[Senate Hearing 116-501]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-501
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
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HEARING
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
JULY 31, 2019--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-000 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Vice
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JACK REED, Rhode Island
JERRY MORAN, Kansas JON TESTER, Montana
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
Shannon H. Hines, Staff Director
Charles E. Kieffer, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairwoman
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, (ex JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ranking
officio) PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
Professional Staff
Clare Doherty
Gus Maples
Rajat Mathur
LaShawnda Smith
Jason Woolwine
Courtney Young
Dabney Hegg (Minority)
Jessi Axe (Minority)
Christina Monroe (Minority)
Administrative Support
Elisabeth Coats
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Senator Susan M. Collins.................... 1
Opening Statement of Senator Jack Reed........................... 2
Summary Statement of Hon. Carl E. Burleson, Acting Deputy
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration................. 4
Prepared Statement of Carl E. Burleson....................... 5
Aviation Safety.......................................... 6
UAS Integration.......................................... 7
UAS Rulemaking........................................... 8
UAS Remote Identification................................ 8
UAS and the Airport Environment.......................... 9
Airports and Infrastructure.............................. 9
AIP Investments.......................................... 9
Streamlining Certain Types of Development................ 10
Airport Safety........................................... 10
Conclusion............................................... 11
Statement of Ali Bahrami, Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration........................ 11
Statement of Winsome Lenfert, Deputy Associate Administrator for
Airports, Federal Aviation Administration...................... 12
Statement of Angela Stubblefield, Deputy Associate Administrator
for Security/Hazardous Materials Safety, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 13
Additional Committee Questions................................... 37
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins.................. 38
Airport Improvement Grants................................... 38
UAS Integration.............................................. 38
UAS Traffic Management....................................... 40
Cybersecurity................................................ 41
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 42
Questions Submitted by Senator John Boozman...................... 42
Questions Submitted by Senator Steve Daines...................... 44
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed......................... 45
Counter Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)....................... 46
Emergency Medical Kits (EMKs) and opioid overdoses........... 47
PFAS/Airport Firefighting Foam............................... 47
FAA Network Modernization.................................... 48
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein.................. 49
Noise Disruption............................................. 49
Safety Certification......................................... 49
FAA and Boeing Relationship.................................. 50
Fuel Efficiency.............................................. 52
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Durbin.................... 52
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:45 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan Collins (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Boozman, Capito, Hoeven, Reed,
Murray, Durbin, and Manchin.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF CARL E. BURLESON, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
opening statement of senator susan m. collins
Senator Collins. The committee will come to order. Today,
our subcommittee is holding an oversight hearing on the Federal
Aviation Administration. I am very pleased to be joined by
Senator Jack Reed, the subcommittee's ranking member. Senator
Capito is here right from the start, and I am sure we will be
joined by others.
The FAA is a $17 billion agency with 44,000 employees who
are responsible for virtually every aspect of aviation in our
country, including the safety of commercial airlines, general
aviation, and cargo aircraft. Every day, FAA's air traffic
controllers are responsible for more than 44,000 flights and
2.7 million airline passengers across more than 29 million
square miles of airspace.
Over the last year, much-needed attention has been focused
on the crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Air Flight
302. Serious questions have been raised about the effectiveness
of the FAA's regulatory framework. For the sake of the 346
victims and their families, we need to ensure that these
accidents are thoroughly investigated, their causes identified,
and their solutions implemented.
Unfortunately, at this point, we do not yet have the
conclusive results of the two crash investigations and cannot
say definitively why these terrible accidents occurred. For
these types of catastrophic events, however, there is rarely
just one cause. There is almost always a cascade of errors or
failures that lead to an airplane crash.
Nevertheless, since the second crash in March, we continue
to hear of more problems with FAA's certification of the 737
MAX aircraft. A New York Times article over the weekend shed
additional light on some of the problems with the FAA's
Organizational Designation Authorization, or ODA, program. In
particular, the press story details instances in which FAA
managers appeared to be more concerned with Boeing's production
timeline rather than the safety recommendations of its own
engineers.
These stories are particularly damaging for the leadership
of FAA's safety oversight. The ongoing investigations by the
Inspector General and the National Transportation Safety Board
are looking at all aspects of the MAX aircraft, including the
certification of the MCAS, (Manoeuvring Characteristics
Augmentation System) the installation of the angle-of-attack
sensors, the pilot training, the level of automation in the
aircraft, and the human factors related to the design of the
cockpit.
While the MAX aircraft accidents deserve much of our
attention this year, it is critical that the FAA continues to
make progress in improving air travel in our Nation's congested
airspace. Our Nation's airspace continues to become more
complex with new players in the aviation industry, such as
commercial space operators and unmanned aircraft systems, or
drones.
During the last two years, this subcommittee has provided
substantial funding to improve safety, increase the efficiency
of air travel, and modernize the infrastructure at our Nation's
airports, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
how these investments have improved air travel for the public.
The NextGen programs, like Performance-Based Navigation and
Time-Based Flow Management, will improve air travel by reducing
flight times. Planes are burning less fuel, emitting fewer
emissions, and creating less noise through other NextGen
improvements.
By January 1st of next year, all commercial aircraft and
most general aviation will be equipped with Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, allowing us to transition
away from ground-based radar to more precise GPS tracking. With
ADS-B, pilots can see other aircraft in the sky, pinpoint
hazardous weather and terrain, and receive important flight
information. ADS-B will also improve the efficiency of our
skies by allowing planes to fly safely with reduced separation
and also enhance safety on the tarmac by reducing the risk of
runway incursions.
Turning to our Nation's airports, I would point to the $1.5
billion in additional funding that this subcommittee has
provided for our Nation's airports over the last two years.
This funding has been particularly beneficial for small, rural
airports, such as those in--such as the one in Rangeley, Maine,
which was awarded an $11 million grant for a runway extension
project. With the longer runway, LifeFlight of Maine, an air
ambulance system, will be able to bring its twin turboprop
aircraft to provide air medical services for communities in an
area that has access to few medical providers.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on all of
these key issues this morning, but particularly the issues of
safety. Let me now turn to Senator Reed for his opening
remarks.
opening statement of senator jack reed
Senator Reed. Thank you, Chairman Collins.
This is a timely hearing, given the unresolved safety
issues that have led to two fatal airline crashes and the
grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX. Every possible measure must be
taken to ensure the aircraft is safe before it is allowed to
return to the skies. It is critical that Boeing and the FAA get
this right in order to restore public confidence in both the
aircraft and the certification and oversight process. Failure
to do so will jeopardize continued U.S. leadership in the
aviation sector and FAA standing as the gold standard for
safety.
As the chairman indicated, a New York Times investigative
report released last week describes, in their words, a broken
regulatory process that effectively neutered the oversight
authority of the FAA. You can see the deference granted to
industry reflected plainly in a joint industry-FAA product
certification guide published in 2017, which highlights ``How
an Applicant and the FAA can begin a transition to a state
where there is progressively less direct involvement of the FAA
in the compliance activities of the Applicant.''
In its article, the Times goes on to say that at a crucial
moment in the MAX's development, the agency operated in the
background, mainly monitoring Boeing's progress and checking
paperwork. Boeing was treated as a client, with FAA officials
making decisions based on the company's deadlines and budget.
FAA engineers found they had little power, even when they did
raise concerns. These allegations are grave and speak to the
need for a culture change that rebalances the relationship
between regulator and industry.
The need for a culture change appears to extend beyond the
FAA's certification program. The DOD Inspector General is
raising alarms on the FAA's oversight of the air carrier
maintenance program. Specifically, the IG raised concerns that
the FAA has shifted its safety strategy from emphasizing
enforcement actions to a more relaxed compliance assistance
model to help air carriers address the root causes for
noncompliance of safety regulations. In doing so, the FAA's
current guidance allows inspectors to close safety compliance
actions before validating that the corrective action has been
implemented and is effective.
FAA also lacks centralized database for inspectors to
identify, track, and monitor safety violations and compliance.
This leaves a huge gap in FAA oversight of air carrier
maintenance activities.
To add to the many challenges the FAA faces today, there
are very few technologies that are developed as rapidly as
unmanned aviation systems, or UAS, or drones. Drones are
changing the way we do business, helping farmers monitor their
crops, and improving the way we inspect pipelines and
railroads, and have the potential to revolutionize the delivery
of goods in this country.
These are exciting developments, but there is also growing
concern about the incidents being reported in the news, whether
it is a drone flying dangerously close to a passenger airplane
or a drone with a camera flying over someone else's private
property.
The FAA needs to establish clear rules of the air to safely
integrate this technology into our airspace, and there is a lot
of catching up to do. UAS technology is evolving so quickly,
and we need to know that the FAA is keeping up and responding
strategically.
I look forward to hearing about your progress in this issue
area, particularly in mitigating the risk of drones in and
around airports. I know the Blue Ribbon Panel on UAS Mitigation
at Airports interim report was just released, and I am
interested to hear your reactions. I look forward to hearing
from all of our witnesses today.
The FAA is certainly facing many challenges ahead in an
increasingly complex airspace. I am hopeful that, with your
leadership, we will sustain the leadership of the United States
in having the safest, most efficient aviation system in the
world.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Senator Reed.
I now want to turn to our panel of witnesses, all of whom
are senior career officials of the FAA. We are joined today by
Carl Burleson, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA; Ali
Bahrami, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety;
Winsome Lenfert, the Deputy Associate Administrator for
Airports; and Angela Stubblefield, the Deputy Administrator for
Security and Hazardous Materials.
Mr. Burleson, we will start with you.
summary statement of hon. carl e. burleson
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Chairman Collins, Ranking Member
Reed, and members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting us all to speak with you today to
update you on the Federal Aviation Administration's work to
fulfill its mission to provide the safest, most efficient
airspace system in the world. We are committed to advancing the
Administration and the Department of Transportation's
priorities of creating a stronger infrastructure and
maintaining American leadership in innovation, while ensuring
safety and access for all users in the National Airspace
System, or NAS.
As Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Reed just noted,
innovation is reshaping the NAS, and the pace of technological
change is nothing short of amazing. Consider that we have
approximately 1.4 million drones registered in less than 4
years, flying taxis in experimental design or testing phase
with major aerospace companies. We have proposed new rules to
remove the red tape and streamline the testing process for a
next generation of civil supersonic aircraft, and we have
civilian space pioneers getting ready to take suborbital
excursions offered by multiple startup space companies at
nontraditional launch sites. That is a challenge for the FAA,
and one we welcome.
How do we introduce these new entrants while simultaneously
modernizing the National Airspace and maintaining safety and
access for all users? Congress provided us a reliable
foundation to do this through the FAA Reauthorization and the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, and we are working diligently
to accomplish the directives set forth in these bills.
The safe integration of UAS and commercial space operations
are a key priority for the FAA. We are adjusting processes and
practices to accommodate more of these operations without
compromising safety. We are taking concrete steps to fulfill
this mission.
For UAS, we have deployed the prototype Low Altitude
Authorization and Notification Capability, or LAANC, at nearly
300 air traffic facilities, covering about 500 airports and
more than 100 contract towers. LAANC allows UAS operators to
gain airspace authorization in a matter of seconds, compared to
weeks previously. LAANC is a good first step, as we progress
toward automated air traffic management for drones.
We took another concrete step for commercial space
integration by opening the Challenger Room inside the Air
Traffic Control System Command Center, where Joint Space
Operations Group assessed proposed launch and re-entry
operations that have an impact on the Nation's airspace. This
greater operational visibility, coupled with the space data
integrator that we are developing, will allow us to safely
reduce the amount of airspace that must be closed to other
users during launch and re-entry.
In addition to our UAS and space integration activities, we
are also operationalizing NextGen Technologies, including ADS-B
Out and Terminal Flight Data Manager. ADS-B Out, which will be
required for aircraft operating in most U.S. airspace on
January 1, 2020, provides surveillance information that is more
accurate than radar, and more cost effective, especially in
remote areas like the Gulf of Mexico. To date, roughly 80
percent of the U.S. airline fleet, and more than 60,000 general
aviation aircraft have been equipped.
