
    time and space in a dynamic environment--a critical operational
    competency during times of crisis. This is true for militaries the
    world over, all of whom strive to exercise under conditions anticipated
    in potential conflict. To succeed in war, we must train hard in peace.
    To succeed in Korea, we must train the CFC in the essential tasks
    necessary to credibly deter aggression and readily deliver victory if
    challenged.
        However, we must continuously strike a balance between the clear
    need to train and exercise military capability and the requirement to
    create space for and support strategic diplomacy. To help achieve this
    equilibrium, we are innovating and evolving our approach by tuning 4
    dials that adjust exercise design and conduct--size, scope, volume, and
    timing. Adjustments to these dials allows exercise design to remain in
    tune with diplomatic and political requirements without sacrificing the
    training of essential tasks. Additionally, such fine tuning allows for
    the mitigation of impacts inherent to rapidly switching from our
    traditional large-scale exercise program to one of more targeted
    events.
        USFK and CFC are working closely with our South Korean partners and
    INDOPACOM to conduct exercises routinely, both joint and combined, to
    test the preparedness and resiliency of our foundation, refine
    operational concepts, and sustain proficiency of mission essential
    tasks. Recent examples include Combined Staff Training (CST) and the
    on-going Korean Marine Exercise Program (KMEP). CST stresses the CFC
    and USFK headquarters and networks to respond to crisis by effectively
    coordinating and communicating activities from the tactical to the
    strategic level. The KMEP series puts combined marines through their
    paces in simulated wartime conditions testing a full spectrum of
    essential tasks and core competencies. Since October 2018, we have
    conducted dozens of small-scale exercises among the components--our
    air, ground, naval, and marine forces train habitually with their ROK
    counterparts on the fundamentals of warfighting.
        Together, these exercises provide the benchmark from which we are
    evolving our program and mitigating the near-term effects of recently
    suspended traditional, large-scale training events. We continue to
    aggressively pursue innovative approaches to joint and combined
    training and are committed to demonstrating that creating space for
    diplomacy need not impede military readiness.
    Taking Care of our Warriors and their Families
        Servicemembers, civilians, and families are our most precious
    resource, and I am committed to providing the best possible quality of
    life for them as they serve their nation while stationed in South
    Korea. Among my priorities of effort are sexual assault prevention and
    response, command sponsorship, and high quality medical care.
        United States Forces Korea is committed to strict compliance with
    all Secretary of Defense and Service Chief Requirements and is working
    toward the goal of eliminating sexual assault by fostering a culture of
    dignity and respect across the Command. Our approach is prevention-
    focused with an uncompromising adherence to commander involvement and
    victim assistance guided by five critical focus areas: prevention,
    victim assistance, investigation, accountability, and assessment.
        My personal philosophy is ensuring personnel understand they are
    responsible for fostering a climate where sexist behavior, harassment,
    and assault are not tolerated. Additionally, victims' reports are to be
    treated with the utmost seriousness and bystanders are expected to
    intervene--offensive or criminal conduct is neither tolerated nor
    condoned.
        I continually assess the wellbeing of the 7,600 Department of
    Defense dependents living in Korea. The Command Sponsorship Program
    enables 24-36 months accompanied tours for servicemembers. These tour
    lengths are far superior to 12-month unaccompanied tours and benefit
    our warriors, our families, and the commands. Serving in Korea
    accompanied by one's family improves quality of life and morale while
    simultaneously increasing continuity and heightened levels of theater-
    specific competency. I fully support our Command Sponsorship Program
    and assess South Korea to be among the safest locations for
    servicemembers and their families to serve abroad.
        Among the most important quality of life issues in South Korea is
    access to high quality medical care for servicemembers and their
    families. TRICARE beneficiaries in South Korea have access to the
    entire spectrum of healthcare services through Department of Defense
    hospitals and clinics plus a TRICARE network of 30 first-class host
    nation hospitals. In addition, the construction, validation and
    certification of the new, state-of-the-art Brian Allgood Army Community
    Hospital at Camp Humphreys, once delayed by as much as 8-months, has
    now been placed on track for completion by November 2019. Before year's
    end, we will deliver a new facility for our families, one that meets or
    exceeds all U.S. medical requirements and standards.
                              resourcing readiness
        I wish to thank the Committee for their continued commitment to the
    readiness of UNC/CFC/USFK and for supporting the development and
    fielding of capabilities critical to sustaining our edge and mitigating
    asymmetric threats. To further harden our posture and improve our
    readiness to act, my prioritized areas of concentration for future
    investment are: the network, situational awareness, lethality, and
    interoperability.
        The dynamic nature of conflict, particularly in a combined setting,
    applies unique stress on the networks upon which command and control,
    communication, computers, and intelligence rely. Our networks must
    remain impervious to cyber intrusion or effect; the DPRK demonstrates
    increasing cyber capacity that must be matched and thwarted.
    Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets along with
    sensors capable of detecting a broad array of threats and activities
    provide the situational awareness that informs decision-making during
    both armistice conditions and crisis. We require persistent ISR that
    overcomes the inherent challenges of geography and allows for reliable
    operational indications and warning that prevents strategic
    miscalculation. Increasingly lethal capabilities, from the tactical to
    operational, are required for unquestioned power projection in a region
    with rapidly advancing competitors and adversaries. Our superiority in
    the air remains vitally important; our ability to rapidly counter
    aggression and defend South Korea relies upon dominant air power.
    Lastly, interoperability remains essential if we are to derive the
    benefits of joint and combined warfighting.
        We are making progress in each of these areas by working in close
    coordination with the Department of Defense, INDOPACOM, our South
    Korean ally, UN Sending States, the interagency, industry, and academic
    partners. I look forward to answering your questions concerning these
    initiatives and providing you with all relevant information required to
    inform this Committee's work.
                                   conclusion
        I remain confident that our four enduring priorities are correct in
    the short term: sustain and strengthen the Alliance, maintain the
    armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force. The central
    themes of my 90-day personal assessment will underpin my continued
    review of readiness in an ever-changing strategic environment and will
    help us remain focused on these priorities.
        The men and women, military and civilian alike, who serve within
    the UNC, CFC, and USFK have the tools required for success. They are
    highly motivated, capably armed, and well supported by their parent
    service, the Department of Defense, and this Committee. The force is
    sufficiently postured to deter aggression and defeat any adversary, if
    necessary. We continue to train at echelon to maintain the readiness
    required to translate a strong military posture into decisive victory
    on short notice.
        Our Alliance with the Republic of Korea remains ironclad and stands
    as a testament to our shared history of service and sacrifice. The
    combined strength of that alliance is formidable as our warriors embody
    our slogan--Katchi Kapshida (We go together)! As soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines of both nations make the daily sacrifices inherent
    to uniformed service, we strive to ensure we provide for them and their
    families. A well postured, ready, and nurtured force strikes fear in
    the heart of those who would challenge it.
        We are in a historic period on the Korean Peninsula. While the
    near-term future is unclear, the significance of this moment cannot be
    overstated. In the midst of dynamic change, UNC/CFC/USFK stands as a
    steadfast, stabilizing presence in the region. This has been the case
    for over 65 years and will continue into the decades ahead. I am proud
    to lead the men and women who carry on the noble work of generations
    past. I am confident that our actions--our readiness--directly
    contributes to the defense of the United States and the security of
    South Korea, while providing the credible military strength from which
    our distinguished diplomats can negotiate and advance lasting peace for
    the Korean peninsula and the region.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General. Let me first of all
    mention something that we've talked about quite a bit of times.
        You know, the American people are not really aware of the
    threats that we face. I think we all understand that. The
    problem with this is for us to have the proper priorities for
    our military, I think it's necessary for the American people to
    understand why we're having to do all of this. You still see
    things that are happening, that they still believe that we have
    the best of everything and nothing to worry about because
    that's how it's always been and so forth, but they don't
    realize how fast China has modernized and the problems that
    we're facing out there.
        Admiral Davidson, what do you think can be done? Our
    military has come forth--General Dunford, when he said, ``We
    have lost our qualitative and quantitative edge over the
    adversaries.'' Milley said, ``In terms of artillery, the Army
    is outranged and outgunned by our adversaries.''
        Same thing was true with Moran in talking about the Hornet
    Fleet. You know, I've been on the Senate and the House Armed
    Services Committee for many, many years. I don't ever remember
    a time when the military has come forth with the shot of
    realism like they have recently. I'd like to know, what can you
    guys do more to make the American people more aware of the
    threats that we face?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
    question. The advances made by China, especially, but the other
    threats I articulated in the region, Russia specifically in the
    21st century, have really been profound. While our Nation has
    been focused on the efforts of land wars in Southeast Asia,
    these advances have been basically unchecked with the economic
    power that China has brought to bear, and they have greatly
    advanced their capability truly in all domains.
        You mentioned space. What was essentially a handful of
    satellites at the turn of the century has now become hundreds
    of satellites--capabilities and communications and surveillance
    and reconnaissance and other capabilities in space. If I move
    it all the way down through air, they've now got fourth- and
    fifth-generation fighters, which were not there at the
    beginning of the century, and they have now advanced surface
    and submarine assets that they also did not enjoy at the turn
    of the century.
        The time to invest in these things is now. I'm quite
    encouraged by all the concepts that you've seen come forward
    from the services, from Multi-Domain Task Force to the
    distributed maritime operations, as well as the commitments and
    the profiles that the services have begun to make and being
    able to operate in these multi-domains where these advances
    have taken place.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I think you're right on that, but
    we're also seeing them rubbing our noses in it. We've not seen
    this before. Admiral Greenert wrote a recent paper that his
    Chinese counterpart, the head of the PLA [Chinese People's
    Liberation Army] Navy, was surprised that ``the United States
    did not have a more''--and I'm quoting now--``a more forceful
    reaction'' when China began its island building in 2013.
        They're actually talking about us. Where this is reflected
    is with our allies. Several of us on this Committee were in the
    South China Seas just a short while ago, and our allies, you
    know, they're almost looking at what's happening in the South
    China Seas, with the island building and all of that, as the
    Chinese preparing for World War III and, you know, which side
    are we going to be on?
        That's something that does bother me. I think, also, it's
    affecting a lot of the attitudes. I know that Xi Jinping said
    that he would not--and this is his quote--``abandon the use of
    force as a potential means of achieving the unification of
    Taiwan.''
        Now, what more can we do to try to overcome this attitude
    that's out there and is having an adverse effect on our allies?
    Any thoughts on that?
        Admiral Davidson. In the operational space, one of the
    things we've been able to do in just the last 5 months,
    Senator, is get our allies and partners to join us in the South
    China Sea. Not all of their operations are defined as freedom
    of navigation operations as we would define them, but their
    willingness to sail independently in there, to work with us on
    exercises demonstrates the international commitment to
    maintaining the freedom of those seas and airways. I think it's
    critically important to message China that it's not just the
    United States that is concerned about the freedom of the South
    China Seas, but indeed all nations. I expect allies and
    partners to continue to help here in the months ahead, both
    with some combined operations that we'll be executing, as well
    as some individual operations as well.
        One of the other factors that we're working on in the
    diplomatic space is to help ASEAN [Association of Southeast
    Asian Nations] in this discussion about Code of Conduct
    negotiations with China. China has essentially delivered a
    draft that dictates to those ASEAN nations when and where and
    who they would sail with in the South China Sea. Helping them
    protect the international freedoms of the seas and airspace
    that have been long established in maritime law that the United
    States and others have fought for over the centuries is quite
    important.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, well that's good.
        My time is expired, General Abrams, but I will have a
    question for the record having to do with South Korea and
    what's going on.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Abrams, there's been discussions about the cost of
    our forces on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump suggested a
    few times that it's expensive. These negotiations with the
    Special Measures Agreement seem to be more controversial than
    previous years and, interestingly enough, it's just for a term
    of 1 year, where typically it's a 5-year term, so we're going
    to be right back in the saddle of talking about supporting
    forces and the South Korean support for our forces on the
    peninsula.
        Can you talk about the significance of maintaining our
    force presence there? Is it critical or can we afford to draw
    down?
        General Abrams. Senator, our presence and our posture is
    appropriate in terms of providing an adequate deterrent against
    the DPRK. It provides a force structure in numbers and
    capability that's capable of responding to hostilities and
    provocations and prepared to defend the Republic of Korea if
    they are called upon. Our posture there also serves as a
    stabilizing factor, stability in Northeast Asia. It provides
    reassurance to not only the Republic of Korea, but to Japan and
    other partners in the region, and serves as a bulwark against
    the expansion of China, as Admiral Davidson just outlined. Our
    presence there serves multiple purposes.
        Senator Reed. One purpose I suspect also, too, is to give
    confidence to our allies, the South Koreans and the Japanese
    particularly. Would they be concerned if we drew down our
    forces in any way?
        General Abrams. Senator, I hesitate to speak on behalf of
    the Republic of Korea or Japan, but in my dealings with both of
    them I would say yes, they would be concerned if we were to do
    that.
        Senator Reed. One of the other aspects in this relationship
    between the South Koreans and Japanese is there is a long, long
    history there. There are at times some difficulties between
    that relationship. Can you characterize the relationship? I
    think many people assume it's just completely harmonious, but
    I've observed comments and issues in which there was some
    friction. Is that still the case?
        General Abrams. Senator, as you stated, there are long-term
    items of friction between those two countries. In my
    experience, it's difficult for Westerners to appreciate the
    breadth and depth of some of that tension as these are very old
    countries, ancient societies, and many of their tensions go
    back hundreds and hundreds of years. Occasionally, it flares up
    with misunderstandings between the two that are exacerbated by
    topics of the current day. Those only serve to re-inflame those
    old grievances.
        Having said that, militarily we continue to see cooperation
    and commitment on both sides because they both understand that
    there are much bigger concerns for them to worry about than
    some of their long-term friction points. They've got some
    mutual goals that they've got to work together on.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Davidson, again, thank you for your service, too.
    One of the proposals consistent with the National Defense
    Strategy that the Marine Corps is advancing is to occupy
    islands forward of their present position and use them not only
    to protect them from seizure by anyone, but also to help defend
    the fleets and our air forces operating in the region. Is that
    a concept that you support?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, all the services have put forth
    expeditionary concepts like that. They all have slightly
    different names--the EABO [Expeditionary Advanced Base
    Operations] concept, the Multi-Domain Task Force--but those are
    capabilities that I think serve a deterrent basis in the region
    and they're also fight-and-win capabilities that we may have to
    utilize in the future.
        Senator Reed. Let me just, in general, are you satisfied in
    terms of the weapons systems that you have available given what
    the Chinese, in particular, are developing so quickly? You
    alluded to them in your comments repeatedly--new generations of
    fighters, long-range precision missiles that threaten our
    carriers that 10, 15 years ago were not even on the--certainly
    not deployed. Are you satisfied you're getting kind of the
    weapons that can counter those weapons?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, we speak frequently about the
    erosion of our advantage in the theater, which is really the
    case here. China has seriously eroded that quantitative
    advantage--the number of assets that they have--but they're
    also eroding that qualitative advantage is what I'm talking to
    you about fourth- and fifth-generation. Are we now making
    progress, I think, in that budget? Yes. We do have the roots of
    some capabilities, many capabilities, that would be applicable
    in any warfare scenario as I see the future play out. But the
    investments, I think, need to come more rapidly, and we need to
    be willing to innovate to get there as well.
        There is much to be done in this space. I don't want to
    give the impression that last year's budget necessarily is
    putting us on the track to regain that advantage. On-time
    budgets and the kind of investments that we've been talking
    about in the Department for the 2020 and 2021 budget to come,
    which I haven't seen the final 2020 budget, I think are
    critically important to regaining that advantage.
        Senator Reed. Just a final comment. If there is a
    particular system that is being developed that you think that
    would be very applicable, but it's not being adapted by the
    services from your standpoint, both of you as combat
    commanders/field commanders, please let us know. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        During the course of this hearing, we are going to have
    some subjects come up that would be better addressed in a
    closed session. There will be a closed session at 2:30 this
    afternoon.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed has touched on an issue that is surprising to
    many of us and I believe that needs some more attention. He
    asked General Abrams about the worsening relations between two
    of our great allies, the Republic of Korea--South Korea, and
    Japan. I would submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, two
    articles; one from the February 9th Washington Post entitled
    ``Japan-South Korea ties worst in five decades as United States
    leaves alliance untended'' and also a February 10 article from
    The Nelson Report entitled ``Japan, ROK crisis gets worse.''
        [The information referred to follows:]

    japan-south korea ties `worst in five decades' as united states leaves
                               alliance untended
    By Simon Denyer
    February 9

        TOKYO--Leaders have turned their backs on each other. They have
    traded barbs. Military and business ties are fraying, and the media is
    up in arms.
        Relations between Japan and South Korea, the most important United
    States allies in the Asia-Pacific region, are unraveling fast. And
    while the leaders of both countries share the blame, the Trump
    administration has taken its eye off the ball, experts say. This has
    allowed spats to grow that could undermine United States efforts to
    sustain a coalition of Asian democracies and contain China.
        Japan ruled over South Korea from the beginning of the 20th Century
    until the end of World War II, and Seoul and Tokyo's complicated
    history has always loomed large in the background.
        But the rancor that has soured relations lately is among the worst
    in generations.
        ``The relationship between South Korea and Japan is suffering a
    compound fracture unprecedented in the five decades since the two
    countries established diplomatic relations,'' said Shin Kak-soo, a
    former South Korean ambassador to Japan.He added, ``The Trump
    administration did not pay attention to the alliance.''
        The rift came after a South Korean Supreme Court decision in
    October ordering a Japanese steel producer to compensate Korean workers
    forced into labor during Japanese colonial rule, but the root of the
    crisis runs much deeper and its effects have reverberated in all
    directions since.
        In November, South Korea shut down a foundation established to help
    care for the Korean women--more commonly known as ``comfort women''--
    who were forced into sexual slavery in Japanese military brothels
    during World War II. The foundation was funded by Japan as part of a
    2015 deal intended to put the issue to rest.
        [Japan's Abe stakes out new regional identity]
        Then Tokyo went public with accusations that a South Korean warship
    had locked its fire-control radar onto a Japanese patrol plane, a move
    seen as a precursor to actually firing.
        Seoul denied the accusation and countered with the charge that the
    Japanese plane had been flying dangerously low. Japan's conservative
    Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korea's liberal President Moon Jae-
    in come from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.
        In South Korea, Abe is an unpopular figure, seen as reluctant to
    express genuine remorse for Japan's behavior during its colonial rule
    over the peninsula.
        In Japan, Moon is seen as the latest in a long line of South Korean
    leaders who have exploited popular resentment of Japan to shore up
    their own flagging popularity and reneged on agreements reached by
    previous governments.
        Tokyo says the Supreme Court decision violates a 1965 deal
    establishing diplomatic relations, under which Japan gave South Korea
    much-needed economic aid as compensation for forced labor. But if Japan
    takes a legalistic position, then many South Koreans are more concerned
    with what they see as justice, said Shin. Moon himself was a human
    rights lawyer who once represented claimants in a case against
    Mitsubishi over forced labor.
        Liberals in South Korea tend to see the 1965 agreement as an
    unequal treaty imposed by Japan on a weak country still recovering from
    the ravages of war, led by military strongman Park Chung-hee, who
    trained in the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria during the final
    stages of World War II.
        To outsiders, the antipathy between the two countries--both free
    market democracies with close relationships to the West--can come as a
    surprise.
        But the tragedy of the current crisis, according to Yasushi Kudo of
    the Japanese think tank Genron NPO, is that this antipathy had been
    gradually subsiding, especially among young people, thanks in part to
    booming tourism and a mutual affinity for the other country's popular
    culture.
        A territorial dispute over a group of small islands, administered
    by South Korea but claimed by Japan, has also inflamed passions,
    notably when then-President Lee Myung-bak visited the islands in 2012.
        But the relationship is also complicated by the immense changes
    that have swept through South Korea over the past five decades, as the
    country has emerged from Japan's shadow to become a thriving democracy
    and economic powerhouse in its own right.
        South Korea grew up, and Japan never really accepted that,
    according to Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Tokyo's
    Sophia University.
        ``Many Japanese leaders are still caught up with a condescending,
    or even perhaps bordering on a racist, attitude toward South Korea as a
    smaller and less developed country,'' he said. ``There is this attitude
    among conservatives that, at the end of the day, we can bully Korea
    into submission.''
        South Korea, fiercely nationalistic in its own right, is far from
    overawed. In fact, it's preoccupied with other issues--its
    relationships with North Korea, the United States and China are today
    seen as more important than its relationship with Japan.
        Liberals in Seoul tend to place less value than conservatives on
    the alliance with the United States, and so less value on the
    triangular relationship with Japan, said Junya Nishino, director of
    contemporary Korean studies at Keio University in Tokyo.
        At home, though, both leaders are playing populist tunes, and the
    media in both countries is dancing to it.
        Nishino fears the situation is about to get worse. Despite
    tensions, the relationship was founded on strong ties between the two
    militaries, civil society contacts and extensive business and trade
    links.
        All three have suffered in the latest dispute.
        Former U.S. president Barack Obama played an important role in
    mending ties between the two countries earlier in the decade, arranging
    a trilateral summit in 2014 and brokering the comfort women agreement
    the following year. By contrast, Trump has shown much less interest in
    or affinity for America's Asian allies, experts in both countries said.
    The crisis is bad news for the United States, experts say, and
    undermines United States efforts to gather like-minded nations under
    the banner of a free and open Indo-Pacific and counter China's rising
    influence.
        However, it also undermines Japan's ``brand'' in Asia, Nakano said,
    with its ability to play a leading role in the region hobbled by its
    failure to resolve disputes over its wartime past, especially with a
    fellow democracy.
        ``Japan can't continue to have the influence it used to have in the
    region without getting along with Korea,'' he said. ``As a democracy,
    we were supposedly at the forefront of progress in Asia in the postwar
    period, but we are becoming more and more reactionary, a declining
    power.''

        Admiral Davidson, I don't want to spend the whole time on
    this, but General Abrams commented on it. This is a serious
    problem which potentially affects our ability to gain
    cooperation between our allies; is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. I think both nations recognize, Senator,
    that the future in the Indo-Pacific is going to require great
    democracies like Korea, Japan, the United States and others to
    work together here for the very long term.
        I can tell you, to the point about whether the alliance is
    being tended to, I've spoken to both the chiefs of defense in
    Korea and Japan in the last week. I will return a call to the
    chief of defense in Korea later this week. I've talked to both
    our ambassadors in the last week there, met with one of them--
    both of them, actually--personally. Much is going on to help
    facilitate our mutual concerns in the region and our alliances.
        Senator Wicker. Does State and DOD, do they both understand
    the seriousness of this deterioration, and are they both
    tending to it?
        Admiral Davidson. I would say the answer to that is yes,
    sir.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. Very good. That's, I think,
    surprising to hear and good to know there are efforts made.
        Now, after the USS Fitzgerald and McCain, tragic collisions
    resulting in fatalities and the loss of hundreds of millions of
    dollars, there were two investigations. Senator McCain and I
    introduced the Surface Warfare Enhancement Act asking that many
    of the recommendations of these investigations be implemented.
    This led to inclusion of most of our legislation in the Fiscal
    Year 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
        Are we on track to fully implement the Surface Warfare
    Enhancement Act? The reviews that caused so much concern were
    that demand for naval power was far outstripping the supply of
    ships and submarines. That was what led in part to these
    collisions and tragedies. What's the state of that imbalance
    today,
        Admiral Davidson, and what do you need compared to what you
    have now?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. I have been quite
    pleased with the progress that Navy has made on the
    recommendations that I made in the Comprehensive Review. I'll
    be watching the 2020 budget when it comes together. There are a
    couple of items in there, investment in schoolhouses, that I
    want to make sure are followed through on.
        I'm quite confident in Admiral Aquilino's approach to the
    OPTEMPO [Operating Tempo] out in Seventh Fleet right now. We've
    had the good fortune of being able to relieve some of the
    responsiveness based on the easing of some of the tensions on
    the peninsula, as well as reshuffling some of the priorities
    there in the region. He continues remediation efforts of the
    Seventh Fleet in terms of training and maintenance there in
    Yokosuka, particularly in the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, and so
    I'm quite pleased with how he's managing that force.
        Senator Wicker. Just to make sure, the previous NDAA placed
    a 355-ship requirement that the Navy had established as a
    statutory policy of the United States. Are you still committed
    to that 355-ship Navy and do you still view it as the statutory
    law of the land?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, in the Indo-Pacific region, I think
    we need more capacity in the maritime, to be sure. The Navy is
    undergoing another force structure review I think to look at
    that number again and affirm that for the Department.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    both for being here today and for your service to our country.
        General Abrams, North Korea transferred 55 boxes of remains
    of missing United States servicemen from the Korean War after
    the last summit between the President and Kim Jong-un. Can you
    tell me if we're still cooperating with the North Koreans on
    trying to return more missing servicemen? My understanding is
    we think about 5300 of the 7700 soldiers who are missing are
    believed to have died someplace in North Korea.
        General Abrams. Senator, the short answer is yes, we are. I
    am aware of the DPAA's [Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in
    Action Accounting Agency] efforts to continue dialogue with
    North Korea to move forward in execution of our solemn
    responsibility to do everything that we can to bring home our
    missing in action.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you know if that's on the agenda for
    the President's upcoming summit?
        General Abrams. Senator, I'm not aware specifically. I am
    aware that there is a commitment to continuing that dialogue
    that came out of the June summit, but I have not seen the
    specific agenda for this upcoming summit yet.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Admiral Davidson, our office was contacted by several
    United States employees who had been stationed at our embassy
    in China who have medical documentation to indicate that they
    are suffering from traumatic brain injury and the same symptoms
    that we saw from embassy personnel who were evacuated from
    Havana, Cuba.
        Are you aware of any Americans in China who have been
    affected by those same symptoms, and are you aware of any DOD
    personnel who have experienced the symptoms?
        Admiral Davidson. No, Senator, I am not.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        General Abrams, you talked about the DPRK currently
    engaging in very extensive military exercises and also about
    what we continue to do to train with the Republic of Korea. Do
    you believe it would be helpful to resume military exercises
    with the Republic of Korea?
        General Abrams. Senator, to be clear, there have been
    cancellations of some exercises that have been well publicized.
    But as I mentioned in my opening statement, at least since I've
    been there in November, we are continuing to train, conducting
    combined training and exercise, with our ROK counterparts. That
    is continuing unabated. But it's adjusted in accordance with
    some innovative things that we've done by adjusting size,
    scope, volume, and the timing so that we can continue to
    preserve space for Mr. Biegun and the Department of State to do
    their job.
        Senator Shaheen. Again, do you believe it would be helpful,
    in terms of our readiness, to resume the previous kinds of
    exercises?
        General Abrams. Senator, I have been given authority to
    continue planning for those type exercises typically
    characterized as large-scale exercises. Historically, we've
    conducted one in the spring and one in the summer, and I have
    continued planning for execution of one in the spring. I worked
    very closely with the ROK JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the
    ROK chairman himself in that new construct and have forwarded
    that up to the Department of Defense and received full support
    to continue with our planning.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Admiral Davidson, you talked about Russian influence in the
    Indo-Pacific area in your testimony, and you lay out some
    pretty extensive activities that the Russians are doing in your
    written testimony. Are we seeing the kind of cyber intrusions
    and disinformation from Russia in this area of operation that
    we've seen in Europe?
        Admiral Davidson. They are on the same scale, yes, ma'am. I
    would say though that their conventional activities, their air
    and maritime activities especially, are a little less than
    what's been going on in Europe.
        Senator Shaheen. Are we seeing any kind of an effort to
    destabilize the democracies, some of which are fragile, in that
    region?
        Admiral Davidson. Using cyber means?
        Senator Shaheen. Or disinformation, using whatever means
    they have available. Do we expect any kind of gray zone issues
    like we've seen in Ukraine and other parts of Eastern Europe?
        Admiral Davidson. Russia is maneuvering in the region, and
    I think globally, using information to subvert the
    international rules-based order and our objectives in the
    region.
        Senator Shaheen. Do we have a response to that in the same
    way that we have a response to what's going on in Europe?
        Admiral Davidson. I think, ma'am, that when we talk about
    an information campaign that's global, it is a global response
    that it takes, and the United States Indo-Pacific Command is a
    part of that global response, yes.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    and your continued service.
        General Abrams, let's dig down a little bit deeper into
    this training question. At what level would your troopers
    recognize a difference from what was happening, say, a year
    ago, to what's happening now? Would a new rifleman in his first
    tour on the Korean Peninsula notice a difference in his
    training level or the training exercises he conducts?
        General Abrams. No.
        Senator Cotton. A squad leader?
        General Abrams. No.
        Senator Cotton. Platoon leader?
        General Abrams. No.
        Senator Cotton. Company commander?
        General Abrams. No.
        Senator Cotton. Battalion commander?
        General Abrams. Senator, he has not noticed a difference
    yet, but he might in the upcoming months.
        Senator Cotton. Then, presumably, the command levels above
    battalion might notice a difference in the kind of exercises
    they conduct?
        General Abrams. Yes, within those four dials. They would--
    at that echelon, they would notice it.
        Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say that the commanders at
    that level, the full bird colonel level up to the General
    Abrams level, are pretty well versed in the demands of their
    job from their previous levels of command?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
        Senator Cotton. That's good to know.
        Admiral Davidson, the INDOPACOM is characterized by the
    longest distances in any of our combatant commands. I presume
    that places a premium on long-range precision strike for you
    and your forces?
        Admiral Davidson. It does, absolutely. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Currently, those are predominantly maritime
    and air based systems?
        Admiral Davidson. That's correct.
        Senator Cotton. There's been a lot of news coverage
    recently about the President's decision--long overdue, in my
    opinion--to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty [INF Treaty], and it's focused, understandably, on what
    it means for Europe and Russia since that was a treaty between
    the United States and Russia back when it was the Soviet Union.
    But what does it mean for you and your theater to have the
    prospect of intermediate-range missiles available for ground
    basing.
        Admiral Davidson. China, since they are not party to the
    INF Treaty, has been investing in the kind of weapons that
    create a serious challenge to us. Over 95 percent of their
    ballistic missiles would not be permitted under the INF Treaty.
    For us to have a land-based component with that kind of
    capability restores maneuver to the force, meaning it'll make
    the air, the maritime, and the land component much more viable
    in any warfare scenario and present a much greater challenge
    for our adversaries to threaten.
        Senator Cotton. All those land-based systems are presumably
    cheaper, easier to operate since they just sit there on land,
    they don't have to move around on a ship or an aircraft all the
    time?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, one of the things that will be
    required, Senator, is mobility out of those assets. I think
    land-based assets will be that way. In this day and age, if it
    is fixed on the planet, it is dead. You don't even need space
    assets to support that. The globe has been mapped and a
    ballistic missile can find its way there based on its own
    internal targeting. We would have to have some mobility in
    those land-based assets.
        Senator Cotton. Your counterparts sitting in the People's
    Liberation Army, do you think it makes them happy that you may
    soon have land-based missiles that can reach intermediate
    ranges?
        Admiral Davidson. No, I think it makes them unhappy.
        Senator Cotton. General Abrams, what about your
    counterparts in North Korea; do you think they're happy or
    unhappy that they may soon face land-based intermediate-range
    missiles?
        General Abrams. I can't characterize whether they're happy
    or not, but I'm certain that it makes them very nervous and it
    is certainly changing their calculus.
        Senator Cotton. Complicates their planning.
        General Abrams. Absolutely.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Gentlemen--well, I'll address this to
    Admiral Davidson. You can reserve specific details for our
    closed session, but one point of criticism we've heard is that
    we may not have places to base these systems. As you point out,
    they're mobile, they're not often much bigger than a tractor-
    trailer. Do you think we'll be able to identify places in the
    INDOPACOM where we can base land-based intermediate-range
    missiles?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I think they'll be viable
    assets for us, but it's probably a conversation better to have
    in closed session.
        Senator Cotton. We'll talk about that in greater detail
    this afternoon. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the
    witnesses.
        I want to ask a question about North Korea and then about
    China. On North Korea, I'm struck by the fact that as a member
    of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we have
    still not had a briefing about any details about commitments
    that were made in the Singapore summit, which was nearly a year
    ago, in either of the Committees.
        I note, General Abrams, your testimony, and I just want to
    read it, ``I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no
    verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional
    and asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United
    States, South Korea, and our regional allies at risk.''
        What I'm looking for is what real evidence is there of any
    changed trajectory on behalf of North Korea? I applaud the
    President, actually, for having the dialogue with North Korea
    leadership. Dialogue guarantees nothing, but the absence of
    dialogue often guarantees a bad outcome. I appreciate dialogue.
    But what I'm looking for is what is the evidence that we would
    want to see to determine that North Korea is serious about
    denuclearization?
        In the Foreign Relations Committee, the testimony we've
    received pretty consistently is the evidence that shows they're
    serious is if they agree to provide some kind of inventory of
    their nuclear assets. Until there is transparency and
    disclosure, we have no reason to believe they're serious. If
    there is transparency and disclosure, they might be serious.
    That would be sort of the first step to show they're serious;
    more work to be done, obviously.
        To this point, February 12, 2019, are you aware of any
    commitment that North Korea has made to provide an inventory of
    nuclear infrastructure or assets that they have?
        General Abrams. Senator, I am not aware of that.
        Senator Kaine. Admiral Davidson, are you aware of any?
        Admiral Davidson. No, I'm not.
        Senator Kaine. That's what we really need to see coming out
    of a next summit in Vietnam, or hopefully soon. Until we see
    it, I think this issue about no verifiable progress, we have to
    be skeptical. North Korea has made promises in the past,
    they've been willing to talk in the past, but the question of
    what shows progress, we've got to see some willingness to
    disclose. Let me move to China.
        Admiral Davidson, you talked a little bit about, in your
    testimony and in response to some of the questions, that some
    nations are starting to realize that China may seem friendly up
    front, they may have assets and resources to offer up front,
    but the terms kind of overly debt-burdening. Nations like Sri
    Lanka and others have started to appear very onerous. Malaysia
    has canceled projects and basically has criticized China's way
    of dealing with them as sort of a new form of colonialism.
        We hear this all over the world, not just in Asia--we hear
    it in South America, we hear it in Africa--that the strings
    attached to Chinese assistance, up front they may seem fine,
    but they start to really chafe, and nations are starting to be
    wary. But you can't fight something with nothing. If China is
    there promising resources, a lot of the military posture of the
    United States does also involve what soft power we bring to the
    table to try to encourage nations to not accept the sugar-high
    promise up front only to regret it later.
        What would your advice to us be, not just as Armed Services
    Members, but we're on all kinds of other committees as well,
    what would your advice to us be in terms of the kinds of
    additional focus the United States should be offering in the
    INDOPACOM area to try to wean nations away from over-reliance
    on this dangerous Chinese strategy of kind of getting claws in
    other nations?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think when we look back in
    history, I think it will look very kindly on the passage of the
    BUILD [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
    Development] Act here last fall. The transition from OPIC
    [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] to the Development
    Finance Corporation, the consolidation of some independent
    foreign financing mechanisms in the country, the doubling of
    the investment, the freeing of private investment, these are
    critically important efforts. When we talk about whole-of-
    government, that's the kind of thing that we're talking about.
        The other key factor is----
        Senator Kaine. Just, BUILD Act, if anybody wonders if
    Congress can do things bipartisan, very bipartisan, really was
    to try to amass the governmental resources but also enable them
    to better attract private resources so if we go into nations in
    your or any part of the world, we have more to offer to counter
    the Chinese strategy.
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. We're also working quite
    closely with allies and partners in the region--Australia, New
    Zealand, Japan, especially--particularly in some of the areas
    that are in key competition with China. Leveraging their
    investments and their interests, I think, on this will be
    critically important for the free and open Indo-Pacific as
    well.
        Then I'd say lastly, right now, the Indo-Pacific Command
    gets just a small portion of the foreign military financing;
    really, less than 5 percent of that overall. We need to take a
    look at where we can better port that money in the region to
    help compete in this whole-of-government environs that we're
    talking about.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you both for your service to our country.
        Admiral Davidson, you indicated in your opening statement
    that there was not just China as a threat or the Republic of
    North Korea, but you also indicated that Russia was playing a
    role. Could you expand on that just a little bit and explain to
    us where you see them and what their role is today and how they
    make an impact?
        Admiral Davidson. It's not unlike what's happening in the
    Atlantic in Europe. They're certainly engaging in the region
    diplomatically and in the information space to act as a
    spoiler, really to undermine the rules-based international
    order. They're doing almost nothing to help sanctions with
    North Korea. I can't say that they're specifically opposed to
    them in this forum, I mean actively opposing them, but they are
    doing little to help there.
        One of the key things that occurred last fall is they ran a
    combined portion of their very major exercise, Vostok, in 2018.
    They invited the Chinese to attend that as well, which I think
    is also problematic in signaling to the region.
        Senator Rounds. If you were to look at their activity
    within the cyber realm, within the domain, are they active with
    regard to cyber activity, actively involved in cyber activity
    in the Indo-Pacific region?
        Admiral Davidson. You know, that capability that Russia has
    is a global threat, sir.
        Senator Rounds. With regard to ISR [Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], you have some resources. I
    would assume, as all commanders would suggest, you could use a
    lot more. Do you see any activity or improvements, and can you
    expand a little bit on the discussion of ISR threats to our
    well-being and to the safety and security of our forces in your
    region by all three--Korea, China, and Russia?
        Admiral Davidson. ISR is a critical need in the region,
    sir. Less than half of my requirements are served by the ISR
    that's available the region. Some of that will be investment
    over time. Some of it is the balance globally between the
    combatant commanders, what's required to facilitate our overall
    interests in those regions. I'm thankful for some of the tools
    that Congress has given. There is a contracting tool that was
    activated last year and I'm in conversation with the Department
    of Defense to see if I can gain some of those assets, and I'm
    grateful for that.
        Senator Rounds. General Abrams, same question with regard
    to ISR. How do you see your ISR capabilities as compared with
    that of the anticipated adversary in this particular case?
        General Abrams. Senator, our ISR capability--well first
    off, it outpaces the DPRK's. But that should not change our own
    commitment in terms of calculus because our ISR is what gives
    us not just intelligence, but really, early warning. It
    provides us clarity so that we can begin to see early and with
    some clarity and conciseness so we can prevent miscalculation
    on either our part or their part. That's really the importance
    behind the ISR requirements that we have on the peninsula.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Admiral Davidson, with regard to our allies in the region,
    and we have a number of them there, could you sum up for us, if
    they were expressing concerns to you about our commitment to
    the region, could you share with us what you believe their
    thoughts are with regard to our commitment to the Indo-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Davidson. I think certainly in conversations with
    my counterparts, sir, there's been a general convergence around
    the idea that a free and open Indo-Pacific is going to take all
    of our efforts working together. I think the United States'
    commitment in a variety of operations, whether it's our freedom
    of navigation operations in the South China Sea, our total
    totality of the exercise program in the United States, the
    assistance that we provide to partners in addition to allies,
    and then the commitment that our allies understand in the basis
    of our treaty alliances and our support to those treaties, I
    think, is unquestioned.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
    for your service.
        General Abrams, the United States-Republic of Korea
    military exercises, they've been scaled back or canceled as
    part of a wider diplomatic effort to ease tensions with North
    Korea and push them towards denuclearization. What is your
    confidence level that the talks with North Koreans over
    denuclearization will make any improvements?
        General Abrams. Senator, a couple of data points.
        First off, today is day 440 since the last strategic
    provocation from the DPRK, the last time since we've had a
    missile flight test or a nuclear weapons test. As I mentioned
    in my opening statement, the reduction in the tension on the
    peninsula, it's palpable. If you have not been on the peninsula
    in a while, along the DMZ there has been significant reduction
    that has enabled nation confidence-building measures, it has
    increased prevention--I should say it's decreased the chance of
    mistakes, miscalculation, and it's continued to preserve space
    for the main effort, the Department of State to continue along
    this road of negotiations and discussion with the DPRK.
        I think my personal opinion is the announcement of a second
    summit between President Trump and the supreme leader Kim is a
    positive sign of continued dialogue because it certainly beats
    the alternative of what we were living with in 2017.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Davidson, you stated in your confirmation hearing
    that China is already capable of controlling the South China
    Sea in any scenario short of war with the United States. So my
    question would be what's stopping them right now from
    exercising this capability whenever they feel like it, and what
    are we as the United States or our allies in the region doing
    to continually discourage them from exercising this power?
        Admiral Davidson. One of the things that I think has set
    them back was the international community coming together in
    the South China Sea here in about the beginning of September
    time frame. We've had allies and partners in the region, the
    UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, all in one
    form or another step up their operations in the South China
    Sea, and I think that shows the international community's
    willingness to push back.
        Senator Manchin. Sir, do we currently have the logistical
    capability to surge necessary combat power to the Indo-Pacific
    region if needed to combat Chinese aggression?
        Admiral Davidson. Any discussion of the logistics and
    sustainment that's required depends on the total scale and
    scope of what might be happening. That's true both in our
    ability to defend it from sabotage, special operations attacks,
    you know, conventional maritime and air attacks, as well as
    cyber attacks that might disrupt our logistics networks and
    prevent all those assets from arriving.
        One of the other key needs for the region, sir, is--and
    you're hearing this from other combat commanders as well as the
    services--is the need to recapitalize our sealift fleet. It is
    decades old now and needs to be replaced nearly desperately.
        Senator Manchin. Also, according to the World Economic
    Forum, by 2030, your AOR [Area of Responsibility] will be home
    to many of the world's mega-cities. This will continue to
    present vast complicated governance issues, and my fear is that
    these governments will look to an authoritarian China as a
    model over the United States.
        The question would be, from the military perspective, what
    are some meaningful steps that can be taken to help leaders in
    India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines so that they don't
    start looking at authoritarianism as the way to go?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, I think one of the things that we
    can do is to continue our whole-of-government approach on a
    free and open Indo-Pacific. We have a burgeoning relationship
    with India. We've made significant defense progress on that
    relationship just in the last year with the cosigning of the
    COMCASA [Communications, Compatability and Security Agreement].
    We are working to operationalize that--it's essentially an IT
    [Information Technology]-sharing agreement--in a way that shows
    India the power of being able to link with us in a tactical
    sense and an operational sense as well.
        Committing to that rules-based international order and
    working to that free and open Indo-Pacific ends will attract
    these nations along with us. I can't imagine any country would
    be willing to have an international order led by a nation that
    has a closed and authoritarian internal order. It's just not to
    the benefit of any of us.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen,
    for being here today.
        We've seen a lot of discussion about China, North Korea, a
    revisionist China, and a nuclear North Korea. We also have
    extremist groups that exist within your regions, as well, with
    ties to ISIS and other types of terrorist groups.
        Admiral Davidson, I'd like to start with you. I understand
    that there are a couple of countries or a few countries out
    there, like Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, that operate
    under Compacts of Free Association. We have financial
    assistance that's provided through that, and we've talked about
    a number of different ways that we're cooperating with various
    countries, allies in the region.
        These Compacts of Free Association, some of them will be
    expiring in four to five years. Can you maybe talk us through
    why those are so important? What do we realize out of those
    types of compacts and should they be funded or should we allow
    them to expire?
        Admiral Davidson. In short, Senator, those compacts are the
    connective tissue between the United States and the physical
    air and maritime and terrestrial space to 60 percent of the
    world's economy. The compacts obligate us to defend those
    nations as we would defend ourselves. It also gives them some
    financial assurances and the ability to participate and work in
    our countries without immigrant classifications.
        I can tell you that these nations contribute way out of
    proportion to their population in our defense. I meet
    servicemembers from Palau and the Marshall Islands, all over
    the Indo-Pacific, and they have served quite bravely and
    honorably, in the last 15 years in Southwest Asia.
        Those compact agreements are going to expire in--at least
    the financial mechanism is going to expire in 2023, and 2024
    for Palau. I think the need for us to sustain those obligations
    is important because of the freedoms that it gives us. It
    allows us to keep any third-party nation from taking military,
    from occupying it, from them making a military agreement with
    them. It gives us the strategic flexibility to block that.
        The financial mechanisms are going to expire in the 2023/
    2024 time frame. But the fact of the matter is these nations
    are at risk from the very pernicious approach that China has
    taken with their economic vehicles in the region. To prevent
    that from happening, we should look at the long-term need on
    those COFA states, what the financial mechanisms are that
    retain this strategic alliance for us and the benefits that it
    accrues to the United States military and, truly, the defense
    to the United States. Without those three countries and our
    strategic alliance, the logistics and sustainment of our
    operations in the Western Pacific would be severed.
        Senator Ernst. So bottom line, those agreements are very
    important, correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst. Outstanding. That's a great explanation. I
    appreciate that very much.
        General Abrams, in looking at the threat that's been talked
    about with North Korea, I also want to talk about North Korea's
    special forces, their special operations forces. They presented
    a tactical operational threat to South Korea and the role of
    our own special operators in countering that threat. Could you
    maybe just briefly describe the threat that is being posed by
    North Korean special operators?
        General Abrams. Senator, thank you. In this unclassified
    setting, here's what I can say. Since Kim Jong-un assumed
    responsibility for leading his regime, this has been one of his
    specific investments in terms of increasing the size and
    capability of his special operations forces, and secondly, they
    spend a considerable amount of time doing training. I'm happy
    to give you more detail in the classified session.
        Senator Ernst. We can talk about that later, and I
    appreciate that very much. Are we integrating our own special
    operators to specifically train to push back on the North
    Korean special operators?
        General Abrams. Senator, we are. We have a very small
    Special Operations Command Korea, but extraordinarily capable.
    They punch way above their weight class. We're lucky; we're
    fortunate enough to have a rotational U.S. Army Special Forces
    ODB [Operational Detachment-Bravo]. So for instance, today on
    the peninsula, we have five ODAs' [Operational Detachment
    Alpha] persistent presence embedded with ROK-SOF [Republic of
    Korea Special Operations Forces] training and partnering every
    single day.
        Senator Ernst. That's outstanding. My time has expired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We hear a lot of testimony in this Committee about the
    threats posed by China, Russia, rogue states, transnational
    terrorist groups. A strong military is critical to addressing
    those challenges, but there's some threats that can't be solved
    by traditional military power at all. One of those is climate
    change.
        The unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the
    director of national intelligence said, and I'm going to quote
    here, ``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as
    well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for
    resources, economic distress, and social discontent through
    2019 and beyond.'' That assessment also said, ``Damage to
    communication, energy, and transportation infrastructure could
    affect low-lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and
    cause human displacement and loss of life.''
        Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence
    community's assessment of the climate change threat?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. How does climate change impact operations
    in your area of responsibility and what are you doing to
    prepare for climate change?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, the immediate manifestation, ma'am,
    is the number of ecological disaster events that are happening.
    I've just wrapped up after some 3\1/2\-months of assistance in
    Tinian and Saipan, a contribution of title 10 forces in
    significant numbers, to help clear debris, to help fix roofs,
    to help restore the infrastructure there writ large.
        I've also been called to respond and assist in Indonesia in
    the wake of the earthquake and the tsunami that happened last
    year. A little separate from climate change. But our assistance
    in terms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, our
    ability to command and control, to marshal troops, to deliver
    logistics is important training for the region and something
    that they all need. One of the things that my headquarters does
    is we run a center for excellence in disaster management. That
    training is available not just to the title 10 folks but also
    our interagency here in the United States, and we export those
    courses, as well, to countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and,
    really, globally, to help assist them in these matters.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, adapting to climate
    change impacts our military readiness. I'm glad that our
    military commanders take the threat of climate change
    seriously. I think we, your civilian leaders, owe it to you to
    enact policies here in Congress that recognize that climate
    change is happening and that we need to do more to stop it. So
    thank you. I appreciate it, Admiral.
        I want to, in my remaining time, ask about one other area.
    In this Committee, we also talk a lot about strategic
    competition between the United States, China, and Russia. I
    want to focus on China for just a minute.
        China is challenging the United States and our interests in
    a variety of domains. Our intelligence community's unclassified
    Worldwide Threat Assessment said, and I'm going to quote again,
    ``China's leaders will try to extend the country's global,
    economic, political, and military reach while using China's
    military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy
    investments to diminish United States influence.''
        Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence
    community's assessment on this?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am, I do.
        Senator Warren. Well, in a recent hearing, a former deputy
    of national security advisor and State Department official
    responsible for China policy, Ely Ratner, told this Committee
    that regardless of whether we're talking about Chinese economic
    coercion, human rights, or the South China Sea, the United
    States needs a comprehensive strategy that enhances all aspects
    of our competitiveness. We can't pick just one strategy--
    military or economics or technology or diplomacy--and hope that
    that's going to be the silver bullet.
        Admiral Davidson, do you agree with that?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, I do. It's going to take a whole-of-
    government approach.
        Senator Warren. Can you just say a word more about that
    quickly--we're about to run out of time--about why it's
    important to use all of our tools of national power and not
    just military power?
        Admiral Davidson. I speak quite frequently in the region
    about this, madam, and one of the things that competes so
    strongly for the United States in the region is our values.
    Whether they're allies, partners, or nations that merely aspire
    to have the values that we have, they compete in a more
    pronounced manner than any handful of dollars ever could. But
    it has to be proactive, and we have to move out in the
    diplomatic and the information space, as well as the economic
    space, quite briskly because China is spreading dollars around
    very perniciously through corruption, through the mechanisms
    that you talked about earlier, and we've got to be willing to
    work in these other realms.
        Senator Warren. Yes, and to project our power abroad, we
    have to be strong here at home. Military power is important,
    but we need strong, sustained investments in education, in
    research, and other domestic priorities if we are going to
    maintain a competitive advantage.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Could each of you give us your thoughts on
    what the Congress could do to help you better fulfill your
    missions? What do you need from us?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, the support we've had the last 2
    years have been incredible. Having those budgets administered
    on the 1st of October so they can be executed is critically
    important to the efficiency of the Department of Defense and
    the execution of all the things that we do, from contracting to
    steaming on a day-to-day basis, to use my Navy parlance.
        The other thing we can do is lift the BCA caps. The threats
    that are out there challenge the sovereignty of the United
    States in a way that has not existed since the Cold War. The
    investments that are going to be required to do that, I think,
    are going to be significant.
        General Abrams. Senator, I'd like the opportunity to foot-
    stomp. In my view, the single most important thing is a timely
    appropriation. In my previous assignment as the Army's force
    provider for 3 years, I can't overstate the impact of a
    continuing resolution at every level. Most importantly, those
    that should have to worry about it least, we put it on their
    backs, and that's on soldiers and families, because we did not
    have a timely, on-time appropriation. That would be point
    number one.
        Point number two, I'd say for those programs that we have
    that have reached furthest along in their development and we
    have committed to them, that we have worked on for multiple
    years and are testing shows that it is capable and it's meeting
    those key requirements, continued support of those so that we
    can see them through. One in particular for me is in the
    missile-defense business, and this is one we are keen to. It's
    a key capability. We're grateful for the support of this
    Committee and the Congress. We just need to see it through.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Admiral Davidson, China has been a big supporter and a big,
    I guess lender, to Venezuela. Why is Venezuela of any strategic
    interest to China, and how is that helping them?
        Admiral Davidson. China is challenging and threatening the
    rules-based international order. It's not a regional thing for
    China; it's a global approach. Anywhere that they can make
    inroads on that international order, they will take it. They've
    been moving quite rapidly. I think as Admiral Faller indicated
    last week, in Southern Command as well.
        Senator Scott. Do you anticipate that they would use any
    military resources in Venezuela?
        Admiral Davidson. In the very near term, I don't think
    China would, no.
        Senator Scott. How reliable a partner do most of the
    democracies in Asia perceive America right now?
        Admiral Davidson. I think in our alliances, I think they're
    quite confident in those five treaty allies that we have there
    in the region. This is another area, though, that's under
    threat from China. China maneuvers in the information space in
    a way that undermines everything we do; factually,
    informationally, everywhere.
        Sir, when we all used to read newspapers every Sunday, you
    used to get up and you used to have the Parade magazine as a
    Sunday insert. Throughout the region, there is a China daily
    insert which is Chinese propaganda appearing in newspapers,
    over more than half the population of the globe. It's quite
    pernicious.
        Senator Scott. Are we doing anything to counteract that?
        Admiral Davidson. I would say in the information space we
    do more. We've talked about the BUILD Act, what we are doing in
    the military space. One of the key factors here is the fact
    that we're working with allies and partners in key areas of the
    region.
        You've seen Australia step up, and Papua-New Guinea
    recently, Fiji. New Zealand has made it clear that their very
    near-abroad is going to take some investment. We are working on
    an Indo-Pacific strategy with Japan and looking for
    opportunities of where our economic investments can cooperate
    and collaborate. In just my space alone, just last week we had
    a trilateral at the planning level between Japan, the
    Philippines, and the United States. These are all constructs
    that will help combat China's influence. Senator Scott. Thank
    you, and thanks for your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, both for being here today and for your service.
        Admiral Davidson, I'd like to ask you a little bit about
    the freedom of navigation operations that we have in the South
    China Sea. I know that there were some that occurred back in
    January and even, if I'm not mistaken, this past Sunday there
    was a couple of our fleet near the Spratly Islands. In
    response, the Chinese foreign minister has accused the United
    States of trespassing, infringing on China's sovereignty, and
    damaging regional peace, security, and order, even though it is
    my understanding these operations are going on in international
    waters.
        With that, I think it's important that we continue these.
    But what's not clear to me is how we're resolving the conflict
    between China's stance on these, on our operations, and the
    international community. Are you aware of any conversations or
    discussions that are taking place on this specific issue, and,
    you know, can you talk about contingency plans? Obviously a lot
    of saber rattling can lead to some bad consequences. Are there
    contingency plans if the impasse continues this way?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, to your last point about contingency
    plans, I'd rather hold that for the closed hearing, if I could.
        Senator Jones. Certainly.
        Admiral Davidson. To be clear, not all our freedom of
    navigation operations happen in international waters. Sometimes
    they happen in disputed waters, which was the case this past
    weekend--I won't comment on every one--but was the case this
    past weekend. Other nations lay claim to those waters. Then the
    legal construct of what those features are dictate as to
    whether we can operate and how close we can operate them and in
    what mode, whether it's solely innocent passage, which is the
    way any ship would move through the region, or whether normal
    operations that military assets could use would be effective.
        I'd also like to hold off on a discussion about the
    rhetoric that China responds with in the wake of these
    operations. But I will say this. The vast, vast majority of
    interactions in the South China Sea, that China responds
    professionally and safely.
        These operations are critically important, not for the
    United States, and they're not about two destroyers passing
    safely in this region. This is about the free flow of
    communications. That's oil. That's trade. That's economic
    means. It means the cyber connectivities on the cables that
    travel under the South China Sea, which are deep and profound,
    coming out of Singapore. It includes the free passage of
    citizens between all the great nations of the world.
        If you're taking a flight from Singapore to San Francisco,
    from Sydney to Seoul, from Manila to Tokyo, you are flying over
    the South China Sea. Each time that happens, there is somebody
    with a surface-to-air missile and a Chinese soldier evaluating
    whether that traffic can go on a day-to-day basis. It's quite
    hazardous to the global security, and I think it's quite
    pernicious that China would take such action.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Abrams, let me ask you about, there's been a lot of
    discussion over the years and more recently about the transfer
    of the Combined Forces Command to the ROK. That's been
    discussed a lot. There are conditions, I think, that are out
    there. Can you talk a little bit about the transfer of command,
    what it might mean to the United States presence on the
    peninsula, and specifically, what it would mean to the forces,
    the manning levels that we have on the peninsula?
        General Abrams. Senator, we refer to it as conditions-based
    OPCON [Operational Control] transition. It was most recently
    ratified again in 2015 with the specific conditions that you
    outlined--there's three key areas. The Republic of Korea is
    making good progress towards meeting those conditions.
        This last set of consultative meetings that we had in
    October, there was a reaffirmation from then-Secretary Mattis
    and our brand new minister of defense for the Republic of Korea
    to look for opportunities to accelerate the conditions-based
    OPCON transition. I'm working very closely with the ROK
    chairman, General Park Han-ki, to do just that, look for
    opportunities, understanding that the conditions will have to
    be met. We're working on ways to ensure that we have a shared
    vision as to the way ahead.
        To your specific question about what is the potential
    impact to troop presence, that is not part of the equation for
    conditions-based OPCON transition. This is merely about putting
    a ROK commander, a Republic of Korea commander, in command of
    Combined Forces Command, that position that I currently serve
    in in one of my three positions on the peninsula.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
        Back to you, Admiral Davidson. You mentioned in your
    testimony some sanctions against North Korea, and there's some
    ongoing ship-to-ship transfers that take place primarily in the
    East China Sea. Can you tell me what's the biggest challenge
    that you have in investigating these ship-to-ship transfers,
    what have we done to maybe stop these, and particularly, is
    China involved? What role might China be playing in these
    transfers?
        Admiral Davidson. I should say to your last point, Senator,
    that China is neither helping nor hurting the effort at least
    in the maritime space.
        We have an ongoing multinational ISR and ship effort to
    disrupt refined oil that's going in by sea into North Korea.
    This requires a significant amount of network work to cut it
    off at the supply. The fact of the matter is that you're not
    going to deter the DPRK from pursuing fuel. They have to have
    it. They've been adapting their tactics as we've been adapting
    ours--adding ships, doing transfers in their own territorial
    waters or near their own shores and, occasionally, there have
    been some transfers in Chinese territorial waters.
        We are going to have to go after these things at the
    source. I've got partnership across the DOD, with cyber
    command, especially, to make sure that we understand what's
    happening so that we can disrupt these things at the source,
    refer providers, whether it's shippers, whether it's oil
    brokers, whether it's the oil companies themselves, notify the
    United Nations of those contributions, and then have them
    pursued both by State demarche and Treasury action to prevent
    their future transfers.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you both.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your
    exemplary service and for the service under your command.
    Admiral, it's a particular privilege to welcome you here as a
    native Missourian. We're very proud of you and very proud of
    your service. Thank you for what you do.
        You have a tough job, Admiral, as the commander of what the
    National Defense Strategy tells us is perhaps the decisive
    theater in our current set of priorities that we have,
    strategic priorities as a nation. I want to ask about some of
    the challenges that we're facing. Help us think, if you could,
    about the forward defense posture that the NDS tells us is
    absolutely critical for this AOR, and, if you could, tell us
    what you need from this Committee in order to ensure that we
    have the forward defense posture that is necessary in order to
    prevent a fait accompli in the South China Sea or in Taiwan.
        I just want to pick up on--Senator Manchin mentioned a
    little earlier about surging into the region, but of course we
    know from the NDS that our ability to surge into the region
    after aggression by China is difficult given China's A2/AD
    [Anti Access/Area Denial] capacities and capabilities. Could
    you tell us what is our progress in adopting that offense
    posture that we need in order to prevent a fait accompli and
    what you need from us to ensure that we get there?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Some of what we need to talk about I'd like to do in the
    closed hearing this afternoon. But in an unclassified sense,
    the NDS really asked me to lift my eyes and take a longer view
    of the region and how it's evolving. So much of our basing and
    rotation has been focused on what's been transpiring in
    Northeast Asia, not just in the last couple of years, but
    really over the last several decades.
        This is going to require us to revisit some of the places
    in which we operate and rotate forces, absolutely. It's going
    to require us to think about some places, if not bases in
    areas. We are in conversations with partners and allies about
    what some of the opportunities might be there. But it also
    speaks to concepts, the kind of capabilities that we can bring
    forth, and what you're seeing, new concepts from the services,
    Multi-Domain Task Force operations, distributed maritime
    operations, and the logistics that are going to be required to
    supply that. There is going to be requirements for investments
    across all domains, from the bottom of the sea to space. We
    have to accept the fact that the environment is changing so
    drastically in the South China Sea that it's going to require
    new approaches in many cases and not just iterative ones.
        Senator Hawley. Just to be clear, the level of investment
    that we have seen in these force capabilities and technologies
    over the past 5 years has not been adequate to the challenges
    that we face; is that fair to say?
        Admiral Davidson. I think that's correct.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you in the time I have
    remaining, and I want to come back to the subject, the subject
    we were just talking about, in a closed session, but let me ask
    about the Philippines, if I could. Given, again, our unique
    strategic challenges in your AOR and the significance of the
    Philippines to us in order to meet those strategic challenges,
    let me ask you just about your sense of our relationship there.
        I know that last fall, I think it was, we announced a new
    agreement to hold an increased number of exercises this year in
    2019 instead of 2018, but President Duterte has also announced
    plans for joint oil and gas exploration with China and has made
    other entrees to China. Can you give us an assessment of the
    state of the bilateral relationship and what direction you
    think it's heading for this critical ally in this region?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think the relationship is trending
    in a positive direction. I can tell you in the military space,
    since 2017 when we were able to manifest some of our indirect
    assistance to their fight in Marawi, it has restored the
    military relationship in a way we haven't seen in a couple of
    decades. It has led, in fact, to things like the EDCA [Enhanced
    Defense Cooperation Agreement] as well as the advancement in
    the exercises here in 2018 and 2019.
        There is no doubt that at the political level, some of the
    relationship has been politically fractious. But I take as a
    positive sign the vagueness of the agreements that President
    Duterte signed with President Xi last fall. I think we should
    take a little bit of comfort in that, that we can continue to
    advance this relationship moving forward. Senator Hawley. Let
    me just ask you one other question about that in my time
    remaining. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is a
    flashpoint, as it has been for some time, but political
    leadership in the Philippines has been talking about it a lot
    more it seems recently, including saying that they may need to
    review it and consider leaving it if the United States does not
    make various security commitments related to the South China
    Sea.
        Can I just ask you what a review by the Philippines and
    potential departure of the MDT might mean for us and our
    relationship with them and our strategic posture in your AOR?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. That's been reported
    pretty widely. I think what's been absent from that discussion
    is some of the context in which the Philippine defense minister
    responded to some questions. But to me, the Mutual Defense
    Treaty is quite clear. It says that an armed attack on either
    of us, on the metropolitan territory or on the island
    territories under Philippine jurisdiction in the Pacific, where
    it's armed forces, our public vessels, or our aircraft,
    activates Article 5 of that treaty.
        I think the Philippines should be quite confident in our
    support and our alliance. I'll tell you, I'm quite confident in
    Philippine support, which--and frankly, in our defense, that
    support begins in the Philippines.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and also to the men and
    women under your command, and thank you for your clear-eyed
    testimony today, if I may use the word that you did, General
    Abrams, in describing what I view to be a stark and stunning
    lack of any action, any progress, any steps to slow or suspend
    the North Korean nuclear program. Would you agree with me that
    they are proceeding full pace with their nuclear program?
        General Abrams. Sir, I'd say two things. First, as I said
    earlier, it's been 440 days since the last strategic
    provocation from the DPRK, so since a missile test or a nuclear
    weapons explosion or test. The reduction in tensions and
    nascent confidence-building measures along the demilitarized
    zone and across that part of the Korean Peninsula, those
    reductions are palpable, they're real, and they are having a
    significant positive effect to begin to prevent additional low-
    level--additional confidence-building measures.
        Senator Blumenthal. But do you----
        General Abrams. Having said all that, we have not observed
    activity that's consistent with a full-court press on
    denuclearization.
        Senator Blumenthal. Or any slowing of the nuclear program.
    You said no verifiable progress, I believe.
        General Abrams. I'd say the activity we see is inconsistent
    with that. Senator, we can talk about that in detail during the
    closed session.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me ask you this. Because
    Admiral Davidson, you state, ``North Korea is continuing
    efforts to mitigate the effects of international sanctions and
    the United States-led pressure campaign.''
        I assume you would agree that sanctions are important in
    bringing pressure to bear on North Korea?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the
    effect of those sanctions so far as you know?
        Admiral Davidson. In many aspects, yes.
        Senator Blumenthal. Why is that?
        Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, can you restate your question?
        Senator Blumenthal. Yeah, I apologize for interrupting.
        Admiral Davidson. I want to make sure I understand the
    question you're asking me. Have sanctions taken some effect?
    Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal. That's a good question.
        Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, sir. It has. We do observe
    raised fuel prices in Korea. That's been evident really since
    before sanctions. The prices have gone up. There have been some
    restrictions on luxury goods and some other things in there.
    The impact and its ability to force them to denuclearize, it's
    tough to say whether that's making any progress.
        Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the
    effects of sanctions because of lack of consistent application
    of them, either by ourselves or by our allies or others?
        Admiral Davidson. No, we're on a sustained level of effort
    just on the ship-to-ship transfers realm. I stepped it up in
    the September time frame and expanded the concept of
    operations. We've had a number of allies come alongside to
    help--Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. Japan and
    Korea are sitting side-by-side with us in Yokosuka right now,
    working on this effort. I'm quite grateful for all the
    contributions they've made. I should add that UK has been there
    as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. In terms of our capabilities
    in that part of the world, I note that your testimony focuses
    on our undersea warfare advantages. Do you see those advantages
    are eroding, and how important is it that we continue to build
    submarines?
        Admiral Davidson. I think continuing to build submarines is
    critically important, sir. Our most significant advantage in
    all domains right now is in the subsurface. But some of those
    diversions I'd rather discuss in closed hearing, if you don't
    mind.
        Senator Blumenthal. Sure, and again, maybe more
    appropriately for a closed setting, although I think, really,
    the American people need to know answers to a lot of these
    questions. Our adversaries know the answers. We know the
    answers after we're briefed in closed sessions. The only ones
    who don't know the answers to many of these questions are the
    American people.
        I regret that so much has been kept from public view. Not
    to be critical at all of you or the Pentagon in that respect. I
    recognize that you operate under rules that may constrain you
    from talking publicly. But I hope we'll have an opportunity to
    explore in greater detail these questions and also the
    vulnerability of our aircraft carriers.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General,
    Admiral, good to see you. Thanks for your great service and
    thanks for being here today.
        Admiral Davidson, I wanted to begin just kind of making
    sure we have very, very clear understanding of what's going on
    in the South China Sea. I think it's pretty obvious, but just
    having you state this to the American people, to our allies in
    the Asia-Pacific.
        Standing next to President Obama in the Rose Garden in
    2015, President Xi Jinping said, ``China does not intend to
    pursue militarization of the South China Sea.'' That was a
    quote from the president of China next to the president of the
    United States.
        Just a few months ago in January, China's major state-run
    newspaper, the People's Daily, stated, ``As China's military
    size and quality improve, so does its control of the South
    China Sea. China is able to send more naval vessels as a
    response and can take steps like militarizing the islands.''
    This is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party.
        President Xi, obviously he didn't keep his word when he
    made that statement in the Rose Garden next to President Obama;
    is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. That's correct, sir. In the most liberal
    interpretation of militarizing those islands, China in April of
    2018 populated those islands with antiship cruise missiles,
    with surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jammers.
        Senator Sullivan. Ten-thousand-foot runways?
        Admiral Davidson. Those were already there. But now they
    have the weapons, they've got sufficient military cadre, and
    they've stepped up their operations both in the maritime and
    with bomber sorties and fighter sorties in a way that makes it
    clear that those islands are to support them militarily.
        Senator Sullivan. Just to be clear, 2015, two presidents,
    Rose Garden, and President Xi obviously didn't keep his word on
    that issue.
        Admiral Davidson. I agree with that. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate what you're doing in
    terms of regular FONOPs [Freedom of Navigation Operations] our
    allies. The more we can do, the more regular--the previous
    administration seemed to be a little reluctant to do these. I
    think you guys are doing a much better job, so I commend you
    for continuing to do that. The more we can bring our allies--a
    lot of talk about allies here--with regard to those FONOPs or
    some of the operations you described, the better.
        General Abrams, I wanted to turn to the issue that Senator
    Reed raised and just get your professional military views on
    what would be the tactical effects of removing a large portion,
    or all, of United States Forces from the Korean Peninsula?
        General Abrams. Senator, just for clarity, under the
    current set by the DPRK?
        Senator Sullivan. I'm talking about our forces----
        General Abrams. No, I understand. But nothing's changed on
    the North side of the MDL [Military Demarcation Line]?
        Senator Sullivan. Correct. Correct.
        General Abrams. It would impose significant tactical and
    operational risk if there's no change on the other side of the
    MDL.
        Senator Sullivan. Strategically, hasn't Russia and China
    sought the removal of United States Forces from the Korean
    Peninsula for decades as a core strategic goal of theirs?
        General Abrams. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. China and Russia and North Korea would be
    pleased by such a withdrawal?
        General Abrams. Again----
        Senator Sullivan. If, say, it happened tomorrow?
        General Abrams. There's actually some debate. You know----
        Senator Sullivan. Really?
        General Abrams. Yeah.
        Senator Sullivan. There's debate?
        General Abrams. There is some debate----
        Senator Sullivan. China wouldn't be happy that----
        General Abrams. No, sir; it's on the DPRK. There's some
    mixed views on whether the DPRK really wants us down.
        Senator Sullivan. How about China and Russia?
        General Abrams. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. You might recall we passed a law, the
    NDAA last year, that actually states that the significant
    removal of United States military forces from the Korean
    Peninsula will not be supported in terms of authorized
    appropriated funds by the Congress below 22,000 troops unless
    the secretary of defense first certifies to this Committee that
    it would be in the national interest of the United States to do
    so.
        I just want you to remind everybody who's working on that
    that that's actually in the law right now.
        Senator Sullivan. Finally, Admiral, I just wanted to touch
    base, and I think we can do it in a better sense in a
    classified setting this afternoon, but there is, I think, a lot
    of concern, and a lot of concern on this Committee, on the
    force posture of how our forces are deployed throughout the
    region to be ready for what is really kind of the big strategic
    challenge facing the United States, which is the rise of China
    over the next 50 to 100 years.
        I'll be interested in going into a lot more detail on the
    force posture issues, but I think there's a lot of good work
    that's been going on, but some of it seems to get stuck in the
    Pentagon. I would welcome your views on that. But I think we
    need to be a little bit more creative on how we're looking at
    force posture.
        I would want to remind you, and I know you know it, but
    Alaska is not necessarily in your AOR, but the forces there,
    which are significant, your Reserve forces, for example,
    General, on the Korean Peninsula, our OPCON to PACOM, and a lot
    of those forces are actually closer to the Korean Peninsula and
    other places than forces, say, in Australia. Thank you very
    much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Davidson, are you familiar with the ProPublica
    publication this past week on the analysis of the
    accountability for the collisions with the McCain and the
    Fitzgerald?
        Admiral Davidson. I saw the first article, Senator.
        Senator King. There's, I believe, a second one. I commend
    it to you. It's one of the most sobering analyses of a disaster
    that I've ever seen. It takes responsibility all the way up
    through the very top of the Navy to this Congress, I should
    say. Sequestration in 2013 was one of the contributors.
        But I would like, if you could--and perhaps I'll prepare a
    question for the record--I would like to see specific data on
    where we stand with issues like certification of sailors and
    personnel on the ships, maintenance status of the ships,
    training rules, staffing levels. I want real numbers. I don't
    want general ``we're working on staffing'' or ``we're working
    on more training.'' Because these were avoidable tragedies. I
    would like to drill down on the specific data points that
    indicate the level of readiness for these, for our fleet
    generally, the Seventh Fleet and other naval assets in the
    region.
        Is that something that you can do? You're the handiest,
    highest naval officer I have here today. I don't mean to say
    that you have to be the specific one to respond, but I would
    like to see specific responses from the Navy, not promises and
    not good feelings. This was a--this story is terrible.
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could, a couple of points. One,
    there's a quarterly review that was provided over here to the
    professional staff members by the Vice Chief, Admiral Moran.
    All those numbers are available.
        The idea that there's not transparency in this readiness I
    think is appalling, or that it was some kind of secret or that
    only a few knew about it in the Navy is incorrect. I personally
    testified before the House Seapower and Personnel Subcommittees
    with Chairman Thornberry there in 2016 on the kind of things
    that it took, you know, to keep the fleet going.
        We can't forget one other thing. These two collisions were
    a tragedy. There's no doubt about it. All the senior leadership
    of the Navy feels an immense amount of accountability for that,
    and I'll come back to it. But the fact of the matter is 280-odd
    other ships weren't having collisions. More than a dozen of
    those ships were performing exceptionally well----
        Senator King. I'm sorry, that doesn't----
        Admiral Davidson. Excuse me, Senator.
        Senator King. Airplanes are landing all over America, and
    just because they aren't all crashing doesn't mean they don't
    need a high level of maintenance. To tell me that isn't very
    convincing. I think it was 40 years since we've had collisions
    of this nature. Are you saying that there were no failures that
    led to these collisions because there were 280 ships that
    didn't have collisions? Isn't that the standard, no collisions?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. No collisions is the standard.
    Certainly it's been 40 years since we had lost life to that
    extent, but there had been collisions in the recent past.
        The other thing that we have to remark upon is the combat
    performance. We've had ships in the Red Sea shooting down
    antiship cruise missiles, we've had extraordinary Tomahawk
    performance in this time frame, we had aviation squadrons shoot
    down a MiG aircraft from Syria. You know, these units have been
    tested in combat and doing quite well.
        Senator King. I'm not suggesting otherwise. What I'm
    suggesting is--and I urge you to read that study--I'm
    suggesting that we had a preventable problem; there were
    multiple warnings, it wasn't acted upon, and I want to be
    reassured that it is being acted upon, and I'll be glad to
    review those reports.
        Admiral Davidson. But sir, this is why I'm saying the Navy
    feels a huge amount of accountability for this. They tasked me
    to review those two collisions, I produced a 170-page report
    with 58 recommendations, and the Navy has been moving out on
    those recommendations to provide the kind of unit personnel
    training, to provide advice and resources to the type
    commanders, the fleet commanders, the Naval Systems Command,
    all with recommendations to improve this situation in a way
    that eliminates the variance that I'm talking about.
        Senator King. I'm delighted to know that, and I've heard
    that before. I just want to see the data that backs up the fact
    that these recommendations are in fact being executed.
        Admiral Davidson. Okay. All right. I'll be sure to do it. I
    mentioned earlier in testimony, there are some recommendations
    in the Comprehensive Review that I made that I'm watching
    closely for the 2020 budget to make sure that they're
    accommodated as well.
        Senator King. I don't mean to imply--I said in my opening
    that the responsibility goes all the way up to this Congress.
    Continuing resolutions, which you talked about, are pointed out
    to be part of the problem, and the sequester was part of the
    problem. There's responsibility to go around. But I just, as I
    say, want to see where we are in terms of the data on executing
    on those recommendations. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for being here today, for your service to our
    country, for the testimony that you've prepared and presented
    to us, and for taking the time to take our questions here and
    again as we go into a closed session this afternoon.
        I thought it was so interesting this morning reading Wall
    Street Journal; there is a book review in the opinion section
    and it's on the future of Asia: ``The Future is Asian.'' It
    made me think a little bit about something we talked some about
    in this Committee. It is how the commercial complex and the
    military complex in China have a tendency to be one and the
    same. You see this reflected in their Belt and Road Initiative,
    the Thousand Talents Program, things of that. They even talk a
    little bit about building that dual-use sectors. This is
    something that is going to have an impact on their power in the
    coming years.
        There will be some of this that you can answer now and some
    we'll need to take up in a closed session, but one of the
    things, Admiral Davidson, that I think as you look at this from
    where you sit and you hear the term ``expanding the competitive
    space'' for China, how do you interpret that to your mission? I
    know Senator Hawley asked what your needs are going to be, what
    changes you need to see in the force.
        Then for you, and also, General Abrams, for you, when you
    look at the cyber capabilities that they are using to push
    themselves to information dominance, which would be a goal for
    them, how do you see that slowing our warfare activities and
    how would they use that as a force-multiplier for their
    conventional capabilities and use it to target the links and
    nodes in our mobility system?
        With that, I will give you the time, and thank you for
    your----
        Admiral Davidson. Quickly, ma'am, it is going to take a
    whole-of-government approach on our behalf as well. We talked a
    little bit earlier today about the kind of tools like the BUILD
    Act provides in this whole-of-government approach. I'm quite
    encouraged by all the concepts that are coming forth from those
    services. It's our obligation to knit that together in a war-
    fighting concept out there in the Indo-Pacific.
        It's going to require some investments and some
    capabilities that are, I would say, nascent in our country
    right now, and it's also going to require us to invest in a way
    across the region, the posture of how we are situated, and then
    some of the capabilities from the training apparatus and how
    that might support all this new capability that's coming
    online, as well as the way in which we share and collaborate
    with information with our allies and partners in the region to
    make this whole. But some of the specifics of all of this is
    better discussed in closed hearing.
        Senator Blackburn. Correct.
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you.
        General Abrams. Senator, I'd just like to talk a little bit
    specifics about cyber. As you mentioned, it's one of the key
    components in our interest of achieving information dominance.
        First and foremost, I'll tell you that the creation of U.S.
    Cyber Command has given us now the right level of command
    integration. He is a supporting commander to all of the
    combatant commands, and General Nakasone's done a fantastic job
    and I'm personally appreciative of all the efforts that he's
    done to support our efforts to integrate cyber as part of our
    holistic campaign on the peninsula.
        It is a critical capability. We're still working on getting
    the appropriate authorities delegated to the right level should
    we need them in a period of hostilities, and we can probably
    talk about that in greater detail during the closed session.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    both of you. General Abrams, good to see you again.
        Just as a mention, Senator Wicker asked you, Admiral, about
    the 355-ship Navy, and as you undergo a review of the
    appropriate number of ships for our Navy, I hope that that will
    be a continuing commitment for that number of ships at least,
    and also that we have the resources necessary to repair and
    maintain the ships we already have.
        The Defense Department recently released a 2019 Missile
    Defense Review, which, among other items, noted the
    installation of a Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, very
    important to us as a way to improve the performance of our
    current missile defense system and increase the protection of
    Hawaii.
        Admiral Davidson, are you satisfied that with the
    installation of the Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, the
    defense of Hawaii is optimized for the current and near-term
    threats?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. It fills in a gap in our
    detectability that I think is critically important not only to
    the defense of Hawaii, but really, the defense of all the
    continental United States as well, and Alaska.
        Senator Hirono. Of course I'd ask you to continue to pay
    attention to the timing of when the installation will occur. I
    think it's set for 2023 or somewhere in there.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. That's correct.
        Senator Hirono. General Abrams, do you believe that our
    current missile defense system in place in and around the
    Korean Peninsula serves as an effective deterrent against North
    Korean ballistic missile threat?
        General Abrams. Yes, I do.
        Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you noted in the
    testimony that your command only gets 5 percent of foreign
    military funds. What command gets the largest percentage of
    these funds?
        Admiral Davidson. I would say Central Command.
        Senator Hirono. Central Command?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. When you get only 5 percent of these funds,
    how do you prioritize with the small amount of funding, how do
    you prioritize where the funding goes in a region as large as
    your AOR?
        Admiral Davidson. My own approach is to make sure that
    where we're investing is complementary to our capability and
    also advances the capability of the countries in which we're
    providing this assistance.
        Senator Hirono. Getting only 5 percent of these funds in an
    area as large as yours seems like an underinvestment to me.
    Does this kind of underinvestment in a partner or potential
    partner with these funds provide an opportunity for China to
    increase its influence in these nations?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Both China and Russia.
        Senator Hirono. Who makes the decision as to the percentage
    of these funds that goes to all of our commands?
        Admiral Davidson. It's an interagency decision the way all
    these things come together, between Defense recommendations,
    State disbursements at the end of the day. I think as you
    examine the budgets that will be coming in the next few years,
    you'll see a shift in priority for Pacific Command.
        Senator Hirono. That's good news. Thank you.
        I'm glad that Senator Ernst asked you, Admiral Davidson,
    about the importance of our COFA and the fact that China is
    very much in these nations, Oceanic nations, to widen their
    influence and certainly their economic activities in this area.
    What more can we do as a whole-of-government approach to
    counter China's influence in Oceania?
        Admiral Davidson. We're continuing to work along those ends
    already, ma'am. I can tell you we're partnered with Australia,
    New Zealand, certainly on what I would call their very nearest-
    abroad. I think the United States feels an immense amount of
    responsibility for the COFA states themselves. You know, Japan
    has done a lot across Oceania. In just the last 3 months,
    France has made it clear that their interests--New Caledonia to
    Polynesia, the two bookends there, they want to be part of this
    conversation to make sure that our efforts are all working
    collaboratively and cooperatively.
        We've also stepped up our engagements, not just from Indo-
    Pacific Command, my own visits to the region, but we've helped
    to facilitate visits by the Department of Interior and attended
    some forums like the Pacific Island Forum on providing some
    assistance to make sure that the security in Palau for the
    Oceans Conference in 2020 is going to be sound as well. We have
    to step those things up additionally.
        Senator Hirono. I agree, because these are very small
    nation states. As you mentioned that the citizens of these
    compact nations can travel to our country to any state without
    a visa requirement, and they mainly come to Hawaii and they go
    to Guam. Whatever we can do to provide the kind of support for
    these citizens I think will be very much appreciated because I
    know they feel that we have not done quite what we should be
    doing with regard to their needs.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here. General Abrams, it's
    great to see you again. I appreciated all your hospitality and
    time that we spent together back when you were down at Fort
    Bragg.
        Admiral Davidson, I'll start with you because the subject
    of the 355-ship Navy has come up. To be honest with you, I'm
    not obsessed with a set number. In fact, I think it could be
    dangerous for us to say you've just got to check off until you
    get to 355 because I'm more concerned with capabilities. It
    would seem to me that over time, you're going to determine that
    we need more or less, depending upon how we match up against
    the increasing capabilities.
        Could you talk a little bit about how you could get to a
    point where you start describing the aggregate capacity of a
    355-ship Navy and that that may ultimately manifest itself in a
    very different footprint over the period of time that you could
    actually get to 355?
        Admiral Davidson. As I mentioned earlier, Senator, the
    chief of naval operations and the Navy, they've undertaken
    another force structure assessment, I think to get after
    precisely what you're talking about, make sure that they
    understand not only the capability mix of platforms themselves,
    but what the opportunity is for autonomous and unmanned
    vehicles as they come into this as well, and then how that
    might adjust those numbers going forward.
        Senator Tillis. Well I would think so, because I think if
    you take a look at the inherent cost and survivability with
    manned vessels versus unmanned vessels, the multiplier that you
    could get through relying on different platforms is something
    we should all look at. I get that there are supply chain issues
    and there are shipyards across the country that can see and
    touch and feel a target number for the number of ships that are
    going to be built in a given place, but I don't care about
    that. What I care about is projecting the maximum capabilities
    for the minimum cost based on what the experts believe is the
    best way to match up against the adversary.
        One other question for you. It has to do with the 58
    recommendations and the exchange that you had with Senator
    King. I'd be very curious when you respond to that, in terms of
    progress, the ones that require statutory action. I'd also be
    very curious to see, of the 58 recommendations, maybe why they
    were necessary based on a lack of funding or other factors that
    are clearly the responsibility of Congress at the end of the
    day, I believe rooted, and much of the problems are really
    congressional inaction or inconsistency with funding, being
    able to do something I know is very important to General
    Abrams, readiness, and I don't know how many times you chanted
    the mantra of readiness when you were down at Forces Com. But
    most of that's rooted in inaction or inconsistency on our part.
    We need to put a mirror down there when we're looking at those
    recommendations and recognizing the folks in suits caused a lot
    of those problems.
        General Abrams, you mentioned 440 days with respect to
    Korea in terms of any--we were at a point to where it seemed
    like every week we were watching a missile get launched or some
    sort of test being executed. On the one hand, we'll say that
    they're moving at the current pace and speed, but isn't it fair
    to say that if they're no longer launching missiles, some of
    which failed and they learn a lot from failed tests, they can
    accelerate their program; isn't it fair to say that just that
    lack of activity has had some impact on their rate of growth?
        I know we'll go in the closed session for specifics, but it
    just seems logical from the outside observer, not something we
    would discuss in the closed hearing, that that lack of outward
    activity, that data collection that comes from missile launches
    and tests, has to have some dampening effect on their rate of
    growth unless they've figured out how to do something in a test
    tube versus these ``when we test, it has to be perfect, we
    don't like to test and learn from failure, we want all of our
    tests to succeed.''
        There's an inherent cost in that. But it would seem to me
    that some of the benefit that North Korea was getting from that
    pace that they had up until about 440 days ago has diminished
    now that they're changing their approach. Would you agree with
    that?
        General Abrams. Senator, I'm not the expert on missile
    flight tests nor on nuclear weapons testing, but I have spoken
    to a number of them. It gets to a point in programs, and we can
    talk more about it this afternoon, that when you get to a
    certain point in that volume of testing that they did, and it's
    that point where the mature programs, if they are mature, then
    they can transition to simulation and modeling.
        Senator Tillis. They've captured enough to actually go to
    simulation.
        General Abrams. There's potential of that, Senator, and we
    can talk more about it this afternoon.
        Senator Tillis. Fair enough.
        Last thing. If you could tell me the progress you're
    making, we're talking about more extended deployments in Korea
    to create a work-life balance versus the 1-year iterations that
    we typically have. Have you made any progress on that?
        General Abrams. Senator, we have, and we're working very
    closely with the services to find the right balance so that we
    can do just that. We're looking at different force mixes as a
    possibility in the future to do exactly what you're talking
    about.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, we've already discussed throughout this hearing
    today the tyranny of distance in the Pacific and some of the
    challenges that we face. I myself grew up in Southeast Asia,
    living in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, so I am personally
    familiar with the tyranny of distances.
        You talked a little bit to, Admiral, the need for
    increasing our sealift capabilities. Could you discuss a little
    bit other requirements, such as airlift, heavy lift aircraft,
    that sort of thing, that we might need to plus up in order for
    you to be able to more efficiently and able to react more
    quickly to any type of changes in the situation in the pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, ma'am. I would just add, you
    know, one of the key areas we need to do is better cyber
    defenses of our logistics networks, which touch commercial
    industry so profoundly, both in terms that the people that we
    help contract for their support both in the United States, but
    overseas as well. Some of the inroads with ZTE and Huawei in
    some of these other countries are going to challenge our
    ability to use our existing logistics network without adapting
    it in a cyber sense moving forward.
        Senator Duckworth. Are you speaking to upgrading and
    improving the capabilities of organizations like TRANSCOM
    [United States Transportation Command] in addition to the cyber
    capabilities itself?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. TRANSCOM bears some
    responsibility for those networks that support their logistics
    operations; that's absolutely one of them. As you mentioned
    earlier, airlift is going to be critically important out there
    in the Indo-Pacific region.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        General Abrams, can you expand a little bit on the work
    we've done and the work that still needs to be done to ensure
    we have the necessary logistical tail to support United States
    Forces Korea in any contingency?
        General Abrams. Senator, there's been extensive investment
    by the services over the last couple years under the leadership
    of Chairman Dunford and then-Secretary Mattis to properly not
    only posture the force to improve our posture in terms of
    munitions and other key supplies to appropriate levels based on
    where we were in 2017, but also made the right investments now
    in the supply chains to be able to sustain that if we ever had
    to get to a point of hostilities.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Can both of you give me your brief assessments of how the
    recently-passed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (AKIA) will
    affect our relationship in the region and what more needs to be
    done to make sure it's effectively implemented?
        Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, Senator, could you repeat
    that? I apologize.
        Senator Duckworth. Sure, no worries. I'm the last
    questioner, so totally understandable.
        Can you speak a little bit about the recently-passed Asia
    Reassurance Initiative Act and how that will affect our
    relationships within the region? You know, the importance of
    our alliances in INDOPACOM, particularly Republic of Korea and
    Japan. I don't think it's something we stress enough.
        I think that the successes that we're having in the region
    diplomatically and politically really also stems from the fact
    that we have a solid alliance militarily between United States,
    Korea, and Japan, and that must remain strong in order for us
    to move forward on the other fronts.
        Admiral Davidson. I couldn't agree more, ma'am. We've
    talked frequently about the whole-of-government approach in the
    region, it can't just be in the military space, that we're
    competing out there. The ARIA Act is going to be one of the key
    vehicles in which to advance these relationships going forward.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. General?
        General Abrams. Senator, the only thing I'd add to that,
    specifically in Northeast Asia: no stronger allies than the
    Republic of Korea and Japan. So I absolutely agree with what
    Admiral Davidson said in terms of it's a whole-of-government
    approach that can only serve to strengthen those two great
    democracies as well as our own.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Finally, my last question. Admiral, could you speak a
    little bit to the role of the State Partnership Programs in
    terms of the forces and the work that you do in countries like
    the Philippines and the like and the availability of those
    troops to augment your Active Duty forces?
        Admiral Davidson. The State Partnership Programs not only
    in the Indo-Pacific Command region, but speaking for the other
    combatant commanders----
        Chairman Inhofe. Excuse me, Admiral. Before you answer,
    Senator Reed presiding. Go ahead.
        Admiral Davidson. Have been quite important to us building
    military-to-military relationships. The frequency at which
    those State Partnership Programs can touch some of these other
    nations is quite good, and we've been able in just the last few
    months to expand one of those State Partnership Programs in the
    Oceania region. I don't want to say where and who just yet
    because we haven't announced the final selection of who the
    State partner will be. But it's an area in which I'm looking to
    expand some relationships in the region as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Reed. [Presiding] Chairman Inhofe indicated that
    Senator King requested another question.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Abrams, in thinking about Korea and the history,
    we're currently focused on the nuclear threat of course, but we
    had troops there, a substantial troop commitment, for 50 years
    before the nuclear threat became what it is today. What I'm
    getting at is will we necessarily be able to remove those
    troops if the nuclear threat is reduced or eliminated given the
    conventional power that the North Koreans have, the array of
    artillery along the border, the threat to Seoul, and all of
    that? I want to try to put this discussion into some historical
    perspective.
        Admiral Davidson. Senator, no, you're absolutely right. Our
    troop posture----
        Senator King. Could you say that again? I like hearing
    that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I'm just teasing.
        Admiral Davidson. Our troop posture, you know, it's been
    modulated since the armistice in July of 1953, and it's been
    modulated based on that conventional threat that you're talking
    about as well as other commitments that we had. For instance,
    we had a reduction in forces on the peninsula during the
    Vietnam era, and in fact, the Republic of Korea, really as a
    sign of solidarity to the United States committed two ROK
    divisions to South Vietnam in that conflict.
        So it has, but our conventional capability on the peninsula
    is essentially, as I said earlier, the deterrent against the
    DPRK's conventional threat and their asymmetric threat.
        Senator King. Which may well be necessary even with the
    elimination of the nuclear threat or the reduction of the
    nuclear threat unless there is a concomitant reduction in the
    conventional threat.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator, and until there is a peace
    treaty. Because we still remain in a state of armistice, a
    cessation of hostilities, until such time that there is a peace
    treaty between all the parties.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and thank you
    for your testimony.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, I will adjourn the hearing
    and see you later at the closed session.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                         OKINAWA STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT

        1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, the United States and
    Japan are working together to complete the strategic
    realignment of United States Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam
    and other locations. Okinawa has historically hosted a large
    share of United States servicemembers deployed to Japan
    including about 19,000 marines. Please provide the Committee
    with a detailed update on the progress on the realignment of
    Marine forces.
        Admiral Davidson. Relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa
    to Guam remains an INDOPACOM area of emphasis. Over the past
    few years with Congress' help, we have made notable progress in
    this strategic realignment. On Okinawa, the pace of
    construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp
    Schwab increased over the last year with steady progress made
    on the seawall and the start of landfill work in December 2018.
    Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly reaffirmed his strong
    commitment to FRF. Guam's main cantonment construction has
    commenced following a favorable report from the U.S. Fish and
    Wildlife Service to protect newly identified endangered
    species. Clearing work is underway in support of utilities and
    site improvements. The fiscal year 2018 NDAA included several
    projects for the Guam relocation, including Marine Aviation
    Logistics Squadron facilities, a corrosion control hangar, and
    a second aircraft maintenance hangar at Naval Support Activity
    Andersen; a water well field to feed the new Marine Corps Base
    Guam; and a medical clinic at Apra Harbor Naval Station. Also,
    the fiscal year 2019 NDAA includes ordnance operations, a
    machine gun range, and a combination high intensity tactical
    training facility and dining hall for the air component all
    located on Naval Support Activity Andersen. The Commonwealth of
    Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Training (CJMT)
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is under revision due to
    comments received during the public comment period in 2015. As
    you will recall, CJMT will provide for large scale U.S. Marine
    Corps forces training. The new CJMT Revised Draft EIS will go
    through another comment period after public release of the
    draft. Due to competing interests with the USAF divert program
    on the island of Tinian--and at the request of the Governor of
    CNMI--we paused engagement with CNMI officials and agencies,
    causing progress on the CJMT EIS to slow. In late February
    2019, INDOPACOM met with the CNMI Governor to set the
    conditions for re-engagement on CJMT.

                  UNACCOMPANIED TOUR HOUSING AT OSAN AIR BASE

        2. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, the vast majority of
    servicemembers deploy to Osan Air Base on an unaccompanied 1-
    year assignment. Osan has the largest dormitory inventory in
    the operational Air Force. Please provide the Committee an
    update on unaccompanied tour housing for servicemembers
    stationed at Osan Air Base. What are your specific plans to
    improve the quality of housing?
        General Abrams. There are approximately 4,547 unaccompanied
    airmen assigned to Osan with 3,228 residing on-base and 1,319
    off-base. Osan Air Base currently has 37 dormitories consisting
    of 4,711 rooms, including two dorms ready for demolition and
    two unoccupied dorms under renovation. The average age of Osan
    dormitories is 24 years with the oldest being 34 years old and
    the newest built 5 years ago. In the last 10 years, 2 new dorms
    valued at $42 million were funded with Military Construction
    funding (MILCON) and 1 new $67 million dorm was built with
    Republic of Korea (ROK) funds. In the last 10 years there have
    also been 71 United States-funded projects using Operations and
    Maintenance (O&M) funding valued at $52 million and 14 ROK
    funded ``O&M'' projects valued at $4 million. The overall
    quality of Osan dorm rooms is good, and the average facility
    condition index of the dorms is 80 (on a scale of 0-100, worst
    to best). However, the average condition of the HVAC systems
    for the dorms is 60, and the majority of problems that exist in
    Osan's dorms relate to aging infrastructure, particularly when
    it comes to boilers and HVAC systems. This drives the engineers
    at Osan to work around the clock responding to routine and
    emergency work orders (e.g. completing 14,050 corrective
    maintenance tasks between 1 Mar 2018 and 1 Mar 2019). Due to
    the aging infrastructure in Osan's dorms and ongoing HVAC
    issues, the base will continue to rely on portable chillers,
    space heaters and small A/C units to assist with Quality of
    Life standards until all programmed projects are funded and
    complete. Osan wing leadership has consistently focused on
    maintaining suitable living conditions for all base residents
    and they will continue to pursue initiatives to ensure quality
    housing for our airmen, soldiers, and marines into the future.

        3. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, what resources are
    required and are those resources accounted for in your budget
    plans?
        General Abrams. Osan Air Base currently has 6 Facility
    Sustainment Restoration & Modernization (FSRM) projects for
    dorms in active construction or design valued at $24 million
    (2x FY16, 2x FY17, 2x FY20). These projects are in-depth
    repairs targeting a broad array of issues, such as electrical
    and mechanical systems. An additional 35 projects valued at $69
    million are planned and programmed for future years and will
    compete with other AF priorities for funding. Four of the 35
    FSRM projects, valued at $11.9 million, were programmed for
    fiscal year 2019 execution and have currently been placed in
    the fiscal year 2020 program due to higher priorities in the
    fiscal year 2019 Air Force budget. A new Military Construction
    project for a 528 room, $71 million dormitory is programmed and
    has been submitted through the Air Force MILCON process
    annually since 2012. This new construction is much needed and
    would replace six aging facilities. It is currently the base's
    second MILCON priority and twenty-sixth in Pacific Air Forces'
    (PACAF's) fiscal year 2021 MILCON program. Osan continues to
    mitigate issues as it competes for AF MILCON funding.
                                  ----------

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds

       TERRAIN SHAPING OBSTACLES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND WITHIN THE
                            INDPACOM AOR IN GENERAL

        4. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, I'd like to discuss your
    perspective of the importance of terrain shaping on ground
    maneuver on the Korean peninsula. As a commander, you possess
    the last stock of landmines in the U.S. inventory--a capability
    that has renewed relevance in a fight with peer competitors.
    Can you comment on the importance of these capabilities to
    provide standoff for United States ground forces in a
    conventional war on the Korean peninsula, both to allow
    maneuver and protect soldiers on the battlefield--especially in
    light of USFK's [United States Forces Korea] priority to ``be
    ready to fight tonight''?
        General Abrams. USFK and CFC's continued use of land mines
    as part of our arsenal of terrain shaping measures is
    critically important to our defensive posture. Depite the ROK-
    United States Alliance qualitative military advantage, DPRK
    maintains a quantitative lead in fielded land forces of nearly
    two to one. Terrain shaping munitions, such as land mines,
    mitigates the challenge presented by DPRK's force posture by
    permitting Alliance forces to create operational dilemmas for
    the enemy by restricting their maneuverability while increasing
    the targeting opportunities of our more lethal systems. It must
    be noted, the aging arsenal of scatterable mine delivery
    systems (e.g. Gator and Volcano) leave the joint and combined
    force insufficient munition capacity to cover a doctrinal
    division front or shape the deep fight.

        5. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, in your professional
    military opinion, how important is it for the Army to field
    terrain shaping obstacles to enable maneuver, protect friendly
    forces, and ultimately require less of a prohibitively
    expensive force structure?
        General Abrams. Fielding terrain shaping obstacles, to
    include land mines, is critically important in Korea. The
    quantitative advantage held by DPRK land forces creates both
    risk to force and risk to mission. These risks are mitigated
    through the collective use of terrain shaping obstacles and
    combined fires. The continued use of land mines as part of our
    arsenal of terrain shaping measures also contributes to near-
    term cost savings. However, of concern is the modernization
    efforts on the part of near-peer competitors in the area of
    mines, munitions, and breaching capabilities, while we continue
    to operate with 1980s technology. Existing non-materiel
    solutions to mitigate this growing capability gap have been
    evaluated and determined to be impractical. Ceding the
    qualitative advantage in any area increases underlying risk to
    force and risk to mission.

        6. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, can you comment on the
    need for these capabilities in other places in your area of
    responsibility?
        Admiral Davidson. United States policy prohibits the use of
    anti-personnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and I
    support this policy. However, another subset of terrain shaping
    obstacles, anti-vehicular mines, could improve joint force
    lethality and agility in the region. With the Indo-Pacific home
    to seven of the world's ten largest armies and significant
    time-distance challenges, anti-vehicular mines could provide
    advantages by facilitating effective maneuver for forces even
    when outnumbered. Further, these will also help to enhance the
    protection of bases and other critical infrastructure.

        7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, are you concerned with
    the United States capability gap in this area, which has grown
    exponentially since 2001?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, I am concerned about growing terrain
    shaping obstacle capability gaps particularly with China,
    Russia, and North Korea. I support service efforts to develop
    the next generation of mine capability--particularly ``man-in-
    the-loop ``discriminatory systems--which could help close the
    advantage held by other countries in this area.

                   TACTICAL EXERCISES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

        8. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, during the hearing,
    multiple Senators addressed the impact of the cancellation of
    military exercises in the Republic of Korea [ROK], especially
    Ulchi Freedom Guardian and other command post exercises. I,
    too, believe those exercises are critical to maintaining
    readiness, building relationships, and integrating friends and
    allies, but I am also very concerned about the cancellation of
    tactical exercises. Can you comment on the overall impact that
    the cancellation of tactical exercises in the Republic of Korea
    has on the readiness of USFK/ROK-United States Combined Forces
    Command?
        General Abrams. The suspension of large-scale exercises
    coincident with senior-leader engagements in 2018 was a prudent
    action in support of diplomacy. Following those suspensions,
    and in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary of
    Defense, we have worked to modify our exercise design and
    execution to maintain readiness through combined training and
    exercises while preserving space for ongoing diplomacy. To
    achieve this balance, we have adjusted four dials--size, scope,
    volume, and timing. Adjustments to volume (projecting exercise
    details and atmospherics into the information domain for
    effect) have been key as the design of legacy Key Resolve, Foal
    Eagle, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian purposefully maximized volume
    in order to leverage combined exercises as an element of our
    military deterrence strategy. As we have moved from an
    environment of provocation to detente, it is appropriate to
    change our active messaging posture to achieve the same
    deterrent effect. What is unchanged is the readiness and
    posture of our forces to act as a strategic deterrent postured
    to respond to potential crisis or provocation, and if called
    upon, ready to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in
    the region. This ``Fight Tonight'' posture is maintained
    through the regular conduct of tactical and operational
    combined Field Training Exercises paired with two Command Post
    Exercises. These training and exercise events focus on ensuring
    operational and support units, staff, and senior leaders are
    well trained in their core competencies and are prepared to
    conduct the planning and execution of joint and combined
    operations under the strain of crisis.

        9. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, can you also comment on
    the specific impact the cancellation of tactical exercises has
    on individual soldiers, leaders, and units from squad to
    brigade level, especially on gaining/maintaining detailed
    knowledge of the terrain they would potentially be fighting on
    and integration into combat-effective combined arms task
    forces?
        General Abrams. We continue to conduct combined and
    unilateral tactical and operational training at the unit and
    component command level. In some cases, we have actually
    increased this level of training (e.g. combined Marine training
    has increased 20 percent over the last six months) and I am
    comfortable with the state of core competency and warfighting
    readiness among our joint and combined force. Additionally, we
    continue to rotate Brigade Combat Teams through nine-month
    rotations, thereby creating a depth of experience across our
    formations.
                                  ----------

                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn

                                 CHINA / CYBER

        10. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how does
    INDOPACOM's concept of operations need to change in order to
    account for Chinese electronic warfare and cyber capabilities?
        Admiral Davidson. Beijing has developed significant
    electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities. In the event of
    armed conflict, the PRC will employ these capabilities to
    create a degraded and contested operational environment-
    something the U.S. has not had to persistently contend with for
    over 25 years. INDOPACOM 's concept of operations must
    emphasize agility and resilience across all domains of
    operations to enable the Joint Force to operate effectively in
    this kind of environment. Below the threshold of armed
    conflict, China continuously operates in and through cyberspace
    to achieve strategic advantage. INDOPACOM must collaborate and
    share information with a broad array of partners in order to
    build situational awareness and enable a proactive posture to
    defeat malicious cyber activity at the source.

        11. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, could you expand
    on your statement that INDOPACOM is exploring ``capabilities
    that are nascent''?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM in coordination with
    USCYBERCOM has changed our approach to countering Chinese
    actions in cyberspace. This new approach emphasizes stopping
    attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses, taking
    actions that influence adversary behavior, and introducing
    uncertainty into competitor or adversary calculations. Full
    implementation of the approach requires innovative thinking
    about and experimentation with promising, though nascent,
    tactical, technical, and procedural cyberspace capabilities.

        12. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your
    assessment of China's capabilities in electronic attack or
    electronic warfare?
        Admiral Davidson. China considers electronic warfare (EW
    [of which electronic attack is a component]) an integral
    component of modem warfare. The PLA has fielded an impressive
    array of ground-, sea-, and air-based EW systems that are
    capable of operating against a wide swath of the
    electromagnetic spectrum. As part of the late 2015-early 2016
    force-wide reorganization, the PLA created the Strategic
    Support Force to command, operate, and synchronize space,
    cyber, and electronic warfare elements. PLA EW units routinely
    train to improve their technical proficiency. More importantly,
    they are integrated into most major PLA training events, both
    supporting friendly forces with EW capabilities and acting as
    adversaries I opposing forces, creating a complex
    electromagnetic environment within which PLA forces must
    operate. PLA capabilities include the ability to impact
    adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave,
    infrared, and optical frequency ranges, as well as computer and
    information systems. Like all PLA capabilities, their EW force
    is progressing rapidly but still faces challenges effectively
    integrating into complex, modern combat operations.

        13. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what practical
    operational implications does this have for U.S. military
    forces in a potential conflict?
        Admiral Davidson. In the South China Sea, the PLA has
    constructed a variety of radar, electronic attack, and defense
    capabilities on the disputed Spratly Islands, to include:
    Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef,
    Johnson Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. These facilities
    significantly expand the real-time domain awareness, ISR, and
    jamming capabilities of the PLA over a large portion of the
    South China Sea, presenting a substantial challenge to United
    States military operations in this region.

        14. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your
    assessment of China's capabilities in cyber and space?
        Admiral Davidson. China is developing cyber reconnaissance
    and cyberattack capabilities to support a range of objectives,
    from collecting intelligence and stealing intellectual property
    to manipulating data and posturing for destructive actions.
    China has targeted United States DOD networks to fill gaps in
    its research programs and to gather intelligence on our
    strategies and plans. In addition, China is suspected of
    targeting neighboring countries--particularly in Southeast
    Asia--focusing on political, military, and economic issues--as
    well as on disputed territories, and media organizations and
    journalists. China continues to strengthen its military space
    and counterspace capabilities--including space-based
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms,
    satellite jammers, antisatellite missiles, and directed-energy
    weapons--despite its public comments against the militarization
    of space. China's national policymakers emphasize the
    importance of its space program in bolstering the country's
    scientific and technological modernization and growing its
    high-technology industrial base. China has increasingly sought
    to integrate its civil and military space efforts to streamline
    research and development processes and develop dual-use
    technologies. The consolidation of space, cyber, and other
    capabilities under the Strategic Support Force is probably
    intended to generate synergies between these capabilities to
    make each more effective.

        15. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how would you
    characterize the level of risk to U.S. space-based assets?
        Admiral Davidson. China's space surveillance sensors are
    capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing United
    States satellites. China has already demonstrated ground-
    launched weapons capable of destroying satellites in orbit.
    Additionally, China is developing satellite jamming
    capabilities, directed-energy weapons, and offensive
    cyberattack capabilities, all of which could be used to support
    military operations against United States space-based assets.
    The vast geographic expanse of the Indo-Pacific AOR, makes
    INDOPACOM highly reliant on the global coverage provided by
    space services to accomplish our mission. China recognizes our
    dependence on space and has fielded these counter-space systems
    to hold the majority of United States and allied satellite
    systems at risk. U.S. assets at risk include critical
    communications networks, navigation, weather and intelligence
    sources vital to steady state and contingency operations.

        16. Senator Blackburn. General Abrams, could you expand on
    your statements about command and integration of Cyber Command
    on the peninsula, including delegation of authority?
        General Abrams. USCYBERCOM is fully integrated into USFK
    and provides Direct Support to the USFK and the Joint Cyber
    Center. USCYBERCOM provided personnel as part of the Cyberspace
    Operations--Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE). USCYBERCOM
    provides tremendous cyber capability to USFK and as the
    supporting command to USINDOPACOM, the USCYBERCOM CDR is on
    record as having all the required authorities to carry out
    their mission in support of USFK and USINDOPACOM.
                                  ----------

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                                    CLIMATE

        17. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the
    most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI [Director
    of National Intelligence] states that ``Extreme weather events,
    many worsened by accelerating sea level rise, will particularly
    affect urban coastal areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
    the Western Hemisphere. Damage to communication, energy, and
    transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military
    bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and
    loss of life.'' Please comment on our preparedness to respond
    to future extreme weather events in South Asia, Southeast Asia
    and the Pacific Islands.
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM stands ready to support
    partner nations, in coordination with the lead federal agency
    USAID/OFDA, in response to future extreme weather events. I
    would note that the number of times we have responded to these
    events have declined in recent years because of increased
    partner nation resiliency and capacity. However, for the most
    extreme events, we are typically the only entity with the
    resources and capabilities to respond quickly in order to
    minimize loss of life and suffering.
        General Abrams. USFK works closely with our ROK and
    regional allies and partners, USINDOPACOM, and the interagency
    to maintain the posture and readiness necessary to surge the
    operational and logistic capabilitiy and capacity necessary to
    contend with a an extreme weather event. The same posture and
    readiness essential to our ability to deter aggression and
    defend South Korea prepares us for the challenges of
    humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions.
    Further, USFK participates in regional training and exercise
    events which focus on that mission set and the core
    competencies required for rapid and in-depth response. Of note,
    USFK recently provided support to fighting wildfires in
    northeastern province of Gangwon-do. The training and
    capabilities which facilitated that response are an example of
    the ability to conduct rapid response resident throughout the
    combined ROK-United States readiness posture. Additionally,
    USFK serves as a forward postured arm of USINDOPACOM in the
    event of regional humanitarian assistance/disaster response
    missions.

        18. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, what
    are some of the risks to regional stability that such extreme
    weather events might pose and can you comment on the demands
    that such events have placed on U.S. Forces over the last few
    years?
        Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and
    severity of extreme weather events all factor into the impact a
    disaster might have locally and regionally. Mega-earthquakes,
    mega-tsunamis, and super-typhoons hold the potential to cause
    massive casualties and damage. The resulting widespread human
    suffering, food and water shortages, and extensive power
    outages could serve as precipitating events for regional
    instability, if not properly managed. Over the past several
    years, U.S. Forces have been called upon and less and less for
    assistance because our partners and allies have, with our help,
    built up their own capabilities to respond to these kinds of
    events.
        General Abrams. Extreme weather events threatening
    stability on the Korean peninsula, and in the broader NE Asia
    region, include tropical storms and typhoons but also periods
    of sustained drought. The storm surge and torrential rains
    associated with tropical storms and typhoons are particularly
    impactful to South Korea given the topography of the peninsula
    and the associated high population density in low-lying and
    coastal areas. Critical infrastructure and sources of food and
    commerce such as fisheries, crops, and livestock are all
    vulnerable in the event an extreme storm overwhelms existing
    waterways and containment systems. Likewise, communities in the
    heavily forested and mountainous central and northeastern
    highlands are at risk from wildfires fueled by dry, windy
    conditions and localized drought. Recently, USFK provided
    support to fighting wildfires in northeastern province of
    Gangwon-do. While episodes such as this have been limited, USFK
    exercises its ability to rapidly deliver operational and
    logistic support to humanitarian assistance and disaster
    response missions. Training and exercising to conduct rapid
    response impoves the combined ROK-United States readiness
    posture to provide relief in the event of a natural disaster.
    Additionally, USFK serves as a forward postured arm of
    USINDOPACOM in the event of regional humanitarian assistance/
    disaster response missions.

        19. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the
    recently published Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI
    indicates that: ``Global environmental and ecological
    degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel
    competition for resources, economic distress, and social
    discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' For example, there are
    indications water shortages will induce stress in South Asia,
    especially given the rapid decrease in Himalayan glaciers. What
    is your assessment and the extent to which decreasing water
    resources could inflame tensions within INDOPACOM, USFK, and
    the surrounding regions?
        Admiral Davidson. I believe the availability of fresh water
    is, and will continue to be, one of the largest threats to
    stability in SE Asia and beyond. Wars have and will be fought
    over fresh water. The potential for supply side decreases at
    the same time as potential increases in demand would make this
    issue more challenging. Additionally, there are pressures being
    placed on countries downstream who are often denied access to
    clean water through upstream activities increasing pollution
    and/or flow control for hydroelectric, agricultural or other
    purposes. The nation that controls the water flow might use
    that to control the countries who require access to that water.
    Decreasing water resources could have significant economic and
    food security implications. For example, the area of Kashmir
    sits in a geographic location highly susceptible to climate-
    change induced drought. Climactic instability there could
    trigger conflict between nuclear-armed countries over water
    rights. Urbanization likewise is changing risk profiles for
    millions in this AOR, compounded by uncertainty due to climate
    change.
        General Abrams. Given the availability of fresh water
    stores and the plentiful rainfall in much of Korea, the
    competition over water is unlikely to be a significant driver
    of tension in the near future. Instead, based on its unique
    topography and extensive coastline, South Korea's exposure to
    rising sea levels and increased annual coastal rainfall is
    placing at risk the housing and infrastructure throughout the
    eastern and southern lowlands. This creates the potential for
    internal socio-economic and political disruptions should there
    be an extreme environmental event which leads to excessive
    flooding and the inundation of either or both agricultural land
    and metropolitan areas.
                                  ----------

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

                            PACIFIC FLEET COLLISIONS

        20. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, recommendations
    that you helped author in the Comprehensive Review of Surface
    Force Incidents included enhanced reporting processes to share
    lessons across the surface force, improved safety programs
    across the Navy, and enriched individual navigation skills and
    training opportunities. Last April, you testified that the Vice
    Chief and the Under Secretary of the Navy were leading an
    oversight council to ensure that these recommendations are
    appropriately implemented. Is the Navy implementing the review
    recommendations in a timely manner? Please share any updates
    you have.
        Admiral Davidson. In incorporating the CR/SRR
    recommendations, the Navy is implementing and
    institutionalizing the lessons learned in 2017. To date, the
    Navy has implemented 91 of 111 CR/SR actions and there are
    clear paths forward for the remaining items.

        21. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the collisions of
    the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain were both deemed
    avoidable, for several reasons. Are you confident that
    implementing the recommendations will prevent future unforced
    errors that lead to tragic collisions?
        Admiral Davidson. I am confident that these measures will
    minimize the risk of these types of errors in the future.
    However, due to the nature of the mission and operations in the
    Indo-Pacific, the element of risk cannot be completely
    eliminated.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, are there any
    additional measures or investments that Congress should
    consider during this year's budget cycle to address the
    recommendations of this report and support naval operations
    throughout INDOPACOM?
        Admiral Davidson. The Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget
    request includes funding to establish Maritime Skills Training
    Centers in the fleet concentration areas in San Diego, CA and
    Norfolk, VA. I ask Congress to support this initiative which
    implements specific recommendations from the Comprehensive
    Review.

                    INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

        23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the United States
    can reach both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered
    missiles, neither of which violate the INF [Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces] Treaty. You noted in your testimony that ground
    based systems must remain mobile to be a viable military
    option. Why are ground-based missile systems necessary to
    counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea when the
    United States is already investing in the construction of
    Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines that are mobile by
    nature?
        Admiral Davidson. Land-based precision fires would
    complement sea and air based systems but not replace them.
    These systems would provide the following military advantages:
    increase our deterrence posture with respect to Beijing and
    improve regional security present a persistent, credible threat
    to the PRC forcing PRC investment in costly defensive systems,
    provide a relatively inexpensive augmentation to air and
    maritime strike platforms, helping to restore their freedom of
    action, create a multi-domain targeting dilemma for Chinese
    planners, further demonstrate United States resolve against PRC
    military coercion.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, why not continue
    this investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage
    in undersea warfare?
        Admiral Davidson. I fully support continued investment in
    undersea capabilities and do not view this issue as an
    ``either/or'' proposition between ground- and sea-based
    systems. We must have sufficient numbers of technically
    advanced, reliable, and integrated air-, sea-, and land-based
    systems available to add depth to our defenses and to counter
    the increasingly sophisticated threats we face.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, many of our
    allies--including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF.
    Others, such as South Korea and Australia, do not want to host
    United States offensive missiles. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. How is
    INDOPACOM managing this opposition?
        Admiral Davidson. Many of our allies, Japan included, would
    optimally like to see a multi-lateral treaty with China
    involved and also for Russia to return to INF compliance.
    Pragmatically the prospects for this seem slim. In my view,
    land-based precision fires would increase our deterrence
    posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security
    and safety of all people. We believe that, through dialogue,
    our allies and partners will see this, too.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, if regional
    allies will not support the deployment of ground-based
    missiles, how will INF withdrawal impact regional stability?
        Admiral Davidson. If regional allies are unwilling to host
    ground-based missiles then the Chinese military (PLA) might
    continue to enjoy the unchallenged advantage they have gained
    by not being an INF signatory China has never been restricted
    by the treaty and has fielded approximately 1900 land-based
    missiles with ranges between 500-5500 km; we have none.
    Deploying land-based missiles would increase our deterrence
    posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, given the
    significant United States military presence on Guam, the island
    is already deeply vulnerable during any conflict with China. If
    the United States deploys land-based missiles on Guam upon
    withdrawal from the INF treaty, how will this compromise
    regional security and the safety of United States
    servicemembers stationed on the island?
        Admiral Davidson. Guam is already at risk to PRC
    intermediate range missiles. Deploying land-based missiles to
    Guam would increase our deterrence posture with respect to
    Beijing, improving regional security and the safety of all
    people on Guam.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how do you
    anticipate that China would react to the deployment of ground-
    based missiles in your command?
        Admiral Davidson. I suspect China would protest loudly and
    stridently. They would be losing a significant military
    advantage and would do everything in their power to try to
    maintain that edge. This includes exerting diplomatic and
    economic pressure--Including veiled and overt threats--against
    our regional allies and partners to attempt to force them to
    deny our access.

                                 CLIMATE CHANGE

        29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, DOD's [Department
    of Defense] Climate Change report mentioned that ``at Naval
    Base Guam, recurrent flooding limits capacity for a number of
    operations and activities . . . that support mission
    execution.'' How does this flooding jeopardize INDOPACOM
    operations?
        Admiral Davidson. Specific operational impacts from
    flooding on Naval Base Guam are currently limited, and in
    general, present a low impact to operations and activities that
    support mission execution. Those impacts are primarily the
    result of a slightly wetter climate compared to historical
    standards and recently, an increase in tropical storms.
    Overall, major impacts to operations on Guam result from
    tropical storms and typhoons. Guam lies in one of the world's
    most active regions for tropical storms. In addition to the
    destructive nature of these storms, they often force the
    dispersal of aircraft and ships from the island, resulting in
    lost training opportunities and follow-on operational impacts.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you require
    additional resources to effectively combat the effects of
    climate change?
        Admiral Davidson. No, we do not require additional
    resources to effectively combat the effects of climate change
    at this time.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the DOD Climate
    Change report failed to list the 10 most vulnerable military
    installations for each service, and did not list a single
    United States military installation outside the United States.
    In addition to Naval Base Guam, which military bases throughout
    INDOPACOM are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change?
        Admiral Davidson. I have concerns about the vulnerability
    of military installations on Guam, Kwajalein Atoll in the
    Republic of Marshall Islands, and Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii to the
    impacts of climate change. At this time, DOD lacks sufficient
    data to identify installations as more vulnerable to climate
    change than others. Working with the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the DOD expects to complete
    a study in the next two years that will help us better
    understand how to analyze the vulnerabilities of military
    installations to climate change.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the Pentagon's
    climate change report briefly mentioned that flooding and
    earthquake-induced tsunamis in Indonesia contribute to
    instability throughout INDOPACOM. How does this instability
    impact your mission?
        Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and
    severity of these types of disasters may impact our overall
    mission. However, humanitarian assistance and disaster response
    (HADR) missions have a positive impact on our strategic
    relationships with allies and partners. Our HADR efforts are a
    visible, tangible demonstration of America 's goodwill in the
    region and come with no strings attached, putting us in stark
    contrast with China. Additionally, we have expended a lot of
    effort toward helping our allies and partners build their own
    capability and capacity to effectively respond to disasters,
    lessening their dependence on U.S. assistance. Indonesia is a
    key partner in the region and sits at the center of vital
    transportation routes susceptible to many types of significant
    natural disasters. In the last fifteen years, Indonesia has
    made significant progress in developing the capabilities to
    mitigate these kinds of disasters. For example, the two 2018
    tsunamis that the country faced--one from tectonic activity and
    the other from an underwater landslide--required minimal U.S.
    Government/military assistance.

          NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION, SANCTIONS, AND CYBERSECURITY

        33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
    Abrams, do you think there is a common definition for
    denuclearization and how would you define a denuclearized North
    Korean peninsula?
        Admiral Davidson. The United States and the international
    community have a shared understanding of what final, fully
    verified denuclearization--or FFVD--entails. FFVD means the
    removal of all key components of North Korea's nuclear fuel
    cycle, removal of all fissile material, removal of North
    Korea's nuclear warheads, removal or destruction of all
    intercontinental ballistic missiles, and permanently freezing
    any other weapons of mass destruction programs.
        General Abrams. The definition of denuclearization, as
    noted by our State Department, is nothing short of the final
    and fully verified dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear
    program. Shortly after his July 2018 visit Pyongyang, Secretary
    Pompeo in responding to a similar question said that he had
    ``lengthy discussions about the scope of what complete
    denuclearization means'' during his visit, and that
    denuclearization is broad in nature: ``weapons systems to
    fissile material to the production facilities, enrichment
    facilities, across the range of weapons and missiles.'' Again,
    Secretary Pompeo noted that ``The North Koreans understand that
    and have not challenged that,'' and also that ``they also
    understand that denuclearization makes no sense absent
    verification, and they acknowledge that as well. There will be
    a verification connected to the complete denuclearization.''

        34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, in your
    testimony, you state: ``North Korea is continuing efforts to
    mitigate the effects of international sanctions and the United
    States-led pressure campaign.'' What indicators would you look
    for in North Korean progress toward denuclearization to
    determine that the United States could responsibly consider
    lifting the current comprehensive sanctions on North Korea?
        Admiral Davidson. As our diplomats have stated following
    the Hanoi summit, our position remains that we expect final,
    fully verified denuclearization before sanctions relief.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, in your testimony,
    you state that North Korea ``demonstrates increasing cyber
    capacity that must be matched and thwarted.'' Do United States
    Forces-Korea possess matching cyber capacity to thwart attacks?
        General Abrams. Yes. USFK and USINDOPACOM work closely with
    USCYBERCOM to ensure we are postured to match and thwart the
    cyber threats posed by the DPRK. Our activities and current
    posture are much improved thanks to the development and
    implementation of the National Cyber Strategy, the DOD Cyber
    Strategy, the certainty and resourcing provided by Congress
    over the last two years, and as a result of changes in
    Presidential Policy providing increased latitude for USCYBERCOM
    to prepare and act.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, do you require any
    additional investment in intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets in order to inform decision-making and
    military strategy on the Korean Peninsula?
        General Abrams. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United
    States Forces Korea (USFK) require increased, multi-discipline,
    persistent ISR capability and associated exploitation support
    to lengthen the warning time necessary to provide adequate
    decision space. The requirement for collection capabilities and
    capacity is shaped, in part, by North Korea's behavior. If we
    see a return to demonstrations of threatening military
    capability and associated increase in military tensions,
    collection requirements will be greater. Additionally,
    collection requirements change as the target evolves
    capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additional
    information is provided in a classified response.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
    Abrams, last year, the United States suspended several combined
    military exercises with South Korea, purportedly to increase
    the potential success of nuclear negotiations. Did the
    suspension and scaling back of recent military exercises make a
    tangible impact on diplomacy?
        Admiral Davidson. In my view, the suspension of certain
    military exercises with South Korea created space for
    diplomacy. While we have not yet reached an agreement with
    North Korea, the President's initiative to engage North Korea
    directly has reduced tension on the Korean peninsula and
    provided the possibility for an escape from the long-running
    cycle of North Korean escalation and de-escalation.
        General Abrams. The suspension of exercises in 2018,
    combined with the modifications to training and exercises going
    forward, have been instrumental to creating the necessary space
    for diplomacy by effectively turning down the volume on the
    regional military tensions that escalated throughout 2017. That
    reduction in military tensions has continued through the
    efforts of South Korean, North Korea, and the United Nations
    Command to coordinate, plan, and implement the slate of
    confidence-building measures reducing military activity along
    the DMZ. The outcome of these activities is the sustained
    reduction in military tensions throughout 2018 and into 2019
    which supports our ongoing period of detente and its continued
    diplomacy.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
    Abrams, did these suspensions negatively impact military
    readiness?
        Admiral Davidson. At the battalion level and below, we had
    no change in exercises or military readiness. I believe we
    accepted some prudent risk to military readiness at the
    operational headquarters level last summer to create space for
    diplomacy, but have made adjustments beginning in 2019 to
    account for and mitigate any previous readiness impact at the
    headquarters level.
        General Abrams. The 12 June 2018 Summit presented a
    historic occasion to re-shape strategic settings and relations
    on the Korean peninsula. The United States and South Korea have
    spent almost seven decades refining strategic, operational and
    tactical readiness to defend the Republic of Korea and deter
    aggression. The suspension of certain exercises during the
    spring and summer of 2018 was a prudent step which created
    additional space for diplomacy. Negotiations with the DPRK are
    difficult and require continuous patience, but they provide an
    important mechanism for the development of confidence building
    measures and other steps that have reduced military tensions on
    the Korean Peninsula. Within the resulting period of detente,
    the DPRK has suspended nuclear and ballistic missile testing, a
    development which represents a significant improvement since
    the apex of tensions in late 2017. The center of gravity for
    our military readiness in Korea is the ROK-United States
    Alliance. We have worked to proactively modify our exercise
    design and conduct to maintain that diplomatic space while
    allowing our negotiators to operate from a position of
    strength. During our spring exercise, DONG MAENG 19-1 (DM 19-
    1), we adjusted four dials--size, scope, volume, and timing--in
    order to balance readiness with diplomatic requirements. CFC/
    USFK effectively used DM 19-1 to train 14 of 14 warfighting
    Mission Essential Tasks, validate our C4I and Alliance
    decision-making processes under the stress of simulated crisis
    and hostilities, and demonstrate our Alliance commitment to
    combined readiness.
                                  ----------

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono

                      FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

        39. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you have spoken at
    length about your command's goal to maintain a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific. What does China perceive as the likely effects of
    this strategy?
        Admiral Davidson. China probably perceives the strategy as
    constricting its ability to impose a China-centric system on
    the region. Chinese leaders increasingly seek to assert China's
    model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative development
    path. Many in Beijing view nearly every United States action as
    part of a larger containment strategy and have chosen to frame
    the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as an integral part of that
    approach. It is not. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific is exactly
    what its name suggests, an environment that allows all nations
    to freely choose with whom to associate or trade; an
    environment where all nations have free and unfettered access
    to the air, sea, space, and cyber domains; an environment in
    which all nations can flourish free from coercion or threats.

        40. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, does China view the
    Free and Open-Indo Pacific strategy as a threat?
        Admiral Davidson. The Free and Open lndo-Pacific presents a
    viable, time-tested, and successful model for international
    relations. As noted in my response to question 39, Beijing is
    trying to present its model as a better alternative. China's
    model is many things, but certainly not ``free'' or ``open.''

        41. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, should the United
    States ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
    Sea (UNCLOS) as a step to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. I continue to strongly support accession
    to UNCLOS and believe such a step would reinforce U.S.
    commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Accession would
    express formal U.S. commitment to the rights and freedoms
    reflected in UNCLOS as shared values with our allies and
    partners. It would also strengthen our position vis-a-vis China
    by improving our ability to call out China's actions that are
    contrary to the treaty.

        42. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, beyond some of the
    actions we have already seen in the South China Sea, what is
    the likely next step in escalation China might take to counter
    the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy?
        Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders are likely to do many
    things to challenge the tenets and principles of the Free and
    Open Indo-Pacific strategy through their counter-framework of
    Community of Shared Future for Mankind. China will almost
    certainly continue to pursue efforts to upend the global
    governance system by proliferating its anti-United States
    messaging through targeted investments and propaganda. China
    may also choose to challenge unfettered access to the seas and
    airways by deploying additional air defense or anti-ship
    missiles or other capabilities to strategic locations. China
    already challenges free transit by erroneously claiming
    international space in the South China Sea is ``indisputable
    Chinese sovereign territory,'' a claim specifically not upheld
    by the Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. China
    may challenge basic human rights by proliferating to other
    nations the intrusive monitoring technologies they're using
    against their own citizens. Or China may challenge the
    transparency of trade agreements or protection of intellectual
    property rights by expanding the already large number of unfair
    and non-competitive regulations imposed on those firms that do
    business in or with China.

        43. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, how likely is China
    to undertake any escalatory actions in the next 2 to 3 years?
        Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders have been--and will
    certainly remain--committed to aggressively changing the status
    quo in many areas through economic, diplomatic, military, and
    informational activities, which unfortunately can include
    coercion and/or threats. I think we should expect China will
    engage in many activities, that depending on the circumstances
    and location could be considered ``escalatory.'' A few examples
    might be deploying to and operating combat aircraft from the
    three Spratly Island airfields; pressuring Taiwan's diplomatic
    partners to switch formal recognition to Beijing by economic or
    diplomatic means; establishing additional overseas bases by
    exploiting host nation debt to China; or fielding potentially
    destabilizing military capabilities (such as space-based
    weapons).

                       RUSSIA'S GOALS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

        44. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, while much of the
    public focus regarding the Indo-Pacific focuses on China and
    North Korea, you noted in your written testimony that Russia
    remains a power in the Indo-Pacific. What are Russia's goals in
    the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. Russia's strategic goals in the Indo-
    Pacific are consistent with its aspirations as a global power--
    namely, to protect its sovereignty, strengthen its economic
    relationships, project a powerful military deterrent, and
    expand its regional influence while simultaneously offsetting
    United States influence. Moscow views the Indo-Pacific region
    as key to its prosperity and great power status, particularly
    as it seeks to overcome diplomatic isolation and mitigate the
    effect of Western economic sanctions.

        45. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what is Russia's
    strategy to realize their goals in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. Russia pursues activities across the
    diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrums to
    further its goals in the region. In military activity, Russia
    uses long-range bomber patrols, naval diplomacy, exercises with
    Indo-Pacific nations, and foreign military sales to advance its
    interests. Additionally, Russia is modernizing its Far East
    military capabilities across the services. More capable
    aircraft, surface ships, and submarines will be operational in
    the Pacific in the months ahead, while infrastructure
    improvements are also made to improve airfields and bases in
    the Arctic and Kuril Islands. On the diplomatic front, Russian
    leaders are increasingly engaging regional counterparts--
    whether bilaterally or through multilateral institutions such
    as ASEAN--In an effort to expand Moscow's political and
    economic influence.

        46. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, what are Russia's goals
    specific to the Korean Peninsula?
        General Abrams. Russia's strategic objective on the Korean
    Peninsula is to maintain the status quo of two separate Korean
    political entities. Russia shares a border with the DPRK, and
    has an interest in ensuring potential DPRK internal instability
    does not cross the border via refugees or a humanitarian
    crisis. Russia also has an interest in undermining the U.S.
    alliance network and the current rules-based international
    order. Historically, Russia has been an active actor in
    diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of North
    Korea going back to the Six-Party Talks era. Additionally,
    Russia is seen as enforcing elements of standing sanctions on
    North Korea, but could do more to prevent North Korea's efforts
    to circumvent those sanctions.

        47. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what are some
    specific steps the United States can take in the Indo-Pacific
    to ensure that Russia's goals, where they run counter to the
    interests of the United States and the broader international
    community, are not realized?
        Admiral Davidson. We must continue to conduct consistent,
    persistent operations throughout the Indo-Pacific as a
    deterrent, demonstrating the readiness, modernity, and
    lethality of all of our capability and capacity. To the extent
    we do this with Allies and Partners, the outcomes are more
    substantive. Every action we take with Allies and Partners--
    especially our suite of bilateral and multi-lateral exercises--
    provides a meaningful check against Russian influence. As with
    China, one area where we possess a distinct advantage against
    Russia is with our values. The region desires a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific, the region knows that we are a reliable ally and
    that China and Russia are the greatest threats to a free and
    open lndo-Pacific. All of our messaging should incorporate this
    theme.

                           SPECIAL MEASURES AGREEMENT

        48. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, the week of the hearing
    the United States and South Korea signed a new Special Measures
    Agreement that increased the share of the cost paid by South
    Korea to keep United States troops on the peninsula. The
    agreement is only for 1 year, instead of the 5-year deal that
    has traditionally been agreed to by the United States and South
    Korea. Does the inability to reach a 5-year deal create a point
    of conflict in the overall relationship between the United
    States and Korea?
        General Abrams. The ROK began its direct monetary
    contribution to the Alliance in 1991. The 10th Special Measures
    Agreement (SMA) was signed on March 8th. Once ratified by the
    ROK National Assembly, this agreement will provide the
    framework for ROK support for the next year. The SMAs have
    varied in length over the past three decades. This is the first
    one-year agreement, and while a longer-duration agreement may
    bring more stability and predictability to our fiscal budgeting
    processes, the period it covers does not negatively impact the
    ROK-United States Alliance. The Alliance will remain strong
    under the 2019 SMA, and will build on this strength with the
    next SMA in 2020.

        49. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, does the inability to
    reach a 5-year deal on the Special Measures Agreement disrupt
    or impede the military relationship you and your forces have
    with the South Korean military?
        General Abrams. The ROK-United States military Alliance is
    stronger than ever and is grounded in decades of shared
    sacrifice and a foundation of shared values. The Alliance
    recently conducted the first of our new DONG MAENG exercises.
    The combined command post exercise provided an outstanding
    opportunity for ROK-United States senior leaders and staff
    members to come together to solve problems under the simulated
    stresses and challenges of crisis and contingency conditions.
    Additionally, our combined force continue to train and exercise
    during numerous unit and component-level events throughout the
    year. Close and frequent combined interactions assure that our
    Alliance remains ironclad and will continue to do so under the
    2019 SMA, and will build on this strength as our Department of
    State negotiates the next SMA in 2020.

        50. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, would a new 5-year
    agreement negotiated by the end of this year improve the United
    States-South Korean relationship, both diplomatic and military?
        General Abrams. The Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) have
    varied in length over the past three decades. While a longer-
    duration agreement may bring more stability and predictability
    to our fiscal budgeting processes, the period it covers does
    not negatively impact the ROK-United States Alliance.
    Regardless of the length of the agreement, the Alliance will
    remain strong and the ROK and United States will continue the
    critical work of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2019

                          United States Senate,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
                                    COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Kaine,
    King, Heinrich, Warren, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    posture of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    and the United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
        I'd like to welcome our witnesses: The Honorable Owen West,
    whom I met for the first time today; General Tony Thomas, who
    is planning to retire, somebody told me--and I think you're far
    too young to retire, but that's up to you, and particularly,
    you have two sons that are West Point graduates. You don't need
    to cut them loose that soon, and then General Nakasone. I
    appreciate very much the fact that, in the last couple of days,
    we've had both open and closed meetings because of the
    seriousness of the thing we'll be addressing this morning.
        The Senate Armed Service Committee's top priority is to
    support the effective implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS). Central to the NDS is a growing focus on
    competition with China and Russia, our peer competitors. Of
    course, we also, at the same time, don't want to forget about
    the threat that's posed to us from the terrorist organizations.
        Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven remarkably
    effective in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
    (ISIS), al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups over the last 17
    years. However, these groups remain resilient and continue to
    pose a real threat to the United States and our allies. At the
    same time, the military advancements by China and Russia pose
    new and increasingly complex challenges to our national
    security.
        When you talk to people out in the real world in America,
    there's this assumption that we have the best of everything.
    It's hard to explain, sometimes, that we don't. When we have
    our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) talking about
    how we are actually outranged and outgunned by our adversaries
    in artillery we are advancing, and are ahead of us in some
    areas.
        Another critical component of implementing the NDS is
    developing robust capabilities to counter growing threats in
    cyberspace. The Department of Defense (DOD) is making important
    progress, including the elevation of the Cyber Command to a
    fully combatant command and the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF)
    achieving full operational capability. Additionally, DOD
    released a new Cyber Strategy last year that provides a roadmap
    over how we will operate in the cyber domain. I look to our
    witnesses to describe what investments will be needed to meet
    these objectives.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me join you in welcoming our witnesses for this update on the
    readiness and the posture of U.S. Special Operations and U.S.
    Cyber Command.
        General Thomas, I'd also like to thank you for your
    extraordinary service and your coming retirement after 39 years
    in service. You've ably led SOCOM during difficult times.
    You've done it with great energy, great foresight, and great
    dedication to the men and women you lead. I thank you for that.
    I also want to thank your family, because they served alongside
    you, and they continue to serve with you. Nice to see that your
    sons got good educations, also. So, thank you.
        General Nakasone, this is your first time to appear before
    the Committee since Cyber Command's been elevated to a unified
    command. Congratulations on this. Also congratulations on your
    accomplishments, in partnership with National Security Agency
    (NSA) and other agencies recently, in combating some of our
    adversaries in the cyber sphere. Thank you very much, sir.
        SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the
    only functional combatant command with service-like
    responsibilities for the training, equipping, organizing, and
    readiness of Special Operations Forces. For that reason, it's
    appropriate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Long-Intensity Conflict, the ASD SOLIC, Owen
    West joins us today in his role as the Service Secretary-like
    official responsible for oversight. So, welcome, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you.
        Since passage of the ASD SOLIC reforms contained in the
    2017 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD has made important
    progress, including hiring additional personnel and more
    effectively integrating the ASD SOLIC into departmental
    processes related to budgeting, acquisition, readiness, and
    personnel management. These efforts are necessary, but not
    sufficient, to fulfill the intent of the SOLIC reforms.
    Secretary West and General Thomas, I hope you will provide your
    assessment of what more needs to be done and how this Committee
    can continue to support your efforts.
        SOCOM, as a microcosm of the broader Department and Joint
    Force, continues to adjust the complex security environment and
    the focus of the National Defense Strategy on great-power
    competition. This change will have implications for the
    Department's management of SOF forces, their readiness,
    capabilities, and development, and the operational authority
    that they have to undertake. As the demand for SOF continues to
    grow, we must also keep in mind that there are limits to the
    hardships we can ask Special Operations Forces and their
    families to endure. The United States, along with our allies
    and partners, face an urgent and continuing threat from
    information warfare attacks by Russia and other foreign
    adversaries. Russia attacked our democracy in 2016, and we must
    view these attacks with the same level of seriousness and
    resolve as a military attack.
        While we appear to have had some success in countering
    Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections, we should
    not take this as a sign that we can let our guard down. We must
    do more to anticipate and counter these increasingly
    sophisticated attacks, including by ensuring we are properly
    organized across the U.S. Government and inside the Department
    of Defense. General Thomas and General Nakasone, your commands
    sit at the nexus of DOD efforts to operate more effectively in
    the information environment, and I hope you will give a full
    assessment of what has been accomplished to integrate
    capabilities and authorities in this arena, and what gaps
    remain.
        With respect to CYBERCOM, while much progress has been made
    in the last year, many serious challenges remain. DOD has
    developed what appears to be a viable cyber strategy and has
    conducted a serious cyber posture review. This posture review
    identified gaps in capabilities across the enterprise, and the
    principal cyber advisor's (PCAs) cross-functional team is
    defining objectives, specific tasks, resources, and timetables
    to correct them. When completed, these activities should
    greatly increase the Department's cybersecurity and the
    effectiveness of Cyber Command.
        The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) explicitly established that unacknowledged activities in
    cyberspace conducted below the level of armed conflict are a
    legal form of so-called traditional military activities. The
    NDAA also provided authority to the President to take action
    against sustained campaigns of specific adversaries against the
    United States, including Russia's malign influence campaign.
    This legislation, along with a recent presidential directive,
    provided DOD and Cyber Command with the needed authority to
    plan and conduct more vigorous actions in cyberspace to defend
    the country.
        To support such operations, Cyber Command has developed an
    operational concept to employ so-called persistent engagement,
    in line with the National Defense Strategy. This is an
    important milestone, which I hope will provide an even more
    effective model for engaging our adversaries without undue risk
    of escalation. General Nakasone, I look forward to hearing more
    about this operational concept.
        We have come a long way, but we have a long way to go
    further. I know, with General Nakasone's leadership, General
    Thomas's leadership, and soon-to-be-General Clark's leadership,
    and with Secretary West, we'll continue forward.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We'd now have opening statements. We're going to try to
    confine our remarks to 5 minutes.
        We'll start with you, General Thomas, and work across to
    General Nakasone.
        Okay. All right, I've just been corrected. We're going to
    start with Secretary West.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OWEN O. WEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
         DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Secretary West. Thank you, Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Everyone's pointing at you, anyway, so----
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary West. Senator Reed, Chairman Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify alongside my partner, General Tony
    Thomas, on our global posture for our Nation's Special
    Operations enterprise. Tony's command of SOCOM has safeguarded
    the Nation for 3 years. I look forward to continued progress,
    working with Richard Clark, when he assumes command next month.
        We're honored today to team with General Paul Nakasone,
    whose command defends the Nation at the leading edge of the
    modern battlefield.
        The breadth and capability of our Special Operations Force
    is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this vanguard force
    tackles our most pressing challenges in the most hostile
    environments. In the past 2 years, 23 SOF personnel have been
    killed in action, and many more have sustained life-altering
    injuries. Representing just 3 percent of the Joint Force, SOF
    have absorbed over 40 percent of U.S. casualties in this time.
    This sacrifice serves as a powerful reminder that special
    operators are in the risk business. Their families carry the
    burden of individual tragedy so that we might prevent a
    national tragedy.
        This is a unique time to serve the SOF enterprise, because
    it is at an inflection point. First, the section 922
    legislation has reinvigorated the partnership between my office
    and SOCOM. Second, the National Defense Strategy has challenged
    all of DOD to increase focus on long-term strategic competition
    with Russia and China.
        The SOF enterprise is in the midst of transformation,
    something special operators have always done very well. Any
    transformation starts with people. In November, General Thomas
    and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF
    enterprise, challenging professionals to innovate relentlessly
    in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Special
    Operations should be viewed as an integral point of the Joint
    Force, designed to quickly and cost-effectively solve risky
    problems that do not lend themselves to mass or scale.
        General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the
    strain caused by the high operational tempo and demand. At the
    height of the wars, a large proportion of the force was
    spending as much time overseas as in the United States. This
    year, over 90 percent of the force will spend at least twice as
    much time in the United States as they will on deployment. I'm
    proud to report to you that our Special Operations Force is
    neither overstretched nor breaking, but very healthy, poised
    and eager to defend the Nation against increasingly adaptive
    foes.
        Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are
    concerned about serious ethical failings by some members of our
    SOF community. These incidents have our full attention. They
    are totally unacceptable and do not reflect the true nature of
    the SOF professional.
        Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years
    of service, much of it in combat. From 2001 to 2013, he
    deployed to Afghanistan every year, except for one in which he
    was wounded in Iraq. His relentless desire to defend the Nation
    is an inspiration to us all. He epitomizes quiet
    professionalism as a public official, but, in leading his
    troops and behind Pentagon doors, he is not shy. He
    consistently demonstrates blunt intellectual integrity that has
    personally inspired me. Our Nation will miss him. His wife,
    Barbara, less so now, and probably less in a year.
        Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify
    today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary West follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by The Honorable Owen West
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    our global posture for the Department of Defense's Special Operations
    Enterprise. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
    on my statutory authority within the administrative chain of command
    for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) overseeing the Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) Enterprise. Today, the SOF Enterprise is
    prepared to address the most pressing security challenges our Nation
    faces. I'm honored to have General Tony Thomas as a partner. His
    command has safeguarded this Nation for the past three years. I look
    forward to continued progress working with General Richard Clarke when
    he assumes command next month.
        Having served in this capacity for the past year, I am humbled by
    the daily service and sacrifice of the over 70,000 soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civil servants who comprise the SOF Enterprise.
    Its breadth and capability is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this
    vanguard force tackles our Nation's most pressing national security
    challenges, from Salafi Jihadism to great power competition. These
    guardians often serve in hostile environments. In the past two years,
    23 SOF personnel have been killed in action, while many more have
    sustained life-altering injuries. Special operations personnel, just
    three percent of the Joint Force, have absorbed over 40 percent percent
    of the total U.S. casualties. This sacrifice serves as a powerful
    reminder that special operators are in the risk business. Their
    families carry the burden of individual tragedy so that we might
    prevent a national tragedy.
        This is a unique time to serve the SOF Enterprise because it is an
    inflection point. First, the section 922 legislation has reinvigorated
    my office's role in overseeing and advocating for the SOF Enterprise.
    Second, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) has challenged all of
    DOD to deter rogue regimes and defeat terrorist networks while placing
    new focus on the long-term strategic competition with Russia and China.
    The SOF Enterprise is in the midst of transformation, something special
    operators have always done very well.
                alignment of sof capabilities to nds objectives
        The NDS calls on us to ensure our special operations capabilities
    will compete--and win--in today's complex national security
    environment. The NDS emphasizes the importance of counterterrorism in
    protecting our Homeland from threats to our core national interests,
    while prioritizing investments that restore a decisive competitive
    advantage with our principal strategic competitors. In November,
    General Thomas and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF
    Enterprise. We challenged our SOF professionals to innovate
    relentlessly in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Our enemies
    have scattered from the conventional battlefield. SOF is a fast-
    adapting, full-spectrum force, uniquely capable of imposing costs on
    our adversaries wherever their threat resides and whatever form it
    takes.
        As the Department implements the NDS's vision for strategic
    competition, the SOF Enterprise must adapt to meet the demands of our
    modern security environment. In this environment, both state and non-
    state actors threaten our national security interests with increasingly
    sophisticated and asymmetric capabilities below the level that would
    provoke a U.S. conventional response. SOF's unique capabilities,
    understanding of the threat environment, and interagency and
    international partnerships are critically important in addressing these
    challenges.
        My team, in coordination with USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, the
    Services, and combatant commands, is working to institutionalize our
    approach to irregular warfare across the Department to meet the demands
    of an evolving and increasingly complex security environment. Although
    irregular warfare remains a core SOF competency, successful irregular
    warfare in competition short of armed conflict and against high-threat
    violent extremist organizations will continue to require support across
    the entire Joint Force and close cooperation with our interagency
    partners.
        Even as we and international partners eliminate ISIS's physical
    caliphate, the threat from international terrorists to our interests at
    home and abroad persists. SOF are essential to direct action against
    high-value targets, supporting key allies and partners, and deterring
    state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using
    weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, Southwest Asia and the
    Middle East will continue to be the focus of these efforts, but,
    because these transnational threat networks operate globally, USSOCOM's
    worldwide reach will be essential to confronting them.
        Enabling free peoples to fight for mutually shared interests is the
    original core competency of SOF. Reassuring allies and building and
    sustaining partnerships remain critical to accomplishing our national
    security objectives. Along with general purpose forces' increasing role
    in security cooperation, SOF provide the Joint Force with deep
    cultural, linguistic, stabilization, and operational expertise to build
    the capacity of our partners and allies and develop lasting
    relationships. SOF also provide critical stabilization expertise and
    capability, assisting the interagency in addressing instability across
    much of Africa and the Middle East. From Eastern Europe to South Korea
    and from Colombia to North Africa, SOF presence and partnerships
    support United States national security interests in key regions.
        As the NDS notes, the surest way to prevent a war is to be prepared
    to win one. In this strategic context, SOF personnel, capabilities,
    agility, and technological advantages help enable decisive combat power
    as an integral part of the Joint Force. We have long recognized that
    the vast majority of special operations depend upon a broad array of
    Service-provided capabilities. At the same time, SOF's role as part of
    the Joint Force in a traditional wartime construct is critically
    important in disrupting our adversaries' operations, creating complex
    dilemmas and imposing asymmetric costs. Special Operations should not
    be viewed as distinct but an integral part of the force with a unique
    role derived from its basic value proposition: quickly and cost-
    effectively solving risky problems that do not lend to mass or scale.
    Within this strategic partnership with the Services, SOF capabilities
    serve as a fulcrum that help maximize the effectiveness of the Joint
    Force.
        USSOCOM is an exceptional National investment. Representing
    approximately two percent of the overall Defense budget, USSOCOM
    provides extraordinary leverage to national security. In a
    transformative era, our basic obligation is to tie USSOCOM's fiscal
    strategy with its future operating concept, driving budget discipline
    and delivering downstream performance. The section 922 reforms have
    bolstered this effort. To optimize the efficiency and performance of
    every dollar spent, we foster a culture of performance, accountability,
    and innovation, and the section 922 reforms have strengthened our
    oversight to better inform budgetary and programmatic decision-making.
    As a starting point, the SOF Enterprise capability and program guidance
    is now jointly issued by the Commander, USSOCOM and myself. My office
    is now responsible for approving USSSOCOM's Program Objective
    Memorandum five-year budget plan and is also now authorized to approve
    and submit program and budget review issue papers on behalf of the SOF
    Enterprise.
        With fiscal strategy aligned with future concepts, the SOF value
    proposition as an integral part of the Joint Force is reinforced. Over
    the years, SOF has also developed a culture of innovation, driving a
    battlefield technical revolution in developing a surveillance-strike
    capability that no competitor can quickly replicate. Protecting the
    nation against a terrorist attack remains our enduring task.
    Additionally, we must meet the challenge as a vanguard force in great
    power competition.
                     readiness and resilience of the force
        The SOF Enterprise has enhanced its readiness by balancing
    deployments and dwell-time for strained units, modernizing equipment
    and capabilities, aligning our efforts with NDS priorities, and
    investing in the well-being of SOF members and their families.
        Since 2001, SOF has expanded from approximately 45,000 to over
    70,000 personnel. As we focus on our core tasks and responsibilities in
    implementing the NDS, today's SOF is ready and capable to conduct major
    contingency operations with the Joint Force, conduct and respond to
    irregular warfare, and provide national leadership with options for
    responses to high-priority crises. We have prioritized investments in
    technologies to enhance lethality and effectiveness of the force,
    focusing our modernization on precision strike, directed energy,
    artificial intelligence, close-combat lethality, cyber and space
    operations.
        To improve its readiness for contingencies across the vast spectrum
    of warfare, General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the
    strain caused by the high operational tempo of certain SOF units. Not
    long ago, it was common for many SOF units and personnel to operate on
    a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio. For example, a typical Green Beret
    could have expected to spend six months deployed followed by only six
    months in the U.S. before redeploying. This high tempo strained our
    personnel and their families and eroded our long-term readiness. Given
    that the demand for SOF from the geographic combatant commands will
    likely remain high, we must ensure that these forces are provided on a
    sustainable basis. I am proud to report that SOF is a healthy force,
    and the men and women who comprise this force are prepared to deploy to
    combat at a moment's notice in defense of our Nation.
        Through General Thomas's leadership, we continue to make progress
    toward our 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio target for the Enterprise,
    and, today, 90 percent of our deployed forces are at or above this
    target, allowing more time to train for the full spectrum of special
    operations missions and increasing the time our people spend at home
    with their families. However, we still have more progress to make.
    Approximately 10 percent of our force remains below a 1:2 deployment-
    to-dwell ratio. Many of these personnel are high-demand/low-density
    specialists performing crucial functions. Thanks to the support of
    Congress and the Department, we have plans in place for small and
    targeted end-strength growth that will reduce the strain on these
    essential skillsets.
        My primary concern regarding SOF readiness is our ability to
    continue to attract top talent and retain our high-quality personnel.
    While the challenges SOF face in this area generally mirror those of
    the Services overall, our challenges will likely be magnified given the
    necessary experience levels of our people and our generally lengthy
    training pipelines. We are addressing current and projected shortfalls
    by offering special pay and incentives for high-demand career fields,
    improving recruitment and marketing practices, and optimizing our
    training pipelines.
        Through efforts such as Preservation of the Force and Family
    (POTFF), as well as Service-specific programs and activities, we are
    enhancing the resilience of SOF personnel and their families. As a
    community, we are only as good as our people, and that includes the
    well-being of our families. Programs and resources like these help
    families overcome significant physical, mental, and emotional
    difficulties that accompany deployments. POTFF resources help shorten
    recovery time toward healthy and productive lives, in and out of
    service.
                           culture and accountability
        Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are concerned
    about serious ethical failings by some members of our SOF community.
    Such incidents erode morale of our force, confidence of our allies and
    partners, and the moral authority of American values. In other words,
    moral failings are not individual but can impact our large-scale
    mission. While these specific incidents are being addressed by
    appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, General Thomas and I are working
    to identify any potential systemic problems and to enhance policies
    that hold leaders and individuals accountable. Because SOF operate at
    the forefront of highly complex military operations in remote and high-
    threat environments, we must maintain the highest standards of personal
    conduct, and the recent joint guidance General Thomas and I have issued
    emphasizes the standards of trustworthiness and accountability we
    expect from our SOF community. SOF is a mature and elite force and it
    will be held to the highest standards--and those standards include
    professionalism, ethics, and accountability. My office is currently
    conducting a review of SOF professionalism and ethics, as required by
    the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, which is due to Congress next month.
        These incidents have our full attention. We also recognize that
    they do not reflect the true nature of the SOF professional. When I
    visit with our SOF servicemembers at home and in the field, their
    selfless energy and devotion to mission are clearly evident, and they
    are exemplars of American values when deployed overseas.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by, again, thanking the Committee for
    supporting SOF with the legislation and appropriations essential to
    combating terrorists, building critical partnerships, and enabling the
    Joint Force. Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years
    of distinguished Military Service and for his partnership in leading
    our Nation's Special Operations Enterprise. General Thomas has been an
    inspiration to me and countless others in the SOF formation. From 2001
    to 2013, he deployed to Afghanistan every year but one in which he
    deployed to Iraq, where he was wounded in combat. I have been
    particularly impressed with his dedication to ensuring the well-being
    of SOF servicemembers and their families. Under his command over the
    past three years, USSOCOM continues to field the most professional,
    most highly trained, best equipped, and most effective special
    operations warriors in the world.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Now General Thomas.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS III, USA, COMMANDER,
                UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Thomas. Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm grateful for the
    opportunity to speak to you today on the posture of United
    States Special Operations Command.
        I'm privileged to be here today with Assistant Secretary
    Owen West as well as my friend and teammate, General Paul
    Nakasone, from CYBERCOM. Since its inception, we have enjoyed a
    tremendous relationship with the world-class team at U.S. Cyber
    Command and have forged the type of partnership, reinforced in
    combat, that ensures our absolute collaboration and cooperation
    in our shared mission of defending the Nation.
        USSOCOM continues to field the world's most capable Special
    Operations Forces. We are an integral part of the Joint Force
    and integrated into every facet of the National Defense
    Strategy. Our numerous successes over the past years would not
    have been possible without the support and resources provided
    by the Congress. For that, I thank you.
        For the last 18 years, our number-one priority has been the
    effort against violent extremist organizations (VEOs). As part
    of the Joint Force, we continue to be the main effort, or major
    supporting effort, in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia,
    Libya, the Sahel, the Maghreb, Lake Chad Basin, and the
    Philippines. Everywhere ISIS and al Qaeda and affiliated
    organizations are, we are relentlessly pursuing them to ensure
    this country never, ever endures another 9/11. We remain
    focused on finishing this effort by, with, and through our many
    coalition partners.
        At the same time, again, as part of the Joint Force, we are
    endeavoring to provide a more lethal and capable Special
    Operations Force to confront peer competitors. USSOCOM is
    already well-oriented to the challenges of great-power
    competition, particularly in the competition space short of
    armed conflict. Our SOF network, integrated with interagency
    and international partners, is focused on producing unorthodox,
    yet complementary, capabilities and solutions in support of
    U.S. policies and objectives. We continue to maintain strong,
    enduring international partnerships while leveraging
    authorities in core expertise to convert indigenous mass into
    combat power to deter, deny, disrupt, and ultimately defeat our
    adversaries.
        To build a more lethal force, strengthen our alliances and
    partnerships, and reform for greater performance and
    efficiency, we are reshaping and focusing our current forces
    and capabilities while simultaneously developing new
    technological and tactical approaches to accomplish the diverse
    missions that SOF will face in the future. The joint SOLIC-
    USSOCOM SOF vision that Assistant Secretary West mentioned is
    our guide to move us forward. The emerging security challenges
    will require SOCOM to be an organization of empowered SOF
    professionals, globally networked, partnered, and integrated,
    and relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain for the
    Joint Force and the Nation.
        In addition to our service-like responsibility to man,
    train, and equip the world's most capable Special Operations
    Forces, over the past few years USSOCOM has experienced
    considerable development in our other legislative role as a
    combatant command. We are currently assigned the role as the
    coordinating authority for three major global mission sets:
    counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
    and, recently, messaging/countermessaging. These roles require
    us to lead planning efforts, continually assess Joint Force
    progress towards campaign objectives, and recommend
    improvements or modifications to our campaign approach to the
    Secretary of Defense. In parallel, USSOCOM has begun pursuing
    an aggressive partnership with the other combatant commands
    with global portfolios--CYBERCOM, here today, Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Space
    Command (SPACECOM)--designed to leverage our respective
    capabilities towards providing more agile solutions to the
    Department of Defense.
        SOF has a long tradition of solving hard problems, adapting
    to changing conditions, and fielding innovative technology and
    tactics to give us the decisive advantage in combat. We believe
    that this tradition will continue to serve us well in the
    future. We are increasing our investments in a wide spectrum of
    emerging technologies, to include artificial intelligence (AI)
    and machine learning, automated systems, advanced robotics,
    augmented reality, biomedical monitoring, and advanced armor
    and munitions development, just to name a few.
        We are in the formative stages of establishing an
    experimental force, which will more coherently focus and
    integrate our future force development in the pursuit of the
    required peer-competitor capabilities. Leveraging our proven
    ability to rapidly develop and field cutting-edge technology
    flowing from our focus on the tactical edge of combat, this
    joint experimentation initiative will bring together innovative
    efforts from across our Special Operations Force tactical
    formations to ensure that commanders' combat requirements are
    addressed with the most advanced concepts and equipment
    available.
        Finally, in 44 days, I'm scheduled to relinquish command of
    the greatest Special Operations Force in history. I know that
    sounds a bit haughty, but the men and women of USSOCOM back
    that statement up every day. They represent the best that
    America has to offer, an exceptionally dedicated, effective,
    and resilient group of warriors and problem-solvers. I'd like
    to publicly thank them for the opportunity to be their
    teammate. It has been an incredible privilege to serve with
    them over the course of 39 years of service.
        I'd like to also personally thank Command Sergeant Major
    Pat McCauley, our SOCOM Senior Enlisted Advisor, appearing with
    me again today, for his service as a critical member of the
    SOCOM command team. Pat is the epitome of the best that USSOF
    has to offer, and, in a few short months, will conclude 30
    years of faithful and devoted service to the United States
    Army, United States Special Operations Command, and the Nation.
    During his distinguished career, he's inspired many by his
    personal courage on the battlefield, his sage counsel to
    commanders and leaders at every level of command, and his moral
    and physical leadership. He represents everything that is great
    about this Command--most importantly, our people.
        Thanks again for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Thomas follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Raymond A. Thomas, III
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and distinguished Members of the
    Committee, thank you for this opportunity to inform you on the posture
    of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and your Special
    Operations Forces (SOF). USSOCOM continues to field ready and capable
    SOF to conduct global operations as an integral part of the Joint Force
    against state and non-state threats to America and its interests, and
    to advance U.S. policy objectives. We greatly appreciate the consistent
    support of the Congress in this endeavor.
        Since my last address, USSOCOM has focused its efforts on
    addressing the defense and security threats and challenges from near-
    peer competitors as well as violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
    identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) along the directed
    lines of effort: building a more lethal force, strengthening
    relationships, and reforming our institution for more efficient
    performance. Consequently, we are re-shaping our current forces and
    capabilities even as we develop new technological and tactical
    approaches for our diverse missions. Toward this end, Assistant
    Secretary West and I co-authored a shared US SOF vision to guide us
    into the future. In short, it directs that USSOCOM must be an
    organization of empowered SOF professionals, who are globally
    networked, partnered and integrated, and relentlessly seek advantage in
    every domain for the Joint Force and the Nation. To achieve this
    vision, we are embarking on a path I will outline for you today.
               sof vision--``empowered sof professionals . . . ''
        Our vision recognizes the enduring truth that ``humans are more
    important than hardware'' by emphasizing that our people--more than
    platforms--are the source of our decisive advantage. To that end, we
    continue to recruit, assess, select and retain the Nation's finest
    human potential. We empower them with training, technology and
    authorities to solve some of the most complex and dangerous mission
    challenges. We steward people throughout their careers and their
    transition out of service, placing a special emphasis on resiliency by
    providing exceptional care to them and their families.
        We appreciate your support of SOCOM's Preservation of the Force and
    Family (POTFF) programs through the authorities and funding provided.
    Over the past seven years we have made substantial improvements in the
    readiness and resilience of our force and their families.
        As we address core issues of high operations tempo and personnel
    tempo, we are better suited to holistically address their impacts on
    our people. Last year, I referred to POTFF as ``our stay well plan.''
    This year I would go further and echo the sentiment of my commanders
    across the SOF enterprise and say that it is our lifeblood. POTFF
    resources fuel our ability to continue meeting today's operational
    demands and enables longer, more productive careers in SOF. I am more
    convinced than ever that this is the right thing to do, and that the
    embedded, multidisciplinary model of POTFF is the right way to do it.
    So strong is my conviction, that I have directed mandatory
    participation in the physical and psychological services of POTFF for
    all SOF members.
        In order to execute this program in all of its aspects, we plan to
    add additional behavioral health and psychological performance
    resources. We also plan to expand our Human Performance efforts to
    address rehabilitative needs. Our POTFF programs must be agile and
    innovative, taking advantage of advancements in medicine, psychology
    and data science. I hope we can rely on your continued support as SOCOM
    moves forward with these program improvements.
        USSOCOM is appreciative of Congress' sustained support for our
    Warrior Care Program. Wounds, injury, and illness threaten the ability
    of our SOF personnel and their families to continue to serve. Our
    Warrior Care Program--the largest in the Department of Defense with
    over 15,000 participants--contributes to the resiliency of our force by
    providing advocacy and care coordination through the recovery and
    rehabilitation process, returning SOF professionals to the fight, and
    restoring their families' footing as rapidly as possible.
        We continue to make strides in managing the Deployment-to-Dwell
    (D2D) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) of our personnel. Based on
    updated Department guidance, SOF formations are now focused on
    achieving a minimum of a 1:2 ratio and with the exception of a select
    few critical skill sets and career fields, the vast majority of SOF
    deploy at or above the deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2. This guidance
    is driving ongoing efforts to optimize our current force generation
    models to ensure SOF will continue to provide ready forces at a
    consistent and sustainable rate to meet the NDS and National Military
    Strategy (NMS) objectives. A planned increase of personnel in fiscal
    year 2019-2020 will help close current gaps among our enabler forces.
    These additional support personnel, and adherence to a 1:2 rate for
    Active and 1:5 for Reserve Forces, will ensure SOF can sustain our
    support to future geographic combatant commander requirements with the
    capabilities they require.
        The nature of our special operations missions brings a high
    expectation that USSOF will operate with the highest standards of
    ethics and honor. We are working closely with ASD West to complete the
    assessment of culture and accountability within the USSOCOM enterprise
    mandated by Congress. On January 1st of this year, we began a 90-day
    internal focus on core values. Commands are reviewing programs of
    instruction for opportunities to address SOF culture and implement
    values-based decision making to reinforce moral courage. Command teams
    at the battalion/squadron level and above will conduct direct
    engagements with their personnel on the cultural climate of their
    units. Our goal is that all of our special operations teammates operate
    in a culture that is mission-focused and undistracted by misconduct,
    harassment, or abuse. 99.9% of the USSOCOM teammates continue to serve
    with honor and distinction as our ethos demands. That is 0.1% short of
    our goal. We will not be complacent and will push forward our efforts
    to inculcate and reinforce our core values.
      sof vision--``globally networked, partnered and integrated . . . ''
        SOF is an integral part of the Joint Force and the whole-of-
    government effort that must successfully compete on a global scale.
    USSOCOM provides critical coordination and assessment functions for the
    Department's operations and activities against VEOs and WMD threats.
    And SOF's worldwide access and placement and our networks and
    partnerships enable the Department to understand adversary actions and
    intent and to respond across the spectrum of competition, especially
    beneath the threshold of conflict where our competitors such as Russia
    and China continue to hone their skills and advance their strategic
    objectives.
        As the Coordinating Authority (CA) for the C-VEO mission, USSOCOM
    collaboratively works with geographic and global functional combatant
    commands on the Global Campaign Plan for counter-VEO operations (GCP-
    V). USSOCOM provides an annual assessment on VEO trends--which we have
    just completed--and the Joint Force's progress towards campaign
    objectives. Along with this assessment, we make recommendations on
    campaign adjustments to the Secretary of Defense. To facilitate GCP-V
    execution, USSOCOM integrates Joint Force, Interagency, and partner
    nations' activities into a unified effort, the Transregional
    Synchronization Forum (TRSF). Current campaign efforts are focused on
    disrupting the financial, messaging, and foreign terrorist fighter
    networks that enable and sustain VEOs. Severing these conduits will
    degrade and disrupt VEO attacks against the U.S. Homeland, our
    interests, and against our allies and partners.
        Similarly, as the CA for countering weapons of mass destruction
    (CWMD), we continue to develop and refine our capabilities to execute
    CWMD campaigns. We completed and signed the DOD Functional Campaign
    Plan to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction last November. This
    campaign nests under, cross-cuts, and complements the NDS, the NMS, and
    global and other functional campaigns across the Department. Our
    USSOCOM CWMD Fusion Cell guides and coordinates the planning and
    assessments of CWMD campaign execution, and makes recommendations to
    the Chairman and Secretary of Defense on actions to disrupt and deter
    adversary WMD programs.
        USSOCOM also now has the mission to field a transregional Military
    Information Support Operations (MISO) capability to address the
    opportunities and risks of the global information space--one of the
    domains that challenges the Department's command and control
    boundaries. By April of this year, the Joint MISO WebOps Center (JMWC)
    will be operating in close coordination with the interagency and
    alongside combatant command teams to provide global messaging
    capabilities to a broader portion of the Joint Force and beyond CVEO
    themes. The JMWC will support the combatant commands with improved
    messaging and assessment capabilities, shared situational awareness of
    adversary influence activities, and the capability to coordinate
    internet-based MISO globally. We remain on track to achieve Initial
    Operating Capability in a new temporary facility by the end of fiscal
    year 2019.
        To help the Joint Force address the complexity of networked,
    globalized threats and great power competition, USSOCOM has begun
    collaboration with other global-reach combatant commands to provide
    integrated options to address these challenges. USSOCOM, Cyber
        Command (CYBERCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)--combatant commands whose global
    presence and responsibilities shape our perceptions and the
    capabilities we provide to the Joint Force--are working toward a model
    for integrating our global capabilities more effectively into the
    Department's efforts. Our goal is to help close the seams created by
    our post-WWII (1946) geographic combatant command framework--seams that
    are currently exploited by adversaries who act globally, unencumbered
    by similar regional frameworks.
        We continue to work with and rely extensively upon the capabilities
    provided by DOD. These include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
    the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Defense Information Systems
    Agency (DISA). I want to draw particular attention to the work of the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for their exceptional work in
    CWMD and counter-proliferation (CP). DTRA plays an integral role in
    creating shared awareness of the threat that supports our campaign
    planning. We are also working closely with them on the very pressing
    and expanding asymmetric threat of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
    by VEOs and state actors is a significant concern to the Joint Force.
    USSOCOM fully endorses DTRA's initiatives to understand and counter
    this threat and is working with them on several fronts toward this end.
        Beyond our national collaborative efforts, USSOCOM also extends its
    network abroad to engage willing international partners, as well.
    USSOCOM hosts highly qualified and talented Special Operations officers
    and Non-Commissioned Officers from 24 nations with established SOF
    capability, many of whom are contributing combat forces to today's CVEO
    efforts. We also maintain US Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLOs)
    in 21 countries. These liaison relationships provide agility to a
    global network that creates a common understanding of threats, develop
    response options, and--in some cases--to develop technology, tactics
    and equipment for mutual benefit to our forces.
        For developing countries, security cooperation activities are a key
    tool for enabling them to tackle threats and challenges of common
    concern. USSOCOM appreciates Congressional consolidation of security
    cooperation authorities in 10 USC 333. USSOCOM and GCCs have leveraged
    this authority to provide partner nations the necessary skills and
    equipment to conduct security operations in their own self-defense and
    to become more capable partners.
        SOF continues to use section 1202 to work by, with, and through
    partners, and in support of the geographic combatant commands. This
    authority fills a gap in our arsenal at a critical juncture for USSOF,
    and as the Joint Force re-orients on NDS threats beyond VEOs. Through
    these authorities, we will operationalize select regular and irregular
    forces possessing unique access and capabilities to confront peer
    competitors--at an appropriate level below armed conflict. Recognizing
    the strategic implications of great power competition, we will move
    forward deliberately, coordinated with interagency partners, while
    providing full transparency to Congress.
    sof vision--``relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain to compete
                                and win . . . ''
        In addition to geographic domains, we must fight and win enabled by
    the latest technological advancements. The increasingly data-driven,
    networked, miniaturized, and automated world where goods, information,
    and people move across the globe at a furious pace significantly
    impacts virtually every aspect of SOF operations. We need to understand
    this impact and embrace and harness the opportunities offered by
    technology. Data science, artificial intelligence, automated systems,
    and cryptography are no longer restricted or isolated products
    available to select powers. They are commodities accessible to all.
    Social media and publicly available information presents us with a
    world of far fewer shadows for concealment and yet opportunities for
    understanding heretofore unseen indicators of adversarial intent or
    action. For this reason, to achieve our mission we cannot relent in our
    pursuit of capabilities that will sustain and increase our advantage
    along the entire spectrum of conflict.
        To address these challenges and to seize these opportunities,
    USSOCOM is sustaining previous efforts that are proving impactful,
    establishing new efforts to provoke change in our workforce culture and
    mindset, and intent on confirming our results and findings through an
    experimentation force that will ensure that our pursuits remain solidly
    in support of our operational success on the battlefield.
        In 2018, USSOCOM established the position of Chief Data Officer
    (CDO) to lead the integration of artificial intelligence and machine
    learning (AI/ML) across the enterprise and create a culture of data-
    driven decision making. Our CDO is guiding data governance efforts and
    leading engagement with the Defense Digital Service, the Joint
    Artificial Intelligence Center, Project Maven, and related activities.
    Under the direction of the CDO, USSOCOM is also building a data
    engineering lab and operationalizing a Development Operations (DevOps)
    environment that enables world-class talent to collaborate and deliver
    technical solutions for the SOF enterprise.
        Embracing these technologies will allow our workforce to consume
    and process data in ways that exceed basic human cognitive capabilities
    and reserve our valuable manpower for the tasks that are the
    exceptional domain of the human. To maximize the effectiveness of
    available technology, we must also address data architecture and data
    management as priorities. We will transition to cloud-based data
    services and treat our data as a critical, strategic asset. We will
    ensure that data is defended from our adversaries while remaining
    usable and accessible to those who need it.
        To ensure that these changes are rooted in SOF unique requirements
    and relevant to our special operations missions and tasks, USSOCOM will
    expand the use of wargames, and establish a joint SOF Experimental
    Force (EXFOR) within our force structure. The EXFOR will test concepts
    developed in our SOF Future Operating Concept alongside technology and
    equipment developed from our innovation efforts. The EXFOR will consist
    of existing units and personnel from our SOF service components and
    operational commands and will serve as the pacing element for the
    development and fielding of innovative concepts, equipment, and
    tactics.
        USSOCOM values its acquisition authority and welcomes recent
    legislative acquisition reforms such as expanded authority under
    section 2371b and section 803 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority. These
    initiatives enable our SOF acquisitions personnel to leverage non-
    traditional DOD and commercial markets for emerging technologies and
    capabilities. We are also in our fourth year of leveraging the
    authority to enter into a Partnership Intermediary Agreement to manage
    our SOFWERX efforts. SOFWERX connects a growing ecosystem of over
    40,000 traditional, non-traditional, large and small companies,
    individuals, academia, and government labs to address capabilities
    across SOF mission areas. SOFWERX has conducted over 2,000 events to
    include collaborations, hackathons, rapid prototyping, and
    experimentation to drive speed and efficiency into our acquisition
    processes. We have completed over 96 projects in support of our
    Component and Theater Commands. SOFWERX is currently growing its
    strategic partnerships across the Services' Rapid Acquisition Offices
    and with Other Government Agencies to mitigate redundancy and increase
    the speed of delivery of capabilities to DOD.
        We are enthusiastically supportive of the initiatives of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) to
    streamline policies and procedures within the Department and fully
    support her efforts to minimize constraints and promote a more agile
    process. We also support her call for improvements in DOD software
    development, specifically through increasing the number of program
    managers and contracting officers who are conversant in the commercial
    processes of this domain. USSOCOM engagements with the Defense Digital
    Service has helped us in this regard and we will continue to bring in
    ``digitally native'' talent for the SOF acquisition workforce. We are
    heavily involved with the USD(A&S) effort to increase the use of Other
    Transactional Authorities (OTAs), enabling us to interact with non-
    traditional vendors in a far more commercial format. In the last year
    we have exercised 10 OTAs and will benefit from Defense Acquisition
    University's increased emphasis on OTA training.
        In the push by USD(A&S) towards increased prototyping under Middle
    Tier Acquisition (MTA) rules, USSOCOM comprises 20 percent of the
    Department's total MTA effort. We expect this number to increase
    substantially in fiscal year 2019. MTAs allow for abbreviated
    requirements approval and tailored acquisition approaches. As we move
    forward, we are closely adhering to reporting requirements in order to
    ensure compliance with the statute.
                                   conclusion
        Before I conclude my update, I would like to highlight that USSOCOM
    will host the 2019 DOD Warrior Games in Tampa, Florida from June 21st
    through June 30th. Approximately 300 wounded, ill and injured
    servicemembers and veterans will participate in 11 sporting events. The
    Warrior Games were established in 2010 to enhance the recovery and
    rehabilitation of our personnel with health challenges. The athletes
    will represent the United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force,
    and Special Operations Command. Additionally, allied athletes from the
        United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands will
    compete. A large contingent of these athletes' families will also
    attend. I invite all of you to attend these games, and join us in
    cheering alongside them and honoring their courage and perseverance.
        Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to remember the long and
    dedicated service of the late Senator John McCain, who chaired this
    hearing just over a year ago. Senator McCain was a consummate servant
    leader to his Nation--a true statesman and hero who put the interests
    of his fellow citizens ahead of his own. His presence is missed but his
    impact on our command will never be forgotten.
        In closing, I thank the Congress for the steadfast support for
    USSOCOM. We are already competing with adversaries and adapting to
    complex challenges facing our country and will continue to do so now
    and into future.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Thomas.
        General Nakasone.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
       STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
                    CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

        General Nakasone. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for your
    enduring support and the opportunity to testify today about the
    hard-working men and women of United States Cyber Command. I'm
    honored to lead them.
        I'm also honored to sit alongside these great leaders,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense West and General Tony Thomas.
        For Tony, my congratulations to you and Barb for your
    steadfast service to our Nation. It's been a tremendous journey
    for you, and I've enjoyed our close partnership and friendship.
    My personal best wishes to you, Tony, and your family.
        As the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I'm responsible for
    conducting full-spectrum cyberspace operations supporting three
    mission areas: defend the Nation against cyberattacks, defend
    the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN), and
    enable our Joint Force commanders in pursuit of their mission
    objectives.
        In the cyber domain, we are in constant contact with our
    adversaries, who continue to increase in sophistication,
    magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity, and remain a threat
    to our national security interests and economic well-being. The
    National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense
    Strategy highlight the return of great-power competition.
    Beyond near-peer competitors, China and Russia, rogue regimes,
    like Iran and North Korea, continue to grow their capabilities.
    Using aggressive methods to conduct malicious cyberspace
    activities, adversaries have, until recently, acted with little
    concern for consequences.
        The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy identifies the
    need to defend forward during day-to-day competition with our
    adversaries. This strategy aims to maintain our superiority in
    cyberspace through protection of our critical infrastructure
    and networks. At U.S. Cyber Command, we implement the DOD
    strategy by adopting an approach of persistent engagement,
    persistent presence, and persistent innovation. This past year
    witnessed the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to combatant
    command status, the opening of our Integrated Cyber Center, and
    our shift from building the force to the readiness of that
    force. This progress ensures our ability to execute our mission
    requirements for the Department in defense of our Nation.
        The defense of the 2018 midterm elections posed a
    significant strategic challenge to our Nation. Ensuring a safe
    and secure election was our number-one priority and drove me to
    establish a joint United States Cyber Command/National Security
    Agency effort we called the Russia Small Group (RSG). The
    Russia Small Group tested our new operational approach. With
    the organization and direction from the President and Secretary
    of Defense (SECDEF), the Russia Small Group enabled
    partnerships and action across the government to counter a
    strategic threat. Our response demonstrated the value of a
    tightknit relationship between United States Cyber Command and
    the National Security Agency, bringing together intelligence,
    cyber capabilities, interagency partnerships, and the
    willingness to act.
        Through persistent engagement, we enabled critical
    interagency partners to act with unparalleled coordination and
    cooperation. Through persistent presence, U.S. Cyber Command
    and the National Security Agency contested adversarial actions,
    improving early warning and threat identification, in support
    of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others.
        Beyond the interagency, we partnered and engaged with
    allies and public and private sectors to build resiliency. For
    the first time, we sent our cyberwarriors abroad to secure
    networks outside the DOD Information Network. Our operations
    allowed us to identify and counter threats as they emerged to
    secure our own elections and prevent similar threats
    interfering in those of our partners and allies.
        The Russia Small Group effort demonstrated that persistent
    engagement, persistent presence, and persistent innovation
    enable success. Effective cyberdefense requires a whole-of-
    nation effort. Information-sharing plays a vital role in
    enabling everyone, including government agencies, to defend
    their networks. Therefore, we are now sharing computer malware
    we find during our routine operations with the private sector
    and the broader cybersecurity community. We have posted
    numerous malware samples for crowd-sourcing analysis. We
    believe our actions will have a positive impact on improving
    cybersecurity globally.
        Our actions are impacting our adversaries. Our shift in
    approach allows us to sustain key competitive advantages while
    increasing our cyber capabilities. As we review lessons learned
    from securing the midterm elections, we are now focused on
    potential threats we could certainly face in 2020.
        Looking forward, we need to continue building a warrior
    ethos similar to our other warfighting domains. Cyberwarriors
    are, and will continue to be, in constant contact with our
    adversaries. There are no operational pauses or sanctuaries. We
    must ensure sufficient capability and capacity, people,
    technology, and infrastructure, which we are decisively focused
    on now.
        Through persistent presence, we are building a team of
    partners that enable us and them to act more effectively. The
    complex and rapid pace of change in this environment requires
    us to leverage cyber expertise broadly across public and
    private sectors, academia, and industry. Therefore, we aspire
    to increase our effectiveness and capabilities through
    persistent innovation across these partnerships.
        Cyberdefense is a team effort. Critical teammates, such as
    the National Guard and Reserve, are integral parts of our
    cyberforce. They provide strategic depth and provide the Nation
    a Reserve capacity of capable cyberwarriors.
        Finally, improving readiness continues to be one of my key
    focus areas. I continue to work with the services and
    Department to actively measure and maintain readiness, manning,
    training, and equipping, and certainly an ability to perform
    the mission.
        After a year of change and progress, we see 2019 as a year
    of opportunity. We have much work ahead as CYBERCOM matures. We
    assure you that our people merit the trust you have placed in
    them and that, with your support, they will accomplish the
    tasks that our Nation expects.
        Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of
    U.S. Cyber Command, and for your continued support. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for inviting me to represent the men and women
    of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am honored to lead them,
    and grateful for the opportunity to highlight their accomplishments.
    Our Command has seen a year of change and progress, featuring the
    elevation of USCYBERCOM to a unified combatant command with an expanded
    mission and additional authorities and responsibilities, and the
    completion of the build of 133 teams in our Cyber Mission Force (CMF).
    We have transitioned from building the force to ensuring its mission
    readiness, and in 2018 we enhanced that by opening our new, state-of-
    the-art Integrated Cyber Center. Enabled by changes in law and policy,
    we have produced defensive and offensive operational successes. My
    testimony will summarize threats and opportunities in our strategic
    environment, explain how we prepared ourselves to meet them and what we
    did, and explain our priorities for the future of a USCYBERCOM that
    enables our partners and acts in cyberspace to defend the nation.
        USCYBERCOM's task is to plan and execute global cyberspace
    operations, activities and missions to defend and advance national
    interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners
    across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Our
    responsibilities include providing mission assurance for the Department
    of Defense by directing the operation and defense of the Department's
    information systems (what we call the DODIN); deterring or defeating
    strategic threats to national interests and infrastructure; and helping
    the combatant commanders achieve their missions in and through
    cyberspace. This fiscal year we are executing a budget totaling roughly
    $610 million. Our full-time personnel amount to 1,520 military and
    civilians, plus contractors. This January we had 4,406 servicemembers
    and civilians in our Cyber Mission Force, building to a total of 6,187
    people. We also have both Guard and Reserve personnel on Active Duty
    serving in our forces.
        USCYBERCOM comprises a headquarters organization that directs
    operations through its components. These include the Cyber National
    Mission Force (CNMF); the Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information
    Network (JFHQ-DODIN); and Joint Task Force Ares; plus our Joint Force
    headquarters elements, each of which is paired with one of the
    Services' cyber components. Those Service components are Army Cyber
    Command, Marine Forces Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth
    Fleet, Air Force Cyber/24th Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard Cyber.
        Our efforts and our continued success depend upon the support of
    the Congress and of this Committee. Thank you in advance for the
    assistance you are providing us in 2019 as we pursue opportunities in
    five areas: (1) Supporting strategic competition; (2) Establishing a
    warfighting ethos across the Command; (3) Improving the readiness of
    our cyber forces; (4) Enhancing partnerships across government, allies,
    and the private sector; and (5) Deploying improved operating
    infrastructure.
                           the strategic environment
        Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant
    contact with adversaries. The nation faces threats from a variety of
    malicious cyber actors, including non-state and criminal organizations,
    states, and their proxies. We see near-peer competitors conducting
    sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American
    strength and gain strategic advantage. USCYBERCOM ensures two critical
    capabilities against these threats: it enables partners in whole-of-
    nation efforts to build resilience, close vulnerabilities, and defend
    critical infrastructure; and it acts against adversaries who can
    operate across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations and who
    possess the capacity and the will to sustain cyber campaigns against
    the United States and its allies.
        Renewed Strategic Competition. The National Security Strategy
    (2017) emphasized the emergence of great-power competition and noted
    its spread into cyberspace. In implementing that guidance, the
    Department issued the DOD Cyber Strategy, which described the
    environment we face:

            We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China
            and Russia. These States have expanded that competition to
            include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that
            pose long term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our
            allies and partners. China is eroding United States military
            overmatch and the Nation's economic vitality by persistently
            exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private
            sector institutions. Russia has used cyber-enabled information
            operations to influence our population and challenge our
            democratic processes. Other actors, such as North Korea and
            Iran, have similarly employed malicious cyber activities to
            harm United States citizens and threaten U.S. interests.
            Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity
            continue to rise. The United States' growing dependence on the
            cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and
            military function makes this an urgent and unacceptable risk to
            the Nation [emphasis in original].