We expect to start operational testing of Terminal Flight
Data Manager, or TFDM, this summer. This will allow us to build
a virtual departure queue at airports so flights can wait at
the gate or a non-movement area with their engines off until
they have a direct route to the runway. By moving electronic
data exchange, TFDM will also save time for our controllers in
the tower cab by eliminating certain manual processes.
We are also working to make sure a new generation of
Americans are ready to enter the aerospace workforce. In fact,
one of the highest priorities at the FAA is to bring new, well-
trained women and men into the aviation system. We have
established an Aviation Workforce Steering Committee to focus
on broadening the pipeline of young people interested in
aviation careers, enhancing the proficiency of training and
targeting skills we need in the future, and partnering with
academia and industry to achieve these outcomes.
In conclusion, let me reiterate that the men and women of
the FAA are committed to ensuring the United States is the gold
standard in aviation safety. We would be the first to
acknowledge we are not perfect. But whether a technician
maintaining power systems at a facility in New Hampshire, a
safety inspector helping educate the next generation of pilots
in Florida, or a controller working traffic in Chicago, FAA's
employees are not complacent about their mission. They work
every day to ensure the safety of the American traveling
public. That is why we are confident, with the support of this
committee and the robust engagement of our stakeholders, we can
safely achieve innovation necessary to continue America's
global leadership.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl E. Burleson
Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today to update you on
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) work to fulfill its mission
to provide the safest, most efficient airspace system in the world. The
FAA is committed to advancing the Administration's and the Department
of Transportation's priorities of creating stronger infrastructure that
supports a growing economy and continuing American leadership in
innovation while maintaining safety and access for all users of the
National Airspace System (NAS). Our employees are working diligently to
accomplish the directives Congress set forth in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, which
together provide a reliable foundation for the FAA to achieve these
objectives. Accompanying me today are Ali Bahrami, Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety; Angela H. Stubblefield, Deputy
Associate Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials Safety;
and Winsome Lenfert, Deputy Associate Administrator for Airports. With
their help, I would like to highlight for you some of our activities in
these specific areas: aviation safety, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
integration, and airports and infrastructure.
aviation safety
Safety is the core of the Federal Aviation Administration's mission
and our top priority. With the support of this Committee, we have
worked tirelessly to take a more proactive, datadriven approach to
oversight that prioritizes safety above all else inside the FAA and
within the aviation community that we regulate. The result of this
approach is that the United States has the safest air transportation
system in the world. Since 1997, the risk of a fatal commercial
aviation accident in the United States has been cut by 94 percent. With
respect to commercial space transportation, since 1995, there have been
a total of 388 licensed or permitted launches and reentries (19 so far
in 2019), all without any fatalities, serious injuries, or significant
property damage to the general public. In the past 10 years, there has
been one passenger fatality on a U.S. commercial airline in over 90
million flights. But one fatality is one too many, and a healthy safety
culture requires continuous attention and commitment to continuous
improvement.
In order to maintain the safest air transportation system in the
world, the FAA has evolved from a prescriptive and more reactive
approach to its safety oversight responsibilities to one that is
performance-based, proactive, centered on managing risk, and focused on
continuous improvement. This approach to safety oversight relies on
access to data and requires the open and transparent exchange of
information. We know that it takes collaboration, communication, and
common safety objectives to allow the FAA and the aviation community to
identify system hazards and to implement safety solutions. This
approach gives us knowledge that we would not otherwise have about
safety events and risks. Sharing safety issues, trends, and lessons
learned is critical to recognizing potential risks in the system. The
more data we have, the more we can learn about the system, which in
turn allows us to better manage and improve the system.
The FAA's grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX airplane placed a
spotlight on safety and our approach to oversight of those we regulate.
With respect to the certification of the 737 MAX, the facts are these:
it took 5 years to certify the 737 MAX. Boeing applied for
certification in January 2012. The certification was completed in March
2017. During those 5 years, FAA safety engineers and test pilots put in
110,000 hours of work, and they flew or supported 297 test flights.
After certification of an aircraft design, the FAA continues to oversee
the aircraft's production and operation. As we obtain pertinent
information, identify potential risk, or learn of a system failure, we
analyze it, determine how best to mitigate the risk, and require
operators to implement the mitigation.
This approach to safety and fact-based, data-driven decisionmaking
has been the FAA's guiding principle in our response to the Lion Air
and Ethiopian Airlines accidents. Once the FAA had data showing
similarities between the two accidents that warranted further
investigation of the possibility of a shared cause, the FAA made the
decision to ground all 737 MAX airplanes operated by U.S. airlines or
in U.S. territory pending further investigation.
As part of the FAA's commitment to continuous improvement, we both
welcome and invite review of our processes and procedures. A number of
reviews and audits have been initiated to look at different aspects of
the 737 MAX certification. After the FAA grounded the 737 MAX,
Secretary Chao asked the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General to conduct an audit of the certification for the 737 MAX, with
the goal of compiling an objective and detailed factual history of the
activities that resulted in the certification of the 737 MAX aircraft.
Secretary Chao also announced the establishment of a Special Committee
to review the FAA's procedures for the certification of new aircraft,
including the 737 MAX. The Special Committee to Review FAA's Aircraft
Certification Process is an independent body whose findings and
recommendations will be presented directly to the Secretary and the FAA
Administrator.
The FAA also established a Joint Authorities Technical Review
(JATR) to conduct a comprehensive review of the certification of the
automated flight control system on the Boeing 737 MAX. The JATR is
chaired by former NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart and comprises a team
of experts from the FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and the aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United
Arab Emirates. Completion of the JATR's work is not a prerequisite for
returning the 737 MAX to service; however, the FAA will consider the
findings and recommendations of each of the participants as we
continually review our processes.
Additionally, the FAA met with safety representatives of the three
U.S.-based commercial airlines that have the Boeing 737 MAX in their
fleets, as well as the pilot unions for those airlines. This meeting
was an opportunity for the FAA to hear individual views from operators
and pilots of the 737 MAX as the agency evaluates what needs to be done
before the FAA makes a decision to return the aircraft to service in
the United States. In keeping with the FAA's longstanding cooperation
with its international partners, the FAA also recently hosted a meeting
of Directors General of civil aviation authorities from around the
world to discuss the FAA's activities toward ensuring the safe return
of the 737 MAX to service. We continue to be in frequent communication
with the international aviation safety community and are working
closely with our counterparts to address their concerns and keep them
informed of progress.
The FAA also initiated a multi-agency Technical Advisory Board
(TAB) review of Boeing's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) software update and system safety assessment in order to
determine sufficiency. The TAB consists of a team of experts from the
U.S. Air Force, NASA, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and
the FAA. None of the TAB experts have been involved in any aspect of
the Boeing 737 MAX certification. The TAB is charged with evaluating
Boeing and FAA efforts related to the software update and its
integration into the flight control system. The TAB will identify
issues where further investigation is required prior to approval of the
design change. The JATR is looking broadly at the original
certification of the 737 MAX flight control system, while the TAB is
evaluating Boeing's proposed technical solutions related to the two
accidents. The TAB's recommendations will directly inform the FAA's
decision concerning the 737 MAX fleet's return to service.
The FAA is following a thorough process, not a prescribed timeline,
for returning the 737 MAX to passenger service. We continue to evaluate
Boeing's software modification to the MCAS, and we are still developing
necessary training requirements. The 737 MAX will not return to service
for U.S. carriers and in U.S. airspace until the FAA's analysis of the
facts and technical data indicate that it is safe to do so.
uas integration
The FAA's commitment to global leadership in aviation is equally
evident in the area of UAS integration. The steady development and
expansion of UAS has created a dynamic change in aviation that we have
not seen since the dawn of the jet age. The FAA is committed to
supporting this change and to working with the UAS community to ensure
that this technology is integrated into the NAS safely and securely.
UAS offer expanded capabilities in aviation with a fast pace of
innovation and increasing volume of operations. For example, the
progression of UAS innovation and the change in product cycles can
generally be measured in months, not years. Similarly, the volume of
UAS operations is outpacing manned aircraft. Currently, there are
nearly four times as many UAS as registered manned aircraft.
The new dynamics that UAS bring to the NAS redouble our focus on
the safety of all aircraft operations as the FAA's first priority. An
ongoing challenge to UAS integration is the potential for conflict
between manned and unmanned aircraft. We continue to engage in outreach
to UAS operators and the public at large to educate current and
prospective drone users about their safety responsibilities. Efforts
such as the ``Know Before You Fly'' information campaign have
encouraged UAS operators to understand the rules and responsibilities
for flying an aircraft in the NAS. This campaign and the FAA's related
work on the ``B4UFLY'' mobile application are bearing fruit. The annual
rate of increase of pilot reports about UAS operating in places where
they should not be is dropping by 50 percent each year--while the
number of UAS operating in the airspace is increasing.
The UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) \1\ also has been a crucial
step in accelerating the Department of Transportation's and FAA's UAS
integration efforts. Through the IPP, nine different communities across
the country are working to identify ways to balance local and national
interests. The IPP is a case study in communications, security,
privacy, and data collection. The experience gained and the data
collected from the IPP will help ensure the United States remains the
global leader in safe UAS integration and fully realizes the economic
and societal benefits of this technology. In fact, the IPP is already
paying dividends on the investment. Recently, the FAA granted the first
air carrier certification to a commercial drone operator for package
deliveries in rural Blacksburg, Virginia. Although the regulatory
framework for broader drone operations is not complete, the IPP has
helped to inform the FAA and drone operators of the extent to which
operations can begin under existing rules.
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\1\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-secretary-transportation/
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uas rulemaking
The FAA currently is enabling safe UAS operations using existing
rules, but we also understand the need to focus on enabling an ever-
expanding universe of UAS operations and capabilities. In order to
allow for such operations to be conducted safely and securely, the FAA
has moved forward with a number of regulatory initiatives. Together
with the Department of Transportation's Office of the Secretary, the
FAA recently published a proposed new rule on the operation of small
UAS over people.\2\ The proposal seeks to mitigate safety risks without
inhibiting technological and operational advances. The FAA also
recently published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking seeking
public input to identify drone safety and security issues and explore
ways to mitigate risks UAS may pose to other aircraft, people on the
ground, or to national security.\3\ The FAA's security partners have
helped to highlight some of the important security and public safety
questions that must be addressed.
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\2\ https://www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-
00732/operation-of-small-unmanned-aircraft- systems-over-people
\3\ https://www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-
00758/safe-and-secure-operations-of-small- unmanned-aircraft-systems
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Additionally, in February 2019, the FAA published an interim final
rule on external marking requirements for small UAS.\4\ The rule
requires small unmanned aircraft owners to display their unique
identifier (registration number) on an external surface of the
aircraft. Identifiers are assigned by the FAA upon completion of the
registration process. Small unmanned aircraft owners are no longer
permitted to enclose the FAA-issued registration number in a
compartment. The FAA took this action to address concerns expressed by
the law enforcement community and the FAA's interagency security
partners regarding the risk a concealed explosive device poses to first
responders who must open a compartment to attempt to find the small
unmanned aircraft's registration number.
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\4\ https://www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-
00765/external-marking-requirement-for-small-unmanned-aircraft
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uas remote identification
Going forward, the ability to remotely identify UAS operators will
be a crucial stepping stone for UAS traffic management and will
facilitate what we envision as high volume, safe, and secure low-
altitude UAS operations. Congress recognized the importance of remote
identification when it enacted the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security
Act of 2016. That Act laid the foundation for FAA's work with operators
and our security partners to realize the importance of remote
identification and to reach a consensus on how to address it. More
recently, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 provided the FAA with
additional authority to move ahead with work on universal registration
and remote identification--both of which are critical to the success of
commercial UAS operations and UAS integration more broadly.
Remote identification is fundamental to both safety and security of
drone operations. Remote identification will be necessary for routine
beyond visual line-of-sight operations and operations over people,
package delivery, operations in congested areas, and the continued safe
operation of all aircraft in shared airspace. It will also be
foundational for the advancement of automated passenger or cargo-
carrying air transportation--what is often referred to as Urban Air
Mobility. From a security perspective, remote identification would
enable us to connect a suspect UAS to its control station location and
to identify the registered owner of a suspect UAS. With universal
remote identification, the FAA, our national security partners, and
state and local law enforcement will be better able to locate and
identify a UAS operator, determine if a UAS is being operated in an
unsafe, unauthorized, or criminal manner, and take appropriate action
if necessary. The FAA is committed to establishing remote
identification requirements as quickly as possible.
uas and the airport environment
With the December 2018 protracted UAS disruption at Gatwick
Airport, and other reported disruptions at airports around the world
and in the United States, the FAA understands and shares the concerns
of airlines, airport sponsors, and our security partners regarding the
potential safety hazards and security threats presented by errant or
malicious UAS, particularly in and around the airport environment. A
number of airport sponsors have acquired or are pursuing possible
acquisition of UAS detection systems for their airports. In an effort
to make sure such activity is conducted in a safe and coordinated
manner, in early May, the FAA sent informational correspondence to
airport sponsors, which included information to support informed
airport decisionmaking regarding the demonstration or installation of
UAS detection systems at airports (including the legal uncertainties
posed by certain UAS detection systems), answers to some frequently
asked questions, and technical considerations that the FAA has used to
assess the readiness of UAS detection technologies.\5\ The FAA wants to
coordinate with airports that plan to use UAS detection systems to
ensure deployment and use do not create interference or obstruction
with other aviation safety and efficiency systems.
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\5\ https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/media/Updated-
Information-UAS-Detection-Countermeasures-Technology-Airports-
20190507.pdf
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Given the events in Gatwick, there is no doubt about the
significant operational and economic impacts a persistent UAS
disruption can have in the airport environment and the need to be able
not only to detect, identify, and track a disruptive UAS, but also to
be able to take action to end the disruption. The FAA along with our
Federal security partners have formulated a concept of operations
(CONOPS) for a National Federal Response plan through which current
Federal counter-UAS (C-UAS) authorities and existing Federal C-UAS
equipment can be rapidly projected into a major U.S. airport
experiencing a persistent operational disruption due to an unauthorized
UAS operation. This CONOPS has been socialized with airport and airline
associations and should be finalized for implementation soon.
airports and infrastructure
Airport infrastructure in the United States, with 3,332 airports
and 5,000 paved runways, supports our economic competitiveness and
improves the safety and efficiency of our air transportation system.
According to the FAA's most recent economic analysis, U.S. civil
aviation accounts for $1.6 trillion in total economic activity and
supports nearly 11 million jobs. The FAA's Office of Airports provides
leadership in maintaining a safe, secure, efficient, environmentally
sustainable, and fiscally responsible system of airports. Under
Secretary Chao's leadership, the Department of Transportation and the
FAA are delivering Airport Improvement Program (AIP) investments for
the American people, who depend on reliable infrastructure. The FAA is
also helping to streamline non-aeronautical development at airports and
is increasing airport safety by addressing runway incursions and
improving runway safety areas (RSA).
aip investments
Through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Congress
provided an additional $1 million in supplemental funding for
infrastructure grants. The FAA published a Federal Register notice on
July 9, 2018 \6\, explaining the evaluation criteria and submission
process for supplemental discretionary funding requests. The
requirements under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 included:
requiring the FAA to give ``priority consideration'' to specific types
of airports (smaller and more rural airports); for non-primary
airports, there is no local match required for the work covered by the
grant; and requiring the FAA to obligate the supplemental funding by
September 2020. After the FAA awarded an initial round of $205 million
to 37 airports in 34 states in September 2018, airports in October 2018
submitted additional funding requests for grant awards in fiscal years
2019 or 2020. This project solicitation resulted in requests totaling
$10.9 billion in funding.
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\6\ https://www.Federalregister.gov/documents/2018/07/09/2018-
14675/supplemental-guidance-on-the-airport- improvement-program-aip-
for-fiscal-years-2018-2020
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On May 15, 2019, Secretary Chao announced the intent to award
another $779 million in supplemental funding for infrastructure grants
to 127 airports in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. This represented the
final round of grants awarded under the supplemental funding provided
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. Overall, about 88 percent
of the supplemental funds went to airports meeting the statutory
criteria for ``Priority Consideration'' and more than $430 million went
to non-primary airports. Recipients of the selected grants will still
need to meet any remaining required approvals. Selected projects
include runway reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as new
construction or rehabilitation of taxiways, aprons, and terminals. The
construction and equipment supported by this funding increase airports'
safety, emergency response capabilities, and capacity, and could
support further potential growth and development within each airport's
region. The FAA is currently working through the normal Airports
Capital Improvement Plan (ACIP) process to identify and evaluate
potential projects for the $500 million in supplemental funds
appropriated in fiscal year 2019.
With regard to the total $3.18 billion in regular fiscal year 2019
AIP funding for airports across the United States, Secretary Chao has
announced three allotments totaling almost $1.8 billion in grants
awarded for over 900 airports. Some notable examples of the grant
awards include:
$11 million for reconstruction of Runway 5/23 and mitigation of
factors contributing to runway incursions in Des Moines, Iowa; $10.4
million for construction of an aircraft rescue and firefighting
building and acquisition of two aircraft rescue and firefighting
vehicles to enhance airport safety in Birmingham, Alabama; $3.1 million
for runway rehabilitation in Charleston, West Virginia; $2.7 million
for mitigation of airport noise in New Haven and East Haven,
Connecticut; and $2 million for rehabilitation of a general
aviation apron used for aircraft parking in Helena, Montana.
streamlining certain types of development
The Department of Transportation and the FAA are also working to
streamline project reviews and remove unnecessary barriers to
development. Section 163 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
provided a framework for the FAA to determine that certain types of
proposed development projects no longer trigger a need for formal FAA
review and approval. To date, the FAA has received over 40 requests for
determinations under section 163 and has issued 25 determinations. Some
examples of projects receiving determinations under section 163 are the
sale of 11.8 acres of airport land for development of a $37 million
facility in the Purdue University-affiliated Discovery Park District in
Lafayette, Indiana; and the long-term lease and construction of
industrial warehouse flex facilities on 27 acres of land acquired with
Airport Development Aid Program \7\ funds in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Because formal FAA review and approval is not required for these
projects, they may be able to begin construction more quickly.
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\7\ A forerunner to the current Airport Improvement Program.
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airport safety
The FAA also is engaged in several successful efforts to improve
safety at our nation's airports. Runway incursions, which include wrong
runway landings and takeoffs, are a top airport safety concern for the
FAA. Research has shown that airport geometry can contribute to runway
incursions. As a result, the FAA has provided airports with updated
guidance on recommended taxiway layouts.\8\
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\8\ Advisory Circular 150/5300-13, ``Airport Design'' and
Engineering Brief Number 75, ``Incorporation of Runway Incursion
Prevention into Taxiway and Apron Design'' available at www.faa.gov/
airports/resources/.
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A research study conducted in fiscal year 2012 identified 140
locations with nonstandard geometry and a high incidence of runway
incursions using data from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012.
As a result, the FAA launched the Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM)
program in fiscal year 2015 to help mitigate the nonstandard geometry
at these locations and ultimately reduce the number of runway
incursions. The FAA maintains a RIM database, which is updated annually
with new data.
Currently, there are 128 RIM locations at 77 airports. Airports can
utilize a variety of mitigation strategies to eliminate nonstandard
geometry configurations and reduce the likelihood of pilot confusion
and ultimately, runway incursions. Airports often use a combination of
mitigation strategies for RIM locations, which can include changes to
airport geometry, lights, signs, markings, and/or operational
procedures.
To date, 39 locations have been mitigated through the RIM program,
including Santa Barbara Municipal Airport, Corpus Christi International
Airport, and Albuquerque International Airport. Before mitigation,
these 39 locations experienced 435 runway incursions, compared to 30
runway incursions after mitigation. The RIM locations will be monitored
over time to determine if mitigation efforts were successful and
whether or not additional mitigation is needed.
The FAA has also worked to mitigate the impacts of runway
excursions--incidents where an aircraft overruns, undershoots, or veers
off the side of a runway--by improving RSA at commercial service
airports. The RSA is typically 500 feet wide and extends 1,000 feet
beyond each end of the runway. Many airports were built before the
current 1,000-foot RSA standard was adopted approximately 20 years ago.
In some cases, it is not practicable to achieve the full standard RSA
because there may be a lack of available land. There also may be
obstacles such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, and populated
areas or severe drop-off of terrain.
The FAA began conducting research in the 1990s to determine how to
improve safety at airports where the full RSA cannot be obtained.
Working in concert with the University of Dayton, the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, and the Engineered Arresting Systems
Corporation (ESCO) of Logan Township, NJ, a new technology emerged to
safely stop overrunning aircraft. Engineered Material Arresting System
(EMAS) uses crushable material placed at the end of a runway to stop an
aircraft that overruns the runway. The tires of the aircraft sink into
the lightweight material and the aircraft is decelerated as it rolls
through the material.
The EMAS technology improves safety benefits in cases where land is
not available, or not possible to have the standard 1,000-foot overrun.
A standard EMAS installation can stop an aircraft from overrunning the
runway at approximately 80 miles per hour. An EMAS arrestor bed can be
installed to help slow or stop an aircraft that overruns the runway,
even if less than a standard RSA length is available.
As of October 2014, there are two manufacturers of EMAS products
that meet the FAA requirements of advisory circular 150-5220-22B,
``Engineered Materials Arresting Systems for Aircraft Overruns''--ESCO
and Runway Safe. The FAA must review and approve each EMAS
installation. Currently, ESCO's EMAS is installed on 112 runway ends at
68 U.S. airports, with plans to install 3 EMAS at 2 additional U.S.
airports. Runway Safe's EMAS is installed on four runway ends at
Chicago Midway Airport. To date, there have been 15 incidents where
ESCO's EMAS has safely stopped overrunning aircraft with a total of 406
crew and passengers aboard those flights.
EMAS and other RSA improvements have minimized adverse impacts
otherwise resulting from runway excursions. For example, in July 2013,
Asiana Airlines Flight 214 landed short on Runway 28L at San Francisco
International Airport. Although the aircraft sustained severe damage
and three people died, everyone else on board the aircraft survived,
with many being able to walk away, due to an RSA improvement that
provided the standard 600' of available ``undershoot'' before the
runway. Had it not been for this enhancement, the aircraft would have
landed short in San Francisco Bay. And in March 2017, a McDonnell
Douglas MD83 aircraft carrying the University of Michigan Men's
Basketball Team overran Runway 23L during a rejected take-off at
Detroit Willow Run Airport, and entered an RSA that had been improved
to meet current standards. Although there was damage to the aircraft,
there was only one minor injury reported.
conclusion
In this age of innovation that is reshaping the NAS, the pace of
technological change is nothing short of amazing. What has not changed,
however, is the FAA's focus on safety. It is our number one priority
and the foundation for everything that we do. The United States is the
gold standard in aviation safety and the FAA is committed to
maintaining that standard. In our quest for continuous safety
improvement, we welcome external review of our systems, processes, and
recommendations. We are confident, with the support of this Committee
and the robust engagement of our stakeholders, we can innovate safely
and continue to solidify America's role as the global leader in
aviation.
This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer your
questions.
Senator Collins. Mr. Bahrami.
STATEMENT OF ALI BAHRAMI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Bahrami. Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Reed, members
of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to address
the Federal Aviation Administration's top priority--safety.
The Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air 610
accidents are tragic events that seared the safety conscience
of the entire aviation community. Learning from and recovering
from these accidents is our primary focus within the aviation
safety organization, along with maintaining the continued
operational safety of the National Airspace System.