        I assess we are seeing what we term corrosive threats, in which
    malicious cyber actors weaponize personal information, steal
    intellectual property, and mount influence campaigns. Such measures
    have had and will have strategic effects on our Nation and allies.
        Changes in Strategic Guidance and Authorities. USCYBERCOM has
    recently improved the scope, speed, and effectiveness of its operations
    with the help of legal and policy changes. I want to thank Congress for
    its support of DOD's cyberspace operations as reflected in provisions
    of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
    enhanced our agility to execute missions consistent with law. We also
    received updated policy guidance that, in conjunction with the NDAA
    provisions, significantly streamlined the interagency process for
    approval of cyber operations and thus facilitated recent activities.
        The DOD Cyber Strategy asserts that the Department has a
    significant role in defending the nation. To be effective in doing so,
    the Strategy mandates that DOD components ``defend forward, shape the
    day-to-day competition, and prepare for war,'' enabling the Department
    ``to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.'' We must be
    active because inaction on our part cedes advantage to capable
    adversaries willing to flout international law and impose their own
    norms of cyber conduct. In keeping with guidance to defend forward, the
    Department is aiming to take the initiative against those who act
    against us. The DOD Cyber Strategy states that the Department must be
    prepared to defend assertively the functioning of even non-DOD critical
    infrastructure systems--whether at home or abroad--that are essential
    to project, support, and sustain Departmental forces and operations
    worldwide. In practice, this means confronting our adversaries from
    where they launch cyber attacks and developing robust capabilities that
    are responsive to Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
    activities.
        A New Operating Construct. We are implementing the DOD Cyber
    Strategy through the strategic approach of persistent engagement, which
    includes partnering with other U.S. Government elements to build
    resilience into U.S. networks and systems, defending against malicious
    cyberspace activities as far forward as possible, and contesting
    adversary attempts to disrupt our Nation's key government and military
    functions.
        Our operators, analysts, developers, leaders, and support
    personnel, enabled by new and modified policy guidance, are operating
    more effectively in coordination and partnership with other agencies,
    partners, and allies. Last fall we supported United States European
    Command (USEUCOM), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI), and others to defend the integrity of America's
    2018 mid-term elections. Working together under my command, USCYBERCOM
    and the National Security Agency (NSA) undertook an initiative known as
    the Russia Small Group to protect the elections from foreign
    interference and influence. By enabling our fellow combatant commands
    and other partners, USCYBERCOM assisted the collective intelligence and
    defense effort that demonstrated persistent engagement in practice. The
    tight links between USCYBERCOM and NSA created a mutually beneficial,
    intelligence-operations cycle that let us rapidly find and follow
    leads, discover new information, and create opportunities to act in
    conjunction with partners. Additionally, our co-location in the new
    Integrated Cyber Center optimized our collaboration for efforts of this
    nature. We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor
    adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their
    efforts. We shared information through DHS with state election
    officials to help identify vulnerabilities and improve threat warning.
    We also enabled Department of the Treasury and FBI actions in
    conjunction with the private sector, for instance by posting foreign
    malware for the first time to VirusTotal, a private site for
    crowdsourcing analysis of cyber threats. Finally, working with USEUCOM,
    and with the consent of several European countries, we sent defensive
    teams forward to conduct operations in support of our mission to help
    secure the mid-term elections.
              opportunities and challenges for u.s. cyber command
        I note the progress we have made during the past year and see
    opportunities ahead, with corresponding challenges as well. We have
    achieved much under the National Defense Strategy's commitment to
    prioritize investments in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued
    integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military
    operations. We must use our recent successes to inform future
    activities, ensuring that accomplishments are not isolated events but
    parts of a larger trend of improved operational proficiency.
        Supporting Strategic Competition. Cyberspace is a domain in which
    opponents can attain strategic results without using armed force. Our
    adversaries in cyberspace are acting and taking risks in seeking to
    gain advantage without escalating to armed conflict; they are
    conducting campaigns to gain cumulative advantage (these include theft
    of intellectual property and personal information, malign influence and
    election interference, efforts to circumvent sanctions, and probes and
    positioning to threaten critical infrastructure).
        We see evidence of such cyber campaigns in many places, such as the
    foreign efforts to find vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense's
    Information Network. JFHQ-DODIN used its authorities to direct global
    Department of Defense network operations, security, and defense. By
    operationalizing the network sensors, they assessed effectiveness and
    risk through focused data analysis. This in turn helped improve the
    fidelity of our sensors and analytics, showing us the risks and the
    requirements for mitigation. The data JFHQ-DODIN collected in this
    effort proved that state-sponsored adversaries in cyberspace are
    conducting rapidly evolving campaigns to hamper the routine functions
    of the DODIN and to find seams in its defenses. DODIN protections are
    robust, but we must continue to innovate in our data collection and
    analysis to build resilience and counter the dynamic nature of
    adversary threats.
        In the face of strategic competition in cyberspace, USCYBERCOM
    brings unique advantages in planning, deconflicting, executing, and
    assessing cyberspace operations at-scale.
        Our efforts in defense of the 2018 elections taught us the value of
    persistent engagement to contest adversary campaigns, the power of
    enabling partners, and the ability to impose costs. The DOD Cyber
    Strategy notes we cannot afford inaction--our values, economy, and
    society are exposed and we must assertively respond at all levels.
    USCYBERCOM is working with the combatant commands, DHS, FBI, across the
    Intelligence Community, and in conjunction with private sector and
    foreign partners to improve understanding and act to contest and
    frustrate adversary cyber activities. Through persistent engagement we
    identify and close vulnerabilities in DOD networks, act to contest
    threats, and enable partners in building resilience and in the defense
    of the nation. These steps complement and support national efforts to
    prepare for conflict, to deter adversaries, and to establish cyber
    norms while we simultaneously support combatant commanders in
    contingency operations.
        Supporting the Combatant Commands and Establishing a Warfighting
    Ethos. A competitive mindset is needed to prevail in a deeply
    competitive domain. Such a mindset also helps us prepare to fight and
    win the nation's wars. To support combatant commanders and their
    missions we are engaged in a growing variety and number of activities,
    from planning to intelligence missions to operations in and through
    cyberspace. We bring to the combatant commands a wartime ethos
    reinforced by daily contact with cyber adversaries.
        Our cyberspace operations support kinetic and information
    operations against terrorists across several regions. We are employing
    cyber capabilities to improve force protection, bolster intelligence,
    understand and shape the information environment, and disrupt the
    operations, command and control, and propaganda of several insurgent
    and terrorist groups in support of United States Central Command
    (USCENTCOM), United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and United
    States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Cyberspace operations in
    places like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan today integrate and
    synchronize cyberspace and information operations with kinetic
    missions, with each enabling the other for offensive, force protection,
    and intelligence purposes. Our persistent engagement with this
    adversary for the past several years shows the continuing value of our
    command in being able to operate across all of these regions against
    the key enablers for these groups (e.g., media, finance, and foreign
    fighters). In this context, we have expanded the remit of our Joint
    Task Force Ares, and shifted its chain of command from Army Cyber
    Command to Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command while maintaining its
    principal task of operating against the Islamic State. JTF-Ares has
    also embarked on a special mission partnership with NSA to act together
    as a hub for whole-of-government cyber planning in the ongoing counter-
    terror fight (thus further demonstrating the value of the USCYBERCOM
    and NSA partnership).
        The maturation of the Cyber Mission Force has increased the number
    and proficiency of the cyber units working to protect the networks and
    weapons systems that combatant commands rely on to perform their
    missions. Each combatant commander controls organic Cyber Protection
    Teams (CPTs) that work in conjunction with local and regional
    cyberspace security providers and administrators. The expertise and
    databases at USCYBERCOM tie these teams together and greatly increase
    their collective power. US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and US
    Forces Korea have hosted frequent visits of our teams and experts to
    assist in surveying and hardening their military critical
    infrastructure in advance of any contingencies in East Asia and the
    Western Pacific. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has benefitted
    from similar assistance in support of its global operations and
    commitments. In Europe we assisted USEUCOM, NATO allies, and other
    partners to secure their networks from foreign interference. Finally,
    our efforts helped US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and USNORTHCOM in
    election security, border security, and disaster recovery efforts.
        Evolving national and departmental guidance creates opportunity for
    timely cyber operations in support of the combatant commands and in our
    role in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' global integration efforts.
    This includes both planning cyberspace operations support to trans-
    regional campaigns and prioritizing the allocation of high-demand, low-
    density cyber assets across the commands and in all phases of conflict.
    The Department and the Chairman have clarified the command and control
    of cyberspace forces, and in accord with this guidance we are building
    ``cyberspace operations integrated planning elements'' (CO-IPEs) at
    each combatant command.
        The new, Service-like authorities and responsibilities that
    USCYBERCOM gained as result of elevation are similar to those
    authorized for USSOCOM on behalf of the nation's Special Operations
    Forces. USCYBERCOM is the Department's Joint Force Provider and Joint
    Cyberspace Trainer for cyberspace forces. In these roles, we develop
    strategy, doctrine, and tactics; prepare and submit program
    recommendations and budget proposals; exercise authority, direction,
    and control over the expenditure of funds; validate requirements;
    establish priorities for requirements for cyberspace capabilities,
    forces, training, and operations; and ensure the inter-operability of
    equipment and forces. We are working with the Department to build
    approaches across the force and leverage these new responsibilities to
    better measure, access, and improve the quality and readiness of the
    entire cyber force.
        Improving Readiness. The rapidly evolving cyber domain makes
    achieving and maintaining force readiness a challenge. Similar to other
    Department forces, the readiness of our cyber forces can be understood
    as a two-part equation. First, we are evaluating the readiness of the
    teams that the Services (under their man, train, and equip missions)
    present to the Command. Second, we are studying the readiness of those
    teams to perform the missions they have been assigned by USCYBERCOM,
    something we refer to as ``mission posture.''
        The Cyber Mission Force completed its build in May 2018, and we
    started formally reporting team readiness in the Defense Readiness
    Reporting System (DRRS) shortly afterward. USCYBERCOM is working with
    the Services to ensure that they present cyber forces that meet a
    common, joint standard so that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines coming to the Command have proficiency with foundational
    cyberspace tools, techniques, and procedures. As part of that plan, the
    Services recently assumed the training mission for personnel in the CMF
    that USCYBERCOM (together with NSA) had overseen during the build. We
    are refining training curricula and standards, as well as simplifying
    and updating course requirements so we can ensure the right number
    complete their training with the appropriate skills.
        The second part of the equation--mission posture--is not as
    accurately reflected by traditional metrics. Thus we are developing
    metrics that go beyond those traditionally used in order to capture
    cyber-unique requirements such as authorities, accesses, capabilities,
    and intelligence. Such dependencies are not always measured in
    conventional DOD readiness reporting, yet they play a critical role in
    generating successful cyber operational outcomes. Our goal is to ensure
    operational proficiency in our CMF teams by taking an appropriately
    holistic view of readiness and applying resources to shortfalls.
    Working with the Services and the Department, we will develop and
    institutionalize the changes necessary for us to accurately measure and
    maintain team and mission readiness across the CMF.
        To help sustain an advanced cyber force, all of the Services are
    applying hiring and retention incentives (especially for high-demand,
    low-density skill sets) as well as utilizing the flexibility in
    managing talent that Congress recently granted us by authorizing the
    new Cyber Excepted Service. The retention of top talent--particularly
    in some critical, high-skill jobs--is a significant concern because it
    will be crucial to our continued success. We track attrition closely,
    as the competition with the private sector and other government
    agencies for talent will be an enduring challenge. An important element
    of building certain low-density skill sets, moreover, is outreach to
    and utilization of our Reserve Component.
        Underpinning our readiness are the operational lessons we learn
    from continuous operations in cyberspace. Operations in support of JTF-
    Ares and the counter-terrorism fight, the security of the 2018 midterm
    elections, and ongoing support to combatant commands across both the
    defensive and offensive mission sets, are improving our training,
    informing how we structure our teams, and indicating how best to employ
    our capabilities and teams.
        Enhancing Partnerships. Securing the nation in cyberspace requires
    whole-of-nation efforts and effective collaboration with allies. It is
    a priority for USCYBERCOM to expand its ability to collaborate
    effectively with other government agencies, the private sector,
    academia, and allies. We must do this because they directly and
    indirectly complement and enhance our warfighting capabilities; indeed,
    enabling our partners is a key element of persistent engagement. We are
    working with a range of partners who support, enable, and assist our
    operations.
        The National Security Agency is our most important partner; the
    strength of this relationship will remain critical to the defense of
    the nation. The Agency's world-class expertise, technical capabilities,
    and accesses are crucial to USCYBERCOM's success. The USCYBERCOM-NSA
    relationship is proving mutually beneficial as the Command has matured.
    Indeed, I believe the speed and agility that USCYBERCOM and NSA
    demonstrated in joint operations to defend last fall's elections is
    evidence of the mission benefit of unity of effort and direction, the
    close proximity between USCYBERCOM and NSA, and our joint focus on
    outcomes for the defense of the nation.
        USCYBERCOM works daily with partners in DHS, FBI, and other federal
    agencies, sharing information and intelligence, as the U.S. Government
    furthers efforts to work even more effectively with the private sector.
    Since May 2018 we have worked to broaden these ties, both at the
    leadership and the action-officer levels. I have mentioned last fall's
    whole-of-government effort to defend the mid-term elections, but our
    collaboration with interagency partners is continuous and far broader.
    We interact constantly with the US Coast Guard's cyber forces and have
    Coast Guard senior officers integrated in USCYBERCOM. In addition, the
    CYBER GUARD exercise last year included USCYBERCOM, DHS and FBI
    elements practicing a whole-of-government response to an incident
    involving the nation's critical infrastructure.
        We see growing partnerships with industry (particularly in critical
    infrastructure sectors like energy and finance) as a natural extension
    of such relationships. Working with the DOD-Chief Information Officer
    and NSA, USCYBERCOM has developed a Pathfinder program with DHS,
    sector-specific agencies, and select critical infrastructure partners
    to share threat information, conduct collaborative analysis of
    vulnerabilities and threats, and mitigate those risks. This whole-of-
    nation collaboration is crucial to our ability to deter or defeat
    strategic threats to US national interests and infrastructure. This is
    a complex mission in both technical and policy terms, in part because
    our work in this field occurs at the request of and in collaboration
    with Federal government partners, particularly DHS and FBI. Recent
    changes to our policy guidance--especially those crafted in agreements
    with these and other agencies--have brought clarity to this process. By
    partnering with DHS, FBI, and sector-specific agencies we are building
    persistent presence to improve the resilience and the defense of our
    Nation's critical infrastructure.
        USCYBERCOM has been active with current and prospective foreign
    partners, especially countries contemplating or building their own
    cyber forces. We have integrees from our ``Five Eyes'' partners
    (including a Canadian brigadier general) on the Command staff.
    USCYBERCOM in fiscal year 2018 conducted bilateral cyber exercises with
    France, Estonia, and Japan, while two dozen countries sent observers to
    our annual CYBER FLAG exercise last June. We also provided advanced
    training to a FVEY partner via our first Foreign Military Sales case,
    and provided defensive operations guidance to Singapore. Lastly, we
    maintain robust operational relationships with a variety of
    international partners in the continued fight against violent extremist
    organizations globally.
        We are building strategic depth in our cyber forces with assistance
    from the Reserve Component, and in so doing are assisting the whole-of-
    nation effort to secure our networks. Reservists serve in positions
    across our headquarters staff, the Cyber Mission Force, and our Service
    cyber components, as well as playing vital roles in our exercises and
    training for defending critical infrastructure. Indeed, our Reserve
    strategy seeks innovative ways to utilize the Reserve Component in
    unique missions. Finally, Reserve Component personnel not only bring
    important skill sets to USCYBERCOM, they also enhance our efforts to
    create cybersecurity coalitions of public and private partners,
    particularly with industry innovators.
        Our engagement with the National Guard Bureau and the 54 state and
    territorial Adjutant Generals is continuous. We created a framework for
    DOD to sponsor access to classified information for National Guard
    personnel supporting local and state election systems while in a State
    Active Duty status (this was done in coordination with DHS and the
    National Guard Bureau). We are also exploring options with the National
    Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), which fosters trust with foreign
    militaries through bilateral engagements with roughly 70 partner
    nations. While our Command develops our global partnerships in the
    cyberspace domain, my intent is to work through the geographic
    combatant commands in growing theater security cooperation efforts.
        Deploying Infrastructure. The Command depends on innovative cyber
    tools and capabilities in crafting strategic and tactical options for
    senior leaders. The DOD Chief Information Officer and the Services are
    making necessary investments, in both funding and in finding the right
    people to develop and maintain cyber tools and capabilities. These
    Service investments need to continue and be balanced against global
    mission requirements. Such investments feature the right mix of
    capabilities for USCYBERCOM to achieve its readiness goals and generate
    successful mission outcomes.
        Our cyberspace forces require a comprehensive, integrated
    cyberspace architecture to achieve and sustain the insight, agility,
    and lethality necessary for maintaining competitive advantage against
    near-peer adversaries. Over the past year we have developed the Joint
    Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) to guide capability development
    priorities to this end. The JCWA has five elements: common firing
    platforms at our four cyber operating locations (each operated and
    employed by our Service cyber components) using a comprehensive suite
    of cyber tools; a ``Unified Platform'' for integrating and analyzing
    data from both offensive and defensive operations with intelligence and
    partners (including the private sector); joint command and control
    mechanisms for situational awareness and battle management at the
    strategic, operational and tactical levels; sensors that support
    defense of the network and drive operational decisions; and a
    Persistent Cyber Training Environment where teams can train and even
    rehearse missions under realistic conditions. The JCWA is not a fixed
    future state, but rather an adapting set of capabilities continually
    evolving along with technological change, operational outcomes, and
    shifting threats. The Department has leveraged the architecture to make
    critical JCWA program investments that, when realized, will allow us to
    not only gain advantage in competition with cyber adversaries, but also
    to fight and win in conflict.
        Acquisition authorities are also a critical enabler for us. I thank
    this Committee and Congress for extending our tailored acquisition
    authority through fiscal year 2025, and will work with the Department
    to implement and recommend refinements. That extension allows us to
    craft more contract actions under our current authorities rather than
    having to leverage existing contracts held by other partners. In fiscal
    year 2018 we executed 32 contract actions totaling $43 million, and we
    could reach as much as $75 million in this fiscal year. Our acquisition
    priorities include the geographically distributed set of redundant and
    reliable infrastructures noted above as well as a virtual arsenal of
    capabilities (comprising both open-source and high-end tools);
    implementation of cloud and engineering services in support of a big
    data platform; foundational architecture portions of the Command's
    continuous monitoring capabilities; and a competitive cyber tool
    contract. Cyber tools can be highly perishable, unlike conventional
    munitions, but they are also like munitions in that, as they are
    expended, we must continuously invest in their development and
    procurement.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of U.S. Cyber
    Command. Your continued support is vital to the work we do, both to
    enable our partners and to act in cyberspace on behalf of our Nation.
    USCYBERCOM made significant progress in the past year. We have been
    elevated to a combatant command and are maturing in our new
    responsibilities. All of our Cyber Mission Force teams are built and,
    in conjunction with the Services, we are working to enhance and sustain
    their readiness. The Department is investing in essential operational
    infrastructure and is committing additional resources to build the
    Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture that the Command needs. Enabled by
    new law, policy, and mission guidance, we are conducting operations
    every day--both to support combatant commands and forces engaged
    overseas, and to contest cyber adversaries in defense of the nation.
    Persistent engagement initiatives, like the operations conducted in
    partnership across government, with allies, and with the private sector
    in defense of the 2018 elections, will cumulatively impose cost on our
    adversaries and change their risk calculus for future operations.
        Looking ahead, the work we have done to date may soon seem both
    crucial and preliminary. We are in continuous daily contact in
    cyberspace with capable adversaries determined to erode our Nation's
    strategic advantages. Our efforts to act against them and to enable our
    partner combatant commands, government agencies, and allies have helped
    to defend our Nation and its interests. Those efforts, however, must
    rapidly become more agile, more capable, and more sustainable. My
    vision for the Command encompasses a continuous role for our forces in
    making our fellow combatant commands and our whole-of-nation partners
    even more effective in competition with adversaries and in preparing
    for and acting in conflict.
        We have much work ahead, of course, and your continued endorsement
    and assistance are both necessary and gratefully appreciated. Our
    people are superb. They merit your trust, and, with your support,
    USCYBERCOM will continue to meet every challenge, in both competition
    and conflict.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Nakasone.
        First of all, I think we've all pretty much decided that
    this Commission, the National Defense Strategy Commission, is
    kind of the blueprint that we are using in this Committee. To
    start this off, let me address the two levels of threats that
    we're talking about.
        First, of course, the level of threat would be the peer
    competition that we have out there; then the terrorist element
    that's out there. It's very alive today.
        So, starting off with, maybe, a response from both Generals
    on the first one, how can SOCOM and CYBERCOM most effectively
    support our efforts against China and Russia? Talk a little bit
    about any deficiencies, in terms of resources, that you would
    be suffering in order to carry out these goals.
        General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Chairman, you highlight, at the outset, the
    challenge is to maintain the focus on the counter-violent-
    extremist effort while shifting to the focus of the National
    Defense Strategy. I would tell you that it's burdensome, in
    terms of resources, but something that we can and will manage,
    going forward. I'm lucky, on two accounts. One, my predecessors
    had already focused on Russia and China as emerging threats,
    before the National Defense Strategy, and had already committed
    resources to that effort. So, I appreciate the investment that
    preceded me. I also appreciate some new authorities that have
    developed in this house which have enabled us to approach this
    problem differently, but similarly to the way that we
    approached the counterterrorism problem. So, resources that
    enable some unique, unorthodox approaches to peer competitors,
    especially in that space that we call ``competition short of
    conflict''--a big arm wave, but arguably, the most important
    phase of deterrence.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Thank you.
        General Nakasone.
        General Nakasone. Chairman, in terms of our ability for
    near-peer or peer competitors, our most important thing right
    now is to be able to enable our partners, whether or not those
    partners are Joint Force commanders in cyberspace or those
    partners are other members of the interagency. Our work with
    the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation is an exemplar, I think, of the enabling aspect
    that we will do against near-peer competitors.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Nakasone. I would also offer that the Fiscal Year
    2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at
    U.S. Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities
    that were important for us as we look to further enable. That
    included the ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our
    force to the Department of Homeland Security, the ability for
    us to look at networks that are not part of the Department of
    Defense network. The other piece of it that was critical, as
    Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is the idea of cyber as a
    traditional military activity. I think those are areas that are
    going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.
        In terms of our shortfalls and our challenges, the areas
    that we are very focused on is continuing to ensure that the
    force that has been built, the force that is ready, the force
    that will operate has the required infrastructure--the sensors,
    the locations, the capabilities--to address a number of
    different threats to our Nation.
        Senator Inhofe. Appreciate that.
        I'm going to read a quote from Dan Coats and ask for a
    response, Secretary West and General Thomas. He said, ``ISIS
    still commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it
    maintains eight branches, more than a dozen networks, and
    thousands of dispersed supporters around the world, and will
    exploit any reduction in CT pressure to rebuild key
    capabilities, such as media production and external
    operations.'' Do you agree with that? Let's start with you, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary West. Mr. Chairman, I do.
        Senator Inhofe. General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I do. But, I would add, in
    context, we have crushed the physical caliphate, so the terrain
    that ISIS formerly maintained a sanctuary from where they drew
    their resources--specifically, oil resources--has been badly
    diminished, but they continue to be a threat. I agree with the
    scope of the assessment, as provided by the Director of
    National Intelligence (DNI).
        Senator Inhofe. We get a variety of reports, in terms of
    the effectiveness of ISIS, al Qaeda, and the various other
    terrorist operations. We want to make sure that everyone
    understands, yes, that peer competitors are important, but so
    is the other.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        First, let me join General Thomas in thanking and
    commending Command Sergeant Major McCauley for your service.
    Thank you. We all recognize the noncommissioned officers in
    every service are the backbone and I think, the winning edge
    that we have. So, thank you.
        Secretary West and General Thomas, if you could elaborate
    on the challenges that still face you in implementing section
    922, that would be very helpful to us and, if anything that we
    can do to help make section 922 the whole issue of creating a
    service-like Secretary under the ADS SOLIC.
        So, Secretary West, please.
        Secretary West. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Well, section 922 has certainly reinvigorated our
    relationship, but it's also very timely, because our basic task
    is to help institutionalize USSOCOM within the Joint Force and
    in the Pentagon while keeping its unique attributes. But, it
    also has come along simultaneously with the National Defense
    Strategy. This year, General Thomas and I have cosigned four
    separate letters, one of which was to align SOCOM's fiscal
    strategy to achieve the NDS. This body has been very
    supportive. I think we are very adequately supported. I think
    the task is really left up to us to slowly build this business
    and achieve our objectives.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Thomas, your comments.
        General Thomas. Senator Reed, I noted at the outset that
    Owen referred to me as his teammate, which I appreciate,
    because, technically, he's my boss. In legislation, as you
    know, affected by this last year, with one of my hats on for
    the man, train, and equip, service-like responsibilities, he is
    literally in my chain of command, and we have embraced that,
    going away. I think that actually integrates us with the
    Department more optimally. Conceptually, we've certainly been
    able to drive the relationship, I think, to a much more
    enlightened level. I hope that it continues to evolve. I think
    ASD SOLIC provides a critical function for us, for integration
    with the Department. Again, it's been a pleasure working with
    Owen as we've developed out what I think your intent was.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, again, thank you for your service,
    particularly your great efforts with respect to the last
    election and looking forward to the next one. One of the areas
    is social media. We've talked about it, and you've talked about
    it with the Intelligence Committee. There were two independent
    reports commissioned by the Senate Intelligence Committee that
    looked at social media, not just particular platforms, but the
    cross-movement of information on these platforms. Do you think
    it would be helpful having studies like this for your use?
    Should we contemplate trying to provide you the authority to do
    that?
        General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. What we found with
    those reports is that they provided a window on the adversary
    that we hadn't seen. As you know, our focus on foreign
    intelligence is outside the United States, so that we were able
    to capture that. But, having the reports that were done, in
    terms of what was done within the United States, was very, very
    helpful, in terms of being able to understand exactly what our
    adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our Nation.
        Senator Reed. So, if we could somehow institutionalize
    that--maybe the proper format might be through the Intelligence
    Committee, but those reports are useful to you and complement
    your direct activities.
        General Nakasone. Those reports certainly provided a window
    on our adversary that was very telling.
        Senator Reed. One of the issues that came in the context of
    social media is, will they voluntarily take steps that are
    appropriate and necessary? Now, my understanding is that they
    do take down sites that have been identified. But, I also don't
    think they identify to the consumer that these sites were
    either fraudulent or malign. Is it something that they should
    be doing, in your view?
        General Nakasone. Senator, what we were able to do was
    declassify information about our adversaries, and pass that
    through the National Security Agency to the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation. The FBI specifically worked with those social
    media companies. So, I would defer to the Bureau, in terms of
    its ability to do what you had stated there.
        Senator Reed. Fine.
        Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thomas, thank you for your service to this country,
    and congratulations on your retirement.
        General Nakasone, thank you for your service to the
    country, as well.
        Over the years, many have talked about deterring
    adversaries in cyberspace, and the broader question of cyber
    deterrence is often compared to nuclear deterrence. I've said
    this before. I don't think that's a good comparison at all. You
    made a similar point in a recent article, where you argued that
    deterrence in cyberspace results from the employment of cyber
    capabilities, not the threat of employing them, something you
    describe as persistent engagement. You mentioned, earlier, that
    this Committee and the White House have provided CYBERCOM with
    additional authority in the past year. Can you tell us what
    impact those changes have had?
        General Nakasone. Senator, a year ago, I appeared before
    this Committee for my confirmation hearings. In that year, let
    me just trace, I think, the major elements that have helped our
    Command be able to be more effective.
        First of all, our National Strategy on Cyberspace, the
    Department's Strategy on Cyber Posture Review. Then, the key
    piece that I would offer is the Fiscal Year 2019 National
    Defense Authorization Act. That recognized cyber as a
    traditional military activity, that provided us the baseline of
    being able to operate outside of our Department networks and
    the idea that we would enable other elements of our
    interagency. Tremendously helpful, and then I would say the
    last piece is the work of the President to bring a new policy
    to bear, in terms of how we operated offensively in cyberspace.
        Senator Fischer. Have you been able to put your theory of
    persistent engagement into action?
        General Nakasone. Senator, we have. Our number-one priority
    was the defense of the midterm elections. We utilized all of
    those capabilities, those strategies, and our new operational
    concept, persistent engagement, to ensure a secure and safe
    election.
        Senator Fischer. I appreciated your classified briefing on
    that the other day. I think it was very helpful for Members to
    hear that.
        Is it your view that imposing costs on adversaries through
    persistent engagement--is that going to have a deterrence
    effect? Or do you think there is any connection between a cyber
    deterrent and also a nuclear deterrent? I saw you shake your
    head when I mentioned that in my opening to your question.
        General Nakasone. Senator, I would offer that my view on
    nuclear deterrence is much different than on the idea of cyber
    engagement and being able to prevent our adversaries from
    accomplishing their goals. As I mentioned, in nuclear
    deterrence, the power that a nation-state has is through the
    threat of the use of the weapons. What we're seeing in
    cyberspace is, our adversaries are operating below a level of
    armed conflict every single day to steal our intellectual
    property, to leverage our personally identifiable information,
    to challenge our institutions. This is where I believe being
    able to operate either to enable other elements of the
    interagency or operate outside of our national borders against
    our adversaries is important.
        Senator Fischer. I would say, from your comments, and you
    can correct me on this, but that you don't believe, then, that
    cyber is a substitution for the deterrence that we achieve
    through our nuclear enterprise.
        General Nakasone. I believe that cyber is, overall, one
    element that our Nation is going to use to achieve deterrent
    effects against our adversaries, but there are other elements,
    other powers of our Nation that we will also bear on
    adversaries that attempt to operate below this level of armed
    conflict.
        Senator Fischer. Last year, I discussed the adequacy of the
    size of the Cyber Mission Force with your predecessor, and he
    testified that, ``We're probably going to need some level of
    additional capacity over time. That's something I'll be talking
    to my successor about. I think that it's going to be a key
    thing for him during his time in command.'' So, how adequate do
    you believe the size of the force is compared to the threat
    that we are seeing today? How do you measure force adequacy?
        General Nakasone. Senator, as we measure our readiness
    against what we consider a number of different adversaries,
    primarily both near-peer and rogue states, we believe that the
    teams that we've created right now is the building block for
    that. We are also, as you know, building a series of defensive
    teams in the Army Reserve and the National Guard that are going
    to be a strategic depth for us.
        My sense, as we continue to operate more, as our
    adversaries continue to improve, is that there will be
    requirements that will probably be outside the 133 teams that
    we have right now.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thomas, when we had the new overall National
    Defense and Security Strategies that put more focus on near-
    peer competitors or peer competitors, there was a implicit
    hydraulic effect that efforts were going to go up on the
    conventional peer competitor, and down on counter terrorism
    (CT). Do you see any reduction in the CT threat around the
    world? The hydraulic effect, it seems to me, is not a good
    idea, because the CT threat is still there, is it not?
        General Thomas. Senator, I think the CT threat is in the
    throes of transformation. As I mentioned, this time last year,
    we had just taken Raqqa, the capital of the caliphate, but we
    still had substantial maneuver operations and challenges to
    push through to the destruction and the defeat of the physical
    caliphate. We're much closer now. Somebody played it out to me
    the other day that if you wanted to put a grasp on it in
    physical terms, it's twice the size of the base where I'm
    stationed, MacDill Air Force Base, which is tiny. So, they are
    down to the last dozens of square kilometers, in terms of
    physical----
        Senator King. But, the CT threat between 2001 and 2011
    wasn't measured in territory, it was in terrorist threat. So,
    that's still there, isn't it?
        General Thomas. You're correct. I would offer that, in our
    efforts to defeat ISIS, we have also greatly diminished their
    ability to export the threat to the United States and to our
    Western allies. In, though, the throes of this transformation
    right now, they still are very dangerous, and I could highlight
    the specific groups that we consider to be external threats to
    the United States that are truly our focus. We're staying on
    them.
        Senator King. There is a growing CT threat in Afghanistan,
    is there not?
        General Thomas. Sir, I wouldn't label it as growing. In
    fact, we've made huge progress against the Islamic State in
    Iraq and Syria-Khorason Province (ISIS-K), which is the primary
    external threat in Afghanistan. More regional instability in
    Afghanistan is of late, but not in the form of external
    threats.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, you've described the progress that you've
    made in this year. I'm on my way, from here, to a hearing on
    the security of the electric grid in the Energy and Natural
    Resources Committee. It seems to me this is a classic case of
    cross-jurisdiction. Please describe your relationship of
    CYBERCOM and NSA to FBI, DHS, and utilities. How do we be sure
    that what you know and are able to do is protecting us, because
    you don't have jurisdiction within the United States?
        General Nakasone. Senator, for the energy sector, the lead
    for the securing of that critical infrastructure is the
    Department of Homeland Security. They work very, very closely
    with the sector-specific lead, which is the Department of
    Energy. We tie in on the U.S. Cyber Command side, providing
    enabling support to the Department of Energy and the Department
    of Homeland Security, if requested. Right now, what we are
    doing is sharing information, sharing information very clearly
    about what we know about foreign adversaries that may be
    attempting to get----
        Senator King. Do you share that information with the
    utilities or----
        General Nakasone. We share that with the Department of
    Homeland Security and, specifically, Department of Energy.
        Senator King. Let me ask about structure, sharing of
    information. Is there a regular structure? Is there an
    organizational chart of these relationships, where you meet
    regularly, or is it sort of ad hoc?
        General Nakasone. We have put into place within the
    Department of Defense a pathfinder program to look at this
    element. We've established a regular meeting with the sector
    security agent, which is the Department of Energy, working with
    them and the Department of Homeland Security to share that
    information regularly.
        Senator King. Finally, you've talked with Senator Fischer
    somewhat about deterrence, and you're talking about a
    persistent engagement, which is, in effect, telling the
    adversary we're there. The question is, how do we change their
    calculus? Is your theory of persistent engagement--I think you
    used the term ``engagement, presence, and pressure, or
    innovation'' intended, and will it change an adversary's
    calculus when they come to decide whether to launch a
    cyberattack on our electric grid or a financial system or
    elections?
        General Nakasone. Senator, we think it will, through two
    different means. One is through building resilience, in terms
    of what we're able to provide to our partners and their
    knowledge of our adversaries, but, two, also imposing a cost on
    our adversary.
        Senator King. That's what I want to hear about.
        General Nakasone. Yes. So, the ability either to be able to
    identify where they're operating from, the tools that they're
    using, to be able to provide that cost that the adversary has
    to think twice, in terms of, ``can they conduct and exploit or
    attack against our critical infrastructure?
        Senator King. But, the calculus is, can they do it? But,
    shouldn't there be a calculus, if they do it, they will be
    responded to in a forceful way?
        General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. I think that comes
    not only with cyber, but also all the elements of our Nation
    that can be brought to bear on that adversary.
        Senator King. I think that's important, and it doesn't have
    to be cyber-for-cyber.
        General Nakasone. Right.
        Senator King. It can be other elements of national power.
        Thank you very much, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Assistant Secretary West, many of us on the Committee are
    working through the President's decision to withdraw forces
    from Syria. It appears there's a fair amount of work to be done
    there. I'd just like to know, from your perspective and from a
    SOF perspective, how would you characterize victory in Syria,
    winning in Syria? What does that look like, and what do you
    need to get there?
        Secretary West. Sir, I'd be cautious to use the word
    ``victory,'' but I think it's very important not to diminish
    what has happened there. As General Thomas said, the physical
    caliphate did, at one time, attract over 40,000 foreign
    fighters into that territory, from 100 different countries.
    They can no longer do that. But, this will be a very long war.
    ISIS is quite expansive, in terms of its global territory, but
    it now becomes an insurgency.
        Senator Hawley. General Thomas, let me just ask you the
    same question. What does winning look like in Syria? Have we
    won? I mean, are we satisfied with where we are, in terms of
    SOF's mission there and what you feel that you've been tasked
    to accomplish?
        General Thomas. Senator, again, I'd be hesitant to use the
    term ``winning,'' as opposed to the objective. I think our
    reasonable objective is to reduce the threat in that area, and
    to be able to maintain persistent capability so that an
    external threat cannot emanate from that area in the future.
        Having said that, Syria is perhaps the most complex
    battlespace that I've experienced in 40 years. My recent trip
    out there had our forces operating in and around Syrian regime
    forces, Russian forces, Turks and their surrogates, Iranian
    Revolutionary Guard forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and ISIS.
    Again, an incredibly complex environment that I think, again,
    the objective is to reduce the threat and be able to maintain
    some sort of sustainable security there.
        Senator Hawley. On that point about reaching a point where
    the external threat can't emanate from that region, are you
    satisfied, General, that we're at that point, where an external
    threat from VEOs cannot emanate from Syria? I mean, do you
    think we've accomplished that objective?
        General Thomas. I do not think we're there yet. We're on
    the verge of diminishing the threat, and then in the process of
    determining what residual capability needs to remain in place
    in the region to ensure that we're securing that objective.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you, General, about recruiting
    and retention. You talk about this in your prepared testimony.
    You talk a lot about the significant strain on SOF over the
    doubling of the size of the force and the significant
    deployment demands. Tell me about where you think we are, in
    terms of recruitment, retention, what additional tools or help
    that you need to make sure that your force is ready, is rested,
    is healthy, and is getting everything they need to be able to
    do the very significant and demanding and dangerous work we ask
    them to do.
        General Thomas. Senator, over the years, we have aspired to
    grow the Special Operations Force that the Nation needs, but
    have not dropped standards at all, so it's a little bit of a
    Catch 22 here. Part of our mantra is, you can't create this in
    a hurry, and people are our most important asset. We have had
    challenges, of late. I attribute them to a number of causes, as
    much the downsizing of the Army, specifically, for recruiting
    Special Forces, but there are some very good initiatives in
    place to rectify that and to try and address our recruiting
    shortcoming. So, I think we're trending in the right direction,
    but it has been challenging over the last year to 2 years, in
    terms of getting the numbers in that we would like to have, but
    cognizant of the fact we're not going to drop standards.
        Senator Hawley. Is it your sense, General--and then I'll
    put the same question to you, Secretary West--but, starting
    with you, General, is it your sense that, under the NDS and the
    new reprioritization of great-power conflict, that demands on
    SOF will be the same, or will increase? I mean, what's your
    sense of it as you think about your posturing and your needs
    under the NDS? What do you see about the demands for the forces
    that you command?
        General Thomas. I think, department-wide, we all can take
    away that the NDS highlights there's not going to be a respite,
    in terms of national security challenges. You know, we've had
    an 18-year ongoing struggle, the longest struggle in the
    history of the United States. That has not come to a conclusion
    yet. We have some work left to do there. We've had the
    reemergence of peer competitors as a priority, an existential
    threat and clearly the focus for the Department. So, we share
    that across the Department. I get pretty good guidance from the
    Department, in terms of where they want me, in terms of
    priorities and effects as a part of the Joint Force, and we
    manage that. As global combatant commanders that provide forces
    to the six geographic combatant commands, Paul's and my daily
    challenge, but it's one we embrace.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here today.
        You oversee a directorate and combatant commands that
    operate not in just one geographic area of responsibility
    (AOR), but also in the most austere environments around the
    world. The men and women you lead are often the first in
    battle, and the heroism and dedication are not fully understood
    by elected leaders and the American public. So, I'm very
    appreciative of the opportunity to hear from each of you about
    the state of your Commands and the challenges and opportunities
    you face.
        So, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank General
    Thomas for his 38 years of service as you come to the end of
    your time in uniform. I really wish you the best of luck on
    your next phase of your career.
        Since the Committee began hearing testimony from military
    leadership this year, much of the conversation has been about
    ensuring that our forces are lethal and agile so that they
    provide a credible deterrent, reducing the probability of armed
    conflict with our peer adversaries. Yet, Special Operations and
    Cyber Forces are uniquely tailored and trained to achieve
    effects against our adversaries in a variety of situations that
    are just short of war, itself. Could each of you briefly
    discuss, conceptually, how Special Operations and Cyber Forces
    can exact a toll for malign activities, short of supporting
    armed conflict? In your opinion, what kind of restructuring
    with the Special Operations and cyber communities will they
    need to do in order to dominate these gray-space conflicts?
        Secretary West. Thank you, Senator. Certainly, you're
    correct, in that the nature of war doesn't change, but its
    character has changed radically in the last 15 years. I'll let
    General Nakasone take on the cyber portion.
        In terms of the Special Operations tactics, where SOF
    traditionally thrives, we're also seeing the enemy employ
    these. I'll let General Thomas talk specifics on operations.
    But, when we talk about competition short of armed conflict,
    dealing with partner nations, problems that need to be quickly
    and agilely solved in a cheap manner, you're really talking
    about SOF. So, there's a real role for that, that General
    Thomas will be able to describe.
        General Thomas. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your
    service, as well.
        Senator, we're actually very excited about the opportunity
    that the NDS and the specific subject of competition short of
    conflict offers for us and in conjunction with Paul and others,
    in terms of winning that critical phase, and winning, in that
    case, is not a defeat moniker that applies. It's to disrupt,
    deny, and really, ensure that our U.S. policies and objectives
    are pursued and successful. We think it's a combination of
    information operations, influence operations, partner capacity,
    cyber operations, in conjunction with Paul, the whole array of,
    nonkinetic activities that are really an art form that we're
    excited to employ in the future. We hope to play a substantial
    role there.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, on Tuesday, Admiral Davidson highlighted
    to this Committee the need to enhance the cyber defenses of our
    logistical networks, which touched the commercial industry that
    we help contract for support, both in the United States and
    overseas. Can you provide examples of what might be affected
    and how we might be able to harden the network when it comes to
    organizations such as U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)?
    We have this long logistical tail that must support our forces,
    no matter where they're operate, and I feel like they are
    sometimes the most vulnerable, and we overlook--those
    organizations. How does TRANSCOM fit into your priority for
    cybersecurity?
        General Nakasone. Senator, General Lyons and I have not
    only had discussions about this at Transportation Command, but
    I've also been out to visit him. We see the ability for us to
    project our strategic elements in the world as being something
    that's uniquely suited for our Nation and a tremendous
    capacity. What we are doing at U.S. Cyber Command is ensuring
    that we understand the networks that he has to operate on, the
    platforms that he is utilizing, and, most importantly, the
    data, because it's that data that we want to make sure that we
    can secure.
        The challenge you point out is making sure that we have
    enabled our partners. These partners are oftentimes private-
    sector partners that we work with, the Department of Homeland
    Security, and other sectors, to ensure that they have the
    information upon which they understand the threats to them and
    they can build more resilient networks and protect their own
    data.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    here today.
        General Thomas, let's start with Syria. We've talked a
    little bit about the state of the fight there and the great
    advances our troops have made, and a little bit about what will
    happen when our troops depart Syria. One thing that's been on
    my mind is all the bad guys that are currently being detained
    in Syria. Some of your colleagues have testified before the
    Committee that that number would go into the hundreds. We don't
    have to be any more specific here in this setting. They've also
    testified that, while some of those detainees are front-line,
    untrained cannon fodder, some of them are also external
    operation plotters and master bombmakers and other really bad
    guys. Is that your understanding, as well?
        General Thomas. Senator, without getting into the specifics
    on the numbers, it's actually closer to a thousand than it is
    hundreds already in detention, with potentially more to come. A
    huge area of concern for us is that they're being maintained by
    the non-nation-state that's otherwise known as the Syrian
    Democratic Forces (SDF). So, how we resolve these mostly
    foreign-fighter detentions from, I lost count, but it's in the
    dozens of countries that have contributed to it--but, how we
    reduce this, that threat, and have those people properly
    detained and handled over time is of paramount importance right
    now for the problem.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah, how are we going to do that?
        General Thomas. A pretty aggressive action right now,
    Senator, ongoing with State Department and with other partner
    nations to specifically reduce that threat. I'll give kudos to
    some of the countries, a surprising number of countries who
    have recently stepped up, some of the smaller countries that
    had capacity challenges, but that have, nonetheless assumed the
    burden--or started to assume the burden. We, with State
    Department, primarily, are trying to assist them in reducing
    this problem.
        Senator Cotton. I know it's not in your area of operations,
    but we have empty beds at Guantanamo Bay, don't we?
        General Thomas. Yes, Senator, we still do.
        Senator Cotton. Maybe we should consider that for some of
    those really bad guys in Syria.
        While we're talking about Syria, let's contrast Syria and
    Afghanistan, or specifically Afghanistan against some of the
    other places where we have a serious terrorism threat. The
    President said, a couple of weeks ago, that we're going to have
    troops in Iraq for a while, in part because we need to watch
    the counterterrorism (CT) threat there and the threat of Iran.
    That's right next to Syria, in places like Yemen and Somalia.
    We obviously have freedom of action in the seas for a lot of
    your troopers. Contrast the CT mission that we have in
    Afghanistan, which I think, is 800 or 900 miles from the
    nearest sea, and the challenge that we would face there if we
    significantly drew down our troop presence in the conventional
    forces, for your forces and Special Operations.
        General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Truthfully, we look at it
    in a global context. So, in Afghanistan, as Senator King
    pursued earlier, the external threat adversaries have been
    greatly diminished, and we're focused on them specifically.
    There's a larger counterinsurgency effort that you know is into
    its 18th year, but with a specific focus to support Ambassador
    Khalilzad's efforts to drive that into reconciliation. So, a
    distinctly different problem, but correlated, in terms of the
    global threat and their connectivity.
        Senator Cotton. It would be hard to get after those
    terrorist organizations, though, in Afghanistan, for your
    troops, if we didn't have some kind of physical presence in
    Afghanistan, isn't that right?
        General Thomas. Senator, access and placement are key, and,
    again, something you can't establish in a hurry, necessarily,
    if you leave it. I probably failed to answer Senator King's
    question earlier. The way we look at the current context is
    very similar to 2011. The recent annual assessment we did
    reflects upon 2011, when al Qaeda in Iraq was badly down, but
    not out, and we pulled out of Iraq at that point. We know that,
    in less than 2-years' time, they were ISIS, running the deck
    through Nineveh, running the deck through Anbar. So, how we
    finish that threat, or at least contain it, going forward, is a
    critical concern.
        Senator Cotton. What's true of our troops is true of enemy
    forces, as well, right? It helps them to have a safe, secure
    physical base from which they can carefully plot attacks
    outside of that base?
        General Thomas. Yes, Senator, they thrive on sanctuary, and
    they're actively seeking sanctuary right now if they lose their
    toehold in Syria and other places.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General Thomas.
        General Nakasone, a quick question about the 5G network.
    We've discussed this many times before. What is the status of
    your conversations with counterparts around the world to the
    threat that Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, pose to our
    telecommunications networks?
        General Nakasone. Senator, for fifth-generation wireless,
    on U.S. Cyber Command, we have certainly talked with our
    partners and our allies with that. In terms of the Director of
    National Security Agency, of which I am, we have also worked
    that to the Department of State as they've made engagements
    with our allies throughout the world.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        My time is expired.
        General Thomas, I don't think you'll be appearing here
    before us again. You are smiling at that, I can tell. I want to
    thank you and thank your wife, Barbara, for many years of
    carrying the rucksack of responsibility for our Nation. You
    have more than earned the opportunity and the privilege to pass
    it on to the next man.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to all of you.
        General Thomas, I offer my congratulations, as well.
        I want to ask you a question--and the others may want to
    chime in, too--about an important aspect of our military
    operations, which is building partner capacity. As I've
    traveled in Armed Service Congressional Delegations (CODELs),
    I've often been struck very positively by the response of our
    allies to the partner capacity we do with them all over the
    globe. There was a CRS study--Congressional Research Service
    study--in 2016 that kind of analyzed about 20 instances of
    building partner capacity. Its conclusion was that the results
    are sort of mixed, in terms of effect. I've always viewed the
    partner-capacity issues, whether we're doing work in the field
    in other nations, or bringing foreign military leaders here to
    go to the Army War College, or other institutions, as it's
    great to build strong relationships; you build them with young
    officers, and later they might be a Minister of Defense or even
    a Prime Minister or President. But, as you are finishing your
    time, your lengthy career, what are the sort of metrics we
    should be looking at in the build-partner-capacity investments
    we make through DOD to see whether they're successful or not?
    Just share, kind of, lessons learned on that, please.
        General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Great question.
        I guess my first point of reflection is how drastically
    different the approach to partner capacity and, really,
    partners is from when I first started. It had very little to
    any contact points. Established relationships were checkered.
    Often, when countries were deemed to have behaved badly, the
    first point of separation was to separate International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) schooling and things
    like that. It is of great difficulty to keep partners close and
    to work their capacity if you don't have the point of contact.
        Over the years, the establishment and the expansion of our
    contacts and true partners has been extraordinary, and I tell
    our younger officers, ``You're in a period of time of
    international relations and partners that I didn't grow up in.
    Please don't lose sight of the potential.''
        To your point on success, though, we should assess,
    constantly, what's the return on investment for these, various
    efforts. Again, I think the report card's better than,
    probably, the American public knows, and it's both with
    established nations, and the Russia threat's a good case in
    point. We've had persistent presence in every country in the
    European landmass with Russia for the last 5 to 6 years, and
    are thriving there. But, even with untraditional partners--I
    reflect back on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which
    started as seed corn of a couple hundred people and is now
    60,000 strong, has done most of the fighting and dying in Syria
    in support of that effort, has lost thousands of people, but is
    just an extraordinary force that was cobbled together over
    time, through a partnering effort. So, I am more inclined to
    see the potency and the results than some of the shortcomings
    on it.
        Senator Kaine. Secretary West.
        Secretary West. Senator, the National Defense Strategy
    requires us to answer this question.
        Senator Kaine. Yeah. Secretary Mattis always says, ``by,
    with, and through''--anytime he was with us, ``by, with, and
    through other nations.'' I heard him say that many times, and I
    know that's an important part of the Strategy.
        Secretary West. Since there must be a resource allocation,
    we must begin to look at, number one, the nature of the threat.
    Local forces who do not demonstrate intent or capability do not
    deserve the same resource allocation as do those enemies with
    the capability and the public declaration that they'll strike
    us. Number two, what are--as General Thomas said, what are the
    odds of success of training this force? How long will it take?
    How well connected are they to the people and to the
    government?
        Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, how about in the cyber
    realm? Talk a little bit about the partner-capacity issue and
    activities that we're engaged in with them.
        General Nakasone. I would add to the importance of building
    these partners, as our National Defense Strategy has indicated.
    My perspective, in terms of what I've seen within the
    cyberspace domain, is, it provides us three critical elements.
    First of all, intelligence that we may or may not have by
    ourselves. Secondly, capabilities that our Nation may or may
    not have. Third thing, unique placement, placement around the
    world that is really critical for us, that gives us greater
    reach as a Nation.
        Senator Kaine. I will follow up with this in other
    hearings, as well, because I think it's really important. It is
    a significant investment. It's a part of the DOD budget. It's
    not massive, but I think it has a massive upside if we do it
    right. We just want to make sure we're analyzing the metrics
    correctly.
        I'm going to ask a question, just for the record, General
    Nakasone, for you, but let me just preface it. I'm on the
    Health, Education, Labor, Pension Committee. We are
    reauthorizing the Higher Education Act this year. Part of that
    is analyzing workforce and skills gaps and doing things like
    public-service loan forgiveness and other programs to fill
    gaps. One of the areas that we're looking at significantly is
    cyber professionals, whether it's in the DOD side of the house,
    the DHS side of the house, or in the private sector. So, the
    question I will ask is if you would have any suggestions for
    us, as we work on Higher Ed reauthorization, programs that you
    think are successful to enable us to train and recruit and
    retain the cyber professionals that we need. I'll ask that
    question for the record.
        General Nakasone. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Thanks, Mr. Chairman
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service.
        General Thomas, we most certainly appreciate all of the
    hard work that you've put in, and your service to our country.
        I'm curious, with regard to the Middle East. We've talked a
    lot about Syria and the challenges that we have there. What
    about with regard to Iraq at this point? I know that we've
    talked about the fact that we're going to have forces remaining
    in Iraq in the near future. The President has indicated that
    there's the capability to be able to move back into the Syrian
    areas. But, within Iraq itself, what is the current state of
    play with regard to ISIS, specifically within northern Iraq?
        General Thomas. Senator, I would offer that our Iraqi
    partners have embraced their sovereign responsibility, in terms
    of defending their terrain. We're maintaining, persistent
    pressure on ISIS, both where they were and where they are
    intending to try and have any sort of resurgence. So, it
    continues to be a work in progress, but it's borne primarily
    through the Iraqi forces, who we have rekindled our
    relationship with.
        Senator Rounds. Do you see evidence of their activity in
    northern Iraq with regard to any incidences that they appear to
    be responsible for?
        General Thomas. In terms of the Iraqi forces, sir?
        Senator Rounds. In terms of ISIS' impacts within northern
    Iraq. Are you seeing evidence of where they're trying to impact
    local communities and so forth?
        General Thomas. They are attempting to make a resurgence in
    various locations. But, again, I believe our forces, with the
    Iraqis, are very aware of where they are, and they're
    addressing them accordingly.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, I appreciate the way in which you laid
    out, today, a little bit about the activity that the men and
    women of CYBERCOM, along with their associated forces within
    the NSA and so forth, worked very hard with regard to the 2018
    election. Would it be fair to say that it is not a coincidence
    that this election went off without a hitch, and the fact that
    you were actively involved in the protection of this very
    important infrastructure that we value?
        General Nakasone. Senator, the security of the midterm
    election was the number-one priority at U.S. Cyber Command and
    the National Security Agency.
        Senator Rounds. Can you share a little bit about what the
    tools are to protect an election, and the need to protect the
    tools and the systems and the processes that are used in order
    to protect an election, as an example, and the different types
    of threats that you see and that you have to defend against?
    Could you share a little bit about that?
        General Nakasone. Senator, as part of a whole-of-government
    effort, we were looking at three different areas. First, we
    were looking to ensure that we prevented interference in the
    election. Secondly was to disrupt any attempts by adversaries
    to influence that election. Thirdly, to impose cost on any
    adversary that decided that they would attempt to interfere
    with our democratic processes.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there's been
    clear evidence in the past--we've seen--with regard to Russia,
    who has done propaganda, attempted to manipulate the American
    public, tried to pit one side against the other, and so forth.
    In this particular case, would it be fair to say that Russia
    has, in the past, demonstrated a compatibly in the cyber realm
    to use Internet activity, social media, and so forth, as a way
    to do exactly the same thing with more sophistication than
    perhaps in the past?
        General Nakasone. Senator, the Russians are a very
    sophisticated adversary in using influence operations that you
    described.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair also to say that there
    have been concerns in the past and that the CYBERCOM has worked
    very hard to make sure that the elections that have been held
    in the United States have not been impacted directly, in terms
    of vote counts or anything like that?
        General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. Again, working as
    part of a broad government team, that was our focus. I give
    great credit to Department of Homeland Security, the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation, and other elements of our Government
    to work towards this. This was a team effort.
        Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
        In terms of being able to impact social media, we talk
    about being able to impact and make sure that folks outside of
    the United States coming in are not able to influence public
    opinion by providing misinformation. But, there's another piece
    of this, as well, and that's to actually be able to defend and
    protect the physical infrastructure within the United States.
    Would you just simply explain to the public that there is more
    to it than just simply stopping bad tweets from going out? It
    is a matter of actually protecting critical infrastructure that
    it has a real impact on day-to-day lives of American citizens.
        General Nakasone. Senator, one of the things that is within
    our mission is certainly to protect that critical
    infrastructure in the defense of the United States. You
    accurately portray, obviously, both the opportunity and the
    challenge that we have at our Command in doing that. I would
    also offer that one of the things that is so important here is
    the partnerships that you've formed. If there's anything that
    I've learned over the past several months, these partnerships
    give us real strength in being able to do that.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today, and for your service to
    our Nation.
        General Nakasone, I was grateful to have the briefing that
    we did--classified briefing, very recently, which I think was
    very illuminating as to the continued threats to our Nation as
    a result of cyber, particularly meddling and interference with
    our elections. The threat from Russia continues unabated. Can
    you say that in public here today?
        General Nakasone. Senator, Russia certainly provides a very
    sophisticated threat to our Nation, and one that has done over
    several years.
        Senator Blumenthal. That threat ought to continue to
    concern the American people, shouldn't it?
        General Nakasone. Yes, Senator, it should.
        Senator Blumenthal. I said in that briefing, and I've said
    it in numerous such classified briefings, that, really, I
    wished that the American people could have heard more of what
    you told us. In a sense, the enemies know what they're doing;
    we know what they're doing, to some extent; they know we know
    what they're doing; the only ones who are in the dark, really,
    are the American people. As we enter this next election cycle,
    would you agree that we ought to do everything we can to make
    the American people aware of that threat?
        General Nakasone. Senator, we will, at Cyber Command,
    commit to working that. I think your point is a very important
    one. Being able to educate the public is critical for us. The
    success that we had in 2018, more of our Nation should know
    about.
        Senator Blumenthal. It was success. I think very few of the
    American public know about the successes. They assume that the
    meddling and interference in our election system, when it
    occurs, simply is undeterred or unstopped. I think--again,
    without going into any of the details, there are some successes
    that the American people should know happen, but, at the same
    time, should know that the threats do continue, not only from
    the Russians, but--let me ask you whether you've seen any
    indication that China has sought to conduct activities similar
    to what we have seen from Russia in 2016, 2018?
        General Nakasone. Senator, given the forum that we're in
    today, I would offer to broadly state--what we're seeing is
    that our adversaries understand how to operate, again, below
    this level of armed conflict, and are taking broad lessons
    learned, upon which they will attempt to impact our Nation.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the American
    people should know about the threats from, not only Russia, but
    other countries, as well, because the tools and means and
    techniques are highly asymmetric? That is, they don't need to
    invest tens of billions of dollars to disrupt our election
    system. Some of it is available with very little such
    investment.
        General Nakasone. I agree, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas and Mr. Secretary, I
    know we have been over this issue, to some extent, but I just
    want to be clear. From your standpoint, moving Special
    Operators from Syria to Iraq--in other words, withdrawing from
    Syria and moving those forces to Iraq--could you say, again,
    what the impact is on our operational capability?
        General Thomas. Senator, obviously, it's easier to do our
    job with access and placement and proximity. We've thrived on
    that, being with the Syrian Democratic Forces and enabling them
    to do the heavy lifting that I described earlier. It'll
    certainly be harder to not have that proximity, make it more
    challenging. But, we're working alternate solutions to maintain
    some contact and some level of support for them.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that it
    will make it harder, but you're trying to overcome those
    challenges?
        Secretary West. Militarily, it is more difficult, sir, but
    we can remotely assist and advise. If Special Operations does
    anything, this agile force has already adapted.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Thomas. Senator, I probably would point out, too,
    that's how we started the first of it. We were not in Syria for
    the first year. I was in the command that was responsible for
    that, and we did everything from externally to establish that
    force and provide----
        Senator Blumenthal. But, there was a reason why you went
    into Syria, which is that it enhanced your operational
    capability, correct?
        General Thomas. It got us the return on investment. I mean,
    they maneuvered and destroyed the caliphate, or are on the
    verge of destroying the caliphate, so that was that subsequent
    phase to play.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today.
        It's public information that China is trying to build a
    navy of about 425 ships, within the next decade or so, and
    they're accelerating that. It's been reported, in just
    December, that Chinese hackers have been breaching Navy
    contractors to steal pretty much everything from maintenance
    data to missile plans. A particularly egregious report came out
    later that one breach was about a supersonic antiship missile
    that we were building for our nuclear submarine force. If
    they're successful, by 2030, they'll have a navy that's about
    100 ships bigger than our Navy has today. The problem is, right
    now, that they're accelerating that development through
    hacking, not the Navy network of information, but our
    contractor network of information.
        So, General Nakasone, how do you operate with our
    contractors? Should this data be kept on DOD networks? How do
    you interface with the FBI, when we get into these commercial
    entities out there that seem to be less protected than our
    military networks?
        General Nakasone. Senator, the example that you cited there
    is one that has driven the Department, and we're certainly
    working with that Department as one of the lead agents to
    ensure that contracts are written right and ensure that our
    cleared defense contractors understand the standards that have
    to be met, that we test those standards, working with the
    services, ensuring that there are proper safeguards in place
    that will guarantee that the information that they have that's
    critical for our Nation is safeguarded better.
        Senator Perdue. Are you optimistic you have everything you
    need, from an organization standpoint of funding and so forth,
    to help accomplish that?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I'm optimistic that if I don't
    have what I need, I'm going to come back rapidly to ask for it.
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. You've done a good job of that.
        Let me move on to the organization. Right now--in August of
    2017, it was announced that the Cyber Command would be elevated
    to a unified command, if I'm correct. Today, we're still
    operating in a dual-hat structure, and it's been reported that
    one of the reasons we still have a dual-hat responsibility is
    that there is a concern about the lack of intelligence in a
    separate unified command, versus NSA, that you're still getting
    a lot of your intelligence through the NSA. How do you equate
    this, relative to the long-term plan of having a unified
    command? Does that mean we'll have a duplicate capability, in
    terms of intelligence, both in the Cyber Command and also in
    NSA, or will there always be a close relationship between the
    two?
        General Nakasone. Senator, the decision on the dual hat
    remains with the Secretary. I've commented I need it. During my
    first 90 days, I provided my thoughts on it. Whatever the
    ultimate decision is, there will always be a very, very close
    partnership between NSA and Cyber Command, and so, that's where
    I see it right now, Senator.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        General Thomas, first of all, thank you for the leadership,
    you're at the tip of the spear.
        When we have continuing resolutions, how does it affect
    your operation in the field? You've been at war for 17 years,
    your troops, and I've been around some of your troops around
    the world, and I would have to say, the best and the very best
    of what we have in America is in your uniform. But, when we do
    a continuing resolution here in Congress, I get the feeling
    that it really impacts you guys pretty directly. Is that true?
        General Thomas. Senator, that's an accurate statement. It's
    disruptive, in terms of programming and just normal operations.
        Senator Perdue. Can you describe just a couple of anecdotal
    examples of how that really impacts training, refitting,
    rotations, all of the above?
        General Thomas. Yes, sir. I'd be inclined, because it's
    usually played to me, the biggest impact is in the prescription
    for new starts. The aspect of a continuing resolution inhibits
    our agility to actually adjust to the problems. It's a fluid
    and dynamic environment that we live in. More broadly, it's the
    aspect that we're stuck in a preceding paradigm and not able to
    move on to the newer, better ways of solving problems.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chairman, I'll yield my time.
        But, General Thomas, I do want to echo my colleagues'
    comments about your storied career, but particularly your time
    in the 75th Ranger Regiment in Georgia. God bless you.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, all of you, for your service.
        General Thomas, we wish you well in whatever you do next.
        I want to pick up on Senator Perdue's questions about how
    vulnerable we are to third-party products and software. So, I
    think this is for you, General Nakasone. In 2018, the NDAA
    included a provision that would prohibit the use of products
    and services developed or provided by Kaspersky Lab in third-
    party products. It required a report on DOD's capacity to spot
    and address risks. So, can you tell me what the status is of
    banning all of those Kaspersky products from third-party
    contracts, and also what's the status of the report on what
    risks might still be there?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I know that we have conducted
    the ban, but let me take that for the record to make sure I
    have an accurate response to both parts of that question.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you very much.
        General Thomas, I want to pick up on the questions about
    Syria, and particularly on the detainees. As you are probably
    aware, two of those detainees are suspected in the murders of
    four Americans: James Foley, Steven Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and
    Kayla Mueller. I don't know if you have anything that you can
    tell us today about what their status is and what the potential
    is to make sure that they can be brought back to the United
    States to be tried for their crimes, but certainly that's what
    the families of those murdered Americans would like to see
    happen.
        General Thomas. Senator, I don't have an update on the
    status, but I would express my appreciation for your personal
    interest on the matter. Your visit out there, and your very
    public commentary after that, actually helped focus the world
    on the problem, and then specifically on the U.S. problem. But,
    I don't know the current status. I just know it's in the legal
    wrangling of considering how we handle the special cases like
    that.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope you and Secretary
    West will both take back the interest that the families have in
    making sure that they see justice in the United States.
        But, General Thomas, I also want to go back to the question
    about, How confident are you that, given the estimates on the
    number of ISIS fighters who have gone underground, who may be
    operating out of Iraq or other places in the Middle East, that
    we will be able to contain that threat if we no longer have
    operations in Syria, given the complexity there?
        General Thomas. Senator, as I mentioned, this has been one
    of the most complex challenges that our force has dealt with in
    quite a while. I am concerned that we are not overly restricted
    in the end state, and I don't honestly know what that is. There
    are several planning efforts ongoing, with a focus to
    maintaining what we've gained so far, to focus to ensure that
    there is no external attack capability coming from a morass of
    bad actors--admittedly bad actors, many of whom are just
    regional, local types. So, we're in the throes of trying to do
    the right planning and preparation to provide the Nation
    options to make sure that that's not a shortcoming and we have
    a revisit to the 2011 recurrence.
        Senator Shaheen. How much of a threat continues from Turkey
    to the Syrian Democratic Forces and their continued work on the
    ground?
        General Thomas. Senator, there has been friction which is
    an understatement, right from the very beginning, in terms of
    our choice of a partner force. Truthfully, it was a necessary
    choice. It was the only force really available, and their
    relationship with the Turkish Government--again, I would
    commend General Scaparotti and General Votel, the senior
    leaders who have been trying to work through that friction and
    stay focused on the counter-ISIS effort, which is why we're out
    there. It has been a challenge, but, I think we are certainly
    addressing Turkish sovereign interests and concerns as we stay
    focused on ISIS.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. I hope we're also
    continuing to support SDF, who have been such good partners
    with us in the arena.
        Secretary West, I understand that you're the point person
    at DOD for implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary West. I'm certainly on point, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Okay, good. I wonder if you could give us
    an update. I understand that we are expecting the plan, that
    it's going through final approvals. Can you tell me when we
    might see the final plan for how that's going to get
    implemented, and any thoughts you have about the effectiveness
    of being able to implement that as we're looking at all of our
    operations around the world?
        Secretary West. Senator, we're certainly supporting the
    interagency plan. As they say in the Green Berets, we're trying
    to lead from the back of the front. But, this does establish
    the United States as the world leader in ensuring that women
    are part of the conflict resolution and prevention process. I
    want to thank you personally for the appropriation we have this
    year, because the gender advisors, which were already installed
    in come COCOMs, now will be permanent.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope, as we're looking
    at continued negotiations in Afghanistan, that we will
    certainly make sure that women are at the table in any
    negotiations.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and, on behalf
    of the American public, I would like to say thank you. Because
    much of the work that is done within your commands, the
    American public will never know about, nor will they be able to
    appreciate. So, thank you very much for that.
        General Thomas, I'd like to start with you. What I would
    like to do is, basically, give you an open floor or a moment to
    reflect upon your time in command. There have been many
    innovations during your time in command that you have brought
    forward for Special Operations Command, and I'd like to give
    you the opportunity to talk about some of those innovations,
    why they have been so important to our Special Operators, and
    if there's anything that is not yet finished, what you would
    like to see continue on in your absence.
        Sir, please.
        General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Dangerous to give me an
    open mic, here.
        [Laughter.]
        General Thomas. I'll try and stay focused.
        I joke with contemporaries, whether it's in the Armed
    Forces or in the private sector, that the one problem we do not
    have in Special Operations Command is to spur innovation. It's
    almost runaway innovation and problem-solving every day. As you
    know, it's bottom-up-driven. So, the challenge for us, as a
    higher headquarters, is to assess and bundle the great ideas
    and the solutions that are being forwarded, and put them into
    programs of record that drive budget considerations and things
    like that. Nice problem to have, I would offer. I can't
    recount, the extraordinary number of initiatives and solutions
    that the forces provided over the last couple of years, and I'm
    incredibly proud of it.
        I'm more excited about where it's going in the future. The
    Command is truly poised to be even more relevant for the
    Department of Defense and for the Nation, in terms of securing
    this country, and borne on the back of just the best talent
    that the country has to offer, but with the resourcing that you
    all provide and the ability to do creative solutions.
        The one area that you and I have discussed time and again,
    that was probably the best innovation, that I would ascribe to
    my predecessors, and addresses directly how we sustain this
    force, despite the relentless pace of things, is the initiative
    awkwardly named Preservation of the Force and Family----
        Senator Ernst. POTFF.
        General Thomas.--POTFF, but juxtaposed to our ability to
    care for our people with the Care Coalition. Right now, we
    have, I think, 15,000 wounded, ill, and injured SOF members,
    both currently serving and prior, that are part of our core
    focus to take care of the Command. But, the POTFF effort has
    been just remarkable, in terms of building in resilience to the
    Command. Again, I give all the credit to my predecessors, who
    saw that as a needed requirement, and this body, for giving us
    the resources to get after it.
        Senator Ernst. Well, General Thomas, I thank you so much
    for your emphasis on POTFF. I've had the great opportunity to
    travel and visit with a number of your operators at Fort Bragg
    and Fort Benning, Hunter Army Airfield, Coronado. We've covered
    the bases there, and not only in supporting the operators, but
    their families, as well, because they truly are such an
    important part of the equation on why you are so successful.
    So, thank you for addressing that.
        We do have a closed hearing this afternoon, so I will save
    some of my questions for that time period, but I do want to
    take this opportunity to thank both of you, both Generals.
    Thank you very much for the command structure that you have
    provided, the leadership and guidance.
        Secretary West, thanks for taking on this very challenging
    position out there with DOD. We know that it's an ever-growing
    and -influencing part of the DOD. So, thank you very much for
    that.
        Just in the very short time that I have remaining, General
    Thomas, I want to thank you for your time and service. To you
    and Barbara, my best wishes as you move on to retirement. It is
    well earned and well deserved. You will be missed. You will
    truly be missed. But, thank you for your leadership.
        Thank you very much. I'll yield back.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst, and we all agree
    with her comments.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I also want to add my thank you, General Thomas, for all of
    your work and for your leadership.
        Last year's NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to
    review whether members of the Armed Forces or coalition
    partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of
    detainees during operations in Yemen. The unclassified summary
    of DOD's report to Congress concluded, ``DOD has determined
    that DOD personnel have neither observed nor been complicit in
    any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in
    Yemen,''. So, when I asked General Votel about this last week,
    he said DOD's conclusion was based on the discussions and
    reports from the people that they have on the ground. General
    Thomas, is that your understanding, as well?
        General Thomas. Senator, I monitored your conversation with
    General Votel, and I am in agreement with that assessment.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So, the Associated Press, Human
    Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations,
    all four, have all conducted their own investigations and come
    to a very different conclusion. They determined that our
    Emirati partners oversaw a network of detention centers that
    regularly engaged in torture and abuse. General Thomas, do you
    find these independent investigations credible?
        General Thomas. Again, Senator, I monitored General Votel's
    answer to the same question, and you'll probably hear some
    consistency. Every one of those allegations is taken with the
    utmost interest, in terms of poring into them and determining
    if they're factual, and we have. In fact, I'm not aware of any
    outliers. But, if we observe violations of the Law of Armed
    Conflict, it is a break-contact standard along our force, to
    address it specifically and/or to break contact with those
    partner forces. Again, I would reinforce how General Votel
    answered it. It's a high standard.
        Senator Warren. So, I appreciate that, and General Votel
    said exactly that there--he was very careful about what he
    said. I asked him if he'd reached any conclusions about whether
    or not our Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when
    DOD personnel are not present, and he said he was not aware of
    that. The question I was asking, though, General Thomas, do you
    find those four investigations credible?
        General Thomas. Senator, I find them of sufficient interest
    that it's actually been a topic of discussion back with our
    Emirati partners. It is hard for us to confirm or deny if it
    happened, but not something we just take as something I approve
    or disprove. It's the subject of our discussion with the
    Emiratis that, if we can prove this, or if there is evidence,
    this could be a deal-breaker.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        General Thomas. Again, we take it very seriously.
        Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that, General Thomas. I
    know you work hard to encourage our partner forces to obey the
    Laws of Armed Conflict. But, when it comes to whether or not
    our partner forces have engaged in abuse of detainees, there
    seems to be a really serious disconnect between what DOD
    understands to be true and credible independent reports from
    journalists and human rights organizations. So, I remain deeply
    concerned about whether our partners in Yemen are treating
    detainees in ways that are consistent with the Law of Armed
    Conflict. As you know, turning a blind eye is not acceptable.
    So, I'm going to keep asking questions about this. I appreciate
    your answer on this.
        If I can just ask one other area quickly in the time left
    to me, General Thomas, I'm concerned about the militarization
    of our foreign policy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the
    use or overuse of our Special Operations Forces. I think
    Senator Reed alluded to this earlier. In 2017, Special
    Operations Command deployed forces to 149 countries under your
    Command, and they launch airstrikes, carry out raids, train
    foreign militaries, all in the hope of removing terrorists from
    the battlefield. Many of these countries have governance
    challenges that allow violent extremist groups to grow. Instead
    of treating the causes of violent extremism, we're treating the
    symptom.
        So, let me just ask. General Thomas, do you think that we
    can kill or capture our way out of this problem?
        General Thomas. No, Senator, I definitely do not think
    that's the solution to most of these problems.
        Senator Warren. Do you think that the current pace of
    operations for your Command is sustainable?
        General Thomas. I do, Senator. We had challenges on
    specific parts of our formation and to specifically get to the
    Department-directed standard of a one-to-two dwell rate, so for
    one cycle of deployment downrange, two parallel cycles back
    home--but, we have gotten that back into a very healthy shape,
    with a few outliers, and we're intent on getting them healthy,
    as well, here.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate it. Thank you, General Thomas.
    I just want to say, we need to be thinking harder about using
    our nonmilitary tools, here, as well. Thank you.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe.Thank you Senator Warren.
        Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        To each of you, thank you for your service to our country.
    We appreciate it.
        General Thomas, we do wish you well, and we wish your
    family well, and thank you for the service.
        I will say, Senator Ernst mentioned some of the posts she's
    visited. She also has visited Fort Campbell, and they were, and
    still are, a big part of our Tennessee community. I represented
    that post during my time in the House, and have enjoyed working
    with those military families and looking at the challenges that
    are going to be necessary for 21st-century warfare.
        General Nakasone cyber is an enormous part of that. I think
    it's been really curious to me this week, as we have looked at
    the different geographic combatant commanders and those areas
    of responsiblitites (AORs), maybe a hesitancy to engage in the
    discussion of how our adversaries are using the cyber area to
    their advantage, namely China, of course. We've talked some
    about the great competitive threat that is there.
        So, my question to you, General Nakasone, would be, do you
    feel like that your Command, Cyber Command, is being properly
    integrated into all of the other commands in those missions?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I do feel that Cyber Command is
    being integrated properly into the other combatant commands. We
    have undertaken a very aggressive approach to engage with the
    combatant commands. General Thomas and I have had a long
    association, and one of the things that I think that we've been
    able to leverage is the close partnership of ensuring that what
    we do in cyberspace is supporting his end states and what he
    was trying to do, whether in previous commands or at U.S.
    Special Operations Command. We are very, very appreciate of the
    work that has been done and approved by this Committee to build
    cyberspace operational integrated planning elements at each of
    our combatant commands. This will allow us to develop the
    talent and the planning expertise to ensure that we get to
    outcomes.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Let's talk about artificial intelligence (AI) for just a
    moment, because I think that that strategy--and, of course,
    it's been released--highlights a reality that we've known for
    some time. I want to quote from that, and then have you
    respond. I'm quoting, ``Other nations, particularly China and
    Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military
    purposes, including applications that raise questions regarding
    international norms and human rights. Failure to adopt AI will
    result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our
    people eroding cohesion among allies and partners, reduced
    access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our
    prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to
    societies that have been built upon individual freedom.'' Now,
    that, in my opinion, is a pretty sobering assessment. So, do
    each of you agree with that strategy's assessment? Exactly how
    do you see the AI strategy informing your Command as we move
    forward?
        General Nakasone. I agree with the statement that you read,
    Senator. I do see artificial intelligence, deep learning,
    machine learning, as something that's a critical enabler of
    what we're going to need to do at U.S. Cyber Command. We have
    already seen the power, at the National Security Agency, of
    what artificial intelligence can do for our foreign
    intelligence mission, our cybersecurity missions. This is where
    the world is headed, in terms of innovation and capability. We,
    as the military fighting force, have to ensure that we have
    that enabler. One of the things that I do take great credit and
    pride in is that U.S. Special Operations Command really has led
    a lot of the work in artificial intelligence, in integrating
    some of the early thinking into how they become a more powerful
    force.
        Senator Blackburn. General Thomas?
        General Thomas. Senator, great question. We could spend
    several hours talking about it. Unfortunately, we don't have
    that kind of time. But, agree with the assessment, in terms of
    threat. More importantly, am incredibly enthusiastic about the
    opportunity.
        Anecdotally, 3 years ago, Eric Schmidt visited our Command
    as part of the Defense Innovation Group. Quick assessment that
    he felt compelled to give me, he said, ``You've got tremendous
    people, you prototype pretty effectively, and you're absolutely
    terrible''--he had some more colorful words than that--''for
    machine learning, applied artificial intelligence.''
    Truthfully, it gave me a spark 3 years ago, and turned me into
    a zealot on the subject. But, more importantly, it has really
    kind of reoriented our Command to embrace this phenomenon and
    apply it. It is relevant to everything we do, until it's proven
    otherwise. We're taking, not-so-small bites, but some pretty
    substantial bites into embracing applied artificial
    intelligence, and I'm excited about where we're going in the
    future.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. Thank you for your
    service.
        I yield back.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I apologize for not being here for a lot of the
    hearing. We have three committee hearings going on
    simultaneously.
        General Thomas, I want to thank you for your service and
    all the quality time you've spent in North Carolina. I hope, in
    retirement, you continue to spend a lot of quality time there.
        I'm going to take, probably, the questions a different
    direction in my capacity as Personnel Subcommittee chair,
    because I know a lot of the other members have covered the
    landscape on the extraordinary work you're doing. General,
    thank you for the briefing earlier this week. I got a real
    sense of progress being made. I think some of that stems from
    some of the authorities that you've been granted. You're doing
    great work there, so thank you for your leadership.
        But, I want to talk more about the personnel aspects.
    Number one, when you look at, General Thomas, the very
    challenging job of an operator--and how a disturbing percentage
    of them are going to get injured in one way or another--what
    more do I need to be thinking about, in terms of family
    support, for the members, and actually even in dealing with the
    wounds of war--what more should we be looking at, as a function
    of the Personnel Subcommittee, to send the very clear signal we
    understand the dangerous job and the impact it's having on
    families?
        General Thomas. Senator, thanks for that question, and
    thanks for the concern expressed.
        I would actually challenge the term ``operator,'' because
    therein lies the opportunity for us to do better by our people
    in the future. While you highlighted particular career fields
    that are inherently dangerous, in terms of jumping and fast-
    roping, and things like that, we're as good as our weakest
    link. We're as good as our support personnel. We use the term
    ``enablers,'' which is broadbased, but it's the entire fabric
    of the force, and, arguably, we didn't focus sufficiently on
    the entirety of the force early on, when we talked about POTFF
    and how we sustain it. I think we're much more focused on that,
    and we have come to you to ask for additional resources so that
    we can be more thorough in the application there. But, again,
    thanks for the support we've had so far. Truthfully, the best
    comment we can get on it is, the sister services are emulating
    what you've allowed us to do as the way they could/should take
    care of their people, as well.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Something else that we'll be talking about--I was just
    briefly speaking with Senator King about progress that we can
    make on procurement. We've taken some steps, in recent NOAAs,
    for acquisition and procurement reform. I think we can still
    take a few pages from y'all's book, in terms of rapid
    prototyping and deployment. So, look forward to that in
    subsequent hearings. Mr. Chair, hopefully we can have that as a
    subject, some point in this Congress.
        General Nakasone, you've got a challenge--you mentioned, in
    your opening statements that you're trying to find the
    resources. You're competing with the private sector. Again, in
    the last NDAA, we made some progress, in terms of being able to
    get resources from the private sector into positions. But, what
    more do we need to do? I've got to believe you just don't have
    enough of what you need, in terms of expertise. What more would
    you suggest that we look at, as a matter of policies, going
    into this NDAA cycle?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I think that we have to come
    back to the Committee and identify those critical subsets.
    There are people within our force right now that I call ``10-
    or-20X'' type of people. That means they're 10 or 20 times
    better than the people that they work with, better coders,
    better malware analysts, better developers, and so, how do we
    ensure that we keep those within our force? The services do a
    wonderful job in recruiting. We get great recruits. We do a
    very, very good job in training them. Our challenge will be in
    retaining the very best--not everyone, but the very best. This
    is where I think identifying those categories, coming back to
    you to make sure that we have the proper career paths and the
    proper enumeration will be very helpful.
        Senator Tillis. Well, Senator Rounds and I have talked a
    lot about it in his capacity on Cyber, and we need that
    information sooner. In the private sector, I led a practice
    that had ethical testing in cybersecurity resources. They were
    even scarce in the environment where you could pretty much pay
    whatever the market rate is, so I can't imagine what you're
    going to go through for retention. We just need to think
    creatively and recognize that these are hot skills, and you've
    got to have the SOF equivalent of cyberwarriors out there. We
    need to do everything we can to provide you the authority to do
    that. But, as you just said, you've got to differentiate
    between that person who has a 20-time multiple on skills, and
    just say, we're going to treat you all fairly. We're not going
    to treat you equally, because you've got to have those
    extraordinary warriors in this domain.
        I'm going to follow up with a couple of questions for the
    record, but they happen to do with plumbing in business
    matters, so I'm going to yield back my remaining 10 seconds.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        General Thomas, I really wanted to thank you for all you've
    done for our Nation. I think I've had a bit of a unique
    opportunity to not only get to know you from this position, but
    also when I put my Reserve uniform on. As my commander, he's,
    like, 17 levels above where I am in the organization chart. So,
    you've done a great job, and really appreciate it.
        Secretary West, appreciate the job you're doing. You know,
    unfortunately, there's a very small number of Harvard marines,
    and you're making us proud. Very few.
        General Nakasone, I want to ask you, on this issue of
    offensive operations--I know you probably can't talk too much,
    but you might recall a hearing we had in this Committee a
    couple of years ago, where Director Clapper and some other
    leaders on the cyber and intelligence front openly admitted
    that, after the Chinese hacked the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM) and stole over 20 million SF-86 forms for all
    our top-secret operators, including Members of this Committee,
    didn't retaliate against them, which I thought was kind of a
    stunning admission. To me, it was part of the problem. Whether
    it was North Korea or Iran--I think, a couple of years ago,
    China, certainly Russia, we were viewed as kind of the world's
    cyber punching bag. Any of these countries could come and do
    what they wanted, and we did not retaliate.
        Can you tell me, without revealing anything classified, do
    you feel you have the authorities to hit back, or maybe even
    hit back harder, to make the costs of those kind of operations
    against our country, against our democracy, much more
    prohibitive? Particularly for a country like North Korea, where
    I'm assuming we could just drop their entire electrical grid
    and Internet system overnight if we wanted to.
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, 1 year ago I
    appeared before the Committee for my confirmation, and you
    asked a similar question of me. I think it's important that we
    look at what's happened within this past year: a National Cyber
    Strategy, signed; a DOD Cyber Strategy, signed; the Fiscal Year
    2019 National Defense Authorization Act that provided us
    greater capabilities and greater authorities within the law was
    signed; a new presidential policy that came out on offensive
    cyber; and finally, our ability to have a new construct upon
    which we operate, which is persistent presence. All of those
    provide a much different environment for our adversaries today
    than it did 1 year ago.
        Senator Sullivan. So, can you publicly state, in this
    hearing--again, without getting in classified information--that
    you have the authorities and you are not unwilling to undertake
    offensive operations that can help deter, whether it's Chinese
    stealing 20 million SF-86 forms or the North Koreans hacking
    our companies?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I have the authorities to
    accomplish my mission.
        Senator Sullivan. Or the Russians attacking our election
    systems?
        General Nakasone. I have the authorities that I need to
    accomplish my mission, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Good.
        I want to ask Secretary West and General Thomas--you have
    taken the lead over the last 2 years on the counter-WMD
    mission. SOCOM has that lead. To me, there's probably no more
    important mission for the survival of the entire Nation, the
    entire Republic. We might have threats that rise--ISIS or al
    Qaeda, they might rise and fall, but, as long as we have a
    republic to defend, the counter-WMD mission is going to be, in
    my view, the most important mission. How is that going? Do you
    need more resources on that? Are there any things that we can
    do to help you with the authorities, whether it's working with
    allies, whether it's more resources to undertake that mission,
    in terms of the leadership that you now have with regard to
    that mission?
        General Thomas. Senator, one, we appreciated the
    opportunity to perform this mission. It's a daunting,
    critically important mission, as you mentioned. We actually had
    John Hyten, from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), visiting,
    as well as Paul Nakasone, this past week. I would offer, his
    mission is probably the true, primary mission, and this one's
    connected just underneath.
        The level of cooperation and collaboration that we enjoy
    with the community of action is extraordinary. We just hosted
    our annual seminar, 2 weeks ago. We're about to produce our
    Annual Assessment to the Secretary of Defense. This mission set
    and space continues to move in the right direction. I don't
    know on resources yet. I daresay we will probably uncover some
    gaps, in terms of collection capabilities that we, the Nation,
    need, going forward, whether it's Department of Defense or
    other entities. But, the mission is going very well for us, and
    I'm appreciative of some of the expertise that has been brought
    to bear on it.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one final
    quick question.
        The return of great-power competition is spelled out in the
    NDS, the National Defense Strategy. How is SOCOM aligning with
    regard to that mission? Have we overutilized the SOF community
    on low-intensity threats? Are we focused on the new NDS
    mission, on the SOF side?
        Secretary West. Senator, quickly, from my perspective, SOF
    is perfectly well suited to take on this challenge, because
    it's cheap, it provides the Nation real leverage. But, the
    basic task is resource allocation. As you indicated, we are at
    capacity, and demand signal is not shrinking. Then this, in
    turn, requires a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror
    to repurpose forces.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Nakasone, in February, the Department of Justice
    and the Department of Homeland Security sent a joint report to
    Congress on 2018 election interference. You testified before a
    classified session of this Committee yesterday. But, the
    public-specific conclusions of the report of these two
    departments was as follows, ``There is no evidence to date that
    any identified activities of a foreign government or foreign
    agent had any material impact on the integrity or security of
    election infrastructure or political campaign infrastructure
    used in the 2018 midterm elections.'' I appreciate your
    testimony yesterday, and I realize there are things that you
    cannot get into today. But, what can you tell us, in this
    public setting, about whether or not, based on what you know,
    the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
    Security were correct in saying there was no such interference?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I agree with what you had read
    with regards to that report. What I can say, in terms of our
    role with that, was, within U.S. Cyber Command, and
    specifically the National Security Agency, we took a look at
    all the intelligence information we had on our adversaries. We
    declassified as much of that information as we could. We shared
    that with the Department of Homeland Security, who, in turn,
    shared that with the state and local levels so that they had a
    very, very good picture of what we knew about adversaries that
    might be trying to interfere with our elections.
        Senator Wicker. So, to the extent that there were concerns
    that a foreign government or agent had an impact on the
    election, you concur with the public conclusion of the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice
    that there was not such interference.
        General Nakasone. I concur, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker and all the other
    Senators, and certainly for the three witnesses. That was a
    very eye-opening and a great presentation. Appreciate your
    patience and your thoroughness. Thank you so much.
        We're adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
              special operations forces in great power competition
        1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
    testimony you discussed the Special Operations Forces' (SOF) critical
    role in executing the National Defense Strategy both in terms of gray
    zone operations below the threshold of conflict and in terms of
    deterrence. We didn't hear any discussion of a physical rebalancing of
    forces away from the counterterrorism mission and toward great-power
    competition, however. In fact, Secretary West, you stated that ``We are
    at capacity and demand is not shrinking. So then this in turn requires
    a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror, to repurpose
    forces.'' How close are you to completing that new assessment, when do
    you expect it will be complete, and when and how are you planning to
    repurpose your forces toward the NDS' emphasis on great-power
    competition?
        Secretary West. The Department has been adjusting its focus towards
    great-power competition since the NDS was published. SO/LIC, USSOCOM,
    and the Joint Staff are actively developing policy concepts for SOF's
    role in this new strategic paradigm, which includes ensuring that DOD
    has the tools to meet state-based challenges below the level of
    traditional armed conflict. This shift has already begun, including the
    adjustment of force posture for great-power competition, and will be
    continuously adjusted to meet changing demands and requirements. To
    ensure we continue to meet enduring CT requirements, we will adopt a
    resource-sustainable approach to counter priority violent extremist
    organizations. A primary focus for managing global CT challenges will
    be to share the burden of responsibility with capable partners who can
    manage lesser threats locally. Our willing and capable partners
    understand the need for collective security, and we will seek to
    support their efforts through various security cooperation efforts.
    This, in conjunction with prioritizing VEO threats, will enable our
    forces to sustain our posture appropriately. These, and other
    terrorist-related assessments, will inform my recommendations to the
    Secretary of Defense on priorities for the employment of special
    operations forces against all of our Nation's threats, from great
    powers to terrorists.
        General Thomas. The global and regional challenges that America
    faces today are complex, dynamic, and of a long-duration. Unlike
    conventional forces, SOF have a small footprint, and simply counting
    ``boots-on-the-ground'' does not always capture the disproportionate
    strategic effects our operators have on the adversary every day. We are
    continuously refining our methods of assessing our progress to
    achieving our desired conditions that will allow us to deliver the best
    return on investment for the American taxpayer. It is also important to
    note that while assessments are continuous, it takes time to actually
    see tangible results. Specifically, at the end of the 3rd quarter of
    this fiscal year we will have the results needed to assist in informing
    the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment and USSOCOM's recommendation to
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on force allocation. We
    anticipate, at that time, to begin to identify forces that can be
    repurposed to meet the challenges posed by great power competition.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                              requirements process
        2. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, does a
    requirements process exist whereby unique U.S. Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM) capabilities help influence or determine requirements
    for DOD-wide conventional forces? If so, what is this process?
        Secretary West. The Services and USSOCOM requirements process are
    governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
    (JCIDS). Through the governance boards that support the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council validation and approval of requirements,
    USSOCOM articulates their unique capabilities that have Joint Force
    applications. Some of these capabilities are adopted by the Services,
    and the corresponding management of programs of record transitioned
    from USSOCOM to one or more Services. ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM
    constantly analyze special operations-unique capabilities to identify
    programs that can appropriately be transferred to the Services for
    conventional forces use.
        General Thomas. Yes it does. USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces
    Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOFCIDS) process is
    nested in and compliant with the Joint Staff's Joint Capabilities
    Integration and Development System (JCIDS). SOFCIDS is the process used
    by USSOCOM to implement JCIDS, by validating special operations-
    peculiar capabilities at or below the Joint Staffing Designator of
    Joint Capabilities Board Interest. USSOCOM leverages the Services for
    Service-common equipment whenever possible. USSOCOM posts its validated
    requirement documents in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management and
    Decision Support (KM/DS) depository, to allow the Services to see and
    adopt SOF efforts. This benefits the Services by enabling them to adopt
    USSOCOM-developed capabilities (without spending Service Research,
    Development, Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars), and USSOCOM
    receives the benefit once the Service adopts the solution as Service-
    common and provides it to our Components. Additionally, as the
    Department's proponent for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil
    Affairs capabilities, USSOCOM now has Service coordination and
    validation authority for these types of requirements for conventional
    forces. Consequently, when PSYOP and CA interests are coordinated
    through the SOFCIDS process, the appropriate Service shall be invited
    to participate in that Special Operations Command Requirements
    Evaluation Board (SOCREB). We also leverage the Department's Integrated
    Priority List (IPL) process to highlight USSOCOM needs for Service
    support, as well as the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council for
    attempting to solve some of the complex issues that arise between
    USSOCOM and the Services.
             improving procurement process for allies and partners
        3. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, what actions
    does SOCOM take to encourage allies and partners to utilize the Direct
    Commercial Sales (DCS) program for platforms and capabilities, like
    light attack aircraft?
        Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the
    SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we
    equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements.
    Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD
    partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process.
    Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and
    partners to meet their needs.
        General Thomas. When an ally or friendly country requests to
    procure SOF Peculiar platforms or capabilities, USSOCOM follows
    Department of Defense (DOD) policy and is generally neutral regarding
    the customer's choice to purchase by means of Foreign Military Sales
    (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Although most defense items or
    services can be purchased through either FMS or DCS, in limited
    instances, technology or security concerns may require that sales of
    specific items be restricted to FMS-Only.

        4. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
    experience, have allies and partners expressed frustration about
    navigating the DCS program?
        Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the
    SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we
    equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements.
    Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD
    partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process.
    Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and
    partners to meet their needs.
        General Thomas. USSOCOM has no formal or informal record of an ally
    or partner expressing frustration with the Direct Commercial Sales
    (DCS) process. USSOCOM's role in the DCS process is relatively limited.
    We conduct assessments of proposed dual-use and defense related SOF-P
    technology, articles, and services transfer cases as requested and
    provide coordinated positions to the Director, Defense Technology
    Security Agency.

        5. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
    opinion, would a streamlined process for procuring non-standard items
    through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) be helpful when allies and
    partners want to procure weapons/platforms that cannot be acquired
    through the DCS process?
        Secretary West. We are committed to reforming the way we do
    business at DOD in order to support building partnership capacity. This
    includes improving contracting timelines and processes. Business
    reforms will streamline our ability to deliver capabilities across the
    DOD enterprise. USSOCOM, DSCA, the Services, and my team are working
    together to support allies and partners.
        General Thomas. Building partner capacity is of critical importance
    to SOF operations. We would support a tailored OSD approach to FMS of
    non-standard items based on technical or performance risks to US
    operations.
                             continuing resolutions
        6. Senator Perdue. General Thomas and General Nakasone, in as much
    detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the
    operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on SOCOM/
    U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
        General Thomas. While a Continuing Resolution (CR) continues to
    allow mission accomplishment for USSOCOM, it introduces readiness risks
    that intensify in direct correlation to CR length, including:
    Operationally, CRs negatively affect Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    Components' ability to train and equip SOF, both organically and via
    Building Partner Capacity engagements. These disruptions potentially
    result in mission cancellations or postponements and fluctuations to
    deployment timelines. These impacts weaken SOF credibility with foreign
    partners, diminishing their view of the U.S. as the ``partner of
    choice.'' Inability to execute USSOCOM's new start programs, production
    increases, major weapon platform recapitalization, and Military
    Construction projects. For example, our PB20 request includes two
    fiscal year 2020 classified procurement new starts totaling $45
    million, numerous production increases including the MH-47 Renew
    Program growing from seven fiscal year 2019 airframes to eight in
    fiscal year 2020 at a unit cost of $16 million each, and
    recapitalization of one MH-60 and one MH-47 Battle Loss Replacements
    for $28 million and $38 million, respectively. Our MILCON PB20 request
    includes 15 major construction projects at $494 million. None of these
    examples could be executed under a CR. Financially, constrained CR
    funding levels, particularly when funds are depleted towards the end of
    CR periods, can cause increased contract actions resulting in higher
    costs associated with having to restructure contracts, and reduced/
    restructured/delayed/deferred non-combat related SOF training and
    maintenance/sustainment activities. Overall, USSOCOM is typically able
    to manage the impacts of short-term CRs (less than 3 months), assuming
    an appropriation follows shortly thereafter. As CRs extend in the 3-6
    month timeframe, risk moves from mild to moderate depending on the
    specific appropriation, program or capability as new starts and
    production increases slip to the right in a direct correlation to CR
    length, if not longer. Long-term CRs (6 months or longer) are high risk
    and begin to erode combat effectiveness and SOF readiness, training,
    and modernization efforts, which negatively impact USSOCOM's ability to
    provide timely and essential mission support, eventually elevating risk
    levels to deployed operators and bringing the command dangerously close
    to sinking below a reasonable degree of risk. Service constraints under
    a CR risk exacerbating impacts on USSOCOM as their ability to provide
    consistent service support to SOF is jeopardized.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                            artificial intelligence
        7. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, given the capabilities
    required to meet the 2018 cyber strategy, is a 6,200-person Cyber
    Mission Force sufficient?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, can you rely on artificial
    intelligence (AI) to close the capability gap?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what AI programs and
    applications offer such potential?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what advancements in
    military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely
    China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        11. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, where are you prioritizing
    investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these
    capabilities?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        12. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, what advancements in
    military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely
    China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
        General Thomas. China and Russia continue to hone and field
    artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities and technologies that enable
    the near-real time identification and monitoring of our personnel
    abroad. Advancements in AI-based biometric systems over the past two
    years have significantly improved the ability of both the Chinese and
    Russians to clandestinely collect biometrics at greater distances and
    with greater accuracy. These advancements present an ever-increasing
    force protection and operations security risk to U.S. military
    personnel, U.S. Government civilians, and our allies and partners. We
    anticipate that vast improvements in autonomous facial/voice-
    recognition surveillance will challenge U.S. SOF cover activities and
    clandestine operations moving forward. The global proliferation of
    Chinese safe-smart city surveillance systems and technology gives
    Beijing an advantage in the effort to identify, track, and potentially
    threaten Special Operators as they traverse various locations around
    the world.

        13. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, where are you prioritizing
    investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these
    capabilities?
        General Thomas. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                      information operations capabilities
        14. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
    Nakasone, SOCOM and CYBERCOM sit at the nexus of the Department's
    efforts to address the challenges posed by adversaries' weaponization
    of information. SOCOM is the Joint Force Proponent for Military
    Information Support Operations (formerly known as ``psychological
    operations'') and its forces operate closely with those from CYBERCOM
    at the tactical and operational levels. In your view, what are the
    policy, resource, and capability gaps that limit the Department of
    Defense's (DOD)'s ability to be successful in information operations
    mission space?
        Secretary West. The complex nature of the information environment
    presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in that
    environment and for DOD's strategic partnerships with other government
    agencies. Our strategic competitors and other adversaries increasingly
    and aggressively operate in the information environment below the
    threshold of armed conflict. The Department is communicating how it is
    evolving to conduct operations in the Information Environment through
    quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees. The
    Department recognized that gaps exist and to address those gaps DOD
    began a 2019 revision of the Strategy for Operations in the Information
    Environment (SOIE) published in 2016. That revision is guided by a core
    of seven Secretary of Defense-approved framing principles, which we are
    currently converting into seven Lines of Effort (LOEs). The seven LOEs
    are: affecting perceptions, acquiring the right authorities, leveraging
    and strengthening partnerships, improving DOD's base of knowledge,
    refining how we plan, developing and managing people, and developing
    technology for OIE. This revision is being done concurrently with the
    development of a companion implementation plan and investment framework
    to sharpen the Department's focus on the effort and in recognition of
    urgency. Revisions to the SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates
    in the quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees
    required by Section 1637 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
        General Thomas. The complex nature of the information operations
    environment presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in the
    information environment and its strategic partnership with other
    government agencies. As our competitors increasingly operate in the
    information operations realm outside of traditionally declared
    hostilities, DOD's role and activities are restricted by extant policy
    and legal considerations. The Department is currently working on the
    fiscal year 2019 NDAA Section 1065b report to identify and analyze any
    doctrine, organization, training, material, leader, personnel, and
    facilities gaps in DOD Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
    capabilities. The report is due on May 13th.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
    Nakasone, what are the relative roles of SOCOM and CYBERCOM forces in
    this mission space?
        Secretary West. USSOCOM has specific responsibilities outlined in
    the Unified Command Plan and ones inherent in its designation as the
    Joint proponent for military information support operations (MISO).
    USSOCOM's main role in information operations is to integrate and
    coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and, when directed, execute MISO in
    support of combatant commands. The role of MISO is to influence foreign
    audience behaviors. USSOCOM is supporting integration of MISO
    capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web
    Operations Center (JMWC). The Department submitted a report to Congress
    on January 4, 2019, that outlined how USSOCOM intends for the JMWC to
    consolidate and coordinate combatant commands' Internet-based MISO
    capabilities. USCYBERCOM conducts technically focused cyberspace
    operations. DOD's Strategy for Operations in the Information
    Environment (SOIE) reaffirms that all operations in and through the
    information environment must be integrated as part of
    institutionalization and operationalization efforts. Revisions to the
    SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates in the quarterly reports
    to the congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the
    NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
        General Thomas. As the DOD joint proponent for MISO, USSOCOM's role
    in the information operations mission space is to integrate and
    coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and when directed, execute MISO in
    support of combatant commands. USSOCOM is supporting integration of
    MISO capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web
    Operations Center (JMWC) that will consolidate and coordinate combatant
    commands' internet-based MISO capabilities.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        16. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
    Nakasone, do you believe that a combatant command should be designated
    as the global synchronizer or coordinating authority for all DOD
    information operations (similar to the responsibilities SOCOM has for
    synchronizing counterterrorism and combatting WMD efforts)? If so, what
    additional resources do you believe that would require?
        Secretary West. SecDef designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff as the Global Integrator for Operations. This includes
    operations in the information environment. The Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy remains the principal staff advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense for information operations, and is the designated senior
    official for the integration of strategic information operations and
    cyber-enabled information operations. The Department is examining the
    optimal alignment of internal organizations and resources. The
    Department will report progress in quarterly reports to the
    congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the NDAA
    for fiscal year 2018.
        General Thomas. The complex and pervasive nature of information
    operations and the associated mission sets pose a challenge for
    designating a single coordinating authority construct for operations.
    DOD information operations is an integrating function rather than a
    single capability. Adding a coordinating authority role for all IO
    capabilities to a single combatant command could increase the
    complexity of an already challenging coordination environment. However,
    a combatant command could be designated coordination authority for one
    or more specific information related capabilities (IRC) as SOCOM has
    been for the MISO capability.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        17. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
    Nakasone, during the hearing, General Nakasone stated ``the Fiscal Year
    2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at U.S.
    Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities that--that were
    important for us as we look to further enable. That included the
    ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our force to the
    Department of Homeland Security, the ability for us to look at networks
    that are not part of the Department of Defense networks. The other
    piece of it that was critical is, as Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is
    the idea of cyber as a traditional military activity. I think those are
    areas that are going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.''
    Do you believe similar reforms are necessary to better enable the
    information operations by the Department of Defense against near-peer
    competitors?
        Secretary West. DOD is revising and updating its 2016 Strategy for
    Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) in 2019. That effort
    must necessarily address DOD's requirements, capabilities, and capacity
    to conduct information operations that would not be attributable to the
    United States. At this time, the Department has not identified specific
    concerns that could be addressed by legislation. However, operational
    concepts and capabilities must and will evolve to address increasingly
    sophisticated threats posed by near-peer competitors that are actively
    challenging the United States below the threshold of active
    hostilities. DOD welcomes further discussions with the Committee as the
    strategy develops to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces are well
    positioned to engage in traditional military activities to counter
    adversary threats in an information environment that is more complex
    and diverse than ever before, when hostile actions by our adversaries
    may not be easily recognizable.
        General Thomas. Yes, a review and possible reform to 50 USC, 3090
    may assist DOD in the information operations mission space with regards
    to near-peer competitors. Currently, DOD uses a contextual legal
    analysis to determine if an information operations-related activity,
    such as MISO, is a traditional military activity (TMA). Such analysis
    requires a relationship to an on-going or anticipated hostility
    involving US forces. This requirement often restricts some of what DOD
    can do in the information operations mission space, especially with our
    interagency partners, when our near-peer competitors challenge us in
    environments where overt hostilities are not present or easily
    recognizable. A Congressional review of the definition of anticipated
    hostilities may afford DOD greater flexibility.
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                      advise, assist, and accompany report
        18. Senator Reed. Secretary West, Section 1212 of the Fiscal Year
    2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the General
    Counsel of the Department of Defense and the commanders of the
    appropriate combatant commands, to conduct a legal and policy review of
    advise, assist, and accompany missions to ensure consistency of
    authorities, Executive Orders (EXORDs), doctrinal definitions, and
    other matters with legal and policy requirements. This report was due
    to the congressional defense committees on January 10, 2019. When will
    this report be provided to the congressional defense committees?
        Secretary West. On March 6, 2019, I sent a letter to the
    congressional defense committees indicating that DOD needs additional
    time to analyze the data required by the statute and to deliver the
    report to the congressional defense committees. We anticipate the
    report to be complete by May 15, 2019.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                     prohibition on kaspersky lab software
        19. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
    included a provision that prohibits the use of products and services
    developed or provided by the Kaspersky Lab. Can you provide the Federal
    Government's progress in banning all Kaspersky hardware, software and
    services?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        20. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
    provision also required a report that includes procedures for removing
    suspect products or services and an assessment of gaps no later than
    April 1, 2019. Can you provide a status on the report and whether it is
    on track to be completed?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                   cyber operations during the 2018 election
        21. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, according to your
    understanding, did Russia attempt to conduct espionage or engage in
    influence campaigns during the last election?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        22. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, we have seen that our
    failure to deter Russia has invited others to attempt to interfere.
    Recently Facebook and Twitter disclosed Iranian influence operations
    targeting Americans. Clearly the threat is growing. What countries have
    the capabilities and willingness to meddle in our politics?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        23. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you state in your
    testimony that with the consent of several European countries, you sent
    teams forward to conduct midterm election security operations. How
    important was this forward basing to the success of your midterm
    security mission?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        24. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, is cooperation with
    European allies essential to your enduring mission of election
    security?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        25. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, the President has raised
    the potential of political interference from China on several
    occasions. Have you seen any indication that China has sought to
    conduct campaigns similar to Russia against the United States?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        26. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, countries such as Taiwan
    tend to be the first target of Chinese meddling--are there examples of
    tactics and operations used by China against its neighbors that we
    should be prepared for?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                     talent recruitment in the cyber domain
        27. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, as we know, part of the
    challenge for the Cyber Mission Force is that the private sector can
    provide very attractive offers to our best and brightest. You note that
    you track attrition. Can you provide me metrics of attrition for our
    CYBERCOM?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        28. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how much higher is this
    than other military occupational specialties?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        29. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you mentioned in your
    testimony the need to utilize the Reserve Component to fill certain
    ``low-density'' skill sets. Do you have a plan in place to increase our
    Reserve components in this mission?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you also note that
    CYBERCOM is working with the Services to ensure that there is a joint
    common standard and proficiency with foundational cyber tools. Where
    are we in that process?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, when do you expect the
    Services will meet the common standard?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        32. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how can this Committee
    assist you in this goal to recruit and retain CYBERCOM talent in the
    Reserves?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                syria withdrawal
        33. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, do you agree with General
    Votel that it is always best to operate with your partners? If so, are
    we accepting greater risk to force and mission if we leave our partners
    in Syria to instead attempt to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria (ISIS) remotely from Iraq?
        General Thomas. Absolutely. Fundamentally, the worldwide military
    network of Allies and Partners is vital to our success and serves as a
    vehicle for the U.S. to achieve national policy objectives. In building
    this military network of capable Allies and Partners, SOF demonstrates
    U.S. commitment, deters potential adversaries, and creates options and
    access for the Joint Force. Additionally, we mature this network
    through providing our Allies and Partners equipment, funding, and
    training in those locations we operate in. Operating with our partners
    in the Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) campaign in both
    Iraq and Syria has been critical to our success. In both countries, we
    have relied heavily on our partners to do the fighting. Our job has
    been to enable them with fires, intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance (ISR), and advice. Concerning risk to force and mission
    in the D-ISIS campaign, I defer to the CENTCOM CDR, as he has
    Operational Control of those forces and is ultimately responsible for
    determining appropriate risk to force and mission in those areas.
    Between our partner forces, our coalition partners, and our operational
    capability, we will continue to be successful in suppressing ISIS. This
    partnered approach has been successful over the past few years and in
    the end, our partners will own what is left behind.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what are the advantages to
    operating from the same geographical location as your partners?
        General Thomas. Operating from the same geographical location as
    our partners has many advantages, i.e., we can provide timely support
    when needed, we can immediately exert direct influence at the point of
    friction, and we can effectively plan, coordinate and de-conflict
    operations as required. However, the primary advantage is the
    relationship of trust that we build with our partners. Our presence
    alongside a partner force allows us to directly enable them with
    operational support (fires, ISR, and advice), but more importantly, it
    demonstrates our commitment to their cause and enables the building of
    trust in our partnership.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what would we lose by
    relocating special operators from Syria to Iraq?
        General Thomas. While we are adjusting our military posture in
    Syria, we are preserving sufficient combat power in the region to
    ensure that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and
    ensure it does not return.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, how have
    our Kurdish partners specifically added value to SOCOM forces operating
    in Syria?
        Secretary West. The SDF have been a reliable partner for USSOF
    since 2014, and have suffered thousands of killed and wounded. Their
    leadership, sacrifice, and determination to drive ISIS from their
    homelands was instrumental in the liberation of the vast majority of
    ISIS's physical caliphate.
        General Thomas. Our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces
    (SDF), were essential to our operations in Syria. Since 2014, the SDF,
    our main indigenous partnered force in Syria, have suffered tens of
    thousands of killed and wounded driving ISIS from SDF homelands and
    remain instrumental as we conclude the ISIS fight and move forward.
    Without the SDF, the physical caliphate would still comprise an area of
    34,000 square miles, compared to the less than one single square mile
    it tenuously holds today.
                            operation tempo strains
        37. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, can you describe the type
    of mental health evaluations your servicemembers receive before and
    after deployments?
        General Thomas. Servicemembers are required to complete the DOD
    deployment health assessment cycle to collect information on physical
    and mental health status. DD Form 2795, Pre-Deployment Health
    Assessment is mandated within 120 days prior to deployment. DD Form
    2796, Post-Deployment Health Assessment, is completed 30 days prior to
    or 30 days after redeployment. DD Form 2900, Post-Deployment Health
    Reassessment is accomplished between 90 and 180 days post-deployment DD
    Form 3024, Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), is completed annually. The
    Mental Health Assessment (MHA) is included in the PHA. The MHA is a
    screener which must be performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-
    face).

        38. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, is the evaluation conducted
    by a mental health specialist or is it conducted by a general
    practitioner?
        General Thomas. The DOD-directed evaluations can be conducted by a
    variety of medical providers. If mental health issues are noted, the
    servicemember is referred to a mental health provider/specialist. The
    MHA can be administered by any trained medical professional but must be
    performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-face). Referral to a
    mental health professional is made if the MHA is positive for MH
    issues.

        39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, when
    servicemembers are on dwell time, how often are they away from their
    home base for training?
        Secretary West. The amount of time a servicemember may spend away
    from his or her home base for training purposes varies significantly by
    Service Component, force element, unit, occupational specialty, and
    other variables. USSOCOM's personnel tempo policy sets a threshold that
    a servicemember may not spend more than 480 days away from his or her
    home station in a 24-month period. This includes training, operational
    deployments, and performance of other official duties when
    circumstances prevent the servicemember from spending off duty-time at
    their normal residence.
        General Thomas. Deployment-to-Dwell (D2D) and operations tempo
    (OPTEMPO) are distinctly different than personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO).
    Dwell begins when the unit, detachment or member thereof, arrives at
    its homeport/stations/base from an operational deployment. Dwell ends
    when the unit, detachment or member thereof, departs on an operational
    deployment. A unit is either on operational deployment or in dwell.
    PERSTEMPO begins when a member's official duties require them to be at
    a location make it infeasible for the member to spend off-duty time in
    the housing in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the
    member's permanent duty station. The premise for USSOCOM PERSTEMPO
    measurement has not changed since the establishment of the policy in
    June 2012. Threshold is no more than 480 days away from home (head on
    pillow) in a 730 day window (66% at any given time). Dates for
    calculating the 24 month PERSTEMPO number are a rolling count of 18
    months back and 6 months forward from the current day. The amount of
    time a servicemember may spend away from their home base for training
    purposes varies significantly by Service Component, unit, occupational
    specialty, and other variables. Greater than 99 percent of assigned
    forces are within the USSOCOM PERSTEMPO threshold. In 2018, there was
    only one waiver submitted to exceed the 480 day threshold; the waiver
    was disapproved.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, is time
    spent training in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the
    continental United States (OCONUS) away from the servicemembers home
    base factored into the 1:2 ratio?
        Secretary West. DOD policy defines deployment-to-dwell ratio for
    active components as the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or
    individual is operationally deployed to the time the unit, detachment,
    or individual is in dwell. Dwell is the period of time that a unit or
    individual is not on an operational deployment. Generally, the time a
    servicemember spends training in the continental United States (whether
    at or away from his or her permanent duty station or homeport) is not
    considered an operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell
    time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Certain SOF overseas training
    events are considered operational deployments and are factored as
    deployment time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Time spent training
    in the continental United States or outside the continental United
    States may be factored into an individual's personnel tempo if it is
    infeasible for a servicemember engaged in his or her official duties,
    including circumstances such as training as well as operational
    deployments, to spend off duty-time in his or her normal residence.
        General Thomas. Yes and no. The 1:2 ratio relates to deployment-to-
    dwell (D2D) calculations used to ensure individuals are not overly
    exposed to combat and operational deployments. Time a servicemember
    spends training in the continental United States (whether at or away
    from their permanent duty station or homeport) is not considered an
    operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell time in their
    deployment-to-dwell ratio. However, certain SOF overseas training
    events, due to global force management consideration, (example: Joint
    Combined Exchange Training) are considered operational deployments and
    are factored as deployment time in their deployment-to-dwell ratio.
    Regardless of D2D calculations, time spent training in the continental
    United States or outside the continental United States will be factored
    into an individual's personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) if it is not feasible
    for a servicemember to spend off duty-time in their normal residence.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West, your testimony refers to
    your plan to improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio for the last 10
    percent of your force. Please elaborate on this plan.
        Secretary West. Our efforts to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios
    begins with continuing to improve our force management practices to
    ensure forces are being provided on a sustainable basis as well as
    refining our processes to prioritize SOF deployments in support of the
    Geographic combatant commands. Additionally, we have programmed
    relatively small end-strength growth in Combat Support and Combat
    Service Support (CS/CSS) personnel. This targeted growth is vital for
    us to alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most
    strained critical enabler and support communities that are the result
    of structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler
    communities for certain force elements. These high-demand/low-density
    enablers perform critical specialized functions such as intelligence,
    communications, fire support, medical, maintenance, and other combat
    service support roles.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, you state in your testimony
    that you have achieved a minimum 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio with the
    ``exception of a few critical skill sets and career fields.'' What are
    those skillsets and career fields, and why are they exceptions?
        General Thomas. The majority of career fields that continue to have
    a deployment-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:2 are the Special Operations
    Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) skill sets. These
    high-demand/low-density enablers perform critical specialized functions
    such as intelligence, communications, fire support, medical, aircraft
    maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and other combat service
    support roles. Typically, these skills sets are paired with Special
    Operators for deployment rotations. Due to current force generation
    cycles and manning issues, CS and CSS routinely experience an
    organizational imbalance between the support functions and operators.
    To address this issue, we have programmed relatively small end strength
    growth in CS and CSS personnel. This targeted growth is vital for us to
    alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most strained
    critical enabler and support communities that are the result of
    structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler
    communities.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, both you and Secretary West
    mentioned in your testimony that the Preservation of the Force and
    Family (POTFF) program is important to enhance resilience and readiness
    through providing support to servicemembers and their families. Gen
    Thomas, you state that you have directed mandatory participation in the
    program. What are the physical and psychological services you
    referenced?
        General Thomas. Participation in the POTFF Human Performance
    Program is tailored to the requirements of our servicemembers'
    occupational specialties. For example, a Navy SEAL and a personnel
    clerk have much different needs to prepare for a mission; however, both
    share the need to be mission capable. The command is customizing its
    training programs to ensure that every member of the formation is
    performing at their best and are able to successfully accomplish their
    missions. Participation in the Psychological Performance Program will
    include periodic comprehensive assessments and specialized training to
    enhance cognitive functioning and decision making. We have directed
    immediate implementation of the training through the command's suicide
    prevention policy, and we are developing the assessment program with
    the assistance of the Defense Health Agency. Currently, we are testing
    assessment measures and processes at MARSOC units.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, when did you make
    participation mandatory?
        General Thomas. Participation in the command's human performance
    program has been a mandatory requirement since 2014 for all of our
    special operations qualified servicemembers, i.e. Special Forces,
    SEALs, Special Tactics and Marine Raiders. At a round table meeting
    with all of my commanders in August, 2019. I directed that every member
    of SOF will participate in the POTFF Human and Psychological
    Performance programs.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, did Chief Special Warfare
    Operator Gallagher participate in this program?
        General Thomas. As a Special Operations qualified sailor, Chief
    Gallagher was required to participate in the POTFF's Human Performance
    Program. Information as to whether Chief Gallagher participated in the
    Psychological Performance component of the POTFF program is protected
    under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

        46. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, does the program require
    servicemembers to ``self-report'' mental health issues?
        General Thomas. Servicemembers cannot be compelled to self-report
    mental health issues; however, the command expects that all of our
    teammates will seek to continually improve their mental and physical
    performance. We afford every opportunity for our members to access
    behavioral healthcare, and have worked hard to normalize care and
    eliminate discrimination against those seeking care.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                 higher education benefits to cyber workforce.
        47. Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, are there additional
    incentives Congress could provide you to better address talent and
    capacity gaps in our cyber security workforce?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                       artificial intelligence technology
        48. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, there is a massive amount of
    data coming from SOCOM's operations and from broader global
    intelligence collection efforts. What efforts is SOCOM taking to
    explore AI, and how would AI help SOCOM conduct its mission and
    operations?
        General Thomas. USSOCOM is pursuing an enterprise solution which
    incorporates the collection, storage, and analysis of big data with
    machine learning and AI platforms. AI and machine learning affords the
    ability to make better use of the massive amounts of data, to guide
    decision-makers on prioritization and inform potential future
    opportunities. While there is a significant amount of work to be done,
    we desire to be on the leading edge of AI capability in the DOD by
    partnering with government and non-government agencies to fully utilize
    the tremendous capabilities offered by AI. SOCOM established a Chief
    Data Office to lead the efforts to develop and apply AI technologies
    across the enterprise and recognize the return of increased data from
    AI application. SOCOM recognizes the value of AI/ML across the SOF
    Enterprise and have six initial focus areas where AI/ML is being
    introduced to improve speed, precision, and readiness in combat. These
    focus areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C.
    Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training,
    and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning,
    and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. SOCOM is
    finalizing an Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Data Strategy that
    will help guide our Enterprise to the leading edge of this technology
    by deploying AI at all echelons of the SOF enterprise, developing of an
    AI ready workforce, and executing an aggressive outreach program. The
    CDO has applied significant resources to ensure our efforts comport
    with the new DOD AI strategy, DOD Cloud Strategy, and soon to be
    released DOD Data Strategy. We intend to continue embracing the
    enterprise enablers being delivered by OSD and the Joint Staff
    enterprise enablers being delivered by the Joint Staff and OSD and
    intend to be constant partners who are willing to deploy new
    technologies into our formation to improve our operations and due to
    the nature of AI, improve technologies with every turn.

        49. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, does SOCOM see value in AI
    for countering weapons of mass destruction globally?
        General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM certainly sees value in AI across
    multiple national security threats . . . including countering weapons
    of mass destruction. Operationally, the use of AI will be essential for
    assisting special operations forces in analyzing and acting on
    information that may otherwise be missed due to the massive volume of
    data available. AI provides a platform to narrow the focus of our
    professionals at speeds that cannot be replicated by human operators
    alone. From a strategic perspective, the explosion of unstructured open
    source data has created an information challenge for SOCOM in its role
    as the Department's Coordinating Authority for CWMD. The SOCOM staff is
    exploring optimal employment of AI to ensure collection and assessment
    of CWMD critical information requirements. We are hopeful that AI will
    eventually aid predictive analysis. AI tools have the potential to
    identify and assess threats in a timely--if not real time - manner.
    Moreover, AI threat assessments, combined with staff estimates, will
    improve and inform our defense posture by enabling a more efficient
    allocation of finite defense resources. There remains much work ahead.

        50. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what other mission-sets does
    SOCOM see value in AI for?
        General Thomas. Artificial Intelligence has many applications
    within the Special Operations Enterprise and as we develop our
    capability, we will expand the use but initially, SOCOM is focused on
    six areas for the initial application of narrowly focused AI projects
    that as we learn from their application we will be able to stretch to
    transform all warfighting functions in our enterprise. These focus
    areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C.
    Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training,
    and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning,
    and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. The goal is
    to increase our effectiveness by transitioning as many singular tasks
    to AI/ML as possible thereby freeing our talented workforce to conduct
    more complex human tasks and partner with automated machines to improve
    our speed, precision, and scale of operations.

        51. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what agencies is SOCOM
    partnering with to develop and incorporate AI systems?
        General Thomas. USSOCOM is connected to all combat support agencies
    and benefits from the shared experience as we all explore ways to
    insert this transformational technology into our formations. USSOCOM is
    proud to have been an early partner with USDI as Undersecretary Kernan
    launched Project Maven at the then-Deputy Secretary of Defenses'
    direction. Since then, we've expanded our partnership and have also
    embraced the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center's initiatives,
    initiatives from the DOD Chief Data Office, and the Joint Enterprise
    Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Program as critical enablers to our
    way forward. In the last 30-days we've hosted the Directors of all of
    the programs at this headquarters and have pledged to embed SOF
    professionals in those organizations to both ensure their success and
    reinforce SOF's intent to be a living laboratory for the advanced AI
    technologies they develop to deploy. We believe a continued SOF to
    service model applies with AI and are ready to facilitate the
    introduction of any AI technologies the Combat Support Agencies believe
    will improve SOF operations.
                           red team cyber operations
        52. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, last month, the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation released his annual report. One of
    their observations was that red teams used to assess cyber
    vulnerabilities across the military were severely lacking in the
    personnel, time, and funding to accomplish their assessments. How
    critical is Red Teaming to our cyber security and operations?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        53. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what is CYBERCOM doing to
    address this issue?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        54. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, another major concern is
    retention of master-level Red Teamers. What is CYBERCOM doing to
    recruit and maintain this expertise?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                         china and russia--cyber theft
        55. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, China's cyber operations
    include tapping into our own research and development. What is CYBERCOM
    doing to protect against China's access of our emerging technologies?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        56. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what efforts is CYBERCOM
    taking to protect major acquisitions projects from foreign espionage?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, are you working with
    defense contractors to help safeguard proprietary information and
    prototypes?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                              information warfare
        58. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, we are all worried about the
    weaponization of disinformation, especially with countries like Russia,
    who already excel at these malign operations. SOCOM is standing up an
    operations center to ``provide global messaging capabilities,''
    according to your testimony. Under what principles and guidelines will
    SOCOM operate in terms of those global messaging capabilities?
        General Thomas. The Joint MISO WebOps Center and partner combatant
    commands will support U.S. Government objectives and operate under
    approved MISO authorities to detect, deter, and counter as necessary,
    inaccurate and untruthful narratives in the information environment.
    This is no different than standard MISO activities, except it will
    occur on the internet. The principles and guidelines for conducting
    Military Information Support Operations will not change.
        Cyber Acquisitions
        59. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA
    extended CYBERCOM's acquisition authority through 2025. What are you
    doing to better execute the entirety of your acquisition authority cap?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        60. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what sorts of technology
    are you acquiring and looking for?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        61. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, do you have the skills and
    resources in place to handle CYBERCOM's contracting needs?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                      cyber mission force size and manning
        62. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the current cyber workforce
    shortage is estimated at approximately 300,000 jobs in the United
    States and almost 3 million jobs worldwide. It took since initiation of
    the process in 2013 until this past year to fully man the DOD cyber
    mission force of 133 teams. You stated that we would likely need an
    increase to this force. How great of an increase do you foresee us
    needing given the risk to advanced military capabilities and our
    civilian partners?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        63. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, how do you plan on
    recruiting and retaining this cyber force given the extensive shortages
    already documented and competition from the private sector
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                    cyber operations and the national guard
        64. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, in 2018 West Virginia
    National Guard members were brought on board at Joint Force
    Headquarters--Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) to
    help lead development of the first Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for
    use of National Guard forces to support States' domestic cyber
    operations and for cyber defense support to civil authorities. The
    CONOPS are most effective with an automated mechanism for information
    sharing between States. Where are you currently in the effort to
    automate this information sharing process and what else needs to happen
    to enable this CONOPS?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        65. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the National Guard is
    quickly becoming a major player in the Cyber Operations fight. Last
    year the West Virginia National Guard began sending soldiers to attend
    jointly developed courses in cybersecurity at the University of
    Charleston to grow capability despite a lack of cyber force structure
    in the State. Previous to this the first National Guard cyber battalion
    was stood up in 2017 in Virginia. What is the future of force structure
    developments for National Guard units and how will National Guard units
    be utilized in the future cyber battlespace?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                           adversary cyber operations
        66. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, we've seen a significant
    increase in adversaries operating in the ``gray zone'' short of
    outright armed conflict utilizing cyber-attacks and information
    operations. Examples include Russian election interference, Chinese
    espionage and intellectual property theft, and Iranian and violent
    extremist information operations. Where are we seeing the greatest
    increase in these ``gray zone'' attacks and where are our associated
    greatest vulnerabilities to these attacks?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
             u.s. special operations command and the national guard
        67. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the West Virginia National
    Guard maintains a robust special operations capability primarily in the
    2nd battalion, 19th Special Forces Group of the Army National Guard.
    Are you able to effectively utilize National Guard special operations
    personnel and training spaces to ease workloads on Active Duty troops
    and achieve or attain better than your desired 1:2 deployment ratio?
        General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM consistently utilizes National Guard
    Special Operations Forces (SOF) residing in 17 states to augment Active
    Duty SOF elements in order to meet directed readiness and 1:2
    Deployment to Dwell requirements. National Guard SOF are generated and
    managed at a 1:4 Mobilization to Deployment ratio. USSOCOM expects all
    Active Duty Special Operations Forces will be at or above the 1:2
    Deployment to Dwell Ratio by the start of fiscal year 2021. USSOCOM
    could not accomplish this without the effective use of the National
    Guard SOF.
          u.s. special operations command and artificial intelligence
        68. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the Department just released
    the Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy. In the unclassified
    summary, it says that it ``is likely that the most transformative AI-
    enabled capabilities will arise from experiments at the `forward
    edge''', which means that is ``discovered by the users themselves in
    contexts far removed from centralized offices and laboratories.'' It
    seems clear that the special operations community is going to play a
    huge role in the artificial intelligence spaces. How are commanders
    embracing AI now and what are some things down the road we can expect
    to see our SOF community executing using artificial intelligence.
        General Thomas. USSOCOM is finalizing its AI Strategy, which
    clearly states it's our intention to be an AI Command accelerating
    SOF's ability to produce and use decision grade data at the speed of
    computers across every facet of our operations. Through the USSOCOM
    CDO, we are embracing an ``applied AI'' model, inspired by industry,
    where we focus on rapidly deploying AI technologies from our tactical
    elements to strategic headquarters. We are undertaking steps to create
    an aggressive workforce that can master the application of AI. As we
    improve our understanding of the technology our SOF operators and
    professionals will find creative applications for its use and continue
    deploying the new technologies increasingly rapid rates. As we build
    the team who can help deliver this technology and manage the data
    associated with it we've undertaken efforts with Project Maven to
    expand the deployment and capability of their technology into our
    formation beyond just full motion video but also exploring the
    opportunities to leverage smart system technologies to merge
    intelligence and operational data layers. We've also made our data,
    domain experts, and formation available to deploy new AI technologies
    to facilitate the rapid exploitation of captured enemy material.
    Further, we partnered with the JAIC to introduce the use of data-
    engineering and AI into our rotary wing fleet within the 160th Special
    Operations Aviation Regiment. This initiative provides our maintainers
    with the ability to predict engine failures and plan accordingly to
    avoid the lack of aircraft during operational peeks. The predictive
    model aligns needed maintenance based on data obtained from the
    aircraft with operational requirements to ensure peek readiness rates
    during mission peeks. Over the coming months we plan to initiate
    projects with the JAIC and others to build upon our successful AI
    technology integrations but also expand into other areas that include
    messaging and counter-messaging, identity protection and management,
    human performance, and maneuver.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                                   recruiting
        69. Senator Jones. General Thomas, it's my understanding that the
    numbers of women and minorities in the Special Operations Forces are
    pretty low. I think we all understand the intrinsic value of a diverse
    force, but it seems to me also that recruiting effectively among all
    groups can help you reach your recruitment numbers and that diversity
    among the force can be very helpful when you are operating in other
    cultures and countries, especially in the types of missions Special
    Operations Forces undertake. Do you have a handle on the reasons for
    the low numbers of women and minority Special Operations Forces members
    and are you making efforts to increase those numbers?
        General Thomas. Keeping in mind that most in-service recruiting
    comes from the combat arms fields in the Army and Marines, the
    composition of our Special Operations Forces is highly reflective of
    the diversity make up of those forces. As women and minorities increase
    in the Army and Marine infantry, the numbers in the Raiders, Rangers
    and Special Forces will increase, but it will take time. Likewise, as
    the Air Force continues to recruit more diversity into Battlefield
    Airmen and as the Navy continues to recruit diversity into the SEALs,
    the diversity in SOF will grow. While recruiting is a Service
    responsibility, SOCOM is making every effort to offer all qualified
    servicemembers the opportunity to assess into special operations. To
    this end, we have recently graduated our 25th and 26th women rangers
    with numerous additional women currently in the course. As people self-
    select into the special operations forces, we do have limited ability
    to increase the diversity of the force beyond marketing, recruiting and
    mentoring. Nevertheless, special operations will continue to seek
    qualified diverse personnel to fill our ranks.
                                   recruiting
        70. Senator Jones. General Nakasone, how diverse is the CYBERCOM
    force and what efforts are you making to recruit from groups that are
    underrepresented?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                      preservation of the force and family
        71. Senator Jones. General Thomas, I think the Preservation of the
    Force and Family program is an excellent and creative effort to address
    the unique pressures on Special Operations Forces and their families.
    In my hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, we are proud to host the 20th
    Special Forces Group (Airborne), an Army National Guard unit that has
    been regularly actively deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and a number of
    other places around the world as part of the Global War on Terror. I
    think they could benefit tremendously from the POTFF, as do Active Duty
    troops. Although I know there are key differences between Active and
    Guard units, are you considering extending the program to Special
    Forces Guard members and how would you accomplish that?
        General Thomas. We recognize the sacrifices and challenges faced by
    our SOF Reserve and National Guard forces and their families and
    acknowledge the need for POTFF services similar in scope to those
    provided to our Active forces and families. We are exploring
    alternatives to deliver POTFF to our SOF Reserve and National Guard
    forces. Options being considered include mobile training teams and
    remote/virtual instruction. USSOCOM is actively engaged with the DOD
    and Military Services to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA)
    of Reserve and National Guard forces as related to the DOD's Total
    Force Fitness (TFF) initiative. The CBA is intended to identify
    capability gaps, which will lead to programming resources to fulfill
    those gaps. In an effort to reach SOF families and remotely located
    personnel, including Reserve and National Guard, POTFF is developing a
    website to virtually deliver health and fitness material and to better
    connect SOF communities. The website will be active by mid-2019.
    Reserve and National Guard units that are located in proximity to
    active SOF units are welcomed and encouraged to utilize POTFF resources
    at those units.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
    Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. The
    meeting today is going to receive testimonies from two great
    guys, and it is a really good timing for this event to take
    place. They are General John Hyten, Commander of the USSTRATCOM
    [United States Strategic Command], and General Terry
    O'Shaughnessy, Commander of NORTHCOM [United States Northern
    Command].
        This Committee's top priority is to support the effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS
    Commission, which we have had a hearing on already--I think it
    leads us in the right direction. It is a blueprint that we are
    using in this commission. They made it clear that maintaining
    and modernizing the nuclear deterrent is required. While we
    ignored the nuclear weapons after the Cold War ended, Russia
    and China have focused on more and more nuclear programs. We, I
    guess, assumed that they were not doing anything because we
    were not doing anything at that time. Nonetheless, we have
    fallen behind.
        Now we need to modernize all three legs with the nuclear
    triad, as well as the warheads and infrastructure in the
    Department of Energy (DOE). We have some questions about that
    because there is a lot of comments around negating the
    necessity of the nuclearization modernization that we feel is
    necessary.
        The President and the Department of Defense (DOD) have also
    rightly identified space as a warfighting domain that is
    growing more important every day.
        General Hyten, you are a career space professional and your
    current command both directs and relies upon many space systems
    every day. I look forward to hearing your views on establishing
    the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a full combatant command
    and also your thoughts on the new space force. We had a chance
    to visit in my office, and I appreciate it. I have heard that
    you visited others too. It is kind of a confusing thing when
    you talk about a space force and you talk also about the
    combatant command and where the two are similar. I have some
    questions along that line.
        General O'Shaughnessy, you have operational responsibility
    for the defense of the United States Homeland. What an awesome
    responsibility that is. The Missile Defense Review recently
    enumerated a number of challenges to U.S. missile defenses,
    including cruise and hypersonic missiles. I am interested in
    your views on the most pressing priorities in the missile
    defense arena, as well as what we should be doing to address
    them.
        Lastly, General O'Shaughnessy, I am eager to hear your
    assessment of the ongoing southern border deployment and how
    that might be affecting our readiness. Some interpretations of
    what is happening down there say that that could actually
    improve our readiness. I am anxious to hear your views on that.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, General
    Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy. We thank you and your families
    and the many men and women who serve with you to serve the
    nation and protect the nation. Thank you very much.
        General Hyten, first and foremost, we would like to hear
    from you about the administration's decision to withdraw from
    the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with nothing
    to replace it. I understand that Russia was in noncompliance
    and that China also poses a threat, but I believe a better path
    would have been to continue to pressure Russia back into
    compliance and ask modifications to the treaty, if necessary.
        Treaties are a major component of our security strategy. We
    build and modernize nuclear weapons, but we also have treaties
    which prescribe numbers and use. Withdrawing from this treaty
    puts the extension of New START [New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty] in 2021 on very shaky ground. I am interested in your
    views on this matter.
        The second issue I am concerned about is Russia's
    successful launch of the long-range hypersonic weapon, which I
    understand will be nuclear-capable. China also has a multitude
    of similar systems although not long-range like those of
    Russia. I am interested in hearing your thoughts on the
    capabilities of our near-peer competition and what we need to
    do to counter these capabilities.
        The third issue I would like you to address is the
    administration's space force proposal. I understand the
    importance of space and the need for additional focus and
    resources for that effort. I am also supportive of creating a
    full unified command for space. However, I remain dubious of
    the need to create an entire new bureaucracy of a separate
    service and all that entails. I think it is inevitable that
    such a creation will distract rather than provide focus to the
    critical mission of space. I know you have studied this issue
    closely, and I am interested in your views on the pros and cons
    of this proposal.
        Finally, General Hyten, you are also responsible for the
    synchronization of global missile defense plans and operations.
    I would like to hear your thoughts about the recently released
    Missile Defense Review and the Department's plans for our
    current missile defense systems and how to address future
    threats.
        General O'Shaughnessy, your mission is to protect the
    Homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and
    to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of
    attacks and natural disasters. We saw this demonstrated in
    DOD's support to the States and territories affected by
    hurricanes and wildfires this past year, and we thank you and
    your command for your significant efforts.
        You are also dual-hatted as the Commander of the North
    American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, which brings unique
    responsibilities and partnering opportunities with Canada to
    deter and defend against advancing threats to our nations.
        You are also responsible for the operation of our Homeland
    ballistic missile defense system. We look forward to hearing
    about your priorities for further improvements to the ground-
    based missile defense system in the context of the Missile
    Defense Review. This is particularly important in light of the
    threat from North Korea and potentially Iran.
        Lastly, at a time when the National Defense Strategy and
    our intelligence community's annual worldwide threat assessment
    are stressing the absolute necessity of using scarce resources
    to meet the challenge of near-peer adversaries like Russia and
    China, the administration is committing significant DOD
    resources and attention to what the President has taken to
    calling a national emergency at our southern border. In fact,
    nowhere in these two documents I have referenced, the National
    Defense Strategy particularly, are migrant caravans or drug
    traffickers crossing our southern border mentioned as threats
    to our national security. Russia, China, cybersecurity, and a
    host of other items are in those documents, but nowhere is
    there a finding that calls for 4,000 Active Duty troops to be
    deployed to the southern border. For comparison's sake, we have
    approximately 5,000 troops deployed in Iraq. I have yet to hear
    from a witness before this Committee who has not stressed the
    real threats we face and the need to restore readiness and
    provide modern facilities for our troops and their families.
    Instead, DOD is planning to reallocate funding that has been
    authorized and appropriated for installation commanders' top
    priorities in support of a wall that has no connection to a
    military threat and does not support military effectiveness.
        I will also add that is the responsibility of the
    Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border
    Protection, not DOD, to patrol and enforce our borders. If this
    administration is serious about dealing with the drug epidemic
    in our Nation, then it should properly fund these federal
    agencies and other associated federal agencies.
        General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, again thank you
    for your service, and please pass our regards on to the men and
    women that you lead. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Well, General Hyten, we will start with you and then go to
    General O'Shaughnessy. Try to keep your statements in the realm
    of 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made a part of the
    record. We will start with you, General Hyten.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Hyten. Thank you very much. Chairman Inhofe,
    Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee Members, good
    morning. It is an honor to be here today alongside my friend,
    General O'Shaughnessy, and a continuing privilege to represent
    the 162,000 Americans accomplishing the missions of U.S.
    Strategic Command each and every day.
        This is my third year appearing before this Committee as
    the STRATCOM Commander, and I appreciated the opportunities to
    meet with many of you one on one and to testify before you. I
    want to begin by thanking this Committee for your enduring
    support to our national defense.
        The last time I testified before the Committee, we had
    begun our 10th consecutive year under a continuing resolution.
    Not this year, thanks to your leadership. I cannot overstate
    the importance of an on-time budget. The stability afforded
    with an on-time budget this year came at a critical time for us
    and had a positive impact on our modernization efforts and our
    overall force readiness.
        STRATCOM is a global warfighting command, and as part of
    the joint force, we are responsible for strategic deterrence,
    nuclear operations, global strike, space operations, joint
    electromagnetic spectrum operations, missile defense, and joint
    analysis and targeting. That is a big portfolio. To execute our
    assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    and civilians of my command operate globally across land, sea,
    air, space, and cyber. Our forces and the strategic deterrence
    they provide underpin and enable all joint force operations and
    are the ultimate guarantors of our national and allied
    security.
        The most important message I want to deliver today is that
    I am fully confident in our ability to preserve the peace and
    decisively respond in any conflict. We are ready for all
    threats that exist on the planet today, and no one should doubt
    this.
        Strategic deterrence is an active mission. It is not a
    passive mission. It is dynamic. Our capabilities must continue
    to evolve as the global threat environment changes over time.
    With this evolution, the adversary's decision calculus changes,
    which drives modification to our own deterrence approach. Today
    we are challenged by multiple adversaries with an expanding
    range of capabilities, and we must adapt as well. To
    effectively deter and respond, if necessary, in this multi-
    polar, all-domain world, we must out-think, outmaneuver, out-
    partner, out-innovate our adversaries. Deterrence in the 21st
    century requires the integration of all our capabilities across
    all domains.
        For over 2 decades, China and Russia have studied the way
    we fight. They study the American way of warfare. They have
    watched and learned how we train and fight. They understand the
    advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across all
    domains to accomplish our strategic objectives. To counter our
    long-held advantages, they are actively seeking to exploit
    perceived vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in
    areas of long-held strength.
        While our advantages are beginning to erode, we have not
    yet ceded the advantage. My focus this year is to continue to
    focus on the operations and modernization of our nuclear
    capabilities, focus first on the nuclear triad of ICBMs
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles], submarines, and bombers
    to support a seamless transition as the Department stands up a
    new space-focused organization and to continue the
    implementation of my new responsibilities as the nuclear
    command, control, and communications, NC3, enterprise lead and
    the operator and architect for this critical capability.
        To be successful in everything that we do, we must
    recapture our ability to go fast, faster than all our potential
    adversaries. That is my biggest concern these days. That means
    we must return to the dynamic that made us the strongest, most
    technologically advance military in the world. But over my 38
    years in military service, I have watched as our Nation has
    collectively developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of
    trying to remove all risk from everything that we do. The
    challenge I have issued in my command is go break down the
    bureaucracy, take some smart risks, informed risks, do this
    within the left and right limits that I established in my
    commander's intent, and we have to move fast. It is critical if
    we are to stay ahead.
        I am very grateful for your support in helping us do just
    that. I look forward to an on-time budget this upcoming fiscal
    year so we can sustain the momentum invigorating this
    Department and our best-in-the-world people, our best-in-the-
    world commercial sector to go faster and innovate to bring more
    timely and affordable solutions to our most pressing deterrence
    challenges. It is critical because nuclear war cannot be won
    and therefore must never be fought. Therefore, for us to
    prevent war, we must be ready for war. Success means we have
    lived up to our motto coined over 60 years ago in Strategic Air
    Command: Peace is our profession.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General John E. Hyten
                                  introduction
        USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. This is my third year
    testifying in front of this Committee. My command priorities have not
    changed. They remain: (1) above all else, provide strategic deterrence
    for the Nation and assurance of the same to our allies and partners,
    (2) if deterrence fails, be prepared to deliver a decisive response,
    and (3) do this with a combat-ready force. The 162,000 men and women
    who make up USSTRATCOM are resilient, equipped, and ready thanks to
    your continued support. Budget stability over the past year was
    extremely important and had a positive impact on both our modernization
    efforts and our overall readiness.
        As part of the Joint Force, USSTRATCOM is responsible for Strategic
    Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, Global Strike, Space Operations, Joint
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Missile Defense, and Analysis &
    Targeting. To execute our assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civilians of the command operate globally across
    the land, sea, air, and space. Our forces and the strategic deterrence
    they provide underpin and enable all Joint Force operations and are the
    ultimate guarantors of national and allied security.
        The foundation that enables our strategic deterrence is the triad:
    nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarines,
    and Bombers. A powerful, ready triad remains the most effective way to
    deter adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against the United
    States and allies. Its credibility backstops all U.S. military
    operations and diplomacy around the globe and ensures that tensions--
    regardless of where or how they arise--do not escalate into large-scale
    war.
        However, as all the elements of the triad age beyond their planned
    service life, we must continue to execute our planned modernization
    strategy to maintain an effective deterrent. We require a robust and
    ready nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future. This will remain the
    case until the myriad of legacy and emerging nuclear threats are
    reduced or eliminated. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring.
        Deterrence is created by much more than the 1,550 New START treaty-
    accountable deployed nuclear weapons and 700 deployed strategic
    delivery platforms. Today, our mission to deter major power conflict
    dictates we field ready, capable, and lethal forces, tailored to
    adaptive adversaries. Continued success means integrating the full
    range of missions in all domains and without geographic boundaries. We
    are increasingly integrating our planning and Tier 1 exercises to
    remove seams between global and geographic combatant commands. We are
    pursuing approaches to enhance real world planning and execution of
    globally integrated fires to best deliver the most effective
    capabilities and effects when and where needed.
        The United States must never put our ability to deter in jeopardy.
    Our missions, capabilities, and forces must continue to be an integral
    part of our overarching national security posture. Therefore, to
    continue to provide the security our Nation deserves, we must clearly
    identify the threats we face, develop strategies to deter those
    threats, and ensure we have the required capabilities for decisive
    response if deterrence fails. Only with continued Congressional
    support, can this remain the case.
                          global security environment
        The National Defense Strategy describes the increasingly complex
    global security environment in which we live. We characterize today's
    environment by the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition
    between nations and overt challenges to the free and open international
    order. Although an era of great power competition is again a reality,
    that does not mean conflict is inevitable. It means we must continue
    investing in strength to preserve the peace.
        It is increasingly apparent that China and Russia want to shape a
    world consistent with their authoritarian models--gaining veto power
    over global economic, diplomatic, and security decisions--seeking
    dominance within their perceived regional spheres of influence, and
    expanding their global reach.
        For over two decades, China and Russia have studied the American
    way of warfare; observing first-hand how we train and fight. They now
    understand the advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across
    all domains to accomplish strategic objectives. To counter our
    dominance, China and Russia are actively seeking to exploit perceived
    vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in areas of long-held
    strength. Their development of asymmetric capabilities across all-
    domains is not meant to challenge single aspects of our deterrence
    strategy; rather, their advancements in technology, strategy, tactics,
    and doctrine aim to invalidate our entire deterrence strategy.
                                     china
        China continues to challenge the existing rules-based international
    order. It is advancing a comprehensive modernization program aimed at
    making the People's Liberation Army a world-class military. This
    program includes the continued development and deployment of a nuclear
    triad, combined with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and power
    projection operations. They are also pursuing advancements in offensive
    hypersonic strike weapons, advanced robotics, quantum computing, and
    artificial intelligence (AI) through a combination of research and
    development, forced transfer of intellectual property, and outright
    cyber theft.
        Additionally, China's maturing military space capabilities in
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, satellite
    communications, satellite navigation, meteorology, and robotic space
    exploration present growing challenges in space. With their focus on
    counter-space capabilities, China is pursuing a strategy of denying the
    United States the advantage of space-based systems during crises and
    conflicts.
        Once locked away in intelligence channels, news outlets are
    beginning to note specific threats to our space systems. January marked
    12 years since China publicly tested its direct-ascent system, in which
    it destroyed one of its own satellites and created thousands of pieces
    of debris. This 2007 test demonstrated to the world that China is
    capable of destroying any satellite in low earth orbit, including many
    of our intelligence and communications spacecraft. Today, China has an
    operational ground-based anti-satellite missile intended to target low-
    earth orbit satellites and are pursuing numerous other capabilities.
    These developments, coupled with China's lack of transparency on
    nuclear policies, force disposition, and weapons and their growing
    assertiveness to challenge the existing free and open international
    order undermines regional and global stability. Further, these actions
    seek to erode the United States standing in Asia.
                                     russia
        Russia continues to conduct malign activities that negatively
    impact U.S. interests. Their invasion and attempted annexation of the
    Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf
    of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information
    environment to suit Russian interests, pose a major challenge to the
    United States and NATO. Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the
    potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly
    assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of
    nuclear weapons would serve to ``de-escalate'' a conflict on terms
    favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect
    for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.
        As far back as 2006, Russia committed to modernizing and adding new
    military capabilities to its nuclear forces and upgrading its strategic
    nuclear triad. Today, Russia has completed roughly 80 percent of their
    modernization goals. As part of this program, Russia is upgrading to
    modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs, increasing ballistic missile
    submarine reliability and stealth, fielding new Submarine Launched
    Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs),
    and modernizing its fleet of long-range strategic bombers, to carry
    nuclear and conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missiles. Russia
    is also developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear
    weapons, like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater unmanned
    vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile, which Russia seeks
    to keep outside of existing arms control agreements.
        Russia is also pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles and
    nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which when coupled with their newest
    intercontinental range ballistic missiles, improves upon its capability
    to attack anywhere on the globe with little or no notice. Additionally,
    their production of a new fifth generation bomber expected within the
    decade will enhance their ability for long-range deployment.
        Russia's material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty also remains a significant concern, as demonstrated by their
    deployment of a treaty-violating system, the SSC-8 groundlaunched
    cruise missile, multiple battalions of which have been fielded as of
    late 2018, and illustrates Russia's broader pattern of malign behavior
    and willingness to disregard negotiated agreements when they believe it
    is in their interest. Finally, Russia has an active stockpile up to
    2,000 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs), which are not accountable
    under the New START Treaty. These include air-to-surface missiles,
    short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for
    medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as
    anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for
    surface ships and submarines, and Moscow's antiballistic missile
    system.
        Russia's diverse and flexible NSNW capabilities facilitate a
    doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons.
    Combined with its large nuclear weapons infrastructure and ready
    production base, this underscores Moscow's commitment to having nuclear
    weapon underpin its security and commitment to maintaining its nuclear
    forces for the indefinite future. Their doctrine of coercive use
    further enhances their ability to challenge the United States and NATO
    across the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, military, and
    information warfare.
                              north korea and iran
        North Korea and Iran remain threats but not to the same degree as
    China and Russia. Both North Korea and Iran retain large arsenals of
    short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and are threats to regional
    stability. North Korea has tested ICBM-class missiles designed to range
    the United States. However, the Department of Defense is working
    actively to reduce military tensions and remains in full support of our
    diplomats as they work to achieve the final, fully verified
    denuclearization of the DPRK. Iran remains the world's leading sponsor
    of terror and continues its malign influence and destabilizing
    activities across the region. None of these activities are helpful or
    supportive of peace and stability, and all introduce greater risk to an
    already complex and volatile environment. In both instances, we remain
    vigilant to the threats they pose to the United States, our allies and
    partners, and support the on-going international and whole-of-
    government approaches to reduce these threats peacefully.
                              strategic deterrence
        Strategic deterrence has underwritten our Nation's security and
    preserved our way of life since the end of World War II. While the
    fundamental principles of deterrence remain constant, the 21st century
    landscape is profoundly different. We can no longer focus on countering
    a single adversary with traditional means. Peer adversaries are
    aggressively pursuing outright theft of intellectual property,
    demonstrating willingness to corrupt supply chains, and are exploiting
    rapid advancements in disruptive technologies in destabilizing ways.
    These actions provide China and Russia, in particular, advanced
    strategic capabilities to threaten the United States and marginalize
    our global influence. This requires us to rethink how we continue to
    deter new types of strategic attacks.
        The mission of our Nation's strategic forces of the last 73 years
    endures: to deter major attacks against the United States and if
    necessary employ strategic forces to defeat an ever-changing adversary.
    Effective command and control, that supports global integration, is a
    necessary and critical element.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy states the Department of Defense
    (DOD) ``will modernize the nuclear triad--including Nuclear Command,
    Control, and Communications (NC3), and supporting infrastructure.''
    Thanks to Congressional support and timely budgets, we are making solid
    progress modernizing these weapon systems. However, to fully realize
    the capabilities of a modernized triad we require an NC3 architecture
    responsive to evolving threats and able to adapt to technology
    innovations. Speed is essential. We are beginning to move faster, but
    we are still not moving fast enough. Our most critical weapon systems
    must deliver on time or early. The Services are making progress and I
    appreciate their efforts, but we must continue to strive for more
    timely, affordable programs. We must recapture the ability of our
    Nation to go fast, faster than all potential adversaries, in order to
    maintain an effective deterrent.
        Going fast means that we return to the dynamic that made us the
    strongest most technologically advanced military in the world. Over my
    nearly 38 years of military service I have watched as we collectively
    developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of removing all risk
    from everything we do. Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of the
    Nuclear Navy once said, ``Success teaches us nothing, only failure
    teaches.'' We seem to have forgotten this principle. Although success
    is the ultimate goal, we must accept some healthy failures along the
    way. Today, however, we seem to reward and promote people at all levels
    for never failing, subconsciously creating a collective mindset to
    maintain the status quo at all costs. The best way to never fail is to
    never try, or to try only when success is certain--which means we
    punish those who aggressively take risks. If we continue this trend, we
    will eventually fall behind our competition. In 1991, the United States
    had the only superpower-class military, and status quo at that time
    favored us greatly. We still have an advantage, but that advantage is
    shrinking. I appear before you today fully confident in our ability to
    preserve the peace and dominate any conflict. But without change--
    unless we recapture the ability to take intelligent risk--a future
    USSTRATCOM commander, a decade or so from now, may sit before you and
    not be able to make the same statement. This could put our whole nation
    at greater risk.
        To emphasize that point--today, our forces are still dominant, the
    finest in the world, yet they are equipped with many of the exact same
    weapon systems fielded during the Cold War, including the triad and our
    NC3 capabilities. Moreover, our competitors are moving fast--
    particularly in the area of their strategic forces. Status quo no
    longer favors us; however, our underlying personnel, budgeting, and
    acquisition structures evolved since the end of the Cold War to
    preserve the status quo. This must change. We must counter this
    situation with ruthless determination to reward and promote thoughtful
    risk management aimed at applying innovative technologies and new
    business practices. We must improve our ability to protect our Nation's
    commercial sector where innovation thrives. We must move fast in space,
    in cyber, in all our strategic systems--to once again regain the
    advantage.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Our NC3 system is ready, reliable, and effective at meeting today's
    strategic deterrence requirements. However, to meet the evolving
    threat, advances in technology, and to prepare for a modernized triad
    we must update our NC3 system now. Our current legacy system reflects
    the needs of the Cold War, focused primarily on Soviet-era ballistic
    missile and bomber threats. The next generation NC3 architecture must
    maintain and even improve on the readiness and reliability of today
    while also dealing with the myriad of new threats from our potential
    adversaries. As we transition to a modern threat-based NC3 enterprise
    architecture and address the growing cyber, asymmetric, and kinetic
    challenges, we must ensure positive command and control of U.S. nuclear
    forces at all times, even under the enormous stress of a nuclear
    attack. Getting this right and doing so quickly is one of my top
    priorities.
        The next generation NC3 architecture requires an innovative
    approach tightly linking mission needs, requirements, acquisition, and
    funding strategies to deliver capability on operational and
    threatrelevant timelines. We must transform the enterprise to operate
    with speed and agility, fully leveraging rapid prototyping and
    experimentation, to innovate and outpace the threat. We must
    continually change while maintaining predictability for the user. This
    is a challenging task and once defined must be consistently resourced.
        The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified a range of
    initiatives to ensure our NC3 capability remains survivable and
    effective in crisis. Among these initiatives is reforming NC3
    governance due to the broad diffusion of authority and responsibility
    within the Department. On 03 Oct 2018, the Secretary of Defense
    designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff accountable for all NC3 related activities. Under this
    new governance structure, the Commander of USSTRATCOM is the NC3
    Enterprise Lead responsible for NC3 enterprise operations,
    requirements, and systems engineering and integration, while the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S)) serves
    as NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). We have codified NC3
    governance roles and responsibilities, taken concrete steps to sustain
    the current NC3 architecture with selective modernization, and are
    moving forward to design and field the next generation NC3. This was a
    necessary step to place the authorities under one commander, and I am
    already moving forward in that role.
        To execute these new responsibilities, we are well on our way to
    establishing the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) at USSTRATCOM and are on
    track to achieve initial operational capability this year. The NEC will
    improve mission effectiveness and efficiency while defining future NC3
    capability requirements. The NEC will also establish core NC3
    operational concepts as the basis for aligning the right mix of multi-
    domain capabilities necessary to execute the Nuclear Command and
    Control mission and achieve strategic deterrence objectives. Essential
    to this work, is the ability to direct enterprise-level systems
    engineering and integration activities. Working with the Director,
    Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Joint Systems
    Engineering and Integration Office is now aligned to the NEC and
    receives operational direction and work prioritization from me.
        To support the NEC, USD (A&S) as the NC3 CPM will oversee and
    advise on NC3 enterprise acquisition and resources. The NEC and USD
    (A&S) team will provide comprehensive enterprise-level understanding of
    operational risk, margin and investment priorities as we envision,
    design and field the next generation NC3 in partnership with our
    service and agency leads.
        To ensure we remain aligned, responsive and relevant, the NC3
    enterprise must have dedicated operational and intelligence resources
    to rapidly identify, understand, and anticipate current and future
    evolving threats to the NC3 enterprise. To satisfy this need and
    concurrently address section 1655 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), PL 115-91, USSTRATCOM, in
    coordination with the Office of the Director for National Intelligence,
    is establishing an NC3 Intelligence Fusion Center within the USSTRATCOM
    Intelligence Directorate. This initiative will facilitate aligning
    operations with intelligence expertise to enhance future NC3
    architecture security.
        With the governance structure in place to address future needs, we
    will concurrently continue sustainment and operation of the existing
    NC3 enterprise. We have taken significant steps over the past year to
    improve service, agency, and nuclear command and control operations
    centers reporting to better understand operational risk and margin.
    This data will allow us to continue increasing the analytic rigor in
    our assessments and inform sustainment and modernization investment
    priorities.
        In order to provide the Commander In Chief continuous
    communications and control of the nuclear forces, we are improving
    communications capabilities across all domains to ensure connectivity,
    enhanced conferencing, and decision support tools to the President. In
    the space domain, we continue to launch Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency (AEHF) satellites for integration into a combined Milstar/
    AEHF communications constellation. The AEHF satellites, using the
    eXtended Data Rate (XDR) waveform, coupled with requisite ground node
    and airborne platform Family of Advanced Beyond Lineof-Sight terminals
    (FAB-T) enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors
    under any circumstance and ensure connectivity with the nuclear forces.
        In the air domain, the Air Force and Navy are executing an airborne
    platform Analysis-of-Alternatives for replacing existing E-4B National
    Airborne Operations Center, E-6B Airborne Command Post and Take Charge
    And Move Out (TACAMO), and C-32 Executive Transport fleets. Ongoing
    communications capability enhancements include Air Force programs to
    provide a Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver for the B-2 bomber in 2020
    and a replacement VLF receiver and AEHF-capable terminal for the B-52
    bomber. These capabilities will provide resilient and robust worldwide
    connectivity lasting well into the next two decades.
        Finally, in the land domain, the Air Force Global Aircrew Strategic
    Network Terminal program will deploy an AEHF terminal providing Air
    Force Wing Command Posts, Munitions Support Squadrons, and Mobile
    Support Teams with survivable ground-based communications to receive
    Presidential direction for relay to bomber, tanker and reconnaissance
    forces. This modernization initiative is essential to completing
    transition from legacy Milstar low data rate networks to AEHF extended
    data rate networks.
        I am confident in the direction the Department has taken and the
    priority placed on modernization of the NC3 Enterprise as stated in the
    NPR. As the Enterprise lead, my command will aggressively move forward,
    ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable architecture is in place for
    years to come.
                               the nuclear triad
        Maintaining the planned modernization of our nuclear triad of
    ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers with air delivered weapons remains the best
    approach to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies
    that we are committed to their security. Numerous reviews, including
    the 2018 NPR, validate the nuclear triad's importance in deterring
    Russia and China, providing operational flexibility, and dissuading
    other nations from pursuing their own nuclear weapon programs. With a
    credible and effective force and a supporting declaratory policy, our
    strategic competitors would be hard-pressed to believe they could
    attack the United States or our allies and achieve the benefits they
    seek.
        A modernized triad provides both unique and complementary
    capabilities to address current threats and future uncertainty. Alert
    and always ready to respond, the ICBM force ensures no adversary,
    regardless of size, can be confident in the success of a preemptive
    attack. Our ICBMs create enormous targeting problems for our
    adversaries, requiring a massive raid that would be impossible to hide
    and would guarantee their own demise. With its range, payload,
    accuracy, and speed the ICBM is critical to our Nation's deterrent
    strategy.
        Our strategic bombers provide the President the most visible,
    flexible, adaptable, and recallable options to provide strategic
    deterrence. Should an emerging crisis arise, we can rapidly deploy our
    bombers to clearly communicate our resolve and commitment to our global
    security partners. With the ability to provide a conventional or
    nuclear strike capability, the bomber force plays an indispensable role
    in our overall strategy.
        Nuclear powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles
    patrol the seas and provide a survivable response capable of holding
    targets at risk within hours. Their assured, survivable secondstrike
    capability means that regardless of any attack, our adversaries will
    always face the possibility of a devastating response. The most
    survivable leg of the triad, it is also critical to our Nation's
    strategic deterrent.
        We continue to propose prudent investments in delivery system
    modernization programs across the triad. These modernization efforts
    improve our readiness, increase safety and security, and enhance our
    capabilities/credibility against the threats we face now and in the
    near future. Although some might consider these modernization plans
    expensive, I believe that America can afford survival. The only way to
    change our strategic deterrent is to convince our adversaries to reduce
    the threat. This is not occurring. China and Russia, in particular, are
    not only modernizing the traditional elements of their own triads, but
    are also building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to
    threaten the United States. Both nations employ and are modernizing
    silo-based ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers, and both are
    deploying large numbers of mobile ICBMs--which the United States has
    chosen not to pursue. China and Russia are pursuing hypersonics as we
    are, but, in stark contrast, we have no plans to include them in our
    nuclear force structure. Russia is also building new intermediate range
    nuclear weapons, new cruise missiles, as well as new nuclear powered
    cruise missiles and torpedoes all to threaten the United States.
        We continue to monitor and evaluate all these new threats. We did
    so in last year's NPR. In the NPR, we evaluated and discarded a course
    of action that would match and even exceed the capabilities of these
    adversaries. Our analysis showed that we could continue to deter any
    and all of these threats with a modernized triad augmented by a small
    number of low yield nuclear weapons deployed on our submarines and a
    measured sea launched cruise missile capability. Modernization of these
    capabilities is critical to our Nation's defense. We don't have to
    match all the specific capabilities of our adversaries as long as our
    capabilities are robust enough to deter and if needed respond to any
    attack; this is why we need a triad augmented by some small numbers of
    supplemental capabilities. By pursuing these capabilities, we make sure
    that nuclear-armed adversaries do not falsely conclude there are
    reasonable benefits and acceptable costs to attacking the United States
    and our allies. Sustaining and modernizing the triad requires
    investment, but its contribution to peace and stability far outweigh
    the projected cost required to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
                         land-based strategic deterrent
        The Minuteman III has served the country for over 45 years. Its
    high availability rate is testament to its robust design and the
    diligent efforts of the airmen who operate and maintain the weapon
    system. The Air Force is committed, through such efforts as the
    Programmed Depot Maintenance and Airborne Launch Control System
    Replacement programs, to sustaining the Minuteman III ICBM through
    2030. When the Minuteman III finally retires, it will have exceeded its
    initial 10-year service life by half a century. While still reliable,
    missile component and hardware attrition, coupled with the aging of
    1960's era infrastructure, drive the requirement for a comprehensive
    weapon system replacement within the next decade. Further Minuteman III
    life extension is not cost effective nor will it provide a weapon
    system capable of adapting to advancing technology and changing
    adversary threats.
        To maintain a viable land-based strategic deterrent capability, the
    Air Force must begin deploying the replacement Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent (GBSD) by the late 2020s. We are working closely with the Air
    Force to ensure the GBSD is fully integrated into our modernized NC3
    system and can adapt to an evolving and increasingly dynamic strategic
    environment. To ensure this, the Air Force is incorporating modularity
    and open system standards enabling future technology insertion.
    Additionally, to deliver GBSD on time and on budget, the Air Force is
    pursuing mature, low-risk technologies and working with other strategic
    partners to leverage investments that eliminate delays and reduce cost.
    When fielded, GBSD will be a capable and cost-effective ICBM able to
    deter potential adversaries and assure allies of our commitments to
    their security.
                         sea-based strategic deterrent
        The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine's stout construction and
    pioneering maintenance program allowed it to be life extended from 30
    to 42 years into the 2040s, making it the longest serving submarine in
    U.S. history. However, with no margin to extend the Ohio-class further,
    the Columbia-class SSBN must field on time to avoid a deterrent
    capability gap in the triad. It is also essential that we maintain our
    technological advantage in this critical mission, and Columbia will do
    just that. To this end, the Navy has elevated the Columbia program to
    its top shipbuilding priority, leveraging other efforts and
    implementing advanced procurement to reduce risk and ensure it is ready
    for its first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031. We must continue to
    support our industrial partners and give appropriate prioritization to
    funding throughout the life of the program.
        To avoid complex concurrent strategic weapon modernization
    programs, the Navy life extended the Trident II D5 ballistic missile to
    transition from Ohio to Columbia. The Navy fielded the Trident II D5
    over 25 years ago and is executing a life extension that will allow
    service into the early 2040s. In the face of continuously evolving
    threats, we must begin the effort of designing a flexible and adaptable
    follow-on SLBM that allows rapid and cost effective modifications.
        To ensure our nuclear posture is successful in deterring
    adversaries, the 2018 NPR directed nearterm fielding of a small number
    low-yield ballistic missile (LYBM) warheads and pursuit of a modern
    nuclear-armed SLCM. These capabilities are necessary to our strategic
    deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the
    mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.
        The LYBM has begun production and will serve to provide a timely
    counter to Russia's NSNWs, their doctrine of limited first-use in a
    large-scale conflict on Russian territory, and their perceived
    advantage in low-level nuclear conflict. The SLCM will help close
    deterrence gaps and provide a considerable degree of assurance to
    allies.
                         air-based strategic deterrent
        The current bomber fleet and its associated weapon systems have
    already exceeded or are rapidly approaching the end of their intended
    service life. To preclude a strategic capability gap associated with
    these essential nuclear platforms, ongoing sustainment and planned
    modernization efforts must continue.
        The B-52 remains the backbone of the strategic bomber force today
    and well into the future. It is the only platform capable of employing
    the nuclear AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) which provides a
    standoff capability while providing the President the flexibility to
    recall a strike if necessary. B-52s will remain in service until 2050.
    Until the B-52 is replaced, the Air Force will continue to upgrade the
    aircraft to ensure its long-term viability. Modernization of the
    1950's-era engines, avionics, and weapons systems is essential for
    continued airborne strategic deterrence.
        The B-2, the Nation's only penetrating bomber is also undergoing
    several critical modernization programs to maintain its survivability
    against advanced air defenses. Similar to the B-52, the B-2 recently
    received weapon systems and communication equipment updates to improve
    effectiveness and lethality.
        The B-21 is the bomber of the future, ensuring we maintain a
    technical advantage against planned adversary advancements. Armed with
    both direct attack weapons to hold emerging targets at risk and cruise
    missiles to deny geographic sanctuaries to any adversary, the B-21 will
    deliver the right capabilities based upon the tactical situation. Like
    other modernization programs, it is critical the Air Force deliver the
    B-21 on time and on budget to assure we can meet deterrence objectives
    and global security commitments.
        Complementing the Nation's strategic bomber force, the Long Range
    Standoff weapon (LRSO) will replace the aging ALCM and maintain a
    viable nuclear standoff capability that can hold targets at risk in an
    evolving threat environment.
        Strategic bombers require reliable and robust tanker support to
    execute their strategic deterrence and nuclear operations missions.
    While the Air Force is committing significant resources to maintain the
    aging KC-135 tanker fleet, it is critical we deliver its replacement on
    time. The Air Force remains confident the KC-46 will deliver the
    required capabilities to support our strategic forces. It is imperative
    that KC-135 sustainment and KC-46 deliveries remain top priorities to
    ensure a credible air-delivered strategic deterrent.
        Our NATO partners rely on the credible deterrent of deployed F-15,
    F-16, and PA-200 Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) to provide regional
    assurance against aggression in Europe. The B61 nuclear gravity bombs
    deployed to NATO are over 30 years old and will be replaced by the life
    extended B61-12. By the mid-2020s, the F-35 will be available in Europe
    and capable of delivering the B61-12 into defended areas, maintaining
    the credibility of our deterrent capability and of the nuclear
    alliance. The ontime delivery of these capabilities and our continued
    commitment in support of NATO is a cornerstone of our deterrence and
    assurance objectives.
             nuclear weapon stockpile and supporting infrastructure
        Today, our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, effective, reliable,
    and able to meet deterrence mission requirements. Much like the
    modernization efforts of our delivery systems, we must also take a hard
    look at the components that make up the warheads themselves. Ensuring
    the viability of the nuclear deterrent requires continued resourcing
    and sustained effort to address the increasing uncertainty and growing
    risk in our nuclear stockpile and enterprise.
        The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their
    intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United
    States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while some
    potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons
    and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities. Potential
    adversaries are elevating strategic uncertainty with new capabilities,
    escalatory doctrines, and actions threatening our nuclear forces'
    effectiveness and credibility.
        To address these challenges, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
    recently updated its longrange strategic plan to align with the
    National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and
    implement actions directed in the 2018 NPR. The strategic plan aligns
    the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) nuclear weapons modernization and infrastructure
    recapitalization activities with DOD nuclear delivery system
    replacement programs in support of deterrence and military
    requirements.
        The NNSA recently celebrated important stockpile modernization
    milestones by completing the Navy's W76-1 ballistic warhead life
    extension program (LEP) and achieving first production of key
    components in the Air Force's B61-12 gravity weapon nuclear package.
    The Air Force and NNSA are progressing with the LRSO missile and its
    associated W80-4 warhead to deliver required capabilities on schedule.
        The next significant stockpile effort involves both Air Force and
    Navy ballistic missile warheads, the bulk of our deterrent force. While
    these weapons will not field until the 2030s, development activities
    need to start in earnest now in order to posture the enterprise for
    success. Starting now also provides expanded opportunities for the Navy
    and Air Force to collaborate and leverage investments to their mutual
    benefit.
        None of the required stockpile surveillance, sustainment and
    modernization efforts will succeed without replacing key facilities and
    upgrading our aged nuclear infrastructure. Our present complex
    continues to accumulate serious risk due to atrophy and past lack of
    timely recapitalization. I visited all the design laboratories and
    production plants across the complex last year, and in too many cases
    the enterprise is operating at or near capacity or simply lacks the
    needed infrastructure. This results in little margin to execute planned
    work or respond adequately to an emergent technical issue. Options for
    future systems are constrained by design and production limitations. If
    not corrected with currently underway or planned investments, the
    complex's condition will place us at a strategic disadvantage.
        The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-establishing a
    plutonium pit production and fabrication capacity to meet deterrent
    requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies
    and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by
    2030. I support the NNSA plan to achieve this.
        Additionally, critical infrastructure investments in uranium and
    tritium processing, lithium and non-nuclear component production,
    experimental facilities, and general supporting infrastructure are
    required. Shortcomings in these areas create operational risks to force
    readiness and our surge ability to respond to unforeseen technical
    issues or adversary advancements in their capabilities.
        Along with recapitalizing our infrastructure, we must also recruit,
    train, and retain a qualified workforce to perform the highly
    specialized nuclear weapons work. The enterprise must enact a human
    resource strategy that identifies qualified candidates, fosters
    interest through internships or skilled trade programs, and clears them
    for classified work as quickly as possible. The critical nature of our
    nuclear deterrent mission should drive us to hire and retain the best
    workers our country has to offer.
                      nuclear weapons safety and security
        The Nation's nuclear security standard is absolute denial of
    unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. We work closely with our Navy
    and Air Force partners to assess nuclear security requirements and
    adjust our force posture, training, and equipment to address any
    threat. While we continue to upgrade and evolve our security
    capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are
    necessary to maintain the high standards this mission demands.
        The proliferation, ease of use, and sophisticated capabilities of
    small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) represent a growing threat to
    our deterrence operations. We rapidly fielded counter sUAS capabilities
    and are refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the
    developing threat. Focused leadership, vigilance, and dedicated
    investment are necessary to remain ahead of this threat.
        With Congressional support, we recently achieved an important
    security milestone with the Air Force awarding a contract to replace
    our aged UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139. The new helicopter
    is a critical element in securing our vast ICBM complex and our
    security forces eagerly await its deployment. The first production unit
    is already well along the production line in Pennsylvania. With this
    program moving forward, we can now focus our efforts on replacing
    security vehicles and deploying advanced communication systems that
    will provide security personnel uninterrupted situational awareness
    anywhere they operate.
                            21st century deterrence
        Twenty-first Century deterrence not only requires effective NC3, a
    modernized triad of nuclear ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers with air
    delivered weapons, and an ability to design and produce modern and more
    effective nuclear weapons, it also requires conventional global strike,
    space control, control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and missile
    defense. When effectively integrated these capabilities provide the
    Joint Force the ability to respond to adversary actions in the domain,
    location and time of our choosing.
                           conventional global strike
        Bombers are capable of carrying a variety of conventional and
    nuclear weapon types with diverse attributes contributing to the
    flexibility of the deterrent force. Additionally, bombers are integral
    to our international engagements and partnering through our Bomber Task
    Force (BTF) missions, and our demonstrated capability to conduct strike
    missions originating from the continental United States. BTF
    deployments to the Indo-Pacific and European theaters provide an
    opportunity to exercise and train with our allies and partners,
    demonstrate United States commitment and resolve, and deter potential
    adversaries.
        The B-1 is the workhorse of the past 17 years of conventional
    fighting. The B-1 has had many successes in Iraq, Syria, and
    Afghanistan, while providing USSTRATCOM a credible conventional
    deterrent against global threats. As the threshold platform for the
    Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the B-1 will remain a formidable asset
    for operations in the Pacific and across the globe. Similar to the
    B-52, the Air Force remains committed to maintaining the platform to
    ensure its continued operational effectiveness.
        Strategic competitors are investing significant resources to
    develop offensive and defensive capabilities with the purpose of
    countering our entire deterrence strategy. To maintain peace, the
    United States must continue to invest in technological innovation and
    development of survivable, long-range strike systems able to hold time-
    sensitive and high-value targets at risk. Today, the only prompt
    longrange strike capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with
    nuclear warheads. We need a conventional prompt global strike
    capability. This is the USSTRATCOM requirement. Conventional hypersonic
    strike weapons could meet this requirement and provide responsive,
    long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-
    critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or
    not preferred. While conventional hypersonic weapons are not a
    replacement for nuclear weapons, their unique attributes will increase
    traditional warfighting advantages and bolster conventional and
    strategic deterrence.
        The DOD identified conventional hypersonic strike as a top research
    and development priority and is moving forward with a mix of land, sea,
    and air-launched weapon system options to hold high value, heavily
    defended and time critical targets at risk. This is a Department-wide,
    multi-Service, collaborative effort to provide operational capabilities
    as soon as possible. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)
    program spearheads the initiative as the leading technology maturation
    effort allowing the Navy to field a submarine/ship launched
    intermediate-range CPS weapon system that can be leveraged into Air
    Force and Army efforts. The Air Force continues to explore both air-
    launched hypersonic boost-glide and cruise missile concepts for
    fielding on a variety of strike and bomber aircraft. The Army plans to
    incorporate hypersonic strike systems into their traditional long-range
    precision fires portfolio to expand the reach of surface-to-surface
    engagements. Each of these capabilities have the potential for early
    operational fielding within the next few years. This flexible mix of
    capabilities will provide combatant commanders persistent, visible and
    credible strike options without crossing the nuclear threshold.
                                space operations
        For decades, the United States has enjoyed unimpeded freedom of
    action in space. This allows us to deliver space capabilities that
    include intelligence collection, missile warning, weather monitoring,
    satellite communications as well as precise positioning, navigation,
    and timing essential to joint forces operating globally with unmatched
    speed, agility and lethality. These same capabilities also contribute
    to our economy and support our quality of life.
        The President has directed a renewed commitment to space. Our
    commitment extends to the integration of space capabilities across
    every domain in order to deliver an unmatched global advantage to the
    Joint Force. What remains unchanged is the fact that our principal
    competitors regard space as a warfighting domain. While the United
    States prefers space to remain free of conflict, we are rapidly moving
    to meet and overcome challenges impeding our ability to access and
    freely operate in space. The best way to deter a war that starts in, or
    extends into space, is to be ready to fight and win.
        As part of this effort, the President has given direction for a
    more cohesive, robust space warfighting organization. In December, upon
    the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs,
    the President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command
    (USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command to improve joint
    warfighting in the space domain. Moving expeditiously to a unified
    space command reflects the importance of warfighting in space to the
    Joint Force, the value of space-focused deterrence elements, and the
    critical need for space-related response options for the Nation.
    USSTRATCOM will maintain its focus on this critical mission area until
    authorities and responsibilities governing space operations fully, and
    successfully, transition to a new combatant command.
        In addition to realizing a dedicated unified space command, we are
    moving forward on a priority effort executing tasks directed in Space
    Policy Directive-3. USSTRATCOM is closely partnering with the
    Department of Commerce (DOC) to transition some non-military aspects of
    Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data publication and space traffic
    management-related functions to DOC, while continuing to provide SSA
    data to support U.S. Government customers and to advance military-
    tomilitary relationships that support worldwide combined military
    operations.
        USSTRATCOM's new SSA data sharing initiative, executed through the
    Joint Force Space Component, releases information about space objects
    not previously available outside of DOD channels, to enhance SSA data
    sharing, transparency, and spaceflight safety. This initiative is in
    line with national policy as part of a larger effort to preserve the
    safety of, and accessibility to space, so that our Nation, allies, and
    even the rest of the world, can continue to reap the benefits of space.
        Exercises and wargames continue to refine how we coordinate today
    and how we will work together in the future. This year, Japan
    participated in the Schriever Wargame for the first time, joining
    Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United
    Kingdom. We also executed Global Sentinel 2018, our fifth annual
    operational tabletop experiment for SSA, and increased its
    international participation to include Australia, Canada, the United
    Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of
    Korea. Chile and Norway attended as observers.
        USSTRATCOM continues to focus on cultivating a robust international
    engagement environment with several ongoing lines of effort. In doing
    so, we have generated significant momentum leading to a fully
    integrated partnership of nations dedicated to defending the peaceful
    use of space.
        Improved partnership with allies is paramount for the safety and
    security of the space domain. As we continue our Combined Space
    Operations (CSpO) initiative with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
    the United Kingdom, we recently expanded it with the addition of France
    and Germany. In July 2018, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)
    transitioned to a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), now the
    centralized hub for operational space planning and tasking with
    distributed execution through contributing partners. This effort goes
    hand in hand with our recent update to Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER to
    include international partners and define our operational relationships
    and associated authorities as we conduct combined operations in the
    space domain.
        The National Space Defense Center (NSDC) continues to mature as our
    24/7/365 operational center to protect and defend the space domain. The
    NSDC remains the focal point for unity of effort across DOD, the
    Intelligence Community, and the National Reconnaissance Office for
    information sharing and to rapidly detect, warn, characterize,
    attribute and defend against threats to our Nation's vital space
    systems.
        Future satellite communications (SATCOM) systems remain key to our
    continued strategic posture in space. We must design and fund
    replacement systems and remain on schedule for smooth transition of
    operations to these new systems. We must expand international SATCOM
    partnerships, strengthen our industrial base response to acquisition
    challenges, and integrate commercial opportunities to evolve future
    satellite payloads towards commercial solutions wherever possible.
        The inclusion of our allies is key to building a robust SATCOM
    network that leverages commercial integration, synchronization and
    sharing of resources. Multilateral agreements with Canada, Denmark,
    Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand provide funding for the
    operation of Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). Consequently, the department
    shares bandwidth proportionally with our partner nations and allocates
    bandwidth based on the amount of their financial contribution. The
    growth of the WGS constellation continues as we launch WGS-10 in early
    2019, and with newly-infused funding authorized in the fiscal year 2018
    NDAA, we plan to procure and launch additional WGS capacity.
        Addressing the synchronization gap between terminals, ground
    infrastructure, and on-orbit satellite capacity remains a significant
    concern. The narrowband SATCOM legacy constellation is aging, and we
    must continue to make progress transitioning to the Mobile User
    Objective System, leveraging commercial capabilities where appropriate.
    The fielding of new AEHF Extended Data Rate (XDR) capable satellites
    continued with the launch of AEHF-4 in October 2018. That event,
    coupled with the anticipated launch of two more AEHF satellites in the
    next two years, will cover our near term protected communications
    equities.
        USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with the Services, continues to pursue
    an enterprise approach to fighting SATCOM in a contested domain through
    the stand-up of the SATCOM Integrated Operations Environment (SIOE).
    The SIOE is designed to leverage key wideband, narrowband, protected
    band, and commercial SATCOM enterprise capabilities and expertise to
    improve our ability to mitigate and fight through SATCOM degraded
    environment. We will also aggressively pursue the integration of
    commercial capabilities that have the ability to provide robust,
    resilient augmentation of our constellations for a very reasonable
    cost.
        We must improve how we collectively organize, train, and equip
    ourselves for unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space,
    providing vital capabilities to joint and coalition forces in peacetime
    and across the spectrum of conflict. As potential adversaries continue
    to develop, test, and field more threats to our space systems,
    USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) will benefit from increased
    focus on these key areas that enable us to deter aggression and protect
    our interests. We must go faster to stay ahead of potential
    adversaries, and USSTRATCOM is committed to ensuring sustained space
    operations with available forces during this transition period until
    USSPACECOM is ready to assume the lead role.
        The President has also focused on the benefits of establishing a
    sixth branch of the military, the Space Force. The President and Vice
    President have been personally involved in developing this new Force
    and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan has worked across the
    Department to define the proposal. The Space Force will be a separate
    service within the Department of the Air Force. I support the creation
    of the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. This will
    allow proper focus on the warfighting challenges, effective and aligned
    support to the new USSPACECOM, and given the threats and challenges in
    the domain, help to build an enduring ``space-minded'' culture in the
    department. This effort will not create or require a large, new support
    bureaucracy. Someday, the Space Force will be its own department, but
    this is not yet the right time. I thank the President and the Vice
    President for recognizing that space is a warfighting domain and
    proposing a fiscally responsible approach for the organizations needed
    to address these critical challenges. I encourage the Congress to
    support this proposal.
        USSTRATCOM and the future USSPACECOM will directly benefit from the
    President's intent to accelerate space acquisition timing. Current 10-
    to 15-year cycles from requirement to fielded capability are too long.
    Not only do we miss out on application of new technology and field
    equipment that is already obsolete on Day 1, but we also need a
    systemic change to counter potential adversaries with faster
    acquisition cycles. Commercial innovation has already adapted to
    exploit faster and faster technology discovery in commercial
    competition, and we must change to leverage these accelerating
    opportunities not only to defend our Joint Force in space, but also to
    protect commercial investments that sustain the global economy.
    USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) look forward to leveraging the
    benefits of the new Space Force as our organizations focus on two
    things--defending the space domain and going fast.
               joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
        The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the one physical maneuver
    space shared by all forces in all domains. The EMS is central to the
    first strategic goal of organizing forces to achieve Joint Force
    commander objectives. The Joint Force operates in the EMS to achieve
    superiority at a time and place of our choosing. Our adversaries
    recognize the need to decisively achieve EMS control and have developed
    and organized their forces accordingly. In recognition, we must
    continue to pursue capabilities necessary to maintain EMS superiority.
    Achieving EMS superiority early in conflict is critical for effective
    U.S. operations in all domains.
        USSTRATCOM, in coordination with DOD CIO/DISA, is actively pursuing
    development of an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system to
    enable EMS superiority. We are supporting the EMS Operations governance
    study directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
    coordinating with other combatant commands on the development and
    implementation of JEMSO cells and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    Additionally, we continue to engage Australia and North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization partners to ensure compatible JEMSO doctrine and concepts
    of operation, and to lay the groundwork for interoperable EMBM systems.
        Section 1053 of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, PL 115-232, provides
    guidance to the Secretary of Defense on electronic warfare and JEMSO to
    improve our ability to advocate effectively for requirements.
    USSTRATCOM is working closely with the Acting Secretary and Services to
    implement measures of the act, the Electronic Warfare Executive
    Committee and the previously mandated cross-functional team to identify
    requirements and specific plans for addressing personnel, capability
    and capacity limitations in order to ensure effective implementation of
    DOD's Electronic Warfare Strategy.
                           the missile defense review
        Conducted at the direction of the President, the 2019 Missile
    Defense Review (MDR) presents the Administration's missile defense
    policy and strategy. The MDR aligns with the National Security
    Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 NPR. The MDR
    reinforces the Administration's commitment to defending the United
    States and our deployed forces and allies from adversary missile
    attacks.
        The United States and our allies and partners face potential
    adversaries who are increasing existing missile system capability and
    capacity; adding new and unprecedented types of armaments to their
    arsenals; and integrating offensive capability more thoroughly in their
    coercive threats, military strategy, and war planning. Left
    unaddressed, this expanding missile threat could embolden our
    adversaries into mistakenly believing they can coerce us, inhibit our
    freedom of action, or undermine our security alliances. A concerted
    U.S. effort is required to expand and improve existing capabilities for
    both Homeland and regional missile defense.
        As stated in the National Security Strategy, the United States has
    a robust and credible layered missile defense system. When paired with
    offensive capabilities this combination sends a strong message allowing
    the United States to deny benefits and impose costs against any
    potential adversary. Although the United States relies on nuclear
    capability to dissuade near-peer strategic threats, missile defense
    endures as a critical component of comprehensive U.S. strategic and
    tailored regional deterrence strategies. Our regional missile defenses
    protect against missile attacks on deployed U.S. Forces, allies, and
    partners; assists allies and partners in better defending themselves;
    preserves freedom of action; and counters adversary anti-access/area
    denial tactics. The United States is pursuing new concepts and
    technologies to ensure continuing effectiveness against advanced future
    threats, including space-based sensors and boost phase intercept. As we
    address future threats, we must account for the air and missile defense
    assets required to defend the Homeland, while simultaneously improving
    our regional security architectures. In this effort, there is no one
    silver bullet, but several layered capabilities are in development.
                                missile defense
        The 2019 MDR sets the foundation for the next generation of missile
    defense efforts. Of importance to USSTRATCOM, it provides an
    opportunity to conduct focused reviews clarifying and optimizing
    missile defense roles and responsibilities across the Department. This
    includes opportunity to assign responsibility for integrating pre-
    launch attack operations with defenses to mitigate missile threats,
    ensuring warfighter involvement in our Departmental requirements and
    fielding processes, and assessing how to better use missile warning
    assets against emerging threats. All of these efforts focus on
    reviewing current systems and addressing advanced adversary
    capabilities such as hypersonic threats.
        U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide
    continuing effective protection of the U.S. Homeland against rogue
    states' offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear
    deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and
    Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to
    deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing United
    States declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.
        As the warfighter advocate for Missile Defense, it is imperative
    that we focus materiel developers on research, development, testing,
    and engineering against advanced threats. Rapidly transitioning ready
    systems with identified funding streams to the Services will free up
    needed resources for critical research and development efforts such as
    continued funding of next generation space systems. Research and
    development is key to ensuring we keep pace with evolving adversary
    threats across all domains. Space systems provide valuable solutions to
    layered tracking and discrimination capability. A space tracking and
    discrimination constellation combined with next generation Overhead
    Persistent Infrared systems would provide significant improvements
    necessary to detect advanced threats. Future space-based sensors may be
    able to detect, track, and discriminate hypersonic glide vehicle and
    ballistic missile threats globally. These abilities cannot be fully
    achieved with the current or any future terrestrial-based radar
    architecture due to the constraints of geography and characteristics of
    future missile threats.
        Boost phase intercept is also showing promise. Increasing the power
    and lethality of laser, neutral particle beam, and high power radio
    frequency systems for multi-mission applications, along with new
    fighter-delivered interceptors, can exponentially enhance our missile
    defenses.
                          assuring allies and partners
        USSTRATCOM cannot accomplish its mission without integrating allies
    and partners. Allies are critical to responding to mutual threats,
    preserving our shared interests, and are the greatest asymmetric
    advantage the United States has over potential adversaries. The Command
    continues to expand and enhance the viability of our Nation's alliances
    and partnerships, setting conditions across the globe to deter our
    adversaries.
        USSTRATCOM's engagements with allies and partners are critical in
    shaping the strategic environment, strengthening relationships, and
    building trust. In doing so, we are prepared to act in a combined
    manner to deliver a decisive response in crisis or during contingency
    operations.
        During 2018, our Command conducted over 50 bilateral engagements
    with senior leaders from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France,
    Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, the
    Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
        Our 25-nation, multinational missile defense policy campaign of
    experimentation, NIMBLE TITAN (NT) 2018, concluded with a senior leader
    seminar held at the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, to include
    representatives from Europe, the Gulf States, the Indo-Pacific, and
    North America. The NT 2020 campaign is just beginning, and continues to
    show increased interest by partners and allies.
        USSTRATCOM works closely with our allies and partners to enhance
    awareness within the space domain, increase the safety of spaceflight
    operations, and promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of
    space. During 2018, USSTRATCOM signed new national agreements with
    Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand for sharing
    SSA services and data. Currently, USSTRATCOM has agreements with 18
    nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and over 70 commercial
    satellite launchers, owners, and operators.
        Our efforts in this area increase military interoperability,
    improve alliance capability and capacity, and integrate our critical
    defense missions. The Command's engagements assure allies and partners
    of the United States' extended deterrence commitments and reinforce
    non-proliferation goals and objectives.
                                   conclusion
        USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. Success in all of our
    missions depend on the Command's greatest strength--our people. The
    162,000 men and women stationed around the globe, operating in all
    domains, undertake the active defense of our Nation every day. These
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians are warfighters,
    dedicated to preserving the peace and when called upon, ready to
    dominate and win in conflict. Successful mission execution has the
    appearance of ``business as usual'' which belies the effort and impact
    of executing at the highest standard every day.
        Today, our capabilities are safe, secure, and effective and our
    forces are combat-ready. With continued support of the programmed major
    investments, our forces will prevent nuclear war and ensure that
    regardless of how would-be adversaries might choose to attack the
    United States, we will always retain decisive response options, across
    the spectrum of conflict, for the President.
        We are dominant today. However, advantages we have long-held are
    eroding, challenging the Command's ability to deter strategic attack,
    engage in active defense, assure our allies and partners, and fight and
    win in and across all domains if necessary. We cannot let this erosion
    continue. We must maintain our strategic advantage. We must take
    calculated, smart risks and move fast once again. With sustained
    Congressional support, USSTRATCOM will continue to effectively defend
    the nation.
        Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Therefore, to
    prevent war we must be ready for war. We must maintain today's triad of
    nuclear forces, while simultaneously building the triad of tomorrow. We
    must integrate all domains and capabilities together to effectively
    deter in the 21st century. If we are successful, we will continue to
    live up to our motto, coined over 60 years ago. Peace is our Profession.

        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, General Hyten. An
    excellent statement.
        General O'Shaughnessy?

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF,
     COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
                       AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
    Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am
    truly honored to appear today as the Commander of the United
    States Northern Command and the United States-Canadian bi-
    national command, North American Aerospace Defense Command. It
    is a pleasure to be testifying today alongside General John
    Hyten who is not only my good friend but someone who I have
    admired and respected for so many years.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two complementary but distinct
    commands driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the
    Homeland from attack. In this era of rapidly evolving
    technology and renewed great power competition, the need for an
    energized and active defense of the Homeland cannot be
    overstated. Revisionist powers, Russia and China, have given
    every indication that their own security strategies are based
    on holding the United States at risk with both conventional and
    nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate
    attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the
    event of a conflict.
        Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and
    fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
    detection. Russia and China continue their efforts to penetrate
    our networks while developing and testing hypersonic glide
    vehicles. Both have also established a noticeably stronger
    foothold in the Arctic along the northern approaches to the
    United States and Canada. As a result, the strategic value of
    the Arctic as our first line of defense has reemerged, and
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures to ensure our
    ability to detect, detract, and defeat potential threats in
    this region.
        Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts
    over a number of years to exploit our perceived gaps and erode
    many of the advantages previously afforded by our geography and
    technological superiority. As a result, it is clear that our
    Homeland is not a sanctuary.
        Our mission to deter our adversaries is dependent on our
    ability to detect and ultimately defeat potential threats to
    our Homeland. I am grateful to the Committee for the strong
    support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along those lines of
    effort. Your support for fielding AESA [Active Electronically
    Scanned Array] radars for our aerospace control alert fighters
    and improving the capability and capacity of our missile
    defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrate our shared
    sense of urgency and resolve.
        In that same spirit, we must take prudent steps now to
    ensure our next generation defensive capabilities, to include a
    space-sensing layer of space-based missile defense centers are
    not late to need. That effort cannot start too soon, given the
    fact that our adversaries are already developing and testing
    advanced weapons specifically intended to avoid detection in
    order to hold targets in the Homeland at constant risk.
        I sincerely appreciate the Committee's work to provide much
    needed predictability and stability with an on-time budget in
    fiscal year 2019. I am also grateful for the Committee's
    ongoing efforts to ensure that we avoid the devastating deep-
    cutting impacts that a return to sequestration would bring to
    the Department of Defense.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to
    keep our citizens safe while confronting the challenges
    emanating from multiple approaches and in all domains. I
    especially want to take this opportunity to express my
    gratitude to the amazing men and women in the National Guard
    who are great partners and critical in our ability to perform
    our missions. Whether intercepting Russian bombers off the
    coast of Alaska or providing much needed support to our federal
    law enforcement partners along the southern border, the airmen,
    soldiers, sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to defending our
    Nation, and I am honored to represent them today.
        Senators, we have the watch.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]

            Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, I am honored to appear today as the Commander of United
    States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD)--two complementary but distinct commands.
        USNORTHCOM is the geographic combatant command laser-focused on
    defending our Homeland from an increasingly assertive set of
    competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in
    multiple domains. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for defense support of
    civil authorities (DSCA) and theater security cooperation (TSC) within
    our area of responsibility. Nested under the broader Homeland defense
    mission, DSCA and TSC play a critical and visible role in protecting
    our citizens and enhancing security for the United States and our
    international partners.
        NORAD is the bi-national United States-Canadian command that
    deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United
    States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime
    warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared
    history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex
    security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding
    command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a
    clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and
    Canada.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority:
    defending the Homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China
    have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range
    weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to
    expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches
    to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our
    citizens and national interests at risk, and we must anticipate attacks
    against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a
    conflict. As a result, it is clear that the Homeland is no longer a
    sanctuary.
        These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with
    us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons
    systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit
    perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The
    successful defense of our Homeland today relies more than ever on
    constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a
    reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant
    commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners.
    Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear
    deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence
    backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe.
        The threats facing our Nation are not hypothetical; our
    competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously
    undermining international norms and standards of behavior while
    possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both
    nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our
    territory. In light of this reality, the Homeland defense mission is
    more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized,
    proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment.
    Together with our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and
    international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the
    Homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and
    positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and
    preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national
    power, and, should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always
    ready to defeat any threat to our Nations.
        Our collective ability to confront these challenges is dependent on
    a national commitment to protecting and defending the Homeland. Budget
    stability and predictability are essential underpinnings of this
    commitment, and I ask for the Committee's support of the President's
    budget for fiscal year 2020--and specifically for relief from the
    budget caps directed in the Budget Control Act of 2011. A return to
    sequestration will devastate total force readiness and delay or
    terminate modernization efforts that are necessary to maintaining our
    strategic and technological advantage. Simply put, sequestration will
    make it impossible for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to advance necessary
    Homeland defense efforts and shape our changing national security
    environment as articulated in the National Defense Strategy.
                                     threat
    Russia:
        Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a
    century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to
    threaten us below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to hone and
    flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of air-
    and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff
    ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike
    North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.
        Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched
    cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-
    world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its growing
    precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia
    has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will
    ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and
    strike missions in the coming decades.
        Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK
    continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace
    along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's
    capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing
    proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of
    air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian
    deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.
        Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United
    States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years.
    NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation
    missions inside the United States and Canadian Air Defense
    Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian
    leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near
    future.
        In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its
    anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the
    Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with
    advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more
    lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's
    growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to
    dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on
    terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation
    or opportunistic actions.
        Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive
    cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its
    competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in the
    United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to
    conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt
    to compel de-escalation.
        In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed
    with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly
    precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile
    threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to
    bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-
    300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian
    Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and
    control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.
        Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically
    designed to circumvent United States missile defenses and hold our
    Homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    (ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was
    highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected
    to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile
    warning mission.
    China:
        China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program
    that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities
    while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and
    increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability.
    Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM
    force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple
    independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly
    increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory
    strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first
    class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its
    strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use
    nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber
    capabilities are significant.
        China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army
    (PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric
    mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies
    that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory,
    suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role
    for their military.
        On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in
    infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the
    Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major
    effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape
    their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter
    confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to
    sensitive issues.
        In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network
    operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and
    resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a
    conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure.
    Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of
    information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out
    missions and tasks more effectively.
    Advanced Threat Technologies:
        Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons
    systems capable of striking targets in the Homeland is a major focus of
    both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now
    armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
    detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing
    maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our
    adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and
    civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be
    capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons,
    potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response
    options in both peacetime and crisis.
    North Korea:
        After decades of research and development activity marked more by
    failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in
    2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable
    of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear
    device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of
    ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of
    his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the
    production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.
        Kim Jong-un developed these strategic weapons to deter the U.S.
    from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans to use
    them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the Peninsula.
    Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to grow, as does
    the country's willingness to employ them during peacetime, as North
    Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony Pictures in 2014.
    Iran:
        Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic
    weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer
    range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only
    regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle
    has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent
    launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range
    missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that
    Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable
    of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the
    vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few
    years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.
        However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the
    region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and
    civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-
    armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the
    meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert
    operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran
    considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid
    instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its
    adversaries, even during peacetime.
    Violent Extremist Organizations:
        The terrorist threat to our Homeland has grown more diffuse,
    typified by simple attacks inspired from afar and carried out by
    individuals or small networks that are difficult to detect and
    interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking the
    United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent
    extremists to act in their stead. Despite their territorial losses, the
    Islamic State and their counterparts in al-Qa'ida remain highly
    adaptive foes committed to attacking the United States.
        Commercial aviation persists as a preferred target, probably
    because of the potential for large numbers of casualties, economic
    damage, and widespread media coverage generated by such attacks. I am
    concerned that terrorists could also continue to pursue 9/11-style fly-
    and-crash attacks or the use of unmanned aerial systems against soft
    targets. Meanwhile, terrorists continue to target U.S. military
    personnel both on and off base, compounding our force protection
    challenges.
                             defending the homeland
        Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number
    one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In
    light of the complex and significant threats to our Homeland,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to
    shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we
    are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the
    Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do
    through the lens of Homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring
    that each of our missions help to preserve decision space and maintain
    the ability for our national leaders to project power and exert
    influence in the best interest of our nations.
        In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological
    interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and
    demonstrated their intent to hold our Homeland at risk in multiple
    domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In
    light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for
    others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to
    potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and
    extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and
    continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close
    coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services,
    the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies
    and partners.
        The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada
    challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple
    avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work
    around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond
    at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our
    defenses.
    Ballistic Missile Defense:
        USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United
    States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    attacks from North Korea and Iran, should Iran develop that capability.
    I remain cautiously optimistic that the ongoing negotiations will lead
    North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs. But, in
    the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of fielding
    improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor network, and
    improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor fleet in
    order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability to
    strike the defended area.
        I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea
    or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on
    our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our
    adversaries' rapid technological advancements.
        The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also
    dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported
    warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lt Gen Sam Greaves, is an outstanding
    partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team for their
    dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail mission. I fully
    support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range Discriminating Radar,
    Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, along with the
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3-stage interceptor
    booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based sensors to
    detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China. Each of these
    improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet will help to
    ensure our ability to defend the United States against an ICBM attack
    now and into the foreseeable future.
        Going forward, advanced technologies such as space-based sensors
    and directed-energy missile defense weapons systems show significant
    promise--and will, in fact, become a necessity in the foreseeable
    future in order to defend the Homeland against a rapidly developing
    missile threat. At present, I believe the DOD is striking an effective
    balance between ensuring our ability to defend against current and
    near-term threats while simultaneously investing in the research and
    development of advanced technologies capable of defeating future
    threats. This vision for meeting anticipated requirements is well
    articulated in the recently published Missile Defense Review, and I
    fully support the plan for defending the Homeland.
    Arctic Northern Approaches:
        It has become clear that defense of the Homeland depends on our
    ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the Arctic and
    passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range
    cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and
    striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the
    dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and
    the potential for competition over resources present overlapping
    challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China
    has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the
    Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial
    presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative
    resources and shipping routes.
        I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United
    States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and
    the combatant commander responsible for defending the approaches to the
    Homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic
    conditions throughout the region--across borders and operational
    boundaries--in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate
    the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in
    the northern approaches to North America.
        The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and
    associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing
    effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated
    requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing
    assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense
    Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified
    assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a
    number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated
    overview of current and future requirements.
        As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations
    in the Arctic continue to be impeded by limited communications
    capability, harsh environmental conditions, and vast distances between
    population centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in
    the region are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and
    the military Services have demonstrated their support of those
    requirements through investment in programs such as the Multi User
    Objective System (MUOS)--a satellite-based communications network that
    significantly expands the ability of United States and Canadian assets
    to operate in the far north.
        To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian
    long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely
    on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of
    aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018,
    NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian
    NORAD Region, and the United States Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center,
    conducted an operational assessment of the NWS against representative
    targets, and the data collected from the test will inform the design
    for the air domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to
    come.
        In recognition that the number of military and civilian activities
    in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic will only continue to grow,
    USNORTHCOM is working hand-in-glove with the United States Air Force
    and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to procure additional Arctic
    Sustainment Packages (ASPs) for use by the Alaska National Guard. Each
    ASP is a palletized, air-droppable shelter kit that provides shelter,
    heat, and other life support capability for several weeks in Arctic
    environments in the event that weather or other environmental factors
    delay a rescue operation.
        The ability of the joint force to fight and win in the extreme cold
    and isolation of the far north increasingly depends on placing
    specialized technology in the hands of military personnel who routinely
    train and operate in the region. Fortunately, there are units and DOD
    installations who are already well positioned to share that expertise.
    Essential experience resides in the units stationed in the far north--
    from the airborne brigade and fighter wings stationed in Alaska to the
    LC-130 Skibird pilots and crewmembers of the New York Air National
    Guard, we have a solid foundation to build on as we continue to
    increase Arctic experience across the force.
        The military Services have committed to building on that that
    foundational experience and expertise through a number of efforts that
    will further the ability of the joint force to operate, fight, and win
    in the far north. In a key example, between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel
    will participate in the next iteration of USNORTHCOM's premier Arctic
    exercise, ARCTIC EDGE 2020, more than doubling the number of troops who
    participated in 2018. Arctic Edge 2020 will take advantage of the vast
    training area and unmatched training opportunities afforded by the
    Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and will integrate personnel
    and platforms from all four Services--to include ground, air, and cyber
    operations. This deliberate evolution sends the clear signal that
    USNORTHCOM, strongly supported by the Services, is fundamentally
    committed to expanding the ability of the joint force to defend our
    Arctic approaches and our vital interests in the region.
    Air Domain:
        Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our
    northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian
    Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross
    section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This
    emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance,
    detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the
    Homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.
        The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ
    advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile
    attack against the Homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors'
    development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued,
    aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a
    cruise missile attack.
        In addition, small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) continue to
    present challenges to safety and security within U.S. airspace. NORAD
    has the capability to address larger UAS, but systems that are readily
    available in the commercial marketplace are difficult to detect and
    track due to their small size and relatively slow speeds. While we work
    to enhance our ability to detect, and--if necessary--neutralize
    potential threat UAS in the national airspace, the authorities provided
    by the fiscal year 2019 Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization
    Bill that extend counter-UAS authorities to the Department of Justice
    and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reflect the need for a
    whole-of-government approach to address the potential security
    challenges presented by this rapidly emerging technology.
        As with emerging military cruise missile technologies, the
    proliferation of small UAS requires us to consider new approaches for
    how best to defend the Homeland. We cannot address these new
    capabilities with outdated technology or with old ways of thinking, and
    I look forward to working with the Committee to develop innovative
    technology and strategies to ensure that we are capable of outpacing
    the threat.
    Southern Approaches:
        The threats to our Nation from our southern border are not military
    in nature, but they are significant and deadly. The flow of illegal
    narcotics into the United States continues to inflict a heavy toll on
    our citizens, as clearly demonstrated by the 72,000 Americans who were
    killed by drug overdoses in 2017. USNORTHCOM is proud of our role in
    the counter narcotics fight in support of Federal law enforcement and
    our military partners in Mexico and The Bahamas as they battle
    transnational criminal organizations that have inflicted such harm on
    both sides of the border.
        USNORTHCOM personnel actively collaborate with partners throughout
    the United States interagency and in Mexico to illuminate the networks
    used by the cartels to transport drugs, victims of human trafficking,
    and other illicit goods in a strategic effort to strike at the heart of
    these massive and well-financed criminal enterprises.
        On the U.S. side of our southern border, USNORTHCOM's subordinate
    element Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) supports U.S. Federal law
    enforcement efforts to interdict narcotics shipments into the United
    States. Employing military personnel, unique technologies, and
    specialized skill sets developed in contingency operations overseas,
    JTF-N provides critical support to Federal law enforcement interdiction
    missions operations.
                          theater security cooperation
        USNORTHCOM's theater security cooperation mission pays enormous
    dividends for our defense of the Homeland as well as for our
    relationships with our international partners. These collaborative
    efforts with our international partners seek to sustain our strategic
    advantage in the Western Hemisphere while always seeking to strengthen
    our regional security and reinforce our defense in depth throughout the
    region.
        In particular, USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military
    is strong. USNORTHCOM supports Mexico's efforts to expand its role as a
    regional defense and security leader. The ties between USNORTHCOM and
    our Mexican military partners are close at every level of leadership
    and continue to grow thanks to concerted efforts by commanders on both
    sides of the border. I am proud of the fact that every Mexican Marine
    has trained with a United States Marine, just as I am honored to share
    close relationships with the Mexican Secretary of National Defense
    (SEDENA), General Luis C. Sandoval Gonzalez, and the Secretary of the
    Navy (SEMAR), Admiral Jose Rafael Ojeda Duran. I am proud to work with
    partners who share our commitment to regional stability and security
    throughout North America.
        The Bahamas remains a willing partner with whom the United States
    enjoys a deep and long-standing bi-national relationship, and our
    shared theater security cooperation focus is improving The Bahamas' air
    and maritime domain awareness. In 2018, the United States provided the
    first maritime surveillance system to The Bahamas and secured funding
    for two more systems that will be networked with existing surveillance
    assets, generating a significant increase to The Bahamas' maritime
    surveillance capacity. The Bahamas remains a strong partner in the
    defense of North America as they invest heavily in new capabilities
    that will make them a more significant contributor to our shared
    defense and security.
        Finally, Canada continues to be our indispensable partner in
    reinforcing the defense and security of our countries. USNORTHCOM's
    security cooperation activities with Canada are extensive and reflect
    many years of shared effort and common cause with our allies to the
    North. In June 2017, Canada announced a new approach to defense
    investment that will provide significant benefit to the common defense
    of our nations. This approach, titled ``Strong, Secure, Engaged,''
    acknowledges the significant shifts in the global strategic environment
    and commits accordingly to an active and renewed NORAD partnership and
    investments that will directly benefit the security of both our
    nations.
        In a military-to-military context, the tri-command partnership
    between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command is
    of tremendous importance to all three commands. The bond between these
    organizations reflects the cooperative approach we share with our
    Canadian partners as we work together to outpace the threats arrayed
    against the United States and Canada, maintain a credible deterrent,
    and take steps forward together to ensure the combined defense of our
    nations.
                      defense support of civil authorities
        USNORTHCOM's mission to provide defense support of civil
    authorities provides military personnel and assets to support Federal
    law enforcement and disaster relief agencies in times of need. In the
    nine months since I assumed command, USNORTHCOM has supported DHS, the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection, and the National Interagency Firefighting Center during
    hurricane relief operations, wildland firefighting missions,
    interagency collaboration to ensure that our elections were free from
    cyber interference, and presidentially-directed efforts to secure our
    southern border. For each of these events, USNORTHCOM rapidly delivered
    military-unique capabilities and skilled personnel to augment and
    enable our Federal partners.
        In September 2018, Hurricane Florence provided USNORTHCOM the first
    opportunity to execute the Commander of USNORTHCOM's expanded role as
    the DOD Synchronizer for defense support of civil authorities. The
    consolidation of the DOD effort under one Synchronizer enabled
    significantly improved coordination and collaboration across the entire
    spectrum of the DOD response and consolidated the
    responsibility for collecting and delivering timely and accurate
    information to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DOD
    Synchronizer role increased the coordination and information exchange
    amongst the DOD agencies with major roles in the response, to include
    the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Logistics Agency, the United
    States Army Corps of Engineers, and United States Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM).
        USNORTHCOM support of hurricane relief operations had barely ended
    last fall, when, in response to requests for assistance from DHS and
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Command was directed by the
    Secretary of Defense to deploy Active Duty military personnel and
    equipment to support Federal law enforcement operations along the
    southern border of the United States. Beginning in October 2018, this
    operation has demonstrated the close partnership between USNORTHCOM and
    our Federal law enforcement partners, as well as the outstanding
    support provided by each of the military Services and the Joint Staff
    in response to a USNORTHCOM request for forces.
        Within hours of notification, airmen, soldiers, sailors, and
    marines from installations across the United States were on the move to
    support our DHS partners, and they have performed their assigned tasks
    with extraordinary professionalism and skill. From laying over 70 miles
    of concertina wire to reinforce existing border obstacles, flying
    support missions, delivering medical care, and providing security, the
    USNORTHCOM border support mission has improved our Nation's border
    security while providing our forces with training and real-world
    experience that will serve them well in both peace and conflict.
        Every mission presents unique challenges, and each is dependent on
    collaboration, strong partnerships, and close relationships throughout
    the Federal interagency and between the active and Reserve component.
    In a key demonstration of the strong collaboration between the
    components in the combined response to Hurricane Florence, North
    Carolina and South Carolina established Dual Status Commanders and
    successfully integrated National Guard and title 10 personnel and
    assets in a wide variety of rescue and recovery operations.
        I am proud of the great partnership demonstrated by USNORTHCOM and
    the National Guard Bureau before and during each of those responses. My
    friend and wingman Gen Joe Lengyel and the citizen airmen and soldiers
    he leads are a tremendous group of professionals who proved time and
    again their selflessness and readiness to respond whenever and wherever
    needed.
        While hurricane relief operations may have been the most visible
    DSCA mission for the Command over the last several years, USNORTHCOM
    serves as the designated DSCA synchronizer for the DOD in a variety of
    other efforts. In a notable example of innovative interagency
    collaboration, prior to the 2018 midterm election season, USNORTHCOM
    partnered with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to determine how best to
    provide DOD cyber support to the DHS-led mission to secure the
    elections infrastructure. The partnership between USCYBERCOM,
    USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and DHS was groundbreaking, and
    each of the agencies involved learned a number of important lessons for
    future interagency efforts.
        Interagency cooperation in the defense of our critical cyber
    infrastructure will remain an enduring necessity as networks throughout
    the United States continue to weather near-constant attacks and
    infiltration attempts. In light of this need, I am grateful to the
    Congress for its strong support for the establishment of the DHS Cyber
    Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Although CISA was only
    established in November 2018, it is already clear that we have an
    energized, high-level interagency partner dedicated to our shared
    mission to address and mitigate cyber threats against civilian networks
    and critical infrastructure. Within weeks of its establishment, CISA
    assigned a senior liaison officer to the USNORTHCOM headquarters to
    work alongside the rest of our whole-of-government team, and I look
    forward to many years of close collaboration with our newest partner in
    the defense of our Nation's vital interests.
        Whenever our assistance is requested by our Federal partners,
    USNORTHCOM relies on the military Services to provide trained and ready
    personnel and assets whenever and wherever needed. As we saw firsthand
    in the days before Hurricane Florence made landfall in September 2018
    and in the initial stages of our support to U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection along the southern border, the Joint Staff and all four of
    the military Services worked around the clock to identify, source, and
    deploy the personnel and equipment necessary to fulfill all anticipated
    requests for support from our Federal partners.
        Due to the unhesitating support of the Joint Staff and each of the
    Service Chiefs, the requested forces were on station and ready to
    execute their support missions in a matter of hours and days following
    notification. In both scenarios, the remarkable men and women of our
    armed forces were ready to deploy on short notice and executed their
    assigned missions thanks to their training, professionalism, and
    discipline. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the Joint
    Staff and the Services to exercise our response forces in anticipation
    of future needs, and I am grateful to the Committee for your ongoing
    support of the Services' modernization and readiness requirements.
                     united efforts to defend the homeland
        USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland would not be possible without
    cooperation, collaboration, and a fundamental commitment to mission
    success across a remarkable interagency and intergovernmental
    enterprise. Over 27 unique Federal agencies, from DHS to the Federal
    Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have
    permanently-assigned liaisons and representatives in our USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. Nearly 150 Canadian military
    personnel are assigned to NORAD billets in our headquarters, and we are
    proud to host two permanently assigned Mexican military liaison
    officers, along with liaison officers and representatives from a host
    of DOD agencies and commands to include the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency (DTRA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Strategic
    Command. National Guard personnel are also fully integrated into our
    headquarters staff and maintain a full-time office specifically
    dedicated to coordinating actions between our headquarters and the
    National Guard Bureau. The National Guard continues to be an essential
    and integral part of our USNORTHCOM and NORAD team.
        Our command's integration with the U.S. interagency community is a
    requirement for success, which is why those interagency representatives
    are not simply assigned to the headquarters; they are truly integrated
    members of the USNORTHCOM team. Whenever possible, they are invited to
    participate in command briefings and updates, and I rely on their
    subject matter expertise and professional judgment on a daily basis as
    we work hand in glove to address the challenges and threats facing the
    command.
        The commitment to cooperation shared by each of our interagency
    partners has contributed immeasurably to the broader USNORTHCOM
    mission. For example, during the 2018 hurricane season, DTRA provided
    around-the-clock modeling support that located all of the hazardous
    material production and storage facilities in the storms' paths and
    allowed our planners to develop well-researched plans to mitigate
    potential impacts if the sites were damaged.
        Our collective ability to meet threats head on and to provide a
    rapid, effective response in the wake of natural and manmade disasters
    is absolutely dependent on constant communication, routine interagency
    exercises, and close working relationships between each and every one
    of the civilian and military professionals who strive each day to keep
    our Nation and our citizens safe from harm.
        From USNORTHCOM's components and subordinates to NORAD, which has
    served as the absolute gold standard for international collaboration
    for over 60 years, and our locktight relationship with FEMA, we work
    every day to exercise the interagency and inter-DOD processes required
    to ensure that we are always ready to deliver the right assets in the
    right place at the right time to meet whatever mission we are assigned.
    To ensure USNORTHCOM and our interagency partners are ready at a
    moment's notice in the event of a crisis, we conduct regular command-
    led exercises in each of our mission sets, such as Ardent Sentry for
    DSCA and Vigilant Shield for Homeland defense.
        Finally, I would like to make special note of USNORTHCOM's support
    to the state funeral of former President George H. W. Bush in December
    2018. The men and women of USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force--National
    Capital Region, under the superb leadership of MG Mike Howard,
    demonstrated exemplary professionalism and decorum throughout a three-
    day program in Texas and Washington, DC. The flawless execution of this
    mission was made possible by many months of rigorous planning, close
    communication with President Bush and his family, coordination with
    dozens of Federal, state, and local agencies, and multiple rehearsals
    to ensure no detail was overlooked. USNORTHCOM's support of this
    historic event was both a profound honor for all involved and a
    conspicuous example of the no-fail nature of all USNORTHCOM missions.
                                   conclusion
        Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    standing watch over our Homeland. These dedicated professionals work
    around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and
    ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of
    threats to our Homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic
    missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The
    strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend
    our Nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and
    experience of our people.
        Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to
    lead the outstanding airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians
    of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our Nation can be
    daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any
    challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated
    professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy.
        You know, General Hyten, there are two areas of
    disagreement that we have heard among our colleagues in both
    the House and in the Senate, and you have heard some this
    morning in our opening statements. But one of them is the
    significance of nuclear modernization. Now, it is disturbing
    when we see some of our adversaries, peer adversaries, China
    and Russia, have actually gotten ahead of us in some areas of
    artificial intelligence and hypersonics. But in the area of
    nuclear modernization, I know that Jim Mattis, Heather Wilson,
    and others have said that is the most significant thing that we
    could be doing, and yet, some are saying that is an area where
    we could be making cuts at this time.
        I would like to have you start off by addressing that; do
    you agree with those who talk about the significance of that
    program and make your comments on that. Then I will get to the
    second one.
        General Hyten. It is the most important element of our
    national defense.
        Chairman Inhofe. It is the most important element of our
    national defense.
        General Hyten. We have to make sure that we are always
    ready to respond to any threat. I can do that today because I
    have the most powerful triad in the world. I have ICBMs,
    submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers that are
    ready to respond to any threat that comes. Because of the
    capabilities of each leg of the triad, I have the ability to
    respond to any threat. We did a Nuclear Posture Review. It was
    released last year. In it, it validated the need for a triad.
        Our adversaries have also recognized the need for a triad.
    They are beginning modernization of their programs as well. In
    fact, Russia started their modernization program in 2006. They
    are about 80 percent through completing the modernization of
    their triad. They will be pretty close to being through by
    about 2020, and in 2020, we will still be starting. That is not
    a good place to be from a national security perspective.
        Chairman Inhofe. That is right.
        You have actually jumped to the second area of
    disagreement: the triad. Several people have said that we do
    not need a triad, all three legs. It could adequately be
    handled without all three. Just specifically on the triad
    element of the necessity of the three legs.
        General Hyten. When you look at the threat we face, the
    threat from the Russian triad, soon the threat from the Chinese
    triad, threats from North Korea as well, you have to look at
    the three elements of the triad.
        The bombers are our most recallable element. They are the
    most flexible element of the triad. The bombers can be deployed
    and recalled by the President, deployed and recalled, before
    they employ their weapons. They are the most flexible element.
    We can do almost anything with a bomber.
        The submarine is the most survivable element. It allows us
    to hide from our adversaries and make sure we can respond to
    any surprise attack.
        The ICBM is the most ready element to respond to a quick
    surprise attack, and it also creates the most significant
    targeting problem for an adversary because there are 400
    separate targets across the United States. All would have to be
    independently targeted by an adversary. That targeting problem
    is hugely problematic and creates a significant advantage for
    us.
        When you put those three together, you get this great
    operational capability. But the other thing it provides for us
    is the ability to respond to a failure in any one of those
    legs. If you have a technical failure or intelligence failure,
    I can cover it with another leg, and that has happened during
    my tenure. I never have put this nation at risk because I have
    the flexibility in the triad.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes. General O'Shaughnessy, that is a big
    deal to you too.
        We look at what we have done with our aging system. We are
    talking about now getting into a modernized ICBM. I do not know
    how long that would take. Some people say all the way through
    the 20s. At the same time, you have our adversaries who may
    have been late in starting, but they are starting in a more
    modernized way. Do you agree with that? They become a threat
    even though right now today they may not be ahead of us in
    these areas.
        General O'Shaughnessy: Chairman, I would agree. I think as
    the NDS articulates, the security environment has fundamentally
    changed and part of it is because of what you alluded to. I
    think as we watch both Russia and China create success in some
    of their weapons programs and advancing the capabilities that
    they have, they are fundamentally changing not just on the
    ballistic missile side but, as you mentioned, the hypersonics
    and also in the cruise missiles. It is not just the cruise
    missiles themselves. It is also the platforms that deliver
    those cruise missiles. They have clearly invested very
    specifically with the ability to hold our Homeland at risk with
    things like submarines and bombers that they have modernized
    with the low RCS [Radar Cross Section] cruise missiles that
    they can then launch. Therefore, we have to also modernize. We
    have to stay ahead of that advancing threat. We cannot expect
    to have success with 20th Century technology against 21st
    century threats.
        Chairman Inhofe. Which is what we have had.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed?
        Let me interrupt, Senator Reed, if I might, because we do
    have a quorum now.
        I will ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,818
    pending military nominations. All the nominations have been
    before the Committee the required length of time. Is there a
    motion?
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Senator Fischer. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Inhofe. No?
        [No response.]
        Chairman Inhofe. It carries.
        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 26,
                                     2019.
         1.  LTG Michael X. Garrett, USA to be general and Commanding
    General, U.S. Army Forces Command (Reference No. 24)

         2.  Col. Timothy J. Donnellan, ANG to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 266)

         3.  Col. Stephen J. Mallette, ANG to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 267)

         4.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Jason D. Hoskins) (Reference No. 268)

         5.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Nancy E. Costa) (Reference No. 269)

         6.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Saiprasad M. Zemse) (Reference No. 270)

         7.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 125 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey Wayne Akin) (Reference No.
    271)

         8.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with David C. Salisbury) (Reference No. 272)

         9.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Craig K. Abee) (Reference No. 273)

        10.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Michael J. Chung) (Reference No. 274)

        11.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Robert T. Hines, Jr.) (Reference No. 275)

        12.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Marc A. Banjak) (Reference No. 276)

        13.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Dennis M. Britten) (Reference No.
    277)

        14.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Jason G. Arnold) (Reference No. 278)

        15.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with David P. Bailey) (Reference No. 279)

        16.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Kimberly J. Kloeber) (Reference No. 280)

        17.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Joyce C. Beaty) (Reference No. 281)

        18.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Timothy S. McCarty) (Reference No. 282)

        19.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Jennifer J. Archer) (Reference No. 283)

        20.  In the Air Force there are 61 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Andrew T. Allen) (Reference No. 284)

        21.  In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Elham Barani) (Reference No. 285)

        22.  In the Air Force there are 121 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Homayoun R. Ahmadian) (Reference
    No. 286)

        23.  In the Air Force there are 25 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Francis E. Becker) (Reference No.
    287)

        24.  In the Air Force there are 45 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Margaret E. Abbott) (Reference No. 289)

        25.  In the Air Force there are 252 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Joseph L. Abrams) (Reference No. 290)

        26.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (James B. Flowers) (Reference No. 291)

        27.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Dylan T. Randazzo) (Reference No. 292)

        28.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Jerry D. Hallman) (Reference No. 293)

        29.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Christopher P. Moellering) (Reference No. 294)

        30.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Joubert N. Paulino) (Reference No. 295)

        31.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Saw
    K. San) (Reference No. 296)

        32.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Rebecca J. Quackenbush) (Reference No. 297)

        33.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Stacie L. Kervin) (Reference No. 298)

        34.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Brian R. Kossler) (Reference No. 299)

        35.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Katherine A. O'Brien) (Reference No. 300)

        36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jessica N. Peralesludemann) (Reference No. 301)

        37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Julia C. Phillips) (Reference No. 302)

        38.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Alain M. Alexandre) (Reference No. 303)

        39.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Taliat A. Animashaun) (Reference No. 304)

        40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (G010349) (Reference No. 307)

        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Jordanna M. Hostler) (Reference No. 308)

        42.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Elizabeth N. Strickland) (Reference No. 309)

        43.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Shawn M.T. May) (Reference No. 310)

        44.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Kyle
    A. Zahn) (Reference No. 311)

        45.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Jessica M.P. Miller) (Reference No. 312)

        46.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Rosemary M. Hardesty) (Reference No. 313)

        47.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Brett T. Thomas) (Reference No. 314)

        48.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Matthew T. Coughlin) (Reference No. 317)

        49.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Bethanne Canero) (Reference No. 318)

        50.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Kevin T. Brownlee) (Reference No. 320)

        51.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Kevin F. Champaigne) (Reference No. 321)

        52.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Aaron J. Griffus) (Reference No. 322)

        53.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel H. Cusinato) (Reference No.
    325)

        54.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 5 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Armando A. Freire) (Reference No.
    329)

        55.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Stephen R. Byrnes) (Reference No. 330)

        56.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Herman E. Holley) (Reference No.
    331)

        57.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Darren M. Gallagher) (Reference
    No. 332)

        58.  In the Marine Corps there are 799 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Alexander N. Abate) (Reference No. 333)

        59.  In the Marine Corps there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with German Alicealapuerta) (Reference No. 334)

        60.  In the Marine Corps there are 106 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Eric J. Adams) (Reference No. 335)

        61.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Joseph W. Crandall) (Reference No. 336)

        62.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Aaron S. Ellis) (Reference No. 338)

        63.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Justin D. Mosley) (Reference No. 339)

        64.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Andres J. Agramonte) (Reference No. 341)

        65.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (Katherine R. Morganti) (Reference No. 342)

        66.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (lower half) (list begins with Scott M. Brown) (Reference No.
    360)

        67.  In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (lower half (list begins with Jeffrey T. Anderson) (Reference
    No. 361)

        68.  LTG VeraLinn Jamieson, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance,
    and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Reference
    No. 376)

        69.  In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Patrick N. Westmoreland)
    (Reference No. 379)

        70.  In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Scott A. Adams) (Reference No.
    385)

        71.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Bethany S. Peterson) (Reference No. 386)

        72.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Tolulope O.A. Aduroja) (Reference No. 394)

        73.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Erick L. Jackson) (Reference No. 395)

        74.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Joseph J. Fantony) (Reference No. 396)

        75.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Chariti D. Paden) (Reference No. 397)

        76.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Donald W. Rakes) (Reference No. 398)

        77.  In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Ronnie S. Barnes) (Reference No. 399)

        78.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Charles A. Riley) (Reference No. 401)

        79.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Richard S. McNutt) (Reference No. 402)

        80.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Lloyd V. Lozada) (Reference No. 403)

        81.  In the Army Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Julio Acosta) (Reference No. 404)

        82.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Peter D. Allen) (Reference No.
    405)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 1,818

        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General O'Shaughnessy, as I have indicated in my opening
    statement, I have concerns about the use of American military
    forces along the southern border and a hard time understanding
    the nature of an emergency that would require military forces
    when nowhere in the National Defense Strategy, the worldwide
    threat statement from the intelligence community, nor the
    statement from the Commander of SOUTHCOM indicate that migrant
    caravans of civilians across the border are a military threat.
    In fact, in your opening statement, you say ``the threats to
    our Nation from our southern border are not military in
    nature.''
        Just to be clear, in your professional opinion, does the
    illegal crossing of the border by civilians represent a
    military threat?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first, I would say that I
    do think a secure border does reduce threats to the Homeland.
        Now, specific to your question about is it a military
    threat that is coming towards us, it is not a military threat,
    but that is slightly [different] than answering whether the
    military should be responding to the situation.
        Senator Reed. Following up, in your professional opinion
    again, would a wall be effective in defending a military attack
    on the United States?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I would say that border
    security is national security. I do see that any barrier in
    place to secure our Nation does have some ramifications to our
    ability to defend against a military threat as well. Right now,
    there is not a specific military force from the south that we
    are trying to take action against.
        In this particular case, though, Senator, I would say over
    the last 5 months I have spent a tremendous amount of time on
    the border, as you would imagine, working with our CBP [United
    States Customs and Border Protection] partners. In all of those
    trips and discussions, it has been clear to me that the Customs
    and Border Protection personnel very much value the border
    protection and seeing it, having the awareness, having some
    impediments, whether that be a barrier or wall, et cetera, and
    then having the ability to respond to it. That has been fairly
    universal as I have been doing my trips to the border.
        Senator Reed. They are civilian law enforcement officials
    who have a law enforcement mission, and the context of their
    evaluation is based upon that law enforcement mission.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        You have mentioned many real threats that have been
    articulated in the National Defense Strategy, Russia and China
    in particular. Many of them really are not focused on our
    southern border but our northern border, the opening of the
    Arctic, the operations by both China and Russia in the Arctic,
    and also I think maintaining the capabilities of NORAD. Those
    are multibillion dollar tasks. Do you think they are of more
    military significance than any operation along the southern
    border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is those
    threats are very real. Those threats are what we are focused on
    within both NORTHCOM and NORAD because we do see that the
    evolving threat, as articulated within the NDS, very much is
    trying to take advantage of the northern approach. We have
    vulnerabilities there that we need to continue to close the gap
    on, and so that is a focus area for us at both NORTHCOM and
    NORAD.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Again, thank you
    for your service.
        General Hyten, I just have a few minutes. But the issue of
    hypersonic weapon systems are increasingly critical to us. It
    seems from our perspective that our adversaries are shifting
    more into the hypersonic realm for many reasons. One reason is
    that our defense systems were built for ballistic missiles, not
    hypersonic missiles.
        Do you feel that in the short run you can deter these
    hypersonic vehicles?
        General Hyten. Senator, the hypersonic activities in both
    China and Russia are not the majority of their activities right
    now. The majority are still the traditional ballistic missile,
    submarine, bomber threats that we can deter.
        I also believe that we have the ability to deter any
    adversary that would deploy nuclear weapons against us. My one
    concern in this area is that in order to effectively deter, you
    have to be able to see, characterize, and attribute where the
    threat is coming from. As our adversaries are moving into
    cruise missile technology and hypersonic technology, that
    challenges our ability to provide those attributes of detection
    and characterization. We need to move in that area to sense the
    threat so we can effectively deter it.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask a couple questions because my time
    is running out.
        Is your sense that they have, as we have, a legacy system
    of missiles, medium-range, long-range, intercontinental, but
    they seem to be moving with great energy into hypersonics. That
    could be the weapon of choice in the future.
        The second part of that is that, as I understand it--you
    can clarify it--hypersonics are not governed by the INF Treaty
    so that we could develop hypersonics and still remain within
    the treaty. Where are they going, and can we do that without
    leaving the INF?
        General Hyten. They are clearly moving aggressively in the
    area of hypersonics. Their testing is fully integrated systems,
    long-range and medium-range, as has been well documented, as
    opposed to--what was the second part of the question?
        Senator Reed. The second part was we can conduct hypersonic
    research without violating the INF.
        General Hyten. Right. That is correct. The INF Treaty says
    that it covers ballistic missiles, and ballistic is defined as
    the majority of the trajectory of the missile is ballistic. The
    hypersonic missiles that we are talking about, less than half
    of that trajectory is ballistic. Therefore, they are not
    covered in the INF Treaty.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Hyten, in your prepared remarks, you said the only
    way to change our strategic deterrent is to convince our
    adversaries to reduce the threat and this is not occurring.
    China and Russia in particular are not only modernizing the
    traditional elements of their own triads, but they are also
    building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to
    threaten the United States.
        In your comments to Chairman Inhofe, you explained the
    desperate need that we have for modernization and to continue
    with our triad, the importance that has for our national
    security and for the security of this world.
        I would ask you, are you aware of any intelligence or
    threat assessment supporting the courses of action that are
    called for from some that we need to unilaterally cut our
    nuclear forces?
        General Hyten. I am not.
        Senator Fischer. Is it your view that taking such actions
    would make us more vulnerable and reduce our ability to deter
    threats?
        General Hyten. It would significantly reduce our deterrent.
        Senator Fischer. We are looking at a budget in the
    Department for nuclear forces and the plan for modernization.
    Some people consider it a wish list just to give the Department
    everything that they desire, and no effort has been made to
    sort through things to look at what we truly need to address
    the threats that we have. I am talking about need versus want
    here.
        That is not an accurate statement, is it, that it is a wish
    list?
        General Hyten. I look at our nuclear capabilities, our
    triad, our modernization program as the minimum essential
    capabilities required to defend this nation if we have to
    defend against the most existential threat--and Russia and
    China and their capabilities are the most existential threat.
    To me that is the most minimum essential capabilities that we
    have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be
    just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think
    we can afford that security.
        Senator Fischer. Do you fully support the Nuclear Posture
    Review as it was put forward by the Department?
        General Hyten. I do, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Do you truly believe it is needed that we
    continue on a path forward to reach the goals of that Nuclear
    Posture Review?
        General Hyten. I think it is essential.
        If I could comment on the Nuclear Posture Review, I think
    it is very interesting to look at our approach defined in the
    Nuclear Posture Review and our adversaries' approach. The
    elements in the Nuclear Posture Review that we have put forth
    all stay within our treaty responsibilities. We do not
    recommend developing new nuclear-powered torpedoes, new
    nuclear-powered cruise missiles. We do not look at anything. We
    believe that we can secure this nation through the
    modernization of the triad and the addition of a couple of
    small elements to respond to specific threats. In that case, it
    is the low-yield nuclear weapon and the submarine-launched
    cruise missile. But that is a very measured response to what
    our adversaries are doing.
        Senator Fischer. I appreciated your very clear and concise
    explanation of the importance and really the mission of each
    leg of the triad, and I am very pleased that you made that
    clear and concise for the record today. Thank you.
        I would like to ask you a little bit about the New START
    treaty. In your opening statement, you note that Russia is also
    developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear
    weapons like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater,
    unmanned vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile,
    which Russia seeks to keep outside of existing arms control
    agreements.
        Do you believe that these new systems, if they are
    deployed, should be counted under a New START treaty
    limitation?
        General Hyten. The way the New START treaty is defined is
    that the New START treaty only covers existing weapons when it
    was put in place in 2011. That means it covers the ballistic
    missiles, both submarine- and ground-launched. It covers the
    bombers and the cruise missiles on the bombers, and the
    platforms that carry them.
        There is also a clause in the treaty that says if one of
    the parties of the treaty sees the development of new strategic
    arms, they can come to the bilateral consultative commission
    and bring those things forward. I have not seen that happen.
    But we see them developing capabilities outside of that treaty,
    which is concerning to me.
        Senator Fischer. Do you believe a decision to extend the
    treaty should be made on its national security merits and
    Russia's behavior figures heavily into that evaluation with
    just the example that I gave you, that we need to be looking at
    these not just to renew a treaty?
        General Hyten. I do, ma'am. I want Russia in every treaty.
    I want Russia in the INF Treaty. I want Russia in the New START
    treaty. I support those treaties. But they have to be parties
    to those treaties. It takes two to participate in a treaty at
    least.
        Senator Fischer. Russia has not been a party to the INF
    Treaty. Is that correct?
        General Hyten. Russia has violated the INF Treaty for 5
    years now, and despite our best efforts, we have not been able
    to bring them into compliance. I have talked about that to the
    President. I have talked about New START with the President. We
    all want Russia in that treaty. We want them to participate,
    but if they will not, we are tying our own hands to deal with
    the adversaries in the world, including China, who is not part
    of that treaty.
        Senator Fischer. It does not help when your partner in a
    treaty is not in compliance and we remain in compliance.
        General Hyten. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, General O'Shaughnessy,
    thank you both for your testimony this morning and for your
    service to the country.
        I want to begin my questions with you, General
    O'Shaughnessy, because I understand that part of your
    responsibilities as the leader of a combatant command is to
    look at counter-drug operations at our borders. Is that
    correct?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, what we do is support law
    enforcement agencies in a supporting role for some of the
    counternarcotics work.
        Senator Shaheen. Have you been made aware of any plans that
    would take money from what is being proposed already to fund
    the President's recent directive to reprogram DOD interdiction
    funding to pay for a border wall?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, as you know, with a
    declaration of a national emergency that is now being
    considered, the Secretary of Defense and I, actually together
    with the Chairman, went down to the border this weekend on
    Saturday in order to see firsthand both what our troops are
    doing now, as well as looking at the border and potential
    applications of DOD funding for the border, to inform his
    decisions. Those decisions--and that is ongoing this week. At
    this time, that is work in progress with the Acting Secretary
    of Defense.
        Senator Shaheen. But do I understand you to say then that
    plans are being drawn up that would take money from those drug
    interdiction efforts to use for funding a wall?
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is one of the options that is
    being looked at. It is premature at this time and that work is
    being done literally as we speak.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, as I am sure you are aware, the
    opioid crisis in the United States has taken tens of thousands
    of lives. In New Hampshire, we have the second highest opioid
    overdose death rate in the country. This is an issue that we
    care tremendously about. It is my understanding that most of
    the illicit drugs that come into this country come through
    ports of entry (POE) as opposed to coming across the border in
    other places. Is that what you have seen?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, I have seen a little bit of
    both. There has recently been a DEA [United States Drug
    Enforcement Agency] report that talks about the most common
    method of transportation through the borders is, in fact,
    through the POEs, but it is most common, not necessarily that
    all of it goes through there. It further delineates and talks.
        I will give you an example. Just this week, twice I have
    been to the border. In one of my trips down there, what they
    talked about was the TCOs [Transitional Criminal Organizations]
    that run the migrants coming are the same criminals that also
    run the narcotics. What we are seeing now is a coordinated
    effort, for example, where they will send a large number of
    migrants through over the border to take the Border Patrol
    agents off of the line, and then they will use that as an
    opportunity to bring drugs across the border while the Border
    Patrol agency are processing the migrants. It is a coordinated
    effort here that brings it all together that is very disturbing
    as we go forward.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you agree that it is helpful to have
    technology and more people at our ports of entry so we can
    better interdict drugs coming through there?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, I want to follow up on
    Senator Reed's question about hypersonic weapons because I very
    much appreciated your strong statement that we are in a
    position to defend this country against all threats.
        Does that include hypersonic weapons? There have been
    public reports that we do not have a defense against those
    hypersonic weapons.
        General Hyten. Our defense against hypersonics is our
    nuclear deterrent. If somebody attacks us with a nuclear
    hypersonic capability, we have the ability to respond. Now, it
    is important for us to be able to track that to understand
    where it comes from.
        If you look at the way a hypersonic missile works, the
    first phase is ballistic, but it is a fairly short phase. That
    phase we will see. We will see the launch. We will be able to
    characterize it and understand it came from Russia, it came
    from China. But then from our sensor perspective, it basically
    disappears and we do not see it until the effect is delivered.
    We need to build sensors to be able to understand exactly where
    those things are going so we can better defend ourselves. You
    cannot defend yourself if you cannot see it.
        Senator Shaheen. I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt.
    But do we have any sense about how much time we have from the
    point at which those weapons might be launched until when they
    might land in the United States?
        General Hyten. It is a shorter period of time. The
    ballistic missile is roughly 30 minutes. A hypersonic weapon,
    depending on the design, could be half of that, depending on
    where it is launched from, the platform. It could be even less
    than that. There are a lot of variables into that, but it is
    more challenging than a ballistic missile.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        The United States suspended its obligations under the INF
    Treaty. There has been some discussion about that. Can you talk
    about what our next steps might be to improve our position and
    to strengthen deterrence against Russia, China, and North
    Korea?
        General Hyten. I think the most important thing we can do
    is continue to modernize our nuclear triad. As long as we have
    nuclear capabilities that our adversaries cannot attack, they
    cannot take out, and they cannot eliminate, we will be able to
    prevent the use of nuclear weapons on our Nation. I remember
    when I interviewed for this job with President Obama and then I
    interviewed with Secretary Mattis after he took over, he asked
    me what is the reason we have nuclear weapons. I said the
    reason we have nuclear weapons is to prevent people from using
    nuclear weapons on us. That is exactly why we have them.
        If you do not have a robust capability and our adversaries
    do not believe that you are willing to respond, then you run
    the risk that somebody will take that step across the line that
    nobody ever wants to experience. That is why we have to make
    sure we modernize as we go forward.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
        I want to follow up a little bit with regard to the nuclear
    triad and what makes it as important to us as it does today.
    Part of it is the reliability, and when we start talking about
    the reliability of the nuclear triad, one of the areas that I
    think we have identified as being in need of updating is the
    nuclear command and control of the different portions of the
    triad.
        Could you share with us a little bit about, recognizing the
    setting that we are here, the weaknesses that we are trying to
    improve upon and include within that a discussion about the
    cyber threats that are shortcuts and that really do put our
    systems at risk today?
        General Hyten. One of the interesting things I have
    observed in my 27 months in command now--so that is a long
    period of time, 2 years and 3 months. Not one time in that 2
    years, 3 months have I lost connectivity with the nuclear
    force. Can you imagine any other electronic system in the world
    where that has happened? That shows you how resilient,
    reliable, and effective the current command and control system
    is.
        But what concerned me about it is I really cannot
    effectively explain that to you because it has been built 50
    years ago through different kind of pathways, different kind of
    structures. We look at it hard each and every day, and we know
    that those things are going to have to be replaced in about a
    decade. The big challenges that we have is how are we going to
    replace that old, ancient thing that works so well that we know
    works, but will not work after about another decade. How do we
    replace that with something that works just as well and with
    modern technology when we have the cyber threats we have to
    look at? One of the great things about being so old is the
    cyber threats are actually fairly minimal.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there is not
    an hour that goes by in which our system of protection of our
    communication system is not challenged someplace along the
    pathways?
        General Hyten. We see literally thousands, if not millions,
    of attacks against our systems every day. ``Attacks'' is
    defined as an unknown activity trying to get into a network. It
    may not be an attack, maybe just a curious person. But
    nonetheless, we look at all of those and make sure we defend
    those accordingly. We see that broadly on the network side. It
    is much more secure on the nuclear side because much of that is
    closed off to the world.
        Senator Rounds. With regard to both hypersonics and the
    item of discussion lately, the torpedo, which has been
    discussed in terms of the Russian advancements, in both cases
    there is a question as to the vector that we receive them from.
    Both are capable of movement, changes in direction, and so
    forth, which really changes the way that we defend North
    America because in many cases, our defenses have been built on
    the closest to the most direct route from our near-peer
    adversaries into the North American continent.
        Can you share with us a little bit about the needs, first
    of all, for the space-based capabilities that we are going to
    need in order to determine where hypersonics are at and so
    forth?
        Second of all, General O'Shaughnessy, I would just ask, can
    you share a little bit about the changes within the threats
    that a torpedo that could hit along our shorelines could do
    with regard to how we have to refocus our North American
    defenses as well?
        Really two questions, but if you could each.
        General Hyten. Real quickly, Senator, when I was a young
    officer and the Soviet threat existed, we had big radars on our
    southern border. We had a radar in Georgia and a radar in
    Texas, Robbins and El Dorado, that were looking south for
    threats that we had to worry about.
        When the wall came down and Russia became our friend, we
    dismantled those radars. We have no radars that look south.
        We have built radars and we are building a radar in Hawaii,
    built a radar in Alaska to defend against the Korean threat in
    particular to make sure we can enable General O'Shaughnessy's
    missile defense.
        But there are not enough islands in the world to build a
    radar to defend every avenue. Therefore, we have to go to
    space, and we can go to space now in an affordable way with
    distributed constellations that can look down and characterize
    that threat in a global perspective so we can see them wherever
    they come from. That is the direction we need to go.
        Senator Rounds. All at risk of cyber interference.
        General Hyten. All at risk of cyber interference, which is
    the big challenge of the day.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General O'Shaughnessy?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. As we talked about earlier
    with respect to Arctic as the geography is no longer the buffer
    that it once was, I would say the same thing from the sea. It
    was a time where we for decades actually used the sea as a moat
    and really did not have to worry from the threats directly
    coming against the Homeland from the sea. That has
    fundamentally changed, as you were mentioning relative to the
    weapons that are being created.
        Therefore, we need to go and invest ourselves in our
    ability to have, first, the domain awareness. Just as General
    Hyten had mentioned, you have to see it if you are going to be
    able to react to it and ultimately defeat it. Right now, we
    need to invest in the IUSSS, which is our integrated undersea
    surveillance system, which has atrophied as it relates to the
    continental United States and our ability to defend there. We
    need to invest in that now to be able to defend against these
    advanced threats that are coming from the sea.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and for your very
    forthright and candid answers at this hearing.
        General O'Shaughnessy, is there a national emergency at the
    border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, the President has declared
    a national emergency on the border.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am asking you in your military
    opinion does this nation face a national emergency at the
    border.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator. As the President has
    declared that national emergency, he has given guidance and
    direction down to the Secretary of Defense and then the Acting
    Secretary of Defense. As that has happened, it has been
    parlayed to me in the form of an execution order, which makes
    it very clear to me of my actions that I need to take as a
    result of the guidance from our senior leadership.
        Senator Blumenthal. Did you recommend that he declare a
    national emergency?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I did not directly recommend
    either way, although I will say----
        Senator Blumenthal. Were you consulted before he did it?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will say I have had
    multiple conversations, numerous conversations directly with
    the President with respect to the border. In addition, I have
    had multiple conversations as the Secretary of Defense and
    Acting Secretary of Defense has gone over to the White House
    for these conversations that have happened. I think I feel very
    comfortable that as the operational commander that our
    perspective was considered as those decisions were made.
        Senator Blumenthal. What is the threat to our national
    security that justifies declaring a national emergency,
    General?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, what I see from my perspective
    is that a secure border will reduce the threats to the
    Homeland.
        Senator Blumenthal. That is a general statement. But what
    is it specifically at this moment in time that justifies
    declaring a national emergency?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, again I would say that the
    President has made that declaration. We are responsible for
    that declaration----
        Senator Blumenthal. You are saying in fact--I do not mean
    to be disrespectful--that there is a national emergency because
    the President has said there is a national emergency.
        General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. What I am saying from my
    perspective I get my orders from the Secretary of Defense and
    the President. Those orders are very clear to me. Just like any
    other mission that I am given, when I get that legal order and
    I have the troops that are able to enforce that and take those
    actions, I do it with the same vigor and professionalism that I
    do for my ballistic missile defense, my operational, legal, et
    cetera. I take that same look to the----
        Senator Blumenthal. I understand that you follow orders and
    you do it well and you are proficient and expert in your
    duties. I commend you. But you did not recommend that the
    President of the United States declare a national emergency,
    and you have not given me as yet a specific fact at the border
    now that justifies declaring a national emergency.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I spent a lot of time at
    the border over the last 5 months, had very specific
    conversation with our lead federal agency, in this case the
    Customs and Border Protection, as well as with the Department
    of Homeland Security and directly with Secretary Nielsen on a
    regular, routine basis. I would defer to them with respect to
    the characterization of the threat. I will say we are trying to
    be a good partner to another lead federal agency as they take
    on this challenge.
        Senator Blumenthal. I am concerned, General, very frankly
    that this administration is politicizing our military and
    militarizing our immigration policy, in effect using the troops
    under your command as political props both in terms of
    declaring a fake emergency but also compromising our potential
    security by diverting them away from other assignments and
    missions that are absolutely necessary. My understanding is
    that these troops were engaged in various readiness and
    training exercises at the time they were deployed. Is that
    correct?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there have been quite a few
    different deployments and units within that, but to your point,
    some of them would. I will also say that many of the units that
    have deployed, especially the initial salvo that went out, are
    actually doing exactly what their military skills are. Military
    police do a military police business. Engineers do an
    engineering business. In fact, many of them come back and
    talked about the readiness advantage they have for the way that
    they have been deployed.
        That said, readiness is a key concern of ours and mine in
    particular, and we will continue to look at the impacts to
    readiness as we go forward.
        Senator Blumenthal. General, recently--I think last week as
    a matter of fact--Under Secretary Rood and Vice Admiral Gilday
    testified that a minimum of $237 million has been spent so far
    on deploying both Active Duty troops and guard personnel at the
    border. They were unable to provide a total cost estimate for
    fiscal year 2019 even though those deployments have been
    extended--correct me if I am wrong--through September of 2019.
    Can you give us a cost estimate?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will confirm that the
    deployments have been extended through September of 2019.
        The cost estimate--specifically on the title X side, which
    is the part that is under my command and control--was at $132
    million through the 31st of January of this year. We will
    continue to work with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
    who is ultimately the one who is running the calculations with
    respect to the cost.
        Senator Blumenthal. In connection with the declaration of
    national emergency and the diversion of money that is necessary
    to build the wall, have you made a recommendation as to
    military construction projects within your command that would
    be stripped of funding to fund the wall?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, the actual funding is being
    worked by the Secretary of Defense as we speak. I did go down
    to the border to the El Paso area with the Secretary just this
    last weekend so he would have an understanding both of the
    military aspects of what our troops are doing right now, as
    well as be able to talk to the Customs and Border Protection
    that the folks actually doing the mission there and be able to
    take that into his calculations as this week he determines the
    funding that might be applied toward resourcing a wall or other
    efforts on the border.
        Senator Blumenthal. The money that will be taken from
    military construction projects under your command has not yet
    been determined as to what specifically and where it will come
    from.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We truly do
    appreciate it. I appreciate both of your extreme
    professionalism in a very difficult time. Thank you very much
    for stepping up. I do appreciate it.
        General O'Shaughnessy, let us go back and visit a little
    bit about the National Guard. You happened to mention it in
    your comments. This morning we had our National Guard breakfast
    caucus. A lot of our adjutant generals are here in town today
    and really excited to be here and speaking with all of their
    elected representation.
        Can you talk a little bit about how the National Guard fits
    into the overall force structure here in the United States and
    what type of missions are they engaging in?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the
    opportunity to highlight the great partnership we have with the
    National Guard. I will say certainly from the NORTHCOM and
    NORAD perspective, they are absolutely integral and core to
    every single mission that we do within our commands. It goes
    all the way from whether it is the aircraft that are sitting,
    as we speak right now, across both the CONUS [Continental
    United States] as well as in Alaska or whether it goes to the
    command and control that is part of that, whether it is the
    ballistic missile defense that we have in place. Every mission
    set that we have right now the National Guard is actively
    employed in doing that. Frankly, I can just tell you plain and
    simply we could not do our mission set without the National
    Guard and their contributions.
        Senator Ernst. We appreciate that very much. We want to
    utilize them as much as we can. We do know that there are a
    number of troops that have been activated or mobilized for work
    down on the southern border. We know that to be true.
        I would just state that having served in the National Guard
    and responding to a number of different mobilizations, whether
    it is hurricane relief, whether it is working in flood
    situations, or whether it is down on the border, that our
    troops are actively engaging in their MOS [Military
    Occupational Specialty] specific skill sets. If you are a heavy
    equipment operator, you are out there driving a dozer or you
    are operating. If you are a truck driver, you are driving. You
    are actually doing those skills that have been assigned to you.
    Thank you for highlighting that. I think it is great for our
    readiness to actually be able to engage in our MOSs. Thank you
    for that.
        I also want to go back. We have talked a lot with General
    Hyten about modernization and our nuclear capabilities, but let
    us focus a little more with you. What do you see the most
    pressing modernization requirements for NORTHCOM?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
    opportunity to highlight this. It is actually fairly similar.
    The first thing is domain awareness. Over the years, we have
    just let atrophy our ability to understand and see what is
    happening in and around our Nation. It was done at the time for
    the right reasons because we had a sanctuary. We had the
    ability to not have more advanced sensors and more advanced
    capabilities. But now that it has fundamentally changed based
    on the security, based on our potential adversaries, our peer
    strategic competitors that now have the ability to reach out
    and hold us at risk, we need to fundamentally relook at the way
    that we are maintaining our domain awareness. That cannot be
    done with one single widget, one single particular program. It
    is going to have to be a family of systems. It is going to have
    to include both terrestrial based capability and a reassertion
    of technology in terrestrial based. It is going to have to
    include some air domain advances in technology and capability.
    But it is also absolutely going to have to include space. We
    really need to accelerate our work to put sensors in space that
    can help us understand the domain both on the sea and in the
    air of the threats that are coming towards our Homeland.
        In particular, the Arctic is an area that we really need to
    focus on and really look at investing. That is no longer a
    buffer zone. We need to be able to operate there. We need to be
    able to communicate there. We need to be able to have a
    presence there that we have not invested in in the same way
    that our adversaries have. They see that as a vulnerability
    from us, whereas it is becoming a strength for them and it is a
    weakness for us, and we need to flip that equation.
        Senator Ernst. Yes. You mentioned the Arctic, and I am sure
    that my colleague, Senator Sullivan, will have a lot of great
    questions there.
        But when we talk modernization, have we identified a system
    to replace the aging northern warning system?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, we have a study that is going
    on right now. It is a bi-national study. It is being done by
    our Air Combat Command within the United States Air Force, as
    well as with Canada, that is going to help us. But I will tell
    you that north warning system right now--the last hardware
    insertion of technology was 1985. That needs to be invested in,
    and again, it needs to be part not just of advancing that but
    also doing the all-domain awareness in addition to the
    terrestrial based.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, I appreciate that.
        General Hyten, thank you so much for hosting me last year
    at STRATCOM. I really appreciated the tour and the time you
    took to educate me on your mission set there.
        Can you talk a little bit about the move that is ongoing at
    Offutt Air Force Base?
        General Hyten. Senator, I am glad to be able to sit here
    and say we are actually getting ready to move into the
    building. It has been a long time. It is a couple years late.
    The Guard did an amazing job. We brought in over 20 engineering
    and installation squadrons from the Guard to help us recapture
    some schedule. They saved over $70 million of the taxpayers'
    money, and they saved us probably more than that in schedule.
    We are getting ready to move in. I think we will be able to
    start next week, and I hope to have the opening ceremonies this
    October. That will be a big day because we will be able to do
    our mission even better. That will become the hub of nuclear
    command and control.
        Senator Ernst. Outstanding. Gentlemen, thank you both so
    much for your leadership.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. General O'Shaughnessy, forgive me for
    jumping back and forth between Intel and this Committee this
    morning. There is a little bit of something going on over there
    as well.
        I wanted to return to something that Senator Blumenthal
    came up and just make sure I have the correct information that
    you were not consulted by the White House before the decision
    to use military construction dollars to pay for the national
    emergency.
        General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. That was not my response.
    Specifically, we have been in dialogue. I have been in dialogue
    with the President all the way down for multiple occasions, to
    include in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. The
    actual decision of how that funding will be placed is actually
    what the Secretary of Defense is actually working through
    literally right now.
        Senator Heinrich. Were you consulted before the
    announcement?
        General O'Shaughnessy. With multiple dialogues talking
    about the border, talking about the situation that we see.
        Senator Heinrich. Is that a yes?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our ability to have the operational
    perspective known was absolutely present.
        Senator Heinrich. My question is were you consulted as to
    using military construction dollars as the source of funding to
    pay for the national emergency efforts?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, in fact, with the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Senator Heinrich. That is a decision you support.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I gave my best military advice to
    the Secretary of Defense, to include going down, physically
    going down, with him to the border to make sure he understood
    the operational perspective.
        Senator Heinrich. If those dollars do flow to that priority
    rather than what they were appropriated for and authorized for,
    what impact of the cancellation of some of those construction
    projects have whether it is for military housing or air traffic
    control improvements or even runway upgrades? What impact would
    that have on military morale?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I think right now, Senator, that is
    premature. I think as we look at it, that is exactly the types
    of things that the Secretary is looking at. He is looking at it
    from what is the right balance, what is the right use of those
    funds, and in fact, what would the correct funds be,
    appropriate funds, to use given the direction that he has been
    given.
        Senator Heinrich. Given the Constitution, I would suggest
    that is a job for Congress.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, DOD's initial requirements
    for plutonium pits are to produce 30 pits per year at Los
    Alamos by 2026. Are you and NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] still laser-focused on making that happen?
        General Hyten. We are laser-focused on 30 by 2026 and 80 by
    2030, and my requirement is that. I never said where they had
    to be done, but if we do not get 30 in Los Alamos, we will
    never the 80.
        Senator Heinrich. If personnel and scientific expertise
    were shifted from one place to another during that effort, what
    would be the potential impact for the near-term goals?
        General Hyten. I have told the Secretary of Energy, as well
    as the Administrator of the NNSA, that we cannot move anything
    out of Los Alamos into Savannah River that would take our eyes
    off of the 30 in 2026. I am going down to Los Alamos and
    sending my people down to Los Alamos to make sure that that
    focus is always there because, again, if we cannot get to 30 by
    2026 at Los Al, we cannot get there at all.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I appreciate your focus on this
    effort. It is very welcome, and you are always welcome at Los
    Alamos, as you know.
        I also understand that the administration, General Hyten,
    is currently reviewing whether it will seek to extend the New
    START agreement that limits United States and Russian strategic
    nuclear weapons to 1,550 treaty-accountable warheads with
    additional limits, obviously, on delivery vehicles. Is that
    information accurate? Is that correct?
        General Hyten. We are looking at that. The President asks
    me about that every time I see him. It is high on his mind.
    Again, the issue there is the efforts that Russia has going on
    right now that are not elements of the New START. The torpedo,
    the cruise missile, the hypersonics all are not part of that
    treaty. We believe that we would like to have all nuclear
    weapons as part of a future strategic arms treaty. That is my
    desire. I want Russia in that treaty. I want Russia in the INF
    Treaty, but if they will not participate----
        Senator Heinrich. I share that sentiment and certainly
    hopefully we can move to a world where there is control on more
    weapon systems rather than simply getting rid of the tools that
    we have to, in theory, get something that is perfect and more
    inclusive.
        Does New START provide significant benefits to U.S.
    national security interests? If so, what would those be?
        General Hyten. No treaty is perfect, and New START is
    certainly not perfect. But what it gives me at STRATCOM, it
    gives me two very important things. Number one, it puts a limit
    on the basics of their strategic force. I understand what the
    limits are and I can position my force accordingly so I can
    always be ready to respond. Maybe as important, it also gives
    me insight through the verification process of exactly what
    they are doing and what those pieces are. Having that insight
    through my forces and our partners is unbelievably important
    for me to understand what Russia is doing. But we do not have
    insight into all the other things that are going on right now.
    That will be the challenge.
        Senator Heinrich. If we were to lose that insight without
    gaining more global insight, would that be a step forward or a
    step back?
        General Hyten. That is the balance that will be in the
    decision that the country has to make as we go forward on the
    benefits of New START. I would like everything on the table.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thanks for your exceptional service of both of
    you and all the hard work you are doing.
        I want to talk about the Arctic and missile defense, but I
    actually wanted just to add a little bit to the exchange you
    had with my colleague, Senator Blumenthal, who I have a lot of
    respect for and work with on a lot of issues.
        But, General O'Shaughnessy, let me ask. How many Americans
    were killed by drug overdoses last year? Do you know?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator, I do. 72,000 in the
    last year and 70,000 the year before.
        Senator Sullivan. More than all the men and women killed in
    the Vietnam War just last year, 72,000 Americans.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. That is opioids, heroin, meth. How much
    of the heroin in America comes from Mexico?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there is a significant portion
    that comes up through the southern approaches.
        Senator Sullivan. The number I have heard is over 90
    percent.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. If that is not an emergency, 72,000
    dead Americans killed by opioids and heroin in 1 year, I have
    no freakin' idea what an emergency is. That is just my view on
    that. Do you have any comment on that? Is that an emergency,
    72,000 dead Americans?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I would say that clearly this
    is a national issue that we have to take on with a whole-of-
    government approach.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, okay. Thank you.
        Let me talk about the Arctic. By the way, General
    O'Shaughnessy, I really want to commend you. You are by far and
    away the NORTHCOM Commander who has actually put this on the
    radar as a serious issue. Just today in your testimony about so
    many of the threats operating both in the Arctic and passing
    through I think is a wakeup call. This Committee has been doing
    a lot of work in that regard. Let me ask a couple issues with
    regard to capabilities.
        The Russians have a fleet of polar icebreakers. It is 40.
    They are building 14 more, including nuclear-powered
    icebreakers, weaponized icebreakers. We are finally getting our
    act together on that. Last year's NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] authorized six. This past appropriations
    bill recently signed by the President has about close to $700
    million on the first one.
        But do we have the required capabilities to answer the
    Russian and, by the way, Chinese challenge in the Arctic? If
    so, what more capabilities do we need?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, you started with
    icebreakers, and I will highlight that as well. On paper, we
    have four icebreakers. In reality we have one that is actually
    a polar level.
        Senator Sullivan. We have two and one is broken. Right?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Two. They are sister ships. We have
    one that is cannibalized and one that is----
        Senator Sullivan. They were commissioned in the early
    1970s.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. They are 43 years old.
        Senator Sullivan. Have you ever seen those icebreakers?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I have been on the Polar Star.
        Senator Sullivan. They are a disgrace to the men and women
    who wear the uniform of the United States. Are they not?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. Just this year alone, for
    example, as the Polar Star was going down to Antarctica, she
    had multiple major casualties to include a propeller shaft seal
    that went out that ended up in flooding. Its incinerator
    actually caught on fire. There was a fire and flooding on that
    ship.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. I commend the men and women of the
    Coast Guard who try to keep that ship afloat, but it is a
    disgrace. You put men and women wearing the uniform of our
    Nation on a ship that is that old and dangerous.
        But I interrupted you. Please go on.
        General O'Shaughnessy. In that regard, we are working
    closely with the Coast Guard and, of course, the U.S. Navy who
    is helping the Coast Guard get the six icebreakers, at least
    three that will be polar-capable icebreakers. Those are
    absolutely critical for us even within the Department of
    Defense even though it is ultimately for the Coast Guard to be
    able to clear the access for us to be able to have operations
    in the Arctic. So that is a high priority for us in U.S.
    Northern Command.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. Again, this
    Committee has focused a lot on the Arctic, which I appreciate
    in a bipartisan way. We mandated this strategy that had to come
    out of DOD. Two years ago we mandated the concept of a
    strategic Arctic port. The Secretary of the Navy recently
    testified that we need a strategic Arctic port to protect our
    interests in the Arctic. Do you agree with him?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I had a conversation with the
    Secretary of the Navy just last week on this regard. Clearly
    what we need--I will use an example. We have a requirement for
    fuel north of Dutch Harbor. Right now we do not have access to
    that. Nome, if we were able to make Nome a deepwater port,
    would serve that requirement.
        Senator Sullivan. You think we need that the way he said
    that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I think we need to ultimately have
    the ability to have the infrastructure to allow us to do the
    operations. A deepwater port would certainly be part of that
    going forward.
        Senator Sullivan. General Hyten, let me ask you. You have
    been a great advocate on missile defense. The Trump
    administration recently put out its Missile Defense Review. The
    President actually announced it at the Pentagon with the Vice
    President and SecDef, the Secretary of Defense.
        Again, this Committee has been doing a lot of work in
    regard to that.
        Do you agree with the priorities outlined in the Missile
    Defense Review? Can you just briefly talk about what other
    areas we need and how Alaska is the cornerstone of our Nation's
    missile defense in terms of LRDR [Long Range Discrimination
    Radar] radar, missile fields, and other areas that we need to
    continue to build on?
        General Hyten. I agree with the findings of the Missile
    Defense Review. The thing I liked most about the Missile
    Defense Review is that it was not just a ballistic missile
    defense review. It was a missile defense review looking at the
    entire spectrum of capabilities that we have to have not just
    against ballistic missiles but all the missile threats that we
    face. It talked about getting left of launch, as well as the
    response after the launch.
        When you look at Alaska, all you have to do is look at a
    globe and look at where Korea is and look at where the United
    States is and you understand the importantance of Alaska. That
    is why we are putting the long-range discrimination radar in
    Alaska. That is why that is going to be a critical portion.
        I continue to look at the radar architecture and be
    concerned about vulnerabilities in that architecture. That is
    why I think we need to augment the ground element, as General
    O'Shaughnessy talked about earlier with the space element, and
    then defend that space element as well. That will allow us to
    see, characterize, and hopefully discriminate the threat so we
    can make more efficient use of our interceptors in Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
        I want to pick up on a comment made by my colleague,
    Senator Sullivan, about the Coast Guard icebreakers, and I
    would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to mention
    we have a very aging fleet in the Great Lakes as well. In fact,
    I was on a Coast Guard ship earlier last week, and it was well
    over 50 years old. You can only keep those things running so
    long and you start running out of bubblegum and tape and you
    need to have it replaced. Hopefully we will be able to
    recapitalize that fleet in a much broader way.
        General O'Shaughnessy, you have a very big responsibility
    and an important one with a very large AOR [Area of
    Responsibility]. I am sure you have a lot of sleepless nights
    thinking about various threats. What do you believe is the most
    significant threat to your AOR? We have heard a number of
    different ones here today, but I am just curious as to the one
    that you think most about.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I think right now it in the
    near term is Russia. As we look at the advancement that Russia
    has made, it is not only the capability and the capacity that
    they have, but it is also the investments they made, the
    training they are doing, and the patterns of behavior that
    clearly show they intend to not only hold us at risk but in
    conflict, they would actually take action on the conventional
    side as well as on the nuclear side potentially. It is not just
    a cyber threat. This is a kinetic threat with the cruise
    missiles that we talked about. We need to invest in our ability
    to defend if we are going to be able to maintain our ability to
    defend. That is something that I think we need to have a sense
    of urgency on.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that. That is our number
    one threat to the Homeland in your estimation.
        However, we just recently deployed troops to our southern
    border. As you know, as we have talked about here, we have a
    national emergency that was declared on February 15th.
        My question to you, General, is we sent troops to the
    border last October and into November. Could you tell us how
    the threat environment has changed from November to February?
    Have you seen an increased threat?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Well, first, I would say for the
    specific clarification of the threat we rely on our Customs and
    Border Protection personnel in close cooperation with them. I
    would defer the specifics of that actual threat to them.
        What I will say it is a dynamic that we are seeing where
    the response that we did in October was to a very large
    caravan, and we were tasked to do a request for assistance from
    the Department of Homeland Security to respond very rapidly. We
    did so. I am very proud of the response that was made with our
    military members taking the orders they were given, the mission
    that they were given, and executing it with the professionalism
    that you would expect of our military members.
        Senator Peters. I apologize, General. But just from that
    point forward, what has happened since then to now? What have
    you seen?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, we have seen the caravans are
    not as large, but they are still out there. I would use the
    example of a couple weeks ago where we had to respond to Eagle
    Pass where we had migrants show up there where the Customs and
    Border Protection asked for our assistance again to be able to
    harden the port of entry and provide them assistance in their
    ability to respond.
        Senator Peters. Well, I think we all agree that border
    security is incredibly important. I do not think you will find
    any disagreement with anybody on this Committee. I sit on the
    Homeland Security Committee as well. It is clearly a
    nonpartisan issue. We all believe that borders must be secure.
    It is a fundamental aspect of our government to keep the
    Homeland safe.
        The question is usually how do you do that in the most
    effective way and understand that we have to do it in a way
    that is respectful of taxpayer dollars as well. That I think is
    really the crux of what we are deciding right now.
        You mentioned that you were part of the consultation with
    the administration as to the need for a national emergency. I
    would assume, because of your repeated trips down to the
    border, you have seen significant gaps from Customs and Border
    Patrol. However, as you mentioned earlier in your testimony,
    the DEA has come up with a report that shows that most of the
    drugs, for example, that are coming across the border are
    coming through ports of entry. They are not folks walking
    across the open desert, and if they are, there are probably
    much more effective ways to track those folks down either with
    unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, National Guard troops. I
    understand those National Guard troops use Department of
    Defense drug interdiction program money to go down there. Yet
    now I hear that that drug interdiction money may be diverted to
    something else.
        Could you explain why you think drug interdiction money is
    simply not an effective way of dealing with drugs coming across
    the border and we should look at other avenues?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is that we
    have been in consultation with the Secretary of Defense on
    exactly these issues. With our role within USNORTHCOM, we have
    JTF-North [Joint Task Force North], for example, that is
    dedicated to the counternarcotics mission. That gets funding
    through the 284 money that you are alluding to. That is
    something that we are articulating up to the Secretary of
    Defense with the aspect of saying we want to preserve that
    ability for that particular program, as just an example of what
    inputs the Secretary of Defense is getting as he works through
    what is the appropriate way to work the funding and what is the
    report and response from the Department of Defense to this
    demand signal.
        Senator Peters. You are recommending that that money stay
    in place. That would not be diverted.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I am talking about very specifically
    the USNORTHCOM perspective of a very small sliver of the
    overall funding piece that needs to be considered within the
    broader context of the requirements that the Secretary of
    Defense has been given.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy,
    thank you for being here. Thank you for your exemplary service,
    and thank you for the service of the men and women under your
    respective commands.
        General Hyten, I want to go back and talk about something
    you have touched on several times already this morning, the
    need for the modernization of our nuclear arsenal. I want to
    focus in on, in particular, one aspect of that as it relates to
    low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
        We know that Russia and China, our two peer or near-peer
    competitors, have been investing significantly in these types
    of weapons. Russia, for instance, in anti-ship cruise missiles,
    nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth charges. China, other nuclear
    weapons designed for regional conflict like the DF-21, DF-26
    ballistic missiles. For these reasons, of course, the Nuclear
    Posture Review that was released last February called for us,
    the United States, to deploy new low-yield tactical warheads.
        Can you explain? Do you agree with that assessment by the
    Nuclear Posture Review? Can you explain why this type of weapon
    might be important given the strategic choices that we are now
    facing?
        General Hyten. Senator, I do agree with the Nuclear Posture
    Review. I had a lot of input into the creation of those
    recommendations. The thing I liked best about the Nuclear
    Posture Review and our National Defense Strategy is they are
    threat-based documents. When you have a threat specifically in
    Russia, which is my biggest concern, with low-yield nuclear
    weapons where they have deployed an order of magnitude more of
    those than we even have in our inventory, we need to be able to
    quickly respond to that and provide the President a spectrum of
    options in order to do that. Now, we have low-yield nuclear
    weapons in the air leg of our triad, but not in another leg of
    our triad. I talked about the attributes before about timely,
    responsive. We want to make sure the President always has a
    responsive option to respond.
        We are recommending that, but it is important to note that
    is inside the New START treaty. Russia is building those
    outside the New START treaty. We are going to take missiles off
    of the submarines, take big weapons off the submarines, put
    little weapons on the submarine, put it back on. We will still
    have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons, but the total yield will
    be smaller. I do not think that is escalatory in any way. I
    think that will allow the President to have options to manage
    the threat effectively.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
        I wonder if you could go on, General Hyten, and just
    explain how it is that deploying new low-yield nuclear weapons
    can, if we do it effectively, if we do it right, actually
    reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.
        General Hyten. Because the adversary watches exactly what
    we have and then they look for gaps. If they think they can
    deploy a nuclear weapon and get away with it, they very well
    may do that. The Russian doctrine is escalate to win, and if
    they execute that doctrine as they have said--and I have to
    believe them at their word--if they execute that doctrine as
    they have said and they may consider if something is going bad
    on the battlefield somewhere to deploy a low-yield nuclear
    weapon and the United States will not respond because if we do
    that, we have to respond with a high-yield nuclear weapon, they
    might take that chance. But if they see we have a low-yield
    nuclear weapon, they will not go that direction. That is the
    whole theory of deterrence is if they see an effective response
    to that, they will not use that weapon.
        Senator Hawley. Given that, General, what place do you
    think that the use of these tactical low-yield nuclear weapons
    ought to have in our own strategic doctrine? I think you have
    touched on it, but explain a little bit more.
        General Hyten. The most important thing to realize is they
    are deterrent weapons. The first use of a deterrent weapon is
    to make sure the weapon is not used against you. Now, in order
    for that to happen, the adversary has to look at that and see a
    rational response. The second priority is to use that in
    response to that option. But the goal of that weapon is to make
    sure that weapon is not used on you.
        Senator Hawley. This is particularly important, is it not,
    General, as we face peer competitors, near-peer competitors who
    may well have significantly larger conventional military forces
    than we do so that we do not find ourselves in a position where
    a disadvantage that we may have with conventional forces tempts
    aggression. Is that fair to say?
        General Hyten. I never want to be at a disadvantage in any
    element of our architecture. I think it was Senator Inhofe,
    Senator Reed talked about disadvantages or places our
    adversaries are ahead of us. As far as I am concerned, that
    should never happen in the United States of America. But it is
    happening. I never want to be there.
        On the conventional side, we are still the most dominant
    conventional force on the planet. If we can move our
    capabilities into an operation, we will dominate the
    battlefield today. That is where the threat of a low-yield
    nuclear weapon becomes at risk because an adversary may see the
    opportunity to deploy conventional forces and have that short-
    term advantage, but eventually that advantage will turn and
    that is where that escalation risk exists and we have to be
    able to respond.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you so much, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to our witnesses.
        I am sorry that Senator Sullivan left. I want to return and
    say that 72,000 deaths, overdose deaths, is an emergency.
    40,000 people died in 2017 by gun violence in the United
    States, murders and suicides. That would seem to me to be an
    emergency.
        The question is not whether 72,000 drug deaths or 40,000
    gun deaths are an emergency. The question is should we allow a
    President to unilaterally declare an emergency and to take $6
    billion out of the Pentagon's budget to apply to a situation,
    General O'Shaughnessy, that you said the threats to our Nation
    from our southern border are not military in nature. The
    question that Congress and the Senate is going to grapple with
    in the next couple weeks is will we allow a President to
    declare that drug overdose deaths are an emergency, but the
    threat is not military and still will take $6 billion out of
    the defense budget to deal with it because if we set that
    precedent, I could certainly foresee a day when a President is
    going to say 40,000 gun deaths a year are an emergency, and why
    do we not take the money out of the Pentagon budget to deal
    with that? If we let the President take $6 billion out of the
    Pentagon's budget to deal with a non-military threat of drugs,
    then you guys are going to see money taken out of your budget
    for other emergencies as well. That is the vote that we are all
    going to be casting in the next couple of weeks.
        General O'Shaughnessy, I applaud the honesty of your
    written testimony. It is 23 pages of testimony. The first
    section of it is threats, five pages. You identify six threats,
    nothing to do with the southern border. The second section is
    defending the Homeland, eight pages of testimony, four
    different domains. The last is southern approaches, and you
    acknowledge that it is not a military threat. You focus in your
    three paragraphs of testimony on illegal narcotics.
        The question we are going to have to vote on is do we want
    the President to take Pentagon money for a threat that you
    acknowledge is non-military in nature.
        The President proposes $6 billion. The first chunk is $2.5
    billion of drug interdiction money. The Pentagon account on
    drug interdiction does not have $2.5 billion in it. Right now,
    an ABC news this morning article--one of the two Pentagon funds
    the Trump administration plans to tap to help secure the
    southern border after declaring a national emergency has
    nowhere near the $2.5 billion that is projected for use. It has
    $85 million, not $2.5 billion. It has $85 million that is
    available. The Pentagon is saying that they are going to have
    to reprogram or shift money from other accounts into the
    account to make the $2.5 billion.
        I gather, General O'Shaughnessy, from your testimony
    earlier you do not yet know where the Pentagon plans to find
    the money to shift into the drug interdiction account to then
    take to use for the President's emergency. Is that correct?
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator. That is
    beyond the purview of USNORTHCOM. That is something that OSD is
    working with the joint staff.
        Senator Kaine. Within the Pentagon but not NORTHCOM.
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct.
        Senator Kaine. Secondly, I want to make sure I understand
    your testimony. That is the $2.5 billion. The $2.5 billion to
    be taken is a fund that has $85 million in it. There is
    apparently an attempt to shift other Pentagon monies into it.
    We do not yet know where it will come from.
        The second chunk is $3.5 billion out of MILCON, military
    construction, projects. General O'Shaughnessy, in NORTHCOM I
    gather there are ongoing military construction projects as well
    as projects that you would like to do that either are further
    out or not yet funded. Correct?
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. I gather from your testimony you have not
    yet been asked to provide a list of NORTHCOM MILCON projects
    that you would propose or you would recommend to be reduced,
    eliminated, or delayed. Is that correct?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We are actually working very closely
    with the Secretary of Defense's office with respect to the
    prioritization of that, not necessarily specifically related to
    this issue, but we have had communication with them with our
    prioritization of those MILCON dollars.
        Senator Kaine. I want to make sure I understand this.
    Obviously, NORTHCOM is always going to have a list of MILCON
    projects because we are working on the NDAA and that will be in
    it. You will always have a list. But have you been asked
    specifically in connection with this proposal to take $3.5
    billion out of MILCON, give us your recommendations as the
    NORTHCOM Commander about projects that should be reduced,
    eliminated, or delayed?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Again, Senator, I believe that is
    the process that is actually ongoing this very week, and that
    is why I was really pleased that the Acting Secretary of
    Defense took the time to go down, see firsthand, and then have
    a personal insight as he works through those very difficult
    challenges and decisions that he will make as he ultimately
    responds to the direction of the President.
        Senator Kaine. Have you made recommendations or not? Has
    NORTHCOM made recommendations about MILCON projects that should
    be reduced, eliminated, or delayed?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We have not specifically to this
    particular effort as of yet, but it is still premature and pre-
    decisional at this point.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here.
        I know that the hypersonics have been discussed. General
    Hyten, I wanted to come back to that issue. It is important to
    us in Tennessee because of Arnold Air Force and the work that
    has been done there. They have been really a key contributor,
    if you will, to our Nation's aerospace program. They are very
    important to us in Tennessee, and we are pleased that they are
    there. You have discussed some of the program and the advances
    there, the operational capabilities.
        But I want to come back to one thing that they have
    mentioned a couple of times, and it is having both the talent
    and the numbers of individuals to really push forward into the
    hypersonics and into that capacity and, General O'Shaughnessy,
    as you said, 21st century warfare and having what is there. Let
    us take just a minute and focus on the talent and the numbers
    to deliver on that mission.
        General Hyten. Senator, Arnold Air Force Station is a
    treasure to this country. The wind tunnel capabilities that
    they have there are unique, and they allow us to do things that
    we really cannot do anywhere else.
        We have a challenge at Arnold and a challenge across our
    DOD labs and across our Department of Energy labs in
    attracting, recruiting, and retaining the kind of engineering
    talent that is required to move these kind of programs forward.
        What I have learned, though, is when you can explain to the
    youth of America the kind of work that you can do by coming to
    places like Arnold, they will come. They will come because they
    love to do that kind of fascinating work. That is the same with
    Los Alamos or Livermore or Sandia or Rome Labs or any of our
    national labs. The key is then to be able to retain them
    because they will be trained and they will learn unique skills
    and they can go out and do anything. We have to make sure that
    we have the compensation that matches their talent, that we
    compete with the civilian sector in doing that. But the most
    important thing is we can provide them fascinating work.
        The one challenge I would say that we have to work at
    together--and the Department of Defense is looking at this;
    Congress is looking at this--is the time it takes some of these
    employees to get their clearances has been very de-motivational
    for new employees and it is causing some of them to leave
    because it takes years in some cases for them to get the high
    level security clearances to work those issues. Now, the
    Secretary, Secretary Mattis, now Secretary Shanahan, have
    looked at this issue directly, and they are working it directly
    with the broader government. But that is an issue that we want
    to continue to take on.
        Senator Blackburn. Kind of in the same vein, let us talk
    about USSPACECOM and that capacity, that mission, the
    transition of that mission. How are you approaching this so
    that going from STRATCOM to SPACECOM that is a seamless
    transition, and that we keep our focus on those threats that
    are coming to us that we are going to need to--the adversary
    threats we will need to address?
        General Hyten. Two pieces of the answer to that question,
    Senator, is that, number one, I am still the senior military
    person in space still serving Active Duty. So I care
    desperately about space. But as the Commander of Strategic
    Command, space will never be my number one priority. In fact,
    right now it is about number three. The nuclear modernization
    and operations is number one. Nuclear command and control is
    number two. Space is my third priority. With the importance of
    space in today's day and age, that is not good to have that
    priority. We need a command that focuses on that and the
    commander of that command, whoever that person is, he or she
    must have a focus on space 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. That
    is why we are standing up a Space Command.
        One of the ways we are going to make sure we do that
    because I was around when we transitioned the old U.S. Space
    Command to U.S. Strategic Command in 2002--now we are kind of
    going back the other way. I watched us almost break the space
    mission when we did that because we just haphazardly slapped
    billets and said these 500-plus billets are going to move from
    Colorado to Omaha, and I will just say the people did not come
    with them automatically.
        We are going to continue to perform a lot of the mission
    for Space Command in the STRATCOM headquarters. It will be
    Space Command East. Omaha is east in this case if it is in
    Colorado. If it is in Florida, it will be Space Command West.
    If it is in Alabama, it will be Space Command West. Wherever it
    ends up, we are going to continue to support that because we do
    not know the final destination of where that is going to be. We
    cannot break the mission because we have threats to deal with
    today. So we will make sure we cover both of those issues in
    dealing with the standup of Space Command.
        Senator Blackburn. My time has expired. I am going to
    submit for the record a QFR [Questions for the Record] for you
    on supply chain integrity dealing with the space systems. I
    thank you each for your service and for being here today.
        General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman Inhofe. Without objection, it will be part of the
    record. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here today.
        Senator Heinrich asked about New START, and I just want to
    go back and dig a little deeper, if I can, on that.
        General Hyten, in March 2017, you testified in front of the
    House Armed Services Committee, and you said ``I have stated
    for the record in the past and I will state again that I am a
    big supporter of the New START agreement.'' Is that still your
    view?
        General Hyten. It is still my view. I have said it multiple
    times. I am a big supporter of the New START agreement. I want
    ideally in my view all nuclear weapons to be part of the next
    phase of New START and not just the identified weapons that are
    in the New START treaty now.
        Senator Warren. I understand you would like to see an
    expanded New START. Can you just say a word about why you think
    New START is so important?
        General Hyten. It gives me two things at STRATCOM. Number
    one, it gives a cap on their strategic baseline nuclear weapons
    and their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, as well
    as their bombers so I understand what that is. Also, just as
    important, it gives me insight through the verification regime
    to their real capabilities. The INF Treaty, for example, does
    not have a verification regime anymore. The New START treaty
    does, which gives me insight into the Russian capabilities.
    Those are hugely beneficial to me. They just have to be
    balanced against all the other things Russia is doing outside
    of the treaty.
        Senator Warren. Right.
        Actually can you just say a word more about that, about the
    inspection process and what benefit that gives to the United
    States?
        General Hyten. Both Russia and the United States, as party
    to that treaty, have the ability to declare a New START
    inspection. The Russians can land in our country, and I get a
    notification that they landed at a port of entry somewhere. San
    Francisco is one that they land at frequently. Once they land
    there, they can declare wherever they want to go in this
    country to look at our nuclear force. We have the same ability
    in Russia to land at a port of entry in Russia and then go
    wherever we want to look at their capabilities. They open it up
    to verify that the right number of weapons are there, the right
    kind of weapons are there. That gives us insight into those
    capabilities, gives them insight into our capabilities and
    improves our overall strategic stability.
        Senator Warren. I presume, based on what you have said,
    that if we either lost that capacity or the capacity was
    greatly diminished, that you would like to try to find another
    way to be able to conduct that same kind of inspection and know
    what is going on.
        In this setting, how confident are you that we could
    replace those inspections, the data exchanges, and the
    notifications that are now in New START with other verification
    tools in a timely and cost effective manner?
        General Hyten. We have very good intelligence capabilities,
    but there is really nothing that can replace the eyes-on/hands-
    on ability to look at something. We have to do that. But there
    are elements that they have that are not elements of the New
    START treaty that we do not have this insight into.
        Senator Warren. I understand that you want to see this
    expanded. I am just trying to hang onto what we have got and
    then talk a little bit about the expansion.
        Let me just ask, in your view would it be easier or harder
    to provide an effective deterrent without a verifiable arms
    control agreement such as New START in place?
        General Hyten. I believe in any situation I can foresee in
    the next 10 years I can provide an effective defense as long as
    I have a capable triad with the weapons that we have defined. I
    get concerned 10 years and beyond that with torpedoes, with
    cruise missiles, with hypersonics that they could go a
    completely other direction that we would have difficulty. But I
    do not have any problem standing here and saying I can defend
    this nation today and I think the commander after me can, but I
    worry about the commander after the commander after the next.
        Senator Warren. The question I am trying to ask, though, is
    it easier or harder when you have got the tools available to
    you in New START.
        General Hyten. Today it is absolutely easier.
        Senator Warren. That is the part I am going for. This is a
    part of what you are able to accomplish.
        Do you support the extension of New START?
        General Hyten. I have stated for the record in the past--I
    have not changed my opinion--I support New START, but you have
    to have a partner that wants to participate in New START.
        Senator Warren. I know.
        General Hyten. It is going to be like INF. We have to have
    a partner that can participate. It is a two-party treaty. If
    the Russians continued to build the capabilities outside the
    New START treaty that are not accountable and will not come to
    the table under the treaty--there is an element of the treaty
    that says if there is a new strategic arm that appears, they
    should bring that to the table and discuss it. If they will not
    do that, then that causes me to have concerns.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I think you are exactly
    right when you identify who is going to come to the table. As
    you know, New START expires in just 2 years. The administration
    has already ripped up another nuclear arms treaty with Russia,
    the INF Treaty, and it appears to be running out the clock on
    the New START without any plans for a follow-up agreement. If
    this happens, this is going to be the first time since 1972
    that there are no arms control agreements between the United
    States and Russia.
        My view is we have a moral and strategic responsibility to
    do everything in our power to prevent a new nuclear arms race,
    and at a minimum I think that means working with Russia to try
    to get back to the negotiating table, try to get them back into
    compliance with the INF Treaty and working on a New START
    treaty. This just seems to me to be common sense arms control
    and to make America safe.
        General Hyten. I pay close attention to what the State
    Department is doing, and they are reaching out to the Russians
    and the Russians are not answering favorably.
        Senator Warren. Well, I hope we can get them to the table,
    and I am glad to hear that you are in favor of that. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Generals, both of you, for your service and for
    your testimony today.
        Since we talked a couple of weeks ago, General Hyten, I
    have completed my tour of bases in North Dakota. I went to all
    of them. I want you to know that while Minot and Grand Forks
    were grateful, the Cavalier was especially grateful that you
    asked specifically about them, and it was very encouraging I
    will tell you. I am new to this Committee, as you know, and I
    have sat through enough briefings that have made me adequately
    frightened, but I feel much better having gone to the bases,
    including our National Guard ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance] and Global Hawk bases. It is fantastic.
        With regard to modernization, General Hyten, I agree with
    you, that one of the things that concerns me is not so much a
    capability of modernizing, but the speed with which we are able
    to do it. When we think about the history of 60 years ago being
    able to build in 5 years, not just develop but create, produce
    hundreds of ICBMs, I do not even know if we could do that
    today. The timeline scares me.
        Do you have any specific thoughts on the bureaucracy itself
    and how we can improve the bureaucracy and then, as I always
    like to say, what we as policymakers can do to help either
    knock down the hurdles or send the right signals so that we can
    meet the timeline that is facing us?
        General Hyten. Senator, thanks for going to Minot, Cav, and
    Grand Forks. They are pretty special places. When you see the
    people, you should feel very, very good about this country.
    They are amazing people.
        But when you look at the challenges that we face in the
    future, I think Senator Peters asked General O'Shaughnessy what
    kept him awake at night, and General O'Shaughnessy answered
    Russia. What keeps me awake at night mostly is actually
    ourselves because somehow we have lost the ability to go fast.
    I do not know where we lost that, but somewhere we lost the
    ability to go fast, and we better regain that because right now
    we are dominant. I can guarantee you today that STRATCOM can
    keep this nation secure, but we have to make sure that is the
    case. We have to figure out how to go fast again. I can give
    you a lot of recommendations. I will be glad to do it offline,
    but I will give you one here.
        The one recommendation I have is that we have to, once
    again, empower the people that actually build stuff. We have to
    empower in the military the 06 program directors. That is
    colonels and Navy captains that actually build things. Over the
    last 25 years, we have taken all the authorities away from
    them, and in many cases, they are not even staying in the
    military anymore. They go out to do other things in industry.
    But those engineers that want to go build things--that is what
    built this amazing force that I get to command today. We have
    to go back again and do everything we can to empower the people
    down at that level to make the decisions, how to spend the
    money, how to deliver the capability, how to test the
    capability, all those kind of issues because they will do it
    more efficiently than when they have to go through 18 layers of
    bureaucracy above them.
        Oh, by the way, if they do fail, we will fire them and find
    somebody else. That is the other thing that is beneficial about
    having the authority in the right place. Now you know who is
    responsible. Right now, it is almost impossible to tell who is
    even responsible because there are so many layers of
    bureaucracy.
        Senator Cramer. Can Congress do something about that or is
    this----
        General Hyten. Congress has started down that path. Your
    Committee, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, in
    the last 2 years have made significant improvements in moving
    things from the Office of the Secretary of Defense back down to
    the services. I have now watched the services both on the Air
    Force and the Navy side, which are mostly in my command--I do
    not watch the Army as close--move things back out again to the
    2006's. Continuing that process, continuing to look at that
    through this Committee and to push those authorities back
    down--I think that is the biggest thing that would help.
        Senator Cramer. General O'Shaughnessy, could you comment
    on, I guess, the same basic principles within the context of
    your command because, again, having been in Grand Forks and
    Cavalier and even Fargo, frankly, with the Happy Hooligans and
    their ISR work, I find some of the greatest innovators in the
    world, and I just want them to be empowered.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I absolutely agree with everything
    General Hyten said. As you alluded to, I think we have to
    change the way that we are thinking about advancing our
    capabilities, and we cannot go about it the way that we have in
    the past if we are going to keep pace with our adversaries.
        Senator Cramer. Maybe in the remaining seconds, General
    O'Shaughnessy, I would ask for one clarification with regard to
    the debate about the southern border and your role in advising
    or in providing consultation to the President. Do you feel like
    you and the others, but you specifically, have been adequately
    listened to and that the information and intelligence and
    insights that you provided to the President and the others
    around him have been appropriately taken in and considered
    before making this whole-of-government decision?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you for asking that, Senator.
    Yes, I do I believe for a variety of forums, whether it be
    directly with the President or whether it be through the
    Secretary of Defense with the Chairman, whether it be actually
    going hands-on and actually seeing what is going on there. I
    feel very comfortable that the best military advice from
    USNORTHCOM has been put forward and has been in the proper
    forums.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Duckworth?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time today and your
    testimony and your willingness to answer extensive questions.
        General Hyten, in your testimony, you discuss the
    effectiveness of our legacy nuclear command, control, and
    communication systems and the need to pursue updates to meet
    evolving needs.
        Can you discuss the implications of building a new system
    in light of the rapidly changing technologies like AI, quantum
    computing, and machine learning? Could you elaborate, to the
    extent that you are able to in an open setting? Are we building
    an adaptable architecture with the workarounds necessary to
    adapt a future tech and modernization?
        General Hyten. Senator, over the last 6 months, I have dug
    into that very deeply, much deeper than I would ever expect a
    combatant commander to have to do that. That is because on the
    3rd of October, the Secretary of Defense put me in charge of
    the nuclear command and control enterprise. I am responsible
    for operations requirements and system engineering of that
    enterprise now. I felt the need to go out and look at how we
    are doing today, and I understand that pretty well. But then I
    have to define now how we are going to do it in the future in
    this very challenging cyber threat environment that we are
    walking into.
        I have some ideas. I have formed those ideas as I have gone
    through. Basically the broad-based structure of that idea is to
    develop a number of pathways for a message to get through that
    is nearly infinite that nobody can ever figure out exactly
    where it is or deny the ability for that message to get
    through. That is the way to do things in the future, and I
    think we will have the means to do that. We would have to talk
    about it on a much more classified level to get into the
    details.
        I have gone out to industry. I have gone out to the
    federally funded research and development corporations, and I
    have asked them to come in with ideas. Just last week, they
    delivered those ideas to me. We are going to now evaluate those
    ideas and come up with a broad-based set of mission needs that
    we need to explore, and then I will work back with industry to
    figure out how to do that. Then the services, the Army and the
    Navy in this case, will actually build them.
        Senator Duckworth. Have you thought about also going out to
    some of our national laboratories? I know they fall under the
    DOE, but in Illinois, we have both Fermi Lab and Argonne with
    quantum computing capabilities, currently pretty high up on the
    spectrum of quantum computing capabilities. But without major
    investments, we are going to fall behind in that.
        General Hyten. You bet, and I have gone to the national
    labs. I went to the national labs, the federally funded
    research and development corporations, the university
    affiliated research corporations, all those elements looking
    for best ideas. I did that individually because I found when I
    brought everybody together in a room, the answer ended up
    looking like it used to, and when I kept everybody separately
    everybody had very, very innovative answers. So now we are
    going to have to figure out how to capture this innovation and
    move forward effectively. But I had reached out to the DOE
    labs, as well as the UARCs [University Affiliated Research
    Centers] and FFRDCs [Federally Funded Research and Development
    Centers].
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I also want to delve a little deeper with both of you into
    something General O'Shaughnessy mentioned in his written
    testimony. General, when discussing the potential cumulative
    effects of Chinese and Russian advanced technologies such as
    hypersonics and cyber efforts--and you have mentioned them
    here--you said ``collectively these advanced technologies could
    be capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear
    weapons potentially affecting national decision-making and
    limiting response options in both peacetime and crisis.''
        Now, we are very focused and we have had quite a discussion
    today on nuclear strategic deterrence at the moment which, to
    be clear, I do not have a problem with that. I, in fact, do
    think we need to modernize our nuclear arsenal. But my concern
    and question for you both is around our own non-nuclear
    strategic deterrence.
        Would you increase investments on our end whether in
    hypersonics, cyber, conventional prop, global strike weapons,
    other new technologies in an effort to reach a level providing
    a credible deterrent against Chinese and Russian nuclear
    activities as we suggest they may be attempting with us? How do
    we balance that with the real need to continue our investments
    in the nuclear realm?
        General O'Shaughnessy. One, thanks for the opportunity to
    respond to that question because I think it is right in line
    with the NDS, and as the NDS has articulated, the changing
    security environment--one of the things that has really
    fundamentally changed is the strategic deterrence as it applies
    to the conventional aspect. As we look at that, as General
    Hyten mentioned, the cost imposition--in other words, we have
    to be able to impose a cost if we are going to be able to
    deter. But also especially on the conventional side, you have
    to be able to actually deny them their objectives. It is a
    combination of both of those together, imposing costs, denying
    their objectives, and then be able to credibly communicate that
    to them so they understand from a deterrence standpoint that it
    absolutely is not even worth going down that path.
        In order to do that, though, it is going to take an
    investment in just the areas that you mentioned. We have to
    have our own hypersonic capability and we also have to have the
    ability to defend against those advanced threats.
        Senator Duckworth. We are able to reach those capabilities
    if we make these investments?
        General O'Shaughnessy. If we make those investments is the
    key part of your statement. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. General Hyten?
        General Hyten. I agree with General O'Shaughnessy.
        I think one of the most important things you said, though,
    is that you recognize that strategic deterrence in the 21st
    century is wholly different than it was in the 20th Century. It
    is not just about nuclear weapons. It is multi-polar now. It is
    not just the Soviet Union. It is Russia, China, North Korea.
    You have to worry about all the domains. You have to worry
    about nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional. You have to
    figure out how to integrate all those together.
        At STRATCOM, we formed an academic alliance with 35
    different universities to try to get them to start thinking
    about what is really needed in order to do this, not just on
    the technology side, but a policy and a strategy side as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Perdue?
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
        General Hyten, I love the way you summarize this. Every
    time you come before us, you just get right down--you do what
    my wife asked us to do when we were raising kids: major on the
    majors. Thank you for that. But recap triad, command and
    control, Space Command are your top three priorities. I want to
    focus on the first one.
        You are facing five threats across five domains. I could
    not agree more that it is an integrated effort now. It is not
    just about the nuclear capability. Given that, though, the most
    salient comment I have heard today is we have lost our ability
    to go fast. I lived in Asia. I worked in China a good bit in my
    career. I can tell you they can beat us to the core on every
    single development with our technology, with their technology.
    It does not matter.
        I want to focus on one part of our nuclear triad. I want to
    get to a second question very quickly. The Ohio-class has
    served us well for decades, 4 or 5 decades in many cases, but
    it is aging. I know we have got the Columbia-class coming.
    Secretary of Navy Spencer said recently the Columbia-class
    submarine is the most important acquisition program the Navy
    has today. Do you agree with that, sir?
        General Hyten. I do. I cannot tell you how thankful I am
    for Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief Naval Officer] Richardson
    both making that statement and putting that as a priority.
        Senator Perdue. We are going to procure, as I understand
    the schedule, the first Columbia-class in fiscal year 2021, and
    it will take us to fiscal year 2031 before that first delivery
    will be taken in the first, I guess, trial will be done on that
    boat. Is that right?
        General Hyten. Operational capability by then.
        Senator Perdue. How long does it take China to do the same
    thing?
        General Hyten. Actually on the submarine side, it has been
    taking about just as long.
        Senator Perdue. But that is going to change between that
    and 2031.
        General Hyten. That will change because you understand that
    we are experienced in submarines and China is still fairly new
    in developing those capabilities.
        Senator Perdue. Can you give us an update on the
    development of that Columbia-class effort, and is 2031 still an
    appropriate date to expect on that?
        General Hyten. I have done a deep dive look into every
    element of the triad, again kind of an odd thing for a
    combatant commander to do, but it is because I am so concerned
    about it I wanted to look in depth into that issue. I have gone
    with Admiral Caldwell, the head of Navy nuclear reactors, up to
    the shipyard at Electric Boat and done a deep dive.
        When I went through that--I have to be honest, Senator--I
    was very concerned because there was so little margin in the
    overall schedule. Then over the last year, as the Navy has
    informed you guys, we have had some issues with welding----
        Senator Perdue. The missile silo in particular.
        General Hyten. It is the missile tubes, absolutely. Because
    of that, a lot of that margin that was not too much before is
    even less now. It is still on the positive side, but if you are
    10 years away and you are eating margin and not putting margin
    in, that causes me concern.
        Senator Perdue. Can you take a question away for the record
    to help us understand what we could do to shorten that
    gestation period?
        General Hyten. You bet. I would be glad to come and talk to
    you or take it for the record, either one.
        Senator Perdue. I would like an update on the Hong 20. This
    is the new long-range nuclear bomber which is effectively--we
    will go to China now--their first true triad capability, if I
    understand that correct.
        General Hyten. Absolutely. That discussion is better to
    have in a classified setting.
        Senator Perdue. I appreciate that and I look forward to
    that.
        General O'Shaughnessy, I was just at the southern border. I
    agree with everything you just said. I know you were just
    there. I personally believe that we have got a human tragedy
    going on on the border with people coming from all parts of the
    world, not just Central America. But the bigger crisis is the
    drug traffic that is coming through there.
        The first thing I want to get on the record, though, there
    have been three places where a wall has been built: California,
    Arizona, and Texas. In those areas, the numbers I see is that
    human traffic across those borders where that barrier is in
    place dropped 95 percent. Do you agree with that?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I do. I will just add again
    within the last week, I have been twice to El Paso meeting with
    the Secretary Chief, meeting with the individual Border Patrol
    agents, and they confirm exactly that. When a barrier is in
    place, as long as it has cover--in other words, you are
    actually having some sensing of it--and you have the ability to
    respond to it, it totally changes the flow and they can funnel
    it into the areas that they want to. CBP personnel to a person
    talked about the effectiveness that is part of their family of
    systems.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, thank you for your troops' help down
    there. I saw some of those troops and the support that they are
    giving CBP is really remarkable.
        I was in the McAllen sector in Texas. It is the most active
    sector we have now. What we are doing is put barriers up. We
    pushed the activity to other sectors. I went to what I think is
    the most active sector. They were telling me that an individual
    coming across--the two cartels in Mexico that are at war
    controlling that particular sector are very powerful. They pay
    $8,000 per person to the cartel to come through. The people
    that were arrested the night I was there--on patrol were the
    CBP--had no money in their pocket, not a dime. They each had a
    burner phone with one number in it, and it was for a support
    person in the United States that was part of the infrastructure
    here.
        My question for you is, can the U.S. military on the drug
    side of this--if it is a $2 billion business with regard to
    human traffic, it is more than $30 billion just in that sector
    for drugs coming through. There was more fentanyl coming
    through that sector last year, enough to kill every man, woman,
    and child in America.
        My question, sir, is what can the U.S. military do there
    that is within the realm of your responsibility as protectors
    of our country?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, thank you for the question and
    to allow us to highlight some of the efforts that are ongoing
    and will continue.
        Our JTF-North is actually about 190 individuals that are
    focused just exactly 100 percent on this. Some of the things we
    are able to provide are--especially important is the intel
    aspect, understanding the networks. We understand networks. We
    have been doing this for decades overseas. We understand how to
    get to the networks and then partner with our law enforcement
    agency partners to be able to actually get after those networks
    in ways that they may not have worked their way through. It has
    been very powerful having our intel folks as part of this.
        We also bring unique military capability that we are
    applying, whether it is the use of our Fort Huachuca unmanned
    aerial systems or whether it is our ground sensor platoons that
    deploy in there for training. Those are all additive to the
    capability to partner with our law enforcement agencies that
    have proven to be quite effective and really from the dollar
    perspective of what we spend and what we get out of them, a
    very effective use while getting training. Our ground sensor
    platoon that deploy there--they are doing exactly what they are
    going to be asked to do if they deploy over to the Middle East,
    et cetera, and they are doing it in an environment with a
    thinking adversary that really allows them to get ready and
    increase their readiness in the way that we are currently
    applying them.
        Senator Perdue. But with all of that activity, CBP and the
    military, all of our U.S. activity, with all our technology and
    everything else, we are only interdicting about 10 percent of
    the drugs coming in. Is that correct, sir?
        General O'Shaughnessy. That is roughly correct, and it
    obviously depends exactly what you are talking about. Broadly
    that is a correct number, sir.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here today and for your service and for
    all of those behind you for their service.
        I apologize for not being here as much, but we have several
    hearings going on today.
        General Hyten, I know there has been a lot of questions and
    answers about the INF Treaty and the pullout of the INF Treaty.
    I will not kind of rehash all of that.
        What I would ask, though, have we done everything that you
    would advise in order to bring Russia to the table on the INF
    Treaty?
        General Hyten. I think that is a very difficult question
    for me to ask because I do not have the whole picture. I do not
    know everything the State Department has done. I understand my
    discussions with the President. I understand that the State
    Department has worked that issue. As far as I know, we have
    done everything humanly possible to try to bring Russia back
    into that. Every time I talk to the President about it, I want
    Russia in that treaty, but if they will not comply, then you do
    not really have a treaty.
        From my perspective, I think we have done everything
    humanly possible, but I would say that there is still time that
    Russia could come to the table and still participate in that
    treaty. I would hope that that would happen, but I do not think
    that is very likely right now.
        Senator Jones. Do you have any specifics that you would
    recommend that have not been tried already?
        General Hyten. I was thinking about that as you went
    through the question, Senator, and I think you just have to ask
    again and again. I think we have shown the intelligence to our
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. You have seen
    the NATO allies come out and understand that that system is in
    violation of the treaty. I think all our NATO allies agree with
    that. For whatever reason, Russia does not want to play in that
    situation, and if they do not want to come to the table, they
    are not going to come to the table.
        Senator Jones. Thank you for that.
        General O'Shaughnessy, obviously there has also been a lot
    of questions and answers about the border and the national
    emergency. I think you testified earlier that whenever there is
    something coming from the President--I think your testimony was
    when you get a legal order from the President, you act. My
    question is, with regard to the national emergency declaration,
    did you or anyone on the staff that you know of evaluate the
    legality of the order regarding the national emergency on the
    southern border?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, that is beyond the purview of
    NORTHCOM I would say.
        Just for clarity, though, since the actual declaration of a
    national emergency, there has been no specific tasking that has
    come down to NORTHCOM post that declaration. What we have is we
    are actually executing those orders and direction that we were
    given prior to that declaration that those troops are now
    showing up on the border, but that order was given and the
    request for assistance was given from the Department of
    Homeland Security to the Department of Defense prior to that
    declaration.
        Senator Jones. All right. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I think that is all I have. Thank you very
    much.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
        Well, first of all, thank you very much, both of you, for
    the very concise way in which you answered some pretty
    difficult questions, and I appreciate that very much.
        Was there anything else that you would like to bring up
    that you did not have the opportunity to do for clarification?
    Either one of you.
        General Hyten. Senator, you mentioned a few things at the
    beginning that you wanted to make sure we address today. I went
    down the list just a minute ago. We have talked about
    everything on your list except the space force, and I would
    just like to make a few comments on that.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I do appreciate that. In fact, both
    of you may want to do that because my question was there is
    confusion out there when we are talking the space force, where
    that fits in all of this. The two of you would be the logical
    ones to ask. Thank you very much.
        General Hyten. Senator, the space force is structured to be
    the organize, train, and equip element for our space
    capabilities. Right now, the space capabilities are broadly in
    the Air Force, but they are also across the Army, the Navy, and
    other defense agencies as well. When we look at the problem,
    there are really two issues.
        After Goldwater-Nichols, the military services are now
    responsible for organizing, training, equipping forces but not
    fighting. The fighting is done in the combatant commands.
    General O'Shaughnessy and I represent the combatant commands.
    We are responsible for fighting. That is why, in response to
    the questions earlier, the need to stand up a U.S. Space
    Command focused on the warfighting problem in space is what
    that command is doing, which leads to the question, are we
    properly organized to do the organize, train, and equip mission
    for the space mission? The President has said because of the
    importance of that warfighting domain, we are not. We should
    consolidate all of those capabilities from across the
    Department into a single space force.
        I give the President and the Vice President big credit for
    not creating a department of the space force at this time, but
    putting that capability in the Air Force because I was very
    concerned about creating excess bureaucracy. So was the
    President. So was the Vice President. By creating a department
    of the space force, it is just not sized right now in order to
    do that. It will be some day, but it has just not reached that
    point right now.
        But the legislative proposal should come to you shortly.
    There will be some issues we will have to work out with you,
    and we will work those together. But I just want you to know
    that I support the concept of the space force inside the Air
    Force that the President is now pushing.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, you are right. I had brought that up
    both in my opening statement, as well as initial questions. My
    concern was that we wanted two things answered before you
    actually get into a new bureaucracy. One is what the costs are
    going to be. One would it be more efficient. I think you have
    answered both of those. I appreciate that very much.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        I apologize for my tardiness. It has been a fun-filled
    morning of committee hearings all across the Senate.
        General Hyten, each leg of our nuclear triad has its own
    value. Is it fair to say that our ballistic missiles have
    strength in numbers?
        General Hyten. That is one of the big values of our
    ballistic missiles. Four hundred ballistic missiles create a
    huge targeting problem for the adversary. The only way to get
    after 400 hardened nuclear missiles is with a whole bunch of
    incoming weapons, and if you decide to attack those, then you
    pretty much are guaranteeing that we will attack back. That is
    deterrent in a nutshell, and that creates a huge element of our
    deterrent process.
        Senator Cotton. Sometimes referred to as a missile sink for
    the enemy?
        General Hyten. It would be a missile sink. It would be a
    weapons sink. It would be a very, very difficult target to
    impact.
        Senator Cotton. I have heard proposals from some in
    Congress and Washington suggesting that we ought to eliminate
    our Minuteman 3 fleet and cancel the replacement for that
    fleet. If we were to take that step to unilaterally cut over
    400 ballistic missiles and command centers, would it not be
    like giving the Russians and the Chinese 400 free warheads to
    target something else in the United States or around the world?
        General Hyten. I do not understand how, with the threats
    that we face today, which are growing, not shrinking, we would
    make a decision today as a nation to lessen our overall
    strategic deterrent. That makes no sense to me, and my best
    military advice is that we do not do that.
        Senator Cotton. One common argument I hear in defense of
    that position is why do we spend so much money on weapons we
    never use. It is not that much money. It is only 3 to 6 percent
    of the defense budget, depending on where we are in the cycle.
    Would you not say, though, that we have been using our nuclear
    weapons every single day for 74 years?
        General Hyten. We use them every day. Senator, the people
    that say that--I actually find that a little bit insulting
    because the men and women who go to work every day underneath
    the water, underneath the ground, in the air that provide that
    strategic deterrent--they are doing the mission every day. It
    is the most active mission. Strategic deterrence is not a
    passive mission. Deterrence does not exist just because you
    have 1,550 deployable nuclear weapons under the New START
    treaty. You have to do that mission every day, and that is what
    the men and women of my command do. They are proud to do it. It
    is an active mission, one of the most active missions that we
    have. When you send a nuclear submarine out with 160 sailors on
    board, do you think they are thinking to themselves this is a
    passive functional mission? No. They are an active warfighting
    mission.
        Senator Cotton. The whole point of our nuclear deterrence,
    of the way we use that force is not to launch and detonate
    those missiles, but to stop our adversaries from launching and
    detonating theirs to begin with.
        General Hyten. Secretary Mattis asked me what is the use of
    nuclear weapons. Why do we have nuclear weapons? The answer is
    to prevent others from using nuclear weapons on us. But in
    order to do that, you have to be ready. It is the Washington
    analogy. The best way to avoid war is to be prepared for war.
    If you are not prepared, you run the risk of an attack.
        Senator Cotton. If Russia or China or perhaps Russia and
    China combined had clear, demonstrable nuclear overmatch
    against the United States, there is no doubt who would win if
    there were, in fact, a nuclear exchange. What impact would that
    have on the conventional forces and the strategic thinking of
    those nations as against the United States and our allies?
        General Hyten. You know, in my opening statement for the
    record, I said that nuclear war cannot be won. Therefore, it
    must never be fought. Therefore, we must be ready to fight it
    every day. That is the way I look at it. That is a complicated
    thing for some people to understand, but if you are not ready,
    somebody could take a step over the line. If there is an
    overmatch, somebody could think they could get away with it,
    and that could create the worst day in the history of the
    world, the worst day in the history of our country. We never
    want that to happen. In order to do that, I believe in peace
    through strength, not peace through unilateral disarmament.
        Senator Cotton. If you were sitting in your position or in
    the head of state position in a country like Japan or South
    Korea that depends on the extended deterrence of the United
    States and the United States weakened its nuclear triad or even
    eliminated one of their legs, what kind of influence would that
    have on your thinking?
        General Hyten. What I would be concerned about from a U.S.
    perspective is that would cause some of our allies to decide
    they need their own nuclear deterrent. One of the goals we have
    as a country is to eliminate the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons, not just in our adversaries, but around the world. A
    world with fewer nuclear weapons is a better world. But we have
    to be able to defend ourselves. We want our allies to
    understand that we can defend them too. That is what extended
    deterrence is all about, and that means you have to be ready to
    support their contingencies as well.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
        I understand that some opponents of our nuclear force or
    critics of it say that we should not start a new arms race or
    be engaged in an arms race. I will simply observe, based on
    what you have said here today, that it is much cheaper to win
    an arms race than it is to lose a war.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        I thank both of you. I will repeat what I said earlier.
    This has been a really enlightening session, and you have been
    the right ones to be here. Thank you very much.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
      value of thaad [terminal high altitude area defense] for addressing
                         threats from china and russia
        1. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, the National Defense
    Strategy [NDS] states, ``the central challenge to United States
    prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic
    competition by . . . revisionist powers,'' namely China and Russia. Can
    you please tell the Committee what you perceive as the most pressing
    threat and how NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and
    NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] have adjusted their focus to
    counter China and Russia?
        General O'Shaughnessy. In the near term, Russia's development of a
    preemptive ``active defense'' strategy is the most pressing threat to
    the Homeland. This strategy relies on indirect action, cyber, and
    advanced, precision-guided conventional air- and sea-launched cruise
    missile strikes--each of which is currently capable of reaching targets
    in the United States and Canada. Russia's efforts pose significant
    detection, warning, intercept, and infrastructure defense challenges to
    North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States
    Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
        Both Russia and China are actively developing and testing
    intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicles. Russian statements
    indicate the country's new AVANGARD HGV could begin deployment as early
    as this year. If either country successfully fields an ICBM with an HGV
    payload, it will pose unique challenges both to NORAD's Integrated
    Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission as well as
    USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense mission.
        While China does not yet have a conventional capability to strike
    Alaska or the continental United States comparable to Russia's, China's
    leaders are determined to demonstrate capabilities that could dissuade
    or prevent the United States from intervening in any conflict along
    China's periphery. Currently, China could employ its world-class cyber
    forces to attack our critical infrastructure during a crisis. In the
    longer-term, China is likely to develop long-range conventional cruise
    missiles and associated platforms that will threaten the Homeland.
        In response, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have honed the focus of both
    commands to ensure Homeland defense is our absolute priority. Our
    mission to deter our adversaries and defend the Homeland in the current
    strategic environment requires the commands to maintain a strong
    warfighter mindset. Specifically, we are taking active measures to
    improve our missile defenses, expand our ability to operate in the
    Arctic, improve domain awareness and communications in the far north,
    and build a more comprehensive and globally integrated defense
    architecture with fellow combatant commands, allies, and interagency
    partners.
        To ensure our ability to defend the Homeland against threats in all
    domains, we continuously advocate for NORAD and USNORTHCOM requirements
    to the Services and Missile Defense Agency and push the Services, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to reduce or
    eliminate capability gaps.

        2. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, would an additional THAAD
    benefit the Homeland defense mission?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) program has not been tested against an intercontinental
    ballistic missile threat, but could potentially add to our capacity and
    capability to defend the Homeland in the future. THAAD provides a
    significant capability, and we are working with the Missile Defense
    Agency to explore THAAD's utility for our Homeland defense mission.

                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                                  no first use
        3. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe a ``no first
    use'' policy improves our ability to deter conflict and would it be
    your best military advice to adopt such a policy? If you believe it is
    important to maintain the current policy, please explain why.
        General Hyten. No, a no first use policy works against the basic
    tenets of deterrence, increases the risk of nuclear war by changing how
    adversaries and allies view the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent and our resolve to use it when threatened.
        Adopting a no first use policy could undermine the U.S. nuclear
    umbrella we extend to our allies and signals to potential adversaries
    the U.S. may not defend our allies and vital interests with every means
    at our disposal. The current policy provides great strategic value by
    retaining ambiguity regarding the precise circumstance that might lead
    to a U.S. nuclear response. The lack of precision on exactly where the
    nuclear threshold is gives adversaries pause and strengthens our
    overall deterrent.

                      low yield ballistic missile warhead
        4. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the
    consequences if the Navy is unable to deploy the low-yield submarine-
    launched ballistic missile recommended by the NPR [Nuclear Posture
    Review]?
        General Hyten. There is no technical or operational barrier to
    deploying a low yield ballistic missile in our SSBN force. Therefore,
    any impediment imposed on the Navy to deploy a low yield warhead would
    lessen our ability to most effectively address the strategic threats
    identified in the NPR.

                             nuclear modernization
        5. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the
    consequences if the Air Force is denied full funding for the
    replacement of the Minuteman III?
        General Hyten. Any funding reductions to the GBSD program will
    result in a schedule slip. GBSD is a just-in-time replacement for the
    Minuteman III, and it must begin deploying in 2028 to avoid a nuclear
    deterrence operational capability gap.

        6. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe the air-leg of
    the triad would continue to be viable without an air-launched cruise
    missile capability?
        General Hyten. No. The continued viability of the air-leg is
    dependent upon both a long range air-launched cruise missile and a
    penetrating bomber capability to cover operational requirements.

                                      nc3
        7. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what will your relationship be
    with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, as relates to
    NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications] programs, under the
    new governance structure for NC3 approved in October, 2018?
        General Hyten. USD(A&S) serves as the NC3 Capability Portfolio
    Manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition.
    In this capacity USD(A&S) functions in a supporting role to the NC3
    Enterprise Lead (USSTRATCOM) by executing the day-to-day oversight of
    the NC3 Portfolio and advising on risk, mitigation options, and
    prioritization.

        8. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you currently have the
    funding and personnel necessary to effectively execute your
    responsibilities as the NC3 Enterprise Lead?
        General Hyten. The President's Budget request contains the
    resources necessary to carry out my responsibilities.
                            defense of the homeland
        9. Senator Fischer. General O'Shaughnessy, the Missile Defense
    Review [MDR] states that the United States will continue to rely on
    nuclear deterrence to protect the Homeland from large-scale or
    sophisticated ballistic missile attack. If the United States did not
    replace the aging Minuteman III force with a new ICBM [Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile], do you believe the U.S. Homeland would be as safe
    as it is today?
        General O'Shaughnessy. No, it would not be as safe as it is today.
    I absolutely support the nuclear triad as critical to Homeland defense
    and I support the findings in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. I defer
    to United States Strategic Command Commander, General Hyten, for
    specifics on nuclear deterrence capabilities.
                     substitution for nuclear capabilities
        10. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, those who favor reducing the
    size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear capabilities
    can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability
    to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure allies.
    A report released last September by the Global Zero group repeatedly
    argues that ``cyberweapons''--in particular--can be substituted for
    nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber capabilities, their effects, and
    their ability to deter hostile activity is comparable to nuclear
    capabilities to a sufficient degree that one can be directly
    substituted for the other?
        General Hyten. No other weapon system contains the capabilities or
    deterrence effect of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are the
    foundation of strategic deterrence due to these unique characteristics.
    It is important to note that other countries are not only modernizing
    their existing stockpiles, but also increasing the numbers and
    diversity of nuclear weapons.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
       third gbi [ground-based interceptors] site and shoot-assess-shoot
                                   capability
        11. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
    specific additional capability would a third GBI site provide against a
    future ICBM threat?
        General Hyten. A new continental United States Ground-Based
    Interceptor (GBI) site provides an option for added Homeland defense
    against potential future Iranian ICBM capability. In addition, a third
    interceptor site would increase our capacity to negate larger raids,
    expand engagement windows, and improve survivability of Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) assets through dispersal. However, to be
    clear, my first priority is to develop a space-based sensor
    architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
    missile threats.
        General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site based
    in the continental United States, combined with future technologies,
    would increase available interceptor launch window ``battlespace'' for
    engagements. It could also provide the opportunity to utilize a shoot-
    assess-shoot strategy for future intercontinental ballistic missile
    threats from both North Korea and Iran, which could provide us time to
    evaluate an engagement and reengage if a threat reentry vehicle
    survived our initial salvo.

        12. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, does
    the United States currently have a shoot-assess-shoot capability if an
    ICBM were to be launched from the Middle East toward our east coast?
        General Hyten. USSTRATCOM supports USNORTHCOM in the execution of
    the Homeland defense mission, but day-to-day operational decisions are
    within the purview of USNORTHCOM. As such I would defer to General
    O'Shaughnessy for operational details.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Currently we do not possess this capability.

        13. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, would
    a third GBI site in New York, Michigan, or Ohio provide that shoot-
    assess-shoot capability?
        General Hyten. I defer to General O'Shaughnessy for discussion of
    operational issues.
        General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site in New
    York, Michigan, or Ohio, combined with future technologies, could
    provide a shoot-assess-shoot capability.

        14. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, how long would it take
    to stand-up a third GBI site?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
    specifics on timeline estimates to stand up an additional ground-based
    interceptor site.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                   norad missions limfacs [limiting factors]
        15. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, are our aerospace
    warning and missile defense radars along the Alaskan and Canadian
    coastlines sufficient for the current threats associated with great
    power competition against Russia and if so, in your personal opinion,
    if not already, when will these radars become severely limited and what
    are their primary limiting factors?
        General O'Shaughnessy. These radars represent 1985 technology and
    are no longer sufficient due to capability limitations. We need to
    modernize the systems that provide surveillance of our northern
    approaches in order to defend North America against Russian long-range
    bombers, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicle
    threats. In August 2018, NORAD conducted an operational assessment of
    the North Warning System, and the data collected in that test will
    inform the design for the air domain defense of the United States and
    Canada. In addition, the United States and Canada are evaluating
    alternative options to replace the North Warning System. This new
    system will be designed to enhance the capability to maintain effective
    air surveillance of threats approaching North America.

        16. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the rapidly
    evolved Russian threat, how critical is it that we upgrade NORAD
    terrestrial radars to address long-range missile threats and hypersonic
    threats?
        General O'Shaughnessy. One of our most urgent requirements is to
    upgrade these radars against advanced cruise missile and hypersonic
    threats. Simply put, we cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we
    cannot defeat what we cannot detect. Our ability to detect threats and
    defend North America is challenged by rapidly advancing adversary
    capabilities that present significant challenges to our current sensor
    architecture. To expand our early detection and identification
    capabilities against these threats, the best solution should include a
    combination of multi-domain sensors, including terrestrial radars and
    space-based assets. We also continue to support ongoing efforts within
    the Department of Defense, such as the bi-national Northern Approaches
    Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives, to evaluate potential
    solutions for modernizing sensor coverage in the northernmost regions
    of North America.

        17. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the increased
    capability of Russian long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles--both
    nuclear and conventional--how have Russian Tactics Techniques and
    Procedures (TTPs) evolved along with their technology? What risks does
    this pose for our forces in Alaska and in CONUS [Continental United
    States]?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Arctic provides the shortest path
    between Russia and the United States. Russia is developing and
    practicing the tactics needed to employ the variety of conventionally
    armed precision strike weapons they are currently deploying. These
    include a long-range ground-launched cruise missile and a very long-
    range, stand-off air-launched cruise missile.
        Russian heavy bombers frequently conduct air patrols along the
    coastlines the United States and Canada, particularly in the Arctic, to
    underscore Russia's capabilities. According to their own words, these
    patrols are to demonstrate to the United States the continued viability
    of Russia's nuclear and more recently, their non-nuclear deterrent.
        Since 2015, Russia has employed its new generation of very long-
    range, stand-off air-launched cruise missiles against anti-regime
    targets in Syria, providing real-world training for Russian crews and
    demonstrating its growing precision-strike capabilities to the West.
        Moscow continues to bolster its military defenses in the Arctic
    with the delivery of coastal defense cruise missiles, modern air
    defense sensors and weapons and by constructing airfields on Russian
    Islands deep in the Arctic. These weapons are intended to ensure
    Russian control of Arctic waters and air space from their northern
    coast to the Pole and thereby eliminate threats to egressing Russian
    bombers. Once safely away from Russian air space, these bombers are
    capable of launching their weapons and striking the Homeland well
    outside detection range of current NORAD sensors. We must advance our
    capability to detect these threats in order to defend the Homeland; if
    we do not, our forces in Alaska and the continental United States will
    be held at risk.

        18. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, can you clarify what
    exactly you mean when you state in your testimony: `` . . . air- and
    sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff
    ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike
    North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage'' and,
    specifically, how is this a risk to the U.S. Military in Alaska and in
    CONUS?
        General O'Shaughnessy. [Deleted.]
                              space-based sensors
        19. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, how
    critical is the rapid deployment of space-based sensors to addressing
    the long-range cruise and hypersonic missile threats from Russia and
    China?
        General Hyten. It is essential. We need to move sensors to a space-
    based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
    missile threats, to include hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and cruise
    missiles.
        In addition, space-based sensors enjoy a measure of flexibility of
    movement unimpeded by the constraints geographic limitations impose on
    terrestrial sensors and can provide birth-to-death tracking that is
    extremely advantageous. Space sensors are also more survivable than
    individual, fixed ground sites that can be targeted.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Advanced space-based sensors are a critical
    step toward providing a more comprehensive capability to detect and
    track evolving complex threats, such as long-range cruise and
    hypersonic missile threats. Improving our network of missile defense
    and early warning terrestrial sensors, coupled with a space-based
    sensor layer, would allow us to keep pace with these advancing threats.

        20. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in the
    best case scenario, what is a realistic timeline for MDA [Misssile
    Defense Agency] to begin deploying space-based sensors?
        General Hyten. My best understanding is we could have a capability
    by the mid-2020s, but funding is not yet defined or appropriated.
    However, the Space Development Agency (SDA) is charged with leading
    development of space-based sensors and I defer details on this question
    to them.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
    specifics on timeline estimates for deploying space-based sensors;
    however, it is of the highest urgency to me that we gain space-based
    sensing capability as soon as possible to give us the ability to track
    advanced complex threats from `birth to defeat.'

        21. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
    would be your preferred timeline and would this pose an acceptable
    level of risk given the threat?
        General Hyten. Deployment of a complete space-based sensor
    architecture is already late-to-need. We are increasingly disadvantaged
    to find, fix, and track missile threats that risk outpacing our sensor
    capabilities, diminishing our missile warning and sub-optimizing the
    effectiveness of our missile defense assets.
        General O'Shaughnessy. We need space-based sensors to provide a
    more comprehensive capability as soon as possible. Until that happens,
    we must also balance the move to space with more technologically mature
    solutions, such as improving our terrestrial-based radars.

        22. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in
    your personal opinion, what type of space-based sensor system would you
    prefer 1. A smaller number of more capable and more expensive set of
    satellites in GEO; 2. A larger number of slightly less capable but less
    expensive satellites in LEO and MEO; 3. A combination of the two?
        General Hyten. As a combatant commander, I am orbit agnostic, but I
    see potential advantages in a mixed constellation.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I place high priority on fielding space-
    based sensing capabilities. A combination of space-based platforms in
    multiple orbits would provide the most robust tracking capability.

        23. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, which
    of these space-based sensor solutions do you think we might be able to
    build and deploy sooner and how much of a priority factor should there
    be in acquiring them?
        General Hyten. I don't have enough information today to answer this
    question or related questions; which architecture meets my
    requirements, maximizes resiliency, does so at an affordable cost, and
    at the speed of relevance. Ongoing analysis is working towards
    answering these questions.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
    specifics on timeline estimates. But to reinforce my thoughts on this
    issue, I support development of space-based sensors as soon as possible
    to provide a more comprehensive future capability. In the meantime, I
    prioritize addressing urgent operational risks with more mature
    technologies for ground-based capabilities that can be deployed in the
    near term.
                     missile defense priorities and the mdr
        24. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, in your
    personal opinion, did the Missile Defense Review miss any key
    priorities and if so, what are they?
        General Hyten. No. USSTRATCOM fully participated in the Missile
    Defense Review, and I am pleased with the results.
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Missile Defense Review reflects my
    warfighter views and priorities across the spectrum of threats. I
    especially appreciate the much-needed addition of cruise missile
    defense (CMD) into the discussion, although I would have liked to see
    more emphasis on CMD due to significant advancements in cruise missile
    technology by Russia and China.

        25. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, can you
    discuss the importance of continuing to invest so that we field the
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle?
        General Hyten. I fully support MDA's efforts to develop the
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). The RKV is a key component to improving
    the effectiveness of the Ground Based Interceptor.
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) is our
    next-generation kill vehicle. It will increase capacity by adding to
    our overall interceptor count and also bring added capabilities that
    will significantly improve engagement performance and lethality. The
    RKV will eventually phase out the older, less capable, Exo-atmospheric
    Kill Vehicles, increasing overall reliability of the entire interceptor
    fleet. Fielding an additional 20 GBIs in Alaska with RKVs is critical
    to keeping pace with the threat.

        26. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, can
    you discuss the importance of new technologies like Multi-Object Kill
    Vehicle (MOKV), directed energy, new boosters, and space-based sensors?
        General Hyten. My first priority is to develop sensors in a space-
    based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
    missile threats.
        Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine
    depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as
    directed energy, MOKV, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic
    capabilities.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Future technologies are critical to
    outpacing the ever advancing threat. These technologies, while not yet
    mature, will potentially allow for updated tactics, techniques, and
    procedures for how we employ interceptors, resulting in greater
    capacity to defend the Homeland against advanced threats.

        27. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, why
    are terrestrial radars like the Long-Range Discriminating Radar (LRDR),
    Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, important as a
    compliment to future space-based sensors?
        General Hyten. Terrestrial sensors remain the best viable near-term
    solution. Terrestrial sensors have higher power levels and multiple
    sophisticated waveforms can exploit different phenomenology enabling
    persistent, long-range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit
    assessment capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will
    complement future space-based sensors designed to globally detect,
    track, and discriminate ballistic missile threats and HGVs.
        General O'Shaughnessy. These terrestrial radars are an important
    complement to a future space-based sensor layer because they will
    provide resiliency and redundancy for in-depth sensor coverage and
    persistent discrimination capability against evolving missile threats.
    Terrestrial radars, coupled with a space-based sensor layer, will
    provide track and discrimination data from multiple phenomenologies to
    the Ballistic Missile Defense System, enhancing our ability to defend
    the Homeland.

        28. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, are
    United States missile defense testing timelines progressing fast enough
    to stay ahead of the threats from Russia, China and rogue nations?
        General Hyten. As stated in the Missile Defense Review, the United
    States relies on strategic deterrence to protect against large and
    technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental
    ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland.
        Although I would like to go faster for many reasons, I am satisfied
    the speed of testing is sufficient to pace the threat from rogue
    nations such as North Korea and Iran.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    systems were designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
    Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
    missile threats. I support the Missile Defense Agency's efforts to
    maintain a regular ground-based interceptor flight test cadence. Flight
    testing that is conducted at a regular cadence and combined with ground
    testing gives me confidence in the system and how we employ it.
                                polar silk road
        29. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal opinion
    given what China has done in the South China Sea, their Belt and Road
    Initiative, and their pressing need for resources, how would you
    characterize China's interest in the Arctic region?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I would characterize China's interest in the
    Arctic region as focused and committed. Chinese leaders believe the
    Arctic has great reserves of oil, natural gas, and precious metals and
    has extended part of their One Belt One Road initiative to Murmansk in
    northwestern Russia. China recently declared itself a ``near-Arctic
    nation'' which, while having no legal status, clearly indicates its
    intent to have Chinese national interests considered in discussions
    concerning the future of the Arctic. Last summer, China's icebreaking
    research vessel, Xue Long ("Snow Dragon") completed its ninth
    expedition to the Arctic, operating in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and
    the Canada Basin. Xue Long's expeditions are indicative of China's
    increasing interest in the Arctic, and they have enabled China to gain
    familiarity and experience operating in the Arctic environment. China
    is also building its first open ocean-class icebreaker, which will
    enable it to operate surface ships in the Arctic.

        30. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal
    opinion, what is China's long-term strategic objective in the Arctic
    and does that objective line up with United States/Western objectives?
        General O'Shaughnessy. China understands the vast economic value of
    the Arctic due to the potential for exploitation of natural resources
    and the shorter shipping distances to world markets. China's activities
    and objectives in the Arctic conflict with many United States
    objectives. For example, China's hydrographic research vessel, Xue
    Long, has made nine research expeditions to the Arctic in recent years,
    and several of these expeditions have focused primarily on mapping the
    ocean's bottom in and around the Bering Sea. The hydrographic surveys
    performed by Xue Long are more consistent with preparation for
    submarine operations in the high north than scientific monitoring and
    environmental research. To be clear, a Chinese military presence in the
    Bering Sea would be inconsistent with United States security needs.
        On the economic front, China has also extended its One Belt and One
    Road initiative into the Arctic, including investments in the Russian
    city of Murmansk as part of an ongoing effort to claim that China is
    now an interested power in the Arctic. China has also sent merchant
    ships from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean through the Arctic
    during the summer melt. China has made significant investment in
    Greenland's mining industry, and in 2016, China attempted to purchase a
    defunct Danish Naval Base at on the southwest tip of Greenland.
    Although the government of Denmark blocked the acquisition, China
    maintains significant influence as one of the top investors in
    Greenland.
        Based on recent Chinese behavior and coercive economic practices
    employed in other regions, I am concerned that China will continue to
    leverage influence and debt trap economic practices in an effort to
    gain a strategic presence in the Arctic as competition over resources
    increases in the coming years--an effort that risks destablizing a
    region long known for cooperation and adherence to international
    agreements.

        31. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what is China
    specifically doing--in terms of building capability and using monetary
    soft power--to assert itself in the Arctic and does this concern you?
        General O'Shaughnessy. China has already conducted nine Arctic
    expeditions with its research vessel Xue Long and is starting to build
    its first open ocean-capable ice breaker. The Chinese are gaining
    experience with operating in the Arctic environment, and the
    construction of their new ice breaker certainly suggests they intend to
    operate there. China is also investing in various projects in most of
    the Arctic Council nations in an attempt to build goodwill and thus
    influence countries with the most impact over the future of the Arctic.
        While China is currently limiting its actions to peaceable economic
    competition, I am still concerned from a Homeland defense perspective.
    My job is to assume military intent, and therefore United States
    Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command continue
    to remain extremely vigilant for any indications that China is engaging
    in military activities in the Arctic.
                   great power rivalry with russia and china
        32. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Russia poses a
    continually increasing threat to the United States from its operations
    in the Arctic, and China has expressed, in actions and writing, its
    interest in being a ``near-Arctic'' power. What specific capabilities
    are most critical for us to field in order to counter both of these
    threats from our near-peer competitors in terms of protecting the
    Homeland and are there any areas of overlap on which we should
    especially focus?
        General O'Shaughnessy. To outpace adversaries in the Arctic today
    and in the future, we need improved multi-spectrum sensor and domain
    awareness capabilities, the ability to effectively communicate in the
    northern latitudes, and a visible maritime presence capable of
    detecting and defeating multi-domain threats operating in and through
    the Arctic. Our ability to defend the Homeland against Russia or China
    will require our land, sea, and air components to operate routinely and
    effectively in the Arctic. It is essential that they are trained and
    equipped to do so.
                          u.s. arctic naval capability
        33. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, do you agree with
    Secretary Spencer that we need to execute a Freedom of Navigation
    Operation in the Arctic, or at least have the ability to?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. It is long-standing policy of the
    United States to challenge the excessive maritime claims of other
    nations.
                         arctic sar [search and rescue]
        34. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, does 11th Air Force have
    the Search and Rescue forces it requires to meet all of its missions
    today, including its NORAD alert responsibilities, the daily F-22
    training missions, and rescue triad's tactical training requirements?
        General O'Shaughnessy. No. As we expand our Arctic operations to
    meet our adversaries' increased Arctic capabilities and presence, the
    current search and rescue capabilities will no longer be able to match
    our enlarged Arctic footprint.

        35. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what about once two
    combat-code squadrons of F-35s arrive beginning in 2020?
        General O'Shaughnessy. As the F-35 arrives in Alaska, the increased
    footprint will drive a requirement for additional search and rescue
    (SAR) capability to support both increased training and exercises.
    Additionally, as we start to push fighter aircraft further out in
    support of longer-range NORAD intercepts, we will require the ability
    to provide a rapid SAR response over a greater area than our current
    SAR forces can provide.
                             strategic arctic port
        36. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Secretary of the Navy
    Richard Spencer has talked about the importance of strategic ports.
    Right now, the closest strategic port to the Arctic is in Anchorage.
    That's the equivalent of the closest port to Maine being in Florida. In
    your personal opinion, is it in U.S. strategic interest for the
    Arctic's closest strategic port to be essentially the length of the
    Eastern seaboard away from the Arctic and what is USNORTHCOM doing to
    rectify this gap?
        General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
    has an articulated requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska.
    A deep draft port in the Arctic would contribute to our maritime
    Homeland defense mission by providing all-weather, always-available
    fuel for naval vessels operating in the North American Arctic. I am
    aware that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently
    studying the feasibility of improving the Port of Nome and will publish
    their draft report in May 2019.
        As you know, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 expanded
    the feasibility justification for a potential Arctic deep draft harbor
    to include benefits associated with national security and the
    protection of the Homeland. In April 2019, I wrote to the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to outline USNORTHCOM's
    operational requirements in the Arctic and the benefits to our Homeland
    defense mission that would result from the development of a deep-draft
    port north of Dutch Harbor. In addition, USNORTHCOM staff has been
    working closely with USACE to provide detailed information regarding
    our mission requirements in the region.
                                      f-35
        37. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, last May, Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, testified that `` . . . the
    F-35 and the Guard will contribute to Homeland security by flying what
    we call combat air patrols over the United States to preclude a threat
    in any kind of circumstance. So it is very important.'' What do you
    believe to be the best fighter to protect and defend the Homeland and,
    specifically, what role do you believe the F-35 should have in the
    protection of the Homeland?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I consider the F-35 critical to defend the
    Homeland against the most-advanced and emerging threats to North
    America. The F-35 offers unmatched fifth-generation advantages against
    the latest weapons fielded by our adversaries and includes improved
    detection capabilities and increased levels of situation awareness
    enabled by advanced data fusion. The F-35 will provide us with our most
    crucial capabilities and form the cornerstone of our ability to defend
    the Homeland well into the 21st century.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                                 columbia-class
        38. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as presented in hearing
    testimony, issues with the welding of missile tubes during the
    development of the Columbia-class program have led to very little
    margin for error remaining for on-time delivery. It is concerning to
    have margin for error originally built into this critical program
    reduced to such a small level at the front-end of a 10 year project.
    What actions can be taken, including by Congress, to ensure the
    Columbia-class program remains on schedule for delivery in 2028, and is
    operational by 2031?
        General Hyten. The Navy is actively pursuing means, to include
    advanced procurement, to increase schedule margin and ensure Columbia
    is ready for its first strategic deterrent patrol in fiscal year 2031.
    I defer to the Navy for any specifics on these measures.
        Continued Congressional support of the Columbia program is also
    essential, to include full funding and on-time appropriations.

        39. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as discussed in the February 26,
    2019, Senate Armed Services Strategic Command hearing, the Chinese are
    speeding up their delivery time of submarine technology. Is there a way
    to speed up the delivery of the Columbia-class program and is it
    necessary?
        General Hyten. I defer to the Navy for specific Columbia-class
    program questions.

        40. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, developing and maintaining a
    skilled workforce is essential to submarine production. Would the
    potential addition of a new Virginia-class submarine in 2022 and/or
    2023 help develop the workforce needed for Columbia-class production or
    in some other way affect production?
        General Hyten. The shipyards are critical national assets to
    America. The skilled workforce is essential to building and overhauling
    all ships, particularly nuclear-powered ones like SSBNs, SSNs, and
    CVNs. It is all of our responsibility to ensure the workforce, a
    strategic asset, is supported across the board.
        Regarding the addition of the new Virginia-class submarine in 2022
    or 2023 and any effects on the workforce for Columbia, I respectfully
    refer you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.

        41. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, because of shared submarine
    construction infrastructure, do other acquisition programs (Virginia-
    class) affect the Columbia's on time delivery and if so, how?
        General Hyten. The Navy has stated that the Columbia-class SSBN
    program is their number one shipbuilding priority. I respectfully refer
    you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                     space
        42. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, do you believe U.S. space
    assets are most vulnerable to adversary jamming, kinetic attacks,
    cyberattacks, or directed energy attacks?
        General Hyten. Focusing on one or two avenues of attack is not
    prudent. The effectiveness of any attack vector is situation dependent
    and it is likely that multiple attack vectors will be employed.
        The Administration and DOD are moving rapidly to address the
    significant adversary counter-space threat to our critical space assets
    through institutional changes (i.e., the standup of USSPACECOM, USSF)
    and significant PB space investment.

        43. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, I have concerns regarding the
    supply chain integrity supporting space systems. Do you see a path to
    resolution among the space defense industry and industrial base?
        General Hyten. Yes, but resolution will require a diligent focus on
    security and risk-mitigation actions like those recommended in the EO
    13806 Report, ``Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and
    Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United
    States,'' and in other best-practices designed to guarantee supply
    chain integrity.
        This integrity is vital to establishment and preservation of a
    resilient space enterprise industrial base and will enable the
    increased capability development/fielding timelines necessary to
    outpace our adversaries.
                                   __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
                 inf [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty
        44. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, as you know, President Trump
    recently withdrew from the INF Treaty that Russia has been violating. I
    worry that the Trump administration is leaving this treaty in a
    reckless manner, gleefully inviting a costly and dangerous arms race
    while giving Putin the legal right to deploy an unlimited number of
    their previously banned missiles. I led a letter signed by 26
    Democratic Senators calling for the Trump administration to do the
    hard, if sometimes boring and monotonous work, of finding a diplomatic
    solution to this problem. I further co-led a bill that would require
    this administration to actually do its homework before proceeding with
    any withdrawal. To this end, can the United States counter Russian
    violations with INF-compliant missiles, allowing us to simultaneously
    counter Russia militarily and punish them diplomatically as violators
    of a treaty?
        General Hyten. The supplemental capabilities announced in the 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review would allow us to effectively respond to Russian
    violations of the INF Treaty. The Department is developing a small
    number of low-yield nuclear weapons and re-introducing a nuclear sea-
    launched cruise missile capability, which are both INF Treaty
    compliant.
        In addition, the Department is pursuing treaty compliant R&D on a
    limited conventional Ground Launch Cruise Missile capability.
        The strategy is intended to incentivize Russia's return to INF
    Treaty objectives while simultaneously enhancing our deterrent posture.

        45. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, the basing of INF-type
    missiles will require buy-in from allies. I am worried that even if one
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nation agrees to host these
    missiles, it will be over the objections of other allies. This could
    act as a wedge in the NATO alliance. Has NATO, as a whole, agreed to
    actually host INF-type missiles and has a Pacific ally?
        General Hyten. The United States has made no request to deploy
    intermediate range missiles on the territory of an ally or partner and
    no NATO nor Pacific ally has made this request.
        It is important to note the low-yield options the Department is
    pursuing are sea-based and do not require host-nation basing. Likewise,
    the Administration has not made any determination to move beyond the
    treaty-compliant Ground Launch Cruise Missile R&D activities.
                                   new start
        46. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, now that the administration
    has announced its withdrawal from INF Treaty, the New START [Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty will soon be the only thing standing in
    the way of a world without limits on the United States and Russian
    nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. New START is due to
    expire in 2021, but can be extended for five years. Russia has been in
    verified compliance with the treaty and is interested in beginning
    talks on an extension. Alarmingly, this administration has been
    unwilling to begin these talks to continue the decades-long bipartisan
    tradition of nuclear arms control. General Hyten, if we were to lose
    the New START Treaty and the ability to inspect Russia's nuclear
    arsenal, what would that mean for the long-term planning of our nuclear
    force structure and how would this affect our current nuclear weapons
    modernization program, which is already slated to cost a staggering
    $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years?
        General Hyten. The impacts from the failure to extend New START are
    unlikely to drive significant changes in U.S. Force structure, but are
    more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns are with the
    myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is already
    producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START.
        Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that
    addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the
    Department of State.
        However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the
    NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against
    prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad,
    including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons,
    provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for
    effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
                                  saudi arabia
        47. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, it has been revealed
    recently that actors in the Trump administration had attempted to
    circumvent established protocols to provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear
    technology, usurping Congressional authority and possibly risking a
    nuclear arms race in the Middle East. If the sale of nuclear technology
    were to enable Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons, how would that
    undermine international non-proliferation efforts?
        General Hyten. Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear-weapon state-party to
    the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As such they are
    legally prohibited from pursuing nuclear weapons development.
    Similarly, the NPT also prohibits nuclear weapon states from
    transferring nuclear technology that would lead to the development of a
    nuclear weapon. It is important to continue to preserve the tenets of
    NPT.
                               homeland security
        48. Senator Gillibrand. General O'Shaughnessy, the Eastern Air
    Defense Sector, based out of New York, is responsible for detecting,
    characterizing, and directing the alert forces that will respond to the
    next air attack on America east of the Mississippi. This includes
    critical sites like New York City and Washington D.C. However, higher
    Air National Guard priorities have prevented the resourcing of 41 full-
    time Operations positions necessary to support a 24/7 Homeland defense
    mission. Can you commit that you will prioritize the full funding of
    the Eastern Air Defense Sector in order to assure our national
    security?
        General O'Shaughnessy. We have formally advocated for these
    positions, and I am committed to working with National Guard Bureau,
    U.S. Air Force, and Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) leadership to
    ensure the National Guard provides EADS with the necessary resources
    and funding to perform their critical mission.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              troops at the border
        49. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, do you believe that
    the deployment of troops to the southern border--both Active Duty and
    National Guard--laid the foundation for a national emergency
    declaration?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense has a long history
    of supporting the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) in their mission to secure the U.S. border,
    spanning multiple presidential administrations. I believe the recent
    deployment of troops to the southern border continues to enhance CBP's
    ability to execute its border security mission.

        50. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, I understand that
    many servicemembers were in the middle of important readiness and
    training exercises when they were deployed to the border. What
    exercises--and how many exercises--were interrupted and will these
    interruptions compromise readiness?
        General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. military personnel are supporting the
    Department of Homeland Security with the following missions: conducting
    contingency planning, assisting with the hardening or reinforcing ports
    of entry (POEs), operating Customs and Border Protection (CBP) mobile
    surveillance cameras, and placing wire obstacles between POEs. Military
    personnel are also providing force protection coverage to U.S. military
    and CBP personnel, as well as providing aviation support and medical
    assistance efforts to U.S. forces and CBP personnel.
        As the Service Chiefs have stated previously, the military units
    executing the DOD support to the southern border mission are conducting
    operations that enhance their overall military readiness when employed
    in line with their military skill sets. I defer to the Service Chiefs
    on specific training exercises that may have been impacted by units
    conducting operations along the southern border.

        51. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, engineering units
    have installed concertina wire along the southern border. How long will
    this c-wire remain installed?
        General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
    taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its
    disposal.

        52. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, when Active Duty
    troops eventually--hopefully--leave the border, what will become of the
    c-wire?
        General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
    taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its
    disposal.

        53. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the
    environmental impacts of the troop deployments and base camps
    established along the border and how does DOD plan to assess the
    inevitable environmental degradation?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Potential environmental impacts of military
    operations are the same as for any human activity on the environment,
    including: soil disturbance, fuel spills, solid waste generation, human
    waste generation, wastewater generation, vehicle and generator
    emissions, increased storm water runoff, and light and noise pollution.
    Where operations are planned, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts
    a baseline environmental survey to catalog existing conditions. During
    the operation, local commanders implement controls to prevent and
    mitigate environmental impacts. Upon completion, the DOD conducts an
    environmental survey to identify, document, and remediate any residual
    problems.

        54. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, are you concerned
    about a potentially indefinite, domestic deployment of troops within
    your command?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense and United States
    Northern Command work to provide capability requested by the Department
    of Homeland Security that is approved by the Secretary of Defense. We
    will continue to do so as requested and approved by the Acting
    Secretary of Defense. We are fully prepared to do what is ordered in
    defense of the Homeland.

        55. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what is the basis
    for the extension of Active Duty deployments through September 2019?
        General O'Shaughnessy. In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    Requests for Assistance to the Department of Defense, DHS states their
    extension requests are based on the current and evolving border
    security environment and lack of available support by other federal,
    state, and local partners, thereby projecting that the risk to Customs
    and Border Protection's ability to carry out its federal functions will
    exist through September 2019. The Acting Secretary of Defense has
    subsequently approved all requested extensions.

        56. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, given the evolving
    role of the Active Duty troops deployed at the southern border, what is
    your understanding of the limitations of their mission based on Posse
    Comitatus?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10
    Armed Forces from providing direct support to civilian law enforcement,
    except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
    U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress.

        57. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what actions or law
    enforcement activities would constitute a violation of Posse Comitatus?
        General O'Shaughnessy. In accordance with Enclosure 3 of DOD
    Instruction 3025.21, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10 DOD
    personnel from providing forms of direct civilian law enforcement
    assistance such as interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or
    other similar activity; search or seizure; arrest; evidence collection;
    and forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from
    a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation.
                               nuclear deterrence
        58. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, in your testimony on the
    Nuclear Triad, you stated the need to ``support our industrial
    partners'' and prioritize funding for these partners throughout the
    life of the Columbia-class programs. Do you agree that workforce
    development is a vital component of this support?
        General Hyten. I defer to the Navy regarding specifics, however the
    shipyards, as well as the rest of the industrial base, are strategic
    assets, critical to the defense of the Nation. They are one of our
    strengths.
        It is clear continued and focused support is essential to build the
    workforce required to execute construction of the Columbia and Virginia
    programs.

        59. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, you state in your testimony
    that we must field the Columbia-class on time to avoid a deterrent
    capability gap in the nuclear triad. What are the strategic
    consequences to a gap in our nuclear triad capabilities--particularly
    given that nuclear powered submarines are the most survivable leg of
    the triad?
        General Hyten. Any gap in Triad capability reduces options to the
    President in time of need and weakens our overall deterrent posture.
        In the event a legacy system's availability is challenged due to
    unexpected age-related techinical issues or we experience delyas in
    replacement systems, we can intentionally leverage operational
    flexibility inherent in the Triad to mitigate short-term shortfalls.
        The best way to manage future risk is to ensure current systems are
    adequately sustained and replacements fielded on time.

        60. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, as you note in your
    testimony, we currently have no margin for error in our Columbia
    program timeline as the Ohio-class rapidly approach retirement. What
    funding streams for the industrial base should Congress prioritize in
    this funding cycle to ensure the timely production and delivery of the
    Columbia-class?
        General Hyten. I defer to the Navy with respect to specific funding
    streams. However, full funding and on-time appropriations are critical
    to delivering Columbia on schedule.
                    intermediate range nuclear forces treaty
        61. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if you believe that Russia's
    material breach of the INF Treaty is a significant concern, are you
    concerned that scrapping the INF entirely will lead to an escalation of
    Russian development of its intermediate-range nuclear stockpiles?
        General Hyten. Russia has been in material breach of the INF Treaty
    for many years and has already fielded multiple battalions of a system
    in direct violation of its obligations. The strategy in the NPR is
    intended to bring Russia back into the INF Treaty, but if that fails,
    make sure we are able to develop capabilities needed to deter and
    respond effectively.

        62. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, the United States can reach
    both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered missiles, neither
    of which violate the INF Treaty. Do you believe ground-based missile
    systems are necessary to deter Chinese aggression in the South China
    Sea when the United States is already investing in the construction of
    Virginia and Columbia-class submarines?
        General Hyten. Regarding specifics with respect to the South China
    Sea, I would defer to Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command.
        From a strategic perspective, the United States is prepared to
    respond decisively to Chinese non-nuclear or nuclear aggression. The
    United States conducts exercises in the Asia-Pacific region that, among
    other things, demonstrate our capabilities and resolve which
    contributes to assuring our allies.
        Likewise, being forward-deployable, survivable, penetrating, and
    responsive, Virginia and Columbia-class submarines will strengthen our
    posture and preparedness, and therefore our deterrence vis-a-vis China.
        Finally, I support the need for other basing options (including
    ground) that can increase our overall capabilities.

        63. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, why not continue this
    investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage in undersea
    warfare?
        General Hyten. I don't view this as an ``either/or'' proposition.
    Investment in the research and development of ground-based missiles
    does not detract from planned investments in undersea capabilities.
    Diversity in capability and basing is, in fact, key to our strategy.

        64. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, many of our allies--
    including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF. Others, such as South
    Korea and Australia, do not want to host United States offensive
    missiles. NATO allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. As STRATCOM
    [United States Strategic Command] Commander, how will you manage this
    opposition?
        General Hyten. In a February 1, 2019 statement, NATO Allies fully
    supported the U.S. suspension of its obligations under the INF Treaty
    and declaring United States intent to withdraw from the Treaty if
    Russian did not return to full and verifiable compliance. In the
    statement, the Allies agreed that Russia would bear sole responsibility
    for the end of the INF Treaty if Russia did not honor its obligations.
        The U.S. is in close dialogue with all our allies, but I defer to
    the State Department and the geographic combatant commanders in
    managing relations with specific allies and partners.
        From a USSTRATCOM perspective, we will continue holding at risk,
    under all conditions, any nation that can hold us at risk. This is the
    foundation of deterrence. Our strategy and posture will pose
    insurmountable difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression
    against the United States, its allies, or partners.

        65. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if regional allies will not
    support the deployment of ground-based missiles, how will the INF
    withdrawal impact strategic deterrence?
        General Hyten. NATO is continuing to assess the consequences of
    Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and fielding of multiple
    battalions of the SSC-8, and recognizes the need to provide a credible
    and effective deterrent.
        Per the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is modifying a
    small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
    warheads to provide a low-yield option. Likewise, in the longer term,
    the U.S. will pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
    missile.
        These supplements will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and
    assurance as well as expand the range of flexible and credible U.S.
    options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                           missile defense of hawaii
        66. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, in your written
    statement you said that you are confident in the ability of the Ground-
    Based Midcourse Intercept (GBI) defense system to defend the United
    States against ICBMs from North Korea. Does that assessment include
    ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, I am confident we can defend Hawaii
    with our ground-based interceptors.
                         homeland defense radar-hawaii
        67. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, you
    both mentioned your support for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and
    the Pacific Radar in your written statements. What capability do these
    radars add to our current missile defense system?
        General Hyten. These sensors represent the near-term solution.
    These sensors have higher power levels and multiple sophisticated
    waveforms to exploit different phenomenology enabling persistent, long-
    range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment
    capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will complement
    future space-based sensors designed to globally detect, track, and
    discriminate critical missile threats.
        General O'Shaughnessy. These two radars, along with the Long Range
    Discrimination Radar, will provide much desired `birth-to-death'
    discrimination across the entire flight profile of threat missiles. The
    capabilities these radars will deliver when fully operational could
    potentially allow us to change our shot doctrine, which could increase
    capacity to engage threat missiles.

        68. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, do
    these two new radars increase our ability to defend against missile
    threats from China and Russia, in addition to North Korea?
        General Hyten. These radars support the characterization of all
    threats detected in their field of view, but are specifically designed
    to counter ballistic missile threats emanating from North Korea. We
    have other radars designed to meet the requirements of high-end
    competition.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
    Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
    missile threats.

        69. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, once operational, will
    the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii improve the likelihood of
    successfully intercepting an ICBM targeting Hawaii?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii will
    provide mid-to-late flight discrimination against intercontinental
    ballistic missile threats targeting Hawaii, allowing for more refined
    targeting of threat reentry vehicles and effective engagements.
                              future of deterrence
        70. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, you have repeatedly stated that
    strategic deterrence is your number one priority. In an era of cyber
    threats, misinformation campaigns, hypersonic weapons and space as a
    warfighting domain, how has the concept of deterrence evolved in the
    first part of the 21st century?
        General Hyten. The basic tenets of deterrence have not changed but
    the application is much more challenging today. What has changed is the
    threat. We face a more diverse threat and the challenge of a more
    uncertain, multipolar geopolitical environment. We must enhance our
    agility across the spectrum from strategy development to capability
    acquisition in order to address this ever more complex environment.
        USSTRATCOM, in partnership with the combatant commands, is working
    to utilize current capabilities to meet the evolving threat while
    shaping strategies and fielding new capabilities for the future. Our
    nuclear forces remain the backbone of our deterrence strategy. However,
    deterrence must span the entire spectrum of conflict and be supported
    by credible U.S. capabilities in all domains.

        71. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, what additional tools does the
    United States need to develop further to meet an evolving concept of
    strategic deterrence?
        General Hyten. The U.S. must rediscover the ability to move with
    speed and agility across multiple domains in operationally-relevant
    timelines. This includes assessing the threat environment, developing
    strategy and policy, fielding capabilities and producing plans to
    ensure our strategic deterrent remains robust, credible, and relevant.
    Our nuclear forces are the backbone of our strategic deterrent, and we
    must complete the planned modernization of the force on time, to
    include fielding the low-yield capabilities discussed in the Nuclear
    Posture Review.
        Additionally, we must continue the work of integrating our
    capabilities across the combatant commands, all domains, and every
    element of national power as well as with our allies and partners in
    order to deter potential adversaries.
        nuclear command, control and communications (nc3) modernization
        72. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, your written statement
    appropriately emphasizes the importance of modernizing our NC3 systems.
    It seems like there is some overlap between the mission requirements
    for nuclear operations and those for missile defense. Will a modernized
    NC3 system be equipped to support missile defense operations and
    decision making in addition to the nuclear mission?
        General Hyten. While both Nuclear and Missile Defense command and
    control systems leverage many of the same sensors, communication paths
    and data streams, the operational requirements and decision authority
    for each mission are different and distinct and drive mission-unique
    solutions.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                             missile defense review
        73. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, the
    2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise
    missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new
    creative solutions or investment efforts to address them. Do you
    believe we are acting with the right sense of urgency to counter these
    threats?
        General Hyten. The MDR recognizes we are on the wrong side of the
    cost curve and directs a comprehensive approach to prevent and defeat
    emerging threats, including better integration of offensive and
    defensive capabilities.
        The President's Budget supports continued investment and
    development of game-changing technologies aimed at providing a more
    effective and affordable missile defense.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I view the cruise missile threat to the
    Homeland with an enormous sense of urgency. Simply put, we are behind
    and losing ground. Our ability to defend the Homeland against advanced
    cruise missiles is USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top capability gap, and I am
    equally concerned about the threat presented by our adversaries'
    emerging hypersonic capabilities. Our ability to track, defend, and
    defeat advanced missile threats is significantly challenged by these
    new weapons systems. We require significant, focused investment in
    cruise missile defense that incorporates existing and emergent
    technologies to counter both current and emerging threats, or we risk
    falling further behind.

        74. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
    technologies and systems should the Committee be investing in to
    address these threats?
        General Hyten. My first priority is to move missile warning/missile
    defense sensors to a space-based architecture in order to detect, track
    and discriminate advanced missile threats.
        Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine
    depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as
    directed energy, Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), boost phase
    intercept, and non-kinetic capabilities.
        General O'Shaughnessy. I believe we need to take a holistic
    approach and fundamentally change our defense against cruise missiles
    and hypersonic threats by expanding capabilities and capacity across a
    layered defense architecture. This requires building upon our current
    capabilities as well as developing new capabilities to address these
    complex threats. The solution may include a layered architecture
    consisting of capabilities such as sensors, communications, command and
    control, airborne early warning, active electronically scanned array
    radars, munitions, ground-based air defenses, information operations,
    increased research, development, test, and evaluation, Arctic
    operations, and logistical support. The bottom line is that our
    capability challenges cannot be solved by individual capabilities.
                      space r&d [research and development]
        75. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, the Space Rapid Capabilities
    Office is something I've focused on for a number of years. Today, it
    serves as the lynchpin of our responsive space strategy. I'm a firm
    believer that we have parts in place within the Space R&D enterprise
    that are working very well and they should be expanded upon. Moving
    pieces around is where we're going to run into trouble in terms of
    costs and inefficiencies. How important is it that we don't reinvent
    the wheel in areas like Space RCO [Rapid Capabilities Office] and other
    research and development entities during the current space
    reorganization?
        General Hyten. It is vitally important every effort be made to
    reduce costs and inefficiencies by linking Space RCO research and
    development activities with the Space Development Agency (SDA) and
    Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to eliminate duplication of
    effort, maximize outcomes, and enable a focus on experimentation, rapid
    prototyping and accelerated fielding of specific next-generation
    capabilities.
                  nuclear command, control, and communication
        76. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, you've mentioned that ``we're
    in good shape in the near term'' when it comes to defending our space
    assets, but that we need to look to how we will defend those assets in
    the future. Can you describe the necessary upgrade to the nuclear
    command, control, and communication program and why it is so important
    to the STRATCOM mission?
        General Hyten. Sustaining a reliable, endurable, and survivable NC3
    architecture is foundational to strategic deterrence.
        To that end, the Department is moving towards fielding more
    resilient satellite architectures for protected communications, missile
    warning and responsive counter-space effects.
        Understanding space is no longer a ``sanctuary,'' the Department is
    also pursuing expanded capabilities in the aerial and terrestrial
    domains to provide NC3 resilience and reliability in the event of
    degraded or denied space capabilities.

        77. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you still on track to
    produce a concept of operations for space by June?
        General Hyten. Yes. We produced a draft concept of operations and
    evaluated it during our Global Lightning 20 exercise. My space
    component is incorporating lessons learned and refining the document.
    We expect to finalize the document in June.
                        ground based strategic deterrent
        78. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, our adversaries are
    modernizing and advancing their nuclear weapon systems. Understanding
    that stable requirements are essential to the success of nuclear
    modernization programs, are you providing input to the Air Force on how
    requirements need to be shaped for programs like Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent to stay relevant to a constantly changing threat?
        General Hyten. USSTRATCOM has been an active partner with the Air
    Force to shape the requirements for the GBSD program from inception.
    Our requirements are being met, and I am confident the GBSD weapon
    system will be relevant in the face of future threats.

        79. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, it is our understanding that
    the contract award for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program
    will occur in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020. Is it your
    understanding that is still the Air Force plan?
        General Hyten. I am confident the Air Force will complete Milestone
    B and contract award in the fourth quarter fiscal year 2020.
                                   new start
        80. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, to the best of your knowledge,
    including information you might have provided by the U.S. intelligence
    community, are the United States and Russia complying with the treaty?
        General Hyten. Yes, but it is important to note the New Start
    Treaty does not cover all Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear
    weapons.

        81. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START provide for
    intrusive inspections by both parties, including United States boots on
    the ground in Russia inspecting specific Russian nuclear sites, so that
    the United States military has a good degree of confidence in Russian
    compliance with the treaty?
        General Hyten. Yes. The New START Treaty's verification regime
    (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) provides
    transparency into Russian strategic offensive capabilities,
    contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force structure and
    pace of modernization.
        The U.S. State Department is responsible for determining compliance
    with United States treaties, and I am confident in the State
    Department's and Intelligence Community's efforts to verify and monitor
    Russian compliance with the New START Treaty.

        82. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START include
    notifications about changes and movements in Russian strategic nuclear
    weapons systems, notifications that provide valuable information to the
    United States intelligence community and the military?
        General Hyten. Yes--this is done via Treaty-specific processes
    managed by the Department of State's Nuclear Reduction Center. Part
    Four of the New START Treaty Protocol stipulates each party shall
    notify the other about changes in data (status) pertaining to ICBMs,
    SLBMs, and heavy bombers. These notifications are required to be
    submitted within five days after the change in status. Again, many
    other types of nuclear weapons are not covered by these protocols.

        83. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you aware of any estimate
    from the U.S. intelligence community or elsewhere that indicates what
    it would cost to attempt to replace the data provided under New START
    verification provisions, if the treaty did not provide them?
        General Hyten. I am not aware of any such estimate and would defer
    to the Director of National Intelligence for such information.

        84. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, would it not be a very
    significant undertaking to try to replace that information?
        General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director
    of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing
    information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions
    through alternative means.
          microsystems, engineering, science, and applications (mesa)
        85. Senator Heinrich. Gen. Hyten, your testimony notes the need to
    upgrade key nuclear facilities and infrastructure, including for
    production of non-nuclear components. Do you agree that strategic rad-
    hard microelectronics at the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science
    and Applications] Complex are among the key technologies needed to
    maintain the nuclear deterrent?
        General Hyten. Yes. The trustworthiness of the nuclear weapon
    supply chain providing specialized components must be sustained to
    protect against the potential for sabotage, malicious introduction of
    an unwanted function, or subversion of a function without detection.
        NNSA's MESA facility at Sandia National Laboratories is currently 5
    years beyond the intended 25-year design life and relies on tools and
    capabilities that are no longer supported by manufacturers. Ongoing
    investments in infrastructure and tools to support the MESA complex are
    required to provide key technologies to meet planned LEPs and evolving
    national security needs for strategic radiation-hardened microsystems
    beyond 2025. Without sustained investment and eventual large-scale
    recapitalization, the MESA complex will experience failures due to
    aging and will become obsolete.
                 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
        86. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, this Committee, and our
    companion committee in the House, heard testimony from many of your
    colleagues about the gap between your needs for Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and what you receive from
    various sources of ISR. Are your needs being met; and if not, are there
    alternative sources that you can turn to, such as U.S. commercial
    sources or allied partners for the collection of ISR data?
        General Hyten. No operational Commander is fully satisfied with the
    level of ISR support available to them given the overwhelming
    requirements to understand the threat and gain decision advantage in
    today's contested global multi-domain environment. That said, I am
    pleased with the support I get and agnostic as to the sources of ISR
    information as long as they contribute to answering my information
    needs in a reliable, timely and secure manner.
                            artificial intelligence
        87. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, is the Department of Defense
    fully utilizing commercial artificial intelligence platforms and
    algorithms to refine and process the terabytes of ISR data being
    collected?
        General Hyten. Not fully. However, USSTRATCOM continues to
    implement various algorithm-based tools and programs in partnership
    with the IC and DOD. These tools use artificial intelligence and
    machine learning to help analysts triage large amounts of ISR data. For
    more details on DOD's utilization of these types of technologies I
    would defer to the USD (I).

        88. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, what system or process does
    the Department of Defense have in place for commercial industry
    providers to pitch artificial intelligence products to military leaders
    to help them meet DOD requirements?
        General Hyten. Artificial Intelligence is one of DOD's
    modernization priorities, and the Department has created a Technical
    Director for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to
    consolidate the Service and CCMD AI requirements.
        In addition, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) website posts DOD
    hard problems that need industry involvement to solve, and the Defense
    Technical Information Center (DTIC) has the CCMD Priorities listed in
    the DTIC Classified reading room for industry to review and offer
    solutions to solve AI gaps.
        Finally, industry providers are encouraged to submit potential
    solutions and brief their products via regularly scheduled technical
    interchange meetings and conferences.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                 f-15c/d fleet
        89. Senator Warren. General O'Shaughnessy, the Air Force is
    reportedly considering buying new F-15s to refresh the F-15C fleet,
    which is nearing the end of its service life. How would a
    revitalization of the F-15C/D fleet with advanced F-15s affect your
    ability to defend the Homeland in terms of the capacity and
    capabilities available to you as NORTHCOM Commander?
        General O'Shaughnessy. For our Homeland aerospace defense mission,
    we advocate for required capabilities rather than specific platforms.
    The Air Force is on record with its requirement to buy 72 new fighter
    aircraft per year to implement the National Defense Strategy, and we
    understand the Air Force remains fully committed to advanced 5th
    generation capabilities and the F-35. However, the decision to refresh
    4th generation capability helps mitigate capacity risk while balancing
    near term readiness concerns, getting closer to the goal of 72 new
    fighter aircraft. Recapitalization of the Air Force fighter force,
    including the F-15 variant, will help give us the resources and
    flexibility necessary to defend the Homeland.
                                new start treaty
        90. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if New START expires in February
    2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no constraints on
    Russia's nuclear forces, would that increase or decrease the threat
    Russia poses to the United States?
        General Hyten. It's difficult to predict with any certainty, but I
    doubt Russia would realize any strategic value in increasing the size
    of its stockpile and following that course of action would
    significantly increase the burden on its economy and society. The more
    likely response would be to continue the path the Russians are already
    on, which is to increase the capability and diversity of their existing
    platforms and stockpile.

        91. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we have less visibility into
    Russia's nuclear capabilities, their force structure, and their
    modernization plans, which would be the case without New START, what
    impact would that have on United States military planning and spending
    and what countermeasures would we need to consider and what would be
    the cost?
        General Hyten. The impacts from not extending the New START Treaty
    are unlikely to drive significant changes in United States force
    structure, but are more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns
    are with the myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is
    producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START--with
    or without an extension.
        Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that
    addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the
    Department of State.
        However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the
    NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against
    prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad,
    including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons,
    provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for
    effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.

        92. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we lose the New START data
    exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon and the
    intelligence community have to spend more on national technical means
    of verification to make up for this loss?
        General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director
    of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing
    information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions
    through alternative means.

        93. Senator Warren. General Hyten, given the extensive United
    States experience in negotiating and pursuing arms control agreements
    with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, how do you recommend the
    United States pursue arms control agreements with Russia and China in
    the years ahead?
        General Hyten. My ideas are stated in the answer to Question 91
    above. However I defer to the State Department as to the best means to
    approach arms control negotiations.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
               nuclear command, control and communications (nc3)
        94. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, the Nuclear Posture Review,
    your written testimony and your verbal testimony all highlight the
    critical requirement for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications
    modernization. Being given the sole responsibility for NC3 as commander
    of USSTRATCOM as well as the opening of the new USSTRATCOM headquarters
    this year mean a lot of modernization and change occurring rapidly
    within your command. Given the cyber warfare and cyber espionage
    challenges from adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran,
    what measures are you and your team taking to guard against an
    aggressive and persistent cyber threat?
        General Hyten. USSTRATCOM is engaged with key experts from across
    the Department to develop a comprehensive cyber defense plan for the
    current NC3 enterprise.
        Teams regularly assess individual NC3 systems for vulnerabilities
    and build mitigations to address cyber threats to our aging systems.
        In addition, the Department is considering and incorporating
    information security best practices in all new modernization programs
    at the onset of development to ensure fielded systems are capable of
    defending against future cyber threats.

        95. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, you have two platforms in the
    E-4B and E-6B that are critical components of our ability to execute
    NC3 operations in both peacetime and war. The last major platform
    upgrades were 34 years ago (1985) for the E-4B model and 21 years ago
    (1998) for the E-6B model. We spend a lot of time discussing the aging
    B-52, ICBM inventory and submarine fleet, but little time discussing
    the E-4B and E-6B. Further, the Nuclear Posture Review cites these
    platforms as a strength while your written testimony highlights efforts
    to find replacements. How survivable and interoperable are these
    current platforms in a modern war and when do we need to seriously
    consider a replacement or major upgrade to these weapons systems?
        General Hyten. Both of these key command and control platforms are
    survivable in the most stressed environments and fully interoperable
    with all elements of the National Military Command System. The
    fundamental challenge facing these platforms is in fully meeting
    operational mission availability requirements.
        The E-4B is projected to reach end of life in 2032. Operational
    availability is negatively impacted by a continuous cycle of
    maintenance, major overhauls, and system upgrades that are necessary to
    keep the fleet operationally capable.
        Likewise the E-6B is challenged to meet operation mission
    availability requirements due to a combination of limited fleet size
    and increasing depot-level and routine field-level maintenance to
    address aging airframe issues.
        The Air Force is leading a joint analysis of alternatives to
    explore options to recapitalize the E-4B, E-6B, and the VC-32 and is
    expected to complete in late fiscal year 2019. We will take this
    information and integrate it into our broader NC3 architecture work in
    order to define the best way ahead.
                                  space force
        96. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, in your testimony you praised
    the decision to keep the newly developing Space Force under the
    umbrella of the Department of the Air Force. With the development of
    the Space Force and a Unified Space Command, what steps are you taking
    to ensure USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM and the new U.S. Space Command are all
    resourced appropriately and have the appropriate authorities given the
    significant interests all three commands have in space capabilities?
        General Hyten. My staff is working with the Joint Staff, in concert
    with AFSPC and Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) to identify
    the resources and authorities required to establish an effective
    USSPACECOM. In the interim, I am committed to ensuring there will be no
    operational degradation during the transition and have directed my
    staff to provide robust support until USSPACECOM reaches full operating
    capability.

        97. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, are you concerned about
    shortfalls as the Air Force tries to fully support all of the commands?
        General Hyten. I fully recognize the challenges the Air Force faces
    supporting another combatant command, but the Air Force has been
    responsive to the changes directed by the Department. My staff
    carefully monitors competing interests to ensure USSTRATCOM and future
    USSPACECOM support is properly prioritized.
                                missile defense
        98. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, a December GAO
    [Government Accountability Office] report reviewed the Air Force's
    position and analysis of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya island. While
    the report did highlight an excellent mission capable rate, it also
    listed Air Force and Missile Defense Agency estimates of required
    investments of $200 million in operations and maintenance funds and
    almost $70 million in upgrade and sustainment costs over the next 5
    years to keep the system running. Given existing and future
    capabilities such as the Long Range Discriminating Radar, the Space
    Fence, the Pacific Radar, the sea based X-band radar and radars in
    Japan, is the Cobra Dane still providing such a critical function to
    our missile defense that we need to continue to invest large sums of
    money into sustaining this aging system?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The Cobra Dane radar contributes
    significantly to Homeland defense and continues to be the ``backbone''
    of the ground-based midcourse defense system. Due to its unique
    geographic location, the radar provides engagement quality mid-course
    tracking data of missiles threatening CONUS and Alaska. I work closely
    with the Missile Defense Agency and the Air Force to ensure Cobra Dane
    remains a critical operational element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System architecture until it can be replaced by assets that provide
    equal or better capabilities.

        99. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, we currently have 44
    ground based interceptors in our inventory between Fort Greely, Alaska,
    and Vandenberg AFB [Air Force Base], California. You have previously
    stated that you do not consider this to be adequate for defense of the
    United States and North America as a whole. How many additional GBI do
    we need to be adequately prepared for a North Korean or Chinese
    ballistic missile threat?
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
    Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
    missile threats. I am confident in our ability to defend against the
    current North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile threats.
        I support the Department of Defense's initiative to field twenty
    additional interceptors at Ft Greely, AK that will carry the Redesigned
    Kill Vehicles. This effort will provide both capability and capacity
    improvements. We will continue to reassess the sufficiency of our
    interceptor fleet based on the estimated threat going forward.

        100. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you have testified
    extensively in writing and verbally that the arctic is quickly becoming
    a vulnerable spot in our defenses for North America. What are your
    requirements for defense of North America from a northern approach in
    the form of radars, interceptors, ships or investment in other
    infrastructure such as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
    (IUSS)?
        General O'Shaughnessy. The defense of North America requires modern
    sensor systems for aerospace surveillance and warning capable of
    detecting advanced threats at long ranges. These sensor systems must be
    able to detect, characterize, and attribute potential threats from
    airborne, surface, and subsurface launch platforms operating in and
    through the Arctic and the northern approaches to the Homeland.
        United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) currently have nine Arctic-related
    items on the commands' Integrated Priority List that address air and
    cruise missile defense, communications, maritime undersea surveillance,
    indications and warning, and Homeland defense. The commands have also
    articulated a requirement for ice-strengthened surface vessels capable
    of exercising and deploying, positioning, and conducting deterrence and
    decisive operations in the ice-diminished waters of the Arctic.
    Additionally, USNORTHCOM has a requirement to support those vessels
    with fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Finally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    have stressed the urgency of Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
    recapitalization with the United States Navy, as Russia and China have
    fielded advanced submarines and missile systems that present
    significant threats to the Homeland.
              counter terrorism and violent extremist organization
        101. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you highlighted in
    your written testimony your significant concern over terrorist or
    violent extremist attacks on the United States to include another 9/11
    style attack on the Homeland. What steps are you taking at USNORTHCOM
    either militarily, through interagency or multi-nationally to gather
    intelligence and conduct operations to combat the persistent terrorist
    threat?
        General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
    takes a comprehensive approach to countering threats to the Homeland.
    We maintain constant awareness of terrorist threats through routine,
    daily coordination with the U.S. intelligence community and utilization
    of a vast network of liaison officers and interagency partners,
    including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
    Homeland Security. We have also built strong relationships with other
    combatant commands through which we share information and participate
    in multi-national forums run by Special Operations Command that focus
    on countering violent extremist organizations. In addition, USNORTHCOM
    has developed robust counterterrorism plans which we exercise and
    rehearse frequently.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                         space force and space command
        102. Senator Jones. General Hyten, at the hearing, you emphasized
    the importance of ``not breaking the mission'' in separating Space from
    SRATCOM and re-establishing it as a separate combatant command. Please
    be more specific about the steps STRATCOM is taking to ensure a smooth
    transition and to avoid overlap, duplication, and inefficiency among
    the Space Force, Space Command, the Space Development Agency, the NRO
    [National Reconnaissance Office], and the Services.
        General Hyten. My chief concern and focus is ensuring there is no
    disruption in space operations or support to other commanders, the
    Joint Force and DOD/USG agencies.
        To facilitate seamless transition, USSTRATCOM in association with
    the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and the NRO developed
    both a transition Divestiture Plan and Implementation Plan.
        These plans are continuously refined, socialized, and coordinated
    through exercises in advance of the transition. Additionally, a
    Memorandum of Agreement codifies how elements of the USSTRATCOM Staff
    will support Commander, USSPACECOM throughout the transfer.
        USSPACECOM, at establishment, will be postured to issue orders, as
    well as command and control assigned and attached forces, but will not
    be fully mission capable.
        To that end, I directed my staff to continue providing robust
    support to ensure mission success through USSPACECOM declaration of
    FOC.
                            homeland defense design
        103. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, your written testimony
    briefly references the three-phase Homeland Defense Design. Please
    provide an update on that effort and how it's progressing.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Our cruise missile defense efforts for the
    first two phases of the Homeland Defense Design initiative started in
    the National Capital Region (NCR) and are just part of our overall
    initial effort encompassing the whole aerospace domain. We are
    utilizing lessons learned from point defense against cruise missile
    threats in the NCR and broadening our understanding of what is required
    to defend critical infrastructure throughout North America.
        As we move to Phase III of Homeland Defense Design, it is clear
    there is much to be done. From a warfighter perspective, we need to be
    able to find, track, and defeat launch platforms and cruise missiles at
    greater ranges than we've previously planned for. This will require
    changes in our operational approach and investments in advanced
    sensors, and weapons, all of which we are addressing with the
    Department.
        Expanding cruise missile defense beyond the NCR is significantly
    more complex. The Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of
    Alternatives (NAS AoA) and my Commander's Estimate on Homeland cruise
    missile defense are both currently underway, and these two key,
    overarching efforts will be crucial to identifying the best way to
    defend our Homeland against cruise missile threats.
        These studies are critical to our efforts, but we must take action
    now to address the threat. As such, we have taken action to address
    immediate needs as we continue efforts to identify and implement short,
    mid-, and long-term solutions. The immediate includes achieving the
    best possible results with the capabilities and capacity available
    today. The short-term includes increasing capacity of the systems we
    already have and targeting investment in capabilities giving me the
    best flexible deterrent options for the available funding. Our mid-term
    and long-term efforts are heavily reliant on current and emergent
    science and technology and will require significant investment now to
    field solutions as soon as possible.
                      combatting illegal drug trafficking
        104. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, in your testimony, you
    acknowledged that the majority of illegal drugs are coming through the
    ports, not across uncontrolled sections of the border. Could you give
    us your best military advice on whether NORTHCOM's forces have an
    appropriate role in combatting illegal drug trafficking and if so,
    explain what the most appropriate and effective use of NORTHCOM's
    forces is in that effort?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I believe United States Northern Command
    (USNORTHCOM) has an appropriate role in combatting illegal drug
    trafficking. USNORTHCOM routinely provides military-unique capabilities
    in support of federal civilian law enforcement and participates in
    training with both U.S. civilian law enforcement and foreign partners.
    As authorized by 10 USC Sec.  124 and 10 USC Sec.  284, USNORTHCOM
    contributes to counterdrug efforts by providing maintenance and repair
    of equipment, transportation support, engineering, training of law
    enforcement agencies, employment of detection and monitoring sensors,
    intelligence analysis, and aerial and ground reconnaissance. This
    support enables our law enforcement partners to more effectively
    interdict drugs and other illicitly trafficked commodities.
                             emergency declaration
        105. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified that you
    have not yet received any orders from the Commander in Chief pursuant
    to the Emergency Declaration of March 15, 2019. Please explain what
    process, if any, you undertake when you do receive an order from the
    Commander in Chief to determine the legality of that order and state
    whether that process will be followed if you receive an order pursuant
    to the March 15, 2019 Emergency Declaration.
        General O'Shaughnessy. Orders received by United States Northern
    Command (USNORTHCOM) from any source are reviewed by the our command
    staff judge advocate and legal staff to determine if there are any
    potential legal concerns associated with any given order. If there are
    legal concerns, in coordination with Chairman of the Joint Chief of
    Staff Legal Counsel and the Department of Defense Office of General
    Counsel, our legal team develops recommended courses of action that
    resolve or mitigate those concerns for my consideration. Based on this
    information, I select a course of action and issue appropriate orders
    to our headquarters staff and subordinate commanders. This is the
    process I have followed to date, and it is the same process I will
    continue to follow for future orders I receive as Commander of
    USNORTHCOM.
                                 national guard
        106. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified about the
    importance of the National Guard to NORAD's missions. We have an Air
    Guard unit in Alabama that is scheduled to receive the new F-35 fighter
    jets in a couple of years. How will that unit and those capabilities
    contribute to the defense of the Homeland?
        General O'Shaughnessy. I am absolutely confident the Alabama Air
    National Guard, equipped with the new F-35 Lightning II, will be
    ideally suited to defend the United States against the most advanced
    and emerging threats to North America. The F-35 is unmatched in its
    ability to counter and defeat the latest 21st century advanced threats
    to the Homeland. In short, the F-35 and the Air National Guard provide
    critical combat capability and will be integral to the defense of North
    America.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, McSally,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono,
    Kaine, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee today meets to continue
    receiving the posture statements from our combatant commands.
    Testifying today are General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of
    the United States European Command [EUCOM], and General Stephen
    Lyons, Commander of the United States Transportation Command
    [TRANSCOM]. I welcome both of you here and thank you for your
    service.
        The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
    ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy [NDS]. That is our blueprint. We pretty much agreed to
    that. It means that we need urgent change at a significant
    scale to address the challenges of strategic competition with
    Russia and China.
        I just got back from Munich, Kosovo, Djibouti, Algeria, and
    these areas, and that is where Russia and China are. We need to
    be aware of the strength and what the competition is. Putin has
    demonstrated both the capability and the intent to use force to
    achieve his objective, most notably in Georgia, Ukraine, and
    Syria. Putin will not hesitate to use other tools in his
    arsenal as well, whether it is cyber attacks, election
    meddling, or assassinations with chemical weapons. Perceived
    weakness will only provoke further aggression from Putin.
        That is why efforts such as full support for the European
    Deterrence Initiative that is made up of primarily the old
    Soviet Union countries provides the defensive lethal assistance
    to Ukraine and why they are so important.
        Likewise, we need a defense budget that is of sufficient
    size and invests in key capabilities we need in Europe, areas
    like long-range fires, cruise missile defense, anti-submarine
    warfare, and the supporting infrastructure.
        I was in Munich 2 weeks ago, and it was clear that we
    cannot be successful in the strategic competition with Russia
    without a strong, unified NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] alliance. America is safer and stronger because
    of our NATO alliance. General Scaparrotti, I look forward to
    your thoughts along these issues.
        General Lyons, you have had a long history with TRANSCOM
    serving as its Deputy Commander for 2 years before assuming
    your current role. I look forward to hearing your assessment of
    the services and the resources that you have there because I
    know that there is some discussion even of some privatization
    in that area. We will be anxious to hear your statements.
        Before I turn to Senator Reed, I would like to remind all
    of our members that we will have a classified, closed, informal
    briefing, at 2:30 in the Visitors Center with both of our
    witnesses.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
    join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
        General Scaparrotti is returning to testify before the
    Committee for the third time on the United States military
    posture and programs in Europe. He is dual-hatted as Commander
    of United States European Command and NATO Supreme Allied
    Commander, or the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].
    Welcome, General Scaparrotti.
        General Lyons, I want to welcome you to your first posture
    hearing before this Committee.
        Let me thank both of you for your many decades of military
    service, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated
    men and women serving under your commands. Thank them very much
    for us.
        Over the last several years, the security challenges in the
    United States European Command have grown increasingly complex.
    Russia has reemerged as an aggressive opponent of the rules-
    based international order, which Russia views as a counter to
    its strategic interest in reclaiming great power status. The
    National Defense Strategy issued last year highlights the need
    to counter a revanchist Russia with a credible military
    deterrent that demonstrates that any military aggression
    against the sovereignty and integrity of NATO members or threat
    of such aggression will not succeed. General Scaparrotti, I am
    interested in your assessment of the progress of our force
    posture in Europe in meeting NDS requirements.
        In addition to its military modernization and aggressive
    military posturing, Russia is conducting a campaign of hybrid
    warfare, below the level of military conflict, using all tools
    of national power to advance its strategic interests. Our
    democracy was attacked in 2016, and we have been persistently
    under attack ever since, including during last year's midterm
    elections. I would be interested in hearing from General
    Scaparrotti whether EUCOM is getting the cyber resources and
    personnel it needs and whether we are investing in the right
    non-military tools of national power to counter this hybrid
    warfare.
        An additional challenge is the unprecedented strain on
    alliance cohesion within NATO. Former Secretary of Defense
    Mattis stressed that the United States' strength is
    inextricably linked to our systems of alliances and
    partnerships. Yet, a recent report from the Harvard Belfer
    Center by Ambassador Doug Lute and Ambassador Nicholas Burns
    describes a crisis within NATO, which they attribute in large
    part to the absence of strong U.S. leadership. The Senate and
    Congress as a whole have repeatedly gone on record to reaffirm
    our strong commitment to NATO and the transatlantic
    relationship as a core element of U.S. national security. There
    should be no doubt among our allies or our adversaries
    regarding the United States' resolve to meet its NATO
    commitments to collective defense.
        Turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM perform
    duties that sustain the whole Department of Defense effort in
    protecting our Nation's security. With the competitive edge in
    its ability to deploy and sustain America's armed forces,
    TRANSCOM provides DOD [United States Department of Defense]
    with unique capabilities that we have come to expect and
    perhaps too frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are
    busy supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
    without them, the United States would be at a significant
    disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
        The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships
    held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, but it is
    aging and will need to be modernized over the next decade. Two
    years ago, the Committee authorized the Department to start a
    program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force by authorizing
    DOD to purchase up to two foreign-built vessels, while the Navy
    designed a family of auxiliary vessels for a number of uses,
    including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force. Then last
    year, Congress authorized the Department to buy five more
    foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department put forward a
    funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S. shipyards.
    General Lyons, I am interested in the status and the next steps
    for RRF recapitalization in fiscal year 2020.
        The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil
    Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as
    40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable after
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will be able to provide
    needed surge capacity in the future. General Lyons, I am
    interested in your view on the state of this fleet and if
    anything needs to be done to ensure these capabilities and
    their readiness.
        Our global transportation capability, owned and managed by
    TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
    years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
    will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year,
    General McDew told the Committee that TRANSCOM has been
    conducting analyses to assess requirements for an environment
    where our mobility forces would be challenged, and his
    assessment was that additional investment in lift would be
    needed. However, when we received the report of that analysis
    in the Mobility Requirements Study earlier this year, the
    study's conclusions differed from General McDew's assessment.
    General Lyons, perhaps you could give us an update on why there
    was a change.
        Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats
    because of the command's extensive network with private sector
    entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General
    Lyons, I would like to get an update from you on progress in
    the cybersecurity efforts you have made since last year.
        Once again, let me thank the witnesses for their service
    and for their testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        You guys know the drill. First, you are going to have 5
    minutes. Try not to exceed 5 minutes, but your entire statement
    will be made a part of the record. We will start with you,
    General Scaparrotti.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
         UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
              ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

        General Scaparrotti. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the
    Commander at United States European Command. I am honored to be
    here today this morning with General Steve Lyons as well.
        First and foremost, I want to thank you for Congress'
    support of the servicemembers, civilians, and families in
    Europe. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and
    dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is
    essential to our national security and to maintaining global
    peace and prosperity. We as a nation are blessed by their
    voluntary and exceptional service. Thank you again for your
    steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
        The threats facing United States interests in the EUCOM
    area of responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and
    growing. They are complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and
    multi-functional. This remains one of the most dynamic periods
    in recent history in my view. Russia has continued its
    reemergence as a strategic competitor and remains the primary
    threat to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment.
        While the United States maintains a global military
    superiority over Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten
    to erode our competitive military advantage, challenge our
    ability to operate uncontested in all domains, and diminish our
    ability to deter Russian aggression.
        In light of Russia's modernizing and increasingly
    aggressive force posture, EUCOM recommends augmenting our
    assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrence
    posture. EUCOM also recommends further investments that enhance
    European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support
    rapid deployment of multi-domain United States Forces in
    Europe.
        In addition to the threat from Russia, the risk of
    terrorism in Europe remains high despite a decline in
    fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists
    present a clear and present threat to Europe's people and their
    infrastructure.
        Thankfully, the United States is not alone in facing these
    other challenges across the Euro-Atlantic theater. As our
    National Defense Strategy states, the NATO alliance deters
    Russian adventurism, contributes to the defeat of terrorism,
    and addresses instability along NATO's periphery. Our allies
    and partners play a vital role in our collective security, and
    they have made significant progress in increasing cash
    contributions and capabilities that provide our common defense.
    For almost 70 years, NATO has been the cornerstone of Euro-
    Atlantic security. As NATO adapts to remain relevant and fit
    for purpose, we will find, as we always have, that every
    challenge is best addressed as an alliance.
        Let me close by, again, thanking Congress and this
    Committee for your continued support, especially the sustained
    funding of the European Deterrence Initiative, EDI. EUCOM's
    future success in implementing our National Defense Strategy
    and fulfilling our mission is only possible with Congress'
    support. Thank you.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is my honor to testify today in
    what is likely my final year as Commander of the United States European
    Command (USEUCOM). I humbly represent over 68,000 brave and dedicated
    men and women who are forward-deployed or stationed in the European
    theater of operations. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and
    dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is essential to our
    national security and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. We as
    a Nation are blessed by their voluntary and exceptional service. Thank
    you for your steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
        Europe and the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance remain crucial to our
    national security, as clearly stated in the President's 2017 National
    Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and
    the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS). USEUCOM's operations,
    activities, and investments are aligned with the principles and
    guidance provided by these strategic documents. I cannot stress enough
    that USEUCOM's ongoing and future success in implementing and executing
    these strategies is only possible with Congress' support, especially
    the sustained funding of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
    A Dynamic Security Environment
        The threats facing United States interests in the USEUCOM area of
    responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing. They are
    complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional. They require
    the United States, together with our European allies and partners, to
    constantly adapt with forces and concepts that are able to out-pace the
    evolution of these threats. A revisionist Russia is the primary threat
    to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. Russia has invaded
    Ukraine, occupied Crimea, launched cyber-attacks against the Baltic
    States and Ukraine, interfered in United States and other Western
    elections, and attacked Ukrainian navy vessels attempting to transit
    the Kerch Strait to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. It is also
    overhauling its nuclear forces--including those that threaten European
    territory, such as the dual-capable, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    (INF)-violating SSC-8/9M729 ground-launched cruise missile. Given
    Moscow's demonstrated willingness to violate international law and
    legally-binding treaties, and to exercise malign influence, Russia
    threatens the United States' vital national interests in preserving a
    Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
        We have already made significant strides in adapting our European
    force posture to meet these threats. As we continue to adapt, USEUCOM
    remains steadfastly committed to fielding a lethal, agile, and
    resilient force and to strengthening the NATO Alliance. With continued
    investment, innovative use of resources, and the strength of our
    Nation's resolve, I am confident that we will continue to meet the
    challenges of the dynamic security environment. This includes ensuring
    the continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which
    backstops all U.S. military and diplomatic operations across the globe
    and helps ensure that tensions with Russia--no matter where or how they
    arise--do not escalate into large-scale war.
               risks and challenges in the strategic environment
    Russia
        Russia is a long-term, strategic competitor that wants to advance
    its own objectives at the expense of U.S. prosperity and security and
    that sees the United States and the NATO Alliance as the principal
    threat to its geopolitical ambitions. In pursuit of its objectives,
    Moscow seeks to assert its influence over nations along its periphery,
    undermine NATO solidarity, and fracture the rules-based international
    order. Russia actively pursues an aggressive foreign policy in
    violation of other nations' sovereignty, carrying out subversive and
    destabilizing activities in Europe and the United States and exploiting
    opportunities to increase its influence and expand its presence in
    Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia.
        Russia employs a whole-of-society approach through a wide array of
    tools to include political provocateurs, information operations,
    economic intimidation, cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies,
    special operations, conventional military forces, and nuclear forces.
    Russia pursues its strategic objectives in Europe, while avoiding
    direct military conflict with the United States and NATO, by targeting
    countries through indirect action--backed up by the coercive threat of
    its conventional and nuclear forces. Such actions include questioning a
    government's legitimacy, threatening a country's economic interests,
    mobilizing fringe opposition groups, and utilizing proxies or armed
    civilians, such as private military contracting companies with opaque
    ties to the state.
        Russia's military capability improvements are significant. Russia
    continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to complete its
    broad-based upgrade of its nuclear forces and produce advanced weapons
    and capabilities specifically designed to counter United States
    military superiority. Russia's nuclear modernization program covers
    every leg of its strategic triad and includes advanced modern road-
    mobile and silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), new
    Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Long Range Strategic
    Bombers. Russia is also developing and deploying new strategic nuclear
    delivery platforms, to include its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered
    underwater unmanned vehicle, intercontinental-range cruise missile, and
    its air-launched ballistic missile, all of which Russia seeks to keep
    outside of existing arms control agreements. Additionally, they are
    pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons, which could provide them the
    capability to attack anywhere in the globe with little or no notice.
        Russia is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-
    strategic, dual-capable weapons. It currently has an active stockpile
    of approximately 2,000 of these theater-range systems, which are not
    subject to the New START Treaty's limitations on deployed warheads.
    These systems include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic-
    missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges, and Russia's INF-violating
    ground-launched cruise missile, among others.
        Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern
    because it facilitates Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear
    first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia
    a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. The
    2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for adjustments to U.S. nuclear
    forces to close this perceived gap on the escalation ladder and
    reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.
        Outside of its nuclear forces, Russia is fielding advanced anti-
    access/area denial (A2AD) integrated air defense systems (IADS),
    precision guided cruise and ballistic missiles, modern cyber and
    electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and counter-space weapons meant
    to impede United States power projection in Europe. They have improved
    readiness via investments in infrastructure, training, and
    compensation, and their exercise program demonstrates increasingly
    sophisticated command and control and integration across multiple
    warfare areas. In the Arctic, Russia continues to invest in their
    forces as environmental changes open up access to the High North.
        The Kremlin has also demonstrated the ability and political will to
    deploy its modernized military and expand its operational footprint.
    Last year we observed a historically high combat maritime presence in
    the East Mediterranean along with military deployments and
    demonstrations in Syria. Their most advanced and quietest guided
    missile submarine, the Severodvinsk, conducted extended deployments in
    the northern Atlantic.
        Russia seeks advantage over the United States and its European
    allies through its non-compliance with long-standing arms control
    treaties. Its violations of the INF Treaty allowed Moscow to develop
    capabilities that the United States continued to forego. Its
    ``suspension'' of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty gave
    it greater flexibility to posture forces in regions of special interest
    to Moscow and to do so with significantly less transparency towards its
    neighbors in ways we do not because of our adherence to these treaties.
    Its violation of certain provisions of the Open Skies Treaty--as well
    as its selective implementation of Vienna Document transparency
    measures--poses challenges for ensuring full military transparency.
        Our NATO allies supported the U.S. announcement to begin withdrawal
    from the INF Treaty because they recognize that Russia's Treaty-banned
    systems hold much of Europe at risk and that despite significant
    diplomatic efforts--more than 30 engagements over nearly six years--
    Russia refuses to return to compliance.
        While the United States maintains global military superiority over
    Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive
    military advantage, challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all
    domains, and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression.
    Ukraine
        Moscow persists in its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine
    and block Ukraine's democratic choice to align with the West. Following
    Russia's purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia's aggressive
    activities, including those of Russia-led forces in the Donbas region
    in eastern Ukraine, target Ukraine's defense, economic, and political
    sectors. Russia has not implemented its commitments in the Minsk
    agreements, and Russia continues to arm, train, lean, and fight
    alongside antigovernment forces in eastern Ukraine. The conflict in
    eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous ceasefire violations
    reported weekly. The UN reports that approximately 13,000 people have
    been killed in the Donbas since Russia instigated the conflict in 2014.
    More than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2018 as well as 55
    civilians. Due to Russian intransigence, no peacekeeping initiative has
    been implemented. Russia's unjustified use of force against Ukrainian
    vessels and naval personnel in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait last
    November demonstrated Russia's disregard for Ukraine's sovereignty and
    territorial integrity, denying Ukraine its right of free passage in
    accordance with international law. In addition, through its support of
    illegitimate elections in the so-called ``Donetsk and Luhansk People's
    Republics'', Russia has sought to undermine the government of Ukraine.
    Russia will likely attempt to interfere in Ukraine's upcoming
    presidential elections, as it did in 2014.
    Georgia
        After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia stationed 7,000 troops on
    sovereign Georgian territory. Russia now occupies approximately 20
    percent of Georgian territory and maintains a significant military and
    border presence in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has
    recognized the two territories as independent, entering into defense
    agreements with these territories and incorporating South Ossetian and
    Abkhazian ``national military forces'' into Russian Army command
    structures. Russia exacerbates tensions by fomenting discord between
    these territories and the rest of Georgia. While Georgia supports
    confidence building measures, such as granting the EU Monitoring
    Mission in Georgia (EUMM) access to the occupied territories in
    accordance with its mandate. Russia opposes them.
    Balkans
        Security in the Balkans, a strategically significant region, is
    tenuous, and Balkan nations are a primary target of Russian malign
    influence. Negotiations between Kosovo and neighboring Serbia to
    normalize their relations and agree on a long-term solution that is
    viable for both countries have struggled to make progress for some time
    and are currently on hold. Russia fuels regional instability in an
    effort to prevent individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path
    toward greater Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Seeking to
    maintain its influence in Serbia through political, military, and
    economic support, Russia also opposes the recognition of Kosovo as a
    sovereign country. NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes over
    3,500 troops from both NATO and non-NATO nations, plays an important
    role in maintaining security and stability in this region. Bosnia and
    Herzegovina also continues to work toward long-term peace and
    stability. Despite challenges from Republika Srpska, which is
    influenced by Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina partners with the United
    States and NATO, supporting the Resolute Support Mission in
    Afghanistan.
    Baltics and Poland
        Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are a focal point of United
    States and NATO deterrence posture and activities as Russia attempts to
    intimidate these nations, both politically and militarily. Russia also
    tries to influence ethnic Russian populations, especially in Estonia
    and Latvia, and both countries remain mindful that in Crimea, Russia
    used these ethnic groups as a justification for intervention. Poland
    has offered at least $2 billion towards United States basing in Poland,
    and the form of such an increased United States troop posture in Poland
    is currently being discussed in Working Groups under the auspices of a
    DOD-led Executive Steering Group.
    Turkey
        Turkey is a strategically important ally facing significant
    security challenges, the most pressing of which is the ongoing Syrian
    conflict. It must maintain security along its border with Syria, and
    within its borders, Turkey hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees.
    Turkey continues to view the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Syrian
    Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as a single entity, one that
    constitutes a greater threat than ISIS. This has complicated United
    States-Turkey cooperation on Syria. USEUCOM works closely with Turkey
    to help secure its borders, and we have improved our efforts, in
    support of Turkey, to counter the PKK and the threats this terrorist
    organization poses to Turkish citizens. USEUCOM also supports United
    States interagency efforts to effect a deliberate withdrawal of United
    States forces from Syria that ensures the enduring defeat of ISIS,
    preserves Turkey's security, and keeps faith with United States
    partners on the ground. Finally, USEUCOM supported United States
    interagency efforts to provide an NATO-interoperable alternative to
    avert Turkey's planned purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense system,
    which risks triggering the Countering America's Adversaries Through
    Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Such an opposition puts at risk NATO cohesion
    and our longstanding and mutually beneficial United States-Turkish
    defense industrial cooperation.
    Violent Extremist Networks
        The risk of terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline in
    fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists present a
    clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and infrastructure. ISIS
    seeks to re-establish itself in Iraq and Syria, expand into new safe
    havens, and plan attacks against Western targets. We must remain
    vigilant to all jihadist groups trying to extend their operational
    networks and radicalize recruits in Europe.
    Israel
        In the Levant, Israel faces a complex set of security challenges
    from numerous actors across multiple domains. Israel must constantly
    defend itself from threats posed by Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and
    Iran, which has expanded its network of proxies while also pursuing
    advancements in its missile program to assert its influence throughout
    the Middle East. Israel must also guard against Russia's increased
    presence in Syria, its facilitation of Iran's presence, and ISIS
    militants along its Syrian border.
    Additional European Security Challenges
        Several other issues present ongoing challenges to European
    security. Though migrant flows slowed in 2018, Europe's migrant crisis
    has led to difficult political discussions about demographic
    integration and the allocation of resources. Transnational organized
    crime and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons, to
    include weapons of mass destruction and related materials, can be
    linked with terrorism and place an added burden on European security
    and police forces. USEUCOM is also monitoring China's activities in
    Europe as it seeks to expand its influence and grow its presence. For
    example, China is looking to secure access to strategic geographic
    locations and economic sectors through financial stakes in ports,
    airlines, hotels, and utility providers, while providing a source of
    capital for struggling European economies. Russia and China have
    increased their transactional collaboration based on some common
    objectives and opportunities to increase their power and influence at
    the expense of the United States and our allies.
          accomplishments and opportunities--``strength and balance''
    Strategy Implementation
        USEUCOM is confronting the risks and challenges in its area of
    responsibility by aggressively adapting our thinking and posture in
    accordance with the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the
    Secretary's National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman's
    National Military Strategy (NMS). We are particularly focused on
    expanding the competitive space with Russia by increasing the lethality
    of our forces and strengthening alliances and partnerships. Our forces
    demonstrate commitment to the defense of our allies while our execution
    of the Dynamic Force Employment concept, along with our operations and
    exercises, introduce operational unpredictability to our adversaries.
    USEUCOM will help ensure that our Nation successfully competes with
    Russia, deters aggression, and if necessary, prevails in conflict.
    Supporting NATO
        The NSS, NDS, and NMS all emphasize the central role of a
    revitalized NATO in securing our vital national interests. NATO allies
    help shoulder our common defense burden through cash (defense
    spending), contributions (such as troop deployments), and critical
    capabilities (e.g., advanced missile defense systems). Allies have made
    considerable progress in each of these areas.
        Since January 2017, allies have added more than $41 billion in
    increased defense spending over the 2016 level; and by the end of 2020,
    Allies--according to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg--are on track
    to add approximately $100 billion in increased defense spending. In
    2018, eight allies spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense and ten more
    have presented plans or made political commitments to do so by 2024.
    Fifteen allies are already allocating at least 20 percent of their
    defense budgets to major new equipment in 2018, and 11 more have
    presented plans or commitments to do so by 2024. In addition, all U.S.
    EDI-funded military construction is being submitted for consideration
    of future funding via recoupment through the NATO Security Investment
    Program (NSIP).
        At last year's Brussels Summit, NATO Heads of State agreed that
    ensuring alliance responsiveness, readiness, and reinforcement are
    strategic imperatives for implementing a credible deterrence and
    defense posture. There are several distinct elements to this
    commitment. Implementation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS)
    Adaptation will include a refined Initial State Peacetime Establishment
    (ISPE) manning increase, the stand-up of NATO Headquarters Joint Forces
    Command--Norfolk (JFCNF) to command and control (C2) operations in the
    Atlantic, and the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling
    Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany.
        NATO allies are also making progress in developing a more capable,
    interoperable, and ready alliance force. NATO's Political Guidance for
    defense planning (PG19) provides direction for a variety of required
    cross-domain capabilities. PG19, discussed at the February 2019 NATO
    Defense Ministers conference, is the first step in the process NATO
    uses to influence allied nations, develop and deliver interoperable
    forces, and ensure the alliance has the required capabilities and
    readiness needed to strengthen deterrence and defense. Additionally,
    the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), which builds upon the 2014
    Readiness Action Plan's comprehensive package of Assurance and
    Adaptation Measures, will provide ``4-30s''--30 major naval combatants,
    30 medium or heavy maneuver battalions, and 30 air squadrons ready to
    fight within 30 days--by the year 2020.
        In terms of contributions, allies have stepped up their support for
    NATO-led missions. From 2014 to 2017, the number of NATO troops serving
    on deployment was up from 18,000 to just under 23,000 (with almost half
    of that number, 10,500, from outside the U.S.). In addition to the
    United States, Germany, Canada, and the UK serve as Framework Nations
    for the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in the Baltics
    and Poland. The UK, Romania, and Croatia all contribute forces to the
    United States eFP mission. Germany serves as the Framework Nation for
    the 2019 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) brigade. NATO
    allies and partners also contribute forces to NATO's Baltic Air
    Policing, enhanced Air Policing in the Black Sea region, Standing
    Maritime Group, Resolute Support Mission (RSM), and KFOR.
        As directed by the NDS, we will `fortify the Trans-Atlantic
    Alliance' in part by increasing our collaboration with our European
    allies and partners. With thanks to Congress for its support to our
    security cooperation and security assistance initiatives, USEUCOM
    continues to bolster our engagement in places like Ukraine, Georgia,
    the Balkans, and in other allied and partner nations along Russia's
    border. USEUCOM employs programs such as the Ukrainian Security
    Assistance Initiative, Section 333 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, and
    Title 22 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to build partner capabilities
    in key European nations, enhancing their abilities to defend their
    sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to operate in coalition with
    the United States. Additionally, USEUCOM works closely with NATO
    planners and forces to integrate our collective capabilities, and we
    will regularly test and improve these capabilities through title 10
    exercises, our Joint Exercise Program, and through NATO Response Force
    (NRF) certification exercises to ensure interoperability on the
    battlefield. We will continue to press allies to meet the important 2
    percent mark, advocate for individual nation capability targets that
    meet their most pressing force requirements, and align with their
    assigned NATO capability targets.
        NATO is also a key platform for engagement and displaying
    solidarity on issues such as Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. The
    Alliance unanimously supported our declaration of Russia's material
    breach of the INF Treaty in December and our announcement that we were
    suspending our legal obligations and initiating withdrawal from the
    Treaty in February. We remain engaged on this issue with our NATO
    Allies to ensure NATO is postured to defend against Russia's new
    intermediate-range capability and to deny Russia any military advantage
    from its unlawful conduct.
    Working with Non-NATO Partners
        Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in Afghanistan,
    where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute Support with
    almost 900 troops currently deployed. The United States-Georgia
    security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in
    2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone
    in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a
    credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The
    program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its
    national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea
    region.
        Ukraine seeks to partner more closely with the United States, NATO,
    and the European Union (EU), and it has made progress in developing a
    capable, sustainable, and professional force. USEUCOM supports
    Ukraine's efforts through the Joint Multinational Training Group-
    Ukraine (JMTG-U), combined exercises including the annual naval
    Exercise Sea Breeze, and other activities. The United States delivered
    the Javelin anti-armor capability to Ukraine in April 2018 to deter
    Russian aggression against Ukraine. Continued senior-level engagement
    and support for Ukrainian self-defense capabilities and institutional
    reform will help enhance regional security and demonstrate our
    continued commitment to Ukraine's security and territorial integrity,
    and a rules-based international order in Europe.
        Thanks to the historic agreement this past summer between Greece
    and North Macedonia, we are poised to welcome NATO's newest member once
    Allied ratifications are complete. North Macedonia is a consistent
    contributor to security, regularly deploying forces to Afghanistan and
    to other United States and NATO-led exercises, and the Alliance will be
    stronger with North Macedonia as a full member.
        The EU has moved to enact multiple defense reforms and initiatives
    in an attempt to create efficiencies and commonalities in European
    defense. These include the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, which
    serves as the basis for preparing the EU's long-term Capability
    Development Plan and identifying defense and investment capability
    shortfalls; the European Defense Fund, which will amplify research and
    development undertaken by multiple participants to achieve economies of
    scale and free up funds for additional capability development; and
    Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a legal framework to
    cooperate more intensively on defense issues and jointly develop
    defense capabilities for EU military operations. NATO continues to work
    with the EU to ensure these efforts complement rather than duplicate
    NATO initiatives or undermine NATO as the foundation of Euro-Atlantic
    security.
    Strengthening U.S. Deterrence Posture
        A combat-credible United States deterrence posture in Europe means
    fielding a force that is lethal, agile, and able to maneuver across the
    continent, capable of delivering joint fires, flexible enough to
    operate inside a highly contested environment, integrated with multi-
    domain capabilities, resilient through redundant systems, protected
    through integrated air and missile defense systems, and prepared to
    leverage the full power of our allies and partners. Establishing this
    force requires us to make resource-informed decisions about the
    appropriate combination of persistent forces (assigned, forward
    stationed, or persistent heel-to-toe 365 day rotations), and those that
    can quickly reach and operate in theater under the Dynamic Force
    Employment concept.
        Each of USEUCOM's Service Component Commands has strengthened our
    deterrence posture. The capability and lethality of United States Army
    Europe (USAREUR) forces stationed in Europe were enhanced by persistent
    armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)
    rotations. The forward stationing of long-range fires and air defense
    units will further improve the lethality and resilience of USAREUR
    forces. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) executed a no-notice deployment of
    the Harry S. Truman (HST) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the
    Mediterranean in the summer 2018 and to the North Atlantic in the fall
    2018. As part of its deployment, the CSG participated in Trident
    Juncture 18, which had not involved a CSG in over 20 years. In Eastern
    Europe, strategic bombers and fourth- and fifth-generation fighters
    deployed to support United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
    deterrence missions. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) sustained
    rotational elements in both the Black Sea region and Norway. Special
    Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provided rotational teams that
    helped build the resiliency of allies and partners exposed to Russian
    malign influence. In support of the Service components, our Nation's
    Reserve component forces continue to play a critical role in supporting
    our assurance and deterrence mission, especially through the National
    Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).
        Enhancing our logistical infrastructure and capacity is another key
    element to fielding a combat-credible force. EDI investments in
    resilient joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
    (JRSOI) have resulted in infrastructure improvements as well as the
    Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and European Contingency Air Operation
    Sets (ECAOS). USEUCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM in the Joint
    Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to find integrated
    solutions and facilitate strategic movement and maneuver through our
    military and commercial partners. The EU is also addressing logistics
    through its PESCO project focused on military mobility, with the goal
    of partnering with NATO to better facilitate the movement of troops and
    equipment across European borders. Furthermore, we are working to
    enhance munition stocks and ensure interchangeability with NATO
    munitions to allow flexibility within the Alliance.
        We have also strengthened our deterrence and defense through the
    Joint Force Headquarters Exercise Program, which prepares USEUCOM to
    effectively carry out its wartime mission and trains our Component
    Commands to assume Joint Force Component Command and Joint Task Force
    (JTF) missions. Our exercises maintain and enhance our ability to
    jointly operate in a multi-domain and multi-functional environment. We
    execute four Tier 1 exercises--Austere Challenge, Juniper Cobra,
    Juniper Falcon, and Jackal Stone, along with numerous theater-specific
    and global integration exercises.
        Although we have increased our forces, improved our infrastructure,
    and successfully executed multiple rotations, deployments, and
    exercises, a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency
    operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter
    aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary.
        As for our nuclear forces, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    validated the importance of maintaining the nuclear triad for strategic
    stability with Russia and China. Great power competition requires that
    we maintain a credible strategic deterrence, which includes modernizing
    its supporting infrastructure. This underwrites U.S. security,
    diplomacy, and our conventional military operations worldwide.
    Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
        USEUCOM works directly with our combatant command counterparts and
    our European partners to identify and counter terrorist threats. We are
    increasing our intelligence-sharing and strengthening a counter-VEO
    network that includes NATO, partner nations, and international
    organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL. Our EU, NATO, and USEUCOM-
    shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO networks and
    facilitates expanded intelligence-sharing with law enforcement.
    European allies provide the United States with critical strategic
    access for counter-terrorism operations in USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM
    theaters, and they also deploy their own forces to support U.S.-led
    operations, including Operation Inherent Resolve. Counter VEO efforts
    led to a significant decline in directed and enabled attacks across
    Europe in 2018.
    Competing in Cyberspace
        USEUCOM's ongoing efforts to build operational-level cyberspace
    capabilities are critical to implementing the NDS. USEUCOM benefits
    from resources and authorities that enable us to partner more closely
    with USCYBERCOM. We are well-aligned in the planning and conduct of
    cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives that include deterring
    Russia, countering misinformation, and defending computer networks. Our
    Joint Cyber Center (JCC) continues to mature in manning, facilities,
    and authorities to actively counter cyber-attacks and help strengthen
    ally and partner nation cyber capabilities.
    Building Intelligence Capacity
        USEUCOM is working alongside our allies and partners to grow our
    intelligence and analytical capability in order to meet both steady
    state and contingency planning requirements. We are leveraging language
    expertise resident in European nations and are utilizing non-
    traditional ISR platforms to mitigate the global shortage of high-
    demand, low-density assets. In addition, USEUCOM is leveraging the
    growing capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in
    sourcing intelligence communication and dissemination platforms, such
    as the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System (MARS),
    Publicly Available Information and Open Source Intelligence (PAI-
    OSINT), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
    (JWICS).
    Countering Russian Malign Influence
        As we expand the competitive space with Russia, USEUCOM is working
    with the interagency to effectively compete below the level of armed
    conflict. A leading effort in this domain of competition is the Russian
    Influence Group (RIG), jointly led by USEUCOM and our Statement
    Department counterparts in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
    The RIG brings together the interagency to share information and
    collaborate in efforts to counter Russian malign activities in Europe.
    Separately, United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are also
    working with select European allies and partners to enhance their
    defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian malign
    influence. USEUCOM and USSOCOM work together to employ SOF in Europe,
    where their unique access and capabilities can be utilized to compete
    below the level of armed conflict.
    Providing Assistance to Israel
        USEUCOM directly supports our Nation's unwavering commitment to the
    security of Israel. We meet regularly with senior Israeli military
    leaders, coordinate in planning, and regularly participate in combined
    exercises. USEUCOM also assists in the defense of Israel through a
    continuous missile defense presence in the Mediterranean under
    Operation Sharp Sentry. Israel continues to be the largest recipient of
    Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funds, and in September 2016, the United
    States and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that
    provides $3.8 billion per year in military assistance over the fiscal
    year 2019  fiscal year 2028 period, totaling $38 billion, enabling
    Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge over its adversaries.
    Enabling Global Operations
        Strategic geographic access, forward basing, and overflight
    permissions within Europe support multiple combatant commands and
    enable allied, coalition, and United States operations. European basing
    and access remains our strategic military ``high-ground'' for the
    United States and a key enabler of our global power projection. The
    bilateral agreements that grant the U.S. these permissions are built on
    trust and sustained by maintaining relationships with our allies and
    partners. Last year's United States-led cruise missile strike in Syria
    is the latest in a number of examples in which European access, basing,
    and overflight were critical in executing short-notice, contingency
    operations.
    Fiscal Year 2020 Requests
        The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) provides funding to
    improve our deterrence posture and execute our deterrent initiatives
    and activities. First, EDI ensures that we position the right
    capabilities and refine the necessary infrastructure to respond to
    adversaries in a timely manner. Second, it underwrites our commitment
    to article 5 and to the territorial integrity of all NATO nations.
    Third, EDI increases the capability and readiness of U.S. Forces, NATO
    allies, and regional partners so we can effectively deter adversary
    aggression and adventurism. USEUCOM has remained disciplined in
    nominating EDI projects that are consistent with Congressional guidance
    and follow five distinct lines of effort: increased presence, exercises
    and training, enhanced prepositioning, improved infrastructure, and
    building partnership capacity.
        In accordance with your Congressional guidance, we plan and execute
    EDI as if it were a Future Years Defense Program. This allows us to
    maintain fiscal and program discipline and prepares the command for
    when EDI transfers from overseas contingency operations (OCO) to base
    service budgets.
        Our fiscal year 2020 Budget request focuses on: (1) continued
    implementation of Enhancing Army Prepositioned Stocks to improve
    responsiveness of ground forces and provide rapidly deployable combat
    capability in the event of contingencies; (2) continued implementation
    of the Air Force Prepositioned Stocks and airfield facilities to
    improve flexibility and resilience of air forces and provide rapidly
    deployable combat capability in the event of contingencies; (3)
    continued enhancement to the Theater's Anti-Submarine Warfare through
    the procurement of additional equipment and the improvement to theater
    infrastructure; and (4) enhancing other key capabilities and
    requirements throughout the theater including, but not limited to: (a)
    Naval logistics hubs; (b) Integrated Air and Missile Defense: and (c)
    JRSOI.
    Conclusion
        Given the transformation of the European security environment and
    its impact on United States national security, a strong commitment to
    the USEUCOM area of responsibility is more important than ever. I would
    like to thank Congress for their acknowledgement of these threats and
    their continued support of efforts within the USEUCOM theater. Russia
    continues to engage in armed aggression in eastern Ukraine, is yet to
    fulfill Minsk Agreement obligations, maintains an illegal occupation of
    Crimea with reinforced forces, openly violates International law, to
    include the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in
    Europe, and Open Skies Treaties, and blocks Vienna Document revisions
    which are needed to address non-accountability of political-military
    realities. As witnessed last March with the Skripal poisoning, the
    Kremlin is willing to act boldly, employing banned military-grade nerve
    agents against civilian targets on the territory of our ally, contrary
    to all international norms, expectations of civilized society, and
    their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The
    growing capability of Iran and its proxies is challenging Israel's
    security. Violent extremists, though slightly abridged in activities
    last year, remain intent on destroying a rules-based system of
    government and will continue to target United States and European
    civilians and infrastructure.
        Fortunately, we are not alone in meeting these challenges. As
    stated in the NDS, the NATO Alliance will ``deter Russian adventurism,
    defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of
    instability building on NATO's periphery.'' NATO has been, and will
    remain, vital to our national security, and a central element in
    addressing the challenges of the 21st century. Our Trans-Atlantic bond
    is strengthened by a shared commitment of collective defense,
    democratic principles, and mutual respect of national sovereignty.
        The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    civilians at USEUCOM continue to display selfless service and
    dedication to meet the demands of the European theater. They are the
    lethal, agile, and resilient force that will protect and defend the
    Homeland and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Scaparrotti.
        General Lyons?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                     STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General Lyons. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you
    today and represent the men and women of United States
    Transportation Command.
        I am pleased to join General Scaparrotti. He is one of
    several but very important supported commands of the United
    States Transportation Command, and his more than 40 years of
    exceptional leadership remains a stellar example for all of us.
        I could not be more proud of the more than 120,000
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and coast guardsmen and
    civil servants that are assigned to United States
    Transportation Command. They project and sustain the joint
    force every day.
        The Department's global deployment networks, transportation
    capacity in air, on land, and over the sea and our global
    command and control capabilities combine to provide the United
    States with a strategic competitive advantage unmatched around
    the world. Somewhere on the globe a TRANSCOM aircraft is
    touching down every 3 minutes. TRANSCOM ships are under way.
    Aerial refueling missions are orbiting overhead, and planes
    converted to intensive care units are moving our Nation's ill
    and injured.
        I should remind everybody, though, that the key to our
    success is global access, and I would like to highlight that
    our allies and likeminded partners that provide access to key
    regions, support substantial basing, and reinforce DOD's global
    reach are critical to our mission.
        We know we must never take our success for granted. For
    decades, we could generally deploy our forces when we wanted,
    assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. With
    the rise of great power competition, we can no longer assume
    that we can operate with impunity.
        Before closing, I would like to acknowledge the letters
    that I received from more than a dozen members of Congress
    concerning the Defense Personal Property Program, which
    relocates the household goods for our servicemembers,
    civilians, and their families. Simply put, I agree. We lack the
    capacity during peak season, and we lack measures to hold
    industry accountable. Our most important resource is our people
    and we owe them better. In consultation with the service
    secretaries and the service chiefs and on behalf of the
    Department, TRANSCOM is leading an initiative to restructure
    our relationship with industry in an effort to improve quality,
    capacity, and accountability.
        In closing, I am proud to support DOD's enduring mission of
    providing a combat-credible military force to deter war and
    protect the security of our Nation. Our nation relies on United
    States Transportation Command to respond with immediate force
    on short notice and seamlessly transition to project a decisive
    force when needed. I am fully committed to retaining this
    strategic competitive advantage.
        Thank you for your support to the Department and your
    support to United States Transportation Command, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
                   united states transportation command 2019
    Delivering for our Nation
        United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is one of ten
    warfighting combatant commands (CCMD) in the Department of Defense
    (DOD). Our ability to deliver and sustain combat power anywhere in the
    world underpins the lethality of the Joint Force. USTRANSCOM's purpose
    is to project and sustain military power at a time and place of our
    choosing in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). In doing
    so, we advance American interests and provide our Nation's leaders with
    strategic flexibility to select from multiple options and create
    multiple dilemmas for adversaries. No other country in the world
    possesses the capability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces across
    strategic distances, providing an immediate force and a decisive force
    when needed.
        With global responsibilities and capabilities that transcend air,
    land, and sea, USTRANSCOM is uniquely postured to fulfill five specific
    responsibilities within the 2017 Unified Command Plan that include: 1)
    the DOD's Single Manager for Transportation, 2) the Mobility Joint
    Force Provider, 3) the DOD Single Manager for Global Patient Movement
    (GPM), 4) the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC) for
    the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), and 5)
    providing Joint Enabling Capabilities via the Joint Enabling
    Capabilities Command (JECC).
        USTRANSCOM responsibilities are operationalized and executed
    through three component commands; Military Surface Deployment and
    Distribution Command (SDDC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air
    Mobility Command (AMC); and one subordinate command, the Joint Enabling
    Capabilities Command (JECC). In addition, the Joint Transportation
    Reserve Unit (JTRU) provides critical Reserve manpower augmentation to
    USTRANSCOM headquarters. USTRANSCOM also has a strong connection with
    commercial industry, sometimes referred to as the `4th Component,'
    because they provide important augmentation in day-to-day and surge
    operations.
        Our Total Force team is comprised of more than 122,000 Active Duty,
    National Guard, Reserve, and Civilians that conduct worldwide
    operations. In addition, industry partners under contract to the U.S.
    Government provide critical transportation capacity, access to global
    trade networks, and trained Merchant Mariners to crew U.S. Navy sealift
    vessels. On an average day in USTRANSCOM, 115 railcars are moving DOD
    equipment, 33 ships are underway, 1,500 trucks are delivering cargo, an
    aircraft is taking off or landing around the world every 2.8 minutes
    with 455 airlift sorties in motion, 47 tanker sorties are refueling
    receiver aircraft, and 13 airborne patients are under expert medical
    professionals' care. This activity, although significant, would be
    dwarfed by a wartime scenario that requires a fully-mobilized
    deployment enterprise.
      Strategic Environment
        The NDS describes the DOD's response to the most complex security
    environment we have experienced in recent memory, and we expect that
    power projection will be contested in all domains. For decades, the
    U.S. enjoyed dominance in every operating domain; we could generally
    deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and
    operate how we wanted. China, Russia, and to a lesser extent rogue
    regimes now challenge this ability through competition across all
    dimensions of power, resulting in long and potentially contested lines
    of communication for USTRANSCOM. In this operating environment, focused
    DOD effort, complemented by a whole-of-government effort, is necessary
    to enable sufficient comparative advantage in mobility and logistics
    for USTRANSCOM to project military power decisively when our Nation
    calls.
    Projecting the Joint Force Globally
        USTRANSCOM and the broader JDDE are designed to project and sustain
    military forces around the world. We conduct globally integrated
    mobility operations through dynamic synchronization of (1) global
    deployment networks; (2) a global command & control and integration
    construct to dynamically allocate resources for our Nation's strategic
    priorities; and (3) transportation and mobility capacity operating
    across air, land, and sea.
      1. Global Deployment Networks
        USTRANSCOM's global networks of nodes and routes provide the Nation
    with multiple paths to connect the globe and deliver Joint Force
    capability for supported combatant commanders (CCDR). Power projection
    capabilities are enabled by en route infrastructure and are metered by
    a command's ability to receive the force. Power projection is
    underpinned by diplomatic alignment and geopolitical agreements with
    allies and partners to enable strategic maneuver of the force and
    deliver effects to the point of need.

      1a. CONUS Power Projection
        CONUS power projection relies upon DOD installations, seaports,
    railways, and highways that connect them. USTRANSCOM manages several
    programs on behalf of DOD, in coordination with other government
    agencies, to ensure our national infrastructure is sufficient to
    support military mobilization. The Strategic Seaport Program consists
    of 23 primary seaports and multiple alternate ports. The majority of
    these ports are active, commercial ports spread across the east, west,
    and gulf coasts. The Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) program
    connects rail lines with over 120 defense installations and sites of
    military importance.
        The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) includes over 62,000 miles
    of roadways connecting important military installations to each other
    and with strategic seaports to facilitate rapid movement of military
    cargo. DOD power projection requires close coordination with other
    federal agencies to create a Joint Force conduit from garrison
    locations to ports of embarkation.

      1b. Geopolitical Access
        Assured, international access across air, land, and sea is
    underpinned by close coordination with like-minded allies and partners
    to obtain and retain sufficient and resilient en route support networks
    providing durable comparative advantage that no competitor can match.
    Allies and partners provide access to key regions, supporting a
    substantial basing and logistics system that reinforces the DOD's
    global reach. Without that system, the DOD would lack options in many
    contingencies and our responses would require more time to execute at
    greater cost. For the past 75 years, our allies and partners have
    joined us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the
    rules which underwrite a free and open international order. Strategic
    investment in international agreements, defense partnerships, and
    infrastructure provide multiple power projection pathways supporting
    global deployment.
      2. Global Command & Control and Integration
        USTRANSCOM's mission transcends traditional geographic combatant
    command boundaries, and our ability to integrate global mobility
    operations enables the JDDE to dynamically redirect capacity and
    operate at the speed of relevance. Global Command and Control allows
    USTRANSCOM, in support of Joint Force global integration, to apply
    resources consistent with strategic priorities in time and space.
    Through global networks and the capability to prioritize across all
    missions and modes, USTRANSCOM has the ability to source the optimal
    method of transportation to maximize value and responsiveness for
    supported commanders.
        Ultimately, Global Command & Control and Integration is necessary
    for USTRANSCOM to achieve decisive warfighting effects. Our adversaries
    intend to disrupt or deny this capability through cyber attacks, which
    requires robust defense capabilities for mission assurance.
      3. Transportation and Mobility Capacity
        Transportation and mobility capacity provides the lift that
    operates within the global deployment network. USTRANSCOM's assigned
    mobility forces consist of sealift, aerial refueling, inter-theater
    airlift, and intra-theater airlift forces. The DOD mobility force mix
    is spread across the Total Force with approximately 60 percent of the
    capacity retained in the Guard and Reserve. They are integrated into
    our day-to-day operations--some as directed through mobilization and
    others obtained by volunteerism. Our wartime mission success is
    dependent on the mobilized output of our Guard and Reserve partners.
    When necessary or when fiscally advantageous, military mobility
    capacity is augmented by commercial industry, and during wartime, they
    contribute to Joint Force projection through emergency preparedness
    programs. The following paragraphs address mission profiles in the
    areas of sealift, aerial refueling, airlift, patient movement, and
    industry capacity.

      3a. Sealift
        The DOD's sealift transportation fleet is expected to transport
    approximately 90 percent of our military cargo during wartime surge
    (primarily for the U.S. Army), and it consists of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/
    RO) ships, prepositioned afloat vessels, specialty ships for heavy
    lift, over-the-shore petroleum distribution ships, and crane support
    ships. Because the majority of our sealift fleet support is dedicated
    to wartime requirements, a significant portion is maintained in a
    Reduced Operating Status that is available for tasking five days after
    activation. Due to the increased age of the sealift fleet, degraded
    fleet readiness, and wartime requirements, sealift is USTRANSCOM's
    number one readiness concern. USTRANSCOM needs continued Congressional
    support for DOD efforts to improve sealift.
        Due to the age of DOD vessels and the level of maintenance funding
    in prior years, the overall health of the Surge Sealift Fleet has
    deteriorated. The Ready Reserve Force vessels average nearly 44 years
    old with the oldest in the fleet being 55 years old. In contrast, the
    average age of U.S.-flag, militarily useful vessels in the commercial
    sector is approximately 19 years of age, which by international
    standards is approaching end of service life. The use of steam-
    propulsion has become obsolete across the competitive global shipping
    market, however five steam-ships remain in the U.S.-flag commercial
    sector, and they are all scheduled to be phased out by 2021. When that
    occurs, USTRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operator of steam-powered
    vessels, with 26 vessels, complicating readiness because of the near
    extinction of steam-propulsion engineers, parts obsolescence and
    unavailability, and increased maintenance costs.
        The DOD has not met ship availability goals in recent years, and
    the U.S. Navy is addressing this problem by pursuing a three-pronged,
    sealift recapitalization strategy through 1) service life extensions
    where cost effective, 2) acquiring used vessels with Congressional
    approval, and 3) procuring new sealift vessels in the out years. The
    fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization
    Acts (NDAA) authorized the purchase of seven used vessels, and we
    expect to procure the first two vessels in 2021 and 2022.
        Commercial industry plays a critical role for DOD sealift by
    augmenting capacity, providing access to global trade networks, and
    generating a supply of qualified private sector Merchant Mariners
    essential to crew every surge sealift ship. Although the U.S. Merchant
    Mariner pool is currently sufficient to crew the surge sealift fleet,
    long-term, sustained conflicts could overstress the commercial
    industry's supply of contract mariners needed for sustainment
    operations.
        USTRANSCOM utilizes commercial industry during day-to-day
    contracted operations, and if needed in contingencies, we can activate
    participating companies through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
    Agreement (VISA) to gain access to critical sealift and intermodal
    capacity. When required, DOD also leverages U.S. commercial industry
    and foreign-flag shipping for strategic transport of bulk petroleum.

      3b. Aerial Refueling (AR)
        The AR fleet provides the backbone of rapid U.S. global operations,
    and ``tankers'' are the lifeblood of our Joint Force's ability to
    deploy an immediate force supporting all NDS mission areas. AR is
    USTRANSCOM's number two readiness concern. Today's AR fleet consists of
    the new KC-46 currently being delivered, the 33 year-old KC-10 that is
    planned for divestment, and the KC-135 which is a 57-year old airframe
    programmed to continue flying through mid-2050. Currently, we must
    manage limited AR capacity and globally position/reposition tankers to
    meet the highest priority NDS requirements while taking risk in lower
    priority missions.
        Limited fleet capacity, an aging fleet with degraded readiness, and
    non-mobilized operational utilization challenges pose significant risks
    to meeting future demands. Approximately 60 percent of the AR force
    resides in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), requiring careful
    management to satisfy daily operations and enable the crew force to
    attain full spectrum readiness. During KC-46 unit conversions, we are
    working closely with the U.S. Air Force to retain sufficient AR
    capacity and potentially delay the retirement of KC-135 aircraft in
    order to maintain sufficient number of aircraft to meet operational
    requirements. We strongly advocate for continued Congressional support
    to enhance tanker readiness and balance new aircraft fielding with
    aging aircraft divestiture in order to retain the necessary number of
    accessible AR assets over the next decade to ensure USTRANSCOM can meet
    NDS demands.

      3c. Airlift
        Airlift forces enable rapid power projection and sustainment of
    forces around the world. Our strategic airlift force is comprised of C-
    5s and C-17s that are designed to carry over-sized and out-sized cargo.
    In addition to strategic lift, C-130s provide intra-theater delivery
    under austere conditions. USTRANSCOM also enables theater rotary-wing
    and fixed-wing contract airlift support where there is a demand and
    security conditions permit. For example, USTRANSCOM routinely provides
    contracts which support passenger and cargo airlift services, air
    ambulance, medical evacuation, sling-load cargo operations, and
    delivery of supplies for USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, and
    USINDOPACOM.
        Sixty percent of the military airlift fleet resides in the ARC
    underscoring our Nation's reliance on Reserve forces and the need to
    balance crew tempo in non-mobilized operations. We are at the lowest
    non-mobilized airlift capacity for daily activities since 2003. The
    military fleet of `gray tails' is reinforced by commercial augmentation
    accessed through day-to-day contracts or through the Civil Reserve Air
    Fleet (CRAF) emergency preparedness program in times of crisis. We are
    increasing the use of commercial augmentation to balance daily airlift
    workload with unit readiness and enhance high-end warfighting
    proficiency of the Mobility Air Force.

      3d. Global Patient Movement
        The USTRANSCOM patient movement mission is executed by the U.S. Air
    Force aeromedical evacuation (AE) system and is a unique and vital part
    of the military mobility enterprise for supported commanders. En route
    care is provided by aeromedical professionals across the Total Force
    that are specially trained to operate within the AE system and enabled
    by nodal staging facilities located at key locations around the globe.
    These professionals provide time sensitive, fixed-wing, mission
    critical in-flight care to patients in transit for varying levels of
    medical care. Highly specialized Critical Care Air Transport Teams
    (CCATTs) are capable of providing intensive care while airborne, which
    are growing to meet anticipated demands of operational plans. Global
    patient movement is a Total Force mission with nearly 90 percent of the
    total AE structure in the Reserve component to meet mission
    requirements.