With respect to returning the 737 MAX to service, the FAA
is following a thorough process, not a prescribed timeline. We
continue to evaluate Boeing's software modification to the
MCAS. In addition, we are developing necessary training
requirements as we support various investigations and audits
underway.
We are working through the Joint Authorities Technical
Review, or JATR, to conduct a comprehensive review of the 737
MAX's flight control system certification. We have also
initiated multi-agency Technical Advisory Board review of
Boeing's MCAS software update and system safety assessment. Let
me emphasize that despite this strong spotlight we are under,
we welcome the scrutiny as it will make us stronger.
Our data-driven, risk-based systems approach to standards,
certification, and oversight forms the backbone of the proven
quantifiable safety record that we have come to expect in
commercial aviation. In the past 10 years, U.S. carriers have
transported more than 7 billion passengers with one fatality,
but one fatality is too many.
Further, as the aviation environment becomes more complex
with the new entrants, we know a healthy safety culture
requires commitment to continuous improvement. Through our new
strategic plan, we are aligning our safety culture to be
responsive to the new challenges we face, including new
entrants, the fastest growing of which is, of course, unmanned
aircraft systems, or UAS.
We have sharpened our focus on the safety of all aircraft
operations, and we work on a number of initiatives to support
UAS integration. We are using existing rules to enable UAS
operations where we can and focusing on safety-enabling an
ever-expanding universe of UAS operations and capabilities.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that in our quest
for continuous safety improvement, we welcome external review
of our systems and processes, and we remain committed to making
commercial and general aviation even safer.
Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Ms. Lenfert.
STATEMENT OF WINSOME LENFERT, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIRPORTS, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Lenfert. Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Reed, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak with you today.
The Office of Airports works with more than 5,000 airports
across the country and, more specifically, 3,300 airports that
are part of the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems. We
also work closely with airlines, general aviation pilots, State
aviation professionals, neighboring communities, local
governments, and many other stakeholders. Our top priority is
always the safety of the traveling public, while optimizing
capacity, efficiency, and security of our Nation's airports. We
also ensure environmental responsibility and financial
accountability.
We are deeply grateful to the United States Congress, and
particularly this committee, for the trust that you place in
us. The needs far exceed the available resources, but the funds
that you provide are crucial to keeping our Nation's airports
as safe as the airways that connect them. The nationwide system
of airports that we help maintain represents a critical safety
net, which is part of why the United States has the safest air
transportation system in the world. They are also crucial to
our national, regional and local economies.
Understanding the importance of infrastructure to our
Nation's economic wellbeing, we work closely with airport
operators and their planning, and their development programs.
In 2018, we issued a total of $3.46 billion in airport
improvement funding, including a portion of the fiscal year
2018 supplemental funds. In Fiscal 2019, so far we have
processed more than $2.4 billion in grants, including
additional funds from the fiscal year 2018 supplemental
program.
We also continue to improve safety through inspections of
certificated airports, through site visits, and through our
latest initiative, the Runway Incursion Mitigation Program.
Through construction, procedures, and signage and marking
changes, we were able to reduce runway incursions at 39
locations by 93 percent.
But we could not accomplish this work without our highly
skilled professional workforce. They, too, depend upon the
resources that allow them to perform their daily functions,
such as helping develop runway extensions in remote areas. They
help figure out how to optimize safety and capacity at
constrained airports. They help determine how to justify a
runway extension with a balance between community environmental
concerns and the system capacity and safety needs.
Our compliance experts ensure that aviation-related
revenues are used for aviation-related purposes, which is
critical to the functionality of our system. Our people work
closely with other parts of the FAA, as well as other Federal,
State, and local agencies. We are dedicated to working with you
and our stakeholders that we serve to help solve problems and
to ensure that we have the safest and most efficient airport
system.
Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Ms. Stubblefield.
STATEMENT OF ANGELA STUBBLEFIELD, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR SECURITY/HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Stubblefield. Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Reed,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
speak with you today about how the FAA is addressing security
risks associated with UAS integration.
Safe and secure integration of UAS into the National
Airspace System cannot be achieved without addressing the risks
posed by malicious or errant UAS operations. Just as the U.S.
Government has built a strong foundation of aviation security
to support manned aircraft operations, we are focused on
creating a comprehensive and holistic UAS security regime that
includes the ability to prevent, deter, detect, and, when
necessary, respond to unauthorized UAS operations.
The FAA's prevention efforts include continuous public
outreach and education, and support to law enforcement and
public safety agencies. The FAA and our security partners
believe most noncompliant UAS operations are committed by the
clueless and the careless with no malicious intent. To deter
reckless operators, we are providing instructional resources
and investigative support to law enforcement agencies, which
also enables FAA civil enforcement.
We are publishing a remote identification rule to support
prevention, deterrence, and detection of potential safety and
security risks. The ability to remotely identify UAS and their
operators in flight is crucial to locating and taking
appropriate action against UAS operators posing a safety or
security risk. Detecting the presence of an unauthorized UAS
and locating the operator is critical to UAS safety, security,
and integration. The FAA is providing information to airport
sponsors to help them make informed decisions about deploying
UAS detection technology at some airports.
Turning to response, the FAA is closely coordinating with
the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and Homeland
Security to ensure counter-UAS technologies allow them to
accomplish their security missions, while avoiding adverse
impacts to the National Airspace System. For domestic airports,
several unique challenges in the airport environment require
more evaluation and development of counter-UAS technologies.
And as directed in the FAA Reauthorization, we are planning to
test UAS detection and mitigations systems at several airports.
We share concerns about the potential impacts of a drone
disrupting airport operations and are closely coordinating with
our Federal security partners to finalize a national Federal
response plan to deploy counter-UAS authorities and
technologies to address a persistent UAS disruption at a major
U.S. airport, ensuring the U.S. Government is ready to respond
to an event similar to the UAS disruption at UK's Gatwick
Airport in December 2018. Working together to prevent, deter,
detect, and respond to UAS risks, the FAA, security and law
enforcement agencies, and critical infrastructure owners will
enable the United States to continue leading the way in UAS
integration and innovation, while maintaining the safest, most
secure, and most efficient airspace system in the world.
Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Burleson, I want to start with you today. In your
testimony, you state that the FAA prioritizes safety above all
else, which is what we would want and expect. When one reads
the New York Times story and the Wall Street Journal story that
came out today, one has to question what has happened to that
commitment, whether resource shortages have caused the agency
to be too deferential to the aircraft manufacturer and whether
it is really wise in the case of Boeing to have allowed the
company to certify 96 percent of its own work.
More disturbing, the New York Times story recounts case
after case where safety concerns seem to be placed second to
concerns about Boeing being able to meet its own timelines.
Would you comment on why the FAA would give apparently more
consideration to an aircraft manufacturer's production timeline
than to safety concerns that were raised?
Mr. Burleson. Senator, thank you very much for the
question.
And again, let me start with foundational and FAA, and our
core principle is safety. I think you see that in--as we are
working through all the challenges of coming to a place where
we feel comfortable ungrounding the MAX, step by step. We
constantly say there is no timeline. The issue is safety.
In terms of the newspaper reports, I think that, again,
that they offer a perspective, but I would say that the
professionals who are working this day in and day out have an
incredible commitment to trying to get it right. There are
often times as--and certainly Mr. Bahrami can elaborate on this
because, having worked in the safety part of the FAA, he
certainly has a lot more knowledge of the details of the
engineering process, the process of delegation. But I will say,
we do not, and never have, allowed self-certification of--
whether it is Boeing or any other product.
We are fundamentally involved at the beginning of a
certification project. The Boeing aircraft that--the MAX took 5
years to certify. We were in the beginning phases of deciding
what was more routine, what could be delegated in that process,
and then what the key technologies and risks that had to be
addressed.
So, again, I think we have been fully knowledgeable in
dealing with the development of that plane, and I think that
while--and we have--again, the process of delegation is
longstanding and has, again, been a critical part of producing
the safety record we have in the United States.
I will say it doesn't mean that it is perfect. It doesn't
mean that each decision we have made has always been perfect.
But I do think the fundamental process of how we went about
certifying the MAX was sound.
And I think the other positive here, Senator, is that, as
Mr. Bahrami mentioned in his testimony, we have a number of
reviews ongoing, looking at what we did in the past with that.
We certainly are committed to if there are improvements we need
to make, changes we need to make, if there needs to be a
different balance in delegation or ODA, we are certainly
willing and ready to take those recommendations.
And there is also committees that are also reviewing--
looking at the future. Because, again, airplanes are not going
to be less computer centric going forward. So, again, we are
looking not just at what--how we can improve the past, but we
are also at this point waiting to see what recommendations
might come in terms of improving future certification process.
Senator Collins. Well, I have many more questions for both
you and Mr. Bahrami, but I know that Senator Reed is on a tight
time schedule, so I will turn to him.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Bahrami, it seems that to make sense, to me at least,
that pilots who fly these aircraft on a day-to-day basis should
be involved in the certification process. In fact, day-to-day
pilots, if you will, were involved in finding an additional
flight control software issue when they were given access.
Going forward, will the FAA reconsider requiring that everyday
pilots--I am using the term generically--not just test pilots,
play a greater role in aircraft certification?
Mr. Bahrami. Senator, thanks for that question.
Pilots and flight test engineers and operational pilots are
engaged in certification, and they have always been involved.
What you recently heard with respect to the recent findings on
the issue was a review of the system safety assessment, and
what we found out, that there was a particular failure, which
was extremely remote. And we acknowledged that. We understood
that.
And based on what we learned from the two accidents, we
decided that we need to actually verify the assumptions, and
that is where our pilots got involved to, in fact, verify that
this particular situation if it occurs, is recoverable. And in
that particular case, several of our pilots were able to
recover, but there was one or so that they could not recover
successfully. And because of that, we said that change needs to
occur. So the good news is the pilots are engaged and involved
in the process.
Senator Reed. But the question is, will they be formally
engaged going forward?
Mr. Bahrami. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. In a much more robust way officially. Not
just informally, but officially by the FAA.
Mr. Bahrami. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Today, the Wall Street Journal reported, as the chairman
indicated, on the situation, and one of their points was that
the FAA's early goal after the first crash was to, in their
words, get something out immediately and then mandate something
more permanent. Specifically, the FAA analysis suggests that a
warning to pilots would be enough to provide Boeing about 10
months to design and implement changes to MCAS, according to a
person close to the manufacturer. Boeing had been planning to
complete the changes by April, within the 10-month period. That
is the end of their quote.
This information appears to contradict earlier statements
by the FAA. You previously thought notification would be
sufficient to remedy safety concerns after Lion Air accident.
So, Mr. Bahrami, is this accurate, the report that--did the FAA
intend to have a short-term pilot warning, knowing that Boeing
needed to make a more significant fix to the MCAS software?
Mr. Bahrami. One of the most important roles that we play
is continued operational safety. On a daily basis, we get
reports from the fleet with respect to events, occurrences,
difficulties, whether it is operational or technical, on a
regular basis. All of those are reviewed by our engineers and
specialists to determine what we need to--first of all, are
they really serious safety risks, what we need to be doing in
the interim, and at the same time, in the long-term action. And
what--this is a normal practice.
In that particular case, based on the data and information
that we receive, we recognize that in Lion Air case, pilot
action played a significant role. And because of that, we felt
that the most important, urgent thing to do until we have
appropriate fixes in place, to provide the pilots with the
appropriate procedures to focus on going forward, while we
develop this. This is our interim measures. And then the final
fix was supposed to occur at the later time.
And this is normal practice. I could give you numerous
examples that we have done that.
Senator Reed. But the implication was that this pilot
change would be sufficient to provide airworthiness, and there
was no real mention of improvements and necessary changes of
the MCAS system, leading I think most people to conclude that
there was no long-term issue with the MCAS. That lack of
transparency, I think, is not appropriate.