      3e. Commercial Industry
        The JDDE is inextricably linked to commercial industry capacity,
    networks, and capabilities to support DOD requirements. From day-to-day
    operations through wartime mobilization, commercial nodes, rail
    infrastructure, trucks, aviation, and sealift capabilities are integral
    to USTRANSCOM's ability to respond and scale to need. In times of
    crisis DOD accesses strategic transportation capacity through
    designated emergency preparedness programs--VISA and CRAF.
        The Maritime Security Program (MSP), authorized by Congress and
    administered by MARAD, provides a stipend for 60 U.S.-flag ships that
    are contractually committed to be available for national contingencies.
    These MSP participants contribute to VISA which enables USTRANSCOM
    assured access to shipping services using U.S.-flag ships and their
    global transportation networks during contingencies through pre-
    approved contingency contracts.
        Our CRAF contract providers are essential to meet global airlift
    mobility requirements for both cargo and passenger movements in times
    of need. This important relationship provides Long-Range International
    airlift for approximately 40 percent of DOD air cargo and over 90
    percent of passenger movements required in operational plans. To
    incentivize support for this essential program, CRAF enrollment is a
    prerequisite for U.S. General Services Administration's City Pair
    Program, which spends approximately $3 billion annually on government
    travel. The CRAF program is fully subscribed and provides DOD with
    aircraft from 25 safety certified airline companies to augment the U.S.
    Air Force mobility fleet during contingencies and national emergencies.
      Cyber Mission Assurance
        Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which
    capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's
    ability to project the Joint Force globally. As in all warfighting
    domains, assuring mission capabilities requires resilience and
    simultaneous efforts across multiple functions and stakeholders,
    including defense, interagency, and industry partners. Our actions are
    underscored by the need to understand adversary intentions,
    capabilities, and actions targeting the JDDE. USTRANSCOM actively
    manages mission risk and advances our cyber domain capabilities by
    understanding our large and complex cyber terrain, which is an evolving
    endeavor. Defending cyberspace operations, providing for mission
    assurance through continuity of operations when degraded, and ensuring
    our ability to conduct uninterrupted Global Command & Control and
    Integration are paramount to our success.
        In addition to operations on Department of Defense Information
    Networks (DODIN), USTRANSCOM has special interest and equities in the
    mission assurance of industry partners relying on non-DODIN cyber
    networks. We are working closely with industry partners and have
    mandated contract language to improve cyber hygiene and mandate
    contractor compliance with National Institute of Standards and
    Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171 standards, which contains
    110 distinct cybersecurity controls, on commercial networks. Industry
    partners are required to conduct annual self-assessments and are
    encouraged to share information with associated timelines for
    improvement where necessary. NIST controls are just the first step in a
    longer journey toward commercial industry's cyber mission assurance.
    Industry partners have been responsive to DOD cyber initiatives and
    recognize the utility in resilient operations capability in the cyber
    domain.
      Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS)
        At the direction of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, USTRANSCOM
    collaborated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an MCRS assessing
    the force sufficiency of airlift, AR, and sealift capacity to meet the
    NDS missions. The study concluded that current, programmed fleets are
    sufficiently sized in the near-term to meet combatant commander
    mobility requirements, as defined in previously approved war plans,
    with elevated risk. The study also highlighted readiness challenges
    with the reliability of existing sealift vessels and AR tankers that,
    if not addressed, will lead to increased risk in mobility support to
    the NDS wartime missions. Specifically, the study reaffirmed the
    requirement to recapitalize aging U.S. Navy sealift vessels and U.S.
    Air Force AR fleets. Key enablers for network resiliency and protection
    of mobility operations were also identified as beneficial to overcome
    contested environment challenges. As plans evolve, we will continue to
    assess the mobility enterprise's sufficiency against globally
    integrated plans to capture the simultaneous demands of future
    scenarios.
      Joint Enabling Capabilities
        The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command provides DOD's mission-
    tailored joint communications, planning, and public affairs support
    packages for all CCMDs, accelerating the establishment, organization,
    and operation of Joint Force headquarters. In fiscal year 2018, the
    JECC played a critical role supporting DOD globally integrated
    operations through short notice, limited-duration deployments of over
    1,000 joint personnel (70 percent were Reserve and National Guard) to
    18 countries supporting 14 requests for forces, five Global Response
    Force deployments, two Defense Support to Civilian Authorities
    assignments, and tailored organic communications networks supporting
    simultaneous requirements to multiple CCMDs. The JECC is a key enabler,
    which has provided planning support for Joint Staff campaign plan
    development, Customs and Border Patrol, Northeast Asia force flow
    requirements, Hurricane Florence and Michael support, and multiple
    operations and exercises around the world. It would be expensive and
    inefficient to embed this level of highly qualified expertise in every
    CCMD, so this pool of experts is an economy of force that allows the
    CJCS to weight the joint effort to achieve desired mission outcomes.
      Keeping Pace: Leveraging the Cloud, Data, and Analytics to Meet
            Evolving Requirements
        USTRANSCOM is on a path to leverage our Data and Analytics strategy
    to generate competitive global planning and decision-making advantage
    for the JDDE. Success in this area starts with access to data through
    an Enterprise Data Environment coupled with advanced analytics, machine
    learning, and artificial intelligence. Our primary goal in leveraging
    data and analytics is to enhance our operational insights and
    foresights to make better decisions in support of Joint Force power
    projection. Our cloud journey embraces a modern, digital infrastructure
    which is critical to defend against cyber-attacks as well as provide
    greater reliability, adaptability, and scalability of the systems that
    support USTRANSCOM and our components. Innovation and critical thinking
    are essential at every echelon, and USTRANSCOM will evolve and overcome
    emerging threats by being agile in our processes, willing to test,
    rapidly adopt or reject new technologies, and make wise investments to
    for the future. Leveraging the cloud, data, and analytics is essential
    to understand, think, and act at the speed of relevance to out-pace our
    adversaries in an increasingly complex and dynamic operating
    environment.
      The Defense Personal Property Program (DP3)
        USTRANSCOM is working with military services and is committed to
    improving relocation process for military members and families. We
    appreciate Congress's expressed interest in improving the DP3. Each
    year, the DOD relocates over 400,000 servicemembers, DOD civilians, and
    their families to assignments across the globe. Roughly 40 percent of
    these moves occur between May 15 and August 31, which is the period we
    refer to as `Peak Season' due to the strain the DOD's assignment cycle
    places on commercial capacity. Customer satisfaction survey respondents
    rate their personal property relocation as either satisfactory (9
    percent), good (18 percent), or excellent (63 percent). However, 10
    percent of respondents report unsatisfactory experiences, which usually
    correlate with peak seasons.
        In response, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment established a joint working group to identify ways in which
    DOD could improve moving experience during peak season. As a result,
    the Services are attempting to spread military moves to off-peak
    timeframes and are issuing PCS orders earlier to facilitate planning.
    These are important initiatives that will generate marginal progress to
    mitigate stress on the moving industry but will not fundamentally
    improve DP3, a program plagued by diffused responsibilities and
    accountability, lack of transparency, and insufficient quality capacity
    to meet peak requirements. In support of the DOD reform initiative,
    USTRANSCOM is exploring a centralized acquisition approach that would
    transition DP3 to a single move manager. This concept would improve
    capacity and curbside service by incentivizing long-term investment by
    industry, reduce barriers to entry into DOD markets, and establish
    clear accountability and transparency. If approved, this contract will
    be in place by 2021.
    Executive Summary
        The Nation relies on USTRANSCOM to project an immediate force
    tonight and a decisive force when needed and continues to adapt to the
    most complex security environment in recent history. JDDE power
    projection utilizes the global deployment network; global command &
    control and integration; and transportation and mobility capacity, to
    include commercial industry, to move Joint Force capability in support
    of national priorities. This capability is underwritten by whole-of-
    government coordination to secure and sustain access, basing, and
    diplomatic agreements. To maintain strategic comparative advantage, we
    have three top mobility concerns to fulfill NDS mission requirements:
    1) readiness of the U.S. Navy's aging sealift fleet, 2) readiness and
    capacity of the U.S. Air Force's air refueling platforms, and 3) cyber
    domain mission assurance. We appreciate the exceptional teamwork from
    the Services, combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, and Congress. USTRANSCOM's ability to project the Joint Force
    globally at the time and place of our choosing provides our Nation's
    leaders with multiple options while presenting multiple dilemmas for
    potential adversaries. I am extremely proud of our soldiers, sailors,
    marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen who serve with pride and answer
    our Nation's call every day.
        Together, We Deliver.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Lyons.
        Senator Reed brought up in his opening statement the
    question as to whether or not, General Scaparrotti, we have the
    right posture and capabilities in EUCOM to handle the credible
    deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe. What is your
    feeling about that?
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you.
        We have clearly made progress in European Command, thanks
    to the support of Congress. We have added forces and
    capabilities. We have improved the readiness. But I would tell
    you in response to your question that I am not comfortable yet
    with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of
    the National Defense Strategy.
        Chairman Inhofe. Where are the shortfalls, as you see them?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have shortfalls in our land
    component and the depth of forces there--I would like to get
    into more detail in that in the closed hearing--and in our
    maritime component as well, both of those in particular when
    you look at both the building capability and the modernization
    of the Russian forces that we face there.
        Finally of concern is my intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) capacity given that increasing and growing
    threat of Russia. I need more ISR. Again, in the closed
    hearing, I can go into detail.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. You will have that opportunity at
    2:30 today.
        General Scaparrotti, we keep hearing from sources that
    maybe we have some redundancy in our nuclear program. Now, we
    have been guilty I think for a long period of time in not
    addressing our nuclear modernization. We now are faced with a
    situation where we have both Russia and China with what we
    would call a triad system. I think that people with your
    background need to respond as to why a triad system is not
    redundant and is necessary.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, first of all, our strategic
    nuclear force is critical to our deterrence and our security,
    and a triad as a part of that force is important as well. Each
    one of those legs of the component gives us specific qualities
    that are somewhat different, and we need those differing
    qualities just for a safeguard within the component itself, but
    also to make it complex for our adversaries to determine or
    believe that they have the opportunity to strike and gain
    dominance. I think with the triad I am certain that they
    cannot. I would note that they also have a triad as well.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and it needs to be repeated because
    the suggestions keep coming on.
        In Ukraine, Russia is now in their sixth year at war there.
    We have talked about and we have actually had language in our
    defense authorization bills to send lethal help to Ukraine, and
    to my knowledge, there has only been one case where we actually
    were using lethal assistance. That was in the Javelin.
        Can you tell us why we have not been able to successfully
    do that since the authorization is there?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think as recommendations
    for Ukraine, particularly on the lethal side, work its way, it
    has to go through the policy deliberations that provide
    authority to deploy those kinds of weapon systems. As you
    stated, we got the authority with Javelin. The Ukrainians in my
    view have trained very well for the use of that. They have been
    responsible in the security and the deployment of it, and we
    watch that closely. They have handled that well.
        There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition, and
    perhaps looking at the Kerch Straits, perhaps consideration for
    naval systems as well here in the future as we move forward.
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, we have an authorization bill coming
    up. Is this something that you think that we might need some
    more language on?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, as you will see, I will have
    recommendations for that.
        Chairman Inhofe. Good.
        General Scaparrotti. I would like consideration of those
    recommendations.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
        General Lyons, I know there is a problem in trying to get
    all the service materials transported out where they are
    needed, and recently there has been some suggestion that maybe
    some of that should be contracted out. Now, we have gone
    through some problems with the housing program recently on
    contracting out.
        Do you have any comments to make about that as being one of
    the solutions to the problem that we face getting this material
    out?
        General Lyons. Chairman, if you are referring to the joint
    deployment enterprise, we are heavily linked to industry on
    multiple levels. If we are referring specifically about the
    household good program--I think that is what you are referring
    to, sir?
        Chairman Inhofe. That is what I am referring to and that is
    where the suggestion has come out.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. What I would say on that is that
    is 100 percent commercial industry. It is not an effort to
    privatize whatsoever, but it is an effort to restructure our
    relationship with industry in a way that delivers higher
    quality capacity and holds carriers and the government
    accountable.
        Chairman Inhofe. Good.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your
    testimony.
        Last March, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the
    Committee, I do not believe there is an effective unification
    across the interagency with the energy and the focus that we
    could attain. Is that still your view?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, it is still my view. We
    have improved, and Congress, as you know, has committed funding
    to some of the entities in the interagency to help us with
    this. But it is still my view.
        Senator Reed. I presume, based on your response, that we
    need a synchronized campaign prosecuted in a unified manner
    across the interagency, which is multiple institutions, to
    counter Russian hybrid warfare and to deter anything greater
    than that. Is that accurate?
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct, Senator. We need a
    whole-of-government approach to this.
        Senator Reed. Where are the gaps right now? Where is it
    that we are not making the investments in your view?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think actually we need to
    probably get greater focus and energy into actually a strategy,
    a multifaceted strategy, to counter Russia. As you know,
    General Gerasimov just made another speech that underscored
    their view of indirect activity, the use of whole-of-government
    activities as a part of their spectrum of warfare. We have to
    approach this in a way that we can counter that and I think
    specifically within information operations, challenging their
    disinformation, and cyber areas that we need to continue to
    press.
        Senator Reed. That would presumably require State
    Department activity. Again, I am old enough to recall the Voice
    of America, which is something that was very pronounced in the
    1950s and the 1960s. Those types of very proactive information
    campaigns--they are not being conducted at this point. Are
    they?
        General Scaparrotti. Not in the way that you recall, when I
    recall, and I think we have the talent to pursue particularly
    when it goes to underscoring our values, which I think is
    important.
        Senator Reed. All of this is designed, obviously, to deter
    and to disrupt Putin's plans or aspirations, and without it, he
    has more of an open field. Is that correct?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, they have a good deal of
    agility, and they seem to have no constraints on what they are
    willing to say publicly.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Lyons, thank you for mentioning in your comments
    the defense personal property program, DP3. As the Chairman
    indicated, we are receiving some comments, and I am going to
    follow up with some specific questions for the record because I
    think this is an important issue. There is a proposal to move
    to a single mover manager. Again, this has some echoes of some
    of the discussions we are having currently about housing issues
    in the military. We want to be ahead of the game. We will send
    those questions to you for your response.
        Even before you took charge at TRANSCOM, the command was
    concerned about war planning. For many years, we assumed that
    we would be operating in a benign atmosphere. We could fly
    civilian aircraft unprotected. We could move ships in
    unprotected, et cetera.
        Last year, General McDew, your predecessor, hinted that,
    for example, the KC-46 tanker that we are buying might be too
    expensive to purchase because the number we would need in a
    challenge situation to replace and to overmatch the adversary
    would be significantly more than projected.
        As a result, we asked TRANSCOM to produce a mobility
    requirements study, and the report essentially came back and
    said there is no problem with our ability to support
    contingencies, we have got the right mix. It essentially was
    disconnected with the comments that I heard, at least my
    perception of what General McDew was talking about.
        What has changed? We all recognize this is going to be a
    much more hostile environment to move equipment in, and we do
    not seem to be responding in an appropriate way. Your comments,
    sir.
        General Lyons. Sir, thanks for the question.
        I think you are referring to the Mobility Capabilities
    Requirements Study that the NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] directed in 2018. That study was directed
    between the Department and TRANSCOM to look at force sizing and
    sufficiency of the mobility force against the program
    essentially out to 2023. We did that and we did that based on a
    demand signal from the existing plans that exist on the books
    today.
        But I would acknowledge to you today--and I think General
    McDew was alluding to this--as we emerge our defense planning
    scenarios to be more reflective of the defense strategy, as we
    emerge and develop globally integrated plans, which are
    happening right now in the Joint Staff, we do see the potential
    for an increased mobility requirement, particularly in the area
    of aerial refuel, which is the lifeblood of the joint force.
        Senator Reed. What you sent up to us has been overtaken by
    events, more or less.
        General Lyons. Sir, I would say we still have work to do on
    the plans on which it is based. The demand signal is emerging
    right in front of us. We will adapt the study to the plans as
    they evolve. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, thank you very much
    for your work, and I think it is clear that we have great
    leadership in your area of responsibility.
        General Scaparrotti, about 3 weeks ago, this Congress sent
    five delegations, House and Senate, to the Munich Security
    Conference. That show of force was followed on then by a
    delegation going to the NATO parliamentary assembly and another
    delegation going on a week later to the OSCE [Organization for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe] parliamentary assembly.
        Does that volume of participation by House and Senate
    members send a positive statement? Is it helpful to you in
    dealing with your friends in Europe--with our friends in
    Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. First, it is very helpful,
    and it is helpful to us as a nation. You know, at Munich, that
    was the largest congressional delegation that they have ever
    had there. It was noted by everyone. That in and of itself is a
    strong message of commitment to our allies in Europe. Then I
    would tell you the congressional delegations that traveled
    during the year to different spots within European Command have
    a very positive influence, again another sign of commitment and
    actual discussion about the issues of the day. I routinely get
    feedback from the chiefs of defense, ministers of defense, and
    others when our congressional delegations visit. I know that it
    has an impact.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, I could guess we could have a
    debate about whether there is a crisis in NATO. I hope there is
    not. But I do hope that the strong statement of wanting to be
    involved was heard. I appreciate your comments in that regard.
        General Scaparrotti, you are recommending augmenting our
    forces in Europe. Specifically with regard to sea power, what
    are your suggestions? For example, there are four destroyers in
    Rota, Spain now. Do we need six? What else needs to be done?
    What specifically can you tell us in an open hearing that would
    help with regard to our sea power aspect of helping you?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, specifically for
    the maritime component, what we are looking at is an evolving
    and modernizing Russian fleet, and in the closed hearing, I
    plan to go through just the changes I have seen in the 3 years
    that I have been in European Command. If we want to remain
    dominant in the maritime domain and particularly under sea,
    which we are today, we have got to continue to modernize, and I
    think we need to build our capacity.
        Specifically for destroyers, yes, I have asked for two more
    destroyers within EUCOM. I would like to go into a little more
    detail on that in the closed hearing rather than here. But
    again, we do need greater capacity, particularly given the
    modernization and the growth of the Russian fleets in Europe.
        Senator Wicker. In addition to the two destroyers, can you
    tell us publicly what else you are asking for in terms of
    ships?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, this primarily has to do with
    capabilities that deal with the numbers of Russian ships that
    we see within our theater today and also for anti-submarine
    warfare. I would like to go into the more detailed piece in the
    closed hearing.
        Senator Wicker. Are we going to need more ships or fewer
    ships?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, that is a service
    question as to how they----
        Senator Wicker. In your area.
        General Scaparrotti. In my area, more. I would like to see
    at least the rotation of naval component, carrier strike
    groups, amphibious strike groups at a little better pace than I
    have seen in the 3 years that I have been in command.
        Senator Wicker. General, at the Halifax Security Conference
    and at the Munich Security Conference, a number of us met
    individually with the defense minister from Turkey. At the
    military level, are we doing better with Turkey than it would
    appear on the front pages of the newspapers? What is the news
    out of Turkey recently, and is there any good news?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I would say, first of all, that
    we have a good, very strong mil-to-mil relationship with our
    counterparts in Turkey. I know very well their chief of defense
    and their minister of defense, who was the chief prior to this,
    prior to him becoming the minister. We do have some
    differences, as you know and you can see in the paper. But we
    have very candid and frank conversations, and we have been very
    successful at working through mutual interest to this point.
    Our mil-to-mil relationship, as it reflects in the deployment
    of our forces, in my view has improved over the past year. That
    is what I would hope that our work together will continue to do
    here as we look at the tough issues we have got to face within
    European Command.
        Senator Wicker. In terms of military-to-military, things
    are a little better than they were a year ago.
        General Scaparrotti. They are. They have improved, and I
    think we have a good candid relationship.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General Lyons, I noted your concern about the
    movement of personal items and want to volunteer as a
    consultant. Fifty years ago, I worked for Allied Van Lines in
    this area moving military families. If you need technical
    assistance, it is a lot better, for example, to move a carton,
    to pick up a carton of lamp shades than it is books. I learned
    that the hard way. Anyway, I could not resist. You brought back
    a lot of memories when you talk about moving furniture for
    military families.
        General Scaparrotti, I know you touched on this, but game
    out for me what happens if little green men appear in Lithuania
    or Latvia? Have we war-gamed what happened in the Ukraine and
    Crimea? How do we respond? It seems to me this is a real
    challenge for our whole deterrent posture.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. We have taken a close look at
    both what has happened in the past and what we think could
    potentially happen here in the future.
        The first thing I would say is that as a result of that, we
    have worked with our allies in the Baltics, Poland, Romania,
    Bulgaria along the eastern border on what we have learned and
    also on the capabilities that we think we need as an alliance,
    both them and us, in order to deter this. Our first perspective
    is what do we do today to ensure that Russia fully understands
    the commitment of article 5 for an alliance.
        Senator King. But the question is what is the definition of
    attack. It seems to me that is the gray area that we are in to
    know when and how to respond when it is not clear that tanks
    are not rolling across the border.
        General Scaparrotti. You have hit it on--I mean, the thing
    that I worry about most----
        Senator King. You can continue with that, you hit it on the
    head, Senator. I like that in the record.
        [Laughter.]
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you did.
        The thing that is difficult is not necessarily an actual
    attack that you can see coming. It is actually the kind of
    subversive undermining of both the nation's authority, one of
    the nations that they are undermining, which is what they do,
    and other elements of power that are not necessarily military.
    The military would be one of the last that they want to use.
    That is the most difficult.
        But we also work with our interagency to the point that
    Senator Reed made. That is the importance of all of our
    elements of power here. When you can combine 29 nations with
    their elements of power in response to Russia's, it is a slam
    dunk. There is no doubt that we can handle this, and they will
    be deterred. But we have got to work together.
        Senator King. A question about funding and budgets. We have
    not seen a budget yet, but there is talk that there will be a
    significant increase in the military budget but primarily in
    OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] as opposed to line items.
    Give me your thoughts about having money in OCO rather than
    allocations and authorizations that you can put to work in your
    AOR [Area of Responsibility].
        General Scaparrotti. Well, primarily those budgets that
    come in within the base budgets itself, laid out in a FYDP
    [Future Years Defense Program], give me greater stability and
    knowledge of what is coming in the future. Really what we need
    is predictability. OCO tends to fluctuate each year. I
    personally underscore the greater predictability we have and
    stability in our budget as we look forward. Obviously, the more
    efficient we can be with our funding and the more sure that
    what we need in terms of force capability, readiness, et
    cetera, can be planned and we can deliver it.
        Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        General Lyons, you mentioned in your testimony--and it is
    clear--that a large part of your responsibility is met through
    civilian enterprises, shipping, airplanes. I know you talked
    about this, but please outline for us your level of
    satisfaction and confidence in the cybersecurity of the private
    sector partners.
        General Lyons. Sir, we acknowledge this is a significant
    challenge. We work very closely with our industry partners. As
    a matter of fact, we have introduced language into our
    contracts. We require self-assessments. We do a level of
    analysis on that, and we work more closely to ensure that their
    resiliency is improving.
        However, I would admit to you that if an advanced,
    persistent threat actor were on their systems today, it would
    be problematic. There is no question about that.
        Senator King. Do you red team their systems? Self-analysis
    does not make me sleep a lot better at night. Do you have a red
    team capacity where you can mock attack them to show them their
    vulnerabilities?
        General Lyons. No, Senator, we do not.
        Senator King. I would urge you to consider that as an
    option. In other areas of the government, that has been very
    effective. It has a way of waking people up when a skull and
    crossbones appears on the CEO's [Chief Executive Officer]'s
    computer.
        General Lyons. Sir, I agree with that.
        Senator King. Thank you, General.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lyons, as you know, Nebraska is the home of the
    155th Air Refueling Wing, and that plays an important role
    especially during deployment with your command. I am proud of
    those airmen. I just met with them a couple of weeks ago back
    in Nebraska.
        But my question to you is when we are looking at the
    challenges and the risks that we are facing in order to meet
    the future demands--you kind of touched on that earlier--what
    is the biggest issue you see contributing to the limiting
    capacity of the fleet?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, specifically in the area of aerial
    refueling?
        Senator Fischer. Yes.
        General Lyons. I think you alluded to this. Aerial
    refueling is the lifeblood of the joint force's ability to
    project power immediately. There is nothing in the joint force
    we can do without that capability. I was very pleased to see
    the Air Force accept the KC-46 and begin that modernization
    process. I think that is a very important first step.
        The other initiatives that the services are working--the
    service in this case, the Air Force--is improved readiness
    against the KC-135 fleet and the potential deferment of
    divestiture of some of those weapon systems so that we do not
    have a dip in capability over time.
        Senator Fischer. I am happy to hear you say that. As you
    know, the KC-46--it is online, but it is going to take quite a
    while to make it an important part of the fleet. As we look at
    the 135, there are maintenance issues, and we are seeing delays
    in that.
        Are you confident that there is a good balance between
    Active, Reserve, and Guard when it comes to refueling?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, I am. I will defer to the service on
    the force mix specifically, but I think you know very well we
    have guardsmen on alert, 2 hours trip alert today. It is a
    total force effort in everything we are doing. Over 60 percent
    of our capability does exist in the Guard and Reserve.
        Senator Fischer. What would you offer us as suggestions so
    that we can mitigate some of the obstacles we are facing with
    that limited refueling fleet that we have with their capacity?
    Do you have any suggestions for us?
        General Lyons. Well, ma'am, in the near term, it is really
    about generating higher levels of readiness. In the KC-135
    fleet, for example, we are unable to meet that 85 percent goal.
    The Air Force is working very, very hard to improve that
    readiness. In the near term, that would generate more tails
    available for mission.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Scaparrotti, I would like to ask you about some
    logistic challenges that I think you face in EUCOM. There have
    been quotes in the past, in fact, from you when you said the
    expansion of the alliance to include former Eastern Bloc
    countries has exacerbated the lack of common transportation
    networks between the newer NATO members in the east and the
    more established allies in the west. For example, Germany just
    allows trucks loaded with tanks to be on their highways at
    night on weekdays. The rails on the Baltic railroads--the gauge
    is set wider apart than we have in the western standard. It is
    my understanding trains have to be unloaded and then reloaded
    near Poland's border with Lithuania.
        As we are looking at movement of troops and to be able to
    respond quickly, to some of the possible challenges that we are
    looking at in that area, how serious is this issue today? What
    steps have you taken in order to address that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you.
        It is true what you stated in terms of the status today in
    Europe. It is a serious issue because we need to be able to
    move 360 within Europe with our forces and the allies' as well.
        If there is good news, the good news is that, as you know,
    Congress has supported, particularly through EDI, some of the
    key infrastructure improvements that we need, particularly in
    the east, to support our movements, reception of our troops,
    support of the troops that we put in place there, but also it
    helps the allies. The allies, as well, are financing, along
    with many of those projects, things that they should do with
    regard to airfields, fuel lines, rail, et cetera.
        Senator Fischer. I apologize for interrupting you, but are
    we trying to facilitate some changes so that our NATO allies
    can make those changes? Are they working together as well?
        General Scaparrotti. They are. Within NATO and the EU
    [European Union] both, NATO had a study of the infrastructure
    and logistics support that needed to happen. EUCOM was very
    involved in that. We provided help to them, and we also
    provided to the EU who did a mobilization study. That has
    resulted in about $7 billion the EU is going to invest in
    logistics and infrastructure over the next 5 or 6 years. Much
    of what we recommended was, in fact, accepted. We now have a
    study. We know what our issues are. We have insight within both
    EU and NATO on that, and we have got to follow up and make sure
    that that investment goes to the right places and actually
    makes a difference in military mobility.
        Senator Fischer. To be able to have a rapid response.
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony and your
    service over many years.
        General Scaparrotti, you are well aware that if there is
    ever a major conflict in Europe, the first shots are likely to
    be cyber. They are not going to be kinetic. We have to be
    prepared for that. I know since the Russian attack against
    Estonia in 2007, the Baltic countries have been really leaning
    into this in a pretty major way. Estonia created the Cyber
    Defense League, established NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense
    Center of Excellence, and as you know, Latvia is home to NATO's
    Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.
        But I would like you to give us an update and share some of
    your thoughts on what you are seeing in the Baltic countries,
    lessons learned, things that we may want to be replicating in
    other places around the world.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, you noted the changes that have
    taken place. I would add as well that after NATO determined
    that cyber was in fact a domain, which needed to happen to give
    me as SACEUR authorities, we now have a cyber center that
    operates within NATO. It is connected with each of our nations.
    Most of them are building a cyber capability. You noted the
    Cyber Center of Excellence, for instance, that I think is a
    very good one. It is important because it is through that
    process--that is one of those nodes that we are able to advance
    lessons learned, do training, ensure that we can help with
    defense within NATO but also to specific nations.
        Like anything in cyber, though, it is a very dynamic world.
    We are facing Russia, who is very agile in this and good at it.
    We really cannot rest. We have got a lot to do yet in cyber,
    particularly capacity. We have to build the skills we need to
    man these centers.
        Senator Peters. You know, one idea that has come to me--and
    I would love to have your comments on it as we try to provide
    more resources into that and really leverage some of the State
    partnerships we have with the National Guard. For example, we
    have a cyber unit in Michigan, but those around the country as
    well. I know our partners in the Baltics would love to have
    more presence of United States Forces in country there as well.
        Talk to me a little bit about whether or not it makes sense
    to have rotations of particularly cyber National Guard units. I
    mean, this would be good for morale. It would be great for
    retention. It would be great for recruiting. It would allow
    them to be at the tip of the spear while exchanging great
    ideas. Is that something that makes sense to you?
        General Scaparrotti. It absolutely makes sense, and it is
    something we are already doing particularly where you have
    State partnership programs because they have a level of trust
    that has been built, some over 25 years, and they have that
    expertise. It helps me in EUCOM because otherwise I pull from
    my cyber center expertise, and I send that team out to a
    nation. Here we can rotate forces through from a State with the
    same expertise and ability to build that capacity. We are
    actually beginning to do more of that in Europe today.
        Senator Peters. I understand there might be some need for
    additional funding through the National Guard to do that. Are
    there adequate resources for you to conduct that program or
    will you need more?
        General Scaparrotti. You would have to ask the National
    Guard for the specific answer to that, but my general response
    is when you pick up an OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] like that
    and you bring them in--generally, for the Guard there is a
    funding issue, and one of us has to pick that up.
        Senator Peters. We can explore that further because I think
    that is necessary for us to do that.
        General Lyons, I am a former supply corps officer in the
    U.S. Navy Reserve, and so I think there is a lot of truth in
    General Omar Bradley's maxim that amateurs talk tactics and
    professionals study logistics. It is good to have you here.
        I wanted you to comment a little bit about a recent Defense
    Science Board Task Force Survivability Logistics Publication
    that came out that talked about the decay in logistic readiness
    was perhaps a result of insufficient war-gaming that
    incorporated logistics. In a lot of war games, they are
    typically just wished away. We know professionals cannot wish
    away logistics or you are in a world of hurt pretty quickly.
        Could you comment on that report and give us an update on
    how you are integrating combatant commanders with exercises so
    the logistics is an integral part of war-gaming and a real part
    of war-gaming, not just wished away?
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
        I am familiar with the report. There are efforts actually
    ongoing now, given the defense strategy and the security
    environment, that will operate in the future to better connect
    logistics outcomes, for example, in TRANSCOM's case, mobility
    outputs and our ability to generate the force with a campaign
    analysis, which is currently disconnected. We are working with
    the Department to move in that direction in the future.
        Senator Peters. General Scaparrotti, briefly. I know we are
    running out of time. But how is that being incorporated in your
    war-gaming?
        General Scaparrotti. We work very closely here in terms of
    our war-gaming and do a transportation feasibility in each one
    of those. Our planners in fact work with his, either coming
    back or they come when we do our war planning. That is just a
    standard part of what we do.
        Senator Peters. You do not think it is just being wished
    away--the logistics challenges and the war-gaming?
        General Scaparrotti. No, I do not. In fact, if anything, we
    have leaned into this trying to be very factual about what our
    problems will be, particularly with respect to those in Europe,
    as we mentioned earlier.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. General Scaparrotti, welcome to your
    last hearing and, General Lyons, to your first hearing. I am
    sure there were no jokes made at General Lyons' expense before
    this hearing began by General Scaparrotti.
        General Lyons, with that smile on your face, I would like
    to address some issues I have heard from logistics companies,
    including some in Arkansas, dealing not just with your command
    but with the Federal Government as a whole, but obviously, your
    command is one of the largest if not the largest in the entire
    government when it comes to moving things and equipment. They
    express frustrations with the kind of inscrutability or
    perplexed at the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with the
    government. A lot of these companies are either run by veterans
    or they have a large veteran workforce, given the training that
    the military gives its personnel in logistics. They would like
    to work more with the government and with TRANSCOM in
    particular. They just sometimes find it to be a challenge.
        What kind of working groups, if any, does TRANSCOM have
    with private industry to try to make what you do more
    transparent to them so they can better serve our personnel
    through your command?
        General Lyons. Senator, it is a great question. We are
    inextricably linked in our relationship with industry and their
    ability to generate the force.
        We have a relationship with our industry partners at
    multiple echelons, all the way from action officer to executive
    working groups that my three-star deputy leads. I also meet at
    least two times a year with the senior executives from our
    industry partners.
        I acknowledge your point that from time to time, based on
    our federal acquisition regulations, it can be a bit of an
    obstacle to work with the government. We try to minimize that
    as much as possible, and in fact, that is really, Senator, what
    is driving some of our restructure initiatives on the household
    goods side of the house to open up the market to more capacity.
        Senator Cotton. Good. I would just like to encourage that
    kind of linkage to continue. As the logistics industry changes
    so rapidly through the use of information technology, the more
    connections you can have to private sector leaders and to the
    people who are out doing this on the front lines I think it
    will just be beneficial to the personnel that you are serving
    on the front lines, whether it is moving household goods in the
    summer months or getting material down range as well. I would
    like to have my office continue to work with your command to
    try to facilitate some of those conversations.
        General Lyons. Sir, that will be great. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. General Scaparrotti, I noted with great
    interest that Vladimir Putin yesterday directed Russia to
    withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF]
    Treaty, which I find somewhat ironic since they have been
    violating their commitments under the INF Treaty for the last
    10 years. Do you have any thoughts on that news?
        General Scaparrotti. It would only be to underscore what
    you just suggested and that was the fact that they left the INF
    Treaty some time ago, years ago, by very deliberately producing
    a weapon in violation, and they have been deploying that
    weapon.
        Senator Cotton. The United States Government has publicly
    recognized these violations under both the Obama
    administration, and the Trump administration. We recently
    announced our intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
        Was there any public opposition from a NATO partner or was
    it uniform NATO support for the United States' decision to
    withdraw from that treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. NATO both in December and February
    produced very strong statements in support of each step that we
    took in terms of our withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
        I would say that our NATO allies understand that the INF
    [Treaty] is a very important component to European security
    from their view. They will emphasize--I am sure you have heard
    them--with each step they would hope that we would continue to
    work to bring Russia back into compliance before we are fully
    out, the 6-month period, or that we would look forward from
    that then to perhaps a new treaty that would encompass the new
    weapon systems, et cetera. They very much understand the
    importance of this, but they did support us strongly--29
    nations strongly--in our decision.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Obviously, one reason why it is in our national security
    interest to withdraw from the INF Treaty besides Russia's
    noncompliance with the treaty is that China has been free to
    build intermediate-range missiles at unlimited rates for
    decades now. As you know from your time at United States Forces
    Korea, that has a significant impact on our security interest
    in the Pacific region.
        But China is not just limited there. It wants to be a
    global player. I noted with interest last year that the
    government of Denmark agreed to build some airports at
    Greenland, which it controls, not exactly considered a
    traditional EUCOM area, but it is within your area of
    operations.
        What are the implications of Chinese presence if they were
    to get a foothold, which they were largely denied in that
    airport construction project last year in the high north?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, it could have an absolute
    impact. I mean, I am concerned personally about the strategic
    investments that we see by China throughout Europe in air and
    sea ports or vicinities of that in critical technologies and
    companies that hold that particularly in the high north where
    you note Greenland and Iceland both are important bodies in
    that line of communication. I think we need to watch carefully
    China's investment in these ports. As you know, many of their
    commercial companies are actually state-owned.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you for your service
    to our Nation for over 40 years. I know you have been wearing
    that fourth star on your shoulder for longer than anyone else
    in the armed forces right now. You have well earned the
    retirement that you have ahead of you. But I think I speak for
    most members of this Committee when we say that we would like
    to see you back in the employ of Uncle Sam sometime in the
    future.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your
    service to the country.
        General Lyons, I want to follow up on some of the concerns
    that have been raised by Senators Reed and Fischer about the
    phasing out of our KC-135's and when the KC-46's are going to
    arrive. It is my understanding that in New Hampshire where we
    have the 157th Air Refueling Wing that there will be a period
    of months between the time the 135 is phased out and the 46 is
    delivered, given that it is already behind schedule.
        Can you comment on what we should assume will happen during
    those months when there is no refueling capacity and whether
    the intent will be to try and keep the 135's around longer
    until the delivery of the 46's?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, from my perspective, the key issue is
    to maintain operational capability throughout the conversion.
    The Air Force is working that very issue. In fact, they are
    working currently to delay the divestiture of a select number
    of KC-135's so that we do not have this exorbitant dip in
    capability over time. The service is working that, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. Should we assume that that is going to
    happen? I appreciate that the service is working it, but does
    that mean that we are going to see that extension happen?
        General Lyons. Senator, it has been my request. It has been
    well received by both the air component and the chief.
    Obviously, it is going to cost some money, and when the money
    is put into the program, that is when we will know. But the
    intent is to retain 28 weapon systems beyond their currently
    scheduled retirement.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        In terms of Boeing's delivery of the 46's, I know that they
    have accepted or made a commitment to address some of the
    concerns that have been expressed about the tankers. Do we know
    whether that is going to speed up the further delivery, or
    should we assume that we are going to see further delays?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, the decision to deliver I think was a
    good one. Right now, we are on a pause, as you may know, based
    on some Boeing issues with a foreign object. I do not have a
    sense, until that is cleared up, for the impact on the program.
    But I will talk to the Air Force about that.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am sure
    that all of us hope that Boeing will do everything they can to
    make sure those deliveries are done to address the concerns
    that have been raised.
        General Scaparrotti, you mentioned in your testimony the
    concern about Turkey acquiring the S-400 at the same time they
    are supposed to take delivery of the F-35's. I know that there
    has been an effort underway to try and encourage Turkey to look
    at other alternatives and that there was an offer made early in
    January for the sale of the Patriot system. They have until the
    end of March, it is my understanding, to decide whether they
    are going to take delivery of that or not.
        But the question I have is, if Turkey moves forward with
    the agreement with Russia on the S-400, do we assume that they
    should receive delivery of F-35's and what does that do to
    their accessing that technology?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would say, first of all, if
    they accept the S-400 and to establish it within Turkey, there
    is, first of all, an issue that it is not interoperable with
    NATO systems nor is it interoperable inside of our integrated
    air missile defense system. That presents one problem.
        The second has to do with the F-35. It presents a problem
    to all of our aircraft, but specifically the F-35 I believe. My
    best military advice would be that we do not then follow
    through with the F-35 flying it or working with an ally that is
    working with Russian systems, particularly air defense systems,
    with one of our, what I would say, is probably one of our most
    advanced technological capabilities.
        Senator Shaheen. I am pleased to hear you say that, but the
    question I have is I understand that some of the parts for the
    F-35 are being made in Turkey and what happens to that assembly
    and who picks up that slack if Turkey cannot receive the F-35.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, that is one of the issues that
    is being considered and will be considered I am sure, as you
    know.
        But for them, I would just underscore the fact that this is
    a huge decision for Turkey. I have talked to them personally as
    all of our leadership has. It connects in many different ways
    to the employment and the integration that they have within the
    system itself, the F-35, but also the FMS [Foreign Military
    Sales] and other systems that we sell to Turkey as well. I
    would hope that they would reconsider this one decision on S-
    400, one system, but potentially forfeit many of the other
    systems and one of the most important systems that we can
    provide them.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I share that view. I
    think Turkey is an important ally, but it is one that we hope
    to be able to depend on.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Let me inform you that some of the KC-46's have been
    delivered. In fact, I flew the right seat of a KC-46 from
    Seattle, Washington to Altus. It is running fine.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your service.
        General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about a few things.
    First, there is a narrative that I think has played out a lot
    in the media that the administration or what you are doing in
    your capacity is somehow being weak on Russia and Putin. I just
    want to talk about a few actions that under your leadership we
    have been taking because is it not true that the one thing that
    Putin understands more than anything is power. Right? Would you
    agree with that?
        General Scaparrotti. I would agree.
        Senator Sullivan. Power of military forces, energy
    production, not worth by actual power.
        Does it help that we have now our forces deployed in
    countries like Poland and the Baltics in the European
    Reassurance Initiative, which this Committee has supported in a
    bipartisan fashion?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, very important.
        Senator Sullivan. It does not get a lot of press, but my
    colleague, Senator Ernst, was recently in Ukraine. As you know,
    the previous administration was reluctant and never helped the
    Ukrainians with defensive weapon systems that they could use to
    protect themselves. Under Secretary Mattis' leadership when he
    got involved, we did provide the Ukrainians the Javelin anti-
    tank missile system. How is that working out?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, as I said
    earlier in testimony, they have received the system. I have
    been impressed with their training and their preparation to
    utilize it.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think that makes Russian T-72 tank
    drivers in eastern Ukraine a little more nervous?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it does. I think the fact that
    they have a Javelin that they can employ and they know how to
    employ it is a deterrent.
        Senator Sullivan. Are we seeing any force posture
    indications that they are taking that into consideration when
    they are moving those kind of forces? I am talking about the
    Russian forces.
        General Scaparrotti. Not directly because we have not
    employed them right on the line. The Ukrainians have not. But I
    am sure that they are aware of them, and they take that in
    consideration in the employment of their forces and where they
    put them. They know it is a lethal weapon system.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        I do not know if you mentioned it--I am sorry. I had to
    step out prior to your testimony. But could you talk a little
    bit about the Vostok 2018 exercise? My understanding was it
    involved 300,000 Russian troops, 80 ships, notably 3,200
    Chinese troops, including up to as many as 900 Chinese tanks.
    Are those reports accurate and should we be concerned about
    that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, the numbers that
    they published are higher than what was factually present. I
    can talk in more detail on this in a classified hearing this
    afternoon. It was not that large, but it was large. Yes, we
    should take notice primarily because it was designed for them
    at a very strategic operational level to be able to command and
    control large forces in a force-on-force type of exercise
    scenario. It connected them with multiple of their regional
    commands specifically in order to practice that. It covered
    both conventional long-range precision munitions training, as
    well as nuclear training offset toward the end. It included
    China, as you noted, which is the first time I can recall them
    providing forces in a partner training scenario, which is quite
    unusual. The size of it, the complexity of it, the
    communications that they demonstrated, the fact that it was a
    hybrid conventional and nuclear exercise I think is all
    important.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
        General Lyons, you and I had a discussion, and the Chairman
    I see was just talking about the KC-46 and the deployment of
    that. I know that is not ultimately your call, but certainly
    you are an advocate and you have a lot of knowledge. I am going
    to ask just a couple quick questions that I would just
    appreciate quick answers to.
        But when you look at the places where you would want to
    deploy that, either CONUS [Continental United States] or OCONUS
    [Outside Continental United States] decisions, you know, the
    National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition
    with China and Russia, decisive action against North Korea,
    would it make sense to place KC-46's in a part of an American
    territory, State, or otherwise as closely proximate to those
    places?
        General Lyons. Senator, just to be clear, Alaska is clearly
    a strategic location.
        Senator Sullivan. You are getting to my punch line already.
    I have not even gone through the list. Let me go through the
    list.
        We are close to all those places. We are the only State
    where you are actually right at the seams of EUCOM, PACOM
    [United States Pacific Command], NORTHCOM [United States
    Northern Command], STRATCOM. The State of Alaska is in the
    seams of every one of those. The OPLANs [Military Operation
    Plans] that support contingencies all focus on Alaska. It has
    the fourth largest fuel storage area of the Air Force in any
    place in the world. It is going to have over 100 fifth
    generation fighters in the next 2 years. One hundred. No other
    place on planet earth will have 100 combat-coded fifth gen
    fighters. It has the existing infrastructure to support aerial
    refueling operations. JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range
    Complex] will be the best training place for fifth gen aircraft
    anywhere in the world.
        Is your advocating for the KC-46--I mean, of course, I am
    advocating for the State I represent, but I would not do it
    unless I thought it made 100 percent strategic sense. Just give
    me your thoughts on that very quickly.
        General Lyons. Sir, I know the Air Force is still
    developing the basing plan. It is not complete yet,
    particularly in the future years. I do have confidence that
    they will look completely at the operational range and
    capability to be able to swing and give us the flexibility in
    TRANSCOM to employ that important weapon system. I am sure that
    Alaska is part of that discussion. I just do not know the
    details, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Duckworth?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope on that
    right-seat ride, you did not try to get them to do a hammerhead
    or anything, did you, with any aerobatic maneuvers?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Duckworth. Stay within the restrictions.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation today.
        General Scaparrotti, I want to return to the discussion
    about logistics challenges especially in the Eastern European
    area. Illinois National Guard has been the sponsor in the State
    Partnership for Peace program with the nation of Poland for 28
    years now I believe--27-plus years. Through my service, I am
    somewhat familiar with the challenges that we face there.
        Could you update us on how the establishment of the NATO
    Joint Support and Enabling Command [JSEC] is going? Let us
    remind us of why it was created and what it will better enable
    you to do in theater to respond to Russian aggression. When
    will this command be fully operational?
        General Scaparrotti. The establishment of JSEC, as you
    called it, is moving I think on timeline. It is actually ahead
    of pace in my view. The Germans who were the framework nation
    for this headquarters in Ulm, Germany have--in my view they
    have really leaned into this. They have already got their
    commander designated. They have a portion of the staff there.
    They have been present in my headquarters in SHAPE [Supreme
    Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] to do the further planning
    that needs to take place to ensure that it is right-sized, to
    make sure that the planning, the understandings, roles, and
    responsibilities are correct. That is really the piece that we
    are doing right now, but it is moving along very well.
        This fall is IOC [Initial Operational Capability], and it
    is another year before it would be fully operational. We have
    got some time here before it would be fully operational. But I
    would say to you that I think they will be ahead of that in
    terms of real output. They are already making a difference in
    terms of our logistics planning with other logistics commands
    within the headquarters and throughout the component. I think
    they will actually be leaning into that before they are
    actually fully established, so to speak.
        Why did we set that up? Primarily because in a European
    environment where we have got to be able to support and move
    360, not just to the eastern border, but north to the high
    north, south, and west with a threat that is actually 360 and
    then we needed to protect the central lines of communication,
    critical ports, seaports, and infrastructure in doing that
    because as has been testified to here by General Lyons, we are
    now in a contested environment. We needed a headquarters that
    both looked logistically, as well as protection of those key
    assets. That is really why we stood up that command, and it is
    well placed being in kind of the heartland of Europe, so to
    speak, in Germany.
        It is a very important step for NATO to take, and I think
    it demonstrates NATO's focus on making sure that it will be
    relevant for the environment that we are in today.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        General Lyons, how would TRANSCOM plug into the JSEC, and
    has this been tested yet? I mean, how would you plug in during
    conflict, for example, and have we tested it?
        General Lyons. Senator, first let me tell you thank you for
    your understanding of logistics and the importance of logistics
    to warfighting. I greatly appreciate that.
        I have actually been to Europe several times, and I met
    with the leadership that were developing the JSEC and I
    understand that concept very well. I think it is a great
    initiative that General Scaparrotti and his team are moving out
    on.
        I do not know that we plug in directly. We plug in directly
    to his EUCOM headquarters through a European deployment and
    distribution operations center and then across at echelon to
    include his headquarters, and we would take the signals that he
    would be sending on his priorities for mobility and then meter
    them accordingly. Then he would have the role then to integrate
    that from a coalition perspective.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        With that, I would like to return, General Scaparrotti to
    an understanding of sealift. We had a discussion earlier today.
    I understand that recently NATO reactivated its Atlantic
    Command to guard the sea lanes of approach into Europe in the
    event of war.
        Can you describe for me in general terms the amount of
    sealift that would be required to move significant United
    States Forces to Europe in the event of conflict? Are you
    comfortable with the amount of sealift at your disposal right
    now in the event of a conflict?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, when we go to the
    closed session, I can probably get into more detail on that.
    But I would say it is significant. Because of the types of
    forces I move--I think Steve would agree that we rely on
    sealift largely for a lot of that bulk and heavy movement.
        You know, I am aware of the challenges to particularly our
    Reserve Force for naval forces and our commercial support. That
    is all important if we had a full conflict in Europe. I would
    just underscore the importance of funding that and making sure
    that we have the readiness in the right place because we will
    rely on it heavily for any crisis in Europe.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. We will probably try to
    follow up in the session later today. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Let me just, since you brought up the KC-46, remind all of
    us here that is replacing eventually the KC-135. The first KC-
    135 that was delivered to Altus Air Force Base was in 1959. It
    has been operating for 60 years. It gives you an idea of the
    significance of the KC-46 to the distant future of that
    capability.
        Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti, General Lyons, thank you both for
    being here. Thank you for your exemplary service, and thank you
    to the men and women under your command.
        General Scaparrotti, if I could just start with you, I want
    to talk a little bit about the NDS Strategy Commission. The NDS
    Commission, various RAND studies, and others have clearly
    indicated that we are not optimally postured to deal with a
    Russian assault into the Baltics in particular. The NDS clearly
    states that the joint force has got to be prepared to blunt
    this assault and to prevent a Russian fait accompli.
        My question is building on the positive work in the
    previous years, the European Defense Initiatives, and other
    activities, could you give us a progress report? I understand
    you may want to save some of this for the closed session, but
    can you give us a progress report on our force posturing
    developments to prevent that fait accompli? Where are we on
    this in your judgment?
        General Scaparrotti. We have made clear progress as I
    stated up front in this regard, and largely thankful to the
    support of Congress, particularly EDI, in funding the changes
    that we need to make. We made progress, I would tell you, in
    every domain that is important to that, including cyber in
    that, for instance. But we are not postured yet where we need
    to be, and as you cited, the studies that have come out
    recently have underscored that. In a closed session, I would
    like the opportunity to talk to you more specifically about
    where we are at and what we are short.
        But, for instance, you know, we now have rotational
    brigades, an armored brigade, a CAB [Combat Aviation Brigade]
    in the east, a battalion task force as a part of NATO. We have
    rotational air forces. We have rotational bomber forces. We
    have had twice now--well, three times actually--a carrier
    strike group once already in the high north for the first time
    in 20 years. At the beginning of my time here, 3 years ago, we
    were moving one brigade at a time and challenged. A month ago,
    I moved four brigades, two armored, two CABs, simultaneously in
    Europe. That is the progress. Thanks to TRANSCOM and others
    that help us do the work, provide the assets, increase the
    infrastructure to make that happen. Clearly progress, but we
    are not there yet.
        Senator Hawley. Again with the reservation I realize you
    wanted to save the specifics for the closed session, I think it
    is important to get some of this on the record as we are about
    to, as you know, go into the authorization season here and then
    the appropriations season where we will be needing to make the
    case for authorizing and then spending what is necessary in
    order to get you what you need.
        Can you give us an overview at least about what more you
    think we need, generally speaking, to get you to the posture
    that the NDS recommends?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, we will start with
    the cyber domain. There is a plan and an increase in my cyber
    capability, and I have been increased by CYBERCOM as a
    priority. That has happened. But I still have personnel and
    skills in the numbers of around 50 personnel yet. It would be
    very helpful to have them in place. That is one of those.
        If you go to the land component, I need greater land
    component capability not only in armored elements but with my
    enablers, and I will go into more detail on that in the other.
        I have mentioned maritime, greater capacity there, as well
    as specific capabilities to stay ahead of, frankly, the
    modernization that we see in Russia's maritime forces.
        The Air Force is presently on a rotational basis providing
    fifth gen aircraft to me, bomber aircraft, et cetera, which we
    need to employ for a deterrent factor and also to ensure our
    readiness and capability. I am looking forward to those being
    stationed permanently in some numbers within Europe as well.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you.
        Let me ask you about our European allies. Can you give us a
    report--you mentioned some of this in your written testimony.
    Can you give us a report on the work with our European allies
    especially Germany to ensure that they are meeting their NATO
    commitments and have a plan to do so going forward?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, we have been
    working with all of our allies, and I mentioned up front the
    cash contribution. Since 2016, our allies have put another $41
    billion into defense. By 2020, it will be $100 billion based on
    the plans that they had to provide here in December. Their
    contributions have stepped up. We asked for greater force
    structure to assist in Afghanistan. Our allies responded. I
    think when you look at that, they are clearly responding, but
    we have a ways to go yet.
        Germany in particular has responded as well. They plan to
    bring their defense investment up to 1.5 percent. That is not 2
    percent yet. That is where it needs to be, but they are clearly
    refocused on their contribution, as well as their readiness. As
    you know, they have got some readiness issues. That has been in
    the paper. I believe that is true from what I have seen.
        But they are providing the very high joint task force, for
    instance, for NATO, and they made sure that they produced a
    force that was ready and credible. I have seen it. We operated
    with that force in Trident Juncture, for instance. They
    understand the issue and they are working hard to get their
    readiness up to where it is going to be. But they spent a good
    deal of time, in particular, as many of the other--we did as
    well, but European nations where they rested and they did not
    invest in their defense, and now they are having to invest
    heavily to get back up on step.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to discuss the national security threat that cannot
    be addressed by traditional military power at all, and that is
    climate change. The unclassified worldwide threat assessment by
    the Director of National Intelligence said--and I am going to
    quote here--global environmental and ecological degradation, as
    well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for
    resources, economic distress, and social discontent through
    2019 and beyond. End quote.
        That assessment also said, quote, damage to communication,
    energy, and transportation infrastructure could affect low-
    lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human
    displacement and loss of life.
        I have asked this question to other combatant commanders,
    so I want to make sure that I get this on the record. General
    Scaparrotti and General Lyons, do you agree with the
    intelligence community's assessment of the climate change
    threat?
        General Scaparrotti. I do, and I believe that, as you
    noted, much of this will be drivers for potential conflict or
    at least very difficult situations that nations have to deal
    with.
        The second, I would point you to the high north and that is
    the increasing opening of the northern sea route and the
    challenges that presents from a security perspective.
        Senator Warren. Yes. Thank you.
        General Lyons, do you also agree?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, I agree. These are sources of
    conflict, and we certainly have to be prepared to respond to
    them.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        Could I then ask each of you very briefly because we have
    very limited time just to describe how climate change impacts
    your operations in your commands and what you are doing to
    adapt to these changes? General Scaparrotti, would you like to
    start?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the most apparent to me
    is the one that I noted and that is in the Arctic. We already
    are seeing longer periods of time that the northern sea route
    is open. As a part of that, there is an increased interest in
    commercial and resource capabilities there. China, for
    instance, is pressing to get into the high north and have some
    presence there. That creates competition. Russia, because that
    northern sea route is the one that follows most closely to
    their borders, has increased--reopened 10 of their airports
    there. They now have radar systems up. They have begun to move,
    on periodic times, different weapon systems up there for
    control of the area. Those are all things----
        Senator Warren. That is serious.
        General Scaparrotti.--that I have to bring into my
    planning.
        Senator Warren. What has been your response to that, just
    briefly?
        General Scaparrotti. Briefly? We have updated our plans as
    a result of that. We have had to change the posture of some of
    our forces. We have changed our operational patterns so that
    we, in fact, deter and we send a signal of the importance of
    the Arctic to us. Those are just some of the ways day to day
    that we have made changes in our normal routine in order to
    demonstrate significance and capability in the Arctic.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        General Lyons?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, anything that degrades our ability to
    project and sustain power globally at our time and place of
    choosing is a concern. We know that we have to operate in any
    conditions whatsoever.
        Senator Warren. What are you doing by way of response?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, in other words, in our planning and
    so forth, we consider all environments. But more specific to
    General Scap's point about the more scientific piece of it is,
    that is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
        Senator Warren. Fair enough. I really was not looking for
    so much of a scientific answer, but as General Scaparrotti
    said, how you have to kind of readjust where you are and what
    you are doing.
        If I can, I just want to say adapting to climate change
    impacts our military readiness, and I am glad you both take
    this threat seriously. I appreciate that.
        In my remaining time, I just want to ask very briefly, if I
    can, about the INF Treaty. We all know this is a landmark arms
    control treaty with Russia negotiated in 1987 by President
    Ronald Reagan. The treaty prohibits both of our countries from
    testing and deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise
    missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Yes, we know
    that Russia is in violation of the treaty since 2014, but
    rather than use the mechanisms within the treaty or other tools
    available to us to try to get Russia back into compliance, the
    administration is abandoning the treaty entirely.
        I just want to ask what is our plan to prevent Russia from
    building more INF Treaty-prohibited missiles in the absence of
    the treaty? Do we have a plan here? General Lyons?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, I would have to defer on that. That
    is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        General Scaparrotti?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, I think that we are
    still in a 6-month period here where we are looking at what our
    options are. We, in fact, have told our allies in NATO that we
    will do the planning in collaboration with them. We have begun
    that. I do not know that we have a plan today. I know that we
    are working on what we think that plan might be. I personally
    think that it has to be multi-dimensional. It has to be across
    all of our domains, and it has to be whole-of-government in
    order to respond to that.
        I would finally say that from my point of view that when
    you have a peer competitor, particularly a modernizing one,
    that will be challenging us, such as Russia, that we should
    look toward treaty capabilities in order to provide some
    stability, to provide signals and communications and limits
    that we understand that we can work from.
        Senator Warren. Well, I am glad to hear that you are trying
    to work with our allies. I think the Polish, for example, have
    said that they are concerned about missiles on their land. I
    just urge you to think about, instead of withdrawing from the
    INF Treaty, whether or not we should be redoubling our efforts
    to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty. We know
    that Putin cannot be trusted, but we have a responsibility to
    prevent a dangerous and expensive arms race in Europe and
    without the treaty I am worried that is what we are doing.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. I apologize.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both, gentlemen, for being here.
        General Lyons, I was down at Fort Bragg this past Friday
    with Secretary Esper, and we were talking with folks there who
    are in unacceptable housing conditions.
        We also talked a little bit--and I have had a number of
    discussions in the past with families about some of their
    household belongings being moved, some of the bottlenecks, and
    unsatisfactory service.
        I like the idea of taking the personal property program
    into what I would consider to be one throat to choke sort of
    model. But maybe if you could briefly describe where you think
    this is going to end up. I really want to make sure that we get
    this right in terms of accountability, predictability, and
    customer satisfaction so that any relationship we create with
    this confederation of movers--I get that you are going to have
    a consolidator, but you are still going to have a number of
    individual providers. We have got to get the compensation and
    accountability models right so that we do not end up here
    honestly trying to do a good thing and ending up where we are
    with the housing situation.
        Can you give me some assurances or briefly describe how
    that is going to work?
        General Lyons. Senator, I can. This is definitely not a
    privatization effort by any stretch of the imagination. As a
    matter of fact, what I have offered to the service secretaries
    and service chiefs is instead of this completely de-aggregated,
    diffuse value chain of very little centralized responsibility
    even inside the government, I would look at them and I would
    say hold me accountable. Allow me to develop an acquisition
    tool to hold industry accountable. We have a track record of
    being able to do that, as a matter, in other parts of the
    defense personal property program like personal-owned vehicles.
    We do this today.
        I do know, Senator, that there is some concern in industry.
    We get a lot of feedback from industry. Some are very, very
    supportive where we are headed. They see opportunities to enter
    the market. We want to grow the market. Others are concerned
    about potential change. What I tell them and what I have seen
    in our past acquisitions that have been similar is that below
    the level, we still need the same or greater number of movers
    out there who just need a level of quality and accountability
    in the system.
        Senator Tillis. And some peaking capability.
        I would be very interested in maybe having the right people
    in your organization meet with my staff to describe what that
    really looks like operationally. In a simplistic way, it would
    almost be this baseline guarantee of capacity with some peaking
    capability that is almost uber-like in terms of having the
    household know that they are going to get their things moved at
    the appropriate time hopefully to a house that is in much
    better condition than some of the ones that I saw down at Fort
    Bragg on Friday, a separate issue and not your problem.
        General Scaparrotti, I appreciate the time you spent in the
    office yesterday. I appreciate your years, decades of service,
    and I associate myself with Senator Cotton's comments that if
    you take your uniform off, we hope that does not mean that we
    will not see you back here serving in some other capacity.
        I am going to save a lot of my questions for the classified
    briefly, but I do want to highlight my concern with the Turkey
    situation, particularly with the S-400's. I know--and you gave
    a great briefing on where we are working together on a
    legitimate homeland security threat that they are dealing with
    with the PKK [Kurdistan Worker's Party]. On the one hand, we
    are trying to partner and continue to build on that
    relationship.
        Turkey is a vitally important NATO partner in the most
    complicated part of the world. I understand some of their
    behaviors, but I do not understand under any circumstances why
    on earth they would be considering purchasing a missile defense
    system that would not be interoperable, that would require the
    deployment of capabilities on the ground in Turkey that would
    threaten the presence of our Joint Strike Fighter, why on earth
    they would be considering a decision that would make us have to
    rethink whether or not they can actually even be in the supply
    chain for the Joint Strike Fighter, let alone deploying assets
    that are scheduled to be there in 2020, but even raising doubts
    about whether or not we can legitimately manufacture and
    distribute parts in the supply chain for the production of
    Joint Strike Fighters.
        The message that I want to send to the Turkish leadership
    is this is an area--Congress got educated quite a bit on the
    Joint Strike Fighter and on Turkey last year when we were
    dealing with a matter involving a pastor from my State. I think
    we are very well briefed on it now and some of the risks there.
    I would just encourage the Turkish Government and the
    leadership to recognize that they should not have this one
    decision put all the other great things that we are doing, that
    we will do in the future in the balance and have Congress
    potentially in a position where we would have to act.
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. As you know, we,
    the United States, have a team there today talking to the
    Turks, and I am sure a very candid conversation about the S-400
    and the potential consequences are a part of that conversation.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lyons, let me first ask you a question about
    privatization. As you are familiar, as you know, Army veteran
    and military spouse Megan Harless recently wrote an op-ed that
    criticized TRANSCOM's plan to privatize the military move
    program. She stated that the military move advisory panel
    convened by TRANSCOM has not been consulted regarding
    privatization, and TRANSCOM also has not solicited feedback
    from military families or from the moving industry.
        Do military families support privatization? Does industry
    support it?
        General Lyons. Senator, there is no initiative whatsoever
    to privatize the household goods industry. This is a 100
    percent--every task inside that value chain is conducted by
    commercial industry today.
        What we are proposing, however, is a restructure of how the
    government approaches this with industry. To be honest with
    you, Senator, I have received more letters on this particular
    issue in the 6 months that I have been Commander than any other
    issue that TRANSCOM deals with. In fact, I agree with the
    criticisms of the program. I think we need to take action to
    remedy the program as it exists today. We have been studying
    this since 1996.
        Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to prioritizing the
    needs of those military families in any kinds of reforms that
    you may consider?
        General Lyons. Sir, there is no question about it. This is
    all about improving curbside service for military families.
    That is our north star. That is the only reason that we are
    doing this, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to consulting with the
    TRANSCOM advisory panel?
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. We consult regularly with
    industry. Some very much support where we are headed, and some
    are very, very concerned.
        I do know, Senator, that the moving associations, for
    example, are drafting language to insert in the NDAA that would
    delay any kind of progress in this area, perhaps to study it
    for 2 more years. I can just say I really think that would be a
    gut punch for our military families.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, talking about the
    Ukraine, is there evidence of the Russians meddling in the
    Ukrainian elections that are planned?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, in terms of their influence,
    they certainly are supporting the parties where they believe
    they can have the most influence and those individuals. There
    is certainly disinformation as a part of that. They are playing
    in that way. I think, for instance, Russia's seizure of their
    ships and their 24 sailors and the fact that they have not been
    released is likely also another way that they have some
    leverage and influence on the outcome of that election.
        Senator Blumenthal. Has there been an increase in
    disinforma- tion or other Russian interference?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, just generally it has been
    targeted at undermining the present government and the
    president.
        Senator Blumenthal. What is your command or other American
    resources doing to counter it?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, both not only my command--I deal
    with the military aspects of this, but there are others
    diplomatically, for instance, in State that we are working with
    in this regard. But we do have personnel there that support in
    military means their defense of disinformation, appropriate
    information, and cyber defense as well. In the closed hearing,
    I can be more specific about precisely what we are doing.
        Senator Blumenthal. Just to reassure the American people--
    and that is the purpose of an open hearing really to inform the
    American people--can you provide some description of what is
    being done in the cyber domain by your command to bolster the
    Ukrainian defenses?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I guess I would underscore,
    first of all, what we do with the others is just to make sure
    that this is a free and fair election. Within the cyber domain,
    mine is to help them with their defense of their systems. It is
    not selected by any means at all. It is primarily defense and
    help them to understand how they ensure that they do, in fact,
    have a free and fair election.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will tell you it has been such a pleasure for me to go
    through this series of hearings with our different commands in
    your area of responsibility and hear repeatedly from you all
    some of the needs and stepping up our game, if you will,
    dealing with Russia and China and especially with cyber.
        General Scaparrotti, I am from Tennessee, and I have got
    some National Guardsmen that are under your command at this
    point, folks in the Ukraine and Poland. We appreciate their
    service, and we appreciate you and the leadership that you have
    shown throughout your career to our men and women in uniform
    and to those that are currently under your command.
        Let me stay with looking at our enemies, Russia, China, the
    cyber component, and we will come back to that this afternoon
    in the briefing. But what I would like to know, General, as you
    look at Europe and as we talk about the rollout of 5G and you
    are looking at that European Deterrence Initiative, do you have
    what you need? Where do we need to be planning forward on that,
    and how are you approaching the integration and the utilization
    for really what some of our troops at Fort Campbell--when I
    talk to some of our special ops guys, 5th Division, 160th, this
    is very important to them, 5G and the utilization of that,
    knowing that that is going to help fuel artificial
    intelligence, et cetera, knowing they are going to use that
    with some of the ISR capabilities. If you will just touch on
    that briefly, and then we will explore it a little more this
    afternoon.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I will just start
    with the 5G part of this. This is a considerably different
    capability than what we have today. It is not just a
    modernization or an upgrade.
        Senator Blackburn. It is a whole new world. It is like
    going from analog to digital.
        General Scaparrotti. That is right. It is a different
    world. What we have to know is that we have a secure 5G
    capability. That is one of the reasons that when you now go to
    our allies, that we have said they need to be very careful
    about Chinese investment----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes. No Huawei and no ZTE.
        General Scaparrotti.--in their telecommunications
    capabilities because we also want to know that we are secure
    with our allies that we can act with. There may be an outcome
    where we cannot connect with our allies unless they change the
    composition of their systems. We are trying to get ahead of
    that.
        Senator Blackburn. Is this an open discussion that you are
    having?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, it is an open discussion.
        I would say to you that just to give you an idea of how
    this has come along, 2 years this would not have been a topic.
    A year ago, it was starting to come in, and now----
        Senator Blackburn. It is front and center.
        General Scaparrotti. Now it is front and center, and we are
    beginning to have the right conversations as a security issue.
        Senator Blackburn. Good. That is great.
        General Lyons, TRANSCOM has had some problems with some
    breaches, and I think it was a couple of years ago, Chinese
    hackers got into the network like 20 times. What you do and
    with logistics--and we have talked about different points. I
    think Chairman Wicker brought up Rota, Spain. As you look at
    the integration and all that comes under you, give me an update
    on the security of your systems and then how are you dealing
    with contractors that are a part of your system.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am. As you indicated, this is
    an area of concern and it is a high priority for the command. I
    tell folks this is a warfighting domain. There is no one thing
    that is going to solve this. We have got multiple things going
    on, everything from just operator discipline, through cyber
    hygiene, through defense, through infrastructure, and a high
    level of collaboration with Cyber Command to create conditions
    to allow us to operate.
        As for our industry partners, we are also upping our game
    there through our contractual language and their compliance
    with NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology]
    standards, basically their assessments and collaboration and
    information sharing. But that is a much more complex area
    outside of the DODIN
    [Department of Defense Information Network] where a level of
    protection is lower, and that does become a vulnerability in
    the enterprise.
        Senator Blackburn. We will talk a little more about that in
    this afternoon's hearing.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses for your service and your
    testimony.
        A House bill to overturn President Trump's emergency
    declaration is pending before this Committee and will likely be
    voted on on the floor of the Senate within the next 10 days or
    so.
        There are at least two issues that Senators are grappling
    with about the bill: one, the question of whether there is an
    emergency. General O'Shaughnessy of NORTHCOM testified before
    us last week and said in a very straightforward way there is no
    military emergency at the border.
        But a second issue we are grappling with is where will the
    money come from. The President has proposed to use $6 billion
    from the Pentagon to direct toward this non-military emergency:
    $3.5 million of MILCON [Military Construction] funding and $2.5
    billion of drug interdiction monies within the DOD budget.
        I want to ask you about these proposals because we are
    trying to get information about exactly how the moving of the
    $6 billion is doing to affect military operations.
        Have either of you in your commands been asked to provide
    lists of MILCON projects that should be either delayed or
    reduced or eliminated with respect to this particular $3.5
    billion proposal? General Scaparrotti?
        General Scaparrotti. Not with respect to this proposal, no,
    sir.
        Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
        General Lyons. No, sir. But it probably would not be
    appropriate. TRANSCOM relies on the services for their MILCON.
        Senator Kaine. Right, so that you do not have the big
    MILCON back list that the others do. I understand.
        General Lyons. That is correct.
        Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, you say not with
    respect to this proposal. I gather what you mean by that is you
    are often putting together MILCON lists. That would be one of
    the things you would do in EUCOM is looking at MILCON needs
    within that command. You have been doing that, but you have not
    been asked with respect to this proposal what MILCON projects
    could be reduced, delayed, or eliminated.
        General Scaparrotti. With respect to the budget as a whole,
    well prior to this question, we went through the normal process
    of our discussion within DOD as to what the priorities were
    across the Department with respect to my MILCON.
        Senator Kaine. Right.
        General Scaparrotti. We had to prioritize. We did delay
    some, but that was well before this conversation.
        Senator Kaine. Do you know if and when a decision is made
    about where the $3.5 billion of MILCON projects, which will be
    affected--do you know whether you will be in that decision loop
    or whether it will be made by others?
        General Scaparrotti. I expect I will be in the decision
    loop within the Department. We have a close relationship with
    them. We generally would have. No one has discussed it with me,
    and I am confident they would when and if that should----
        Senator Kaine. The ``they'' would probably be the service
    secretaries and the SecDef?
        General Scaparrotti. It would be the service secretary or
    the SecDef, probably the SecDef as well. I actually talked to
    the SecDef personally about the potential delay, et cetera that
    I just told you about as we were going through the budget.
        Senator Kaine. Let me ask the second half of the question.
    The other funding that is suggested could be used is the $2.5
    billion drug interdiction account at the Pentagon. Reporting
    suggests that there is not $2.5 billion in that account. There
    is about $750 million, of which only $85 million is available
    for use right now. There is a suggestion that what the Pentagon
    would do would be to take monies out of other accounts to fill
    up the drug interdiction account to $2.5 billion prior to using
    it for the emergency proposal that the President has suggested.
        Have either of you been involved in any discussions about
    funds within your bailiwick that might be used to pull into the
    drug interdiction account?
        General Scaparrotti. No, Senator, I have not.
        Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
        General Lyons. No, sir.
        Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, let me ask you about
    this. The 70th anniversary of NATO is in April, a really
    important one. NATO has a headquarters both in Brussels and
    also in Virginia in the Hampton Roads area. I have a proposal,
    a bill that is a bipartisan bill, that would stipulate that
    NATO, a treaty that the Senate ratified--the U.S. should not
    unilaterally withdraw from that without either a Senate vote or
    an act of Congress. The bill is a bipartisan one, and it is
    meant to send a strong signal of congressional support for the
    NATO alliance at the 70th anniversary.
        Would that message be positively received by our NATO
    allies?
        General Scaparrotti. Senator, I believe it would. The votes
    by Congress that you have taken in the past to reinforce our
    commitment to our allies have been helpful as well.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
        No further questions. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being
    here today and willing to answer questions.
        Like so many of my colleagues, I do want to make sure that
    you have the tools and resources necessary to enable you in
    your missions and make you successful.
        As Senator Sullivan mentioned just a little bit earlier, I
    did recently return from a trip to Ukraine, and during that
    trip, I was able to see firsthand the Russian aggression that
    is being exhibited in that region against what is a very
    important strategic partner to us. Not only do we want to push
    back against Russia because of Ukraine and Europe but, of
    course, for many of our other allies around the world as well.
        General Scaparrotti, I would like to start with you, sir.
        Of course, while I was in Ukraine, the Ukrainians expressed
    a very strong desire for military assistance, defensive
    assistance and lethal assistance. Senator Sullivan mentioned
    that we have provided Javelins to the Ukrainian army.
        I met with members of the defense establishment there, as
    well as members of the Ukrainian parliament, and those that I
    had the opportunity to meet with in Kiev and also the joint
    forces headquarters near the eastern front--they really
    appreciated that assistance.
        What more can we do for the Ukrainians in that regard for
    lethal assistance? Is it just simply more Javelins, or is there
    additional assistance we can provide?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think personally--and you will
    see soon here a list. I think it has already been provided to
    Congress. But as you know, we provide that prior to it being
    authorized, the actual purchase from the funding that you have
    given.
        But from my point of view, the things that we need to
    continue is to continue their support for counter-battery, Q-
    36/37, that they have the assets and the systems that they need
    to do that well. They have asked us for help in communication
    at an operational level, and they do have a distinct need for
    that because while we focus on the line of contact, their chief
    of defense is also focused on other areas of the country that
    are a threat, that Russia could present a threat as well. He is
    trying to determine--he is trying to establish a good
    communications system for his entire force, as well as just the
    front.
        They have asked us specifically for some assistance to help
    with sniper proficiency, the right kind of ammo and weapons,
    grenade launchers.
        Then finally the area that I would say is that we need to
    study how we help their maritime component, their navy, which
    as you know, is not large to begin with, given the portion of
    the fleet that Russia took when it annexed Crimea, and they
    just lost a couple of ships as well in the Kerch Strait. I
    think there are some areas there that we can help them get this
    navy back up and begin to supply it with what they believe they
    need to defend themselves and deter Russia's aggressive
    actions.
        Senator Ernst. I appreciate that very much, sir. Thank you
    for bringing up the Kerch Strait incident because they are
    still holding those 24 sailors, as you referenced earlier, and
    using those sailors as leverage with the elections coming up. I
    do appreciate that you think we need to do more on the maritime
    front, not only in assisting them with their navy, but is it
    possible that we as an American force need to have more of our
    naval forces in the Black Sea region?
        General Scaparrotti. Both the United States and NATO has
    stepped up its presence in the Black Sea. As you know, the
    Donald Cook just departed yesterday or the day before, and it
    is the second time that we have had a destroyer in the Black
    Sea here in the past 2 months. We believe there is a need for
    that. We have stepped up and our allies have as well. NATO has
    a fleet right now in the Black Sea.
        Senator Ernst. Do you think it is sending a clear message
    to President Vladimir Putin?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is. I mean, they frankly do
    not like us in the Black Sea. It is international waters and we
    should sail and fly there.
        Senator Ernst. That is a great thing, and I love it. Thank
    you, sir.
        The presidential elections are coming up. I will just close
    with this. I think it was very important that I take this trip
    to Ukraine and spend time with the folks within their defense
    sector and also spent time with some of their brand new special
    operations forces that had just graduated from their Ukrainian
    Q Course, which is run by our American special operations
    forces. I appreciate what we are doing in that region, sir. I
    appreciate your leadership in that region.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here today and for your service.
    General Scaparrotti, I appreciated you coming by the office the
    other day. I enjoyed that very much.
        I also appreciated your candid answers concerning climate
    change. I think we sometimes get caught up in the political
    discussions about climate and not really focus on the real
    world consequences that are affecting us today.
        Earlier today, you spoke with Senator Cotton about China's
    investments in your AOR. If you can, I would like to have you
    discuss what, if any, actions EUCOM may be taking to counter
    China's activities in Europe today.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, most of all, in terms of EUCOM,
    it is discussions with our counterparts and leaders about the
    concerns of China's what I would say is strategic investments.
    Most of this is diplomatic at this point, but we do try to
    ensure that we can point out to them not only economic benefits
    which China demonstrates and make sure they are aware of, but
    also the security aspects of their control of seaports,
    airports, critical key terrain, investment in infrastructure
    particularly with technology that is critical to security. We
    try to emphasize the security aspects of their investments.
        Senator Jones. Has the administration's tactics with regard
    to the tariffs and European tariffs--have you seen any effect
    on that with any of our allies--the economic impact?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, it is certainly a point of
    discussion among the allies and one of concern because our
    country and Europe has a very significant trade and economic
    linkage there. But in terms of the direct impact for me, the
    mil-to-mil relationships are strong. That essentially is dealt
    with on the diplomatic side.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, sir.
        General Lyons, I want to kind of go back to a conversation
    you had with Senator King on cybersecurity. If you can in this
    hearing as opposed to the closed hearing, could you please
    maybe describe the impact on operations of a nation state cyber
    attack on TRANSCOM's networks and how this could impact your
    discussions and your ability and interaction with COCOMs [U.S.
    Combatant Commands]?
        General Lyons. Senator, anything that would degrade our
    ability to project power is a concern. Cyber as a warfighting
    domain does create an area of vulnerability across what is
    largely an unclassified surface of employment. We are working
    very, very hard to prioritize and to ensure that we have the
    appropriate level of resiliency and to move to an
    infrastructure that is more secure. We are moving very, very
    rapidly in that area.
        Senator Jones. Right.
        Just staying with you, General Lyons, you mentioned earlier
    that there was a plan to improve the household goods shipment
    process using a single contractor to manage transportation
    service providers. How will that change improve the process?
    What will it cost, and will it increase accountability?
        General Lyons. Senator, it will definitely increase
    accountability, and I believe it will also increase capacity.
    Those are the two major issues. Those are the two major
    complaints. The way that enhances capacity is it is a longer-
    term investment with our industry partners, and so they are
    willing to invest in capacity over time, as well as reducing
    barriers to entry into the market that we, unfortunately,
    create for ourselves.
        There is no question that it will improve accountability.
    Today, there are 950 various transportation service providers
    that compete for work on a transactional basis. Very, very
    difficult across the services and TRANSCOM to maintain
    accountability and all that. But the business folks know the
    business, and that is the right relationship to have with a
    single move manager.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both for being here.
        Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the remainder of my time.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
        Well, it looks like we have run out of members here so we
    will close it.
        Several people during the course of this hearing, General
    Scaparrotti, have speculated this may be your last time that
    you attend this hearing. It is also your birthday today. Is
    this a birthday present to you?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. It is Congress' birthday
    present, I assume. I have enjoyed it.
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, we thank you so much for all of the
    service. Both of you, but particularly you because you have
    appeared so many times, and as has been pointed out by Senator
    Reed, you have held the fourth star longer than anybody else in
    existence here. You have served your country in a way that many
    others have not. Thank you so much for that service.
        Anything else?
        Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman. Just let me join in
    thanking both General Scaparrotti and General Lyons,
    particularly General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                              ready reserve force
        1. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act] provided authority to procure
    seven used vessels, sufficient to sustain sealift recapitalization
    requirements through fiscal year 2025. Based on the Navy's fiscal year
    2019 30-year shipbuilding plan, meeting the full sealift
    recapitalization requirement would entail procuring 26 used vessels
    through fiscal year 2031. Has the Navy developed and shared with you
    its acquisition plan to procure the vessels needed to recapitalize the
    ready Reserve force?
        General Lyons. Yes, the Navy coordinated with USTRANSCOM when it
    developed its plan titled, ``Sealift that the Nation Needs,'' which
    includes plans for new construction and used ship acquisitions to
    recapitalize the sealift fleets. The Navy continues to work with
    USTRANSCOM to enhance near-term readiness of strategic sealift
    capabilities through an accelerated buy-used acquisition timeline.
                              ready reserve force
        2. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, last year's NDAA authorized the
    procurement of seven used vessels to sustain sealift recapitalization
    requirements through fiscal year 2025. What is the status of procuring
    those new vessels and where are we getting them from?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM established requirements and is
    coordinating with the Navy and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to
    acquire used vessels and recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force. MARAD
    completed a Request For Information (RFI) that identified 78 viable
    ships owned by U.S. and international companies. While authority exists
    to purchase now, Navy budgeted funds to purchase two vessels in fiscal
    year 2021 and fiscal year 2022. USTRANSCOM has submitted an Unfunded
    Priority List requesting that funds be appropriated in fiscal year 2020
    to purchase the first two vessels. Once funding is available, MARAD
    will release a request for proposal (RFP) to initiate the acquisition
    process. The source of the ships will be determined through responses
    received from the RFP.
                                sea and air lift
        3. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, I read with interest the op-ed in
    the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2019 by Mark Helprin. In
    particular, I was concerned with his statement regarding ``America's
    inadequate military sea and air lift'' abilities when it comes to
    resupplying our forces. As Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, I
    worry not only about our Navy fleet but also our commercial maritime
    industry, which is critical to our surge abilities during war. What is
    TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] doing to work with the
    Navy and MARAD [United States Maritime Administration] to ensure both
    our military and commercial supply ships can maintain sea lines of
    communication to our bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam during a
    potential conflict in the Pacific?
        General Lyons. Within the DOD, geographic combatant commanders and
    fleet commanders are tasked with planning and establishing the
    necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and
    commercial assets to ensure their safe transit. To further aid in
    assurance, in coordination with Military Sealift Command, we are
    reevaluating the strategic posture of strategic sealift assets and how
    commercial assets are utilized in the Pacific when operating within a
    contested environment. Additionally, we partner with MARAD on improving
    civilian mariner manning, training, and the industrial base to support
    high-end conflict. Finally, in support of these efforts, we, along with
    combatant and fleet commanders, continue to plan and conduct wargames,
    multi-faceted experiments, tiered exercises, and innovative proofs of
    concept that address the challenges of operating within a contested
    environment.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                    defense personal property program (dp3)
        4. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, broadly speaking, how will
    outsourcing the Defense Personal Property Program to a single source
    contract improve the current program?
        General Lyons. Rather than describing this as `outsourcing,'
    USTRANSCOM characterizes this effort as a fundamental restructuring of
    DOD's relationship with industry to enhance accountability, stability,
    and capacity. Currently 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are
    executed by commercial providers. Under a single commercial move
    manager construct, 100 percent of the movements will continue to be
    performed by commercial providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD
    offices to coordinate the operations of 950+ Transportation Service
    Providers on a shipment-by-shipment basis, with no underlying formal
    contractual agreement, DOD seeks to award end-to-end transportation and
    storage processes to a single commercial move manager to drive
    integration and capitalize on the market intelligence of industry.
        We seek to evolve beyond the current transactional approach, which
    hinders industry's ability to conduct long-term planning and invest in
    sustainable relationships. Entering into a multi-year relationship
    provides industry with both the confidence and rationale to invest in
    capacity and strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet
    peak demand. DOD will have a single company to engage and hold
    accountable when necessary to better meet the needs of military
    families.

        5. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
    transition to a single-move manager will affect the costs to the
    Defense Personal Property Program and what metrics are you using to
    measure this effect?
        General Lyons. The purpose of transitioning to a single move
    manager is to improve access to--and management of--quality capacity to
    meet peak demand and enable DOD to affix responsibility and
    accountability. DOD will withdraw this recommendation if the formal
    acquisition process identifies no viable candidates or if the Military
    Services deem the final product is unaffordable.

        6. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
    transition to a single-move manager will increase moving capacity and
    what metrics are you using to measure this increase?
        General Lyons. The fractured nature of the current Defense Personal
    Property Program (DP3)--both in terms of the number of Transportation
    Service Providers (TSPs) and disparate government offices trying to
    manage them--is a root cause of the capacity and quality issues
    reported by servicemembers and DOD civilians.
        The DOD is the largest single consumer of moving and storage
    services, accounting for 20 percent of the domestic household goods
    market, yet we still compete with the broader population for assets.
    Under our current construct, each of the DOD's 42 regional shipping
    offices deals with a pool of TSPs and awards business on a shipment-by-
    shipment basis. In day-to-day operations, the transactional nature of
    this approach results in inefficient crew and truck utilization. More
    broadly, this transactional approach hinders industry's ability to
    conduct long-term planning, and with no meaningful forecast of what
    they can expect to move--offers no basis to invest in relationships
    with agents or assets to respond to DOD's very predictable demand.
    Centralizing demand planning with a single entity improves utilization
    of available capacity. In addition to better utilizing existing
    capacity, I believe this construct will attract new providers. Industry
    representatives who are currently unaffiliated with DP3 state that the
    programs existing over- engineered rules make DOD an unattractive
    partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much of industry would
    rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic moving and storage
    market.
        Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and
    delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall
    customer satisfaction.

        7. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
    transition to a single-move manager will improve customer service for
    our military families and what metrics are you using to measure this
    improvement?
        General Lyons. The DOD encounters the same set of challenges--and
    results--each peak season: quality capacity is lacking, DOD has limited
    accountability measures to drive improvements, and DP3 customers do not
    know who to call when things go wrong. Restructuring DOD's relationship
    with industry promotes long-term stability and investment that
    ultimately eliminates unnecessary friction and opacity for DP3 users.
    Building relationships with trusted suppliers and increasing
    accountability should lead to increased customer satisfaction.
        Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and
    delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall
    customer satisfaction.

        8. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how are you working to include
    input from industry and servicemembers in your decision to outsource
    the DP3 program?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM interacts with industry and
    servicemembers in a number of venues. We conduct spring and fall
    Personal Property Forums with industry and personal property
    professionals representing the Military Services. We conduct monthly
    calls with those same professionals during the non-peak season and
    weekly during the peak season.
        USTRANSCOM conducted two `Industry Day' engagements as part of
    ongoing market research, which included the opportunity for industry
    personnel to conduct one-on-one meetings with DOD personnel to address
    their specific questions and concerns regarding the single move manager
    contract. My team has also released a DRAFT RFP to industry for their
    review and feedback to improve the final RFP. My Deputy and I have
    personally hosted group meetings with industry CEOs, leaders of the
    associations that represent them, and accepted numerous requests for
    one-on-one phone calls and office calls with CEOs.
        We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with industry leaders and
    we also conduct a monthly Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel
    with some leading spousal advocates from the military services.
    Additionally, I have personally engaged each Service Secretary and
    Service Chief on this effort.
        Each of these engagements leaves me more in tune with industry's
    concerns as we develop the path ahead. They have informed how we intend
    to structure the program and how we continue to solicit inputs for
    program improvement. They have also informed the development of the
    acquisition strategy and DRAFT RFP. After every engagement, I am more
    convinced that restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and
    implementing this single move-manager construct is the right answer for
    DOD personnel and their families.
                     russia/china great-power collaboration
        9. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic,
    operational, and tactical implications of China's involvement in
    Russia's exercise Vostok 2018?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, how does China's
    investment in the infrastructure of nations like Denmark and Belgium,
    especially ports, relate to China's intention to develop a ``blue
    economic passage'' connecting China to Europe through the Arctic Ocean?
        General Scaparrotti. China is leveraging their growing economic,
    diplomatic, and military clout to increase economic, trade, and transit
    links to Europe and in the Arctic through projects such as the ``One
    Belt, One Road'' Initiative (OBOR).
        Since 2013, China has elevated OBOR from a regional infrastructure
    project connecting western China with Eurasia to a global foreign
    engagement strategy that presents Belt-Road Initiative as a new
    platform of international cooperation and showcases China as an
    alternative model of economic and political development.
        China has increased activities and engagement the Arctic region
    since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. In January
    2018 China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a Polar
    Silk China linked its OBOR initiatives. The strategy identifies China's
    interests as access to natural resources, Sea Lines of Communication,
    and promoting an image of a responsible major country in Arctic
    affairs.

        11. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in your personal
    opinion, is there incentive for a resource-producing nation like Russia
    and a resource-consuming nation like China to work together?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
     eucom [united states european command] & nato [north atlantic treaty
                        organization] arctic capability

        12. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, as Russia dramatically
    increases its Arctic capability and capacity, what is the strategic
    cost of not increasing United States and NATO activity in the Arctic?
        General Scaparrotti. The strategic risk is that we would cede the
    Arctic to the Russians. The intent of increasing U.S. and NATO activity
    in the Arctic should not be to militarize the Arctic but to ensure that
    the region continues to be an area of international cooperation. It
    will be important to continue the cooperation and governance that has
    historically made the Arctic a region of cooperation, not a zone of
    conflict. Having U.S. and NATO assets increase Arctic activity ensures
    that no single nation can unilaterally make decisions there that affect
    the world.

        13. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what specific
    capabilities are needed to improve our Arctic posture in EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. Across the USEUCOM AOR, including the Arctic,
    there is a need for domain awareness capabilities (such as
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment) in the
    undersea, surface, and air domains. Additional communication
    capabilities and infrastructure are also required to facilitate
    military activities as well as basic search and rescue operations.
                                  vostok 2018
        14. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic
    implications and messaging of the scale and complexity of Russia's
    exercise Vostok 2018 and what should we be doing to respond?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in light of Vostok 2018,
    what does EUCOM need to do to maintain a credible deterrent to Russian
    activity?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                    republic of georgia--ascension into nato
        16. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your written testimony,
    you said, ``Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in
    Afghanistan, where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute
    Support with almost 900 troops currently deployed.'' How important are
    non-NATO partners like Georgia for NATO to fulfill its objectives?
        General Scaparrotti. The contributions of our non-NATO partners are
    critically important to our mission in Afghanistan. Our various
    partners, including Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, support
    Resolute Support Mission (RSM) objectives by providing critical
    functions, including trainers, advisors, planners, and security and
    force protection units. These contributions not only allow NATO to make
    progress in RSM, but also demonstrate commitment to shared values and
    closer relationships.

        17. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the United States-Georgia
    security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in
    2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone
    in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a
    credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The
    program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its
    national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea
    region.'' How important is engagement and security cooperation with
    Black Sea countries like Georgia to NATO's posture in the region?
        General Scaparrotti. Security cooperation and assistance efforts
    with Black Sea countries like Georgia are vitally important to United
    States and NATO interests. These efforts promote regional security,
    good governance, and democratic principles of civil-military relations,
    especially professional service, civilian control of the military,
    transparency, and accountability. Additionally, programs such as the
    GDRP improve Black Sea nations' ability to generate and sustain their
    own military forces, which further strengthens regional security.

        18. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
    affirmed support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the
    eventual membership of Georgia in NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. Section 1248 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
    states that in order to strengthen the defense of the United States and
    its allies and partners in Europe, the Department of Defense should
    affirm its support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the
    eventual membership of Georgia in NATO. This statement is consistent
    with the 2008 Bucharest statement and does not dictate a time frame for
    Georgia's membership. USEUCOM provides assistance to Georgia that will
    help the country's defense establishment prepare for a future political
    decision among the NATO allies on Georgia's eventual membership.

        19. Senator Perdue. General Scaparroti, how would NATO
    strategically benefit from Georgia's ascension into NATO?
        General Scaparrotti. With Georgia's ascension to NATO, the Alliance
    would benefit from Georgia's geographic position and steadfast support
    for NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan. NATO would also
    benefit from Georgia's assistance to counter Russia's malign narratives
    along their periphery.
                   joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
        20. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in the era of great power
    competition, electronic warfare has risen in strategic importance. For
    example, Russia demonstrated in its incursion into Ukraine a full range
    of capabilities, including communication jamming, message intercepting,
    and geolocating units based on the electromagnetic signatures they
    emit. Last year's NDAA required a report on the status of
    operationalizing the Joint Electromagnetic Operations Cells at the
    COCOMS and what resources were needed to do so. The United States Army
    fielded Raven Claw, a mobile variant of the their EW Planning and
    Management Tool (EWPMT), in Eastern Europe last year, as well. How
    important is it to provide our warfighters in the European theater with
    the right tools to plan and manage military operations in the face of
    sophisticated EW attacks in EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. It is vitally important that we provide our
    forces in Europe the right electromagnetic warfare (EW) equipment and
    training as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a critical
    warfighting area that crosses all military domains. Russia is
    increasing its EW capabilities and already integrates EW into their
    military operations. Our ability to leverage the EMS requires tools
    that combine multiple intelligence and operational feeds to quantify EW
    threats and electromagnetic interference, while not interfering with
    host nation infrastructure. Additionally, effectiveness in this domain
    will require the continued coordination with host nation partners to
    manage and utilize the electromagnetic spectrum.

        21. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your assessment, how
    would the availability of a joint version of EWPMT and the mobile
    version, Raven Claw, benefit EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. A joint version of an Electromagnetic Battle
    Management (EMBM) system, similar to EWPMT, would be highly beneficial
    as it helps reduce labor-intensive manual processes and enables greater
    freedom of action in the electromagnetic environment. Any EMBM system
    would require thorough evaluation to ensure it meets current and
    emerging needs for USEUCOM forces.
                             continuing resolutions
        22. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, in as
    much detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the
    operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on EUCOM/
    TRANSCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. Continuing resolutions significantly impact
    the operations, training, and readiness of units in our European
    footprint and the Atlantic Resolve (AR) assurance and deterrence
    mission. Constrained distribution of fiscal resources causes execution
    impasses, decreases unit OPTEMPO, and impairs rotations (e.g., ABCT,
    CAB, MP/CSSB RFFs, 1ACB) to, from, and within Europe. Additionally, the
    investment of resources to improve infrastructure and facilities
    throughout the European theater provides our allies, partners, and
    potential adversaries a clear indication of the United States' long-
    term commitment to Europe. Continuing resolutions limit the capacity to
    execute these improvements, compromising our ability to set the theater
    for assurance and deterrence. The specifics of these infrastructure and
    operational impact can be found in USEUCOM fiscal year 2020 J-book
    submission.
        General Lyons. As we have seen in the past, a Continuing Resolution
    impacts readiness, mission operations and modernization funding when
    the Services cannot project funding levels for manning, training, and
    equipping mobility forces. In order to maintain readiness, USTRANSCOM
    requires a balance between Services having adequately appropriated
    funding and workload levels in order to provide the enterprise a
    sufficient Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) cash balance. A
    Continuing Resolution has some direct, immediate impact to USTRANSCOM's
    appropriated workforce such as our Research and Development and new
    start projects including Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations;
    however, a Continuing Resolution will significantly impact readiness of
    our Service Components, who execute our missions, and ultimately
    reflect on our overall readiness to conduct global mobility operations.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                  european energy security (russian coercion)
        23. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, Russia currently has
    significant leverage over many of our European and NATO allies due to
    their reliance on Russian natural gas exports to provide for their
    power needs. Last year, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the
    HASC [House Armed Services Committee] that ``we [and our allies] are
    working toward relieving some of the dependency on Russia . . . [and]
    there's facilities being built that will allow us to transport
    [liquefied natural gas]'' . You also said ``frankly, I think we should
    continue to do that, because, as you know, Russia uses energy to coerce
    and compel''. Nord Stream 2 is set to be completed later this year and
    would double the amount of gas Russia transports directly to Germany.
    Eventually Russia aims to eliminate the movement of Russia gas to the
    European Union through Ukraine. Such a development would eliminate 1.5
    percent of Ukraine's GDP outright and make Ukraine more vulnerable to
    gas cutoffs by Russia, making Ukraine more vulnerable to annexations.
    General Scaparrotti, is Russia continuing to use its natural gas
    exports to Europe as a weapon against our European allies and NATO
    partners?
        General Scaparrotti. Russia uses its status as a major energy
    exporter as a tool of coercion in Europe. Russia continues to
    demonstrate a willingness to use (or threaten to use) energy supply
    disruption as a tool of leverage to affect partner and Allied decision-
    making, or as a punitive response to decisions viewed as counter to
    Russian interests.

        24. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, what can we and our NATO
    partners do to clear the regulatory roadblocks and make the
    infrastructure investments to ensure the United States can prevent
    Russia from coercing our European allies by threatening to turn off the
    taps to their energy supply?
        General Scaparrotti. Since most of the infrastructure and energy
    markets in NATO nations are owned and operated by the private sector or
    by civilian-managed, government-owned entities, NATO governments are
    responsible for addressing any shortfalls and roadblocks to promote
    investment and energy supply diversification. USEUCOM, together with
    our military counterparts in NATO, are identifying fuel supply-chain
    vulnerabilities and providing civilian leadership our best military
    advice on energy security risks and infrastructure investments that can
    help mitigate Russian coercion. Civilian and military investments in
    enhanced energy efficiency, fuel supply diversification, and overall
    energy resilience programs and policies will help grow our shared
    capabilities to respond to future supply disruptions.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                       defense personal property program:
        25. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, I understand your command is
    considering getting out of the personal property moving business by
    privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program. But TRANSCOM is in
    fact in the business of moving stuff. Watching what has come to light
    over the last three weeks with the military's privatized housing
    initiative, I have grave concerns with the idea of TRANSCOM handing
    this off to the lowest bidder. Could you describe your Command's
    deliberations on privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `get out of the
    Personal Property moving business,' nor is it `privatization.' In part,
    the current DP3 program is prone with problems similar to those
    identified with the privatized housing issue. Much like individual
    rental contracts for housing without adequate leader oversight each
    servicemember arranges household goods shipments one transaction at a
    time without accountability provided by leader oversight. Rather,
    USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally
    restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity,
    stability, and accountability. Ultimately, USTRANSCOM will be
    responsible for holding industry accountable. We will never relinquish
    this responsibility.
        Currently, 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are executed by
    commercial providers. Under a single commercial move manager construct,
    100 percent of the movements will continue to be done by commercial
    providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD offices to coordinate the
    operations of 950+ Transportation Service Providers on a shipment-by-
    shipment basis, with no underlying formal contractual agreement, DOD
    seeks to award end-to-end transportation and storage processes to a
    single commercial move manager to drive integration and capitalize on
    the market intelligence of industry.
        USTRANSCOM will award this contract based on a ``best value'' basis
    that meets the needs of the program. We will not award a contract, and
    will withdraw this recommendation if the acquisition process identifies
    no viable candidates or if the Services deem the final product
    unaffordable.
        Restructuring DOD's relationship with industry in this manner will
    promote stability and ultimately eliminate some of the most critical
    gaps and seams that generate unnecessary friction and opacity for
    military families.

        26. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, what can you do to assure me
    that TRANSCOM will maintain sufficient oversight of any contract that
    privatizes the DP3?
        General Lyons. Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM
    will be the DOD's lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized
    oversight--something today's DP3 lacks in the current construct. The
    DOD's 42 regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by
    the Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis
    to a regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured
    nature of operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the Services
    issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where TSPs were
    operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and issued over
    2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed; however,
    because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate offices in
    an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not translate
    into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with industry
    will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.
                               f-15x procurement
        27. Senator Hawley. General Scaparrotti, according to public
    remarks made by Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein at the Air
    Warfare Symposium, the Air Force will include new F-15s in this year's
    budget request as part of an effort to refresh the F-15C fleet. What
    impact would fielding new, advanced F-15s for the 48th Fighter Wing at
    RAF Lakenheath have on your ability to reassure United States allies
    and deter Russian aggression?
        General Scaparrotti. As the current fleet of F-15Cs continues to
    age, the Air Force's initiative to field new, advanced fighters will
    help ensure that USEUCOM has the necessary assets to maintain air
    superiority, deter Russia, and reassure United States allies and
    partners, in part through participation in the NATO Air Policing
    mission.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
              women, peace and security (wps) act and gender roles
        28. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how has United States
    European Command (EUCOM) been satisfying the Women, Peace and Security
    Act?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM's approach to institutionalizing the
    Women, Peace, and Security program focuses on formal change management,
    establishing internal structures and training, and external capacity
    building in partnership with the Department of State, USAID, and the
    Department of Justice. USEUCOM has implemented an ``Executive
    Coaching'' initiative focused on educating our senior leaders on the
    importance of participation by women in conflict prevention, peace
    processes, mitigation, and resolution. Additionally, with our Command
    Gender Advisor, we mandate training on international human rights law
    and protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking
    in persons.

        29. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how do you view EUCOM's
    approach to WPS and the progress that has been made?
        General Scaparrotti. In the past year and a half, USEUCOM has made
    good progress in operationalizing the WPS program by working with our
    Allies and partners to ensure a synchronized effort moving forward.
    USEUCOM's approach centers on values-based education and change
    management within the command. It nests with NATO's approach to WPS and
    reinforces the role of women in conflict prevention, management, and
    resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.

        30. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to
    get to a place where it can hand over a crisis situation to NATO with a
    seamlessly integrated gendered approach?
        General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM is mirroring NATO WPS structures as
    well as adopting their key terms of reference for WPS. During our last
    headquarters exercise, which focused on managing a crisis with NATO,
    our Gender Advisor was an active participant in several key decision-
    making discussion forums. Additionally, during our everyday steady
    state operations, we are actively engaged with the NATO gender network.

        31. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, does EUCOM have a full-
    time gender advisor?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. USEUCOM has a full-time Gender Advisor
    (GENAD).

        32. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, if so, what are the
    responsibilities of the current gender advisor?
        General Scaparrotti. Internally, USEUCOM's Women, Peace, and
    Security Program Management and Gender Advisor (GENAD)is responsible
    for: strategic document and orders mainstreaming, internal instruction
    writing and implementation, education and training for all of USEUCOM
    and the component commands, training exercise gender advising, advising
    senior interagency representatives from State and USAID, and senior
    military leaders' preparation and advising for key leader engagement.
        Externally, the GENAD is responsible for capacity building
    throughout EUCOM's 51 country AOR to include mainstreaming of
    documents, strategy development of national action plan implementation
    as well as education and training support, and supporting and advising
    the NATO International Military Staff and Allied Command operations
    GENAD.

        33. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, is he/she exclusively
    focused on WPS and what else do they work on?
        General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM Gender Advisor's primary task is
    to execute the WPS program. As a member of our Interagency Partnering
    Directorate (ECJ9), her additional performance elements are related to
    Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) and Interagency Coordination.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              military move system
        34. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how would privatizing the
    military move process improve transparency and better serve military
    families?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `privatize' DP3.
    Rather, USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally
    restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity,
    stability, and accountability. Currently, 100 percent of
    servicemembers' movements are executed by commercial providers. Under a
    single commercial move manager construct, 100 percent of the movements
    will continue to be done by commercial providers.
        The single move manager construct will not only improve
    accountability, but will also improve transparency in the program.
    Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM will be the DOD's
    lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized oversight--something
    today's DP3 lacks. Under the current DP3 construct, the DOD's 42
    regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by the
    Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis to a
    regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured
    nature of our operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the
    Services issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where
    TSPs were operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and
    issued over 2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed;
    however, because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate
    offices in an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not
    translate into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with
    industry will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what oversight and
    accountability measures would you implement to ensure we don't make the
    same mistakes made when the military housing system was privatized?
        General Lyons. The increase in accountability by transitioning to a
    single move manager cannot be overstated. In many respects, the
    fragmentation and diffused responsibility associated with our current
    program mirrors the shortfalls Congress highlighted with DOD's
    privatized housing model. As we restructure our relationship with
    industry, we will similarly restructure the DOD's management framework
    to provide the rigorous, centralized oversight required.
        The current lack of accountability in DP3 mirrors the lack of
    accountability in housing privatization, reinforcing the need to
    fundamentally change our relationship with industry with a single
    commercial move manager construct. USTRANSCOM, as DOD's lead agency for
    maintaining rigorous centralized oversight, will never relinquish
    responsibility for moving military families.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what cost-benefit analysis
    have you conducted on privatization?
        General Lyons. After conducting an internal program review and a
    survey of decades of studies on the topic, three consistent themes
    emerge: 1) that DOD's assignment cycle exerts considerable strain on
    capacity during the summer months; 2) that the transactional nature of
    our relationship with industry prevents us from capitalizing on the
    capacity that is available; and 3) that the program is fractured.
        The cost of delaying significant action and committing resources to
    extended study while preserving the status quo is clear; we will
    continue to subject our military families to substandard moves,
    something that has been brought to my attention through multiple
    discussions with servicemembers, industry, and Congress. In order to
    fundamentally improve the program, restructuring our relationship with
    industry is necessary to capitalize on the market intelligence and
    capability of industry to develop lasting relationships to increase
    accountability, stability, and capacity.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what other studies have you
    conducted on your proposal to transition to a fully privatized moving
    system?
        General Lyons. This program has been studied numerous times by OSD,
    the Military Services, GAO, DOD IG, and various think tank
    organizations. These studies, which are still relevant because they
    apply to the same system, reveal the same root causes and repeat the
    same recommendations which have led to our intended transition to a
    single move manager. Accountability and oversight will be enhanced in
    this system and remain under USTRANSCOM's scope of responsibility.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do military families support
    privatization?
        General Lyons. Military families have spoken out, loud and clear,
    that they want improvements in the relocation process. Improving the
    process for military families is our North Star and the reason we are
    taking action. Military families' concerns, along with surveying
    decades of studies on the topic highlighting recurring problems based
    on the fractured nature of the current system, have led me to the
    decision to restructure our relationship with industry to improve
    quality capacity, stability, and accountability.

        39. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, does industry support
    privatization?
        General Lyons. We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with
    industry leaders, and we have held multiple industry days to gather
    feedback. My Deputy and I have personally hosted group meetings with
    industry CEOs, leaders of the associations that represent them, and
    accepted numerous requests for one-on-one phone calls and office calls
    with CEOs.
        Many move managers and larger asset-based providers agree that
    DOD's business model is outdated, and recognize the business
    opportunities associated with this change. Some of these companies
    support the proposal knowing full well that they do not have the
    resources to serve as the prime contractor; yet, the opportunity to
    engage and invest in longer-term relationships and operate in an
    environment with other industry professionals free from DOD's
    artificially complex business rules is an attractive prospect.
        Each engagement with industry leaves me convinced that
    restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and implementing this
    single move-manager construct is the right answer for DOD personnel and
    their families.

        40. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, have you included military
    families' input in your plans for privatization?
        General Lyons. Yes, improving the relocation process for our
    servicemembers and their families is our North Star and the reason we
    are taking action. We have received feedback through our monthly
    Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel with leading spousal
    advocates from the military services.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, will you commit to
    prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider reforms to
    the personal property program, and reporting back to Congress on how
    their input is being implemented?
        General Lyons. Yes, I will.
                     increased military presence in europe
        42. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, with a returned focus to
    Europe, are you reestablishing routes and connections previously used
    during the Cold War?
        General Lyons. In coordination with USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM is
    consistently reviewing various means of providing efficient and
    effective distribution based on the geographic combatant command's
    analysis of their requirements. This may include previously used routes
    and nodes, as well as newly established locations to meet that
    commander's timeline across various OPLANS.
        USTRANSCOM is closely coordinating air and sea ports of debarkation
    with USEUCOM; some of those are the same as the Cold War and some may
    be different based on the nature of the planning as it evolves; the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) mandates strategic predictability with
    operational unpredictability and the use of theater nodes will adapt to
    the USEUCOM planning.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, are these routes and
    connections adequate for the technology, interoperability, and capacity
    required by missions?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the distribution
    network for the most effective and efficient means of meeting the
    geographic combatant command's requirements. There are identified risk
    areas, for which mitigation strategies are being developed. A key
    responsibility for USTRANSCOM is to meter the strategic flow of forces
    and sustainment in daily competition and under wartime conditions to
    ensure onward movement meshes with the capacities planned by USEUCOM.
    This is both an operational and information technology challenge that
    must be effective at multiple echelons to coordinate end-to-end
    movements.
        European seaports and airports, for the most part, are very modern
    and have robust infrastructure, capacity, and capability. Associated
    routes and connections to these entry points will adapt to the plan,
    specific USEUCOM concepts of operations, and implementations of Dynamic
    Force Employment in accordance with the NDS.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, NATO allies and EU member
    states may be moving troops, equipment, and cargo along the same routes
    and will use the same platforms, such as railroads, that we use to move
    assets. Is there a mutually agreed upon plan in determining which
    countries' assets have priority in the various European transportation
    modalities?
        General Lyons. There is a command and control structure designed to
    prioritize transportation movements. If NATO allies are moving assets
    during a contingency operation, the USEUCOM Commander will be dual
    hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and will make
    prioritization decisions.
        As far as the strategic network is concerned, there is sufficient
    capacity at European seaports which will receive the bulk of military
    equipment, and USEUCOM has done considerable coordination with industry
    on the availability of railcars and trucks for onward movement. While
    USEUCOM is responsible for intra-theater movement coordination with
    NATO allies and EU members, USTRANSCOM needs awareness of that movement
    in order to meter strategic flow. To that end, USTRANSCOM will be
    linked with USEUCOM through the Europe Deployment and Distribution
    Operations Center at USEUCOM headquarters.

        45. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, what
    capabilities does Russia have to interfere with our logistics pipeline
    in Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Russia has numerous kinetic and non-kinetic
    means of interfering with the United States logistics chain in Europe.
    Kinetically, Russia can threaten ports, supply depots, and lines of
    communication throughout the European theater with land, sea, and air-
    delivered precision-guided munitions, potentially assisted by special
    operations forces. In the non-kinetic domain, Russia can use cyber or
    electronic warfare attacks against a variety of targets throughout the
    supply chain, including factories, sea, rail, and highway
    transportation, key nodes such as airports and seaports, and space-
    based navigation and communication systems. Russian actions against
    logistics nodes and distribution routes would delay and disrupt force
    closure and sustainment movements to include commercial commerce.
        General Lyons. [Deleted.]

        46. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons,
    should we be more concerned about physical obstructions, manipulation,
    and destruction, or meddling in the cyber realm?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
        General Lyons. [Deleted.]
                         upcoming elections in ukraine
        47. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, have you observed any
    instances of Russian meddling leading up to Ukraine's presidential
    election?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        48. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to
    deter and counter Russia's propaganda and misinformation campaigns in
    Ukraine's upcoming elections?
        General Scaparrotti. Our Military Information Support Team- Ukraine
    (MIST-UKR) has and will continue to conduct DOD Military Information
    Support Operations (MISO) activities in coordination with the United
    States Embassy Kyiv since May 2014 in accordance with a SECDEF approved
    EXORD. MIST-UKR focuses its enduring efforts providing alternative,
    truthful information, reinforcing the U.S. Commitment to NATO Allies
    and Partners, and expressing United States support for Ukraine
    sovereignty and self-determination.

        49. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, how are you working
    with other agency partners, such as the Department of State, to ensure
    Russia does not employ covert ways to influence the vote?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                          conflict in eastern ukraine
        50. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you
    state that ``the conflict in eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous
    ceasefire violations reported weekly.'' What progress, if any, has been
    made in the last year to counter Russia's aggression and improve the
    capabilities of Ukraine's forces?
        General Scaparrotti. Through the Ukraine Security Assistance
    Initiative (USAI), over the past year the United States has provided
    counter-battery and counter-mortar radars, secure communication
    equipment, and night vision devices. This assistance has increased
    situational awareness, early warning, and survivability for Ukrainian
    units operating in the Joint Forces Operations (JFO) area. The first
    $125 million tranche of USAI 2019 is also being contracted to provide
    two additional counter-battery systems, sniper rifles, shoulder fired
    rocket launchers, and, in response to Russia's actions in the Sea of
    Azov, counter-sea-mine equipment, special operations inflatable boats,
    and dive equipment.

        51. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what more can the
    United States do to help Ukraine reestablish sovereignty and
    territorial integrity?
        General Scaparrotti. The United States must remain committed to the
    Multinational Joint Commission (MJC), which is the leading organization
    for eight partner nations to determine requirements, identify
    shortfalls, and coordinate international assistance efforts to support
    Ukraine's sovereignty. We must also continue to leverage the Joint
    Multinational Training Group--Ukraine (JMTG-U) mission to help Ukraine
    develop a modern and self-sustaining capacity to generate combat units.
    Finally, we must sustain funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance
    Initiative (USAI), which helps enable Ukraine to defend itself and
    deter further Russian aggression.

        52. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what do you see as the
    most impactful thing the United States can do to support Ukraine?
        General Scaparrotti. Unwavering United States political support to
    Ukraine, both bilaterally and through NATO, will have the most
    significant impact on Ukraine's efforts to secure its sovereignty and
    territorial integrity.
                               sealift shortfalls
        53. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, you state in your testimony
    that sealift is TRANSCOM's number one readiness concern. Is DOD [United
    States Department of Defense] properly addressing TRANSCOM's readiness
    concerns--particularly Sealift--in their budget requests?
        General Lyons. Yes, the Navy is in close consultation with
    USTRANSCOM, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Military
    Sealift Command (MSC) who maintain the government-owned organic sealift
    fleets. Through current and future budget cycles, the Navy is reviewing
    all parts of the recapitalization strategy, including maintenance and
    repair of the current fleets, Service Life Extensions, funding used
    acquisitions, and the new construction program.
        USTRANSCOM's focus is on improving near-term sealift readiness
    which will benefit by accelerating the retirement of aging, difficult-
    to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used vessels.

        54. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how can Congress assist
    TRANSCOM in addressing these concerns?
        General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued budget
    stability and execution in support of the DOD. Additionally, Congress's
    oversight and advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as
    outlined by the DOD and MARAD will assist greatly in mitigating
    USTRANSCOM's #1 readiness concern. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused
    on the immediate need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable
    level. This can be accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement
    of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used
    vessels.
        USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the
    Congressional authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the
    understanding that 26 total used vessels are required as part of the
    sealift recapitalization effort.

        55. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, can the American shipping
    industry support recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force, the Maritime
    Security Program, and the 355 ship Navy?
        General Lyons. Although I cannot speak to the 355 ship Navy, the
    American shipping industry will play a significant role in providing
    new construction capacity to recapitalize a portion of the organic
    sealift fleet. Regarding the Maritime Security Program, the law
    requires participants to replace ships in the program upon reaching a
    maximum age of 25 years. MSP participants have provided ship
    replacements as needed since the program's inception, providing the DOD
    with significant capacity and capabilities, although not typically from
    U.S.-built sources. However, the refurbishment of these used ship
    replacements and the construction of new ships will both occur in U.S.
    shipyards.

        56. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what is your priority here?
        General Lyons. My top priority is maintaining sealift readiness to
    meet DOD force deployment and sustainment requirements. Given the
    advanced age of the organic sealift fleets, continued Service Life
    Extensions on existing ships will not provide readiness outcomes
    needed. The acceleration of the acquisition of more modern, used
    vessels is the most practical means to alleviate readiness concerns in
    the near-term.

        57. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what does Congress need to
    do to support recapitalization?
        General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued oversight and
    advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as outlined by the
    DOD and MARAD. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate
    need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be
    accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement of aging,
    difficult-to-maintain vessels with more modern, used vessels.
    USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the congressional
    authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the understanding that
    26 total used vessels are required as part of the sealift
    recapitalization effort.

        58. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do you think the Navy has
    the capability to escort Sealift ships?
        General Lyons. Combatant and fleet commanders are tasked, in
    coordination with USTRANSCOM, with planning and establishing the
    necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and
    commercial assets to ensure their safe transit within the respective
    areas they operate. With any near peer competitor, all the Services
    will be challenged to maintain open lines of communication including
    from the sea. Defense of the sea lanes is a Navy mission that can be
    accomplished by a variety of means, to include escort; however, with an
    increased threat level, the Navy may have limited escort capacity
    available for sealift at a given time. In that scenario, the Navy may
    augment escort with additional measures such as aerial reconnaissance,
    patrol or the use of escort support from a coalition partner.

        59. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, in your testimony, you state
    that ``TRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operators of steam-powered
    vessels.'' Can the American maritime labor force support the operation
    of steam vessels?
        General Lyons. The steam engineering skill set is eroding in the
    commercial maritime sector as commercial fleets rely less on steam
    engineering plants. However, mariners with steam credentials and
    experience are vital to the continued success of existing steam powered
    vessels in the MSC and MARAD Ready Reserve Force Fleets.
        This decline in steam ships and steam engineers paints a dire
    picture for manning and maintaining steam powered vessels. At the same
    time, the American labor force is increasingly unable to support the
    operation of steam vessels as the number of steam vessels in the
    American Fleet is decreasing. MSC and MARAD are working together on
    options to alleviate this potential shortfall in mariners with
    experience in steam engineering, to include leveraging military-to-
    mariner transition of military personnel with steam experience that are
    departing the service and providing opportunities for cross-deck
    training of mariners to expand their skill sets. For this reason,
    USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve sealift
    readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in part by
    accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels
    with more modern used vessels.

        60. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do sailors require
    additional training?
        General Lyons. The mariners that crew the surge fleet are
    commercial contractor mariners who are trained to their respective
    commercial standards. There are some unique military training
    requirements, and those are generally handled during the activation
    period. Under certain conditions, augmentation with government
    personnel may be necessary to perform all the necessary tasks in
    contested environments. Our mariners and shore staff must be ready for
    the threats and complex problems they may encounter. Focusing on ship
    and crew readiness is a priority--be it the material condition of our
    platforms, training of our shipboard personnel, proper manning of our
    ships with qualified mariners, or the resilience of our people and
    their families.

        61. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, Last year, Department of
    Transportation chief Mark Buzby stated in an interview that the Navy
    may not have enough ships to escort the sealift fleet during a wartime
    surge. This is a vulnerability we must address to ensure our
    servicemembers have the resources to defend against an attack on our
    vital logistics network. Are you concerned that our logistics network
    is vulnerable to attack if we cannot defend our shipping lanes?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM recognized this growing problem a few
    years ago and has conducted analysis of operations in a contested
    environment and begun to take actions to negate anti-access/area-
    denial threats. To increase the resiliency organically within sealift
    fleet against potential threats and provide greater confidence in
    mission assurance in a contested maritime environment, we have renewed
    our focus on operational tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well
    as procuring secure communications, navigation, and force tracking
    equipment. Naval escort may be one of several means to enhance the
    protection of sealift operations. Other means may include maritime
    aviation patrols, routing away from engagement zones, and decoy or
    masking of vessels. All such protective measures will be considered in
    the risk calculus.
        The recent Mobility Capability and Requirements Study included
    contested environment injects, and we have some initial insights to
    build as our understanding of potential effects on force projection and
    delivery. We are in coordination with other combatant commands, the
    Services, and the Joint Staff on these issues through a variety of DOD
    and USTRANSCOM forums. We continue to conduct analysis to determine the
    vulnerabilities of greatest impact.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                           allocation of naval assets
        62. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, recent increases in
    Russian naval activity, particularly submarine activity, deserve the
    full attention of EUCOM. During the hearing, you mentioned that you
    need two additional Destroyers in EUCOM. How many more submarines and
    anti-submarine warfare aircraft do you need in EUCOM to maintain
    awareness of Russian submarine activities?
        General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

        63. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, the Navy recently
    announced its intent to eliminate the mid-life refueling and overhaul
    of the aircraft carrier, USS Harry Truman (CVN 75), effectively
    retiring the ship more than two decades before the end of its planned
    service life and reducing the inventory of aircraft carriers from 11 to
    10 in the near future. What is the impact to the combatant commanders
    in general and you specifically in EUCOM of having less aircraft
    carriers available?
        General Scaparrotti. Increased Carrier Strike Group presence is
    essential to expanding the competitive space, especially in the
    Northern Atlantic and Eastern Mediterranean, and achieving a combat-
    credible posture for deterrence and defense as directed by the 2018
    National Defense Strategy. Achieving this increased carrier presence in
    the European theater depends not only on the Navy's capacity (in terms
    of the number of carriers in the fleet) but also upon how that capacity
    is allocated globally through the Department's Global Force Management
    process.
                         russia's goals in the pacific
        64. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, Russia remains your
    primary threat in EUCOM, but Russia is a power in the increasingly
    competitive Pacific as well. What do you assess are Russia's strategy
    and goals in the Pacific?
        General Scaparrotti. In the Pacific, as in the Euro-Atlantic,
    Russia's strategy and goals are to undermine U.S. interests, ensure its
    territorial security, and achieve greater influence over its neighbors.
    Russia also maintains economic interests throughout the region and
    seeks to develop additional markets for military equipment, grain, and
    energy exports. Moscow aims to attract more direct investment from
    China, Japan, and South Korea for development of the underpopulated,
    resource rich Russian Far East.
                                   jones act
        65. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony describes
    the challenges in the Ready Reserve Fleet, both in terms of vessels and
    Merchant Marines. The Jones Act helps maintain a critical base of U.S.
    Merchant Mariners that the nation will depend on in a crisis. Quite
    simply, it is an investment in our national security that will pay huge
    dividends in the event of a crisis. Does TRANSCOM continue to affirm
    the importance of the Jones Act for our national security?
        General Lyons. The domestically trading fleet is a critical
    component to the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA),
    providing assured access to wartime production capacity, global reach
    to intermodal networks, and a pool of trained merchant mariners to
    bring our government-owned, organic fleet from reduced to fully
    operational status. Additionally, the Jones Act contributes to a robust
    domestic maritime industry by helping maintain the U.S. industrial
    shipyard base and infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S.
    vessels.

        66. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what would be the implications
    for the number of U.S. merchant mariners if the Jones Act were
    eliminated?
        General Lyons. The impact would be significant. Currently there are
    30 Jones Act eligible ships committed to VISA. At approximately 40
    mariner jobs per ship, the overall mariner pool could decline by
    approximately 1200. Recent studies indicate there is already a
    shortfall of approximately 1,800 mariners for sustained contingency
    operations.
                              ready reserve fleet
        67. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony does a
    good job of laying out the readiness challenges regarding sealift. Does
    your current plan with the Navy to pursue service life extensions and
    buying a mix of new and used vessels fully address current readiness
    shortfalls?
        General Lyons. Service Life Extensions are part of the current plan
    as a short-term means to maintain capacity until either new or used
    replacement capacity can be acquired; however, extending the life of
    aging, difficult-to-maintain ships is not desired and will not fully
    address current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost and risk.
    For this reason, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve
    sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in
    part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain
    vessels with more modern used vessels.

        68. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, based on your strategy with the
    Navy for the Ready Reserve Fleet, when will DOD meet its ship
    availability goals?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM will continue to have readiness and
    availability issues until a substantial portion of the fleet can be
    replaced with newer ships. Extending the life of aging ships will not
    fully address the current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost
    and risk. USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve
    sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in
    part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain
    vessels with more modern used vessels. The authority to acquire used
    vessels will help to raise fleet readiness and availability as the
    newer ships are brought into the fleet.
                           maritime security program
        69. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Maritime Security Program
    (MSP) is a critical link in our ability to project military power. Are
    the 60 vessels currently contracted in the MSP enough to meet
    operational needs?
        General Lyons. Yes, MSP's 60 ships and associated 2,400 highly
    qualified U.S. Merchant Marines continues to meet USTRANSCOM's
    operational requirements. The MSP is an extremely valuable part of
    USTRANSCOM's overall sealift portfolio to meet operational needs. MSP
    carriers' global networks provide DOD not only with the vessel capacity
    committed by participants through VISA but also with access to their
    complete intermodal transportation systems and freight management
    capabilities around the world. Those intermodal systems--not just the
    ships but also the terminals, people, training, facilities, and
    information systems provide DOD the global reach it needs for mission
    accomplishment.
                        strategic importance of red hill
        70. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
    Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor/Hickam is a key component of the
    Defense Department's operations in the Indo-Pacific, as it provides the
    largest source of underground fuel storage in the region. What is the
    potential impact to operational plans and logistics if the Navy were no
    longer able to use the Red Hill facility?
        General Lyons. Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) Pearl Harbor
    includes war Reserve and day-to-day operational stock fuel storage at
    Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hickman Air Force Base, and the Red Hill
    storage facility. The fourteen operational tanks at Red Hill provide
    storage capacity for up to 175,000,000 gallons of fuel. The primary
    fuel products are jet fuel, naval jet fuel, and maritime fuel.
        In addition to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickman, DFSP Pearl Harbor
    supports Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Air Field, Marine Corps Air
    Station Kaneohe as well as Sand Island (Honolulu Harbor) and Barber's
    Point Coast Guard stations. Red Hill is the largest storage area in the
    Pacific and facilitates trans-load, forward deployment, and sustainment
    operations in support of various operational plans for the region. I
    defer to INDO-PACOM as to potential risks to operational plans and
    logistics.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                    defense personal property program (dp3)
        71. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in 2017 TRANSCOM took over the
    Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). Your command has stated
    objectives that attempt to streamline the move process and reduce
    backlogs, ultimately aiming for a centralized, or single, move manager.
    Despite these actions, there are still numerous stories of damaged
    goods, late shipments and overall dissatisfaction with the companies
    that are executing the moves. As you prepare for the second ``peak
    season'' in charge of the DP3, what actions have you taken or are
    undertaking to ensure that this move season is an improvement over last
    year?
        General Lyons. Improving the overall relocation process requires a
    variety of initiatives and investments from the Military Services'
    Personnel and Logistics communities. OSD has established a Personnel
    and Logistics Cross Functional Team that has the Department properly
    aligned and focused on an action plan with near and long-term tasks to
    improve many aspects of the overall relocation experience.
        The Department of Defense has emphasized a number of improvements
    for the 2019 Peak Season. These improvements include: earlier delivery
    of permanent change of station orders for servicemembers and civilian
    employees, allowing earlier scheduling of transportation and personal
    property appointments; more in-person quality assurance inspections on
    moving days; and increased claims valuation. In addition USTRANSCOM has
    taken steps to add 68 new providers to the program, created new transit
    time standards in partnership with industry, and relaxed overly-
    engineered and burdensome business rules to allow industry more
    flexibility to provide better service.
        USTRANSCOM is also fundamentally restructuring DOD's relationship
    with industry with a single move manager to achieve the accountability,
    stability, and quality capacity required for substantial progress. We
    expect to award a contract in January 2020 with performance beginning
    in October 2020.

        72. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, delays in the move process for
    military families have been attributed to the overall housing boom in
    the United States taking commercial capacity away as well as an overall
    lack of numbers of commercial moving company capacity. Can you describe
    what TRANSCOM is doing to incentivize or encourage the growth of
    private moving companies required to meet the demands of the Defense
    Personal Property Program?
        General Lyons. A single move manager contract will provide industry
    with both the confidence and rationale to invest in capacity and
    strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet peak demand. In
    turn, that single move manager will have the latitude to partner with
    the companies it believes will provide both capacity and quality on the
    terms and conditions those companies believe make sense (versus being
    bound by the DOD's overly-complicated rule set). In addition to better
    utilizing existing capacity, DOD assesses this construct will attract
    new providers. Industry representatives who are currently unaffiliated
    with DP3 state that the program's existing over- engineered rules make
    DOD an unattractive partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much
    of industry would rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic
    moving and storage market.
                         transcom civilian partnerships
        73. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in your testimony you
    extensively cover the numerical problems with and ageing of our
    mobility assets, especially in the sealift realm. The truth is in a
    major conflict we are going to be relying heavily on civilian support
    to move our military through both the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
    Agreement (VISA) and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programs. Do you
    assess that industry will be able to provide the promised and required
    mobility assets to meet our demand in the case of a major conflict in
    Europe or the Pacific?
        General Lyons. Yes, the Mobility Capability Requirements Study
    examined both organic and commercial capacity and concluded the
    combined capacities from organic and commercial providers were
    sufficient to meet NDS objectives based on current plans. Additionally,
    CRAF and VISA providers are committed under contract to provide their
    capacity when needed. We have close relationships with our industry
    counterparts through the National Defense Transportation Association
    and CRAF/VISA Executive Working Groups that meet twice a year and are
    chaired by my three-star deputy where we identify and resolve issues on
    these programs. One area of focus going forward is the impact of the
    contested environment on CRAF/VISA and what that will mean for when,
    where, and how we use this vital and required commercial capacity.
        However, a fundamental premise for use of commercial CRAF/VISA
    capabilities is the necessity to operate in an acceptable operating
    environment to minimize risk. This often requires setting conditions to
    mitigate threats or conducting trans-load operations at locations
    removed from the immediacy of the combat zone which complicates
    operations and potentially increases the burden on military
    capabilities for subsequent onward movement.

        74. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what quality control mechanisms
    do you have in place or are working on to ensure that our industry
    capability has not atrophied and remains accountable and able to
    deliver on their agreements given the changing international
    environment and the concern over a conflict with a major power?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM closely tracks and reports capacity
    levels monthly and compares this data to our mobility requirements to
    ensure the Command's strategic sealift portfolio is adequately sized
    and ready to meet any contingency. VISA and MSP are joint programs
    between MARAD and USTRANSCOM in which vessel selections are managed to
    ensure they continue to meet national defense needs. Additionally,
    regular industry engagements such as the National Defense
    Transportation Association Fall Forums, CEO Meetings, and CRAF/VISA
    Executive Working Groups pay huge dividends by enhancing relationships
    with our commercial partners. These executive sessions, regular
    operational wargames, and planning sessions ensure we align the
    emerging threat environment with industry capabilities and
    expectations.
                              worldwide logistics
        75. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, the only reason we're able to
    offer a credible threat to our enemies at any time is TRANSCOM and the
    logistical support it provides in moving cargo, personnel and refueling
    operations. As the United States continues to expand operations in
    foreign countries as we see increased aggressiveness out of Russia and
    China, there is concern that logistical networks outside of our country
    will be unable to handle the burden if we do go to war. What is
    TRANSCOM doing to address the ability to quickly and efficiently move
    military equipment through Europe, Japan and Korea given significant
    challenges in access to highways, rail and other mass transportation
    mediums in these areas?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM participates in integrated planning with
    the Joint Staff, Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, and
    Combat Support Agencies to address contingency and crisis requirements
    for projecting and sustaining the Joint Force. As part of our everyday
    activities, USTRANSCOM works with geographic combatant commands'
    theater posture efforts to maintain and expand access, basing, and
    overflight across the globe. Additionally, we maintain close working
    relationships with our commercial partners and components through
    various forums to translate required capacity from planning into
    capability at the point of need.

        76. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, as we expand our operations in
    Africa, can you explain logistical issues with a lack of real road or
    rail infrastructure or even developed airfields in much of Northern
    Africa and the Sahel and what initiatives the command is executing or
    advocating for to ensure that we are able to project power or defend
    allies whenever and wherever we choose?
        General Lyons. With the significant size of the African land mass
    and the lack of robust infrastructure, deployment and distribution is
    challenging and often resolved via airlift, which is quite expensive.
    To mitigate gaps and optimize distribution in the West and Central
    regions, we have partnered with United States Africa Command to develop
    the West Africa Logistics Network (WALN) designed to reach forces in
    these far reaching locations. WALN is structured with a single,
    strategic, multi-modal hub with tactical lift to several West and
    Central Africa locations. We are considering a similar ``hub and
    spoke'' approach in East Africa where we also have regularly scheduled
    airlift missions. USTRANSCOM also provides regularly scheduled
    strategic airlift missions to Tunisia in North Africa. Russian and
    Chinese influence at various ports are growing concerns from an access
    perspective. In order to enhance our relationships with partners and
    allies, USTRANSCOM holds annual multinational logistics symposium and
    explores common avenues for multinational cooperation,
    interoperability, and innovation with logistics professionals.

        77. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what are TRANSCOM's priorities
    to invest in regarding relationships with allies or infrastructure and
    capabilities for airfields or naval facilities to ensure constant
    access for our currently deployed forces in support of combat or
    security operations?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's priorities for infrastructure
    investments and capabilities are aligned with the National Defense
    Strategy and the combatant commands' planning to conform to that
    strategy. USTRANSCOM's Posture Plan, which includes the En Route
    Infrastructure Master Plan, provides the basis for responding to a
    wide-range of global activities. We seek agreements to ensure constant
    access for deployed forces. The Command continually reviews
    requirements for infrastructure and agreements, coordinating closely
    with the various combatant commands and incorporating their operations
    planning mobility needs via various cross-organization collaborations.
                                eucom and israel
        78. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, Israel is the lone
    country in your area of responsibility that faces the constant threat
    and use of rockets and missiles against their nation. The United
    States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Security Assistance
    approved by Congress provides $500 million in funding for annual
    missile defense cooperation. How do you asses the effectiveness of
    programs and systems that have resulted from this investment such as
    Iron Dome, Arrow and David's Sling?
        General Scaparrotti. The Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling
    systems are highly capable and have demonstrated their effectiveness in
    testing and in defending against real-world threats. Nevertheless,
    large numbers of rockets and missiles with enhanced capabilities could
    overwhelm Israeli defenses.

        79. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what benefit do you see
    to see to United States national interests through security cooperation
    with Israel and where do we need to increase this cooperation to ensure
    we are paying attention to the areas that require the most support?
        General Scaparrotti. Israel and the United States share many
    regional interests, and Israel supports United States interests in the
    Middle East by deterring Syrian aggression, countering Hamas and
    Lebanese Hezbollah, combatting the Iranian threat network, fighting
    radical Islamic extremist organizations in both Syria and the Egyptian
    Sinai, and enabling United States access and presence in the eastern
    Mediterranean and Levant. We must continue to strengthen cooperation in
    rocket and missile defense, air superiority, cyber capabilities, and
    intelligence sharing.

        80. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, last month EUCOM
    participated with the Israeli Air Force in exercise Juniper Falcon and
    with the Israeli defense forces in the Juniper Cobra ballistic missile
    defense exercise. What are the benefits to the United States and our
    allies of continued bilateral military exercises with the Israelis and
    EUCOM, and how are we going to continue to realize these benefits
    through future military exercises?
        General Scaparrotti. Bilateral exercises with our Israeli partners
    are an integral component to one of USEUCOM's core missions--assisting
    Israel in its inherent right to self-defense. The Juniper Cobra and
    Juniper Falcon exercises not only demonstrates United States commitment
    to the defense of Israel, but also enhances our ability to rapidly
    deploy, integrate, and conduct military operations with a critical ally
    who furthers our objectives and protects our interests in the Middle
    East.
        Through the Juniper exercise series, United States Forces are
    postured and ready to integrate military personnel and combat systems
    into a combined architecture for the defense of Israel. As the United
    States and Israel both bring new combat systems on line, such as the F-
    35 and Israel's Arrow 3 missile defense system, and as we continue to
    upgrade existing systems such as the Patriot and Aegis missile defense
    systems, future bilateral exercises with Israel will allow the United
    States to hone weapons systems, tactics, techniques, procedures,
    bolster capabilities, and increase interoperability.
                 relations and security assistance with turkey
        81. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, our relationship with
    Turkey has become increasingly strained due to actions taken by their
    government and policies regarding their relationship with Russia and
    the Kurds in northern Syria. Regarding Russia, Turkey has continue to
    pursue the purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile system despite
    the United States offering to sell them a Patriot missile system.
    Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan said a few days ago that we won't
    transfer any F-35's to Turkey if they complete their acquisition of the
    S-400. What actions or precautions are you taking in EUCOM to try and
    reinforce our alliance with Turkey given the apparent change in
    temperature regarding United States-Turkey relations?
        General Scaparrotti. Continued efforts to reinforce our bilateral
    relationship, in the face of current difficulties, is critical. EUCOM
    maintains strong Mil-Mil relations with Turkey through such lines of
    effort as intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, military
    training, cyber security, and other regional security issues. EUCOM
    also participates in land, air, and maritime exercises with the Turkish
    Armed Forces. We are also exploring ways we can provide forces to
    support Turkey as it leads the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task
    Force beginning in 2022.
        The United States's extensive security cooperation with Turkey
    includes 334 Active Foreign Military Sales cases worth $9.9 Billion and
    the participation of 112 Turkish Officers in various International
    Military Education and Training opportunities, including participation
    at United States War Colleges.

        82. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what actions are you
    taking with regard to Turkey and CENTCOM [United States Central
    Command] to ensure our Kurdish partners who have fought so hard
    alongside us against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] are
    protected even as we begin to draw down combat operations in Syria?
        General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM staff has been closely integrated
    with the USCENTCOM staff as withdrawal planning is formulated and
    executed. Throughout this process, we have reinforced the message with
    our Turkish counterparts that the Kurds must be protected.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                 BUDGET POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer,
    McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
        It's nice to have the--Steve Turner, Northeastern State, in
    the audience today to advise us along our line.
        We're very pleased to have the--Patrick Shanahan, the
    Acting Secretary of Defense; General Joseph Dunford, the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and David Norquist.
        I have to say, David, I enjoyed our breakfast together the
    other day. I think--some people think it's pretty outrageous
    that we can actually have an audit. I'm glad that you're in
    charge of it.
        Secretary Norquist. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank the panel for their distinguished
    service to the country.
        I'm pleased to see that--the Department of Defense budget
    request for $718.3 billion and the overall national defense
    request of $750 billion. This amount is an increase of less
    than 3 percent of real growth. You know, this manual represents
    the blueprint that we're following right now. We had a hearing
    on this. I think, in all the years I've been here, this is the
    most productive hearing that we've had, where we had Democrats
    and Republicans alike in agreement on what our needs are to try
    to perform this function. Well, one of the things that is in
    this book that we all agreed to, and all the uniforms that came
    to our hearings agreed with this, was to have an increase while
    pulling out of this period of time and rebuilding our military
    would be between 3 percent and a 5 percent increase over
    inflation. Well, this 750 is actually less than 3 percent over
    inflation. So, I just want to remind people of that. We didn't
    quite get to that point.
        The top line is only part of the story. We must ensure that
    we are effectively and efficiently spending the money. That's
    why I want to commend you, Secretary Norquist, for all of your
    hard work delivering an audit of the Defense Department this
    year. It's something we haven't seen. That audit should help us
    identify areas that need more attention and hold people
    accountable to spend the money more properly.
        Despite leadership changes at the Department of Defense, I
    believe the implementation of the National Defense Strategy
    should continue, without pause. This is the book that we're
    referring to, right here. When President Trump came to office,
    he inherited an American military in crisis. Meanwhile, China
    and Russia were rapidly modernizing their militaries and
    actually passing us up in many areas.
        America's military advantage has eroded in key warfighting
    areas, such as long-range ground-based fires, cyber, space,
    electronic warfare, as well as air and missile defense. The
    Commission on the National Defense Strategy, a bipartisan,
    independent commission, stated, quote, ``Put bluntly, the U.S.
    military could lose the next state-versus-state war that it
    fights,'' unquote. The conclusion of the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy states that we--and I'm quoting again--``need urgent
    change, at significant scale, to address strategic competition
    with China and Russia.''
        I look forward to hearing what the urgent changes are and,
    our witnesses, what they recommend. Even the best-prepared
    budget request will be meaningless if we don't reach a budget
    agreement soon. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy
    also stated that there must be--another quote--``There must be
    greater urgency and seriousness in funding the national
    defense. Without sufficient, sustained, and predictable
    funding, we'll squander the progress the military has made over
    the past 2 years.'' Improved readiness, increased procurement,
    and critical capabilities and investment in future
    technologies, I see no bigger imperative than this, to reach a
    budget agreement immediately in order to fully fund defense and
    to fully implement the National Defense Strategy.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses, Secretary
    Shanahan and General Dunford and Secretary Norquist.
        Before we consider the details of the Defense Department's
    budget request, I'd like to address some of the broader fiscal
    challenges we face. Once again, we find ourselves in a
    situation all too familiar, debating how best to fund the
    government under the caps required by the Budget Control Act of
    2011, the BCA. There is bipartisan consensus that enforcing
    budget discipline through the BCA and sequestration is
    ineffective and shortsighted, and that the BCA caps for fiscal
    year 2020 will deprive us of the resources needed to
    sufficiently meet the needs of our Nation.
        Last year, because we had passed the Bipartisan Budget Act
    of 2018, and we knew the permitted spending parameters, and
    therefore, were able to mark up and pass the fiscal year 2019
    defense authorization and appropriations bills before September
    30th, this gave the military the funding certainty that it has
    lacked for many years. I believe Congress should pass another
    2-year budget agreement to provide further relief from the caps
    and provide stability for budget planning. Without such an
    agreement, we will face great difficulty in crafting a
    bipartisan authorization bill and will be hard-pressed to
    provide the Defense Department with another on-time
    appropriation. Delay will likely lead to recurring continuing
    resolutions that disrupt planning and, ironically, add cost and
    inhibit readiness and modernization, and, to the Chairman's
    point, undermine that sense of certainty that is probably worth
    billions of dollars in budget authority. So, I would urge that
    we do that.
        Today, we consider the fiscal year 2020 budget for the
    Department of Defense, which seeks $544.5 billion for the base
    budget and $164.6 billion in overseas contingency operations
    (OCO), of which $97.9 billion is designated to pay for base
    requirements. In addition, there is another $9.2 billion
    requested for emergency funding.
        In its base budget request, the Defense Department
    highlights resources intended to prioritize programs targeted
    for the high-end fight against near-peer competitors and to
    operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including
    investments in the space and cyber domains, larger purchases of
    aircraft, ships, and munitions, and increased research-and-
    development dollars for unmanned systems, artificial
    intelligence, hypersonics, and directed energy. The base budget
    request also supports the quality of life of our servicemembers
    by sustaining family support initiatives and by authorizing a
    3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in 10 years. However, it is
    clear that the base budget request will not cover all the
    Defense Department's requirements, so we've been presented with
    a particularly egregious misuse of the OCO account. I
    acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations in the
    past have included elements of base funding in OCO accounts,
    but overloading the OCO request with $97.9 billion worth of
    activities that truly belong in the base budget just to avoid
    the threshold of the BCA cap far exceeds any President and
    cannot be justified.
        Ironically, last year, the President's Acting Chief of
    Staff, Nick Mulvaney, called for a, in his words, ``transition
    away from using OCO as a gimmick to avoid the sequestration
    caps,'' close quote, in his testimony before Congress. Yet,
    this defense budget is a prime example of such a use and
    undercuts the integrity of the entire request.
        I'd also highlight that section 1524 of the Fiscal Year
    2018 Defense Authorization Act directed the Defense Department
    to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be
    covered by OCO. Neither OMB nor the Defense Department have
    updated these guidelines. I hope our witnesses shed some light
    on when this will be done and what the details are of this OCO-
    for-base request.
        I also have serious concerns with the $9.2 billion
    requested in emergency funding for unspecified military
    construction projects, $3.6 billion of that total is intended
    to replenish funds that may be diverted from military
    construction projects that Congress already authorized and
    appropriated to build a wall on the southern border. Even if
    this funding is replenished, these projects could be delayed or
    even canceled. I would also like to note that Congress has not
    yet been given the list of projects whose funding may be
    diverted, and I'm interested if the witnesses can provide some
    information on that list.
        Moreover, we've learned that an additional $3.6 billion of
    emergency funding in Defense Department's budget will be used
    to build more of the wall, projects that have not been
    identified in any way and arguably have zero military utility.
    Much of our witnesses' testimony today describes the $750
    billion in investment needed to fulfill the National Defense
    Strategy, but the National Defense Strategy Commission, as the
    Chairman cites is authoritative in his comments, noted that
    comprehensive challenges will require whole-of-government and
    even whole-of-Nation cooperation, extending far beyond DOD.
    Diplomatic statecraft and other nonmilitary tools will be
    critical. So will adequate support for funding for those
    elements of American power. With the State Department and other
    agencies facing drastic cuts in this budget request, I'm
    interesting to know if the Defense Department will truly be
    able to realize the National Defense Strategy.
        It is a duty of this Committee to ensure the men and women
    we send into harm's way have the resources necessary to
    complete their mission and return home safely. But, I firmly
    believe, if the Senate decides to modify the budget caps for
    fiscal year 2020, we must do so in a manner that continues to
    provide sufficient funding for both defense and nondefense, as
    we have done every other time we've adjusted the caps.
        I'm proud that this Committee has always worked in a
    bipartisan fashion during this process. I look forward to
    working with all the Committees to come to a reasonable
    agreement again this year.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We'll now have opening statements by both the Secretary and
    General Dunford. Your entire statement will be made a part of
    the record, but, if you can hold it down to around 5 minutes--
    we have a full house today, and we want to get to questions by
    all of our members on both sides.
        So, we'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK M. SHANAHAN, ACTING
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE DAVID L.
           NORQUIST, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe and Ranking
    Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
    for this opportunity to testify in support of the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2020.
        I'm joined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Joseph Dunford, and the Department's Comptroller and
    Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist.
        During my time at the Department of Defense, I've engaged
    in substantive discussions with many of you. In our
    conversations, there has been an enduring constant. That is,
    the bipartisan nature of defense, proved by the sustained
    funding increases Congress has provided, the last 2 years. On
    behalf of our military's selfless patriots, thank you.
        It has been a great privilege and honor to serve alongside
    the men and women of the Department of Defense, and it was a
    pleasure to work with Secretary Mattis to craft the 2018
    National Defense Strategy. Released in January of 2018, that
    strategy laid the foundation for restoring military readiness
    and modernizing our joint force for an era of great-power
    competition.
        I now oversee the continued execution of our strategy,
    which is the undisputed driver of today's budget request. It
    was extremely helpful for the Department to receive the
    authorization and appropriation bills on time and at the
    requested top line last year. That is equally important this
    year, as our competitors have not been complacent. China's
    defense spending approaches that of the United States when we
    take into account purchasing power and the portion of our
    budget going to military pay and benefits. That, coupled with
    China's organized approach to steal foreign technology, has
    allowed China to modernize its missile, space, and cyber
    capabilities, as well as project power far beyond its borders.
    Russia, for its part, continues to compete asymmetrically with
    the United States, modernizing and developing its own missile,
    space, and cyber capabilities. Simultaneously, North Korea's
    nuclear weapons and missiles remain a pressing concern. Iran's
    missile and cyber threats and malign aggression across the
    Middle East and beyond threaten United States national
    interests. We know violent extremist organizations like al
    Qaeda and ISIS continue to foment instability in vulnerable
    areas.
        We have seen marked progress in our current operations as
    we work by, with, and through an expansive network of allies
    and partners across the globe. In Syria, the 79-member Defeat
    ISIS Coalition has liberated virtually all of the territory
    ISIS once held. As the United States drawdown continues, we
    will maintain a presence to prevent ISIS resurgence.
        As part of a whole-of-government approach, we fully support
    Iraq's fight against terrorism, and we continue to enable the
    Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas and
    thwarting ISIS's attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
        In Afghanistan, United States and coalition forces are
    training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces to apply
    pressure on the Taliban. We support the ongoing negotiations,
    the best window for peace there in 40 years, and continue to
    stymie terrorist threats to our Homeland.
        Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS
    remains the top United States national security interest in
    Yemen. At the same time, we fully support UN efforts to bring
    all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table.
    The $750 billion top line for national defense enables DOD to
    maintain irregular warfare as a core competency, yet prioritize
    modernization and readiness to compete, deter, and win in any
    possible high-end fight of the future.
        The budget is critical for continued execution of our
    strategy, and reflects difficult but necessary choices that
    align finite resources with our strategic priorities. To
    highlight some of those choices, this is the largest research,
    development, training, and evaluation budget in 70 years. The
    budget includes double-digit increases to our investments in
    both space and cyber, modernization of our nuclear triad and
    missile defense capabilities, and our largest shipbuilding
    request in 20 years, when adjusted for inflation. It also
    increases our total end strength by roughly 7,700
    servicemembers and provides a 3.1 percent pay increase to our
    military, the largest in a decade.
        Now to the specifics. The top line slates $718 billion for
    the Department of Defense. Of that total, the budget includes
    $545 billion for base funding and $164 billion for the overseas
    contingency operations. Of the overseas contingency operation
    funds, $66 billion will go to direct war and enduring
    requirements, and $98 billion will fund base requirements. To
    round out the numbers, $9.2 billion will fund emergency
    construction. That includes an estimated $2 billion to rebuild
    facilities damaged by Hurricanes Florence and Michael; up to
    $3.6 billion to support military construction projects that
    will award in fiscal year 2020 instead of fiscal year 2019 so
    we can resource border barrier projects under emergency
    declaration this year; and $3.6 billion in case additional
    emergency funding is needed for the border. Military
    construction on the border will not come at the expense of our
    people, our readiness, or our modernization. I caution that no
    adversary can be as damaging to our military readiness as
    budget instability.
        We built this budget to implement the National Defense
    Strategy, and I look forward to working with you to ensure
    predictability, on-time funding at our requested top line so
    our military can remain the most lethal, adaptable, and
    resilient fighting force in the world.
        I close with the words of William Jennings Bryan etched
    into the walls of our Capitol so we may never forget their
    meaning, ``Our Government, conceived in freedom and purchased
    with blood, can be preserved only by constant vigilance.''
        Senators, I appreciate the critical role Congress plays to
    ensure our warfighters can succeed on the battlefields of both
    today and tomorrow. I thank our servicemembers, their families,
    and all those in the Department of Defense for maintaining the
    constant vigilance as they stand always ready to protect
    freedoms.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Shanahan follows:]

       Prepared Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan
                                  introduction
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
    Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2020. I am joined today by
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, and the
    Department's Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David
    Norquist.
        The size, scale, and importance of collaboration between Congress
    and the Department of Defense (DOD) shows we are united in our purpose
    to protect and defend our Nation. During my time as Deputy Secretary of
    Defense and now as Acting Secretary of Defense, I have engaged in
    substantive discussions with many Members of this Committee. I look
    forward to continuing our engagements, in this hearing and beyond, with
    both long-serving and new members, as the Department drives results
    along our strategic priorities.
        We in DOD appreciate Congress's partnership in repeatedly
    demonstrating the bipartisan nature of defense. I thank Congress for
    voting to lift budgetary caps and providing sustained funding increases
    over the last two years, which have helped our military meet today's
    challenges while preparing for those of tomorrow. Members of this
    Committee, the entire Congress, and the American people can rest
    assured that DOD has efficiently and effectively invested your money.
    Thank you, in particular, for your support of the fiscal year 2019 2.6
    percent pay increase for our military personnel.
        Our responsibility is to remain responsible stewards of your trust
    and the American people's hard-earned tax dollars. DOD has accelerated
    necessary changes in how we develop, posture, and employ our Joint
    Force. We are taking a clear-eyed approach to the strategic environment
    in which we operate and marrying our past experiences to new ideas,
    driving progress and fostering innovation in the process.
        Our fiscal year 2020 budget reflects the President's vision for
    prioritizing the security, prosperity, and interests of the American
    people. It also reflects my vision for the future--one marked by a more
    lethal, results-oriented Department of Defense with the capabilities
    and capacity to ensure national security and implement our National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) at the speed of relevance. Today I look forward
    to discussing that vision and how it is reflected in DOD's posture and
    resourcing decisions.
                      the 2018 nds: an enduring framework
        To provide context for that discussion, I want to take us back in
    time: two years ago, our Department had brand new civilian leadership
    ready to drive results. With a military enduring the longest continuous
    duration of combat in American history, we contended with a host of
    challenges, including an increase in North Korean missile testing; an
    aggressive Iran; violent extremists in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan;
    and growing strategic competition with China and Russia. In addition,
    cyber and space emerged as contested, warfighting domains, further
    complicating an already complex security environment.
        Amidst these challenges, the release of our 2018 NDS last January
    provided the strategic unity DOD needed, with clear direction on
    restoring military readiness and modernizing the Joint Force to address
    great power competition.
        The 2018 NDS's unified framework enables a potent combination of
    teamwork, resources, and an unmatched network of allies and partners
    stepping up to shoulder their share of the burden for international
    security. The NDS also fosters alignment within the Department, the
    Interagency, industry, and Congress.
        Fourteen months after its release, I say with conviction: the NDS
    remains the most effective aligning mechanism for the Department. Its
    implementation is our most critical mission. Yet, strategy cannot be
    static; it must be constantly reevaluated. Last month, my staff
    concluded a clear-eyed assessment of our NDS priorities and our
    progress in meeting them, highlighting our successes and making clear
    we still have more work to do. Most significantly, it reaffirmed that
    erosion of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to
    be DOD's most pressing ``central problem.'' Our three primary lines of
    effort--increasing our military's lethality, strengthening our network
    of alliances and partnerships, and reforming DOD's business practices--
    remain the most effective avenues for addressing this challenge.
        I thank Congress for its own evaluation via the NDS Commission.
    Having reviewed the findings of both our internal DOD assessment and of
    the Commission's report, I am confident we are aligned on the most
    critical matters. The few areas where we did not agree reflect the
    reality that finite resources require tough choices. DOD stands by
    these choices as necessary components of our strategic approach.
        As our Department has aligned behind our Strategy, our competitors
    have not been complacent. They have accelerated their own military
    modernization efforts and vigorously pursued the development and
    fielding of advanced technologies with a clear intent: create an
    asymmetric military advantage against us, our allies, and our partners.
                      priority threats & policy objectives
    The China Threat
        As this Committee recognizes, the Chinese Communist Party exports
    coercive influence far beyond its borders while internally wielding
    authoritarian governance over its own people. To achieve hegemony in
    the Indo-Pacific in the near term and shape a world consistent with its
    authoritarian model, China is: (1) aggressively modernizing its
    military, (2) systematically stealing science and technology and
    seeking military advantage through a strategy of Military-Civil fusion;
    (3) undermining the rules-based international order, which has
    benefited all countries, including China, and (4) building an
    international network of coercion to further its economic and security
    objectives.
      Military Modernization
        The trajectory of China's military spending is clear. In just
    twenty years, China's official defense budget soared from roughly $20
    billion in 1998 to $170 billion in 2018, with actual spending even
    higher. Just last week, China announced a projected 7.5 percent
    increase in defense spending in 2019. China devotes these funds to
    aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development,
    from nuclear and missile capabilities to space and cyber. Accounting
    for purchasing power and the significant portion of our military budget
    going to pay and benefits, today, China's defense spending approaches
    that of the United States.
        China has made investments specifically intended to offset United
    States advantages, including robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
    networks, more lethal forces, and new strategic capabilities. If
    deployed to overwhelm United States or allied combat power at initial
    stages of a conflict, these capabilities could seek to achieve a ``fait
    accompli'' that would make reversing Chinese gains more difficult,
    militarily and politically. Implementation of our Strategy ensures we
    have the capabilities, posture, and employment of forces so this never
    comes to pass.
        On the nuclear front, China is developing long-range bomber
    capabilities that, if successful, would make it one of only three
    nations in the world to possess a nuclear triad. In addition, China is
    building up its inventory of missiles, focusing on those intended to
    circumvent U.S. and allied defenses and deny the United States critical
    military access to the Indo-Pacific. Within the past five years alone,
    China has successfully tested hypersonic cruise and boost glide weapons
    concepts for these purposes.
        In 2018, China conducted more space launches than any other nation.
    In choosing to develop counterspace and dual-use space capabilities and
    enhance space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
    China has demonstrated its ability to weaponize space, if desired. We,
    in turn, cannot ignore China's ability to target United States and
    allied space capabilities. We also cannot ignore China's ambitions in
    the cyber domain, which it recognizes as the battlefield's ``nerve
    center.'' With all People's Liberation Army (PLA) cyber operations
    coordinated under one roof, China can operate in this contested domain
    without bureaucratic red tape to slow it down.
      Technology Theft
        The rate at which China is systematically stealing United States
    and allied technology for its own military gain is staggering.
    Reversing this dangerous trend--one which could impact our troops on
    the battlefield--means acknowledging reality: every Chinese company is
    at risk of being either a witting or unwitting accomplice in China's
    state-sponsored theft of other nations' military and civilian
    technology. To quote China's own cybersecurity law, private companies
    are required to ``provide technical support and assistance to public
    security organs and national security organs,'' whether they want to or
    not. Any United States or allied company that works with Chinese
    companies, without proper safeguards, thus opens itself to theft as
    well.
        To grasp the pervasiveness of the problem, look to the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are open Chinese economic
    espionage or technology theft cases in nearly all FBI field offices.
    For years, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has indicted members of
    the Chinese state and military for stealing U.S. technology. In
    January, DoJ recognized China's escalating tactics and took a step
    further, indicting executives of Chinese telecommunications company
    Huawei for scheming to steal T-Mobile's trade secrets.
        Huawei exemplifies the Chinese Communist Party's systemic,
    organized, and state-driven approach to achieve global leadership in
    advanced technology. With initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, Made
    in China 2025, and Thousand Talents Program in play, which spur
    companies and individuals to carry out its bidding, China aims to steal
    its way to a China-controlled global technological infrastructure,
    including a 5G network. China pursues large-scale acquisition of
    foreign companies in sensitive sectors and pressures companies into
    transferring technology. Finally, China's Military-Civil Fusion
    strategy seeks to translate cutting-edge technology into advanced
    weapons.
        Here I must note: some United States companies have voiced ethical
    qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced technology, in some
    cases even terminating relationships--often while continuing to work
    with China. DOD takes ethical considerations extremely seriously when
    researching and developing emerging technologies, and our efforts
    improve performance and allow human beings to make better decisions.
    China, on the other hand, repeatedly demonstrates little regard for
    international ethical rules and norms.
        China's approach to technological advancement matters for our
    military advantage, and its ambitions threaten the security of critical
    United States capabilities and technological infrastructure, and thus
    our military operations, safety, and prosperity.
        Let me be perfectly clear: the United States does not oppose
    competition, as long as it takes place on a fair and level playing
    field. However, we cannot accept the unfair and illegal actions of
    others who intend to tilt the playing field through predatory economics
    and underhanded tactics.
      Undermining the Rules-based International Order
        We all know China's population is comparable to the Americas and
    Western Europe's combined. But China is also geographically situated
    within arm's reach of 2.4 billion people, roughly a third of the
    earth's population, across Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. Make no
    mistake--China is extending that reach by increasing its overt military
    and coercive activities vis-a-vis its neighbors.
        China's increasingly provocative behavior in the Indo-Pacific,
    particularly the South China Sea (SCS), should concern us all. Between
    2013 and 2018, China increased its air and sea incursions into the SCS
    twelvefold. Within those five years, it also increased deployments of
    offensive and defensive weapons systems to the SCS by the same order of
    magnitude.
        China's land reclamation and militarization far exceed that of
    other claimants combined in the South China Sea. Between 2013 and 2015
    alone, China created more than 3,200 acres in the SCS, building
    features within its self-proclaimed `nine dash line'--a claim the
    Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 has no legal
    basis. These constructed features are almost four times the size of
    Central Park in New York City and roughly five times the size of this
    Capitol Hill neighborhood. Imagine walking from this hearing room to
    the Marine Barracks at 8th and I over what used to be part of the
    Pacific Ocean.
        Now also picture Chinese interference in freedom of navigation. Yet
    for this, we do not have to use our imaginations. China habitually
    threatens this freedom, using both conventional military force
    projection and ``gray zone'' or irregular warfare activities. For
    example, in September, Chinese military vessels came dangerously close
    to the USS Decatur off the coast of the Spratly Islands. China's force
    projection inside and outside the SCS disrespects and undermines our
    rules-based international order and threatens regional stability and
    security.
      International Network of Coercion
        Lastly, China is diligently building an international network of
    coercion through predatory economics to expand its sphere of influence.
    Sovereign nations around the globe are discovering the hard way that
    China's economic ``friendship'' via One Belt, One Road can come at a
    steep cost when promises of investment go unfulfilled and international
    standards and safeguards are ignored.
        Let us look at just a few examples. Saddled with predatory Chinese
    loans, Sri Lanka granted China a ninety-nine-year lease and seventy
    percent stake in its deep-water port. The Maldives owes China roughly
    $1.5 billion in debt--about thirty percent of its GDP--for construction
    costs. Pakistan owes China at least $10 billion in debt for the
    construction of Gwadar Port and other projects.
        In Africa, Djibouti owes China more than eighty percent of its GDP
    and, in 2017, became host to China's first overseas military base. In
    Latin America, Ecuador agreed to sell eighty to ninety percent of its
    exportable crude oil to China through 2024 in exchange for $6.5 billion
    in Chinese loans. After leasing land tax-free to China for fifty years,
    Argentina is denied access and oversight to a Chinese satellite
    tracking station on its sovereign territory, unwittingly allowing the
    facility's use for military purposes.
        The list of nations entrapped by China's predatory debt tactics
    runs long, and some have started to push back. Yet, under the guise of
    good-intentioned development, Beijing continues to leverage debt for
    economic or political concessions--a practice we expect will intensify
    as more nations prove unable to pay China back.
    Policy Objectives to Meet the China Threat
        Left unaddressed, China's success in unfairly tilting the playing
    field in its favor has serious implications for our own military
    advantage. While we do not seek to contain China, we expect China to
    play by the rules, meeting the same standards to which the United
    States and all other nations are held. We will cooperate with China
    wherever and whenever possible, but we also stand ready to compete
    where we must to ensure our military's competitive advantage for
    decades to come.
        As German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen said last month
    in Munich, ``our partnerships are not built on domination. They do not
    create political and economic dependencies.'' Our pursuit of many belts
    and many roads creates alternative options for nations unwilling to
    succumb to China's increasingly coercive methods.
        As such, DOD's priority policy objectives are to outpace Chinese
    military modernization to deter future conflict, or win decisively
    should conflict occur; protect United States and partner research and
    development of advanced technology from rampant Chinese theft, and;
    maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific built on strong alliances and
    growing partnerships.
    The Russia Threat
        China is not the only nation attempting to undermine U.S. interests
    and security to alter the international order in its favor. Despite
    having an economy smaller than that of the state of Texas, Russia,
    against the economic odds, seeks a return to great power status. Though
    it has not reached that goal, Russia is playing a weak strategic hand
    well by: (1) aggressively modernizing its military; (2) projecting
    military might beyond its borders; (3) intimidating its neighbors,
    including exploiting their energy dependence for strategic gain, and;
    (4) undermining other nations' sovereign democratic processes.
      Military Modernization
        Russia is aggressively modernizing its military to gain an
    asymmetric advantage over the United States and NATO. Russia plans to
    spend $28 billion to upgrade and modernize each leg of its strategic
    nuclear triad by 2020, and has already spent more than ten percent of
    its total military budget every year since 2011 on nuclear
    modernization efforts. In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin
    announced Russia's development of six new strategic weapons systems--
    five of which are nuclear capable--including hypersonic systems able to
    maneuver at ten times the speed of sound and intended to circumvent
    U.S. missile defense capabilities. One of those hypersonic systems is
    expected to enter service this year.
        In addition to modernizing its strategic weapons systems and
    delivery platforms, including its submarine fleet, Russia is building a
    large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems, including the
    dual-capable SSC-8 cruise missile, which clearly violates the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Every NATO Ally agrees
    on this point and supports our decision to suspend United States Treaty
    obligations in response to Russia's material breach. A treaty not
    followed by all parties cannot be an example of effective arms control.
    For any who doubt United States efforts to bring Russia back into
    compliance with the Treaty, I would emphasize: we held over thirty
    meetings with the Russians at every level of government for more than
    five years--across two administrations, one Democrat and one
    Republican.
        Moving to space, Russian systems are intended to disrupt, degrade,
    and damage United States satellites in orbit. There is no question:
    Russia treats space as a warfighting domain to gain military advantage
    over the United States. Moscow has already fielded ground-based
    directed energy laser weapons and is developing air-based systems and
    additional novel counterspace capabilities to target our space-based
    missile defense sensors. Russia now has the third largest collection of
    operational satellites in the world, behind only us and China.
      Projecting Military Power
        On top of modernizing its military capabilities, Russia also
    projects its military might around the globe. In 2018, Russia conducted
    its largest strategic military exercise since 1981. Today Moscow
    deploys a variety of aviation and naval missions to the Pacific, the
    Arctic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the western
    hemisphere, including the Caribbean. In December, Russia conducted
    landing and overflight operations in our own front yard, sending
    bombers to Venezuela. In the Middle East, it has continued support for
    Syria's murderous regime with expeditionary operations and long-range
    strikes. These examples make clear Russia's ambitions for a more
    globally dominant military footprint.
      Strategy of Intimidation
        In addition to projecting military power far beyond its borders,
    over the last decade Russia has attempted to incrementally push
    geographic boundaries with its neighbors. From its 2008 invasion and
    continued occupation of twenty percent of Georgian territory to its
    2014 invasion and continued occupation of Crimea, Russia demonstrates
    blatant disregard for other nations' sovereignty. Lest we forget,
    Russia still holds twenty-four Ukrainian crewmembers it captured last
    November, when it attacked three Ukrainian ships near the Sea of Azov
    in violation of international law.
        Russia's escalating intimidation efforts are amplified by irregular
    warfare and ``gray zone'' tactics intended to sow confusion, conceal
    military movement, and limit accountability. By deploying mercenaries--
    like those of the Wagner Group to places like Crimea, Syria, Libya, and
    now Venezuela--instead of uniformed soldiers, Russia hopes its use of
    proxies will further muddy the already murky waters of conflict and
    limit international response to its actions. Russia's attempts at
    deception are not fooling anyone.
      Undermining Sovereign Processes
        Russia's duplicity also extends to the cyber domain, where it
    propagates coordinated disinformation campaigns to undermine sovereign
    democratic processes. In April 2018, Facebook estimated that roughly
    one million users followed a page operated by Russia's Internet
    Research Agency (IRA). Last year, Twitter identified more than 3,800
    IRA accounts that had generated millions of tweets over a nine-year
    span. These accounts are intended to foster divisiveness in the West
    and undermine trust in democratic institutions.
        Russian efforts extend beyond their bots and internet trolls--they
    conduct deliberate cyber operations against the United States and other
    sovereign nations. To name a few examples of Russian handiwork: it has
    targeted United States Government and critical systems to allow damage
    or disruption of U.S. civilian or military infrastructure during a
    crisis; launched distributed denial of service attacks against NATO,
    Ukraine, and German Government websites, and; released a potent cyber
    virus that caused billions of dollars in damage around the world.
        In response, we are not complacent. DOD is getting after the
    problem, and we are achieving results, most notably in our recent
    successful efforts to stymie Russian disruption of our midterm
    elections. We are determining what other actions DOD and our
    Interagency partners must take to ensure the continued safety and
    integrity of our democratic institutions.
    Policy Objectives to Meet the Russia Threat
        As these examples make clear, Russia is intent on undermining
    United States military advantage to alter the existing balance of power
    in its favor. In order to thwart Russia's efforts to regain peer
    competitor status, DOD is focused on modernizing our military to
    enhance deterrence and prevent future conflict, while bolstering burden
    sharing to ensure the NATO Alliance remains credible and capable
    against Russian aggression.
        We are also working diligently with the Interagency, our allies,
    and our partners to deter Russia's physical intimidation and contest
    its cyber aggression, information warfare, and ``gray zone'' tactics in
    Syria and beyond. That includes ensuring Russia does not control the
    international narrative, casting its malign intentions and actions
    under a cloak of subterfuge, disinformation, and malign propaganda. We
    are strengthening our ability to counter this deliberate deceit, both
    on our own and with our allies and partners.
    Regional Threats: North Korea & Iran
        As DOD modernizes to win competition with China and Russia, we also
    remain alert to regional threats, like those posed by the Iranian and
    North Korean regimes.
        While President Trump and our diplomats negotiate for the
    denuclearization of North Korea, its collection of nuclear weapons and
    ballistic missiles continues to pose a threat to the United States
    Homeland, as well as our allies.
        Iran, for its part, relentlessly seeks to expand its malign
    influence across the Middle East and beyond. By providing conventional
    manpower and support to the Syrian regime and Houthi rebels in Yemen,
    and offering support and financing to terrorist groups like Lebanese
    Hizbullah, Iran is entrenching and proliferating its clout across the
    region. In addition, Iran demonstrates reckless behavior in the
    maritime domain. Iranian leaders repeatedly threaten to close the
    Strait of Hormuz--the gateway for almost a third of all global sea-
    traded oil--to international shipping and allow Iranian-backed Houthis
    to conduct attacks on international shipping in the Bab al-Mandab.
        Iran has also increased funding for its cyber efforts twelvefold
    under President Rouhani, as well as increased espionage and targeting
    of United States Government and commercial entities since withdrawing
    from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. DOD also remains closely
    attuned to the threat of Iran pursuing nuclear weapon and advanced
    missile capabilities, including Iran's testing of space launch vehicles
    with technology virtually identical and interchangeable with that of
    ballistic missiles.
    Policy Objectives to Meet Regional Threats
        In support of the ongoing negotiations for the denuclearization of
    North Korea, DOD aims to ensure our diplomats continue to speak from a
    position of strength. Our alliances in the region remain ironclad,
    including with the Republic of Korea and Japan. Together we deter North
    Korean aggression and maintain our ability to protect the Homeland and
    win decisively should conflict ever occur.
        To counter Iran's destabilizing influence across the Middle East,
    DOD seeks to deepen and expand alliances in the region and strengthen
    local partners' capabilities and capacity to manage and counteract
    threats. We also seek to ensure freedom of navigation for all, bolster
    resilience against destructive cyber-attacks, and prevent weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of irresponsible
    actors.
    The Terrorism Threat
        Working by, with, and through an expansive network of international
    partners, we have made meaningful progress in thwarting terrorist
    designs against the U.S. Homeland and interests. Yet we do not discount
    the threats that continue to emanate from violent extremist
    organizations (VEOs), as they seek to conduct and inspire attacks, gain
    legitimacy by exerting control over territory, enjoy safe haven in
    under-governed countries, obtain access to WMD material, and
    proliferate their ideology to others across the globe.
        Taking a step back from our hard-won successes against the Islamic
    State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), we also recognize the global fight
    against radical Islamist terrorists is not over. From the 1980s to now,
    the number of nations, either unwittingly or willingly, providing safe
    haven to VEOs has increased eleven-fold. Today, radical Islamist
    terrorist movements are organized in more than two dozen countries, and
    the globe must contend with more than one hundred VEO-directed,
    enabled, or inspired attacks every year. VEOs continue to take
    advantage of instability in places like Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, the
    Maghreb, Lake Chad, Somalia, and Afghanistan, preying on the conflict-
    ridden to grow their influence.
    Policy Objectives to Meet the Terrorism Threat
        Recognizing terrorism as a global threat, we must pursue global
    solutions that utilize the unique capabilities and capacities of our
    allies and partners, in addition to our own. Military might alone will
    not eliminate terrorist ideology or the threat of future terrorist
    attacks.
        However, we can and are reducing the likelihood of an attack on our
    Homeland, our troops, and our interests by contributing to a whole-of-
    government and coalition approach. Together, we are removing
    terrorists' ability to control and hold territory; bolstering the
    internal security and stable governance of vulnerable states; ensuring
    the proper safeguarding of WMD material from terrorist hands; checking
    their ability to exploit emerging technologies, including unmanned
    systems; targeting VEO financial networks and countering terrorist
    ideology online to limit its spread to the greatest extent possible;
    and sharing intelligence to limit the risk of attack around the world.
                           what dod is doing about it
        To meet our policy objectives, DOD cannot simply keep pace with our
    competitors as they increase their regional and global influence, grow
    their military capabilities, and develop and field advanced
    technologies. We must--and will--significantly outpace them.
        We have made tough choices that align finite resources with our
    strategic priorities, reducing some day-to-day operational requirements
    now so we are prepared to deter, compete, and win against strategic
    competitors in the future. Our work bringing the NDS to life is far
    from over, but we are demonstrating clear progress along our three
    lines of effort.
      Increasing Lethality
        In order to protect the Homeland and remain the most lethal
    military in the world, we have begun a paradigm shift towards a more
    balanced, distributed, survivable, and cost-imposing Joint Force. In
    2018, we closely linked our combatant commands' operations to policy
    objectives and our Service plans to capability and capacity, with a
    focus on execution and performance. We are adjusting our posture,
    increasing lethality, improving operational readiness, and beginning to
    modernize and innovate at scale. These efforts allow us to better
    exploit adversary weakness, project power in contested environments,
    and expand our combat credible forward presence.
        We have shifted our posture in key regions, taking initial steps to
    economize for sustainable missions in the Middle East and South Asia to
    prepare for the possible high-end fight of the future. In doing so, we
    maintain strategic predictability and implement operational
    unpredictability via the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model. This
    approach provides assurance to our allies and partners, while keeping
    our competitors and adversaries on their toes. We demonstrated DFE in
    action last year, when one of our carrier strike groups returned early
    from deployment unannounced and quickly redeployed to the North
    Atlantic--the first carrier strike group to conduct operations there
    since the 1990s.
        We encourage and welcome all individuals who can meet our exacting
    requirements to join our military's ranks. A key element of
    strengthening our military and increasing lethality is ensuring our
    warfighters achieve established physical, mental, and security vetting
    standards. War is unforgiving, and our mission demands we remain a
    standards-based organization. In upholding systematically applied
    standards, we ensure the readiness of our Joint Force and cohesion of
    our units. One of those standards is deployability. Since June, we have
    lowered the percentage of non-deployable servicemembers from 6.4 to
    5.4--that means roughly 21,000 fewer non-deployable servicemembers
    today than eight months ago.
        DOD has also worked diligently to ensure our personnel have the
    capacity, training, and capabilities they need to achieve results. Last
    year, we accelerated delivery of more than 14,000 munitions and
    precision guidance kits to our warfighters, turned the corner on
    replenishing critical munitions stockpiles, and made strides to rapidly
    deploy cutting edge equipment to the warfighter. Our Close Combat
    Lethality Task Force continues to strengthen our infantry's lethality,
    survivability, resiliency, and readiness for close combat. Four out of
    five U.S. combat deaths occur in our infantry. Therefore, it is a
    strategic imperative to ensure those who confront war's grimmest
    realities never enter into a fair fight.
        This work on personnel and munitions readiness feeds into
    complementary efforts to increase equipment readiness. In October 2018,
    we set an eighty percent readiness target for mission critical aviation
    platforms. In just a few months, almost every type, model, and series
    of aircraft targeted by that memorandum has demonstrated progress. This
    year, we will establish similarly ambitious readiness targets across
    the DOD enterprise. In addition, our Services have made impactful
    readiness gains. As one example, the Air Force's operational squadrons
    are twenty-three percent more ready today than in 2017, and we will
    have twenty-five percent more pilots able to carry out missions in
    fiscal year 2019 than in fiscal year 2016.
        On modernization, we remain committed to a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence has kept the peace over
    the last seventy years, and its importance has been reaffirmed by every
    Congress and every president since Harry Truman. Last year, DOD
    released our Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which details the need for
    modern and tailored nuclear capabilities and capacity that meet the
    realities of our times. We are moving out on those efforts. With fiscal
    year 2019 funding, we are recapitalizing and modernizing our aging
    legacy forces, including our nuclear command, control, and
    communications (NC3), while pursuing prudent, modest adjustments to our
    arsenal, which will increase the flexibility of our response options.
        Here it is worth re-stating--Russia is aggressively developing and
    modernizing a suite of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Not
    only does this add urgency to the modernization of our legacy forces,
    it underscores the importance of the supplemental capabilities called
    for in last year's NPR. Both the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic
    missile (SLBM) and the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) close what we
    believe to be troubling gaps in regional deterrence. These are not
    redundant capabilities. The low-yield SLBM, deployed in small numbers,
    will provide a highly tailored response to specific developments in
    Russia's forces and doctrine that may lead Russia to mistakenly believe
    it could potentially use a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons
    without risking a United States military response. A nuclear SLCM will
    provide a similar capability in response to serious developments and
    trends in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear forces. These supplemental
    capabilities enhance deterrence and stability.
        Turning to emerging technology fields, DOD has identified ten key
    areas: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space;
    quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning;
    microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology.
        We have invested in basic research, rapid prototyping, and
    experimentation to mature technology that can be used at scale. We are
    also updating our warfighting doctrine as the character of warfare
    changes. Take AI for example--competitors are investing heavily in this
    field, redefining the future of warfare. Last year, DOD established the
    Joint AI Center (JAIC), and we released our AI Strategy just last
    month. These efforts accelerate DOD's delivery and adoption of AI at
    the speed of relevance, while attracting and cultivating the best
    global talent.
        In pursuit of stronger missile defense, DOD released our Missile
    Defense Review (MDR) in January, which recognizes the accelerating
    proliferation of advanced offensive missile capabilities around the
    world. The MDR articulates a comprehensive approach that combines
    deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack operations.
    We continue to maintain ground- and sea-based missile defenses while
    also developing new capabilities to counter new threats.
        As the MDR illustrates, our military is not constrained by earth's
    geography. We are taking steps to secure unfettered access to and
    freedom to operate in space, in accordance with our international
    agreements and obligations. Reforming the organization of the military
    space enterprise is fundamental for protecting our roughly $19 trillion
    economy and our position as the world's strongest military. Earlier
    this month, we submitted a legislative proposal to Congress, requesting
    authorization for a U.S. Space Force. If authorized, the Force would
    transform our approach to space, increasing our responsiveness in this
    warfighting domain. Establishing a sixth branch with dedicated military
    leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate the development of space
    doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats,
    institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further build space
    warfighting culture. I ask for your support of our proposal, so we can
    move out in this critical domain.
        We recognize restoring military readiness, modernizing our Joint
    Force, and increasing lethality will not happen overnight, but as the
    above examples demonstrate, we are making meaningful progress.
      Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
        Beyond DOD's efforts to improve readiness and lethality, we are
    expanding collaboration and cooperation outside the Department. DOD's
    participation in combined military exercises has increased by seventeen
    percent in the last two years, and our Foreign Military Sales have
    increased by more than sixty-five percent in the last three years.
    Across the globe, DOD has leveraged opportunities to expand and deepen
    our already unmatched network of allies and partners, while making real
    progress on burden sharing for international security.
        Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority theater, we continue to
    pursue many belts and many roads by keeping our decades-old alliances
    strong and fostering growing partnerships. In all our actions, we
    demonstrate our commitment to a free and open region, marked by respect
    for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, big and
    small.
        We are fortifying our bedrock alliances with Australia, Japan, the
    Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand while growing key
    partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. It is worth noting here that four
    out of the five nations in our Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network
    are also Pacific nations, further emphasizing the region's importance.
        In 2018, the United States took historic strides with two key
    partners in particular, Vietnam and India. Our Navy conducted the first
    United States aircraft carrier visit to Vietnam since the Vietnam War,
    and we participated in the inaugural United States-India 2+2 Strategic
    Dialogue in New Delhi, showing growing trust between the world's oldest
    and largest democracies.
        While our diplomats chart a path to the denuclearization of North
    Korea, DOD continues to enforce United Nations Security Council
    resolution sanctions against North Korean ship-to-ship transfers,
    alongside allies and partners. We have also improved integration of our
    missile defense assets on the Korean Peninsula to better protect United
    States Forces and allies.
        In July 2018, we conducted the largest naval exercise in the world,
    the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC, alongside twenty-five other nations.
    That and our Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative have boosted
    interoperability and increased our allies and partners' ability to
    conduct maritime security and awareness operations on their own. Our
    efforts across the region have enabled our allies and partners to take
    a tougher stand against Chinese aggression in international waters. For
    example, this past year France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada,
    Australia, and New Zealand all increased their presence in the East and
    South China Seas, reiterating our collective stance to fly, sail, and
    operate wherever international law allows.
        In Europe, the United States is fortifying relationships, realizing
    burden sharing gains, and developing a more lethal, combined
    capability. This year, NATO--the most successful Alliance in history--
    marks its seventieth anniversary as the bedrock of transatlantic
    security. NATO is poised to bolster deterrence through larger and more
    frequent exercises, mobility and infrastructure improvements, a
    revamped command structure, and increased force presence in territories
    most vulnerable to Russian aggression. We are rapidly pursuing our
    ``Four Thirties Readiness Initiative'' by 2020: thirty mechanized
    battalions, thirty air squadrons, and thirty combat vessels ready to
    fight within thirty days or less.
        Over the last two years, NATO has made significant burden sharing
    progress, both financially and operationally. Since 2017, our NATO
    Allies have increased their defense spending by $41 billion. The nine
    percent increase from 2016-2018 represents the largest in a quarter
    century. By 2020, NATO projects Allies will increase defense spending
    by $100 billion. These are impressive numbers. Yet NATO contributions
    do not all boil down to simple dollar amounts. The Alliance continues
    to provide valuable manpower, specialized capabilities, and territory
    that no other partnership in the world can match.
        I now move to the impactful work we are doing by, with, and through
    our allies and partners across the Middle East and South Asia.
        In Syria and Iraq, the United States, as part of the seventy-nine-
    member Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and our local partners have liberated
    more than thirty towns and cities from ISIS control since January
    2017--that's virtually all of the territory ISIS once held.
        As we look ahead in Syria, we will continue to stand with those who
    fought and continue to fight alongside our Coalition, address Turkey's
    security concerns along Syria's northeast border, maintain the global
    Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and set conditions for continuing United States
    counterterrorism operations in the region. We fully support the
    government of Iraq in its fight against terrorism and will continue to
    enable the Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas
    and thwarting ISIS attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
        In Afghanistan, we are executing President Trump's South Asia
    Strategy, R4+S (regionalize, realign, reinforce, reconcile, and
    sustain). In applying military pressure on the Taliban, we support
    Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Secretary Pompeo's ongoing
    negotiations, which are Afghanistan's first chance for real peace in
    forty years. We are also applying maximum pressure on ISIS-Khorasan
    (ISIS-K) and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, to stymie any
    threats to the United States Homeland.
        Since 2016, our allies and partners have stepped up to create
    necessary conditions for negotiations. Afghan forces now lead one
    hundred percent of missions, with United States and coalition personnel
    performing train, advise, and assist roles. In 2018, international
    partners agreed to extend their roughly $1 billion in annual financial
    sustainment of Afghan forces through 2024. NATO's fulfillment of
    requirements in Afghanistan has increased more than fourteen percent
    since the introduction of President Trump's South Asia Strategy, its
    highest level in the Mission's history. Since 2016, the number of non-
    U.S. Coalition troops to NATO's Resolute Support Mission has increased
    by more than thirty-five percent, and two new countries, Qatar and the
    United Arab Emirates, are formalizing their status as operational
    partners.
        Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS remains
    the United States' top national security interest in Yemen. At the same
    time, we fully support UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths's efforts to
    bring all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table. I
    am encouraged by the ceasefire in the strategically-important city and
    port of Hudaydah. Though not easy, these are necessary first steps on
    the path to lasting peace.
        In Africa, we are helping partners build their security forces'
    capacity to counter terrorist and other transnational threats,
    bolstering relationships to ensure U.S. influence and access against
    great power competition, enhancing our ability to conduct crisis
    response, and supporting whole-of-government efforts to advance
    stability and prosperity.
        The last stop in our abbreviated walk around the world is closer to
    home--to our allies and partners in the western hemisphere and our
    efforts to protect our southern border. Over the last year, we have
    fostered strong military-to-military ties with our Canadian and Mexican
    neighbors, while bolstering relationships with Brazil, Argentina,
    Colombia, and Chile. We appreciate and applaud these nations'
    contributions to international security, demonstrated notably last year
    when Chile served as the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander
    at RIMPAC--the first time in the exercise's history a non-English
    speaking nation has done so.
        As we continue to monitor the situation in Venezuela, we are
    working closely with the Department of State, United States Agency for
    International Development, and regional partners to provide
    humanitarian assistance, while maintaining our posture to protect our
    national interests and citizens abroad.
        On the southern border--last month, I visited the El Paso area to
    assess the security situation and DOD's role in supporting our
    Department of Homeland Security partners.
        As these myriad examples illustrate, our thriving, global
    constellation of alliances and partnerships provides an asymmetric
    advantage no competitor or adversary can match. We take that advantage
    seriously, and we continue to foster its growth at every opportunity.
      Implementing Reform
        Let me now turn inward--to reform of our internal business
    practices. Over the last year, we have made marked improvements to our
    fiscal transparency, instituting a wide range of reform initiatives
    that bolster efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.
        We have focused reform in key areas, including healthcare, contract
    management, information technology (IT), acquisition, civilian resource
    management, and financial management. Let me provide a brief overview
    of our progress so far. Over the course of fiscal year 2017 and fiscal
    year 2018, we have saved $4.7 billion from reform across our
    headquarters' activities--a down payment on more to come.
        On healthcare, we realized savings of almost $519 million in
    TRICARE reform, with $3.4 billion in savings planned through fiscal
    year 2021. Our entire Fourth Estate has now participated in contract
    service requirement reviews to eliminate unnecessary contracts,
    resulting in $492 million in programmed savings.
        Within the IT field, we modernized our defense travel system,
    trimming our regulation by almost 1,000 pages. The reform allows for
    better industry competition and has saved nearly $160 million to date.
    Within acquisition reform, our Services saved more than $550 million in
    fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 by selling equipment to foreign
    partners and negotiating multi-year procurements over single year
    contracts.
        Within financial management, DOD completed our first-ever
    consolidated financial statement audit in 2018, covering roughly $2.7
    trillion in assets. As of February 1, DOD had developed corrective
    action plans to address more than thirty-three percent of the total
    audit findings and recommendations, with many more corrective actions
    to come.
        In addition to business reform, the Department has also made
    important structural reforms, including elevating U.S. Cyber Command to
    full combatant command status, standing up U.S. Army Futures Command,
    and finalizing our split of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    office into two separate offices: Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) and
    Research and Engineering (R&E).
      The Way Ahead
        Our Department has been busy, but we are just getting started. I am
    encouraged by our initial progress. Focus and discipline are vital for
    our NDS's continued execution.
             our fiscal year 2020 request: a strategy-driven budget
        Our fiscal year 2018 funding stopped the erosion of our competitive
    edge by beginning to restore military readiness. Our fiscal year 2019
    funding continued readiness gains and made key down payments on a more
    lethal military. Now our Department needs adequate, sustainable, and
    predictable funding to maintain momentum and expand our modernization
    and readiness efforts. Every line of our fiscal year 2020 request is
    designed to implement our Strategy. Therefore, every dollar of it--both
    in baseline funding and overseas contingency operations--is critical. I
    ask for Congress's support for on-time funding of our $750 billion
    topline for National Defense, so we can continue to breathe life into
    the NDS.
        Our strategy-driven budget drives further progress along our three
    lines of effort and brings our military modernization efforts to life
    at the speed of relevance. It enables critical shifts to compete,
    deter, and win in any high-end fight of the future, while preserving
    capabilities to support current operations. With this funding, we
    ensure America maintains our asymmetric military advantage with a more
    lethal, agile, and innovative Joint Force.
        The fiscal year 2020 request includes the largest research,
    development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget in DOD's history, when
    adjusted for inflation. That is $104 billion in total requested funds
    for fiscal year 2020--$9 billion more than what we will spend this
    fiscal year. We have made strategic choices to prioritize lethality for
    the high-end fight.
        Across DOD, these choices move our capabilities from cost-accepting
    to cost-imposing, from the exquisite and purely survivable to the
    affordable and attritable. Through targeted investment, we will replace
    a federated approach with an enterprise one, enabling a more
    distributed, scaled path to innovation and modernization. This path
    prioritizes unmanned and machine capabilities, as well as the ability
    to ``fight in the dark'' without network dependency.
        With that broader context in mind, I will now focus on four
    priority areas: (1) Investing in the contested space and cyber domains;
    (2) modernizing in traditional air, maritime, and land domains, as well
    as multi-domain enterprises; (3) innovating in emerging technology
    fields to strengthen our competitive edge, and; (4) building on
    readiness gains to meet requirements for our current operational
    commitments and future challenges.
      Space and Cyber Investments
        Our request recognizes the critically important role space will
    play in maintaining military superiority in the future. The $14.1
    billion dedicated to space will counteract the erosion of our
    competitive advantage by enhancing our existing space-based
    capabilities, like GPS, satellite communications, and missile warning,
    as well as increasing launch capacities. We will also stand up the U.S.
    Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space Command, and Space Development
    Agency to best prepare DOD to assure freedom of operation in space,
    deter attacks, and when necessary, defeat space and counter space
    threats to the United States, our allies, and our partners.
        We also note the cyber domain's crucial role, both now and in
    warfare's future. That is why we have requested $9.6 billion to support
    offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, shore up network
    resiliency against adversaries, and improve our cyber posture. These
    efforts help ensure DOD has the information and communications
    technology capabilities necessary for implementing our NDS and
    realizing our mission.
      Traditional and Multi-Domain Investments
        The fiscal year 2020 budget will ensure the U.S. military maintains
    long-term competitive advantage on land, in the air, and on the sea.
    Across these three traditional domains, we are investing a total of
    $107 billion for modernization.
        In the air domain, this includes $57.7 billion to increase the
    procurement and modernization of our fighter force. A balanced mix of
    fourth and fifth generation aircraft will effectively and affordably
    meet the entire spectrum of NDS missions, providing the stealth needed
    to gain air superiority, execute precision strikes, and conduct stand-
    in electronic attack against peer competitors in highly-contested
    environments, while also providing counter-air and strike in more
    permissive environments. We will also purchase additional tankers,
    Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air missiles, and Joint Air-Surface
    extended range missiles.
        On land, we will invest $14.6 billion to fund roughly 6,400 combat
    and tactical vehicles, including M-1 Abrams upgrades and Amphibious
    Combat Vehicles, as well as multiple combat systems that provide
    overmatch on the last two hundred meters of the battlefield.
        In the maritime domain, we will increase and diversify our strike
    options, including offensive-armed unmanned surface and underwater
    vessels and advanced long-range missiles. Fiscal year 2020 funds will
    also accelerate fleet growth, delivering more ships faster, including
    cutting edge unmanned variants.
        The fiscal year 2020 request also invests $14 billion in
    modernizing and recapitalizing all three legs of our nuclear
    capabilities, to include the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent system,
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, Long-Range Standoff Weapon,
    B-21 bomber, life-extended Trident SLBM, and the F-35 dual-capable
    fighter aircraft; while also enhancing our missile warning and NC3
    capabilities.
        We also slate $13.6 billion for missile defeat and defense
    modernization, increasing the capability and capacity of our ground-
    based defenses, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and Aegis
    Ballistic Missile Defense systems; enhancing our space-based missile
    warning and other capabilities to address hypersonic threats; and
    developing boost-phase missile defense systems, including directed
    energy and air-launched kinetic interceptors.
        Also on the multi-domain front, we will invest $3.4 billion for our
    Special Operations Forces. The fiscal year 2020 request refocuses on
    strategic competition by increasing funding for research and
    development, modernization, and expanded capabilities for the high-end
    fight, while maintaining irregular warfare as a core competency.
      Innovation and Advanced Technology Investments
        With more than $7.4 billion directed toward DOD's development and
    fielding of technologies focused on the high-end fight, the fiscal year
    2020 budget prioritizes funding across four key emerging areas:
    autonomy, AI/machine learning, hypersonics, and directed energy.
        Let me expand on hypersonics for a moment as one example. Without
    the long-range, survivable, and fast strike capability of hypersonic
    weapons, it will be difficult for our military to maintain access to
    key regions or come to the defense of allies and partners in a crisis
    or war. Yet, with the $2.6 billion requested in fiscal year 2020,
    projected doubling of funding requests in coming years, and close
    inter-service cooperation, we are accelerating pursuit of options
    deliverable from land, sea, and air, with some capabilities expected to
    deploy to the warfighter three years earlier than previously planned.
      Sustainment and Readiness Investments
        This budget sustains our Joint Force and builds on critical
    readiness gains. We will invest almost $125 billion in operational
    readiness and sustainment, including $1.5 billion for advanced training
    facilities and ranges, $2.6 billion for improving and expanding cyber
    operations training, and $41.2 billion for further improving tactical
    aviation readiness.
        In addition, the fiscal year 2020 budget will allow an increase to
    our total end-strength by roughly 7,700 servicemembers over the
    projected fiscal year 2019 level, as well as give our men and women in
    uniform a much-deserved 3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in a decade.
        In concert with the funding priorities I have just outlined, we
    will continue to pursue opportunities that balance capacity and
    capability by realizing economies of scale in large equipment
    acquisitions, like aircraft carriers and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
    As we do so, we will continue to assess the utility of our investments
    through a lifecycle lens.
                                   conclusion
        With Congress's support and delivery of on-time funding at our
    requested topline, this budget ensures our military maintains the
    lethality, adaptability, and resiliency necessary to compete, deter,
    and win against any adversary in an increasingly dangerous world.
        It is a privilege and honor to lead the most lethal military in the
    world. I thank those in uniform and their families for all they do,
    today and every day, to keep us safe, and I appreciate the critical
    role Congress plays to ensure our warfighters are ready to succeed on
    the battlefields of today and tomorrow.
        The men and women of the Department of Defense stand ready, as
    always, to protect liberty and freedom.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Shanahan.
        General Dunford.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF
                       THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Dunford. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
    opportunity to join Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary
    Norquist here today. It remains my privilege to represent your
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
        While much of the discussion this morning is going to focus
    on the challenges we face, it's important I begin by assuring
    you that your Armed Forces can deter a nuclear attack, defend
    the Homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and effectively
    respond, should deterrence fail. I believe we have a
    competitive advantage against any potential adversary, defined
    as the ability to project power to fight and win at the time
    and place of our choosing.
        But, as Members of this Committee know, 17 years of
    continuous combat and fiscal instability have affected our
    readiness and eroded our competitive advantage. As the
    Secretary highlighted, China and Russia have capitalized on our
    distraction and restraints by investing in capabilities
    specifically designed to challenge our traditional sources of
    strength. After careful study, they deployed capabilities
    intended to contest our freedom of movement across all domains
    and disrupt our ability to project power. With the help of
    Congress, starting in 2017, we began to restore our competitive
    advantage. Recent budgets have allowed us to build readiness
    and invest in new capabilities while meeting our current
    operational commitments. But, I think we all know we can't
    reverse decades of erosion in just a few years. This year's
    budget submission would allow us to continue restoring our
    competitive advantage by improving readiness and developing
    capabilities to enhance the lethality. It proposes investments
    in advanced capabilities across all domains--sea, air, land,
    space, and cyberspace. This year's budget also sustains
    investments in our nuclear enterprise to ensure a safe, secure,
    and effective strategic deterrent, the highest priority of the
    Department of Defense. We've also taken steps to more
    effectively employ the force we have today and build the force
    we have tomorrow. We've implemented fundamental changes in our
    global force management processes to prioritize and allocate
    resources in accordance with the National Defense Strategy
    while building readiness and the flexibility to respond to
    unforeseen contingencies. We've also refined our processes for
    developing and designing our future force. A joint, concept-
    driven, threat-informed approach, which leverages a wide body
    of analytic work, will allow us to deliberately evaluate and
    prioritize warfighting requirements. This also enables us to
    pair emerging technologies with innovative operating concepts.
        In closing, I'd like thank the Committee for all you've
    done to support our men and women in uniform and their
    families. Together, we've honored our solemn obligation to
    never send our sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your
    continued support, we never will.
        [The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]

           Prepared Statement by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this
    Committee, it is an honor to join Acting Secretary Shanahan and the
    Honorable David Norquist in testifying before you today. It remains my
    distinct privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines of the United States Armed Forces.
        Today, I can assure the Committee that the United States military
    can defend the Homeland, meet our Alliance commitments, deter nuclear
    attack from any state actor, and effectively respond should deterrence
    fail. We have a competitive advantage against any adversary across all
    domains--air, sea, land, space, and cyber--and we can project power to
    advance the interests of the United States anywhere around the globe.
        But that competitive advantage has eroded. This is the result of
    seventeen years of continuous combat against transregional violent
    extremism and the damaging effects of funding instability. China and
    Russia have capitalized on our distraction and our constraints. They
    have invested in capabilities specifically designed to challenge our
    traditional sources of strength and have sought to undermine the rules-
    based international order that brought prosperity and relative peace
    for the last seven decades.
        With your help, starting in 2017, we arrested the erosion of our
    competitive advantage. Appropriations in fiscal years 2017-2019 allowed
    us to restore readiness and invest in new capabilities while meeting
    our ongoing commitments across the globe. However, we cannot undo
    decades of degradation in just a few years. This year's budget allows
    us to continue to restore our competitive advantage by enhancing our
    readiness and lethality.
                             strategic environment
        Today's strategic environment is extraordinarily complex and
    volatile. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) characterizes and
    prioritizes our strategic challenges with a ``2+3'' framework that
    names China and Russia as the primary challenges with which we must
    contend, along with North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism. This
    framework provides a benchmark against which we can measure our
    capabilities. It is not intended to be predictive of future crises or
    armed conflicts; rather, it is an important tool for planning, managing
    risk, and developing capabilities. Our assumption is that if we build a
    Joint Force with the capabilities and capacities to meet these
    challenges, either individually or in some combination, we will be
    well-positioned to respond to whatever threats the future holds.
        China. China has paired its rapid economic growth with substantial
    military investment as it strives for regional hegemony and global
    influence. By investing heavily in the space and cyber domains while
    expanding air and maritime capacity and militarizing disputed land
    formations, they are developing the ability to deny us access to the
    East and South China Seas. The intended effect is to weaken our
    alliance structure in the Pacific and allow Beijing to rewrite the
    norms, standards, and laws in the region. They are also advancing their
    interests globally through the One Belt One Road Initiative, creating
    exploitive economic relationships across Asia, Africa, and Latin
    America. These relationships can be leveraged to reduce our influence
    and the access we need to project military power.
        Russia. Similarly, Russia has invested in asymmetrical capabilities
    where they perceive they have a competitive advantage. They are using
    information, cyber, and unconventional operations combined with
    economic and political influence to advance their interests while
    seeking to undermine the credibility of NATO. We have seen examples of
    their revanchist behavior in the invasion of Georgia and Crimea, their
    ongoing activity in the Donbas, and the recent seizure of Ukrainian
    vessels near the Sea of Azov. We also saw their efforts to undermine
    democracy in 2016, both in Europe and the United States.
        North Korea. While we remain hopeful for a peaceful
    denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, after two summits between
    President Trump and Kim Jong-Un, it is clear that we must remain ready
    for multiple contingencies. We are still dealing with a country that
    has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that threaten our Allies in
    the region and our Homeland. Regardless of the expressed intent of the
    North Korean leader, that capability exists and we must retain the
    force posture to deter and defend against the threat.
        Iran. Iran continues to project malign influence and present
    challenges with missile, cyber, proxy, and maritime capabilities. We
    also continue to monitor Iran's nuclear capability. The regime aims to
    establish itself as the dominant regional power; their military
    development is designed to restrict our access to their sphere of
    influence while their activities threaten freedom of navigation along
    important commercial routes, destabilize the government of Iraq,
    exacerbate civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and support proxies inside of
    Lebanon and Syria.
        Violent Extremist Organizations. While we have made significant
    progress against ISIS, al Qaeda, and affiliated groups, the threats to
    the United States and our Allies and partners remain. Violent extremism
    is a global, generational, society-level problem of which military
    operations can only manage the symptoms. In the meantime, we have
    implemented a fiscally, politically, and militarily sustainable
    counterterrorism campaign.
        Our security, our prosperity, and the international system that
    makes them possible are threatened today by actors ranging from
    advanced and ascending militaries backed by nuclear arsenals to lone
    fighters inspired by radical ideologies. The Joint Force must respond
    by balancing the capabilities we need for today's operations with the
    depth, flexibility, and advanced technologies required to respond to
    the challenges of the future. If approved, the President's Budget 2020
    (PB20) request will enable the Department to adapt the force we have
    today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges.
                            the force we need today
        The Joint Military Net Assessment--a rigorous tool we use to
    evaluate the Joint Force's ability to meet its strategic objectives--
    identified challenges across all domains in the context of our near-
    peer competitors. Other assessments and strategic reviews have also
    highlighted the sustained investment we need to improve readiness,
    capabilities, and capacities in the Joint Force. The fiscal year 2020
    budget provides funding for current operations and, building on budgets
    of recent years, continues to build readiness and improve lethality by
    modernizing existing capabilities and expanding capacity.
    Readiness.
        We have realized readiness improvements through fundamental changes
    in our global force management processes. As directed in the NDS--and
    in support of its 2+3 strategy--we have implemented Dynamic Force
    Employment (DFE). This is a top-down process of prioritizing and
    allocating resources against our strategic priorities with bottom-up
    refinement from the geographic combatant commanders.
        DFE allows us to position resources globally to mitigate strategic
    risk and be operationally unpredictable while remaining strategically
    predictable. This improves our ability to respond to unforeseen
    crises--as well as opportunities--and provide strategic flexibility for
    senior decision makers while maintaining readiness across the Joint
    Force.
        Within this new framework for global force management, your men and
    women in uniform are operating across the globe every day to assure
    Allies and partners, deter adversaries, and assist local forces in
    combatting violent extremism at its sources. President's Budget 2020
    provides them the resources they need to accomplish their missions and
    return home safely.
    Current Operations.
        China. United States Forces conduct freedom of navigation
    operations globally to challenge excessive maritime claims--including
    those made by China--and demonstrate our determination to operate
    wherever international law allows. In the South China Sea and elsewhere
    in the region, we also fly bomber missions, demonstrating a resilient
    global strike capability that checks Chinese ambition and assures our
    regional Allies and partners. Throughout the Pacific, our troops
    exercise and engage with partners to signal our commitment and
    counterbalance China's challenges to the rules-based order.
        Russia. In Europe, the European Defense Initiative and associated
    posture adjustments and combined exercise programs represent the
    largest reinforcement of NATO's collective defense posture--and the
    largest demonstration of its interoperability--since the Cold War.
    United States personnel also contribute to NATO's integrated ballistic
    missile air defense in Europe. In both the Atlantic and Pacific, we
    conduct sustained air and sea operations to monitor Russian activities
    and deter any aggression.
        North Korea. United States troops on the Korean Peninsula are
    postured and trained to deter North Korean aggression, provocation, and
    coercion. Their current priority is supporting the State Department-led
    maximum pressure campaign to achieve the full, final, and verifiable
    denuclearization of the Peninsula. In concert with like-minded nations,
    we have expanded our sea and air operations to deter and disrupt
    illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum and other materials
    restricted by UN Security Council Resolutions.
        Iran. United States forces conduct freedom of navigation operations
    in the Strait of Hormuz. We continue our commitment to the stability of
    the government of Iraq, and our efforts to build the capacity of our
    regional partners. In these and other ways, the Joint Force complements
    United States diplomatic and economic efforts to counter Iranian malign
    influence in the Middle East.
        VEOs. The United States has assembled a global coalition to counter
    violent extremist organizations--leveraging a relatively small
    footprint of U.S. Forces to enable local partners throughout the world.
    The immediate priority is achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq
    and Syria through Operation Inherent Resolve. We are also working by,
    with, and through partners in every region to cut the ``connective
    tissue'' of foreign fighters, resources, and the ideological narrative
    that enable violent extremists to operate transregionally.
        Iraq and Syria. United States troops remain engaged in the D-ISIS
    campaign. As the campaign transitions from clearing ISIS-held territory
    to a focus on stabilizing the region, activities such as training local
    security forces, enabling local governance, and conducting
    counterterrorism operations will help prevent a power vacuum in
    Northeast Syria and a resurgence of ISIS. We are working with our
    Coalition partners to ensure we meet Turkish security concerns as well
    as protect those that fought with us against ISIS.
        Afghanistan. Along with our Allies and coalition partners, we are
    setting the military conditions to fully support an Afghan-led, Afghan-
    owned peace process. Coalition forces train, advise, and assist
    Afghanistan National Security Forces, as well as provide critical
    aviation support, intelligence, and other capabilities to make them a
    more effective fighting force.
        In addition to readiness gains from improved force management, DOD
    budgets in recent years helped arrest the decline of unit readiness
    across the Joint Force. In fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, we
    increased the quality and quantity of unit training, improved personnel
    deployment availability, increased stocks of key munitions, streamlined
    aviation depot processes, and added capacity to address shortfalls in
    maintenance and sustainment functions. President's Budget 2020 enables
    us to continue on this path, but a decade of neglect will require years
    to correct. A full restoration of our readiness will require sustained,
    sufficient, and predictable funding into the future.
                  a modern and more lethal force for tomorrow
        The NDS calls for a more lethal force that expands the competitive
    space to meet critical challenges and key operational problems. The
    President's Budget 2020 request invests in a more lethal force by
    funding efforts to modernize current capabilities and expand
    warfighting capacity.
        A primary modernization priority is our aging nuclear enterprise. A
    large-scale nuclear attack poses an existential threat to the United
    States. U.S. nuclear forces are the indispensable means of addressing
    this threat, making nuclear deterrence the highest priority mission of
    the Joint Force. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review established the
    elements of the nuclear modernization program--a program that is
    necessary, prudent, and affordable given the nature and evolution of
    the threats we face. President's Budget 2020 fully funds that program.
        President's Budget 2020 also enhances joint warfighting capacity by
    fielding the capabilities we need to project power. In the air,
    continued procurement of 5th generation fighter aircraft allows us
    greater flexibility to respond globally today and in the future. At
    sea, recapitalizing the naval fleet with modern and lethal platforms
    sustains undersea, surface, naval aviation, and fleet logistic
    advantages while increasing investments in unmanned, autonomous
    maritime capabilities. On the ground, enhancement of long-range
    precision fires, development of the next generation combat vehicle, and
    investments in close combat systems ensure our soldiers and marines'
    overmatch on the battlefield.
        Space continues to be a priority area for modernization and
    innovation. In response to the evolution of threats to U.S. assets in
    space, we will establish the U.S. Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space
    Command, and Space Development Agency. To deter our adversaries, we are
    pursuing organizational constructs, systems, and capabilities that will
    produce a more lethal, resilient, and agile Joint Force. Additionally,
    this budget request includes substantial investments in Missile
    Warning, launch platforms, Space Situational Awareness, Space Control,
    and enhancements to Position, Navigation, and Timing.
        In the cyber domain, President's Budget 2020 allows the Joint Force
    to further develop and employ the necessary tools to defend DOD
    infrastructure, compete below the level of armed conflict, and operate
    as part of broader joint operations. This budget request increases our
    investments in required capabilities to operate effectively in
    cyberspace and maintain our competitive advantage against near-peer
    adversaries.
        While improving lethality in the near term, we will continue to
    develop and design a future Joint Force that can fight and win against
    any adversary on any battlefield of tomorrow. A joint concept-driven,
    threat-informed approach to capability development--leveraging
    wargames, exercises, and experimentation--allows us to more
    deliberately evaluate needs of the current force and prioritize future
    requirements. Our refined approach to Force Development and Design
    allows senior leaders to pair emerging technologies with optimal
    organizational constructs and innovative operating concepts to plan and
    execute joint operations now and in the future.
        No investment is more important to the effectiveness of our future
    force than the development and education of our future leaders. The
    nation's ability to compete, deter, and win requires leaders who have
    the vision, intellect, and critical thinking skills to employ, develop,
    and design the future Joint Force. With a special emphasis on
    revitalization of the War Colleges, our leader development program is
    designed to fully support the development of these strategic thinkers
    and future senior leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces.
                                   conclusion
        This is my fourth and final appearance before this Committee in
    support of the Department's annual budget request. I thank you for the
    great honor of representing your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines.
        More importantly, I would like to thank the Committee for all you
    have done to support our troops, as well as their families. In visits
    to the Joint Force at bases and posts, stateside and around the world,
    I continue to be amazed by their spirit and dedication to the mission.
    Through the support of the Congress and the people you represent, our
    servicemembers in uniform will prevail in our current conflicts and be
    prepared to confront the threats the United States will surely face in
    the future.
        Together, we have honored our solemn obligation to never send our
    sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your continued support for
    sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding, we never will.

        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, General.
        What we're going to do is have a round of 5-minute
    questions. We are very well attended this morning, so I ask
    people to try to keep within their time. I will do the same
    thing.
        To kick it off, we talked about the blueprint that we're
    using. I'd like to ask each witness a question about this.
        Secretary Shanahan, you said that the Department of Defense
    would realign the resources in the budget to implement this
    program. Now, in order to do that, can you quickly run over any
    of the programs or systems or missions that have been either
    reduced or accelerated to accommodate this?
        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
    highlight, in this year's budget, three major structural
    changes, in terms of being able to accelerate. The first is
    space. The Space Force, itself, is intended to accelerate,
    dramatically, our capabilities to defend. Second, missiles.
    Probably the best characterization of that is our efforts on
    hypersonics. Third, a significant investment in cyber
    capabilities. When we think about reductions, I think the Army
    is the best illustration of that in their modernization plans
    as they look to make reductions across their portfolio to, I'll
    say, about 100 different programs.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
        General Dunford, similar question. The National Defense
    Strategy Commission listed several capability gaps, vis-a-vis
    China and Russia, such as long-range fires, additional air
    defense units, and others that I mentioned in my over
    statement. Which of these capability gaps do you think the 2020
    budget addresses?
        General Dunford. Chairman, thank you.
        The budget actually addresses all the challenges you
    identified. What I can assure is that the National Defense
    Strategy really has been the basis for our prioritization for
    capability development. We did careful analysis of China and
    Russia, in particular, the capabilities developed over the last
    few years to limit our ability to operate freely in space,
    cyberspace, land, sea, and air. The capabilities that we have
    identified in this year's budget are really designed to allow
    us to project power when and where necessary to advance our
    interests in that context of that emerging threat from China
    and Russia.
        Chairman Inhofe. All right. I appreciate that.
        Now, I am concerned about one other area. Neither one of
    you is personally responsible for this, but I'm a little
    disturbed by the idea that we're going to be taking the USS
    Truman out of the system and I wonder how this is going to work
    in just our sheer numbers. Now, we have a law that says we have
    to maintain 11 carriers. We would also look at this and realize
    that 10 would equal what's necessary to conduct a major war.
    How do we get to the number we're supposed to have if we don't
    follow through with the midlife of the Truman? Now, recognizing
    that would take up to, I think, 2024. But, nonetheless, it's
    going to take longer if we start--depending upon the multiple
    buy that we're talking about, particularly of a vehicle that
    still--the elevator still doesn't work and carry the ordinance.
        So, what's your thought about that? How are we going to,
    number one, comply with the law that we have--in fact, Mr.
    Norquist, this might be a good question for you, because you're
    into these issues, also--and still not follow through with our
    original plans with the Harry Truman?
        Anybody.
        Secretary Shanahan. Why don't I lead off?
        First of all, I think the Truman decision represents some
    of the strategic choices we've made in this year's budget. It
    was a very difficult decision for us. Carriers represent, now
    and in the future, critical force structure for the Navy. The
    Truman decision was made in concert--it was an integrated
    decision with our two-carrier buy. Let me walk through the
    benefits of the decision and then potential off-ramps so that
    we don't find ourselves in a difficult situation.
        So, the first is that, with this decision of the two-
    carrier buy and to not refuel the Truman, our lethality of our
    carriers and capability increases with the new carriers. The
    second is, until mid-2020s, we maintain the level of 11
    carriers. The third is--and part of the calculus here--was to
    maintain employment. In fact, with this decision, we grow
    employment in the industrial base. We needed to make sure, not
    only that our shipyards maintained their employment--there's
    actually growth--but also the supply chain. The last is that
    the funds that we freed up from making these decisions are
    invested in the future force. The decision for two carriers
    saved $4 billion.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        Secretary Shanahan. Not refueling the Truman saves $3.4
    billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)----
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Yeah, we're going to run out of
    time, and I'm going to set the example of not allowing us to
    run out of time. But, I still am not happy with the results of
    that. My mental numbers don't agree with that. I think it's a
    very important thing. I personally brought this up before
    Wicker gets here.
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Chairman Inhofe. All right.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Mr. Secretary, on February 18th, you sent a letter to
    Secretary Nielsen stating that you had, in your words, ``not
    yet decided whether the use of Section 2808 is necessary.''
    That would be the section under the emergency that would
    authorize access to military construction (MILCON) funds.
    You've asked for information from the Secretary, to include a
    list of proposed border construction projects that would
    improve the--again, your words--``effectiveness and efficiency
    of DOD personnel supporting these Customs and Border Patrol.''
    Have you received a response yet from Secretary Nielsen?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not. I expect it this week.
        Senator Reed. Again, I--in the context of something that is
    supposed to be an emergency, this seems to be a pretty casual
    sort of approach to the issue. But, beside that, at this point,
    then, you don't know what projects Deputy Assistant Secretary
    (DAS) is requesting, and whether or not those projects would be
    appropriate under 2808.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, the projects we've received, or
    the updates from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date,
    are on--with regards to their 2019 appropriations, they're for
    the expenditure of forfeiture of Treasury funds and then needs
    as they----
        Senator Reed. Those are all programs that are automatic.
    You've already put those--do--I'm talking about the 2808, which
    would require not only the emergency declaration, but also a
    judgment whether--of their military utility.
        Mr. Chairman--General Dunford, you have the obligation to
    advise the Secretary on the military utility of these projects
    with--if they're being incorporated. What criteria do you
    intend to use?
        General Dunford. Thanks, Senator Reed.
        The criteria I intend to use is, we'll look carefully at
    the mission that our soldiers, sailors, marines have been
    assigned, and some airmen, as well. We'll look at how these
    projects support, directly, the mission of those individuals.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. The Secretary will make the
    ultimate decision, but based upon your recommendation.
        General Dunford. Senator, I'll be one of the inputs, and
    I'll provide military advice to the Secretary on the
    relationship between the resources, the projects, and the
    mission.
        Senator Reed. If it comes to pass, then, you'll have to
    delay certain military construction projects we've authorized
    and appropriated. Do you have a list of those projects yet, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I don't have a final list of
    those projects.
        Senator Reed. Well, obviously, I think it would be
    important to all of us to understand which projects would be
    sacrificed, even in the short run. So, I would encourage you to
    get that list.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. See Appendix A, fact sheet for the list
    of projects.

        Senator Reed. In the emergency request, there's $3.6
    billion for, essentially, backfilling those projects which have
    already been authorized and appropriated, which is, I think, an
    unusual way to fund military construction projects. But, then
    there's an additional $3.6 billion that's just been set aside
    for ``the wall,'' competing with other potential military
    projects. That's emergency funding. Do you think that's
    appropriate?
        Secretary Shanahan. It was appropriate, given the planning,
    when we were putting together, to provision for the next year.
    I'll ask Secretary Norquist to comment about how we came up
    with the planning.
        Secretary Norquist. Sure. One of the things we wanted to be
    certain to do is to not disrupt future military construction
    projects. So, if 2808 extends, which it will, into fiscal year
    2020, it just gets--at least it's 12 months. If it's longer, we
    don't want that to disrupt other projects. So, we put in
    funding so that it would be available and not to be able to--in
    order to be able to protect the other military construction
    projects.
        Senator Reed. But, essentially, what you're doing is
    creating appropriations dedicated, at this point, to building a
    wall, which has not, I think, been authorized or appropriated
    by the Congress. That 3.6 extra funding, you know is going to
    the wall. It might be a backfill or a--or a circuitous way, but
    it's essentially for the wall. Is that correct?
        Secretary Norquist. Right. It's in the request. Therefore,
    would need to be both authorized and appropriated to----
        Senator Reed. Okay. So----
        Secretary Norquist.--take effect. Absolutely, sir.
        Senator Reed. So, that, in our process, we are
    authorizing--you're asking us literally to authorize funding
    for the wall.
        Secretary Norquist. Yeah.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Just a quick question, because I want to follow the
    Chairman's guidelines. You mentioned $2 billion in the
    emergency request for hurricane reconstruction. The Marine
    Corps has indicated to me, as late as yesterday, that it's
    about $3.7 billion. Tyndall Air Force Base is--$5 billion. So,
    it would seem to me, if you're trying to address the real needs
    of the Department of Defense, that, instead of using 3.6 or $7
    billion for the wall, that could be used immediately for
    repairs at Camp Lejeune and Tyndall Air Force Base.
        Secretary Norquist. So, what you have is--yes, there are
    significant requirements for both of those two bases. One of
    the things we're looking at is, particularly, the military
    construction projects. The planning and design lead means that
    some of them can be executed in 2020, so we have $2 billion in
    for that, some of them won't be able to be executed till 2021
    or later. We're trying to balance that and address those. But,
    we're happy to work with you on those requirements.
        Senator Reed. Respecting the Chairman, I----
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay, thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dunford, do you believe a ``no first use'' policy
    improves our ability to deter conflict? Would it be your best
    military advice to adopt such a policy?
        General Dunford. Well, thank you, Senator. I think the
    current policy is one that complicates an adversary's
    decisionmaking process, and I wouldn't recommend any change to
    simplify an adversary's decisionmaking calculus. I also can
    envision several circumstances where we would not want to
    remove that option from the President in the future. I could
    certainly talk about that in a classified venue. But, I
    absolutely believe the current policy is the right policy.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        As you know, those who favor reducing the size of our
    nuclear forces, they often argue that a non-nuclear capability
    can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our
    ability to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries,
    and assure our allies. A report released last September by the
    Global Zero Group repeatedly makes this argument and claims
    that cyberweapons, in particular, can be substituted for
    nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber operations, their effects
    and their ability to deter hostile activity, is comparable to
    nuclear weapons, or are these extremely different capabilities?
    Is this idea of direct substitution unwise?
        General Dunford. Senator, I don't believe that cyber
    capabilities can be substituted for nuclear capabilities. I
    think we need to be very careful to maintain a safe, effective,
    and credible nuclear deterrent on its own.
        We, as you know, have looked at this through more than
    three or four administrations in a row. We've carefully looked
    at, What does the Nation need to do what I described in my
    opening statement as the most important mission in the
    Department of Defense, and that is to deter a nuclear war?
    We've concluded that the current construct of a triad with a
    robust nuclear command-and-control capability is the most
    effective way to deter a nuclear war. It is also the most
    effective way to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear
    weapons by any potential adversary.
        Senator Fischer. You mentioned that, in order to maintain
    that safe deterrent, we must follow the advice of all previous
    administrations, both Republican and Democrat, all previous
    military leaders, that we maintain that triad?
        General Dunford. Yes, Senator. I have participated in two
    Nuclear Posture Reviews since I've been in this assignment and
    been exposed to the wide body of analytic work that was behind
    those two Nuclear Posture Reviews that came to the very same
    conclusion in two different administrations. It's very
    consistent with the military advice that I provided on both
    occasions.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Moving to a different topic. Late last year, General, you
    characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a stalemate. In
    the time since, we've seen some indications that negotiations
    with the Taliban are showing signs of progress. Do you believe
    the South Asia Strategy is working? What is your view of the
    current security situation?
        General Dunford. Oh, thanks, Senator.
        First, I think we're all cautiously optimistic that there
    is, for the first time, serious inroads made into
    reconciliation. Ambassador Zal Khalilzad just completed a round
    of negotiations with the Taliban. He's back in Washington, DC.
    I'll have an opportunity to speak to him later today, and I
    think we'll see him tomorrow morning. We're encouraged. I can
    tell you, on behalf of Secretary Shanahan, everything that we
    are doing now in the military space, led by General Miller on
    the ground, is in support of Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts.
        I think, on the ground, by and large, the general strategic
    situation has not changed, but General Miller has incorporated
    elements of the strategy to increase the pressure on Taliban
    leadership. We do believe that some of that pressure has
    contributed to the fact that the Taliban are now at the peace
    table for the first time since the war began.
        Senator Fischer. What conditions on the ground do you
    believe are necessary if we're going to be able to see any kind
    of progress in discussions that we have with the Taliban? Can
    you be specific in this setting?
        General Dunford. You know, first, to put pressure on the
    Taliban, we need to continue to provide enabling capability to
    the Afghan forces. That's been in the form of train, advise,
    and assist. We have the right leaders at the right place to
    assist the Afghans. We're also providing combat-enabling
    capability--aviation, intelligence, logistics support--as well.
    Then, most importantly, though, Senator, on the ground is a
    counterterrorism capability, remembering that the reason why
    we're in Afghanistan is to prevent attacks against the American
    people in the Homeland. The combination of support for the
    Afghans to allow them to put pressure on the Taliban also
    creates the conditions for us to have an effective
    counterterrorism presence in South Asia to secure the American
    people.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it's important to
    always consider conditions on the ground and always keep in
    mind what our goal and mission is.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Shanahan--I'm sorry----
        Senator Shaheen. Shaheen.
        Chairman Inhofe.--Shaheen.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. There we go.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been on
    this Committee for about 8 years now.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. That's right.
        Senator Reed. His Irish----
        Senator Shaheen. Yeah, actually--that's right. It's----
        Senator Reed. His Irish----
        Senator Shaheen.--St. Patrick's Day is coming up, so for
    that I'll be ``Shan.''
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Secretary Shanahan, I must say I was quite concerned this
    morning when I read The New York Times story that the
    Department of Defense is pushing back against the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA), which is trying to set tougher
    standards for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS)
    chemicals. I will just show you. The article was in the Times,
    and the headline here says, ``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker
    Standards on Chemicals Contaminating Drinking Water.'' You and
    I first had a chance to talk about PFAS chemicals and how
    they're affecting the former Pease Air Force Base in 2017. I
    told you about the hundreds of people, children, who had been
    drinking water, and those chemicals now have shown up. No one
    knows what the long-term health impacts of drinking that water
    is.
        There are 401 known military facilities in the United
    States that the Pentagon has admitted have PFAS contamination.
    This Committee worked, 2 years ago, to authorize the first-ever
    health study on PFAS chemicals. I'm just--I'm very concerned
    about the fact that the Department of Defense would be trying
    to reduce the standard that the EPA is setting to try and
    ensure that drinking water is safe, not just for the civilians
    around our military installations, but also for our members of
    the military. I must say, the Air Force has been very
    responsive at Pease and Portsmouth. Under the previous
    Secretary, Deborah James, and the current Secretary, Heather
    Wilson, they have come up, they have put in remediation
    efforts. I think this health study that has been started is
    going to be critical in answering questions for people. But, I
    don't understand how you and the Department of Defense could be
    trying to reduce the standards that affect drinking water for
    literally millions of people around the country.
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I'm not familiar with the
    article this morning. You have my assurance that I'll take a
    look at what the actual situation is, in terms of the
    standards.
        What I am accountable and responsible for is the safety and
    security of our men and women. You have my assurance that we
    will continue to do that. I will look into this matter. I take
    these matters personally, very, very seriously, just as we had
    talked before. I am the advocate to take care of those matters,
    so let me take that for the record, and I will follow up with
    you directly to explain the situation and what we're doing to
    take responsibility.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD)
    supports the use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
    Compensation, and Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established,
    risk-based approach to determine when groundwater cleanup is
    needed. The Department is not seeking a different or weaker
    cleanup standard. Using the Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA) risk assessment process supporting this statute, the
    unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of groundwater
    with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic
    acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion (ppt). DOD
    uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to add
    the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine
    CERCLA responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime
    Health Advisory (LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA
    applies to drinking water, but also considers all PFOS/PFOA
    exposures over a lifetime. Therefore, the LHA is not a cleanup
    level.

        Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. Can you confirm
    or deny whether DOD has urged a lowering of the standard that
    the EPA is trying to put in place?
        Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to that specific. I will,
    very quickly, find--get an answer back to you.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I think that's
    something that is important for the entire Committee to know,
    because, as you know, installations across the country are
    affected, and a lot of people's--and we don't yet really know
    what the long-term health impacts are. So, getting those
    answers is very important.
        Can I ask--and I'm not sure who, quite, to direct this
    question to, but, General Dunford, you said that you were going
    to be weighing in on any projects that were put on a list--any
    MILCON projects put on the list to consider delaying because of
    the President's effort to put more money into a border wall.
    Can you tell me what objective criteria that you're looking at
    in trying to come up with those projects?
        General Dunford. Senator, the Secretary will get inputs on
    the impact of the projects from the service secretaries and the
    service chiefs. What I will do is talk about the
    appropriateness of those projects and how they relate to the
    performance of our mission along the border so the Secretary
    will get a wide variety of inputs. Each of the service
    secretaries, I know, will share their assessment of those
    impact of those projects to the Secretary.
        Senator Shaheen. But, a number of those projects would not
    affect the border, would they?
        General Dunford. No----
        Senator Shaheen. I mean, we have a--MILCON projects at the
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard that are very important, I think, to
    our national security, that don't affect the border directly.
        General Dunford. Yeah, sorry, Senator, if I conflated two
    issues. There is the list of projects, and then the service--
    that may be used to free money up for projects along the
    border--the service secretaries and the service chiefs will
    provide input to the Secretary on the impact of those projects
    to the services and, as you point out, bases and installations,
    maybe, where those projects would have been executed. What I
    will do, when the decision is made to support the border with
    infrastructure, is assess the relationship of that
    infrastructure to the DOD mission. There are two separate
    processes that affect----
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        General Dunford.--infrastructure and projects.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. General Dunford, how many troops, roughly,
    do we have on the border today?
        General Dunford. Senator, we have approximately 4,000 in a
    title 10 status, and we have approximately 2,000 in a title 32
    status.
        Senator Cotton. How many do we have in the demilitarized
    zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula?
        General Dunford. We have a total of 28,500 in Korea.
        Senator Cotton. They're all pretty close to the DMZ, but we
    have a lot that are right up on the DMZ, too, correct?
        General Dunford. We do, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. How many do we have today in the Baltics
    and Poland nations that border Russia?
        General Dunford. We have several hundred. Then, of course,
    in Poland we have a constant rotational presence that can be up
    in the thousands. We have brigade combat teams that rotate into
    Poland for training. I was there visiting them in December,
    and, at that point, we had probably about 3,000 forces inside
    of Poland at that time.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. So, we have lots of troops around the
    world on other countries' borders. Does it cause you any
    disquiet that we have troops on our own border?
        General Dunford. It does not cause me disquiet that we have
    troops on the border, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Let's turn to the budget. The budget has a very large
    request for the overseas contingency fund, $174 billion. I
    think that's probably about a hundred-billion more now than
    what we've spent this year. That, obviously, is a big patch to
    try to get around the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. There's
    a lot of people on Capitol Hill who are not going to like that.
    But, let's think about it, first, from a military standpoint.
        General Dunford, what does it mean for modernization if the
    opposition to such a large overseas contingency fund results in
    a 1-year continuing resolution?
        General Dunford. Well, Senator, my understanding this year
    would be that we would not have a continuing resolution, that
    we would go back to BCA levels. I'm not given to hyperbole----
        Senator Cotton. So, let's say it's a continuing resolution
    that suspends the BCA levels. So, because of the dispute over
    the overseas contingencies fund, the Congress can't reach a
    budget-cap agreement, and therefore, we have to have a 1-year
    continuing resolution that suspends the caps.
        General Dunford. Yeah, one of the challenges that we've
    had, Senator, over the last few years is, the fact that we have
    not had a budget--last year, we did, but the fact that we have
    routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has
    delayed new-starts, and it's been incredibly inefficient in how
    we prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year. The
    three adjectives I use--and I think they're all important--is,
    predictable, sustained, and adequate levels of funding. If we
    had the entire fiscal year, we can be the good stewards that
    you should hold us accountable for being.
        Senator Cotton. Secretary Shanahan, is a dollar of spending
    in the overseas contingency fund equal to a dollar of spending
    in the base budget?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, yes, it is.
        Senator Cotton. Could you elaborate on that a little bit
    more?
        Secretary Shanahan. When I think about the top line and how
    we built the top line, it was a requirements-built budget. So,
    every dollar in the budget is based off a derived requirement.
    So, how we package the money doesn't change how we built the
    budget. So, the color is indifferent to what it is we would put
    the money towards.
        Senator Cotton. If the Congress could reach a budget-cap
    deal, though, and have that money in the base budget, would
    that be better off for the Department of Defense?
        Secretary Shanahan. Be much better off.
        Senator Cotton. Can you explain why that would be better
    off?
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, for a number of reasons. I think
    and I'll ask David to comment on this, but it's in the out
    years. When the base budget gives us the predictability and the
    stability the Chairman just spoke to, that not only gives us,
    internally, the stability to do our planning, but also our
    partners in the industrial base, their investment and their
    planning and their sizing, they have confidence that that
    continuity of money will continue. It----
        Senator Cotton. Yeah, if we could--that's probably a good
    question for the Comptroller. Could you just explain the
    efficiency of spending a dollar in the base budget versus a
    dollar in the OCO budget, especially in the out years?
        Secretary Norquist. So, in the regular year, they follow
    the same congressional oversight; they get spent the same way.
    It's a presentation difference. To be clear to the members, we
    have presented the budget so that that which has historically
    been OCO is distinctly presented from the OCO for base, because
    we want to understand--to be able to do analysis, you need to
    be able to compare. But, when you go to the out years, what
    people look at is, What numbers can we expect in the out years?
    It is easier to project, and we have done that in the past.
    You'll see, in some of our presentations, a different base-and-
    OCO mix in the out years when you get to the point where all
    that is OCO is the contingency versus the OCO for base and
    others. But, it helps with planning.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah. I say the reason we're in this bind
    is a law against which I have inveighed for many years, the
    2011 Budget Control Act. I hope that we can get another, and
    final, 2-year cap deal. I do worry, though, that we may be
    heading in the direction of a full-year continuing resolution.
    I would hate to see that for all our men and women in uniform
    out on the front lines.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. I thought Senator Blumenthal was here
    before me, so I'll----
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator----
        Senator Hirono.--defer to him first.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Take the ball and run.
        Chairman Inhofe. Go.
        Senator Blumenthal. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very
    much for your service. Appreciate your being here, and your
    candid and forthright answers.
        President Trump's budget has been criticized in many ways.
    In my view, it gets a lot wrong, but it got very right the
    commitment to undersea warfare and building three submarines,
    Virginia-class attack submarines, a year in fiscal year 2020. I
    want to thank you and your entire team for their commitment to
    that issue of paramount importance to our future Navy and our
    national defense. It is an area where we have an asymmetric
    advantage that must be preserved. There are others that are
    also important, cyber and air superiority and space, for all
    the reasons that you know. But, I just want to highlight that
    area.
        I want to ask a question that is unrelated to the defense
    budget, but is very much on the minds of many of us, relating
    to the Boeing 737 MAX 8. I know it's not a topic of interest
    today before this proceeding, but it is a topic of interest to
    work that you've done in the past. I'd like to know whether you
    have spoken about the Boeing 737 MAX 8 to anyone in the
    administration, in the Department of Transportation, or in the
    White House.
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I've not spoken to anyone
    regarding the 737 MAX.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you been briefed at all on any of
    the problems relating to it?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, sir, I have not.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, Are you in favor of an
    investigation that would look into why these defects that
    caused crashes were not known earlier or were not acted upon
    earlier?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I firmly believe we should let
    the regulators investigate the incidents. I would just say, my
    heart goes out, and my condolences, to the families and the
    employees involved in the Lion Air incident and the Ethiopian
    Airline incident.
        Senator Blumenthal. The independent watchdog, Citizens for
    Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, recently asked the
    Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate whether
    you have broken any ethics rules by promoting Boeing while you
    served as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Do you support such an
    investigation?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I do.
        Senator Blumenthal. I welcome your support for that
    investigation.
        Other government watchdog groups have looked at records
    indicating that the Department of Defense spent almost $140,000
    at Trump-branded properties in the first 8 months of the Trump
    presidency. More than a third of those payments were made at
    Mar-a-Lago. Some of the payments overlapped with presidential
    trips, but others do not. All the payments--you may be familiar
    with the emoluments lawsuit that I and other members of
    Congress have brought--would violate that domestic emoluments
    clause, potentially, which prevents the President from
    receiving money from the Federal Government, or any other
    payments and benefits, without consent of Congress. Are you
    aware of those expenditures by the Department of Defense?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I'm not, but I'll ask Secretary
    Norquist.
        Secretary Norquist. I'm not aware of those.
        Senator Blumenthal. Could you give us, in writing, a--an
    accounting of those expenditures by the Department of Defense
    at Trump-branded properties?
        Secretary Norquist. I'll take that for the record, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a
    total of $147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the
    inauguration. These were all government travel credit card
    purchases by individual employees and members of the military.
    It is not Department of Defense policy to recommend that its
    personnel patronize any particular hotel or restaurant.
    Individual travelers are largely free market players in
    choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally
    responsible for paying the amounts due on their government
    travel credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging
    allotment and a meals and incidentals expense allotment with
    which to make these payments.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        As the Acting Secretary of the Department of Defense, I
    have been alarmed by reports that indicate a pattern of
    retaliation against some of the Pentagon reporters, and
    restricted press access to some of the top DOD officials. Are
    you aware of those restrictions? Do you think they're
    appropriate?
        Secretary Shanahan. I'm not aware of any restrictions. In
    fact, I think there's probably, since I've assumed these
    responsibilities, much more interaction and engagement with the
    press.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, if you could--since my time is
    expired, if you could let me know of any restrictions that have
    been imposed?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Blumenthal. For the record, if you would take that
    question.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions
    put in place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my
    leadership. My team and I are committed to upholding this
    promise.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. President--or, thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. A lot of Irish mistakes going on here
    this morning.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. Maybe we're getting close to St.
    Patrick's Day or something.
        I want to thank you, all you gentlemen, for your service.
        Under Secretary Norquist, I know Senator Perdue's going to
    ask a lot about the audit, but I think that was really good
    work that you were doing.
        General Dunford, I just want to thank you. You know, I know
    that there has been an announcement of a new Chairman, but
    certainly we view you as the Chairman who's done an exceptional
    job, not just as Chairman, but in your entire career. I know
    you've got a lot of work to do left, but I do want to do a
    shout-out to your exceptional service to our Nation.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to ask a couple of questions that
    relate to the President's recent visit to Alaska. He was there,
    coming back from North Korea. Billy Mitchell, who's the father
    of the U.S. Air Force, in a congressional hearing similar to
    this right before World War II, called Alaska ``the most
    strategic place in the world.'' The President kind of echoed
    Billy Mitchell's comments when he was in Alaska visiting with
    our troops. He said, ``Since the second World War, our intrepid
    servicemembers in Alaska have proudly stood as the top cover
    for North America. You are a powerful warning to the world to
    never strike American soil. You are a warning that everybody
    knows about and nobody wants to mess with.'' He went on to
    say--he was at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson (JBER)--``Next
    year, the 11th Air Force, headquartered right here at JBER,
    will receive the first of 54 brand-new F-35 fighters. You are
    getting very special planes, and you're getting a lot of them.
    That'll make Alaska the home to very 100 fifth-gen fighters. No
    place on the planet Earth will have that much combat fighter
    power. It's because of our strategic location.''
        The President then went on to talk about Alaska's critical
    role in missile defense, ``We are also deploying more than 20
    ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, which will further
    strengthen our missile defense system. So important. Our
    missile defense system is being rebuilt very substantially, and
    we're going to have the latest and greatest here very soon.''
    So, that was the President, 2 weeks ago, in Alaska.
        Do you agree with these statements by the President, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I do.
        Senator Sullivan. You called North Korea a pressing
    concern. Like the President indicated by his remarks, do you
    believe that the rapid deployment of advanced missile defense
    for America is critical to our readiness, defending from North
    Korea missile attacks?
        Secretary Shanahan. Extremely critical.
        Senator Sullivan. How about the rapid deployment of 100
    fifth-gen fighters that can be defending our troops in Korea,
    because of Alaska's strategic location, within 5 hours?
        Secretary Shanahan. Deployment and sustainment of them is
    vital.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Let me ask, on the issue of allies, Do you agree that China
    and Russia have been trying for years to split us from our
    traditional allies? NATO, Japan, Korea. Hasn't that been a
    strategic goal of them--of those countries?
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, China, in particular, but we see
    this constantly with Russia and NATO, particularly in the
    Balkans. I'd ask the Chairman, maybe, to comment on the recent
    activity in the Balkans.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, let me just----
        General Dunford, do you see that as a strategic goal of the
    Chinese and the Russians, to split us from our allies?
        General Dunford. It's been a very consistent pattern of
    behavior to split us from our allies. More specifically, to
    create doubt, in the minds of our allies, that we can meet our
    alliance commitments.
        Senator Sullivan. So, I appreciate what the President's
    been trying to do, particularly to get our NATO allies to 2
    percent, but there have been press reports about a cost-plus-
    50-percent approach. Mr. Secretary, do you know how much the
    Koreans paid for the new Camp Humphreys on the Korean
    Peninsula?
        Secretary Shanahan. I do. Slightly less than a billion
    dollars.
        Senator Sullivan. So, they paid $9.8 billion out of a new
    facility cost, $10.8 billion. Isn't that correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Ninety-three percent of a U.S. Army base.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Sullivan. Have you been to Camp Humphreys?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I haven't.
        Senator Sullivan. You should go there. It's an outstanding
    facility.
        I'm sure you've been, General.
        General Dunford. I have, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. So, 93 percent, United States Army base
    on Korean soil, paid for by the Koreans. Do we really think--
    and maybe those statements--maybe the press reports aren't
    true--cost-plus-50--are we driving our allies away from us in
    the way that Putin and Xi Jinping are probably cheering right
    now?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, Senator, we don't do cost-plus-50
    percent.
        Senator Sullivan. So, those reports in the press, all over
    the press----
        Secretary Shanahan. They're----
        Senator Sullivan.--are incorrect?
        Secretary Shanahan. They're erroneous. We're not going to
    run a business and we're not going to run a charity. The
    important part is that people pay their fair share. Payment
    comes in lots of different forms. Could be contributions, like
    in Afghanistan. But, at the end of the day, people need to
    carry their fair share. Not everyone can contribute. But, it is
    not about cost-plus-50 percent.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Shanahan, the recently released Missile Defense
    Review (MDR) directed a study on operationalizing the Aegis
    Ashore site of the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), on
    Kauai. You and I discussed this. I have some significant
    concerns about what operationalizing the site would do to PMR's
    ability to meet its testing mission, which I assume you agree
    is important. You can----
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely, Senator, and----
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Secretary Shanahan. The----
        Senator Hirono. I'll get to the question.
        Secretary Shanahan. All right.
        Senator Hirono.--as well as the impact of removing that
    testing capacity from PMRF. So, briefly, could you tell us how
    operationalizing the Aegis Ashore site in Kauai would add to
    our ability to defend Hawaii from missile threats, especially
    as the major missile threat to Hawaii would be an
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Aegis Ashore
    is not set up to counter ICBMs?
        Secretary Shanahan. My understanding of the request in the
    MDR is that it's a study to assess taking the test assets and
    operationalizing them. As you well point out, the ground-based
    midcourse defense system that is resident in Alaska defends
    Hawaii. I believe that the study will look at what are other
    threats that may be posed to Hawaii, and how there might be a
    layered defense. But, as you pointed out, the test range there
    is vital capability and capacity for developing our missile
    defense systems.
        Senator Hirono. So, I want to make sure that my concerns
    are in the record. For Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford,
    2 weeks ago before this Committee, General O'Shaughnessy, the
    Northern Command Commander, testified that the current
    situation at our southern border is, to quote him, ``not a
    military threat.'' Do you agree, Secretary Shanahan, that the
    situation on the southern border is not a military threat?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you're referring to General
    O'Shaughnessy's testimony?
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. What I recall from his testimony
    is, he said that it is not a military threat. He said border
    security is national security.
        Senator Hirono. I understand that. But, he said
    specifically that it's not a military threat. I'm asking you
    whether you agree with him that----
        Secretary Shanahan. I----
        Senator Hirono.--it's not a military threat.
        Secretary Shanahan. I agree with him.
        Senator Hirono. General Dunford?
        General Dunford. I agree. It's a security challenge, not a
    military threat.
        Senator Hirono. So, you testified, Secretary--Mr.
    Secretary, that there are 6,000 troops currently deployed at
    our southern border. Can you tell us how long they're going to
    be there?
        Secretary Shanahan. I'd say 30 or 40 percent of them will
    be departing in the next month or so when they complete some of
    their work. I believe we'll probably draw down to between 3,000
    and 4,000.
        Senator Hirono. Is this something that the President is
    indicating to you, or can he say that, ``I want you all to
    remain at the border''?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, this was part of the tasking from
    the Department of Homeland Security. Based on their request to
    us----
        Senator Hirono. From the President.
        Secretary Shanahan. From the Department.
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        Let me get on to a matter that is of great concern to
    some--to a lot of us, actually. Secretary Shanahan, in your
    response to Senator Inhofe's question about refueling the
    Truman, you stated that growing the workforce in the shipyard
    is a priority, and the move to not refuel the Truman would save
    $3.4 billion over 5 years. How does canceling 3 years of
    shipyard work grow the workforce there?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. The workforce--when we look at
    what is in the shipyard, so the combination of submarines, new
    carriers, and then maintenance, all that is done in the same
    shipyards, and that workforce moves from project to project.
    So, when we look at the total employment, the actual total
    employment goes up over the period of time in which we're
    building the two carriers.
        Senator Hirono. Frankly, as I talk with some of the people
    from the shipyards, I'm not so sure that that is the case.
    It'll cost about $3.4 billion to refuel the Truman, which, by
    the way, by not refueling, we're only getting about 50 percent
    of the Truman's service life. At the same time, there's $3.6
    billion in the emergency fund which you acknowledge is going to
    be set aside--you want us to authorize setting that aside for
    the wall. So, doesn't it make sense--maybe I should ask this of
    General Dunford--that we should use the money from the
    emergency funding that you're requesting us to set aside for
    the wall for something--i.e., the refueling of the Truman--that
    actually fits with the NDS and that your combatant commanders
    want?
        General Dunford, would you like to respond?
        General Dunford. Senator, I would. I'm not trying to be
    evasive, but I think my responsibility is to identify for the
    Secretary the priorities within our top line, not to identify
    what the top line is, and not to identify how the money within
    the total top line ought to be allocated.
        Senator Hirono. Well, I would say probably if you all had
    your druthers, if you could get some money to refuel the
    Truman, you would do so, wouldn't you?
        General Dunford. Again, if I look at it through the
    military dimension alone, that would be true, but I have to
    acknowledge that the Secretary and the President have broader
    responsibilities than I do.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, like building a vanity wall.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
        Mr. Secretary Shanahan, in 1990, Congress passed a law that
    required the administration to produce an audit of the
    Department of Defense. I want to give you guys kudos for
    producing the first-ever audit of the Department of Defense
    last year, in November. Thank you for that. Can you give us an
    update on that? Give us a little idea of what the Department is
    learning from that audit. I know we don't have a clean audit
    yet. Secretary Norquist may want to comment on that. But, I'd
    like to get a brief update about what we're learning, what kind
    of opportunities we have for efficiencies and a better use of
    capital in the military.
        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
        First of all, the audit was to look at $2.7 trillion worth
    of assets. So, this was the largest audit ever conducted,
    probably in the history of mankind. We were asked, Would we
    ever do this? Because it had never been done. We made the
    commitment to this Committee that it would be accomplished. We
    always knew that there would be discoveries. But, audits really
    aren't about doing the audits, it's finding the problems, as
    you've pointed out. We specifically focused on identifying
    certain problems that are vital to operating the Department.
    Some of them are financial in benefit, as you described,
    efficiencies, but others are identifying cyber shortfalls. So,
    we used the audit to find efficiencies, vulnerabilities from
    cyber, as well as where there is noncompliance.
        The best part of the audit is, we've identified those
    items, and now we're incorporating all the corrective actions,
    we're building the muscle movement and the habits to
    continuously address those findings and make ourselves better.
        Dave, would you like to talk about the efficiencies?
        Secretary Norquist. Sure. So, I think one of the things you
    point is, before we started the audit, there was sort of two
    potential misconceptions. One is, it was going to be a
    paperwork exercise, and we'd learn nothing. Or the other is,
    we'd open the floors and discover pots of gold hidden
    underneath. Of course, part of the value of getting through is,
    you move past those to discover the tangible value. Let me just
    give a couple of specific examples:
        The first is inventory. We discovered there are certain
    facilities where what they thought they had in inventory did
    not match what they had in inventory. If your responsibility is
    spare parts for airplanes, the accuracy of that inventory
    matters. So, for example, at Hill Air Force Base, uninstalled
    missile motors, they don't just check the quantity, they check
    the condition. They were labeled as unserviceable. When you
    visit them and look at them, they're actually usable. So, you
    wouldn't have needed to order more. That saved us $53 million.
        Other places, you go to Osan and Kadina, 14,000 munitions,
    $2.2 billion, 100 percent accounted for, not a single
    exception.
        What we learned is, there are some places that are doing
    this quite well, and there are others where we need to either
    help them fix their process or give them better attention. But,
    the commanders in the field recognize the direct correct--
    connection to mission and readiness. So, I had expected a lot
    of pushback once the audit findings came in, that this was just
    paperwork, but they saw the tangible value. I think, as we move
    forward, the accuracy of the data, adopting more businesslike
    practices, will be tremendously helpful for the Department.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you. How long will it take us to get
    a clean audit, in your estimate?
        Secretary Norquist. I don't know how long the Department,
    because the Department's opinion will be the last of the
    organizations. But, I think, over the next couple of years,
    you'll see either the working capital fund of the Army or the
    Marine Corps start to get to clean opinions, and then you'll be
    able to differentiate between which of the organizations
    missing progress and who needs an extra hearing.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        Chairman Dunford, today we have about 5,000 troops, I
    think, directly in Iraq. Is that correct?
        General Dunford. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Perdue. So, General Thomas recently before this
    Committee--the combatant commander of SOCOM--said, and I quote,
    ``Our Iraqi partners have embraced their sovereign
    responsibility in terms of defending their terrain.'' What are
    we doing--and also, we hear about this potential vote in the
    Parliament in Iraq about asking United States Forces to leave
    Iraq. Then, just this week, we had President Rouhani visiting
    Prime Minister Modi. Can you talk to us a little bit about what
    assumptions we have in this budget with regard to our presence
    in Iraq? How do you see our continuing role there in Iraq?
        General Dunford. Senator, this budget includes an enduring
    presence in Iraq, slightly less than the forces that are on the
    ground right now. What's important is that we do that in
    partnership with the Iraqi Government. So, as the Iraqi
    Government settles, and they're prepared to enter into a
    conversation about what our reliable partnership will be moved
    forward, then our Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
    will work out the exact numbers to meet the requirements that
    the Iraqi Security Forces will still have to ensure the lasting
    defeat of ISIS, which is--of course, our collective focus.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm somewhat saddened to have so much of this hearing taken
    up with issues about the wall, because I and all Members of
    this Committee have been very bipartisan. We've always been
    very supportive of the military. But, there are some questions
    I feel that I have to ask.
        Secretary Shanahan, you testified earlier, in answer to
    Senator Reed's question, that you don't know which military
    construction expenditures are going to be canceled in favor of
    this $3.6 billion. Is that correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, that's correct.
        Senator King. Why is that correct? You've had a month. I
    find it very hard to believe that there's not a list.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator King. Are you testifying there's no list, there's
    no information you can give us about which construction
    projects are on the chopping block?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, what I can tell you are what
    projects aren't on the chopping block. So, for example----
        Senator King. Have you assured Members of the Senate--
    individual members, that there are not projects in their States
    that are under consideration?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not.
        Senator King. You have not made any assurances to any
    member of the Senate.
        Secretary Shanahan. I have had questions as to whether
    projects--this has been a blanket statement that's been made.
    There are no projects in this fiscal year that will be
    canceled. That has been a--and anything associated with family
    housing or barracks.
        Senator King. But, wasn't the appropriations, the $3.6
    billion--I mean, that's part of a larger appropriation for
    military construction that's been through this Congress, been
    through the Appropriation Committee--didn't it list projects?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, it doesn't.
        David?
        Secretary Norquist. So, what he's talking about is--the
    projects, when we go to prioritize, when we have the guidance
    from DHS's request, and the Secretary makes a decision--we'll
    look at those that are unobligated, meaning the contracts
    haven't been awarded. If you look at the----
        Senator King. But, those are projects that have been
    identified. This is----
        Secretary Norquist. Absolutely.
        Senator King. You weren't just say, ``We'll give you $50
    billion for military construction.''
        Secretary Norquist. Correct. The projects individually
    identified by the Congress and the committees, correct.
        Senator King. But, you're telling me that the Department
    has not identified which of those projects are going to be
    canceled in--or deferred in order to spend this $3.6 billion on
    a wall.
        Secretary Norquist. We don't know which projects will be
    deferred. I don't know if the Secretary's decision will be $3.6
    billion. He has to determine that it's relevant----
        Senator King. It's your testimony, Mr. Secretary, that you
    have not had conversations with Members of the Senate to assure
    them about the safety of projects in their States.
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, let me be clear on this so it's--
    I have told members there are projects and this is writ large--
    there are no projects scheduled to be obligated in this fiscal
    year that will be canceled. That's the only information I've
    shared.
        Senator King. Well, I'm confused. I mean, either projects
    are going to be canceled to find $3.6 billion, or they're not.
    Please explain, Mr. Norquist.
        Secretary Norquist. Sure. The projects in military
    construction have up to 5 years to be awarded. So, if you
    receive funding for a project in 2018 or 2019, it might not get
    awarded till 2020 or 2021.
        Senator King. So, you're focusing on the word ``awarded,''
    but I'm focusing on the fact that these are identified projects
    in the appropriation. Are they not?
        Secretary Norquist. Correct. But, if----
        Senator King. Mr. Chair--Secretary, are you saying that
    there are no identified projects in the appropriation for this
    year that are going to be defunded or deferred because of this
    3.6? I mean, this 3.6 is coming from somewhere.
        Secretary Norquist. So, okay--so, I think you're talking
    past each other. There's a difference between the 2019
    appropriations bill versus projects that are scheduled to be
    awarded, meaning the contract is going to be funded and the
    construction would begin in 2019. Those projects have up until
    the year 2023 or so to be awarded. The reason we put the $3.6
    billion in the request is so that money would be available and
    allow those projects to continue. In many cases----
        Senator King. All right. Let me put it another way. I know
    of projects in New England that were funded in this bill. Can I
    be assured that they're safe, they're not going to be deferred
    or canceled to find this 3.6? I mean, it sounds--something's
    not computing here. The 3.6 is coming from somewhere. It's
    coming from projects that were authorized and appropriated by
    this Congress. You won't tell me what they are.
        Secretary Norquist. The 3.6 will come from projects--well,
    assuming the Secretary signs off--I don't know the number of
    the requirement yet--but, assuming the Secretary signs off, the
    3.6 would, in fact, come from projects previously authorized
    and appropriated by Congress. We would look to not--we would
    not touch those that dealt with family housing or military
    construction. We would prioritize----
        Senator King. I'm going to ask my question once, Mr.----
        Secretary Norquist. Sure.
        Senator King.--Secretary. Have you spoken to any Members of
    the Senate to assure them that projects in their State are not
    going to be affected by this policy?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned about this. I don't think
    we're getting full information. I intend to follow up.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator McSally.
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I do want to follow up on that, as we did have a
    conversation, and there are four projects in Arizona that are
    appropriated in fiscal year 2019, and you broadly said those
    fiscal year 2019 projects, across all the country, will not be
    impacted by this, just to be clear. Correct, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
        Senator McSally. Thank you.
        Senator King. How----
        Senator McSally. I just wanted to clear that up.
        Senator King. How does that square with what he just told
    me?
        Senator McSally. Well, you rebound if you get more time,
    sir, but I've got some other questions to ask. I just wanted to
    clear that up, since it seemed that may cause some confusion
    about some conversations that we had.
        I want to get to a different topic. In 2017, there were
    6,769 sexual assaults reported across our entire military,
    likely thousands of others that were not reported. These blue-
    on-blue crimes are unacceptable. They're harming our warriors,
    and they're degrading good order and discipline and military
    readiness. Many steps have been taken by the military over the
    last years, and this body. Over 100 legislative actions. But,
    it's not enough. There are thousands of our warriors in
    military readiness that's been harmed by these crimes. I
    believe commanders must be educated, equipped, and held
    accountable, and still be responsible for the decisions, the
    culture, and the discipline regarding sexual assault. However,
    something needs to change. ``Insanity'' is doing the same thing
    over and over again, expecting a different result. Perhaps we
    need to take a fresh look at this issue.
        I've spent a lot of time thinking about this, and more so
    over the last week. We have weeks, now, before the NDAA will be
    marked up before this Committee. I am fully locked on, like a
    missile, on this target. I want to be working with you and the
    military services to take a fresh look at this. I've asked the
    Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff to start with
    a summit with the Air Force. But, it's not just the Air Force,
    it's across our military services.
        So, can I get your commitment that we are going to partner
    on this, and we're going to take a fresh look and tackle this
    over the next 45 days together, which includes being responsive
    to my questions, maybe forming a team of experts and resources
    to be able to really dial in as to what's working, what's not
    working, across the spectrum of prevention and response and
    prosecution? We can tackle this together, come up with some
    ideas, impact on the NDAA, culminating with a tank meeting with
    all the leaders there, with myself, and solve this thing
    together. Can I get your commitment you'll work me--with me on
    that?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you have my commitment.
        Senator McSally. Thank you.
        Chairman Dunford?
        General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator McSally. Okay, great. Let's follow up immediately
    on that. I appreciate it.
        I want to shift to a different topic. I was over on the
    Korean Peninsula, less than a year ago, visiting the troops,
    and I will tell you, I am so proud of them and their ability to
    fight tonight, and everything that's been done by our military
    and the services to make sure that we were using all elements
    of national power to crank up the pressure with a deterrent
    capability to keep the pressure on North Korea for the
    negotiations and to thwart the threat that they are.
        I want to get some clarity, Secretary Shanahan, on
    exercises. As we know, military exercises, every single day. I
    mean, every day, you--you're going out with your squadron, your
    unit, and you are making sure that you're ready to fight
    tonight. But, people rotate in and out over there every year.
    So, large-scale crisis-response exercises are critical for us
    to have that decisionmaking process for key leaders at the
    highest level. So, can you just clarify where we are with
    military exercises on the Peninsula, and what the
    decisionmaking process was on that?
        Secretary Shanahan. Right. So, Senator, the exercises that
    we have on the Peninsula, which are ongoing as we speak, and
    the Minister of Defense for South Korea, ROKs [the Republic of
    Korea], will come see me at the end of this month, and we'll
    discuss progress and the findings of those exercises. They were
    redesigned this year for three things: support the peace
    process, the expanded responsibilities of the South Koreans, in
    terms of operational control, and to----
        Senator McSally. Okay.
        Secretary Shanahan.--maintain foundational readiness.
    Underlying all of this is maintaining the readiness we need if
    we're called to fight tonight.
        Senator McSally. Right.
        Secretary Shanahan. We've sustained that readiness.
        Senator McSally. Okay. So, are you--can you say that, with
    the adjustment--I understand turning the volume down so it's
    not being so provocative, but those higher-level operational
    crisis exercises, the command-post level and beyond,
    decisionmaking for new leaders, is really important----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator McSally.--especially as they rotate so quickly over
    there. Are--can you assure us that there will be no degradation
    in the readiness----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator McSally.--to fight tonight, based on adjustments to
    the exercises?
        Secretary Shanahan. I have had personal conversations with
    General Abrams, and I can assure you there will not be
    degradation. We will have the capability we need.
        Senator McSally. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, to our witnesses today.
        Before--Assistant--or Secretary Shanahan, before I ask you
    a few questions, I just want to go back and get a little bit
    more clarification from some of the answers that I've heard to
    Senator King and Senator Hirono.
        I noticed, in the budget, there is a line for $9.2 billion
    for emergency----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Peters.--for fiscal year 2020. Is that $9.2 billion
    that you're asking Congress to appropriate related to the
    emergency declaration that the President has made?
        Secretary Shanahan. $7.2 billion of it is, and $2 billion
    is for hurricane.
        Senator Peters. So, you're asking Congress to appoint--or
    to appropriate $7 billion to deal with what the President has
    declared an emergency. I want to be clear about that.
        Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
        Senator Peters. So, the Senate, as you know, will be voting
    later today on a resolution of disapproval relating to this
    emergency declaration. Is it safe to say you would revise the
    request for national emergency funding if a majority of the
    House and the Senate disapproves of the emergency declaration?
        Secretary Shanahan. I will stick to the budget that we've
    submitted.
        Senator Peters. But, if we don't approve an emergency
    declaration, why would you come and ask us for money for an
    emergency declaration?
        Secretary Shanahan. I will work with this Congress to get
    the right top line.
        Senator Peters. So, you will look at that and revise it, if
    necessary, if we disapprove it.
        Secretary Shanahan. I'll work with the Committee and I'll
    work with the Congress to get the right top line.
        Senator Peters. Could you describe the Department's
    response to the request for assistance that DHS sent a few
    weeks ago, and perhaps provide some characterization of the
    specifics in that request for us? I also serve on the Homeland
    Security Committee. I think it would be helpful to know.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right. Which request for assistance is
    this?
        Senator Peters. On the southern border.
        Secretary Shanahan. It's just--is this--yeah, there's been
    a number of them.
        Senator Peters. Could you give me--could you characterize
    what the--what they have been asking for and what--your
    response?
        Secretary Shanahan. Right. I'll--do you want to----
        General Dunford. Sure.
        Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
        General Dunford. Senator, I'll take that, if you don't
    mind. The----
        Senator Peters. Yes.
        General Dunford.--the most recent request requested our
    engineers to reinforce some of the infrastructure along the
    border. We also have some soldiers that are supporting the
    detect-and-monitor mission by manning cameras that allow
    Customs and Border Protection to see what activity is ongoing
    around the border. Those are the two primary tasks. That's, of
    course, in addition to the National Guard sustain mission,
    which provides rotary-wing aircraft for surveillance, some
    logistics support, some planning support, and some intelligence
    along the border.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Secretary Shanahan, at your confirmation hearing for the
    position of Deputy Secretary, I asked you about what was
    previously known as the ``third offset'' that essentially was
    using technology to improve military tactics and strategy. We
    had a further conversation about that in my office, and I
    appreciate that. Your predecessor as Deputy Secretary, Bob
    Work, championed the initiative and sought out ways to use
    technology to create and maintain an advantage over our
    competitors, very similar to what was envisioned in the
    National Defense Strategy.
        Well, now that you've been inside the Department, I'm going
    to ask this question again. Now, as an insider--before, I asked
    that, prior to your appointment--what is your view on how
    technology's going to impact warfare? In particular, give me a
    sense of how you view the most disruptive technologies to some
    of our legacy weapon systems that are pretty much ingrained in
    DOD culture, also tend to be incredibly expensive. But, as
    we're thinking about this budget going forward, that could
    change very dramatically. Give me your sense and how that is
    reflected in this budget.
        Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. To Bob Work's credit on the
    third offset, that was the underpinning for many of the
    concepts that we're requesting funding for this year. So, in
    terms of the four major disruptive capabilities, they are
    space, missiles, cyber, and autonomy. So, take, for example,
    missiles on--in answering your question: low cost, cost-
    imposing, and attritable versus very expensive, manned assets.
    Same can be said for cyber, all the effects that you can create
    with cyber. When we think about the trade in cost, terms of
    being able to deploy forces, versus effects--significant cost
    imposition. Space, you know, when we think about having
    unfettered access to the world, outer space provides us that
    environment.
        Senator Peters. So, when you're talking about some--I--my
    time is running low, but you're talking about some of this
    disruptive and autonomy. So, when you think about legacy
    systems of pilots and airplanes and aircraft carriers, things
    of that nature, all of those things we should be looking at----
        Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. I mean, when we think about
    the challenge to find pilots, that challenge goes away. When we
    think about surface/subsurface and the capability to build for
    lower cost, hide and suspend for longer periods of time, these
    are real enablers. The cost to support them is significantly
    less.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being with us today.
        Mr. Shanahan, I want to move a little bit of a different
    direction as we talk about budget and priorities. I'm from
    Tennessee. I spent 16 years in the House and represented a
    district that was home to Fort Campbell and many of the
    enlisted men and women that are there, the 101st, 160th, 5th
    Division, and have really developed a good working relationship
    with those families and the enlisted, and also with command
    teams that have been there that have done such a terrific job.
    We have some of those that have served at Fort Campbell that
    are members of our team. So, we hear a good bit from them, and
    hear about their concerns. I join Senator Cotton in being
    tremendously concerned about the Budget Control Act from 2011,
    with the sequester that was placed on our military. That has
    not served us well. My hope is that we're going to be able to
    solve that situation and address some of the problems that it
    has brought forward.
        But, one of the things I hear from, especially, our Special
    Operations guys is their desire to make certain that 5G
    technologies are available to them, and that those networks are
    secure. I appreciate that in your testimony you mentioned three
    of your priorities as cyber, hypersonics, and space. We have
    had our COCOM [combatant command] hearings and have talked some
    about the placement of these technologies so that we're
    fighting 21st-century warfare and that we're not just focused
    on today.
        I'll tell you, one of the things that I've heard a little
    bit of scuttlebutt about that causes me some concern is that
    maybe some of the fighter pilots from Air Force are not that
    excited about having a Space Force that would function there as
    Air Force. So, I want to give you a couple of minutes to talk
    about Space Force, how you see it standing up, how you expect
    to deploy it, how you intend to protect the funding for that so
    that we are looking forward as well as tending to today.
        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
        The--with 2 minutes, I'll go as quickly as I can.
        Senator Blackburn. Good.
        Secretary Shanahan. I'll summarize it this way. Our Nation,
    our $19 trillion economy, and our military, we're carrying too
    much risk, given the vulnerability we have in space now that
    space is a contested domain. The Space Force represents a
    chance to accelerate our ability to respond to that threat
    environment. The Space Force really gets after three items in
    order for us to reduce that risk:
        The first is, the assets that are in space were never
    designed to be resilient and deal with the threats that exist
    today. It's a bit like, ``You can't pick your parents.'' We
    need to design new capability and put it up on orbit as quickly
    as possible. Space Force recommends a Space Development Agency
    (SDA), which really gets at cutting the redtape to do
    development and tapping into commercial space technology, save
    costs, save time.
        The second is, stand up the Space Command, much like we've
    done Cyber Command, so that we can focus, have dedicated focus
    to provide the rules of engagement, authorities, and the tools
    to defend our assets.
        The third is, bring together and train. Make space a
    dedicated profession, where we can provide this cadre of
    professionals the right training so that they have the ability
    to have a career that leads to----
        Senator Blackburn. Well done in a summary. Now give me 15
    seconds on great-power competitiveness with China in this
    arena.
        Secretary Shanahan. I think we've been ignoring the problem
    too long.
        Senator Blackburn. Well done.
        Yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here.
        So, the administration has submitted a national defense
    budget request for $750 billion for next year. That is a pretty
    big number even by the Department's own standards. In fact, the
    budget rules govern how much money is available for defense
    spending, is set at $576 billion, which is still a huge sum.
    But, you're requesting $174 billion more than the amount that
    is allowed by law; $165 billion for the overseas contingency
    operations, OCO, and another $9 billion for emergency funds for
    the wall. Now, some of the things in the DOD budget request
    seem to me to point in the right direction--more investments in
    research, for example. We need to have a much larger
    conversation about whether these budget caps make sense, and
    how defense and nondefense priorities should stack up. But,
    right now, I just want to dig into how you got your numbers so
    all of the nondefense budget experts out there can understand
    the tricks the administration is using to justify skyrocketing
    defense spending.
        Secretary Shanahan, the Department proposes to get around
    the budget rules by requesting that 165 billion extra dollars
    in the OCO account. The amount in the OCO account is not
    counted toward statutory budget caps. Is that correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So, let's dig in a bit, then, on OCO.
    As the cost to fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan began to
    increase in the early 2000s, Congress had to pass emergency
    supplemental appropriations every year. So, in 2009, President
    Obama established OCO so that they can set aside funds for this
    and other related operations. Because those funds are for
    emergencies, they don't count toward the overall limits in
    defense spending, as you just said. This year's OCO request is
    a 140 percent increase from the $69 billion you requested for
    OCO in last year's budget. So, tell me, did the cost of
    supporting our overseas operations suddenly increase by 140
    percent last year?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, they did not.
        Senator Warren. They did not. Okay. In fact, the last time
    OCO account was even close to the amount you've proposed for
    next year was in 2010, when we had approximately 100,000 troops
    deployed in Afghanistan and another 50 to 100,000 troops in
    Iraq. Today, we have about 21,000 troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    and Syria, combined, a number that's largely unchanged from
    last year. So, let me ask another question. Since last year,
    has the Department deployed a large number of troops to fight a
    war someplace other than Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan?
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, no, we have not.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So, the actual cost of supporting
    operations overseas did not increase by 140 percent, and we
    haven't launched a war someplace else, triggering that kind of
    emergency. Yet, you're asking for $165 billion for, quote,
    ``overseas contingency operations.'' I just want to be
    absolutely clear so the taxpayer understands. You're requesting
    funding in OCO to fund activities that have nothing to do with
    the reason that OCO was established. Is that correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. What we've done this year is, we've
    taken our base budget from last year, per the Chairman's
    blueprint, grown our budget 3 percent in real growth.
        Senator Warren. Okay. I appreciate it. But, you can just
    answer my question.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Warren. That is----
        Secretary Shanahan. The----
        Senator Warren. You're requesting funding in OCO to fund
    activities that have nothing to do with the reason that OCO was
    established. Is that right?
        Secretary Norquist. So, Senator, to make it transparent, if
    you go through the budget material, we've got it in two groups.
    One is what you think of as traditional OCO, and the other is
    clearly labeled ``OCO for base.'' That's the distinction
    you're----
        Senator Warren. So, I----
        Secretary Norquist.--looking for.
        Senator Warren. You can call it whatever you want. We know
    why OCO was established. My question is, Are you asking for
    this increase for the reasons that OCO was originally
    established? It's an easy question.
        Secretary Shanahan. No----
        Senator Warren. Secretary Shanahan?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, we're asking for a $750 billion top
    line, and we want to work with this Committee to get the
    appropriation and authorizations proper.
        Senator Warren. You're asking for an increase in OCO for
    purposes that OCO was not established. In fact, your own staff
    said so yesterday. They said you're asking at least for $98
    billion for things that have nothing to do with contingency
    operations. I'm not quite sure why you can't say that.
        What we're really talking about here is the establishment
    of a slush fund to hide what's happening with defense spending
    and get it out from underneath the statutory caps. I think it's
    time to stop this business of more, more, more----
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Warren.--for the military.
        Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
        Senator Warren. Establishing a slush fund like this, and
    saying, ``Oh, because we put it in two different accounts''----
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Warren.--somehow changes the fact is just not true.
    We just need to be honest with the American people about how
    much we're spending here.
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we have provided, in our
    justification books, 100-percent transparency. There is no
    slush fund. We can take the money and tie it back to the
    National Defense Strategy and what we need to defend America.
        Senator Warren. I have----
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator----
        Senator Warren.--no doubt that you see this----
        Chairman Inhofe.--Warren.
        Senator Warren.--is more, more, more.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Let me start by saying that--first, a note just about Fort
    Leonard Wood. I'm looking forward to seeing the budget
    justification books next week so we can see the details here
    about the budget, itself. I'm anticipating it will include an
    increase for the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood,
    in Missouri, my home State. These are professional soldiers, of
    course, who train and respond to an adversary's use of chemical
    weapons on the battlefield. Four of the five threats, I'm
    struck, called out in the National Defense Strategy have a
    chemical weapons capability. By investing in places like Fort
    Leonard Wood, we ultimately, of course, save lives on the
    battlefield. So, I'm very proud of the work that they do, and
    look forward the Department's continuing support for their
    important mission.
        Let me just shift and ask about our challenge in emerging
    technologies, cyber, and space; in particular, China's
    investment in those areas, and our eroding advantage. I was
    struck, Mr. Secretary, by a comment that you make in your
    written testimony. You say, ``Some U.S. companies have voiced
    ethical qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced
    technology. In some cases, even terminating relationships,
    often while continuing to work with China.'' What are we
    talking about, here?
        Secretary Shanahan. I think we're talking about Google and
    their support to China, and their lack of support to the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator Hawley. So, Google has refused to work with the
    Department of Defense, actually was under contract, weren't
    they, with the Department of Defense? Tell us about that.
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, they haven't refused, they just
    have said they're not going to continue to do business with the
    Department of Defense on certain contracts.
        Senator Hawley. But, they are doing business in China in a
    way that benefits, you're saying, our Chinese competitors.
        Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
        Senator Hawley. Say more about that.
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, the interesting thing--and this
    is why China is--this is such an important issue for our
    country. You have this--the fusion of commercial business with
    military is significant, $5 trillion of their economy is state-
    owned enterprises, so the technology that is developed in the
    civil world transfers to the military world. It's a direct
    pipeline. Not only is there a transfer, there's also systemic
    theft of U.S. technology that also facilitates even faster
    development of emerging technology.
        Senator Hawley. So, I just want to make sure that I
    understand exactly what you're saying. You're telling me that
    Google, an American company, supposedly, is refusing to work
    with the Department of Defense, but is doing work with China,
    in China, in a way that at least indirectly benefits the
    Chinese Government. Is that correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. I haven't heard the word ``refuse,''
    but there's a lack of willingness to support DOD programs.
        Senator Hawley. General, you're nodding your head. Do you
    want to weigh in on this?
        General Dunford. No, Senator. I'm nodding a head on exactly
    the point that you made, that the work that Google is doing in
    China is indirectly benefiting the Chinese military. I've been
    very public on this issue, as well. In fact, the way I
    described it to our industry partners is, ``Look, we're the
    good guys, and the values that we represent, in the system that
    we represent, is the one that will allow, and has allowed, you
    to thrive.'' That's the way I've characterized it. So, I was
    just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the
    general sense of all of us as leaders. We watch with great
    concern when industry partners work in China, knowing that
    there is that indirect benefit. Frankly, indirect may be not a
    full characterization of the way it really is. It's more of a
    direct benefit to the Chinese military.
        Senator Hawley. I just want to underscore this for the
    record so that we are absolutely, perfectly, 100-percent clear,
    here, that Google, an American company based in this country--
    again, supposedly an American company--is doing work in China
    that directly or indirectly benefits the Chinese Government at
    a time of increased peer competition with this country. We are
    in a struggle with the Chinese Government over whether or not
    they're going to become a regional, and maybe global, hegemon
    with values very different from ours, certainly values that do
    not favor freedom in the world, and we have an American company
    that does not want to do work with our Defense Department,
    which is, you know, one thing, but they are happy to help the
    Chinese, at least--the Chinese Government, that is--the Chinese
    military--at least indirectly. I think that's just
    extraordinary.
        In my time remaining, Mr. Secretary, tell us what, from
    your perspective, we need to do to maintain our competitive
    advantage on AI and these emerging technologies. What do we
    need to see, going forward?
        Secretary Shanahan. We need to--well, two things. One, we
    need to continue to invest. This year's budget doubles our
    investment in artificial intelligence. Then the string that
    you're really pulling on, the talent is in this country. We
    need to use the talent in this country. The talent in this
    country needs to support our great-power competition.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shanahan, I'd like to follow up with the line of
    questioning from my colleague from Arizona, Senator McSally.
    You know, I think there's no doubt we'll continue to see
    tensions in North Korea, on the Korean Peninsula, after the
    latest breakdown in talks between the President and Chairman
    Kim. How do you plan to use your position as Acting Secretary
    of Defense to reassure our allies in the region? We know our
    great friends, the Republic of Korea and Japan, have a much
    more tense and complicated relationship with each other. For
    example, there were questions about them sharing non-combatant
    evacuation plans (NEO) plans with one another. What do you plan
    to do to work on bridging that gap?
        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you for that question, Senator.
        That gap could be bridged at--well, I'll say, at three
    different levels. There's a relationship level. I have
    relationships with the Defense Minister for Japan as well as
    the Republic of Korea. So, it's important that I play a role in
    keeping the two countries together there. Exercises that we'll
    do together. Technology that we'll develop together,
    particularly in the area of missile defense. As you well know,
    a sizable investment by the government of Japan is to put Aegis
    Ashore as well as develop other, I'll say, defensive
    capabilities in the event of an escalating situation on the
    Peninsula.
        Senator Duckworth. So, you had answered Senator McSally,
    saying that there would be--not be any degradation of our
    relationship and readiness as it pertains to military
    exercises. But, are you changing the nature of those exercises
    to, for example, simply being tabletop exercises or just
    computer exercises, as opposed to how they've been conducted in
    the past?
        General Dunford. Senator, if you don't mind me taking that
    question.
        Senator Duckworth. Yes, of course.
        General Dunford. The way I would describe it--and you're
    quite familiar with this--what we have changed--and I want to
    be clear--is, we've changed the method of training to focus on
    the mission-essential tasks that each of the levels of command
    needs to be proficient in. What we haven't changed is the
    outcome and the readiness to fight tonight. So, the way you
    characterize it is, in part, true, that some of our large-scale
    exercises are done, now, with simulation Command Post Exercise
    (CPX) and so forth. What's really important to highlight is
    that, at the battalion and the squadron level and below,
    there's been no changes to training and the ability of our men
    and women on the Peninsula to train in the integration of
    combined arms. We've made adjustments to our large-scale
    exercises. What we've done is--very quickly, I'll just try to
    highlight--we've shifted from certifying our readiness, based
    on the conduct of an exercise, to a much more complex system,
    that General Abrams and Admiral Davidson have developed, which
    identified all the mission-essential tasks for every level of
    command in making sure that we have a proven method of
    developing proficiency.
        Another thing I can assure you is that, as soon as General
    Abrams and Admiral Davidson have any concerns about their
    ability to maintain readiness--and right now we're executing
    their plan--they know that they come right back to the
    Secretary and I, and we will work with the Koreans to make
    adjustments. But, I can assure you, from a military perspective
    right now, I am quite confident in our 2019 training plan, and
    confident that that will deliver the level of readiness that we
    have historically done--accomplished in large-scale exercises.
        Senator Duckworth. So, you're saying that, for brigade and
    below, or battalion and below, there's no change as far as the
    leaders that see what's happening?
        General Dunford. That is correct. That's an important
    point, Senator. That is correct.
        Senator Duckworth. So, above brigade, that's where the
    changes----
        General Dunford. That's where the----
        Senator Duckworth.--have taken place.
        General Dunford.--changes are. In some cases, it's dialing
    down the volume of the exercises. As you know well, those
    exercises had two purposes; one was deterrence, one was
    proficiency. I'm confident right now that our exercise program
    does deliver the latter, proficiency in our mission-essential
    tasks.
        Senator Duckworth. Have those exercises taken into account
    the role of logistics in sustaining any type of a fight that we
    would have to engage in? I do think that we focus on what's
    happening on the Peninsula, but sustaining that fight long-term
    and then getting whatever we need, resources, there is a real
    challenge. The Pacific--I don't think people realize how vast
    the Pacific Ocean is.
        General Dunford. Right.
        Senator Duckworth. Can you speak a little bit to the
    logistical challenges?
        General Dunford. Senator, I can. In fact, this past year,
    we did what we call a Korea Readiness Review, and we played out
    the first 60 days of a Korean conflict, to include the detailed
    logistics planning that was necessary to support operations for
    the first 60 days. We, needless to say, learned a lot during
    that exercise, but our exercises absolutely include the
    logistics factors associated with our ability to conduct
    operations.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Our National Defense Strategy outlines a shift in primary
    focus from countering violent extremism to great-power
    competition. As Acting Secretary, Mr. Shanahan, what's,
    specifically, do you plan to do in areas perhaps less obviously
    impacted by either of these priorities? For example, SOUTHCOM
    or AFRICOM.
        Secretary Shanahan. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are critical, in
    terms of defeating ISIS, dealing with regional threats. The
    Chairman, in his role as the integrated global campaign
    planner, we make sure that the risk in those areas, and the
    resources required to manage, are properly delivered, both to
    SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to all of you, for your service and for your candor
    today.
        Now, as I listened to Senator Fischer talk about and ask
    about nuclear modernization, I wanted to follow up on that.
    Then I heard Senator Blackburn talk about Space Force, and I
    wanted to follow up on that. So, I'm going to try to combine
    the two as quickly as I can, because I think there are some
    similarities.
        I'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan. You know, many of
    the critics of nuclear modernization imply or state
    emphatically that we can't afford that, that it's unaffordable,
    that, in fact, we have to choose, in essence, between nuclear
    or conventional modernization. Yet, as I look at the budget,
    historically, and as I look at the budget, going forward, I
    see, for the most part, a peaking of modernization costs for
    the nuclear force at under 6 and a half percent in year 2029.
    Can we afford not to do it? I mean, it seems to me that that's
    a pretty efficient use of deterrence dollars, and I would just
    like to hear you elaborate a little bit on whether we can
    afford it.
        Secretary Shanahan. I'll ask David to talk about the
    affordability, but, as our competitors are building up their
    nuclear capabilities--this is setting aside budget--as our
    competitors are building up their nuclear capability, or
    modernizing, we should not unilaterally disarm. I think we have
    to start there.
        Terms of timing of the budget, David, maybe you could speak
    to that.
        Secretary Norquist. Sir, the--Senator, the numbers you used
    are correct. The peak is about 6 and a half percent. When you
    realize that in--normal maintenance runs 3 percent. Right?
    That's--that increase, for the amount of peace and stability
    that that deterrent provides us against what is probably the
    most catastrophic threat we can face, I think is a reasonable
    and sound approach, and something that you'd want to be very
    careful about changing, because of the stability that it
    provides globally and for the safety of the American people.
        Senator Cramer. Okay. So, then let's move to space, because
    I think I have a similar line of questioning as it relates to
    the affordability of it. I understand concerns. I could--it's
    easy to see why somebody that has a particular system within
    the Air Force might feel threatened by a competing--you know,
    competing for limited dollars. Secretary Shanahan, I think
    you've referenced it, at least to some degree, and I'd like to
    have you elaborate even a little more on the efficiencies that
    can be found. Clearly, space is a realm that we're competing
    in. Clearly, you're--we need to probably ramp up some of our
    capabilities there. As you pointed out earlier, you know, we
    need--we don't--we can't pick our parents. The resiliency isn't
    what it needs to be. Yet, maybe you could speak to--and maybe
    this would be a good one for the Comptroller, as well--to the
    efficiencies that will be found in the process of creating a
    Space Force as a sixth branch.
        Secretary Shanahan. I think, on the efficiency side--and
    I've had conversations with Senator Reed on this subject, and
    many in Congress are experts in this area--we can't build a
    bureaucracy. In standing up the Space Force, we have a chance
    to build it from the bottom up. I think we'll build a
    bureaucracy if we build it from the top down. So, it's an
    opportunity to build it correctly.
        The biggest effort needs to be at retiring the risk. We're
    too vulnerable, and, you know, it's a little bit like the
    nuclear conversation. I actually think it's going to cost us
    less. I mean, we've--I've had lots of arguments about whether
    that's true or not. I think, in--at the end of the day--I mean,
    what we hear quite a bit is, ``This is change versus the status
    quo.'' This is a fundamental structural change. But, in that
    structural change, we'll get after reducing our vulnerability,
    and I really believe, the end of the day, have more capability
    and more money, terms of, we won't have spent as much.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and maybe speak a little bit to the
    realigning of existing space programs as part of that
    efficiency, if that makes sense.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely.
        The--you know, when we talk about standing up a new
    service--this is a very small service. You know, you think
    about 15,000 to, you know, 18,000 people, so it's really not
    about a large group being consolidated. This is really talking
    about, How do you consolidate development efforts within the
    Department? So, how do we take what's being done--you know, the
    Army's going to undertake a brand-new modernization program.
    How do we combine that with work going on in the Air Force,
    with what's going on in the Navy, and then integrate it into
    all the combatant commands? This is really about doing it at a
    DOD level. These are, like, once-in-a-generation opportunities.
    Since we must address the contested environment, and we're
    going to make significant changes, why not do it at an
    integrated level for the Department instead of, you know, in
    each service?
        Senator Cramer. Well, your answers were as efficient as I
    expect the Space Force to be. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Shanahan. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        The Minority Leader had a question, and has a scheduling
    problem, so let's go ahead and recognize him----
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe.--and then we'll get to the rest of them,
    if that's acceptable.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're very
    gracious. I appreciate it.
        I'm trying to clarify the debate that Senator King
    initiated about projects at risk. I'm going to take the really,
    really dangerous path for a social scientist to try to break it
    down into simple numbers, particularly dealing with an engineer
    and a numbers person. Bear with me.
        Let's say X equals the authorized MILCON for the last 5
    years. That's the universe. Y equals the unobligated MILCON
    projects after September 30th of this year. X minus Y, or Z,
    equals those projects that are at risk of being captured for
    the wall, with some limited exceptions. No public housing, et
    cetera. You know what that Z is right now. You have the list.
    Is that correct, Mr. Shanahan? You have the ability to create
    the list.
        Secretary Shanahan. Let me make sure I understand what Z
    is. I'm going to look at my friend, here.
        Senator Reed. Okay.
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Shanahan. So, Z is----
        Senator Reed. Z----
        Secretary Shanahan. We know what that universe of projects
    is.
        Secretary Norquist. The--if the question is, What is the
    universe of either unobligated projects or unobligated projects
    after a certain date? Those are things that can be generated,
    yes.
        Senator Reed. Exactly. Those projects, with the exceptions
    you've mentioned--family housing and some others--are all
    subject to being taken away to fund this wall. They might not
    all be taken, but they are the projects at risk, correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. That's the pool.
        Senator Reed. I would like that list today, Mr. Secretary.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        See Appendix A on page 560.

        Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
        Senator Reed. So, we'll be waiting. I'll be--my fingers----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Reed.--and we'll have that list. So we'll--everyone
    will know is at--what project they have to worry about----
        Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
        Senator Reed.--going forward.
        Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
        Senator Reed. Is that it?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Thank you for the clarification.
        Senator Reed. That's a deal?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. That's a deal.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Can I assume that there are
    congressionally appropriated fiscal year 2019 projects that
    received military construction funding that are going to be in
    that list?
        Secretary Norquist. Because of 5-year monies, yes.
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah. I can't tell you, Mr. Chairman, how
    inappropriate I think that is. Congress has the power of the
    purse. This is wrong. This is abusive. We should do something
    about it, all of us, because I guarantee you, if you let this
    happen, it will happen under the next President and the next
    President, and you won't always like how this money gets spent.
        Acting Secretary, how much do you know about PFAS?
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, I understand the nature of the
    chemical. So, when we talk about it being a fire retardant and
    being used over--extensively and militarily and commercially,
    and the issue of it being in the water supply.
        Senator Heinrich. So, have you had a chance to read the
    article in The New York Times this morning with the headline,
    ``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker Standards on Chemicals
    Contaminating Drinking Water''?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, I haven't had a----
        Senator Heinrich. Okay.
        Secretary Shanahan.--chance to read the paper.
        Senator Heinrich. I would ask that you read that.
        Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
        Senator Heinrich. I hope it's highly inaccurate.
        Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
        Senator Heinrich. The second clause in the first sentence
    says that the Pentagon is pushing the Trump administration to
    adopt a weaker standard for groundwater pollution.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Heinrich. Are you aware of any conversations going
    on in the Pentagon that would push for a standard that was not
    set by the best-available science?
        Secretary Shanahan. Right. I--I'm not aware of any
    conversation. I shared with Senator Shaheen that I would follow
    up with her, also, on this matter after I have a chance to
    investigate. I'll do the same with you.
        Senator Heinrich. I would deeply appreciate that.
        The right way to do this is to follow the science.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Heinrich. The right way to do this is not to set a
    standard based on trying to limit liability.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Heinrich. I know that there is--we're going to have
    a big pricetag attached to this. There is no question about
    that. But, we're also going to have a very big human cost
    associated with this. I'll just give you one example.
        Highland Dairy Farm was forced to close its doors in New
    Mexico after 25 years. That's a local business. For months,
    because of this contamination, they had to dump 12,000 to
    15,000 gallons of milk per day. That's enough to give a carton
    at lunch to 240,000 kids. That is one example of how this is
    impacting the communities that have been enthusiastic about
    hosting our Air Force and other military establishments.
        We are going to need to get in front of this. I don't think
    it has received adequate attention from the Pentagon. So, I
    look forward to working with you on that. But, we're at the
    front end of this, and there's going to be a lot of work that's
    going to have to go into trying to make this right for these
    communities.
        I very much agree that our competitors are rapidly fielding
    new capabilities in the space domain, and that we need to move
    with a greater sense of urgency. I welcome the increased
    prioritization the Department has put on this area, and your
    focus on that. In terms of R&D as we stand up a Space
    Development Agency, one of the things I want to make sure we're
    not doing is reorganizing the existing pieces or reinventing
    the wheel. Things like the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the
    Space Vehicles Directorate, the Advanced Systems Directorate,
    and many others, all are--play a critical role in researching,
    developing, and fielding our Nation's space systems. So, I
    would just urge you, as you look at that, and urge Secretary
    Wilson, Dr. Fred Kennedy, Dr. Mike Griffin, all to fully
    utilize the existing R&D assets as you stand up SDA so that
    we're not losing a few years of reorganization to make the
    whole system work better.
        If you have any thoughts on that, I'd love to hear them.
        Secretary Shanahan. No, I--when I think of the Space
    Development Agency, what I don't want it to be is a
    reorganization. The number-one element of the Space Development
    Agency that we need to take advantage of is large-scale systems
    engineering. How do we put together a national team so that we
    can do this at scale? There is incredible technology in the Air
    Force. We don't lack for talent. That is not our issue. We
    don't lack for money. The architecture that's required to be
    able to do this quickly so that we don't have to do it three or
    four times is really the problem we have to get after.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today, and for the service
    provided to this country, and, to all those behind you, for
    their service, as well.
        You know, as we approach these hearings, we hear a lot
    about the threat assessments and our nuclear capabilities and
    our hardware. Often, we overlook, sometimes, the very human
    element of this. As you probably are aware, this Committee's
    had a couple of hearings about some serious--I think, very
    serious ongoing health and safety problems with privatized
    housing on our military bases. Some of those have occurred in
    my State, at Maxwell Air Force Base and at Fort Rucker. I did
    not notice any language in either of your statements on this
    particular topic. Not surprising. I'm not criticizing that.
    But, I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on these
    issues and whether or not any of these issues are going to be
    resolved through the budget that you're proposing this year.
    I'll ask the--Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford----
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, maybe I'll just start out
    with--it's an embarrassment where we are, so I'm not going to
    defend anything. It's a leadership failure. Once we get past
    that, it's, What are we going to do about it? I've had
    considerable interactions with the service secretaries, and
    they've assured me, for the time being, they'd like to run with
    the lead to address the problem. But, the conversations I've
    had with them are like this, ``It's okay if we identify the
    problem. Let's make sure we put the resources that are required
    to be responsive in place.'' That's what I intend to follow up
    on. The second piece is, we can't fall into this hole again.
    What is the enduring issue? But, for the families that are in
    these--the servicemembers and their families, we need to
    rapidly address the problem. Let's make sure the resources are
    put in place.
        Senator Jones. General?
        General Dunford. Senator, first, I agree with the
    characterization of the problem, the Secretary's comments about
    the sense of embarrassment about the conditions that we found
    recently in family housing. The Secretary talked about it from
    a resource perspective. I can assure you that the leadership in
    the Department has gripped this issue, and the services have
    done things, like make sure that a leader goes and visits each
    and every individual's home so that we have a personal hands-on
    view of the conditions under which our men and women are
    living.
        When the Secretary talks about a leadership challenge, it's
    very simple what happened. We contracted out for family
    housing, some years ago, and a gap grew between leadership and
    the contractor. That should not be the case. Leadership should
    be decisively engaged in the overseeing of those contracts,
    and, more importantly, should be decisively engaged in the
    challenges that our men and women have in family housing.
        So, there is a resource issue that you spoke about, there
    is a human element to it, which is the men and women in those
    houses, but there's also the important leadership point that
    the Secretary mentioned, and that is, making sure that our
    leaders are, in fact, decisively engaged in all aspects of our
    men and women's lives; in particular, the housing.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both.
        The resources--I'm assuming you're talking about our
    military and the various leaders on the bases getting to the
    bottom of this and trying to correct it. But, I'm hoping that
    the resources to actually correct these problems are going to
    be borne by these companies who are making the profits.
        Secretary Shanahan. That's my concern, is--we'll identify
    the issues, and then we'll say we'll fix them, and it'll take
    too long. We need to fix them quickly. If it means getting
    extra resources, these companies, they need to find a way to do
    that.
        Senator Jones. All right. Thank you. There's nothing in the
    budget, though, that we--that we're looking at to budget to
    actually fix the resources, as opposed to first looking to the
    contractors. Is that--would that be fair?
        Secretary Norquist. We are, first, looking to the
    contractors to do it. We have resources in the budget, should
    the Committee want to address additional things, but the
    contractors are the one responsible for delivering the service
    at the rate they were funded.
        Senator Jones. All right, great.
        Secretary Shanahan, I'm really interested in additional
    funding in the budget for hypersonics and directed-energy
    programs. A lot of that work is going on in my State, up in
    Huntsville. Are you anticipating any new programs or more
    funding for existing programs in those areas?
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, this budget has a sizable
    increase in hypersonics, and then we continue to double down on
    directed energy. Most of the focus in directed energy is to get
    a form factor so we can operationally deploy these concepts.
    But, you'll continue to see more and more funding going towards
    these technologies.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the time.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        General Dunford, thank you so much for being here, and
    thanks for dropping by and chatting with us the other day at my
    office.
        Let me ask you about LHAs and LPDs. There's pressure to
    build a fleet better able to face Chinese and Russian precision
    missiles. The Navy, therefore, appears to be reducing its
    investment in warships, like LPDs, big-deck amphibs, and
    aircraft carriers, to free up money for more offensive weaponry
    on smaller surface ships, submarines, and aircraft.
    Additionally, moving the build of the new amphibious ships into
    the future would likely delay the Navy's ability to reach its
    goal of 38 amphibious ships from the current level of 32.
        General, does the Marine Corps still have a stated need for
    38 amphibious ships, as indicated in the Navy's force-structure
    assessment? How many amphibs do we have in the inventory today?
    Do you foresee eliminating Marine Corps core mission of
    amphibious operations at any point in the near future?
        General Dunford. Senator, the requirement you identified,
    of 38, is still the requirement. I went back, after our
    conversation, to just check to make sure what the facts were.
    The requirement is 38. The 355-ship program of record that was
    submitted last year, I think they're working minor adjustments,
    but there's still a cardinal direction of the Navy. The issue
    with the amphib ships inside of this program was an issue of
    sequencing. They--the Navy put a higher priority on other
    platforms during this period of time, but did not walk away
    from the requirement or the long-term plan to have those ships
    in place.
        Senator Wicker. Now, in terms of facing the Chinese and
    Russian threat, just inform the public, through the mechanism
    of this hearing, how the amphibs fit into that.
        General Dunford. Senator, it's critical for us to be able
    to project power in the context of China, and to seize--one of
    the traditional missions of the Marine Corps is seizing
    advanced naval bases. If you look at the island chains and so
    forth in the Pacific as platforms from which we can project
    power, that would be a--an historical mission the Marine Corps
    has, and one that is very relevant in the China scenario.
        Senator Wicker. Projecting power with marines being
    transported by these amphibs.
        General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Right.
        Secretary Shanahan, last year Congress appropriated
    considerable funds toward both LHA-9 and LPD-31, yet those two
    ships were not funded in this year's budget request. We just
    heard General Dunford's answer. So, why did the Department
    withhold funding for LHA-9 and LPD-31 in this year's budget? If
    both these ships are going to be built at some point, wouldn't
    you agree that we should fund them in the most cost-effective
    manner? Were both the Navy and Marine Corps in agreement with
    this decision to delay funding of the LHA-9 and LPD-31?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Senator, what I recall, in the
    development of the plan, there was a--it was a sequencing, not
    a requirement, issue, in terms of--General, you know the--in
    terms of the--providing the availability. Yeah.
        General Dunford. You know, Senator, the issue--when they
    looked at all the money that was available to the Navy, and
    they looked at the shipbuilding plan, they prioritized other
    platforms within this program over those two amphibious ships,
    and they moved those two amphibious ships outside the program
    without adjusting the requirement.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. So, the requirement's there, but the
    sub-part of my question about the efficiency of building them
    in the most cost-effective and efficient manner, would you--
    either of you care to comment on that? Wouldn't it make sense
    to do it in the most efficient manner?
        Secretary Shanahan. It would.
        Senator Wicker. What has been proposed is not necessarily
    that, is it?
        Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to the specific----
        Senator Wicker. Could you, General Dunford?
        General Dunford. Not with regard to what the difference
    would be in the cost of the ship or the efficiency within the
    program, as opposed to outside the program. I can't talk to
    that, Senator. But, we can get back to you on that specific
    question.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Dunford. This was answered directly with Senator
    Wicker's MLA on 18 March via phone call with CDR Hagerty,
    OCJCS/LA.

        Senator Wicker. Okay.
        Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator--yeah, Senator Manchin. I believe--yeah, he was
    here first. Yeah. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank all of you. I'm so sorry. We get--sometimes we get
    shortchanged here and we have to go to different meetings. I'm
    handling an Energy meeting now. But, I just wanted to thank you
    all so much.
        So, Secretary Shanahan, as you know, State-owned National
    Guard facilities that cause PFAS contamination do not have
    access to defense environmental restoration dollars like Active
    Duty bases do. Senator Gillibrand had a situation similar to
    what I had in Martinsburg. I think you're familiar with both of
    those. So, I think my question would be--National Guard units
    use the same firefighting foam that the Active components use.
    The training is often the same. It makes no sense for the
    National Guard to not have access to these dollars. So, would
    you be supportive of a similar amendment this year if we could
    get access to them?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I would.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. You've been brought up to speed on
    that.
        Secretary Shanahan. I'm not totally up to speed on that
    particular----
        Senator Manchin. We'd love to--if we could--you tell us who
    to designate in your--on your staff, and we'd love to bring you
    up to speed, because it would be very helpful, because it's
    really been detrimental to the community.
        The President's budget request is something I wanted to go
    over. A combination of emergency funds as well as other budget
    shell games. You gave us an $8.6 billion--I think you all might
    have touched on this. What we're looking at is a holistic
    approach of how we're able to secure our border and, really,
    the immigration challenges we have. Do you all know how many of
    the--maybe you have this--as far as the DACA--some DACA
    children that are involved in military, do you have any idea?
    It would be helpful to us if we could find out how many of
    these young people are participating in defending our country
    that are asking to be considered as being available to be a
    citizen of our country. I think it would be quite appropriate
    for us to be able to know that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. Based on security concerns, the
    Department of Defense (DOD) discontinued the MAVNI Pilot
    Program in 2016. However, DOD has continued to access existing
    MAVNI recruits already in the pipeline determined to be ``vital
    to the national interest'' for military service. Under MAVNI
    there were approximately 834 Deferred Action Childhood Arrival
    (DACA) recipients recruited.

        Senator Manchin. Again, a big thing with me, when Senator--
    God rest his soul--Senator McCain was here, is the audit. You
    might have touched on this, and my question might have been
    asked. If there's something on the audit that you can give me
    an update on where we are and what your intentions are and how
    we can get a complete audit of the Department of Defense, would
    be very, very, very helpful.
        Secretary Norquist. Senator, I'm always happy to give an
    update on the audit for you.
        Senator Manchin. Okay.
        Secretary Norquist. So, we've started the second. We've
    completed the first-year audit. We received over 2,300
    findings. We have corrective action plans that each of the
    services are developing to address those. The major areas of
    focus this year are, particularly, inventory, information
    technology, and real property. Those services will be executing
    those. The auditors have already started the second audit. They
    don't wait. They come right back and begin the next year.
    They'll be testing the progress on those and we'll--I think we
    do twice-a-year updates to the Committee staff, and we expect
    the reports to be completed and delivered to us, on the second-
    year audit, on November 15th.
        Senator Manchin. The other thing I need to know and have
    more information, whoever would be responsible for, is the
    procurement, how we are--the procurements we handle, the
    changes that have been made in procuring, you know, all the
    different types of anecdotes and jokes have been made about how
    we buy things and what we pay for things, and things of that
    sort. I'd like to be able to go back to the citizens of West
    Virginia and say that we are investing the money properly. They
    have total support--they have given total support for the
    military. They want to make sure that we're using the resources
    in the most prudent way.
        Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we'd be happy to put together
    for you to be able to share: here's how we've been saving
    money, here's where we've been saving money, here are our plans
    to save even more.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Shanahan. The Department has identified $7.7 billion
    within five areas of business operations to include: contract
    management, healthcare management, acquisition, information technology
    and business systems, and logistics and supply chain management. Reform
    efforts within the Department's five areas of business operations are
    focused on delivering optimized enterprise business operations to
    assure the success of the National Defense Strategy. Reform results
    (savings and investments) have been aligned to six reform levers and
    discretely accounted for within the budget. These levers are: better
    alignment of resources, business process improvements, business system
    improvements, divestments, policy reforms, and weapons system
    acquisition. The attached table is a summary of the $7.7 billion
    savings accounted for in fiscal year 2020, by reform lever.

        Senator Manchin. The other thing, Secretary Shanahan, is on
    the F-15X, if you could explain to me a little bit about that.
    If the experts in air combat in the Air Force identify a need
    for the F-15X, then what does OSD know that the Air Force
    doesn't about the future threat environment?
        Secretary Shanahan. Oh, yeah, let me address that. So, my
    responsibility in pulling together the budget is to make sure
    we identify what are the threats and campaigns that we need to
    structure, develop, do force design and force development. The
    services, the joint staff, and the cost assessment and
    performance evaluation organizations then do the analysis. So,
    I can ask the Chairman on what the recommendation, in terms of
    mix of tactical aircraft.
        General Dunford. Senator, I spoke at length with the Chief
    of Staff of the Air Force and others on this issue. So, I can
    give you the framework for making the decision.
        Senator Manchin. Sure.
        General Dunford. First, the primary aircraft of the future
    for the Air Force is the F-35. They're not walking back off
    that program or the importance of the F-35 program. But, as
    they looked over the next several years, they had two problems.
    They had, one, capability represented by the fifth-generation
    aircraft, the F-35, and then they had capacity issue, both
    numbers of aircraft plus the amount of ordnance that could be
    carried by those aircraft. Then they had the F-15C, which was
    aging out in the 2027-2028 period. So, within the next 5 or 10
    years, the best solution was to go to the F-15--it's called
    EX--platform to backfill the F-15. Eventually, we'll get to an
    all-F-35 program. But, from both a cost perspective and a
    capacity perspective, this particular mix of aircraft, for the
    near term, was determined to be the right mix of aircraft. So,
    again, not walking off the fifth generation, but the near term,
    need that combination of a fourth generation and a fifth
    generation to generate capacity. I would add that the F-15X is
    slightly less expensive from--for procurement than the F-35,
    but it's more than 50 percent cheaper to operate over time, and
    it has twice as many hours, in terms of how long it lasts.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, to the witnesses, for your testimony and
    service.
        I was late to the hearing today because Secretary Esper
    asked me to accompany him to Fort Belvoir to visit with
    military families about the housing issues. I've got to tell
    you, I did a visit on Norfolk Naval Base last Friday, so my
    expectations were pretty darn low, but I'm just stunned after
    talking to these families. The physical condition of their
    units--mold, water damage; poor, shoddy construction; poor,
    shoddy repairs--the lack of responsiveness, that they can't get
    response from the housing companies, that they're told, when
    they go to chain of command, ``We don't do this anymore. We
    don't have any responsibility,'' that, when they do get a
    response, the quality of the repair work done both by the
    maintenance connected with the companies or contractors they
    come up with is atrocious.
        But, then what I really heard about today was the number of
    people who are getting sick. Hospitalizations, families being
    forced to move out of units for significant amount of time as
    their units are being repaired so that they can be habitable,
    carbon monoxide, CO2 monitors going off, and people being told,
    ``It's fine, you can move back in,'' but not being told what
    was wrong that was causing there to be CO2. A 10-year-old girl,
    mother just told me this at--within the last hour, missed 45
    days of school last year--that's one-quarter of the school
    year--because of respiratory problems caused by mold in the
    unit.
        I know that you're focused on this, but I just got to say,
    as the father of a marine, as somebody who is in a State that's
    heavily military, it was just absolutely depressing, the
    physical conditions. We've got to have both housing companies
    that will improve and a military that will fix. I have been
    pointing out, nobody enlisted to be a tenant of Lincoln
    housing. They enlisted to be a marine or an airman or -woman,
    or a solider or a sailor. So, it's the military that's got to
    fix it.
        I want to focus on the emergency issue. Secretary Shanahan,
    my reading of title 10, section 2808, is that the President can
    continue to use unobligated MILCON dollars for the duration of
    the emergency. So, having declared an emergency, unless
    Congress rebuts that, as long as the President says they're in
    an emergency, we basically are put--tapping the spigot into the
    MILCON budget for this budget year and future budget years
    until the emergency is declared over. Is that your
    understanding of the section?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, my understanding is, as long a
    there's a declaration of emergency, that is an authority that
    goes along with the declaration.
        Senator Kaine. So, I just want to make plain to everybody
    what we're voting on this afternoon. We're voting on an
    emergency declaration that, until this President says there's
    not an emergency, it is a spigot tapped into the MILCON budget
    that can allow not only 2019 funds, but 2020 funds, 2021,
    future funds, to be pulled out of the MILCON budget, at the
    President's discretion--in my view, counter to the
    appropriations powers of Congress.
        Secretary Shanahan, I wrote you a letter on February 15
    asking you for information about MILCON projects--unobligated
    MILCON projects that could be affected by the President's
    emergency declaration. My understanding is, the Committee staff
    has been repeatedly in contact with your office on the same
    thing. I was not here, but I understand that you committed to
    Senator Reed that you will get him that list today. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. I got to tell you, I feel completely
    sandbagged.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Kaine. The service secretaries have had that list.
    They've had the list. The service secretaries have been willing
    to share the list of their unobligated MILCON projects. So,
    you're going to send it to us today, after the vote on the
    emergency declaration?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Kaine. Members of the Senate are entitled to know
    from where these MILCON monies will be pulled.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Kaine. The fact that you come here today and say
    you'll now give it to us, right after the vote this afternoon?
    Your service secretaries and chiefs have had these lists, and,
    when we've asked them to send them to the Committee, they've
    said, ``We can't, without the permission of the SECDEF.'' So,
    were they only available in the last half-hour?
        Secretary Shanahan. No, the--well, first of all, Senator, I
    think the situation is being misrepresented. There has not been
    a deliberate attempt to withhold any information to this
    Committee.
        Senator Kaine. Let me state this to you. The staff has been
    reaching out to the service secretaries and saying, ``Send us
    the list of unobligated MILCON projects.''
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Kaine. They have been told that they cannot do
    that----
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Kaine.--it has to come through the OSD.
        Secretary Shanahan. Right. Right.
        Senator Kaine. You're now going to produce that list today,
    after we have a vote at 1:45? This information is highly
    relevant to the Senators who are voting on this emergency
    declaration, because the question is, Should a President be
    able to declare a nonmilitary emergency--that's the what the
    military has testified--and then ransack the Pentagon budget
    for $6.1 billion? I think we're entitled to know where the
    money might come from, especially since you've just said this
    is a multiyear declaration that opens up a spigot into the
    MILCON budget. I don't think you giving us that list today,
    after the vote----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Kaine.--when we've been asking for it for a month,
    is a good-faith response to the requests of this Committee.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
        Senator Kaine. Now, tell me if I'm misrepresenting what's
    going on.
        Secretary Shanahan. Throughout this process of the
    emergency declaration--and I just have to say, this is not
    something we do every day--from the very start, we have worked
    to be 100-percent transparent with Congress. 100 percent.
        Senator Kaine. I agree you don't do an emergency
    declaration every day, but, every day, you have a list of
    unobligated MILCON projects, don't you?
        Secretary Shanahan. Well, I think the list--we've always
    had a list of--that's how we keep book--I mean, it's not like
    we don't have a list of projects.
        Senator Kaine. But, why wouldn't you--why wouldn't you--why
    wouldn't your services share those with the Committee----
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator Kaine.--after continuing requests from the
    Committee?
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine, your time is long expired.
    I know the passion that you feel right now, but we are
    adjourned.
        Senator King. Chairman, I had a couple of follow up
    questions.
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, I know you did.
        Senator King. Are we adjourned?
        Chairman Inhofe. You know, I have to say this about Senator
    King. I say this in front of all my--well, they're gone now. Of
    all the members, Democrat and Republican, you are the one who
    has been the most responsible, you've been to every single
    meeting. No one else can say that. I--even though it would be a
    violation of what we're going to do, if you want to have--I'll
    withdraw that just long enough for you to do one question. Only
    because it's you. Got it?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. All right. One comment and one question.
        The comment is, I want to complement Mr. Norquist for the
    work that he's done. I failed to do that before. Doing--working
    through the audit process for the Defense Department is a
    herculean task, and you were--embarked on it well and truly,
    and I compliment you on that. I qualify that a little bit by
    the invention of the phrase today ``OCO for base.'' That's like
    ``rabbit for bicycle.'' I mean, those two things aren't really
    consistent.
        My followup question, Mr. Secretary. Based upon all this
    discussion--and I'm honestly confused. My father used to say,
    ``You--the Pentagon is the only building in America you can
    drive straight toward and it keeps getting further away.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. I feel a little bit like that today.
        Is it your testimony that 2019 military construction
    projects that were authorized and appropriated for are off the
    table, or are they only off the table if they're obligated
    before September 30th?
        Secretary Shanahan. Right.
        Senator King. Fairly straightforward question.
        Mr. Norquist, perhaps you can answer.
        Secretary Norquist. Senator, it's the award day. What we
    are looking at in prioritizing is contracts that award later.
    So, if you----
        Senator King. So, if a--there's a project in the 2019 bill
    that hasn't been awarded, it's on the--it's potentially on the
    chopping block. Is that correct?
        Secretary Norquist. That is correct.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
                   cybercom and nsa ``dual hat'' relationship
        1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Shanahan, what are your views about
    maintaining or ending the ``dual hat'' relationship whereby the
    Commander of U.S. Cyber Command also serves as the director of the
    National Security Agency?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Department is not at a decision point.
    Because of recent election-related operations and the publication of
    the new DOD Cyber Strategy, I deferred making a recommendation to the
    President in order to ensure operational lessons learned are accounted
    for and incorporated into the decision calculus.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                            space development agency
        2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how will the Space
    Development Agency perform better than other currently established
    organizations?
        Secretary Shanahan. Our adversaries are developing and deploying
    threats against our legacy space systems faster than we can field new
    capabilities. I established the Space Development Agency (SDA) as an
    expressly threat-driven organization, intended to define and create the
    Department's comprehensive next-generation space architecture. SDA will
    not wait for a validated requirement; instead, the agency will work
    closely with the warfighter and intelligence communities to quickly
    identify and evaluate existing and emerging threats, then proceed to
    design, build, and launch an ensemble of space-based capabilities to
    address those threats in less than 24 months. To meet such a compressed
    development schedule, the SDA will heavily leverage commercial space
    technologies and systems (i.e., satellites, payloads, ground control
    hardware and software, and user equipment). Additional tranches of
    capability will follow on 24-month upgrade cycles. This approach to
    rapid, agile acquisition has not been attempted on an architectural
    scale and will only be achievable by partnering with, and drawing from,
    the burgeoning commercial space sector.

        3. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, what special authorities or
    exemptions will the Space Development Agency use that other space
    acquisition organizations cannot also be provided?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Director, Space Development Agency (SDA)
    has the delegated authority to act the SDA's Senior Procurement
    Executive; is designated the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)
    including exercise of Middle Tier Acquisition authority; has the
    authority to enter into transactions other than contracts, cooperative
    agreements, and grants carrying out basic, applied, and advanced
    research projects as well as certain prototype projects; will exercise
    available special hiring authorities including direct hire via limited-
    term appointments for highly qualified experts (HQE) and non-
    competitive short-term hires; will exercise approval authority over
    assignment of military personnel selected for duty at SDA, rate such
    personnel, and approve their rating chains; and will exercise original
    classification authority. While these authorities can and should be
    provided to other agencies (to enhance their operational tempo), the
    SDA is unique in that it was established explicitly to build out the
    next-generation national security space architecture, rapidly and
    efficiently. SDA will work to leverage commercially-derived
    capabilities (e.g., launch services, user radios and antennas, mass-
    produced satellites and payloads) to disincentive risk aversion and
    incorporate innovative upgrades in every generation of new capability.
    Legacy organizations have operated in a risk-averse environment for
    decades, and their policies reflect this. Starting a new organization,
    with a culture dedicated to speed, will drive the development of new
    tools on far shorter timelines than would otherwise be possible.

        4. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how does the Space
    Development Agency prevent duplication of effort amongst organizations?
        Secretary Shanahan. Space Development Agency (SDA) will work with
    its partner organizations to ensure that its development efforts are
    complementary to their work and not duplicative. SDA will be laser-
    focused on building a comprehensive, next-generation space architecture
    that addresses the DOD's Space Vision, comprised of eight essential
    capabilities described in the Department's August 2018 Report on
    Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space
    Components of the Department of Defense. These capabilities include:

          1.  Persistent global surveillance for advanced missile
    targeting,
          2.  Indications, warning, targeting, and tracking for defense
    against advanced missile threats,
          3.  Alternate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) for a
    GPS-denied environment,
          4.  Global and near-real time space situational awareness,
          5.  Development of deterrent capability,
          6.  Responsive, resilient, common ground-based space support
    infrastructure (e.g., ground stations and launch capability),
          7.  Cross-domain, networked, node-independent battle management
    command, control, and communications (BMC3), including nuclear command,
    control, and communications (NC3), and
          8.  Highly-scaled, low-latency, persistent, artificial-
    intelligence-enabled global surveillance.

        These are critical, unmet capabilities. Were we to apply historical
    practices and procedures, acquiring and fielding space systems to
    address these capabilities might require a decade or more, during which
    time our adversaries will have developed and deployed new
    countermeasures against those systems. We no longer have the luxury to
    respond on timelines of this length. SDA will work to develop a unified
    architecture comprised of legacy capabilities (servicing primarily
    validated requirements) as well as an agile, responsive, next-
    generation architecture intended to pivot as necessary to meet new
    threats as they arise. This will greatly facilitate our ability to
    conduct future military operations against peer competitors at campaign
    scale.

        5. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, has the DOD Cost Analysis
    and Program Evaluation office completed their analyses on whether
    projected Space Development Agency projects will be better than current
    plans?
        Secretary Shanahan. Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has
    completed its analysis of Space Development Agency (SDA) projects
    funded in Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget Request. CAPE is
    analyzing SDA's proposed further projects as part of its broader review
    of the Department's portfolio of future space capabilities. This review
    will complete this summer, and the results will inform the fiscal year
    2021 President's Budget Request.

        6. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, who will establish the
    priorities of the Space Development Agency?
        Secretary Shanahan. Currently, priorities for the Space Development
    Agency (SDA) will be established and executed by Director, SDA. These
    priorities will be informed by the Space Development Executive Board
    (SDEB) for SDA-related strategic policy, plans, program priorities, and
    investment areas and by the SDA Warfighter Council (WFC) on current and
    assessed multi-domain threats to national security for which next-
    generation space capabilities that would support the joint fight and on
    architectural vulnerabilities and potential adversarial attack
    surfaces.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                             camp lejeune recovery
        7. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how much risk are we
    assuming by delaying and under resourcing recovery at Camp Lejeune and
    Cherry Point?
        Secretary Shanahan. The operational and training impacts from the
    initial hurricane damage remain. Projects to repair or replace damaged
    headquarters facilities, railroad tracks, beach erosion, and roadways
    have been planned and designed. Since there is limited funding, most
    facilities scheduled for repair have been dried out, cleaned, and
    temporarily re-roofed. Trailers have been provided to house personnel
    that were displaced from the severely damaged buildings that could no
    longer be occupied. With the 2019 hurricane season starting June 1, the
    current conditions of many of the buildings on both bases creates high
    risk. Temporary repairs--such as tarps and plastic sheathing--will not
    withstand hurricane force winds and rains created throughout the
    upcoming seasonal change. Similarly, the temporary trailers are also
    not fabricated for these conditions.

        8. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long is it going to take
    to rebuild those bases?
        Secretary Shanahan. If funded, repair and replacement construction
    projects will take approximately three years to fully complete.

        9. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, at the start of this
    hurricane season on June 1st, will our facilities and assets there be
    particularly vulnerable due to the state of reconstruction?
        Secretary Shanahan. The buildings that were damaged during
    Hurricane Florence and were temporarily repaired (e.g. those that
    received a tarp roof) will be the most vulnerable to further damage.
    Additionally, Camp Lejeune's Onslow Beach and the roadways and railroad
    trestles could be further degraded.

        10. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long are we going to
    have to wait until Camp Lejeune regains baseline functionality?
        Secretary Shanahan. In order to regain full functionality, all
    buildings and infrastructure will need to be either repaired or
    replaced. Once funding is provided, it will take approximately three
    years to fully complete.
                            camp lejeune resiliency
        11. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how vulnerable are our
    Marine Corps facilities and assets in North Carolina to another
    disaster such as Hurricane Florence of Hurricane Matthew?
        Secretary Shanahan. Most of the newer buildings were not
    significantly damaged during Hurricane Florence. Where possible, we are
    designing the repair projects to include these new standards and
    building materials in order to maximize resilience. Removing and
    replacing asphalt shingle roofs with standing seam metal roofs will be
    a main design change. The more durable metal roofs last longer and are
    able to withstand hurricane force winds and rain.

        12. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, what needs to be done to
    ensure that those installations are survivable and resilient in the
    future?
        Secretary Shanahan. In addition to improving design standards and
    selecting the most durable building materials, as noted above, it is
    also important to fund preventive maintenance and select the best site
    to prevent flooding and seismic damage. These important factors are
    combined with the Commandant's Infrastructure Reset strategy, which
    reduces the facilities footprint and optimizes the resources necessary
    to ensure our installations remain a key enabler to generating and
    sustaining combat readiness.
        As a matter of course, the Department's resilience initiatives
    address risks from its ``all hazards'' approach, allowing our
    installations to support critical missions regardless of the threat,
    including weather, climate, natural events, or direct attack (either
    physical or cyber). While climate is often the focus, the reality is
    our installations must be resilient in the face of a variety of threats
    and conditions. The Department views these threats to installations
    holistically and responds with a balanced approach. The Department
    considers resilience throughout the installation planning and basing
    processes. This includes consideration of resilience risks in
    installation master planning, training and exercises, management of
    natural resources, design and construction standards, utility systems/
    service, emergency management operations, and supporting analytical
    tools. DOD is including the forecasts for rising sea levels in planning
    future flood zones and elevations along coastal installations, as well
    as developing a tool for forecasting changes to major precipitation for
    inland areas.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                    vulnerable installations--climate change
        13. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, the Department ignored a
    requirement in law for each service to submit their top ten list of
    most vulnerable installations to climate-related events, required by
    section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. Despite the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps testifying to this Committee that Camp Lejeune will need
    billions of dollars to rebuild in the wake of Hurricane Florence, the
    section 335 report that was submitted failed to even mention the Marine
    Corps once. It also ignored the billions of dollars likely required to
    rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base. Do you commit to sending us the top ten
    lists that were required by section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
    within a week?
        Secretary Shanahan. The top ten list of most vulnerable mission
    assurance priority installations per Military Department is attached.
    The Marine Corps has no installations on the Mission Assurance Priority
    Installation list for reasons that we can share with Congress on a
    classified basis.
        General Dunford. I defer to OUSD (A-S) to provide the appropriate
    response to this question.
                               osd personnel caps
        Section 143 of title 10, United States Code, limits the number of
    military, civilian, and detailed personnel supporting the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 3,767. According to the report produced
    by the National Defense Strategy Commission, ``Civilian voices have
    been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and
    national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian
    control.''

        14. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, in your assessment, has the
    personnel cap on OSD constrained the ability of your office to execute
    its required responsibilities, including those mandated by Congress?
        Secretary Shanahan. Secretary Shanahan, the Department is executing
    its required responsibilities within the personnel caps set forth in 10
    USC 143. The manpower limit does constrain the ability to address new
    missions and emerging / expanding requirements in the future.

        15. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, would a revision of this
    personnel cap facilitate more effective management and oversight of the
    Department of Defense?
        Secretary Shanahan. The elimination of headquarters manpower caps
    in lieu of a more appropriate single constraint (e.g., cost limit)
    would greatly improve the flexibility of the Department to manage the
    total workforce. The policy of the Department, in line with 10 USC 129
    and 129a, is to manage our workforce to requirement and cost. The
    constraints imposed by military and civilian limits inadvertently
    drives solutions toward contract support which may not be appropriate
    or the most cost effective solution. Additionally, any constraining
    provision would need to be adjusted periodically to account for
    emerging statutory or high priority requirements. However, the most
    pressing constraints for Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD)
    manpower are the cost limits imposed by section 346(b) of the fiscal
    year 2016 NDAA (for fiscal year 2020) and section 931 of the fiscal
    year 2019 NDAA (for fiscal year 2021) and the contract support limit
    imposed by section 865 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA (for all fiscal
    years through fiscal year 2023). These cost limits on OSD are impacting
    our ability to address new missions and emerging/expanding
    requirements.''

        16. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, are there specific OSD
    responsibilities that would benefit from an upward adjustment of the
    OSD personnel cap? If so, please provide some examples.
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes, there are several emerging requirements
    that could benefit from an upward adjustment. The Department recently
    added resources to the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) for
    establishment of the Secretariat for Special Operations (SSO)
    (supporting the Assistant Secreary of Defense (Special Operations &
    Low-Intensity Conflict)'s oversight of United States Special Operations
    Command), realignment of the Defense Innovation Unit to the USD(R&E),
    Military Health System Transformation, establishment of the Personnel
    Vetting Transformation Office (PVTO), and establishment of the Joint
    Artificial Intelligence Center (among other increases). While these
    additions are being managed under the statutory caps (both manpower and
    cost), it is coming at a cost to other high priority areas in OSD
    because of the need to direct cuts to keep under the limits.

        17. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, what other civilian personnel
    constraints would you recommend Congress reevaluate so to allow the
    Department greater flexibility to recruit, retain, and manage its
    civilian workforce more effectively?
        Secretary Shanahan. I appreciate Congress' recognition of the
    Department of Defense's need for increased flexibilities to attract,
    hire, and retain its civilian workforce. The multitude of stand-alone
    civilian hiring and pay authorities granted by Congress has been
    effective; however, the Department seeks to implement a civilian
    personnel system that is simple and streamlined to improve our ability
    to focus on strategic workforce needs and efficiently acquire and
    retain the right talent. I recommend Congress consider streamlining
    existing authorities to reduce complexity and grant additional
    flexibility to enable the Department to respond rapidly to meet
    emerging mission needs with proven hiring and pay methodologies.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                         russian election interference
        18. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is the
    Department of Defense looking at potential Russian interference in the
    upcoming election in Ukraine and the European Union as a sign of new
    innovative techniques they may use toward the United States elections?
        Secretary Shanahan. As part of the ``defend forward'' concept
    elaborated in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, the Department of Defense is
    paying close attention to democratic elections overseas to monitor for
    new techniques that adversaries might utilize in future U.S. elections.
    The Department is also working closely with a number of partners and
    allies to learn lessons from recent elections, to improve partner's
    abilities to defend their own networks, and to conduct combined
    Defensive Cyber Operations on partner networks.
        General Dunford. [Deleted.]
                                     kc-46
        19. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, General Dunford and
    Secretary Norquist, earlier this month, I asked General Lyons,
    commander of TRANSCOM, about the delivery delays of the KC-46 and he
    expressed concerns about the additional costs to maintain at least 28
    KC-135's beyond their currently scheduled retirement. Do you share
    General Lyons' concerns about the additional cost these delays will
    have on the Air Force?
        General Dunford. Any additional cost incurred to maintain legacy
    tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates is concerning.
    The KC-46A delivery schedule and the Air Force's planned legacy tanker
    aircraft retirement dates are coordinated to provide the joint force
    with sufficient tanker aircraft capability and capacity throughout the
    transition time.
        Secretary Shanahan. and Secretary Norquist. Yes. The Department is
    concerned about any additional costs that may be incurred to maintain
    the legacy tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates. This
    includes both the KC-10 aircraft as well as the KC-135 aircraft. The
    KC-46A remains a key Departmental acquisition program and delivery of
    these aircraft is critical to ensure timely retirements of the legacy
    fleet. The Department plans to retire KC-10 aircraft beginning in 2020
    with the KC-135 aircraft beginning in 2022 and we will continue to
    review the transition from legacy aircraft to KC-46 in order to
    minimize the need to sustain legacy platforms.
                               pfas contamination
        20. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, has is the Department of
    Defense advocated for interim actively pursuing groundwater clean-up
    recommendations for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) or
    perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) standards substantially higher than
    those suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency as suggested by
    The New York Times article published on March 14? Does the Department
    of Defense support groundwater cleanup recommendations for PFOA and
    PFOS higher than EPA's lifetime health advisory levels for these two
    chemicals? What is the contamination concentration the Department of
    Defense believes to be appropriate to trigger groundwater cleanup and
    remediation of PFOA and PFOS? Is it the position of the Department of
    Defense that concentration levels of PFOA and PFOS should be counted
    separately when determining whether cleanup of these two chemicals
    should begin?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the
    use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
    Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established, risk-based approach to
    determine when groundwater cleanup is needed. Using the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) risk assessment process supporting this
    statute, the unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of
    groundwater with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and
    perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion
    (ppt). DOD uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to
    add the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine CERCLA
    responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime Health Advisory
    (LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA applies to drinking water,
    but also considers all PFOS/PFOA exposures over a lifetime. Therefore,
    the LHA is not a cleanup level.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                     ethics
        21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed
    any Boeing matters while serving as Deputy Secretary, or Acting
    Secretary of Defense?
        Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my
    service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and
    substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have
    provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public
    website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to
    ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I
    consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain
    committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement,
    and my previous promises to this Committee.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed
    the advantages of Boeing products, or disparage Boeing competitors
    during your time at the Pentagon?
        Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my
    service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and
    substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have
    provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public
    website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to
    ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I
    consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain
    committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement,
    and my previous promises to this Committee.
                           president trump properties
        23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD
    spent at Trump properties since the inauguration?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a total of
    $147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the inauguration. These
    were all government travel credit card purchases by individual
    employees and members of the military. It is not Department of Defense
    policy to recommend that its personnel patronize any particular hotel
    or restaurant. Individual travelers are largely free market players in
    choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally
    responsible for paying the amounts due on their government travel
    credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging allotment and a meals
    and incidentals expense allotment with which to make these payments.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD
    spent on military aircraft flights for the President to travel to Mar-
    a-Lago and other Trump properties?
        Secretary Shanahan. The costs, flying hours and sorties associated
    with operating the presidential airplane for President Trump are
    comparable to what the program has spent every year for the past 5
    years. Air Force financial management does not track the cost of each
    trip the President makes and cannot break out trips to Trump properties
    versus other presidential trips. The attached spreadsheet details costs
    per flying hour and sorties associated with the presidential aircraft
    for each calendar year since 2014.

       Costs, Flying Hours, and Sorties for Presidential Aircraft

        25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, since 2016, have you
    personally spent any money at any Trump properties? Have any of your
    family members stayed at any Trump hotels?
        Secretary Shanahan. I am not immediately aware of any family
    business transactions at Trump hotels, but I am confident my financial
    disclosures are all in accordance with Office of Government Ethics'
    regulations and standards of ethical conduct.
                          answering to president trump
        26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary of
    Defense, do you feel that you are accountable to the President of the
    United States, or to the American people?
        Secretary Shanahan. As Acting Secretary of Defense, I serve the
    American people as the principal assistant to the President in all
    matters relating to the Department of Defense and am subject to the
    direction of the President in accordance with the law.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, Attorney General
    Sessions and Secretary of State Tillerson were both fired for not
    following the wishes of the President when doing so would run counter
    to departmental policy or law. Do you commit to following the law, and
    upholding the Constitution, even if doing so would result in your
    dismissal?
        Secretary Shanahan. Yes.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as you are well aware,
    Secretary Mattis resigned in a letter to Trump that expressed his
    personal disagreement with President Trump's policies. How would you
    respond if you are given an order that you felt was not in the best
    interests of American national security or military personnel?
        Secretary Shanahan. I will endeavor to provide the President the
    best advice I can on all matters pertaining to the Department in
    accordance with the law.
                 press access and retaliation against reporters
        29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how often do you think
    is appropriate for the Pentagon to host a press conference? How often
    should the Secretary of Defense address the media?
        Secretary Shanahan. I believe it is our duty to provide timely and
    accurate information to the American people, and I am committed to
    ensuring the Department regularly engages with the press. In addition
    to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who
    speaks with members of the press daily in both formal and informal
    settings, the Department of Defense has a team of public affairs
    professionals who are subject matter experts on their portfolios. The
    media have direct access to this team and they are available to the
    media on a daily basis, including nights, weekends, and holidays. As
    issues arrive, I address the media with timely information, and I
    frequently engage with the press during my regular activities as well
    as on official trips.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to
    ensuring that media outlets will have full access to the Pentagon?
        Secretary Shanahan. In keeping with the First Amendment, I am
    committed to ensuring that media outlets have and will continue to be
    granted full access to the Pentagon. Unlike many government agencies,
    the Department of Defense provides media representatives with
    unescorted access to our headquarters. We continue to issue Pentagon
    press badges that authorize such access, and our press corps has 24-
    hour access to our team of public affairs professionals. We respond to
    queries posed by members of the press from around the world on a daily
    basis. In addition, we continue to develop and publish transcripts for
    all public events such as briefings, honor cordons, and other open-
    press events involving our senior leaders. Media representatives are
    invited to travel with our leadership, including myself, within
    logistical limits. This includes my recent trip to the U.S. Central
    Command Area of Responsibility. Procedures for media access to the
    Pentagon remain the same as previous years. More information can be
    found on defense.gov via this direct link: https://www.defense.gov/
    Newsroom/For-the-Media/

        31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to
    preventing any retaliation against reporters who publish unfavorable
    stories?
        Secretary Shanahan. My team and I am committed to preventing any
    forms of retaliation against reporters.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if you do discover that
    press access is being restricted, and reporters are facing retaliation,
    what steps will you take to remedy this activity?
        Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions put in
    place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my leadership. My
    team and I are committed to upholding this promise.
                                      f-35
        33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, why does this budget
    request cut the Marine Corps F-35Bs?
        Secretary Shanahan. In its President's Budget (PB) for Fiscal Year
    2020 submission, the Marine Corps chose to rebalance its aviation
    portfolio, deferring several F-35B aircraft into future Low Rate
    Initial Production contracts in order to balance concurrency management
    while taking advantage of emerging future technologies. The Marine
    Corps increased its procurement of F-35Cs over the Future Years Defense
    Program to 28 F-35Cs (up from 19 F-35s in PB19) to ensure the service
    would be able to transition its F-35C squadrons on schedule. This
    decision provides the Marine Corps flexibility as it continues to
    determine the best mix of tactical aircraft as operational requirements
    develop and change.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, I understand the budget
    request also includes 8 fourth generation F-15X aircraft in fiscal year
    2020, and a total of 80 F-15X jets in the Future Years Defense Plan
    (FYDP) over the next 5 years. Who directed the investment in F-15X, and
    when was this decision made? Please elaborate on the reasoning for this
    decision.
        Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX
    was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs,
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program
    and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and
    2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity
    that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military
    operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued
    investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has
    an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX above the
    baseline F-15's. One added factor in the decision was that for the F-
    15EX, the Operations and Sustainment costs are significantly less than
    that of a fifth generation aircraft.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does your current plan
    to purchase F-15EX's effect DOD's previous validate requirement for
    2,456 F-35s? If the validate requirement remains unchanged, please
    explain how purchasing additional F-15EX's could result in a cost
    savings?
        Secretary Shanahan. Procuring F-15EX does not affect the F-35
    program requirement. Even with the full F-35 program, we have an
    emerging capacity shortfall due to an aging 4th Gen fleet. The F-35
    will replace aging F-16 and A-10 aircraft as planned. The F-15EX is the
    most cost-effective way to replace aging F-15C/D and close the capacity
    shortfall because 4th Gen aircraft are cheaper to operate in missions
    that do not require 5th Gen aircraft.
                 uss harry truman retirement and navy interests
        36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what are the risks of
    retiring the USS Truman early and reducing our naval carrier fleet from
    11 to 10?
        Secretary Shanahan. Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
    increased the requirement from 11 CVNs to 12 CVNs to meet the increased
    warfighting response requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance
    Defeat/Deny force sizing direction. CVN 75 is planned for retirement to
    pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms (e.g.
    CVNs) and complementary capabilities from emerging technologies.
    Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is projected to be
    balanced with these accelerated portfolio options of distributed
    effects.
        Persistent threat analysis and ongoing warfighting studies will
    continue to inform the requirements for specific battle force ships in
    the context of an evolving capability force mix, and the Navy is
    postured to respond to these studies. Reducing the naval carrier fleet
    without the complementary capabilities could result in reduced
    presence, a delayed warfighting response, and/or inability to deter a
    second opportunistic aggressor if engaged in a major combat operation.

        37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you concerned that
    our near peer competitors--most notably China--may attempt to exploit
    our near-term carrier capability gap?
        Secretary Shanahan. I do not foresee a gap in carrier capability or
    capacity. CVN 75 is currently scheduled for retirement in fiscal year
    (FY) 2024 and the Navy will maintain its capacity of 11 carriers until
    then. The $3.4 billion in savings from the decision to cancel the CVN
    75 refueling and comprehensive overhaul (RCOH) will be invested to
    pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms
    (including CVNs) and complementary capabilities leveraging emerging
    technologies. Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is
    projected to be offset by this portfolio of accelerated capability
    options. If these future force capabilities cannot be developed at a
    pace to mitigate the retirement of a carrier in fiscal year 2024, then
    we will revisit the decision and adjust accordingly.

        38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if this decision was
    made to increase investment, why does this year's budget request for
    Science & Technology (S&T) remain stagnant?
        Secretary Shanahan. While Navy Science & Technology account
    increased only by 1.2 percent from fiscal year 2019, most of the
    cutting-edge investments to improve naval lethality are part of either
    the Navy RDT&E account, which increased by 9.4 percent, or Procurement
    which increased by 7.8 percent. Within that context, the Truman
    decision, along with a two-carrier buy, provided funds to heavily
    invest in future diversified strike options. Those National Defense
    Strategy-driven decisions represent a conscious paradigm shift in naval
    force structure procurement for more advanced and distributed naval
    strike options to increase lethality and maneuver. To reach that goal,
    the Department increased investments in advanced strike options,
    including $3.6 billion in large, offensively-armed unmanned surface
    vessels; $1 billion in extra-large and large unmanned underwater
    vehicles; and $3.5 billion in advanced long range offensive and
    defensive munitions.

        39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does the President's
    budget require any additional resources to effectively address the
    submarine maintenance backlog? What additional funding or authorities
    may be necessary to get this timeline back on track? Will the Navy
    continue to award submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
    sector in order to alleviate these delays?
        Secretary Shanahan. As described in the Chief of Naval Operations'
    Fiscal Year 2020 Unfunded Priorities List, a number of requirements
    have emerged since the President's Budget was formulated. First among
    these is $653 million needed for submarine maintenance ($290 million
    for USS Boise, $306 million for USS Hartford, and $57 million for USS
    Columbus).
        The Navy will continue to consider both the public and private
    industrial base when scheduling the maintenance and modernization of
    its ships and submarines, however no further authorities are needed at
    this time to address the submarine maintenance backlog. The Navy is
    committed to working with the private shipbuilders to improve private
    sector cost and schedule as these are key to the Navy's ability to
    outsource future work. The Navy is reviewing contracting strategies,
    scheduling tools and better ways to share lessons learned from the
    public shipyards with private industry to improve private shipyard
    performance. The current plan is to award two SSN 688 class Engineered
    Overhauls in the next two fiscal years to the private sector to help
    reach the goal of eliminating submarine idle time by 2023.
                            civilian control of dod
        40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary,
    what actions have you taken to ensure DOD is upholding the principle of
    civilian control? In your view, has DOD fully addressed the
    Commission's concerns regarding the erosion of civilian control?
        Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
    exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
    responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
    planning. Civilian oversight of the military will continue to be
    vigorously exercised throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    as long as I am the Acting Secretary of Defense.

        41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, the Commission's report
    highlights the importance of civilian participation in discussions
    regarding force management and the prioritization of global challenges.
    What efforts have you made to identify and address instances where
    civilian voices were absent from critical discussions pertaining to
    national security strategy development and implementation--particularly
    in regards to global force management?
        Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
    exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
    responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
    planning. In particular, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
    Joint Staff work closely together to implement National Defense
    Strategy priorities; civilian voices are a key component of this
    implementation in global force management.

        42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what has DOD leadership
    done to ensure civilian employees feel empowered to fulfill their
    responsibilities?
        Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
    exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
    responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
    planning. I expect all Department of Defense civilian leaders to
    exercise these responsibilities on a daily basis.

        43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in November, the
    Commission testified that civilian personnel vacancies were a
    contributing factor to the imbalance of civilian control. What are you
    doing to recruit and retain civilian personnel? What is the current
    vacancy rate?
        Secretary Shanahan. I am confident in the civilian leaders we have
    in the Department of Defense and am proud to serve with them. The White
    House Personnel Office handles civilian nominations for the Department
    of Defense. My office provides recommendations to the White House to
    fill vacancies, but ultimately, key leader personnel decisions reside
    in the White House.

        44. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in your view, what are
    the long-term consequences of eroding civilian control of the military?
    How does an imbalance of civilian and military perspectives impact
    national security policy, and frame defense advice provided to the
    President?
        Secretary Shanahan. If civilian control of the military was eroding
    it would have my full attention, but I do not share the perception of
    this erosion. The Department has been and is civilian-led and under
    that statutory organizational model, I enjoy a close working
    relationship with all levels of military command.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                    indo-pacific alliances and partnerships
        45. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, in your written testimony you
    stated that the intended effect of China's efforts to deny access to
    the East and South China Seas is to weaken our alliance structure in
    the Indo-Pacific. Based on that, what is the current state of our
    alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, specifically the
    military-to-military relationships?
        General Dunford. Senator, in an update to the last 12 months,
    overall I assess China's behavior in the East and South China Seas has
    actually strengthened alliances and partnerships in the region. For
    some of the littoral states, China's militarization of the South China
    Sea and its challenges in the East China Sea have actually produced the
    opposite of China's intended effect--bringing the threat ``closer to
    home'' and hence the stronger mil-mil ties with the United States as a
    counterweight. However, those countries which have significant
    political and economic ties with China still have to tread carefully to
    maintain those interests.

        46. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, how resilient are our allies
    and partners in the face of China's economic and military growth?
        General Dunford. Senator, each of our allies and partners has their
    own sovereign decision and interest vis-a-vis China, and each has
    varying levels of economic and military capability and capacity to
    resist Chinese coercive influence. While some are better positioned
    economically and militarily, we cannot take their resilience for
    granted because China is actively pulling economic and military levers
    to negatively tip the scale towards their favor--interfering in allies
    and partners' domestic national choices. One-Belt One-Road is but one
    example of this economic-security fusion. We must offer stronger
    incentives across all elements of national power, but especially in the
    economic realm, to effectively bolster and complement the security
    support we provide to allies and partners to resist China's increased
    influence. We have to help allies and partners resist this infringement
    on their sovereignty and the abuse of the global norms. One example is
    strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense
    Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Over the last
    year, we have seen that countries across the region are becoming more
    aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose. Malaysia
    announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion in
    August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects,
    decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and
    criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.''

        47. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, what is the U.S. doing to
    support our allies and partners in the region to bolster our alliance
    structure?
        General Dunford. Senator, we have been, and will continue to resist
    coercive behavior and publically condemn maligned activities by all
    actors. Our allies and partners are encouraged by U.S. willingness to
    ``have skin in the game''--that is by sharing mutual risks, our
    commitment to support international laws and norms, and our willingness
    to speak out against destabilizing behavior. At the strategic level,
    the most effective action we can do to support allies and partners is
    to let them know that the United States military is combat credible and
    is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts have provided our
    allies and partners the space to push back against this oppressive
    influence. At the operational level it is to enhance our
    interoperability throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Expanding our
    interoperability will ensure our respective defense enterprises can
    work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and
    conflict--if it is imposed upon us. Increasing interoperability also
    includes ensuring our military hardware and software is able to more
    easily integrate with those of our closest allies and partners,
    offering financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment to
    security partners, and opening up the aperture of United States
    professional military education to more Indo-Pacific military officers.
    As such, we have strengthened our alliances with Australia, Japan, the
    ROK, and the Philippines, while maintaining our long-standing alliance
    with Thailand. These alliances are indispensable to peace and security
    in the region and our investments in them will continue to pay
    dividends far into the future.
                        military housing and child care
        48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, as you are aware, there was
    recently a tragedy in Hawaii where a 7-month old child passed away at
    what appears to be an unlicensed home day care in military family
    housing. While there are several investigations ongoing in that
    particular case, it raises a broader policy issue. Most enlisted
    servicemembers are under the age of 35 and many have families with
    young children. Nothing is more nerve-wracking for a parent than having
    to find safe, affordable child care for their children, especially when
    moving to a new duty station. Yet as the Committee has learned during
    the hearings on the privatized housing initiative and the tragedy in
    Hawaii, there are far too few child care slots available in military
    Child Development Centers (CDCs) for the families who need them. Many
    common-sense measures such as constructing new CDCs, streamlining
    hiring processes for child care workers, and increasing the
    transparency of wait lists have been proposed to address this issue.
    Will you commit to working with the Committee to address access to
    safe, affordable child care for military families as a readiness and
    retention issue?
        Secretary Shanahan. We are a young force with young families and we
    know that our servicemembers need to rely on safe, quality child care
    in order to focus on the mission. The Department of Defense has long
    been recognized as a model for child care in the United States; our
    programs provide care to more than 160,000 children on a daily basis.
    We fully understand that even with these numbers, many military
    families are challenged in finding access to child care. Unfortunately,
    there is no ``one size fits all solution'' for what is a national
    challenge, not just a military challenge. My office and each of the
    Military Departments are exploring a number of solutions.

        49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, does the fiscal year 2020
    budget request of over $700 billion for the Defense Department include
    appropriate resources to address the lack of sufficient access to this
    critical service for our military families?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Military Services indicate that they have
    reviewed their budgets and adjusted where needed to ensure sufficient
    funding for children, youth, and family programs.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                military housing
        50. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
    service chiefs agreed last week that there is value in having a uniform
    building code for military housing. Do you agree?
        Secretary Shanahan. To the maximum extent practicable, the
    Department of Defense (DOD) has required uniform building codes in the
    housing privatization agreements. When the Military Departments
    developed their agreements with the housing privatization partners,
    they required that the privatized housing adhere to DOD Unified
    Facilities Criteria (UFC) for fire protection and housing space
    standards, as well as state and local building codes (unless overridden
    by DOD UFCs), in addition to installation or Military Department
    specific requirements such as installation architectural standards.
        General Dunford. Nothing is more important than taking care of our
    members and their families and as such, I agree with the service
    chiefs, there is definite value in having a uniform building code for
    military housing. My staff and I will continue to work with the
    services to ensure our military families receive the housing they
    deserve.
                                  hypersonics
        51. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, I am
    pleased to see $2.6 billion budgeted for hypersonics. Sandia National
    Laboratories has played a critical role in developing this technology
    over decades. I've heard from our national labs how valuable it is to
    co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems. Do you agree?
        Secretary Shanahan. The National Labs, Government Labs, Federally-
    Funded Research & Development Centers and University Associated
    Research Centers have played a critical role in the development and
    demonstration of foundational hypersonic concepts and technologies.
    Much of the intellectual capital for the vehicle designs, and even some
    of the more advanced manufacturing techniques, resides within this
    government research and development ecosystem. We need to make sure
    that this core intellectual horsepower continues to focus on rapidly
    evolving our technology to address our most difficult challenges moving
    forward. We must accelerate the rate at which we transition from
    technology development and prototype demonstration to production of
    weapon systems. We are creating a highly collaborative environment
    between industry and government to accomplish this acceleration.
    Industry is essential to being able to produce weapon systems with the
    complexity and scale necessary to field warfighting capability. We must
    capture essential knowledge and transfer it to industry for production
    of the first generation of weapons while enabling the Labs to work on
    the next generation of capability.
        General Dunford. Co-location of research and development with
    manufacturing could result in efficiencies when it comes to getting new
    technologies into the manufacturing process. This is by no means a
    requirement, with today's world of technology and data transfer
    capabilities, information can be readily available in just about any
    location with Internet access. Contract selection should be based on
    considerations for how to develop the most effective systems, while
    being good stewards of our budget. It is possible that person to person
    contact can provide synergy and efficiencies that are difficult to
    quantify. However, it is also possible that a location-centric approach
    could increase costs over prioritizing allocation of available funding
    towards R&D.

        52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, do
    you think it is worth encouraging an ecosystem where the manufacturing
    and the core expertise for these systems exist together?
        Secretary Shanahan. I do not think that colocation of core
    hypersonic technical expertise with manufacturing is necessarily the
    most effective or efficient model for accelerating and sustaining the
    fielding of warfighting capability enabled by hypersonics. The
    expertise associated with some of the more advanced technologies may
    reside within our government research and development ecosystem, but
    that ecosystem is not as well suited as industry for production of
    large quantities of complex weapons systems. As such I think we need to
    work across our national infrastructure to optimize our path forward.
        General Dunford. I am an advocate of co-locating R&D and
    manufacturing facilities when it provides the warfighter an advanced
    capability fielded in the shortest amount of time and is also cost
    effective. There are potential areas where a geographically co-located
    ecosystem could play an important role in the cost, ease of
    communications and quality of the manufactured product; however, in
    today's highly-connected internet-of-things world geographic
    differences within the ecosystem could have less impact than they have
    had in the past on collaborations between design, manufacture and
    fielding activities, and are best determined on a case by case basis.

        53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
    2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise
    missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new
    creative solutions or acceleration of efforts to address them
    defensively. Do you believe we are acting with the right sense of
    urgency to counter those threats on the defensive side?
        Secretary Shanahan. In fiscal year 2020, the Department is
    continuing investments in Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defensive
    concepts. MDA is identifying the architecture requirements necessary to
    design an effective hypersonic missile defense system that can be
    integrated into the current ballistic missile defense system.
    Attributes of this architecture will be sensors for detection and
    track, battle management, command and control systems, and weapons for
    hypersonic missile intercept. The department is investing in
    technologies to mature promising space and ground sensor concepts and
    kinetic and non-kinetic intercept concepts through industry
    engagements.
        General Dunford. Yes--President's Budget 2020 is consistent with
    the National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review
    (MDR). The Missile Defense Defeat Enhancement (MDDE) in 2018 provided
    significant investment and the Department is sustaining critical near-
    term layered capabilities and initial investment in studies. The MDR
    directs researching improvements for timely warnings on hypersonic and
    advanced cruise missiles launched at the U.S. Homeland. Future
    investment recommendations will be balanced by additional insights
    drawn from an MDA Defense Against Hypersonic Threats (DAHT) Analysis of
    Alternatives (AoA) and an MDR directed follow-on analysis. MDA's DAHT
    AoA investigated a wide range of options.

        54. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, does
    the budget invest in those specific defensive capabilities to counter
    these threats? If so, please identify them for the Committee.
        Secretary Shanahan. The Missile Defense Agency Budget request for
    fiscal year 2020 includes $157.4 million for Hypersonic Defense to
    continue to assess architecture alternatives and provide
    recommendations for future Ballistic Missile Defense System
    configurations to keep pace with this threat. The budget request also
    invests $38 million for advanced targets to begin testing against this
    threat. The Agency is investing $116 million for Directed Energy to
    include a laser scaling effort that will develop scalable, efficient
    and compact high energy laser components for integration into high
    power systems; and $132 million for Discrimination Sensor Demonstrator
    Development to provide an airborne sensor to detect and discriminate
    advanced threats. The Space Development Agency (SDA) budget includes
    $20 million to foster development of a Department-wide Space Sensor
    Layer effort (referred to as Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
    Sensor (HBTSS)) and $30 million to do an assessment of architectures
    for a discriminating space sensor and a Space Based Interceptor.
        General Dunford. The Department is requesting $157.4 million in
    fiscal year 2020 for hypersonic defense to move from concept
    development to technology risk reduction. The fiscal year 2020 plan
    includes software modifications to current BMDS assets and further
    defines the architecture for future capability demonstrations. In
    addition, the Department is requesting $49.8 million in fiscal year
    2020 for the Space Development Agency to pursue a proliferated Low
    Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation. One goal of this constellation is to
    provide the space sensor capabilities for missile warning and missile
    defense.

        55. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, what
    specific defensive technologies and systems should the Committee be
    investing in to help counter cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
        Secretary Shanahan. Investments in space based sensor technologies;
    kinetic interceptor technologies to include advanced sensor,
    propulsion, material science and guidance and control technologies;
    non-kinetic directed energy defeat concepts to include cyber, high
    powered microwave systems, and high energy lasers; artificial
    intelligence for advanced command and control in conditions of high
    uncertainty, and electronic warfare will be essential technologies for
    defeat of advanced cruise and hypersonic missile threats.
        General Dunford. The fiscal year 2020 budget submission requests
    accelerated funding ($428 million) for the Army's new Patriot radar
    (Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS); rapid acquisition
    Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) for near-term air and
    cruise missile defense, and the restructuring of the Indirect Fire
    Capability (IFC). The Navy PB2020 budget invests in SM-6 and Air and
    Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The SM-6 RDT&E of $116 million budget
    includes initial funding for rapidly developing a new Block 1B
    interceptor to extend the range of the current system. This would
    increase the SM-6 capabilities to air defense, ballistic missile
    defense, and anti-ship strike. In addition, the Department is
    requesting $149.8 million in fiscal year 2020 for the Space Development
    Agency to pursue a proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation.
    Finally, the Department is developing a Low-Power Laser Demonstrator to
    evaluate the technologies necessary for mounting a laser on an unmanned
    airborne platform to track and destroy missiles in their boost phase.
                            artificial intelligence
        56. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, part
    of the challenge we are going to experience with integrating Artificial
    Intelligence into mission sets is that we need a deeper foundation of
    people who understand the technology and the importance of good,
    useable data. Do you believe DOD recruitment efforts are doing enough
    to target individuals with that kind of skill set?
        Secretary Shanahan. In both our enlisted and officer corps, the
    Services select and train individuals to meet future and current
    manning requirements. This includes specialized programs like
    Artificial Intelligence and Cyber. Officers are educated from a variety
    of outstanding colleges and universities around the country through the
    Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps, while others will attend the
    Military Service Academies. This education provides new officers with a
    solid foundation and the latest information available in these
    specialized areas. The Military Services also collaborate with industry
    to further develop the required skills of these officers. Our enlisted
    force is selected from among the best and the brightest of today's
    youth. The Military Services' selection and classification process uses
    a number of tools to further identify individuals with the greatest
    potential and aptitude to do well in these specialized areas. These
    servicemembers are selected and trained to meet the needs of their
    respective Military Service. Our civilian workforce also helps to round
    out and fill the needs of the Department for such skill sets.
        General Dunford. Yes. The Department is not complacent and across
    the government we need to synch efforts to attract the right people.
    The Services are recruiting skills sets that have the greatest
    potential for understanding the Artificial Intelligence (AI)
    technology. The military personnel policy changes within the 2019 NDAA
    and the service academies commitment to producing future leaders with
    computer science and technical education are among the many efforts the
    Services are implementing to produce the right skill sets. In addition
    to recruiting efforts, Services internally train enlisted personnel who
    have demonstrated aptitude in cyber and other technical fields and
    endeavor to retain this talent by increasing bonuses in those highly
    technical areas. The Services have routinely collaborated with industry
    leaders in many technical fields to build critical skills within our
    current force. The civilian workforce also helps to meet Department
    needs, and I defer to Civilian Personnel leaders to address how the
    civilian workforce is employed.

        57. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is
    there value in the services assigning someone specifically for
    recruiting individuals in this area?
        Secretary Shanahan. I believe each Service is best positioned to
    make that determination based on its own needs and requirements. The
    Military Services currently have the authority and resources to pursue
    that effort.
        General Dunford. Yes. There is value in assigning specific
    individuals to recruit in AI. Services have seen success in using those
    already in a particular field to recruit additional talent in that same
    field and the Services are best positioned to determine those needs.
    For example, the Navy uses nuclear trained sailors and officers to
    recruit others into the field of this high demand/low density area.
    Special Operations, Cyber, and Linguists have all been used to recruit
    personnel within their respective areas of expertise. In this
    increasingly challenging recruiting environment, we appreciate the
    additional authorities granted in the NDAA as we consider initiatives
    to attract and retain the right talent.
                           breakout of dod ai funding
        58. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, the fiscal year 2020
    budget request includes a $927 million investment in Artificial
    Intelligence, with money directed toward the Joint Artificial
    Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Advanced Image Recognition (Project
    Maven). Can you please provide the breakdown on how the $927 million
    will be allocated?
        Secretary Norquist. The Department's total Artificial Intelligence
    (AI) request is classified and can be provided under separate cover
    upon request. The $927 million request highlights three major AI
    efforts. The funding allocation is detailed in the table below:

        59. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, one impediment to
    accurately evaluating funding levels for AI is the lack of a stand-
    alone AI Program Element (PE) in DOD funding tables. As a result, AI
    R&D appropriations are spread throughout generally titled PEs and
    incorporated into funding for larger systems with AI components. As the
    lead coordinating entity for AI, do you have visibility on the
    Department of Defense's total investment in AI, including Services and
    components, and can you provide that breakdown to the Committee by PE
    and amounts?
        Secretary Norquist. The Department is working to more rigorously
    identify AI funding in its databases for future budget requests. For
    fiscal year 2020, the Department's data call likely captured most of
    the ongoing AI efforts, but a complete report of funding by program
    element is not available. While some AI efforts are large, stand-alone
    projects, such as JAIC and Project MAVEN, the vast majority are
    embedded in weapons and business systems. Identifying the cost of these
    efforts within larger systems will always have an element of
    uncertainty.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                defense funding
        60. Senator Warren. General Dunford, in the course of your
    testimony, you said the following with regard to defense funding: ``We
    have routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has
    delayed new starts and it's been incredibly inefficient in how we
    prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year and the three
    adjectives I use and I think they are all important is predictable,
    sustained and adequate levels of funding and if we had the entire
    fiscal year we could be the good stewards that you should hold us
    accountable for being.'' With the understanding that predictability,
    sustainment, and adequacy are all important, please prioritize among
    those. Which one is the most important and why?
        General Dunford. Predictable, sustained, and adequate funding are
    interdependent variables and are equally necessary to meet NDS
    priorities. All three attributes translate to budget stability, which
    the Department requires to build a more lethal, resilient, agile, and
    ready Joint Force. Predictable funding builds readiness and supports
    effective planning--both for the military and the Industrial base.
    Sustained funding ensures we can modernize and invest for the future.
    Adequate funding ensures the Joint Force can balance building capacity
    to ``fight tonight'' while also ensuring the ability to deter, defend,
    and, if necessary, defeat future threats posed by near-peer
    adversaries.
                                 climate change
        61. Senator Warren. General Dunford, the unclassified worldwide
    threat assessment by the Director of National Intelligence said:
    ``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate
    change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic
    distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' That
    assessment also said: ``Damage to communication, energy, and
    transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military bases,
    inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and loss of
    life.'' Do you agree with the Intelligence Community's assessment?
        General Dunford. Yes.

        62. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that climate
    change is a national security threat to the United States?
        General Dunford. Climate change is a national security issue. The
    effects of climate change such as shortages of water, food, or
    migration can be sources of conflict.

        63. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the
    Department of Defense can and should be doing more to address the
    threat of climate change? Please explain.
        General Dunford. The U.S. military is routinely tasked to assist
    with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

        64. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the
    combatant commands should incorporate climate change into their
    operational plans and planning processes?
        General Dunford. The joint staff and combatant commands already
    take the effects of climate change into account when planning. Climate
    change is one of many factors the Joint Force considers when planning
    for future military operations.

        65. Senator Warren. General Dunford, does adapting to climate
    change have any negative impact on the readiness of our military to
    address the five challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and
    violent extremism)?
        General Dunford. Responding to any conflict or unanticipated
    requirement impacts readiness and affects our ability to respond to
    other challenges.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                     pfoa/pfos clean up for national guard
        66. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as you know state-owned
    National Guard facilities that are associated with PFAS contamination
    of drinking water in their communities do not currently have access to
    Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) dollars like their
    Active Duty counterparts do. Last year Senator Gillibrand, who had
    similar problems with National Guard facilities in her state, proposed
    an amendment in the NDAA to change this and allow National Guard
    facilities to utilize DERP funds instead of being forced to take from
    their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. This amendment was
    stripped prior to the final version of the NDAA. Obviously,
    environmental cleanup is not the purpose of O&M dollars. Our national
    guards units use the same firefighting foam and train the same way as
    their Active Duty counterparts for ease of integration and to maximize
    the effects of the total force. Would you support the passage of an
    amendment proposed again this year to allow National Guard facilities
    to access DERP dollars for PFAS and any associated contamination
    cleanup?
        Secretary Shanahan. We reviewed the authorities for use of Defense
    Environmental Restoration Program funds at State Air National Guard
    (ANG) facilities for remediating PFOS/PFOA. While these funds are not
    available for use at State owned or operated ANG facilities for cleanup
    activities, Operation & Maintenance ANG funds are being used, making a
    change unnecessary. The Air Force has programmed funds in the Air
    National Guard Operation & Maintenance account for the ANG to meet
    their Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
    Act responsibility.
                                f-15ex and f-35
        67. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, in February the Secretary
    of the Air Force Heather Wilson admitted that the Air Force's 2020
    budget submission to the Department of Defense did not include any F-
    15EX aircraft procurement. Further, she stated that the F-15EX
    procurement was added by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    for the final department budget. Further, recent OSD budget briefs to
    Congress have referenced results of a comprehensive study that explains
    the requirement for a fourth generation fighter to fill capacity and
    operational cost gaps, but they can't share much of the details due to
    claims of classification. If the experts in combat aircraft and
    associated force presentation, the Air Force, didn't identify a need
    for the F-15EX, then what does OSD know that the Air Force doesn't
    about the future threat environment or operational needs requiring the
    addition of fourth generation aircraft?
        Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX
    was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs,
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program
    and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and
    2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity
    that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military
    operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued
    investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has
    an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX. The savings
    of F-15EX are not realized in the initial procurement but instead in
    the Operations and Sustainment costs that are significantly less than
    that of a fifth generation aircraft.

        68. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the F-
    15EX is a platform that is already largely un-survivable against many
    near peer weapon systems. This problem will only get worse over the
    expected lifespan of the F-15EX of 15-20 years. What is the long term
    intent of acquiring up to 80 F-15EX aircraft that clearly do not align
    with the priorities set forth in the National Defense Strategy of
    competing with ever advancing technology from our biggest competitors?
        Secretary Shanahan. The F-15EX aligns with many portions of the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS). Specifically, the capability and
    capacity that a modernized and capable 4th generation platform brings
    to bear against both state and non-state actors. The NDS highlights
    that even non-state actors now have access to increasingly
    sophisticated weapons systems. The F-15EX has been continuously
    modernized both for the United States fleet as well as over $5 billion
    worth of investment by foreign partner nations that continue to procure
    the aircraft today. At the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict,
    there is still a requirement for fourth generation aircraft even
    against a near pear competitor if it is part of an appropriate balance
    of capabilities. Not all missions will require the low observability
    and advanced systems of 5th generation aircraft. The decision to
    procure F-15EX is directed at replacing existing legacy F-15s that are
    approaching the end of their lifecycle. The age of legacy F-15s
    contributes to increased O&S costs.
        General Dunford. The gaps identified in the 2018 Joint Military Net
    Assessment led to the Air Superiority Competitive Area Study which
    outlined capability, capacity, and readiness issues. The Competitive
    Area Study identified materiel and non-materiel recommendations and
    investment opportunities that could increase capability and/or
    capacity. One of the recommendations was F-15EX. F-15EX supports the
    priorities identified in the National Defense Strategy by providing
    modernized capacity, teamed with 5th gen capabilities, to contribute to
    and enhance lethality and survivability in contested environments.
    Short term recapitalization of the aging F-15C with F-15EX provides
    increased munitions capacity, advanced sensors, and weapons
    capabilities, and improved operational readiness capacity. The F-15EX
    replaces the aging F-15C/D fleet which will be retired by the late
    2020's.
                   cybersecurity and defense industrial base
        69. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, West
    Virginia is home to a number of companies that are a part of the
    defense industrial base and we're proud of the work that they do to
    ensure that our servicemen and women have the resources it needs. Our
    industry partners are just as big of targets, if not more, as the DOD
    for cyber theft and espionage. I'm particularly worried about our
    smaller subcontractors who do not always have the capital to invest in
    robust cybersecurity protection for their networks. What industry best
    practices or internally developed actions are you undertaking to better
    protect our industry partners who are developing defense capabilities
    from being attacked?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Defense
    Industrial Base (DIB) are true partners in addressing the needs of
    cybersecurity because every aspect of software and information
    technology pervades all aspects of DOD's mission (from business systems
    to weapons systems, supporting infrastructure to cybersecurity to
    space). Our collective responsibility is to ensure that DOD goods and
    services are delivered in conjunction with a strong, unified
    cybersecurity standard. We in the department see the need to create a
    unified cybersecurity standard, as currently there are several. The
    unified standard needs to take all of the controls called out in
    National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171.1 and
    53, as well as International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
    27001 and other various standards across the DOD Supply Chain. With our
    industry partners we are currently evaluating how to strengthen and
    unify these cybersecurity standards in the DOD Supply Chain. We believe
    a comprehensive standard, as well as certification, will reduce risk
    across the entire DIB. Small businesses are critical to our National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) especially for innovation and specialization
    within the DIB. We aim to support the unified standard with a third-
    party certification process. The certification must be cost effective
    enough that small businesses can achieve certification with
    commercially available solution sets for those who might not have the
    capital to invest to meet certification. This unified standard effort
    is supportive of our efforts in regard to the SECURE Technologies Act
    of 2018. That Act, among other things, establishes the Federal
    Acquisition Security Council. The Department will actively participate
    in that Council, which is chaired by the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB), to develop security standards and metrics for the entire
    Federal Acquisition Supply Chain. We are doing this in an open dialogue
    with all elements of the industrial base, as we need to be cognizant
    that we are just partners in our DIB. This effort is currently
    underway, and we will be conducting listening sessions with industry
    over the next few months to chart our path forward.
        General Dunford. Senator, the Department is gravely concerned over
    the illicit transfer of advanced capabilities. As we continue to invest
    in next generation technologies, it is critical that we protect each in
    the R&D phase and beyond. Just last November, the Department stood up
    the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force which reports directly
    to the Vice Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This group is
    tasked with integrating, accelerating, scaling and institutionalizing
    the Department's efforts to protect critical capabilities. That said,
    this issue extends beyond contractors, subcontractors, and
    cybersecurity. Our adversaries are acquiring U.S. critical technology
    through a variety of licit and illicit means to include cyber theft,
    nefarious engagement in our R&D base, investments in acquisitions, and
    talent recruitment efforts. Specific to attacks on the defense
    industrial base, we are raising cybersecurity standards for new and
    existing contracts, moving away from a self-assessment evaluations to a
    model where the Department is actually enforcing cybersecurity
    compliance, and making cybersecurity part of our source selection and
    program evaluation criteria Furthermore, the President's Budget
    submission for fiscal year 2020 contains a request for $15 million in
    fiscal year 2020 and $10 million in fiscal year 2021 for a ``DIB Cloud
    Pilot''. The Department anticipates using these funds to develop a
    Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) effort and to conduct
    a range of other supporting Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity
    pilots. The objective of the CMMC activity is to accelerate and
    validate the adoption of a cybersecurity maturity model for the DIB and
    further develop a framework for implementing an independent third party
    certification process to assess the commercial sector against the CMMC
    standards. The maturity model standards will be tiered and provide a
    more cost effective approach for smaller companies by requiring them to
    implement the appropriate set of controls based on the information they
    need to protect. The additional DIB pilot efforts will assess the
    feasibility of smaller DIB companies migrating to more cost effective
    secure environments. These combined activities are intended to increase
    the overall cyber hygiene of the DIB and help smaller companies better
    secure their data. Finally, we are also looking at measures to increase
    the integrity of the supply chain so that increased levels of
    cybersecurity extend beyond the prime contractors typically associated
    with DOD contracts to those subprime contractors as well.
                         dod budget and border security
        70. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as we have started to dig
    into the President's budget request this week, there's a lot of
    questions over the DOD portion being requested for border wall funding.
    A combination of an emergency fund as well as other budget shell games
    give us $8.6 billion in border wall funding for fiscal year 2020. Given
    the briefs we've already heard from your office this week, it seems
    like a lot of energy is being spent by your department to figure out
    how to fund this primarily non-military requirement from the President.
    This appears to be taking a large portion of both your time and staff
    time to discuss and calculate. Is our attention in the Department of
    Defense budget discussion adequately covering the required defense
    items given the time and energy senior officials and staff have spent
    on figuring out how to carve out pieces of the military budget for a
    border wall?
        Secretary Shanahan. Preparation of the Department's Fiscal Year
    2020 President's Budget request is a comprehensive, deliberative
    process involving the Department's senior leadership. The Department of
    Defense fiscal year 2020 budget request provides a foundation for
    transformational change and implementation of the National Defense
    Strategy. Through the strategic reprioritization of resources during
    the development of the budget, the Department increased investments in
    specific key areas such as cyber and space warfighting domains,
    capability modernization, and acceleration of emerging technologies.
    The deliberate investment of time in developing this budget will better
    enable us to deter and win against adversaries.
                   critical infrastructure and cyber security
        71. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
    budget we've been presented lays out $9.6 billion for DOD cyber domain
    efforts to include network, infrastructure and offensive and defensive
    cyber capabilities. As the Ranking Member of the Cyber Security
    Subcommittee and with my work on Energy and Natural Resources I have
    become deeply concerned with the vulnerabilities faced by our Nation's
    critical infrastructure. How much of the Department's efforts with
    these cyber security funds are directed at making sure our critical
    infrastructure that is vital to the defense of this country is
    protected from cyber-attacks by countries like China, North Korea,
    Russia and Iran?
        Secretary Shanahan. Defense of national critical infrastructure is
    a key area of emphasis for the Department. This emphasis reflects the
    fact that competitors are targeting these assets, and that any large-
    scale disruption or degradation of national critical infrastructure,
    not just Department of Defense (DOD) infrastructure, would be a
    national security concern. We seek to preempt, defeat, or deter
    significant malicious cyber activity targeting national critical
    infrastructure by 1) defending forward to stop threats before they
    reach their targets and 2) supporting the Department of Homeland
    Security in fulfilling its responsibility to coordinate the overall
    Federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the Nation's
    critical infrastructure.
        Last year, Secretary Mattis and Secretary Nielsen signed a joint
    memorandum of understanding (MOU) detailing how our two departments can
    cooperate in order to secure and defend the Homeland from cyber
    threats. The MOU reiterates Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
    primary role as the U.S. Government lead for protection of national
    critical infrastructure, and emphasizes DOD's unique mission of
    defending forward. These roles are mutually reinforcing; DHS's efforts
    at home enable DOD to project power both in cyberspace and in the
    physical domains, even as our efforts outside the Homeland help to
    secure U.S. infrastructure. As part of the efforts to implement this
    MOU fully, DOD and DHS senior leaders recently signed a charter
    creating a Cyber Protection and Defense Steering Group. This steering
    group provides us with visibility into existing areas of DOD-DHS cyber
    cooperation, enabling us to synchronize our efforts more effectively.
    By bringing leaders from both departments into the same working group,
    we are able to collaborate better, and to ensure that our two
    departments are able to address cyber threats synergistically, rather
    than work at cross-purposes.
        General Dunford. The Department is also deeply concerned about
    protecting our Nation's critical infrastructure. Congruent with the
    2017 NDAA Section 1650, we have been addressing this issue. The Joint
    Staff provided a tiered list of DOD installations based on strategic
    importance to global missions and OSD is actively working to conduct
    evaluations of cyber vulnerabilities at these locations. We are
    currently in a pilot phase of cyber assessments and hope to use these
    pilots as a model to conduct full evaluations of all DOD installations
    in the near future. Our budget request includes $8 million and 8
    manpower positions for this purpose. Once our vulnerabilities are
    identified, we will work with Congress to fund mitigations strategies
    to maximize security of our infrastructure. DOD keenly understands that
    we rely heavily on commercial infrastructure, and particularly, our
    Nation's energy grid. To that end, we are actively working with
    industry and the Army Cyber Institute to increase DOD participation in
    the Jack Voltaic series of research projects, which is an innovative
    bottom-up approach to critical infrastructure resilience. This analysis
    of strengths and weaknesses, tailored specifically to stress aspects of
    the incident response and disaster recovery plans, identifies gaps in
    critical infrastructure cybersecurity that directly and indirectly
    supports the DOD mission.
                            state department budget
        72. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, the State Department is
    seeing a 23 percent decrease in its budget at the same time the
    Department of Defense is seeing an increase of approximately 5 percent.
    Secretary Mattis famously said that if we cut the State Department we
    were going to have to buy him more bullets. The State Department
    already traditionally operates on a fraction of the amount that the
    Department of Defense receives. I understand that you are not
    responsible for them, but do you consider such a drastic cut to the
    State Department budget as an overall negative for the Department of
    Defense given the additional duties your department will be forced to
    execute alongside a weaker State Department?
        Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense supports the State
    Department's role in U.S. foreign policy. Along with the National
    Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security, we have
    generated remarkable alignment across the U.S. Government on a range of
    defense issues. I am in constant dialogue with Secretary Pompeo, and
    will let him address the appropriate level for the State Department
    budget. That said, achieving the objectives of the National Defense
    Strategy requires a strong, well-resourced interagency partner in the
    State Department.
                               gao high risk list
        73. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, this week GAO released its
    2019 High Risk List report. There were several DOD items on the list--
    for right now, I'd like to focus on Weapons System Acquisition. In
    April 2018, GAO reported that the DOD expects to invest $1.66 trillion
    in total to develop and procure its portfolio of 86 major defense
    acquisition programs. For years, DOD has struggled with cost, schedule,
    and performance goals. In fact, this weapons system acquisition was
    added to the GAO High Risk List in 1990. While GAO notes there has been
    some partial progress, there are still things that need to be done such
    as:

        Tracking the costs to correct defects after ship delivery to help
    determine cases in which warranties could contribute to improvements in
    the cost and quality of Navy ships.

        Requiring the Missile Defense Agency to make its cost estimates
    more comprehensive, to stabilize its element and program baselines by
    better understanding requirements before setting a baseline, and--once
    a baseline is set--to track revisions to enable meaningful comparisons
    over time.

        Can you tell me how you and the Department of Defense are
    addressing these issues by discussing any meaningful steps being taken
    and when we will see or be briefed on the results?
        Secretary Shanahan. With regard to cost, schedule, and performance
    goals generally, section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by
    section 831 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 (Public Law 115-232),
    requires the designated milestone decision authority to establish cost,
    fielding, and performance goals (also called targets) before funds are
    obligated for technology development, systems development, or
    production of a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). Further,
    Department of Defense Instructions stipulate that MDAPs are to report
    program data including unit cost estimates and Defense Acquisition
    Executive Summaries (DAES) on a quarterly basis after submission of the
    Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). USD(A&S) offices provide analysis of
    reported data to USD(A&S), Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) and
    Program Offices.
        With regard to tracking the costs to correct defects after ship
    delivery, the Department of Defense stated in our response to the GAO
    recommendation 3 in GAO-16-71 Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: Navy
    Should Reconsider Approach to Warranties for Correcting Construction
    Defects, the GAO assertion that the Navy is not tracking the costs to
    correct defects after ship delivery to help determine cases in which
    warranties could contribute to improvements in the cost and quality of
    Navy ships is inaccurate. The Navy has been differentiating the
    Government's and shipbuilder's responsibility for defects and tracking
    the costs to correct all defects after delivery on shipbuilding
    contracts. The costs for any shipbuilder responsible corrections are
    tracked by the SUPSHIP and the shipbuilding program office.
        With regards to the Missile Defense Agency, the Department
    partially concurred with the GAO recommendation regarding the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) life cycle costs, agreeing that decision makers
    should have insight into the full life cycle costs of programs. The
    Department concurred with the recommendation regarding the
    stabilization of the MDA acquisition baselines. However, it is
    necessary to recognize that Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
    baselines change to respond to evolving requirements provided by other
    organizations and leaders, from the Warfighter to the President, to
    counter changing threats. We also noted that the MDA Director has
    authority to make these adjustments within departmental guidelines. The
    MDA has enhanced the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
    Accountability Report (BAR) format to be able to track revisions.
                               duty status reform
        74. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, Duty
    Status reform is a significant concern of mine given the large National
    Guard presence in West Virginia. I hope that your proposals are based
    on extensive consultation with the states regarding title 32 and other
    significant National Guard issues. Can you please share your
    discussions with state leadership and the results of those discussions
    as far as support or disagreement with your Duty Status Reform
    suggestions?
        Secretary Shanahan. From the very beginning in developing a Duty
    Status Reform proposal, the Department has been open and transparent,
    collaborating freely across the entire Department of Defense and
    throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with leadership
    from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau, as well as
    with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs and
    Labor, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional
    Budget Office, and others. Throughout the entire process, the
    Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and
    adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to
    include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At
    numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked
    collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed the identified issues,
    while retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the
    proposal is cleared by OMB and enacted, we anticipate a significant
    period of time will be required to fully implement. The Department will
    continue to work with the Congress to make any additional changes that
    are required prior to implementation. I commit to continuing to work
    with States and other stakeholders as we move forward on this critical
    reform effort.
        General Dunford. From the very beginning in developing a Duty
    Status Reform proposal, the Department has been fully open and
    transparent, collaborating freely across the entire Department of
    Defense and throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with
    leadership from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau,
    as well as with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans
    Affairs and Labor, the Office of Management and Budget, the
    Congressional Budget Office, and more. Throughout the entire process,
    the Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and
    adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to
    include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At
    numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked
    collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed these issues, while
    retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the
    proposal is enacted, we anticipate a significant period of time will be
    required to implement. We request the support of Congress to support
    any legislative adjustments that need to be made to address unforeseen
    issues and concerns that may arise post-enactment. We are committed to
    continuing to work with the Congress, the states, and others as we move
    forward to implement the comprehensive, fundamental reform needed to
    support our National Guardsmen and reservists.

        75. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
    Governors have been very clear that they do not accept that changes to
    the Insurrection Act in title 10, chapter 13 are necessary to complete
    the Duty Status Reform. Have any of your Duty Status reforms made
    changes to title 10, chapter 13, and if so, what are the impacts and
    cost of Duty Status reform?
        Secretary Shanahan. Throughout the development of our Duty Status
    Reform initiative, the Department has zealously guarded the
    prerogatives, responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and
    states, including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in
    chapter 13 of title 10, United States Code. Today's ``patchwork quilt''
    of laws, policies and procedures that govern how leaders utilize and
    manage our Reservist components, and how Reservists and National
    Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits, is a complex system fraught with
    inequities, disparity, and complexity. I recognize some concern has
    been expressed that Duty Status Reforms would fundamentally alter the
    role of governors as it pertains to the Insurrection Act. I can assure
    the Congress that is not our intent.
        General Dunford. Throughout the development of our Duty Status
    Reform initiative, DOD has zealously guarded the prerogatives,
    responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and states,
    including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in chapter 13 of
    title 10, United States Code. Duty status reform, however, is long
    overdue. Today's ``patchwork quilt'' of laws, policies and procedures
    that govern how our leaders utilize and manage our Reserve components,
    and how Reservists and National Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits,
    is a complex system fraught with inequities, disparity, and complexity.
    Through adoption of a new Reserve Component duty status structure, our
    comprehensive draft legislative proposal simplifies and streamlines the
    more than 27 existing Reserve Component duty statuses, improves the
    utilization of the Reserve Components, and most importantly, aligns pay
    and benefits according to the nature of the work Reserve and National
    Guard members perform in service to their country. I recognize some
    concern has been expressed that the Department's duty status reform
    concept would fundamentally alter the role of governors as it pertains
    to the Insurrection Act. I can assure the Congress that was never our
    intent, and while it is absolutely necessary to reorganize the
    provisions of the Insurrection Act in order to effect the simplified,
    streamlined, duty status structure we are proposing, our current
    legislative draft proposal does preserve the governor's role and
    authority as specified in the Act. To the extent, however, that
    specific concerns with the Department's proposal as currently drafted,
    have been identified, OSD staff has worked closely with their National
    Guard Bureau colleagues and state Adjutants General representatives to
    address these concerns. Further, the Department will continue to work
    openly and transparently with all stakeholders to ensure any future
    concerns are also responsibly and fairly addressed. In terms of the
    part of your question that pertains to costs, at this time our proposal
    is pending release by the Office of Management and Budget, so the
    Department is unable to address the specifics of the budgetary
    implications of this proposal. However, throughout the development of
    the Duty Status Reform initiative, the Department considered the
    potential budgetary implications of this comprehensive, fundamental
    reform.

                               Appendix A
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  ARMY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Cramer, McSally, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal,
    Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        We--as soon as we have a quorum here, we do have some
    nominations that have to break into the regular order.
        The Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of
    the U.S. Army in fiscal year 2020 budget request.
        We welcome Dr. Mark Esper, the Secretary of the Army, and
    General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army. We thank both
    of you for your years of distinguished service. Look forward to
    the upcoming months.
        The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
    to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This
    means that we've got to be prepared to deter--if necessary,
    decisively defeat--potential near-peer adversaries, obviously
    referring to China and Russia.
        In order for the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must
    be manned, trained, and equipped appropriately. The Army has
    made significant progress in rebuilding readiness across the
    force, but there's still a lot to be done. A high state of
    readiness is crucial for our Nation to demonstrate peace
    through strength.
        With their alarming speed of modernization of both
    conventional and nuclear forces, China and Russia now present a
    credible threat to America and our allies in their regions, and
    an increasing threat around the world. In fact, in some areas
    they--they've actually surpassed us. It's a hard thing to
    explain to American people. They always assume that we have the
    very best of everything. That has been true in the past. It's
    not true today.
        It's past time for action. You have testified that the Army
    is outranged and outgunned, as currently organized and
    equipped. The future of our Army readiness and the relevance
    requires modernization now. Any successful modernization
    strategy must focus on results. Rapid prototyping and realistic
    experimentation will be vital to getting modern, reliable,
    lethal weapons into the hands of our soldiers, and doing so on
    time within allotted budgets. We cannot allow the past
    acquisition failures to continue any longer.
        The Army undertook a detailed and exhaustive look at every
    single program to ensure that each supports the National
    Defense Strategy. This National Defense Strategy, which, of
    course, we've had two hearings on this, it's a strategy that
    was agreed to by both Democrats and Republicans, and we're
    trying to use that as our blueprint. These choices will require
    an open and transparent dialogue with Congress along the way.
    We look forward to working with you to make our shared
    modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvests itself to
    become a 21st century fighting force prepared for the more
    lethal and dynamic battlefields of the future.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Esper and General
    Milley to this morning's hearing. This will likely be the last
    time that General Milley testifies before the Committee in the
    capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army. So, let me thank you,
    General, for the leadership of our soldiers, very, very much.
        The President's budget request for fiscal year 2020
    includes $182.3 billion in funding for the Army. Of that
    amount, 150.7 billion is for the base budget requirements, and
    31.6 billion for overseas contingency operations activities.
    This request should be evaluated in the context of the National
    Defense Strategy and the national security challenges facing
    our country. The renewed focus on strategic competition with
    China and Russia will require the Army to train for full-
    spectrum operations and to field equipment necessary for a
    high-end fight. I commend the Army for recognizing that, while
    there is a change in strategy, budgets remain constrained. I
    understand that, as this budget was developed, senior Army
    leadership scrutinized existing programs to determine which
    ones supported the Army's modernization priorities and which
    programs should be reduced or canceled so that savings could be
    reinvested. While the Committee may not agree with every budget
    decision made by the Army, they did make tough decisions to
    prioritize funding for the future fight.
        In support of the focus on near-peer competition, the Army
    has also made major structural changes to expedite
    modernization across the force. The Army has established eight
    cross-functional teams to demonstrate capabilities through
    prototyping and experimentation for major modernization
    priorities. The Army is also exercising new acquisition
    authorities provided by Congress, while Army Futures Command
    was established as the single command for all modernization
    efforts. Delivering cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter
    under an expedited acquisition timeline is always a challenge.
    To do so while undergoing a major structural and cultural
    change with the establishment of the Army Futures Command makes
    this process even more complex.
        While I applaud the Army for taking a hard look at their
    acquisition processes, we do not have a wide margin for
    mistakes, given the threats from our adversaries. I asked our
    witnesses this morning to share what the Army has learned to
    date from these efforts.
        While modernizing military platforms and upgraded equipment
    are critical for the battlefield, ensuring our soldiers are
    ready for the fight remains our highest priority. I commend
    Army leadership for their focus on unit readiness and for
    submitting a budget proposal that supports 25 Combat Training
    Center rotations for brigade combat teams. This budget request
    seeks an increase of 2,000 Active Duty soldiers as well as a
    slight end-strength increase for the Army National Guard and
    Reserve. It is imperative that, as the Army grows, it remains
    focused on the quality of our soldiers rather than the
    quantity. The Army has acknowledged that they were unable to
    meet the recruitment goals last year, and I would like to know
    from our witnesses how the Army plans to address this
    challenge.
        The President's budget also requests an across-the-board
    pay raise of 3.1 percent for all military personnel, equal to
    the annual increase in the employment cost index. However, once
    again, the President has decided not to include in this budget
    the funding necessary to support a pay raise for civilian
    employees. This budget request also makes reduction to Federal
    employee pensions affecting current and future employees.
    Civilians working in the Department of the Army are force
    multipliers and part of the total force. Unfortunately, by
    denying a corresponding pay increase for our civilians and
    cutting their pensions, the President's budget request sends
    the message that their work and contributions to our national
    defense are not as highly valued as they should be, and it
    hinders the Army's ability to recruit the very best civilian
    workforce we need. I hope to hear from our witnesses their
    views on the morale of the Army civilian workforce and their
    ability to effectively manage the total force, including
    civilian employees.
        Finally, I wanted to close on two important issues. First,
    this Committee has received the list of military construction
    projects that will be targeted in order to resource the
    President's proposed wall. Many of these projects are Army
    military construction priorities, and they will be at risk for
    delay or cancellation. Also, there are concerns that troop
    deployments to the southern border may undermine Army readiness
    goals. Given the efforts by the Army over the past several
    years to rebuild readiness, I would like to hear from our
    witnesses today whether moving funds from military construction
    projects or deploying soldiers to the border will have a
    detrimental impact on readiness.
        Second, I want to emphasize the urgency of fixing the
    substandard living conditions that are pervasive in privatized
    military housing. I appreciate the Army has acknowledged the
    enormity of the issue and that they are working to address this
    crisis. In the meantime, this Committee will continue our
    stringent oversight until every servicemember and their family
    has access to the high-quality housing that they have earned
    and deserve.
        Again, thank you. I look forward to hearing from the
    witnesses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Now Carl Doms and your group understand why you're here
    today.
        Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to
    consider a list of 2,743 pending military nominations. All the
    nominations have been before the Committee the required length
    of time.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these----
        Senator Reed. So moved.
        Chairman Inhofe.--2,743----
        Senator Wicker. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe.--pending----
        There's a motion. There's a second.
        All in favor, say aye.
        [A chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
        [No response.]

        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
    Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 26, 2019.
         1.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with Leonard F. Anderson IV)
    (Reference No. 32)

         2.  In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel M. Anderson) (Reference No.
    288)

         3.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Matthew D. Colsia) (Reference No. 305)

         4.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Deven R. Gaston) (Reference No. 306)

         5.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Steven M. Angeline) (Reference No. 319)

         6.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with David F. Hunley) (Reference No.
    326)

         7.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (John C. Jarvis) (Reference No. 328)

         8.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Nathaneal J. Hart, Jr.) (Reference No. 337)

         9.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Matthew J. Anderson) (Reference No. 340)

        10.  RADM(lh) Peter G. Stamatopoulos, USN to be rear admiral
    (Reference No. 346)

        11.  RADM(lh) Gayle D. Shaffer, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
    No. 347)

        12.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (list begins with Kelly A. Aeschbach) (Reference No. 348)

        13.  In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (list begins with Blake L. Converse) (Reference No. 349)

        14.  Capt. Dean A. Vanderley, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 354)

        15.  Capt. Kenneth W. Epps, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 355)

        16.  Capt. Timothy H. Weber, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 356)

        17.  Capt. James L. Hancock, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 357)

        18.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (lower half) (list begins with Nicholas M. Homan) (Reference
    No. 358)

        19.  Capt. Charles W. Brown, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 359)

        20.  In the Army there are 949 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Adrian Acevedo) (Reference No. 380)

        21.  In the Army there are 556 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Benjamin T. Abel) (Reference No. 381)

        22.  In the Army there are 555 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Kwansah E. Ackah) (Reference No. 382)

        23.  In the Army there are 51 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Alan Adame) (Reference No. 383)

        24.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Elizabeth A. Fields) (Reference No. 384)

        25.  RADM John B. Nowell, Jr., USN to be vice admiral and Chief of
    Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower,
    Personnel, Training, and Education, N1 (Reference No. 393)

        26.  MG Steven L. Basham, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Commander, US Air Forces Europe and Deputy Commander, US Air Forces
    Africa (Reference No. 419)

        27.  Col. Steven J. Butow, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 420)

        28.  MG Karen H. Gibson, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Director of National Intelligence for National Security Partnerships,
    Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Reference No. 421)

        29.  In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (list begins with James P. Downey) (Reference No. 422)

        30.  RADM Ronald A. Boxall, USN to be vice admiral and Director,
    Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff (Reference
    No. 423)

        31.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (Thomas D. Crimmins) (Reference No. 425)

        32.  In the Air Force there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Shawn C. Bishop) (Reference No.
    427)

        33.  In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Michell A. Archebelle) (Reference No. 428)

        34.  In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Peter N. Fischer) (Reference No. 429)

        35.  In the Air Force there are 425 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Brian M. Alexander) (Reference No. 430)

        36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (P.J. Fox) (Reference No. 433)

        37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Nathan M. Clayton) (Reference No. 434)

        38.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Adam
    P. James) (Reference No. 435)

        39.  In the Army Reserve there are 33 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Jason S. Baker) (Reference No. 436)

        40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Shelia R. Day) (Reference No. 437)

        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Robert D. Cope) (Reference No. 438)

        42.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (William C. Mitchell) (Reference No. 439)

        43.  BG Thomas L. Solhjem, USA to be major general and Chief of
    Chaplains, US Army (Reference No. 457)

        44.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    general (list begins with Telita Crosland) (Reference No. 458)

        45.  LTG Daniel R. Hokanson, ARNG to be lieutenant general and
    Director, Army National Guard (Reference No. 459)

        46.  MG Leon N. Thurgood, USA to be lieutenant general and Director
    of Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition, Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
    Technology (Reference No. 461)

        47.  MG Walter E. Piatt, USA to be lieutenant general and Director
    of the Army Staff (Reference No. 463)

        48.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Latoya D. Smith) (Reference No. 472)

        49.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (Lisa Marie Ahaesy) (Reference No. 473)

        50.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Rubirosa B. Bago) (Reference No. 474)

        51.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Meghan C. Gerrity) (Reference No. 475)

        52.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Daniel M. Jansen) (Reference No. 476)

        53.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Randolph Powell) (Reference No. 477)

        54.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Michael J. Prokos) (Reference No. 478)

        55.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Anthony Bellofigueroa) (Reference No. 481)

        56.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Sean
    R. Richardson) (Reference No. 482)

        57.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Kahtonna C. Allen) (Reference No. 483)

        58.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Angelo N. Catalano) (Reference No. 484)

        59.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Charles J. Calais) (Reference No. 485)

        60.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Robert T. Evans) (Reference No. 486)

        61.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Edward M. Prendergast) (Reference No. 487)

        62.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Thomas L. Hinnant III) (Reference No. 489)

        63.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Sanjay Sharma) (Reference No. 490)

        64.  LTG James C. Slife, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 493)

        65.  LTG Paul E. Funk II, USA to be general and Commanding General,
    US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Reference No. 494)

        66.  RADM Dee L. Mewbourne, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
    Commander, US Transportation Command (Reference No. 497)

        67.  RADM Jon A. Hill, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Missile
    Defense Agency (Reference No. 498)

        68.  RADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief
    of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5
    (Reference No. 499)

        69.  In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Julie Huygen) (Reference No. 500)

        70.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Paula I. Schasberger) (Reference No. 501)

        71.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Angela Tang) (Reference No. 502)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 2,743

        Chairman Inhofe. The motion carries.
        We'll now hear from our two witnesses. It's a pleasure
    having both of you here.
        We'll start with you, Secretary Esper. Try to keep your
    remarks somewhere in the neighborhood of 5 minutes. You're
    recognized.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, I'll watch the clock, here.
        So, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today.
        I want to, first, thank Congress for helping us reverse the
    readiness decline that developed following several years of
    budget uncertainty. Because of the strong support provided in
    the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 budgets, we have
    increased the number of fully ready brigade combat teams by 55
    percent over the past 2 years. However, while I am confident we
    would prevail against any foe today, our adversaries are
    working hard to contest the outcome of future conflicts. As a
    result, the Army stands at a strategic inflection point. If we
    fail to modernize the Army now, we risk losing the first
    battles of the next war.
        For the past 17 years, the Army bore the brunt of the wars
    in Iraq and Afghanistan. For over a decade, we postponed
    modernization to procure equipment tailored to
    counterinsurgency operations. Our legacy combat systems,
    designed for high-intensity conflict, entered service when I
    joined the Army in the early 1980s. While they dominated in
    past conflicts, incremental upgrades for many of them are no
    longer adequate for the demands of future battlefield, as
    described in the National Defense Strategy. We must build the
    next generation of combat systems now, before Russia and China
    outpace us with their modernization programs.
        Despite Russia's looming economic difficulties, they are
    steadily upgrading their military capabilities. In addition to
    field testing their next-generation T-14 Armada tank, they
    continue to advance the development of their air defense and
    artillery systems. When combined with new technologies, such as
    drones, cyber, and electronic warfare, Russia has proven its
    battlefield prowess.
        We have no reason to believe that Moscow's aggressive
    behavior will cease in the short term. Russia's blatant
    disregard for their neighbors' sovereignty, as demonstrated in
    Ukraine and Georgia, is a deliberate strategy meant to
    intimidate weaker states and undermine the NATO alliance.
        In the long run, China presents an even greater challenge.
    They continue to focus their military investments in cutting-
    edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence, directed
    energy, and hypersonics. Beijing's systematic theft of
    intellectual property is also allowing them to develop
    capabilities cheaper and faster than ever before. Additionally,
    China's coercive economic practices are expanding its sphere of
    influence in ways contrary to our Nation's interests.
        To deter the growing threat posed by great-power
    competitors, and to defeat them in battle if necessary, we must
    leap ahead to the next generation of combat systems, and we
    must do so now. Over the past year, the Army took a major step
    forward in reorganizing its entire modernization enterprise
    with the establishment of Futures Command. In doing so, we
    stripped away layers of bureaucracy and streamlined our
    acquisition process while achieving unity of command and
    greater accountability. Guided by our six modernization
    priorities, Army Futures Command is hard at work developing the
    systems needed to maintain battlefield overmatch in future
    conflicts.
        When we received our budget this time last year, we felt
    that it was unreasonable to ask Congress for the additional 4
    to 5 billion dollars needed annually to fund our modernization
    without first looking internally to find the necessary
    resources. As a result, the Army's senior leaders took an
    unprecedented initiative to review every Army program. Our goal
    was simple: Find those programs that least contribute to the
    Army's lethality, and reallocate those resources into higher-
    priority activities. After over 50 hours of painstaking
    deliberations, we eliminated, reduced, or delayed nearly 200
    programs, freeing up over $30 billion over the next 5 years. We
    then reinvested this money into our top priorities, those
    systems and initiatives we need to prevail in future wars. The
    Army will continue to ruthlessly prioritize our budgets to
    provide a clear, predictable path forward that will achieve our
    strategic goals. That process is underway now as we develop
    next year's budget.
        Support for the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget is critical
    to building the Army the Nation needs and demands. Those who
    are invested in legacy systems will fight to hold on to the
    past, while ignoring the billions of dollars in opportunity
    created by our investments in new technologies and what it
    means for the Army's future readiness. While change will be
    hard for some, we can no longer afford to delay the Army's
    modernization. We believe we are following the sound guidance
    conveyed to us by many of you.
        In this era of great-power competition, we cannot risk
    falling behind. If left unchecked, Russia and China will
    continue to erode the competitive military advantage we have
    held for years.
        The Army has clear vision--a clear vision, which I ask be
    entered into the record--and a sound strategy to maintain
    battlefield overmatch. We are making the tough choices. We now
    need the support of Congress to modernize the force, and it
    starts with the fiscal year 2020 budget. The bottom line is
    this: We owe it to our soldiers to provide them the weapons and
    equipment they need to win decisively in the future.
        Thank you again for your continued support. I look forward
    to your questions and appreciate the opportunity to discuss
    these important matters with you today.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Excellent
    statement. Without objection, the report made part of the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                the army vision
        The United States Army is the most lethal and capable ground combat
    force in history. It has proven this in multiple conflicts, across a
    broad spectrum of operations, in various locations around the world,
    defending the Nation and serving the American people well for over 240
    years. The key to this success has been the skill and grit of the
    American soldier, the quality of its Leaders, the superiority of its
    equipment, and the ability of the Army--Regular, National Guard, and
    Reserve to adapt to and dominate a complex and continuously changing
    environment as a member of the Joint Force.
        As we look ahead, near-peer competitors such as China and Russia
    will increasingly challenge the United States and our allies in Europe,
    the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, we
    should expect these countries' arms, equipment, and tactics to be used
    against us by others, including threats such as North Korea and Iran,
    failed states, and terrorist groups. Our adversaries' ambitions and the
    accelerating pace of technological change will create challenges and
    opportunities for the Army's battlefield superiority.
        Meanwhile, the many demands on the Nation's resources will put
    downward pressure on the defense budget in the future, forcing the Army
    to continue making difficult choices about how it spends scarce dollars
    to meet national objectives and compelling us to become ever more
    efficient. A continued commitment to strengthening our alliances and
    building partnerships will help offset these challenges.
        The Army Mission--our purpose--remains constant: To deploy, fight,
    and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained
    land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as
    part of the Joint Force. The Army mission is vital to the Nation
    because we are a Service capable of defeating enemy ground forces and
    indefinitely seizing and controlling those things an adversary prizes
    most--its land, its resources, and its population.
        Given the threats and challenges ahead, it is imperative the Army
    have a clear and coherent vision of where we want to be in the coming
    years so that we retain our overmatch against all potential adversaries
    and remain capable of accomplishing our Mission in the future. As such,
    the Army Vision--our future end state--is as follows:

            The Army of 2028 will be ready to deploy, fight, and win
            decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere, in a
            joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict, while
            simultaneously deterring others and maintaining its ability to
            conduct irregular warfare. The Army will do this through the
            employment of modem manned and unmanned ground combat vehicles,
            aircraft, sustainment systems, and weapons, coupled with robust
            combined arms formations and tactics based on a modem
            warfighting doctrine and centered on exceptional leaders and
            soldiers of unmatched lethality.

        To achieve our Vision, the Army must meet the following objectives
    in the coming years:

          Man. Grow the Regular Army above 500,000 soldiers, with
    associated growth in the National Guard and Army Reserve, by recruiting
    and retaining high quality, physically fit, mentally tough soldiers who
    can deploy, fight, and win decisively on any future battlefield.

          Organize. Ensure war-fighting formations have sufficient
    infantry, armor, engineer, artillery, and air defense assets. Units
    from brigade through corps must also have the ability to conduct
    sustained ground and air Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance; Electronic Warfare; and cyber operations to shape the
    battlefield across all domains. Aviation, additional combat support,
    and robust logistical support must be readily available to units.

          Train. Focus training on high-intensity conflict, with
    emphasis on operating in dense urban terrain, electronically degraded
    environments, and under constant surveillance. Training must be tough,
    realistic, iterative, and dynamic. Continuous movement, battlefield
    innovation, and leverage of combined arms maneuver with the Joint F ,
    allies, and partners must be its hallmarks. This training will require
    rapid expansion of our training environments and deeper distribution of
    simulations capabilities down to the company level to significantly
    enhance soldier and team lethality.

          Equip. Modernize the force by first reforming the current
    acquisition system and unifying the modernization enterprise under a
    single command to focus the Amy's efforts on delivering the weapons,
    combat vehicles, sustainment systems, and equipment that Solders need
    when they need it. This includes experimenting with and developing
    autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and robotics to make our
    soldiers more effective and our units less logistically dependent.

          Lead. Develop smart, thoughtful, and innovative leaders
    of character who are comfortable with complexity and capable of
    operating from the to the strategic level. We will build a new talent
    management-based personnel system that leverages the Knowledge, skills,
    behaviors, and preferences of its officers and noncommissioned
    officers. This system, when coupled with more flexible career models,
    will enable the Army to better attract, identify, develop, and place
    these leaders to optimize outcomes for all.

        To achieve and sustain these objectives given the uncertainty of
    future budgets, the Army must continually assess everything we do,
    identifying lower value activities to discontinue and ways to improve
    what we must do, in order to free up time, money, and manpower for our
    top priorities. Trusting and empowering subordinate leaders will
    facilitate both reform and greater performance.
        In all these efforts, we will ensure that our soldiers, civilian
    workforce, and their families enjoy the professional opportunities and
    quality of life they deserve. From the top down we must also remain
    committed to the Army Values. The Army is at its best when we wort and
    fight as one team, and our Army Values, coupled with our Warrior Ethos,
    will guide and serve us well as we face the challenges ahead.
        Since 1775, the United States Army has proven itself absolutely
    vital to protecting the American people, safeguarding the Nation, and
    advancing our Interests abroad. This fact remains true today. Our
    ability to do so will be even more in the future as threats continue to
    emerge and evolve, becoming ever more dangerous and more complex. To
    remain ready to accomplish our Mission of fighting and winning the
    Nation's wars, the Army must fulfill the future Army Vision outlined
    herein. We are confident that with the right leadership, the proper
    focus, sufficient resources, and sustained effort the U.S. Amy will
    achieve our Vision, remain the world's premier fighting force, and
    serve the Nation welt for decades to come.

    Mark A. Milley
    General, United States Army
    Chief of Staff

    Mark T. Esper
    Secretary of the Army

        Chairman Inhofe. General Milley.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
                                  ARMY

        General Milley. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you again for
    the opportunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
        It remains an incredible privilege and honor to represent
    the million soldiers in uniform in the regular Army, the
    National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, arrayed in 18
    divisions, 58 brigade combat teams, with 180,000 of them
    tonight deployed on freedom's frontier in 140 countries around
    the world.
        While much of our testimony today is going to focus on our
    challenges and how to make us stronger and more lethal, it's
    important to note up front, to you, the Committee, and to the
    Congress, to the American people, our allies, and, perhaps most
    importantly, to our adversaries, the United States Army is
    highly capable, globally deployable on very short notice to
    anywhere in the world, and we have the training, equipment,
    people, and leaders to prevail in ground combat against anyone,
    anywhere, anytime.
        I concur with Secretary Esper's comments on the threats
    posed by China and Russia. The international order, and, by
    extension, United States interests, are under increasingly
    dangerous pressure. China is a significant threat to the United
    States and our allies in the mid and long terms. They're a
    revisionist power seeking to diminish our influence in the
    Pacific and establish themselves as the controlling regional
    power in Asia, and they are setting conditions to challenge the
    United States on a global scale.
        Russia seeks to return to global great-power status, and
    will continue to challenge the United States, not only in
    Europe but also in the Middle East, Asia, the Arctic, Africa,
    and the western hemisphere. Russia continues to undermine NATO
    as an alliance and to sow dissent throughout the European
    continent and in our own Homeland through a variety of means.
    Russia remains the only current existential threat to the
    United States, and will likely become increasingly
    opportunistic in the near term, in my view.
        In the last 17 years, our strategic competitors have eroded
    our military advantages, as outlined by Secretary Esper. With
    your help, starting 2 years ago, we began to restore our
    competitive advantage, and our recent budgets have helped
    improve readiness and lay the groundwork for future
    modernization. We ask, with this budget, that you sustain these
    efforts. Our goal remains 66 percent, two-thirds, of the Active
    Duty Army brigades at the highest levels of readiness, and 33
    percent of the Guard and Reserve also at the highest levels.
    Those numbers, those levels of readiness, are what we need to
    be able to align with the strategy, as laid out in the National
    Defense Strategy. With continued, consistent, predictable
    congressional support, we can reach those levels of readiness
    sometime in 2022.
        Specifically, this budget will fund, in terms of readiness,
    58 brigade combat teams, six security force assistance brigades
    for the total Army, 32 combat training rotations, to include
    four for the National Guard, increase pre-positioned stocks in
    both EUCOM [European Command] and INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific
    Command]. In terms of modernization, which is really just
    another term for future readiness, this budget will improved
    capabilities across our six modernization priority areas and
    the 31 specific programs that are embedded within that. In
    addition to that, it funds 51 other programs that are of
    significant importance to the Army. It'll increase the
    lethality of munitions across the globe, and it will fill
    specific solutions that we have identified, 17 critical gaps
    relative to our near-peer competitors that I can brief in
    detail in a classified hearing, if you so choose.
        Lastly, I want to highlight that this Committee and
    Congress as a whole has provided us tremendous support over the
    last several years. We recognize that, and we are committed to
    applying our resources deliberately and responsibly,
    understanding that they've been entrusted to us by Congress and
    the American people. We will continue to do that, going
    forward, to ensure that our solemn obligation to never send our
    sons and daughters into harm's way unless they are properly
    trained, fully manned, have the best equipment money can buy,
    and are extraordinarily well led.
        Thank you again for your continued support to our soldiers
    and their families. I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Dr. Esper and General
    Milley follows:]

              Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Mark T. Esper
                                      and
                             General Mark A. Milley
                                  introduction
        America's Army stands ready today to deploy, fight, and win our
    Nation's wars. The Army has made great progress in recent years,
    recovering from depleted levels of readiness following extended periods
    of sustained conflict and reduced defense spending. Our near-peer
    competitors, however, capitalized on this period to advance their own
    positions by modernizing their militaries and reducing the overmatch we
    held for decades. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
    Army is pursuing a path to ensure we stay ahead of our competitors and
    remain ready and lethal into the future.
        The Army's Vision and Strategy outline the force needed to prevail
    over the threats of the future, along with the plan for building that
    Army. To accomplish this, the Army's efforts are focused on three
    priority areas: building readiness for high-intensity conflict against
    strategic competitors; modernizing our doctrine, equipment, and
    formations to conduct multi-domain operations; and reforming our
    personnel system, business processes, and fiscal management to ensure
    our resources are put towards the highest priority activities.
    Additionally, the Army will continue to take care of its people, live
    the Army Values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships to
    sustain long-term success in wartime and peace.
        We are grateful to Congress for the strong and timely support
    provided to the Army in the fiscal year 2019 (FY19) appropriations.
    Receiving this funding on time reduced risk to short term readiness and
    allowed us to make significant investments towards our six
    modernization priorities. In order to achieve the defense objectives in
    the NDS and meet our goals as outlined in the Army Vision, we must
    receive predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding in the
    future. The Army's total fiscal year 2020 budget request is $182.3
    billion, consisting of $150.7 billion for base requirements and $31.6
    billion for Overseas Contingency Operations requirements. This request
    provides the resources the Army needs to build readiness, while
    modernizing for the future.
                             strategic environment
        The Army faces a global security environment that continually grows
    more competitive and volatile. The challenges are many: the reemergence
    of great power competition; a resilient but weakening post-World War II
    order; accelerating technological advancements empowering state and
    non-state actors; and persistent threats to the Homeland. The Army must
    be ready now, and in the future, to confront this challenging strategic
    environment. We must have an Army prepared for high-intensity conflict,
    modernized to extend overmatch against near-peer adversaries, and
    trained to fight as part of the Joint Force alongside our allies and
    partners, all while sustaining our ability to conduct irregular
    warfare.
        The modern battlefield encompasses all domains--air, land, sea,
    space, and cyber-space--and is increasing in geographic scale. Near-
    peer competitors, like China and Russia, are aggressively pursuing
    modernization programs to erode American overmatch. They have developed
    sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems, fires,
    cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based capabilities that generate
    layers of stand-off to disrupt the deployment of military forces, deny
    the build-up of combat power, and separate Joint Force capabilities in
    time and space. These capabilities may embolden more aggressive
    behavior in the conventional realm. China's military modernization
    program aims to transform the People's Liberation Army into a modern,
    mechanized, Information Age force in the next one to two decades and a
    world-class military capable of strategic force projection and
    warfighting by mid-century. Their military strategy seeks to protect
    Chinese interests outside of Asia and into Europe, the Middle East, and
    Africa. Furthermore, Russia is likely to threaten our interests for the
    next 20 years as they attempt to regain control of historic spheres of
    influence and shape European economic and security structures in their
    favor. Although we may not face China and Russia directly, we are
    likely to face their systems and methods of warfare as they proliferate
    military capabilities to others.
        Regional state adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran, also
    present significant challenges as they pursue advanced capabilities and
    weapons of mass destruction to gain regional influence and ensure
    regime survival. Additionally, transnational terrorist organizations
    continue to pose a threat to our Homeland and our interests, as well as
    our allies and partners. The Army must be prepared to defeat and deter
    highly capable adversaries while disrupting violent extremists and
    simultaneously defending the Homeland.
        Today, the Army contributes to our Nation's efforts to counter
    these challenges by providing combatant commanders over 179,000
    soldiers in more than 140 countries, including 110,000 soldiers
    deployed on a rotational basis. This includes over 30,000 soldiers
    supporting operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan; 8,000
    soldiers supporting NATO operations and the European Deterrence
    Initiative; and over 17,000 soldiers providing a forward American
    presence on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, Army forces remain
    prepared to respond to other contingency requirements, both abroad and
    at home. Concurrently, the Army is investing in the research and
    development of the next generation of weapons and equipment needed to
    stay ahead of our adversaries. Through a disciplined prioritization of
    resources, the Army will remain postured to defend the Nation in an
    increasingly dangerous world.
                                   readiness
        America's Army stands ready today to defeat any adversary that
    threatens our Nation and our national interests. We have made great
    progress in rebuilding warfighting readiness, which remains the Army's
    number one priority as we increase lethality to prepare for the future.
    Ready forces must be organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and
    sustained ground combat. This ensures the Army can deploy, fight, and
    win decisively in high-intensity conflict against any adversary,
    anytime, and anywhere. Over the past year, the Army balanced our force
    structure, increased manning in combat units, filled equipment
    shortfalls, and improved deployability to build readiness across the
    force. From September 2016 to December 2018, we increased the number of
    ready Brigade Combat Teams from 18 to 28, and more broadly, increased
    readiness across all Army units by nearly 11 percent. We achieved these
    readiness gains despite sustained operational demand for Army units.
    Our fiscal year 2020 budget request sustains this momentum, so the Army
    can achieve our readiness objectives by 2022.
        The Army has implemented several readiness initiatives to
    reorganize for high-intensity conflict against near-peer competitors.
    We are increasing combat readiness by working to fill our operational
    units to 100 percent of authorized strength this year and 105 percent
    of strength by the end of 2020. Furthermore, we reduced the non-
    deployable rates of soldiers from 15 percent in 2015 to six percent
    today. We anticipate achieving our goal of five percent non-deployable
    soldiers by the end of this year. This equates to thousands more
    soldiers ready to deploy in support of global contingency operations.
    We also rebalanced our force structure to increase lethality by
    initiating the conversion of two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to
    Armored Brigade Combat Teams, our most potent battlefield formation.
    Furthermore, we plan to modestly grow the Regular Army to 480,000 with
    associated growth in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in
    2020. This growth will allow the Army to fill critical gaps in the near
    term in cyber, air and missile defense, and fires while we develop the
    necessary force structure and end strength needed to execute Multi-
    Domain Operations.
        Another critical element of readiness is training. We overhauled
    Army basic training to develop more lethal, disciplined, and resilient
    soldiers. This includes extending Infantry One Station Unit Training
    from 14 weeks to 22 weeks. Initial reports show a significant reduction
    in attrition and injuries with significant improvements in physical
    fitness, land navigation, and marksmanship skills based on the
    additional training time and a reduced Drill Sergeant to trainee ratio.
    Other branches may see similar adjustments through fiscal year 2024.
        Army collective training focuses on high-intensity conflict, with
    an emphasis on operating in complex terrain, electronically degraded
    environments, and under constant surveillance. Training is tough,
    realistic, iterative, and task focused. We eliminated or reduced over
    85 individual training requirements to unburden commanders and allow
    them to focus on training their units. In the Army National Guard and
    the Army Reserve, we increased the training days for select units to
    increase the pool of Reserve component units available to support
    operational requirements. Additionally, we maximized capacity at our
    combat training centers to meet Army force readiness requirements. The
    Army will execute 26 Decisive Action Training Environment rotations for
    Brigade Combat Teams and six other mission specific rotations for a
    total of 32 combat training center rotations in fiscal year 2019.
    Moreover, we continue to develop a Synthetic Training Environment which
    will integrate live, virtual, constructive, and game-based training
    environments into a single platform to increase home station training
    repetitions and enhance training realism in a variety of scenarios and
    locations.
        We also approved the new Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) to
    fundamentally improve our fitness culture, reduce injuries, increase
    deployability, and increase the probability that a soldier survives on
    the battlefield of the future. We have focused our fitness standards on
    the skills needed to fight in sustained close combat where physical
    toughness and endurance will be pushed to the extremes of human
    capacity. We began field-testing the ACFT in 2018 with 63 units across
    the Total Army and will begin full implementation this year. By the end
    of fiscal year 2020, the ACFT will be the fitness test of record for
    all soldiers.
        Increasing readiness is also about improving our equipment. To this
    end, Army Materiel Command increased the spare parts inventory and
    ammunition stockpiles. The Army also redistributed equipment to Focused
    Readiness Units, which remain at higher readiness levels to support
    global response. Furthermore, we are making progress towards achieving
    ground and aviation equipment readiness goals Army-wide.
        To further improve equipment readiness and enhance our power
    projection capabilities, the Army uses prepositioned stocks to quickly
    execute operational plans and conduct contingency operations. We
    budgeted $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 to
    improve the readiness of Army Prepositioned Stocks. Additionally, we
    initiated a Configured-for-Combat effort to equip Army Prepositioned
    Stocks with combat enablers such as communications, modernized weapons,
    and counter-measure systems in order to speed our ability to build
    combat power. This reduces the time it takes to build combat power by
    weeks and significantly reduces the amount of strategic airlift
    previously required to deploy early entry Army forces. Follow-on forces
    will continue to rely on modern and ready strategic lift assets,
    especially sealift, to deliver ready and lethal ground forces in
    support of the Joint Force. We must continue to invest in robust power
    projection platforms and strategic lift capabilities to ensure we can
    rapidly deploy and operate anywhere in the world.
        Through these readiness initiatives, the Army is getting stronger
    by the month in manning, training, and equipping the force. With
    Congressional support, our fiscal year 2020 budget will allow us to
    continue to increase readiness and build lethality.
                                 modernization
        While we continue to build readiness, the Army must also prepare
    for the future. This includes modernizing our doctrine, equipment,
    processes, and organizational structures to extend our overmatch
    against any competitor on any battlefield. Guiding our modernization
    effort is our Multi-Domain Operations concept, which identifies the
    threats and challenges we will face in the future. Great power
    competitors like China are developing capabilities to create standoff
    intended to frustrate our ability to build combat power and maneuver at
    will. To counter this, the Army will need to integrate our capabilities
    with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines even more in the future. The
    Army's new Multi-Domain Operations concept describes how we will
    synchronize our capabilities across all domains in support of the Joint
    Force.
        The Army is using the Multi-Domain Operations concept to inform
    future force development through numerous iterations of experimentation
    and analysis, including field experimentation with Multi-Domain Task
    Force pilots in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Our future success
    depends on modernized equipment, evolving doctrine, and the
    organizations essential to ensure overmatch against our competitors.
    These elements will work in concert to increase our combat capabilities
    across all domains.
        As a major step towards developing the capabilities needed for
    Multi-Domain Operations, we reorganized our entire modernization
    enterprise for greater speed and efficiency. Last year, the Army made
    its most significant organizational change in over 40 years by
    establishing the Army Futures Command (AFC). We stood up AFC in the
    innovation hub of Austin, Texas with a focus on providing unity of
    command and unity of effort for the modernization enterprise. For the
    first time, one commander is driving concept development, requirements
    determination, organizational design, science and technology research,
    and solution development. We located AFC outside of a traditional Army
    installation to increase their accessibility and ability to collaborate
    with industry and academia. Through these partnerships, AFC will
    identify and deliver new capabilities with greater speed and more
    efficient use of our resources.
        To guide AFC, the Army established a clear set of modernization
    priorities that emphasize rapid maneuver, overwhelming fires, tactical
    innovation, and mission command. Our six modernization priorities will
    not change, and they underscore the Army's commitment to innovate for
    the future. We have one simple focus--to make soldiers and units more
    capable and lethal. Over the last year, we identified $16.1 billion in
    legacy equipment programs that we could reinvest towards 31 signature
    systems that are critical to realizing Multi-Domain Operations and are
    aligned with these priorities. The six Army modernization priorities
    are:

          Long Range Precision Fires--We will improve the range and
    lethality of cannon artillery and increase missile capabilities to
    ensure overmatch at each echelon. Army artillery weapons, including
    Extended Range Cannon Artillery and the Precision Strike Missile, will
    neutralize and dis-integrate adversary A2/AD networks, from extended
    ranges, to create windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to
    exploit. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery is on schedule for
    delivery in fiscal year 2023. It will protect and support maneuver
    forces in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with an
    extended range out to 70km and increased 6-10 rounds/minute volume of
    fire. The Army has requested $1.31 billion for Long Range Precision
    Fires in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to accelerate
    prototyping and initial fielding.

          Next Generation of Combat Vehicles--The Army will
    modernize the next generation of combat vehicles through technology
    development, experimentation, and prototyping to ensure overmatch
    against near-peer competitors. These vehicles will employ greater
    firepower, mobility, and protection to successfully maneuver on more
    lethal battlefields. They will have manned and unmanned variants for
    combined arms maneuver, and be built with future growth in mind. The
    first prototype will arrive in fiscal year 2021 to accelerate
    experimentation and initial fielding. We requested $2.0 billion in the
    fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to deliver an initial capability.

          Future Vertical Lift--We will increase our competitive
    aviation advantage with next generation aircraft to penetrate contested
    airspace and support independent maneuver from greater distances
    through extended range, endurance, and lifting capacity. The most
    important FVL investments at the moment are the Army's development of
    the Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft, designed to address the gap
    left by retirement of the Kiowa, and the Future Long Range Assault
    Aircraft. An additional investment includes integrating unmanned aerial
    systems, which we will prototype in fiscal year 2024, for manned/
    unmanned teaming and improved lethality, situational awareness, and
    survivability. Over $797.2 million is included in the fiscal year 2020
    President's Budget to develop initial designs and unmanned
    demonstration systems.

          Army Network--The Army Network supports mission command
    and the continuous integration of combined arms and Joint capabilities.
    We will deliver a resilient and secure tactical communications network
    effective in the most challenging contested and congested
    electromagnetic spectrum and cyber environments. This network includes
    advanced information technology, hardware and software, and a reduced
    electromagnetic signature. We have allocated $2.28 billion in the
    fiscal year 2020 budget to build our integrated tactical network as
    part of our network restructuring.

          Air and Missile Defense--Advanced air and missile defense
    will protect our forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones
    to enable joint operations. This includes both theater systems and
    short-range air defense, like the Mobile Short-Range Air Defense with
    directed energy technologies. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes $1.4
    billion to rapidly deliver an initial capability by fiscal year 2022.

          Soldier Lethality--We will equip and train soldiers to
    extend overmatch through increased lethality, mobility, and
    survivability against emerging threats. This includes improved weapons,
    sensors, body armor, and training. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes
    $1.18 billion for prototyping, development, and procurement of the Next
    Generation Squad Automatic Weapon and Squad Rifle, Enhanced Night
    Vision Goggles, Integrated Visual Augmentation System (HUD 3.0), and
    Synthetic Training Environment.

        Eight Cross Functional Teams (CFTs), aligned under AFC, lead the
    development of these modernization priorities. The CFTs streamline Army
    acquisition processes to reduce the requirements process, shorten
    acquisition time, and, by engaging soldiers early in development,
    ensure fielded systems are affordable and meet warfighter needs. This
    approach demonstrates our commitment to good stewardship of taxpayer
    dollars. In addition to this organizational realignment, we updated
    acquisition policies. Our new intellectual property policy will
    encourage private industry to work with our CFTs to develop innovative
    solutions to maintain technological overmatch.
        The Army is taking a holistic approach to modernization so we can
    achieve multi-domain dominance by 2028. Next generation equipment,
    combined with modern doctrine and formations, will allow the Army to
    maintain overmatch on future battlefields.
                                     reform
        Over the past year, the Army aggressively pursued reforms to free
    up time, money, and manpower for our highest priorities and to empower
    subordinate commanders to make more effective and timely decisions. In
    addition to our detailed program review process, we are executing the
    Army Reform Initiative, instituting fiscal discipline, scrutinizing
    contract management and contract services, and working towards
    financial auditability. Through these reform efforts, we realigned over
    $30 billion across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for higher
    priority programs to build readiness and increase lethality.
        In our most significant reform effort, Army Senior Leaders
    conducted a detailed review of Army equipping programs for the fiscal
    year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 budgets. Through this in-depth, time
    intensive process, we eliminated, reduced, or consolidated nearly 200
    legacy programs to reallocate funding towards our modernization
    priorities. While each of these programs had value, we must continue to
    make hard choices to ensure we spend each dollar wisely and remain
    aligned with Army priorities.
        Through the Army Reform Initiative, we garnered over 700 ideas to
    eliminate, delegate, consolidate, or streamline Army policies, programs
    and practices. Inputs included work efficiencies, business process
    improvements, and structural realignments. For example, through our
    installation management reform effort, we are realigning Installation
    Management Command under Army Materiel Command and consolidating staff
    functions to garner personnel savings and improve efficiency. This
    integration of sustainment and installation functions provides the
    ability to prioritize resources on key requirements for both combat
    readiness and soldier and family support. Additionally we have an
    ongoing headquarters reduction effort across multiple levels of
    command. The goal of the Army Reform Initiative is to eliminate
    redundancy and delegate authorities and resources to the lowest
    appropriate level of command. This allows for rapid actions and
    decisions while simultaneously saving resources for higher priorities.
        To improve fiscal discipline, we implemented the Command
    Accountability & Execution Review (CAER) to optimize the purchasing
    power of the Army's operating budget. This Army-wide program educates
    Army leaders on fiscal stewardship, updates policies to increase
    purchasing power, and creates a scorecard of key performance indicators
    to measure progress. While still early, CAER has generated a marked
    improvement in the efficient execution of the Army's budget for fiscal
    year 2018 and we anticipate greater success in fiscal year 2019.
        In 2018, contract management and contract services reform saved the
    Army $1.6 billion across the FYDP by eliminating contract redundancies,
    improving contract competition processes, and using data analytics for
    contracting decisions. We continue to implement category management and
    increased emphasis on the use of strategic sourcing contracts to
    improve management of services acquisitions. This year, we found
    service acquisition efficiencies in Army rotary-wing aircraft and
    ground system maintenance programs, food services, and the use of
    advanced data analytics. We saved over $400 million and are on pace to
    reach over $1 billion in budget savings from improved contract
    management in fiscal year 2019. These savings and their reinvestment
    into modernization are crucial to the Army and our progress towards the
    force of the future.
        The Army completed its first full financial statements audit in
    fiscal year 2018, and the audit findings are an important part of our
    larger reform effort. We fully support these audits, which help the
    Army identify ways to improve resource management and business
    practices. We are aggressively implementing corrective action plans and
    are on track to achieve auditable financial statements across all
    accounts by fiscal year 2022.
        Another major area of reform is the directed reorganization of our
    medical capabilities across the Army. Readiness is the primary focus
    throughout this effort because the Army will continue to be responsible
    for a ready medical force trained in clinical skills that are critical
    to wartime missions. As we transition medical treatment facilities to
    the Defense Health Agency, we are working to ensure we retain the
    necessary combat medical support at each echelon to maintain readiness
    and deliver premier military health care on the battlefield and in
    garrison. This reorganization provides us an opportunity to optimize
    the Army medical structure and plan for future medical capabilities.
        The Army will continue to pursue savings in time, money, and
    manpower that we can reinvest into our top priorities. These aggressive
    reform efforts, will sustain our momentum as we build readiness and
    increase lethality to prepare for high-intensity conflict against great
    power competitors.
                               allies & partners
        America's network of allies and partners is an unrivaled strategic
    advantage the Army is actively working to enhance. Every day, the Army
    works to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships through
    security cooperation and security assistance. A continued commitment to
    our allies and partners helps us compete against great power
    competitors and bolster deterrence. In support of our allies and
    partners we established Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), which
    will consist of six subordinate Security Force Assistance Brigades
    (SFABs)--five Regular Army and one Army National Guard. The SFABs are
    specialized units whose core mission is to train, advise, assist,
    enable and accompany allied and partner nations. SFABs reduce the
    demand on conventional Brigade Combat Teams enabling them to focus on
    high-intensity conflict against near-peer threats. The Army deployed
    its first SFAB to Afghanistan in support of the Afghan National Army to
    validate the proof of concept, and we will apply what we learned to the
    second SFAB deployment this year.
        The Army works with Combatant Commanders to ensure our security
    cooperation efforts support their priorities as we work to increase
    interoperability and build partner capability. Interoperability ensures
    we can train and fight alongside our allies and partners more
    effectively and efficiently so we are ready to face any threat
    together. In fiscal year 2018, the Army executed $115 million on 58
    multinational exercises with 95 allies and partners. In fiscal year
    2019, we programmed $165 million for multinational training exercises
    to increase interoperability.
        In Europe, we are leading a multinational battlegroup in Poland as
    part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission to deter Russian
    aggression. Last summer, our soldiers participated in Exercise Trident
    Juncture alongside forces from every other NATO ally and two of our
    closest partners, Sweden and Finland. This was the largest NATO
    exercise conducted in recent years, and it demonstrated both the
    Alliance's commitment and collective defense capability. We will
    continue these efforts as we prepare for the division-level Defender
    exercise in 2020, which will exercise the Army's force projection
    capabilities. We also maintain close training and exercise
    relationships with Ukraine and Georgia, key partners in the region for
    promoting peace and security.
        Likewise, in the Indo-Pacific region we are deepening cooperation
    with our allies to protect our national and shared interests. The
    United States Army presence in the Republic of Korea and Japan deters
    North Korean aggression and protects United States interests. Assigned
    and rotational forces participate in combined training exercises, such
    as Yama Sakura in Japan and Yudh Abhyas with the Indian Army. These
    exercises strengthen our relationships and build interoperability.
    Furthermore, we are testing the Multi-Domain Task Force in exercises
    through our Pacific Pathways program to determine the right capability
    mix to counter Chinese A2AD capabilities. We will continue to use
    regional training and exercises to work with new partners and leverage
    multi-component and inter-service integration. This helps us to expand
    the competitive space and counter Chinese influence throughout the
    region.
        We are assisting our partners around the world in building military
    capabilities to enhance security. The Army, through its security
    assistance enterprise, supports combatant command theater security
    cooperation plans. We will continue to prioritize security assistance
    programs to counter key threats and achieve shared defense objectives
    with our allies and partners.
                                people & values
        The Army's greatest strength is our people--the intelligent,
    adaptable, and professional soldiers, civilians, and families who
    sacrifice for our Nation. We take care of our people by ensuring our
    soldiers are ready for combat with modern doctrine, equipment, and
    realistic training while simultaneously providing their families with
    the resources they need to thrive at home. Furthermore, our continued
    commitment to the Army Values ensures we foster strong and resilient
    units built on a foundation of trust.
        Comprehensive reform of the Army's personnel management system is a
    top initiative for 2019. To remain the most lethal ground combat force
    in the world, we must continue to attract, develop, and retain the best
    people our Nation has to offer. A competitive labor market for
    America's most highly skilled talent complicates this effort. We thank
    Congress for the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
    reforms and additional authorities in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and we
    will incorporate these into our new Talent Management Strategy. We are
    moving the Army towards a market-based assignment process with more
    flexible career models along with updates to our promotion system and
    retention incentives.
        The Army faced significant challenges in meeting our fiscal year
    2018 recruiting goals, however, we remain committed to quality over
    quantity. Despite these challenges, we recruited over 70,000 new
    soldiers into our ranks, the most in any single year since 2010. To
    meet our fiscal year 2019 recruiting goals, we changed our approach to
    increase the pool of qualified applicants so we can attract the best
    talent and improve diversity in our ranks. We restructured our
    accessions enterprise to ensure unity of effort across the Army, manned
    our recruiter positions at 100 percent, realigned resources to increase
    our recruiting capacity, and improved our use of technology.
    Additionally, we centered this recruiting initiative in 22 major
    metropolitan areas across the Nation to expand our reach using micro-
    targeted web advertising and local marketing. This revised strategy
    expands recruiting across the Total Army to increase awareness of the
    opportunities for service and to better connect the Army to the
    American people.
        Taking care of Army families remains a top priority, and we are
    taking steps to improve quality of life programs across our
    installations. This year we increased staffing rates at Army child care
    centers, and we are implementing new policies to improve spouse
    employment opportunities. Given recent reports of deficient conditions
    in some of our family housing, the Army has taken immediate action to
    ensure we are providing safe, high quality family housing. We are
    visiting all Army housing and inspecting all barracks to identify
    health, life, and safety issues that exist. We will work with the
    Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) companies to remediate these
    issues immediately, and over the long term, to improve work order
    resolution, customer satisfaction, and communication with residents. We
    are also reviewing and standardizing partnership agreements and
    incentive structures to ensure we hold the RCI companies accountable
    for providing quality housing. The Army is fully committed to providing
    a safe and secure environment on all of our installations where our
    soldiers and families can thrive.
        The Army Values form the bedrock of our profession and guide us in
    all that we do. The Army's Senior Leaders have asked everyone to
    recommit themselves to these Values, and we demand that every member of
    our Army team treat each other with dignity and respect. Across the
    Total Army, we continue to focus on eradicating sexual harassment and
    sexual assault from our ranks. Over the past several years, we have
    placed a high priority on our prevention efforts, and the Army will
    continue to improve the effectiveness of our prevention efforts moving
    forward. This starts by ensuring that the perpetrators of sexual
    assaults are held accountable and that the victims are protected
    without fear of retribution. Additionally, we are reinforcing leader
    responsibility for building a climate of trust and professionalism that
    emphasizes the Army Values. We are taking a similar approach with other
    essential programs including Equal Opportunity, Suicide Prevention,
    Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, and Resilience.
                                   conclusion
        The Army mission remains constant: to deploy, fight, and win our
    Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance
    by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the
    Joint Force. Our Army is ready today to win in the unforgiving crucible
    of combat. We are supporting the National Defense Strategy and
    expanding the competitive space by increasing our lethality through our
    modernization effort, strengthening American alliances through combined
    operations and training, and reforming our business practices to be the
    best stewards of the resources Congress has provided. The Army thanks
    Congress and the American people for their continued strong support,
    which enables our ability to accomplish our mission. By providing
    predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding, Congress will
    ensure America's Army remains the most capable and lethal ground combat
    force in the world.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
        Both statements were excellent, and I appreciate--and we
    appreciate, up here, the time you're devoting to making us
    aware, and America aware, of the threats that are out there in
    our peer competitors of China and Russia.
        Unfortunately, the Army missed our recruiting goals in both
    fiscal year 2018 and 2019, coming up short about 9,500 of what
    this Committee authorized in fiscal year 2019. So, let's
    start--General Milley, what's your assessment of the most
    critical manning shortfalls facing the Army as we begin to try
    to meet our blueprint, here, with the--what would come to your
    mind as the most critical?
        General Milley. We did miss the shortfall. I would add that
    we did recruit and assess 70,000 soldiers into the United
    States Army, which was a 10-year high, which, in combination,
    is more soldiers than are in the British and Canadian armies,
    combined. So, that's significant, I think. In terms of the
    shortages, going forward, what we're asking for this budget is
    modest growth of an increase of 2,000, which I think Senator
    Reed mentioned in his opening statement. We knew we had a very
    significant and high objective on the last years' recruiting,
    and we've made a variety of changes inside Recruiting Command,
    to include the commander. We're focusing on 22 significant
    cities throughout the United States. We're looking at where the
    storefronts are. We're looking at redoing the advertising
    campaign. There's a variety of other initiatives. We are very
    confident--we're on glidepath right now, and we're very
    confident that we'll meet the recruiting and accessions
    missions for this year.
        Chairman Inhofe. What do you think, Secretary?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I agree. Last summer, we actually
    turned up the standards. We raised the quality standards,
    because quality is more important than quantity. We need to do
    that. We need to raise the quality, and we need to continue to
    bring more in each year, because we need to fully man the units
    exist, we need to put capabilities back into----
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        Secretary Esper.--the units that we lost over the years,
    such as EW--electronic warfare--and we need to add new
    capabilities to our units, such as cyber. So, this is all
    consistent with the vision of where we want to go. The vision
    that we outlined says we definitely need to be above 500,000
    soldiers by 2028.
        Chairman Inhofe. That's good. What we don't want to do,
    we've emphasized and you have emphasized in the past, that we
    don't want to lower standards in order to increase.
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Reed. That's not happening now, and it's not going
    to happen.
        You addressed this, this goal, General Milley, of 66
    percent. It's probably--you don't want to get into any detail
    on that, but would you repeat what you did--what you said in
    your opening statement? I think you said, in year 2022--what's
    going to happen?
        General Milley. We think, by our projections, if things in
    the international environment remain at a constant and we
    continue to get steady budgets at the rates we're getting, we
    assess that we'll be at the highest levels of readiness, with
    two-thirds, 66 percent, in the regular Army and 33 percent in
    the Guard and Reserve, sometime in 2022, which is significant.
    When I became the Chief of Staff, 3 years ago--3 and a half
    years ago--we had three brigades at the highest level of
    readiness. Today, we have--roughly speaking, as of December's
    reports, you're looking at about 28. So, that's a significant
    increase. But, we have yet to achieve that 66 percent. We are,
    essentially, right now, somewhere around the high-water marks
    of pre-9/11, but we need--if we're serious about Russia, China,
    and what's in the NDS, with North Korea, Iran, and the violent
    extremists and terrorist organizations, our assessment is, of
    those 58 brigades, 66 percent in the--or 66 percent in the
    regular Army, 33 percent in the Guard and Reserve. We'll----
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
        General Milley.---- achieve that in 2022.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Before I run out of time, I do want
    to get a comment from each one of you on the budget. You know,
    we went through a period of starvation, the last 5 years, of--
    between 2010 and 2015--of actually reducing, in constant
    dollars, the amount of money that came into our military. We
    are now paying for that. Even with the budget increases that we
    saw in 2018, 2019, what we're proposing for 2020, it still
    doesn't put us where we need to be. When you go back to this
    book, you're talking about an increase in--for that 5-year
    period, of somewhere between 3 and 5 percent above inflation.
    Even the 750 doesn't reach that. It would have to be somewhere
    around 757, I think it would be. So, I'd like to have each one
    of you comment as to where we are. Do you think that's a figure
    that's going to be adequate to take care of the needs that we
    have in our assessment?
        Secretary Esper. Mr. Chairman, you summed it up well. I
    mean, the needs will always exceed the means, but we think, if
    Congress passes this budget, we will continue on a good
    trajectory with regard to restoring readiness and modernizing
    the Army. That's really the key thing right now.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Milley. I concur with the Secretary. As you well
    know, Chairman, it's all related to the amount of risk we are
    willing to take relative----
        Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
        General Milley.--to the tasks.
        Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
        General Milley. So, it's all about risk.
        Chairman Inhofe. We understand that.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, General Milley, last night we received
    notice that the Department of Defense was reprogramming $1
    billion from the Army to support border wall construction. This
    is being done without approval by Congress, which is a custom
    that both sides have relied upon for many, many, many years to
    ensure that our constitutional authority over spending is
    maintained. The Army also has a $2.3 billion unfunded
    requirements for fiscal year 2020. Does this $1 billion
    reprogramming support Army requirements, or could the funds be
    spent better elsewhere to improve readiness and maintain the
    Army?
        Secretary Esper. The funds do not affect our fiscal year
    2020 budget, Senator Reed. With regard to fiscal year 2019,
    it--those funds came out of our Military Personnel (MILPERS)
    wedge, if you will--military personnel--that we could not fill
    that end strength. So, that's where those came from. The--
    otherwise, the fiscal year 2019 budget approved by this
    Congress on time meets our readiness needs.
        Senator Reed. You still do have $2.5 billion of unfunded
    readiness, including things like aviation readiness----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed.--whole host of issues that the money could
    have been used for.
        Secretary Esper. That's true.
        Senator Reed. In a sense, you are foregoing at least the
    immediate use of those funds for military purposes, like
    aviation readiness. Is that correct?
        Secretary Esper. Like I said, the fiscal year 2019 budget
    was more than adequate for our needs, but, you know, clearly,
    with--there--as I said, to--in response to the Chairman, the
    needs always exceed the means. So, yes, we could have used that
    money for--as the other services, for--to continue to improve
    our readiness.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        The Army's unfunded requirements list included $564 million
    for key infrastructure projects. As I mentioned in my opening
    statement, the Committee has received the list of military
    construction projects that will be--or could be included in
    order to resource the proposed wall along the southern border.
    These will obviously include Army construction projects. Given
    the Army has identified more than half a billion in unfunded
    infrastructure requirements for the fiscal year 2020 budget,
    how detrimental will it be to the Army readiness if we cancel
    or delay these projects?
        Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, we have to see what
    projects will be teed up for repurposing. I think, once we see
    those initial requests, we can make a better estimate of what
    the impact will be.
        Senator Reed. One of the areas, too, that's been identified
    are projects overseas, the European Defense Initiative and
    other areas. We often rely upon host and partner contributions
    to facilitate those constructions. They schedule sometimes on
    calendar years or fiscal years. So, what impact would we have
    on delaying those projects?
        Secretary Esper. Again, I'm familiar with some of those
    projects. It includes everything from schools, I think, to
    warehouses. We'll have to, again, assess, based on--once DHS,
    Department of Homeland Security, makes the request to DOD, and
    then, from there, DOD, I assume, will prioritize the projects,
    and we will do our own reprioritizing within the Army
    submission and assess the impacts at that time.
        Senator Reed. Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
    asked for each military service to submit the top 10 list of
    most vulnerable installations to climate change, extreme
    weather, or whatever appropriate terminology that you want to
    use. Unfortunately, to date, we have not received that letter.
    Could you commit to sending us the top 10 list of Army
    facilities that are vulnerable to weather effects?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. Pursuant to NDAA 2018 Section 335, the
    Army has been evaluating the effect of the six specified
    climate impacts: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification,
    wildfires, thawing permafrost, and rising sea tides.
        The Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory
    (CRREL), home of the United States Army Corp of Engineers'
    Climate Preparedness and Resilience Community of Practice,
    created a model to assess the risk to individual Army
    installations. While the work in ongoing, the table below lists
    the top ten most at-risk installations in the 50 United States.
    Assessment of installations overseas and in U.S. territories is
    forthcoming. The analysis is based on climate science only and
    is not influenced by strategic or mission considerations.
        The Army will continue to work closely with other leaders
    throughout the Department of Defense and with Congress to
    identify corrective actions and implement steps to enhance our
    readiness and capability in the face of climate related
    threats. Thank you for your interest in this matter, as well as
    your continued support of the Army.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Primary driver of   Secondary driver
                           Installation                             State       climate effects   of climate effects
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yuma Proving Ground.......................................           AZ     Desertification             Drought
    Fort Irwin................................................             CA   Desertification             Drought
    Fort Huachuca.............................................           AZ     Desertification             Drought
    Fort Bliss................................................           TX     Desertification             Drought
    White Sands Missile Range.................................           NM     Desertification             Drought
    Camp Roberts..............................................             CA   Desertification             Drought
    Hawthorne Army Depot......................................           NV     Desertification             Drought
    Tooele Army Depot.........................................           UT     Desertification             Drought
    Military Ocean Terminal Concord...........................             CA Riverine Flooding             Drought
    Pueblo Chemical Depot.....................................             CO   Desertification             Drought
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Note: All of the top ten are subject to riverine flooding
    and wildfires. Military Ocean Terminal Concord is also subject
    to coastal flooding.