Mr. Bahrami. If I may say, sir, when we get involved in an
accident investigation, we get involved for two reasons. Number
one, to support the NTSB and investigators with the technical
knowledge and information. Number two is to make sure that we
understand what we need to do in order to protect the fleet
based on the real-time information that we get.
As part of the requirement in our agreement with the NTSB
is that we do not disclose information or any indication what
may have gone wrong in that particular case, and that is a very
delicate balance for us to play. So we wanted to basically
resolve the issue without having to disclose information that
the investigators did not want us to disclose.
And from the safety perspective, we felt strongly that what
we did was adequate, and that was based on discussions with our
airlines, our own operators, based on the review of the data
that we have obtained from our operators, and also Canadian
operators. We thought that was sufficient.
Now, knowing what we know today, and maybe we would have to
take a revisit of that based on these reviews that will come
out, we will definitely make adjustments.
Senator Reed. But of concern is that there are various
equities. Companies don't want their planes grounded or even
questioned about the safety because that would interfere with
the profitability of their operations. The inspectors want to
conduct an inspection, isolate as much as possible from the
public. But the FAA, we expect you to basically be the person
or entity that stands up and says this aircraft is completely
safe to fly, that there are no further corrections necessary,
or if there are, they are being undertaken. That does not
appear to be the case in this situation, but thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Madam Chair.
During the 35-day Government shutdown, which President
Trump initiated earlier this year, I made a point of meeting
with air traffic controllers in St. Louis and in Chicago. And I
learned that over 3,000 aviation safety professionals had been
furloughed during the President's shutdown, and that another
15,000 controllers and aviation safety professionals worked
without pay. Many of them were working extraordinarily long
shifts to try to make up the difference.
Well, it has been 6 months since the Government reopened,
and we are still, I understand, feeling the impacts of that
shutdown on our air traffic control system. The air traffic
controllers union reports that the shutdown led to early
retirements and delayed classes at the FAA Academy, causing
some students to drop out.
For an organization that already experienced--experiencing
worker shortage and for air traffic controllers who have been
forced to work longer hours for too long, the shutdown caused
serious damage. And the FAA has reportedly had to lower its
hiring target for controllers from 1,400 this year to 900.
The shutdown also negatively affected the implementation of
new safety systems, including the arrival prediction alerting
system, a safety system that can alert a pilot if they are
about to land on the wrong runway and need to circle the
airport.
Six months after President Trump's shutdown, can you give
us an update on the size and scale of the impacts it had on air
traffic control? How much ground did we lose when it comes to
air traffic controller hiring and safety upgrades?
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
And again, I will start with I just want to say I
appreciate your acknowledgement of what FAA did. It was pretty
extraordinary. I mean, I have been at the agency for 30 years,
and I will say this is one of our finest hours; that for 5
weeks, the system ran perfectly, safely, efficiently, where
again, a good portion of our workforce was sitting home, and
the rest was working without pay.
Senator Durbin. Bless you, and bless the controllers, but
this was totally unnecessary. This was a Government shutdown
inspired by one man. Would you continue and tell me today where
we stand in terms----
Mr. Burleson. So, Senator, today--so, again, I think the
good news is we have made great progress. Again, there was--
again, like any large organization, if you shut it down for 5
weeks, there is going to be some impacts.
I will say in terms of controller targets and training,
this year's class is slightly lower. But in terms of overall
targets of what we are trying to achieve--and we sent our
staffing plan to Congress--you will see that we are still on
track in terms of getting to about 14,000 controllers. The
composition is a little--slightly different in terms of we have
about 3,500 trainees as part of that. But again, there was some
delay at the academy, but the classes have restarted, and we
certainly are not concerned of making sure that we have the
right level of controllers in the system.
We did have some delays in the implementation of a number
of the NextGen projects. Again, if you shut down an
organization, that is going to happen. I think the good news,
again, is we are working to try to schedule waterfalls of how
we get different parts of the NextGen systems out in the
system, coordinating schedules of our controllers, our
technicians. And so, again, there has been some delay, but I am
confident we are going to be able to address those issues over
the next year and get that work back on track.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Burleson, I think more than anything,
the words ``safety'' and ``FAA'' are almost synonymous. That is
your reason for being. And the point I hope I have made, and I
think you have reinforced, is that Government shutdown
compromised the safety of our aviation--at least threatened to
compromise the safety of our aviation system. And it wasn't
until the air traffic controllers announced that they were
going to start slowing down the traffic at our airports that
this Government shutdown finally came to an end.
What you are telling me as well is that many projects that
Congress has asked for and you have initiated to make our air
traffic or our aviation system even safer have been delayed
because of this Government shutdown. This note--I said earlier
that the FAA has reportedly lowered its hiring targets for air
traffic controllers from 1,400 to 900. We received that
information from you. Is that the case?
Mr. Burleson. So, Senator, yes. The class size this time
went down. But again, in terms of what we need for filling
controllers overall in our overall target, it is not going to
have an appreciable impact.
But let me come back to you, Senator. I have to
fundamentally disagree. At no time in that 5 weeks was the
aviation system of the United States unsafe.
Senator Durbin. That is----
Mr. Burleson. We would not--sir, we would not have
allowed----
Senator Durbin [continuing]. Sir----
Mr. Burleson [continuing]. the operations----
Senator Durbin [continuing]. I didn't say that. And I think
it was not unsafe because air traffic controllers still on the
job were working long hours to try to make up the difference,
despite many of them facing the reality of no pay. And I can
tell you some specific stories of these air traffic controllers
that I met with and the sacrifices and pressure they were under
because of that shutdown.
I would like to believe that an air traffic controller is
working a normal shift, without that kind of pressure and
family pressure, with no paycheck, and doing their job and
doing it professionally. I don't think we made it any easier
with that Government shutdown. Let me just ask you point blank.
Do you? Do you think the Government shutdown made their job
easier?
Mr. Burleson. No, sir. It did not make our controllers' job
easier. It did not make our airport inspectors, nor our safety
folks--no one--it did not make it easier. All I want to say,
sir, is that because of the commitment--and this is what I said
in my statement. The men and women of the FAA have an amazing
commitment----
Senator Durbin. Thank goodness they do.
Mr. Burleson [continuing]. to the safety of the aviation
system. And this is what you see in that shutdown, that they
reported to work. They did their jobs as the Government sorted
out its issues between the Congress and the administration. Our
focus is not that. Our focus is making sure the system runs
safe every day for Americans.
Senator Durbin. If you could also give me a report on
secondary cockpit barrier progress, I would appreciate that.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
all for this hearing.
I am going to get right to the 737 MAX. And I think that,
Mr. Bahrami, this will mostly be for you.
It seems like every few months that we are learning
something new about the problem. First, it was the MCAS system
existed at all. We didn't know about that. It wasn't even
included in the pilot's manual.
Second, we learned that changes were made to the MCAS
system late in the design process that made the system more
powerful, allowing it to push the nose down much more
aggressively. Even so, this system relied on the single sensor
and had no redundancy.
Third, we learned that the FAA never performed its own
assessments of the system, and in fact, that had delegated much
of its oversight to the Boeing Company.
We are still in the position to be helpful. We want to be
helpful. We need to get these planes moving again. As I--last
count I have, 389 planes that have been grounded; 200 built and
not even delivered. So we are at 600 planes.
What does that do for the safety of the system right now if
we are running planes that should be timed out or maybe should
be grounded? Are we running planes longer than they should be
run since they are not being replaced? Are we losing a lot of
flights, which is a tremendous economic hurt to all areas of
the country?
Sir, I question basically our role as the Federal
oversight, making sure that the skies are safe, the planes that
are going in the skies are safe, people are trained properly,
the tach indicator, things of this sort. It is just
unbelievable that we got to this position, and we let them--I
am understanding it was driven by the industry who did not want
to go through the retraining process and try to save an awful
lot of money and time just making the transfer of a new plane
coming into the system.
So if you can talk to that, sir. I know you are over all of
this. I know you started out with 737 MAX. Then you went back
to the private sector. Then you came back to the FAA. So if you
can explain to me how we got to this position.
Mr. Bahrami. Thank you for the question. Sir, you have
multiple questions.
Senator Manchin. Yes.
Mr. Bahrami. And statements in there, and let us just put
things in the proper perspective.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Mr. Bahrami. Then I will defer to you to tell me where I
need to explain certain things more.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Bahrami. First of all, let me talk about myself. I have
40 years in aviation, all of it in large transport. All of it
in certification. And I was a designee of the company, and I
know what it is to be a designee. It is a badge of honor that
once the greatest safety organization in the world tells you
that you are trusted to do work on my behalf in terms of data
improvement, that is--that is probably the highlight of an
individual career.
So I would say that when we talk about delegation,
delegation is sound, and over the years we have been able to
improve it and get better at it by shifting from individual
designees to organizational delegation. And to the point that
we are today, it is supposed to be the most comprehensive, and
in terms of oversight, systems--system oversight. That is our
focus.
So I--the reason I did go to--there is a write-up on it. I
went back to industry. I come back. And I spent 25 years at the
FAA in charge of large transports in Seattle, was based in
Seattle.
Senator Manchin. If I can just direct, because time--I
know--if I can just go over a little bit. This was a complex
plane. Okay? You hung new engines on, you did a lot of
different things with a software system that wasn't even
mentioned in the pilot's manual. It wasn't even mentioned in
the pilot's manual, and yet the FAA agreed that pilots only
needed an hour of iPad training to get up to speed. That is
incomprehensible to me, to be in that position, when we did a
complete makeover, basically using the same air frame, but we
changed the whole dynamics of that plane to perform
differently.
Mr. Bahrami. The pilot training, that is a great question.
The pilot training decision is not made by one individual or
one inspector or pilot in the FAA. It is done through a process
which is called flight standardization board.
Senator Manchin. Is that under you all, the FAA?
Mr. Bahrami. Yes
Senator Manchin. Well, here is the other thing on that. The
biggest selling point for the MAX was that it would require
minimum pilot training, and Boeing promised Southwest millions
of dollars in rebates if the MAX required simulator training.
Mr. Bahrami. If I may?
Senator Manchin. You already basically eliminated simulator
training, didn't think it was needed, to basically adhere to
what Southwest demands were.
Mr. Bahrami. If I may finish.
Senator Manchin. Sure. I am sorry.
Mr. Bahrami. No, that is okay. What I wanted to point out
was that when we have a new design, whether it is a derivative
or a new model, the pilots, including line pilots, people for
the airline, they get together as part of this group and they
see what changes are made to the flight deck. They compared it
to the previous model. And then they go through the training
syllabus and make a decision whether--what type of training is
needed. It was the decision of that body that says that this
MCAS training, this computer-based training is sufficient.
I am not a pilot, but I can tell you that from human
factors perspective, you want to make sure you provide the
pilots with sufficient information to be able to control the
aircraft, but you don't want to overwhelm them with all kinds
of information that may not be relevant. An MCAS system was
supposed to be a system that works in the background, and it
should be transparent to the flight crews. That was the logic.
Now, knowing what we know today and what Acting
Administrator Elwell has said, we should have included more
description in the computer-based training in order to explain
what MCAS is and what it will do. So what we should be focusing
on--and I am going to do that, and that is what the team is
doing--is a better appreciation and understanding of system
safety assessment, ramifications of various failures and things
like that.
Senator Manchin. Are we doing investigations into this
agency that is supposed to have the oversight of the training?
I am a pilot. So the only thing I know is that I am flying IFR
and I think that I have got to override the autopilot, I have
got a couple switches to flip, and I am overriding my
autopilot. I mean, that is the first thing that I have learned.
When I go back to pilot training, the same thing. I am
being basically trained in case of an emergency. I already know
how to fly the plane. I want to know what happens if I have to
try to fly through an emergency.
Mr. Bahrami. That is right.
Senator Manchin. And for some reason, these two pilots, I
guess the foreign pilots had no idea they could turn the system
off?
Mr. Bahrami. Sir, thank you very much. That is a very
important point you are making.
In an age--in our business, in the business of safety, you
want to be focused on the issues that you need to focus on and
help things--make things better. I do not want to pass judgment
on the qualification of the pilots that were on those flights,
but I will say, a review of the flight data recorder and the
preliminary information and what we know, the actions they took
was inconsistent with what you would think.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say and I will wrap this up.
Mr. Bahrami. That was an issue, that we were----
Senator Manchin. Thank you for being so kind, Madam
Chairman, but I want to wrap up by saying this. We have relied
on the industry more than we should rely on the industry to do
the job that we should do to make sure that the American public
is safe.
I would say for the 737 MAX to get back into the air, every
Boeing official should be flying that plane for 1 month to make
sure that we have the confidence for a passenger to get back on
that plane. I am not getting on the 737 MAX until I see the
president of Boeing and all of his and her associates be on
that plane first and fly for any substantial time.
Mr. Bahrami [continuing]. We absolutely agree that it is
necessary for us to do everything we can to gain the confidence
of the flying public. And let me assure you that most of my
time at this point, talking to foreign authorities, talking
with the airlines' executives, talking to labor unions, is to
make sure that when we are there, all along they understand how
we got to where we are, and what we have done is the right
safety action.
Senator Collins. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bahrami. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
hearing, which is so important.
I would like to talk about a few things that are important,
not that these others aren't. You know, that is the nice thing
about having you all is we can talk about a variety of issues,
but some things that area really important to all of our
States. One of those is the contract tower program.
Mr. Burleson, I think it is one of the most successful
Government-industry partnerships that we have and, as you well
know, has a very strong bipartisan, bicameral support in
Congress. It is validated numerous times by the Department of
Transportation Inspector General. The program continues to
provide high-quality, cost-effective, and critical air traffic
control services to over 250 smaller airports throughout our
Nation's transportation system, including five in Arkansas.
Given the critical importance of contract towers to rural
Americans, smaller airports, what steps are the Department and
FAA taking to work collaboratively with industry to ensure the
continued success of rural airports that depend on our contract
towers?
Mr. Burleson. Senator, thank you for that question.
And FAA, we absolutely agree that this is an incredibly
important and efficient program in terms of providing air
traffic services to large parts of the county. Currently, we
have, I guess, in the President's budget going forward is $169
million is proposed for contract towers. From our assessment,
that appears to cover the existing contract towers in the
program, as well as it appears to cover what--the new
applicants that are coming our way.
In terms of the steps we have taken recently, in June of
this year, we reopened the application process for contract
towers, and we currently have, I believe, six new applicants,
sir, that are going through the process of review. We are
also--based on the congressional direction, we are doing all
the cost-benefit analyses that are required for both the new
entrants and the Cost Share towers. Those will be accomplished
by September of this year.
I know there is also an issue we are seeing in terms of
staffing challenges. Part of it is because a lot of the
controllers are now--we are recruiting them. It potentially is
creating some challenges for some of the vendors of contract
towers. So our air traffic organization is holding discussions
with them to see are there ways that we can try to address and
help in this area.
Senator Boozman. Very good. On April 9, 2018, the
Department of Transportation signed an MOU implementing
Executive Order 13807, also known as the One Federal Decision
Framework. The framework signals a continued emphasis by the
Trump administration on expediting infrastructure project
reviews by requiring improved coordination among all Federal
agencies within a single process.
Mr. Burleson, understanding this is a relatively new
framework, has the One Federal Decision had an impact on
streamlining approvals thus far?
Mr. Burleson. So, thank you for the question, Senator.
So, again, I would actually defer to Winsome Lenfert, who
is our Head of Airports, who has a lot more experience in the
environmental world and might be able to----
Senator Boozman. She looks like she knows the answer.
Mr. Burleson. She seems to know the answer, yes, sir.
Ms. Lenfert. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
And I would actually like to recognize that the Office of
Airports and the overall entire FAA has actually been working
very hard to streamline environmental processes for many years.
So we appreciate the executive order that was put in place. It
just increases the Government-wide emphasis on this
streamlining.
So we work very closely in doing a lot of planning up front
in a project and then working very closely with the airport
sponsor to ensure that we are implementing the environmental
requirements in the executive order. But we also have to strike
a balance in that, in that we make sure that we are following
our environmental due diligence in a thorough review of the
projects, while ensuring that we are implementing our
infrastructure projects.
Senator Boozman. Very good. So things are moving forward.
You are having some success. This is so important. We struggle
with the debt, the deficit. This is an area that actually would
save a lot of money. And we don't want to shortchange any of
the environmental considerations or anything else, the safety
considerations, but we do want to make sure that we work
together. Are there any improvements that we can help with as
far as helping you in that regard?
Ms. Lenfert. Not at this time. I think one of the things
that was approved in the recent reauthorization is Section 163,
which actually allows us to look at a project and make a
determination that there is minimal Federal impact required,
especially on non-aeronautical development on an airport. And
we have been very successful with this program. So far, there
have been about 25 different projects throughout the country
where we have had to do minimal review, and the airports are
going forward and putting the projects in place with minimal
environmental and Federal oversight.
Some of the projects example is in Lafayette, Indiana. They
were able to go forward and to put in an industrial research
park with minimal Federal oversight and environmental review.
Spokane, Washington, is also another one that we recently did.
Senator Boozman. Very good. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Administrator Bahrami, could you provide me with a--you
know, you and I had a conversation last week. I appreciate that
very much. As you know, we are working on some things at our
Northern Plains test site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and one
of those we work very hard on is Beyond Visual Line of Sight.
And so I am wondering, do you have a list of milestones or
specifics that we would need in order to approve the BVLOS, the
Beyond Visual Line of Sight, flights without chase planes?
I mean, have we gotten to those specifics that they need?
Because, as you know, we have worked on this very diligently,
put a tremendous amount of resources in place, and we need to
know what is required to finish that up so we are doing it on a
routine basis.
Mr. Bahrami. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
talk to you about this just recently. As I said on the phone
the other day, we have a very, very strong partnership with
North Dakota, the test site, and they are supporting us in so
many different ways, frankly, numerous projects.
As you know, they are engaged in the integration pilot
program. They are engaged in supporting us for Operation Beyond
Visual Line of Sight. They are also working on No Chase
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) currently with
General Atomics.
And as I committed to you, with respect to the Beyond
Visual Line of Sight, specifically the company with Excel
Energy, I committed to you that we will have this result and
changes made by end of this week. I was informed actually this
morning before I came here that we made progress, and we are
going to be communicating that to the test site. And they will
be--with this decision, they will be able to eliminate the
observers that was a costly aspect of that. That is one issue
that I was told this morning, which resolved the concern they
had.
With respect to the No Chase COA, the issue there is work
and coordination between several air traffic centers. And
today, there is a meeting that is taking place to talk about
that with the test site officials, and there will be the
follow-on discussion with General Atomics.
I guess what I am trying to point out is I will be happy to
provide you a list of all of the projects, but frankly, these
are the two most important ones that were both--that were
brought up, brought to our attention, and we have already taken
actions on those.
Senator Hoeven. That is good. The key is understanding what
they are and the timeline, and our people will work through it
with you. And I want to take the opportunity to thank not only
yourself, but Mr. Burleson and the others for the relationship
that we have with the FAA. And we are trying to keep these
things moving along, so we just want to make sure we understand
exactly what the requirements are and that we have some
timelines we can set to achieve them.
Mr. Bahrami. Sir, if I may say, one important thing in
honoring your partnership is to keeping commitments. I totally
understand that. And the appreciation of our mission, which is
safety, and making sure that we balance safety and innovation
appropriately. That is where we need the input and the data and
the expertise that the tech center will bring to us, and we
definitely welcome that.
Senator Hoeven. Okay. Thank you.
And then Ms. Stubblefield, thanks for traveling to see our
UAS operations. We appreciate that. I guess questions I would
have for you in regard to--when do you expect to complete the
current rulemaking process on remote identification for UAS?
Ms. Stubblefield. So, thank you for that question, Senator
Hoeven, and I very much appreciated the trip out to North
Dakota. It was very instructional to talk with the UAS test
site and the folks out there.
The remote identification rule is the top priority for the
FAA on UAS rulemaking. It is an extremely complex rule, and it
is a rule that requires not only the rule itself, but several
other pieces that we have been working on. So we are working
very hard to publish that rule this year.
But it is important to remember a couple of things as we
talk about probably some of your frustration with the timeline.
One is the fact that, up until October of last year, the FAA
did not have the authority over all UAS operators in the
airspace, and we are extremely grateful to Congress for
restoring the FAA's authority over all UAS operators, in
particular the recreational operators.
Before that time, we were struggling with putting together
a rule that really addressed what needs to occur in the
airspace with remote identification to take advantage of that
from the security perspective, the safety perspective, and
enabling integration. Once we had that authority, we were able
to move forward in really building out the rule.
But there are also two other facets that have to come
together to actually enable remote identification
implementation in the airspace. One is standards, and there are
several industry groups that the FAA is supporting in putting
together industry standards that will be necessary to execute
the rule. And then on top of that is the infrastructure piece.
So when that remote ID requirement is out there, how will that
information be transmitted? How will it be communicated to law
enforcement and other security partners?
That infrastructure has to be built out. And we have had an
RFI out on the street since December to get a cadre of industry
to start working on that. So the goal is, when the rule comes
out, we have the standards we need and the infrastructure in
place to execute those altogether.
And on top of that, we are also--in June, our Drone
Advisory Committee sought--or is seeking input on a 90-day
timeframe to have the DAC members, who are industry, State and
local law enforcement, State and local government, other
aviation industry players, coming together to talk about how we
can incentivize early equipage of remote identification so that
we can take advantage of that as quickly as possible.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you. Madam Chair, I do have some
additional questions. Are you going to have another round?
Senator Collins. We are. Thank you. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins and
Ranking Member Reed. I appreciate your work on this.
And before I ask my questions, I do want to note that my
top priority here is the safety of the flying community, and I
know FAA is working to resolve the many aviation safety
challenges we are currently facing, including the
recertification and oversight efforts that are ongoing with the
Boeing 737 MAX planes.
I understand the work of the multi-agency Technical
Advisory Board is well underway. I look forward to their
findings, as well as those of the FAA. And I would just ask all
of you to continue to work as transparently as possible to keep
members of Congress in the loop as new information becomes
available and developments occur so that we can prevent future
tragedies. I know this issue has already been talked about
here, so I won't ask any questions about it, I am following it
extremely closely.
The question I did want to ask today is the issue of sexual
assault on airplanes. This is an issue that I have been working
on for a long time because I heard from constituents who were
sexually assaulted during flights, and they experienced a
complete lack of information as to how to respond or who to
report to, what would happen next.
So both the fiscal year 2018 appropriations bill and the
FAA Reauthorization Act required DOT to work with relevant
Federal agencies and other stakeholders, including sexual
assault survivors themselves and representatives from the
flight attendants, airports, and air carriers, to establish a
task force that would address sexual misconduct on airplanes. I
am really glad the task force has started its work, and I hope
it will work with all of those stakeholders to recommend swift,
effective action.
But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Burleson, today, how is the
FAA working with DOT and the Office of the Secretary on this
task force?
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Senator, again, for raising this
question because this is a very important issue. Certainly no
one should be exposed to the risk of sexual assault taking a
flight.
Again, as you noted, Congress has set up provisions where
the Office of the Secretary is leading this effort. FAA is
cooperating with that task force. And again, we are really
waiting for the outcome of that task force to decide how we can
best adopt the recommendations, both in terms of both the
general prescriptions, as well as I know the Attorney General
is also working across Federal agencies to decide how best to
collect some of the metrics. So, again, we stand by to, based
on the recommendations that come out of that task force, to
figure out how best to adopt that in the aviation system.