        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, appreciate your service.
        General Milley, let's talk about Poland. The Army's there
    on a rotational basis now. The Government of Poland has asked
    us to look seriously at a permanent station there. Section 1280
    of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA required a DOD report on the
    feasibility and advisability of permanently stationing United
    States forces in the Republic of Poland. Do you know the status
    of that report? It was due March 1st. What can you tell us
    about your opinion as to how that would work, sir?
        General Milley. Thank you, Senator. I do not know the
    status of the actual report, and I'll have to get back to you
    with that. I'm not sure where that's at in the pipeline sort of
    thing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Milley. Given that discussions with the Polish on
    the $2 billion offer are still ongoing, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (Policy) sent an interim letter to
    Congress offering to provide periodic classified updates in
    person until discussions have concluded. A physical report will
    be provided once discussions are complete.

        Senator Wicker. All right. Just----
        General Milley. But, as far as personal----
        Senator Wicker.--just give us your assessment.
        General Milley. Yeah. My assessment, I am in the camp of
    recommending rotational forces to Europe, in general, and
    Poland, in specific. There are some forces that should and
    could be forward-stationed, some enabling-type things, some
    infrastructure. But, for the most part, I recommend, and have
    recommended, rotational forces, for a couple of reasons. From
    the analysis I've seen, rotational forces are more cost-
    efficient, cheaper, than permanently-based. Secondly is, you
    don't have to build schools and post exchange's (PX's) and all
    the infrastructure that goes with permanent-based forces. Third
    is, I think you get much more operational flexibility for
    SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, because he can move
    forces around much easier than he can if they're tied down to
    bases--permanent bases, with families, et cetera. Fourth is,
    you get a strategic benefit from rotating forces, because we
    exercise the strategic muscle memory of TRANSCOM
    [Transportation Command] to move large-scale forces back and
    forth to Europe. There are some other reasons, but bottom line
    is, I recommend rotational forces, with some exceptions for
    infrastructure and enablers, command and control, some other
    things that would be necessary at the higher end. But, for the
    most part, most forces, I recommend rotational.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Some of the things we're mindful of with regard to Russia
    are Russia rapidly seizing NATO territory, reinforcing it and
    presenting it as a fait accompli scenario to the West. Do you
    think the rotational idea that you've enunciated is sufficient
    to meet those challenges?
        General Milley. I do, for a couple of reasons. One is,
    depending on how you structure the rotations--in the National
    Defense Strategy, we talk about dynamic force employment, so
    you want to keep an adversary guessing as to where you're going
    to position forces around the globe at a moment in time. By
    rotating forces, you can pick and choose your own schedule, you
    can do heel-to-toe, so you have the same strategic effect,
    operational effect, as permanent-based, or you can have
    episodic, where the adversary doesn't necessarily know when and
    where you're going to introduce forces of different sizes. I
    think, depending on the size of the force, the disposition, and
    the rotational schedule, it would be sufficient to enhance the
    deterrent effect of United States forces in Europe.
        Senator Wicker. Did DOD ask for your input in formulating
    the report that is now due?
        General Milley. I'll have to go back and check to see if
    they specifically asked for Army input. I've given my input on
    numerous meetings, numerous occasions, to both DOD, EUCOM, and
    the Army. I'm at a loss, Senator, as to the specific report
    that you're referring to, whether I inputted that.
        Senator Wicker. All right.
        General Milley. I input a lot of things, and I'll have to
    go back and doublecheck----
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        General Milley.--and see if that specific----
        Senator Wicker. Appreciate that. If you'd get back to us.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Milley. The report has not yet been written. When
    discussions with the Polish Government have concluded, the Army
    will provide input to the report.

        Senator Wicker. Let me just ask, then, General, about the
    idea of a new rotary wing program called the Future Attack
    Reconnaissance aircraft. It is meant to fill the capability gap
    in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in complex,
    degraded operation environments. Can you describe, in an
    unclassified setting, what type of capabilities we're talking
    about there, and how such an aircraft would fare against
    Russian and Chinese threats?
        General Milley. As Secretary Esper mentioned, in terms of
    these six priority areas, one of which is future vertical lift,
    and the FAR [future attack reconnaissance] aircraft, which is
    the one you're referring to is one of those programs underneath
    the future vertical lift. The Apache helicopter is one of the
    big five that came in in the 1980s, so it's been in now for 40
    years or so. That particular aircraft, although it's deadly--
    it's a great weapon system, the Apache--it's going to need to
    be replaced in the out years. So, we're looking for an aircraft
    that, without going into specific requirements and
    classifications, essentially goes further, can see further, can
    acquire targets further, and can engage at greater ranges than
    currently exists, and has greater legs, can fly further with a
    greater payload of weapon systems. A significant improvement
    over that which exists today.
        Senator Wicker. Can you tell the Committee how soon you
    envision moving in that direction?
        General Milley. We're already moving in that direction, in
    terms of research, development, and the development of the
    prototypes. In terms of actually fielding the weapon, or
    fielding the helicopter, that, I think, is still a moving
    target with industry, because we want to see the prototypes and
    we want to do proof of principle on some of the technologies.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary Esper and General Milley, for your
    testimony this morning.
        Secretary Esper, I was pleased to see a story in--a report
    this morning that said that the Army had backed down on the
    Freedom of Information request relative to contamination from
    PFAS components. I just wanted to applaud the fact that you had
    decided to waive those fees. We have a significant
    contamination from PFOS and PFOA at the former Pease Air Force
    Base, and the Air Force has been very responsive to the
    community of Portsmouth and New Hampshire on that. I hope the
    Army will be as responsive.
        I want to go back to pick up on Senator Reed's question
    about the $1 billion that is coming for the President's border
    wall, because the reports--the news reports have suggested that
    that $1 billion is counterdrug money. Can you--you mentioned
    that it was coming from a different fund, in your testimony--
    can you clarify where, exactly, that billion dollars is coming
    from?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. My understanding--and I
    would obviously defer to OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense], because it's their decision, of course--is, that is
    money that was in the fiscal year 2019 budget for the Army for
    military personnel. When we adjusted our end-strength number
    down, it freed up the 1 billion or so military personnel money,
    and that money is now being reprogrammed into what's called the
    284 counterdrug account. Then that is the means by which it is
    leveraged to build the necessary barriers that were outlined, I
    think, in the notification sent to Congress.
        Senator Shaheen. So, it's actually being programmed into
    the counterdrug account----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I'm----
        Senator Shaheen.--is what you're saying?
        Secretary Esper. I'm not familiar with all the movements.
    Again, it's not my decision or action, but, my understanding,
    it gets reprogrammed from the DOD account into the 284 account,
    and eventually ends up with the Corps of Engineers.
        Senator Shaheen. Can you or General Milley speak to the
    reports that have suggested that a number of the dollars that
    are being talked about to be taken from military construction
    are coming from projects in Europe that are going to be needed
    for our various activities in defense of Europe and the West?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. As you know, as you've read,
    there are things that, as I understand it, will not be
    included, will not be eligible, if you will, that would be--and
    it was our recommendation, ``Do not include barracks or
    dormitories or housing.'' Then the decision was also made to
    not include any fiscal year 2019 projects that aren't awarded,
    I think, before the end of this fiscal year. That leaves a
    numbers of projects. We would need to take a look at the final
    list. Those projects are all over the world and the United
    States, of course. Then I'd have to look at the eaches to kind
    of--and we--and the Army staff will now have to look at, How do
    we prioritize those, based on MILCON thrust typically being--
    begins with readiness and power projection.
        Senator Shaheen. So, are any of those funds coming from the
    European Deterrence Initiative?
        Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator, because I don't
    think any decisions have been made yet on how much money needs
    to be drawn and, therefore, which projects, because I think OSD
    has available to them Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps
    projects to choose from in order to fund what they want to do
    next.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly hope that none of those
    dollars are going to be taken from funds that are needed to
    protect the national security of this country.
        I understand that there has been a proposal to downsize or
    eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
    that's at the Army War College in Carlisle. I wonder if you can
    give us the status of that. I'm particularly interested because
    they're the entity that's charged with implementing the Women,
    Peace, and Security legislation. If that's going to be
    downsized or eliminated, what's going to happen to that
    initiative?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. In the context of National
    Defense Strategy, we were told that, while we shift to higher-
    intensity conflict, we need to maintain proficiency in
    irregular warfare. So, the Army decided to stand up what we
    don't have, which is an irregular warfare office. In the
    context of reform, what we've done is, we looked at a number of
    programs throughout TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] and
    everywhere else to make sure we moved money and people
    internally. The assessment was that we had nearly 50 people at
    the Peacekeeping Institute, that we could accomplish the same
    mission with fewer people. That's what was done, at the
    recommendation of Training and Doctrine Command, is to
    reallocate people while preserving the functions, including the
    one you mentioned. Further reform also included aligning that
    Institute, because peacekeeping is a part of the mission set--
    aligning it much more closely with Fort Leavenworth, which is
    the home of Army doctrine, so we have a greater connectivity.
    We think we've got a more manageable set, more focused and
    better connected, both to Army doctrine and while retaining the
    connections at Carlisle, if you will, and with the joint
    community. We don't see that as degrading their mission, but we
    felt 50 people was more than enough, that we could reduce that
    some in order to help build the irregular warfare office that
    we need for the Army.
        Senator Shaheen. So, what's going to happen to the Women,
    Peace, and Security Initiative?
        Secretary Esper. My understanding is, that is--that
    function is being preserved.
        Senator Shaheen. Where?
        Secretary Esper. At Carlisle, is my understanding. I'll
    get--I'll confirm and get back to you, though.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
    Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at
    Carlisle Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort
    Leavenworth, KS, taking command of both PKSOI and the newly
    established Army Irregular Warfare Proponent Office. The Army
    established the Irregular Warfare Proponent Office at Fort
    Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the National Defense
    Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support Joint
    peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military
    members or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be
    directed to move to Fort Leavenworth as part of the
    reorganization. Regarding the Army's role and responsibility to
    the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) mission, the CAC will
    assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
    With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are making efforts
    to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to support
    WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will
    take place no later than October 2019.

        Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper. There's nothing--my understanding is,
    nothing is moving out of Carlisle, but there is a
    reorganization of the reporting chain to improve the
    connectivity, again, back with Army doctrine at Leavenworth.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you----
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Shaheen.--very much. That makes sense, Secretary.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary and General, I have the honor of representing
    the men and women of the Nebraska National Guard, and I want to
    take a moment to recognize their work. For the past week to 10
    days, they've been active across our State, responding to the
    catastrophic flooding that Nebraska has experienced. They're
    working around the clock to save lives and protect property.
    They are truly the best representation of what it means to be a
    soldier in the United States Army National Guard, and all of us
    in Nebraska are deeply thankful for their efforts.
        My question for you is, With the additional funding for
    modernization and rebuilding readiness gaps projected for
    fiscal year-2020, how will you be working to ensure that
    adequate investments are made across the Active, Reserve, and
    the Guard components?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. First of all, our hearts go
    out the people of Nebraska for what they're going through right
    now. I'm sure it's going to take some time, so we really feel
    for them, and, you're right, a lot of kudos to the Nebraska
    Guard for what they're doing. It's a tremendous use of our
    Guard. I remember my days in the Guard, the same thing. It's a
    mission we're very proud of.
        Our commitment is to man the total Army and to field the
    total Army with the equipment needed to do all the missions.
    So, we've made that commitment, particularly with aviation
    assets, which are being in heavy--heavily used right now in
    Nebraska. That's our commitment.
        The Guard is no longer a strategic Reserve. It is an
    operational force, and it's proved itself very well over the
    past many years, along with the United States Army Reserve.
        Senator Fischer. General?
        General Milley. If I could just add one comment. The United
    States Army's tasked, within the broader national security
    establishment, to conduct large-scale ground combat operations,
    campaign quality over extended periods of time. The United
    States Army cannot execute that mission, that wartime mission,
    defense of the United States--cannot do it without the National
    Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. We're the only one of the four
    services with over 50 percent of the force in the Reserve
    component. We have 53 percent in the Guard and U.S. Army
    Reserve. Navy has very tiny Reserve. Marines have a tiny
    Reserve. The Air Force, about 25 percent are in the National--
    Air National Guard. So, the Army is dependent upon the National
    Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve to execute our wartime mission.
    It cannot be done without it. So, we take that into
    consideration, and we ensure that, through the budgeting
    process and the prioritization, that the Guard and the U.S.
    Army Reserve are carefully considered and they're in all the
    meetings. We want to ensure that they are properly manned,
    trained, and equipped.
        Senator Fischer. Do you see the role of the Guard changing
    in any way as we transition to the goals of the National
    Defense Strategy? Do you see that component having to change in
    any way?
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. How so?
        General Milley. The--I think the OPTEMPO [Operational
    Tempo] of the Guard will increase for selected units within the
    Guard on our annual basis. We're already designating them with
    the head of the Army Guard, Tim--General Kadavy. Those units,
    the amount of training time they do per year will increase. We
    increased the Combat Training Center rotations from two to
    four. We intend to use those National Guard units on rotations
    to either Europe, Korea, Kosovo, the Middle East, wherever. So,
    fully incorporate the National Guard into the operational
    rotations.
        Senator Fischer. With that increase in tempo, do you see an
    increase needed for personnel, or is recruitment going to have
    to increase for the Guard?
        General Milley. Yes, for both. Within this budget, as
    mentioned, a 2,000 modest increase, rise over run, a few
    thousand a year, for the regular Army, 500 a year for the Army
    Guard, and 250 for the Army Reserve. So, slight increases over
    time until we achieve our end-state objectives sometime in the
    2028 period.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I think the other challenge for
    the Guard and the Reserve will be in future conflict with
    Russia and China, is the ability to mobilize and deploy
    quickly, much more quickly than they have, because I don't
    believe Russia and China will give us the time to build combat
    power in the future.
        Senator Fischer. I would assume you have plans on how to
    help the Guard do that.
        Secretary Esper. We have to work on that. That's--yes,
    ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Are you working with General Kadavy? Does
    he then work with our local Guard?
        Secretary Esper. We----
        Senator Fischer. Our State people?
        Secretary Esper.--see General Kadavy every day, and----
        Senator Fischer. Who is also a Nebraskan.
        Secretary Esper. General Kadavy and his counterpart,
    General Luckey, of the United States Army Reserve. Again, we
    meet as one team, one Army, and they are fully involved in all
    of our considerations.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        General Milley, in your opening statement, you mentioned
    that the Army is focusing on using directed energy for its
    mobile short-range air defense, or MSHORAD, capability. Is the
    Army still on track to field battalions of air-defense Strykers
    with directed-energy technology?
        General Milley. We're on track, in terms of establishing
    prototype systems and in the overall program, yes. So, we're on
    track, on budget, and we still intend to do that.
        Senator Heinrich. What's the timeline look, moving into the
    future? How important is continued investment in directed
    energy----
        Secretary Esper. We're----
        Senator Heinrich.--to this project?
        Secretary Esper. We're looking at a couple of batteries
    deployed to Europe----
        Senator Heinrich. Secretary?
        Secretary Esper.--in fiscal year 2021, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. Great.
        Secretary Esper. I think it's--so, it's very exciting. It
    reflects--directed energy is one of our big-five, if you will,
    technologies, along with hypersonics and artificial
    intelligence and robotics. We're--the Army's doing a lot of
    good work, and working with sister services, on directed
    energy.
        Senator Heinrich. I look forward to continued progress in
    that area.
        Secretary, I also want to ask you--the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps recently warned Pentagon leaders that deployments
    to the southwest border and funding transfers under the
    President's emergency declaration have posed, quote,
    ``unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps combat readiness and
    solvency,'' end quote. Specifically, he stated that marines
    will not participate in planned training and exercises in
    Indonesia, in Scotland, in Mongolia, and will reduce their
    participation in joint exercises with Australia and South
    Korea. Have there been similar impacts to the Army when it
    comes to training exercises?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I may defer to the Chief on
    this----
        Senator Heinrich. Okay.
        Secretary Esper.--because he's much more involved, in terms
    of watching training and readiness. But, we have spoken with
    commanders and with the 2800-or-so title 10 soldiers and 1900-
    or-so title 32 soldiers. In the scale of a 1.1-million-man
    Army, the impacts on readiness, if there are any, are
    negligible, if you will. It's not unlike when we deploy to
    tackle Ebola in western Africa or flooding in Puerto Rico. So,
    it's part of our mission set that we accept.
        But, in terms of specifics, Chief, I don't know if you want
    to----
        Senator Heinrich. General Milley. Maybe you can speak to
    whether any Army units canceled either home-station training
    events or overseas participation.
        General Milley. Anytime an Army unit goes on an unplanned
    contingency operation, whether it's Hurricane Katrina or Puerto
    Rico or Ebola or goes to Afghanistan or wherever--doesn't
    matter where it is--they're going to cancel whatever they were
    doing prior. So, the short answer would be yes, for the
    specific units. The larger answer, though--Does it impact the
    readiness of the Army? The answer is no, it doesn't have a
    significant impact at all. It's a very modest, negligible
    impact on the Army as a whole, because of--primarily because of
    scale, which is slightly different scale than what the Marines
    are talking about in that letter.
        So, our assessment is that the units that are going down
    there, primarily engineers, MPs, some aviation, transportation,
    medical units, they're within their mission profile, in terms
    of what the tasks that they're actually doing, so we don't see
    a significant degradation in readiness at this time for the
    Army.
        Senator Heinrich. Can you provide us with just a list of
    what exercises may have been impacted, either at home or
    abroad?
        General Milley. Absolutely. Sure.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training
    exercises in fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or
    unbudgeted factors.

        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper, I know last year you and I worked quite
    hard to accelerate a Military Construction (MILCON) project at
    White Sands Missile Range, and Congress actually appropriated
    $40 million to replace the 57-year-old information facility
    that actually recently caught fire; it's so old. That facility
    is used in the development and testing of our most advanced
    weapon systems, things like the Standard Missile-2, the Patriot
    missile systems, and others. In the era of big data, this kind
    of technological facility is critical for transmitting the vast
    amounts of data generated during military testing. I am raising
    this simply because this is just one of the projects we've seen
    as potentially on the list for the chopping block to transfer
    those funds to the border wall. Do you believe that this is the
    kind of project that's at risk?
        Secretary Esper. Well, first of all, Senator, thank you. I
    did enjoy my visit to White Sands last year, and it was very
    helpful, instructive to me. I--thank you for that.
        I'd have to look into the details of what you're referring.
    I'm sorry to hear about the fire. I was not tracking that. But,
    I'd have to get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. I will work to preserve as many Army
    projects as possible, with a prioritization on projects that
    directly impact Army readiness, our ability to project power,
    military housing, and barracks, but ultimately the Army will
    follow direction and guidance provided from OSD.

        Secretary Esper. As I said up front, once we see the list
    of MILCON projects that may be put up for consideration,
    that'll be an OSD call. We'll have to assess that, based on the
    prioritization we put to them, and then get back with you.
        I know one of the things that--in the OSD budget--in the
    DOD budget that OSD put in there was a--this $3.6 billion, if
    you will, to backfill any type of MILCON that might be used to
    mitigate any type of thing--projects like that.
        Senator Heinrich. I think the sooner we can get our hands
    on what is really on the list, versus off the list, then we can
    have a much more informed conversation.
        Secretary Esper. Agreed.
        Senator Heinrich. I've got one more question on AI, which I
    will just submit for the record. But, I look forward to hearing
    the Army's plans on that front, as well.
        Secretary Esper. I'll just say one thing on Artificial
    Intelligence (AI), if I can have 30 seconds. I think the Chief
    and I would agree that AI has the promise of maybe
    fundamentally changing the character of warfare. Whoever gets
    there first will have overmatch for years to come. So, we are
    putting significant investments into AI. In fact, I was in
    Pittsburgh about 2 months ago, doing both recruiting for the
    Army and then also opening up our AI Task Force at Carnegie-
    Mellon University, which is pulling in industry and schools
    from all across the country. So, AI is very, very important.
        Senator Heinrich. I'm glad to hear that.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I particularly want to compliment both of you, as well as
    Under Secretary McCarthy, for the very painstaking effort you
    put in, in going through the Army budget, line by line, to find
    the savings to fund so many of these critical modernization
    projects. One doesn't have to agree with every single decision
    you made, and I suspect there'll be some Members of this
    Committee that won't agree with every single decision, to
    realize it was a long overdue project and that it's responding
    to Congress's long-stated desire to see that we have that kind
    of effort. So, thank you very much for doing that for the Army.
    General Milley, maybe you'll have a chance to do that for the
    entire Armed Forces a few months from now.
        General Milley, I want to return to something that you said
    to Senator Wicker. He was asking you about the presence of our
    troops in Poland--and, presumably, Baltics, as well--and the
    concept of permanent basing versus rotational forces. You made
    a pretty strong case for the advantages of rotational forces
    over permanent basing. Would that not apply to Germany as well
    as Poland?
        General Milley. It could. In fact, we are rotating. We're
    rotating a brigade right now. There's two brigades in Europe,
    as you know, the 173rd, down in Italy, and then the Stryker
    Brigade, up in Germany, and we rotate an armored brigade combat
    team through Germany right now. What is permanent, the two
    brigades plus some infrastructure--artillery, some aviation,
    some command and control. That's what's in Germany today.
    Compared to, say, the Cold War, where we had 300,000 troops, or
    something like that, in Germany. We're sort of doing a
    combination of both, rotational for the combat units, and
    permanent for the infrastructure. That's something similar to
    what I would recommend for any other part of Europe, for that
    matter.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Milley. We're doing it----
        Senator Cotton. Yeah.
        General Milley.--in Korea, as well, by the way.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Just listening to your response to Senator Wicker,
    juxtaposed to the announcements in the last few days that
    Germany is going to slash its defense budget, I thought was
    pretty telling. In the end, I don't think we can expect
    Americans and American soldiers to care more about Germany's
    security than Germans do. It's troubling that they're going the
    opposite direction of so many other of our NATO allies.
        Secretary Esper, I want to talk about the THAAD missile
    defense system. Is the Army going to take full ownership of
    that from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I know that's under
    consideration. It's being discussed in great detail. I think we
    could, but what's important is that the budget would come with
    that if that happens. So, we just can't accept the program
    without all the budget authority, to include the research
    aspects of it, as well. So, I think that's still being worked.
    But, we don't want to get stuck with a bill.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah, sure. What's the timeline in which
    you think you might make that decision?
        Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator. I think that's--
    it's really an OSD decision, if you will. But, we can get back
    to you on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. Recent high-level discussions between the
    MDA and the Army have led to a unified position that no
    transfer of the THAAD and AN/TPY-2 programs occur. THAAD and
    AN/TPY-2 are BMD-purpose built systems that are fully
    integrated into the MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System
    (BMDS). Transfer would risk disruption to this tightly coupled
    integration into the BMDS architecture and MDA-managed
    configuration control of THAAD and AN/TPY-2. The THAAD and AN/
    TPY-2 programs are jointly managed with the Army and fully
    integrated as Army capabilities as demonstrated by multiple
    THAAD forward deployments and stationed batteries. MDA has
    initiated a modernization program for the AN/TPY-2 radar to
    increase the THAAD weapon system capability. If a transfer is
    directed, the Army has previously stated that all the upgrades
    must be completed prior to transfer and all associated funding
    for THAAD would need to be transferred as well. Additionally,
    any separation of funds between the MDA RDT&E and Army for
    Procurement would result in budgetary and programmatic
    inefficiencies for both MDA and the Army putting THAAD
    development and the force at risk. Finally, a transfer could
    also have adverse effects on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) such
    as delays and resultant higher costs which could jeopardize
    current and future agreements.

        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        I'm pleased to see that one of the big modernization
    prospectus--or lines of effort is long-range precision fires,
    what many just call ``artillery,'' expanding the range and
    lethality of artillery. Could you please explain the concept
    for the so-called extended-range cannon, what it would mean to
    have a gun that has that kind of range, that--those kind of
    fire power to it?
        Secretary Esper. I'll take the first shot, and then----
        Senator Cotton. Sure.
        Secretary Esper.--no pun intended--and then let the Chief
    talk to it.
        But, clearly, as the Chairman said up front, when it comes
    to artillery systems--the system, we are outmatched by the
    Russians. The extended-range cannon artillery--and I was able
    to go to Yuma, Arizona, and see it shoot--provides us
    incredible reach. When we talk about deploying to the Baltics
    or Poland, when you think about a gun that can shoot around 70-
    plus kilometers--and we think we can get further--it can be a
    game changer for us, in terms of reach, and, more importantly,
    in terms of deterrence, from the get-go. So, this is one of
    the--long-range precision fires is the top priority of the six,
    and we're moving out at both the tactical, the operational, and
    the strategic level.
        General Milley. Yeah, I mean, we made it the number-one
    priority because fires are fundamental to the American way of
    war, which is all about maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is--
    fires with movement, in combination, equals maneuver. We have
    lost a little bit, relative to some near-peer adversaries--
    China, Russia, example--with respect to cannon and rocket
    artillery. So, we intend to regain the comparative advantage
    that we've had, at least in modern history, in that weapon
    system. That's really, really important to us. Extended Range
    Cannon Artillery (ERCA) is one of multiple programs in the
    entire concept of long-range precision fires that go everywhere
    from the tactical, the 30-to-40-kilometer range, the 70 for the
    ERCA, and beyond, up to 499, for the limits of the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and beyond that for
    some other systems. So, it's an entire suite of capabilities to
    regain American dominance in the area of long-range fires.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        One final question. Going to have a lot of vehicles, a lot
    of aircraft, a lot of guns coming online in the coming years.
    General Milley, you and I have discussed this before. No
    soldier wants to ride in or shoot an acronym. I hope there's a
    plan to come up with good names for all these things, like the
    Bradley and the Abrams.
        General Milley. We were thinking the Inhofe and the Reed.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. We'll have the----
        General Milley. Or maybe the Cotton.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. Have to stick with the Inhofe and the Reed,
    but I do hope that there are going to be cool names for our
    soldiers to ride in and shoot for many years to come, as
    they've had for so long. Not an acronym.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
        I want to follow up on some of the questions related to the
    reprogramming of a billion dollars from the personnel accounts.
    You know, this is--certainly it was the decision made without
    the approval of Congress. As you know, a majority of Congress
    has actually voted against the President's national emergency
    declaration. So, basically, this is an end-around Congress,
    which I think is unacceptable. But, I think it was also
    interesting that, as you're moving a billion dollars from
    personnel funds to the DHS, the Army, just yesterday, sent the
    Congress a list of 2.3 billion in unfunded priorities, included
    more than 1 billion for readiness requirements and 247 million
    for modernization. So, given you're reprogramming a billion
    from personnel and Reserve personnel accounts to DHS
    counternarcotics account, just curious, from both of you
    gentlemen, how is the southern border a greater priority than
    Army readiness and modernization?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, on the first part, the billion
    dollars from the military personnel was that--again, that delta
    of 6500 soldiers that we were unable to fill, along with others
    from the end-strength number. That was an amount of money that
    we----
        Senator Peters. I understand that.
        Secretary Esper. Okay.
        Senator Peters. I understand where it came from. But,
    still, you've reprogrammed that for the southern border. You
    haven't come to Congress to ask for it. So, that's an end-
    around.
        Secretary Esper. We returned it to OSD, and OSD is using it
    to meet the requirements set out in the--I think, the national
    emergency declaration established by the Commander in Chief.
        Senator Peters. That has been rejected by Congress.
    Correct?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. You sent a list for 2.3 billion in unfunded
    priorities that could have been met with this 1 billion that
    originated for the--as you described. So, my question is--you
    made that a priority, as opposed to readiness and
    modernization, and yet you're here, telling us readiness and
    modernization is a priority, and yet it seems as if you've
    prioritized the southern border over Army readiness and
    modernization. Tell me why.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, the fiscal year 2019 budget, even
    with--because the money was for the military personnel that we
    cannot fill, the fiscal year 2019 budget meets our readiness
    and modernization goals. As I said up front, the needs of the
    services will always exceed the means. So, that's just a state
    of--the state of things. It's always been that way. So, I don't
    see it the way you've characterized it, if you will.
        Senator Peters. Well, you had a billion dollars you could
    have transferred to your list of unfunded priorities that you
    submitted to us just yesterday.
        Secretary Esper. Yes. Well, that was for fiscal year 2020.
    This is fiscal year 2019 money we're talking about. But, you're
    correct, that's--as I said----
        Senator Peters. I mean, that's your----
        Secretary Esper.--as I said to Senator Reed up front, we
    could have used that money to continue to improve readiness.
    That's fair.
        Senator Peters. But, you're saying the southern border is
    more important than readiness.
        Secretary Esper. I'm not--I'm not saying that. I'm saying
    that we--the Department of Defense made decisions based on what
    the President set out as priorities, and we are following
    through, we are executing.
        Senator Peters. General Milley, is readiness and
    modernization a priority over the southern border?
        General Milley. Readiness is the Army's number-one
    priority; and modernization is future readiness, and that's our
    number-two priority. But, I--you know, Senator, I'm a soldier.
    Priorities and national security priorities are established by
    civilian control of the military. We're given those as matters
    of policy. When they're given to us, we execute. So, it is not
    for me to say one is more important than the other, relative to
    the entire national security of the United States. But, within
    the Army, we've said priority one is readiness, priority two is
    modernization. But, within the Nation, that's not our call.
        That's the call of the United States Congress and the
    President of the United States. We were told to move that
    money. We gave it back to DOD. DOD's applying it in accordance
    with presidential priorities.
        Senator Peters. Of course, the Congress has spoken on this
    issue. We know that.
        But, a question in the remaining time, for both the
    Secretary and General Milley, deals with the Army's Future
    Command. I just want to get a sense--a better sense of how you
    see that fitting in with existing Army activities.
    Particularly, how does the Future Command work with the Army
    science and technology (S&T) community? What do you expect to
    see happening, in terms of that Future Command, with what we
    have now?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, first of all, the acquisition
    enterprise, if you will, under Dr. Jette, Army Acquisition,
    works hand-in-glove with Army Futures Command. In the Army
    Futures Command, what he's given us is unit--what we say, unity
    of effort, unity of command. So, in the past, where the
    acquisition enterprise was spread out across the Army, with no
    clear one person in charge, there were multiple people in
    charge, what we've done with Futures Command, by standing it up
    last summer, was really unify it under General Murray, in
    Austin, and that--what that also did was, we moved out of--we
    moved, organizationally, our S&T enterprise under him, as well.
    So, now his responsibility is to think about the future,
    Futures Command. How will the Russians and Chinese, say, fight
    in the year 2035, 20---2045, if you will, and then, how does he
    start looking at the capabilities we will need to deter and
    defeat them at that point in time? Then he can think--he has
    the ability now to direct the S&T side of the house. In this
    budget, we shifted 80 percent--we continue to shift of 80
    percent of our S&T dollars to those modernization priorities.
    That's his call, to make sure that we're all lined up, aligned,
    focusing on what the future threats are. That's his--that's a
    big part of his job. That eventually turns into requirements.
        Senator Peters. Right.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your leadership for our
    men and women in the Army. We certainly do appreciate that.
        Increasing our warfighting readiness does remain the Army's
    number-one priority. Thank you for emphasizing that over and
    over again. However, we do understand that sexual assault
    within our Army formation is not only a serious criminal
    offense, but it also degrades our readiness. It also degrades
    discipline, morale, unit cohesiveness, and going back again to
    the combat readiness. So, to both of you, please. We'll start
    with you, Secretary. What is the Army doing to continue to
    combat the problem of sexual assault in the military? Are you
    seeing an increase in the leadership in our culture, where we
    are addressing the issue of sexual assault?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, thank you for that question.
    You've hit a number of good points.
        Let me say up front, there is no room in the United States
    Army for sexual assault and sexual harassment, period. We will
    not tolerate it. It's not just a readiness issue. It's contrary
    to our values as an institution. We are working very hard to
    continue to get the--and we see it, statistically. Prevalence
    over the years is coming down, and reporting is going up. Those
    are good trend lines. We have another report coming out in a
    month or so. We'll see what that looks like. But, what we've
    done in the last year is, rather than focus on soldiers doing
    online training and sending them off to an auditorium to get a
    speech or whatever, we are putting the chain of command back
    involved in teaching the importance of dignity and respect for
    everybody, and not tolerating sexual assault and harassment.
    So, what we want to do is leverage the culture of the Army and
    the chain of command to get at this. My experience, my view,
    the commanders' view, as well, is, that's the way you get at
    this. I think we've set it aside for too long. It's much like
    housing. We--the chain of command stepped aside a little bit.
    We need to get back in the game. That, on top of all the
    education we're doing, the training, the stand-downs, I think
    will continue to move the needle on sexual assault and
    harassment until we get it down to zero.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I do think that's important. We
    do need to focus on those issues. But, active engagement by our
    leadership is very, very important. Thank you, Secretary.
        General Milley, would you like to make some comments?
        General Milley. I would echo the comments of the Secretary,
    that it's not tolerated. We are deeply, deeply committed to
    that. From a soldier's standpoint, from a commander's
    standpoint, this is blue-on-blue. This is a friendly force
    inflicting a casualty on a friendly force. There's no room for
    that. There's no room for it with bullets on a live-fire range,
    there's no room for it with bullets in combat, and there's no
    room for it with sexual assault in a barracks or at a party or
    wherever.
        There are some key things that we are doing. The chain of
    command here is absolutely critical. The ownership of the
    small-unit leader all the way up to the senior-most leaders of
    the Army, chain of command engagement is critical to resolving
    this. I know there are people who think the chain of command
    should not be involved in this, from a legal standpoint, UCMJ
    [Uniform Code of Military Justice]. I disagree 100 percent with
    that. The chain of command has got to own it, wrap its arms
    around it, and prevent it. Alcohol, we know, is a contributing
    factor in almost 50 percent of the cases. We know that almost
    all of the cases occur on weekends, Fridays and Saturday
    nights, between midnight and 0300. We know that a lot of the
    victims, or most of the victims, are young women. There are
    male victims, but most of them are young women between 19 and
    24 years old, newly assigned to a unit, in the first 60 days.
    We know that it normally involves a party and there's alcohol
    involvement.
        So, there are things that we know we can do. We can control
    the barracks, we can control the night, we can ensure the chain
    of command are present at various functions--unit functions, et
    cetera. We can beat this. It is a cancer within the ranks. It
    destroys cohesion and discipline. It must be stamped out in the
    military, writ large--not just the Army; military, writ large.
    There are TTPs--tactics, techniques, and procedures--to do it,
    and we intend to do it.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Going back to something that you
    said, General--Secretary Esper, I'd like you to comment on it--
    you mentioned the chain of command. Very important. I would
    like to discuss section 541 of our fiscal year 2015 NDAA. This
    provision required relevant service secretaries to review
    sexual assault cases where the staff judge advocate has
    recommended referral of charges to a court-martial but where
    the commander who serves as the convening authority has refused
    to refer the case. To the best of your knowledge, Secretary,
    how many cases has the Secretary of the Army reviewed under
    this provision between its enactment in 2015 to the present?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I can't speak for my
    predecessors. I'd have to go find that information. But, I
    don't believe I've reviewed any. I need to dig into this and
    come back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. Neither I, nor my predecessors, have been
    asked to review any cases under the provisions of section 541
    of Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA or section 1744(c) of the Fiscal Year
    2014 NDAA.

        Senator Ernst. Okay. I believe that you are correct, sir,
    that there have been zero. Based on this, is it your assessment
    that commanders are following the legal advice provided by
    their staff judge advocates with respect to sexual assault
    cases?
        Secretary Esper. I'd have to check. The expectation is
    that, in most cases, they would. I can't speak to them all.
    There's--but, I'd have to come back to you with the numbers.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. Yes, it is my assessment that Commanders
    are following the legal advice provided by their judge
    advocates with respect to all cases, including sexual assault.
    Commanders value the advice and counsel of their legal
    advisors. It is the Commander, however, who bears ultimate
    responsibility for making decisions about the proper
    disposition of a case. Legal advisors will often provide a
    range of options for the Commander to consider, and the
    Commander combines that advice with his or her training and
    experience to make a decision in the best interests of justice,
    good order, and discipline.

        Senator Ernst. Yes. If they are not following, they would
    go----
        General Milley. Let me----
        Senator Ernst.--to you, Secretary Esper.
        General Milley. As a commander who's been a general court-
    martial convening authority on multiple occasions, I think the
    percentage is extremely high, like 99.9 percent, where
    commanders are following----
        Senator Ernst. Follow----
        General Milley.--the advice of their SJA [Staff Judge
    Advocate]. It would be a very stupid commander not to do that,
    in most cases. That's not--he has the authority not to follow
    it, but he--that wouldn't be a very smart commander.
        The other thing, in terms of way ahead, we are partnering
    with Senator McSally and her initiative with the Department of
    Defense. We want to partner closely with that. We think there's
    a lot of promise in that initiative that we intend to fully
    participate in it over the next 90 to 120 days.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. That would be a stupid commander
    that does not----
        General Milley. It would be a stupid commander.
        Senator Ernst.--follow his JAG's advice--his or her JAG's
    [Judge Advocate General] advice.
        So, thank you. I appreciate that, gentlemen. Thank you very
    much for your service.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here today. I really appreciate
    it. Thanks for your service, to both of you.
        General Milley, I'd like to just kind of follow up on a
    question that Senator Cotton asked. Earlier, he asked about the
    Army taking THAAD over from the MDA, which came as a little bit
    of a surprise to me. Can you kind of explain that a little bit
    more to us, and what's going on there?
        General Milley. I think what he's talking about is the
    money and the procurement, acquisition, and the way ahead for
    the prototyping, and the force structure of THAAD. I believe
    that's what Senator Cotton was talking about.
        Senator Jones. All right, sir.
        I guess this would be to both of you. I notice, in the--the
    requested $63 billion in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)
    funding, which is a pretty big increase--89.8-percent increase
    from the amount that we enacted in fiscal year 2019. Going into
    that a little bit, I've noticed that a lot of line items in the
    budget request is kind of a mix of base and OCO funding, which
    really kind of makes it hard to tell what might be affected if
    Congress doesn't provide that level of OCO funding. So, how can
    we tell anything about your priorities by just digging into the
    OCO percentage for a particular item? How can we look and see
    what your priorities are and what you might be doing with that
    money?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, two things. I think the OSD
    Comptroller would say that there are two buckets of OCO, one
    that he would describe as ``OCO for base,'' which is about 31
    billion, and then one is the pure base, which is about 31
    billion. So, I think, for us, if you look at the 150 billion or
    so that is the base plus the OCO-for-base, in there you will
    see the prioritization the Army has placed on, number one,
    readiness. It's reflected in the maximization of our CTC
    [combat training center] rotations, the flying-hour program for
    aviation, et cetera. Then, with regard to modernization, which
    is future readiness, you see the early stages of this big shift
    from legacy systems into future systems. In fiscal year 2020, I
    think it's over $4 billion gets shifted, but, over the FYDP,
    over the 5-year period, you will see a 30-plus-billion-dollar
    shift, because most of that money is needed in the 2022, 2023,
    2024 timeframe, when we start procuring things, as our S&T
    ripens into projects ready to harvest.
        Senator Jones. All right.
        General Milley, you have anything to add to that, or is----
        General Milley. For me, as a Chief--and I've said this the
    last 3 and a half years, or three--previous three testimonies--
    the color of the money, whether it's OCO or base, I know that's
    important from a budgeting standpoint, it's important to
    Congress, but, as a recipient of the money, what we need is the
    money in order to train, man, and equip this Army, in order to
    defend the United States of America. However that is
    categorized and the color of the money, I won't say it's not
    important to me, but it's less important than getting the
    money. That is important.
        The reason it's being done is because of BCA [Budget
    Control Act] and the continuing resolutions (CR) that have been
    done over the years. I would caution this Congress that, if we
    were to go to BCA levels of funding, we will place the United
    States of America at great risk. So, that's why it's being done
    the way it is.
        Senator Jones. All right. Thank you, sir.
        I also want to talk a little bit about the budget that
    calls for declines in support for AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM as well
    as USFK [United States Forces Korea], but a pretty big
    increase, about 35 percent, for EUCOM. I have two questions
    about that. One, I'm still a little bit--I am concerned as--
    about North Korea. Maybe not as much as Russia and China, but
    I'm still pretty concerned about North Korea, which remains
    pretty volatile. We've got decreased funding there. I'm
    wondering if we should take this as an indication that our
    troop levels on the Peninsula are going to be reduced. Also, as
    a different part of that question, the operational changes,
    what will we see as operational changes at EUCOM with a 35
    percent increase?
        General Milley. A couple of points. Over the previous, I
    guess, it was 18 months or so, the United States military--and
    the Army, specifically, as part of a broader effort--did many
    things, some in a classified setting, and others were open
    knowledge, that shored up military capabilities on the
    Peninsula of Korea and in the general western Pacific region.
    We think that today the United States Army capabilities that
    are forward-deployed in the Pacific are in pretty good shape to
    handle whatever might come.
        Secondly is, the military's clearly in support of a
    diplomatic effort in the Pacific. Although there's various
    reporting about North Korean nuclear capabilities, et cetera,
    one thing we can say with certainty is, there has not, at least
    to date--over the last year, year and a half or so, that there
    has not been another nuclear test. There has not been another
    missile test. The rhetoric has died down considerably. The
    North Koreans are doing various things, along with the South
    Koreans, in engaging and interacting with each other. There
    have been LPOPs [Listening Post/Observation Post] in towers
    that have been brought down along the DMZ [Korean Demiliterized
    Zone]. So, the situation today is different. There's been two
    meetings, of course, between the President of the United States
    and the leader of North Korea.
        All of that diplomatic engagement, is pointing in a good
    direction. We are not done yet. There's a lot of--a lot yet to
    be done on North Korea. But, we're in a different place today
    than we were--we think we are in a different place today than
    we were, say, 18 months or more before.
        The increase in Europe, we think--at least my estimation is
    that, as I said in my opening statement, Russia is still the
    only country on Earth that is actually an existential threat to
    the United States of America, they're the only ones who have
    the capability to bring that level of destruction to our
    country. They have been very aggressive in the last, call it,
    decade or so, in--with Georgia and Ukraine and Middle East and
    various other places. They are intentionally, with malfeasance
    and forethought, trying to undermine NATO on a daily, weekly,
    monthly basis, and with a variety of tactics, techniques, and
    procedures that are just below the level of war. They have
    clearly done various nefarious activities in the United States,
    as well. So, beefing up our capabilities in Europe is important
    to the defense of the United States.
        Alliances still do matter. NATO is important to the United
    States. Our President has said NATO's important to the United
    States. We want NATO to belly up to the bar and pay their 2
    percent. Clearly, we want that. But, at the same time, we know
    that we need to forward-defend in order to defend the United
    States, as well. So, there is some additional monies going into
    Europe just for the purpose of deterring further aggression by
    Russia.
        Senator Jones. All right. Thank you General Milley. I
    really appreciate those responses.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator McSally.
        Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for your leadership for the
    men and women in our Army.
        You talked, in your testimony on page 7, about the need to
    increase unmanned aerial system (UAS) integration was related
    to future vertical lift. As you look at modernization,
    obviously unmanned aerial systems are going to be more and more
    important as to how we fight and integrate both manned and
    unmanned. Fort Huachuca houses the unmanned aerial system
    training right now, the only solely dedicated UAS training
    airspace. Unlike other places in the country, we're actually
    increasing that airspace, our 2303; whereas, other places,
    airspace is being encroached.
        As you know, General Milley--you were down there when I
    hosted you--there's over 300 days of sunshine for the training
    there. It really is a unique location for this capability for
    our Army, never mind all the joint base and airspace and
    opportunities for joint training around it in the future, and
    it is along the border, so, in defense support to civil
    authorities, if they do see something, they can pass that on.
    So, I really see this is a national security asset for us.
        Do you agree that, as we grow our UAS training
    opportunities or grow UAS missions, that Fort Huachuca is a
    national asset that needs to have its training protected and
    potentially increased?
        Secretary Esper, I'd love to host you down there so you can
    see that, firsthand.
        General Milley. Senator, I--you know, Fort Huachuca is a
    great base. Arizona has 300 days of sunshine, as you noted. The
    airspace is mostly always clear. So, yes, Fort Huachuca and
    other capabilities and bases within Arizona are--and other
    States--are national assets. As far as UAS-specific, it's a
    great place to fly UAS. There are some other bases around the
    U.S. that do that. But, clearly, UAS has a role to play, and it
    is an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance asset. You've
    got the Intelligence School there. That's why it was there.
    Now, we have taken UAS and realigned it with the aviation
    community of the United States Army. But, in terms of where it
    bases, where it trains, we're taking a look at all of that.
    There's a variety of options. Arizona's clearly right on the
    top of the list.
        Senator McSally. Okay. I appreciate it. Again, if we're
    going to expand the capability that, you know, we continue to
    preserve that national treasure that we have there.
        Secretary Esper, can I host you down at Fort Huachuca
    before any decisions might be made in the future?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. I think we're planning a
    trip for the fall. So, I'd love to----
        Senator McSally. Okay.
        Secretary Esper.--meet up with you down there and do
    soldier meetings and watching training and all those great----
        Senator McSally. Outstanding. Thank you.
        I know you mentioned, in talking to Senator Cotton, that
    you were down at Yuma Proving Group, you know, watching some
    fires there. One of the challenges we have with long-range
    precision fires being your top priority is the range space that
    we have, and the need to modernize it and lengthen it. They
    actually have to shut down the road when they do longer-range
    fires. So, is part of your budget taking a look at--I know
    there's some initiatives in Yuma for land swaps and other
    things, but trying to modernize the ranges so that we can
    actually test these long-range fires for future?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. You hit on an important point.
    We're looking at all of our training ranges to make sure that
    they can accommodate the future systems that we have under--
    that we're designing or developing. It's not just the range,
    itself, but it's the sensors, it's all the----
        Senator McSally. Exactly.
        Secretary Esper.--all the stuff you need. So, we're looking
    at that for Yuma, I think, White Sands, a number of locations,
    for all of these six priorities, as we need them.
        Senator McSally. Okay, fantastic. Is there any resources in
    this budget related to expansion of those training ranges?
        Secretary Esper. I'd have to get back to you and--with a
    note and tell you what is or is not. I just--I don't have that
    level of detail, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. The Army is currently reviewing whether
    expansion is needed at both Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) and White
    Sands Missile Range (WSMR) to meet the needs of future weapon
    systems. The Army has funds for proposed YPG land expansion in
    the fiscal year 2020 budget to safely allow for air drop at
    higher altitudes. The Army is continuing to research the
    necessity of expansion at WSMR, and won't be in a position to
    seek funding for another 1 to 2 years.

        Senator McSally. Okay, great.
        Another question on the precision-strike missile. Right
    now, it's being developed in accordance with the INF Treaty.
    We've made a notification to be withdrawing from the INF
    Treaty. I think that will happen in August, with a 6-month
    notification. Are there any plans to release--remove the
    previously imposed range restrictions in the development of
    that capability, based on us pulling out of INF?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I've talked with our acquisition
    folks, and they've talked with industry. I think there are two
    competitors. I think, if and when we exit the treaty, they're
    prepared to adjust the ranges above 499 kilometers.
        Senator McSally. Great.
        Secretary Esper. We've got to see how far. But, that--
    clearly, again, long-range precision fires is something that's
    important to us, and the ability to do that with conventional
    means gives us that reach.
        Senator McSally. Great, thanks.
        Oh, go ahead, General Milley.
        General Milley. Nope.
        Senator McSally. Okay.
        One last quick question. Nearly 75 percent of young
    Americans age 17 to 24 are not fit for military service, for a
    variety of reasons. I know you've had some recruiting
    challenges. This was already touched on. This is obviously
    concerning, if we're coming from such a small pool. Is there
    anything else that we can do innovatively to address this issue
    to make sure that we've got the best and brightest joining our
    military in the Army?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, you're right, it's--you know, 29
    percent are not qualified, for mental, physical, behavioral
    reasons. For--on the physical side, it's mostly obesity. Then
    you take a look at that same population of--less than 4 percent
    have a proclivity to serve. So, we're trying to go out, by--we
    reorganized and overhauled our recruiting organization. One of
    the initiatives we have is the Focus 22 cities, where we go
    back to America's biggest cities, and we try and talk to kids,
    young men and women, where they are, and speak to the
    opportunities that the Army provides them. It's different in
    each part of the country. I was--I've been in Cleveland and in
    Boston and L.A., and I've been all over. But, you have to
    appeal to them where they are, and talk to them about what the
    Army brings.
        The bigger challenge that we face--this is a national
    issue--is, fewer and fewer Americans--young Americans
    understand the military.
        Senator McSally. Right.
        Secretary Esper. There's no relationship, whether it's the
    Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force. That's--in our own little way,
    we're trying to reverse that by getting out and telling our
    story.
        Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
        I'm out of time. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank Senator Ernst for focusing on the
    continuing scourge of sexual harassment and assault in the
    military. In addition, we need to focus on retaliation that
    continues. I know that we need to change the culture, which
    doesn't happen overnight. It's an ongoing, continuous effort. I
    certainly share Senator Ernst's perspective and concerns.
        Mr. Chairman, we spend a lot of time on this Committee
    talking about China as a near-peer competitor. But, of course,
    Russia is also a significant rival, and of--General Milley just
    talked about Russia as posing the only existential threat to
    the United States, undermining NATO, what they're doing in the
    Ukraine, Syria, their nefarious activities in the United
    States. So, we learned, Mr. Chairman, that the--President Trump
    has invited Putin to the White House. We don't know what they
    talked about during their Helsinki meeting. We have no idea
    what they will talk about this time. It should concern us that
    the Commander in Chief is talking to a near-peer adversary, and
    we won't know what they will talk about or what kind of
    understanding they may come to. So, I think this Committee
    should be seriously concerned.
        I have a question for both of you regarding the Army's role
    in the Pacific. It is important that the United States projects
    strength, reassure our allies, and build partnerships in the
    Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of the actions of China and
    North Korea. Your fiscal year 2020 budget request specifically
    noted the goal of strengthening alliances and partnerships by
    funding multilateral exercises. How much money was added for
    those exercises in the 2020 budget?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I'll have to get with--back to
    you on the exact numbers, but clearly we do want to strengthen
    our relationships and exercises. Pacific Pathways has been very
    successful. We were actually looking at----
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. In the fiscal year 2020 budget, the Army
    allocated approximately $156 million in additional funding for
    Defender Pacific and a number of other, smaller, exercises.

        Senator Hirono. Thank you, because one of my subquestions
    was whether Pacific Pathways will be included in your budget--
    --
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono.--request.
        Secretary Esper. It is, and it's a very robust series of
    exercises. But, we're also looking at doing our own type of
    dynamic force employment as part of multidomain operations,
    where we do even bigger exercises out in the Pacific to reflect
    the shift to the National Defense Strategy.
        Senator Hirono. Can you tell me, Mr. Secretary, how many of
    these targeted multilateral exercises are in the Pacific?
        Secretary Esper. I can't, off the top of my head, Senator.
    We can give that to you. But, we've had soldiers, from National
    Guard to regular Army, training anywhere from Singapore and
    Indonesia to Thailand, all over.
        Senator Hirono. So, you'll get back to me.
        Secretary Esper. Absolutely.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        Senator Hirono. I want to know how many of the--how much of
    the Army's funding for the exercises goes toward exercises on
    the Korean Peninsula, as a subpart.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. There are five multilateral exercises and
    23 bilateral exercises regularly conducted with partners and
    allies in the Pacific. Approximately $8 million was budgeted in
    fiscal year 2020 for exercises on the Korean Peninsula.

        Senator Hirono. Has there been a change in the Army's
    funding for exercises in Korea, since larger joint and combined
    exercises have been canceled or modified, starting last year?
        General Milley. Let me----
        Senator Hirono. General Milley?
        General Milley.--help out a little bit here, Senator, if I
    could.
        There are dozens of exercises in the Pacific. We'll get you
    the exact list. You're familiar with the big ones----
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        General Milley.--Corporate Gold, Yama Sakura, Keen Sword,
    and so on, so forth.
        Senator Hirono. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
        General Milley. Pacific Pathways. We are funding those. We,
    years ago--I guess it was 4 or 5 years ago now--made a
    commitment to pivot to the Pacific. We, the United States Army,
    have about 87-88,000 U.S. soldiers in the Pacific. We've got
    the--most of the 28,500 that are on the Korean Peninsula are
    Army soldiers. We've got United States Army, Japan. So, as you
    are well aware, we're--we, the Army, are very deeply engaged
    and very committed to the Pacific. It's not just all about
    Russia and Europe. We'll get you the exact number of exercises,
    and the money.
        General Milley. With respect to the Korean Peninsula, there
    was, as you know--I guess it was within the last 30 days, there
    was a commitment to go ahead and reduce some of the major
    overall exercises, in terms of large-scale CPXs [command post
    exercise] and stuff like that. Our estimate is, is that, from
    an Army perspective--and I've talked to General Abrams, as
    well--that the degree of readiness is modest--the degree of
    declining in readiness is modest. We don't think it's going to
    have a huge detrimental effect. Anything brigade and below,
    where the rubber meets the road, in terms of combat actions,
    those guys are still training every single day, and they're
    still capable of fighting tonight. So, we're comfortable with
    where we are, in terms of our training schedules and our
    training plans, on the Korean Peninsula.
        Senator Hirono. So, with our training in the Korean
    Peninsula, we are doing these in conjunction with the South
    Korean military----
        General Milley. Absolutely.
        Senator Hirono.--are we not? Because we need to----
        General Milley. Yeah.
        Senator Hirono.--coordinate, if anything----
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Hirono.--happens there.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Hirono. I want to get to the need for childcare
    facilities and capacity, Mr. Secretary. When we met, there was
    a 7-month-old infant who passed away, what appears to be an
    unlicensed home daycare. I think that we have to pay a lot more
    attention to the need for childcare, as we have families now,
    more and more, in the military. Is access to safe, affordable
    childcare for military families an important readiness issue
    for you?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I've traveled the Army now for
    18 months or so, talking about this. I was at Schofield
    Barracks lat year. It's--the challenge is particularly acute in
    Hawaii, where we have probably an unmet demand--I'm trying to
    recall--anywhere between 20 and 40 percent. So, there are a
    number of things we're doing to tackle that. A big part of it
    is civilian hiring, spousal hiring----
        Senator Hirono. Yes.
        Secretary Esper.--to fill----
        Senator Hirono. We need to make sure that we decrease the
    delay in hiring appropriately trained people.
        Secretary Esper. So, we've taken about a dozen-plus
    initiatives, everything from allowing, after the background
    check by the FBI, within 72 hours, line-of-sight access. We see
    our numbers going up, which is very good. I can come brief you
    on a number of other things. But, we--it's trending in the
    right direction. We do need to actually expand authorized in-
    home childcare. That's another route. The other thing that I'm
    hearing lately that I want to go after is providing hourly
    childcare for folks, outside of the daycare centers, because
    it's a need for spouses, for moms and dads who need to--you
    know, maybe the spouse is on deployment, to be able to do that.
        Senator Hirono. So, we'll continue to work with you on
    these, thank you for recognizing our reality for many military
    families.
        Secretary Esper. Very important.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Secretary, I'd like to begin with a comment about
    something that is a little bit outside the jurisdiction of this
    Committee but is not outside your jurisdiction. I'm talking
    about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As you know, large
    portions of my State is currently--are currently under water,
    which is true for other Members of this Committee. I was just
    in the State in recent days, surveying the damage from this
    historic flooding. It is quite significant. I have to say, I've
    heard from my constituents in the State over and over again
    that they have had significant trouble in working with the Army
    Corps, both in terms of responsiveness, but also in terms of
    significant concerns about, perhaps, misplaced priorities by
    the Corps and their management of the river systems. So, I look
    forward to working with you on this. Like to visit about it
    and--whether that's taking a look at the master manual or other
    reforms that we need to pursue to make sure, as we face a year
    of historic flooding, that this sort of thing does not keep
    happening, and that we're able to meet the needs of folks who
    live in and make their living along the river.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, if I may, first of all----
        Senator Hawley. Please.
        Secretary Esper. Well, again, our hearts go out for the
    folks affected by the flooding, your constituents. What I'd
    like to do is get the Corps of Engineers up here today to your
    office and find out----
        Senator Hawley. Great.
        Secretary Esper.--what's going on.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much. I appreciate--
    --
        Secretary Esper. Then we can----
        Senator Hawley.--that.
        Secretary Esper.--we can tackle it, and then we'll take it
    back down to the district level and make sure we get it--get
    working on it ASAP.
        Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you very much.
        I just want to offer a word of praise, Mr. Secretary, both
    to you and to you, General, for your leadership in reform,
    modernization, pursuit of the NDS priorities, I think, and
    really making the Army, perhaps, the leading service, in terms
    of pursuing reform and modernization. It's really impressive
    what you have done in this most recent budget and your
    leadership overall. So, thank you for that.
        Let me ask you an NDS-related question. I'm wondering
    about--thinking about the Indo-Pacific, does the Army have
    plans--what are the Army's plans to contribute with INF-range
    conventional missile systems in that theater to restoring our
    conventional edge against China?
        General, go ahead.
        General Milley. The--I don't want to go into classified
    briefings, but we've got a variety of capabilities that--
    emerging capabilities that we're going to deploy to the Pacific
    theater that we think will have significant impact on any
    potential conflict that could emerge in that area. We are
    experimenting that with what we're calling multidomain task
    forces. We're establishing two of those. One of them is in the
    Pacific. They are experimenting with the doctrine or the new
    concepts of multidomain operations. That task force will be
    equipped with a variety of capabilities that'll be able to
    establish dominance from the land, in space, cyber, perhaps
    maritime, as well--not subsurface, but surface, to be sure--as
    well as air. So, there's a variety of capabilities that we're
    going to deploy and a variety of cannon, rocket, and missile
    capabilities from the land that will have a significant impact.
    Just did a secure video tele-conference (SVTC) with--Admiral
    Davidson and Under Secretary McCarthy and Vice Chief of Staff
    McConville were out there just last week, and we were talking
    about that very issue, and we'll be introducing some of that
    stuff in exercises over the course of the next 24 months.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much.
        Let me switch theaters, but a similar set of questions
    about the NDS, thinking about, now, the Army in the context of
    the Joint Force in the Baltics and this Baltic scenario that
    the NDS talks about. How have you made progress on that? Where
    do you--what do you still need? What are your plans to get
    there?
        General Milley. Again, most of those exercises that we've
    done, and then the analysis we've done, is classified. We are
    keenly aware of Russian capability with respect to the Baltics.
    We are shoulder to shoulder with the Baltic nations--Lithuania,
    Latvia, and Estonia--as well as Poland. The rotation of forces,
    the European Defense Initiative (EDI), the exercises we're
    doing and the capabilities that we're deploying, we think will
    be sufficient to cause pause for any further Russian
    aggression.
        Senator Hawley. Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Esper. Senator, you made a very important point.
    You said, ``What do you need?'' What we need is this budget.
    Because the Russians are building new tanks, the Russians are
    modernizing their fighting vehicles, they are modernizing their
    air defense systems. Across the board, they are doing things
    that we need to get on with doing. This budget, and the
    billions of dollars we shift, will get us there so we're
    prepared to deter them and, if necessary, defeat them, should
    war come.
        Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you, again, Mr. Secretary,
    General, for your leadership.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, to the witnesses.
        I want to start with Secretary Esper, a thank you. Two
    Thursdays ago, you hosted Senator Warner and I at Fort Belvoir.
    I just want to commend you and the Army in the way that you're
    going after this very, very tough challenge on military
    housing. Secretary Esper escorted us around to a couple of
    homes, where we were able to visit with folks who live there,
    but then a roundtable session with many other families. I was
    very impressed, because, when problems came up and it seemed
    like there was a little bit of, ``Well, that's the housing
    company's problem,'' or, ``That's the garrison commander's
    problem,'' Secretary Esper was in a ``Well, no, we're going not
    fix it'' mode, and you just had a really good assuring demeanor
    to the families that were there that I know gave Senator Warner
    and I assurance, as well. The Army has also played the lead
    role in, I think, doing the initial draft of a Tenant's Bill of
    Rights that might be used more systemwide to protect folks who
    are living in military housing. So, I'm going to just begin
    with that. I know, Secretary Esper, you have a sense of urgency
    about this.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine. General Milley, as well. We'll all be after
    it, focusing on it during the NDAA.
        Secretary Esper. Thank you for going down with me. Having
    the support of this Committee makes a big difference. We will
    fix it, because there's nothing more important than our
    soldiers and their families.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you so much for that.
        You--your last answer to Senator Hawley was, ``What we need
    is this budget.'' I'm going to ask budget questions. So, does
    your--does the fiscal year 2020 budget request include any
    funding for sustaining support activities on the southern
    border past September 30?
        Secretary Esper. I don't believe, Senator, but I'd have to
    get back with you on that.
        Senator Kaine. I think that's an important one, just to--
    for my colleagues. So, can you explain what you mean by
    ``sustaining''----
        Secretary Esper. Yeah.
        Senator Kaine.--just the current deployment of any, you
    know, Army units. General Neller was talking about this
    recently with respect to the Marines. The current deployment of
    Army units to the border is something that is important, but I
    wonder if the budget that we are talking about here assumes
    that that will continue past September 30. My sense is, it
    doesn't, from looking at it.
        Secretary Esper. I don't believe so, but let me come back
    to you with a definitive response.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol
    (CBP) began on October 26, 2018, was first extended through
    January 31, 2019, and has since been extended to September 30,
    2019. The CBP has not requested and the Army has not been
    directed to deploy troops at the border past September 30,
    2019. Therefore no funds were requested for the mission in this
    budget request.

        Senator Kaine. So, I think that's an important one, because
    if you're here testifying about the budget, and you say, ``What
    we need is this budget,'' but the budget includes nothing for
    continued sustainment of these troops at the border, that also
    tells us something about what priorities are.
        It's more than just priorities. My understanding of the
    President's authority under 10 U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON
    monies is that MILCON monies can be reprogrammed, but they have
    to be in support of military personnel. So, if we're going to
    reprogram $3.6 billion of fiscal year 2019 MILCON monies,
    they're not going to be immediately put up. I mean, that's
    going to take some time to put things under contract and do
    them. If we're not assuming that we're going to be having a
    sustained presence of military personnel at the southern
    border, sort of raises a question about, ``If we need this
    budget, but those who put this budget together did not
    determine that that was a priority, then why use U.S.--10
    U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON monies if we're not going to
    have a sustained presence of military personnel there?'' You
    can understand the question that I'm asking. I think it's
    relevant to the vote that the House is going to undertake
    today. But, I'm sort of curious and may ask, for the record, Do
    you know why there was not a request, as part of this budget
    submission, to have sustained activities of the Army at the
    border?
        Secretary Esper. One of the challenges with the budget
    process, Senator--and it involves any number of things, which
    is--and it's inevitably why we ask for reprogramming--is, the
    budget that you see before you today was developed this time
    last year and submitted in June of last year. That's one
    explanation, if you will. And----
        Senator Kaine. But, it was submitted, but it wasn't like
    unamended and unedited and unrevised----
        Secretary Esper. That's true. I'm--that's correct. Yes,
    sir. I mean, it's--but, pretty much it leaves our hands in June
    or July, and then it goes through its various iterations, and
    we have a chance every now to make some movements. But,
    that's--that is a factor I just wanted to point out. It
    involves weapon systems and what we--you know, we gain new
    knowledge on things, and that's inevitably why we come back to
    you--we, the Army and, I'm sure, the other services--come back
    to the Congress to ask for reprogramming----
        Senator Kaine. Well, just--at the end of the day, the
    budget that gets submitted to us, the final signoff, is by the
    President and the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) and the
    White House. It's just interesting that they would not have
    included funding for sustainment of activities at the border at
    the same time as they want to put in MILCON that is supposed to
    be in support of that personnel that, apparently, will not be
    at the border.
        Let me ask you this. The fiscal year 2020 budget asks for
    9.2 billion under the Department of Army account for emergency
    funding. My understanding is, that's 2 billion for hurricane
    relief, 3.6 billion to repay accounts from 2019. I'm assuming
    that's the MILCON monies that are being changed. Is that right?
    To refill those accounts?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I believe so, but that was an OSD
    insert, if you will, on the Army budget for those purposes, as
    you outlined.
        Senator Kaine. Then, I'll ask that one for the record, just
    to confirm that----
        Secretary Esper. Sure.
        Senator Kaine.--our understanding about that is correct.
        Secretary Esper. We'll get back to you on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Esper. The Department requested $9.2 billion in
    emergency funding in the Army's Military Construction, Army
    (Oversees Contingency Operations account of the 2020
    President's Budget request for the following: Reconstruction
    from natural disasters ($2.0 billion), restoration of funding
    from military construction projects used to support the
    declaration of national emergency ($3.6 billion), and emerging
    fiscal year 2020 requirements in support of the declaration of
    national emergency ($3.6 billion).

        Senator Kaine. Thank you much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator--Senator Kaine.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General Milley, I haven't seen you since the
    Patriots won the Super Bowl. As a New Englander, I'm sure you
    share my delight that we had to suffer through a 3-month
    drought between world championships between the Red Sox and the
    Patriots.
        Secretary Esper. Don't get--please, Senator, don't get him
    going.
        General Milley. I'm sitting here next to a guy from
    Pittsburgh, but, I agree, it's been 60 days since the world----
        Senator King. It was a very tough period----
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator King.--for us all.
        General Milley. Agonizing.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        First, I want to commend both of you. Both of you addressed
    the sexual assault question several times, and also, General
    Milley, your addressing of the--Russia's threat. Those were
    excellent statements, the most forthright, succinct, and
    powerful statements on those two subjects that I've heard in
    this Committee in a long time, and I want to commend you for
    making those statements.
        Looking at the budget, as I understand it, we're talking
    about a total Army budget of 182 billion, of which 33--31 is
    what I call traditional OCO, and 31 and a half is OCO-for-base,
    a wonderful new phrase. I said, a week ago, that's like
    ``rabbits-for-bicycles.'' I mean, these are two things that
    aren't really related. Wouldn't it be better if we just stepped
    up and had an honest budget, and said, ``This is what the base
    budget needs to be, and OCO is for OCO, not for ongoing
    needs''? Isn't that a more honest way to present this? I'm not
    suggesting you're dishonest, but this is a sort of charade that
    we do around here instead of saying, ``We need 182 billion for
    the Army.''
        Secretary?
        Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, I've, you know, spent my
    share of time on the Hill, as well, on the other side of the
    dais, and this is not new, if you will, in many ways, with
    regard to OCO and how you fund the base and all that. I think
    what's underlying this, too, is--the Chief said it very well
    earlier--is, certainly on the defense committees, nobody likes
    the Budget Control Act, and it's put us in a bind, where it
    impacts the readiness of the services, our modernization
    ability, et cetera. Frankly, if it were implemented, it would
    severely undermine----
        Senator King. Then maybe we ought to admit that----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator King.--change those caps to reflect the current
    reality. Those caps were established, 2011, 8 years ago. The
    world has changed dramatically since that----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator King.--time.
        Secretary Esper. Changed, and nobody thought that was ever
    going to happen. I remember the time. But, it is what it is.
    But, the--as the Chief said so well, all I look at is $182
    billion, because I know I have to organize, man, and train,
    equip an Army to defend the Nation.
        Senator King. I--and I agree with that, but I--but it does
    trouble me that 34 percent of that under an 82 billion is
    supposedly contingency money, and it really is, and everybody
    knows that. I just--truth in budgeting, I think, would be
    helpful.
        Now, as I understand it--and I think you just testified to
    this--the 9.2 billion emergency is storms plus the funding
    going out of military construction for the southern border. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, that's my understanding. It's--I
    think a share of it was for the--what happened at Tyndall and
    with the Marine Corps, some damage down there, and then the
    MILCON replenishment, if needed.
        Senator King. Well, what's troubling is--to us, is that we
    go through this process of budgeting and appropriating, and
    looking at priorities and everything, and then 3.6 gets pulled
    out, and then it gets put back in, the next year. In effect,
    the Congress is funding something it refused to fund. I realize
    that wasn't your decision or your call, and you've got to abide
    by this, but it's a kind of shell game. I mean, we're--we said
    we're not going to fund this, the appropriations process didn't
    fund it. So, it's coming out as an emergency, and now we're
    being asked to, in effect, fund it, in retrospect. I think
    that's troubling.
        One other question or--before I leave you, on--not on the
    budget. I'm concerned about recruitment, and concerned about
    not only recruitment in general, but the geography of
    recruitment. I'm worried about the military becoming isolated
    from the rest of the society and--for example, there are no
    significant military bases in the--in New England. We don't--
    and I think that's a loss for the country. We don't want the
    military to be a separate caste system over--and separate from
    the rest of the society. Could you speak to that?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I'm concerned, as well. I think
    you heard me say it a few minutes ago. I spoke to this
    particular issue, that we risk having a society that's
    increasingly--or a military increasingly isolated from the
    people it serves. That concerns me. The Army's trying to do its
    part. We have, maybe, two dozen initiatives to improve our
    recruiting, make sure we can meet our numbers. One of them
    includes what we call the Focus 22 cities, so it's 22 of our
    biggest cities, many of them in the Northwest and Northeast,
    where maybe upper--under-representative--under-represented.
    It's our efforts to kind of go to there, go to those cities and
    talk to those kids. So, I was in Boston 2 weeks ago, met with
    the mayor, met with the Governor. I was in Cleveland last week.
    I've been to L.A. I'm going to be going back up to Seattle,
    here, soon. But, it's our effort to go out to these cities and
    really speak to America's youth and appeal to them in whatever
    way resonates most. For many, it's jobs, it's skills, it's
    opportunity. For others, it's college money. For others, it's
    adventure. It's different, depending on where you go. So, in
    Cleveland, for example, it's about learning the trades, getting
    skills that you could use elsewhere. If you go to Seattle, it's
    about STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering and Math]. They
    want to see how it applies. So, I think this is our effort to
    go to America's cities where the young men and women are, and
    reengage in those places where--like you said, are, maybe,
    under-represented.
        Senator King. Well, I think part of that is that we also
    have to work with the States on credentialing to accept----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Senator King.--the credentials so a person that has all the
    skills in the world coming out of the Army doesn't have to go
    back through an apprenticeship program, or whatever is
    required. That's a separate issue.
        Secretary Esper. As I said, in both Boston and Cleveland,
    if you don't want to go regular Army, the Army Reserve and the
    Army Guard are great opportunities well--as well, where you can
    learn those skills and still stay home, in your local area, and
    be with your friends and family, or whatnot. Those are all
    great options. If you don't want to go Army, you can go another
    service. But, I think reengaging in these areas is very
    important to the future of the country.
        Senator King. You may want to go back and revise your
    testimony, ``If you don't want to go Army, you want to go one
    of the other''--I'm--you may not want that on the record.
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Esper. Well, they should go--if they want to go
    to the best branch, they should go Army, but I think--you
    know--and this generation, there is appeal to serving something
    bigger than themselves----
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper.--their communities. I think we should tap
    into that.
        Senator King. Thank you for that work. It's very important.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So, I know that you're aware of the crisis in the
    military's privatized housing program. The private companies
    that were put in charge of managing military housing failed to
    provide safe and clean homes to military families. Nonetheless,
    they managed to rake in millions of dollars in profits. The
    services have fallen short in their oversight responsibilities
    by allowing military families to live in hazardous and
    unhealthy conditions.
        I want to focus, this morning, on just one part of that
    problem. When repairs to military housing are either poorly
    made or not made at all, it can threaten the health of
    servicemembers and their families. We now know that many of
    them have developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to
    mold, lead paint, and other hazards. So, I want to ask both of
    you, as a matter of principle, do you think the United States
    Government has the responsibility to cover the lifetime costs
    of treating servicemembers and their families for health
    problems that are connected to unsafe military housing?
        General Milley, maybe I should start with you.
        General Milley. Absolutely yes.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        Secretary Esper?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. But, frankly, I'd like to see
    the companies pay, first.
        Senator Warren. Well, I'm fine with that. But, I want to
    know whether or not the military should be on the hook, whether
    or not the Federal Government should be on the hook, for its
    failure to having supervised those----
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, I agree. For that reason, I
    agree.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        General Milley. To that extent, Senator, we have
    established--we are establishing a housing registry to make
    sure that, (a) we know all the houses that have had any life,
    health, or safety issues--lead, asbestos, or whatever, to
    include mold; and we want to make sure that we backtrack, as
    many years as it takes----
        Senator Warren. Good.
        General Milley.--to go back and make sure that we know the
    names of all of those inhabitants of those houses, both adults
    and children. We want to track them throughout their life. If,
    at any point in time in the future, they have a serious health
    issue that can be directly related, cause and effect, to having
    lived in that house, it is our belief that the Federal
    Government and the RCI [Residential Communities Initiative]
    partner should be on the hook for the payment of that.
        Senator Warren. Good. I'm very glad to hear this. This is
    very reassuring. I also want to make sure that we memorialize
    this in law. I am introducing a broader military housing reform
    bill that will ensure that no member of the military or
    military family will have to pay for medical care as a result
    of unsafe housing. When a servicemember or that servicemember's
    child or spouse gets sick because the military failed to hold
    these companies accountable, then it is time for the military
    to step up and fix the problem. That means making sure this
    never happens again and paying the ongoing medical bills. So,
    thank you.
        I want to take my remaining time and ask a critical
    question about readiness facing the Army. Climate change. The
    Defense Department's most recent report on climate change
    discussed the impact of this human-caused problem on our
    military operations in bases. This report included a statement
    by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford,
    who said--and I'm going to quote, here--``When I look at
    climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflict
    around the world and things we'd have to respond to.''
        General Milley, just a simple yes or no is fine, 'cause
    I'll have some followup questions. Do you agree with General
    Dunford?
        General Milley. I do, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        General Milley. If I could just make an additional----
        Senator Warren. Sure.
        General Milley.--comment. I think what we're talking about
    here are the effects--the potential effects of climate change.
    Clearly, there'll be military implications as well as other
    implications down the road.
        Senator Warren. Good. So, is adapting to climate change
    necessary for Army readiness?
        General Milley. I'm not sure exactly what you mean by
    ``adapting to climate change.''
        Senator Warren. Well, taking this into account, if you're
    thinking about----
        General Milley. Of course. It's a----
        Senator Warren.--readiness.
        General Milley.--consideration.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        General Milley. For example, there could be resource
    shortfalls in various parts of the world, which will increase
    stress on the society, which could increase insurgency,
    revolution, terrorism, or a wide variety of other factors. So--
    --
        Senator Warren. Well----
        General Milley.--there's a variety of effects that we'd
    have to take into consideration.
        Senator Warren. So, do you think it would be prudent for
    the Army to incorporate climate change into operational and
    strategic planning?
        General Milley. We already do.
        Senator Warren. Good. How would you rate Army
    installations, as a whole, in terms of their climate-change
    resiliency?
        General Milley. That is a work in progress. So, we're
    evaluating those and coming up with a list. There's some--the
    Army is--by its nature, is more inland than on the coast, so
    the climate change, as it affects some of the Army
    installations, varies. The coastal ones tend to, probably, have
    greater impact. But, that doesn't mean the ones on the interior
    of the country don't. So, we're evaluating all the variety of
    bases we have. We do have a list--that was mentioned earlier by
    one of the Senators, but we do have a list, and we'll get that
    list promptly to the----
        Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that. You know, it's
    clear that climate change is a threat to our military's
    infrastructure and operations. It's critically important for
    the Army and other military services to incorporate climate
    change into their operational plans. It's a readiness issue,
    and I'm very glad to see that the Army takes this seriously.
        Thank you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here, for your service.
        General Milley, thank you for rearranging your calendar and
    participating in the sensing session we had done at Fort Bragg
    on Friday. I think it was illuminating. What I paid particular
    attention to is just how many notes you've taken, so I have no
    doubt that, in those particular cases, then we're going to make
    progress. I think that we still have to take a look at the
    broader issue. We've got a footprint out there we haven't yet
    figured out.
        Secretary Esper, thank you and your wife for coming down
    and being a part of a sensing session, about a month ago.
    Because I think we're making progress there. The command's
    taking it seriously. They've got a good strategy for putting
    resources on the ground. We need to make sure we do everything
    we can, as members of Congress, to support that.
        But, maybe very briefly, could you guys give me an idea of
    how the housing issue and--could actually affect--have an
    impact on readiness?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I think--if you submit to our
    foundational principle that there's--the importance of the
    soldier and their family--I think if a soldier is deployed--and
    I--you--when we--you and I, I think, have spoken to families--
    the last thing you want is a soldier, particularly facing a
    lethal situation, to be distracted, worrying about his or her
    wife and children being impacted by mold in the house, or
    having to--dealing--deal with a broken tub, or whatever the
    case may be. So, in that regard, it becomes very acute. Having
    done my share of deployments during my Army days, you do worry
    about your families. That's--at that point in time, you want
    them focused on the mission, focused on being successful and
    coming home safe. For that matter, you don't want the
    distraction.
        Senator Tillis. I--one of the two houses that I visited
    last week down on Fort Bragg, the husband's deployed, the
    mother is there with two--he's an officer--the mother is there
    with two kids. You walk down a fairly narrow hallway, and there
    is about a foot reserved for you to walk through, because the
    other 2 feet are taken up by an industrial-sized dehumidifier
    that is sucking so much moisture out of this particular unit
    that they had to run a hose into the tub. I just saw it dump I
    don't know how many quarts of water while I was sitting there
    talking to them. That's a distraction, when you get on the
    phone with a spouse and you're talking about that kind of
    environment that they're living in.
        So, we're going to continue to focus on it. I'd tell any
    military families who may be watching these hearings that we're
    not going away until it's fixed. I know that I have you-all's
    commitment to be there every step of the way. So, thank you for
    that.
        Mr. Secretary, when you and I had breakfast several months
    ago, you were talking about your top-to-bottom review of
    programs that would--you know, that are either critical, nice
    to have, or not necessary. Can you give me an idea where you
    are on that review now, and what specific actions you've taken?
        Secretary Esper. So, the second round of that review--
    it's--in layman's terms, it's being called ``Night Court''--is
    underway right now for the fiscal year 2021 budget build. The
    fiscal year 2020, which was the one that the Chief and I
    initiated this time last year, again, has resulted in this
    budget. What we did was, we ended up canceling, reducing, or
    delaying nearly 200 programs. It began with--we began on the
    opposite end of the table. That is, What do we need to
    modernize the Army? That began with our 31 cross-functional
    team programs that show our six modernization priorities. Then
    we knew we had another 50 or 60 programs that were also
    critical to readiness. We filled those buckets first. Then,
    when you get to the end of the list, there were programs that
    we knew--not that they didn't have value, but, relative to
    everything else, they just either didn't cut the--didn't make
    the cut.
        Senator Tillis. General Milley, I was here earlier in the
    Committee. I'm sorry I couldn't be here longer. I've got four
    committees meeting concurrently. But, you were talking about
    the dramatic increase in readiness. I think you said, at one
    point, we had three BCTs [Basic Combat Training], and then you
    said in the upper 2020s that are at a ready state. You said,
    ``Provided that we get the resources, we'll continue to build
    on that.'' You know, when you get them to the state, though,
    there's a certain cost associated with keeping them there. So,
    as we move into future budgets, what worries you most about
    being able to sustain that level and not see a downward trend
    over the near-to-intermediate term?
        General Milley. Well, you just said it, Senator. It's the
    ability to sustain that. Once we get to the level we want to
    get to in--sometime in 2022, which is 66 percent of the regular
    Army and 33 percent of the Guard and Reserve, we have to
    sustain that. We recognize--we, in the Army, but, more broadly,
    in the military--we recognize that we are a very, very
    expensive endeavor. We appreciate the support of Congress and
    the American people. But, there is one thing that's a lot more
    expensive than what we do on a day-to-day basis, and that's
    having a war. By funding us, we deter war. By making sure that
    we have large, capable, competent, excellent military that is
    dominant on any field of battle, that goes a long way towards
    telling any potential adversary, ``Don't mess with the United
    States.'' If we underfund that in the future years, or if we do
    two steps forward, one step back constantly, then that, I
    think, provides opportunity and encourages aggression on the
    part of any potential adversary.
        Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. I'll submit some questions
    for the record regarding end strength and some of the great
    work I think you're doing on modernizing, recruiting. Like to
    know how you're doing on hitting the goals this year.
        But, thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you----
        General Milley. We'll make it----
        Chairman Inhofe.--Senator Tillis.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to ask about the units in--or the military
    construction projects that may be defunded in Puerto Rico. I
    think there are ten Army National Guard projects and two Army
    Reserve projects in Puerto Rico. The total value of the
    projects potentially in jeopardy is about $550 million. I'm
    concerned that defunding these projects will detract from the
    effort of the island to recover. In this panel, at the time of
    the hurricane, we heard very unmistakable commitment to the
    recovery efforts. I would like your commitment that these
    projects will not be cut and that there will be a continued
    commitment to the recovery efforts on the island.
        Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Esper. Senator, I cannot make that commitment,
    because it's not my decision to make. It's going to be made, I
    think, by at least the Acting Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you commit to encouraging Acting
    Secretary Shanahan to avoid selecting any projects in Puerto
    Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall, given the
    natural disaster that happened there and the continuing
    disarray on the island?
        Secretary Esper. I think what will happen, here, next is,
    the Army will look at all that those--all those projects that
    are up for consideration, and then I'd--we need to assess each
    one of them. Candidly, our prioritization will be readiness and
    the ability to project force, going forward. Then we'll
    certainly consider other factors, as well, as we build a
    prioritization list.
        Senator Blumenthal. But, you're aware of the continuing
    needs and challenges of recovery on the island, and the very
    important role of the National Guard.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Puerto Rico National Guard does
    a great job, and there are a lot of needs out there. I
    recognize that. It was--you know, the hurricanes that hit
    there, it was tragic what it did to the island.
        Senator Blumenthal. I saw firsthand, perhaps you have, the
    critical role that the National Guard has played there.
        Secretary Esper. They do.
        Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Secretary, I know that Senator
    Kaine has asked about the budget item for deployment of troops
    at the border if their deployment there is extended. Can you
    explain why the budget request does not include funding for
    those border deployments?
        Secretary Esper. My best explanation, as I said to him, was
    that, at the time this budget was built--was last summer. This
    was not on anybody's radar screen, so that would be the first
    thing I would say. Even going into the fall, where we had a
    chance to amend, it just was not on our radar screen.
        I don't know if you have anything to add.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you want to amend it now? If so,
    for what period of time would you contemplate----
        Secretary Esper. I don't think----
        Senator Blumenthal.--that deployment?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I think much more needs to--we
    under--we need to understand that--and it's going to be driven
    largely by Department of Homeland Security (DHS), because DOD
    is in support of Department of Homeland Security, of what they
    will need, how long they will need it, and in what numbers. I
    think time will tell what that mission looks like.
        Senator Blumenthal. How much time will tell?
        Secretary Esper. I don't know. That's--we're all waiting, I
    think, to understand what DHS will need in the coming weeks and
    months.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a timeframe for that
    decision being made?
        Secretary Esper. No, sir, I don't. I'd have to ask the
    Acting Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you know the factors that will go
    into that decision?
        Secretary Esper. I don't. I think that they--you know,
    they're considering what it takes in order to secure the
    border. And----
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you know who will make that
    decision?
        Secretary Esper. I think it's Secretary Nielsen. I think it
    begins with her.
        Senator Blumenthal. But, the troops are your
    responsibility, are they not?
        Secretary Esper. So, DHS would make the request of DOD, and
    then DOD would have to assess whether it can--can or cannot
    meet that request, depending on the law and resources, et
    cetera, et cetera. At that point in time--and this works
    through Northern Command--eventually, it gets tasked down to
    the military to see if we can fill that need. Right now, I
    think, on the border, all the services are--it's more than just
    the Army on the border, and it--that's the process by which
    these taskings happen.
        Senator Blumenthal. I know it's more than just the Army,
    but right now the Army's budget and its plan for the future is
    before us----
        Secretary Esper. That's correct.
        Senator Blumenthal.--for oversight. We have no idea, as we
    sit here----
        Secretary Esper. Right.
        Senator Blumenthal.--when and how and whether that review
    will occur.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I can't tell you
    authoritatively, either, whether or not we would need funding
    to sustain forces on the border beyond September 30th, 2019.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. Thank you very
    much.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Go Army, hooah.
        Gentlemen, an interesting find as I examined your budget
    request was a $24 million decrease in logistics operations. I--
    in my conversations with both of you, I have discussed what I
    view as the important role of logistics in any type of future
    operations with our Army as well as when it comes to our
    positioning for great-power competition. I--my sense was that
    you both agreed with me on the role, the importance of
    logistics. Yet, I'm left assuming that your analysis now is
    that logistics operations from infrastructure to delivery are
    resilient against threats posed by great-power competitors and
    violent nonstate actors because you think that you can cut 24
    million from that budget. Otherwise, you would either request
    the same amount as enacted in fiscal year 2019 or you would
    increase it. This is in light of the fact that you had the NDS
    that came out and you're talking about, you know, we have
    increased great-power competitions, we need to spend more money
    on these things, and yet, you're cutting logistics. So, that
    doesn't seem to make sense to me. I would love for both of you
    to respond. You can choose who goes first.
        Secretary Esper. So, Senator, in the--we talk a lot about
    ``Night Court'' and Army's reform efforts with regard to
    equipping. But, frankly, this process went through everything.
    It went--it included training, it included our manning budgets,
    it included our installations. Part and parcel, this was
    logistics. We have a great commander at Army Materiel Command,
    in General Perna. He proposed a number of things, where he
    thought he can accomplish his mission and, in some cases, do it
    better, by making adjustments. We've--for example, we've
    consolidated all classes of supply underneath him at Army
    Materiel Command. We've looked at logistics readiness centers,
    how we can improve them.
        So, I'm fully confident that we can meet the needs. I
    wouldn't infer, necessarily, that, just because we made cuts
    here and there, that we lost capability. Like I said, there are
    a lot of efficiencies gained. We've reduced headquarters, we've
    reduced--we've pushed people out of headquarters, both military
    and civilian. We've really devolved operations down to the
    brigade and division level and corps level. So, there's a lot
    that's going on, where we save money, but yet we're still able
    to accomplish the mission. I--again, I think this is what
    Congress has asked us to do.
        Senator Duckworth. Is it the current mission, or are you
    talking about positioning yourself for great-power competition,
    though?
        Secretary Esper. It's both. So, we have the current
    mission. We have to sustain, obviously, operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and we have any number of brigade combat teams
    deployed presently, but we're also thinking ahead. So, he's
    doing some very innovative things down there as we build our
    ammunition stocks, as we think about, in the future, for
    example, How do we do additive manufacturing on the
    battlefield, behind the forward line of troops, to reduce the
    amount of time it takes to reequip heavy vehicles, for example,
    or helicopters? So, a lot of innovative things as he looks
    forward into the future.
        Senator Duckworth. General?
        General Milley. I would echo what the Secretary said,
    Senator. I don't think the 24 million is--as we look to the
    future and the great-power competition, is going to have any
    kind of significant negative effect on our logistical
    capability to sustain the force. We, through this ``Night
    Court'' process, went through a huge amount of due diligence.
    Based on the recommendations of General Perna--and that's not
    all one type of logistics, that's a wide variety of nickels and
    pennies that we've cut in various programs across the Army in
    the logistics world. I think it's an acceptable degree of risk,
    and I don't think it's going to have any detrimental effect
    with respect to great-power competition.
        Senator Duckworth. Okay. I tend not to agree with you, but
    I would love to take a closer look at how you got to this
    number, because I am deeply concerned that we are cutting,
    here, and then you're going to be back and saying, ``Now we
    need to increase it, and now we're falling behind.'' That's a
    real concern.
        I want to touch on something that one of my colleagues
    talked about a little bit, which was the Army Corps of
    Engineers. It now has a 31-percent cut in its budget, as you've
    presented. The President says that he is committed to improving
    the aging domestic infrastructure, which some say is a national
    security risk. As a representative of this administration, can
    you explain the discrepancy, Mr. Secretary, between the policy
    and statements in this issue, and especially, you know, as--
    look at the problems along the locks and dams on the
    Mississippi River, as a great example of where we actually
    should be putting in more money in order to help the Corps of
    Engineers do its job.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator, I can. I think there was
    some confusion that came out of a press story a few weeks ago
    about this, about a 31-percent decrease. I think what it was
    is, the story spoke to what was enacted in fiscal year 2019
    versus what was requested. So, in fiscal year 2019, the Army,
    for civil works, the request was actually 4.785 billion. The
    request for 2020 is 4.827 billion. So, you see an increase.
    What happened is, last year, in fiscal year 2019, Congress
    enacted a $6.9 billion budget. That's not unusual, to see
    Congress put more money in for MILCON or civil works--I'm
    sorry, for civil works. So, I think what you have to compare
    is, not enacted, but you have to compare requested versus
    requested. You'll see, frankly, we have a--we have an increase
    there.
        Senator Duckworth. Barely an increase.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, barely an increase, but,
    again, within a budget constraint, but it doesn't reflect a 31
    percent decrease. It's just a difference between what Congress
    enacted in 2019 and what we requested in 2019.
        Senator Duckworth. Can you explain why, then, there's not
    much--barely an increase, then? Let's go with that number.
    Because from everything that I've heard from the Corps of
    Engineers, what I've heard from the White House is that there's
    actually a need for great increase in the Army Corps of
    Engineers budget so that they can meet the infrastructure needs
    of this Nation.
        Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. There's a long list of civil
    works projects out there. In the billions, for sure. But, it's
    a matter of--as I said, in any number of programs, the needs
    and wants seem to always exceed the means. Where do you draw
    the line? This is another case.
        Senator Duckworth. I think my farmers would disagree with
    you. But, thank you.
        I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Thank both of our witnesses for your tolerance and your
    patience today.
        We are adjourned, before someone else shows up.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                  future attack reconnaissance aircraft (fara)
        1. Senator Wicker. Secretary Esper, we know that the Army is
    exploring new rotary wing programs to modernize its aging airframe
    fleet. One of those programs, FARA, is meant to fill a capability gap
    that the Army has in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in
    complex degraded operation environments. Can you describe what type of
    capabilities that FARA will bring to the Army and how such an aircraft
    will fare against Russian and Chinese threats?
        Secretary Esper. Optimal manning with revolutionary increases in
    reach (speed and range), protection, lethality, and agility at the
    objective will allow Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) to
    fly and fight in any environment leveraging multi-function sensors and
    payloads as well as extended range munitions that are affordable and
    rapidly tailorable via aircraft agnostic, open mission systems
    architectures.
        Advanced teaming FARA with next generation unmanned aerial systems
    (UAS) delivering lethal and non-lethal air launched effects enables
    cross-domain fires to penetrate and dis-integrate enemy A2AD systems
    and exploit expanded maneuver to overmatch peer adversaries.
        Based on High-Fidelity modeling against peer adversaries in highly
    contested environments, FARA will enable the joint force to operate
    dispersed over wide areas with the ability to rapidly converge to
    penetrate the multiple layers of stand-off employed by the threat,
    disintegrate A2/AD systems, and exploit this advantage to achieve
    strategic objectives to return to competition.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                     improved turbine engine program (itep)
        2. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, the Improved Turbine Engine
    Program (ITEP) remains the Army's #1 Aviation Modernization priority
    program that will save a combined $1 billion per year in reduced fuel,
    maintenance and operating costs while increasing the capability of
    today's Black Hawk and Apache helicopters and provide engines for the
    Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program. On February 1st, the United States
    Army awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Design (EMD) contract for
    the ITEP program to the General Electric Company. On February 19th the
    Advanced Turbine Engine Company (ATEC) a 50/50 joint venture between
    Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney, filed a protest with the General
    Accountability Office (GAO) on the award. I understand DOD cannot
    comment on the award due to the protest, but I request clarification on
    ITEP specifically. What is the purpose of this program?
        Secretary Esper. The purpose of the ITEP is to deliver the next
    generation turbo-shaft engine for the Black Hawk (H-60), Apache (AH-
    64E), and for the future the Army's Future Vertical Lift Future Attack
    Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Compared to the current H-60 and AH-64
    engine, the Improved Turbine Engine will increase operational reach and
    lethality and provide increased power, fuel efficiency, and reliability
    while fitting in the current engine bays of the Black Hawk and Apache
    aircraft.

        3. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, will ITEP improve the overall
    performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets?
        Secretary Esper. Yes, the ITEP is expected to improve the overall
    performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets by regaining
    lost capability due to aircraft weight growth, significantly increase
    aircraft range, payload, and endurance over the current engine.

        4. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does ITEP impact the Army's
    Future Vertical Lift program?
        Secretary Esper. The requirement is for Future Attack
    Reconnaissance Aircraft to include the ITEP Engine as program efforts
    mature.

        5. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were engine power, fuel
    consumption, reliability, and maintenance key elements for ITEP?
        Secretary Esper. Engine power, engine growth, specific fuel
    consumption, reliability, and maintenance were all considered for ITEP.
    All technical requirements/key elements were thoroughly evaluated by
    the Army and they were included in the System Requirements Document
    (SRD) which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for Proposal (RFP).

        6. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were there any other key
    elements?
        Secretary Esper. All technical requirements/key elements were
    included in the System Requirements Document (SRD).

        7. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how were these factors
    prioritized?
        Secretary Esper. The EMD contract award is currently under a
    protest with GAO. Until this is resolved, specifics regarding
    evaluation criteria cannot be provided. Engine power, future engine
    improvements, fuel consumption, reliability, and maintenance, however,
    were all considered for ITEP. The Army evaluated all technical
    requirements/key elements and they were included in the System
    Requirements Document which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for
    Proposal.

        8. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the
    Army's turbine engine-manufacturing industrial base, and specifically,
    for combat helicopters?
        Secretary Esper. The commercial and military rotorcraft turboshaft
    engine industrial bases are healthy with no identified lower tier
    supply chain risks that are of significant substance to program
    execution risk. All identified supply chain risks are being managed
    and/or mitigated through normal industrial base surveillance and risk
    mitigation techniques. The Army's turbine engine industrial base
    consists of turbo shaft engines and does not include turbine fan
    engines. For turbo shaft engines, the industrial base includes several
    diverse companies.

        9. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does the industrial base
    impact innovation and cost?
        Secretary Esper. A healthy industrial base, which exists for
    turbine shaft engines, will increase competition and drive down costs.
    Combat helicopter turboshaft engine innovation and cost are driven by
    DOD requirements (e.g., better fuel efficiency, power, etc.) and the
    industrial base's ability to meet those requirements. The commercial
    sector continuously utilizes advanced manufacturing techniques and
    processes, such as additive manufactured parts, ceramic matrix
    composites, and other advance materials, to achieve key performance
    requirements. While many factors impact cost, key innovation items
    mentioned above will reduce piece part count, streamline manufacturing,
    and improve performance and reliability, which will have direct impacts
    on production and operations and sustainment costs.

        10. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, do we have a sufficiently
    robust industrial base to meet future turbine engine requirements?
        Secretary Esper. The combat helicopter turbine engine industrial
    base was examined in-depth in 2012, 2016, and twice in 2018 with focus
    on support of the ITEP program and the Future Vertical Lift. Commercial
    and military engines are usually very similar in configuration, which
    leads to a stronger industrial base as a manufacturer will be
    supporting both users at the same time. These examinations consistently
    determined that this industrial base segment is healthy and prepared to
    support upcoming and emerging Army aircraft programs.
                           sigint, ew, cyber and ems
        11. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what strategy is the Army
    implementing to integrate SIGINT, EW, and Cyber and what does that
    strategy mean for the development of the EMS?
        Secretary Esper. The Army is developing a framework for an
    implementation plan that guides the integration and harmonization of
    the approved strategies for SIGINT, EW and Cyber Operations
    capabilities in support of multi-domain operations. The resulting plan
    will describe the actions to accomplish the major objectives from each
    strategy. Coordination with the cross-functional teams will ensure the
    development of a comprehensive integration plan. The governance plan
    for this framework will include (a) assessment during the Army
    Cyberspace Council; (b) updates during the intelligence senior
    initiatives group, and; (c) updates at the Intelligence Center of
    Excellence, Cyber Center of Excellence Home-on-Home series. Employing
    cyberspace and EW capabilities under a single planning, integration,
    and synchronization methodology increases the operational commander's
    ability to understand the environment, project power, and synchronize
    multiple operations using the same domain and environment.
    Synchronizing offensive and defensive activities allows a faster
    response to enemy and adversary actions. The EMS is the common
    denominator for both cyberspace and EW operations, and also impacts
    every operation in the Army.

        12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what does the Army's new
    SIGINT strategy mean for the development of future systems/
    capabilities?
        Secretary Esper. The SIGINT strategy provides ends, ways, and means
    required for U.S. Army SIGINT capabilities to be flexible, agile, and
    rapidly adaptable to keep pace with the threat in a multi-domain
    operational environment. The strategy describes agile processes
    required to acquire and adapt SIGINT equipment to address new threats
    leveraging conventional acquisitions processes as well as Army rapid
    acquisition approaches (Information Technology Box, Quick Reaction
    Capability, Army Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, Rapid
    Capability Office.)
        The Army's new SIGINT strategy incorporates capabilities pertaining
    to the cyberspace domain. This new strategy also improves the rapid
    acquisition process to keep better pace with the changes happening with
    computing.
        The inclusion of the entire electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as part
    of SIGINT ensures that Electronic Warfare is integrated into SIGINT
    capability design.

        13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, in complex EMS environments,
    the legal partition between title 10 and title 50 can generate
    inefficiencies in acquisition with respect to combined tactical EW and
    SIGINT systems. How are Army acquisition officials managing this divide
    and what steps is the Army taking to bridge it?
        Secretary Esper. Titles 10 and 50 each have their respective
    authorities with regard to command and control of EW and SIGINT
    systems. This includes how each system is used, whether it is employed
    in support of tactical military operations (title 10) or in support of
    national intelligence/covert operations (title 50). The Army builds
    materiel solutions to approved requirements. Any issues are worked out
    as the Army develops the requirements for each system. Army SIGINT / EW
    Program Managers work closely with various intelligence and security
    organizations to ensure materiel solutions are accredited by cognizant
    authority prior to their employment.

        14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how are the Army's EMS-related
    activities (Cyber operations, EW, Spectrum Management, and SIGINT)
    aligned?
        Secretary Esper. The Army has aligned SIGINT, EW, and CO
    capabilities to produce fully integrated staff processes to improve
    mission execution at every echelon. This alignment is consistent with
    the Joint Cyberspace Concept and the Army Concept Framework. Alignment
    concepts are continuously being developed in partnership between the
    Intelligence and Cyberspace Centers of Excellence to coordinate and,
    where applicable, consolidate force and capability development efforts
    with an integrated approach. This will ensure that SIGINT, EW and CO
    capabilities are interoperable, deliver more versatility, and are
    mutually supporting.

        15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what changes across DOTMLPF-P
    is the service pursing to ``Man, Train, and Equip'' our combatant
    commanders for modern operations in complex EMS environments?
        Secretary Esper. The Army must fight and win in a contested
    electromagnetic operational environment. Cyberspace and the EMS will
    grow increasingly congested, increasingly contested, and will be
    critical to successful multi-domain operations. Success will be
    measured by the ability to execute operations freely in cyberspace. On
    May 17, 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed U.S. Army
    Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop a framework focused
    on providing increased cyberspace support to corps level and below
    commanders titled, ``Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Support to
    Corps and Below'' to address specific electronic warfare concerns and
    issues. In April 2017, CSA directed Cyber and Intelligence Centers of
    Excellence to conduct an assessment to identify gaps and solutions
    associated with the integration of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT),
    Electronic Warfare (EW), and Cyber capabilities, the findings of which
    will be incorporated into a mission strategy.
                             emergency preparedness
        16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, you previously testified
    before the Senate Appropriations Committee (May 5, 2018) that the
    Department would place increased emphasis on a range of business
    reforms, specifically addressing acquisition reform, contract
    management, and budget execution. Private sector solutions have
    historically played a critical role in ensuring that the Department has
    access to top quality, cost effective products and services. It has
    been brought to my attention that the Department is using funds to
    research, build and deploy an emergency preparedness and response
    technology (the Protection Services Infrastructure Framework (PSIF)
    produced by the United States Army Combat Capability Development
    Center). This emergency preparedness and response technology already
    exists in the market today, and has proven effective in other state,
    local and federal agencies that have acquired it. What factors are
    considered when the Department evaluates whether to expend these
    resources versus deploying a Commercial Off the Shelves (COTS)
    technology?
        Secretary Esper. Between 2002 and 2010, the Combat Capability
    Development Center Armament Center (CCDC AC) adapted its combat
    decision aids technologies for dual-use applications to address
    situational awareness and emergency management to bridge the
    information gap between Defense and Civil agencies. Combat decision
    aids allow commanders to identify decisions and solutions to reduce
    decision timelines as situations develop in the operational
    environment. Following the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, Joint Project
    Manager Guardian (JPM GUARDIAN) received a directed requirement from
    the working group organized to study what happened during the shooting
    to provide an installation common operating picture, mass warning and
    notification, and enhanced 911 system. A standalone commercial product
    capable of bridging the aforementioned gap in a ``plug-and-play'' open-
    architecture framework did not exist at that time. Given this
    requirement and knowledge of a separate CCDC AC effort to enable
    interagency information sharing at the Port Authority NY/NJ, JPM
    Guardian selected CCDC AC in 2010 as the lead system integrator for the
    Physical Security Integration Framework--Interconnection Capability
    Suite (PSIF ICS).
        In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Title 10
    USC Sec.  2377, when the Army evaluates whether to pursue a
    developmental program in lieu of a COTS technology, the Army must first
    determine if a COTS or non-developmental product exists capable of
    satisfying the requirements, or whether the COTS/NDI product could be
    modified to meet the requirements, or determine if the COTS/NDI product
    could meet the requirements if the requirements were modified to a
    reasonable extent. Numerous factors are considered, including:
    threshold and objective capability performance specifications, breadth
    of capability to meet unique U.S. Army requirements, potential
    reasonable modifications to the requirements, open vice closed/
    proprietary architectures (to enable interface with multiple COTS/
    Government off the Shelf Solutions [GOTS] solutions), performance, and
    schedule as well as overall lifecycle sustainment costs. Lifecycle
    sustainment costs consist of maintenance, licensing fees, replacement
    costs, and technological refresh rates. In addition to the economic and
    specification measures noted above, potential COTS/GOTS capabilities
    undergo operational and developmental testing and evaluation to
    determine optimal functionality, durability, and the ability to meet
    operational mission requirements, and possible COTS/NDI modifications
    to meet the requirements.

        17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, current policies in place
    require all federal agencies, including DOD, to comply with the
    Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act. The Mutual
    Obligations in Statute were specifically designed to allow government
    entities to communicate with one another during times of crisis.
    Emergency response and preparedness is crucial to our national
    security. It's my understanding that most Federal installations,
    including the United States Army, are connected to each statewide
    system--but there are several that are not. Has the Department made
    efforts to close this gap, and ensure that the Army has a technology in
    place that allows for the sharing of information and personnel during
    times of crisis?
        Secretary Esper. The Army has fielded mass warning and
    notifications (MWN) systems that are Emergency Planning & Community
    Right-to-Know Act compliant at 100 of 144 installations. The Army plans
    to field MWN at all installations in early 2020.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                         waats/apache pilot throughput
        18. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I
    understand Ft. Rucker is having a hard time processing Apache pilots on
    schedule. Is the Army is still experiencing a pilot shortage? How is
    throughput at Ft. Rucker for attack pilots progressing? For AH-64
    pilots specifically? Has the Army considered locating a Mobile Training
    Team (MTT) at the Western Army Aviation Training Site as a way to speed
    up throughput in the short-term? As part of the replacement for the 24
    AH-64 helicopters/Attack Reconnaissance Force Structure lost due to
    ARI, Arizona is on track to receive 13 replacement UH-60A/L for an
    Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) by the end of the month. Arizona now
    has two AHBs in the state (w/ 10 UH-60A/Ls each) and two Med Evac
    detachments (w/ 3 UH-60A/Ls each). Arizona has also been identified to
    receive an accelerated upgrade of the AHB's UH-60A/Ls to the UH-60M by
    August 2020. Is that plan still on track? I also understand these the
    Med Evac detachments are scheduled to be upgraded to UH-60V models--
    what is the timeframe for delivery of these variants?
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army is short 647 Aviation
    Warrant Officers (AWO) across all components. The Army under-produced
    pilots between the years 2010-2017 due to reduced budgets and
    subsequent reductions to force structure. As a result, a shortfall
    developed among junior AWOs in those year groups. The Army is
    mitigating the shortfall by retaining a surplus of senior-level AWOs.
    The Army's strategy to address the shortage is two-fold: incentive
    programs to retain pilots beyond their initial Active Duty or Reserve
    Service Obligation, and increasing throughput capacity at Fort Rucker.
        The Army is not yet meeting its AH-64 pilot training requirements
    at Fort Rucker for all components, but AH-64 pilot throughput is
    progressing in a positive direction. We have both improved the
    maintenance readiness levels of the AH-64s and increased the number of
    AH-64s at Fort Rucker, both of which were limiting factors.
    Additionally, we are increasing the number of Instructor Pilots and the
    amount of funding at Fort Rucker to meet pilot training requirements.
    The overall shortage of AH-64 aircraft across the Army will continue to
    challenge the training of pilots.
        Historical analysis shows that the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
    Excellence (USAACE) at Fort Rucker is the most efficient training
    location due to economy of scale. USAACE can train over twice as many
    pilots per aircraft as compared to the Western Army Aviation Training
    Site (WAATS), which has not conducted AH-64 training since 2013.
        The current timeline for the Arizona National Guard to receive UH-
    60Ms is by 2020. The timeline for UH-60V fielding is being developed.
             yuma proving ground (ypg) long range firing expansion:
        19. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper, I appreciated our discussion
    during the hearing regarding the need to update and expanding our
    testing ranges, like the Yuma Proving Ground, to be able to accommodate
    Army's top modernization priority of long range precision fires
    testing? In your answer, you mentioned there are some specific
    resources in the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget regarding these
    updates. Are resources to update our testing and training ranges
    reflected in Army's fiscal year 2020 budget? If so, how specifically?
    Army's Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) @ Ft. Huachuca is looking into
    expanding electromagnetic spectrum access in order to allow for
    additional military training within channels where adversaries may try
    to target government and civilian communications. With modernization a
    top priority, is the Army also prioritizing updating and investing in
    its electronic testing facilities, like the EPG at Ft. Huachuca? In the
    face of growing grey-zone threats, is expanding electromagnetic
    spectrum access for more testing and training is a priority for the
    Army? If so, how? If not, why not?
        Secretary Esper. The Army annually plans and programs investments
    in test capability modernization and sustainment for its test ranges
    that support the testing required for legacy and modernization
    priorities. The fiscal year 2020 budget has targeted investments in
    infrastructure and instrumentation at Army test ranges which will
    support modernization efforts including Long Range Precision Fires
    systems. The Army is investing in test capabilities such as range fiber
    optics, radars, telemetry, and support vehicles to support all Yuma
    Test Center (YTC) testing efforts including Long Range Precision Fires
    at the YTC on U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. In addition, the
    Army is leveraging Office of the Secretary of Defense funding to
    develop optical instrumentation and autonomous flight safety systems
    for future YTC testing needs.
        The Army is specifically investing at the U.S. Army Electronic
    Proving Ground on Fort Huachuca, Arizona in electronic test
    capabilities for Network, Radio, and GPS systems as well as threat
    emulation capabilities which include threats typically found in grey
    zone conflict.
        Department of Defense (DOD) ranges, including those on Fort
    Huachuca, are faced with challenges in spectrum access, airspace
    restrictions, and land use. For example, the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and the Federal Communications Commission have
    curtailed DOD's access to the spectrum while the global wireless
    broadband industry is seeking to reallocate spectrum from Defense use
    to commercial use. The Army is working with the following to address
    some of the challenges:

        1)  DOD to establish provisions for assured and dynamic access to
    the spectrum including spectrum that is already in use.

        2)  Fort Huachuca, other Services, and FAA to convert the Tombstone
    Military Operations Airspace into restricted airspace that would better
    support DOD training and provide the airspace necessary to test sensing
    technologies.

        3)  Fort Huachuca and its Sentinel Landscapes partners to expand
    its Electronic Warfare Test Range to enable electronic testing and
    training operations with a brigade size element.
                              future vertical lift
        20. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I
    appreciate the Army's fiscal responsibility in trying to cut less
    promising programs in order to pay for its modernization priorities,
    including Future Vertical Lift (FVL). However, how you chose pay for
    those programs is critically important. I'm concerned that some Army
    National Guard (ANG) aviation programs may be seen as a pay-for for
    some of these priorities and, as a result, ANG's modernization budget
    may be disproportionately affected. When is the Army planning to begin
    receiving new rotary-wing aircraft based on your Future Vertical Lift
    initiative? Is the Army expecting a top-line budget increase to fund
    FVL, or are you planning to cut existing programs to fund FVL
    development and procurement? Which programs does the Army plan to cut,
    when, and which units (or components) will be affected? (For example,
    we understand that UH-60M production from fiscal year 2024-2028 is
    planned as one offset for modernization programs, and this
    modernization will primarily affect primarily the Guard because if the
    Active component is modernized first, UH-60V production/delivery for
    the ANG may never occur).
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. Regarding whether we expect a
    topline budget increase to fund FVL, at this time we do not. We are
    planning for defense budgets to stay relatively flat or potentially
    decline so we are choosing to reprioritize resources within our
    expected topline to pay for near term readiness and future
    modernization requirements.
        The Army is at an inflection point as procurement of its AH-64 and
    UH-60 fleets wind down while developing the Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
    acquisition programs: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the
    Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. The Army must balance continued
    modernization of the current fleets with the requirement to field new,
    more advanced aircraft capable of operating effectively on the Multi-
    Domain Battlefield against near-peer adversaries to maintain overmatch
    in this domain. The Army will not turn to Army National Guard (ANG)
    aviation programs to pay for FVL. Additionally, the Army will not
    impact ARNG and USAR rotary wing modernization. UH-60M, AH-64E, and UH-
    60V programs are currently funded and on schedule.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
            peacekeeping and stability operations institute (pksoi)
        21. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, I understand that the Army
    plans to downsize or eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability
    Operations Institute (PKSOI) located at the Army War College in
    Carlisle, Pennsylvania as part of an effort to restructure your over
    Irregular Warfare enterprise. I also understand that Assistant
    Secretary Owen West has requested that the Army delay any decision
    regarding PKSOI until the Irregular Warfare review is complete, but the
    Army has not agreed to honor that request. I am particularly concerned
    about these changes because PKSOI is currently the Army's lead on
    Women, Peace and Security. Can you provide an update as to the Army's
    plan for PKSOI and specifically, what does that mean for the Army's
    implementation of Women, Peace and Security if it is transferred to the
    Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas?
        Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
    Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at Carlisle
    Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS,
    taking command of both PKSOI and the newly established Army Irregular
    Warfare Proponent Office. The Army established the Irregular Warfare
    Proponent Office at Fort Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the
    National Defense Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support
    Joint peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military members
    or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be directed to move to
    Fort Leavenworth as part of the reorganization. Regarding the Army's
    role and responsibility to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
    mission, the CAC will assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort
    Leavenworth, Kansas. With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are
    making efforts to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to
    support WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will
    take place no later than October 2019.
               precision guidance kit--anti jam (pgk-aj) program
        22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the
    threat posed to our armed services in GPS denied environments, the Army
    is funding the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the
    Precision Guidance Kit--Anti Jam (PGK-AJ) program. The goal of this
    program is to bring affordable, degradation resistant precision to our
    artillery forces. The funding planned in the latest budget drops
    sharply after fiscal year 2020. What is the Army's plan to continue to
    fund this critical capability improvement to complete its full
    qualification and reach an Initial Operational Capability by 2025 or
    sooner?
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Precision Guidance Kit--
    Anti Jam program is fully funded in fiscal year 2020, and the Army is
    committed to funding PGK-Anti Jam development and delivering the
    Initial Operational Capability to our Warfighters by fiscal year 2025.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                              southern border wall
        23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, have you made any
    recommendations regarding any Army construction projects that could be
    diverted to build the wall?
        Secretary Esper. On March 19, 2018, the Department identified a
    complete pool of unawarded military construction projects from which
    funding could be reallocated to support the construction of a border
    barrier should the Secretary of Defense decide to use 10 USC 2808
    authority. To support his determination on utilizing this authority,
    the Army and the Department are reviewing the pool of unawarded
    projects with award dates in fiscal year 2020 or later to minimize
    potential impacts of delays of resourcing. No military housing,
    barracks, or dormitory projects will be impacted. No definitive date
    has been set for the Acting Secretary of Defense's determination on the
    use of section 2808 authority or for identifying a final list of
    military construction projects that could be deferred.

        24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what is your criteria for
    evaluating and prioritizing Army construction projects? How will you
    formulate recommendations for projects to be defunded?
        Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to
    undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section
    2808. We are carefully considering whether and which MILCON projects
    could be deferred, applying these criteria:

          No MILCON projects that have already been awarded, and no
    MILCON projects with fiscal year 2019 award dates will be impacted;

          Only MILCON projects with award dates after September 30,
    2019 will be considered;

          No military housing, barracks, and dormitory projects
    will be impacted; and

          MILCON projects would be selected to minimize the impact
    on readiness and take into account the National Defense Strategy.
                                  puerto rico
        25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will you commit to
    encouraging Secretary Shanahan to not select any Army projects in
    Puerto Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall given the
    recent natural disasters and economic disarray?
        Secretary Esper. No definitive date has been set for the Acting
    Secretary of Defense's determination on the use of section 2808
    authority or for identifying a final list of military construction
    projects that could be deferred. MILCON projects would be selected to
    minimize the impact on readiness
                         troops at southern border wall
        26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will troops be deployed to
    the border for as long as it takes to build the wall?
        Secretary Esper. The U.S. Army will provide support to U.S.
    Northern Command as directed by the Secretary of Defense in response to
    requests made by the Department of Homeland Security.

        27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, is construction of a
    border wall under section 2808 contingent on extending the deployments
    of troops at the border, even beyond the current extension through
    September 2019?
        Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to
    undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section
    2808.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, if you anticipate that
    deployment orders for troops at the border will be extended, why does
    the President's budget request fail to include funding for border
    deployments?
        Secretary Esper. To date, the Army does not anticipate troop
    deployments extending past 30 September 2019. Further, the Acting
    Secretary of Defense has not ordered the Army to deploy troops to the
    Southwest Border beyond 30 September 2019.
                     general neller concerns with readiness
        29. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you share the concerns
    that General Neller articulated? Do you agree that the border
    deployments, among other factors, are compromising Army readiness and
    solvency?
        General Milley. The Army has managed several unplanned and
    unbudgeted events, to include support to the Department of Homeland
    Security along the Southwest Border, support to hurricane relief
    efforts in the Southeast, and support to flooding relief efforts in the
    Midwest. From an Army-wide perspective, the readiness impact of these
    unplanned and unbudgeted factors has been negligible.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, have you communicated any
    concerns to Acting Secretary Shanahan?
        General Milley. No.

        31. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, in the memos made public,
    GEN Neller lists 4 Marine Corps exercises that have been decisively
    cancelled or reduced, and 7 potential cancellations. General Milley,
    has the Army also been forced to cancel readiness exercises? How many?
        General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training exercises in
    fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or unbudgeted factors. There have
    been some planned training events, not exercises, disrupted by support
    to the border, but all are recoverable after units return to home
    station and Commanders reschedule that training. The border commitment
    has represented no more than 5,000 soldiers, or 0.5 percent of the
    total Army. Additionally, we took mitigating steps to reduce any risk
    to readiness such as rotating forces frequently to prevent disruption
    in training.

        32. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you concerned that
    these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the
    case, can you estimate the impact on readiness?
        General Milley. No. Given the Army's large size in proportion to
    the support mission, and our ability to rotate units for the mission,
    continuation of deployments at the current level would have a
    negligible impact on readiness of the Army.
                              future vertical lift
        33. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1
    Defiant conducted its first flight last week. Can you please provide an
    update on how the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program is
    progressing?
        General Milley. The flight of the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant is
    another step in the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator (JMR-TD) process
    that is helping us reduce risk. The Future Vertical Lift Cross
    Functional Team is on schedule to field both Future Attack
    Reconnaissance Aircraft and Future Long Range Assault Aircraft to units
    in the 2030 timeframe. We will accomplish fielding by capitalizing on
    existing, mature technology and through a modular open systems
    architecture (MOSA) enabling Future Vertical Lift to integrate the most
    reliable and capable technical solutions available from government
    efforts and commercial industry. No later than June 2019, the Army will
    award four to six initial Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft design
    contracts. No later than March 2020, the Army will select two vendors
    for final design and competitive prototypes. November 2022 is the
    target date for the prototypes to first take flight followed by a year-
    long ``Fly-Off'' competition in 2023. The Army will decide whether or
    not to buy one of the prototype designs by 2024.

        34. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe--as your
    Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team leader BGEN Rugen does--that
    the Army is at an inflection point in aviation modernization and should
    now pursue a new design or concept for power lift?
        General Milley. Yes, I agree with BG Rugen. We had to make a
    decision as to whether we keep incrementally upgrading our current
    rotary wing fleet that were designed in the 1970s or go with a ``clean
    sheet'' design. The current rotary wing fleet is as capable as ever and
    now is the time to build an Army aviation force that is optimized for
    large-scale combat operations against a peer or near-peer competitor.

        35. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you satisfied with the
    progress Future Vertical Lift Program? How can Congress best support
    your aviation modernization efforts?
        General Milley. While I am satisfied with where we are with Future
    Vertical Lift, we are always looking for opportunities to accelerate
    the programs to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army sooner. We've
    enjoyed recent successes under the Other Transaction Authorities that
    Congress has provided the Services and look to continue to leverage
    those authorities to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army.

        36. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe the Cross
    Functional Team organization is effective in leading modernization
    efforts in powered lift for the Army? What are the challenges and how
    are you addressing them?
        General Milley. Yes. The Cross Functional Team construct allows us
    to consolidate warfighter, technical, programmatic, and acquisition
    communities to fuse time and investment of readiness priorities. The
    Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Teams (FVL CFT) are designed to
    rapidly integrate and synchronize critical solutions across the
    modernization enterprise and deliver timely solutions to the
    warfighter. As we have demonstrated in Future Long Range Assault
    Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA)
    schedules, the FVL CFT has literally cut years off the normal
    procurement schedule by working with the acquisition and contracting
    community to maximize the use of Other Transaction Authorities; worked
    with the Science and Technology community to capitalize on existing,
    mature technology as well as the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator
    (JMR-TD) program to reduce risk in the accelerated timeline. The FVL
    CFT is working hand in hand with the Program Manager--Unmanned Aerial
    Systems and applied the ``Buy, Try, Decide'' method to accelerate the
    replacement for the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Systems. Overall, we are
    very happy with all of our Cross Functional Teams' performance but we
    are always looking for ways to improve and, in turn, accelerate the
    process to get the next generation of equipment into our soldiers'
    hands as soon as possible.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                      department of the army budget review
        37. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, does your fiscal year 2020
    budget request include any funding for sustaining support activities
    along the Southern Border?
        Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
    began on October 26, 2018 , was first extended through January 31,
    2019, and has since been extended to September 30, 2019. The CBP has
    not requested and the Army has not been directed to deploy troops at
    the border past September 30th. Therefore, no funds were requested for
    the mission in this budget request.

        38. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, have you been informed that you
    will need to sustain your deployment of forces to the southern border
    past September 2019?
        Secretary Esper. No. the Army has not been informed to sustain
    troop deployments to the Southwest Border past September 2019.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                white supremacy
        39. Senator Warren. General Milley, white supremacy is rising in
    the United States. The Anti-Defamation League found a 182 percent
    increase in propaganda efforts by white supremacist groups in the U.S.
    in 2018, compared to the previous year. That same group found that
    white supremacist murders in the U.S. more than doubled in 2017, with
    white supremacists responsible for 53 percent of extremist-related
    murders in the United States. A recent Huffington Post investigation
    found that two marines, two Army ROTC cadets, an Army physician, a
    member of the Texas National Guard and one member of the Air Force
    belong to a white supremacist group called Identity Europa. This group
    reportedly helped organize the white supremacist rally in 2017 in
    Charlottesville, Virginia and spews racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-
    immigrant views. I believe that Army values are American values, and
    that the vast majority of our soldiers live those values every day and
    represent the best of America. I do not blame the Army for every
    offensive thought or act by every soldier. How does the Army ensure a
    command climate of zero tolerance for white supremacist or white
    nationalist views and acts, including how soldiers are disciplined for
    such behavior?
        General Milley. All soldiers are prohibited from supporting
    extremist organizations or extremist activities, and participation in
    extremist organizations and activities by Army personnel is
    inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Enforcement
    of this policy is a responsibility of commanders at all levels, is
    vitally important to unit cohesion and morale, and is essential to the
    Army's ability to accomplish its mission. Further, Commanders have the
    authority to prohibit military personnel from engaging in or
    participating in other activities that the commander determines will
    adversely affect good order and discipline or morale within the
    command.
        Commanders have several options for dealing with violations of the
    prohibitions, which include punishment under the UCMJ or administrative
    actions such as separation for unsatisfactory misconduct, or for
    conduct deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline or morale;
    reclassification actions; bar to reenlistment; or other administrative
    or disciplinary action deemed appropriate by the commander based on the
    specific facts and circumstances of the particular case.

        40. Senator Warren. General Milley, in recruiting quality soldiers,
    how does the Army ensure that recruits do not have an association or
    participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or
    causes of any kind?
        General Milley. The Army uses a comprehensive set of policies and
    procedures to identify extremism during the accessions process. These
    checks include screening with the National Crime Information Center
    which checks the Gang File and the Known or Appropriately Suspected
    Terrorist File which provide the Army identifying information about
    violent criminal gang and terrorist organization members.
        Army accessioning agencies complete, for each applicant, tattoo
    screening for tattoos or brands that are extremist, indecent, sexist,
    or racist; they also require applicants to complete numerous
    questionnaires and be subject to interviews with Army leaders in the
    accession process, credit checks, and also be subject to a Personnel
    Security Investigation (Tier 3 PSI).
        Many applicants are also subject to an even more in depth Single
    Scope Background Investigation comprised of additional screening
    including interviews by security screeners with persons who know the
    applicant (neighbors, coworkers or former supervisors or teachers). A
    particular area of emphasis in the screening process is to detect and
    deter those with a history of gang or extremist activity, which is
    often found to be an indicator of racist behavior.

        41. Senator Warren. General Milley, Military Times ``conducted a
    voluntary, confidential online survey'' of Active Duty U.S.
    servicemembers in September 2017, in which ``[t]he questions focused on
    President Trump's time in the White House and national security issues
    facing American leaders.'' That survey found: ``Nearly one in four
    troops polled say they have seen examples of white nationalism among
    their fellow servicemembers.'' Furthermore, according the survey,
    ``When asked whether white nationalists pose a threat to national
    security, 30 percent of respondents labeled it a significant danger.''
    Has the Army conducted a voluntary, confidential survey of soldiers
    regarding the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the
    ranks, or the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the
    United States?
        General Milley. The U.S. Army has not surveyed soldiers regarding
    the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the ranks, or
    the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the United
    States. During the 1997 to 2011 timeframe, the U.S. Army Research
    Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducted a
    biannual survey that contained items asking soldiers about their
    experiences with extremist organizations/activities. The survey also
    asked soldiers for their perceptions of the seriousness or the extent
    of extremist/hate group activities within their unit. In 2013, the
    Department of Defense's Office of People Analytics (OPA) also asked
    soldiers to what extent racist/extremist organizations or individuals
    were a problem at their installation.
        Overall, the vast majority of Active Duty soldiers said extremist
    activities were not a problem at all or only a slight problem.

        42. Senator Warren. General Milley, how many soldiers were
    discharged each year for the last 10 years for association or
    participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or
    causes?
        General Milley. The Army doesn't track discharges for association
    or participation with white supremacy or white nationalist groups or
    causes. The Army tracks the overall basis for which a servicemember is
    separated (e.g., civil conviction, court-martial conviction,
    misconduct, unsatisfactory performance). Army policy prohibits
    participation in extremist, terrorist, and criminal gang organizations
    and activities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                               apache helicopters
        43. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after the Aviation Restructure
    Initiative the Army National Guard was left with four Apache helicopter
    battalions. Each of these battalions is manned by only 18 aircraft
    instead of the traditional 24 required aircraft per battalion. This
    means that the National Guard units must constantly share aircraft to
    ensure adequate training for combat operations or are forced to borrow
    aircraft from Active Duty or accept reduced readiness. Is this plan
    sustainable for long term readiness of our National Guard Apache fleet
    or do we need another restructuring of assets?
        General Milley. The four ARNG Attack Reconnaissance Battalions are
    scheduled to reach full authorization of 96 total aircraft by the end
    of fiscal year 2026. The first battalion will be fielded with 24 AH-
    64Es in fiscal year 2022, the second in fiscal year 2023, the third in
    fiscal year 2025, and the fourth in fiscal year 2026. All 96 aircraft
    are scheduled to be the Version 6, which is the most advanced, capable,
    and lethal version of the AH-64E. Regular Army units are also short of
    AH-64 aircraft, and must also cross-level them for deployments. Given
    the aforementioned plans to field more Apache aircraft in the future to
    the National Guard (and the Regular Army), this plan is sustainable and
    does not require another restructuring of assets.

        44. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after a limited procurement of
    new build AH-64E Apache block IIIB helicopters over the last few years,
    the service has elected to shift this year's budget for Apaches
    entirely into remanufacture of airframes for the Apache block IIIA.
    Given the already significant service of some of these Apache
    airframes, if we ignore cost numbers which are not significant in the
    long term are we making the correct investment now to facilitate long
    term reliability of our attack helicopter assets?
        General Milley. Yes, we are making the correct investment. The
    remanufactured Apache has a new airframe, comes off the production line
    as a zero-hour new aircraft, and it costs less than procuring a new
    build aircraft. There is no difference between the life or capability
    of a REMAN and new build Apache. Both will serve the Army through 2050.
                               budget priorities
        45. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, we are
    currently in a period of the highest defense budgets we have ever seen.
    Last year's enacted Department of Defense budget was the largest in
    history, only beat by this year's request in the President's budget.
    This trend of increasingly massive defense budgets is unsustainable. Do
    your budget priorities laid out in the request adequately take
    advantage of the large budgets now to prepare the force for a likely
    time in the future where we will see decreasing budgets and the
    inability to fund every project you want?
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. The fiscal year 2020 budget
    resources the Army's essential support of the National Defense
    Strategy. It furthers the Army's total readiness recovery goal by 2022
    and puts the Army on a path to achieve our modernization objectives by
    2028. The Army needs timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained
    funding now and in the future to ensure we meet these goals. Any
    reduction now or to future budget requests would likely impact the
    Army's fiscal year 2022 readiness goals and the fiscal year 2028
    modernization goals. The Army has/is taking a holistic approach to
    modernization for the future which is demonstrated by the establishment
    of AFC and the six modernization priorities--which drive our future
    objective of achieving multi-domain dominance by 2028. The Army's six
    modernization priorities will not change and they demonstrates the
    Army's commitment to innovate for the future.
                     proportional and concurrent equipment
        46. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, a top
    priority of the National Guard year in and year out is the acquisitions
    of proportional and concurrent equipment. Having the same equipment on
    the same timelines as Active Duty massively enhances the total force's
    ability to train and fight alongside the Active Duty and overall
    enhances our national security. Do your current and future budgets
    support National Guard acquisition of items such as Bradley and Abrams
    mods, and Joint Lightweight Tactical vehicle in the short term as well
    as projects like Future Vertical Lift in the long term?
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army National Guard's
    equipping focus is on deployability, sustainability, and
    interoperability. The Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle is fully
    funded through fiscal year 2025 to support Army National Guard
    requirements. The Abrams modifications are fully funded through fiscal
    year 2025, which supports all Army National Guard requirements. The
    potential reduction in Bradley modifications to COMPO 1 would result in
    delaying the cascade of the A3 variants to COMPO2. Future Vertical Lift
    fielding plans are not developed; however, the Army has an obligation
    to ensure soldiers going into harm's way, regardless of component, have
    the best equipment available.
                weapons of mass destruction civil support teams
        47. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper, National Guard Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) are a critical component
    of domestic ability to respond to acts of violence here at home.
    Congress has made this a priority and our Governors and Adjutant
    Generals in the states depend on the funding of these assets to ensure
    we maintain this capability. Does the fiscal year 2020 budget request
    and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) include the necessary
    funding levels and resources to ensure that this capability is fully
    sustained?
        Secretary Esper. The Department of the Army recognizes the
    importance of the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
    Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) in supporting civil authorities' efforts to
    counter weapons of mass destruction. The Army decided not to pursue
    certain upgrades in order to fund more urgent and important
    modernization priorities. In coordination with the NGB, the Army is
    currently reviewing funding levels for the WMD-CST program in the
    fiscal year 2021-2025 POM build.
                          mq-1c gray eagle procurement
        48. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in May
    2017 the Army updated its MQ-1C procurement requirement to 204 aircraft
    based on the decision to man your brigades with 12 MQ-1C aircraft
    versus 9. However, your budget request allots for only six War
    Replacement Aircraft in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, with no
    procurements listed In fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023 or fiscal
    year 2024. This action leaves your force short of the overall 204
    aircraft. What is the plan for future requests and utilization of MQ-1C
    Gray Eagle aircraft?
        Secretary Esper and General Milley. The entire MQ-1C Gray Eagle
    Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 204 is procured with the fiscal
    year 2019 appropriation. The fiscal year 2020 request is for pre-
    planned battle losses which shortens the timeline to acquire
    replacement aircraft to reduce risk to the Gray Eagle fleet.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

           THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Cramer, Scott,
    Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
    Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. We will come to order. Consistent with our
    policy of starting on time, it is now time.
        I appreciate your being here. I want to say one thing to
    Secretary Perry. You have a lot of fans here that you did not
    know you would have because just 28 and a half miles north of
    Texas is Fort Sill, and Fort Sill is in Washington this week,
    and so we were talking about the fact many of them are going to
    come and see. A lot of people are not aware of what the Senate
    Armed Services Committee (SASC) has to do with this whole issue
    that we are going to be talking about today. This will be an
    opportunity to do that. We thank you for being here and for
    your service.
        The Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year
    2020 budget request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) atomic
    energy defense activities.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses, Rick Perry, former
    Governor of Texas, and Lisa Gordon-Hagerty. Both of you
    distinguish yourselves in your fields, and we are very
    fortunate to have your service.
        The Committee's top priority is to support an effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS,
    which is this manual right here--the commission that put this
    together--just as a reminder, this is equally two Democrat and
    Republicans. It is something that is the blueprint for
    everything that we are doing in the military right now. That
    commission made it clear that maintaining a nuclear deterrence
    is required. In recent years, since the Cold War ended, Russia
    and China have increasingly prioritized nuclear programs, while
    our lack of focus on these programs--we are paying for it now
    because they have caught us in many areas.
        We heard a few weeks ago from General Hyten at STRATCOM
    [U.S. Strategic Command] about the need to modernize our
    nuclear triad, and as he mentioned, it includes the Department
    of Energy's warheads and infrastructure.
        Secretary Perry, about three-quarters of your Department's
    fiscal year 2020 budget request is in this Committee's purview
    and will help us continue this vital work.
        I was pleased to hear that NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] recently assembled the first W76-2 low-yield
    warhead, which was recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) and authorized by Congress last year. This is an
    excellent example of how responsive the nuclear enterprise
    should be. From a requirement to production, it happened in
    just 1 year. You do not see that very often.
        But we cannot be responsive when half of our facilities are
    more than 40 years old and a quarter of them date back before
    World War II. We need to modernize infrastructure across the
    complex. I was disappointed to learn that we have workers in
    buildings with chunks of concrete falling off the ceiling and
    flooding damage--rooms and expensive equipment that cannot be
    quickly repaired.
        We have some pictures at each of the desks up here and also
    with the two of you, who have seen this many times, just to
    kind of get a visual of how bad things are.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Inhofe. We are going to have to correct that. We
    owe it to the men and women who work across the nuclear
    enterprise to provide state-of-the-art 21st century facilities
    to work in. I am glad to see that the Department is requesting
    substantial funding for infrastructure modernization. I hope
    that we are going to be able to maintain the bipartisan
    consensus to fund this work in the future.
        I look forward to your testimony, and thank you for being
    here. Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Perry back to the
    Committee, and I also want to welcome Administrator Gordon-
    Hagerty who is appearing for the first time. Thank you both for
    your service.
        The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for
    defense-related activities at the Department of Energy is $23
    billion. This is a 4.3 percent increase over last year's
    enacted level, and it is approximately 73 percent of the entire
    $31 billion request for the Department of Energy. The specific
    request for the National Nuclear Security Administration, or
    NNSA, is $16.5 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion, or an 8.3
    percent increase, over last year. Given that defense-related
    activities comprise such a large percentage of the Department's
    budget and the large proposed increases to the NNSA budget, I
    want to particularly thank the Chairman for asking these
    witnesses to testify before our Committee today.
        Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the requested $1.2 billion
    increase to the NNSA budget is intended to help meet the
    requirements of both the 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
    The NNSA's workload is at its highest peak since the 1980s with
    plans to overhaul five weapons systems over the next 15 years.
    These projects include a cruise missile warhead first built in
    1980; the B61 gravity bomb, which first entered production in
    1961; and an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] warhead,
    which entered service in 1978. All of these programs will
    require nuclear and non-nuclear parts from your complex at the
    same time. The NNSA is also preparing to product 30 pits per
    year at Los Alamos which will require extensive new equipment
    while, at the same time, NNSA is building a $6.5 billion
    building at Oak Ridge to handle uranium. I am interested in
    your approach to ensuring all these projects can be
    accomplished on time and on schedule and on budget. It is quite
    a challenging list.
        Also, in anticipation of this increased workload, the
    fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    authorized a cost estimating and program evaluation office to
    provide an independent review on programs and their cost
    estimates. I am interested in hearing if this office is being
    funded and staffed appropriately.
        Secretary Perry, your Department recently revised the
    environmental cleanup liability of former atomic weapons
    production sites from an estimated $163 billion to $377
    billion, a jump of $244 billion over the next 30 years. I would
    note, for example, at the Hanford Washington Reservation, there
    are approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive liquid
    sludge in 177 underground storage tanks, some of which are
    leaking. I would like to know why the cost of cleanup has grown
    so much. In addition, I would like to understand why it is
    taking so long to clean out the Hanford underground tanks while
    the Savannah River site cleanup of underground storage tanks is
    well on its way.
        On a final point, Secretary Perry, proposals to sell United
    States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have generated
    significant interest and could have broader repercussions for
    the Middle East and global nonproliferation efforts.
        In May of last year, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
    stated that if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow
    suit as soon as possible. That statement, combined with
    apparent Saudi insistence on the right to produce fissile
    material, whether it be enriched uranium or plutonium, requires
    that we carefully evaluate whether we could unintentionally
    encourage a nuclear arms race in the Middle East by selling
    Saudi Arabia nuclear reactors and associated technology.
        Since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the
    United States has promoted the peaceful use of atomic energy.
    Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the United States
    and any country seeking a transfer of nuclear technology to
    sign a nonproliferation agreement that is reviewed by Congress.
    Part 57b of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that you, Mr.
    Secretary, review any transfer of technology that could lead to
    the production of special nuclear material outside the United
    States. Clearly the intent of Congress for over 70 years has
    been to balance the peaceful use of atomic energy against the
    possibility it might be used to make a nuclear weapon. We have
    serious questions in this regard, Mr. Secretary, and I hope you
    will respond to them. We would appreciate your update on this
    issue and many more.
        Again, let me thank both of you for appearing here today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Both of you know what is going on here, what we want to get
    to. What we are going to do is start with your opening
    statements, and we would like to have you confine that to
    around 5 minutes because we have a good attendance up here. We
    are going to get all of our questions asked. We will start with
    you, Secretary Perry.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RICHARD PERRY, SECRETARY OF
                                 ENERGY

        Secretary Perry. Chairman Inhofe, thank you very much for
    the invitation, and to Ranking Member Reed, it is good to be in
    your presence, and thanks for allowing us to come earlier in
    the year to sit down with you and your staffs to discuss before
    we came here. The other members, it is a privilege to be with
    each of you, and a number of you who have served as governors,
    it has been a great privilege to share that executive spirit
    with each of you.
        So my work today and discussing the President's fiscal year
    2020 budget for the Department of Energy--and I just want to
    say it continues to be a great privilege for me. Many of you
    have this before, particularly those governors in the audience
    there, that this is the coolest job I have ever had before. It
    is not the best job I ever had before, but it is the coolest
    job.
        I am pleased to be joined with the Under Secretary of the
    Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty.
    Each of you have had the opportunity to work with her, and you
    know the incredibly high quality intellect and experienced
    individual that we have running that side of the shop.
        I am blessed to get to have a front row seat, if you will,
    and some of the most remarkable innovations that are bringing
    us energy independence, greater prosperity, a more robust
    national security position.
        The Department's overall budget request of $31.7 billion is
    designed to further our progress by providing funding for the
    National Nuclear Security Administration. It directly supports
    our national security. By funding our Office of Environmental
    Management (EM), it helps us clean up the environmental legacy
    of the effort dating to the Manhattan Project, and this budget
    request seeks to build upon the progress we made in both of
    those areas, both NNSA and the EM, over the last year.
        Thanks to NNSA's diligent efforts, along with congressional
    support, I, along with the Secretary of Defense, was able to
    certify to the President once again the reliability of our
    nuclear weapons stockpile as we extended the service life of a
    key warhead by 30-plus years by completing the W76-1 life
    extension program in December of last year.
        We continue our regular safe and reliable nuclear
    propulsion and naval fleet support, while contributing
    expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program,
    ensuring sea-based deterrent capabilities for decades to come.
        We are also seeking to replace our aging nuclear security
    infrastructure. You made mention of that, both Senator Reed and
    you, Mr. Chairman, much of it that is older than I am, and so
    that is getting a little age on it since even before the 1950s.
        Behind all of this is a bedrock belief that we continue to
    embrace at DOE. Given the rising threats to our Nation and the
    world from both state and non-state actors, we must maintain
    our nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, we would like to eliminate
    nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, but until that
    becomes feasible, we must continue to pursue through strength
    that peace that we all desire by keeping nuclear weapons out of
    the wrong hands, supporting nonproliferation efforts. Through
    NNSA, we seek to minimize the number of states that possess
    nuclear weapons; deny nuclear access to terrorists; control
    weapons usable material; related technology, and expertise; and
    help ensure arms control agreements can be verified and
    enforced. As I have said many times, we have a moral obligation
    to defend our country by strengthening our nuclear deterrent.
        But we have an equal duty to address the environmental
    legacy left at the sites that produced the materials that
    helped defeat tyranny and secure peace. That is exactly why the
    EM program, which marks its 30th anniversary this year, exists.
    To date, EM has completed cleanup activities at 91 sites in 30
    States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The 16 EM sites in
    11 States that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest
    and most complex cleanup challenges. Recently we made
    significant progress from coast to coast from the Hanford site,
    Jack, that you mentioned, in Washington to the separations
    process research unit in New York. We are working to ensure
    that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these
    challenges in a sustainable manner going forward.
        In conclusion, this budget represents a commitment from all
    of us at the Department of Energy to serve the American people
    with stewardship, accountability, and service. In partnership
    with our national labs, we will continue to support the world
    class scientists and engineers who ignite America's ingenuity
    and drive our competitiveness.
        I look forward to working with each of you, your
    colleagues, and your excellent staff in the weeks and months
    ahead on these important funding details.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I will attempt to
    answer any questions you have.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Perry and
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Rick Perry and Under Secretary
                             Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
    it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the Administration and
    the Department of Energy (``the Department'' or ``DOE''). We appreciate
    the Committee's strong support for DOE's environmental management
    program and enduring national security missions and the opportunity to
    testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal year
    (FY) 2020.
        The Department's budget request supports America's continued rise
    as an energy independent Nation, and advances U.S. national security by
    modernizing our indispensable, yet aging, nuclear deterrent, and
    promotes economic growth by making investments in transformative
    science and technology innovation to promote affordable and reliable
    energy. It also includes funding to meet our national security and
    environmental cleanup challenges.
                       accomplishments in the past year:
        Thanks to strong support from the Administration and Congress, over
    the past year, DOE has made significant progress in advancing America's
    security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and
    nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology
    solutions.

          Last year, the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) continued to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of
    nuclear weapons through the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP),
    enabling the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to
    certify to the President once again the reliability of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile. While we are confident in the state and
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent today, we must--as General Hyten
    of STRATCOM recently testified--provide sustained and reliable funding
    for nuclear modernization so that future Secretaries and commanders can
    brief future Congresses with the same confidence. In addition to its
    critical role in sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile
    and its supporting enterprise, NNSA also continued its important work
    to advance U.S. nonproliferation, nuclear security, counterterrorism,
    arms control objectives, and naval nuclear propulsion.

          In December 2018, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension
    Program (LEP), extending the warhead's service life another 30+ years.
    The B61-12 LEP, W80-4 LEP, W88 Alteration (Alt) 370, W87-1
    Modification, and the W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget
    and on schedule. These achievements are a testament to NNSA's ability
    to deliver on commitments we have made to the Department of Defense
    (DOD) and Congress.

          The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-
    establishing a robust plutonium pit production capability to meet
    military requirements, supported by numerous studies and analyses, of
    no fewer than 80 war reserve pits per year by 2030. Last May, the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's recommended alternative
    calling for plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). This two-site approach
    bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's responsiveness and
    resiliency.

          The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project continues
    to make timely progress with the recent commencement of the
    construction of the main buildings at the Y-12 National Security
    Complex (Y-12). UPF will be delivered by the end of 2025 for no more
    than $6.5 billion. This project is on budget and on schedule. NNSA also
    broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex in New Mexico, which will
    house 1,200 employees when complete.

          Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental in the conversion of
    a Nigerian research reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This
    marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or isotope production facility
    conversion, which was followed by the repatriation of the highly
    enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country,
    plus Taiwan, to become HEU free.

          NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors continued its record of
    safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and nuclear fleet support, while
    contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program.
    This next generation nuclear-powered submarine will ensure required
    sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.

          The Office of Environmental Management (EM) broke ground
    on a new ventilation system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
    facility in New Mexico. WIPP is the lynchpin to the final disposition
    of transuranic waste across the cleanup complex and the new ventilation
    system will increase airflow in the WIPP underground for simultaneous
    mining and waste emplacement operations.

          The EM program successfully completed safe demolition of
    the 10,000-square-foot vitrification plant at the West Valley
    Demonstration Project in New York.

          In June 2018, DOE's Office of Science (SC) Oak Ridge
    Leadership Computing Facility's Summit system reclaimed the top spot
    for the United States in the global ``Top 500'' list of high
    performance computing systems and held the top spot in the November
    list, which included five DOE systems among the top 10.

          The Summit system is also launching the Exascale
    computing era by enabling researchers to break the Exascale barrier,
    achieving a peak throughput of more than two exaops--faster than any
    previously reported science application.

          Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) unveiled
    the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the world
    according to the Top 500 list.

          In May 2018, the White House's National Science and
    Technology Council (NSTC) established an interagency committee on
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) to advise the White House on Government-
    wide AI research and development priorities and will work to establish
    partnerships among government, private sector, and independent
    researchers. The DOE serves a leading role on this Committee.

          On February 11, 2019, the President signed Executive
    Order 13859, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial
    Intelligence. The Initiative focuses Federal Government and Department
    resources toward developing AI technology, while ensuring that the next
    great AI inventions are made in the United States.

          In support of the Executive Order and building on our
    core competencies in science and technology, DOE is developing a
    coherent, long-term strategy to maximize the capabilities and
    scientific benefits of transformative AI technologies to all of our
    mission, business and operational areas.

          Our approach includes development of innovative AI
    technologies, aggregation of DOE mission-related data that together can
    foster innovative advancement of next generation hardware and software
    technologies.
                        building a strategic capability
        The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national
    strategy to keep the American people safe and secure for more than 70
    years and its credibility backstops all U.S. diplomatic and military
    activities around the globe.
        While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been an
    aspiration for many for generations, we must recognize the reality that
    foreign nuclear threats are growing. Russia and China are investing
    massive resources into upgrading and expanding their nuclear arsenals,
    all at a time when they seek to challenge United States interests and
    unravel U.S. alliances around the world. It is imperative that we
    undertake prudent efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear stockpile and
    enterprise--ensuring that the United States can continue to speak from
    a position of strength and that tensions--regardless of where or how
    they arise--do not escalate into all-out war.
        DOE is building on the previous year's achievements with new
    activities tailored to 21st century threats. In fiscal year 2020 and
    beyond, the Department will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary
    capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure and the needed skills of the nuclear enterprise
    workforce. This includes the ability to produce strategic materials
    (uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium) associated with nuclear
    weapons, as well as refurbish and manufacture components made from
    these materials.
        Consistent, robust, and predictable funding and authority from
    Congress are essential for the Department's nuclear weapon and
    infrastructure modernization efforts. These modernization efforts are
    aligned with the needs outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) and approved by the NWC.
                        modernizing our nuclear forces:
        The Department is modernizing our nuclear enterprise to ensure that
    we have the scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities
    necessary to maintain an effective and safe nuclear triad and respond
    to future national security threats.
        Unique, state-of-the-art capabilities for research, development,
    testing, evaluation, and production enable this critical effort. In
    coordination with DOD, we have fully integrated the scope, budgets, and
    schedules of the LEPs, infrastructure modernization, and nuclear
    delivery systems.
        We are making significant progress in the full set of LEPs,
    modifications, and alterations while remaining aligned with DOD through
    the NWC.

          W76-1 LEP: The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the
    sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, completed its last production unit
    in December 2018. Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include
    archiving production tooling and program records, and completing
    component overbuilds to support hardware provisioning for the life of
    the warhead system.

          W76-2 Modification Program: The W76-2 modification is
    currently on schedule, on budget, and the program achieved First
    Production Unit (FPU) in February 2019. This low-yield option is a
    measured way to reinforce deterrence in the face of Russia's large,
    diverse, and modern stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which
    facilitate Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear first use,
    potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia a coercive
    advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict.

          B61-12 LEP: The oldest weapon system in the U.S. nuclear
    arsenal, the B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the B61
    gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of that vital weapon
    system. Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has
    demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight
    tests, including eight joint flight test drops with the U.S. Air Force.
    The B61-12 LEP will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in the fourth
    quarter of fiscal year 2019, following completion of system
    qualification and Pantex Plant production readiness activities.

          W88 Alt 370: The W88 Alteration 370 is on track for FPU
    in fiscal year 2020. This program, which also supports the sea-based
    leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production
    Engineering, and will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in September
    2019.
          W80-4 LEP: In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4
    LEP to transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal
    year 2020 request for $898.6 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain
    on track to achieve FPU in fiscal year 2025 in support of the Air
    Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
          W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 program will
    replace the aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to
    support fielding on the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
    (GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of
    Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement
    warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 program will improve safety
    and security, addressing antiquated design, material obsolescence,
    evolving performance expectations, and emerging survivability threats.
                recapitalizing our cold war era infrastructure:
        As stated in the 2018 NPR, ``an effective, responsive, and
    resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U.S.
    capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements. Such an
    infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential
    adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and can help to deter,
    assure, hedge against adverse developments, and discourage adversary
    interest in arms competition.''
        More than a third of NNSA's facilities are over 60 years old. It
    will take sustained investments to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons
    infrastructure.
        With Congress' support, NNSA is making these investments,
    including:

          An enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium
    pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. The time to
    move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
    Facility (MFFF) at SRS to produce 50 war reserve pits per year and
    continuing to invest in LANL to produce 30 war reserve pits per year is
    the optimal path forward to meet pit production requirements while
    managing the risks and costs associated with increasing production
    rates and maintaining existing plutonium missions at LANL.

          Investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary for
    the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit
    production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA
    anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next five years, and
    LANL is actively installing pit production equipment and has begun
    hiring to meet future work scope. As the nation's plutonium center of
    excellence for research and development, LANL plays a critical role in
    early design efforts for pit production.

          Investing $774 million at SRS in fiscal year 2020, a 75.8
    percent increase over fiscal year 2019. NNSA will continue termination
    activities of the MFFF project at SRS, continue to pursue a dilute and
    dispose strategy to fulfill U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric
    tons (MT) of plutonium, and modernize SRS infrastructure to support the
    tritium supply chain.

          Fully funding the Uranium Processing Facility.

          Ensuring availability of sufficient unobligated low-
    enriched uranium and the necessary reactor capacity to produce an
    adequate supply of tritium.

          Investing over $900 million in fiscal year 2020 to
    sustain and recapitalize NNSA's mission-enabling infrastructure to
    support mission needs and improve facility reliability, sustainability,
    productivity, and efficiency.

          Disposing of several high-risk process-contaminated
    excess facilities. Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated
    facilities will ultimately be transferred to the Environmental
    Management (EM) program for disposition. In the interim, NNSA is
    focusing on reducing risks where possible. For example, NNSA has made
    critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-contaminated
    facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's Alpha 5 and
    Beta 4 facilities.

          Commencing an effort by the EM program to remove Building
    280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence vLivermore
    National Laboratory. The Department identified five (including Building
    280) of the top ten list of the highest risk excess facilities at
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

          Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL) EM program has
    been able to remove risks and stabilize a portion of the 220 excess,
    contaminated, and deteriorating facilities at the Y-12 National
    Security Complex (Y-12) and ORNL. While Oak Ridge has more high-risk
    excess contaminated facilities than any other site, crews continued
    addressing this issue in 2018 by tearing down two high-risk buildings,
    preventing more than 6,000 pounds of mercury from entering the
    environment, completed characterization for future demolition projects,
    and immobilizing contamination in hot cell facilities.
                       preventing global nuclear threats:
        Effective nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures
    support U.S., allied, and partner security by controlling the spread of
    nuclear materials and technology; placing limits on the production,
    stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; reducing misperception
    and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
    competition. The 2018 NPR reiterates the U.S. commitment to effective
    nonproliferation and arms control measures, both of which are vital to
    our Nation's ability to have a credible deterrent.
        In 2018, the U.S. Government interagency coordination on nuclear
    nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism programs and strategy
    enabled NNSA to:

          Remove or confirm the disposition of nearly 352.4
    kilograms of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU).

          Partner with the U.S. healthcare industry, which resulted
    in the first domestic production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in 30 years.
    Mo-99 is a vital medical radioisotope used in approximately 40,000
    patient procedures daily in the United States.

          Downblend or ship for downblending, 2.5 MT of surplus
    HEU, for a cumulative total of 160.4 MT, which after downblending
    cannot be used in a nuclear weapon.

          Deploy a total of 48 radiation detection systems to
    prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials worldwide.

          Secure 87 domestic and international civilian buildings
    containing high-priority radioactive material.

          Provide technical reviews of 5,973 U.S. export license
    applications and 3,053 interdiction cases to facilitate legitimate
    nuclear cooperation and prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear and
    dual use goods.

          Hold over 40 international nuclear safeguards engagements
    including training, and technical meetings with foreign partners.

          Conduct 84 export control trainings for U.S. enforcement
    agencies and foreign partners.
        All of the aforementioned work was completed by NNSA's Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). DNN is committed to continuing
    its efforts to: (1) minimize the number of nuclear weapons states; (2)
    deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials;
    (3) strictly control weapons-useable material, related technology, and
    expertise; and (4) support the Department of State to make sure arms
    control agreements enhance security, and are verifiable and
    enforceable.
                       countering global nuclear threats:
        The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
    provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or
    radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the
    unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.
    Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain
    readiness to support lead federal agencies to find and render safe
    potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively
    manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and to
    support enhanced security operations at large national public events.
        CTCP also maintains operational nuclear forensics capabilities to
    enable the attribution of a nuclear attack against the United States.
    These capabilities allow the U.S. Government the ability to collect
    evidence if a device is rendered safe prior to detonating, or to
    characterize and identify the material used if the device detonates,
    allowing policymakers to hold those accountable for the attack. CTCP
    will also implement the National Nuclear Material Archive program
    within NNSA to identify, consolidate, and analyze historical nuclear
    material samples of value to the technical nuclear forensics program.
        NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major
    American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and
    mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device. Over the
    next few years, CTCP will continue to provide training and conduct
    operations in support of these FBI teams and begin transitioning to the
    Capability Forward initiative, under which life-saving responses to a
    nuclear threat device will be accelerated. As part of this initiative,
    NNSA will provide additional training, equipment, and technical support
    to the current 11 U.S. cities--eventually growing to 14 cities by
    fiscal year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations
    more rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training
    facilities to accommodate the increased training requirements
    associated with regional render safe capabilities.
                   responsible stewardship of the environment
        The government's nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research
    programs made significant contributions to our Nation's defense for
    decades. The EM program is tasked with the safe disposition of
    radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel and special
    nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and water; and the
    decontamination and decommissioning of thousands of excess facilities.
    As DOE continues to open new horizons in innovation, national security
    and American energy production, we also remain focused on addressing
    the environmental liabilities accrued while ending World War II and
    keeping the peace in the Cold War.
        This year marks the 30th anniversary of the EM program. DOE is
    making great progress toward reducing and eliminating legacy waste in a
    safe, efficient and cost-effective manner that is protective of human
    health and the environment.
        With a track record of demonstrated results, EM has reduced the
    footprint of the cleanup program from 107 sites comprising a total of
    3,100 square miles to just 16 sites, with an active cleanup footprint
    of less than 300 square miles.
        Over the past year, EM has made significant progress, including the
    following:

          At the Hanford site in Washington State, workers are
    making real progress towards Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
    vitrification of tank waste with a milestone to complete hot
    commissioning of the Low Activity Waste facility by December 31, 2023.

          Work performed by Oak Ridge's EM program brought the site
    closer to its ambitious goal to complete major cleanup at the East
    Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in 2020.

          EM published the Final Environmental Impact Statement at
    Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC).

          Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000
    cubic yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the SRS. They
    completed it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million.

          The EM Los Alamos (LA) Field Office safely ramped up
    operations during the initial months of the new legacy cleanup
    contract, and successfully completed 13 milestones under the Consent
    Order with the State of New Mexico.

          And, project crews at EM's Separations Process Research
    Unit (SPRU) in New York completed the last phase of building demolition
    with the removal of Building H2. The SPRU facilities were built in the
    late 1940s and operated through the early 1950s to conduct pilot tests
    for recovery of uranium and plutonium.

        The EM sites that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest
    and most complex cleanup challenges. The Department is working to
    ensure that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these
    challenges in a sustainable manner going forward. To that end, the
    Department has reinvigorated the completion mindset that has been the
    foundation of EM's greatest successes.
        EM is taking lessons learned from three decades of cleanup and
    institutionalizing a strengthened and robust results-driven approach
    that protects our Nation, continues risk-based cleanup progress and
    drives down liabilities to the American people through close
    collaboration with regulators and stakeholders.
        EM is now managing capital projects and procurements with a greater
    degree of rigor and consistency. With billions of dollars in
    procurements coming up over the next few years, the Department has the
    opportunity to implement improved contracting approaches that ensure
    that safety remains paramount, while incentivizing results and allowing
    for great flexibility.
        As the Department looks to best position EM to meet long-term
    challenges, innovative ideas and approaches are necessary. The greatest
    incubators of innovation are the DOE National Labs. The Department is
    focused on fully utilizing the capabilities of our National Labs to get
    cleanup to completion safer, sooner and more efficiently.
              recruitment and retention of highly qualified people
        Across the Department, our greatest asset will always be our
    workforce. DOE's challenging national security missions require it to
    recruit, train, and retain highly skilled and dedicated federal
    employees and Management and Operating (M&O) contract workforce. DOE
    and Congress must continue to provide these highly-talented men and
    women with the tools necessary to support their work as they carry out
    complex and challenging responsibilities. Funding alone is not the only
    thing needed. The Department will also need to have the necessary human
    resource authorities to attract and retain the best and brightest
    people from around the country. These positions are not just in
    science, technology, and engineering but also manufacturing,
    maintenance, project and program management, and construction.
        A skilled federal workforce is required for appropriate program and
    project oversight as the nuclear security enterprise is busier than it
    has been since the end of the Cold War. Over the past nine years,
    NNSA's program funding has increased 50 percent, while staffing has
    decreased 10 percent. Last year the Office of Personnel Management and
    NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation both
    independently determined the need to significantly increase NNSA
    federal staffing. Therefore, for NNSA to meet its growing nuclear
    security mission requirements, as described in the 2018 NPR, it will
    need the funding to hire aggressively for the next two years.
                        fiscal year 2020 budget request
        The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests $31.7 billion
    for DOE to advance U.S. national security and economic growth through
    transformative science and technology innovation that promotes
    affordable and reliable energy through market solutions and meets our
    nuclear security and environmental cleanup challenges. The fiscal year
    2020 budget request provides: $16.5 billion to modernize and restore
    the nuclear security enterprise and to maintain the safety and
    effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, a $1.3 billion increase over
    fiscal year 2019 enacted levels; $6.5 billion to continue our
    commitment to cleaning up the Cold War nuclear legacy; $5.5 billion to
    conduct cutting-edge, early-stage scientific research and development
    (R&D) and build state-of-the-art scientific tools and facilities to
    keep U.S. researchers at the forefront of scientific innovation,
    including achieving exascale computing in 2021.
        This budget request demonstrates the Administration's strong
    support for NNSA, EM, and SC. For the Nation to retain a credible
    deterrent and prevent, counter, and respond to global nuclear security
    threats, NNSA will require significant and sustained investments in its
    nuclear security mission.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's Weapons Activities
    account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion or 11.8 percent
    over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this
    account support the Nation's current and future nuclear defense posture
    and the associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology,
    engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
        The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their
    intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United
    States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while
    potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons
    and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's DNN account is $2
    billion, an increase of $63.3 million, or 3.3 percent above the fiscal
    year 2019 request. DNN account activities address the entire nuclear
    threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to
    nuclear and radiological incidents around the world.
        NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2020 budget request is
    $1.65 billion, a decrease of $140.2 million or approximately 7.8
    percent below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level.1 The funding supports
    Naval Reactors' mission to provide militarily effective nuclear
    propulsion plants for Navy vessels and to ensure their safe, reliable
    and long-lived operation.
        1 Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds to the Office of
    Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation of the Advanced Test
    Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Request includes $71 million in
    combined AI funding for SC's Advanced Scientific Computing Research
    (ASCR), Basic Energy Sciences (BES), Biological and Environmental
    Research (BER), Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), and High Energy Physics
    (HEP) programs, and $48 million for NNSA.
        The EM program represents one of the top financial liabilities to
    the American taxpayer. As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the
    fiscal year 2020 budget request provides the resources necessary to
    build upon recent successes, bring a renewed sense of urgency to the
    program and enable meaningful, measurable progress to projects and
    sites throughout the cleanup complex. Resources provided for in the
    fiscal year 2020 budget request will:

          Advance construction on the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment
    Facility, progress deactivation and demolition of remaining facilities
    at the East Tennessee Technology Park, and continue preparation of
    Building 2026 to support processing of the remaining uranium-233
    material at ORNL in Tennessee.

          Initiate two transuranic waste processing lines, complete
    characterization of the high explosives plume in Canon de Valle and
    implement the full interim measure for the chromium plume at Los Alamos
    in New Mexico.

          Complete verification of cleanup, site restoration, and
    closeout activities at SPRU in New York.

          Ramp up efforts to address radioactive tank waste at the
    SRS in South Carolina through start-up of the Salt Waste Processing
    Facility and continued construction activities for necessary Saltstone
    Disposal Units.

        Together, these investments for environmental management will make
    significant progress in fulfilling our cleanup responsibilities while
    also starting to address our high-risk excess facilities at NNSA sites.
       project management execution--safe quality construction on budget:
        NNSA is driving continued improvement in contract and project
    management practices. Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2
    billion in projects under budget--a significant portion of NNSA's total
    project portfolio. Some of NNSA's acquisition and project management
    achievements include:

          Over $500 million in cost savings via M&O contract
    competitions.

          Small Business Administration score revised from ``F'' to
    ``A.''

          Government Accountability Office narrowed the focus of
    its High Risk List to projects greater than $750 million.

          Delivered $2 billion project portfolio eight percent
    under budget.

          U.S. Strategic Command requested NNSA's best practices
    for project management.

        NNSA is continuing to encourage competition and increase the
    universe of qualified contractors by streamlining its major acquisition
    processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value
    acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, by using a
    tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that are
    appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site.
                                   conclusion
        This budget request represents a commitment from all of us at the
    Department of Energy to serve the American people with stewardship,
    accountability and service. We commit to ensure that DOE performs
    efficiently and effectively as we pursue our mission-driven goals.
        We are at an extraordinary moment in American energy. In
    partnership with our National Laboratories, we will continue to support
    the world-class scientists and engineers who ignite American ingenuity
    and drive our competitiveness. The President's fiscal year 2020 budget
    request for the Department of Energy positions us to seize
    opportunities and prioritize investments. We look forward to working
    with you and your colleagues in Congress in the coming weeks and months
    on these important funding details. Thank you, and we look forward to
    answering your questions.

        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. Excellent
    statement.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, we are very pleased to have you
    here, and please proceed with your opening statement.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, UNDER
      SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe and
    Ranking Member Reed. I have no opening statement this morning.
    I defer to Secretary Perry. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. What I want to do is get into a
    couple of the things just to kind of set them out because I
    know they are going to be covered by questions, general
    questions.
        Last year, the NNSA proposed to repurpose the half-built
    MOX [mixed oxide] building. Of course, that has been the main
    discussion for a long period of time and an area of confusion.
    That is the one that is located in South Carolina to produce
    plutonium pits. Los Alamos National Lab would still operate the
    current facility in New Mexico producing 30 pits a year while
    South Carolina I think would be in the neighborhood of some 50
    more to meet the STRATCOM requirement which is for 80 by what
    year, 2030?
        Secretary Perry, explain why the Department chose last year
    to construct a plutonium pit production facility in South
    Carolina and what advantages would this option bring in
    addition to the current smaller capability in Los Alamos.
        Secretary Perry. Mr. Chairman, I think for so many years,
    as you know as well as anyone in this room, the challenge that
    we have had with the mixed oxide facility in South Carolina--I
    do not want to relitigate that at all. What I would like to do
    is say thank you to the Members who agreed that this was not a
    program that needed to go forward, and you had the courage to
    work with us and others to terminate that and then to
    transition that facility.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, because you are talking about a very
    large investment that we have had in the past. We are
    interested in seeing what is the most we can get out of it now.
        Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I think we are on a track that
    will take us to a reasonable development there. Los Alamos is
    and, as Senator Heinrich knows, will always be the center for
    pit production, the center of excellence in the world for
    plutonium pit production. Pits 0 through 30 will be done there.
    There is an additional $5 billion that is headed towards that
    facility in Los Alamos. It will be a substantial buildup. They
    are going to continue to play, I will suggest, the lead role in
    the immediate out-years. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by
    2030, there will be the requirement to do 50 pits. The decision
    was investigated, decision made that you could bifurcate that
    effort with the continual focus on Los Alamos and have pits 31
    through 80 be done at the Savannah River site. We can discuss
    further about that decision-making, but both the DOD, those in
    the nuclear weapons world agree that that is a legitimate,
    thoughtful way to go forward with the pit production.
        There are some other potentials at Savannah River, but the
    main legacy program that would come out of the repurposing of
    the MOX facility will be the development of those pits 31
    through 80 at Savannah River.
        Chairman Inhofe. I understand that, and I appreciate that
    very much.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, there are a lot of people
    speculating that we may not be able to reach those goals. In
    fact, in NNSA's own analysis, it suggests that reaching the 80
    by 2030 is going to be a problem. No matter what the location
    of the production, how do you plan to mitigate in the event we
    do not make it?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As the Secretary said, this is going to be a challenging
    undertaking for the NNSA and for our entire nuclear security
    enterprise. When the Nuclear Weapons Council determined that
    based on STRATCOM requirements, that we needed to produce not
    less than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030, it was a
    challenge. I need not remind Members of this Committee that the
    United States has not had a plutonium pit production capability
    since the early 1990s, and it is well past time that we provide
    a resilient infrastructure for our nuclear weapon deterrent.
    The focus of that is on plutonium pit production now and in the
    future. In order to do that, we believed that a two-pronged
    strategy is the most affordable and optimal way to get to the
    80 pits per year by 2030. Again, it is not less than 80 pits.
        We have a lot of challenges ahead of us. We believe that
    our two-pronged approach where we are undertaking the
    investments, the significant investments, as the Secretary
    stated, at Los Alamos which will provide several hundred
    million dollars over several years in order to increase the
    production capacity, as well as the infrastructure necessary at
    Los Alamos, and the facility at South Carolina. We are making
    significant investments in that to undertake the preconceptual
    design, and we are seeking $410 million to continue that
    repurposing of the facility at South Carolina.
        Chairman Inhofe. My time has expired, and I want to make
    sure that we get everyone here.
        But let us do this for the record. When we see a staggering
    figure like $677 billion, referring to the Hanford site, that
    does not seem achievable to me. Right now, we are in the middle
    of a budget, and that is overwhelming.
        I would like for the record for each one of you to spend
    some time to analyze how that can be diminished. I am talking
    about using grout instead of glass or any number of things. For
    the record, not at this time. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Energy continues to thoughtfully and
    deliberately work toward determining the best path forward to
    safely and successfully treat all of Hanford's tank waste. We
    continue to make progress towards commissioning of the direct
    feed low-activity waste facility and we recently initiated an
    Analysis of Alternatives to evaluate options for the high level
    waste fraction of the tank waste. We fully recognize the
    challenges we face and we are addressing these challenges head-
    on with an eye toward getting waste out of tanks and disposed
    of sooner, safely and at a reasonable cost.

        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, as I mentioned in my opening
    remarks, you have undertaken the overhaul of at least five
    weapons systems. You are building two multibillion nuclear
    facilities, uranium and plutonium. You are employing and
    performing inspections of the deployed stockpile with a federal
    workforce of about 1,700 people. Are you at all concerned about
    too much work and too little capacity?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        As I mentioned previously, this is a challenge ahead of us,
    but we are taking on this challenge throughout our entire
    44,000-person workforce and throughout our entire nuclear
    security enterprise. We recognize the challenges ahead of us.
    When we talk about pit production, that is only 11 years away.
    This a major challenge. We have five modernization programs, as
    you stated today.
        We also have challenges with hiring workforce. Right now,
    in the next 5 years, we are expecting 40 percent of our
    workforce to be retirement eligible.
        So we have got a number of challenges ahead of us, but I
    believe we can--with the robust staffing plan and robust
    funding that we are seeking from Congress, I believe we can get
    through the systems and continue to be on time and on budget,
    which we are finding we are in right now, in alignment with the
    Department of Defense (DOD).
        Senator Reed. Can I ask very quickly, what is the biggest
    risk? Is it the pit production at Los Alamos?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The biggest risk right now is
    sustained and supported funding to recapitalize and modernize
    our infrastructure. In terms of programs, yes, it is plutonium
    pit production, but we have our eye on that, and we are focused
    specifically on plutonium pit production.
        Senator Reed. The first critical point is 30 pits by 2026.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Correct.
        Senator Reed. One of the concerns I will put on the table
    is that as we start to build up the facility in South Carolina,
    there will be at least a temptation to pull resources out of
    Los Alamos at a time when that is a critical--the first
    critical action will be made there. If we cannot get those 30
    pits by 2026, then we have a serious nuclear security problem.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I absolutely agree with you,
    Senator Reed. One of our challenges, however, is to put
    together what we call integrated product teams in an
    implementation strategy across our entire enterprise. So this
    does not just involve South Carolina and the facility we are
    repurposing there, as well as Los Alamos, but it also affects
    all of our other parts of our enterprise whether it is Y-12 for
    sub assemblies or the actual production complex at Pantex in
    Amarillo, Texas. We are working across our entire enterprise as
    an integrated approach.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I mentioned in my opening comments the
    ongoing negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a non-
    nuclear weapons state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
    That is correct. Is it not?
        Secretary Perry. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. Does it concern you that the Crown Prince has
    made statements that they are prepared to obtain an atomic
    weapon if Iran particularly gets one? That would violate their
    standing under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
        Secretary Perry. I share your concern with any world leader
    that we are doing or we are not doing business with, for that
    matter, that would say that their intention was to do that.
        Senator Reed. Part of the negotiation involves ensuring
    that they are not able to enrich fissile material or keep
    fissile material. That seems to be a non-waiverable condition
    in any arrangement. Is that correct?
        Secretary Perry. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. For further depth, we have an arrangement
    with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They have, indeed, agreed
    not to enrich nuclear materials. Is that accurate?
        Secretary Perry. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. There is a fear that if we did not have the
    same arrangement with the Saudis, that the UAE might feel that
    they are unconstrained. Is that a concern that you have?
        Secretary Perry. I think you would be correct in that
    analysis.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Quickly following up, the Chairman made comments about the
    significant increase in cost, as I mentioned, at Hanford
    particularly. We have a problem and we have a huge increase in
    resources we have to devote to it. I would concur with the
    Chairman's request that you provide us more information and
    more details as we go forward.
        Secretary Perry. Coming your way.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator, I am trying to take stock of the progress
    that we have made in achieving the goals that were laid out in
    the New START's ratification, and the Nuclear Posture Review
    makes the point that despite a longstanding goal and one that
    was particularly reinforced during the debate on the New START,
    quote, the United States has fallen short in sustaining the
    modern infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to
    respond to unforeseen developments.
        That treaty was signed in 2010, and since that time, we
    expected a pit production facility to be completed by 2023 and
    work is just now beginning with the optimistic target, I
    believe, of reaching full capacity at 2030.
        After years of delay, the uranium production facility is
    moving forward, but its scope is reduced to one-third of its
    original capacity, and several warhead life extension 16
    programs were delayed. Revised schedules appear to be holding,
    but the stockpile is older than anticipated.
        In my view, we have a lot of work ahead of us if we are
    going to achieve the vision that was articulated in 2010 and
    really be able to attain a responsive nuclear complex. Would
    you agree with that?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
        Senator Fischer. Do you see us moving in that direction, a
    more positive direction, at this point?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I do, Senator Fischer. I believe
    that our entire complex has our eye on our goal, and the goal
    is to continue to modernize our five nuclear weapon systems
    that we are currently undertaking. I am happy to say that they
    are all on schedule and all on budget. However, a minor slip in
    any of those could cause a rippling effect across all of the
    different modernization programs.
        With regard to UPF [Uranium Processing Facility], the
    facility to which you alluded, our uranium processing facility,
    to date we have spent $2.5 billion in construction activities.
    This year, we have undertaken the actual construction of the
    main processing building. That building will cost $6.5 billion
    and be completed by 2025. Again, I am glad to say that we are
    on schedule and on cost for that.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        You and I--we talked a lot about pit production, and the
    two questions previous to mine dealt with some pit production
    issues as well. NNSA's goal has been to be able to produce
    those plutonium pits per year 2030. I know that you do have a
    strategy to accomplish this and you are pursuing it.
        But it is my understanding that as a result of the years of
    delay that this effort has faced, I guess you could say plans
    are extremely fragile at this point, and achieving this goal is
    going to be challenging for you. I am pleased you are focused
    on it.
        But my question is, to what extent has NNSA thought about
    any contingencies or any supplemental plans should it face
    delays or any kind of disruption to your current strategy that
    you hold?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have a number of different
    options available to us. We are, obviously, focused on the most
    optimal, which is to go with the two-pronged strategy for pit
    production, which will be, as the Secretary said, Los Alamos
    producing pits 1 through 30, and as we repurpose the former MOX
    facility in South Carolina, that we will look to have an
    aggressive plan for that.
        One of the historical notes about NNSA is that I like to
    say we used to do things in serial. Well, now we are doing
    things in parallel. We have a lot of work on our plate, but I
    am absolutely confident in the men and women of the NNSA
    enterprise that we can get this done. We have no further time
    to delay.
        In addition to everything else we are doing, we have a
    massive infrastructure and recapitalization program. As the
    Chairman mentioned, more than 30 percent of our facilities were
    built during the Manhattan Project, and it is long time past
    that we do something to modernize our infrastructure and give
    the tools to our workforce that are necessary to maintain our
    nuclear deterrent.
        Senator Fischer. I know you are trying to do things in
    parallel and not step by step, but as you view your next major
    strategic materials challenge, what comes after the plutonium
    pit production for you?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. High explosives.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks to the witnesses for your service and testimony.
        Secretary Perry, Reuters broke a story last night, ``United
    States Approves Secret Nuclear Power Work for Saudi Arabia.''
    Just to read the opening paragraph, United States Energy
    Secretary Rick Perry has approved six secret authorizations by
    companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to
    Saudi Arabia, according to a copy of a document seen by Reuters
    on Wednesday.
        Is the story accurate?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, as you probably know, as well as
    any of us, from time to time, the media may get a story wrong.
        Senator Kaine. That is why I asked.
        Secretary Perry. It is always good to hear in the public,
    and I hope that there is some good reporting going to be going
    on about this conversation you and I are about to have relative
    to that because it is important to have a little understanding
    of the history of the part 810.
        Senator Kaine. Part 810. These are part 810 authorizations
    that we are talking about. Correct?
        Secretary Perry. That is correct. These go all the way back
    to the 1970s, about the same time that the Department of Energy
    was created in 1977.
        Frankly, I think the word ``secret'' is what gets everybody
    spun up when they see the word ``secret'' in there. What we are
    talking about here is something that goes on every day in this
    town and across the country.
        Senator Kaine. If I can lead the witness a little bit, I do
    understand these part 810 authorizations are common. They have
    happened for a long time. The Reuters story suggests, though,
    that in the past, part 810 authorizations have been publicly
    available to be reviewed at the Department of Energy office,
    but in this case, these six authorizations have not been
    subject to any review by the public.
        Secretary Perry. Here is what I will suggest to you, is
    that the proprietary information that these companies, these
    U.S. companies, that are going to be doing this work want to
    keep that proprietary information from being out in the public
    domain. I totally understand that. When we were governors, our
    business model from time to time--well, not from time to time,
    generally speaking, they were not interested in putting out and
    having their competitors look at it.
        Senator Kaine. Let me not ask anything about any
    proprietary information. I do not want to do that.
        Is it accurate, though, that six part 810 authorizations
    have been issued to American companies to do this prep work for
    a potential nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. Well, since January of 2017, here is what
    I think is really pretty important from my perspective.
        Senator Kaine. How about just really quick. Is it true that
    six part 810 authorizations have been issued to companies----
        Secretary Perry. Here is what is true. Since 2017, there
    have been 65 applications for part 810's, and we have issued 37
    of them, with nine of them to the Middle East.
        Senator Kaine. Okay, and six to Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. That is correct, and two to Jordan.
        Senator Kaine. When was the last one issued? Give me the
    date. You said since 2017. When was the last one done to Saudi
    Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. Let me get back with you on that.
        Senator Kaine. Do you know whether or not it was done
    before or after October 2, 2018?
        Secretary Perry. I do not. I do not want to give you a date
    specific.
        Senator Kaine. That was a date that a constituent of mine,
    a Virginia resident, was murdered, Jamal Khashoggi, by the
    Saudi Government in a Saudi consulate in Istanbul. I would be
    very interested to see whether the United States was signing
    deals, part 810 authorizations, to enable nuclear work for
    Saudi Arabia after that date.
        Secretary Perry. We will get you that specific date.
        Senator Kaine. We will ask that for the record, the record
    of all six of the authorizations.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The international commercial nuclear power industry is a
    highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
    number of competitors, even the name of a company and the
    market they are competing in can be harmful to an American
    company seeking to market their products. Certain companies can
    be easily identified by the technology associated with them,
    thus revealing the name or technology associated with such a
    company would reveal that they were competing in a certain
    market.
        Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
    information in question, the Department has been working with
    Congress to provide access to this information in the
    appropriate setting and manner.

        Senator Kaine. Let me switch topics quickly.
        The Department of the Navy is recommending that the USS
    Harry S. Truman be decommissioned rather than overhauled in the
    next few years. I serve on the Seapower Subcommittee of this
    Committee. We had a hearing about this yesterday. Has the
    Department of Energy been given any direction to fund or plan
    for the decommissioning of the Truman?
        Secretary Perry. Let me let the Administrator have a bite
    at that.
        Senator Kaine. Indeed.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. What I could say, Senator Kaine,
    is that obviously part of that comes under the Office of Naval
    Reactors, which falls under NNSA. I can get back to you on that
    information to let you know specifically what we are providing.
        Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. It would not be
    surprising I think. There is just a little bit of an effect in
    the SASC budget this year on it, and it may be that the DOE
    portion of it would be downstream from fiscal year 2020. I am
    just curious to see whether there has been any instruction
    given to DOE about potential decommissioning. If so, what
    effect would that have on the budget? I will ask that question
    for the record.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Scott?
        Senator Scott. Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Gordon-
    Hagerty, thank you for being here and thank you for your hard
    work. I know it is a lot of work to get done, what everyone
    expects you to do.
        I want to thank Secretary Perry for not running for
    reelection in 2014. I was never able to beat you in job
    creation in my first 4 years as Governor, but your departure
    was welcomed and we were able to beat you for quite a bit. I
    hope you appreciated those phone calls every month when I let
    you know how we were doing.
        Secretary Perry, the National Defense Strategy focused on
    our national security efforts, more on the threats of China and
    Russia. How does the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's--how do you address these threats through your
    mission and programs?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you.
        The NNSA, as I said in my opening remarks, keeping our
    nuclear deterrent at a position that clearly modernizes it,
    clearly sends the message that the United States is going to
    defend itself against any threats. That is one aspect of what
    the Department is involved with.
        I will suggest to you an equally important part of this is
    through some of the work that goes on at our national labs in
    the super computing side of things. The ability to protect the
    grid against any attacks that could come from a cyber
    standpoint--statutorily the Department of Energy is the sector-
    specific agency that deals with that. The Idaho National Lab
    and the grid, the test grid, that they have there is a great
    example of that. Our super computing en route to exoscale
    computing, the first exoscale machine will be at the Argonne
    Laboratory, up and running by 2021. Then we have the number
    one, number two fastest computers in the world, most powerful
    computers in the world today at Oak Ridge in Tennessee and at
    Lawrence Livermore. When that Argonne facility in Chicago comes
    up--its name is Aurora--then we will be at the exoscale level.
    Senator Cotton, you know the importance from a cryptology
    standpoint, the ability for us to use our super computing
    capacity and abilities.
        I will suggest to you those are two of the things, Senator
    Scott, that DOE is directly involved with. What Lisa has over
    on her side of the house is the single most important part of
    our deterrent, but also our ability to serve multiple agencies
    of government, whether it is the DOD, whether it is the
    Secretary of State, whether it is the other three letter
    agencies of government, with our cryptology, with our ability
    of using the super computers that the Department operate in
    that National Security Council (NSC) environment, DOE plays a
    monumental role in the acquisition, interpretation, and other
    engagements that are very important to sending the message to
    those who would not necessarily have America's best interests
    in mind, that we are prepared, we are substantially engaged,
    and we have both offensive and defensive capabilities to keep
    this country free and secure.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        The budget that you propose--is that sufficient for you to
    meet your needs?
        Secretary Perry. Yes.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Secretary, I would like to ask you about the role of the
    Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB). I have to say
    that I am hearing from communities in New Mexico that DOE's
    unilateral revision of Order 140.1 will significantly affect
    the board's ability to meet its statutory oversight
    responsibilities at NNSA and the EM facilities, including
    obviously the three in New Mexico.
        In light of this new order, talk to me about how you can
    assure me of your commitment to preserving both the board's
    oversight responsibility but, more importantly, to ensure
    public health and safety for workers and for local communities
    around the complex.
        Secretary Perry. Senator Heinrich, thank you.
        I do not think there is a more important relationship
    between the Department of Energy than through the labs, through
    the contractors with the local communities. I will say having
    the great privilege over the last year, I think last fall I
    visited the 17th of the 17 labs and to be in those communities
    to see the great support that comes from the communities to the
    labs--and it is one of our goals to make sure that that is the
    case, recognizing the highly technical work and sometimes the
    contentious public issues that come out of whether it is on the
    weapons side or what have you--
         Senator Heinrich. Why change the order when you had built
    up all that credibility with the local communities?
        Secretary Perry. I do not think we have. You know, there
    may be certain individuals who think that we like to do it the
    way that we have always done it. What I have always found was
    that anytime you kind of make a change in the way things have
    historically run, somebody is going to go, wait a minute, I am
    losing some of my authority, I am losing some of my what have
    you.
        But what I would like to do is I would like to get Lisa to
    weigh in here as well and share with you her aspect of it.
        I think it is very healthy to have conversations about here
    is why we are going to change this and have that public input,
    and I think we are having that. I think we are having some good
    back and forth on this and find a reasonable solution.
        But if I may, Senator, can I ask Lisa to----
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich. Good morning.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. First of all, let me say that the
    DOE order is just updating a 17-year-old order that is, quite
    frankly, antiquated. What it does is it more clearly defines
    the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Energy
    where it is related to the independent oversight of the Defense
    Nuclear Facility Safety Board. We enjoy a very strong and solid
    relationship and continue to have one with the DNFSB, and we
    continue to interact with them.
        However, we do need to clearly define and redefine the
    responsibilities of Department of Energy because if in fact
    health and safety situations do occur, the roles and
    responsibilities and the accountability rests solely with the
    Department of Energy and NNSA and not with the Defense Board.
    So that is what we are looking at.
        Senator Heinrich. Administrator, I do not want to cut you
    off, but I am really getting short on time here. So I do want
    to pivot real quickly and ask the Secretary one more quick
    question, which is, Secretary, you mentioned the Manhattan
    Project, which is something we are incredibly proud of in New
    Mexico and the role that we played in it. But 75 years later,
    we still have not cleaned up all the waste. Once again this
    year, in the proposed budget, there is a $25 million cut to
    that cleanup. Why cut cleanup at Los Alamos?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, I will share with you that some
    of the reductions on the EM side is because we have
    successfully been able to make some cleanups and finish those
    and transitioning over to some others.
        Senator Heinrich. That is not the case here, though,
    because the more we stretch this out, I mean, we could be there
    for another 20 years or we could be there for a much shorter
    period of time. So I just want you to know that I will work
    with Senator Udall to, once again, restore that funding like we
    did last year. But we are making good progress. We have a new
    contractor on board. This is an opportunity to show to the
    State, to whom commitments have been made, that we are going to
    keep those commitments. So I would just urge you to look at
    that.
        Secretary Perry. We will, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty,
    for being with us today and, of course, for your ongoing
    access. It is really very helpful.
        If there is time at the end, I will maybe get into some
    plutonium pit production questions, but it sounds like we have
    covered it pretty effectively.
        So let me focus, first of all, on something that is very
    important specifically to my home State of North Dakota, and
    that is warhead modernization efforts. Obviously, it is
    important to us in Minot. Our B-52's, of course, carry the
    long-range standoff weapons, and then of course, the ICBMs and
    whatever might replace them. They are both hosted at Minot.
    They really are depending on getting the new warheads on
    schedule so that we can continue to provide the strategic
    deterrence that our country and our allies need and depend on.
        Let me just put it real straightforward. I am going to
    maybe ask three questions in one, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, and
    then you can answer all of them probably in one breath.
        If you were forced to delay, for example, the W84, what
    would the impact of the program be--on the program be? Would it
    introduce challenges to integration with the LRSO [Long Range
    Stand Off]? Likewise, would there be similar concerns with a
    delay in the W87-1 as it relates to our Minuteman III's and
    future ground-based systems? I will just open the door for you
    to walk through that and answer.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Thank you, Senator
    Cramer.
        Yes, obviously, our programs are all--all five of our
    modernization programs are currently on cost and on schedule,
    and they are completely aligned with our customer, the
    Department of Defense. If we see any slippage whatsoever in any
    of our programs, that could obviously affect or impact and will
    impact the LRSO or the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent]
    programs--excuse me--the W80-4 or the 78 replacement programs.
    Again, we are thoroughly aligned with the Air Force right now
    and with the Department of Defense. So we need the additional
    funding, the resources necessary to continue those programs so
    they are on schedule, on budget so we can deliver them on time
    to the Department of Defense.
        Senator Cramer. Any chance of doing it faster than that?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have our challenges, and of
    course, as Senator Reed had said, we are busier than we have
    been the 1980s. We are working every possible way to slim up
    the margins to do whatever we can to move faster, quicker, and
    speedier, as General Hyten often likes to say. We are
    thoroughly aligned with the Air Force, and where we can make
    commitments to improve those processes and those timelines, we
    will do so. But we are working as closely as we can with the
    Air Force to make sure that we can deliver on our commitments.
        Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, anything you would want to
    add to that?
        Secretary Perry. Well, I will just say that they restarted
    phase 6, which activates the W87-1 modification program. That
    obviously supports the ground-based strategic deterrent.
        Again, I am comfortable that the funding stream is
    appropriate.
        Here is my concern, is if the Department gets tasked with
    some other areas--and I will make reference to what is going on
    in North Korea. Knock on wood, if that goes forward and we get
    tasked with verification issues and what have you, DOE would
    play a very, very leading role in a verification of the weapons
    that are there and then the obvious next steps past that. Were
    that to be the case, then I would remind this Committee that
    the funding that would be required for DOE to take those
    additional duties on would be substantial, and at that
    particular point in time, Administrator Gordon-Hagerty's job
    becomes incredibly challenging. I have total faith that she can
    keep a lot of balls in the air at one time, but just looking
    out over the horizon, sir, and saying here is what you need to
    be prepared for, something coming out of left field that you
    may not have had in your line item that was not funded for,
    that is one that I think, Mr. Chairman, we need to kind of just
    keep in the back of our mind. If this goes forward, the DOE's
    requirement will be substantial, incredibly important, and it
    could affect our other programs as we are trying to get those
    addressed as well.
        Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, thank you for that
    observation and for that warning because would we not all love
    to be able to have too much to do with regard to the Korean
    Peninsula?
        Secretary Perry. It would be a good problem to have.
        Senator Cramer. It sure would. But I, like you, am
    confident that Secretary Gordon-Hagerty is capable of a lot of
    multi-tasking. That has been my observation. I thank you both
    for keeping the main thing the main thing. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome to you both and thank you for your service.
        I want to ask a question about fuel cells. As you know,
    they are highly efficient and clean technology that use
    domestically available resources to advance our security goals
    and efforts to create a more resilient and reliant source of
    electricity generation.
        In Connecticut, the United States Navy has agreed to
    install a 7.5 megawatt fuel cell park on the United States
    submarine base in New London, which is home to about 16 fast
    attack submarines. This move is going to provide a very cost
    effective source of power to the base that will advance long-
    term grid independence and power resiliency. As you know, the
    solid oxide fuel cell program within the Office of Fossil
    Energy at the Department of Energy supports the advancement and
    eventual full scale deployment of fuel cell technologies. The
    Navy has been a leader in this effort, so has the military in
    general, using fuel cells as sources of energy in Afghanistan
    and elsewhere.
        Could you tell me, Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the
    solid oxide fuel cell program at the Department of Energy?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, we have got a lot of different
    alternative energy programs that we are working on. That is
    obviously one of them, and both at PNNL [Pacific Northwest
    National Laboratory] and at some of our other labs, we are
    doing work on the fuel cell side of things.
        Our advanced--I will shift gears on you just a little bit,
    but micro-reactors, another area that held some extraordinary
    potential for the future. I think it is one of the reasons that
    both basic research and applied research----
        One of the things that we have done over at the Department
    is we have created a chief commercialization officer to be able
    to take some of these technologies like you speak about here,
    be able to take them from their inception and commercialize
    them. It is one of the things that I am proud of although we
    have had discussions in this Committee and other committees
    about budgetary items over at the Department and what the
    priorities are, but from my historic perspective, one of the
    great gifts that we have at the Department of Energy is being
    able to take the research in many areas and commercialize that
    and make it available to the general public and in many cases,
    obviously, for our military as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to spending the full
    $30 million that the fiscal year 2019 budget appropriated to
    fuel cell development, the solid oxide program, for fuel cell
    development?
        Secretary Perry. That is our intention, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Coming back to the transfer potentially
    of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, I think Senator Kaine
    asked you whether any part of the 810 authorizations were
    signed after October 2, 2018. Would you not know that sitting
    here now?
        Secretary Perry. No, sir, I would not. We sign a lot of
    papers, and I have got a pretty good memory but to remember
    every date that I sign a piece of paper might be above my
    ability to recall, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Although that is a pretty significant
    piece of paper.
        Secretary Perry. I understand that. But, again, asking me
    to recall when I signed a particular piece of paper, when I
    sign literally thousands of pieces of paper, might be just
    above my ability to recall, sir.
        Here is what I can share with you--I will get it to you and
    you will have it post haste, and we can see whether or not it
    meets the timeline of what you asked.
        Senator Blumenthal. But you are concerned about the
    transfer of that technology in light of the Crown Prince's
    refusal to agree to any prohibitions on enriching uranium or
    reprocessing of spent fuel.
        Secretary Perry. What I am concerned about is any country
    that is going to not go forward with nonproliferation. Here is
    what I am really concerned about, Senator, is that if the
    United States is not the partner with Saudi Arabia, for that
    matter, Jordan, which is the other country that we have signed
    810's with, and they go to Russia and China for their civil
    nuclear technology, their civil nuclear partners, I can assure
    you that those two countries do not give a tinker's damn about
    nonproliferation. That is why we continue to work very, very
    diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop
    civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States
    because we are committed to nonproliferation. We got a history
    of nonproliferation, and nobody in the world will do it better
    than us. It is very, very important for the world, for the
    Middle East, for the United States to be the partner in as many
    of these development of civil nuclear energy programs as we can
    be.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary, we have been promising the American people
    for 70 years a solution to the storage problem of high-level
    nuclear waste. We have not managed it yet. Governor, perhaps
    you want to take this one. But where are we? This is one of the
    reservations that people have about the future development of
    nuclear power is how do we responsibly tell people that we can
    manage this issue without having what amounts to 100 or more
    high-level nuclear waste sites scattered all over the country
    because that is what we have now.
        Secretary Perry. Senator King, thank you.
        It does seem to be the issue that has vexed this country
    for a long time. There are two different issues here, two
    different problems I guess. There is a technical issue with
    where are you going to put this high-level waste, and there is
    a political challenge.
        Senator King. Which is also radioactive.
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Perry. My role is to find a solution, and we had
    a conversation yesterday with the Senate appropriators in a
    public forum about getting together over the course of the next
    2 weeks and talk about what some of those options are. If Yucca
    is not going to be one of the sites, if WIPP [Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant], which Senator Heinrich represents, is going to
    limit, where are the other options? Well, there is a site in
    far west Texas that has historically been open and supportive
    of waste coming into that part of the State of Texas. That is
    an option.
        Here is what is important. If we are going to find a
    solution for storage, Congress must act. You are going to have
    to change the statute. Today the only entity that can take
    possession of high-level waste is the Department of Energy. If
    you are going to have an option to that, you are going to have
    to change the statute. The statute is going to have to allow
    for private sector entities to be able to take possession of
    that. For instance, if it were to go to a place like Andrews,
    Texas waste control specialist, you have to change the law. You
    have to continue to fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC) to be able to get those licensings processes forward. You
    have a real challenge on your hand.
        But let me leave you with this. If you do not act, by not
    acting, you are saying that we have permanent high-level waste
    repositories in the United States and they are in 39 of your
    States.
        Senator King. Including one in my State of Maine.
        Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. It is a pretty stunning map to
    look at, Senator King, when you look at the 39 States that have
    high-level waste in them. I will suggest to you we have a moral
    responsibility to get that waste out of these States, to get it
    to secure, appropriate sites. That is the map. Every one of
    those red States has high-level waste. I do not think that is
    what the American people want. I do not think what the men and
    women sitting around your dais today want. But we have some
    hard decisions to make as a country about are we going to go
    forward with a high-level waste repository, or are we going to
    have interim storage? Hopefully the men and women of Congress
    can deal with this and deal with it in a short period of time.
        Senator King. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your
    commitment to continue working on this problem because it not
    only is a commitment based upon existing sites, as you talked
    about, but it is impairing the ability to even think about
    future nuclear development if we cannot tell our citizens that
    the waste problem has been dealt with.
        I am running out of time. Madam Secretary, maybe for the
    record, you could supply for us some thinking about how we
    deter a nuclear attack by a non-state actor. My concern is that
    traditional concepts of deterrence work on a nation state, but
    they do not necessarily work on a group of 30 people who are
    ready to die anyway. Deterrence has been at the core of our
    nuclear strategy. How do we cope with the idea of a non-state
    group getting the technology from a rogue regime that has it? I
    understand we have got to talk about intelligence. We have got
    to talk about interdiction. So for the record, my time has
    expired. If you would supply a page or so on that, that would
    be helpful.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The U.S. Government's approach to countering nuclear
    terrorism recognizes the difficulty of deterring non-state
    actors through the means that have traditionally been used to
    deter hostile states, that is, threatening overwhelming
    reprisal in response to a nuclear attack. The National Strategy
    for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, released
    by the White House in December 2018, captures this conundrum,
    noting that threats of retaliation do not resonate among
    fanatics who do not value human life, including their own, who
    may lack sanctuary to occupy or destroy, and who may even
    welcome retaliation as a means of galvanizing popular support.
    Consequently, the U.S. strategy for deterring nuclear terrorism
    is comprised of two central elements: (1) attempting to
    convince terrorists that a nuclear attack against the United
    States would be unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, and (2)
    deterring foreign governments from providing support to would-
    be nuclear terrorists.
        The United States undertakes multiple efforts to persuade
    non-state actors that a nuclear attack would be prohibitively
    difficult. First, the U.S. Government expends significant
    resources around the world consolidating, securing, and when
    possible eliminating the nuclear materials necessary to
    construct an improvised nuclear device, with priority given to
    materials that are at highest risk of acquisition and use by
    non-state actors. Similar efforts are undertaken to eliminate
    disused radioactive materials or better secure materials still
    needed for medical and other applications. In addition to the
    intrinsic value of these programs, which have dramatically
    improved global nuclear security, a secondary benefit is to
    nurture the perception that these materials are simply too
    difficult to acquire. This perception may in turn persuade
    terrorists to pursue less lethal attack modes.
        Second, the United States fields a variety of domestic and
    international defenses against nuclear terrorism and actively
    messages these capabilities in various media. For example, the
    U.S. Government has installed hundreds of radiation portal
    monitors at foreign seaports and border crossings around the
    world, complicating the ability of illicit smugglers and
    terrorists to move nuclear material from its point of origin to
    the United States. At home, the U.S. Government also vigorously
    scans for radiation at airports, seaports, and other ports of
    entry. Additionally, specialized capabilities are maintained to
    search for, interdict, characterize, and disable terrorist
    nuclear devices. The fact that these assets are strategically
    pre-positioned throughout the country to respond to nuclear
    incidents is consistently advertised as part of a conscious
    strategy to deter non-state actors from attempting a nuclear
    attack.
        The second pillar of the United States' deterrence strategy
    is to dissuade hostile foreign states from providing nuclear
    material, equipment, and expertise to would-be nuclear
    terrorists. This objective requires advanced nuclear forensics
    capabilities to identify the source of material used in a
    nuclear device and thereby help attribute state support for an
    act of nuclear terrorism. These capabilities may also induce
    states to augment their nuclear security practices, lest an
    inadvertent loss of material be perceived as an act of willful
    assistance to terrorists. Like U.S. defenses, the existence of
    nuclear forensics capabilities are actively messaged using a
    variety of media platforms.
        In tandem with forensics tools, the United States has
    consistently issued declaratory policy to identify the severe
    consequences that would result if a hostile state facilitated a
    terrorist nuclear attack against U.S. interests. To wit, the
    2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pointedly states that the
    United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist
    group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables
    terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices. Further
    amplifying this message, the NPR notes that our adversaries
    must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the
    United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an
    extreme circumstance' under which the United States could
    consider the ultimate form of retaliation an unambiguous
    reference to the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation
    against such states.
        Although deterrence of non-state actors and potential
    foreign patrons is merely one dimension of the United States'
    strategy to counter nuclear terrorism, these efforts represent
    an important element of the Nation's defense-in-depth against
    this grave threat.
        Additional information on the U.S. Government's approach to
    deterring nuclear terrorism can be provided in a classified
    setting.