Senator Murray. Okay. Well, I know that the FAA issues
regulations, advisory circulars, guidance to air carriers, all
related to cabin safety. So outside the task force and waiting
for a task force to complete its work, are you undertaking any
efforts at the FAA to deal with this issue?
Mr. Burleson. Senator, I know we have collected some basic
data to try to help provide information. But again, there has
been at least one meeting already of the task force. So, again,
I know it is working at pace, and so, again, we are waiting to
see what we can do.
Now, again, we take the normal--as flights happen in the
system, we, again, work very closely with the normal law
enforcement community as issues are reported to try to do as
much as we can to ensure that law enforcement officials meet
the plane, things are dealt with. But again, in terms of a
larger strategic effort, we are awaiting the recommendations of
the task force.
Senator Murray. Okay. Well, this is a critical issue, and
waiting means somebody is going to have an issue between now
and when a task force comes back. So I encourage you to keep
this top of mind.
Let me pivot quickly. There are seven contract towers in my
home State of Washington, and these towers, like all the other
250 contract towers in the country, support a wide array of
critical aviation operations, like scheduled passenger and
cargo airline service. They do Medevac, military. They do
aerial firefighting, aircraft manufacturing, corporate and
general aviation, just a wide range of things.
And I wanted to ask you, given the workforce challenge that
is confronting the aviation industry, including the hiring of
air traffic controllers into the FAA, I understand that many of
these contract controllers are being drawn from the contract
towers at rates high enough to cause challenges for the
contractors in the program. This has created a really growing
concern in the airports that they serve and have led to some
questions about whether contract towers will be actually fully
staffed. So I wanted to ask you what steps are being taken by
the FAA to work perhaps collaboratively with the contractors in
industry to make sure they have full staffing levels?
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Senator.
So as I had shared to an earlier question, we are very firm
supporters of the contract tower program, and this issue of
staffing has come up. Again, it is of concern to us. We want to
make sure that there are the right staffing available for
vendors that actually man these towers. So our air traffic
organization is actually having discussions to try to explore
what options we might have in terms of workforce.
Workforce generally is a very important issue for us. We
have taken a number of steps in the FAA to try to tackle this
broader issue of the aviation workforce going forward. You
probably have seen some of the reports that over the next 20
years, we need 600,000 pilots, probably almost equal amounts of
technicians. We need new kinds of skill sets.
So we held a summit last September with industry and
academia, unions, to start tackling this issue. FAA has formed
a task force inside the agency, and we are really working to
try to figure out how do we expand the pipeline of interesting
the next men and women in aviation careers, how do we target
the right kinds of proficiency and skills in the training
process, and how do we partner with both education and industry
to try to make aviation careers attractive? So we are working
very hard at this.
Senator Murray. So you have a task force. Are you going to
bring recommendations to us? Is there policy things or funding
things we need to be focused on?
Mr. Burleson. We are, at this point, that is actually part
of what we are working through in terms of how best to do some
of these activities. We will have going forward, I suspect we
will have some recommendations. At this point, we are doing a
lot of assessment of how best to deal with some of these issues
in terms of pipelines, proficiencies and partnership.
But again, this is a very top priority because, again, the
heart of aviation being successful in America really has relied
on the workforce, whether it is working for us in the FAA or
with industry. So, again, we see this as critical, both for the
vitality, as well as the safety of the system.
Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that and look forward to
your recommendations, hopefully sooner rather than later.
Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Bahrami, I want to follow up on the line of questioning
that I began in the first round. I would ask that you bring
your mike a little bit closer to you so that we may hear you
more clearly.
The New York Times story that I mentioned asserted that at
one point in the certification process, FAA managers conceded
that the MAX did not meet agency guidelines for protecting
flight controls. But then the FAA considered whether any
requested changes would interfere with Boeing's timeline, and
FAA managers wrote that, ``It would be impractical at this late
point in the program for the company to resolve the issue.''
I have two questions for you. First, is that accurate? And
second, should FAA managers and engineers be concerned about
Boeing's production timeline when making decisions that are
related to safety?
Mr. Bahrami. First of all, that is not correct. In every
certification program, there is debate, dialogue exchange, with
respect to compliance with the specific regulations. As you
know, some regulations are very prescriptive. Frankly, those
are the easy ones to find compliance to because it is either
this or not.
There are others that are very subjective. And in some
cases, those regulations often are debated and discussed
tremendously in a period of a 1-year, 2-year timeframe. And I
have seen in my career certifying programs like 787, Airbus
A380 and others since 777, I have seen those situations occur.
That is why we put in place processes. That is why we put a
process where we get the appropriate people get together,
discuss the facts and information.
In that particular case that you are referring to, there
were prior discussions as part of the process that the
documentation of that particular action was taken. Several
folks were not happy with that. That issue, again, was elevated
and went through a prototype process that we put in place. And
after that, based on all the data, managers made the decision,
and the decision that was made, it was not necessarily to the
liking of one or two individuals.
Frankly, that is what I get paid for. That is what managers
get paid for: To look at the data, fact, and information and
make the decisions, and those are very tough issues that we
need to deal with. In my view, the process was followed, and I
would definitely look forward to all these different reviews
that are being conducted, for them to take a look at it again
to see if we could have done anything differently or there are
areas that there are shortcomings in.
Senator Collins. So is your testimony that pressure from a
manufacturer to meet its deadlines for production has no impact
at all on the decisions that you make with regard to safety?
Mr. Bahrami. When it comes to safety, absolutely. Safety is
number one. That is what we focus on.
Senator Collins. Well, let me follow up on Senator Reed's
question about the article in the Wall Street Journal this
morning. According to this press account, after the Ethiopian
Air crash, FAA's internal analysis found that the underlying
risks of the MCAS were unacceptably high, and that they
exceeded internal FAA safety standards.
Now, in the past when FAA has found that an aircraft poses
an unacceptably high safety risk, it has mandated equipment
changes, inspections, or training. But in this case, what FAA
appears to have done is simply to issue a reminder to pilots on
how to respond to an MCAS malfunction, and FAA gave Boeing many
months to fix the underlying issue. What troubles me about this
is, if the agency's own analysis found MCAS to be an
unacceptable risk, why did the FAA not take immediate action to
address those risks?
Mr. Bahrami. So I just want to make sure, just a
clarification. The discussion that we had was concerning the
events after the Lion Air, not the Ethiopian Airlines.
Ethiopian Airlines, we understand what happened in that case,
and shortly after we get the facts and data and information, we
grounded the fleet.
On the Lion Air situation, when you say a reminder and
notifications to the pilots or air flight crews, we do that
through airworthiness directives. Airworthiness directives are
laws. They are not just reminders. They have to comply with
that.
And typically what happens in case of a procedure or a
change or focus on a particular process, a copy of the
airworthiness directive actually put in, in the flight book for
the pilot, so they know that this is something they need to be
mindful of. So it is not just a notification be aware this is
an issue, it is there for them to act upon should they
encounter that issue.
So that was an interim action. We knew that eventual
solution would be to have the modification, and based on our
risk assessment, we felt that we have sufficient time to be
able to do the modification, you know, and get the final fix,
what that means, typically, when we have refer to it as closing
action. Closing action basically eliminates all the interim
actions, removes that particular piece of paper from the flight
manual, and then the MCAS modifications are incorporated. So
those processes are what we use, and we did the same in this
particular case.
Senator Collins. Of course, and I will yield to Senator
Reed, but one issue here, which Senator Manchin mentioned, is
that MCAS wasn't in the original manual, which seems very
strange.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Ms. Chairman.
Mr. Burleson, you are aware that the Department of
Transportation IG is conducting a review of certain air
carriers' management and maintenance programs, and we
understand that they have developed a systemic concern that FAA
is transitioning from a strategy that emphasized enforcement to
one that is more relaxed in terms of compliance. And they have
also indicated that questions arose about the agency's ability
to effectively document maintenance issues and identify
persistent problems with trends over time as a result of this
new approach.
And as I indicated in my opening statement, they contend
FAA guidance even allows inspectors to close out compliance
actions without ensuring that corrective action has been
implemented and is effective.
Given all these comments, can you explain how the FAA is
mitigating safety risks and holding air carriers accountable to
appropriately maintain the fleet with this sort of relaxed
approach?
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
And what I would like to do is set a larger historical
context and then let my colleague, Mr. Bahrami, talk
specifically about the maintenance issues with the IG report.
So, again, where we have arrived today in the compliance
program is all about how do we identify risk and deal with
safety proactively. And again, it is not a matter of relaxed
enforcement. We still take enforcement, if you cannot meet the
standards, if you cannot comply to our safe operation, we will
take appropriate action. And again, this was a process that has
been developed over two decades.
Again, I have been so long at the FAA, I remember back in
the '90s when we were facing significant challenge with the
growth of air traffic and the accident rates we were facing,
potentially, we were going to face worldwide an accident every
other week. And so this clearly wasn't going to be acceptable
for the aviation industry. So we had to find a different
approach.
And so this is what has developed the whole process of
working closely, more closely, to provide information from
industry. In fact, Congress was a critical part of that, of
setting up the voluntary reporting system. So this is how we
have developed in the commercial aviation safety team this
process of being able to access information that before wasn't
disclosed to us and to be able to take action toward
compliance. Now, again, that doesn't mean we don't do
enforcement when there is egregious or criminal behavior.
So, again, I think when you look at the results in the last
two decades and see where we were in accident rates in the `90s
versus where we are today as we said earlier, we had one
fatality over 10 years, 90 million flights, 7 billion
passengers. That is quite extraordinary.
So I would say the approach we started in the '90s and
gradually developed has been successful. That said, it doesn't
mean that there are not improvements. And again, we continue to
try to work, and certainly the IG, we appreciate his input in
terms of the program on the maintenance. And let me turn to Mr.
Bahrami so he can elucidate there.
Mr. Bahrami. I just want to give you a number, and that
number is 23,000. And from 2015, when the compliance program
went into effect, until recently, those are the number of
compliance actions that have been identified and corrected in
the system. I can assure you that it is virtually impossible
for any audit to be able to get to that many number of findings
throughout the system because no matter what we do, we go out
and look at areas that we have traditionally had problems.
If you look at the iceberg analogy, what we did in the
past, we only saw the tip of the iceberg. That was regulatory
area and audits. What we are doing with the compliance program,
we are actually getting below the waterline, and we are getting
into areas that we have not necessarily been able to get into
or do not have the knowledge to be able to understand because a
lot of those issues come through operational understanding and
the details of operation. So I believe that our compliance
program has been very effective and will continue to be
effective.
And the other point that I want to point out, I am very
thankful for the recommendations that came from the IG. And in
fact, GAO is also conducting a review of the effectiveness of
the compliance program. An area that you mentioned, which is
follow-through of the closure action, documentation of that,
that is an area of focus. In fact, we are revisiting our
training in that area because in certain sectors of aviation,
specifically GA, we have to do some work and get better.
Senator Reed. And I think the committee would be well-
informed if you could get back to us when the report is
official, indicating what corrective action you have taken in
response and any issues you have. Because, again, when it comes
to safety, I don't have to remind this panel, you can't do
enough.
And I just want to thank Ms. Stubblefield and Ms. Lenfert.
Ms. Lenfert, thank you for your help at T.F. Green Airport. And
as you have learned, good work is rewarded by more work. We
will be back.
Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Capito.
Senator Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to thank
you all. I apologize for coming in early and then having to
leave. We had a markup in Commerce Committee, and I was unable
to hear all of your statements. So I apologize for that.
I first want to begin with a thank-you to the FAA. We had
an issue with our EMAS, which is our emergency system at Yeager
Airport. I see some nodding heads in Charleston, West Virginia.
We had a hillside collapse in 2015, which wiped out our
emergency runway overrun area, and we actually had to do
literally an act of Congress so that we were able to secure the
grants to replace. We just had the final ribbon cutting of the
final EMAS, which will allow for a lot of safety issues.