        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Perry, I will begin by saying thank you so much
    for the attention you have given to Oak Ridge and to Y-12 and
    being on the ground there. It is noted and it is appreciated.
    We hope that you will come back often. Good things are
    happening there that are important to both our energy and our
    military, our complex.
        When we were looking at the Nuclear Posture Review, it was
    talking about the age of the infrastructure. Forty years old is
    primarily the age of the infrastructure, a quarter of which
    dates back to the Manhattan Project, and at Y-12 at that
    national security complex, in 2014--and I know you have visited
    there--chunks of concrete weighing up to 20 pounds fell from
    the ceiling of building 9024. Fortunately, no one was injured.
    It was good timing, if you will, that left workers not being
    injured, which is fortunate. But that is a building that was
    built in 1944, still operational today.
        Then we had noticed in the annual site environment report a
    statement on this building, building 9024, and I am quoting,
    that it has degraded to the point that repair is no longer an
    option. Other deferred maintenance such as inoperable air
    conditioning equipment causing recurrent lost work days and
    critical fire and emergency operations crowded into too small
    facilities that would be rendered inaccessible in critical
    security events are unacceptable.
        So you look at this. Should site report on some of our most
    critical infrastructure and the national security enterprise
    contain the term ``World War II vintage buildings''? I wish
    that you would spend a couple of minutes for the benefit of our
    Tennessee constituents there working at Oak Ridge and at Y-12.
    Talk a little bit about what is needed with the backlog of
    maintenance. Have you arrested the growth of deferred
    maintenance? Kind of give a little bit of perspective on this.
    Then if you will refer to what will be your implementation plan
    and how do you intend to ensure that all of these projects are
    attended to.
        Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you very much. Just for the
    record, I will be out at Oak Ridge the first week of May for an
    ex-lab.
        Senator Blackburn. You are going to be welcomed.
        Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. They will look forward to having you
    there.
        Secretary Perry. It is a great facility. I hope everyone
    has the opportunity to go. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I
    am remiss in not having tendered an invitation to every Member
    of the Committee to come to one of the national labs of their
    choice, or if we could pick one for them, it would be an
    extraordinary event for them. It is the most enlightening,
    exciting thing I have done to go be engaged in these national
    labs and none more intriguing, interesting, nor has a greater
    history than Oak Ridge National Lab, ``The Girls of Atomic
    City,'' the ladies who helped with the Manhattan Project, a
    really fascinating book that I know you have.
        But let me address directly your question about--in fiscal
    year 2016 and 2017, NNSA--they stopped the growth of the
    deferred maintenance for the first time in nearly a decade. For
    fiscal year 2019 funding and certainly in this budget, 2020
    requested, will help NNSA to begin decreasing the deferred
    maintenance that you very vividly laid out here. We are
    committed to implementing the infrastructure modernization
    initiative as directed in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense
    Authorization Act to reduce NNSA's deferred maintenance backlog
    by no less than 30 percent by 2025. So I hope there is some----
        Senator Blackburn. So what I am hearing you say is that
    NNSA turns the corner on this in 2020.
        Secretary Perry. Correct.
        Senator Blackburn. Correct, okay. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to pick up on a point that Senator Reed raised. Last
    month, the House Oversight Committee issued a report detailing
    attempts by the Trump Administration officials to fast track
    the transfer of sensitive American nuclear technology to Saudi
    Arabia. Now, career ethics officials advised against this
    transfer, and they said such a transaction would be illegal
    without review by Congress. We know this happened because
    whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm.
        Secretary Perry, you are referenced nine times in the House
    Oversight Committee's report, which describes how you and other
    administration officials pushed the Saudi Government to buy
    nuclear reactors from American companies, including
    Westinghouse by name.
        This is a serious matter, and Congress is right to demand
    answers here. You lead the Energy Department. So let me ask,
    how many documents has your Department provided to the House
    Oversight Committee in response to its investigation into this
    matter?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, let me get back with you on the
    information.
        Senator Warren. Well, it is a matter actually of public
    record. The answer is zero. Your Department has produced zero
    documents to the House Oversight Committee and its
    investigation.
        I think the Energy Department should cooperate fully in
    this investigation. So I have a few more questions about it.
        Secretary Perry, do you agree that any agreement to
    transfer our nuclear materials, facilities, or sensitive
    technology to Saudi Arabia requires congressional review?
        Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, whatever the
    law may be.
        Senator Warren. Well, I would like to know that you know
    what the law is here.
        Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, Senator.
        Senator Warren. The law is it requires congressional
    review. Are we clear on that?
        Secretary Perry. Then I think you and I both agree.
        Senator Warren. Are you just now learning that that is the
    law?
        Secretary Perry. No, ma'am. I am just agreeing with you,
    Senator.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So you understand that is the law,
    that Congress has to approve before the Saudis can get nuclear
    material.
        Secretary Perry. Senator, if you have any evidence that the
    Department of Energy has not followed that, I would be----
        Senator Warren. I just want to make sure that we are clear
    going forward here while you are out there pushing this. Under
    U.S. law, any civilian nuclear cooperation or 123 agreement
    with a foreign country must meet nine specific requirements to
    ensure that nuclear material cannot be reprocessed or enriched
    to build a bomb. You seem more focused on pushing the Saudi
    Government to hire companies like Westinghouse to build
    reactors than you do on working with Congress to nail down an
    agreement that will prevent the Saudis from developing a
    nuclear weapon.
        At a committee hearing in the House last May, you said that
    you told the Saudi Crown Prince that if he wants the world's
    best nuclear reactors, then, quote, you have to use
    Westinghouse.
        So let me just make sure we are clear on this. Secretary
    Perry, do you agree that any agreement to transfer our
    sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia should ensure that
    they cannot use that technology to develop a nuclear weapon no
    matter which company makes the reactors or how high their
    profits might be?
        Secretary Perry. I agree.
        Senator Warren. Okay, good, because at a minimum, I expect
    the Trump Administration to follow the law when it comes to any
    potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi
    Arabia. Any agreement must ensure that there can be no
    reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material without our
    prior approval.
        Frankly, I think it is a bad idea to even consider
    transferring our sensitive nuclear technology to the Saudi
    Government. This is a government that continues to fuel a
    humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Saudi Crown Prince ordered
    the brutal murder of journalist Khashoggi. The last thing we
    should be doing is giving the Saudi Government the tools to
    produce nuclear weapons.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary Perry and Under Secretary, for being
    here.
        I want to first start off by saying that, of course, we are
    very proud that in my home State we are proud of the
    partnership we have with the NNSA, Under Secretary, dating
    back, of course, to the Second World War, but on display now
    with the new Kansas City National Security Campus, which we are
    very, very proud of. It employs over 4,000 people in the State
    of Missouri, manufactures, assembles, and procures 85 percent
    of the non-nuclear parts of the U.S. nuclear weapons. We are
    very proud of that. Of course, that is just the tip of the
    iceberg in terms of the service that that facility renders to
    the United States.
        I thank you for your leadership, both of you, on this and
    look forward to working together to ensure that that Kansas
    City campus continues to have what it needs to advance its
    important mission. So thank you for that.
        Let me ask you, Under Secretary, talking about research
    here for a moment. Given the prior administration, the Obama
    Administration's efforts to reduce the nuclear stockpile,
    constrain research and development for nuclear weapons, do you
    feel that--and nuclear components--do you feel that you have
    the resources and the authorities that you need in order to
    carry out the research and development that is important as we
    make the shifts outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator Hawley. It
    is nice to hear such complementary words of Kansas City and we
    do. KCNSC [Kansas City National Security Campus] is one of the
    proud eight locations in the NNSA. So your words resonate with
    us and with our entire workforce. So thank you.
        With regard to the nuclear stockpile, our research and
    development testing, all the programs that we need to underpin
    our weapons activities, to modernize our nuclear weapons
    stockpile, I believe that the request that we are making in the
    fiscal year 2020 budget will certainly support our initiatives
    going forward. However, we have more priorities than there are
    resources.
        We have done considerable work in racking and stacking, if
    you will, what the near-term priorities are and also putting us
    in a place where we do not find ourselves in the position we
    are today where we are focusing strategically on what the tools
    are that are necessary to maintain our nuclear deterrent, as
    well as plan for the future.
        Senator Hawley. Yes. Thank you.
        I mentioned the Nuclear Posture Review and let me just stay
    with that for a moment. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes
    low-yield capabilities, particularly modifying the small number
    of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles and other
    low-yield options to ensure that potential adversaries perceive
    no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation. That is a
    quote.
        Do you agree with this assessment on the utility of low-
    yield capabilities and the absolutely invaluable deterrent
    potential that they provide?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do.
        Senator Hawley. Would you agree that having the flexibility
    of these weapons that they provide is essential to keeping this
    country safe and strong?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Tell us about what more you need in order
    to ensure that, again, the priorities outlined in the NPR go
    forward here and that we continue to develop and modernize the
    triad to continue to keep this country safe.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We continue to need stable and
    predictable funding. That is first and foremost our biggest
    requirement.
        With that, that does not only just modernize our stockpile.
    What it does is it modernizes the infrastructure and do the
    recapitalization that has been long necessary. As many people
    have noted, more than 30 percent of our entire enterprise is
    more than 60 years old. That is clearly unacceptable that we
    put our workforce, our very dedicated workforce of 44,000 men
    and women across our nuclear security enterprise in a situation
    where we might be working eventually in untenable conditions.
    We tried to minimize that situation, but with a broad, robust,
    and continued support in funding from the Congress, which we
    have seen for the last year or 2, that predictable and stable
    funding is what we need to continue to ensure that our nuclear
    deterrent remains second to none.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
        Secretary Perry, let me just ask you. As we think about the
    priorities outlined in the NPR, we know that Russia, who the
    National Defense Strategy identifies as a peer competitor--they
    have been investing in lower-yield nuclear weapons and, of
    course, their famous escalate to deescalate strategy. Can you
    talk a little bit about our cooperation with our NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and how that is going in
    aligning our nuclear priorities to ensure that NATO is
    resilient and ready to address Russia's advances?
        Secretary Perry. Senator, our relationship with our NATO
    allies from my perspective as I travel in Europe and I am
    generally talking to them about buying American liquefied
    natural gas, talking to them about how to have multiple
    options, a diversity of fuels, a diversity of suppliers, a
    diversity of routes, and as those conversations take place,
    what I have observed is that we have a very, very strong
    relationship with our NATO allies. They recognize our very
    important role, particularly on being able to deliver our
    energy to them. There has never been a time in history, or
    certainly in my history, that the United States has been in a
    stronger position to be able to support our allies with a
    source of energy that will give them the option of whether or
    not they are required to buy that energy from Russia. That is a
    very, very powerful tool and I will suggest to you one of the
    most powerful geopolitical tools that we have in our toolbox
    today.
        So our NATO allies--not only they respect us for whatwe
    have done over the last 75 years, but also what we are doing
    today. I can assure you that Poland and the work that is being
    done in Poland building LNG [liquefied natural gas] import
    facilities, buying United States LNG is a powerful deterrent to
    Russia, and it is a very comforting work that is being done
    that our allies in Europe see and recognize that we are more
    than willing to continue to deliver this diversified energy
    source to them.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Jones?
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary and our witnesses today. I really
    appreciate you being here.
        Secretary Perry, just a quick question about a GAO
    [Government Accountability Office] report that was released in
    December of 2018. It laid out some criticism for how the
    Department of Energy and NNSA handles recording and sharing of
    lessons learned from mainly capital asset projects, claiming
    that not all the lessons are documented consistently or shared
    in a timely manner, which has led to cost and schedule
    inefficiencies. Additionally, the report found that these
    lessons were not accessible to other relevant staff.
        Have you had a chance to look at that? Do you agree with
    that, or can you address whether or not the Department has
    taken steps to address those concerns?
        Secretary Perry. With your permission, could I ask the
    Administrator to address that? That is really more over her
    specific shop.
        Senator Jones. Absolutely. Wherever we can get the best,
    that is fine with me. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, ma'am.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
        We are constantly trying to improve our processes and
    procedures. We have come off of a number of different places,
    off our high-risk list that GAO has put together. We are
    undertaking best practices. We are taking that particular issue
    about how we can categorize and also codify, if you will, so
    that we can share best practices and lessons learned throughout
    our entire NNSA, and we are sharing those capabilities with the
    rest of the Department. So, yes, we are taking all of those
    recommendations under consideration by GAO, and we are finding
    ways of putting together and improving our best practices
    program so we can share those lessons learned.
        There is nothing worse than finding ourselves in a
    situation where we are repeating the problems that we have had
    in the past. We have got a robust program through our Office of
    Acquisition and Project Management that are undertaking those
    efforts, and across our entire enterprise, we are undertaking
    that effort.
        We also have a closer effort at home that we have
    undertaken in the last 6 months to capture lessons learned on
    very specific projects and see how we can affect the rest of
    the complex with those types of improvements that we are making
    from the lessons learned of the past.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much for
    that.
        Either of you can answer this as well. In October, the NNSA
    collaborated I think with British, Norwegian, and Chinese
    experts to remove highly enriched uranium from a research
    reactor in Nigeria that proliferation experts have long warned
    could be a target for terrorists.
        Can you talk about the impact a little bit about that
    operation and if there is potential to do similar type
    operations even with folks like China and Russia where we are
    not always on the same side?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The example that you cite,
    Senator Jones, is a great news story. We have worked with the
    IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], with Nigeria, and
    China to repatriate Chinese origin material. So what we did was
    we actually refueled the reactor in Nigeria with low-enriched
    uranium, a proliferation-resistant fuel, and repatriated the
    material to China. It is a huge success story, and it happened
    over a number of years.
        I am heartened to say that we have done that and we had
    those commitments and have done 33 type of reactors, plus
    Taiwan. Thirty-three countries now have low-enriched uranium
    fuel reactors where we have repatriated or sent the material to
    the origin of the highly enriched uranium. These are great
    nonproliferation success stories, and we continue to pursue
    opportunities like that throughout the world.
        Secretary Perry. Great. Thank you, Senator. If I could just
    add, you really make a great point of recognizing that the
    United States from time to time work with countries that are
    not necessarily our friends or in areas that are in the world's
    interest.
        The questions that I have been asked today about the work
    that we have done with countries who may have historically not
    been in our sphere but we would like to have them in our
    sphere--I have been asked a number of times about Saudi Arabia
    and why you would do business with Saudi Arabia. I think you
    make the absolute great point that if it is not the United
    States that is trying to create civil nuclear programs in
    countries, particularly in the Middle East and in Africa, that
    the potential for nonproliferation--it could be expanded by X
    factor if it is not the United States. From time to time, these
    are countries that do some things that we really are offended
    by, but the potential of proliferation of nuclear materials, if
    the United States is not involved, will be substantially moved
    forward. I think it is our moral responsibility as a country to
    be engaged with this every place we can so that that does not
    happen, the United States and our ability to make sure that
    nonproliferation is being conducted. So thank you.
        Senator Jones. Well, thank you. I know my time is out. I am
    going to follow up and maybe get some information close to
    home. The Bellafont nuclear plant is up for sale, and we have
    got an issue. That is a really important issue to the people in
    my State, and I would like to maybe get an update from you at
    some point----
        Secretary Perry. Consider it done.
        Senator Jones.--about whatever we can do to help to move
    that along. So thank you for that. We will follow up.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. We are going to deviate from a policy I do
    not like to deviate from, and that is one of our Members has
    come back and wanted to ask one more question. We going to make
    an exception. Senator Heinrich, you are recognized.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I wanted to ask the Administrator actually, because we ran
    short on time, about the Mesa facility at Sandia National Labs,
    how we are addressing the long-term need for rad hard
    electronics, how we are going to address that in the short
    term, but also what the plans are to make sure that sort of
    capability is with us in the out-years in or 15 or 20 years as
    well.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. With regard to the Mesa facility
    at Sandia, we know that we will be able to provide radiation
    hardened electronics for our nuclear weapons stockpile, a
    critical component to our stockpile, through 2040. We are now
    undertaking a robust plan to consider what, if any, challenges
    we will undertake as we look to refurbish, if you will,
    recapitalize or actually modernize our Mesa facility. We are
    making investments into it to make sure that we can maintain
    that facility through 2040, but the time is now to start
    thinking about recapitalizing that capability, a critical
    component, as we have discussed previously. We are also
    speaking with our counterparts in the IC and in the Department
    of Defense about what their needs are. Perhaps there are some
    common themes there, but certainly this is a critical component
    to our stockpile.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Administrator.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Thank you to our witnesses.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                             energy infrastructure
        1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, it has been brought to the
    Committee's attention that New England communities are having to import
    natural gas from Russia due to constraints in the northeast. Have
    natural gas shortages effected New England?
        Secretary Perry. For decades, some of New England's natural gas
    demand has been met by liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Most of
    these imports have been into Exelon's Everett LNG receiving terminal
    near Boston, Massachusetts, but Repsol's Canaport LNG facility (in New
    Brunswick, Canada) and Excelerate's Northeast Gateway Deepwater Port
    LNG import terminal (located offshore of Boston) also provide some of
    the LNG imports that serve the New England market. The vast majority of
    these LNG imports comes from Trinidad and Tobago. In 2018, over 44
    billion cubic feet of natural gas was imported from Trinidad. Also in
    2018, New England received LNG shipments from the United Kingdom and
    France that consisted mostly of re-exported LNG that was produced at
    the Yamal LNG export facility in arctic Russia; the total volume of
    these shipments was 6 billion cubic feet. Similarly, early in 2019, re-
    exports of LNG from France that were initially produced at the Yamal
    LNG export facility were imported into the Northeast. The United States
    has never received a direct shipment of LNG from Russia.
        Domestic natural gas production is at record high levels, and the
    U.S. Energy Information Administration projects production to continue
    to increase over the coming decades. U.S. natural gas supplies are
    ample to meet domestic demand, but there are pipeline constraints in
    the Northeast and New England that limit natural gas delivery in the
    region. The impacts of these constraints are felt most acutely during
    very cold weather events during the winter when natural gas demand
    peaks.
        The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) examined the
    impacts on energy markets of the cold weather event known as the ``Bomb
    Cyclone'' that occurred between December 27, 2017, and January 8, 2018.
    \1\ The NETL analysis found a lack of sufficient natural gas pipeline
    infrastructure and the surge in natural gas demand for heating led to
    sharp increases in natural gas spot prices exceeding 300 percent across
    the Northeast. The largest price spike occurred in New York with
    Transco Zone 6 NY spot prices increasing nearly 700 percent during the
    Bomb Cyclone event. \2\ Natural gas spot prices in the independent
    system operator New England (ISO-NE) footprint increased 400 percent
    during the weather event, peaking at over $80 per million British
    thermal units. \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability,
    Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March
    13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/ files/
    ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
    leof Thermal Units--031318.pdf
        \2\ Ibid, page 1.
        \3\ Ibid, page 7.

        2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, do you believe this a threat to
    energy security?
        Secretary Perry. Any time we have to rely on imports of energy, it
    can be argued our energy security is diminished. The United States is
    blessed with plentiful energy resources, including abundant supplies of
    coal, oil, and natural gas. Producers in America have demonstrated a
    remarkable ability to harness innovation and to cost-effectively unlock
    new energy supplies, making our country a dominant energy force. Last
    year the United States surpassed production records set nearly 5
    decades ago and is in all likelihood now the largest producer of crude
    oil in the world. The United States is also the world's leading
    producer of natural gas, becoming a net exporter in 2017 for the first
    time since 1957. The United States will continue to be the undisputed
    global leader in crude oil and natural gas production for the
    foreseeable future.
        These robust energy supplies present the United States with
    tremendous economic opportunities. To fully realize this economic
    potential, however, the United States needs infrastructure capable of
    safely and efficiently transporting these plentiful resources to end
    users. Without it, energy costs will rise and the national energy
    market will be stifled, job growth will be hampered, and the
    manufacturing and geopolitical advantages of the United States will
    erode. As described in the previous answer, natural gas prices spike in
    New England during very cold weather events because of the lack of
    sufficient infrastructure to deliver natural gas to the region as
    demand increases. \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability,
    Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March
    13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/files/
    ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
    leofThermalUnits --031318.pdf

        3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, would more natural gas
    infrastructure, like pipelines, help get our abundant domestic supply
    to New England so they don't turn to Russia?
        Secretary Perry. Yes. A number of pipelines have been proposed over
    the past several years to deliver natural gas from the prolific
    Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New England. These
    pipelines have faced challenges in securing state regulatory approvals,
    notably the required state certification of water quality under Section
    401 of the Clean Water Act.
        In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and
    Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the
    Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine
    whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private
    investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will
    focus on:
          The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and
    collaboration;
          The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
          Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in
    a certification;
          Expectations for reasonable review times for various
    types of certification requests; and
          The nature and scope of information States and authorized
    tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification
    request within a prescribed period of time.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                office of cost evaluation and program execution
        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in the Fiscal Year 2016
    NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we created an Office of Cost
    Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) much like the DOD [Department
    of Defense] has with the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Management
    (CAPE). This was after years of having programs at the NNSA [National
    Nuclear Security Administration] exceed their estimates. Their job is
    to be the counter-balance directly to you on the program managers who
    might be too optimistic. Are you ensuring they have the proper staff
    and resources to carry out their mission?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. A number of pipelines have been
    proposed over the past several years to deliver natural gas from the
    prolific Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New
    England. These pipelines have faced challenges in securing state
    regulatory approvals, notably the required state certification of water
    quality under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.
        In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and
    Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the
    Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine
    whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private
    investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will
    focus on:
          The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and
    collaboration;
          The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
          Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in
    a certification;
          Expectations for reasonable review times for various
    types of certification requests; and
          The nature and scope of information States and authorized
    tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification
    request within a prescribed period of time.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                         nuclear sales to saudi arabia
        5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, are you concerned about the
    potential transfer of sensitive United States nuclear technology to
    Saudi Arabia? Do you believe this transfer should continue?
        Secretary Perry. The regulations governing the transfer of
    unclassified civil nuclear technology abroad are found at 10 CFR Part
    810. These regulations define the term sensitive nuclear technology as
    any information which is not available to the public and which is
    important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or
    maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing
    facility or a facility for the production of heavy water. I have not
    issued any authorizations to U.S. companies to export sensitive nuclear
    technology as defined by regulation.
        I have issued authorizations, however, for the export of
    unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia that is not
    sensitive nuclear technology. The authorizations issued for the export
    of unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been done
    in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810. The
    Department of State secured assurances from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
    that the transferred technology will be used only for peaceful
    purposes, will not be retransferred for any military use, and will not
    be retransferred to a third destination without prior United States
    consent.

        6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, could the transfer of
    sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia contribute to the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East and
    exacerbate existing regional tensions?
        Secretary Perry. I have not authorized any United States company to
    transfer ``sensitive nuclear technology'' to Saudi Arabia, nor do I
    intend to do so.
        Longstanding U.S. policy seeks to prevent the further proliferation
    of nuclear weapons to any country and region. For this reason, the
    United States seeks to ensure that all countries comply with strict
    U.S. nonproliferation requirements, which are the strongest in the
    world. One way the United States achieves this goal is by placing
    legally binding nonproliferation conditions on U.S. civil nuclear
    exports.

        7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, should government officials
    involved in the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology concurrently advise
    private industry interests?
        Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory
    responsibility for authorizing the transfer of unclassified nuclear
    technology and assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. This regulatory
    function is performed by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    (DNN) within the National Nuclear Security Administration. DNN
    interacts with private interests in the context of its regulatory
    function.
        Separately, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy works with the U.S.
    civil nuclear industry to help develop new and innovative technologies
    that will help return the United States to a position of global
    leadership in civil nuclear energy.

        8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin
    Salman has reportedly refused any prohibitions on enriching uranium or
    reprocessing of spent fuel. Can Saudi Arabia can be trusted with this
    sensitive technology and what restrictions and safeguards should the
    United States require if the transfer continues?
        Secretary Perry. All authorizations for the export of unclassified
    civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been issued in accordance
    with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810.
        As Under Secretary of State Thompson recently stated, the United
    States seeks the highest nonproliferation commitments in all peaceful
    nuclear cooperation negotiations, including legally binding commitments
    over enrichment and reprocessing. By law, every 123 agreement must
    contain all of the security and non-proliferation requirements
    specified in section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.
        Additionally, the United States has long-promoted the universal
    adherence by all non-nuclear weapon states to the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, regardless of the nature of
    that State's fuel cycle aspirations. In this context, the United States
    encourages Saudi Arabia at every appropriate opportunity to conclude an
    Additional Protocol with the IAEA as soon as possible.

        9. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Section 123 of the Atomic
    Energy Act (AEA) stipulates that the U.S. may not transfer nuclear
    technology to a foreign country without congressional approval. Do you
    agree that the Trump Administration must seek congressional review of
    any transfer of United States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. 10 CFR Part 810 implements AEA section 57 b. (2),
    which provides the Department of Energy with statutory responsibility
    for authorizing the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear technology
    and assistance. The part 810 regulations apply to technology transfers
    and assistance related to certain nuclear fuel-cycle activities,
    commercial nuclear power plants, and research and test reactors.
    Covered transfers include the transfer of physical documents or
    electronic media, electronic transfers or the transfer of knowledge and
    expertise. A 123 Agreement is not required for the export of the above-
    described technology and assistance, and there is no legal requirement
    for Congressional approval. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a
    separate and distinct procedure from the part 810 application
    authorization review process.

        10. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, did you sign any of the
    six ``part 810'' authorizations for companies sharing nuclear
    technology with Saudi Arabia after the October 2, 2018, murder of Jamal
    Khashoggi?
        Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy has issued seven part 810
    authorizations for the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear
    technology to Saudi Arabia to date. There have been two part 810
    authorizations issued since October 2, 2018. A part 810 authorization
    simply provides United States companies the ability to compete in the
    international civil nuclear market.
        A part 810 authorization does not authorize the transfer of nuclear
    material, equipment or components. The process involves a thorough
    interagency review that requires the Department of Energy to secure the
    concurrence of the Department of State, and consult with the
    Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
                            artificial intelligence
        11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, do you have any concerns
    that private sector partners in Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems
    developed with support and funding from your department will sell these
    technologies to foreign adversaries or otherwise make such systems
    broadly available?
        Secretary Perry. No, as the Office of Science (SC) works on basic
    research which funds open source proposals.

        12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, when you contract on
    project with private sector partners like on Project Maven, what
    contractual mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that the highly-
    accurate and efficient systems that were developed based on sensitive
    government datasets and collaboration are not provided to foreign
    actors?
        Secretary Perry. Technology is a critical part of the DOE's mission
    and requires special consideration in identifying and protecting
    sensitive technologies and ensuring appropriate protection of DOE
    funded intellectual property.
        DOE contractors are subject to applicable U.S. export control laws,
    regulations and policies when exporting materials and technical
    information resulting from the performance of their contracts. Within
    the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) there are
    contractual requirements related to the protection of the Department
    funded technology and information. These contractual requirements put
    in place controls requiring: differing levels of review based on the
    technology and information; review and approval of all foreign national
    visits and assignments; review of all Scientific and Technical
    Information generated under the contract to determine appropriate
    release and handling; and many additional controls.

        13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, what controls do you
    recommend the United States put in place on private sector
    collaboration to protect U.S. developed AI technologies from getting
    into the hands of our strategic competitors?
        Secretary Perry. This is an area the United States will need to
    continue to monitor. However, at this time we believe the present
    controls are adequate.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                      u.s. nuclear part 810 authorizations
        14. Senator Kaine. Secretary Perry, in your testimony you mentioned
    over 37 part 810 authorizations approved since your tenure as Secretary
    of Energy, 9 of which were to the Middle East. Provide a list formatted
    by Date Issued / Company / Country for every part 810 authorization
    made since you were confirmed as Secretary of Energy, to include those
    which are not publically available.
        Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power
    industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
    number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they
    are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to
    market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by
    the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or
    technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were
    competing in a certain market.
        Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
    information in question, the Department has been working with Congress
    to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and
    manner.
                     decommissioning of uss harry s. truman
        15. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, have you been given
    any direction from the Department of Defense to commence planning or
    provide funding for the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier USS
    Harry S. Truman?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. No, NNSA has not been given direction by
    the Department of Defense related to the decommissioning of the USS
    Harry S. Truman. The Department of the Navy is responsible for the
    planning and budgeting to support a nuclear ship's refueling complex
    overhaul or its inactivation.

        16. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what would be the
    impact to future DOE [Department of Energy] budgets if the Navy were to
    go through with the early decommissioning of the Truman?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. There will be no impact to NNSA's budget
    if the USS Harry S. Truman is retired early. The Department of the Navy
    is responsible for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's
    refueling complex overhaul or its inactivation.

        17. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, when would planning
    and funding need to commence if the decommissioning were to start in
    fiscal year 2024?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The Department of the Navy is responsible
    for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's refueling complex
    overhaul or its inactivation. The Deputy Administrator for the Office
    of Naval Reactors is responsible for ensuring safe and effective
    nuclear propulsion plants for the Navy's fleet of submarines and
    aircraft carriers, to include the USS Harry S. Truman. Naval Reactors
    remains engaged in discussions with the Navy on retaining this aircraft
    carrier through its remaining service life based on recent
    announcements by the Administration.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                  implementation of plutonium strategy at lanl
        18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, I appreciate your
    reconfirming Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) continuing role as
    the Nation's center of excellence for plutonium research and
    development. You also stated there is an additional $5 billion that is
    headed to Los Alamos to provide the capacity in PF-4 to produce at
    least 30 plutonium pits per year by 2026.
        Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over
    five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per
    year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year (FY) 2020 for LANL will
    be provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production
    personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility
    (PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024;
    install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits
    per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and
    materials characterization equipment scope.

        19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, can you please confirm the
    $5 billion in additional funding for LANL and provide the full budget
    justification for it and a breakout of how the additional $5 billion
    will be used at LANL?
        Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over
    five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per
    year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year 2020 for LANL will be
    provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production
    personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility
    (PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024;
    install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits
    per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and
    materials characterization equipment scope.

        20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, what portion of the $5
    billion in additional funding for LANL will be used to provide
    technical support to SRS (Savannah River Site) to establish the
    capacity to produce plutonium pits in the repurposed MFFF [MOX Fuel
    Fabrication Facility]?
        Secretary Perry. The funding for Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) includes provision of technical support to the Savannah River
    Site (SRS), as the two-site approach allows for complementary training
    plans at both sites. NNSA is developing plans for workforce
    recruitment, training and sustainment, and pit production knowledge
    transfer to the future workforce. NNSA is also evaluating options for
    cross training personnel at SRS and LANL. Additionally, a portion of
    the funding is provided for and will continue to be provided for LANL
    efforts supporting equipment design for the proposed Savannah River
    Plutonium Production Facility.
           fiscal year 2020 budget request for plutonium sustainment
        21. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please
    provide a breakout of proposed scope of work for fiscal year 2020 at
    LANL under NNSA's budget request for plutonium sustainment, including
    LANL's support for establishing the capacity to produce plutonium pits
    at Savannah River Site?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. In the fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget
    request for LANL, Plutonium Sustainment Operations provides funding to
    hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production personnel at
    LANL; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility (PF)-
    4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024; and
    support production activities. The Savannah River Plutonium Processing
    Facility Project element of Plutonium Sustainment Operations in the
    fiscal year 2020 budget request invests in completing conceptual design
    to repurpose the facility for pit production and supports developing
    other project documentation required for Critical Decision-1. LANL is
    providing expertise and design support for conceptual design of special
    facility equipment for this project.
                  savannah river plutonium processing facility
        22. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please
    provide your current best estimate of the schedule and timeline of the
    major milestones, including NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act]
    review, to establish the capacity to produce 50 plutonium pits per year
    in the re-purposed MFFF?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is currently executing conceptual
    design activities for the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing
    Facility (SRPPF) to produce 50 pits per year. An independent cost
    estimate for refurbishment of the proposed SRPPF will be done prior to
    Critical Decision-1. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy
    Act (NEPA) and pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.311, NNSA is preparing an
    environmental impact statement (EIS) for the proposed action to
    repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to produce a
    minimum of 50 pits per year at the Savannah River Site (SRS). On June
    10, 2019, the Office of the Federal Register published a Notice of
    Intent to prepare an EIS on plutonium pit production at SRS. NNSA
    expects the draft EIS to be available in 2020.
                             pit production at lanl
        23. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I understand Los
    Alamos has been making steady progress in restoring the capacity to
    produce plutonium pits in PF-4. What is the current status of the
    effort to produce development W87-like pits are you satisfied with the
    progress being made to begin pit production in PF-4?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA remains committed to achieving pit
    production requirements established by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC) to produce the first war reserve (or W87-like) pit in 2023, 10
    war reserve pits per year in 2024, 20 war reserve pits per year in
    2025, and 30 war reserve pits per year beginning in 2026 at LANL. LANL
    has demonstrated progress in meeting these goals and fabricated four
    development pits in fiscal year 2018, is fabricating five development
    pits in fiscal year 2019, and plans to produce five process prove-in
    pits in fiscal year 2020.
                    doe's order 140.1, interface with dnfsb
        24. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, as you know, DOE issued
    Order 140.1 without any consultation with either the Defense Nuclear
    Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) or with the local communities most
    impacted by DOE's nuclear facilities. The Chairman and Members of the
    DNFSB have been unanimous in their opposition to DOE's unilateral
    implementation of order 140.1. In particular, the board takes strong
    exception to the order's exemption of some facilities from the board's
    oversight, the adoption of a new definition of public health and safety
    that exempts onsite individuals and workers from oversight, new
    limitations on access to facilities, personnel and information, and
    denial of the board's requests related to deliberative and pre-
    decisional documents. The board has clearly and repeatedly conveyed to
    you its position that DOE's new Order 140.1 is both inconsistent with
    the board's statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act and with
    DOE's own policy of continuing a strong and productive relationship
    with DNFSB as a valued external and independent reviewer. Community
    leaders in my state echoed these concerns at the board's recent public
    hearing on Order 140.1 in Albuquerque.
        To restore credibility with the local communities, will you agree
    to collaborate with the DNFSB to try to address the board's specific
    concerns with Order 140.1, and to demonstrate again a shared focus on
    adequate protection of public health and safety?
        Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) values the Defense
    Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (DNFSB) advice on our two agencies'
    shared focus on protecting public health and safety.
        DOE issued Order 140.1, Interface with the Defense Nuclear
    Facilities Safety Board, on May 14, 2018, to update and streamline a
    17-year old, out-of-date DOE Manual (Manual 140.1-1B), to make the
    Manual compliant with changes made to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as
    amended, as well as to clarify DOE personnel roles and responsibilities
    in our interface with DNFSB.
        Since the issuance of Order 140.1, DOE leadership and senior
    managers at Headquarters and Field Offices have participated in three
    DNFSB public hearings to discuss compliance with the Atomic Energy Act,
    as amended, including a public hearing held in Albuquerque, NM, on
    February 21, 2019.
        DOE federal and contractor employees are particularly trained to
    execute their work in and around the hazards posed by our activities;
    their safety is the focus of our training programs and multiple
    requirements established by our governing directives, standards, and
    procedures. The adequate protection of the public health and safety is
    our primary point of interface with the DNFSB, and should be the focus
    of our interactions.
                         upgrade of mesa at sandia labs
        25. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, for over 30 years
    the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications] facility
    at Sandia Labs in Albuquerque has been a real workhorse for meeting
    NNSA's unique requirements for strategic rad-hard microelectronics. The
    aging facility is outdated and unable to support adequately life-
    extension programs in the post-2025 timeframe. Upgrading MESA will
    require a major infrastructure investment. What is the current strategy
    and plan to sustain the unique capabilities of Sandia's MESA Complex to
    produce strategic rad-hard microelectronics beyond 2025?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is committed to sustain the MESA
    Complex through 2040. Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL) Microsystems
    Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Complex currently is the
    only U.S. foundry with the capability to deliver custom strategically
    radiation-hardened microelectronic components required to sustain the
    Nation's nuclear deterrent. NNSA recognizes the distinguished
    capability provided by SNL and, over the last several years, NNSA has
    worked to assess the long-term viability of the MESA Complex to provide
    war Reserve components that meet system requirements. As the Silicon
    Fabrication (SiFab) foundry surpassed its 30-year intended life, NNSA
    and SNL contracted Aerospace Corporation and Longenecker Associates to
    conduct independent risk assessments. Both concluded that the foundry
    can be extended until 2040 with modest upgrades to infrastructure and
    equipment.
        NNSA and SNL have partnered in the development of an Extended Life
    Program (ELP) to understand investments required to sustain the
    existing capabilities of the MESA Complex. The ELP plan will provide a
    20-year forecast of tools and equipment recapitalization, and
    facilities and infrastructure projects.
        NNSA and SNL are also partnering in the development of the MESA
    Integrated Program Plan, which will provide a 5-year view of
    operations, weapons program commitments, and operational costs, to
    include the budgeting information for maintenance of capability, R&D
    programs, production programs, and technology maturation activities.

        26. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what are the
    specific milestones you are planning for the upgrade this year and for
    fiscal year 2020?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked closely with Sandia
    National Laboratories to generate a facility project schedule that
    poses minimal risk to the Life Extension Programs (LEP) production
    schedule. Based on the complexity and age of MESA, facility projects
    must be prioritized and executed based on areas of highest need to
    avoid extended shutdowns of production fabrication, and with
    consideration for the quality of the systems supporting production,
    e.g., cleanliness of deionized water, air quality, and regulation of
    airflow. fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 maintenance projects and
    associated improvements to the MESA facility include enhancements to
    the bulk chemical distribution system; Silicon Fabrication Facility
    (SiFab) Uninterruptible Power Supply system upgrades; commencing a 3-
    year SiFab HEPA filter and bay ceiling replacement project; and
    structural upgrades to support packaging equipment for the W80-4 LEP.
                      lep workload at nnsa labs and plants
        27. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the ongoing Life-
    Extension Programs (LEP) are essential to assuring the stockpile is
    safe, secure and reliable. I believe the LEPs are a top priority. You
    currently have four major LEPs underway: B61, W88, W80-4 and W87-1 with
    about $2 billion in required work per year. Are you confident that the
    NNSA's labs and sites have sufficient capacity needed to perform this
    critical work, and stay on the schedule and budget for each LEP?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We are confident that we have sufficient
    capacity to execute these modernization activities. However,
    significant technical issues can arise that have the potential to
    affect LEP schedules and budget. For example, NNSA is assessing the
    impacts of a technical component that did not pass qualification
    testing and is common to several components on the B61-12 LEP and W88
    Alt 370.
      future of pulsed power and z machine at sandia national laboratories
        28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Z Machine at
    Sandia Labs continues to provide one of the critical pieces of our
    stockpile stewardship program by simulating pressures and radiation
    environments that previously required underground testing. Do you agree
    that pulsed power science is important to NNSA's mission, and what do
    you see is the future role of pulsed-power science for mainting the
    strategic deterrent?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Pulsed power capabilities are key to
    supporting weapon survivability and radiation effects, materials
    science, and thermonuclear burn. Given the promise demonstrated by
    pulsed power and magnetic drive in recent years, the work at the Z
    Pulsed Power Facility has been prioritized within the Inertial
    Confinement Fusion Program. NNSA plans continued increases in its
    investment in pulsed-power science to capitalize on recent advances in
    fusion concepts, which may provide high neutron yields and meet
    national security needs without requiring fusion ignition.

        29. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in light of the
    recent article in the South China Morning Post concerning China's
    future plans for pulsed power, what are your thoughts on the need to
    extend the laboratories' capabilities in pulsed power science to
    support stockpile stewardship?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The priority for the next fiscal year is
    the completion of the Inertial Confinement Fusion 2020 goal, which
    includes the development of credible physics scaling to multi-megajoule
    fusion yields for each of the ignition approaches. The conclusions of
    this study will be used to guide future research and facility
    investments. The 5-year experimental plan initiated in fiscal year 2019
    includes activities that will explore the mission need for next-
    generation facilities and identify the best approaches.

        30. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, are there risks to
    the U.S. deterrent if adversaries advance major scientific capabilities
    in pulsed power beyond what the national labs currently have today?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA continuously assesses and manages
    the full breadth of risks to the deterrent, including the impact of new
    technical capabilities of our adversaries. As we monitor global
    scientific advances, we will continue to use our full suite of tools to
    ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal,
    including possible investments in new capabilities as appropriate.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                       saudi civilian nuclear cooperation
        31. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, my understanding is that the
    Department of Energy has not produced a single document or made a
    single agency official available to respond to the House Oversight
    Committee's February 19, 2019, request for documents related to its
    ongoing investigation into ``efforts inside the White House to rush the
    transfer of highly sensitive U.S. nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia in
    potential violation of the Atomic Energy Act and without review by
    Congress as required by law.'' Will the Department of Energy commit to
    speedily producing documents and any other relevant information and
    making Energy Department officials available to the House Oversight
    Committee? If not, please explain why your Department is not
    cooperating with this investigation.
        Secretary Perry. The Department has produced several hundred pages
    of documents to the House Oversight Committee. The Department is
    continuing to search for and review responsive documents.

        32. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Trump Administration
    continuing to engage with the government of Saudi Arabia about a
    potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement? If yes, what is the
    status of that engagement?
        Secretary Perry. Negotiations began in 2012 under the previous
    Administration and remain on-going. The United States continues to seek
    the strongest possible nonproliferation and security commitments from
    Saudi Arabia.

        33. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what other agencies, if any,
    is the Department of Energy consulting with regarding a potential
    civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with government of Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act mandates that
    the negotiation of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement be led by the
    Department of State, with the technical assistance of the Department of
    Energy and in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

        34. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, you reportedly expressed
    interest in the plan to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia,
    known as part of a ``Middle East Marshall Plan,'' in a March 2017
    National Security Council (NSC) meeting, just two months after
    President Trump's inauguration. Why are you interested in transferring
    American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia?
        Secretary Perry. In 2017, Saudi Arabia announced that it is
    proceeding with a nuclear power program and requested bids to construct
    two large light water reactors. As U.S. companies have requested the
    Department's authorization to compete in that tender process, I have
    imposed nonproliferation obligations on such exports that comply with
    the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810.
    Moreover, the Department of Energy has provided technical assistance to
    the Department of State in the negotiation of a 123 agreement. If we
    are able to conclude such an agreement, it will help ensure that Saudi
    Arabia will develop its civil nuclear program in accordance with the
    highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation.

        35. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, have you received direction
    from anyone in the White House to pursue the transfer of American
    nuclear technology to government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please list
    the names of those White House officials.
        Secretary Perry. Private companies apply directly to the Department
    for authorization to transfer part 810-covered unclassified civil
    nuclear technology and assistance abroad.

        36. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with Jared Kushner about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer
    American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes,
    please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
    interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
    matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
    technology issues.

        37. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with Tom Barrack about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer
    American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes,
    please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
        Secretary Perry. I do not recall any conversations with Tom Barrack
    during my time as Secretary.

        38. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with then-National Security Advisor Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael
    Flynn about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American
    nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please
    explain the date, location, and outcome of any conversation.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
    interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
    matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
    technology issues.

        39. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with then-Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland about the
    Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology
    to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date,
    location, and outcome of any conversation.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
    interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
    matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
    technology issues.

        40. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with Derek Harvey, the Senior Director for Middle East and North
    African Affairs at the National Security Council about the Trump
    Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the
    government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date, location,
    and outcome of any conversation.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
    interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
    matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
    technology issues.

        41. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with any employee of IP3 International about the Trump Administration's
    efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the government of
    Saudi Arabia? If yes, please identify every individual employee with
    whom you had a conversation, as well as the date, location, and outcome
    of any conversation with that employee.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
    interact with industry representatives and other energy stakeholders.

        42. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
    with President Trump about the Trump Administration's efforts to
    transfer American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia?
    If yes, please explain the date, location, and outcome of any
    conversation.
        Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I regularly
    advise the President on matters within the jurisdiction of the
    Department, including nuclear technology issues.

        43. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the Administration intend
    to authorize any licenses for the export of nuclear material or
    equipment to the government of Saudi Arabia without a nuclear
    cooperation agreement (commonly known as a 123 agreement) in force?
    Please explain in details.
        Secretary Perry. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible
    for licensing exports of nuclear material or equipment.
        The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory responsibility for
    authorizing the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and
    assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. A 123 agreement is not required for
    the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and assistance. 10
    CFR Part 810 authorizations are often the first step in U.S. nuclear
    industry engagement with a new foreign partner and often serve as an
    indication that the partner is committed to beginning a civil nuclear
    program that includes the strongest possible nonproliferation
    requirements. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a separate and
    distinct procedure from the part 810 application authorization review
    process.

        44. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the 123 agreement under
    negotiation with the government of Saudi Arabia meet all of the
    security and non-proliferation requirements specified in Section 123(a)
    of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954? Please explain in details.
        Secretary Perry. By law, the Department of State leads in the
    negotiations of all 123 agreements. I would refer you to the Department
    of State for further information on the status of these negotiations.

        45. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, according to a recent Daily
    Beast report, the Department of Energy ``has approved six
    authorizations for United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear
    related work in Saudi Arabia.'' If this is accurate, please list--
    without divulging any trade secrets or proprietary information--the
    names of the United States companies to which the Department has issued
    a Saudi Arabia-related part 810 authorization, which allows for limited
    cooperation related to the ``development or production of any special
    nuclear material outside of the United States'' if that activity has
    been determined by the Secretary that it ``will not be inimical to the
    interest of the United States.'' If you will not list the names of
    these companies, please explain how refusing to disclose this
    information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep
    the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which,
    under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the
    functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently
    informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the
    Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of the Atomic Energy Act of
    1954 (emphasis added).
        Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power
    industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
    number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they
    are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to
    market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by
    the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or
    technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were
    competing in a certain market.
        Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
    information in question, the Department has been working with Congress
    to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and
    manner.

        46. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, without divulging any trade
    secrets or proprietary information, please list the names of any United
    States companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or
    denied, a part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in
    Saudi Arabia. If you will not list the names of these companies, please
    explain how denying access to this information is consistent with the
    Department's obligation to ``keep the committees of the Senate and the
    House of Representatives which, under the rules of the Senate and the
    House, have jurisdiction over the functions of the Secretary or the
    Commission, fully and currently informed with respect to the activities
    of the Secretary and the Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of
    the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (emphasis added).
        Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications
    that may be in process.

        47. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please provide a brief update,
    without divulging any trade secrets or propriety information, on the
    status of the part 810 authorizations for the category of United States
    companies described in the previous question (i.e., United States
    companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or denied, a
    part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in Saudi
    Arabia).
        Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications
    that may be in process.

        48. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please list any federal
    agencies and the names of any White House officials that were involved
    in the Department of Energy issuing any current part 810 authorizations
    to United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear related work in
    Saudi Arabia since January 20, 2017. If you refuse to list such
    agencies and officials, please explain how refusing to provide this
    information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep
    the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which,
    under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the
    functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently
    informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the
    Commission'' as provided under the Section 303 of the Atomic Energy Act
    of 1954 (emphasis added).
        Secretary Perry. Part 810 authorizations involve a robust intra-
    and-interagency review. As required by Section 57 b. (2) of the Atomic
    Energy Act, the Department of Energy must obtain the concurrence of the
    Department of State and consult with the Departments of Defense and
    Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For each of the seven
    authorizations for Saudi Arabia, the Department of State concurrence
    was obtained following their receipt of government-to-government
    nonproliferation assurances from the government of Saudi Arabia. The
    Departments of Commerce and Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission were consulted and provided no objection to the approval.
        Typically there is no review of part 810 applications by White
    House officials.

        49. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, do you currently have any
    financial interest, or did you formerly have any financial interest, in
    any of the following companies: General Electric, Exelon, Nuscale,
    TerraPower, Lightbridge, AECOM, BWXT, Centrus Energy Corp., and X-
    energy? Please explain in details.
        Secretary Perry. No, I do not have any current financial interests
    in those companies. I have not had any reportable financial interests
    in those companies since December of 2016.
        Q50. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties as the
    Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any meetings
    with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi Government to
    lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of nuclear reactors or
    any other nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? Please
    explain in details.

        50. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties
    as the Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any
    meetings with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi
    Government to lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of
    nuclear reactors or any other nuclear technology to the government of
    Saudi Arabia? Please explain in details.
        Secretary Perry. As Secretary, I routinely engage with my foreign
    counterparts, including at the Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry and
    Mineral Resources.

        51. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in a Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee (SFRC) hearing on May 24, 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo
    said in reference to a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with
    Saudi Arabia: ``[W]e have told them we want a gold standard section 123
    agreement from them which would not permit them to enrich.'' Do you
    agree with Secretary Pompeo? If not, please explain why it is in the
    national security interest of the United States to conclude a 123
    agreement that would allow the Saudi Government to enrich or reprocess
    nuclear material for the development of a nuclear weapon.
        Secretary Perry. Yes. The United States seeks to conclude 123
    agreements with foreign partners that legally restrict their ability to
    engage in any enrichment and reprocessing activities.

        52. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, on May 16, 2008, the United
    States and Saudi Arabia reached a ``United States-Saudi Arabia
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation,''
    which states: ``Saudi Arabia has stated its intent to rely on
    international markets for nuclear fuel and to not pursue sensitive
    nuclear technologies, which stands in direct contrast to the actions of
    Iran.'' While not legally binding, is this MOU still valid, and if so,
    is the Energy Department working to ensure that the Saudi Government
    adheres to the commitment it made in this document?
        Secretary Perry. The United States-Saudi Arabia Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation signed in 2008
    supported the United States Government's initial engagement with Saudi
    Arabia. This engagement was during the height of the nuclear
    renaissance when Saudi Arabia, similar to other newcomer countries,
    expressed an initial interest in pursuing civil nuclear development.
    The MOU provided a framework for cooperation, but none materialized.
    Saudi Arabia elected not to conduct any cooperation under the 2008 MOU.
    In 2015, the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded a new MOU that is
    currently active and covers cooperation in renewable and nuclear
    energy. Under the 2015 MOU, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
    civil nuclear energy action plan in February 2018, but no substantive
    cooperation under the action plan has occurred to date.

        53. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what steps are being taken by
    the Energy Department to ensure that the government of Saudi Arabia is
    adhering to its current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
    Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
        Secretary Perry. The Department regularly invites officials from
    Saudi Arabia to attend DOE-sponsored international and regional
    safeguards and safeguards-related workshops and training events.
    Additionally, DOE is prepared to engage with Saudi officials on a
    bilateral basis to address any safeguards technical or implementation
    questions they may have.

        54. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in the opinion of the Energy
    Department, is the government of Saudi Arabia adhering to its IAEA
    Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
        Secretary Perry. The Department believes that Saudi Arabia is
    adhering to the safeguards agreement that currently is in force between
    the IAEA and the Government of Saudi Arabia.
                             iran nuclear agreement
        55. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in an Armed Services Committee
    hearing on March 22, 2018, I asked if you agreed with the opinion of
    the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that the Iran nuclear
    agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) ``extended the
    amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a
    nuclear weapon from a few months to about 1 year'' and ``has enhanced
    the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities.'' You replied, ``I
    cannot tell that I do or I do not.'' In a January 29, 2019 Senate
    Intelligence Committee hearing, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
    Director said in reference to Iran: ``at the moment, technically they
    are in compliance.'' Do you agree with the CIA Director that Iran is
    currently complying with the nuclear agreement? If you do not agree,
    please provide your evidence of an incurable material breach of the
    nuclear agreement by the Government of Iran.
        Secretary Perry. We work closely with our colleagues at the U.S.
    Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations
    organizations in Vienna to monitor developments related to Iranian
    compliance with commitments made under the JCPOA. The International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization in charge of verification
    and monitoring of these commitments, releases quarterly reports on
    Iranian compliance and we would direct your attention to those reports.
    DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise, equipment, and
    training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran. DOE will
    support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work closely with
    our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your attention to
    those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise,
    equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran.
    DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work
    closely with our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your
    attention to those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical
    expertise, equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to
    monitor Iran. DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities
    and work closely with our interagency partners as needed.A\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Since the date of the hearing, the IAEA has reported to its
    Board of Governors that Iran has exceeded its JCPOA commitments with
    respect to its uranium enrichment levels, low-enriched uranium
    stockpile and research and development on advanced centrifuges.

        56. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Department of Energy
    currently involved in working to negotiate an alternative to the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? If yes, please explain the
    objectives of that work. If not, please explain why not.
        Secretary Perry. DOE would refer you to the Department of State,
    which has the lead on the administration's efforts to secure a
    comprehensive agreement with Iran based on the 12 points described by
    Secretary Pompeo in May 2018. DOE/NNSA continues to monitor Iran's
    nuclear activities and provides critical support to the interagency's
    efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If called
    upon, we will support interagency discussions to negotiate a new,
    comprehensive agreement.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
            nuclear material security and theft prevention programs
        57. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, under the previous
    and current administration's budget requests for NNSA led nuclear theft
    prevention programs have been declining over the years as well as
    actual funds being appropriated. Current funding levels are at their
    lowest since the early 1990s and even after the most recent Nuclear
    Posture Review noted that nuclear terrorism is one of ``the most
    significant threats to the security of the United States.'' The fiscal
    year 2019 and current budget requests have suggested cuts to domestic
    and international radiological security, nuclear smuggling and
    deterrence, security at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate
    and remove nuclear weapons usable materials. Can we count on the NNSA
    to partner with the Senate Armed Services Committee and other relevant
    committees to identify the risks we face domestically and
    internationally so we can correctly allocate resources to the
    applicable programs responsible for preventing radiological materials
    theft and preventing terrorism incidents?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA values its partnership with the
    Senate Armed Services Committee and other committees on nuclear
    security. NNSA will continue to work diligently with Congress to ensure
    that any and all risks domestically and internationally are identified
    and appropriate resources allocated to support our nuclear security
    priorities.

        58. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what efforts are the
    NNSA undertaking with international partners to consolidate nuclear
    weapons usable materials to the minimum practical number of locations
    to maximize security and effectiveness of resources?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked with 48 countries and
    Taiwan to minimize the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material at
    civilian sites by consolidating these materials at fewer sites and
    where possible eliminating them, for example by downblending highly
    enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Recent and near-term
    activities include making Ghana and Nigeria HEU-free by returning
    Chinese-origin HEU from these countries to China; eliminating all HEU
    from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau, Kazakhstan; and
    working with Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other partners to
    eliminate excess HEU from a number of other facilities.

        59. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Department of
    Energy's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request suggests cutting the Global
    Material Security budget by $65 million. As you are aware, the Global
    Material Security plays an important role in permanent threat reduction
    and working closely with international partners to interdict illicit
    nuclear materials that could be used in a non-state actor attack. Do
    you agree that this program is critical for maintaining U.S. nuclear
    security leadership and preventing potential theft and illicit use of
    such materials?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget
    Request supports the Global Material Security mission of preventing
    terrorists and other actors from obtaining nuclear and radioactive
    material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or a
    radiological dispersal device. This work, which is critical to our
    national security and to NNSA's efforts to reduce global nuclear
    security threats, is fully supported by the fiscal year 2020 budget.
        Fiscal year 2019 appropriations included an increase above the
    budget request for Global Material Security. This allowed NNSA to
    accelerate a number of activities that had been planned for fiscal year
    2020, including procurements to support the replacement of cesium-based
    irradiators, the development of transportation containers to remove
    disused cesium-based irradiators, and activities to secure buildings
    with radioactive material. The increase also allowed for the
    acceleration of counter nuclear smuggling efforts near unofficial
    border crossings, targeted operations along air traffic and unregulated
    maritime pathways, and with interior security services. All of these
    important efforts will continue in fiscal year 2020.
                          nuclear enterprise security
        60. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, many U.S. partner
    countries have limited experience with vulnerability assessments that
    test for areas that an adversary may be able to exploit security
    systems and/or testing ``force on force'' exercises at borders or at
    facilities that house sensitive materials. What activities or
    partnerships is the NNSA leading to ensure our international partners
    have the training to properly asses and build awareness around their
    security practices?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA works on a bilateral and
    multilateral basis with partner countries across the globe to prevent
    the theft, sabotage, and diversion of nuclear material. NNSA pursues
    this mission in concert with technical experts from the National
    Laboratories.
        NNSA has extensive experience working with partner countries in
    developing vulnerability assessments to ensure the effectiveness of
    physical protection systems for nuclear material. Additionally, NNSA
    conducts force-on-force trainings for foreign response teams at
    domestic and international training facilities and transport security
    trainings for foreign police organizations. NNSA also provides physical
    protection upgrades on a case-by-case basis, and assists partner
    countries in building capacity in critical areas such as cybersecurity
    and insider threat mitigation.

        61. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the International
    Atomic Energy Agency maintains an Incident and Trafficking Database,
    which compiles information from participating member states on
    incidents such as loss or theft of radioactive materials. Does the NNSA
    maintain any a similar database and is it accessible by other agencies
    and by international partners?
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA maintains an internal list of
    detections of nuclear and radioactive material gathered both from open
    source reports, including the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB),
    and from our bilateral partnerships with foreign governments.
    Information reported to NNSA by international partners is used for
    internal project assessment, planning, and prioritization. NNSA also
    encourages its partner countries to report incidents to the ITDB. In
    addition, NNSA closely collaborates with other appropriate U.S.
    interagency partners on detections of concern to ensure a consistent
    whole-of-government effort in counter nuclear smuggling.
                        nuclear enterprise cybersecurity
        62. Senator Manchin. Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty,
    the budget request you presented shows a 39.9-percent increase in
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity funding for the National
    Nuclear Security Administration. USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] is
    also in the process of modernizing cybersecurity as a part of an
    overall effort to modernize nuclear command, control and
    communications. Are DOE and DOD engaging in any cooperative efforts
    regarding nuclear cybersecurity in order to avoid duplication of
    efforts or systems that lack interoperability?
        Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, NNSA and DOD are
    strategic partners and continuously engage in various activities.
    NNSA's Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) currently works
    with NNSA's Office of Defense Programs and the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy on cybersecurity, information
    technology, and operational technology for weapons activities. The
    Nuclear Enterprise Assurance Steering Group (NEASG) is the senior DOE/
    DOD management body that oversees, coordinates, and shares lessons
    learned that will improve the country's ability to prevent adversarial
    threats against nuclear weapon systems. This collaboration allows us to
    maintain communication and engage in any cooperative efforts regarding
    nuclear cybersecurity, where opportunities exist.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive
    testimonies on the posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal
    year (FY) 2020 budget request.
        We welcome Dr. Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force,
    and General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    and thank both of you for your service and all that.
        We're all saddened by the decision that's been made by
    Secretary Wilson. Your work has just been great, and maybe
    there's still--it's still time to change your mind. All right?
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. The National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    directs our Nation's military to prepare for the return to
    great-power competition. This means that we must be prepared to
    deter and, if necessary, defeat potential near-peer
    adversaries. Obviously, China and Russia. In order for the Air
    Force to achieve that goal, it must properly be manned and
    trained and equipped. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the
    National Defense Strategy Commission, we are still in a
    readiness and modernization crisis. At the end of the Obama
    administration, the Air Force was at a historic low in
    readiness. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons were ready
    and--to deploy, and even less were prepared for the peer fight.
    We have made progress in rebuilding the readiness, but more
    needs to be done. A high state of readiness is crucial for our
    Nation to demonstrate peace through strength.
        While our forces suffered from being ill-prepared, our
    adversaries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional
    and nuclear forces. So, all the time that we were resting and
    we were coasting, China and Russia were not. In spite of the
    previous neglect of our military, our men and women have done
    outstanding work for our Nation, but it's past time for action.
    You have testified that, quote, ``Our Air Force is too small
    and too old to do what the Nation asks,'' unquote, and that the
    Air Force needs to grow to the 386 squadrons. I agree that it
    needs to grow and modernize. The future of our Air Force
    readiness and relevance requires both growth and modernization
    now.
        Any successful modernization strategy must focus on results
    and meeting the needs of tomorrow's fight. Fielding relevant
    technology fast requires discipline in acquisition strategies.
    It also requires rapid prototyping and experimentation in order
    to get modern, reliable, and lethal systems into the hands of
    our warfighters, and doing so on time and within allotted
    budget. So, executing the strategy will require an open and
    transparent dialogue with Congress all the way. We look forward
    to working with you to make our shared modernization visions a
    reality and to ensure the Air Force is a fighting force
    prepared for the more lethal and dynamic battlefields of the
    future.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Wilson and
    General Goldfein to the Committee this morning to testify on
    the plans and programs of the Department of the Air Force in
    review of the fiscal year 2020 presidential budget. We are
    grateful to all the men and women of the Air Force for their
    professional service, and to their families for their continued
    support.
        In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced
    difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernizing and
    keep the technological advantage over near-peer competitors and
    the need to support ongoing operations and sustain today's
    readiness. This budget request proposes funding increases to
    address readiness concerns, munitions shortfalls, preparing for
    the future fight, and modernizing our strategic deterrent
    capability. While each of these issues is important, I'm
    concerned that the Air Force may not have taken as thorough a
    review of what programs could be cut, delayed, or made more
    efficient in order to pay for the proposed increases, so I am
    interested in the witnesses' view on what efforts could be
    taken to offset current and future costs.
        In the near term, the Air Force has money in the disaster
    emergency relief supplemental they need by May 1st. If the Air
    Force has not received the $1.2 billion funds by this date,
    they will be forced to stop all work at Tyndall Air Force Base,
    which will, in turn, delay the return of full base operations.
    If these funds are delayed past that date, other dire
    consequences may result, such as halting recovery operations at
    Offutt Air Force Base, stopping maintenance on some aircraft,
    and grounding others. I hope we can focus on the potential
    consequences and move the disaster emergency relief
    supplemental forward very, very quickly.
        In addition, because significant levels of funding are
    being transferred to build a wall on the southern border, the
    amount of reprogramming authority will be limited. Our main
    concern is that the Air Force and other services may run short
    of head room and reprogram authority, which could lead to
    delays in other shortage areas as we approach the end of the
    fiscal year.
        One of the major issues that will be considered in this
    year's NDAA is the Air Force proposal to buy more F-15
    aircraft. For years, the Air Force has adamantly opposed buying
    any more fourth-generation aircraft. I believe the Committee
    needs to understand this reversal. Any Air Force proposal
    deserves our careful consideration, but we must consider it
    against the recent history of abrupt Air Force changes of
    direction on such programs as A-10, U-2, Global Hawk, Compass
    Call, C-27 airlift aircraft, and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and
    Target Attack Radar System]. Another area of change is light
    attack experimentation program--light attack aircraft
    experimentation program. For the past several years, the Air
    Force has been conducting experiments with small trainer
    aircraft that have been modified to include a modest ground
    attack capability. Some expected these experiments would result
    in a program that would produce one or two wings of aircraft
    for the Air Force. In the fiscal year 2020 budget request, the
    Air Force has changed the nature and timing of that effort. The
    budget request would defer funding for any light attack
    aircraft until fiscal year 2022, at which point the Air Force
    would buy roughly 24 aircraft. The aim of this revised program
    would be to encourage coalition partners to contribute to the
    air campaign effort with such aircraft, and to provide training
    support for our partners who wanted to participate in such a
    program. I ask that the witnesses explain this change in focus
    and clarify the role of proposed light attack aircraft.
        In last year's budget request, the Air Force proposed to
    truncate the program to modernize the JSTARS, and to replace it
    with a combination of other systems, including unmanned systems
    and overhead sensors. The Committee supported the Air Force
    proposal, and the plan was ultimately adopted in the fiscal
    year 2019 NDAA. I understand that the Air Force has continued
    this program in the fiscal year 2020 budget, and I look forward
    to receiving an update on the progress.
        I'm also interested in hearing updates of your continuing
    efforts to improve the state of Air Force personnel, including
    progress on improving the shortfalls within the remotely-
    piloted aircraft operator community, and how the Air Force has
    addressed shortfalls within the larger pilot community and
    maintenance personnel.
        The one major issue I have not mentioned is the proposal
    for Space Force. I--discussion of Space Force this morning
    because Chairman Inhofe intends, and I heartily concur, to
    convene a hearing next Thursday dedicated solely to this issue
    with Acting Secretary Shanahan, Chairman Dunford, Secretary
    Wilson, and General Hyten as witnesses. With that in mind,
    rather, I plan to use the hearing to focus on the issues I've
    already discussed.
        Once again, Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, thank you
    very much.
        Secretary Wilson, thank you for your distinguished service
    to the Nation. You did an extraordinary job. I wish you well at
    University of Texas--El Paso, Madam President.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. It does get pretty hot down there.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, it's--anyway, you two have been here
    before. You know the drill, and I look forward to hearing your
    opening statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of
    the record.
        We'll start with Secretary Wilson.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE
                               AIR FORCE

        Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With my full
    statement in the record, I'll just summarize a few points, and
    then ask the Chief to add in.
        The budget proposal that we've put forward for fiscal year
    2020 is driven by the National Defense Strategy and the five
    priority missions in that strategy. There are three things that
    I think I'd like to highlight from our testimony in what we're
    trying to do.
        The first is, we're building a more lethal and ready Air
    Force. The Air Force is more ready for major combat operations
    today than we were 2 years ago because of the support and the
    consistent budgets that have been approved by the United States
    Congress. In the first place, that means more people, and
    getting the right people, and getting them trained. Two years
    ago, we were 4,000 maintainers short in the United States Air
    Force. As of December, we are no maintainers short in the
    Active Force. Now, that means that our maintainers are young,
    and now we have to season them and make sure that they are
    fully capable to do the jobs we're asking them to do. Last
    year, we stopped the decline in pilots, and we are increasing
    pilot training in order to close that gap, as well.
        We are building that more lethal and ready force, but we
    are also building tomorrow's Air Force faster and smarter. The
    United States Congress gave us new authorities in order to buy
    equipment in new ways to meet a rapidly innovating adversary.
    We cannot win this contest with an acquisition system from the
    Cold War. We are taking advantage of the authorities that the
    Congress has given us. Delegation works when you do it to
    competent people and then monitor results. We are using the
    authorities for prototyping and experimentation that you have
    given us to start bending metal earlier, finding out what
    really works, and then setting requirements. We are also doing
    so in a way that is as transparent, or more transparent, than
    the traditional acquisition system, by giving reports to the
    Congress on our prototyping and experimentation programs three
    times a year and setting clear guardrails for when we need to
    report to you even more frequently.
        The third thing I would say is that we are changing the way
    in which we engage small business. Many of you were involved
    and helped us get the word out on our first Pitch Day, where we
    took in proposals on some of our hardest problems from over 400
    companies, narrowed that down to about 60, whom we invited to a
    1-day Pitch Day with our program managers in New York City.
    Fifty-one companies earned awards on that day. The average time
    to complete a contract was 15 minutes, and the contract is one
    page long. We have to change the way we engage America's most
    innovative businesses in order to have them work with us, the
    United States Government. We're showing the way--or leading the
    way on how we can do that.
        The third thing I would say is that the Air Force we need
    is larger and different from the Air Force that we have. This
    Committee asked General Goldfein and I, last year at this
    time--we have a new National Defense Strategy, and one of you
    asked us, ``Well, you know, you always come up here and defend
    the budget amount that you've proposed, but what is the Air
    Force you need to execute the National Defense Strategy?'' We
    didn't know the answer. We should know the answer. So, you
    directed us to do a study, which we turned in to you, in
    classified form, on the 1st of March, that sets out, after
    almost 8 months of study, what is the Air Force we need to
    execute the National Defense Strategy. We have 321 squadrons
    today. As the Chairman pointed out, our analysis shows that,
    for the 2025-2030 timeframe, we need 386 operational squadrons
    to accomplish the missions of the National Defense Strategy at
    a moderate level of risk.
        Finally, I would say this. On-time budgets and certainty
    matters a lot. This Congress gave us that certainty this year.
    In the first quarter of this year, when we looked at our first-
    quarter results, we were able to execute about the first
    quarter of our program. We were able to do new-starts and set
    priorities and manage appropriately. So, thank you for that
    certainty and that on-time budget.
        I would also say that one of the most difficult things that
    we are facing as a service right now is the results of two
    catastrophic storms that hit two of our Air Force bases:
    Tyndall Air Force Base, in October; and, most recently, Offutt
    Air Force Base, in Nebraska, with flooding. We need the
    supplemental to recover from those terrible storms at Tyndall
    and Offutt. I look forward to working with you all to achieve
    that end.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        General Goldfein.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Goldfein. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
    Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. It's
    really an honor once again to represent your Air Force, Active,
    Guard, Reserve, civilian airmen who stand the watch and provide
    top cover for the Nation and our joint and allied teammates.
        This hearing is among the first official forums since
    Secretary Wilson announced her pending departure from the Air
    Force. I want to say publicly, on behalf of all airmen and
    their families, what an honor it's been to work with her every
    day to make our Air Force more ready and more lethal. This
    budget represents the culmination of our work together to build
    the Air Force we need to compete, deter, and, if deterrence
    fails, to fight and win. I want to state for the record that
    we're a better Air Force because of the leadership and the
    vision of our Secretary, Dr. Heather Wilson.
        Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman, I went to the war--I went to war for the first
    time as a young captain, flying F-16s out of Shaw Air Force
    Base in South Carolina just days after Saddam Hussein invaded
    his neighbor in Kuwait. At the time, we had 401 operational
    squadrons consisting of 945,000 Active, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian airmen, and 8,629 aircraft, with an average age of 17
    years, in an Air Force that landed our Nation's initial punch,
    401 operational squadrons to defeat a middleweight, non-nuclear
    power who threatened his neighbor and the region, but posed
    little threat to our Homeland and our way of life. Today, we
    have just 312 operational squadrons, down from 401. We have
    685,000 airmen, down from 945,000. We have 5,314 aircraft, down
    from over 8,600. The average age of our aircraft is 28 years.
        Chairman, we are not the Air Force of Desert Storm. When
    General McPeak was the Chief of Staff in 1991, he and his
    fellow Joint Chiefs were focused on supporting a single
    combatant commander, General Norm Schwarzkopf, the Commander of
    U.S. Central Command. Today, should deterrence fail and we find
    ourselves defending a Nation--our Nation against a major
    nuclear power, I expect to get three phone calls simultaneously
    on my Red Switch phone. First the geographic combatant
    commander will request forces to support his operational plan,
    which will include backfill for any fighters, tankers, and
    command-and-control (C2) forces he must place on nuclear alert.
    The next call will be from the U.S. Strategic Command
    Commander, who will tell me how many bombers, tankers, and
    command-and-control forces he needs to execute his nuclear
    deterrence mission, protecting not only our Homeland, but also
    our allies and partners. The third call will come from the
    Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD), who will tell me how many fighters,
    tankers, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and C2
    aircraft he will need to execute his operational plan to defend
    the United States and Canada. The Air Force will be required to
    support these missions simultaneously, not sequentially, while
    at the same time, shoulder-to-shoulder with our joint
    teammates, maintaining a global presence to deter any rogue
    nation while simultaneously maintaining campaign pressure
    against violent extremism.
        This is the stark difference between fighting a
    middleweight rogue nation without nuclear weapons versus
    competing, deterring, and, if deterrence fails, fighting and
    winning a peer fight. It's why Secretary Wilson and I continue
    to articulate in every forum, ``The Air Force is too small for
    what the Nation is asking it to do.'' It's why we reported to
    this Committee, as the Secretary said in March, that the Air
    Force we need to execute the National Defense Strategy requires
    386 operational squadrons. It's why the National Defense
    Strategy Commission, after their research, stated, ``Regardless
    of where the next conflict occurs or which adversary it
    features, the Air Force will be at the foresight--at the
    forefront.'' With your support of this budget request, we'll
    continue to rebuild the readiness and lethality of this force,
    which you supported last year with an on-time appropriation
    following a damaging sequester and years of budget uncertainty.
    For that, we thank you.
        Chairman, history doesn't always repeat, but it does rhyme
    now and then. My father fought as a young F-4 pilot in Vietnam,
    and he and many of his peers stayed in and rebuilt the Air
    Force his son needed to fight and win in Desert Storm, which
    was followed by 28 years of continual combat operations,
    including 10 years of operations Northern and Southern Watch,
    air campaigns in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia, and continuing
    through the past 17 years fighting violent extremism in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. Today, my daughter
    and my nephews are young airmen. With your continued support,
    with on-time appropriations, we'll build the Air Force they're
    going to need to fight and win in this era of great-power
    competition.
        So, on behalf of every airmen serving today, and their
    families, I want to thank this Committee for your unwavering
    support. Secretary Wilson and I look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared combined statement of Secretary Wilson and
    General Goldfein follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank both of you.
        We'll have a round of--a 5-minute round.
        That was a great historic perspective. I appreciate that
    very much. It's one that a lot of people have forgotten.
        Now, I know that we're all locked into the NDS and the
    Commission. They've done a great job. We had two good hearings
    here. Everyone believes that we should be following that
    blueprint that we've established. While, yeah, we--this is--
    we're on the way to recovery right now, we still have problems
    out there. I mean, if we were to follow the NDS, that would be
    an increase for this 5-year--for the Future Years Defense
    Program of between 3 and 5 percent increase over inflation.
    This 750 doesn't do that. We're not quite there. So, I think,
    when--your discussion, starting with that as something we kind
    of agreed on, you had to give in some areas that probably could
    have very well produced some risk.
        General, during that process, what things did you kind of
    either slight or change from what we had thought was going to
    be a good model and a blueprint to follow?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'm aligned with the Chairman,
    who's testified, as well, to say that 3 percent allows us to
    keep--stay even; 5 percent allows us to improve and modernize
    in both capability, capacity, readiness. The trades that we
    made----
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, but we didn't do the 3 percent,
    even.
        General Goldfein. That's right. So, the challenges that we
    had--one of the places we didn't take risk was readiness
    recovery. What the Secretary talked about, in terms of getting
    our maintainer shortage to zero and ensuring that we're
    investing in people, we did not take risk. Where we had to take
    risk was in areas of--some areas of modernization, some areas
    of procurement, and some areas where we'd like to have bought
    more to get at that shortfall we have of the aircraft we need--
    --
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        General Goldfein.--to go forward.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        Secretary Wilson, someone's got to say this. We're right in
    the middle of a budget thing. If something should happen that
    we're not able to do this, and we had to go back--keeping in
    mind that we went through fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019
    as recovery years, and--but if fiscal year 2020 comes up and we
    don't do the--if we have to fall back to Budget Control Act
    (BCA) and to the--or a CR [continuing resolution], describe to
    us what the result of that would be and how this would have
    impacted what we've already done in fiscal year 2018 and 2019.
        Secretary Wilson. Well, let me give you--with respect to
    the Budget Control Act and sequester, for the Air Force that
    would be about a $29 billion cut. To put that in context, that
    would be four times as large as what happened in sequester the
    last time. So, let me give you what that would look like.
        Now, a sequester is kind of across the board, but what
    would the--what would the magnitude of those choices look like
    under the Budget Control Act? Twenty-nine billion dollars. That
    would be no F-35s. Cut all of the KC-46s, all--stop the B-21
    program. No ground-based strategic deterrent. No research,
    development, test, and evaluation for any space system, most of
    the fourth- and fifth-generation modifications and all of
    science and technology. Or $29 billion means all of weapon
    system sustainment, all flying hours, all base operations and
    airfield support, and all munitions, together to make $29
    billion. I think you can see that that would be absolutely
    devastating in scope and scale.
        With respect to a continuing resolution, what that would
    mean is, we've got 16 new military construction projects that
    wouldn't start, and 18, for current missions, military
    construction that wouldn't start, and we would also--we've got
    89 research, development, test, and evaluation new-starts in
    this budget that wouldn't start.
        So, either of those would set us back significantly.
    Sequester, at this point, would be four times as bad as it was
    in the previous time that the Air Force went through it, and we
    are still recovering from a sequester that would be just one-
    quarter of the impact if we had to go through it again.
        Chairman Inhofe. That's a frightening scenario. But, I
    would agree with that. You think about the progress that we
    made during that period of time, the two fiscal years. You had
    mentioned the Tyndall and the Offutt. We do know that there are
    some problems. One thing has--that has been discussed is
    cutting the 18,000 flight hours. You know, we went through that
    once before, and that turned out to be a disaster, and we
    changed our situation there. Does that look like one of the
    things that you think we might have to do in order to come up
    with the results that we're looking for?
        Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, with respect to Tyndall,
    last week I had to hold back money for 61 facility
    modernization projects in 18 States because we still--we're
    cash-flowing the damage to Tyndall. Just this year, the impact
    will be about $750 million. As we get further into this year,
    my options narrow further and further. If we get into May,
    we're probably going to have to stop the recovery at Tyndall,
    and that means an impact to flight operations there, as well as
    to people who are going to continue to live in--and work in
    degraded facilities. We're going to have to, in May sometime,
    stop a lot of aircraft repairs. We're going to have to ground
    some of our bombers if we don't get the supplemental to
    recover----
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        Secretary Wilson.--from Tyndall. If we get towards the end
    of the year and we've only got a month or so left, there's very
    few options that we have. So, I'm trying to minimize the impact
    and give the Congress enough time to pass a supplemental. But,
    if I get into that last month and I still haven't balanced,
    because of the impact of the storm, and we don't have a
    supplemental, yes, it will impact flying hours.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Well, my time's expired, but for the
    record, I'm going to ask you a question as to where we are
    right now when we're talking about 48 F-35s and eight F-15s. I
    mean, it seems to me we're getting back into the fourth
    generation that we're hoping to be out of. Then, we remember so
    much. Sometimes in history, we forget about the fact that--what
    happened to our F-22s. You know, it started out that was going
    to be 750, ended up being, what, 187, and we've paid dearly for
    that ever since then. That was a huge mistake, should not have
    happened. So, I'll be asking those questions for the record.

        Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, an all fifth generation
    fleet would be ideal; however it simply isn't a realistic
    option given the current budgetary situation. Our analysis
    shows in the 2030 timeframe, sufficient fighter capacity is
    critical in a fight with a near-peer. A mix of F-15EX with F-35
    is our best option given present resources. Additionally, we
    will continue to rely heavily on our fourth generation aircraft
    for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, some of those aircraft--
    most specifically the F-15C/Ds--are rapidly reaching the end of
    their service lives. Replacing the F-15C with a modernized
    successor such as the F-15EX allows us to benefit from foreign
    partner investments and enhance capacity without transition
    costs to another platform in the near term.

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        So, I'm interested in those topics, too, Mr. Chairman,
    since I raised it in my opening statement.
        Chairman Inhofe. You did.
        Senator Reed. So, General Goldfein, for years the Air Force
    has declined to request funding for F-15s or F-16s, and it was
    a pretty strong declination. This year, there are eight F-15s
    in the budget, 1.1 billion over the FYDP, 7.9 billion for about
    80 F-15s. Can you just give us an idea--and I think it touches
    upon the Chairman's question, too--based on your personal and
    professional judgment, is this a wise acquisition?
        General Goldfein. Sir, this is what went into the decision.
    It starts with, Chairman Inhofe, your point. If you go back to
    the decision when we cut the F-22, a part of that decision was
    the program of record. We should have 1100 F-35s today. We have
    less than 300. The F-15Cs were supposed to be long gone. So,
    first and foremost, as we went into looking at the capacity
    challenges we're facing right now, we're absolutely adamant
    that the F-35 program, the program of record that we have,
    stays absolutely on track, and that we don't take a dime out of
    the F-35, because it's not only a game changer for us, it's the
    quarterback of the penetrating joint team. So, what you'll see
    in our budget is not only maintaining the F-35 program, but
    we're actually adding $1.8 billion to the F-35 program to make
    sure we stayed on track.
        Here's the challenge we faced. We have the capacity--those
    missions--those phone calls that I'm going to get, that I laid
    out in my opening statement, that are simultaneous--our mission
    assessments of the Air Force we need says that we need all of
    the capacity of both fifth- and fourth-generation. We've got
    four fourth-generation aircraft that have got to fly into the
    2030, the F-15C, the F-15E, the F-16, and the A-10. One of them
    is not going to make it, and that's the F-15C. So, knowing
    that, we had to find a way to refresh the F-15C line only by
    keeping the F-35 program on track. We only looked at one
    option, which was a F-15 variant to replace an F-15. Because
    what that does was, it allows you to use the same hangars, same
    construction, same base, same operating equipment, which is 90-
    percent common, same maintainers, same operators, and no time
    and minimal costs to make a transition. The Saudis and the
    Qataris have kept that line open and have invested in making it
    a much better airplane. So, we can capture all that, the
    business case for being able to refresh that F-15C line only,
    on top of the F-15, with the other fourth-generation airplanes,
    make--made the most sense to us, and using the CAPE [cost
    assessment and program evaluation] estimates.
        We are now an Air Force of about 20 percent fifth-
    generation, 80 percent fourth-generation. By 2040, our target
    is to reverse those numbers: 80 percent fifth-generation, 20
    percent fourth-generation. That target has not changed, and we
    have not changed our position on the F-35. We've just got a
    capacity near-term issue we've got to solve.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Just a quick, almost, footnote on the F-35. One of the
    issues you're still dealing with is sustainment costs, which
    are much higher than you can manage, frankly, going forward. I
    presume both you and the Secretary are committed to getting
    those sustainment costs down dramatically. That fair?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we are committed to that. We've made
    that very clear to the contractor, as the largest customer, I
    believe we speak not only on behalf of the Air Force, but also
    on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps teammates and all of the
    international air chiefs and the international partners who are
    in the F-35. The target that we've put out is to get a
    procurement cost below 80 million and an average cost per
    flying hour of less than 30,000 per flying hour, which puts it
    comparable to the high end of a fourth-generation.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        General Goldfein. If we can hit those targets, then we've
    got an affordable airplane that is already a game changer.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, last year's NDAA,
    section 335, asked for the list of 10 most vulnerable
    installations to weather challenges. We have not yet received
    that list from the Air Force. We had the Army here last week.
    They committed their leadership to send us this list. Would you
    do that? Because, you know, looking at Tyndall, looking at some
    of these other bases, it's not a one-off experience. We're
    going to have more storm damages and if we don't know where to
    start putting our mitigation funding and our sustainability
    funding, we'll misspend resources. Can you send us those lists?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir, we will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        This list was sent to the professional staff members of the
    Senate Armed Services Committee on April 30, 2019.

        Notes:

         LThe list is organized alphabetically by state; it
    is not a ranked 1 to 10 list.
         LThis list differs from the Office of Secretary
    Defense (OSD) list submitted in March 2019 pursuant to Section
    335 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act.
         LThe OSD Report on Effects of a Changing Climate
    to the Department of Defense submitted in fulfillment of
    Section 335 included Air Force input. The Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD
    (A&S)) provided each Service the same list of bases, and the
    Air Force noted the presence or not of current and potential
    vulnerabilities to each Air Force site to five climate-related
    events: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires
    and thawing permafrost over the next 20 years.
         LThe Air Force list is different because we took a
    broader look at the full inventory of primary Air Force bases
    in the continental United States to determine our exposure to
    current and potential severe weather and climate effects. It
    also evaluated coastal and inland flooding vulnerabilities
    separately, and appropriately weighted flooding, wildfire and
    drought vulnerabilities. These factors led to results that were
    different from OSD results. Additional similarities and
    differences between OSD and Air Force approaches are below.
         LThe OUSD (A&S) mission assurance list included 34
    active Air Force sites and 2 National Guard sites. The Air
    Force list is derived from 74 Active sites, 10 Reserve sites,
    and 2 National Guard sites.
         LWe analyzed our expanded list of bases with the
    same authoritative data used for the OUSD (A&S)-provided list.
         LWe separated the OUSD (A&S) `recurrent flooding'
    category into coastal and inland flooding to capture those
    sites that are, or could be, impacted by multiple flooding
    effects.
         LWe applied the same weighting methodology used by
    OUSD (A&S), which ranked current effects higher than potential
    effects, and weighted recurrent flooding (in our case, two
    categories of flooding--coastal and inland) and wildfire
    vulnerabilities higher than drought, desertification, and
    thawing permafrost.
        The Air Force analysis that underpins both Air Force-
    specific list, and our input to OSD's list, is subject to some
    caveats:
         LIt reflects an installation's susceptibility to
    the consequences of severe weather events, not necessarily 50
    to 100 year climatic changes
         LIt does not consider any specific critical
    mission implications. For example, even if the base is subject
    to flooding because a portion is within a 100 year flood plain,
    the mission critical facility may not be impacted because of
    its location on the base (e.g. STRATCOM HQ Building on high
    ground at Offutt)

        Moving forward, we plan to conduct a more robust analysis
    of Air Force installation vulnerabilities related to mission
    criticality and specific locational aspects within the
    installation, to include accessibility concerns. Once we have a
    better understanding of the linkage to mission, then we can
    begin to assess where best to apply resources to improve either
    resiliency or adaptability.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, ma'am. Thank you, Madam
    Secretary.
        One of the other issues that came up last week when we were
    speaking to the Army is, they did a deep dive. They looked at
    where they could save money to pay for--which we understand are
    significant challenges. We're trying to help, but, as the
    Chairman and the dialogue here is presented, you know, we're
    not up at that 5-percent level. We're probably hovering close
    to the 3. So, some of these savings have to be found
    internally. Can you give us just a quick sense of what you've
    done and what you propose to do?
        Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Senator. The Air Force also
    conducted what we call the ``zero base review'' of our 1,072
    programs in the Air Force. We will do that again for fiscal
    year 2021. Our approach was to come up with a balanced budget
    that made us as lethal as we possibly could be. We restructured
    our next-generation air-dominance program. Of course, last
    year, we had proposed, and you all approved, the restructuring,
    cancellation of JSTARS and moving to advanced battle
    management. We terminated the B-2 high-frequency program. We
    put money into readiness and tried to focus that on the
    squadrons where it made the most difference, what we call our
    ``pacing units.'' So, we also--and when we try to do
    acquisition faster and smarter, we're trying to bring more
    competition into our procurements, because that drives down
    cost. In fact, with the four major procurements that we've
    announced in the last 7 months, we came in $15 billion below
    the independent cost estimate, and were able to take that $15
    billion and roll it back into greater readiness and lethality.
        So, our approaches have been slightly different than the
    way the Army has approached the problem set, but the intent is
    the same, to get the most value we can out of every dollar that
    we spend.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Madam Secretary and General, I'd like to thank you both for
    making visits to Offutt Air Force Base after the flooding that
    we saw hit Nebraska a couple of weeks ago. Madam Secretary, it
    was a pleasure to be able to have you at office when we were
    able to survey the damage together there. I thank you for your
    commitment to rebuild Offutt, and I look forward to working
    with you on that task.
        I have no doubt that this Committee appreciates the
    essential value of that installation. I do think it's important
    that this Committee also understands the full impact to Offutt
    and what will happen if we do not provide supplemental funding.
    You mentioned the effects of sequester, a CR, if we do not get
    the supplemental funding to Tyndall, with looking at the 61
    projects that are out there in 18 states, and the effect that
    has, not just on repairs, but on readiness. But, now you add
    Offutt into that mix, as well. Can you explain the effect that
    that will have if we do not get this supplemental funding done?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me talk a little bit about
    that. We have a rough estimate now of what it's going to do--
    what we're going to need to just recover from the damage done
    at Offutt. So, it wasn't just that a third of the runway was
    covered by water, it is that the water came up into a number of
    our facilities and buildings there, including some satellite
    facilities and other things.
        I would say two things first. One is a real thank you to
    the people in Nebraska. When the base put the call out for
    needing people to help with sandbags to protect the base, the
    city of Bellevue showed up with dump trucks' worth of sand. It
    was a wonderful partnership, even when they were also
    threatened.
        The second thing that I would say is that STRATCOM
    headquarters was in the middle of an exercise when that flood
    hit, and they didn't miss a beat, because there was redundancy
    in power, and we worked with the commercial power provider to
    make sure that power was shut off in an orderly way and shifted
    to the backup systems. Resilience does matter.
        The reality is, though, that we're going to probably have
    $350 million worth of damages there at Offutt just this year,
    and that's not including MILCON [military construction], which
    will be further out, to recover and rebuild some of those
    facilities. If we don't get the supplemental to recover from
    the storm damage, in July we're going to have to start
    deferring Offutt recovery other than for matters related to
    health and safety. That means the risk of mold and continued
    damage to buildings that then cost more to recover will
    increase.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        As you both know, the 55th Wing is also at Offutt. It's the
    home of the RC-135, which is Air Force's largest manned ISR
    platform. Secretary Wilson, last October, you responded to a
    question that I submitted for the record on the future of the
    RC-135, and you stated, ``The RC-135 family of aircraft will
    continue to operate through at least 2040 to 2050''.
        General, yesterday, you were at the HASC hearing, and, in
    testimony, when discussing the RC-135, you mentioned that the
    Air Force is looking at fusing capabilities that are platform-
    centric. Can you explain--or can you expand on this and what it
    really means for the C-135 family of aircraft? I think there
    might have been a little confusion yesterday on that.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
        First of all, let me reinforce Secretary's testimony that,
    in fact, the RC-135, which is not only a U.S. platform, but one
    that we also do with our U.K. partners. We're partners in that
    program. So, our ability to fly that airplane into the 2040s is
    going to be absolutely essential.
        The Advanced Battle Management System, the debate that we
    had last year that this Committee supported, is bigger than
    Joint STARS. This is about the future of joint warfighting and
    how we move from a platform-centric approach to a network-
    centric approach. The visual I would offer you--you know,
    sometimes we, I think, are guilty of putting forth PowerPoint
    slides that have big, red domes over countries that--as though
    we cannot penetrate or get in. A better visual actually is a
    block of Swiss cheese, because that's about what any country
    can put over the top of them to defend themselves. It's our job
    to actually know where the holes are and get in. Once we get
    in, then we do the--what I call the ``five Ps'' of air
    superiority, right? We've got to penetrate, we've got to
    persist when we're inside there, we've got to protect what's in
    there, not only on the ground, in the air, at sea, we've got to
    proliferate, and we've got to be able to punish by holding
    targets at risk.
        So, if an adversary actually ever sees an F-35, which is
    unlikely, I would like to also send them a message on their
    screensavers that says, ``We're here.'' Not ``I'm here,'' but
    ``We're here.'' Because the visual I would offer you is that,
    if the F-35 is inside, it is the quarterback of a penetrating
    joint team, and that joint team consists of an F-35, a B-21, an
    RQ-170, an X-37 in space, low-Earth orbiting satellites, a
    penetrating attack submarine, a small team on the ground. The
    key for that penetrating team to operate is to connect every
    sensor to every shooter. That's advanced battle management.
        This is bigger than the Joint STARS. This is about the
    future of joint warfighting and how the entire Department is
    shifting to networked warfare of the future.
        Senator Fischer. As we move to that future, though, the
    135s definitely have a role to play, as the Secretary said,
    through 2040 to 2050, because that future is not where we are
    at the present. Is that a correct statement?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Where I would give you in the
    visual is, every sensor to every shooter, and the RC-135 is a
    critical sensor.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here.
        Let me add my voice, Madam Secretary, for your service. I
    want to particularly thank you for the time that you've spent
    with me over the last 15 months as I joined this body. It's
    been very, very helpful.
        In one of our meetings, in particular, we talked about Air
    Force's Junior ROTC program. That program really came to my
    attention through a similar program that the Air Guard in
    Alabama has. Colonel Sparrow--"Swapper Sparrow'' has a program
    to give some scholarships for kids. I notice that, for the Air
    Force to grow from, like, 312 operational squadrons to 386,
    we're going to need, like, 1,480 pilots for fiscal year 2020. I
    am hopeful that, in doing that, we can also increase the number
    of female and minority pilots, which I think is really--that
    Junior ROTC program is directed to. I'd like for you to just
    talk about that program for a minute, and talk about the
    success for that program. We have introduced a bill recently to
    kind of expand that across the other branches of the services.
    So, I think it's a good opportunity for you to talk about the
    Air Force's success in that program.
        Secretary Wilson. Well, thank you, sir. Thanks for the
    opportunity.
        We are facing a national shortage of aircrew and pilots.
    While we are having plenty of people volunteer to go through
    training with us and we don't think we'll have trouble getting
    to the 1,480, we need to inspire the next generation of
    aviators and cause people to choose to fly. When we look at who
    we don't have volunteering in the Air Force and who's not
    stepping up in civil aviation, as well, there is a
    disproportionately low number of women and minorities who
    choose to fly. When we looked at the data, one of the things
    that was interesting was that, if you ask an Anglo boy, ``When
    did you decide to learn to fly?''--they usually say, ``Fourth,
    fifth grade,'' somewhere around there. If you ask girls, women,
    or minorities, it's much more common for them to say, ``In high
    school'' or ``In college.''
        One of the things we looked at was the Junior ROTC program.
    Here's an interesting factoid that I didn't know before I
    became Secretary. But, our Junior ROTC programs, which we have
    in high schools across America, are 58 percent minority. Last
    summer, with some of our excess funds, we decided to sponsor
    170 high school kids to get their private pilot's license. We
    partnered with seven universities around the country. They had
    to be in Junior ROTC, which gave us a--you know, we--so, we're
    going after the population we were interested in. So, they
    showed some interest in the military. There was no requirement
    to join the military. But, a full-ride scholarship on a college
    campus for 7 weeks in the summer to get their private pilot's
    license. So, we're trying to inspire the next generation of
    aviators. About 90 percent of them were successful in getting
    that private pilot's license, and we hope that we have sparked
    a dream.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that. I
    hope we can get that going across the other agencies.
        Following up on that a little bit, just, General, about
    recruiting, we've heard the challenges, sometimes, of
    recruiting, but I notice, you know, in the budget the Air Force
    has increased its recruiting goal without really talking about
    challenges. Have you experienced challenges? It seems that, to
    meet the budget, you are trying to recruit 4,400 new airmen.
    What experience have you with challenges? But, more
    importantly, what are some of the Air Force's successful
    recruiting strategies?
        General Goldfein. Thanks, Senator.
        We have met our recruiting goals, but, I'll tell you,
    what's been interesting is--you know, there's a tradition at
    the Recruiting Squadron; when they meet their quota, they ring
    a bell. Normally, through most of the year, they ring the bell
    about the middle of the month. What we're seeing is that
    they're often ringing the bell in the last day or 2 days,
    because it's becoming harder and harder. This is a challenge
    across--this is--this has to do with, 29 percent of America's
    youth that's physically capable of serving and we're all
    fishing in that same pool. So, it's a challenge for all
    services. We're happy to report that, to date, we've been able
    to meet our recruiting goals.
        When we looked at the growth and the glide slope that we
    could sustain, in terms of increasing our numbers, 4,400 a
    year, plus then about 3,000 or so after that, allows us to have
    a very steady growth path that allows us to not only go out and
    recruit what we need, but also bring them in. We have the right
    numbers in basic military training, the right numbers in tech
    schools. So, the entire pipeline now has been built to be able
    to sustain that growth over time.
        Probably the biggest success story, I will tell you, is in
    our special warfare business. We stood up a new recruiting
    squadron to go after our Special Operators, our young men and
    women who are capable of probably the most intense training
    pipeline of any of the services, certainly in our--2 years'
    pipeline. We're seeing a lot of success with mentors, a
    preparatory program, and getting out to high schools and
    talking about what an Air Force does on the ground.
        Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you all very much. I
    appreciate that. I'm looking forward to talking about SPACECOM
    next week.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Secretary Wilson, General
    Goldfein, for your testimony today.
        I know you spoke a little bit earlier about what would
    happen if the Air Force returned to sequester-level budgets.
    Let's hope that doesn't happen. It usually hasn't happened
    since 2013. But, General Goldfein, I'd like for you to address
    what would happen under an alternative scenario that some
    people in Congress are talking about. Let's suppose you got a
    full-year continuing resolution. So, Congress couldn't reach an
    agreement to lift the budget caps and pass the normal annual
    spending bills, the way we have the last l2 years, so Congress
    throws up its hands sometimes later this summer or early fall,
    and says, ``You know what? We're just going to have a full-year
    continuing resolution for all of fiscal year 2020. You'll get
    exactly what you got last year.'' What would that impact be?
        General Goldfein. Thanks, sir.
        I'll just give you a few examples of what that'll mean for
    us, because, of course, a year-long CR, we would assume, would
    be to execute, with no new-starts, at the 2019 levels. So, new
    mission MILCON, KC-46, F-35, TX would all stop. That would
    affect about 16 projects that would stop and, therefore, stop
    our ability to bed down, because you have to have the
    infrastructure to bed down the weapon systems. We have about 18
    current mission MILCON projects that would cease and stop that
    would affect our readiness. You know, any procurement,
    research, development, training, and evaluation (RDT&E), new-
    starts would stop. That would affect over 89 programs, the
    United States Air Force, for an Air Force that's working hard
    to modernize, that this Committee has supported. If it goes
    anything more than 6 months, it would put our end-strength
    growth at risk, because we will not be able to bring on the
    additional airmen we need, not to have mission growth, but
    actually to fill our formations to do the missions that we're
    already doing. So, it would have a significantly negative
    impact.
        Senator Cotton. So, almost the worst thing imaginable.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Sequester would be the worst thing, but
    it's hard to----
        General Goldfein. Yes.
        Senator Cotton.--imagine we would go back to the actual
    sequester levels. But, a proposal that's being batted around to
    have a full-year continuing resolution, almost the worst thing
    imaginable.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. All right, thank you for that.
        Couple of NDAAs ago, the Congress directed the Air Force to
    begin to transition a significant number of UAV [unmanned
    aerial vehicles] pilots to enlisted ranks, an issue on which
    I've worked. Senator King and Senator Jones and I are working
    together on this pilot issue. Could you tell us how that's
    going, what we've learned about--learned from it?
        General Goldfein. Sir, no surprises. As you might imagine,
    what we learned is, our enlisted force can do anything we ask
    them to do. The enlisted members who have been in the--we put
    them in the RQ-4, the Global Hawk program, and they've
    performed brilliantly.
        We've now expanded the discussion, though, because, as we
    work through in space and look at the--building the force we
    need to fight and win in a contested environment, today all
    constellations are being flown by our young enlisted force. You
    know, we have seven members right now who are on duty, who are
    running GPS for the globe right now at Schriever Air Force
    Base. So, the question we're asking is, What is the future of
    the enlisted operator when you look at space transitioning to a
    contested domain and high-altitude ISR, going forward? Is there
    a broader discussion that we're having about that enlisted
    operator in high-altitude ISR when it's above the atmosphere
    and below the atmosphere? Is there a career path where someone
    can now go into the business of ISR as an enlisted operator and
    transition between the two? So, we're taking the lessons we
    learned from where we are today, and now expanding that
    discussion. That's where I think we're going to land.
        Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you.
        I'd like to talk about the B-21 budget request. I have
    occasional hearings on the B-21 and its progress in a closed
    setting so we can ensure that, 20 years from now, people don't
    look back on some of the decisions made now, as we do look back
    on the F-35. Last year, the budget request was 2.3 billion.
    This year, it's 3 billion. Secretary Wilson, in this setting,
    could you tell us a little bit more about why we've seen that
    increase and what the Department plans to do with it?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we've got--we're moving forward
    with the research, development, test, and evaluation of this
    new aircraft. We had the critical design review late last year,
    fourth quarter last year. The program is on track and on
    schedule.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        General Goldfein, anything to add?
        General Goldfein. No, sir. Same.
        Senator Cotton. I know we're projected at 100, minimum,
    aircraft. Given the threat environment we face and the posture
    review that you've undertaken, can you envision a scenario in--
    where we need to have more than 100 B-21s?
        General Goldfein. I can, sir. Not surprisingly, when we did
    our analysis of the Air Force we need, which was over 2,000
    computer iterations of different force elements against the
    latest combatant commander OPLANs, operational plans, and the
    projection of the threat in the 2025 to 2030 timeframe. No
    surprise that long-range aviation was in the shortest supply
    and in the greatest demand. So, tankers, bombers, long-range
    ISR and command and control, those are where you're seeing the
    largest amount of growth required for the Air Force we need.
    So, I do see an environment where the bombers would be a larger
    number required.
        Senator Cotton. Over the long run, that would produce a
    lower average unit cost, I would assume, right?
        General Goldfein. It would.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        Thank you both for your testimony.
        Secretary Wilson, thank you for your service. We're sorry
    to see you leave. I guess, though, congratulations is in order
    to see you leave Washington?
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Wilson. I was released early for good behavior.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. Very well.
        Thank you all.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here, and also, thank you for your
    service.
        General Goldfein, you stated that F-35 is the quarterback
    of our fighters--fighter aircraft. You also said that, by 2040,
    you want a 80-20 percent dominance of the Air Wing by the
    fifth-generation fighters, like the F-35. In all my time on
    House Armed Services Committee, we had a lot of discussion
    about the need to invest in more fifth-generation into our
    current fleet, but then also to start investing in sixth-
    generation aircraft, certainly because our competitors, on the
    global scale, the Chinese, are pushing into the sixth-
    generation, themselves. So, I'm a little bit confused. How will
    funding the F-15X--EX--affect your goal of this dominance,
    given that a sustained defense budget is not guaranteed, moving
    into the future?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        First, I'll just--I'll say that the F-35, as I describe it,
    is the quarterback of more than the fighter force. It's the
    quarterback of the penetrating joint team. When you look at the
    investment in--that we are making, in this budget, in
    penetrating capability, you'll see $135 billion of investment.
    But, the--but, that is F-35, plus B-21, plus other capabilities
    that we're--plus space capabilities--that are all required to
    penetrate enemy airspace and be able to watch the enemy. So,
    first and foremost, the F-35, which is why we are not backing
    an inch off of our program of record, and maintaining the F-35,
    because it is the quarterback of the joint team that we need.
        The challenge we face is a near-term challenge. Our
    analysis indicated that, to be able to drive aircraft aged to a
    manageable level and to be able to do the missions that we
    require, we have to procure 72 aircraft a year to do that.
    There's four aircraft that we have to fly in the fourth
    generation, capacity-wise, into the 2030s, and that's the F-
    15C, the A-10, the F-15E, and the F-16. Three are going to be
    capable of flying into the 2030s. One is not going to make it.
    So, the F-15 refresh is only to give us the capacity we need as
    we make that transition from 20-80 to 80-20. We find ourselves
    in this position again, because, as the Chairman mentioned,
    when the decision to cancel the F-22 occurred--we're supposed
    to have 1100 F-35s right now. We have less than 300. So, we're
    faced with the situation we have right now. As the Secretary
    and I looked at the cost estimates, an F-15 refresh, using the
    investments that the Saudis and the Qataris have put in that
    line, to replace the F-15C, as long as we don't impact the F-35
    line, was a reasonable choice.
        Senator Duckworth. So, you're refreshing the Charlie-model
    F-15s, and they're going into the EX. Then you-- what's the
    projected lifespan for the refresh model into the future?
    You're saying into 2030?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Actually, longer. The model
    of--the EX model has got a 20,000-hour service-life expectancy.
        Senator Duckworth. Will that affect what your future
    requests are going to be for the number F-35s?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, if we ever get to a point where we
    are trading F-35s for F-15s, let me tell you, that's a bad
    choice. The F-15 is not an F-35. It will never be an F-35. We
    are just--you know, in the flying business, we--you know, we
    describe things as ``runway behind us and runway ahead of us.''
    The run--the decision that was made on the F-22 to put us in
    the place we're in is ``runway behind us.'' I can't affect
    that. The Secretary and I can only affect ``runway ahead of
    us.'' What we need is, we need the capacity, and we've got to
    get to 72 aircraft a year. We've got to look at the cost
    projections to be able to make an affordable decision, going
    forward.
        Senator Duckworth. Understood. Also, ``airspace above--
    altitude above you and gas on the ground, behind you,'' right?
        Last year, it was reported that more than 126 military
    installations or sites and their surrounding communities rely
    on wells or groundwater sources that contain dangerous levels
    of two chemical compounds that are tied to birth defects and
    certain cancers, known as PFOS and PFOAs. Secretary Wilson, how
    many Air Force military installations may be threatened by
    dangerous levels of PFOS and PFOAs? Do you know?
        Secretary Wilson. Ma'am, we have done 110 detailed site
    inspections. We have looked at 297 total locations. So, we've
    done the detail of those. Of the ones we did--so, we did an
    initial look, and then--and, in that initial look, we
    identified 21 installations where we need to do alternative
    water supplies. So, there is, immediately, alternative water
    supplies to make sure that people have safe drinking water.
        We then go back and do a more detailed site inspection. We
    have done 110 detailed site inspections of a total of 189, I
    think, active facilities. We also do some on locations that
    were BRAC'd [Base Realignment and Closure].
        Senator Duckworth. What about the ones that are on Air
    Guard locations?
        Secretary Wilson. That includes Active, Guard, and Reserve.
        Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
        Yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Goldfein, Secretary Wilson, first of all, thank you
    both for your service to our country.
        Secretary Wilson, we're going to miss you up here, but it
    sounds as though you've got an opportunity that--it's clearly
    something in your future, and you'll do great.
        I do have a question with regard--for Secretary Wilson--
    with regard to the DOD's submitted budget of $750 billion this
    year. Why is the Air Force unfunded priority list (UPL) over a
    billion dollars--a billion dollars greater than your fiscal
    year 2019 request, despite the top-line growth in the overall
    DOD budget?
        General Goldfein. Senator, I'll----
        Secretary Wilson. I'll go----
        General Goldfein.--answer, if that's----
        Secretary Wilson. Sure.
        General Goldfein.--okay, just because the----
        Secretary Wilson. Sure.
        General Goldfein.--the unfunded priority lists normally
    comes from the service chiefs.
        What you'll see in the unfunded priority list--first of
    all, it's always those things that didn't make the cut line
    when we were building our budget, and it--the intent is always
    to tell you where we would place money if additional money were
    available. It's important to note that, in the first--and we
    listed ours in priority order, as well, in the UPL--the first
    thing we listed was money for MILCON, and those--and if we were
    not--to not get a supplemental, we placed in the UPL, in 2020,
    money that we would need to recover from the damage done in
    2019 if we didn't get a supplemental. Important to note that,
    in that money is also adding three to five additional
    professionals at 63 bases where we have privatized housing and
    identified privatized housing issues, because of that--of
    course, that issue came up after we had completed our POM.
        What you'll also see there is in money for defendable
    space, because we are--we're transitioning from a noncontested
    domain to a contested domain. This accelerates things that
    we're already doing in the program, but moves them to the left,
    and you see that. Then you see money in there for aircraft
    procurement so that, again, if there was additional money left,
    it gets us to this--to 60 F-35s, which is what we are told,
    from the company, they can produce in 2019, and it also adds
    KC-46s, which our Air Force We Need Assessment told us long-
    range aviation is a high priority.
        Senator Rounds. All right. Well, as you both know, we're
    very pleased with the bed-down determination, where Ellsworth
    Air Force Base will be the first bed-down for the B-21.
    Community of Rapid City is very pleased, and I can assure you
    that they are prepared and willing to assist any way possible
    to make that as workable as possible. But, we're very happy
    with that decision, and we look forward to seeing the B-21
    being deployed on time and on target with regard to budget.
        Based upon the study that you've provided us, which is
    ``The Air Force We Need,'' the number of required bomber needs
    to be increased, according to your assessment. I think
    Secretary--or Senator Cotton talked a little bit about it. But,
    I want to go into this a little bit. We'd originally talked
    about the 100 B-21s as--first it was, that's what we were
    looking at, in terms of the budgeted items, but, really, that's
    a minimum number. But, there really is no scenario laid out in
    which you could get by with just 100.
        What I'd like to do is to talk about two items. First of
    all, what is that real number? What is the number that we're
    really going to need to make this thing work? Second of all,
    you've got the F-35s coming in. I agree with you, you've got to
    get to the right number of F-35s. But, that's not an air-
    dominance system. It's not designed to be the F-22. The F-22 is
    now, what, closing in on 40 years in age? So, you're going to
    have to be looking at that next-generation air-dominance
    system, that platform. What's the plan? How do you fit in
    maintaining and moving forward with the required numbers of B-
    21s that you're going to need and still allow for us to
    maintain the air dominance necessary with that next new
    platform or system? How does it fit together?
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, I may let the Chief talk a little
    bit about the numbers of bombers, but let me talk a little bit
    about next-generation. Probably within the next couple of
    weeks, we will be releasing the Science and Technology Strategy
    for the Air Force. The Air Force does that every 7 to 10 years.
    But, one of the things that we are going to do is go back to
    what we call vanguard programs, where we use the authorities
    you've given us to prototype, to experiment, and to rapidly
    innovate. I think there's--if you look back, there's probably a
    legitimate criticism of some of our major defense programs,
    where, you know, there are multiple miracles required in a
    program. That's probably not the way to set yourself up for
    success. Rather than looking at a particular platform, our
    next-generation air-dominance will identify the technologies
    that we need to develop and test, and then make decisions along
    the way on how we will deploy those technologies. Beyond that,
    I think, probably we should go into--I'll talk to you in a
    classified setting, on what we're thinking about.
        General Goldfein. Sir, with respect to bombers, the minimum
    number we need to be able to meet the current operational plans
    of the combatant commanders is 175. That's 100 B-21s and 75 B-
    52s. To be able to keep the B-52 flying in the period of time--
    and we did a business-case analysis to look at the cost of a
    brand-new bomber versus, you know, taking the B-52 and
    reengining it and putting new radars in it. What we found is
    that the cost alone for a, you know, EMP-hardened new bomber,
    to be able to bring that level of payload in a standoff
    capacity, is far more significant than the cost of just
    upgrading it, because it has good bones and can last for
    awhile.
        So, it's 175 that is the minimum number in the Air Force we
    need. We have--you'll see that that pluses up from a current
    squadron number of 9 to 14, with an additional 5 squadrons.
    Those 5 squadrons are based on the simultaneous missions and
    the simultaneous plans that we're going to have to support, be
    that STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, EUCOM, or PACOM.
        Senator Rounds. But, the key was, the B-52 was a standoff--
    --
        General Goldfein. Yes.
        Senator Rounds.--weapon system----
        General Goldfein. Absolutely.
        Senator Rounds.--not a penetrating.
        General Goldfein. Not a penetrator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here today.
        Let me add my voice to the others on the Committee who have
    said how much we will--have appreciated your service, Secretary
    Wilson, and how much we will miss you.
        General Goldfein, we're glad you're staying.
        A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to be at the
    ``Last Plane Out'' ceremony for the KC-135 that left the 157th
    Air Refueling Wing at the former Pease Air Force Base. I just
    want to share with you one of the things that commander of that
    unit, Colonel John Pogorek, said as he was saying goodbye to
    the plane. He pointed out that for the third year running, the
    157th has flown more sorties, and more sorties per KC-135, than
    any other Guard unit, Reserve unit, or Active Duty unit in the
    world. So, as you can appreciate, we--and I should point out
    that the plane that left was the oldest plane in our inventory.
    It wasn't through yet. It was built in 1957, and it was going
    to Arizona. So, obviously, we're waiting, with great angst, for
    the new tankers to come to Pease. I know there have been some
    reports in the news lately indicating that there has been
    another discovery of foreign debris found in the aircraft, and
    that there has, again, been a halt to delivery of the tankers.
    So, I wonder, Secretary Wilson, if you can give us an update on
    where we are with this and what you expect to happen with
    Boeing and the production of the tankers.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the production is going forward.
    I had the joy of being on the first KC-46 to fly in to
    McConnell. Senator Inhofe brought the first one in to Oklahoma,
    I believe. We have found some debris on the line. The
    inspectors found some debris that shouldn't have been there,
    should have been wiped out of some of the compartments on the
    KC-46, on the manufacturing line. We have worked with Boeing on
    a corrective action plan. It will also require greater
    inspection and attention for quality assurance by both the Air
    Force and Boeing. But, we expect that they will be able to
    implement those quality improvement plans this month so that we
    can restart acceptance of the aircraft and the arrival of the
    aircraft at Pease will not be affected.
        Senator Shaheen. I'm delighted to hear that. Are the issues
    that were found with the--as I understood, it was the
    electronics that also had some issues with the plane. Has that
    been resolved, as well?
        Secretary Wilson. There were two issues that we accepted
    the plane with, where we had some deficiencies that we had to
    work through. One of them is going to be fixed at Boeing's
    expense, and that has to do with the remote vision system. So,
    in the KC-135, as you know, you kind of look out--you lie down
    and look out the back window.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        Secretary Wilson. In the KC-46, you look at a video screen
    that has cameras on the back, and there's some distortion of
    that screen because of the way the cameras are located and so
    forth. We have reached agreement with Boeing on how that needs
    to be fixed, and that that will be retrofitted into aircraft--
    all of the aircraft, and added in on the line, going forward.
    That will be done at their expense.
        There was one other deficiency that we identified. That had
    to do with the stiffness of the boom when refueling an A-10,
    which is a very light aircraft. They met the international
    standard, so that actually will be a change that the Air Force
    will pay for. It's the change of an actuator to affect the
    stiffness of the boom.
        Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you for the update.
        I also should thank you for the responsiveness of the Air
    Force to the PFAS issues that we've had at Pease, and your
    support for the study that the Agency for Toxic Substances and
    Disease Registry is doing, the first long-term health impact of
    PFOA and PFOS that will have been done. So, that should provide
    a lot of information that we can use, going forward.
        Unfortunately, we've also heard from a number of military
    retirees and their families who believe that exposure to a
    dozen other known carcinogens at the air base has caused them
    health impacts, including a number of cancers, ranging from
    prostate to bladder cancer. The National Guard has requested
    that the Air Force Medical Support Agency conduct a public
    health study for military personnel and civilian individuals
    that lived and worked on Pease to determine if there is a
    higher-than-expected rate of morbidity and mortality. Can you
    tell me if that is a possibility and what would need to happen
    in order for us to be able to get that done?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I don't--the answer--the quick
    answer is, I don't know what would have to happen in order to
    do that kind of a study. But, of course, we'd have no
    objections to that kind of a study being done.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, if there's anything that I can do,
    and anything that we need, in terms of the upcoming defense
    bill, I'm happy to work on that.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and outstanding performance
    in the last 2 years.
        Two years ago, when you sat before us, you inherited the
    smallest and oldest Air Force ever. You reminded us of that.
    You also called out, Secretary, that your three priorities were
    readiness, recap, and rationalization. I want to thank you both
    for what you accomplished in the last year and a half on
    readiness. It's remarkable to see what you've done to bring our
    force to the current level of readiness. I know we have a lot
    of work yet to do, but I want to thank you for that.
        Chief, can you just give us an update--you mentioned it
    earlier--on ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System]? I have
    two questions for both of you, so I'd appreciate some brevity,
    here. But, in June of last year, in 2018, the Air Force
    announced that Robbins would actually host some of the initial
    elements of ABMS. That statement actually said it is a service
    transition--and I quote, ``transition to ABMS, the Air Force
    will fly the E-8C JSTARS fleet in the mid to late 2020s. The
    air and space systems that make up the ABMS network will
    include a fusion center and associated supporting activities.''
    Can you give us an update on what's happened in the last year,
    how that's progressing, and how it's developing, and how you're
    managing the gaps from current technology into this model that
    you're talking about, in this environment?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        You know, the decision that was made to place Air Battle--
    Advanced Battle Management System at Robbins was based
    primarily on the fact that that's where our Ph.D.'s of battle
    management exist. We looked, first and foremost, at that
    community, who understands this business better than any other
    community. They're the doctors of battle management that we
    need to lead us into the future.
        There's three increments to this transition. Increment one
    is focused on taking the current sensors that we have and
    advancing them and connecting them in ways that they're not
    currently connected. So, one of the first things we did with
    the money that you authorized us to put, is, we bought back E-3
    AWACS as they were currently--we were planning to retire, and
    we put money into them to be able to bring in feeds that didn't
    currently exist. Because this is about current--increment one
    is current sensors, and connecting them together. That is on
    track.
        Increment two is about bringing new sensor capability--many
    of those are going to be in space--and bringing that new
    capability on, and connecting them together.
        The final increment is to connect it all together. We've
    just brought on, this year, an architect, Mr. Preston Dunlap,
    to lead us through that. His first stop was to meet the doctors
    of battle management at Robbins. Matter of fact, I believe he's
    still there today. We're on track, and I'm really excited that
    Robbins is going to lead the way.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Madam Secretary, in your first testimony here, you talked
    about China. We've just received this RAND report. It's an
    update on their views of what's going on. My concern about
    China was that they were moving out from a defensive posture,
    evidenced by publishing the Made in China 2025, along with what
    they've known they've been doing with the BRI, Belt-Road
    Initiative, along with their port loans in Africa and South
    America. The one that really concerns me is that their air
    force investments and what they're doing right now looks like
    they've been moving more to a strategic posture, certainly over
    the next 10 years. So, as you talk about what we need, in terms
    of the 386 squadrons and so forth, does that reflect this
    change in strategy that you see China moving to right now?
        Secretary Wilson. We do see rapid innovation in China, and
    a change to their strategic approach to the world from being a
    largely--the old PLA was largely internally focused and focused
    on internal control. They made a decision to be more of a
    regional power and a--they have words for it. I can't remember
    them, like, off the top of my head, but there was a very good
    Defensive Intelligence Agency unclassified study recently on
    this subject, as well, looking outward and developing a
    military commensurate with their place in the world, I think is
    kind of the way it was. The J-20, which is a--is in service now
    in the Chinese air force, and they've just flight-tested the J-
    31, so they are moving forward with advanced aircraft, but also
    advances across the board in other kinds of capability as air
    defense, of course, their surface navy and so forth. So, we're
    seeing modernization across the board and in all domains.
        Senator Perdue. I'd like to say one last thing, Mr.
    Chairman. The greatest threat that these two people have,
    certainly General Goldfein as he faces this next year, is, I
    think we're staring down the barrel of a CR, September 30th. We
    have 39 working days left between now and July 31. If we don't
    move this up as a priority, there is no way we're going to get
    defense authorization done--HHS, if we have to combine them,
    whatever we have to do. This needs to be our Committee's top
    priority right now to make sure that, in the remaining few days
    we have before that, quote, ``August work period'' comes up
    again, that we get this defense budget authorized and
    appropriated. Because we're staring down the barrel of another
    CR. After 2 years of not having--the number-one thing I've
    heard from these guys and others that we've met over the last 2
    years is that this is the number-one threat to getting
    readiness back and beginning this long haul toward recap. I'll
    just close.
        Madam Secretary, thank you for your service. You guys have
    accomplished great things in the last 2 years under your
    leadership, and as ``off you go into the wild blue yonder,'' I
    wish you all the best.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Senator Perdue. Let me
    assure you, that is our intent, and that's our commitment. I'm
    fully aware of the time remaining. I'm also fully aware of the
    fact that we've never had to face a China like this before, or,
    for that reason, a--also a Russia.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, thank you.
        The private companies that were put in charge of managing
    military housing failed to provide safe and clean homes to
    military families, but they still managed to make millions of
    dollars in profits. The services have fallen short in their
    oversight responsibilities. Now, many of these families have
    developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to mold,
    lead paint, and other hazards. Last week, I asked the Army
    Chief of Staff, General Milley, whether he believes, as a
    matter of principle, that the U.S. Government has the
    responsibility to cover the lifetime costs of treating
    servicemembers and their families for health problems connected
    to unsafe military housing. He said, ``Absolutely yes,''.
        General Goldfein, do you agree with him?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, do you agree?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        One other quick question. I'm concerned that the southern
    border deployment is having some negative effects on readiness.
    General Neller recently wrote a memoir to the Secretary of the
    Navy that listed border deployment among the factors
    contributing to readiness challenges. General Goldfein, have
    any training exercises or overseas deployments been canceled or
    delayed due to units supporting border developments?
        General Goldfein. No, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Not----
        General Goldfein. Not in the Air Force.
        Senator Warren. Not--okay.
        I also want to ask another readiness issue facing the Air
    Force: climate change. The Defense Department's most recent
    report on climate change discussed the impact of this human-
    caused problem on our military operations and bases. This
    report included a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, General Dunford, who said, quote, ``When I look at
    climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflicts
    around the world and things we have to respond to.''
        General Goldfein, just a simple yes or no on this one is
    fine, and then I have some followups. Do you agree with General
    Dunford?
        General Goldfein. I do, ma'am. I do think--if there's time
    at the end, I'd like to sort of qualify where I think he was
    going with that.
        Senator Warren. Sure. But, let me ask, Does adapting
    military bases and other infrastructure to climate change
    contribute to Air Force readiness?
        General Goldfein. It does, ma'am. I think what General
    Dunford was referring to, though, is that--I mean, if you go
    back--if you take a look at Syria as an example, most don't
    remember what caused the Syria conflict to start. It started
    because of a 10-year drought----
        Senator Warren. Yes. Water.
        General Goldfein.--and folks having to move from their
    family farms into cities, where they then were not getting any
    support and, therefore, a civil war began. I think what
    Chairman Dunford was talking about is that we have to respond
    militarily, very often, to the effects globally, of climate
    change.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        So, let me ask, Do you think it is prudent for the Air
    Force to incorporate climate change when making strategic
    decisions, like strategic basing decisions, for example?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me take that one.
        Senator Warren. Sure.
        Secretary Wilson. We just published an Infrastructure
    Investment Strategy, and we also just finished a major piece of
    work on weather. Maybe the Air Force looks at these things more
    because weather is such a big impact on us for all of our
    flying operations every day, and we're the ones responsible for
    weather forecasting around the globe. The infrastructure
    strategy looks at resilience and, How do we get more out of
    every dollar that we spend? So, there's a number of pieces of
    that strategy. But, the resilience of our bases is very
    important because we fight from our bases. We don't leave our
    bases to fight. We fight from our bases. Their resilience is
    very important to----
        Senator Warren. How would you rate Air Force installations
    as a whole, in terms of their climate resilience?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, it probably varies a lot. I
    couldn't give you a red, yellow, or green chart on that at this
    point, but I know that, overall, we've got significant
    infrastructure challenges overall, but from a number of
    factors.
        Senator Warren. Well, I see that the Air Force is
    requesting nearly $5 billion in emergency funds to rebuild Air
    Force bases in Florida and Nebraska, alone, that were damaged
    by natural disasters. So, I think it's very important that the
    Air Force and the other military services continue to
    incorporate climate change in their planning so that when
    disaster strikes, the impact on operations is minimal. This
    clearly is a readiness issue.
        So, thank you for your work on this.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you both for being here, and, Secretary Wilson, for
    your service. I was also sad when I heard you were moving on,
    but I can certainly thank you for everything you've done and
    share the Chair's advice to you that it's still not too late to
    change your mind.
        I think I'll start with General Goldfein. It's on the KC-
    46. Specifically, I know that--I believe that Senator Shaheen
    asked a question earlier. I'm more interested in our current
    plans in the basing in Seymour Johnson, whether or not that's
    shifting to the right, or what the current status is.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we're--I think we're--we are
    going to be fine on the basing. We're not seeing an impact
    there. We just needed to have Boeing stop, put a corrective
    action plan in place, get up to the standards that we expect on
    the manufacturing line, and then get the line moving again. You
    actually can't fix a manufacturing line while it's stopped. It
    has to be flowing. But, they have to put the corrective actions
    in place for quality assurance.
        Senator Tillis. I also had a question on the talent
    marketplace. I think, right now, the--almost all the officer
    assignments are in there. Give me an idea of how that's working
    and what progress has been made.
        General Goldfein. Sir, it's working well. As a matter of
    fact, you know, when I travel and talk to, especially, young
    officers, you know, what I hear over and over again is the fact
    that they want to have a little bit more control over their
    future, and they want to have a better visibility on what's out
    there. Not only them, but also hiring officials want to know--
    get a--have a better sense of who they can look at for hiring
    purposes. The fact that we're now connecting them for dialogue
    is pretty powerful. Initial rollout's been very--very
    successful, and--but, we're not going to slow down. We're going
    to continue to listen to the force, screen with our ears, and
    modify it to make it better.
        Senator Tillis. On a related note, how well are we doing,
    or what kind of changes have we put in place to address the
    pilot shortage?
        General Goldfein. So, this year we were successful at
    stopping the reduction. So, it's the first year where we
    actually haven't had increasing numbers leave. So, we see that
    as----
        Senator Tillis. What do you think that could be attributed
    to?
        General Goldfein. I think it's a combination of things,
    sir. I think, you know, what I hear over and over, it's a
    combination of quality of service, quality of life. The
    financial incentives that Congress has approved, I think, have
    been very helpful. But, it's as much quality of service as it
    is quality of life. I think the combination--we have, like, 69
    different initiatives that we're working on. I don't think
    there's one silver bullet. A combination of reducing overseas
    deployments, I think, has helped. Putting more white space on
    the calendar, we've looked at every one of our exercises and
    reduced those that aren't value-added. I think that making
    flying in the United States Air Force as rich an experience as
    we can make it is going to have the most lasting effect. That's
    going to start with inspirational and courageous commanders and
    senior NCOs [non commissioned officers], and so, where the
    Secretary and I have focused is on where--when we select and
    how we develop these young officers to make sure that, when
    they are in command, they can build a culture that thrives.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        I share Senator Perdue's concern about where we're headed
    with respect to a CR. I see your budget request. I tend to
    agree and would support and advocate for it. But, I believe
    it's more or less going to be a paper exercise, and that we're
    going to be looking at a CR. So, I think one thing that we need
    from you, Madam Secretary or General Goldfein, is an
    understanding of the consequences of that, because here is a
    trajectory to increase readiness capabilities and things that I
    think are important. I think we also have to understand the
    consequences of our inaction, to go through regular order
    appropriations. We'd like to see that so that, when those who
    would resist moving through regular-order appropriations
    understand the consequences of their actions, we need that. You
    can infer it, but I'd like, very specifically, to look at
    things that are going to be affected by that.
        Secretary Wilson--I mean, we can talk about that now, but I
    think I'd--what I'd prefer to do is go, if you don't get this
    and you have to deal with the consequences of a CR, what does
    that look like in the near term, and how it could potentially
    be disruptive to progress that you've made?
        Secretary Wilson, you have a comment on that?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, there will be 16 new MILCON
    projects for new missions that wouldn't start. That means that
    we can't put those aircraft at those bases. There were the 18
    MILCON projects for existing missions that would not go
    forward, and 89 new-starts for programs where we're trying to
    modernize this force and trying to stay--our adversaries don't
    have to deal with continuing resolutions or sequester. They
    keep going, and so, there is risk in deciding that we're just
    going to do a CR.
        Senator Tillis. We need to look at that in terms of the
    effect that it has on MILCON and then the effect that it has on
    what we would flesh out after those MILCON projects are
    complete. People really need to understand that, because I
    think we're doing you all a disservice. We need to make sure
    that those who oppose going through that process understand the
    direct consequences of their actions, both in terms of the
    opportunities in the communities for these projects to move
    forward, but, more important to me, the capabilities and
    readiness that we're leaving on the table when we talk, in
    every committee, about our great-power competition and the need
    to really move forward with these projects. People need to
    start taking responsibility for holding up what I think is an
    important regular-order process.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, both of you, for your service. I appreciate it very
    much.
        We're sorry to see you going, Secretary Wilson, but thank
    you for what you've done. I've got one last request before you
    leave, too. I met with Secretary Shanahan on Tuesday, and he
    mentioned, in the city of Martinsburg, that has still not
    received their money for PFAS. He agreed we're going to get on
    that. So, only thing I'm asking--it's less than $5 million, and
    this little city really needs that. It means a lot to them, and
    they've put the money out already, and they just don't have the
    resources. So, before you depart, if you would check into that.
    The city of Martinsburg. It's the National Guard base. Our Air
    Base National Guard there in Martinsburg does a great job, and
    it would be very much appreciated.
        The other thing I want to ask for is, you know right now
    statute only allows us to tap operations and maintenance, O&M,
    dollars from the Air National Guard. That's what I consider to
    be unfair, considering that they are using the same
    firefighting foam as the Active component uses. So, my question
    would be, Do you agree--or will you agree that we should be
    able to use defense environmental restoration dollars for the
    National Guard facilities, the same as military does?
        Secretary Wilson. I--Senator, whenever I get involved in
    the Guard issues, there are different colors of money there,
    and I'm going to have to take that question for the record. Our
    commitment is to do the cleanup on all of our bases where we've
    been responsible for this. I'll have to get back to you on that
    specific question about which funds can be used for which kinds
    of----
        Senator Manchin. Yeah. I don't know why they would be
    objectionable, because----
        Secretary Wilson. I don't----
        Senator Manchin.--in NDAA, we've tried to do this, and got
    stripped out. I think every Senator has a Guard component that,
    basically, needs to be able to use their money the same as the
    branches use theirs. Okay?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, you may well be right. I just
    don't know.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. I appreciate your--again, that's one
    other question before you leave, because I know you will be
    diligent about that.
        Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Wilson. Defense Environmental Restoration Account
    (DERP) funds cannot be used to fund environmental restoration
    actions at State-owned and operated facilities where DOD was
    not the ``owner'' or ``operator'' at the time of the release of
    PFOS/PFOA into the environment. DERP funding is allowed for
    initial investigations in order to resolve DERP eligibility or
    ineligibility, and for cleanup where the release occurred when
    DOD was the ``owner or operator.'' The Air National Guard (ANG)
    is in the process of determining DERP eligibility for all its
    sites and is now programming for both DERP funding and
    Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding to address its required
    environmental restoration activities.

        Senator Manchin. I think this is probably--General
    Goldfein, maybe you can help me on this one. The F-15EX--and I
    understand the arguments for--procuring capabilities. I
    understand all of that. Where I'm unclear about is the plan how
    you're going to integrate that. Because I think it's a 4-year
    phase-in, and, during that 4-year phase-in, even though it's
    the same aircraft, the components are different. So, I'm
    understanding that we don't have the ability to train or--or
    the simulators that it will take to train them, and won't be
    ready in 4 years. How are we going to have our pilots ready and
    prepared for the--for that to come onboard in 4 years, and them
    not have the proper training?
        General Goldfein. Sir, because the F-15EX is only intended
    to help us with a short-term capacity shortfall and replace
    only the F-15Cs, the----
        Senator Manchin. How many aircrafts, General, are we
    speaking about?
        General Goldfein. Right now, we're looking at 80----
        Senator Manchin. Eighty.
        General Goldfein.--is what we have laid----
        Senator Manchin. That's because the F-35 is not going to be
    able to meet the demand.
        General Goldfein. It's to supplement the F-35 program to
    make sure--and I said before----
        Senator Manchin. I understand that, and I'm okay with all
    that. I'm----
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Manchin.--just understanding--as a pilot, myself,
    and you as--having many hours, as you have--there's still some
    simulation time it takes to integrate into that.
        General Goldfein. It does. The 90 percent of the
    architecture--the support equipment for the F-15C is common to
    the F-15EX. That's one of the reasons--so, we're not looking
    at----
        Senator Manchin. You're not concerned about the transition.
        General Goldfein. No, sir. Matter of fact, that's one of
    the reasons that we only looked at an F-15----
        Senator Manchin. Okay.
        General Goldfein.--as a replacement.
        Senator Manchin. I trust you on that.
        Next, my final question is this. This picture here. This
    shows the J-31 and the F-35. They kind of look similar, I
    think, if you look at it. They're fairly similar, here. I'll
    pass just around to my colleagues. I'm not an expert on jet
    fighters, but they sure do look like that someone had some
    plans. My concern is this. I understand we have the prime
    contract, and then it goes from the prime to sub to sub to sub
    to sub to sub to sub. This didn't happen by accident. They're
    able to--and I'm understanding they're actually able--the
    Chinese and Russians, and whoever else, has been able to get up
    to speed quicker by being able to access--and maybe it might
    not be high priorities or high profiles--they were able to get
    into things that weren't classified, and reverse engineer.
    We're not holding our subs accountable, and we're not holding
    the prime accountable to the subs. Do you all see that as a
    tremendous concern? How do we change it? Will you work with us
    to change the procurement process, holding the primes--holding
    your prime subcontractors totally responsible for the food
    chain, if you will, and bringing some of these platforms to
    reality?
        Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, very happy to work with you on that.
    The intelligence threat, particularly from China, is
    significant, and it's----
        Senator Manchin. But, I'm saying it's continued. For them
    to have the rapid acceleration--and everybody here is concerned
    about that--that has to be stopped. We're not doing anything to
    stop it. I'm on Cyber Command, I'm concerned about this. So,
    I'm just hoping that you all are in total agreement with this.
    It needs to be changed. Do you all agree it needs to be
    changed?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'll tell you that we've stood
    up a Cybersecurity Task Force, under the leadership of General
    Pawlikowski, when she was Air Force Materiel Command. That
    Cybersecurity Task Force is designed to do just what you're
    talking about, look at every system and subsystem to----
        Senator Manchin. Who's heading that up?
        General Goldfein. Now it's Colonel--the Commander of Air
    Force Materiel Command. If----
        Secretary Wilson. McMurray.
        General Goldfein. Yeah, thanks. General McMurray.
        Senator Manchin. General McMurray, okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Madam Secretary, General, for being here. Thank
    you, as always, for your exemplary service.
        To Secretary Wilson, I was delighted, last week, to get the
    news that Whiteman Air Force Base is slated to be the second
    location for the B-21 Raider. Of course, I think we ought to be
    the first location, but we're delighted to be hosting the B-21.
    I just want to say for the record how proud I am of the 509th
    Bomb Wing and the work they've done with the B-2 Spirit over
    many a year. We stand ready at Whiteman to receive the B-21
    when the time comes.
        I know Senator Cotton asked you about the schedule and
    whether we were on schedule, in terms of production. Let me
    ask--and you testified that we are--let me ask you just about
    the budget. I know the target price is about 500 million a
    piece. Are you confident that we're going to come close to that
    number? What's it looking like?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we don't discuss publicly the B-
    21 program costs, and we're--actually would be very happy to
    come and talk to you in detail about where we are. But, we are
    pleased with the management of the program, thus far, by both
    the contractor--and we're doing this one a little bit
    differently. We do this through our Rapid Capabilities Office.
    It's a small high-performing team, and they're doing a very
    good job.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        Let me shift gears just slightly and ask you about a number
    that appears a number of times in your written testimony, the
    386 number. Let me ask you about the relative importance of
    this. The NDS states very clearly that the Joint Force and the
    Air Force need to focus on improving in our key warfighting
    scenarios against China and Russia while carrying out
    operations in the greater Middle East more economically. I'm
    wondering, why is purchasing more platforms now better,
    relatively speaking, than investing in R&D [research and
    development], munitions, base resilience? I mean, can you give
    me some sense of why 386 is important, and how you got there?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, the 386 is a size construct, but
    the work that we did in this evaluation looked also at
    different ways of fighting. It is not just more of the same.
    It's not just about capacity. It also looks at, What do we have
    as a stand-in force, what do we have as a standoff force, how
    do we integrate things so that we get more bang for the buck,
    if you will? If you think about this, you know, to--and the
    Chief talked about Desert Storm and having 401 operational
    squadrons. If we're talking about meeting a near--defeating a--
    deterring and defeating a near-peer adversary, a safe, secure
    nuclear deterrent, Homeland defense, countering violent
    extremism, and deterring rogue states, all at the same time,
    with 386 squadrons. They're obviously more capable squadrons
    and a different way of fighting. So, it's both.
        Senator Hawley. You're satisfied, then, that this budget
    advances the NDS priorities, and particularly those on, not
    just capacity, but also capability, lethality, resilience.
        Secretary Wilson. I am. You know, there are always more
    things that we can do, and we're always making tradeoffs. But,
    even things like multidomain operations and the need to connect
    everything as part of a network, and driving those things
    forward. Our science and technology--early-stage science and
    technology budget is--you know, combined with research,
    development, test, and evaluation, is fairly healthy.
        Senator Hawley. General, do you want to comment on any of
    this?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I'll just tell you that, by the time
    Secretary Mattis rolled out the National Defense Strategy, the
    last version I saw was version 67. I said that because it was
    very inclusive--typical Secretary Mattis--very inclusive. We
    had folks that were there, and it allowed us--it allowed
    Secretary Wilson and I, actually, to align the 2019 budget,
    because we were part of the writing of the National Defense
    Strategy, and then 2020, our guidance to the team, and our
    scoring of our budget inside was alignment with the National
    Defense Strategy. So, that's what this budget submission is all
    about.
        Senator Hawley. Thanks very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        General Goldfein, I want to ask you a little bit about
    artificial intelligence. It is going to be critical, both on
    and off the battlefield in the future. As you know, AI is just
    not possible without good, high-quality data. AI is only
    effective if we have a workforce that really understands how to
    take care of that data. Do you think that the Air Force is, at
    this point, adequately able to recruit a workforce that is
    literate and understands that future?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I think we're in the beginning
    stages, really----
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        General Goldfein.--of--and the Secretary and I have--maybe
    turn it over to the Secretary, because, you know, having a
    Secretary that was formerly a president of a STEM [Science,
    Technology, Engineering & Math] university, and understanding
    how the universities work, and how you bring in young people,
    and how you motivate them, and you bring them in as interns. I
    think we've done a lot to make sure that we are a--we're an
    easy place----
        Senator Heinrich. Are you extending her work assignment?
        General Goldfein. Would love to.
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        One other thing, and then I do want to get to you,
    Secretary. It--is it--is there value to thinking about whether
    there should be someone within the services that just has that
    responsibility--and maybe this is a good time to pivot to you,
    Secretary--for making sure that we're recruiting coders and
    data scientists and the folks that we're going to need as we
    make this transition into AI? Specifically, I'm curious whether
    it might be even worth considering a mission occupational
    specialty for that area, to make sure that we do make that
    transition quickly.
        Secretary Wilson. That's actually an interesting idea. In
    the Air Force--you know, the Navy has been talking, I know, to
    the Committee about a Chief Information Officer position. In
    some ways, the Air Force already has--we've got our Chief
    Information Officer, our Chief Data Officer, and our Chief
    Management Officer all in the same--all combined and reporting
    directly to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. So, we've
    got--organizationally, got that. I would say that we've got--AI
    is not just about the data, it's about gathering and directing
    that data, and analyzing it, at speed. In many cases, it's
    about the analysis happening right at the sensor edge and not
    as you bring it in. So, for all of us, in the military and in
    the wider society, we are probably going to see a significant
    shortage of data scientists and analysts over the next couple
    of decades. It's a very high priority.
        Senator Heinrich. Secretary, I want thank you for your
    service, and specifically, as--you know a great deal about what
    we now call the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) and how
    much that has contributed to our national security with its
    infrastructure and personnel and acquisition authorities. I
    just want to thank both of you, really, for your work in
    building secure facilities at Kirtland for Space RCO and
    enabling that office to really quickly deliver solutions to the
    military. I look forward, General, in continuing that progress
    with you.
        Secretary, one other thing I want to ask you about is--I'm
    starting to hear from another of--a number of folks, both in
    and outside the services, who have said that if the U.S.
    doesn't start to buy the emerging commercial offerings that
    we're seeing, in terms of small satellites, small launch
    providers, that we could see those things migrate overseas. Is
    the Air Force being assertive enough in procuring or even just
    experimenting with some of these smaller commercial
    capabilities?
        Secretary Wilson. I think there's going to be a huge demand
    for small commercial capabilities, globally. The Air Force has
    funded, through DARPA, an experiment. It's called Black Jack,
    and it's looking at a small satellite constellation using
    commercial satellites. But, I will say this. We've done a lot
    of modeling and simulation. Many of you have participated in a
    tabletop exercise that we've done about the shift from an
    uncontested environment to a contested environment. What is the
    strategy that makes sense in that environment? Then, how do we
    develop programs to support that strategy? One of the
    challenges with a proliferated low-Earth-orbit satellite system
    that's where commercial satellites usually live and operate is,
    it's very close to the Earth. That's great to be able to see
    things, but it also means that they are vulnerable. The
    commercial systems, without any defenses on them, are also
    quite vulnerable. So, we need to think about not just how
    expensive they are, but, Do they survive in a contested domain?
    The way I like to put it is, you know, I drive a Subaru. It's a
    great--I love it. It's less expensive than a tank. But, I
    wouldn't take it into combat. So, we need to think about it
    from a warfighting point of view.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, Secretary, I want to thank you
    again for your service. I'm out of time, here, but, before you
    begin your transition, I would just urge you, on the PFAS issue
    that Senator Manchin brought up, whatever we can do to make
    these folks, who have been so severely impacted by that, whole,
    really through no fault of their own, in all of these cases, I
    would just urge you to give that all the attention you can
    before you make your transition to El Paso.
        Secretary Wilson. Thank you.
        Senator Heinrich. Thanks.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, both of you, for appearing again.
        Let me add my congratulations and just tell you I agree
    with all the accolades you've received today, Secretary Wilson.
    I don't think any of them are even a little bit exaggerated.
    But, thank you for your service.
        To both of you, thank you for your candor. You have spoken
    with great clarity, and particularly in differentiating the Air
    Force we need from the Air Force that we can afford. More
    importantly, thank you for your candor in answering the what-if
    questions, the ``What if the worst? What if we don't get our
    jobs done as it relates to appropriate appropriations?'' So, we
    need that clarity, our constituents need to hear that clarity,
    and I thank you for that.
        I'm tempted, of course, to ask about plans to modernize two
    very important aircraft to me, the Global Hawk in Grand Forks
    and the B-52s. I think we've talked a lot about that. But,
    before we get to that, I've not heard a lot today about, and
    I'm very intrigued with, and interested in, Space Force. I'd
    like the--the message that is coming out, I think you have 72
    million in this budget for the headquarters. But, I would ask
    each of you to, maybe, elaborate a bit, first of all, on the
    importance of it--as we look at scarcity of resources, and
    we're talking about a sixth branch, there--you know, lots of
    people have lots of opinions, and yet this domain seems--well,
    I think it seems critically important, and I haven't heard
    anybody--any of the combatant commanders or anybody else,
    whether related to Space Force or not, say that it's not a good
    idea. But, I just would open the floor to let you explain to us
    one more time why it's so important, maybe starting with the
    Secretary.
        Secretary Wilson. You know, Senator, we are the best in the
    world at space. Our adversaries know it, and they are seeking
    to develop the capability to deny us the use of space in crisis
    or in war. In private conversations, as we've received
    briefings and so on from combatant commanders--not from the Air
    Force, but from combatant commanders and other services--they
    understand the importance of space as an enabling capability
    for everything they're trying to do. We have made significant
    changes in programs, based on threat analysis and strategy, in
    fiscal year 2019, which this Committee and others in the
    Congress supported, and we propose, in fiscal year 2020,
    another boost, a 17-percent increase in our space portfolio in
    the fiscal year 2020 budget. So, we're making the financial
    investments. We are also buying those capabilities faster and
    smarter. In fact, in the space realm, we--you know, we set
    ourselves a goal 10 months ago. In some ways, it was a gimmick,
    but it got people focused. We wanted to strip 100 years out of
    Air Force procurement in 12 months. So, look at every program,
    see if we could optimize these in a--you know, not--we're not
    skimping on any requirements. We're going to buy a tailored
    suit rather than a suit off the rack. We're currently at 78.5
    years taken out of Air Force procurement programs. Of that, 21
    came from space, alone. So, we are moving forward to buy things
    in space faster and smarter. Our policy is to maintain American
    dominance in space so that space capabilities are available to
    the Joint Force, and so that we deter any attack on the United
    States or our allies.
        So, the organizational change that was put forward in
    parallel with this budget is actually--you know, it's a change
    that elevates, that enhances the influence of space and leaders
    in the Pentagon. That's in it for the long haul. So, I think
    one of the things that--taken all together, the combatant
    command, which is being stood up, plus the increases in
    spending that all of you have supported, and the shift to a
    strategy for a--strategy and the programs to support it for a
    contested domain, will keep us dominant in space. That is our
    job.
        Chief?
        General Goldfein. Thanks, ma'am.
        You know, I look at it from a warfighter perspective.
    Having been the space coordinating authority and component lead
    for Central Command for--deployed for 2 years, I've employed
    space capabilities against an enemy. I look at it from a
    warfighting perspective. I see, given the situation we're in,
    and obviously aligned with the Secretary's statement--the
    problem statement, that we are the best in the world, we've got
    to do three things simultaneously. First, we have to defend
    what we have, because it's going to be there for awhile, and we
    all rely on it. From the blue dot on our phone to the
    indications and warnings of missile launch, I mean, we rely on
    space capabilities. So, we have to defend what we have.
        But, it's not good enough just to step in the ring and
    defend and take punches. At some point, you've got to be able
    to punch back. Our adversaries need to know that we can punch
    back. It needs to be part of their calculus. So, we have to
    develop offensive capabilities.
        the third piece we have to do is develop the force that can
    fight and win, because this transition from an uncontested
    domain to a contested domain requires that force to be
    developed for the future.
        So, I believe that, as we were in a robust debate about how
    to get at the President's guidance, we were debating between a
    separate service, separate department, separate Secretary,
    separate Chief, to a Med Corps, JAG Corps. Where we landed,
    which is a separate service within the Department of the Air
    Force, to me, is the most recognizable model from a business of
    warfighting. Of all the things that we're doing, going forward,
    I would offer, the most important act that I would ask this
    Committee to take on this year is to stand up U.S. Space
    Command with a commander. Because, in the business of joint
    warfighting, that aligns how this entire Department does
    business, going forward.
        Senator Cramer. Well said. Thank you both.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to pursue this question of the Space Force, but I
    understand we're having a full hearing next week, so I'll
    defer. Put me down as skeptical that an organizational change
    costing half a billion dollars a year is going to change our
    capacity. So, be prepared to help me through that question. I
    look forward to that discussion next week.
        Secretary Wilson, everybody's praised you today. I plan to
    do something about it. You'd better watch the National Defense
    bill. I'm thinking of an amendment prohibiting your retirement.
    So, you'd better have that--have your legislative staff scour
    that document as it goes forward.
        You have done a sensational job. I think a perfect example
    is the comment you made a few minutes ago about the amount of
    time you've cut out of the procurement process. That's a big
    deal. Procurement has two problems, historically, in the
    Defense Department. One is money, cost, and the other is time.
    You have done something that had needed doing a long time, and
    I really want to thank you for that.
        A second general comment. I understand neither of you had
    anything to do with this, but I just don't like this OCO-for-
    base business. Twenty-five percent of your budget is OCO, and
    three-quarters of the OCO is OCO-for-base, which is a non
    sequitur. If it's base, it's base. If it's OCO, it's OCO.
    Again, I realize that you're--this is something that was handed
    down from other parts of the government, but it's not honest
    government, it's not honest to the Congress or the people of
    America. This isn't OCO. Let's get real about what these
    numbers are.
        General, the light-attack experiment, which is to use
    existing platforms, try to develop a new counter-violent-
    extremist--I understand the A-10 is--I heard, yesterday, from
    people in the maintenance business, that they are hard to
    maintain now. They're just wearing out. How's this experiment
    going? Where does it stand?
        General Goldfein. Sir, let me tell you, first, that light
    attack, A-10, two completely separate----
        Senator King. Okay.
        General Goldfein.--issues, here. Light attack is not
    designed to, nor will it ever, replace the A-10. Our intent is
    to fly the A-10 as one of the four weapon systems----
        Senator King. You can----
        General Goldfein.--that we need through the 2030s.
        Senator King. Because we've been hearing, for the last 3 or
    4 years, about getting rid of the A-10. Are we now back to
    maintaining the A-10?
        General Goldfein. We are, and--through the 2030s, for the
    A-10.
        Senator King. So, let's move now to the light attack.
        General Goldfein. Light attack. Sir, to understand light
    attack and where we're going--and I will tell you that I can't
    think of a better example of how we used the authorities you
    gave us to accelerate our understanding about a particular
    weapon system. You go back to the National Defense Strategy,
    the second line of effort is about building allies and
    partners. That's what the light attack is all about. The
    question--the strategy in the National Defense Strategy is to
    drive violent extremism down to the point where it can be
    handled inside the borders of governed nations. This is a
    global challenge, from the Philippines to Nigeria. So, the
    question we asked to ourselves was, How do we build a platform
    sensor/weapon combination and an intelligence-gathering and a
    network that will allow more allies and partners to join us in
    the fight against violent extremism? So, we went out----
        Senator King. So, this would be a--an aircraft that could
    be utilized by our allies.
        General Goldfein. Absolutely. That's been the primary
    focus. It remains our focus. So, again, we went out, 5 months
    after I signed an initial declaration of an experiment, when it
    went out, companies came in, we did an experiment at Holloman
    Air Force Base. We went on to a second experiment. What you'll
    see in our budget is money to procure three of each kind of
    airplane that we've been experimenting with. We're going to put
    a detachment at Nellis, where we do our task-level training.
    We're going to put a detachment at Hurlburt, where we do
    Special Ops. We're going to invite allies and partners. The
    most exciting part of this experiment, that we would not have
    been able to do without your authorities, is, we have built a
    coalition-friendly intelligence-gathering and information-
    sharing network that we don't have to tell anybody, ``No, you
    can't have this information.'' It's platform-agnostic. By
    owning these airplanes, now, as prototypes, we can modify.
    We're going to bring industry in, we're going to bring allies
    and partners in, and we're trying to solve the math equation
    that currently exists in North Africa. One-thousand Americans
    plus 4,000 French enables 35,000 fighters that are taking on
    violent extremism across North Africa. This is the air-
    component contribution to the National Defense Strategy, to do
    just that.
        Senator King. I take it from your comments that you feel
    like this has been a worthwhile experiment, and that we're
    making some real progress.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Not only has it been
    worthwhile, but I will tell you that the companies that have
    been with us from the beginning have been spectacular. I think
    there is no better example I can give you of how we used your
    intent for these authorities to advance. We're not even 2
    years----
        Senator King. You mean you're saying, for the record, that
    we did something right?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We jumped on it.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I'm out of time, but a question for the record. I'm very
    interested in maintenance levels and readiness levels of
    aircraft, and increasing those levels to, if not duplicate, but
    approach commercial availabilities. For the record, if you
    could give me some thoughts on where we are, progress made,
    perhaps graph where we are. You understand the nature of the
    question.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator King. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thanks, to the witnesses. Secretary Wilson, I'll add my
    congratulations. I'll tell you who I'd be--who is really
    nervous right now. The individual running Air Force ROTC at
    UTEP [University of Texas El Paso], because if that program
    isn't the best-performing one in the country, with the former
    Secretary of the Air Force as president of the university, that
    person's going to have some 'splaining to do, I think. So----
        Secretary Wilson. Sadly, there's only Army ROTC at UTEP,
    so----
        Senator Kaine. Okay, good. All right. They ducked that
    bullet. Congratulations to you.
        I just want to pick up, first, on comments--a number of
    folks on the other side of the dais here have raised the
    specter of CR. Folks on this side of the dais aren't talking
    about CR. The notion that we're heading toward a CR, I hear
    that from one side. I don't know where that's coming from. We
    don't want a CR. We want an appropriations bill, and we'll get
    one. We got a great appropriations deal at the end of 2018,
    with two Republican houses, that Republican colleagues here
    voted for. But, then, after the President said he didn't like
    it, folks switched their votes, they voted against it, and we
    shut the Government down for 35 days. That hurt the military.
    Didn't hurt the Air Force directly, but the Coast Guard's part
    of the military, even though it's not part of the DOD. They
    weren't getting paid for 35 days. So, let's be clear who's
    talking about CR, who's expressing worry about CR, who's saying
    we might run into a CR. It's not Democrats. We don't want a CR.
    We want a budget.
        Let me just ask, If there is a CR and sequester kicks back
    in, my understanding is, it's not steady-state funding. Am I
    correct that funding would start to ratchet down under a CR if
    sequester kicks back in?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, if you move to a sequester, the
    cut for the Air Force would be about $29 billion. I think you
    were at another hearing when I was talking about this, but
    that's four times the size of the sequester we had last----
        Senator Kaine. Yeah.
        Secretary Wilson.--time the Air Force went through this,
    and just to--so, the choices--I mean, sequester would be across
    the side----
        Senator Kaine. Right.
        Secretary Wilson.--of all program elements. But, if it were
    concentrated, the scope of this is--it would be all F-35s, all
    KC-46s, all B-21s stopped, ground-based strategic deterrent,
    all research, development, test, and procurement of space, and
    most fourth- and fifth-generation modifications, all science
    and technology. You add all of that together, and you get $29
    billion in a single year.
        Senator Kaine. Sequester would be foolish. CR would be
    foolish. There's nobody on this side of the dais who is talking
    about either. We can do an appropriations bill.
        Let me move to hurricane relief. I have a publication from
    the OSD Comptroller, and I just want to make sure this is
    right. The Air Force hurricane recovery estimate--just the Air
    Force--is 5 billion--that's my understanding--for Tyndall,
    Eglin, Warner Robbins, Goldsboro, Sumter, and Hampton, VA. Is
    that 5-billion number accurate, Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. It's 3.7 plus 1.2.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. So, 4.9--$4.9 billion. Now, that's the
    Air Force number. The--DOD-wide, the hurricane recovery request
    is $8.9 billion. That's for Hurricanes Michael and Florence.
    Here's the way that we're proposing to deal with that. The DOD
    has--they're trying to cobble together 2.4 billion out of the
    fiscal year 2019 budget, and they're flexing cash around to be
    able to do it. They may need a supplemental of 1.8. They may
    not be able to find enough, but they're trying to find 2.4
    billion in fiscal year 2019. The Department has, in the
    budget--the budget before us--3 billion for fiscal year 2020.
    So, that gets to 5.4 out of the 8.9. That leaves 3.5, 3.6
    billion unfunded for hurricane relief. Now, I'm struck, when I
    saw that the unfunded requirement for hurricane relief is $3.6
    billion, that that is exactly the amount that the President is
    taking out of the fiscal year 2019 MILCON budget: $3.6 billion.
    It's 3.6 billion out of MILCON. It's 2.5 out of the drug
    interdiction account.
        So, if we were not taking the 3.6 out of MILCON to deal
    with what your colleagues have testified here is a nonmilitary
    emergency, that $3.6 billion could be used to fill the unfunded
    requirements for hurricane relief for the entire DOD. I'm just
    putting that on the record, because many of us voted against
    the declaration, a few weeks back, because we don't think a
    nonmilitary emergency should give the President a license to
    ransack the military's budget. The numbers, dollar for dollar,
    are the same. That $3.6 billion is the amount of the unfunded
    requirement to do the hurricane relief on Tyndall and on other
    installations--Lejeune, et cetera--that are outside the Air
    Force. That's important.
        General Goldfein, the last thing I want to say is this.
    Military housing folks have asked you about it. Your statement
    in that hearing, where you said, ``I've lived in military
    housing most of my life, as a child, as a member in the
    military, and my wife and my kids have lived in military
    housing.'' I think you said 50 years, plus, in military
    housing, or something like that. You said that you have never
    worried for your own health, you've never worried for the
    health of your spouse, you've never worried for the health of
    your kids in military housing. You said that in a very powerful
    way to point out that people who are in military housing right
    now shouldn't have to, either. That comment gave me a feeling
    that there is a command presence here that's going to take this
    very, very seriously until we get it right. We'll make sure
    that you do. But, I'm given confidence by the way you expressed
    that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
        You know, let me just make one comment, here, and we can
    discuss this in a different setting, perhaps. Just keep in mind
    that the problem that many on this side of the aisle see is
    parity. This is the first time in my memory that we've been in
    a situation--and I'm older than you are, I've been around
    longer than you have, and I've observed, certainly since World
    War II, that we have not been in a situation where defending
    America wasn't the number-one priority. It is no longer, as a
    result of the last administration.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I know there have been questions about the F-35 and the F-
    15. As you well know, prior to the release of the President's
    budget request, my Connecticut colleagues and I sent a letter
    to Acting Secretary Shanahan expressing concern about the then-
    rumored cuts to the F-35 program. I am deeply disappointed,
    more so now than then, that these reports proved to be true.
    Instead of the robust investment in the fifth-generation F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter, this budget request proposes a mix of
    fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. This step seems to be a
    shift in strategic planning. This shift appears to have been
    directed by the Secretary--or, I should say, the Acting
    Secretary of Defense, not the Air Force. Is that true?
        Secretary Wilson. No, sir. The Secretary of--Acting
    Secretary of Defense did not direct us to do that--or did not
    direct me to do that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
        Secretary Wilson. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't hear you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
        Secretary Wilson. Sir, when we put together a budget and
    make sausage, there's--we put forward ideas, they then go
    forward to the OSD level and cost analysis and program
    evaluation, and the Comptroller then look at various programs
    and how all of this works. In the process of that, we did a
    deep dive particularly looking at tactical air and how are we
    going to get to where we need to be without our airframes--
    we've got some airframes, particularly the F-15C, that's not
    going to make it there. You look at the various sand charts and
    pieces of analysis and what the combatant commander
    requirements are, and we cannot meet their requirements in
    capacity, because that F-15C--it's just not going to live long
    enough. What should we do about that within the money that we
    have? The solution that we came up with, in concert with CAPE
    and the Comptroller, was to buy--we're committed to the F-35--
    was to buy 48 F-35s and then, instead of trying to extend the
    life of those F-15Cs, replace them with an F-15E.
        Senator Blumenthal. What was the initial recommendation,
    though, that you made before all of the grinders----
        Secretary Wilson. Well----
        Senator Blumenthal.--then took over?
        Secretary Wilson. I can tell you that, when we--what the--
    what we could do within the money that we were--the way this
    works--and I didn't know it when I was up here on the Hill, but
    you--we, basically, are given a top line internal to the Air
    Force and try to build the best program we can to achieve the
    National Defense Strategy objectives within that top line. That
    included a proposal for 48 F-35s. With that, we would see a
    decline in the number of fighter squadrons we would have in the
    out years, because those F-15Cs weren't going to make it. When
    we went forward and said, what does this mean for our ability
    to meet combatant commander requirements? The answer was good.
    We can't keep declining in the number of fighter squadrons we
    have. In cooperation with CAPE and the Comptroller, one of the
    ideas was to replace those dying F-15Cs with an F-15EX off the
    line. By doing that, the Qataris and the Saudis have kept the
    line open, and have invested in modernization there. We
    wouldn't have any MILCON cost. We could do local training to
    shift from an F-15C to an F-15E. Most of the ground equipment
    is the same. Many of the parts are the same. We wouldn't have
    to retrain the maintainers. So, when it's a balance of capacity
    and capability, given the budget that we have available, that
    was what made, we thought, the most sense.
        Senator Blumenthal. So--I hate to be simplistic about it--
    your initial recommendation, as I understand it, your initial
    budget that you submitted to the Secretary of Defense did not
    include the F-15s, and then all of these factors were made
    aware to you?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, we do the best we can with the
    top line we're given internally, and that included 48 F-35s and
    a declining size of the number of fighter squadrons. The
    question then was, What is the impact of that? When we went
    forward with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
    CAPE and the Comptroller--and, you know, they never allocate
    all the money out when we go through this process, and it was,
    ``Well, if there were more money available, can we stem that
    decline in the number of fighter squadrons we have available?''
    The first thing was to keep 48 F-35s. We're committed to that
    platform. It's a game changer. How can we reduce the impact of
    the loss of the F-15C? This was the answer we came up with.
        General Goldfein. Sir, I would just offer that, as part of
    the dialogue, one of the things that the Secretary and I made
    very clear was that we were not going to take money from the F-
    35 and put it into an F-15. This is additive, F-15. We
    absolutely have to keep the F-35 program on track, because, as
    the largest customer, we speak not only for the United States
    Air Force, but also for our teammates in the Navy and the
    Marine Corps that are buying the F-35, and all of our
    international teammates, because we need our international
    allies and partners in the fifth generation with us. To give
    you an example, we need Canada, who's going through their
    process right now. We need them. They're part of an alliance
    that we've worked together in NORAD for 60 years. To defend our
    Homeland together, we need them in the fifth-generation. So,
    we're not backing an inch off the F-35 as we go forward.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, I take it at word, because my
    time is expired, that there will be no diminishing of
    commitment to the F-35. I think that is certainly the right
    goal.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Let me make one comment about the F-35 that I don't think
    was--has been made. Yeah, we have the figure of 1,763--1,763
    that's supposed in this timeframe. We are now at 182. We should
    be at 1,100. I think you would agree with that figure. So,
    that's one of the problems that we have not had a chance to
    explore, but it's a problem, certainly not of your doing.
        Appreciate very much the great responses that you made to
    all these questions.
        We're adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                                    bombers
        1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many
    combat coded bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need
    requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber
    squadrons. The exact number of combat coded bombers is classified but
    remains available in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.

        2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many
    penetrating (non-standoff) bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need
    requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber
    squadrons. To achieve this capacity while reducing overall bomber
    operations and sustainment costs, the Air Force plans to keep the
    current four B-52 squadrons and transition the rest of the bombers to
    B-21 long-term. Therefore, the remaining 10 bomber squadrons would
    eventually consist of penetrating bombers. The exact number of
    penetrating combat coded bombers is classified but remains available in
    the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                            manned-unmanned teaming
        3. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, as we continue to build
    readiness and modernize our forces to potentially fight a great power
    war, we must contend with issues such as the ongoing pilot shortage.
    Part of this can be addressed through recruitment and retention,
    however, emerging capabilities provide additional avenues to overcome
    this challenge, as well as many others. What initiatives has the Air
    Force undertaken in the realm of manned-unmanned teaming to increase
    the number of combat aircraft without necessarily requiring as many
    pilots?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force is continuing to develop,
    demonstrate and assess advanced control automation techniques, a key
    initiative to make manned-unmanned teaming work. In our budget we are
    funding research to continue the development in three areas: 1) mixed
    initiative control techniques for teams of remotely piloted aircraft
    and/or manned-unmanned teams in contested, dynamic mission
    environments; 2) integration of unmanned systems into controlled
    airspace and airbase operations; and 3) autonomous behaviors for safe,
    loyal wingman that maintain appropriate human control over weapons
    employment.

        4. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, do you foresee a future in
    which a single pilot or pilot-pair could fly while simultaneously
    directing autonomous aircraft in combat?
        General Goldfein. This is exactly the type of game-changing
    capability we envision for future autonomous combat air vehicles.
    Manned and unmanned teaming in future operations will require unmanned
    platforms to autonomously fly in complex and fluid formations. Manned
    and unmanned teaming will also be dependent upon on how well our
    systems seamlessly share information.

        5. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, what hurdles would need to be
    overcome to field these types of formations, and how would emerging
    technologies such as artificial intelligence be leveraged to field them
    effectively?
        General Goldfein. A variety of technologies, including advanced
    sensors, flight control systems, artificial intelligence, flight safety
    systems, communications capability and others will have to be leveraged
    to field these types of formations. As the technology evolves, we will
    iteratively hone our thinking on human control, develop employment
    concepts, and then the detailed tactics, techniques and procedures
    needed to employ these new capabilities.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                  f-35 beddown
        6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the
    Air Force's beddown of F-35 aircraft proceeding on schedule?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The beddown of 54 F-35As in
    2 Squadrons at Eielson AFB, AK remains on track. The first squadron has
    already started receiving F-35 personnel, and is currently planned to
    receive F-35s from the spring of 2020 to the spring of 2021. The second
    squadron's F-35s are planned to arrive from the spring of 2021 to the
    winter 2021/2022.

        7. Senator Sullivan. General Goldfein, please describe the
    strategic importance of bedding two squadrons of F-35s down at Eielson
    AFB.
        General Goldfein. F-35 beddown at Eielson AFB adds the newest fifth
    generation fighters to our major Air Force command within the Pacific,
    adding significant capacity to provide Air Superiority to United States
    Indo-Pacific Command's area of responsibility. In accordance with the
    National Defense Strategy, they are strategically located there to
    deter Russia and China and aid the United States in a time of great
    power competition.

        8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, are
    there any ongoing military construction projects at Eielson AFB that
    would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were to be delayed?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no ongoing
    Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that, if delayed,
    would affect the F-35 beddown.

        9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
    are the programmed but not yet awarded military construction projects
    at Eielson AFB that would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were
    to be delayed or cancelled?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no programmed, but
    not yet awarded Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that,
    if delayed or cancelled, would affect the F-35 beddown.
                                 kc-46 progress
        10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, what problems and concerns
    with KC-46 production and quality control prompted you to halt delivery
    of KC-46 aircraft from Boeing twice? What was the timeline for those
    problems, concerns, and the Air Force's decision-making process?
        Secretary Wilson. On February 28, 2019, the Air Force halted KC-46A
    aircraft acceptance after discovering excessive Foreign Object Debris
    (FOD) during aircraft acceptance inspections. Deliveries resumed on
    March 11, 2019, following Boeing's Corrective Action Plan brief to the
    Air Force and successful FOD sweeps of delivering aircraft. Deliveries
    were halted a second time on March 23, 2019, after inspections to
    selected sealed areas uncovered additional FOD as well as workmanship
    and quality issues. On April 5, 2019, the Air Force resumed deliveries
    after determining additional corrective actions proposed by Boeing were
    sufficient. Delivered aircraft can continue to fly as there is no
    immediate safety of flight issue. Inspections to select sealed areas of
    delivered aircraft are required and will be accomplished via a Time
    Compliance Technical Order in the coming months, at Boeing's expense.

        11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, when will you release the
    outcome of the Air Force's Strategic Basing Decision for KC-46 OCONUS
    basing?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force will make future final basing
    decisions approximately three years prior to projected first aircraft
    delivery. Future KC-46A basing strategies will be made in light of the
    National Defense Strategy and combatant commander requirements to
    maintain optimum combat capacity during recapitalization. The National
    Defense Strategy informs the optimal sequencing of Active Duty,
    Reserve, and guard locations for future KC-46A squadrons.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
             new air national guard aeromedical evacuation squadron
        12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, this year, the Air Force will
    continue with its strategic basing process to establish a new
    Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AES) within the Air National Guard,
    including site surveys this spring. Savannah Hilton Head Air Guard
    Station is one of fourteen locations being considered. The September
    18, 2018, approval of the enterprise definition and criteria emphasizes
    the operational, manpower, and capacity requirements of the AES
    mission. Within the manpower criteria is an emphasis on recruiting, and
    in particular, registered nurses. Georgia Southern University has a top
    tier School of Nursing located in Savannah and is uniquely positioned
    to offer support in the way of nursing professionals, as well as other
    health professional programs. How important is a local, academic
    recruiting pipeline to the success of this new AES?
        Secretary Wilson. As shown in the basing criteria released to
    Congress, registered nurses and the ability to recruit form 70 percent
    of the Recruiting score listed under Manpower, which is a Mission
    criterion. Recruiting and retention, combined, form over half the
    Mission score. Recruiting and retention are primary considerations for
    this Air National Guard basing action.

        13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how important is support from
    local academic institutions to ensure there is the required, trained
    workforce available to this mission?
        Secretary Wilson. The recruiting measure in part includes assessing
    the registered nurse population proximate to the installation,
    therefore although not directly measured as a part of this basing
    action, local academic support may positively impact recruiting pool
    and retention levels, which are measured.

        14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how can academic and
    workforce development partners tailor their programs to prepare to
    support the Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron?
        Secretary Wilson. Academic institutions offering Bachelors of
    Science in Nursing programs benefit the Air Force by providing the
    basic qualifications needed by flight nurses. Also any partnerships
    related to physician training would also apply. Workforce development
    partners, with critical care capabilities, should allow Air Force
    medics to practice within their facilities through memorandums of
    agreements or training affiliation agreements with our Active Duty
    medical treatment facilities so our Aeromedical Evacuation medics can
    keep their skills up.
                                  jstars/abms
        15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, in February 2019, the Air
    Force submitted a report to Congress on the ``Joint Surveillance Target
    and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Sustainment and Viability Plan''. The
    report states that the E-8C fleet service life projection has been
    updated and extended as a result of the wing and fuselage widespread
    fatigue damage analyses conducted by Boeing. The report states that
    these analyses indicate the ability to operate ``into the 2030s''.
    However, the platform's service life may be much greater, with the
    potential to operate well into the 2040s. What is the most current
    service life projection for the E-8C JSTARS fleet?
        Secretary Wilson. The current airframe service life projection is
    past 2070, but other critical components begin to limit the E-8C's
    service life in the 2030s. The next major limitation is engine
    availability, driven by engine depot throughput, a lack of replacement
    parts to maintain aging engines. In parallel, multiple communication
    and datalink mandates, and aging/Diminishing Manufacturing Sources
    (DMS) components all limit the service life.

        16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the February 2019 JSTARS
    Sustainment and Viability Plan states that the System Program Office is
    currently executing multiple initiatives to address declining fleet
    aircraft availability rates, to include addressing negative non-mission
    capable (NMC) drivers. However, the report does not identify which
    elements of the aircraft are most responsible for driving NMC rates,
    nor does it describe how exactly the Air Force intends to address these
    issues. The propulsion system has repeatedly been identified as the
    number one non-mission capable driver for the platform, and that it is
    also one of the largest time and cost drivers during depot maintenance.
    Of the multiple initiatives currently being executed by the System
    Program Office, are there any related to the propulsion system, and
    what is the Air Force's plan going forward to address issues related to
    the propulsion system?
        Secretary Wilson. The program office is actively pursuing efforts
    to address key non-mission critical drivers such as engine
    availability. Efforts include: locking out the engine thrust reversers;
    working with Tinker engine depot to improve engine replacement
    throughput; and sub-contracting engine maintenance to augment the
    Tinker depot. Each will increase engine availability, but not eliminate
    all issues completely.
        The thrust reversers are the biggest non-mission capable driver for
    the JSTARS engines. The thrust reverser lock out project is expected to
    begin this summer and last six months. During the six months, engineers
    will design a permanent hardware solution, which locks the thrust
    reverse in place preventing any movement of the reverse eliminating the
    issue. The project is funded.
        To address parts limitations, the Air Force will ask for additional
    money in fiscal year 2021 to increase depot part throughput and
    availability. Right now, the program office is working with Northrop
    Grumman to sub-contract an alternative engine depot to augment the
    current depot throughput.

        17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the progression of the ABMS
    program is now being measured by ``phases'', rather than
    ``increments.'' What is the rationale for this shift, as well the
    impact it will have on formal milestone designations, decision
    authority, and progress measurement?
        Secretary Wilson. The objective is to field ABMS capabilities as
    they are ready and not wait for a specific preconceived date in the
    future.

        18. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, does the Air Force have an
    estimate on when they expect ABMS to deliver a BMC2 and GMTI capability
    that is at least comparable to that of the current JSTARS fleet? Please
    provide both the timing (fiscal year) and acquisition stage (both phase
    and increment).
        Secretary Wilson. We are committed to doing ABMS thoughtfully,
    prior to the retirement of any legacy systems, to ensure that we have
    the right warfighter capabilities. This will enable us to project power
    in contested environment, not simply a permissive environment.

        19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, on June 4, 2018, the Air
    Force announced that Robins would host the initial elements of ABMS.
    The press release specifically said, ``Selecting Robins enables the Air
    Force to leverage existing infrastructure and the more than 40 years of
    experience resident in the Robins' workforce. There is no intent to
    reduce manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.'' Is
    it still the case that the Air Force expects no reduction of manpower
    at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS?
        Secretary Wilson. Yes. The Air Force still expects no reduction of
    manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                     support to southern border operations
        20. Senator Reed. General Goldfein, in a response to a question
    from Sen. Warren, you said there were no training exercises or impacted
    deployments based on the Air Force's support of troop deployments to
    the southern border with Mexico. Given the news and readiness impacts
    General Neller outlined in his memoranda to Secretary Spencer, I wanted
    to give you an opportunity to clarify. Have there been any adverse
    impacts to unit readiness, any training exercises deferred or missed,
    or otherwise any impacts on unit deployments based on Air Force support
    to southern border operations?
        General Goldfein. General Goldfein's memo dated May 2, 2019
    provided amplifying details to answer Senator Warren's questions on the
    readiness challenges posed by the deployment of troops to the southern
    border. No exercises or deployments were cancelled or delayed due to a
    unit supporting a southern border deployment. However, an HH-60G Rescue
    Squadron missed an opportunity to attend the Navy's TRIDENT Exercise
    from January 14-26, 2019. The exercise would have provided an opportune
    platform for deck landings. The Rescue Squadron's inability to attend
    the Navy exercise due to southern border deployment had a limited
    impact on a training opportunity. There was no impact to long-term
    readiness of the squadron due to other training opportunities
    throughout the year and deck landings are not required for current
    deployments. The HH-60G Rescue Squadron is no longer supporting
    southern border operations as of January 31, 2019.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                      f-35
        21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, with the recent shift in
    National Defense Strategy toward great power competition against near
    peer threats like Russia and China, isn't having a robust generation 5
    tactical fighter aircraft like the F-35 now more important than ever?
    What is the value of having stealth fighter in a non-permissive
    environment?
        Secretary Wilson. The capabilities of the F-35 are crucial for
    deterring and prevailing in combat against a peer adversary. The F-35's
    stealth capabilities allow it to penetrate enemy advanced air defense
    to hold key targets at risk. Additionally, the F-35s Battle Management
    Command and Control (BMC2) capabilities are essential for Joint Team
    success. The F-35 increases the value of other assets against a peer
    threat--it is the centerpiece of achieving air superiority in future
    contested environments.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force unfunded
    priority list includes 12 F-35A's. How would the Air Force's benefit
    from receiving those additional 12 F-35's in this year's budget
    authorization and appropriation from Congress?
        Secretary Wilson. The F-35 brings game-changing capabilities to the
    fight--it has increased survivability through a number of technologies
    including stealth. Its advanced integrated sensors will provide
    battlespace awareness to the Joint Team through the resilient network.
    The F-35's situational awareness and targeting abilities allow it to
    effectively employ our most advanced weapons in a highly contested
    environment. Analysis shows that we must procure 72 fighter aircraft a
    year to account for aging aircraft retirements and to meet National
    Defense Strategy and Operations Plans assigned missions. Appropriating
    funding for an additional 12 F-35A's would bring the Air Force closer
    to that number.

        23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, you have said recently
    that F-15s were not in the initial Air Force budget you submitted to
    the Secretary of Defense. Why did you decide to reverse course and add
    8 F-15EX's to your budget this year? Were you directed to do so?
        Secretary Wilson. No. It is true that our initial fiscal year 2020
    POM submission did not include the F-15EX; however, several key pieces
    of analysis and information became available during Program and Budget
    Review (PBR) to support the fiscal year 2020 PB position to procure the
    aircraft. We must procure 72 fighter aircraft a year to account for
    aging aircraft retirements and to meet the National Defense Strategy.
    This requirement, combined with current budget realities and the global
    missions of the Air Force demand a mix of 4th and 5th generation force
    structure to balance near and mid-term readiness with future needs.
                                dod resignations
        24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, did the abrupt departure
    of Secretary Mattis influence your decision to resign? Why did you
    decide now is the right time to leave the Air Force?
        Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
    SecAF resignation.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, are you concerned that
    your position--like many other administration positions--may remain
    unfilled for an extended period of time? What are the potential
    negative effects of this void?
        Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
    SecAF resignation

        26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, what qualifications and
    experience should this Committee seek in your successor as we vet the
    next Air Force Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
    SecAF resignation

        27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, as you know, Acting
    Secretary Shanahan has been serving in a temporary status since January
    1st. This is the only time in the last 70 years the Secretary of
    Defense position has been vacant for more than two months. How has this
    vacancy impacted the Department, and specifically the Air Force? Are
    you concerned that Acting Secretary Shanahan appears to be serving
    indefinitely, without a confirmation to serve as Secretary of Defense?
        Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
    SecAF resignation
                              c-130h modernization
        28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, can you provide any
    updates to the approval process since I wrote to you on this issue?
        Secretary Wilson. The NP2000 8-bladed propeller is a performance
    enhancing modification approved and currently funded for 44 total C-
    130H aircraft. Currently, 11 aircraft have had been modified with
    NP2000 propellers. The remaining 33 aircraft will begin NP2000
    installations in June 2020. Since your letter, we have continued flight
    testing of the NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion
    modifications all scheduled for completion fall 2019. Data from this
    test and the accompanying analysis of performance information will
    inform Air Force leadership of composite propeller capabilities as a
    baseline for future decisions for the C-130H fleet.

        29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, in light of the recent
    tragic events and the subsequent revelation of the serious risk to our
    Air Force C-130H aircrews while flying the legacy propeller, what is
    the proposed timeline for installation of the NP-2000 propeller on the
    C-130H's like the ones we have in Connecticut?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force continues flight tests of the
    NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion modifications scheduled
    to complete fall 2019. Data from this test and the accompanying
    analysis of performance information will inform Air Force leadership of
    composite propeller capabilities as a baseline for future decisions for
    the C-130H fleet.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, I understand that Collins
    Aerospace is currently producing enough propellers for two aircraft per
    month. Due to the risk associated with the legacy propeller, would you
    support an increase to 3-4 aircraft per month if Congress appropriated
    additional funding to support the increased production costs?
        Secretary Wilson. Our budget request includes a plan for propeller
    modifications. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it is
    possible the Air Force could accelerate the modification.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                            indo-pacific importance
        31. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the U.S. National Security
    planning has for several years centered its policies in relation to the
    five major threats it faces, four of which are in the Indo-Pacific AOR.
    What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific region as the
    Secretary of the Air Force?
        Secretary Wilson. There are four main areas of concern, basically
    stemming from China's threatening regional posture: 1) Rapid growth of
    Chinese ability to attack United States and allied forces throughout
    the region and hinder United States entry, 2) Chinese competitive
    actions aimed at pushing the United States out of the Western Pacific,
    3) Lack of resilient and hardened basing to execute Agile Combat
    Employment, and 4) Increasing ops-tempo on USAF and allied air forces
    in responding to aggressive Chinese intrusions.
        Iran, North Korea, and other violent extremist groups are opponents
    we are equipped to manage, but China's large economy has enabled its
    huge and often hidden military expenditures. Ironically, we enabled
    China's economic growth by welcoming them into the international system
    with open arms. Over the last few years, however, it has become
    abundantly clear that China fundamentally rejects the equitable
    system--the system which has prospered more than any other--and aims to
    dominate its own sphere of influence by force, while threatening us in
    our own region.

        32. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, are additional assets and
    investments needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive
    advantage against our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region? If so, in
    what areas?
        Secretary Wilson. There are several material steps we can take such
    as base hardening/base resiliency, more munitions, more cyber
    capability, hypersonics, and resilience in space. But we are only
    beginning to invest. Just as important is the time and effort our
    leaders put into engaging with our allies and partners, explaining our
    commitment to a free and open Indo Pacific, and our willingness to work
    cooperatively with all nations who wish to keep it that way.
                            indo-pacific operations
        33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, last month, B-52H
    Stratofortress bombers deployed in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command's Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP). The CBP has been
    operational for more than a decade in support of a free and open Indo-
    Pacific. The bombers conduct training with NATO allies and partners to
    enhance interoperability and readiness. During this operation, one of
    the bombers flew over contested islands in the South China Sea for the
    first time since November. United States officials recently criticized
    China for setting up the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over
    the East China Sea in 2013, which does not conform to international law
    and overlaps similar zones operated by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
    How important are operations such as to show support to United States
    partnerships abroad and to communicate our commitment to ensuring the
    South China Sea remains open?
        Secretary Wilson. Our Air Force's presence, along with our sister
    services and civilian counterparts, is critical to maintaining a free
    and open Indo-Pacific.
        To ensure we balance this critical mission with readiness needs, we
    continually evaluate the specific measures we take, such as CBP, for
    their effectiveness and efficiency. That means our specific actions can
    and will change, but our commitment remains firm.

        34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, how important are these types
    of missions in support of Air Force readiness?
        Secretary Wilson. Real world missions require a ready and able
    force. In some cases, employing that force in critical missions
    improves readiness. However, there are some aspects of readiness that
    are best done or can only be done, within the United States. There may
    come a point when best supporting a particular mission means bringing
    forces home, and possibly changing the configuration of forces abroad.
                            artificial intelligence
        35. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, I see that your unfunded
    priority list calls for $18 million for further development and
    demonstration of cutting-edge technologies like hypersonics and
    autonomy. What is the importance of these technologies for the
    capabilities of the Air Force to meet our near-peer and peer
    adversaries?
        Secretary Wilson. In the dynamic battlespace, the Air Force must
    gather decision-quality information and act on it faster than our
    adversaries can react. Technologies such as autonomy and hypersonics
    will give the Air Force advantages over near-peer and peer adversaries
    in regards to acquiring information and acting upon it with speed.
    Artificial intelligence, aided by machine learning, will play a
    critical role in enhancing human-machine teaming, allowing for
    collaborative platforms and sensors, predictive analysis, and rapid
    decision making. Current autonomy research efforts have demonstrated a
    long-range, high subsonic unmanned air vehicle, as well as live mission
    exploitation techniques to accelerate analysis of full motion video,
    computer assisted detection, characterization, and tracking of humans
    in operational surveillance imagery. Current hypersonics research
    efforts have demonstrated hypersonic engine performance in ground
    testing and physics based simulations for the utilization of hypersonic
    weapons. These technology efforts will improve decision-making
    processes and advance weaponry that outpaces our adversaries. The
    additional funding would accelerate the completion of these technology
    efforts.
                            capability and readiness
        36. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
    National Defense Strategy clearly articulates a focus on near-peer and
    peer competitors such as China and Russia. How does the budget reflect
    the requirements of the Air Force to meet the challenges of the Great
    Power Competition?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The National Defense
    Strategy directs the Air Force to increase lethality, restore
    readiness, and prepare for high-end conflict against a near-peer
    adversary. We are getting after the challenges of the NDS in our budget
    by funding programs that are vital to win in the high-end fight, such
    as: hypersonics, F-35, Next Generation Air Dominance, B-21 Raider, KC-
    46, T-X, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, ABMS, and preferred
    munitions. However, as our Air Force We Need analysis shows the Air
    Force at 312 operational squadrons is too small to meet the demands of
    the NDS.

        37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, your
    budget calls for increasing the Air Force by 4,400 airmen and 5,143
    civilians. What are you doing to ensure that you can get the proper
    talent to fill these vital positions?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. In an environment with a
    fast growing competition for talent spurred by a robust economy, we are
    committed to improving how we recruit and prepare airmen to succeed,
    even as we have found success in attracting top talent from across our
    Nation. The increased airmen will go to support maintenance of our new
    weapon systems as well as increasing requirements in cyber,
    intelligence, rated and pilot production, career enlisted aviators and
    battlefield airmen. We have found success in recruiting most of these
    areas, and to ensure continued success we've adopted a total force
    recruiting approach which allows all recruiters to fill positions in
    the Active, Guard, Reserve and civil service. This ensures we maximize
    the productivity of each recruiter. We've added new recruiters to
    markets where we need additional support and focused our advertising
    and marketing program. Moreover, we've seen an increase in the number
    of leads through online career interest survey, Air Force Work Interest
    Navigator (AF-WIN). To date this survey has generated over 141,000
    leads--an average of over 400 surveys per day. We also stood up a
    squadron that is solely responsible for recruiting battlefield airmen,
    as well as a recruiting detachment to focus on engaging the pre-
    accessions demographic as part of the Air Force's efforts to improve
    outreach to youth, specifically increasing opportunities and awareness
    to diverse populations. Using these multiple approaches and tools, we
    are confident highly talented and skilled Americans will continue to
    find quality of service and quality of life while serving their country
    as airmen.
        The Air Force instituted numerous improvements to our civilian
    hiring and recruitment processes and developed a Comprehensive
    Recruiting Strategy in order to increase our applicant pools. We
    established a Talent Acquisition Team dedicated to recruiting civilian
    talent for mission critical and highly skilled fields. The Talent
    Acquisition Team combines workforce planning, forecasting, and analysis
    with innovative marketing, acquisition tools, and sourcing strategies
    to address both short and long-term hiring needs. The talent
    acquisition strategy includes leveraging social media and civilian
    sector recruiting sources and technology to improve the speed and
    quality of hiring. As one example, from January through March 2019, the
    AF conducted 23 outreach and hiring events across the nation at 22
    colleges/universities. These efforts increased recruiting by 63 percent
    and generated 93,000 primary leads. There are numerous other more
    localized programs at our Major Commands and installations throughout
    the country. The Air Force also implemented changes to our hiring
    processes to reduce time-to-hire in order to ensure we do not lose top
    talent through lengthy delays in hiring. We continue to make steady
    progress in reducing hiring timelines and are continuing to press for
    greater reform to civilian hiring.
                         military construction funding
        38. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in your
    recent MILCON fiscal year 2020 budget request, the Air Force continues
    to prioritize critical infrastructure requirements to meet mission
    needs and operational timeliness. The request states that its MILCON
    investments support the combatant commanders' highest construction
    priorities, new weapons system beddowns, and modernization of research,
    development and testing. What is the importance of MILCON investments
    to improve your capabilities to deter our adversaries in the Indo-
    Pacific region?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Military Construction
    investments are critical to supporting the operational beddown,
    training and employment of our future force. At the same time, Military
    Construction is vital to supporting our people and their families.
    While we are exploring a variety of different approaches to future
    military operations within the Indo-Pacific region, Military
    Construction will continue to be a vital part of all approaches.
        Air Force Military Construction supports combatant commanders,
    beddown of new weapons systems such as the F-35, and recapitalization
    of our existing infrastructure. Military Construction investments are
    powerful tools in the Indo-Pacific region, as they provide us with
    alternative airfields, fuels resiliency, modernized facilities, and
    surveillance capabilities in remote and isolated areas. Each completed
    project reminds our partners and adversaries of the United States'
    commitment to the Indo-Pacific Region.
                       sexual harassment and retaliation
        39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, annual
    reports on sexual assault in the military and annual reports on sexual
    harassment and violence at the military service academies consistently
    document the direct correlation between incidents of sexual harassment
    and incidents of sexual assault. Many past witnesses in Senate Armed
    Services Hearings have testified to the seriousness of addressing
    sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military. Please provide an
    update on what the Air Force is doing on the issue of sexual harassment
    and retaliation.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Training: Sexual Harassment
    is a topic highlighted during the curriculum for all initial training.
    We also reinforce sexual harassment policy at different stages
    throughout an Airman's career. Additionally, Sexual Harassment
    Awareness Education (SHAE) Training is a tool we provide to Key Leaders
    to reiterate sexual harassment policy. SHAE training includes the
    following:
          Define sexual harassment
          Identify behaviors that may constitute sexual harassment
    using DOD definition
          Identify the effects and describe the impact of sexual
    harassment
          Prevention strategies
          Individual roles and responsibilities when addressing
    sexual harassment
          Sexual harassment scenarios
        Prevention: In addition to training, we utilize organizational
    climate assessment tools as a preventive measure for Commanders to
    identify and track problematic behavior trends (to include sexual
    harassment), and develop action plans to address and counter those
    behaviors within their unit.
        Complaint Processing Options/Policy: Military sexual harassment
    complainants have the option to file informal and formal complaints
    through the military equal opportunity process. Civilian complainants
    have the option of filing a sexual harassment complaint through the
    equal employment opportunity process.
        Retaliation: We advise all complainants of their rights in regards
    to reprisal and retaliation by equal opportunity practitioners during
    initial discussions, and upon any inquiries by customers who contact
    the equal opportunity office. Any allegations of reprisal presented to
    the EO office by military personnel, including cadets, are referred to
    the Inspector General. We are aligning the AF Equal Opportunity
    Retaliation Program with DOD's Retaliation Prevention Response Strategy
    (RPRS), which is designed to operationalize the following:
          Develop and employ a common definition of retaliation to
    describe the full spectrum of retaliatory behavior;
          Initiate a data-driven approach to inform retaliation
    prevention and response mechanisms through a case tracking system;
          Hold offenders appropriately accountable;
          Facilitate a variety of support resources for sexual
    assault victims, sexual harassment complainants, witnesses, bystanders,
    and first responders;
          Provide leadership with additional education and tools to
    promote unit climates intolerant of retaliatory behavior.
                               space capabilities
        40. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, the Maui Space Surveillance
    Site provides a space capability combining operational satellite
    tracking facilities with a research and development facility. What are
    some areas in which we could make greater space investments (e.g.,
    cyber)?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force is making a number of key
    investments in space, consistent with the National Defense Strategy.
    First, we are recapitalizing current generation systems with resilient,
    defendable capabilities along with the means to defend them. Second, we
    are developing capabilities to fight back, if necessary, at a time,
    place, and domain of our choosing. Third, we are investing in the
    people that will develop, field, operate and support these new
    capabilities.

        41. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, what is the importance of a
    whole-of-government approach when working with our allies in this
    integrated and interdependent domain?
        General Goldfein. A whole-of-government approach when working with
    our allies in an integrated and interdependent space domain is
    critically important for ensuring the dominance and lethality to deter,
    defend and if necessary fight and win a future war. We are threatened
    by economic, military and political aggression, and we need to preserve
    the peace through strength. Our strength as a nation, however, is
    greatly magnified by embracing allies and partners who share our values
    and contribute to our common defense. As part of this approach, the Air
    Force is strengthening alliances, establishing new partnerships,
    leveraging industry and non-governmental organizations and increasing
    information sharing. A prime venue for this was the April 2019 Space
    Symposium, which brought together Air Force, other Government entities,
    industry, international and commercial leaders in a week-long
    conference to collaborate and share best practices across the space
    enterprise. Other activities being pursued by the Air Force in support
    of a whole-of-government approach include increased international space
    training where we consistently review course material for increased
    inclusion of allied nations and the participation of allies and
    partners in U.S. wargames. The Air Force is also appropriately sharing
    more classified information with our allies, and it is integrating more
    allies into operations centers such as the Combined Space Operations
    Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. This center was
    established last year to coordinate space intelligence sharing among
    allies and commercial space companies. Current participants include
    Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
                                  eagle vision
        42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the fiscal year 2020 Air
    Force Budget briefing documentation includes a claim that through the
    identification of redundant capabilities, the AF was able to divest all
    funding for the Eagle Vision program through an agreement between the
    Air Force and a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. A claim is
    also made that the Air Force receives a higher resolution of service at
    no cost to the Air Force saving $21 million per year.
        Please submit a copy of the referenced agreement between the Air
    Force and NGA.
        Secretary Wilson. While there is no formal memorandum of agreement
    between NGA and the Air Force, NGA's NextView License allows release of
    Digital Globe imagery to the Air Force. NGA's NextView License provides
    similar services of which some are identical in nature to Eagle Vision.
    Please see Appendix A, page 776, ``NextView License Sharing and Release
    Guidance.''

        43. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does the
    agreement take into consideration the fact that Eagle Vision, in
    addition to support for domestic operations, also provides support for
    natural disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security
    Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations where NGA does
    not fully release commercial imagery?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The current NextView License
    allows imagery support for domestic operations, support for natural
    disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security
    Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations. Imagery released
    to combatant commanders can be shared directly with third party users
    where the mission is of U.S. interest.

        44. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, can
    NGA's commercial imagery be released to all coalition and partner
    nations? If not, please provide any restrictions to the share-ability
    of this imagery.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. NGA may share imagery with
    organizations beyond the USG, such as coalition and partners nations,
    provided that it supports a USG purpose with a direct benefit to the
    USG. The NextView License allows NGA to disseminate and share
    commercial data imagery, imagery services, and imagery derived products
    with members of the USG including all branches, departments, agencies,
    and offices for U.S. Government purposes. Imagery released to combatant
    commanders can be shared directly with third party users where the
    mission is of U.S. interest. In addition, NGA may share commercial
    imagery directly with the following organizations: State & Local
    Governments, Foreign Governments and Intergovernmental agencies, USG
    contractors and university researchers supporting USG contracts, and
    Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Non-profit Organizations.
    NGA's corporate dissemination systems limit accesses to commercial
    imagery in accordance with intelligence oversight policies. NGA also
    provides commercial data to foreign partners in 42 countries across the
    globe and now can provide imagery to foreign government in support of
    combatant command requests.

        45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, please provide a copy of the
    analysis used to determine that the NGA could meet the requirements of
    the Eagle Vision system to include the need for timely imagery.
        Secretary Wilson. It was through a body of evidence that the Air
    Force determined NGA could meet the requirements of the Eagle Vision
    system. Please see attached Air Force Audit Agency report and Air Force
    Requirement Office memorandum.

        46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, without
    a Federally declared emergency, does the National Guard have access to
    NGA commercial imagery for all domestic response situations, both
    archived and new collections?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as a result of updates
    to NGB processes, NGB confirms access to all NGA commercial imagery for
    both state declared and federally declared emergencies via the U.S.
    Geological Survey (USGS).
        As a result of the NextView license in 2018, NGA approved ``Limited
    Public Release'' of imagery. For example, all commercial imagery
    related to Hurricane Matthew was released prior to the storm making
    landfall. This approval, along with expedited delivery of commercial
    imagery directly to FEMA servers, allowed the widest distribution of
    imagery to Federal, State, and Local authorities. Imagery was also
    publicly released to assist with storm preparations as well as post-
    storm rescues and damage assessments.

        47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA
    currently have an unclassified SAR capability or contracts with
    commercial vendors to obtain unclassified SAR imagery?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, NGA has a bilateral
    agreement with the Canadian government, called the NorthernView
    Agreement, which enables NGA and its customers to have access to
    unclassified SAR collections world-wide. This capability is comparable
    to that of Eagle Vision's TerraSAR-X access.

        48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA
    have a mobile, direct downlink capability from commercial imaging
    satellites?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. [Deleted.]

        49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, one of
    Eagle Visions' strengths is a robust capability to process and produce
    unclassified and sharable imagery products from remote deployed
    locations. Does NGA have this mobile capability?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as mentioned in
    question 52, the Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial Intelligence
    System (DMIGS) units can support domestic remote delivery and
    dissemination requirements. NGA does have some small tactical unmanned
    imaging systems used to support limited operations.

        50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air
    Force has other alternative imaging capabilities. What are the costs
    associated with utilizing alternative imaging capabilities? For
    example, what are the costs for utilizing such platforms as Global Hawk
    and U2 for imagery?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There is no cost additive to
    the Air Force for utilizing alternative imaging capabilities. As with
    Eagle Vision, programs are federally funded for their sharable imaging
    capabilities as a part of their missions. However, in situations that
    drive addition flying hours or conflicts between title 32 or title 50,
    additional cost could be assessed above Air Force programed dollars.

        51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is
    the process the Air Force customer uses to order domestic response
    commercial unclassified imagery from NGA? What is process for Eagle
    Vision imagery requests? What is the difference in the timeline?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are multiple facets
    with respect to the process Air Force customer(s) use to order domestic
    response commercial unclassified imagery from NGA and Eagle Vision.
    These are broken down into the following:
        1)  Access to data,
        2)  When Satellite is Overhead,
        3)  Customer Order,
        4)  Satellite Tasking, and
        5)  Product Delivery.
        1) Access to Data--Both NGA and EV users have the ability to
    generally quickly access commercial unclassified imagery from their
    respective data repositories through web based access.
        2) When Satellite is Overhead--When the satellite is overhead of
    the target area, both NGA and EV can gain collection of the image and
    it can be accessed by users generally on the same timeline.
        3) Customer order--NGA can direct and update collection plans up
    until 20 minutes prior to satellite uplink and collection over target
    area. EV can request collection as late as the satellite rising over
    the horizon.
        4) Satellite Tasking--NGA customers request their collection needs
    through an NGA Source Strategy. Analysts build collection plans that
    optimize sensor capabilities and maximize efficiency and effectiveness
    of the satellite time while satisfying requirements from across the IC,
    DOD, and Fed/Civ communities. These tasking(s) requests are fulfilled
    as the next available satellite collects the image request when over
    the target site. EV direct tasking can be accomplished by calling the
    EV Program Manager to request a collection, who then makes the request
    for the user which is met when the next available satellite passes the
    target area, including direct tasking as the satellite rises over the
    horizon.
        5) Product delivery--NGA NextView license is contractually
    obligated to deliver 90 percent of their satellite data in under 100
    minutes or less. Historically, to date 98 percent of that commercial
    data has been delivered in under 50 minutes, as the average delivery
    time. EV historically downlinks, processes and is available for
    delivery as the satellite sets over the horizon.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                  hypersonics
        52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I am
    pleased to see the Air Force budget $576 million for hypersonics. As
    you know, Sandia National Laboratories has played a critical role in
    developing this technology over decades and is the core reason for why
    we have a capability ready to prototype. I have spoken to lab directors
    who are eager to transition this technology to industry and believe it
    is important to co-locate the R&D and the manufacturing of these
    systems. Do you agree there is value in ensuring the core talent and
    expertise of the technology is nearby production efforts?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Sandia National Laboratories
    (SNL) has been instrumental in the technical and design development of
    hypersonic system concepts. SNL expertise and technical data continues
    to be leveraged by the Air Force as it pursues its hypersonic strike
    capability, and in particular its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon
    (HCSW) prototype effort. For specific HCSW milestones, SNL is working
    with the Air Force to deliver the first several sets of hypersonic
    glide body hardware to Lockheed Martin Space (LMS) for integrated
    flight test and technical expertise. SNL will continue to be engaged
    for expertise in transitioning this technology to industry.

        53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
    are we doing to co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force acquisition
    framework recognizes there are many ways to combine technical
    expertise, manufacturing capability, and testing infrastructure. The
    Air Force acquisition process does not prescribe to industry how they
    organize to deliver weapon system capability.
                         new mexico air national guard
        54. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the Air National Guard
    enterprise is based on established Capstone Principles that set the
    foundational framework for aircraft in the 54 states and territories.
    Specifically, one of those Capstone Principles is to allocate at least
    one unit-equipped wing and flying squadron to each state. Yet, the New
    Mexico Air National Guard is the only one in the country without an
    operational flying mission and one of three states--New Mexico,
    Virginia, and Washington--that lack ownership of aircraft. Are states
    that are currently unable to align with these core principles due to
    divestiture of aircraft in the past given priority for new mission
    opportunities?
        General Goldfein. While we recognize the value and intent of the
    ANG's Capstone Principles, our Strategic Basing Process does not give
    specific priority to states based on their alignment with them. We do,
    however, work hard to ensure the enterprise we define for each basing
    action is as inclusive as possible. The Strategic Basing Process
    evaluates candidates through a number of important factors (e.g.,
    suitability of existing facilities, capacity to absorb additional
    mission, location demographics and environmental factors) and all three
    components are fully represented. As mission demands evolve and
    resource constraints remain, the Air Force continues to ensure it
    leverages the collective talent and experience of the Regular, Guard
    and Reserve Forces to compete, deter and win.

        55. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, will you commit to working
    with the National Guard Bureau to address the lack of a unit-equipped
    wing and flying squadron in the New Mexico Air National Guard and to
    address aircraft ownership in New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington?
        General Goldfein. I look forward to continuing our collaborative
    efforts with the National Guard Bureau on building a more lethal and
    ready Total Force. The New Mexico Air National Guard represents one of
    the many opportunities that can help us accelerate towards the Air
    Force We Need and the additional unit-equipped air, space and
    cyberspace squadrons that are required. That strategic design effort is
    led by the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), and
    the Air National Guard's integration into that office underscores our
    commitment to capitalize on the strengths and opportunity in the
    Reserve Component.

        56. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, considering the mission
    growth suggested by the Air Force We Need imperative, will a
    substantial proportion of that growth be realized in the Air National
    Guard?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force will need to grow across all
    components--Active, Reserve and Air National Guard. The assumption in
    the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 1064 Study was to maintain the current force
    mix ratios across all the mission sets. If the Air Force were to
    increase by 25 percent, more analysis would need to be conducted to
    determine the optimal growth across components based on operational,
    strategic, and cost factors associated with meeting NDS demand across
    many mission sets.

        57. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, if the Air National Guard
    will likely take on additional mission sets in line with the Air Force
    We Need guidelines, is it reasonable to expect that locations with
    available ramp space, infrastructure, and manpower will be given
    priority to maximize budgetary limitations?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force strategic basing process considers
    existing excess capacity first. Using existing excess capacity results
    in judicious use of taxpayer dollars and potentially reduces overall
    bed down costs.

        58. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, given the recognized
    performance enhancements of the CV-22 aircraft for both federal and
    state roles, will the airframe be purchased in larger numbers to meet
    the increased demands on Special Operations mission sets? If so, will
    they be considered for equipping Air National Guard units?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force Program of Record for the CV-22 is
    54 aircraft; the Air Force has no plans to procure additional aircraft.
    Once the 54 aircraft are procured, the Air Force Special Operations
    Command's four Attrition Reserve CV-22s will be located where they are
    most needed based on CV-22 enterprise requirements. AFSOC has two
    associate ANG units.

        59. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the proposed light attack
    program for the United States Air Force has gone through multiple
    iterations of aircraft competitions, testing issues, extended timelines
    and program de-prioritization. What is your current posture to realize
    an affordable option that has clear potential to fulfill a niche role
    in support of the National Defense Strategy?
        General Goldfein. Our current posture is to procure a small number
    of aircraft from two vendors for ACC and AFSOC to support continued
    experimentation. Beyond just airframe capability, our exploration
    efforts include an exportable tactical data network to enhance partner
    nation support to this NDS role. If the results of the experimentation
    are positive, the budget includes procurement funds in fiscal year
    2022-24 to buy aircraft.
                           kirtland military housing
        60. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, Kirtland was one of the
    bases affected by issues associated with privatized military housing.
    Specifically, the Maxwell development at Kirtland is in disrepair; so
    much so that very few military personnel live there. However, the
    privatized-housing contractor is leasing the space to civilians. Can
    your team report back to me on the current status of this housing
    development and when did military personnel stop living there?
        Secretary Wilson. The housing units on the Maxwell parcel are
    smaller units with older floorplans located off base. As these are
    older units, they do require more maintenance than newer housing units.
    While this housing neighborhood has more non-military residents than
    the main housing area on Kirtland Air Force Base, 37 percent of
    residents in the Maxwell neighborhood are military, including military
    families and unaccompanied military members.

        61. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, it is my understanding
    Maxwell Housing is slated for demolition, but that the homes are
    currently under a 5-year extension. Why, and under what terms, was the
    extension granted; and when can we expect demolition to take place?
        Secretary Wilson. The Maxwell homes were extended through April
    2024 in order to generate additional revenue for the Kirtland Family
    Housing Project and strengthen cash flow available for mid-term
    reinvestment. Even with this additional revenue, the project may still
    have significant long-term shortages in sustainment and
    recapitalization funding, which may drive another extension unless
    market conditions change. Currently, the units are slated for
    demolition upon the termination of the extension in April 2024.

        62. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, are the Maxwell homes still
    generating revenue? If so, where does that revenue go?
        Secretary Wilson. The 5-year extension of the Maxwell homes is
    projected to generate a total of approximately $5.3 million in
    additional funding for the Reinvestment Account after debt obligations
    and operating expenses are paid. The Air Force has approval authority
    for how Reinvestment Account funds are spent, and can direct the
    funding to be used for sustainment and reinvestment in any housing
    units within the Kirtland Family Housing Project (including homes in
    the main housing area on base).
        Directed Energy Programs Designated as ``Section 804'' Accelerated
    Acquisition Programs
      directed energy programs designated as ``section 804'' accelerated
                              acquisition programs
        63. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, to my knowledge there are
    no Directed Energy programs currently designated as ``Section 804''
    Rapid Prototyping or Rapid Fielding activities, which is different than
    many other Air Force acquisition efforts, especially in space and
    hypersonics. Why have you not designated any Directed Energy programs
    as 804 activities?
        Secretary Wilson. We have used similar rapid prototyping activities
    for our Directed Energy Experimentation Campaign. In addition, two
    prototype High Power Microwave Systems were funded using OSD-level
    Rapid Prototyping Funds. We have not specifically designated programs
    for 804, because airborne applications are still in the technology
    demonstration phase and ground-based applications are undergoing
    operational experimentation to assess military utility, concepts of
    operations, and policy issues. Once airborne Advanced Technology
    Demonstrators are built, current estimate in 2021, we will conduct a
    round of experimentation and consider airborne Directed Energy as a
    candidate for rapid prototyping. Once our ground-based prototypes
    conclude operational experiments later this year, we will consider them
    a candidate for 804 activities.

        64. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, would the 804 designation
    speed the prototyping and fielding of these much needed capabilities?
        Secretary Wilson. Once the airborne technology demonstrators are
    built and ground-based prototypes complete operational experiments, the
    804 designation would absolutely speed the fielding of these
    capabilities.
                     laboratory and test range bureaucracy
        65. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, please provide an update on
    the use of the streamlining authorities that this Committee authorized
    under Section 233 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. These authorities
    allows lab directors and range commanders to cut red tape and move
    their organizations to embrace the agile and innovative activities that
    we all think will be necessary to enhance Air Force research, testing,
    and innovation and lead to more efficient deployment of new
    capabilities. They will also help make these Air Force institutions
    behave more like their private sector counterparts, and make them a
    more attractive employer for world class technical and innovative
    talent. The Navy, in particular, has aggressively and successfully used
    these authorities for its labs and warfare centers.
        Secretary Wilson. The AF greatly appreciates the section 233
    authority. The Air Force Flight Test Center, which oversees the
    developmental test ranges, and the Nevada Test and Training Range have
    used the authority resulting in three innovative activities. To date,
    the Air Force laboratories have not utilized the authority but plan to
    do so in the near future.

        66. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what successes has the Air
    Force seen from using these authorities?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Flight Test Center (AFTC) has
    utilized the section 233 authority to update the Center Scheduling
    Enterprise software allowing communication between Edwards AFB and
    Eglin AFB scheduling centers, improving distributed test operations
    efforts. AFTC has also standardized instrumentation tasks for greater
    sharing of test instrumentation resources across the 412th Test Wing
    and the 96th Test Wing instrumentation groups. Lastly, the Nevada Test
    and Training Range (NTTR) has developed a threat simulation capability
    that cuts required development time for new or upgraded threats at
    reduced cost. The NTTR effort will begin production in June 2019.

        67. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what are the plans for the
    use of these authorities in the near future?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Major Range Test Facility Base
    plans to continue to utilize Section 233 authority when and where
    applicable while the Air Force Research Laboratory is looking forward
    to take full advantage of the authority in the coming year.

        68. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what has been the major
    challenge in using these authorities to date?
        Secretary Wilson. There have not been difficulties in utilizing the
    233 authorities.
                         internal afrl research funding
        69. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, I note that the Air Force
    has struggled to develop a mechanism to fully use the authorities of 10
    USC 2363--which would allow AFRL lab directors the ability to use funds
    available to them to fund internal R&D and fund other activities,
    including lab construction and workforce development programs. The GAO
    noted that the Air Force has not yet developed a mechanism to charge
    research laboratory customers a fixed fee for costs that would fund
    these activities. Please provide an update and timeline for
    implementation relating to Air Force to respond the GAO finding on the
    inability to develop this charging mechanism.
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is continuing to work towards
    establishing a special account within the Treasury to properly receive
    and expend these fixed percentage fees. Air Force has taken the
    necessary steps to request the creation of a Special Fund account
    through OUSD(C). Once OMB and Treasury approves and establishes the
    account the Air Force will begin collecting fees from Air Force
    Research Laboratory's customers. Special Fund account is the existing/
    optimal solution where collections can immediately be made available
    for execution. Air Force is optimistic a Special Fund account will be
    created sometime in fiscal year 2020 and collections will start shortly
    after that, but timeline is driven by OUSD(C), OMB, and Treasury as
    they control the Special Fund approval process.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                     f-15ex
        70. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, how does the Air Force intend
    to field the new F-15EXs? Will they be fielded across both the Active
    and Guard components? Which do you expect to receive aircraft first?
        General Goldfein. The F-15EX is intended to replace the Air Force's
    oldest F-15C/D aircraft. The decision on fielding locations and
    timelines will be made using the Air Force Strategic Basing Process.

        71. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, the F-15EX aircraft in this
    year's budget are intended to replace legacy F-15C and D Eagles. The F-
    15C fleet is flown by Air National Guard units around the country. In
    your testimony this week to Congress, you've noted that transitioning
    units across ``like-type'' aircraft--in other words, from one model of
    F-15 to another--takes advantage of common infrastructure, parts and
    equipment. Can you elaborate on this? How do unit readiness and mission
    conversion costs and schedules factor into this F-15EX decision?
        General Goldfein. The F-15C/D begins to age out between 2023 and
    the last aircraft in 2028. The current buy profile is for 80 aircraft
    through 2024 and we anticipate replacing F-15Cs one for one with
    procured F-15EXs in the FYDP. We estimate that the transition time, to
    return to acceptable readiness levels, from F-15s to the F-35
    (dissimilar aircraft) will take approximately 18 months for an Active
    Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron. The
    transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel training.
    Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to transition from the F-
    15C to the F-15EX. The Air Force is still evaluating specific spare
    inventory requirements and equipment compatibilities. In terms of
    operating costs, we estimate that F-15EX will cost less to operate than
    the F-15C fleet; however, the exact operating costs are unknown at this
    time.

        72. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the
    cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to F-15EX?
        General Goldfein. Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to
    transition from the F-15C to the F-15X.

        73. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the
    cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to an F-35 mission?
        General Goldfein. It will take approximately 18 months for an
    Active Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron.
    The transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel
    training. Based on previous conversion efforts, we estimate cost to be
    upwards of $60-$70 million.

        74. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, under our current national
    defense strategy, it's important that we understand the Air Force's
    decision to procure new F-15s from an operational perspective. Can you
    clarify how a fifth generation fighter like the F-35 and a fourth-
    generation plus platform like the F-15EX would complement each other in
    a near peer fight?
        General Goldfein. The F-35 and F-15EX bring complementary
    capabilities to a peer fight. The F-35 design allows for penetrating
    adversary air defense systems to prosecute targets while passing
    targeting information back to other assets for additional target
    prosecution. F-15EX is an improved model from Boeing, teaming a new
    airframe with an improved radar, cockpit, electronic warfare suite and
    the ability to carry more missiles than previous F-15 model aircraft in
    service. Individually, both are good for what they are designed to do.
    The future fight requires more than just individual platforms which are
    good. It requires weapon systems working together for the enhanced
    capability required to deter and defeat peer adversaries. The F-35 and
    F-15EX complement each other and provide that greater capability to the
    U.S. in a peer fight environment.

        75. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what unique capabilities, if
    any, does the F-15EX bring into your tactical fighter inventory,
    whether in terms of range or payload or stand-off?
        General Goldfein. F-15EX will be able to carry more air-to-air
    missiles than any other 4th generation aircraft in the USAF inventory.
    Additionally, the F-15EX will be able to employ large munitions in the
    above 2,000 pound weapons class. A more detailed discussion of the F-
    15EX's unique capabilities is best provided in a classified setting,
    which we are ready to provide at your request.

        76. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, earlier this year you stated
    the following regarding your plan to buy new F-15EX aircraft in fiscal
    year 2020: ``We've got to refresh the F-15C fleet because I can't
    afford not to have that capacity to do the job and the missions. That's
    what this is all about. If we're refreshing the F-15C fleet, as we're
    building up the F-35 fleet, this is not about any kind of a trade.'' Is
    that still your position?
        General Goldfein. Yes.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                               rc-26b retirement
        77. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, I see in the budget the Air
    Force is planning on retiring the entire RC-26B fleet. The RC-26B is an
    important part of not only the West Virginia National Guard
    contribution but also to the security of the United States in its
    domestic border surveillance and counterdrug missions. I am concerned
    that the Nation will lose a valuable asset and capability if we retire
    this aircraft. How is the Air Force going to mitigate the loss of the
    RC-26B if you follow through with the plan to retire it?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force divested the RC-26 program in the
    fiscal year 2020 budget because there is no longer a DOD/AF/Title-10
    requirement for this platform. There are other existing DOD (MQ-9
    remotely-piloted aircraft, MC-12, Satellite imagery, Army Lakota
    helicopters) and other Federal agency (NOAA, NASA, DHS, CBP) assets
    that provide equivalent or better capability than the RC-26 to support
    border security and/or counterdrug missions. Over the past four years,
    898 percent of National Guard support to the Counter-Drug missions was
    accomplished by assets other than the RC-26 (analysts, linguists,
    rotary wing, etc.)
             national guard c-130h modernization / recapitalization
        78. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force still operates
    a large number of C-130H aircraft across both the Active Duty and
    National Guard. This aircraft, which was first delivered in 1965, is
    aging rapidly. This was highlighted by the propeller issues that led to
    the grounding of 60 C-130H aircraft in February of this year. I see no
    procurement of baseline C-130J aircraft in this year's budget, only the
    MC-130J specialized variant. Does the Air Force have a long term plan
    for replacing the aging C-130H fleet with C-130J or at a minimum
    modernizing all C-130--H aircraft to ensure consistent operations and
    readiness across the Total Force?
        Secretary Wilson. Given limited Air Force funding and a focus on
    the National Defense Strategy priorities, at this time there is no plan
    to purchase additional combat delivery C-130Js beyond the current
    program.
        However, the Air Force continues to program the Avionics
    Modernization Program Increment 1 and 2, as well as operational
    upgrades for C-130H aircraft to ensure that safety/obsolescence,
    airspace compliance, and fleet modernization are priorities.
        Additionally, several C-130H aircraft have received a Center Wing
    Box upgrade, which extends the service life and equivalent flying hours
    of those aircraft.
        The Air Force is conducting an Operational Utility Evaluation on
    the combination of the NP2000 (eight blade propeller), Electronic
    Propeller Control System, and 3.5 engine modifications, all on the C-
    130H aircraft.

                               Appendix A
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2019

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  NAVY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
    Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono,
    Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
        We have a number of nominees to confirm, here. Since we now
    have a quorum, I would like to move to that.
        It is present, and I ask the Committee to consider a list
    of 82 pending military nominations. All of these nominations
    have been before the Committee the required length of time.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these----
        Senator Reed. So move.
        Chairman Inhofe.--82 pending military nominations to the
    Senate? There's a motion.
        A second?
        Senator Wicker. Second.
        Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
        [A chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
        [No response.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Ayes have it. That's done.

        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 9, 2019.
        1. In the Marine Corps there are 12 appointments to the grade of
    major general (list begins with Julian D. Alford) (Reference No. 33)

        2. General Stephen J. Townsend, USA to be general and Commander, US
    Africa Command (Reference No. 378)

        3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason
    A. Anthes) (Reference No. 400)

        4. In the Air Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Jeremiah L. Blackburn) (Reference No. 424)

        5. LTG Timothy J. Kadavy, ARNG to be lieutenant general and Vice
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau (Reference No. 460)

        6. RADM James W. Kilby, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of
    Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, N9
    (Reference No. 495)

        7. LTG Jeffrey L. Harrigian, USAF to be general and Commander, US
    Air Forces Europe; Commander, US Air Forces Africa; Commander, Allied
    Air Command; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (Reference
    No. 517)

        8. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, USAF to be general and Commander, US
    European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Reference No.
    527)

        9. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with La Tanya D. Austin) (Reference No. 529)

        10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Michael T. Charlton) (Reference No. 530)

        11. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Elissa R. Ballas) (Reference No. 531)

        12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Brian C. Bane) (Reference No. 532)

        13. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Robin N. Scott) (Reference No. 535)

        14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Matthew R. Thom) (Reference No. 536)

        15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (David
    M. Powell) (Reference No. 537)

        16. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Ford
    M. Lannan) (Reference No. 538)

        17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Luke
    A. Randall) (Reference No. 539)

        18. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Mark M. Kuba) (Reference No. 540)

        19. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Rhana S. Kurdi) (Reference No. 541)

        20. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Michael D. Norton) (Reference No. 542)

        21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason
    A. Byers) (Reference No. 543)

        22. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Nathaniel C. Curley) (Reference No. 544)

        23. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Sewhan Kim) (Reference No. 545)

        24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Early Howard, Jr.) (Reference No. 546)

        25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Isaac L. Henderson) (Reference No. 547)

        26. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of commander
    and below (list begins with Shawn D. Trulove) (Reference No. 548)

        27. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
    (Charles E. Jenkins IV) (Reference No. 551)

        28. In the Air Force there are 23 appointments to the grade of
    major general (list begins with Christopher P. Azzano) (Reference No.
    553)

        29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Benjamin D. Ramos) (Reference No. 554)

        30. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Christopher D. Black) (Reference No. 555)

        31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (James
    A. Broadie) (Reference No. 556)

        32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Brandon E. Resor) (Reference No. 557)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 82

        All right, we have a--let's go ahead on this. I'm going to
    just go ahead with opening statements, then we'll have a round
    after we hear from our witnesses.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimonies on the
    posture of the Department of Navy in its fiscal year 2020. We
    welcome our witnesses: Richard Spencer, the Secretary of the
    Navy; Admiral John Richardson, Chief of the Naval Operations
    (CNO); and General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine
    Corps. We thank you, all three, for your service.
        The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
    to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This
    means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary,
    decisively defeat, our near-peer adversaries. I think we all
    know who we're talking about. It's China and Russia.
        In order for the Department of the Navy to achieve that
    goal, our Navy and Marine Corps must be manned, trained,
    equipped appropriately. Significant progress has been made in
    rebuilding the readiness, but, still, there's a lot of work to
    be done.
        With the alarming speed of modernization that we've
    witnessed, both conventional and nuclear forces, China and
    Russia now present a credible threat to the United States and
    our allies. It's past time for action. However, we must be
    smart, not hasty, as we modernize our military. Recently--
    recent history should be our guide, because, without better
    acquisition performance, we could fall behind, or further
    behind, our competitors. For example, the last eight combatant
    lead ships cost $8 billion more than their initial budget,
    delivery the last 6 months late, with dozens of deficiencies.
    Another example is our--the 9 to 11 advanced weapons elevators
    on the USS Gerald R. Ford still have not been accepted by the
    Navy, nearly 2 years after the ship's delivery, and some other
    areas, also, the problems with that.
        While the promise of new technology may be alluring, it's
    no substitute for demonstrated performance. I'm highly
    skeptical of claims by the Department of Defense officials that
    early retirement of the USS Harry Truman will result in a more
    modern and lethal force as well as increased industrial-base
    workload. The reality is, the Ford lacks functional weapons
    elevators and has significant reliability problems. No
    combination of unmanned systems has been shown to match and
    reach the lethality of the aircraft carrier and its Air Wing.
    The Truman proposal will result in reductions, not increases,
    of highly skilled employees. We'll have some questions and
    discussion on the USS Truman during the course of this hearing.
        Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Spencer, Admiral
    Richardson, and General Neller to the Committee this morning to
    testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy
    in our review of the fiscal year 2020 authorization request. We
    are grateful to each of you for your service and for the
    service of the men and women under your command, and for the
    support of all Navy and Marine families. Thank them for us,
    please.
        I particularly want to thank Admiral Richardson and General
    Neller, as this is likely to be their last posture hearing
    before the Committee. We thank you for your dedicated years of
    service to our Nation. As the leaders of the Navy and the
    Marine Corps, you face huge challenges as you strive to balance
    the need to support ongoing operations and sustained readiness
    with the need to modernize and keep the technological edge so
    critical to military success.
        In the near term, the Marine Corps has $315 million in the
    disaster emergency relief supplemental that they need
    relatively quickly. I hope we can focus on the potential
    consequences of delaying recovery activities and move the
    disaster emergency relief supplemental forward.
        In addition, because significant levels of funding are
    being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, the
    amount of reprogramming authority will be limited this year. I
    remain concerned that the Navy, Marine Corps, and other
    services may run short of headroom in reprogramming authority,
    which could lead to other delays and shortages. In addition,
    I'm concerned about the opportunity cost of deployments to the
    border.
        The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems
    caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying
    hours, and canceled training and deployments. We are all keenly
    aware of the collisions of the McCain and the Fitzgerald, and
    the loss of life that resulted. I'm interested in hearing about
    the progress the Navy is making in implementing changes that
    will ensure such incidents will not happen in the future.
        All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely
    high operational tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack
    submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and
    strike fighter inventories. In addition, the Navy is now in its
    seventh year of operating with fewer than the legally required
    11 aircraft carriers. The Ford is listed in the Navy inventory,
    but that ship, which is more than 4 years behind schedule, will
    not be ready to deploy for many more months. In addition,
    during the next decade, the Navy will need to buy the new
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the
    Ohio-class submarines. This is an extremely expensive
    undertaking that is on a very, very tight schedule.
        The Marine Corps continues to make modernization of ground
    vehicles a priority, which requires balancing the procurement
    of new systems while upgrading existing platforms to meet
    current operational needs. The amphibious combat vehicle will
    replace the aging inventory of assault amphibious vehicles in
    order to provide the Marines with increased force protection
    and enhanced lethality. The Marine Corps is also partnering
    with the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle, or
    the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), to replace the Humvee.
    I will welcome an update from our witnesses on the status of
    these programs, particularly in view of Army plans to cut back
    on the JLTV program.
        Two years ago, Admiral Richardson, you released the Force
    Structure Assessment that identified a new force-structure
    goal. The Navy's current high level of operations contributed,
    in part, to your conclusions in this assessment that the goal
    for the Navy fleet needs to increase from 308 ships to 355
    ships. I'd like to hear what progress the Navy is making in
    filling these needs. I'm also interested in learning how the
    plan to retire the USS Harry Truman, rather than refuel her, is
    consistent with achieving the 355-ship goal.
        I, again, thank the witnesses for their service and their
    sacrifice. I look forward to their testimony.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        We'll now have our opening remarks by our witnesses. Your
    entire statement will be made a part of the record, and so, be
    brief, if you'd like.
        Senator--or Secretary Spencer.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE
                                  NAVY

        Secretary Spencer. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Committee Members, on behalf of our sailors,
    marines, and civilian teammates, thank you for your bipartisan
    efforts to restore funding stability.
        I would like to take a moment right now, though, and have
    everyone pause for a minute. Yesterday, as you read, we lost
    three marines and one civilian in an attack. It is still a very
    risk-full world out there.
        I would be remiss----
        Chairman Inhofe. I would ask, right now, though, that we
    bow our heads in silence for the lives of these, and the
    families, of these individuals.
        [A moment of silence was observed.]
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
        Secretary Spencer. I'd be remiss, Chairman, if I wasn't to
    take a moment right now, since this might be my last time in
    front of you all testifying on a budget, to say that, wearing a
    businessman's hat, I could not have asked for two better
    business partners than in the CNO and the Commandant. I came
    into a situation that we are working our way out of. If I,
    again, carry the corporate term, it was a turnaround. We've
    done some herculean work, and these two gentlemen were side by
    side, no light between us as we went forward. I'd like to just
    acknowledge that.
        The concept of a strategy is the application of limited
    resources to attain a goal. Aligned to the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS), the Navy strategy for restoring readiness,
    strengthening relationships, and reforming our processes has
    been set, and we will build on that with a disciplined focus on
    our people, capabilities, and processes. This budget
    prioritizes a strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment.
    It builds on prior investments, sustains the industrial base,
    and maintains our competitive advantage, if not expands the
    perimeters as we move to a more cost-imposing, survivable, and
    affordable future of the--future--force of the future.
        Restoration of readiness is underway, and we're seeing
    progress, ladies and gentlemen, every day. My analogy is that
    the wind vanes are all pointed in the right direction. Although
    we might be a little frustrated with the velocity of the wind,
    we are moving it continually, day by day. We're building the
    strength of our team through hiring in areas of critical need,
    such as cybersecurity specialists, aviation technicians,
    scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, shipyard
    workers, and digital warfare officers. We're aligning and
    enhancing our educational institutions' distributed-learning
    venues through the Education for Seapower Review. We're taking
    aggressive actions to return private military housing to a
    premium product, mindful that we recruit the individual, but we
    retain the family. All of these actions have one common thread
    through them: the goal of increased readiness.
        We're building our capabilities through investments in
    hypersonics, machine learning, additive manufacturing, quantum
    computing, and directed energy. We're building the fleet in
    pursuit of a 355-ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include the
    Columbia-class submarine, next-generation frigate, and
    remotely-piloted platforms, such as Sea Hunter and Orca. These
    efforts are increasing lethality through increased distributed
    maritime operations.
        To reach the Secretary's goal of 80-percent mission-capable
    tactical aircraft, we've realigned investments to spares,
    aviation engineering, and logistical support through our newly-
    created Navy Sustainment System, which is based upon best
    practices from outside the wire, as I say, commercial best
    practices. As a pilot program, these activities have moved us
    to review our processes in all maintenance areas within the
    naval enterprise, to include ship, weapon, and vehicle
    maintenance and sustainment. Driven by the Marine Corps Force
    2025 Capability Investment Strategy, we're investing in the
    amphibious combat vehicle, loitering munitions, and unmanned
    logistics systems in order to maintain our competitive
    advantage. Exercising the Marine Corps operating concept is
    moving us to rapidly progress as a continuous learning
    organization as we adapt and experiment in our new competitive
    environment.
        Yet, while we effect the aforementioned, the Marine Corps
    is also contending with unprecedented double impact of
    Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which together damaged or
    destroyed more than $3.7 billion of infrastructure across many
    of our East Coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary
    force-generator for the naval services, directly contributing
    to the capacity and readiness of our force. That area took the
    majority of the blunt impact of those storms.
        Over the past year, we have meaningfully increased our
    interaction with our allies and friends. Exercises and
    education have strengthened our ability to operate; therefore,
    increasing the depth of our collective ability to deliver the
    resources requested. Compared to a year ago, the increase and
    depth of our relationship with our allies and friends has been
    the prime contributor to this good outcome.
        Our Navy has implemented 91 of the 111 readiness reform and
    oversight council recommendations, transforming a culture of
    accepting risk to one of understanding and managing risk. We've
    reviewed and are in the process of remediating our business
    processes following our first top-to-bottom audit. The audit is
    now proving to be a tool where we find we can leverage
    lethality. We're using this information to streamline
    operations and reimagine how support functions can be
    modernized in order to drive continued learning and, therefore,
    produce ever-increasing efficiencies for the American taxpayer.
    We owe it to them to ensure every dollar that we invest--every
    dollar--is invested in the most effective manner possible. I am
    proud to work with this Committee to keep that promise.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]

             Prepared Statement by the Honorable Richard V. Spencer
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee
    Members. On behalf of our sailors, marines and civilian teammates,
    thank you for your bipartisan efforts to restore funding stability to
    the Department of the Navy. The foundation for restoring readiness and
    increasing lethality has been set. Now we must build on that foundation
    with a sense of urgency. While we have much to do, we are well
    underway, and I will highlight some of our progress.
                                 where we were
        At my confirmation hearing in July 2017, I stated my intent to
    expeditiously assess the current situation, develop the tools needed to
    enhance its ability to fight, and to deliver on the title 10
    responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary the Navy. My priorities
    for accomplishing these goals centered on three key areas: people,
    capabilities, and processes.
        I expressed my determination to recruit, train and retain the best
    of our Nation for our military and civilian ranks, and to create a
    flat, lean and agile organization where those who manage critical
    situations have the ability to make decisions to solve the problems in
    front of them.
        I committed to rebuild the readiness and lethality of our
    capabilities, citing cumulative effects of 16 years of wartime
    operational tempo, unpredictable funding, and challenges to our
    warfighting advantage as we return to a geostrategic environment
    dominated by great power competition.
        As a businessman, I expressed my determination to improve our
    processes across the portfolio, analyzing all systems and platforms to
    extract additional efficiencies, incorporating private sector best
    practices, and migrating to a true continual learning enterprise.
                                  where we are
        Over the past year and a half, Admiral Richardson, General Neller
    and I have attacked these goals with a sense of urgency by investing in
    our people, capabilities and processes.
        To build the strength of our people, we've invested in a ready,
    relevant and responsive force: A Marine Corps force with 186,200 active
    personnel and 38,500 reservists; the Targeted Reentry Program to enable
    key former personnel a streamlined return into Active Duty; quality of
    life and retention efforts like the MyNavy Career Center, which
    provides sailors with human resource services around the clock; and the
    military parental leave program. We've used the increased Defense
    Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) flexibility from the fiscal
    year 2019 NDAA to support dynamic changes and requirements in technical
    expertise, agility and innovation in our officers. We've invested in
    our civilian workforce, including enhanced hiring and training at our
    public shipyards to reach our FY20 goal of 36,100 personnel one year
    earlier than originally planned.
        We've enhanced our capabilities, through targeted investments in
    the lethality and readiness of our weapons platforms and munitions. We
    have accomplished this through strengthening our partnerships with the
    private sector. We've gleaned commercial best practices to increase
    efficiency and flow in our ship, ground and aviation maintenance
    facilities. The Navy has added 22 Battle Force Ships over fiscal year
    2017 and fiscal year 2018, while decommissioning nine, for a net
    addition of 13 ships. The Marine Corps has reset 99 percent of ground
    equipment and returned 72 percent of our equipment to the operating
    forces. We have also enabled personnel to ``fix it forward'' through
    technologies such as additive manufacturing, including the procurement
    of 160 3D printers capable of producing over 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-
    approved parts on demand.
        We've also significantly improved our operational processes,
    through the Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review
    (SRR). Over the past year, the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council
    has examined 111 recommendations from the review process. 91 have been
    adjudicated and 83 have now been implemented. Business processes were
    also reviewed and remediated after our first ever top-to-bottom audit
    of the Department of the Navy, and we're using this information to
    streamline our operations and reimagine how support functions can be
    modernized in real time to drive greater readiness, lethality and
    efficiency. Through the development and implementation of the Navy
    Business Operations Plan and our Performance to Plan tool, we are
    beginning to accurately track the output impacts of our efforts.
        It must also be noted that the Marine Corps is contending with the
    unprecedented double impact of Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which
    together damaged or destroyed more than $3.7B in infrastructure across
    many of our east coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary force
    generator for the Naval Services, directly contributing to the capacity
    and readiness of our force. The Marine Corps continues to feel the
    immediate impacts of these storms through lost and delayed training
    time; delayed deployments and redeployments; and daily quality of life
    challenges including the displacement of thousands of personnel and
    their families. Recovering from these disasters will require sustained
    investment and the ongoing support of this Committee.
                               where we are going
        Now that the foundation for readiness and lethality has been set,
    we continue to move forward with a sense of urgency, continually
    thinking of how to deliver the people, capabilities and processes
    needed by the Navy-Marine Corps Team. The Naval Services have developed
    plans informed by the National Defense Strategy, which mandates
    increased lethality, strengthened alliances and partnerships, and
    improved business processes. Now we are aligning those plans with the
    right leaders, tools, budget and technology advancements.
        This budget request invests in our people with the education and
    resources necessary to develop and retain the human capital we need to
    confront a changing world. We'll expand hiring for areas of critical
    need, such as cyber security specialists, aviation technicians,
    scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, and digital
    warfare officers. We'll add end strength to the Marine Corps Special
    Operations Command. We'll complete the rollout of Sailor 2025, updating
    policies, procedures and systems to improve retention and readiness.
        Education is a key component to developing the warfighter the Navy
    and Marine Corps Team needs. We will be effecting the blueprint
    developed by the recently released Education for Seapower Review,
    aligning and enhancing our educational institutions and distributed
    learning venues. And earlier this month, along with Secretary Esper and
    Secretary Wilson, I hosted University and College Presidents and other
    education leaders from across the country for a summit at the United
    States Naval Academy dedicated to eliminating the scourge of campus
    sexual assault and sexual harassment.
        We are constantly mindful that we recruit the individual, but we
    retain the family. And without the family, we are not operating at full
    capacity. As I stated before this Committee last month, upon reviewing
    the issues surrounding Public-Private Venture (PPV) military housing,
    it is clear that in some cases we have fallen woefully short of our
    obligations, and there is culpability around the table. We have
    identified the problems, and are focusing resources on the solutions.
    We will correct bad practices and return private military housing to a
    premium product. This budget supports these efforts, with a request of
    $21.975 million for the oversight of the Department's PPV housing
    worldwide.
        As we move from rebuilding readiness to owning the next fight, this
    budget prioritizes a balanced and strategy-driven approach, to provide
    for a bigger, better trained, and more ready force. It invests in our
    Force 2.0 capabilities in emerging areas such as applied artificial
    intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, additive
    manufacturing, directed energy and more. We will continue to build the
    fleet in pursuit of the 355 ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include
    the Columbia-class submarine, Next Generation Frigate, and remotely
    piloted platforms such as Sea Hunter and Orca, as well as one Ford-
    class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class submarines and three
    Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
        Driven by the Marine Corps Force 2025 capability investment
    strategy, we will continue to modernize the Marine Corps with a 21st
    century Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) by focusing on six key
    priorities:
          C2 in a degraded environment;
          Long range and precision fires;
          Operations in the Information Environment (OIE);
          Air defense;
          Protected mobility and enhanced maneuver; and
          Logistics.
        This budget invests in Networking on the Move (NOTM) capabilities,
    close combat equipment, loitering munitions, unmanned logistic systems,
    ground-based anti-ship missiles, Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/
    ATOR), the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle to ensure the Marine Corps continues to adapt to meet the
    demands of the future operating environment and maintain our
    competitive advantage.
        We will operate with data-informed end to end processes and
    incorporate leading practices to inform how we fight. To achieve the
    goal of 80 percent mission capable aircraft in our Fleet Strike Fighter
    squadrons, this budget funds the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) to the
    maximum executable levels, realigns investments to spares, aviation
    engineering and logistics support, while pursuing reforms such as the
    Navy Sustainment System, which incorporates best practices from
    commercial airline maintenance leaders. We will also incorporate the
    lessons of private industry as we invest in shipyard infrastructure and
    training to improve performance and throughput.
        These are just a few examples of how General Neller, Admiral
    Richardson, the entire Navy Marine Corps Team and I are building on the
    foundation of restored readiness and increasing lethality. We will
    continue to promote a culture of problem solving at every level,
    transform from a culture of risk removal to one of understanding and
    managing risk, and hold ourselves accountable for how and where we
    invest. Every day, we work with a sense of urgency driven by the
    knowledge that the American taxpayers provide us with their hard-earned
    treasure, and trust us to protect them from a dangerous world. We owe
    it to them to ensure that every dollar is invested in the most
    effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred oath. I'm proud to work
    with this Committee to ensure that we keep that promise. Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
        Admiral Richardson.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
    Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank
    you for the opportunity to appear here alongside Secretary
    Spencer and General Neller to discuss the Navy's fiscal year
    2020 budget.
        You know, President Thomas Jefferson wrote that,
    ``Industry, commerce, and security are the surest roads to the
    happiness and prosperity of our people.'' And the causal link
    between prosperity, order, and security is why he deployed the
    United States Navy to combat piracy off the Barbary Coast at
    the dawn of the 19th century. And it's why, for over two
    centuries, we have helped keep the seas open for all and
    opposed those who seek to control the seas at the expense of
    America and our allies.
        Today, as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
    nations like China and Russia are attempting to do just that,
    to stem the tide that has steadily lifted all boats by
    unilaterally redefining international norms on terms more
    favorable only to themselves. Chairman, you mentioned that in
    your opening statement. The Navy and the Nation are responding
    with more than 60,000 sailors deployed aboard nearly 100 ships
    and submarines at this very moment by sustainably operating
    around the globe, advocating for our principles, and protecting
    our national interests.
        To maintain this worldwide posture, the President's FY20
    budget offers a strategy-driven, future-leaning, balanced
    approach to deliver a naval force up to the task in this era of
    great-power competition. The single most effective way to
    maintain our strategic momentum is to provide adequate, stable,
    and predictable funding. This makes everything possible. It
    solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our commercial
    partners, and mitigates operational risk by maximizing our
    planning and execution time.
        The foundation of naval power is our force of talented and
    well-trained sailors. Important to our success, we remain
    committed to recruiting and retaining diverse shipmates whose
    intelligence, curiosity, energy, different backgrounds, and
    varied viewpoints will catalyze the speed and quality of
    decisions we need to outperform our adversaries. As well,
    working with Congress, we continue to transform our pay and
    personnel system to 21st century standards.
        This budget also builds a bigger fleet, 54 battle-force
    ships over 5 years, preserving our industrial base,
    strengthening our ability to prevail in any warfighting
    contingency. The budget fully funds the Columbia-class
    ballistic missile submarine program, fulfilling our existential
    imperative to deter nuclear attack on our Homeland.
        The budget builds a better fleet, fielding state-of-the-art
    systems that are more agile, networked, resilient, and lethal.
    This budget recognizes that aircraft carriers will be central
    to winning the future fight, which is why it invests in the
    Gerald R. Ford-class, delivering far more combat power for less
    cost over their lifetime than their Nimitz-class predecessors.
        This budget also builds a ready fleet, steaming days to
    exercise at sea, flying hours to train in the air, sufficient
    quantities of ammunition and spares, and the resources to
    conduct maintenance, today and in the future, as the fleet size
    grows.
        Meeting the Nation's and the Navy's responsibility is not
    easy. It requires us all to work together. But, this is what
    great nations, and only great nations, can and must do. At the
    dawn of the Cold War, as this Nation took on the challenge to
    go to the Moon, President Kennedy, a naval officer, said, ``We
    do these things, not because they are easy, but because they
    are hard, because that challenge is one that we are willing to
    accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to
    win.''
        I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in
    the Congress for continuing this important work. We look
    forward to sailing alongside you to build and deliver the
    safest navy for our sailors, the strongest partner navy for our
    friends and allies, and a navy that is the worst nightmare for
    our enemies.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
        Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
    Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget.
        To place this budget in its appropriate tactical, operational, and
    strategic context, we must understand what America stands for in the
    world so we don't forget it or, worse, take it for granted; the United
    States Navy's unique and historic connection to those core tenets; the
    challenges to those principles and our national interests by
    competitors like China and Russia--and our Navy's response; and the
    investments made in the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget to deliver,
    operate, sustain, and maintain a Navy that is bigger, better, and more
    ready to sail anywhere and do anything in defense of our country.
            we are a maritime nation--we rely on freedom of the seas
        Our first President, George Washington, best captured the value a
    Navy provides to the American people when he said: ``It follows then as
    certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval
    force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable
    and glorious.''
        Over 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy civilians--
    alongside our partners in the Congress, academia, industry, and around
    the world--devote much of their lives to designing, producing, and
    operating a ``decisive'' naval force. Our decisive naval force operates
    around the world, defends our national interests, stands ready to fight
    if called upon, and de-escalates tensions on our terms. The President's
    Fiscal Year 2020 Budget delivers and sustains this decisive force and
    the investments contained therein will keep our Navy on a true course
    and making best speed to, as our oath declares, ``support and defend
    the Constitution of the United States and the country whose course it
    directs.''
        Our founding values, as well as our livelihoods and collective
    national security, are tied to the world's oceans. The seas are a prime
    facilitator of our prosperity as a people. But prosperity does not and
    cannot exist in a vacuum. It is the result of secure and orderly
    conditions that enable the flow of goods and services, access to
    markets via open oceans and critical waterways, and the ability to move
    unimpeded across the seas.

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        The seas present both challenges and opportunities--and the rapid
    changes in the maritime environment are stark and profound. More than
    90 percent of all international trade travels by sea--60 percent of
    that by value sails in containerized vessels. In recent years,
    approximately 735 million containers were shipped worldwide annually.
    If placed end-to-end, those containers would encircle the globe at the
    Equator more than 11 times. Beyond the numbers on trade, the global
    economy's reliance on the seas for resources--rare earth minerals for
    advanced technology, energy, or aquaculture--increase their economic
    and strategic importance. The seabed also plays host to 287 undersea
    fiber-optic cables through which 99 percent of global internet traffic
    passes, fueling the modern economy.
        Each of these developments serve to make the seas even more
    congested--and more vital.
          challenges to the united states and the international order
        Despite the United States' persistent work over two centuries to
    keep the seas open to every nation and every mariner, there are those
    who seek to upend this free and open order and stem the tide that has
    steadily lifted all boats. As discussed in the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS), China and Russia are deploying all elements of their
    national power to achieve their global ambitions. China and Russia seek
    to accumulate power at America's expense and may imperil the
    diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link the United States to
    its allies and partners. And these actions are not only directed at the
    United States: China and Russia are working to redefine the norms of
    the entire international system on terms more favorable to themselves.
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        China and Russia are determined to replace the current free and
    open world order with an insular system. They are attempting to impose
    unilateral rules, re-draw territorial boundaries, and redefine
    exclusive economic zones so they can regulate who comes and who goes,
    who sails through and who sails around. These countries' actions are
    undermining international security. This behavior breeds distrust and
    harms our most vital national interests.
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        China's Belt and Road Initiative in particular is blending
    diplomatic, economic, military, and social elements of its national
    power in an attempt to create its own globally decisive naval force.
    China's modus operandi preys off nations' financial vulnerabilities.
    They contract to build commercial ports, promise to upgrade domestic
    facilities, and invest in national infrastructure projects. Slowly, as
    the belt tightens, these commercial ports transition to dual uses,
    doubling as military bases that dot strategic waterways. Then, the belt
    is cinched as China leverages debt to gain control and access. In the
    final analysis, these unfavorable deals strangle a nation's
    sovereignty--like an anaconda enwrapping its next meal. Scenes like
    this are expanding westward from China through Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
    Djibouti and now to our NATO treaty allies, Greece and Italy.
            the u.s. navy responding to challenges around the world
        The U.S. Navy is responding to this changing security dynamic by
    playing to our strengths: deploying all around the globe, regularly
    enforcing common principles, strengthening the conditions that have
    enabled mutual prosperity, and protecting our national interests. As
    you read these words, more than 60,000 sailors are deployed on board
    nearly 100 ships and
        submarines to enforce a free and open order that enables this
    unprecedented flow of goods and services.
        As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, the U.S. Navy will
    compete aggressively to shape our modern maritime environment, ensuring
    that order and security continue to underpin our prosperity. We do so
    by harnessing the myriad forces at play--the increasing use of the
    maritime domain; the rise of global information systems and the role of
    data-driven decision-making; and the increasing rate of technological
    creation and adoption. We remain committed to challenging excessive
    maritime claims, strengthening relationships with allies and partners,
    and upholding time-tested values.

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        How can we maintain this worldwide posture and compete given these
    strategic realities? How must we invest in order to build, sustain,
    organize, and strengthen ourselves so that we can continue harnessing
    the global maneuver power inherent in naval forces? The answers lie in
    the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget (PB-20), a submission firmly
    rooted in addressing Great Power Competition and moving boldly and
    swiftly into the future.
        Importantly, the single most effective way to maintain the
    strategic momentum started in fiscal year 2017 is to enact the
    President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget prior to the start of the fiscal
    year. This funding will help us fulfill our responsibilities in the
    National Defense Strategy by building the Navy the Nation Needs: a
    balanced force that will increase America's naval power and safeguard
    our economic, diplomatic, and military interests around the world.
                       a bigger, better, more ready navy
        President's Budget 2020 seeks $160 billion for the U.S. Navy. For
    perspective, this request represents approximately three percent of the
    federal budget. According to the Congressional Budget Office, this
    investment represents approximately half of the amount currently
    expended on servicing the national debt and one-third of current
    expenditures on Medicaid.
        This budget request preserves our industrial base and establishes
    an aggressive, forward-looking, competitive posture. Our industrial
    partners are counting on us for consistent and continuous commitments.
    Absent this behavior, we may perpetuate, rather than end, the ``boom-
    and-bust'' cycles we have experienced in the past. Coincident with this
    aim to steadily grow the force and preserve our industrial base is the
    responsibility to ``own'' the additional inventory when it arrives.
    President's Budget 2020 embraces future capabilities while judiciously
    stewarding our current force.
        The guiding principle of our budget request is to balance naval
    power across its many dimensions. Naval power is not a choice between
    increased capacity or better capability--it is a combination of both.
    Naval power is not a choice between readiness and modernization--it
    requires a balance of both. Naval power is not a choice between more
    complex stand-alone technologies or networked systems--it is achieved
    through both. The talent to operate and sustain a larger and more
    lethal force is not a choice between more people or better training--it
    must draw from both.
    Bigger
        An ongoing force structure assessment will conclude by the end of
    2019. While data-driven analysis may ultimately change the details of
    our long-term fleet architecture, all force structure analyses agree in
    one respect: we must build a bigger Navy.

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        To increase America's naval power, we will build more platforms
    like ships, submarines, and aircraft, and expand our special operations
    forces. In 2018, Congress made a 355-ship Navy the law of the land, and
    this increased capacity will strengthen our ability to prevail in any
    warfighting contingencies, meet demand signals from combatant
    commanders, expand global influence, and support American prosperity by
    safeguarding access to critical markets, waterways, and chokepoints.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget requests nearly $24 billion in ship
    construction accounts to fund one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,
    three fast attack submarines, three large surface combatants, one small
    surface combatant, two combat logistics force ships, and two auxiliary
    support ships. Expanded across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
    President's Budget 2020 funds construction of 55 battle force ships to
    achieve a 301-ship Navy in fiscal year 2020 and a 314-ship Navy in
    fiscal year 2024. Along with class-wide service life extensions, this
    puts us on pace to reach a 355-ship Navy in fiscal year 2034
    (approximately 20 years sooner than President's Budget 2019). The
    Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (also referred
    to as the ``Thirty Year Shipbuilding Plan'') accompanies this budget
    request.
        There is no more existential imperative than deterring a nuclear
    attack on the Homeland. President's Budget 2020 fully funds the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program to do just that.
    Fully funding this request now will ensure that the lead ship's
    construction commences on time in fiscal year 2021, delivers in 2028,
    and conducts its first alert patrol in CY 2030. The Columbia-class will
    guarantee continuity of the most survivable leg of the strategic
    deterrent triad into the 2080s. This budget also procures 373 fixed and
    rotary wing aircraft (including 84 Block 3 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets),
    226 unmanned systems, and over 17,000 weapons and munitions across the
    FYDP.
        The recently approved block buy of two Gerald R. Ford-class
    aircraft carriers (CVNs 80 and 81) saves American taxpayers
    approximately $4 billion. It also maintains our trajectory towards the
    requirement of 12 more survivable and powerful aircraft carriers, and
    it gives our industrial partners much-needed predictability. It also
    represents an investment in future technologies that solidifies the
    nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as a centerpiece of national defense
    through the rest of the century.
        Finally, President's Budget 2020 funds an additional 5,100 sailors
    in fiscal year 2020 (and 18,600 over the FYDP) on top of fiscal year
    2019 end strength levels to recruit, man, maintain, operate, and fight
    these added ships, submarines, and aircraft. Filling gapped billets at
    sea remains our top manning priority, and we are committed to operating
    safely, effectively, and sustainably over time as the battle force
    grows.
    Better
        To increase America's naval power, we will build a better fleet--
    one that is more capable, agile, networked, and resilient across all of
    our naval platforms. This means fielding state-of-the-art systems and
    continually modernizing legacy equipment. In addition to other
    modernization efforts, the fiscal year 2020 budget includes $18 billion
    for research and development--an increase of $1.4 billion over fiscal
    year 2019 enacted levels.
        For example, President's Budget 2020 includes $4 billion across the
    FYDP to modernize 19 guided missile destroyers. This includes critical
    upgrades to AEGIS Baseline 9, enabling them to simultaneously perform
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Ballistic Missile Defense
    (BMD) operations. As well, improvements to Naval Integrated Fire
    Control Counter Air (NIFC-CA) will allow networked ships to share
    identification, targeting, and fire control data. President's Budget
    2020 funds 160 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Service Life Modifications (SLM)
    across the FYDP, equipping these aircraft with more lethality at
    greater ranges, improved signatures, and advanced networks.
        The budget also increases investments in long-range offensive ship-
    , sub-, and air-launched weapon systems, including: Tomahawk Land
    Attack and Maritime Strike missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
    (LRASM), Standard Missile (SM) 6, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range
    (JSOW-ER), Harpoon Block II+, as well as investments in Conventional
    Prompt Strike hypersonics. The budget augments investments for acoustic
    superiority modernization by requesting $93 million in fiscal year 2020
    ($633 million across the FYDP) to improve submarine quieting and sensor
    performance. To deliver capability faster, we are also leveraging
    accelerated acquisition and rapid prototyping by investing $1.3 billion
    in fiscal year 2020 ($4 billion across the FYDP) for the Navy Laser
    family of systems, SM-2/6 weapons, MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based
    unmanned aerial system, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles.

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        The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal
    year 2019 by pursuing near-term Naval Tactical Grid development and
    investing $50 million in fiscal year 2020 ($236 million across the
    FYDP) for the newly-established Digital Warfare Office to design and
    implement a comprehensive operational architecture to support emerging
    Distributed Maritime Operations concepts. The Navy will also invest
    $440 million in fiscal year 2020 (and more than $2 billion across the
    FYDP) to fund Fleet and industrial base cyber security, and hardening
    of ship hull, mechanical, and electrical systems among others.
        As these investments indicate, the Navy is focused on controlling
    the high-end fight. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are, and will
    continue to be, central to this effort. Ford was designed to deliver
    more capability for today's airwing and to provide growth opportunity
    for tomorrow's airwing--more lethal systems, and increased power
    generation. Ford is also proving more cost effective with a 30 percent
    higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than her Nimitz-class
    predecessors. This translates into $4 billion savings over the life of
    the Ford-class when compared to Nimitz-class: in other words, more
    naval power for less cost.
        Ford is innovation on a grand scale, offering a host of new
    technologies that will greatly improve the combat power of strike
    groups. As with naval innovations of the past, we didn't get everything
    right on the first try. We have learned with each test and most of the
    new systems are now operating. And we will continue to learn, iterate,
    and improve: the second Ford-class ship is being built with 18 percent
    fewer man hours. Despite this aggressive approach to adopt new
    technologies, Ford was delivered with less lead-ship cost growth than
    several other ship classes. Ford and her successors will set a new
    standard for afloat performance and combat power projection well into
    the second half of the century.
        We are also making tough calls about the capabilities we need to
    tackle future challenges. President's Budget 2020 removes funding for
    USS Harry S. Truman's (CVN 75) Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH)--
    $3.4 billion over the FYDP. We are applying the funds from the RCOH
    decision to field cost-imposing advanced technologies faster. In
    parallel, we continue to validate this decision through a rigorous
    program of studies, wargames and experimentation to analytically
    validate the best way forward. We remain postured to respond to what
    our studies show us and to adjust pace in-stride, including reversing
    the CVN 75 decision, if needed.
    Ready
        To increase America's naval power, we will build a ready fleet.
    This means steaming days to exercise at sea, flying hours to train in
    the air, sufficient quantities of ammunition and spares, and the
    resources to conduct emergent and planned maintenance--not only for
    today but also for the future as the fleet grows in size. And it's not
    just about buying more parts: President's Budget 2020 includes $23
    million in fiscal year 2020 ($66 million across the FYDP) to research
    and develop additive manufacturing (AM) capabilities. Among other AM
    goals--such as expanding this capability at sea to additional ships and
    beginning to network AM across the enterprise--we intend to produce
    1,000 unique end-use components for fleet installation and operation by
    the end of 2019. Readiness--both materiel and training proficiency--
    transforms our Navy's potential power into actual power. The knowledge
    and efficiency gained from the Department of Defense-wide audit will
    ensure that we do so as effectively as possible.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget continues the readiness and wholeness
    commitments we made in fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal
    year 2019 by funding ship and aviation readiness and enabler accounts.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget increases maritime and aviation spares
    funding compared to fiscal year 2019. Additionally, the fiscal year
    2020 budget stabilizes and incentivizes the industrial base by funding
    62 ship availabilities in public and private shipyards, shifting two
    attack submarine availabilities to private yards, and infusing $546
    million in fiscal year 2020 for naval shipyard infrastructure
    optimization. Finally, the budget includes capital investments of 12
    percent in public shipyard depot facilities and 10 percent in Fleet
    Readiness Centers, exceeding the six percent legislative requirement
    and underscoring our commitment to increase our capacity to maintain
    and modernize our fleet.

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        These investments will help on-time maintenance execution--aircraft
    and ship availabilities--which in turn gives our sailors the time they
    need at sea to build proficiency and confidence; not simply to operate
    safely but to prevail at the high-end of maritime conflict.
        Recognizing the inherent link between readiness and lethality, we
    continue to modernize our logistics capabilities to better refuel,
    rearm, resupply, revive, and repair operational forces. At sea, we are
    prioritizing the recapitalization of auxiliaries and sealift
    capabilities to sustain the Fleet's enduring global posture and support
    mobility of the Joint Force. President's Budget 2020 includes an
    initial $8 million research and development investment in the Common
    Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission Platform (CHAMP) for concept design.
    Ashore, we recognize that readiness is an enabler for force projection;
    in addition to investing in our shipyards, President's Budget 2020
    increases investment in facilities sustainment, restoration, and
    modernization (FSRM) to $3.1 billion (from 80 to 87 percent of the
    sustainment requirement).
        Of course, ships, aircraft, and weapons are not, by themselves,
    sufficient to respond to today's complex challenges. The readiness of
    these platforms and systems depends on talented and well-trained
    sailors, led by commanders of competence and character. Our sailors are
    the glue that binds our Navy team together. This is our Polaris. It is
    also why we established the College of Leadership and Ethics at the
    U.S. Naval War College in April 2018. Just as we have done throughout
    our history, we will continue to develop and empower leaders who are
    driven to build winning teams.

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        The fiscal year 2020 budget continues our generational
    transformation of the Navy's manpower and personnel systems. We are
    investing $235 million in a modern cloud-based personnel and pay
    system, while creating an expanded assignment marketplace and
    increasing career flexibility. For example, we are exercising the
    authorities granted to us in the reform of the Defense Officer
    Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to make better use of investments in
    training and increase career opportunities and flexibility for our
    officer corps. These initiatives leverage state-of-the art practices to
    put more control into the hands of our sailors. This includes more
    transparency regarding their career options. The sailor 2025 suite of
    programs will make today's burdensome and time-consuming process for
    executing orders--from updating pay and benefits to finding new housing
    and moving household goods--as easy as scanning a Quick Response (QR)
    code on a smartphone. Not only will this make the frequent relocations
    associated with military service easier for sailors and their families,
    it will minimize distractions so they can focus on warfighting.
        And we continue to tackle the recommendations listed in the
    Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review (SRR).
    President's Budget 2020 assigns the highest funding priority to CR/SRR-
    related investments--$346 million in fiscal year 2020 and $1.1 billion
    over the FYDP--including construction of new Mariner Skills Training
    Program centers and simulators and programmatic commitments for the
    Next Generation Surface Search Radar. Additionally, we remain committed
    to assessing our ships and crews, understanding the impact of fatigue
    and other human factors, filling personnel gaps for ships on deployment
    or in sustainment, and dedicating time to maintain our forward-deployed
    Fleet. As of February 2019, 20 of the 111 recommendations remain to be
    adjudicated. While we are on track to begin implementation of these
    remaining items by the end of the fiscal year, we will continue to
    analyze the effectiveness of our new programs and iteratively improve
    them over the FYDP.

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        Finally, we remain committed to recruiting and retaining diverse
    shipmates. In a time when evolving artificial intelligence and machine
    learning are factoring into future military capabilities, our sailors
    must bring creativity, innovation, and context to tactical and
    strategic decisions. This potent combination will make us more
    competitive and operationally effective. And it is the diversity of
    their backgrounds and viewpoints that will catalyze the speed and
    quality of decisions we need to outperform our adversaries.
                       continuing our budgetary momentum
        These realities highlight the importance of partnerships and a
    recognition that together we can do so much more. This past year's on-
    time budget put our Navy on a steady course making best speed. Prior to
    last year, when the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) was enacted on August 13, a defense authorization bill had not
    been enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year since fiscal year
    1997; the last time a defense appropriation was enacted by October 1
    was fiscal year 2009. This meant nine years of continuing resolutions
    that averaged one-third of the fiscal year. This uncertain financial
    footing resulted in fluctuating toplines and interruptions to
    government operations and services.
        The Navy looks forward to working with the 116th Congress to
    continue the momentum developed in fiscal year 2019. Stable and
    predictable funding solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our
    commercial partners, strengthens our industrial base, safeguards our
    sailors, and bolsters the interests of your constituents. And most
    importantly, stable and predictable funding mitigates operational risk
    by maximizing our planning and execution time.
        With timely, stable, and predictable investments, the U.S. Navy
    will be bigger, better, and more ready to work every day--in every
    ocean--to set the conditions that allow Americans and all the citizens
    of the world to flourish and prosper.
             the navy's connection to american principles and power
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        The Navy has always maintained a strong connection to the
    flourishing and prosperity of the American people. President
    Washington's phrase--``everything honorable and glorious''--hearkens to
    American values that are derived from the inalienable rights outlined
    in the Declaration of Independence: ``That among these are Life,
    Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.''
        This last value has commonly been understood as the right to
    materially improve our circumstances. The Navy also maintains a deep
    and historic connection to America's economic strength, the engine that
    makes our country a global power. The Navy was founded to protect vital
    sea lanes like Gibraltar and combat piracy off the North African
    coast--a mission to safeguard free movement of trade and free access to
    markets that continues in earnest today.
        ``Honorable and glorious'' also characterizes the mission of the
    United States Navy and the selfless service of more than 600,000
    sailors and civilians, and their families. The U.S. Navy is a
    definitive military force in world events but the Navy also connects
    with every other element of our national power. The Navy is the face of
    the Nation and often the first point of contact between the United
    States and other peoples. U.S. Navy ships have shuttled American
    diplomats across all seven seas: think of the paddle-wheeled steam
    frigate USS Mississippi transporting Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan
    in the early 1850s; the Great White Fleet circumnavigating the globe at
    the turn of the Twentieth Century; and the USS Quincy (CA 71) carrying
    President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Malta in 1945. And our ships have
    hosted international events of the highest consequence that have shaped
    the global security environment, such as the Japanese surrender aboard
    the USS Missouri (BB 63), anchored in Tokyo Bay, which formally ended
    the Second World War. The Navy brings sovereign United States territory
    to the shores of other nations, fostering connections to extend
    American assistance to those who would be our friends and demonstrating
    resolve to those who may oppose us.
        And ingrained in every mariner is the notion that we will never
    sail past another mariner in distress. We will continue to provide
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to our fellow citizens and
    neighbors wherever and whenever they are in need.
                                   conclusion
        This hearing comes at a critical time to both our Navy and our
    Nation. The challenges we face are varied and are growing more dynamic
    by the day. Let there be no doubt: America is a maritime nation and a
    maritime power. Our way of life and our economic prosperity have always
    been linked to the sea. For 243 years--through war and peace,
    uncertainty and stability, turmoil and prosperity--the United States
    Navy has validated founding father Thomas Paine's maxim that ``a Navy
    when finished is worth more than it cost.''
        In the competitive environment we face now and in the future, we
    must increase naval power in a balanced approach to meet our national
    strategic goals. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget ensures that
    the Navy and the Nation can continue to do everything honorable and
    glorious, as Washington intended.
        I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in the
    Congress for starting this important work, and we look forward to
    sailing alongside you to build and deliver the Navy the Nation Needs.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Richardson.
        General Neller.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Neller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm here today to
    testify on the posture of your Marine Corps, and I appreciate
    the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        I know this Committee, the Congress, and the American
    people have high expectations for our marines. As our Nation's
    expeditionary force in readiness, you expect your marines to be
    ready to operate forward with our Navy in the contact and blunt
    layers of a global operating model, to assure our partners,
    deter our rivals, and respond to crisis across the range of
    military operations. And, if deterrence should fail and we are
    called to fight, you expect us to fight and win.
        As we hold this hearing, approximately 41,000 marines are
    forward-deployed or postured in more than 60 countries around
    the world, some in harm's way, as we found out all too well
    yesterday, all engaged, doing exactly what you expect of them,
    throughout our history, if you have called upon your marines to
    respond immediately to crisis around the globe, either from the
    sea, from forward bases, or from home station. To meet your
    intent to be ready to suppress or contain international
    disturbances, short of large-scale war, we strive to prevent
    war by assuring our allies and deterring rivals with ready,
    capable, and persistently present naval expeditionary forces.
    Forward-postured naval forces remain critical to that end,
    providing the Nation a significant operational advantage
    through maneuver access and our presence.
        Now, supporting day-to-day operations through theater
    security cooperation, building partner capacity, humanitarian
    assistance, and disaster relief, or supporting current global
    contingencies requires your expeditionary force in readiness to
    be present. We recognize the strategic environment is
    constantly changing, requiring adaptations to our organization,
    training, equipment, and warfighting concepts in order to
    provide our Nation the lethal naval expeditionary force it
    demands. Your Marine Corps is committed to building the most
    ready, capable, and adaptable force the Nation can afford. This
    requires hard choices as we balance commitments to our current
    operations, work to rebuild our readiness, and pursue
    modernization efforts designed to increase our competitive
    advantage over our adversaries. Thanks to your efforts in
    Congress to provide increased and on-time funding, you have
    made some of our choices far less difficult.
        Still, we remain challenged by the lasting effects of
    Hurricanes Florence and Michael, both mentioned by Ranking
    Member Reed and the Secretary, that hit the East Coast last
    fall. The financial cost of these two storms totals around $3.7
    billion, but their impacts go deeper. And I look forward to
    answering any questions on this issue that you may have.
        I do want to thank the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Congress, and the administration for their work and support
    in approving $400 million of reprogrammed resources so we can
    immediately begin addressing some of the most pressing needs at
    Camp Lejeune. The Marine Corps continues to work to address the
    remaining shortfall within this fiscal year.
        Despite these challenges, the Marine Corps remains on the
    right path as we implement the National Defense Strategy. We
    continue to develop effective warfighting concepts through
    experimentation and invest in the right capabilities while
    experimenting ruthlessly to validate our choices in order to
    prepare for the future.
        Most importantly to the success of your Corps, we continue
    to recruit and train the most qualified men and women our
    Nation has to offer, men and women who raise their right hand,
    yearn to earn the eagle, globe, and anchor, and serve something
    greater than themselves, and represent the best our Nation has
    to offer around the world.
        The Navy/Marine Corps team remains our Nation's naval
    expeditionary force in readiness, forward-deployed, forward-
    postured, competing every day. And with the Congress's
    continued support and commitment, we will ensure that we must
    send our sons and daughters--if we must send our sons and
    daughters into harm's way, they will have every advantage our
    Nation can provide.
        Lastly, as mentioned by Ranking Member Reed, this was
    likely to be my last appearance in front of this Committee as I
    close out 44 years as a marine, the last 4 as the Commandant.
    And I want to personally thank this Committee for your support
    that you show every day to your marines.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
                   marines--ready, expeditionary, and lethal
        The purpose of your Marine Corps remains unchanged since mandated
    by the 82nd Congress--to be ready. Not just ready to go--but ready to
    go now, ready to respond and compete wherever sent, and if necessary--
    ready to fight and win. This idea of a ``force-in-readiness,''
    reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, requires a Marine Corps that is
    ``most ready, when the Nation is least ready.'' As a naval service,
    marines are soldiers of the sea ready to secure or protect national
    policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot.
    And if we must engage in the violence of battle to secure our
    interests, we stand ready for the violent struggle, and prepared to
    impose our will on our enemies. It is this idea of total readiness--a
    constant preparedness, expeditionary mindset, and aggressive
    warfighting philosophy--that remains the driving force behind your
    marines today. Yet we recognize the strategic environment is changing,
    requiring adaptations to our organization, training, equipment, and
    warfighting concepts in order to rebuild our competitive advantage and
    provide our Nation the lethal, expeditionary naval force it demands.
        The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready, lethal
    force the Nation can afford. Unfortunately, the testimony that follows
    is presently a conditional statement as the Marine Corps confronts the
    impacts of recent Hurricanes Florence and Michael in the fall of last
    year. Hurricane Florence was the wettest tropical storm ever recorded
    in the Carolinas, dropping 39 inches of water in less than one week.
    Just a few short weeks later we felt the impacts of Hurricane Michael,
    the strongest storm in terms of maximum sustained wind speed to hit the
    United States since Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The impact of these two
    disasters in terms of cost to the Marine Corps is estimated to be $3.7
    billion, but their impacts go much deeper and the gravity of these
    unforeseen disasters may not be fully known to this Committee:
          3,000 military personnel displaced including 1,000 family
    members living on base.
          North Carolina installations are home to II Marine
    Expeditionary Force which comprises 1/3 of the combat power of the
    Marine Corps.
          North Carolina installations are also home to Marine
    Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Fleet Readiness
    Center-East, and the Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training.
          800 buildings across Marine Corps Base (MCB) Lejeune,
    Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, and MCAS Cherry Point were
    damaged or compromised.
          100 structures were damaged at Marine Corps Logistics
    Base Albany.
          Almost 4,000 of the 6,200 homes across these
    installations sustained damage.
        Your Marine Corps is feeling the immediate impacts of these storms
    through lost and delayed training time; delayed deployments and
    redeployments; and daily quality of life challenges. Many of our ranges
    and training areas remain degraded. Damaged infrastructure to include
    roads, railroad trestles, and beaches have degraded our strategic
    capacity to deploy. All of these present an unacceptable challenge to
    the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness who must remain ready at
    a moment's notice. From a force posture ``risk to force'' and ``risk to
    mission'' perspective, we assess our current risk to both as
    ``moderate.'' Effective 1 June of this year however, we assess our risk
    to both moving to ``high'' as we enter the next hurricane season.
        Thanks to the hard work and support of the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, Congress, and the Administration, the Marine Corps recently
    received $400 million of reprogrammed resources to immediately begin
    addressing our most pressing infrastructure needs. We continue to work
    tirelessly to address our remaining $449 million shortfall within
    fiscal year 2019, and $2.8 billion required over fiscal year 2020,
    fiscal year 2021, and future plans to fully recover. We continue to
    make the decisions necessary in the short term to return our personnel,
    repair our facilities, and restore our readiness. Funding the remainder
    of this requirement internally, however, may jeopardize the readiness
    gains made over that last few years through the efforts of Congress and
    your Marine Corps. We must continue the hard work described in the
    remainder of this testimony to rebuild our readiness and modernize our
    Corps to maintain our competitive advantage against rising competitors.
    Expeditionary
        Throughout our history, marines have been called upon to respond
    immediately to crises around the globe either from the sea, forward
    bases, or home station. To meet Congress' mandate to be `` . . . ready
    to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale
    war,'' we strive to prevent war by assuring our allies and deterring
    rivals with ready, capable, and persistently present expeditionary
    forces. Forward postured naval forces remain critical to that end,
    providing the Nation a significant operational advantage through
    maneuver and access. Supporting steady state operations through theater
    security cooperation (TSC); building partner capacity; supporting
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR); and noncombatant
    evacuation operations (NEO); or supporting current global
    contingencies, requires your expeditionary force-in-readiness to be
    present.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly requires forward-
    deployed naval expeditionary forces that can compete, deter, and
    provide ``inside'' forces capable of denying adversary freedom of
    maneuver as part of our integrated naval defense-in-depth.
    ``Expeditionary,'' however, is more than a simple definition contained
    within joint publications. Marines view the term expeditionary as a
    pervasive mindset that is fundamental to our character, and an idea
    that shapes all aspects of our organization, training, education,
    equipment, and employment. Marines must be able to deploy rapidly,
    leverage the sea as maneuver space, enter the objective area,
    accomplish a broad range of operations, sustain itself, withdraw
    quickly, and rapidly reconstitute while forward deployed to execute
    follow-on missions. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)--by design
    a tailorable, self-sustaining, and scalable expeditionary unit--
    provides our Nation a combined arms force capable of exploiting
    advantages over an adversary. Equally important, the MAGTF provides a
    forward deployed dynamic force available now. Marines approach this
    expeditionary mindset holistically--from our training, capability
    development, employment in austere conditions, and Service culture.
    Although our warfighting concepts must be continually revised and our
    capabilities modernized to sustain our ability to respond when called,
    it is our expeditionary nature, forward presence as a naval force, and
    preparedness for the violence of combat that define our unique role in
    the Nation's defense.
    Competition, Lethality, and Deterrence
        The strategic environment is complex, informationally and
    technologically charged, volatile, and dangerous. The proliferation of
    modern conventional weapons and social media capabilities to a broader
    range of state and non-state actors, along with the erosion of our
    competitive technological advantage in areas where we have long enjoyed
    relative superiority, is likely to continue as peer competitors attempt
    to contest our influence globally. Competition below the traditional
    level of armed conflict and global campaigns such as China's One Belt
    One Road initiative, create a wide range of strategic and operational
    challenges that underscore the need for a globally responsive naval
    force capable of providing an asymmetric maritime advantage.
        Threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states require a
    change to how your Marine Corps is organized, trained, equipped,
    employed, and integrated with the Navy. We must become a more lethal,
    resilient, and capable competitor and deterrent. The Navy-Marine Corps
    team no longer relies on concepts and capabilities premised on
    uncontested sea control. We must establish a forward deployed defense-
    in-depth, anchored on naval ``inside'' forces, capable of Expeditionary
    Advance Base Operations (EABO) in support of the naval campaign. Modern
    sensors and precision weapons with expanding ranges and lethality are
    redefining how we assess our posture and relative combat power.
    Advanced adversary defensive networks are forcing us to reconsider
    methods of assured access required to compete against rising peers
    within a contested maritime space. As naval ``inside'' forces, the
    Navy-Marine Corps team must develop complementary capabilities to
    compete, deter, and win in all domains and facilitate the maneuver and
    projection of Joint Force capabilities. Our warfighting contributions
    must help shape the strategic environment to prevent conflict--one of
    the original mandates of the 82nd Congress for a ``force-in-
    readiness.''
        The Marine Corps assures allies and partners and competes globally
    every day within the Contact and Blunt Layers articulated in the NDS,
    in support of respective Fleet Commanders and Geographic Combatant
    Commands (GCC). Your Marine Corps maintains approximately one third of
    its operating forces, or roughly 39,500 Active and Reserve component
    marines, forward deployed and forward stationed. Amphibious Readiness
    Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs), Special Purpose Marine
    Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTFs), MARSOC, Marine Expeditionary Force
    Information Groups (MIGs), Task Force South West, and allocated forces
    are forward-deployed and forward-stationed to contest the malign
    behavior of our foes, improve interoperability with our allies and
    partners, and prepare to delay, degrade, and deny adversary aggression
    should deterrence fail and competition turn to armed conflict. And if
    our adversaries mistakenly choose to test our will, we must be capable
    of providing a combat credible force ready to absorb the initial blow;
    hold the line; contest their advance; facilitate sea control/denial;
    win the information operations fight; attrit adversary naval, land, and
    air forces; and fight until our allies, partners, and the Joint Force
    reinforces.
        At home, your Corps is preparing to contribute to the war-winning
    Joint Force should deterrence fail. We are preparing to respond to
    global contingencies against peer rivals in contested environments; to
    rapidly aggregate forces from across the globe to deliver capable mass
    to the fight; and prepared and ready to wage violence in all domains--
    from degrading and penetrating anti-access area denial (A2/AD)
    networks--to assuring access and projecting power with command and
    control (C2), fires, maneuver, and logistics. Every Marine throughout
    the MAGTF is constantly preparing through training and exercises that
    approximate the conditions of war as much as possible, and conducting
    training that introduces friction in the form of uncertainty, stress,
    disorder, and opposing wills. At the institutional level, we are
    testing our concepts and developing new tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. At the unit level, we are focusing on our foundational core
    competencies, individual discipline, and continuing actions in order to
    develop the mindset and skills necessary to prevail in any future
    fight. Only through hard, demanding, and realistic preparation can we
    achieve total readiness.
        We must increase the lethality of our integrated naval forces in
    order to deter our adversaries; and if deterrence fails, to win.
    Deterrence requires a combat credible force that possesses lethal
    capabilities, at sufficient capacities, paired with innovative
    operational concepts in order to alter the decision making choices of
    our adversaries. Lethality spans the Corps from the tactical to the
    operational levels of war, and from small unit formations to scalable
    MAGTFs. Ground formations must still locate, close with, and destroy
    the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel the enemy's assault by fire
    and close combat. The Marine Corps is committed to providing every
    lethal advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to
    ensure overmatch against peer threats and improve the lethality of our
    close combat squads. No Marine should ever enter into a fair fight.
        At the MAGTF level, lethality provides the means by which we alter
    the decision making choices of our adversaries. A lethal, integrated
    naval force that can deny adversary freedom of maneuver is paramount to
    this idea. That said, sea control is more challenging now than in past
    decades. Long-range detection and targeting methods possessed by
    adversaries, combined with extended ranges of their land-based anti-
    ship missiles, is increasing the interaction between land and naval
    forces in the littorals, requiring the Marine Corps to further develop
    and integrate force capabilities in support of the Navy--``Green in
    support of Blue.'' While power projection and forward presence remain
    foundational to our naval force, we are developing new concepts and
    capabilities for assured access, sea control, and sea denial that
    include long-range precision strike, raids, Distributed Maritime
    Operations (DMO), Operations in the Information Environment (OIE), and
    EABO. The product of those efforts, through speed, lethality, and an
    asymmetric competitive advantage, is deterrence. Ships and aircraft
    acting within a networked fleet must contribute to the lethality of the
    fleet with the ability to protect themselves from air, surface, and
    sub-surface attack, while possessing organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-
    shore strike weapons required by future naval campaigns. Current
    amphibious ships lack these capabilities, and therefore, must rely on
    support from other combatants to perform sea control and assured access
    missions.
        To increase the lethality and deterrent effect of our existing
    amphibious fleet, the naval force must upgrade C2 suites; introduce
    organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore precision strike weapons;
    integrate organic air defense; decrease ship signatures; and launch/
    recover the MAGTF's growing fleet of unmanned aerial systems--together,
    a more cost-effective approach than seeking a replacement of existing
    platforms. An amphibious fleet so equipped is a force multiplier to the
    larger naval force. The Marine Corps, in support of the Navy, must
    shift from a focus on a near symmetric land-based enemy to an
    asymmetric view in which Marine forces, operating from expeditionary
    advanced bases, threaten enemy naval, land, air, and unmanned forces.
    Marines must be prepared to task organize in support of fleet
    operations in highly contested maritime environments; employing mobile,
    low-signature, operationally relevant, and survivable expeditionary
    forces to mitigate challenges created by adversary advantages in
    geographic location, weapons system range, and precision. These are the
    capabilities and concepts possessed by an integrated naval force that
    offer our adversaries a choice--a choice to de-escalate to a state of
    manageable competition, or a choice to escalate and face a lethal naval
    force at a time and place of our choosing.
    Concepts and Experimentation
        Marines continue to innovate to build the 21st century MAGTF--a
    lethal, adaptive, and resilient Corps that executes combined arms as a
    means to conduct maneuver warfare across all domains. This
    transformation began in 2016 with the implementation of the Marine
    Corps Operating Concept (MOC). The MOC represents our institutional
    vision for how the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win despite
    the challenges of the strategic environment, and like the larger
    institution, will continue to be revised as the character of naval
    warfare changes. The MOC provides the foundation and context for
    subordinate operating and functional concepts--like Littoral Operations
    in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and EABO--and it guides our analysis,
    wargaming, and experimentation. These concepts, and our associated
    thinking on warfighting, are naval concepts which complement broader
    visions and conclusions articulated in the Navy's DMO concept.
        Whereas the MOC, DMO, and EABO provide the concepts for how marines
    will fight and prevail, it is through extensive experimentation and
    wargaming that we validate our force development choices, and inform
    our resourcing and programming strategies. Our experimentation and
    wargaming efforts focus on designing a lethal, agile, and resilient
    MAGTF optimized for the future that incorporates marines capable of
    integrating cyber, OIE, artificial intelligence, and long range
    precision fires capabilities in support of the Navy. As a driver of
    innovation, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab completed the first phase
    of our long-range experimentation plan called Sea Dragon, and over the
    next five years will focus on MAGTF hybrid logistics, OIE, EABO, DMO,
    maritime fires, and maritime C2. Through these efforts, the Marine
    Corps continues to adapt and refine our capability development, force
    structure, and resourcing decisions that modernize the force.
                                our 2020 budget
        ``Competing with a Peer Threat'' is the theme of our President's
    Budget 2020 submission, and directly aligns with the Secretary of
    Defense's guidance to increase lethality, improve warfighting
    readiness, and achieve program balance. This year's budget of $45.9
    billion builds on the momentum gained over the previous year and seeks
    to further adapt and modernize our Corps by focusing on three key
    budget priorities--modernization, readiness, and manpower. Through
    programmatic reforms, divestiture of legacy systems, and key
    investments in manned / unmanned teaming and autonomous systems, we are
    transforming today's Marine Corps into the future force required by our
    Nation and building the most ready force our Nation can afford. To
    accomplish this goal, we require adequate, sustained, and predictable
    funding to properly plan for and resource a ready, capable, lethal
    force.
        The Marine Corps remains committed to fiscal transparency and
    responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars. The results of Full
    Financial Statement Audits for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 generated
    efficiencies through improvements to financial processes, systems,
    internal controls, and accountability of equipment. The Marine Corps
    continues to remediate audit findings and remains focused on achieving
    a modified opinion by fiscal year 2020. Continued emphasis on executing
    corrective action plans, improving information systems, and better
    managing funds provided to us by the taxpayer demonstrates our
    commitment to achieve and sustain favorable audit opinions.
        Marine Corps business reforms identified more than $389 million in
    savings and cost avoidance in fiscal year 2020 to reinvest in
    modernization and warfighting readiness. When combined with reform
    efforts in fiscal year 2019, the cumulative reforms and divestitures
    over the past two years total $956 million. Examples of vetted and
    approved reform initiatives include:
          Multi-Year Procurement for Aircraft
          H-1 (Aviation) Program Procurement Savings
          Infrastructure Reset
          Enterprise Lifecycle Maintenance Program
          Legacy Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive
    Device (CREW) System Divestment
          DoN Under-Execution Review
        Marine Corps business reforms enable us to make strategic choices
    in the divestiture of certain programs to reinvest our limited
    resources toward building a more modern, lethal, expeditionary force.
    We are focused on continuing business reforms in fiscal year 2020 that
    foster effective resource management, support audit readiness, and
    streamline the requirements and acquisition process.
    Modernization
        Modernization remains critical to meeting the demands of a
    strategic environment marked by revisionist and revanchist powers,
    long-term strategic competition, and rogue regimes that have immediate
    access to advanced, lethal, and disruptive technologies. As part of a
    naval expeditionary force, what we desire to achieve is a Corps capable
    of denying freedom of maneuver to deter our adversaries, or when
    necessary, capable of exploiting, penetrating, and degrading advanced
    adversary defenses in all domains in support of Naval and Joint Force
    operations. Deterrence is no longer measured solely by the threat of
    violence. We require a force capable of operating and winning in the
    information environment before the physical fight ever begins. Should
    deterrence fail, we require a future force that can deny adversary
    freedom of action, impose costs, control key maritime terrain, shape
    the operational environment in support of integrated sea control and
    maritime power projection operations, and impose our will in all
    domains while under attack.
        In order to achieve the modern, lethal force required, we must
    experiment with new technologies available on the market, determining
    what will work best in the future operating environment, and then
    deliver those capabilities to the force quickly to mitigate the rapid
    rate of technological change. The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities
    Office (MCRCO) makes this possible, seeking emergent and disruptive
    technologies to increase our lethality and resiliency. The MCRCO
    leverages fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAA provisions and
    partnerships to accelerate the requirements development and definition
    process--with the consistent and steadfast support of Congress--we will
    continue to fund this office. We also embrace the idea of alternative
    acquisition pathways. We are using and seeing value in other
    transactions authority and intend to apply middle tier rapid fielding
    authority at the first appropriate opportunity as a solution to
    expedite modernization, where production is achievable within five
    years or less. Accelerated modernization is an essential part of the
    remedy to our long-term readiness problems and we must not allow
    ourselves to bury modernization efforts under cumbersome acquisition
    processes.
        Modernization investments represent roughly 30 percent, or $13.9
    billion of the total President's Budget 2020 budget submission, and are
    synchronized with Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 2025), the capability
    investment strategy which modernizes the force toward implementing MCF
    2025, MOC, EABO, and the NDS. The following capability areas support
    building a 21st century MAGTF across the Active and Reserve components
    of the force, and are prioritized in the following manner:
         Command and Control (C2) in a Degraded Environment: The
    Marine Corps requires a sustainable, defendable, and resilient C2
    network, integrated with Navy and Joint Force networks, which allows
    for timely and persistent information exchange while enhancing
    battlefield awareness to dispersed tactical units across the MAGTF.
    Investments in Networking-on-the-Move (NOTM), Fused Integrated Naval
    Network (FINN), Terrestrial Wideband Transmission System (TWTS), MAGTF
    Integrated Command and Control (MIC2), and MAGTF Digital
    Interoperability upgrades provide significantly increased capabilities
    associated with maneuver and fires across the battlespace.
    Additionally, in a contested information environment, artificial
    boundaries between a ``tactical'' network and a ``garrison'' network
    erode; the marines at the tactical edge will need seamless connections
    to the marines supporting them further back from the front line. We
    have to modernize our enterprise network and move our data stores to
    the cloud so that marines can access the information they need any
    time, in any place. The Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)
    program and future programs like it are critical to supporting the
    warfighter.
         Long Range and Precision Fires: The modern day battlefield
    requires forces capable of conducting lethal strikes at range, in
    depth, and with precision from air, land, and sea. Marine Corps
    investments include 5th Generation F-35B/C aircraft, maritime Group 5
    MAGTF Expeditionary UAS (MUX) with precision weapons, Guided Multiple
    Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternate Warhead (AW), Ground-Based Anti-
    Ship Missiles (GB-ASM) as well as ground vehicles and Long Range
    Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) armed with loitering munitions enabled
    by Low Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST).
         Operations in the Information Environment (OIE): Adversary
    use of ``information'' to manipulate facts, mobilize mass perceptions,
    and contest our ability to C2 forces undermines our traditional
    military advantages. We cannot count on uncontested access to the
    electromagnetic spectrum any more than we can count on uncontested
    freedom of maneuver on the sea. Establishment of the Deputy Commandant
    for Information (DC I) provides headquarters advocacy while the
    development of the MEF Information Group (MIG) enables the planning and
    integrating of OIE with traditional military activities to enhance
    lethality and our competitive advantage.
         Air Defense: Forward deployed/stationed marines are
    vulnerable to attacks in ways we have not considered for decades. Most
    lack protection and sufficient resilience from long-range kinetic
    attacks that jeopardize our ability to prepare, project, and sustain
    combat power. Expeditionary forces operating away from bases in a
    distributed/dispersed manner provide some degree of resilience through
    distributed mass and reduced signatures. Investments in Medium-Range
    Air Defense Systems, Counter-Cruise Missile, squad-level Counter-UAS,
    swarming technologies operating in a networked manner, and the Ground/
    Air Task Oriented Radar improve the resilience of our posture and our
    air defense capabilities.
         Protected Mobility / Enhanced Maneuver: To distribute and
    concentrate forces and effects, we must be able to maneuver to
    positions of advantage, and engage and defeat threat forces in all
    geographic, topographic, and climatic environments from littoral
    waterways to urban areas. The Corps prioritizes modernization and
    investments in three key vehicle replacement programs required to
    improve mobility and increase force protection: Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle (ACV), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Armored
    Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). To improve dismounted mobility, we are
    investing in lighter, better fitting body armor. Aviation investment
    priorities include procurement and Block 4 capability upgrades for F-
    35B/C; and the CH-53K which will provide an exponential leap in
    vertical heavy lift capability.
         Logistics: In a distributed and contested environment,
    logistics takes on greater significance as a key enabling function
    requiring global logistics awareness, diversifying distribution,
    improving sustainment, and optimizing installations to support
    sustained operations. This requires innovative methods, the ability to
    leverage new technologies, and integration with Navy, Joint, and
    Coalition forces. Science and Technology (S&T) efforts in Additive
    Manufacturing (AM) drove the procurement of 160 3D printers, with more
    than 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-approved aviation parts; immediately
    improving readiness and lethality. Additional investments in developing
    enhanced logistics C2 systems, bulk fuel transportation and storage,
    unmanned logistics systems--to include quadrotor cargo delivery systems
    and littoral connectors--are paving the way in Next Generation
    Logistics (NexLog) capabilities.
        It is equally important that the Marine Corps provide every lethal,
    modern advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to
    make sure our infantry is deadly and protected to the maximum extent
    possible. Aligned with the Secretary of Defense's Close Combat
    Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) initiative, the Marine Corps continues to
    invest heavily in its close combat formation capabilities, including--
    enhanced combat helmet; binocular night vision devices; M-27 Infantry
    Automatic Rifle; M320 grenade launcher; M38 Squad Designated Marksman
    Rifle; and Javelin anti-tank missile. Additional investments include
    Squad unmanned aerial systems; MAGTF electronic warfare; Joint Battle
    Command Platform; Handheld C2; target hand-off system; adaptive threat
    force augmentation; future integration training environment; pattern of
    life automated behavior development, and warfighter augmented reality.
    These capability investments, combined with demanding unit training and
    Service-level force-on-force exercises, provide the path forward to
    ensuring close combat superiority against peer competitors.
    Readiness
        The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready force the
    Nation can afford. Readiness, however, is the product of two metrics.
    The first is the ability of the force to execute its mission with ready
    people, ready equipment, and the right training. The second compares
    the force against potential adversaries, the importance of which grows
    dramatically in an environment of rising peers and global competition.
    If our near-term readiness levels are high and our units are ready,
    then by the first metric we are ready. If, however, that force is
    outranged or outpaced by potential adversary capabilities, then by the
    second metric we are not. This requires an additional long-term view of
    readiness through capability modernization, as discussed in the
    preceding section of this statement. As a Service, we will take a
    deliberate approach to continue the positive trends in our overall
    readiness while simultaneously balancing the need to modernize our
    current force, satisfying existing GCC demands, and building the force
    required by the strategic environment to remain relevant in the future.
    Thanks to your efforts in Congress to provide increased funding, you
    have made the choices the Marine Corps has to make less difficult. Our
    President's Budget 2020 budget provides $14.3 billion, or approximately
    31 percent of our total submission towards near-term readiness.
      Aviation
        While readiness concerns exist across the MAGTF, our most acute
    readiness issues are found in aviation units. Recent increases in
    funding enabled the Marine Corps to simultaneously invest in both
    readiness and modernization, adding capacity to the flight lines by
    fully funding readiness enabler accounts, depot and Defense Logistics
    Agency (DLA), spares, training, and people. The Marine Corps has been
    able to accelerate aviation readiness recovery efforts along four lines
    of effort:
        1.  Depot Readiness Initiative: resources to accomplish certain
    unit level maintenance while an aircraft is being re-worked at the
    depot, which means aircraft that return from the depot to a squadron
    are ready to fly almost immediately.
        2.  Non-Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM): the qualified
    maintenance marines and needed supporting resources (engineers, support
    equipment, etc.) are available to fix aircraft without delay.
        3.  Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS): all parts are available when
    needed to prevent extended aircraft down times awaiting parts.
        4.  In-Service Repair: higher-level maintenance needed at the
    squadron is properly resourced to perform these repairs without delay,
    avoiding excessive aircraft down time.
        Although much work remains to achieve our aviation readiness
    recovery goals, we continue to see significant gains realized along
    these lines of effort: depot throughput met Service goals, NMCM rates
    have decreased, NMCS rates have dropped, and in-service repairs have
    reached our Service goal. In short, these gains mean that marines are
    able to keep existing aircraft in a mission capable (MC) status for
    longer periods, affording aircrew more flying hours and training time.
    In addition to our dedication to fully funding aviation readiness
    accounts, other readiness recovery initiatives include the CH-53E Reset
    program, Depot Readiness Initiative, MV-22 Readiness Program, and
    talent retention efforts aimed at retaining experienced maintainers in
    operational squadrons. Leading indicators of readiness improvements
    resulting from these efforts include: an increase in overall flight
    hours, an increase in average monthly flight time for our aircrew, an
    increase in MC rates of our aircraft, and an improvement of our
    aggregate aviation T-Rating. These gains are a direct result of funding
    provided in the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 defense
    appropriations bills, which allowed investments in readiness enabler
    accounts at maximum executable levels. These investments are now
    realizing significant results. Should funding decrease in fiscal year
    2020 or beyond--aviation readiness will also likely decrease.
        The Secretary of Defense released guidance to the Services
    directing accelerated readiness recovery of tactical aviation (TACAIR)
    to achieve 80 percent mission capable rates by the end of fiscal year
    2019. The Marine Corps is taking action to achieve this goal along five
    lines of effort. The Marine Corps is working towards this goal by
    increasing the number of aircraft available and operating within
    aircraft and maintenance capacity levels. Our investments in fiscal
    year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal year 2019 will produce ready
    aircraft from our depots, $1.6 billion in spares from Navy Supply, and
    $16 million in additional consumables from DLA. Additional goals from
    industry partners include accelerated completion of aircraft
    modifications and retrofits, accelerated depot repair capability, and
    shifting maintenance to the appropriate levels. Successful
    implementation of these efforts will ensure we meet the 80 percent goal
    and sustain it in the future.
      Ground Equipment
        Ground equipment readiness rates continue to show significant gains
    after years of focused effort to reset our equipment. As of 1 October
    2018, the Marine Corps completed reset of 99 percent of our ground
    equipment programs and returned 72 percent of our ground equipment to
    the operating forces. The operational readiness of key Principal End
    Items (PEI) remains high, and we project to complete our ground
    equipment reset efforts in third quarter fiscal year 2019. High
    operational readiness rates of key PEIs, however, mask certain
    underlying readiness issues. Units preparing to deploy are still
    experiencing shortfalls in equipment to train for core mission tasks as
    we support global equipment sourcing for forward deployed units such as
    Special Purpose MAGTFs. Equipping requirements for these rotational
    forces are disproportionally high due to their unique mission sets,
    placing high demand on low density equipment that approaches or exceeds
    availability. The result is risk in equipment availability to respond
    to contingencies and training for non-deployed units. We are addressing
    these issues through aggressive acquisition and redistribution actions.
      Amphibious Fleet
        Use of the sea as maneuver space remains as vital today as any time
    in our history. The Joint Force must maintain access to, and the
    ability to maneuver through the global commons, assure access, compete
    in the maritime domain, and defeat any competitor attempting to deny
    our freedom of action. To adequately accomplish these tasks, the naval
    force must be distributable, resilient, and tailorable while being
    employed in sufficient scale and for ample duration. The amphibious
    fleet allows the naval force to do three basic things:
          Conduct steady state operations around the world,
    including TSC, building partner capacity, HA/DR, and NEO.
          Execute a global cost imposition strategy if we have to
    fight.
          Project and sustain the force in a contested environment.
        Due to existing shortfalls and maintenance issues within our
    amphibious ship capacity, the naval force currently struggles to
    satisfy these basic requirements--an issue that will only grow worse
    over time if not properly addressed. The operational availability of
    the existing amphibious fleet is insufficient to meet global demands
    and negatively impacts the unit training necessary to recover readiness
    for major combat operations. Consequently, the strategic risk to the
    mission and the larger Joint Force is increased.
        The Navy and Marine Corps are currently operating below the minimum
    amphibious shipping requirement detailed in the 2016 Force Structure
    Assessment and 30-year shipbuilding plan. The stated requirement of 38
    amphibious warships is the minimum number required to fulfill our title
    10 obligation. Resourcing to a lower number puts contingency response
    timelines and the Joint Force at risk. Yet, amphibious readiness is
    more than the simple product of capacity and availability; it requires
    an amphibious fleet with the right capabilities to remain survivable,
    resilient, and lethal in a contested environment. Today's naval
    campaigns still demand an amphibious fleet capable of conducting raids,
    demonstrations, assaults, withdrawals, and support to other operations
    (TSC, HA/DR, NEO, etc.) in both permissive and non-permissive
    environments. The naval force must be able to maneuver; gain temporary
    lodgments to establish expeditionary advanced bases from which marines
    hold adversary naval, land, and air forces at risk; and then withdrawal
    quickly as the naval campaign advances. Our amphibious fleet lacks the
    ability to protect itself from air, surface, sub-surface, cyber, and
    information attack; and absent organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore
    strike weapons, must rely on support from other combatants to perform
    sea control and assured access missions. To increase the lethality and
    readiness of our amphibious fleet, the naval force must:
         Upgrade C2 suites, introduce organic ship-to-ship and
    ship-to-shore precision strike weapons, organic air defense, and
    decrease ship signatures to become less targetable.
         Modernize the manned and unmanned surface connector fleet
    that, when combined with our aerial connectors, enable the naval force
    to establish a web of sensor, strike, decoy, and sustainment locations
    based on land and sea that will complicate the strategic and
    operational decision making of our most advanced rivals.
         Address modernization in our prepositioning program to
    ensure persistent forward positioning of our critical equipment and
    sustainment supplies in a manner that is scalable, flexible,
    expeditionary, and survivable in a contested environment; and that will
    further enable our naval expeditionary inside forces to persist inside
    the enemy's weapons engagement zone (WEZ).
         Continue to explore innovative ways to employ alternative
    platforms for amphibious and maritime operations in more permissive
    environments in order to compensate for the shortfall of amphibious
    warships and provide more global coverage in the most resource-
    appropriate manner.
         Continue to develop and employ Naval Task Force elements
    consisting of multiple ship types for optimal lethality and force
    protection; including possible development of more functional and
    operationally suitable naval vessels and craft to expand the
    competitive space and create an asymmetric maritime advantage globally.
      Deployment-to-Dwell
        The rate by which marines deploy largely depends upon what unit
    they are assigned to and the operational demand for those units. The
    majority of Marine units experience a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio
    that is challenging; we confront this daily. While these demands are
    clear and unmistakable evidence of the continued relevance of marines,
    this tempo is difficult to sustain as it limits our time to train to
    our full naval mission sets. Our goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force,
    which would allow us time to train for the high-end fight and achieve
    balance for our marines and their families at home.
        There are three types of marines in our Corps: those who are
    deployed, those getting ready to deploy, and those who just returned
    from deployment. President's Budget 2020 supports an 186,200 Active and
    38,500 Reserve component end-strength force, maintaining an overall 1:2
    D2D ratio. Operating at a 1:2 D2D ratio, although challenging, is a
    conscious, short-term decision to balance modernization, meet current
    demand, and simultaneously recover our readiness. We owe our marines
    and their families the necessary time to reset and train for the next
    deployment or contingency. For many decades prior to the attacks of
    September 2001, Marines in the operating forces benefited from a 1:3
    D2D ratio. The marines that were not deployed had time to prepare, time
    to train, and were ready to reinforce their fellow marines if a major
    contingency happened. A return to a 1:3 D2D would require a substantive
    increase in manpower, or decrease in operational requirements--we do
    not seek a significant increase in end-strength in this year's budget
    and we continue to experience high operational requirements. Although
    we manage the risks associated with a 1:2 D2D in the short-term, our
    long-term goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force.
      Infrastructure
        The Marine Corps previously accepted risk in facilities funding to
    protect near-term readiness and service-level training. Taking risk in
    the facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization, and military
    construction programs resulted in the degradation of our
    infrastructure, which in turn increases lifecycle costs. We must ensure
    our infrastructure, both home and abroad, is resilient against attacks,
    and long-range precision strikes while modernizing to support future
    capability integration and training facilities needed to hone our
    warfighting skills. Our Infrastructure Reset Strategy must be a
    priority--we must improve infrastructure lifecycle management and
    ensure investments are aligned with Marine Corps capability-based
    requirements to support our warfighting mission and contribute directly
    to current and future force readiness. The state of our facilities is
    the single most important investment to support four critical force
    enabling functions our installations provide:
          Housing for our marines and their families
          Deployment platforms from which our expeditionary forces
    fight and win our Nation's battles
          Training facilities required for our MAGTFs to train and
    hone their combat readiness
          An organic industrial base for depot-level maintenance,
    storage, and prepositioning of war reserve equipment to maximize
    readiness and sustain combat operations
        As leaders we have fallen short of our full obligation to our
    marines and their families with respect to privatized military housing;
    we are correcting this shortfall. The Marine Corps has instituted a
    voluntary Marine Housing Outreach program aimed at every marine and
    sailor residing in government quarters, privatized military housing, or
    an off-base civilian rental property. This outreach program is designed
    to raise our awareness of the marines' living conditions to ensure it
    is safe, secure, and environmentally healthy; identify maintenance or
    safety issues affecting the residence, determine any actions taken to
    date to remedy them, and determine how the chain of command can assist
    in the resolution process; and ensure our marines and their families
    are aware of and understand the support processes and programs
    available. In concert with the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps
    is also reviewing the reporting mechanisms and oversight procedures
    that govern the way privatized military housing discrepancies are
    reported, remediated, and verified through our Public-Private Venture
    partners. The Marine Corps is committed to our marines and families, to
    improving the military housing offered aboard our installations, and to
    ensuring unit commanders are personally involved in advocating for the
    wellbeing of the marines they serve.
        The Marine Corps' Infrastructure Reset Strategy ensures every
    dollar is targeted and spent on the highest priorities at the lowest
    total lifecycle costs, optimizing investment over the long-term to
    support our warfighting mission and align investment with our strategic
    priorities. These prioritized investments align with NDS guidance to
    increase lethality by supporting new capabilities and platforms;
    modernizing inadequate and obsolete facilities; relocating and
    consolidating forces; and improving quality of life. fiscal year 2020
    Military Construction (MILCON) and Facilities Sustainment, Restoration
    and Modernization (FSRM) accounts support:
          Guam relocation investments: Barracks, central fuel
    station, and central issue facility
          MCF 2025 initiatives: Consolidated Sensitive
    Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) for I MEF MIG and 10th
    Marines HIMARs complex
          New platform investment: F-35B/C hangar, apron, landing
    pads, and training simulator; ACV maintenance facility; and CH-53K
    cargo loading trainer
          Training: Wargaming Center at MCB Quantico
          Quality of Life: Barracks replacement at MCB Hawaii and
    mess hall replacement at MCB Camp Pendleton
          Recapitalization and replacement of inadequate facilities
    Manpower
        Our people--marines, civilian marines, and families--are our
    institutional center of gravity, and remain fundamental to our ability
    to Make Marines and Win Battles. Maintaining the most ready, lethal
    Marine Corps possible requires talented and dedicated people. Our
    President's Budget 2020 provides $16.1 billion towards manpower
    accounts, approximately 35 percent of our total submission, to continue
    implementing MCF 2025. The strategic environment our Nation faces
    requires a more experienced, better trained, and more capable Corps. It
    requires more than just new equipment and technologies, it requires the
    right force structure and marines with the right skills to effectively
    operate. Modernization priorities require a complementary element of
    force structure changes to ensure we have the right people, with the
    right skills, for the deployment and employment of new capabilities and
    to ensure the future force is compatible and mutually supportive. Our
    goal is to provide a more mature, experienced force to leverage
    individual skill and professional talent with emerging technology
    through select force structure changes that recruits, trains, educates,
    and sustains the most lethal force possible.
        To achieve our goals, our actions focus personnel growth in the
    right areas. Our President's Budget 2020 end strength plans for an
    186,200 Active and 38,500 Reserve component force. This limited growth
    of 100 marines is targeted in specialized fields such as MARSOC and
    several specialties encompassed by OIE: intelligence, electronic
    warfare, and cyberspace operations. Equally important, our manpower
    efforts are addressing the need for more experienced and better trained
    leaders within our infantry formations to ensure the superiority of our
    close combat formations. In order to optimize selection of the most
    talented infantry squad leaders, we have increased the pool of infantry
    Sergeants by 330 marines through realignment efforts within our
    internal structure. Everything we do must focus on making marines
    better, more resilient, lethal, and capable of outpacing our
    adversaries.
        Central to our role in providing a lethal force is recruiting the
    most qualified men and women within our Nation who are willing to raise
    their hand, affirm an oath, and earn the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. We
    must ensure that we recruit the right people, devoted to upholding the
    values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Our new marines must be
    provided the highest level of training that not only prepares them for
    the rigors of combat, but also successfully transforms and sustains
    them in their career paths. As such, a fourth phase has been added to
    Recruit Training. This fourth phase focuses on mentorship and leader-
    led instruction to better prepare new marines for transition to the
    operating forces.
        Education and training is continuous for marines. We must ensure we
    train to fight, and educate to win. New technologies require smarter,
    more mentally agile marines capable of exercising sound judgment and
    decision making in uncertain and challenging situations. Professional
    Military Education remains essential in developing leaders with the
    analytical and critical thinking skills required to adapt in ever
    changing environments. To increase the capabilities of our leaders, the
    Marine Corps has developed the College of Enlisted Military Education
    (CEME), creating a pathway for enlisted leaders to increase skill and
    proficiency through continuing education. We have revamped our PME
    process, adding new PME courses, and enhancing academic rigor to grow
    our force with the intellectual skills and capabilities necessary for
    the future.
        As a marines, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of
    personal conduct and ensure all marines and family members are treated
    with dignity and respect. This requires us to take an introspective
    look at our culture to ensure the long-term success of our efforts. To
    demonstrate our commitment to strengthening our culture, we created the
    Talent Management Oversight Directorate (TMOD). This office supports
    the Assistant Commandant in his role as the Talent Management Officer
    of the Marine Corps, and addresses all personnel and cultural issues
    impacting the Corps' ability to invest in and leverage a diversely
    skilled and talented force. The TMOD's mission is to ensure compliance
    with all objectives, policies, and directives that supports the Corps'
    efforts to recruit, promote, and retain the best talent the Nation has
    to offer. Focused on mission readiness, the TMOD helps ensure we
    maintain an organization where all members are valued based on their
    individual excellence and commitment to warfighting. Treating all
    marines and their families with dignity and respect, as well as
    fostering a culture of inclusion throughout the service, is central to
    our core values.
        Taking care of marines and their families is a key element of
    overall readiness and combat effectiveness. The adage ``we recruit
    marines, we retain families'' remains as true today as ever. Our
    comprehensive system of services, to include Sexual Assault Prevention
    and Response; Suicide Prevention; Personal and Professional
    Development; Drug and Alcohol Abuse Counseling/Prevention; Business and
    Recreation Services; and Spouse Employment; seeks to create the
    holistic fitness and readiness of our marines and families--body, mind,
    spirit, and social. In addition, our Wounded Warrior Regiment continues
    to execute our Recovery Coordination Program to ``keep faith'' with
    those who have incurred life changing impairments in service to our
    Nation.
        Our civilian workforce has the leanest civilian-to-military ratio
    of all the military services, at a current ratio of one civilian
    employee to every ten marines. Approximately 95 percent of our
    appropriated funded civilians work outside the Washington, DC beltway
    at 57 bases, stations, depots, and installations around the world.
    Sixty-nine percent are veterans who have chosen to continue to serve
    our Nation; of those, 18 percent are disabled veterans. Civilian
    marines perform vital functions at our bases and stations, and are
    integral to the daily operations and overall capability of the Marine
    Corps. Challenges with recruitment and retention--notably burdens like
    the threat of sequestration, possible furloughs, antiquated hiring
    processes, and limited pay increases--inhibit our ability to retain top
    talent. Thanks to the hard work of Congress in passing a civilian pay
    raise this year, we continue to fund these critical members of our
    team.
                                   conclusion
        The Marine Corps serves as a naval expeditionary ``inside'' force
    that is most ready, when the Nation is least ready. We seek a constant
    state of readiness--lethal, forward postured, assuring allies,
    deterring adversaries, capable of absorbing the initial blow, and
    holding the line--and if required, prepared to fight and impose our
    will on the enemy. We are an integrated naval force--transiting the
    oceans, aggregating at sea, fighting at sea, and coming from the sea.
    We are organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the range of
    military operations, in every domain, and thrive in uncertainty--
    facilitating assured access operations, sea control operations, or
    maritime security in support of the fleets. We are self-sustaining for
    pre-determined lengths of time, and capable of quickly reconstituting
    for follow-on tasking globally to support dynamic force employment. We
    continuously live ``with our sea-bags packed'' and remain the most
    lethal, credible combat forces available.
        However, despite notable improvement in readiness during the past
    two year years, the preceding seventeen years of war have perilously
    degraded our overall capability and capacity, as those of our
    adversaries have increased. We must increase the lethality of our
    ``inside'' combat credible forces in order to compete with our threats,
    deter our adversaries, assure our allies, and if necessary--prevail in
    any fight. As the force at the forward edge, the force first to make
    contact and hold--we require the most modern, technologically advanced,
    capable Marine Corps our resourcing will allow. To achieve this end,
    the Marine Corps must evolve from today's ``1.0'' force capable of
    addressing our current warfighting needs; to a near-term ``1.1''
    modernized force that leverages select, existing platforms to achieve
    new warfighting concepts; to a ``2.0'' future force with revolutionized
    capabilities and the ability to execute new warfighting concepts.
        The Marine Corps is increasing lethality and evolving our force
    through prioritized investment in modernization, readiness, and
    manpower. This evolution is necessary to ensure we maintain current
    operational readiness and address whatever contingencies may arise
    today, and anticipate what our force of tomorrow must look like to be
    capable of addressing unforeseen threats. But we need Congress'
    continued support. To accomplish this goal, adequate, sustained, and
    predictable funding is required to properly plan for and resource a
    ready, capable force. Our Marine Corps will ensure there will never be
    a fair fight . . . our Nation is not afforded that luxury. We will
    continue to innovate and build a 21st Century Marine Corps--a lethal,
    adaptive, and resilient Corps that can dominate all domains, that is
    ready to fight tonight--and win.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Neller.
        I've had a couple of systems I've talked about, and we--
    that I think are worthy of bringing up in this hearing. First
    of all, Admiral Richardson, what is your current requirement
    for aircraft carriers?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, the 2016 Force Structure
    Assessment lists 12 aircraft.
        Chairman Inhofe. I understand that you're now talking
    about--giving consideration to taking out the USS Harry Truman.
    Now, my question--my first question to you is, Why would you--
    it's my understanding that, over the last--for 22 days last
    summer, there was not a single aircraft carrier strike group
    deployed. Right now, we know that we have a need. And to take
    out, I guess, the Truman, you'd--you could characterize that as
    being in midlife at this time--to take that out of the system,
    will you have something, then, that can actually change our
    deficiency from two to one? In other words, come up with 11, as
    opposed to 10. So, what would motivate that decision?
        Admiral Richardson. Chairman, thanks for that question.
        I like to think of the budget submission as a--particularly
    with respect to the Truman, as a bit of a discussion centering
    around three elements of the budget. One is that we have,
    indeed, proposed not refueling the Harry S. Truman at her
    midlife so that we can take those funds and invest them into
    advanced technologies, all with the idea of increasing naval
    power into the future. Our budget, as I said in my opening
    statement, is forward-leaning into those technologies.
        Chairman Inhofe. But, that would have the result of
    bringing our numbers down----
        Admiral Richardson. It would, indeed.
        Chairman Inhofe.--to buy one additional carrier.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. And so, the third leg of that
    stool, Chairman, is really important, which is that we've got a
    Force Structure Assessment currently underway, and we've--the
    combatant commanders are also studying their requirements or
    OPLANs [Operational Plans].
        Chairman Inhofe. Now, when is that due?
        Admiral Richardson. This is due later on this year. And so,
    if we need to, it's early enough in the program that we can
    reverse this decision. I think it's about $16 million, $17
    million in the budget year. We are ready to readdress that. If
    these studies show----
        Chairman Inhofe. Well, I think that may happen, because
    we're going to be--of course, we're going into our
    reauthorization, and that would be one thing that's--I've
    heard--I'm not the only one who questions that decision, but--
    and you'll have a chance to respond more, because I know others
    are interested in that.
        Let me--I know, Secretary Spencer, the question that--
    obviously, our favorite subject is, When do you project that
    all 11 weapons elevators on the Ford would be ready to be
    accepted by the Navy?
        Secretary Spencer. Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a
    subject of great interest to me. What we're looking at right
    now is, when she sails from her post-shakedown availability,
    right now scheduled to be October. We've taken two deliveries
    since we last talked. We're making progress. We're working with
    contractors, application and resources are being applied, and,
    rest assured, attention is focusing down on it.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Well, let me just be sure that we're
    clear, here. There are other areas of underperformance, as you
    are fully aware, such as the catapults, the resting gear,
    radar, and the propulsion plan. They're going to have to
    demonstrate reliability at the same point that we'd be looking
    at the weapons elevators, isn't that correct?
        Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. And that was going to be July the--July of
    this year, of 2019.
        Secretary Spencer. That is correct. There are other items
    that are pushing the availability out, such as the main thrust
    bearings, propulsion, and just the whole general PSA [post
    shakedown availability] schedule.
        Chairman Inhofe. And that now is going out to October? Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Spencer. That is correct.
        Chairman Inhofe. All right. How confident are you that this
    is going to take place by October?
        Secretary Spencer. I----
        Chairman Inhofe. Now's a good time to express that----
        Secretary Spencer. It----
        Chairman Inhofe.--since----
        Secretary Spencer.--certainly is, Chairman. I am fairly
    confident. This is new technologies. I don't want to use that
    as an excuse, but I will tell you that we're confident, working
    with the contractor, that this is the goal that we will get the
    Ford out the door----
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
        Secretary Spencer.--in October.
        Chairman Inhofe. That's a good idea, because we've
    scheduled a meeting for October, so we'll have a chance to----
        Secretary Spencer. I will----
        Chairman Inhofe.--to look at that.
        Secretary Spencer. I will call up the CO [commanding
    officer], and we'll have lunch----
        Chairman Inhofe. All right.
        Secretary Spencer.--on the ship.
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
        Now--and one other system, here, because I know there's
    some discussion on the CH-53K replacing the CH-53E, and I'd
    like to get, kind of, an update on that. It could be from you
    or from any of the other witnesses.
        Secretary Spencer. Let me start, and I'm more than happy to
    have the Commandant weigh in if he has other comments.
        I think that you remember this has always been a program,
    since I've been onboard, that we've kept an eye on. As of this
    winter, it was not progressing to the speed that I thought was
    appropriate, nor our acquisition folks. We are having some
    negotiations with the prime supplier, Lockheed Martin Sikorsky.
    I just most recently, Mr. Chairman, sat down with the
    leadership of Lockheed Martin, and we have, ``aligned our
    priorities as partners.''
        Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I think that's a good idea. You have
    new leadership there, you have a different corporate setting
    than we did before, and that has to be taken in consideration.
        Yeah, we're going to stay with our time--timing on this,
    this round.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, we mentioned, several of us, the damage by
    Hurricane--several hurricanes to Navy installations. And
    Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA required the services
    to send up the top ten installations that are vulnerable to
    weather, extreme weather. We have not received that yet. Your
    colleagues in the Air Force and Army have committed to do so.
    Can we get a commitment for promptly sending up to us the list
    of the ten most vulnerable installations?
        Secretary Spencer. At 12:01, I will make sure that is
    underway, Senator, and I apologize for the delay.
        Senator Reed. It's--thank you. It's--you're in good company
    with Secretary Wilson and Secretary Esper. So, thank you very
    much.
        One of the things that we've noticed through the course of
    these hearings is that--particularly when talking, again, with
    Secretary Esper and his colleagues in the Army--they did a deep
    dive into their budget to try to find savings before they asked
    for additional resources. Has the Navy, Mr. Secretary and
    Admiral Richardson and General Neller, Navy and Marine Corps
    made such a deep dive and made proposed cuts?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. A way to look at--I think
    you're talking about the Army's Night Court that they were
    having, et cetera.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Spencer. Navy goes through a similar process
    every single budget cycle, although this next cycle that we're
    doing, we're actually calling it zero-base budgeting, where we
    are zeroing everybody out, and everyone has to come in and sing
    for their dinner as to their requirements. But, if you look at
    our savings--I was talking to Senator Perdue about this--if you
    look at our savings from authorities you've given us, whether
    it be block buy, multiyear buys, process improvements, from
    fiscal year 2017 on, we have about $30 billion worth of
    savings, compared to business as usual.
        Senator Reed. Your comments, Admiral Richardson?
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'd just echo what the
    Secretary said. We do this pretty much every year, but we've
    really turned up the heat, under the Secretary's leadership,
    and those tens of billions of savings are exactly what I'm
    tracking, as well.
        Senator Reed. And Commandant?
        General Neller. Sir, there are specific programs that we
    have dropped from the budget that we felt we could accept risk.
    There was risk to dropping them, but we did it, because we
    wanted to generate resources for other more important things.
    And we continue to look at what we call core/non-core actions
    that we do and things where we could possibly, maybe, outsource
    that or not do it at all in order to generate additional
    resources based on the fact that we--as generous as the
    Congress has been, we have to be prepared to be able to do with
    whatever we receive in the future.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, there is a significant amount of MILCON
    [military construction] that has been designated by the White
    House to be shifted to the wall. And I presume, simply by the
    fact of asking for the MILCON, that these are serious
    investments, and that, from a military standpoint, your
    position would be, they should be--they should take priority,
    perhaps, over other funding, including the wall?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. The process that I've been
    made aware of is that the list was going up, then we will be
    asked to prioritize, at some point. I will make sure that my
    prioritization expressions are given.
        Senator Reed. I--the sheer size of the request will limit,
    to a significant degree, what you can protect. And I would
    presume that there will be projects there that are critical to
    the Navy and the Marine Corps that, for the demands of the
    southern wall, will be taken away. And from, again, a military
    standpoint--there are other factors, I'm sure, but from the
    military standpoint, do you think that's a wise diversion?
        Secretary Spencer. When asked, Senator, I will give my best
    advice to the Secretary.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Neller, I mentioned the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicle]. Can you give us an idea how you and the Army are
    going to work together if they try to scale this program down,
    in terms of putting it in the field?
        General Neller. Senator, we have a stated requirement right
    now in the acquisition objective. I think it's about 8800. And
    we're starting to field, actually, this year, for the first
    time. So, I have not heard specifically from the Army that they
    are definitely going to reduce their acquisition objective,
    because that may have some effect on the unit cost, which will
    be passed on to us. So, overall, we have--we've been looking at
    ground vehicles, and we're trying to get no more ground
    vehicles than we need. And so, I'll have to engage with the
    Chief of Staff of the Army on this. But, right now, we're
    fielding the vehicle and trying to get rid of our old Humvees
    and--the oldest Humvees first, and replace them with JLTVs to
    give marines the newest piece of gear that they can get their
    hands on.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        And just a final comment, in just seconds left. Admiral
    Richardson, again, you mentioned the Columbia-class. It's going
    to require a lot of scrutiny, a lot of oversight, and a lot of
    collaboration. It's a great challenge, but necessary. We have
    to replace the Ohio-class. So, thank you for your work, and I
    encourage you to keep a close and sharp eye.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Wicker [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Inhofe has stepped out for a few moments and asked
    me to preside for a few moments.
        General Neller, let me begin with you and, certainly, thank
    you for your four decades-plus of service.
        Let's talk about amphibious ship procurement and the
    current budget proposal. I was heartened to hear Admiral
    Richardson say that the budget submission is an opportunity for
    a bit of discussion about some of these issues. The Navy
    deferred LPD procurement to 2021 and LHA procurement to 2024,
    saying that, in pursuing the National Defense Strategy
    priorities, it was unable to take advantage of last year's
    addition of advanced procurement funding for either fiscal year
    2020 LPD or an adjustment to the LHA. Does the Marine Corps
    still have a stated need for 38 amphibious ships, as indicated
    in the Force Structure Assessment?
        General Neller. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. And do we have those 38 ships today?
        General Neller. No, we do not.
        Senator Wicker. Do you foresee eliminating the Marine
    Corps' core mission of amphibious operations at any point in
    the future? For example, in a potential conflict with China or
    Russia, would our amphibious Marine Corps likely play a key
    role?
        General Neller. Based on the plans I've seen, I would say
    yes, but it's more than that. It--I think we have to look at
    the ability to come from the sea with the Navy as part of a
    maritime strategy. And I think the CNO and I are aligned with
    that. So, yes, they would be part of that planning and in those
    operations.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me just ask you, then, how the F-
    35 exercise went, recently. The Essex Amphibious Ready Group
    and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) recently completed
    the first combat deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
    During this deployment, the F-35 saw action in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and Syria. How does the F-35 expand the
    effectiveness of U.S. amphibious forces? And what did we learn
    about the F-35's logistical and material footprint aboard the
    USS Essex that can be applied to future iterations of large-
    deck amphibious ships, sir?
        General Neller. Senator, I have not received the After
    Action from the 13th MEU. I expect to get that within the next
    week. I can tell you that the material readiness of the
    airplane while they were deployed was--exceeded what I
    expected. They averaged above 70-percent readiness at some
    point. Actually, in 1 month, they were close to 80. They had
    six jets aboard the aircraft. They did operate in the airspace
    above Afghanistan and Syria. So, their material readiness was
    good. There actually--there are lessons learned, as far as the
    aviation maintenance onboard ship and the things you have to
    do, but they set themselves for success. They had us--they did
    a good job on the parts block, and they did a good job bringing
    experienced maintainers. This is a bigger jet than we're used
    to, so there are some deck-handling things that have to go. So,
    all that stuff will come out. As far as the capability, as far
    as information and the passage of information and what they
    were able to do or not do, that's what I'm looking forward to
    hearing in the After Action Brief.
        Senator Wicker. And when do you think----
        General Neller. Overall, it was--in the next week. I
    believe they will be up on the Hill to brief, also, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. But, overall, it's a positive----
        General Neller. It was--material readiness was the thing we
    were concerned with, being away from a home base. And the
    material readiness was excellent.
        Senator Wicker. Great.
        I think Senator Reed, in his opening statement, mentioned
    that he'd like to have a comment, at some point, about how not
    refueling the Truman is consistent with our goal of 355 ships.
    But, let me ask this question instead, Secretary Spencer. And
    it's with regard to the amphibs. Last month, during the
    Seapower Subcommittee hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs, I
    asked Secretary Geurts if, instead of deferring procurement to
    2021 and 2024, could the Navy apply incremental funding to the
    LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020? He said the Navy could apply
    incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020, if
    authorized to do so by Congress.
        I'll ask you the same question. Could the Navy apply
    incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020,
    as--if authorized by Congress? And, if Congress approves
    incremental funding in the fiscal year 2020 NDAA for the LHA
    and LPD, would that allow the Navy to accelerate how it spends
    the 350 million that was appropriated in fiscal year 2019?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. If, in fact, you authorize
    and appropriate our authorities or--to go forward with the
    funding, yes, the answer is, indubitably.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Well, we're
    certainly going to pursue that. I appreciate the candor of our
    witnesses today.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning.
        Admiral Richardson and General Neller, thank you both very
    much for all of your years of service and the excellent job
    that you provided to this country and to the Committee. I'm
    sure that the Committee is going to miss you a lot more than
    you're going to miss the Committee.
        Secretary Spencer, you and I have had the opportunity to
    talk about the importance of the Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Plan and the commitment that you have to make
    progress on that. It calls for $21 billion in investment over
    the next 20 years, and a number of needs, one of which is
    drydock capitalization--recapitalization. I just wanted to pick
    up on Senator Reed's concerns that he expressed about money
    being taken from military construction projects, like those
    that are laid out in the Shipyard Optimization Plan, because of
    their need to address our military needs, going forward. Four
    of the projects that are on that list of military construction
    projects are at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. At least three
    of those are critical to the continued expansion of the drydock
    and the ability of the shipyard to continue to work on our
    attack submarines that are so critical to maintaining the
    defense of this country. So, can you talk about the importance
    of these projects to maintain our submarine fleet, and how
    delaying or taking money from these projects would impact our
    national security?
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, you and I have talked before,
    and I'm more than happy to present to the whole Committee the
    importance of our ability to, not only purchase, but, equally
    important, maintain the ships that we have, to get them back
    out to the fight. When we score our MILCON projects, there is a
    prioritization. This is obviously a very serious
    prioritization. As I said earlier, my job, in this case, is to
    provide the best advice that I can to the decision process. I
    will represent exactly that.
        Senator Shaheen. Have you been asked to do that yet? And is
    there any new criteria that has been laid out by Secretary
    Shanahan in the Department of Defense about how they're going
    to determine which projects to take money from?
        Secretary Spencer. None of that already has been discussed,
    and the timing has not been presented to me as to when he'd
    like my opinions.
        Senator Shaheen. So, you haven't been told of any
    reprioritization that is being done by DOD.
        Secretary Spencer. Not as of this date, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        General Neller, there's been recent reports, that I know
    you're aware of, where you've expressed concern about the
    readiness challenges that are presented by taking funding and
    troops to address the southwest border. Can you talk a little
    bit more about what your concerns are there?
        General Neller. Senator, I wrote a memo to the Secretary of
    the Navy laying out eight fiscal shortfalls that the Marine
    Corps had, one of which was the cost of putting marines on the
    border. So, the marines on the border, their readiness, I've
    checked--personally checked the readiness of every unit down
    there. And, with only one exception, there was no impact to
    their actual readiness. In fact, a couple of units improved
    their readiness. So, to say that going to the border was
    degrading our readiness is not an accurate statement.
        That said, there is a cost there, a small cost compared to
    the others. And we have a shortfall of just under $300 million,
    of which the border mission is less than 2 percent.
        So, what I was looking for was some assistance in trying to
    get money to reprogram, because we have to pay our bills. And
    short of that, we would have to look at other places to get the
    resources. So, that was the intent of the memo. But, there are
    a number of things out there that we don't have funding for,
    some due to other mandates put on us by this body, some by the
    Department of Defense. So, my intent was to just simply lay out
    for my boss what these were and ask for his support in trying
    to figure out how we might fund them.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that
    clarification.
        One of the concerns, Secretary Spencer, that has been
    expressed about our current state of readiness in terms of--is
    the industrial base that we have, that we're going to need as
    we ramp up our shipbuilding. Can you talk about the efforts
    that the Navy's taking to rebuild this industrial base and to
    focus on research and development to support shipbuilding
    efforts?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. It goes across the board.
    Whether it's shipbuilding, aircraft building, weapons building,
    we are tremendously focused on the supply chain, because,
    beyond the prime, who we interface with directly, is this
    underlying matrix of organizations providing parts into the
    platforms. It's critical, on many fronts, whether it goes to
    the cyber protection of the data that they're holding to
    produce the parts to us, all the way to the actual parts.
    You're finding that, in the Navy/Marine Corps enterprise, the
    acquisition side is going deep, personally, themselves,
    alongside contractors to ensure the health and the warning
    signs and friction points that we have in the supply chain, and
    how we can rectify them. As an example, in certain areas we're
    sitting there, going, ``Okay, if, in fact, supplier A is
    industrial-capacity-limited, why don't we go to our allies, if,
    in fact, it's not a critical, confidential part, and actually
    rely more on our allies?'' As you know, we're legally allowed
    to, in many cases, include up to 50 percent foreign parts.
    We're now flexing that muscle again to make sure that we are
    exhausting the whole field of availability.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
        I'm out of time, but I'll submit a question for the record
    to try and learn a little bit more about exactly what we're
    doing.
        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I want to
    return--it was touched upon briefly, the collisions of the
    Fitzgerald and the McCain. In 2017, after those collisions, you
    both initiated a review of the root causes, and arrived at a
    number of corrective actions. Our National Defense
    Authorization Act last year also included 11 provisions related
    to those reviews to improve the readiness of our naval surface
    forces. Could you please update the Committee on the current
    state of readiness, in light of those corrective actions, and
    also tell us what corrective actions have not yet been fully
    implemented?
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'll start and then be more
    than happy to turn it over to the CNO.
        Out of the 111, 91 we discussed and arbitrated, we have
    underway corrective actions, some that were immediate, such as
    turning on AIS, which is the identification system, when
    transiting busy passages, through our longer-term remediation,
    which is the education process, four ships for watch-standing,
    and also the equipment and systems that we are putting in place
    to enhance the education process.
        CNO?
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll just pick up from there.
    Every one of the measures that we committed to do, both to
    ourselves and with the Congress, are on track or complete. And
    we have really moved the discussion from, certainly, regaining
    a safe-to-operate perspective to moving through a climate of
    compliance into a culture of excellence, which is where your
    Navy should always be operating. This included a number of
    different measures across a very wide spectrum, including,
    first and probably foremost, the return of schedule and
    training and certification discipline in the 7th Fleet. And so,
    now we are ensuring that we certify all ships to go out and do
    the missions that they are assigned, and they have the
    requisite maintenance and training time to do those.
        We also addressed the surface warfare officer career path.
    And so, as I alluded--illuminated in my written statement, the
    amount of training throughout that career path, and the amount
    of sea time that an officer accrues before he goes to command,
    has almost doubled, across the board. And so, there's a lot
    more experience being gained.
        Finally, in addition to the amount of training, the quality
    of that training has increased considerably through the use of
    high-fidelity simulators, which are being installed in our
    schoolhouses and in our fleet concentration areas. So, to put
    it broadly, we're making progress across this entire broad
    front to get to that culture of excellence.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, we can send you a little
    followup that I know Senator King had asked for. And being a
    data-centric person, it's the numbers behind what we just
    presented you.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Just to tie a bow on this line of questioning, how
    confident are you that we have no more ships in our Navy that
    have some of the deficiencies that those After Action Reviews
    cited, and that the leaders and sailors on our ships now have
    been fully trained and have the skills that they need to avoid
    such a terrible tragedy in the future?
        Admiral Richardson. I'm confident we're on the right track,
    sir.
        Secretary Spencer. Ditto.
        Senator Cotton. Okay.
        Secretary Spencer, let's turn back to the Truman now.
    There's always been a few lines of questions here. Could you
    tell us, very simply, was the decision about the Truman a
    decision driven by budget considerations or by strategic
    considerations?
        Secretary Spencer. It was a hybrid, Senator. Then-Deputy
    Secretary Shanahan, when we were planning budget rollout, the
    thinking amongst the Navy that we worked on was, we have three
    buckets. We have legacy systems, we modernize legacy systems,
    and the third bucket was what we call Funding Force 2.0, which
    is what we've referred to as our future warfare systems,
    whether that be quantum computing, AI, machine learning, et
    cetera. Couple that with the fact that--I want to make sure
    everyone understands this--the Ford will work. The Ford is not
    a Nimitz. The Ford has 30-percent higher launch capability for
    sorties than the Nimitz. It takes 25-percent less people. It is
    a more efficient machine. So, as I look at modernizing a fleet,
    much like in the commercial world, when organizations modernize
    aircraft, modernize trucks, modernize cars, modernize ships,
    they will move for 20-percent efficiencies and abandon the
    assets that they have. This is not an easy decision whatsoever,
    Senator, but, in light of the technologies that we have coming
    forward--and I defer to the Chairman that there's still work to
    be done, here--the thought process was, we have a much more
    capable, much more lethal, much more projecting platform. Three
    of those in the fleet will make up on a capacity argument. That
    was the primary decision. So, we can take those dollars and
    then deploy those into Force 2.0 as the competitive--changes.
        Senator Cotton. So, my time's almost expired, but just to--
    one final question here. Surely, though, if this Congress
    provided you the money necessary for both the Truman refueling
    and also the rest of your shipbuilding plan, you wouldn't turn
    that money down and say, ``No, we don't need the Truman.''
        Secretary Spencer. I would not turn that money down.
        Senator Cotton. I didn't think so.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So, thousands of Active Duty troops and National Guardsmen
    are currently deployed on the southern border. This operation
    is going to cost at least a half a billion dollars. So, I've
    repeatedly written to the Department of Defense, asking whether
    the deployment impacts military readiness. Each time, the
    answer has been no. General Neller, last month you wrote a memo
    to the Navy Secretary identifying nine factors, ``imposing
    unacceptable risk to Marine Corps combat readiness and
    solvency,''. One was the border deployment, and a second was
    the President's plan to take funding away from military
    construction for a border wall.
        Now, General Neller, I know you did not expect this memo to
    become public, you did not release it, you were just doing your
    job by assessing risks. Ranking Member Reed and I, along with
    several other Committee members, sent another letter to the
    Department yesterday, because that's our job as Members of this
    Committee, to ask questions about the impact of these risks.
    So, let me ask. Have any exercises been canceled, or were any
    units sent to the border instead of going to scheduled training
    exercises? Just factual questions. General?
        General Neller. No exercises, to my knowledge, have been
    canceled. There have been some, due to funding.
        So, Senator, if I could just embellish for a second. You're
    correct, I had a list of eight unresourced requirements, of
    which one was the mission to go to the border. And what I tried
    to articulate was, if we did not get funding for these, the
    total cost of these, about $300 million, of which the border
    mission, right now, to date, costing about 6.2--if we didn't
    get additional money, then we would have to look at other
    sources for money, which could potentially include other
    exercises, which would eventually affect the readiness of the
    force.
        Senator Warren. So, I understand that, but I'm not quite
    sure I heard the answer to the question. Are you saying no
    exercises were canceled?
        General Neller. There was an exercise that we reduced the
    number of people that were going there, but we have relooked at
    our finances, and we're going to cashflow, at least for this
    quarter, those exercises, and we're going to continue to do the
    exercises.
        Senator Warren. Were any exercises delayed because people
    were sent to the border?
        General Neller. No.
        Senator Warren. Okay. Were any units sent to the border
    instead of going to scheduled training exercises?
        General Neller. There were some units that went to the
    border that were scheduled to participate in exercises, and
    they were not able to do so because they were in that mission.
        Senator Warren. So, they were diverted to the border
    instead of doing their----
        General Neller. A small number, yes----
        Senator Warren.--their exercises. Okay. Can you just say a
    word about what are the opportunity costs of the border
    deployment?
        General Neller. It depends on the unit. Some of the units
    have gone down there, and they have done tasks that are more in
    line with their core mission, like engineer units or MP units.
    Aviation units that were assigned to that early on have
    actually improved their readiness, because they are able to fly
    certain profiles. Other units, one particular unit is doing a
    mission today that's not part of their core competency, so it--
    but, for 60 days, they can handle that, but it will affect
    their readiness.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So, when I have raised these issues
    with DOD officials, they seem to deny disruptions to readiness.
    I'm seeing something of a disconnect here.
        Secretary Spencer, maybe you can shed some light on this.
    DOD officials assured me, in writing, that the President's
    southern border deployment and the transfer of military
    construction funds for a wall do not present significant
    readiness risks. But, we now know that concerns about readiness
    have been raised internally. Same question to you. What are the
    opportunity costs of the border deployment?
        Secretary Spencer. I answered the same as the Commandant,
    Senator. There are some that actually benefit from the
    deployment, because they can actually do their job that their
    core competency is, some not. But, let's bring it up--and the
    whole reason that I asked both the CNO and the Commandant for a
    memo such as this is, I feel I have to know, being the chief
    executive of the service, to know where the stresses are. This
    was item G on the whole list. The main stress that we were
    dealing with at the time, Senator, was the hurricane, which was
    imposing the greatest cost on the Marine Corps. Five-hundred
    men for a month at the southern border is $1.25 million. In my
    mind, is that affecting my readiness stress? No, it's not.
        Senator Warren. All right. I understand that it's in a
    context. But, as I said before, part of our job is to explore
    where we have valid concerns to military readiness. You're
    doing your job when you raise those concerns. We're doing our
    job when we ask about them.
        The Commandant of the Marine Corps has said that border
    deployment and the transfer of military construction funds for
    a wall contribute to an unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps'
    combat readiness and solvency. I think it's time for the
    President and Congress to listen to him, and we should keep
    asking these questions.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, both.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our
    country.
        Secretary Spencer, you recently commissioned a report to
    review your cyber operations within the Department of Navy. In
    it the report was very critical of current naval operations
    with regard to cyber operations, and it went to great lengths
    to point out some of the failings within the system today. But,
    I also found it very refreshing, in that it laid out, for
    everyone to see, the challenges that you face, and it clearly
    puts a focus on the need to make significant changes. I find
    that, if you would have taken out the Department of Navy and
    you would have put in any one of our other branches, I suspect,
    other than the anecdotal examples, you would have found a
    consistency across the entire Department of Defense. So, number
    one, I want to thank you for laying this out for everyone to be
    able to see and to review, but also for laying out, not just
    the challenges, but some solutions that I think are moving in
    the right direction.
        I'd like you to talk a little bit about one part, in
    particular. And that is, as we move to a 355-ship Navy, and as
    we talk about the security of every one of those ships and all
    of the work that we do to protect each one of those ships,
    compare that with what our near-peer and peer competitors are
    doing. They're not stealing our ships. They're stealing our
    information. And we need to take a change, in terms of the
    culture, about how we protect our information, just like we
    protect our other assets.
        Would you care to comment a little bit about, number one,
    where you're going with that? And I've got one other question
    I'm going to--I want to ask you about. So, if you could, a
    little bit, share where you're going with this, and just how
    deep in this went to not just cybersecurity, but to all other
    aspects, whether it be acquisitions, logistics, and so forth,
    modernization.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, thank you for the question,
    because it is timely. This was driven primarily out of some
    exfiltrations that happens in our supply system. And that's
    where the concern for the study started. Rest assured, when it
    comes to classified information within the Navy itself, we are
    good at that. Where we're concerned about is out in our
    contractor--cleared-contractor relationship base. That's where
    it started.
        Now, where did it progress from there? One, we need to take
    immediate remedial actions, which we are underway right now,
    with our supplier base, when it comes to our cyber protection.
    You will hear the Navy and ourselves talk about--it's not how
    quickly we can get to the fight. One of our battles is going to
    be getting off the pier, because cyber is around us
    continually, 100 times a minute, a second, whatever analogy you
    want to use. It's there, it's present, it's not going away. We
    need to up our game, not only on cyber defense, because you
    can't have one side of this equation, you have to be
    offensively agile as you do defensively agile. They both
    complement each other. We have to move into that realm. We're
    going to be asking for probably more authorities, in general,
    the DOD, when it comes to this, because it's a balanced
    equation.
        Immediately, in the Navy, we are in the process, right now,
    of--underneath Ron Moultrie, who was a primary member of the
    team, he is helping us coalesce our business plan to go forward
    with our cyber remediation process. That goes from data hygiene
    all the way to organizing what the organization would look
    like. We're sending a leg prop up to you all to entertain
    adding a fifth Assistant Secretary. One of the reasons here is
    that we need to get the people of gravitas, who have the
    education, who have the experience to deal in cyber, to get
    them into a position like that and give them the authority to
    organize and effect the solutions that we need.
        Senator Rounds. I found one other part of this to be
    interesting, in that I think this could be transferred--this
    concept of using the outside resources to not only look at the
    cyber side, but also on your acquisition side and on your
    maintenance side, as well. Last fall, I asked specific
    questions about your attack submarines, the numbers that you've
    got. You've still got a number of them sitting at dock, because
    you're not getting them in to drydock, which means we've got
    nuclear attack submarines taxpayers have paid for that can't be
    used today. In fact, a number of them, including the USS Boise,
    can't dive. You've also got legacy and Super Hornets, of which,
    2 years ago, I believe, we were estimating the operational
    capability at 40 percent. My understanding is, it's pretty
    close to that same level today. Can you share with us a little
    bit about the direction that you're going with regard to those,
    and whether or not you're making progress on those legacies,
    both the Navy and the Marines?
        Secretary Spencer. The good news that I'm very happy to
    bring to you right now is, our F-18, both Navy and Marine
    Corps, the Es and Fs and the legacies are not boasting
    somewhere up around 67 percent availability. And this is part
    of our Navy sustainment effort that we're focusing in right
    now. We have a ways to go when it comes to surface ship and
    subsurface ship maintenance. That is apparent. Senator Shaheen
    brought it up. We need to do our shipyard modernization. This
    is all about flow. We have the fundamental understanding now.
    Now we need to apply the resources to get those out into----
        Senator Rounds. You need to be at 80 percent, correct, on
    the Hornets, to make your mission?
        Secretary Spencer. By end of fiscal year, yes, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you. That's good news. I was not
    aware that that's where we were right now. Because we were down
    as low as 40 percent.
        Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Jones.
        Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you each for your service.
        But, Secretary Spencer, I want to particularly thank you
    for the time and--that you've shown me in my first 15 months
    here. It's been a really enjoyable and informative experience,
    what I've had. So, thank you for that.
        You have stated--I guess this would be mainly to Admiral
    Richardson and General Neller--that we have increased rates--
    we're looking at 5100 sailors and trying to increase the rates.
    I'm particularly interested in the pilot ranks. How diverse are
    our pilot ranks in the Navy? And what is the Navy doing to kind
    of increase the diversity for men, for minorities, as well as
    females? Senator Cotton and I have a bill that we introduced to
    try to increase Junior ROTC and some other things to try to
    increase that diversity. Could you talk about those programs a
    little bit, and what you're doing?
        Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you, in the Navy, and
    then I'll turn it over to the Commandant.
        Just like you, Senator, we're doing everything we can to
    make sure, as I said in my opening statement, that we bring in
    a diverse workforce across the entire Navy, not only in our
    pilots, but everywhere, in that regard. We've opened up all of
    our jobs to women. Certainly, we encourage, you know, a diverse
    population across the board, not only in terms of assessing
    them, but also--you know, look at that population 25 years
    down. Is the leadership retaining that diversity as it gets
    more senior? And so, we've got a number of efforts that I'd be
    happy to come and brief your--you and your staff on in detail
    to get after that. But, suffice it to say that this is the
    competitive edge of the future, is diversity, and we take it
    very seriously.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
        General?
        General Neller. Senator, if I look at the gross numbers,
    particularly in aviation right now, for pilots, the stats are
    not really good. So, it's going to take a concerted long-term
    effort to create a better statistical look at--so that we have
    more men of color and ethnicity and women across the whole
    force, let alone in aviation. But, I can tell you, for the last
    4 years, the number of accessions for officers in the Marine
    Corps has been 24, 25, 26, and, last year, over 30 percent of
    those that accept a commission into the Marine Corps were men
    of color and ethnicity and women. A lot of that comes from the
    Naval Academy, because we have been able to increase the number
    of midshipmen that can join the Marine Corps. Used to be
    limited to 16.6 percent. In the last couple of years, it's been
    around 25. That's been a great source of us for men and women.
        So, it's going to take--it's not going to get fixed in 4
    years, because it takes 22 years to make a colonel, to be an
    air group commander or be a MEU commander. It takes 15 years to
    make a squadron commander. So, we'll continue to track this and
    pay attention to it, but anything you or any other of the
    Committee Members can do to encourage people to serve in the
    military, to be involved in science, technology, and math,
    whether it be high school JROTC, although that is, by itself,
    not supposed to be a recruiting place; that's just a place to
    develop leadership in our high school students. But, anything
    you can do in any area to encourage young men and women to join
    the military--Army, Air Force, Navy, or the Marine Corps--it
    would be appreciated.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, General.
        Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson, as you know,
    Alabama's had an important role on building of the LCS, and
    we're kind of looking forward to the transition to the fast
    frigate. Can you tell us, just briefly, about the importance of
    the frigate's role in the NDS? And do you see the Navy holding
    to the procurement schedule for the frigate?
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, we do. It's extremely
    important that we make this transition to a--frankly, a more
    lethal, small surface combatant as we look at--forward and do
    the Force Structure Assessment, as we look at employing the
    Navy in a distributed way, using this distributed maritime
    operations concept. These fast frigates are going to be an
    important part of that. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Spencer. Just to add to that, Senator, putting my
    business hat on and my title 10 hat on, this is going to be one
    of the most robust competitions that we'll have, having five
    potential forms being submitted into the competition. It's
    quite exciting.
        Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the three of you and all your teams for a
    couple of things. One is, last November, we received our first
    ever in U.S. history DOD audit. I'm not a beancounter. I don't
    think that's what we should be about, but I do think we need to
    look at being the most efficient we can be so our men and women
    get everything they need. I also want to thank you for the $30
    billion of what looked like to me real savings, Mr. Secretary
    and the team, in the--just in the last 2 years. So, this is,
    directionally, very encouraging.
        Admiral Richardson. Billion, sir.
        Senator Perdue. I'm sorry. Billion.
        Admiral Richardson. Yeah.
        Senator Perdue. Thirty billion. Let's put a B in front of
    that. Apologize. Thank you.
        I have two questions. Mr. Secretary, I'd love for you to
    talk to us--you made a quote, 2 years ago now, or in December
    of 2017. I'm going to quote you, if that's okay. I think you
    won't mind this. ``Continuing Resolutions (CRs) have cost the
    Department of the Navy--continuing resolutions have cost the
    Department of the Navy roughly $4 billion. Between 2011 we've
    put 4--since 2011, we've put 4 billion in a trash can, put
    lighter fluid on it, and burned it.'' Do you still stand by
    that?
        Secretary Spencer. Most definitely, Senator.
        Senator Perdue. So, would you also acknowledge that $4
    billion--compared to the deployment at the border, $4 billion
    would have really materially impacted our readiness, would it
    not?
        Secretary Spencer. It would, Senator.
        Senator Perdue. Sir, would you talk to us just a little bit
    about the specific impacts of continuing resolutions? We've
    had--in the last 44 or 45 years since the 1974 Budget Act,
    we've had 187 continuing resolutions. In the last 10 years
    alone, one-third of our time has been, basically, under a CR.
    So, I'm very concerned. We're halfway through our fiscal year
    right now. We're looking at September 30th this year. Would you
    talk to us about what momentum damage that would do to what
    we've done in the last 2 years? And then I have one more
    question about maintenance, if we can get to it at the end.
        Secretary Spencer. I'll be very quick with this, Senator.
    The work that you all have done in both this chamber, across
    the way at the House, both in authorizations and appropriations
    over the last 3 years with the 2017 Regulatory Accountability
    Act (RAA), the 2018/2019 budget, is absolutely spectacular.
    You've heard me say that it's the foundation of readiness, and
    we're building upon it. We are. A CR will knock us off our
    game. It'll be the most painful thing we've had. And what's
    more bizarre to me is that it would self-induced.
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, if I could pile onto that----
        Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Richardson.--just a little bit. I'll tell you, I
    completely agree with the Secretary. This would be like a punch
    in the gut. Just some specifics. It would--it looks like it
    would be almost 16 billion less than the budget request. Of
    course, it's not just the amount, but also the inability to
    start new things. And so, there would be no start to the
    aircraft carrier refueling, the fast frigate program that we
    just discussed, the advanced helo training system, and a number
    of others. There would be no quantity increases to the
    Virginia-class SSN, the carriers, the oilers, and many other
    programs. And so, the list goes on. And we would not be able to
    assess the people that we need to fill gaps at sea. And so, it
    would be devastating.
        Senator Perdue. General Neller, you have a helicopter I
    also believe is due for delivery this year that would be
    delayed until at least 1 full year. Is that correct?
        General Neller. As the CNO and the Secretary said, Senator,
    I mean, everything is impacted. You know, we come up with a
    program and a plan based on what an anticipated budget number's
    going to be. And, although it would be better than the BCA
    [Budget Control Act] number, it still would have impact and
    cause us to have to go back, and would stall our progress on
    readiness and modernization.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        Admiral, supply chain. We've--other people have talked
    about it. You guys have talked about it repeatedly here. After
    sequestration years and cutting the military by 25 percent, the
    supply chain is totally devastated. I've seen that. I've lived
    in the supply chain most of my career, and I've seen that just
    in the last week. I was--I visited--you guys were gracious
    enough to let me visit the Truman yesterday. I want to thank
    you for that.
        One of the things I'm concerned about is, at procurement
    now, you do have some flexibility over a multiyear facet. I
    think it's 3 years. Under maintenance, though, if you don't
    spend money in one year, it rolls to the--it doesn't roll to
    the next, it basically has to be reappropriated. Would you be
    comfortable--or do you see value in a pilot program to test
    providing multiyear flexibility in ship--in depot maintenance
    appropriations?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, thanks for that question. Thanks
    for coming out to Truman yesterday. It was an honor to have you
    onboard.
        Sir, absolutely is the answer to your question. A pilot
    program, I think, would be terrific, because it would match the
    funding window to, really, the job at hand. And so, this would
    give us flexibility throughout the--before, during, and after a
    maintenance. Before, we could get the supply chain, the
    material purchased, the planning done, all of that, in order
    and in place. During, as adjustments always occur, it would
    give us more flexibility to move funds from one project to
    another. And then after, it would allow us to recoup funds that
    we didn't spend efficiencies and apply them to other projects.
    So, across the board, that type of flexibility would be very
    helpful. And I'd be happy to participate in a pilot program of
    that type.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary Spencer. It only makes business sense, Senator.
    It would be a great pilot to try.
        Senator Perdue. Well, that would be a shame, to try
    something commonsense that might help you guys, wouldn't it?
        In closing, Mr.--General Neller, I just want to thank you.
    Forty-four years is a long time to be doing anything, and
    America is better off because you were at the--on the wall.
    Thank you, sir.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join in thanking you, General Neller, for your
    service. Forty-four years is a long time, but you have an
    extraordinary and distinguished career, and it will be a model
    for many of our marines for a long time.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for your service, as
    well.
        I was encouraged to see, Admiral Richardson, your remarks
    about the Virginia-class submarine. I was encouraged that you
    agree that we should seize this moment of opportunity to build
    at the rate of three per year. I would assume that you also
    believe that we need to strengthen our workforce with training
    and the capability to build those submarines, correct?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I had the chance to go up to
    Groton and visit Electric Boat. And one of my main topics was
    exactly that. I'll tell you, this is something that is really
    good for the Nation. Electric Boat and Newport News
    Shipbuilding, together, the two shipyards that build our
    submarines, have reached deep into the community colleges and
    high schools to start building skilled workforce at that level,
    at that age. All of those folks who would, historically, maybe
    go to low-paying service jobs or those sorts of things are now
    doing really high-level work--pipefitters, welders,
    electricians, et cetera--to meet this workforce demand that's
    going to allow us to build these amazing ships.
        Senator Blumenthal. They have begun expanded apprenticeship
    programs and skill training, on-the-job training that is
    building that kind of dedicated workforce in southeastern
    Connecticut. Not only there, but throughout the supply chain,
    which is critical to the future of our national defense. The
    construction of three Virginia-class submarines in fiscal year
    2020 is good news for our national security as well as for that
    workforce and for Connecticut. I'm going to do everything I can
    to support and bolster this effort. I hope it will be a smooth
    process in this year's budget cycle. But, I appreciate your
    commitment to this effort.
        Let me ask you about another area that I think is
    tremendously important to our national security. I know that,
    Secretary Spencer, you've been asked about the report, which I
    think you said is due at noon today.
        Secretary Spencer. I said I'd get it underway, sir, at noon
    today. I don't know if I can deliver it today.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, we'll anticipate it whenever it's
    delivered.
        Secretary Spencer. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. But, you would agree that climate
    change is a national security issue, correct?
        Secretary Spencer. Rising waters are a threat to me at all
    times, yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. The prospect of famine, of flooding,
    drought, wildfires, the disruption that climate change causes
    around the world is a national security threat, correct?
        Secretary Spencer. I would agree with you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you believe that opinion is shared
    throughout the Department of Defense among your fellow service
    Secretaries?
        Secretary Spencer. I loathe to comment on something I
    haven't asked them about, but I know that, in discussions, we
    share concerns about the events that you just discussed.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that our Department
    of Defense is, not only acting, but also planning adequately
    into the future for this national security threat?
        Secretary Spencer. I do, Senator. And the reason I'm
    pausing, I'm thinking about three reports I just read
    internally, primarily on how the Navy is hipping into direction
    from the Department of Defense and what we're doing in that
    regard. So, the answer would be yes.
        Senator Blumenthal. Climate change is really a threat
    multiplier, because it inflames the global instability, it
    exacerbates those floods and food shortages and droughts and
    all of the humanitarian crises, which increasingly breed
    terrorist threats to this Nation. We live in that world now. I
    thank you and your fellow members of the Department of Defense
    for your awareness of this issue, no matter what the climate of
    opinion is elsewhere in this administration.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service.
        I think--Admiral Richardson and General Neller, I think
    this is your last posture hearing. So, thanks for your
    wonderful service. Forty-four years, General. I'm sure the one
    thing you probably won't miss, in terms of your Marine Corps,
    is these kind of hearings. So--you don't have to answer that.
        I'm also glad to see our colleagues, like Senator Warren,
    are raising their concerns about combat readiness for the
    military. I think we all share that. What did the 2010 to 2016
    25 percent cuts in the DOD budget do to combat--to readiness
    for our combat forces? Twenty-five-percent cuts----
        Admiral Richardson. I'll----
        Senator Sullivan.--from 2010 to 2016. A lot of people don't
    remember that, but----
        Admiral Richardson. I think that--Senator, I'll just take
    the first stab at this, then I'll just--I think it's been said
    before, that budget instability and insufficiency has done more
    damage to the military than any enemy.
        Senator Sullivan. General?
        General Neller. Sir, as much as we don't want to admit it,
    we need resources to be able to buy gear, train, and maintain
    the force. So, when we were in the period of time--the forward-
    deployed forces, I believe, we're as ready as we could make
    them, but the difference between that and today is that the
    folks that were back home and on the bench, their overall
    readiness was--is not what it is today.
        Senator Sullivan. Just want to talk about an issue--
    probably won't surprise you--I want to talk about the Arctic.
    You know, China and Russia are making big moves into that part
    of the world, because of resources, transportation routes.
    We're an Arctic nation because of my State, Alaska. The Russian
    buildup has been dramatic. Four new Arctic brigades, a new
    Arctic command, 50 airfields by 2020, 30-percent increase in
    Russian special forces in the Arctic, 40 icebreakers, 13 more
    being built, huge snap exercises, in the tens of thousands.
    This Committee, in a bipartisan way--I see Senator King is
    here--has been very focused on this issue--new Arctic strategy,
    strategic Arctic ports, icebreakers. I want to commend you, the
    three of you, on your focus on this issue, as well.
        Mr. Secretary, can you talk about some of the Navy's plans,
    in terms of freedom of navigation operations, training on Adak,
    that you and I have gone out to see that very strategic naval
    base that kind of breaks your heart to see that it's been
    shuttered, but the opportunities there. Then, General, cold-
    weather training and other opportunities in Alaska and other
    places. You know, when you look at our military and our
    threats, North Korea, Russia, China all present cold-weather,
    mountainous threats, in terms of terrain. I think we need to do
    more in training in that area.
        Can you three gentlemen talk about some of our interests
    and what you're doing in that important strategic space for
    America?
        Secretary Spencer. More than happy to, Senator. Let me lead
    off, and I'll be more than happy to hand it over to both the
    CNO and the Commandant.
        As you and I have discussed and we've presented to this
    Committee before, the Arctic is a focus of ours, and we've
    never taken our eyes off of it. We've been up there since 1964,
    if I'm not mistaken, under sea, making sure our presence was
    known under sea, and in the air. But, now we're taking a more
    proactive step. We have up to three exercises that you've been
    made aware of in Alaska. We have one on Adak that we hope to
    have funded. NORTHCOM is the COCOM that is coordinating that.
        Senator Sullivan. And that's amphibious operations and----
        Secretary Spencer. That is amphibious operations.
        Senator Sullivan.--other P-8 sub-hunter ops?
        Secretary Spencer. Correct. Exactly. Take the airfield,
    then bring in the P-8s, fundamentally.
        We have been, in concert with the Coast Guard and you,
    looking at the needs and the possibility of a strategic port up
    in Alaska. I think this summer----
        Senator Sullivan. At this Committee's behest, correct?
        Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Senator.
        We--the CNO and I have been talking about the possibility
    of bringing some ships up, maybe up to Valdez--again, training
    north of the Arctic Circle. We learned this in the most recent
    Trident Juncture, where we had ships above the Circle. We need
    to learn again what we have done in the past, exercise those
    muscle movements, get the sets and reps so we're ready to fight
    up there, if need be, and/or just to do our freedom of
    navigation and/or diligent maneuvers up there.
        CNO?
        Admiral Richardson. So, I'll just pile on to that, if I
    could. Since the last time we testified before this Committee,
    I've signed out the Strategy Outlook for the Arctic--I'm happy
    to share that with you immediately--which talks about our
    strategic objectives to defend United States sovereignty up in
    the Arctic--as you said, we are an Arctic nation--to ensure the
    Arctic remains stable and conflict-free, protect the freedom of
    the seas, and promote partnerships with United States
    Government and other Arctic nations.
        Since that time, we've been putting our money where our
    mouth is, too. You know, we're not just talking about this,
    we've done four major exercises up in the Arctic. Arctic Edge,
    where more than 1500 military personnel were up in Alaska to
    test our ability to operate up there. As the Secretary
    mentioned, we did the Ice Ex, with two United States submarines
    and one British submarine up there. Trident Juncture, where we
    brought a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for
    the first time since 1991, in November. I can tell you, much
    has changed since 1991, but it's still extremely cold and hard
    to operate, up north of the Arctic Circle. We regained some of
    those muscles. And then, in February, Arctic Exercise. Then, as
    the Secretary mentioned, looking forward to September of this
    year, if we can get the environmental clearances and everything
    to do a exercise up in the Arctic, amphibious with our Marine
    Corps partners, as well, which will include not only a takedown
    and a P-8--in Adak, but also the important part of logistics
    and refueling ashore, and all of those things.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, General, I can get your details from you later on
    this.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Neller. The Marine Corps consistent position
    regarding the Arctic is that ``the Marine Corps must be
    prepared to deploy wherever the Navy (and Coast Guard) deploy.
    The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval
    operations in ``any clime and place,'' including the Arctic.
    Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of
    two MEBs that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold
    weather environments. To develop and maintain this capability,
    the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine Air-Ground Task
    Forces (MAGTF) of varying sizes to conduct cold weather
    training. The units train both in CONUS at the Marine Corps
    Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues including
    Camp Ripley, Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The Service
    also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC EDGE and in Norway,
    in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE as well as winter
    training rotations above the Arctic Circle. These training
    exercise feature interoperability training with NATO allies
    such as the Norwegian Army and the British Royal Marines.
    Additionally, the Marine Corps conducts cold weather training
    in the Pacific, alongside our Korean allies in the Korea Marine
    Exercise Program (KMEP), and in northern Japan, in winter
    exercises such as FOREST LIGHT. The Marine Corps has recently
    upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment (ICCE) cold
    weather inventory. The Service maintains sufficient cold
    weather ICCE for the entire Active and Reserve population and
    Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS) ICCE (sufficient
    for temperatures to minus 25 degrees F) for 35,000 marines,
    with plans to acquire sufficient sets for an additional 4,000
    marines when funding becomes available. The resulting ability
    to outfit 39,000 marines for extreme cold weather supports the
    Arctic-capable two MEB objective. The Service is currently
    (May, 2019) undertaking a study to review and update the
    requirement to provide increased numbers and capabilities of
    cold weather/Arctic-capable units, given the emerging
    requirements of potential operations in northwest Europe and
    northeast Asia, particularly above the Arctic Circle and north
    of the permafrost line.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I was very pleased----
        Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, let me interrupt for just a moment.
        We do have a vote coming up. And so, Senator Reed is going
    to go down and vote early, and come up, relieve me, and I'll
    vote late, and we'll keep on working through.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I was very pleased to see the focus that the DOD
    is now putting on hypersonics, and, in particular, the $2.6
    billion request for prototyping across the services. As you
    probably know, Sandia National Labs has long played a critical
    role in developing this technology, and is the core reason why
    we have--we actually have a capability now that's ready to
    prototype.
        One of the things I've discussed with lab directors, who
    are really eager to transition this technology to industry, and
    believe it may actually be important to co-locate the R&D and
    the manufacturing of these systems. What will the role of the
    lab community and industry partners be as we seek rapid
    development of this capability? And is there some value in
    making sure that the feedback loop between R&D, engineering,
    and manufacturing is as tight as possible?
        Secretary.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, from day one coming here, one
    of my comments was that I have to be able to work, and so does
    Navy enterprise, as a partner with our--with industry. This is
    a prime example of it. But, what's really exciting about this
    project is, not only are we partners with industry, the Navy,
    Air Force, and Army are partners, as we signed out a Memorandum
    of Understanding (MOU) to work together across our traditional
    stovepipes. So, we're applying combined resources together to
    get the goal forward, which is why you're seeing hypersonics
    dragged to the earlier dates. It's going to be critical, as we
    transition from R&D to manufacturing, that there not be a
    stutter-step, there's no light between R&D and the transfer to
    actual production. I believe everybody's onboard with that. The
    proof will be in the pudding, but you can guarantee that the--
    --
        Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
        Secretary Spencer.--three service Secretaries and their
    acquisition arms are looking at it this way.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I really appreciate the joint
    approach on this, because we're behind the eight ball, we're a
    little late to the party, and we need to speed things up. And I
    think making sure that all of those capabilities, the center of
    excellence in manufacturing, are as tight as possible. It's
    going to be really important.
        Admiral Richardson, I was very encouraged by the Navy's
    rapid demonstration of laser weapon systems on surface ships.
    In a short period of time, the Navy has successfully deployed a
    30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce, the 150-kilowatt laser on
    the USS Portland. You have an $80 million unfunded requirement
    in this area. If that were funded, what would it allow the Navy
    to do?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me thank the Committee
    and the entire Congress for all the support in this part of our
    business. It's really been terrific.
        What the--including that on the unfunded priority list does
    is allow us to accelerate it even further, right? The budget
    moves very aggressively in this area already--the submitted
    budget. But, if we got a little bit more money, we could move
    even more aggressively, still. And so, I've been, you know,
    privileged to kind of visit the direct-energy corridor. I was
    just recently out at our labs in California. They're working at
    every possible part of this, from the weapon itself, getting
    higher and higher powers, and then the integration with the
    combat system, shore-based test facilities. We're taking this
    very seriously across a full range of powers.
        Senator Heinrich. Is the Navy looking at high-powered
    microwaves, as well, for----
        Admiral Richardson. We are.
        Senator Heinrich.--high-velocity threats, like cruise
    missiles or hypersonics?
        Admiral Richardson. Indeed, we are, sir. And so, we--when
    we talk about directed energy or electric weapons, a lot of
    times we go right to the lasers, because----
        Senator Heinrich. Right.
        Admiral Richardson.--that's so exciting, but there's also a
    tremendous amount of work being done in high-power microwave.
        Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, I want to sort of
    finish up here with a workforce question on artificial
    intelligence, and really the need to make sure that we're
    building the workforce for these coming changes now. I had a
    conversation last week with Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein,
    on the idea of potentially--whether it would be beneficial to
    create a mission occupational specialty for this type of
    workforce. I'd just love to get your input on what you think we
    need to be doing now to make sure that we're developing a
    workforce that can handle and care for the kind of data that is
    going to be required, and whether it would be helpful to
    consider a mission occupational speciality for that type of
    workforce.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, a very timely question, because
    this obviously does feed to Force 2.0, as I just was describing
    earlier. When I look at it through Navy lenses, the way that I
    view artificial intelligence is, that is the development of an
    algorithm that I can take and then apply to my machines so they
    can learn. I think, in the clearest path, what I would like to
    see is possibly, at the DOD level, have your AI development,
    and Navy be able to go up and check that algorithm out of the
    locker, out of the development field, and then apply it to the
    needs that they have, or amend it to the needs that they have.
    That would be the most efficient, I believe, way to go forward.
        That being said, we need to ring the bell right now, say,
    ``Doors are open,'' and bring as many of the great minds to
    interact with AI right now.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. Thank you, Secretary.
        Thank you, Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
        Secretary Spencer, this budget does not request funding for
    additional littoral combat ship procurement. I understand that
    the Navy plans to shift from buying LCS to the next-generation
    frigate, called the FFGX. I know you plan to purchase nine
    hulls by fiscal year 2024, with the first purchase coming
    fairly quickly, in fiscal year 2020. But, recently, Vice
    Admiral Merz, the Deputy Chief, testified to the House that the
    Navy will be reevaluating its force structure plan, citing
    specifically--and I'm going to quote him right now, ``We know
    we are heavy on large surface combatants, and we'd like to
    adjust that to a more appropriate mix, especially with the
    lethality we're seeing coming along with the frigate.''
        My question to you is, How are you approaching the
    industrial base, given the potential to increase the Force
    Structure Assessment requirement above the current requirement
    for 52 small surface combatants?
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit a nail on the head.
    The supply chain is absolutely critical in this regard, no
    matter which way we move, with what provider. As I said
    earlier, the excitement about this program is--as you know,
    there are five forms that we're considering, so it's going to
    be a very competitive competition. But, we're not just looking
    at the ship, per se. One of the things that we have really
    moved forward on is, when we look at the acquisition of a
    platform, equally important is the sustainment of that
    platform. You might have heard us say that, traditionally, if
    you look back, 70 cents on the dollar was spent on acquisition,
    and 30 on sustainment. We're shifting that model completely
    because of what we've, obviously, learned. It's going to be
    critical that, in this competition, we understand where the
    supply base is, the health of that supply base, and the ability
    of that supply base's resiliency.
        Senator Peters. Well, do you believe the current budget
    request, then, bridges the gap? Because we're going to have a
    gap there in funding to make sure the industrial base can
    continue to operate.
        Secretary Spencer. I believe it does. We're going to listen
    to industry. Right now, that has not become an issue, but we
    will listen to industry when it comes to that point.
        Senator Peters. Very good.
        The Navy's budget also--request--includes a request for ten
    large unmanned surface vessels across the future years defense
    plan, and planned at about two per year, beginning in fiscal
    year '20. So, it's clear the Navy is continuing to embrace the
    benefits of unmanned platforms, particularly given the
    opportunities for low-cost, high-endurance platforms that can
    be reconfigured with a variety of payloads and can often serve
    as a force multiplier to the manned force out there.
        So, my question is to both Secretary Spencer and Admiral
    Richardson. Can you provide more detail on how you expect the
    Navy's unmanned surface vehicle family of systems to develop?
    What are the specific benefits that you hope that these
    platforms are going to offer the fleet?
        Secretary Spencer. Let me just provide, again, from a title
    10 point, buying of these platforms. You all have told us, in
    no mixed terms, that we are to move with urgency. That message
    is being transferred all the way down throughout the whole
    naval enterprise. This is a prime example of where we're going
    to acquire these platforms, and we're going to build, you know,
    use, break, learn, cycle, continually. This is a prime example
    of a platform that we'll do this on.
        CNO?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, the benefits of unmanned in this
    area almost speak for themselves. We can send a ship out there
    for a lot longer. Oftentimes, in terms of endurance, the people
    are the limiting factor there. We can send them into higher-
    risk areas, you know, so all sorts of benefits. I agree with
    you that this large vessel will allow us a diversity of
    payloads, from weapons payloads to logistics payloads. The
    Commandant and I have been talking about some terrific
    opportunities for naval integration using these. The first
    couple, we'll be working very closely with the Strategic
    Capabilities Office to get those two going, and then we'll
    partner very closely with industry. We'll probably use mature
    designs for the hull form and those sorts of things. The real
    R&D part in this is, you know, what about the unmanned, what
    are the autonomy, how do we get into that, particularly when
    it--I mean, there's all sorts of dimensions, not only from a
    safety dimension, a security dimension, an ethical dimension,
    when you start to think about weapons employment. That's why we
    have them in the account--the R&D account, where they are right
    now.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        General Neller, you--the Marine Corps has been conducting
    advanced naval technology exercises with the Navy to leverage
    both the industrial and academic intellectual base with
    prototypes and get it into the hands of marines as quickly as
    possible so that we can be on the cutting edge of new
    technologies but learn from our marines in the field. Could you
    briefly just tell us and inform us, What lessons did the
    marines learn during the technology exercise in 2018, and are
    we going to be continuing those kinds of exercises?
        General Neller. Well, first, Senator, yes, we will. We just
    did another one down at Camp Lejeune, as far as mine
    countermeasures, where we have--basically, we invite vendors to
    show up for certain technologies. The one in 2018--they're all
    kind of running together. We've been doing about one big one a
    year, give a certain theme with these surface-to-surface
    movement, and they show up with their capabilities, and then--
    they talk to the marines, they learn what the marine
    requirements are, they make a change to their thing, and the
    marines kind of say, ``Hey, we think this has got value, and
    this one does not.'' And so, we can narrow it down.
        So, we'll continue to do that. We just recently did a big
    exercise with the Navy on the West Coast, called Pacific Blitz,
    where we had a number of technologies and ideas being
    demonstrated, where we looked at expeditionary-based operations
    where we would employ a marine force to, as part of the naval
    force, control maritime seaspace. So, we'll continue to do
    that, and we'll--the ships that you were just talking about
    with the CNO and the Secretary are of great interest to us.
    They could be platforms, as the CNO said, to carry weapons,
    they could carry logistics. We're seeing now that we need to
    have some sort of a connector that allows us to move from place
    to place. If it's unmanned and it can still do the job, that
    just makes it safer and easier, and it reduces our costs and
    our risk.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Secretary Spencer, thank you for the work out at Annapolis
    last week on sexual assault. I think that it was a great
    discussion, great coming together of expertise. And so, it was
    a good meeting. A great outcome will be specific proposals that
    we can work together on to make sure that we make progress in
    this Congress. But, I thank you for being here.
        I want to go quickly with limited time, to General Neller.
    General Neller, you don't strike me as the sort of person that
    gets rattled very easily, but I've seen and had a number of
    discussions with you on the MILCON challenges that we have down
    at Camp Lejeune. I don't know if it's been covered in any of
    the other meetings--I've got two competing meetings going--or
    discussions, here--but, can you outline for this Committee your
    chief concerns over the billions of dollars of MILCON backlog
    that we have at Camp Lejeune, how it affects capabilities,
    readiness, and the operations of the base?
        General Neller. Senator, it's really not a backlog, it's an
    emerging requirement. As you know, Hurricane Florence struck
    the Carolina coast in September of last year. Fortunately, the
    storm went from a category 4 to a 2, but then, when it did come
    ashore, it sat on top of the--that part of North Carolina,
    rained for 3 straight days, rained over 30 inches of rain. And
    so, when the roofs came off some of these 40-, 50-, 60-, 70-
    year-old buildings, and the water went in, we had a lot of
    damage. And it's not visible. It's not like down in the
    Panhandle, when Michael came across with category-4 winds and
    actually leveled buildings. So, it--when you drive around, you
    don't see it. It's more inside.
        And so, we've gone through. The PPV vendor is working to
    fix the housing that was damaged aboard the base. And they're
    about a 50-percent improve in their process. That was a painful
    thing, to get that going. But, they're working that. But, we've
    gone through and looked at all the buildings, and we've
    prioritized about 30 buildings we think the costs of repair is
    not worth it, that we think they need to be replaced. And the
    total bill's about $3.5 billion. The 400 million that we got in
    reprogramming last week will be helpful, but--so, we still have
    this remaining bill. A lot of this money, the Department says
    they're going to put it in fiscal year 2020. And so, we're
    hopeful that that will be part of the program. But, we still
    have about $450 million we could legitimately apply this fiscal
    year if we were to get the money.
        Senator Tillis. You tell me what the impact is on--what are
    you doing to make do? Some of these buildings, I would assume,
    are inhabitable, and you're having to figure out how to
    continue to operate. Can you give me an idea of how it's
    disrupting the day-to-day operations at Lejeune?
        General Neller. We've had to move people around to
    different places and spaces. We've had to make adjustments on
    some of the communications. And, in some cases, the marines are
    just continuing to operate in the building, making the best of
    what they have. The buildings are not unsafe, but their ability
    to have heating or air-conditioning is limited. And so, it's a
    pretty expeditionary environment, which is something we're used
    to, but--and you can do that for a limited period of time, but
    it would be nice to be able to work in a more normal
    environment, in a garrison environment.
        So, we're confident that we'll get these things fixed. Some
    of the buildings that they're in eventually would be razed and
    a new building would be built, because that's what we think
    it's going to take. We know for a fact from the storm that all
    the new buildings--and the Congress has been very generous with
    all the MILCON down at Camp Lejeune and many of our other
    bases--all the new buildings suffered very little to no damage.
    So, we've got a lot of old buildings down there that we think
    we need to replace if we're going to continue to be able to
    survive what's likely to be continued storms in the future.
        Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer, I appreciate, also, your
    prompt action after a committee where I was a little bit
    animated on housing, a month or so ago, and want to continue to
    work with the--with all of DOD on what I think are unacceptable
    housing conditions. I've gone down to Fort Bragg. I'm going to
    be visiting Camp Lejeune, going to spend some time. And you've
    got to separate the storm damage from some of the problems that
    existed before that. We'll have to sort that out. But, do you
    also--and, Admiral Richardson, do you share the Commandant's
    view that this military construction recovery down at Camp
    Lejeune is a top priority?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you all.
        Last thing I'll leave you with--I left it with Secretary
    Wilson in the hearing last week--is that--I understand the
    funding request. I tend to support what your priorities are,
    and hope to provide the funding. I think that you need to look
    ahead and game out what the likelihood is of getting that
    funding, versus something less than that, and, you know, worst
    case, a sequester, and need to communicate, in very specific
    terms, what your Department will have to do to react to that,
    not here in the Committee, but there needs to be a very clearly
    delineated list of everything that shifts to the right as a
    result of Congress's failure to give you all the resources that
    I think you need and you deserve.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, I'd like to start my questioning with a plea.
    We've had testimony from the SOUTHCOM commanders, over the last
    2 or 3 years, that we have intelligence about drug shipments
    coming to the United States by sea. Of the 100 percent that we
    have intelligence on, we're only able to interdict 25 percent
    because of lack of maritime assets. Since this hearing started,
    12 Americans have died of overdoses. Our country is under
    attack. People are dying. People are dying in my State, one a
    day. Please, see if you can find a way to allocate LCS or other
    maritime assets to work with the Coast Guard to interdict those
    drug shipments. It is inexcusable that we know of a drug
    shipment and can't do anything about it because of a lack of
    maritime assets. If you want to respond, Mr. Secretary, I'd be
    delighted, but, basically, this is a heartfelt request to try
    to use--to do something that's within our power to do.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, could not agree more. The CNO
    and I have been talking, along with Admiral Faller, down in
    SOUTHCOM, exactly about this. This is a mission that fits the
    LCS, and I think, this coming quarter or so, you'll see our
    response in that regard.
        Senator King. Thank you. I'd deeply appreciate that, and
    I'll look forward to continue to work with you on that.
        To just a somewhat lighter question, a major change is--
    you're talking, now, about a large surface combatant. You're in
    the early stages. Can we assume that that's going to follow a
    similar path of the new frigate program of existing hulls,
    working with partners, and that kind of approach to this
    project?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Richardson. If I could, just--the short answer is
    yes, we're going to try and really shorten the acquisition
    cycle, and we do so by leveraging more advanced and mature
    technologies, hull forms all the way up to combat system
    sensors, weapons----
        Senator King. Good.
        Admiral Richardson. And then we take more rapid, shorter
    acquisition steps, if you will, to follow that Moore's Law
    curve, or that exponential curve, a little bit more closely,
    with smaller steps.
        Senator King. Appreciate it. Thank you.
        And I should have, at the beginning--I've had some
    exchanges with naval officers here over the last month or so
    about the accidents with the McCain and the Fitzgerald. I've
    sought data. I've met with you at the Pentagon. I want to
    express my appreciation for the forward-leaning approach that
    you've taken, the data you have supplied. That doesn't mean I'm
    always going to be happy. So, keep at it. I want to see the
    data, on a quarterly basis, specific, ship-by-ship, in terms of
    training levels and all of the issues that were identified in
    the reviews of those two crashes. I think it's very important.
    But--trust, but verify, I guess is what I'm saying. And I
    intend to continue to verify. And I--but, I do appreciate what
    the Navy has done and the responsiveness that you've shown.
        Secretary Spencer, last year we talked about the audit,
    what you expected to find. You said you saw 4 to 7 years, I
    think, as a ramp-up to get to a clean audit. Now that we've had
    a year, any modification of your estimate? And are you
    satisfied with the process, thus far?
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, no update on the date. I will
    say that we've come in a year. I'm not kicking it out one more
    year, keeping 4-to-7 being a constant. We learned a tremendous
    amount, and we are underway right now, remediating the findings
    from the audit itself. But, the remediation is only one of the
    steps we're taking. It's what we're learning from the
    remediation. As an example, in the way that we monitor our real
    estate, in the way that we keep tabs on armaments. We're
    finding many different ways to improve the way we do it. Best
    practices from both other services, other forms of government,
    and outside the----
        Senator King. So, your conclusion is that the audit has
    certainly performed a useful function.
        Secretary Spencer. Its ROI [return on investment] is a
    multiple, sir.
        Senator King. That's excellent. I appreciate that and look
    forward to future progress.
        One, just, short comment at the end. You had an exchange--I
    believe it was with Senator Rounds--about the cyberthreat. I
    deal with cyber in two other committees, and one of the things
    that's come out in recent hearings is the threat via subs, that
    the major contractors are pretty secure and strong, and our
    adversaries are now going through a little six-person
    engineering firm that supplies one screw to a major contractor,
    and that's how they get into the system. I commend to you that
    as a risk factor that I think needs real attention. I also
    commend to you the Red Team approach to get their attention.
        Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit the nail on the
    head, and that came out in the review that we just had, our
    cybersecurity review. But, I'd like to turn around and say
    hat's off to you and Congressman Gallagher for setting up the
    Solarium. We look forward to seeing what's going to come out of
    your organization in that regard. There is not enough time and
    there's not enough resources to be put against this issue right
    now. We've got to get the gray matter starting it, and then
    we're going to start effecting the remediation.
        Senator King. We had our first meeting yesterday. We're on
    our way.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair--Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Reed has returned. We're under--a vote is underway.
    I'm going to go vote, come back. We're going to work through
    it.
        Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you, as always,
    for your exemplary service.
        I have heard much praise for your work, as reflected in
    this budget in a lot of areas, but particularly in an area I
    want to ask you about, in the investments in unmanned,
    undersea, and surface platforms. I want to ask you about an
    unmanned aerial system, the MQ-25 Stingray. I understand this
    is the first of its kind unmanned aerial system that will serve
    as a refueling station for other carrier-based aircraft. And
    many proud Missourians are working on this program in St.
    Louis. Of course, they have my firm support.
        Secretary Spencer, can you update the Committee on the
    Stingray's progress and when you expect it to enter service?
        Secretary Spencer. I'm going to defer to the CNO, here, on
    exacts. This is a fast-track acquisition, and it's a large-
    platform fast-track acquisition. We are tremendously impressed
    with what we've heard coming out of St. Louis on the different
    manufacturing style that they're going to use on the MQ-25,
    which is--without going into the weeds, is going to actually
    speed time dramatically for our receipt of this.
        CNO?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me tell--talk to the
    military benefit of this tanker--unmanned tanker, which will be
    able to stay in flight for so much longer that a manned tanker
    would be. And then, it liberates five F-18 strike fighter
    aircraft to do strike fighter missions instead of tanking
    missions. So, military utility couldn't be stronger.
        As well, the approach to acquisition, as the Secretary
    said, has been unique, in that we partnered with industry very,
    very early on to define the requirements appropriately, going
    back to Senator King's discussion regarding technical maturity,
    so that we can get this out into the fleet as quickly as
    possible. And so, for a sophisticated aircraft program, we let
    the contract for this program in 2018, and we expect this to be
    on deck in 2024, 6 years, which is pretty good, by recent
    metrics.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, that's outstanding. Thank you.
        Admiral, can I just ask you about the--how the Stingray's
    deployment will change how air carrier--or carrier air wings
    operate? I think you started to gesture towards that just now,
    but we'd--if you would say some more about this.
        Admiral Richardson. Well, it'll extend the range of the
    Strike Fighter Air Wing, right, because we'll be able to go
    out--tank those aircraft, and allow them to go out to do their
    mission even further. But, I'll tell you what, sir. This is
    just the beginning for unmanned for us with the Air Wing. I
    think that one of the most exciting parts of this will be to
    integrate unmanned with the aircraft carrier crew, in terms of
    launching and recovery, and then, of course, integrating it
    with the other manned parts of the Air Wing. Lots of lessons
    learned as we continue to advanced unmanned aircraft.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah. Thank you very much.
        Let me just shift to a broader set of questions in the
    Indo-Pacific theater. The NDS focuses our attention on the fait
    accompli scenarios. Of course, in the Pacific, arguably, the
    decisive theater from the NDS standpoint, when it comes to a
    fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan, which is one that is
    featured prominently, much the focus of our attention and
    planning, how are we doing with our current capabilities on our
    capacity to prevent a fait accompli scenario in that specific
    instance?
        Go ahead, Admiral.
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll just echo Admiral Davidson's
    thoughts. He's the Indo-Pacific commander primarily responsible
    for making sure that we are ready, in all respects across the
    entire Joint Force and the interagency, for that contingency.
        Senator Hawley. Do you feel that we are making progress,
    here, from the Navy's point of view, with the capacities, the
    capabilities that are required--I mean, are we making progress,
    here, in getting to where we need to be to prevent a fait
    accompli?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think that one of the major
    strategic messages of the budget submission that we're
    discussing today is that it looks exactly at that problem. If
    you integrate across the size of the force, the capability of
    the force, and the readiness of the force, it's focused on our
    pacing threat, which is the Indo-Pacific.
        Senator Hawley. Can you tell me, there have been--there's
    been some discussion, of course, about aircraft carriers today.
    But, from a broader point of view, can you tell me how you see
    the carriers contributing to our toughest fights in that
    theater, with China? I mean, what is it--as we think about
    their major investments, obviously----
        Admiral Richardson. Right.
        Senator Hawley.--what is that, strategically, the carrier--
    how does the carrier contribute--how will it contribute in that
    theater, in the decisive theater, to that fight with China?
        Admiral Richardson. Right. There's been a lot of discussion
    about aircraft carriers and their role in the future. So, I
    appreciate the question. Once, again, going back to our budget,
    the acquisition of another Ford-class aircraft carrier, and the
    purchase of two of them at the same time, capturing a $4
    billion savings, but is a firm a statement as we can make that
    aircraft carriers are a lethal, survivable part of that future.
    With respect to the theater that you just described, in a very
    high-end fight, the carrier is the most survivable airfield in
    the theater, able to move 700 miles a day and really confound
    any kind of a targeting problem.
        Beyond that, sir, it gets very classified, very quickly,
    but suffice it to say that a competently run aircraft carrier,
    using distributed maritime operations concepts, can inflict a
    tremendous amount of damage against an enemy in that theater.
        Senator Hawley. Okay, I'll look forward to an opportunity
    to take that up further with you in a classified setting. I do
    think you allude to the very significant investment that these
    carriers require, and I think it's incumbent upon us to make
    sure that it's an investment that meets our strategic
    priorities.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And thanks, to all the witnesses.
        I especially just want to offer my congratulations, Admiral
    Richardson, General Neller, for your wonderful service. You
    guys each have Virginia ties. Admiral Richardson, a Petersburg
    native.
        General Neller, congratulations on the UVA [University of
    VA] Cavaliers. That was an exciting evening. There are four
    Senators who have degrees from the University of Virginia.
    Neither of the Virginia Senators had either the talent or
    judgment to be in that number. It's King, Whitehouse, Capito,
    and Cornyn. But, it was exciting. But, again, I just want to
    offer my thanks.
        I have two questions that are sort of a followup, not to
    repeat other questions that have been asked about the refueling
    of the Truman. I associate myself with others' questions on
    these. But, one of the references was to this future-force
    study that's being done. And I want to ask two questions about
    it.
        The first one is a broad one. Do you think we're going to
    see other surprises when that is done--ship classes that are
    being considered for early retirement, or other things like
    that? What would you let us know that we ought to be watching
    for as that study is being done?
        Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you that, one, as we've
    talked about many times, the security environment has only
    become more complex. And so, we would see that the Force
    Structure Assessment would address that increasing demand
    signal for maritime security. I think that the next 25, 50
    years, easy, are going to put a lot of responsibilities on
    maritime security, and the U.S. Navy in particular.
        There are, additionally, new technologies. And so, we'll
    have to see where those new technologies take us. I'm of a mind
    that we need to move into that new technology space on an
    evidenced-based approach. We can't just take a leap of faith
    when our Nation's security is--you know, with the stakes that
    we're claiming. And so, we'll look for a lot of experimentation
    and evidence on which to base those decisions.
        And then there are those sorts of enduring qualities of
    payload volume and energy, and those things will allow a
    platform from which that innovation can take place. And so,
    certainly, as soon as we get any kind of inklings, I would say
    that that would be the area that we're moving. If there are
    places where legacy types of approaches fail to yield a return
    on investment, then we'll be informing you of those, as well.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. We've had a number of classified
    briefs about both the Navy and Marine Corps' operating concepts
    as we talk about future needs. And one concern I always have is
    whether both the Navy and the Marine Corps' operating concepts
    are being represented in any future analysis of shipbuilding,
    aircraft procurement, force structure. Will both the Navy and
    the Marine Corps be signing off on the next iteration of Force
    Structure Assessment, shipbuilding plan, aircraft procurement
    strategy?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, the Commandant and I share just
    about everything. And so, something of this impact, we would
    absolutely habitually share them and address every concern that
    they would have.
        Senator Kaine. General Neller, anything you want to add on
    that?
        General Neller. On the previous comment you made, Senator,
    I think, you know, amphibious capabilities have a--an image in
    people's mind that we're going to storm the beach. That's just
    one thing that they do, and, quite frankly, 97 percent of the
    stuff they do every day is to do the second line of effort in
    the National Defense Strategy, which is maintain alliances and
    build partnerships, and also create presence out in the contact
    zone. We do need to look at the capability of those platforms
    to make sure they're more increasingly survivable and
    increasingly networked. Those are things that--the CNO and I
    sit on a Navy/Marine Corps Board. Our staffs bring us these
    issues. We try to stay as linked as we can through naval
    integration and make sure that the programmatics are in line
    with where we think we need to go. And I think you're going to
    see--in training and experimentations, just like we did at
    Pacific Blitz, you're going to see more and more U.S. Marine,
    U.S. Navy operations, where the two commanders are together. In
    fact, at that operation, probably the most unique thing is,
    they took their staffs and put them together as one staff. So,
    you had a blue-green staff, and so--to try to get rid of any of
    the seams or areas where there wasn't complete interoperability
    between the two forces. And I think it worked out well.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could come back just very
    quickly, with respect to the shipbuilding program that was
    discussed earlier, the enduring need for 38 amphib ships, our
    current shipbuilding plan gets us to 36 by fiscal year 2024,
    the 5 years.
        Senator Kaine. Right.
        Admiral Richardson. With this incremental funding authority
    that we've been discussing, we might be able to accelerate and
    get even closer to 37. And so, we're paying a great deal of
    attention to meeting that requirement.
        Senator Kaine. Excellent.
        Mr. Chair, thank you. Appreciate it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Admiral Richardson, statements from both the President and
    the Secretary of State seem to call into question this
    administration's commitment to defend our NATO allies. At the
    same time, we're building a new, low-yield nuclear missile so
    that we can more easily threaten nuclear war against Russia in
    order to protect the very allies that it is clear to me this
    administration does not care about. So, what do you think would
    make NATO feel safer? Having the United States build a new
    nuclear weapon that dangerously lowers the threshold for
    nuclear war, or have the United States commit to defending our
    allies, which has successfully kept the peace in Europe for
    almost 70 years?
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, if--ma'am, I'm sorry--if I
    could answer that, I would say both----
        Senator Gillibrand. Yeah.
        Admiral Richardson.--that the Nuclear Posture Review makes
    clear that we would enhance our deterrent effect, including
    extending that to our allies with the development of these low-
    yield nuclear weapons, and that would also help defend our NATO
    allies.
        Senator Gillibrand. I understand it's the Department of
    Defense's position that the low-yield nuclear weapons program
    is focused on deterrence. But, does not it also make it more
    possible that it could be used?
        Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I think that the logic would be
    that, if there's an asymmetry in the nuclear arsenal, if you
    will, if our opponents have options that they could use that we
    have no real deterrent symmetric approach, that this imbalance
    is, in fact, the thing that might lower the threshold to use.
    And so, that is the theory behind advocating for these new
    capabilities.
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Spencer, we continue to see
    significant cyberattacks on the defense industrial base. More
    specifically, reports continue to show China's interest and
    success in the illicit collection of critical maritime
    technology and information through both defense contractors and
    universities directly supporting Navy research and development.
    I'm alarmed by the persistent vulnerability. What can happen if
    China continues to collect maritime information and technology
    at this rate?
        Secretary Spencer. It's disastrous, Senator.
        Senator Gillibrand. What concrete steps has the Navy taken
    to mitigate and counter these threats?
        Secretary Spencer. That was the reason, Senator, for
    setting up the Cybersecurity Review, which was just delivered
    to me 3 weeks ago, and we're now rolling out the plan.
        Senator Gillibrand. And how is the Navy collaborating with
    the intelligence community, academia, and industry to improve
    the defense of Navy-affiliated contractors and universities?
        Secretary Spencer. That is actually in the plan, Senator,
    which--I'm more than happy to brief you and/or this Committee
    at any time. That is the key. It's not simply one avenue. It's
    the whole universe of players.
        Senator Gillibrand. Can you expand a little bit on
    potential fixes that can help the Navy more effectively protect
    maritime information?
        Secretary Spencer. CNO will weigh in, here, for a second.
        Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, if I could, just to support the
    Secretary, a lot of this has to do with just ensuring that our
    contractual arrangements with academia, industry, includes
    measures to secure their, you know, cyberspace, if you will,
    right? And so, a lot of this is making sure that there's
    increasing accountability by prime contractors for their
    subcontractors' performance. As Senator King illuminated, a lot
    of that vulnerability comes through the subs. Strengthening the
    security and oversight by making sure that data is encrypted,
    both at rest on those servers and in transit, dual-factor
    authentication. Some of this is pretty low-hanging fruit----
        Secretary Spencer. Web.
        Admiral Richardson.--and well-known things. But, ensuring
    that they are contractually required, and that there is a
    response mechanism and allowance for oversight there, are some
    of the measures we've already taken.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Admiral. And will you please
    submit that report to the Committee, and to me particularly, so
    I can read it? Thank you.
        Admiral Richardson. Most definitely, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Richardson. On May 28, 2019, a copy of the
    Secretary of the Navy's Cybersecurity Readiness Review of March
    2019 was delivered to your office. The classified addendum has
    been provided to the Committee and can be accesses via the
    Security Manager.

        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Neller, for a variety of reasons, including current
    civilian-sector employment numbers, the military's having a
    tough time meeting its own recruiting goals. We've heard, too,
    about the portion of young Americans who do not meet medical
    fitness and education standards to join the Armed Forces,
    shrinking the pool of potential recruits. At the same time, the
    President's proposed budget would slash money from domestic
    agencies that directly address these challenges, programs to
    support childhood nutrition, public education, healthcare for
    low-income families, and others. Do you agree it's possible for
    cuts to domestic spending to further limit the number of
    Americans qualified for military service?
        General Neller. Senator, I'd have to speculate on that, but
    you know as well as I do that less than 30 percent of the
    American youth that are qualified--are qualified to join our
    military. Now, you take the propensity of those in that 30
    percent, and you get a smaller number. That said, I can only
    speak for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has been
    successful in making our recruiting goals and maintaining our
    quality of those applicants to become marines, since 2006. Our
    recruiters work very, very hard, and it's not easy to do. But,
    clearly, anything that we can do within the Nation to increase
    the health, the educational level of our youth, of our
    citizenry, would make it easier and better for us to find more
    and more people that were qualified to serve in the military.
        Senator Gillibrand. We had hearings--just to close the
    loop, Mr. Chairman--in the Ag Committee specifically on this
    issue, because obesity just continues to rise. And so, the
    importance of Food Stamps became obvious, because if you are a
    family on Food Stamps and you cut your nutrition amount, the
    last week of every month, they can't get fresh fruits and
    vegetables at an affordable price, so they eat high-carb, high-
    fat foods that tend to be very inexpensive. And the actual
    consequence of hunger is obesity.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for--all for your service.
        Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
        And thank all three witnesses. It's been good. I think
    we've accomplished a lot, a lot of interest. And we thank you
    for your time and your effort and your service.
        [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                          attack submarine maintenance
        1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, at the
    Seapower Hearing in November, I asked a series of questions about
    submarine maintenance, but received no answers then nor when my staff
    followed up with your staff. I asked about subs in dry dock and the
    queue--and the wait to get into the queue--but the bottom line is that
    the Navy has a tremendous submarine maintenance throughput problem. As
    a result, you have ``out-sourced'' three and they are over a year late
    for completion, with approximately $400 million in cost overruns.
    Consequently, a fourth--the Boise - will be delayed another year, which
    means it probably won't come out of maintenance until fiscal year
    2022--6 to 7 years since its last deployment. With only half of the
    INDOPACOM submarine requirement for attack submarines being met and
    submarines retiring faster than they can be built through the 2020s, I
    view this as an extremely grave matter. What has the Navy planned to
    address this situation--and what help do you need from Congress to
    solve it?
        Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Thank you for the
    questions Senator and for your continued interest in our attack
    submarines. In our public yards, overall performance on aircraft
    carrier (CVN) and submarine maintenance is improving, with the days of
    maintenance delay and the amount of work carried over from year-to-year
    dropping each of the past three years from historic highs in 2016. For
    example, with the recent early delivery of USS Nimitz (CVN 68) from
    Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) we have now delivered eight of nine
    CVN maintenance availabilities on time including the last seven in a
    row at PSNS. In addition, four of nine current attack submarine
    availabilities in the Naval Shipyards are tracking to on-time delivery.
    One contributing factor for our success includes growing the organic
    workforce at the four Naval Shipyards to a total of 36,100. To account
    for the less-experienced workforce (i.e., 56 percent of the production
    workforce has less than five years of experience), the Naval Shipyards
    implemented new training approaches. These approaches included
    streamlining training curriculums, adding/improving learning centers to
    accelerate proficiency development through modern training techniques
    such as virtual reality trainers, and increasing the amount of hands-on
    learning. Additional contributing factors include setting more
    realistic and achievable resource/overtime strategies, increasing the
    discipline and fidelity of our planning processes, and improving our
    learning centers and sharing of lessons learned across shipyards.
    Despite these recent successes, the Navy shares your concern for
    submarine maintenance throughput. We continue working through Naval
    Shipyard availabilities with already-incurred maintenance delays,
    little margin to accommodate new work, and avoidable performance
    issues. Current challenges include: USS Jefferson City (Pearl Harbor)--
    283 days late--projected completion date 12/1/19 USS Springfield
    (Portsmouth)--217 days late--projected completion date 7/22/19 USS New
    Hampshire (Portsmouth)--164 days late--projected completion date 7/15/
    19 USS New Mexico (Portsmouth)--92 days late--projected completion date
    11/1/19 USS Virginia (Portsmouth)--59 days late--projected completion
    date 3/3/21 Further, as you note the two qualified private shipyards
    are challenged to execute attack submarine maintenance on time and on
    budget. The Navy has taken several actions to improve the situation.
    These actions include partnering with Huntington Ingalls Industries and
    Electric Boat to learn from these challenges and share lessons learned;
    driving USS Helena's (SSN 725) availability to completion by providing
    more direct government oversight; and conducting a bottom-up review of
    the USS Boise (SSN 764) work package. The Boise work package needs
    reassessment given the significant growth experienced on USS Montpelier
    (SSN 765), Helena, and USS Columbus (SSN 762) as well as the
    anticipated growth due to the extended idle time. Going forward, the
    Navy expects improved performance across all of our public shipyard
    availabilities based on the actions described above, use of improved
    and predictive data analytics, and implementation of the Navy Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). In February 2018, the Navy
    delivered the SIOP to Congress. Since then, we have been executing the
    groundwork needed to redesign our Naval Shipyards to improve
    productivity by upgrading and repairing dry-docks, replacing obsolete
    capital equipment, and improving workflow within the shipyards. This
    summer we will receive the first digital twin of a shipyard that will
    serve as the springboard to evaluating what we can change to improve
    workflow and productivity. Finally, you asked what help Congress could
    provide. To start, the Navy has identified additional funding required
    for submarine maintenance in the Chief of Naval Operations Unfunded
    Priorities List (UPL) submitted with the President's fiscal year 2020
    budget. This funding supports three attack submarine maintenance
    availabilities; Boise, USS Hartford (SSN 768), and Columbus. As the
    Navy completes the Boise work package reassessment, there is a
    reasonable likelihood that the initial budget estimate was too low. The
    Navy will keep Congress informed if/how the Boise reassessment affects
    the UPL topline. Additionally, passing the fiscal year 2020 budget on
    time, coupled with Congress' continued support for the SIOP and the
    Navy's efforts to balance the workload between public and private
    sector will help to improve the situation. An on-time budget is very
    beneficial as a delay in funding could affect not only maintenance
    availabilities, but also a number of SIOP efforts planned for next
    year.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                industrial base
        2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the recently released annual
    report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of
    Naval Vessels states that ``over the last 60 years, 14 defense-related
    new construction shipyards have closed, 3 have left the defense
    industry and one new shipyard has opened.'' Can you elaborate on the
    efforts the Navy is taking on to rebuild this industrial base? What is
    the timeline for these efforts? What help does the Navy need to
    increase the industrial supplier base?
        Secretary Spencer. The Navy's current and future approach
    recognizes the importance of maintaining stability within the
    industrial and supplier base. Historical boom and bust cycles of Navy
    ship construction contributed to the 14 shipyard closures over the last
    60 years. The Navy is working to preserve our current shipbuilding
    capacity through stable shipbuilding procurement profiles that will
    foster a healthy and stable industrial base and will allow for
    additional growth as required. The current shipbuilders are sufficient
    to meet the Navy's demand. The Navy is focused on understanding the
    capacity and capability shortfalls at the lower levels of the supply
    chain. Consistent annual funding in the shipbuilding account is
    foundational to sustaining predictable workload and capacity. Long-term
    contracting arrangements, such as Multi Year Procurements, Block Buys,
    and serial production support the industrial and supplier base, as
    exemplified in Virginia, DDG-51, LCS, CVN, and AOs. The Navy is
    partnering with industry to define and establish workable requirements
    and is working with Congress to sustain predictable profiles. These
    supportive relationships will continue to promote efficiency through
    capital improvement and expansion, research and development, and
    sustainment of a world-class workforce. We appreciate the congressional
    support for industrial base initiatives. Funds appropriated in fiscal
    year 2018, $225 million for Virginia-class, and in fiscal year 2019,
    $225 million for Columbia-class, will further strengthen the industrial
    base.

        3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the President's Fiscal Year
    2020 Budget update to report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance
    released in March 2019 stated that ``Lack of material availability . .
    . has contributed to an increased reliance on cannibalization of
    material from operational platforms in support of maintenance
    schedules. In a typical Virginia-class depot maintenance availability,
    over 100 items are acquired through this cannibalization process. This
    is unplanned work that adds to the maintenance requirements and
    generates a rolling requirement for the follow-on availability.'' The
    report goes on to mention a material forecasting tool to be developed
    and deployed at all public shipyards that will enable earlier
    identification of material, to provide early procurement options and
    reduce risk of unavailable material. This tool partially addresses the
    problem by providing early procurement options--however, this does not
    address the supplier base; what else is the Navy doing to address
    limited availability of Virginia-class submarine parts?
        Secretary Spencer. In addition to material forecasting, the in-
    service Strategic and Attack Submarine Program Office is evaluating
    opportunities to leverage material management efforts implemented by
    new construction programs for improving original equipment manufacturer
    material support to follow-on submarine planned maintenance
    availabilities. This evaluation is in an early stage but can
    potentially result in better notification to industry of planned
    material purchases and address material shortfalls for submarines in
    repair.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                           virginia-class submarines
        4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you know, we have only
    a few years until our excess submarine production capacity is primarily
    devoted to Columbia-class. Do you agree that it is important to seize
    this window of opportunity to boost our fast-attack Submarine inventory
    by adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, attack submarines are critical to the
    National Defense Strategy, and adding a third submarine in fiscal year
    2020 helps in achieving the 66 submarine requirement sooner. Adding a
    third submarine in this fiscal year also demonstrates our commitment to
    the industrial base, to expand production, and better balances the
    total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five years as the
    Navy begins to build Columbia-class submarines.

        5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does adding this
    additional submarine help reduce the risk of an upcoming fast-attack
    submarine capability gap as Los Angeles-class submarines reach
    retirement?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, it does. The Navy is relying on a steady
    state production of at least two attack submarines (SSNs) per year with
    Virginia-class submarines (VCS) being delivered within contractual
    requirements to reach the force structure requirement of 66 SSNs. The
    addition of a third VCS in fiscal year (FY) 2020 takes advantage of the
    available labor resources in the industrial base prior to the start of
    Columbia-class construction in fiscal year 2021 and gets us to our
    inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.

        6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richardson, I was encouraged by your
    statement in written testimony that all force structure analyses agree
    we must build a bigger Navy. Is the 3rd Virginia-class submarine in
    this year's budget a result of the Navy taking action on this
    consensus?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
    the Navy Strategy provide the overarching high-level requirements for
    all our shipbuilding budget decisions to build the Navy the Nation
    Needs, the Navy's enduring plan for building and sustaining a lethal,
    resilient force through balanced investments across readiness,
    capability, and capacity. Attack submarines are critical enablers of
    the NDS and represent one of the Nation's most lethal asymmetric
    advantages. Numerically, attack submarines remain the furthest from the
    inventory objective. Adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020 shows
    our commitment to the industrial base to expand production, better
    balances the total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five
    years as the Navy also begins to build Columbia-class submarines, and
    gets us to our inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.

        7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, Do you believe that
    industrial base workforce development initiatives are important to meet
    the increased demand for submarines over the coming years?
        Secretary Spencer. Yes, it is vitally important to develop and
    maintain the submarine workforce to meet the demands for the Virginia-
    class and the Columbia-class partners. The Navy is collaborating with
    our industry partners to ensure we meet the needs of the programs.
                                     ch-53
        8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, given your urgent need
    for this aircraft--and the known reality that the industrial base does
    not react well to declines in production ramps for new programs--would
    you support 2 additional CH-53K's this year to maintain a consistent
    annual production rate?
        Secretary Spencer. Thank you for your interest. I support the
    President's Budget of six aircraft in fiscal year 2020. This budget
    provides the best balance of delivering needed capability to the Marine
    Corps while ensuring we have an achievable production profile.

        9. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is there any heavy lift
    helicopter that has the capabilities of the CH-53K King Stallion? Are
    you confident that this program will deliver the capabilities the
    Marine Corps needs for the heavy lift mission?
        General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of
    delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of
    110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as
    the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22,
    the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its
    ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range
    delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation
    Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF).

        10. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, I understand that the King
    Stallion has roughly 3 times the lift capability of the legacy CH-
    53E's. How will this game-changing upgrade transform the Marine Corp's
    operational capability on the battlefield?
        General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of
    delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of
    110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as
    the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22,
    the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its
    ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range
    delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation
    Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF).
                                 climate change
        11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, I am concerned that top
    U.S. military officials have stated publicly that climate change is a
    significant security threat, but that President Trump's White House
    continues to challenge the scientific consensus that human activity is
    the primary driver of climate change. Are you concerned that the Trump
    Administration is undermining the military's efforts to address and
    respond to the threats of climate change?
        Secretary Spencer. The Department of Navy has always considered a
    wide-range of risks, including climate change, and has a proven record
    of planning and preparing for such threats.

        12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, recently, Pentagon
    spokesman Johnny Michael said in an email that the Pentagon will
    ``focus on ensuring it remains ready and able to adapt to a wide
    variety of threats--regardless of the source.'' How is the Navy
    planning to address the impact of climate change in its worldwide
    missions?
        Secretary Spencer. Naval missions under the authority of the
    geographic combatant commands consider risk assessment and mitigation,
    diversity, connectivfity, reserves, and adequate redundancy in all
    plans and operations. In support of Arctic operations, the Office of
    Naval Research, Arctic and Global Prediction Program, is working to
    extend the capability to predict environmental conditions and
    disruptive weather events to several weeks and months in advance. The
    ability to provide useful forecasts of the operational environment,
    such as the location of the sea ice edge, the characteristics and
    evolution of sea ice, and the wind and wave conditions will be critical
    to reduce operational risk in the Arctic. The Department of the Navy
    launches its worldwide missions from installations, where resiliency is
    addressed through the integration of weather and climate considerations
    into existing plans and processes, using partnerships with other
    federal agencies, state governments, local governments, non-
    governmental organizations, and local communities to increase
    preparedness.

        13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does the Navy's budget
    request this year adequately request resources to ensure climate
    resilience? Do you require additional resources to effectively combat
    the effects of climate change?
        Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts
    span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate
    program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are
    provided within existing Department of the Navy missions, funds, and
    capabilities.

        14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you are aware,
    climate change is a ``threat multiplier'' that inflames global
    political instability and exacerbates floods, food shortages, and
    droughts--all of which exacerbate humanitarian crises and increase the
    likelihood of armed conflict. How will Navy strategy evolve to
    incorporate these realities as the impacts of climate change become
    more severe?
        Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts
    span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate
    program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are
    provided within existing Department of the Navy (DON) missions, funds,
    and capabilities and subsumed under existing risk management processes
    consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy priorities to build
    a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and
    reform the Department's processes. To achieve these goals, DON must be
    able to adapt current and future operations to address the impacts of a
    variety of threats and conditions, including those from weather and
    natural events. To that end, DON factors in the effects of the
    environment into its mission planning and execution to build
    resilience.
                    troop deployments to the southern border
        15. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, has Acting Secretary
    Shanahan provided the assistance you requested to repair structures
    compromised by Hurricane Florence?
        General Neller. The Marine Corps currently faces unfunded
    requirements of $778 million to fully recover from Hurricanes Florence
    and Michael. We have worked closely with the Department of the Navy,
    Secretary of Defense and Congressional committees to successfully
    identify funding solutions that address approximately $3 billion of the
    damages. The Marine Corps will continue working with the key
    stakeholders to identify additional solutions that address the
    remaining unfunded need.

        16. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is it fair to say that the
    troop deployments to the border are coming at the expense of Marine
    Corps training or necessary hurricane repairs at Camp Lejeune?
        General Neller. In order to maintain overall readiness, Marine
    Corps units require a combination of training exercises and actual
    operations. The troop deployments to the border have contributed a
    critical portion of this equation, and in some respects have enhanced
    the readiness of the participating units by allowing them to perform
    their core missions under real-world conditions. Even with the troop
    deployments to the border, the Marine Corps has not been forced to
    cancel any training exercises. The Commandant personally checked the
    readiness of every unit on the border, and with one exception, the
    deployment had no impact on their readiness.

        17. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, are you concerned that
    these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the
    case, can you estimate the impact on readiness if the border
    deployments become the status quo?
        General Neller. No, although South West Border (SWB) operations
    have impacted some of the units providing support to the border, in the
    aggregate, the readiness impacts have been manageable. The Service has
    been able to mitigate readiness impacts through unit and personnel
    rotations. If the requirements to support the mission continue into the
    foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will continue to mitigate impacts
    to readiness through similar measures. To date, the SWB mission has not
    significantly impacted our ability to meet our global commitments.
                          future marine corps mission
        18. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is the Marine Corps
    committed to MARSOC longterm?
        General Neller. MARSOC is a highly valued capability by both the
    Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command. Our investment in
    MARSOC, as with all of our supporting capabilities, is limited by the
    need to sustain the readiness of our statutorily mandated Marine Air
    Ground Task Forces, commensurate with modernizing those MAGTFs for
    future conflicts and relative to timely appropriated funding.

        19. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, some recently have shared
    the view that the Marine Corps needs to focus on coastal operations in
    the Indo-Pacific region? What role can MARSOC play in supporting this
    mission?
        General Neller. MARSOC is already playing a significant role in the
    Indo-Pacific region, specifically in the Philippines, while enabling
    the partner force to exert their sovereignty. These forces are
    supported by capabilities provided from MARFORPAC and III MEF in a
    greater joint force effort there. We see the daily access and placement
    MARSOC, and SOF writ large, have in the region as a forces in
    ``contact,'' as greatly assisting in pre-conflict competition short of
    armed conflict shaping operations. These forces contribute to the
    intelligence picture, cultural understanding, partner force
    integration, and bring other specialized skills that can support the
    Marine Corps mission in this region. We are also working closely with
    MARSOC as we work through concepts like Expeditionary Advance Base
    Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Joint
    Forcible Entry Operations. SOF, MARSOC in particular, can help prepare
    these environments now, hoping to mitigate conflict, but preparing for
    larger operations if that becomes necessary.

        20. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, what strategic advantage
    does MARSOC provide to the geographic combatant commanders that we
    would be lost if the Raiders (MARSOC) were disbanded?
        General Neller. MARSOC remains a priority effort for the Marine
    Corps. The command has played a critical role for both the Marine Corps
    and SOCOM. MARSOC is an organization that has come extremely far, in a
    relatively short amount of time, regarding the evolution of its
    warfighting capabilities. From battlefield small unit tactics,
    techniques, and procedures, to the exploration of more effective
    equipment for unmanned aerial systems, precision strike capabilities,
    advanced communications, small arms capabilities, and intelligence
    integration at the lowest levels, MARSOC consistently provides forces
    that possess unity of effort driven largely by a coherent picture of
    the battlespace. As one would expect because it has a foot in both
    camps, MARSOC is a critical enabler of the relationship between the
    Marine Corps and SOCOM and has helped bridge capability development
    efforts between our two organizations. MARSOC plays a significant role
    in migrating capability between SOF and the general purpose forces.
    Raiders have consistently demonstrated an adaptability in the face of
    changing or ambiguous situations; their ability to leverage emerging
    technologies and integrate them has created opportunities for the
    larger Service as well. Operationally, I would defer to SOCOM and the
    geographic combatant commands to answer with details on this issue, but
    would note that Raiders fill approximately 10 percent of their assigned
    missions. From a man, train and equip perspective, MARSOC forward
    deployed forces bring an organic and fully integrated capability for
    operations and all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that
    allows a comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all
    environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special
    operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating
    against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These
    capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the
    force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as
    situations and mission sets evolve. Inherent in all MARSOC deployable
    formations are an ability to conduct unilateral special operations that
    feature special insertion capabilities, precision direct action
    operations, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism missions; but
    are also well-adept and prefer to work through partner nation forces,
    other governmental agencies, and the larger joint force in counter-
    insurgency and foreign internal defense conducting advise, assist,
    accompany and enable missions in order to build resilient partners in
    key areas around the globe. Bringing with them their base culture as
    marines, Raiders find a way to be highly successful and effective in
    what are often ambiguous environments. Demand for their integrated
    capabilities and expertise in these strategic impact operations
    continues to increase. From an operational perspective, Raiders have
    invariably gravitated toward the highest priority campaign activities
    within INDO PACOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM - the three regions comprising
    MARSOC's current regional orientation. Efforts in these three regions
    have helped shape and support larger Joint Force efforts and advance
    Service-level opportunities for integration and interoperability in
    support of both the Counter VEO mission as well as contributing to
    great power competition. One of the best examples of MARSOC's
    collaboration with the Service along the lines of Interoperability,
    Integration, and Interdependence have been its ongoing efforts in the
    Philippines, where Raiders working for SOCPAC are heavily augmented by
    MARFORPAC marines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
    defense of their sovereignty. We can address further specific
    operational details of MARSOC's current missions via classified medium
    if desired.

        21. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, how do you see MARSOC's
    role in great power competition and the National Defense Strategy?
        General Neller. MARSOC Proposed Answer: Understanding that SOF is
    not designed to go toe-to-toe with large Armies, there are many ways
    MARSOC can support, before and during, potential conflict with near
    peer competitors. Just recognizing that we are in constant competition,
    albeit short of open warfare, with certain countries, makes us realize
    that there are many areas we could be shaping now, with our partners
    and the rest of our own government that can have a tremendous effect.
    Similar to the greater Marine Corps role in the context of the NDS,
    MARSOC is a ``contact force.'' As such, we will be among the first
    forces to influence the initial stages in this of this competition,
    whether it goes to open conflict or not. MARSOC forward deployed forces
    bring an organic and fully integrated capability for operations and
    all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that allows a
    comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all
    environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special
    operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating
    against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These
    capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the
    force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as
    situations and mission sets evolve. In the future, MARSOC will continue
    to develop into a more versatile force that brings highly adaptable,
    intelligent, and cognitively gifted individuals to any mission set with
    seamlessly integrated capabilities to rapidly understand and impact the
    surrounding system. Leveraging small size as a strength, MARSOC can
    give a high degree of flexibility to the SOCOM Commander for the
    employment against specific mission sets, including in the great power
    competition cited in the NDS. 1. MARSOC, along with the greater SOF
    enterprise, bridges the gap between covert capabilities from the
    interagency and the larger conventional forces. 2. MARSOC enables a
    deep understanding of the operational environment across the
    interconnected network of transregional threats at all levels of
    warfare against global, regional, and local competitors. 3. Raiders are
    specifically educated and trained to work with indigenous partners. The
    history of great power competition during World War II and the Cold war
    indicate that SOF is strategically useful in leveraging these local
    partners to strengthen the effort to deter, counter, and defeat malign
    influence. 4. MARSOC, and SOF writ large, provides specialized
    unilateral capabilities not easily replicable by conventional or other
    agencies to deter, counter, and defeat global or regional powers. 5.
    MARSOC provide a creative and adaptable perspective and culture to the
    joint force to understand and resolve complex, dynamic, and uncertain
    challenges.

        22. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, you recently stated that
    much of what your service does will not be against a near-peer
    adversary. Can you explain what you mean by this, and expound on what
    you see the Marine Corps' operational role in the next 10-20 years?
        General Neller. The Marine Corps will continue to adhere to the
    strategic guidance of the National Defense Strategy, National Military
    Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance and will orient to the pacing
    threats presented by China and Russia. The Corps will not, however,
    ignore the various roles and responsibilities espoused by title 10 and
    will continue to be America's force-in-readiness that is able to
    respond to crises, inside and outside the scope of great power
    competition, when the rest of the country is least ready to do so. In
    10-20 years, the Marine Corps will be modernized against the pacing
    threats and further integrated with the Navy and the other services to
    compete in the full spectrum of conflict.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                       refueling the uss harry s. truman
        23. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I've
    seen estimates from the Department of the Navy that refueling the
    Truman will cost between three and four billion dollars. It has been
    suggested that if Congress were to add that money on top of the
    requested budget that the navy could continue to operate the Truman.
    But recently I've seen estimates of the rest of the overhaul on the
    Truman taking $6.5 billion. With the combined operating costs of around
    $1 billion per year this puts the additional cost of operating the
    Truman for the second half of its life at over $30 billion. I'm
    assuming that these cost not been factored into the long term plans of
    the Navy due to the plan to retire the Truman. So, if Congress were to
    authorize and appropriate the $3-4 billion and push the Navy to refuel
    and continue to operate the Truman, what does this do to your long term
    procurement plans and force structure decisions?
        Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy is implementing
    the President's recent decision to restore the Refueling and Complex
    Overhaul (RCOH) for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and is updating our
    long-term procurement plans and force structure accordingly. With the
    President's restoral decision, the Navy is reviewing the required CVN
    75 RCOH and airwing funding profile.
                    columbia-class submarine cost estimates
        24. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, on 8 April, 2019, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program detailing how it
    believes the Navy has significantly underestimated the costs of the
    Columbia program. Specifically GAO highlighted a questionable
    assumption of labor hours required for construction as well as no
    allowance for cost overruns, which are expected and typically planned
    for. GAO assesses that these and other errors could lead to billions
    more needing to be invested in the program. Can you address the
    concerns raised by this report and detail how the Navy is either
    mitigating the concerns of GAO or updating the budget accordingly?
        Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy does not agree with
    GAO's assessment. Labor hours required to construct the submarines and
    allowance for cost overruns were considered by the Navy's Cost Review
    Board on September 7, 2016. Neither factor was considered overly
    optimistic or unreliable during this assessment. Navy does concur with
    GAO's three recommendations to do the following:
          Incorporate current cost and program data and an updated
    cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia-class lead
    submarine cost estimate.
          Develop a realistic and well documented estimate of
    savings from use of authorities associated with the Fund and
    incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the
    Columbia lead submarine cost estimate.
          Update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk
    analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. The
    Navy continues to actively manage all Columbia program cost, schedule,
    and performance goals including engineering and integration risks and
    routinely briefs Navy / DOD leadership, and Congress to ensure risks
    are transparent and fully understood.
          virginia and columbia-class submarine construction timeline
        25. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, the fiscal year 2020 budget
    adds another Virginia-class submarine, and subsequently alters the
    production timeline for the Virginia-class. Specifically, I am noticing
    the addition of a third submarine in 2020. This third Virginia-class,
    according to the justification books, will be constructed in 2023,
    meaning three Virginia-class submarines will be being built that year.
    That is the year before the Navy's second Columbia-class submarine buy.
    This, coupled with troubling news reports of a Virginia program that is
    4-7 months behind schedule have me concerned that any small slips in
    the Virginia-class submarine program will have more significant second
    and third order effects in delaying the much needed Columbia-class
    submarines. How is the Navy addressing this shift in the current
    dynamic schedule environment to ensure that both programs stay on track
    despite utilizing many of the same facilities and suppliers?
        Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the
    nuclear shipbuilding industrial base to simultaneously support the
    Columbia-class submarine (CLB) program, and Virginia-class submarines
    (VCS). The focus remains on ensuring the nuclear shipbuilding
    enterprise's facilities, resources, and supplier base are right-sized
    through the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) efforts to ensure a stable
    production cadence for both CLB and VCS submarines and on time
    deliveries to the Fleet. Additionally, the CLB program is utilizing
    additional authorities to execute advance construction to efficiently
    manage transition to submarine production lines for two classes. In
    preparation for CLB and VCS, the shipbuilders have invested and will
    increase their facilities to accommodate both programs. In April 2018,
    the Navy investigated options for increasing VCS production to three
    per year during the CLB gap years in response to the Department's 2016
    Force Structure Assessment requirement for 66 attack submarines. The
    assessment determined the earliest viable option to increase VCS
    production to three per year is in fiscal year (FY) 2022, and only by
    providing advance procurement funding three years in advance to allow
    for an efficient ramp up at both the shipbuilders and their suppliers.
    For the third VCS built in any year without a CLB build, manufacturing
    of critical long lead time material (LLTM) is required three years in
    advance of the third submarine construction start to support normal
    construction spans. Therefore, adding the third submarine in FY 2020
    enables purchase of LLTM to support a fiscal year 2023 construction
    start. Through the addition of a third VCS submarine to the budget in
    fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a predictable signal of
    forecasted workload, allowing the shipbuilders and supplier base to
    prepare and invest for the increased production of submarines
    highlighted in the FYDP. The third ship would start fabrication of LLTM
    and critical shipyard manufactured components in fiscal year 2020 and
    the entire module production cadence would be incorporated over a
    three-year period to support the added ship entering the module
    sequence cadence in fiscal year 2023. This strategy and an additional
    year of LLTM ordering will enable the industrial base to better prepare
    for the increased workload and continue improvements in capacity,
    resources and quality.
                            defense industrial base
        26. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, recent fluctuations in
    Virginia-class submarine timelines as well as aircraft carrier
    refurbishment and upgrades have raised concerns of consistency from
    these valuable defense industrial base partners. Is the Navy
    considering the defense industrial base and their need for consistency
    and forecasting when adjusting or making changes to your programs?
        Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the
    industrial base. Congress has been supportive of the Navy's Integrated
    Enterprise Plan across the nuclear industrial base, particularly with
    components that are common across the submarines and aircraft carriers
    with advance procurement and economic order quantity funds. This allows
    investment in those suppliers to meet the demand signal. This strategy
    is not only critical for today's shipbuilding operations, but also the
    Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) which adds the Columbia-class on top
    of attack submarine and aircraft carrier production. The Navy's
    objective is to ensure the industrial base is ready to support this
    capacity increase, not only to produce more, but to sustain what is in
    the fleet. The Navy believes that if the industrial base is provided
    with a clear demand signal, they will invest in the planned increased
    production of submarines and aircraft carriers highlighted in the FYDP.
    By adding a third Virginia-class submarine along with other Navy
    shipbuilding to the budget in fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a
    predictable signal of forecasted workload, allowing vendors to prepare
    and level load their workforce.
                         cybersecurity readiness review
        27. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, thank you for the
    comprehensive look at Navy Cybersecurity Readiness and the accompanying
    report. The report made a number of excellent observations and
    recommendations. What is the current plan of attack and timeline for
    the Navy to address these recommendations for significantly improving
    the cybersecurity readiness of the service and the defense industrial
    base?
        Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is fully
    committed to addressing the issues raised in the Navy Cybersecurity
    Readiness Review (CRR). The DON is working in parallel across the five
    areas highlighted in the CRR (Culture, People, Structure, Process, and
    Resources), assigning a priority and accountable organization for each
    of the recommendations. The DON is working to strengthen the existing
    partnership between the DON and the defense industrial base to mitigate
    evolving cyber threats, increase communications, establish processes to
    improve information sharing of threat data and cybersecurity best
    practices, and encourage efforts to anticipate and develop protective
    measures. I am looking forward to finalizing the business plan for the
    creation and operation of the DON Cyber Special Assistant to SECNAV.

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