If you have flown into Yeager, you know it is right on the
top of three mountains, actually. And having that safety stop
there, overrun area, is critically important for us to have
bigger planes coming in. And so I just want to thank you all
for all the work that you did with our offices to make sure
that happened, and with our local county commission and our
airport board.
I do want to ask a question, and since I missed a lot of
the testimony, I apologize if this has already been covered.
But in the last hearing on the Commerce Committee on March
27th, I asked about pilot training and the airworthiness
directive that was issued between the Lion Air and Ethiopian
Air airline crashes. I guess I am surmising that recent reports
have noticed that more stringent simulator testing has helped
to identify a separate software issue.
And maybe this isn't the best forum to ask this question,
but hindsight is always really great. If you look at what you
did after the Lion Air crash and then what you have done
subsequent, after this subsequent crash, after Ethiopian, would
more simulator training or more simulator exercises after Lion
Air been able to have been--shown some of these things to
light? So I am just kind of throwing that question out because
I have always wondered. Two is different than one, and if you
had been more aggressive and gone all out after the first
crash, would we have had maybe some better information?
Mr. Bahrami. Thank you for that question, Senator.
First, I want to go back to your comment about it was true
the simulator flight tests or testing was that we found out
these other anomalies or shortcomings in the design. That is
not correct. Let me tell you why.
What happened was, through the system safety assessment,
and because of the accident and the thorough work that we are
doing today, including three other authorities--we have got
Europeans, we have got Canadians, and we have got Brazilian
colleagues supporting us in this review. And based on the data
from the preliminary accident reports, we recognize that some
of the actions that those flight crews took was inconsistent
with what we assumed would be the appropriate action, which
becomes a function of airmanship and air monitoring.
What happened recently, what you read about, was that we
identified a very remote failure case. And at that time, we
said, you know, knowing what we know, we really need to go back
and see if this occurs, can flight crews recover? And that is
how we ended up going into the simulator, to model that
particular scenario and see how the pilots react.
Once we did that, we recognized, and it was the decision by
our test pilots, that the level of proficiency that is required
for this to recover from this event is exceptional. And because
of that, we could not leave the decision, to leave it as is and
don't make the changes. That is why we made the design changes,
why the software changes are being incorporated.
So the simulator was not the one that identified the issue.
It was the actual system safety assessment that identified a
vulnerability that we had to verify as part of our flight
simulator testing.
Senator Capito. So then it goes into the simulator as a
scenario.
Mr. Bahrami. That is correct. So we run it in the
engineering simulator. And the difference between the regular
training simulator and engineering simulator, on the
engineering case, you have the flexibility to actually change
certain systems, where you can't do it in a regular simulator
for training. So we have a lot of latitude in there, and we
exercise those latitude engineering cab and we will be able to
do this. So I would say that the decision to verify the
assumption was based on the information we gathered from the
two accidents.
Senator Capito. Thank you.
Mr. Bahrami. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Senator Boozman, do you have
any further questions?
Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I had a couple more questions that I wanted to follow up on
with Ms. Lenfert regarding some of our airports. In 2004, the
FAA was scheduled to upgrade the ASR-8 in Bismarck to the
digital ASR-11. However, that didn't happen. But the City of
Bismarck wants to move forward with commercial development
close to the airport, and so they need help in terms of
relocating the existing radar to a suitable location that will
allow for commercial development around the airport.
So I know you are not purchasing more of the digital ASR-11
radar systems, but will you work with us and the City of
Bismarck and the Bismarck Airport in order to accommodate that
commercial growth and expansion?
Ms. Lenfert. So on that particular subject, Senator, Mr.
Burleson would probably be better to handle that. That is
actually air traffic organization.
Senator Hoeven. Okay. Well, then I will direct the traffic
to Administrator Burleson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burleson. Thank you, Senator.
So, again, we understand the desire to move the ASR-8, and
as you said, we have some challenges because that system is no
longer even being produced. We at one time thought about
replacing it with the ASR-11. The needs have changed.
Now again, if the airport is interested in moving it, we
have a number of agreements across the country, which we have
entered into with airport authorities where, since we don't
have an operational need, we really can't pay for it. But if
the airport is interested, we are more than willing to work
with the airport if they are willing to pay for the move.
It will create a bit of a challenge with a temporary radar,
but I have talked to our air traffic folks. They are willing to
explore options of how there is a willingness to pay for the
move, a right site found, to try to work out a temporary
solution for the radar while we move the ASR-8.
Senator Hoeven. Okay. Thank you.
At the University of North Dakota, we have a large flight
training school, as you know, so that is actually one of the 25
busiest airports in the country--people don't realize it
because they have more than 100 aircraft at the university
there. And UND students flew over 100,000 hours at the airport
last year alone.
So they have a master plan that they are working on, and I
want to know that if the FAA will continue to work with the
Grand Forks Airport to continue to ensure that the airport's
master plan is finalized and that the expansion project that
they are undertaking is green lit so that they can continue to
not only conduct the existing flights, but to grow. Ms.
Lenfert, is this one you want to take?
Ms. Lenfert. Yes. I can take this one, absolutely.
Senator Hoeven. Great.
Ms. Lenfert. Thank you for the question, Senator.
We are actually working very closely with the Grand Forks
Airport, and actually, I am very familiar with this project. I
recently met with the airport director and representatives from
the University of North Dakota, and we went through the whole
project from beginning to end. We are working very closely with
them on their master plan, and we hope to have their airport
layout plan signed and approved in August.
Senator Hoeven. Oh, that is good.
Ms. Lenfert. So, hopefully, next month.
Senator Hoeven. That is pretty quick.
Ms. Lenfert. Yeah.
Senator Hoeven. Alrighty then.
Ms. Lenfert. They have been doing their homework.
Senator Capito. That is tomorrow.
Senator Hoeven. Yeah. Tomorrow is good.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Lenfert. So we hope. We are getting close. And then we
will be working with them closely to develop an environmental
review once the ALP and master plan is approved. And then we
will be working with them on a potential funding plan once we
get through the environmental.
Senator Hoeven. Well, I am glad I directed that question to
you. How about the air traffic control tower? That is part of
it, too.
Ms. Lenfert. So I believe that we are going to start the
design on the air traffic control tower in August, and then
once the design is complete, we will be looking for further
funding for the actual construction after that point.
Senator Hoeven. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
We are going to do one final round of questions. I know
Senator Capito has one that she would like to ask right now
before she leaves.
Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you.
I just had one additional question, and it is a little bit
along the lines of what Senator Hoeven was talking about. We
have two schools at Fairmont State and Marshall, which have
aviation schools. I guess they are called the CTI Schools,
Collegiate Training Initiative.
In our ATC Hiring Reform Act, we did say that you could
hire out of giving prioritization to graduates of these schools
for air traffic controllers. What is the FAA doing--because we
always hear about the pilot shortage and how difficult that is?
What are you doing to help schools either stand up these
college training initiatives or what kind of, in general, help
can we do to address this challenge through our aviation
schools that are just beginning?
Mr. Burleson. So, Senator, thank you for the question.
Again, controllers are vital to the workforce, and we
actually have had staff talking with Congress on the act
legislation. And we do think--we certainly want to cooperate
with you because we do think it could be helpful.
I think you missed earlier. I made some remarks, to just
frame a larger issue, that the aviation workforce broadly
across not just controllers, but pilots, technicians, we are
very concerned.
Senator Capito. I was talking more about the pilots, yea,
so go ahead.
Mr. Burleson. So, the pilots--we are very concerned about
the future workforce. We are taking a number of steps to work
to try to broaden the pipeline of young people into the
workforce, as well as improve proficiency and training, as well
as cooperate with education institutions like you were citing.
We are working very diligently to try to lay out
frameworks. Our regional administrators have been doing a lot
of outreach recently. We have I think we have increased almost
four-fold the number of activities locally to try to encourage
future aviation professionals. So, again, we are very
interested in this area and certainly we would be glad to talk
with you and your staff as a follow-up.
Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
I am going to switch now just quickly to two issues that
affect the State of Maine. And Ms. Lenfert, this question is
for you.
At the budget hearing with Senator Chao in March, I
described an accident that occurred at an airport in Presque
Isle, Maine, in northern Maine, where a commuter airplane hit
the ground, bounced numerous times, injured three individuals,
terrified everyone on the plane, and the plane itself sustained
substantial damage. And the Secretary committed with us to
working to improve the safety at the airport.
I know that you have been instrumental in helping the
airport to secure some funds for better snow removal equipment.
But we have a problem when you have a severe weather condition
in a small airport like this. So could you provide us with an
update on what else FAA is exploring to improve the safety of
this regional airport?
Ms. Lenfert. Thank you, Senator, for that important
question.
To note, to follow up on your request for Secretary Chao,
the FAA has, in fact, made satellite-based procedures available
at the airport. And so we are also currently continuing our
investigation of this particular accident and looking and
working with our air traffic partners, working with the actual
operators, the NTSB, and other parts of the FAA to determine
what were all of the causal factors in this particular
accident. As you know, it is normally not just one particular
incident that causes the accident.
In the meantime, we are actually preparing to working with
the airport to prepare them for this upcoming winter season. As
you mentioned, we worked with them to procure additional snow
removal equipment, as well as work with them on their aircraft
rescue and firefighting. Once the final investigation is
completed, we will continue to work with them, as we do all
airports, to ensure that they have a safe and efficient
operation.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, and thank you for
your assistance in that matter.
Mr. Burleson if this question shouldn't be directed to you,
feel free to pass it off to one of your colleagues. I am
hearing a lot of complaints from my constituents in South
Portland about increased noise from aircraft landing above
their homes at night, often just 600 to 1,000 feet above their
homes. While most aircraft use the harbor visual approach over
Casco Bay during the daytime, they cannot rely on visual ground
references at nighttime. And instead, they have to fly directly
over the city of South Portland.
The Portland Jetport has submitted to the FAA a request for
a new Required Navigational Performance, or RNP, approach to
provide another option for incoming flights that would
approximate the harbor visual route at nighttime. Now, the FAA
claims that very few of the aircraft coming into Portland have
the proper equipment to be able to use an RNP. However,
according to the airport director, if you take into
consideration the fact that only commercial aircraft are
causing the noise complaints at night, more than 21 percent of
the aircraft would be able to use this new approach.
I am seeking from you a commitment to take a hard look at
this and to consider working with the Portland Jetport to get
the RNP approach approved as quickly as possible, or if that is
not the right answer, help us come up with the right answer to
deal with this noise problem for the residents of South
Portland.
Mr. Burleson. Senator, I am glad to make that commitment.
Again, I was provided the same information, that only about 8
percent of the aircraft are capable of an RNP approach. I will
say, I understand that our air traffic folks have gone back to
the noise roundtable with another proposal, which is to
potentially change some waypoints on the existing procedures to
see if that might also help address noise, given the problem of
equipage.
But again, we recognize aircraft noise can be a
considerable problem with local communities. We certainly are
taking a lot of steps nationally to increasing technology
insertion into the fleets, better community roundtables, trying
to take advantage of some of the NextGen technologies to reduce
noise. So, again, I am glad to commit to work with the
roundtable to see what might be possible.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I really appreciate that. And
as I said, the jetport tells me that when you look at the fact
that it is the commercial aircraft that are creating the noise,
that the number who could use this new approach is actually 21
percent. So that could make a significant difference. But you
have a lot of expertise in this area, and I very much
appreciate your commitment to work with the community and with
the jetport.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. I simply want to point out, Madam Chairman,
that on the way to Portland, you can stop in Providence, Rhode
Island, at T.F. Green International Airport, and whatever you
can do, we would appreciate it very much. But again, thank you,
Ms. Lenfert, for your help, and Madam, thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Ms. Stubblefield, I don't want you to feel that I neglected
you, so I will be certain to submit several questions to the
record for you on drones and the integration of them into the
airspace, and also the issue of counter drones and why FAA is
not enthusiastic about that approach, or so it appears. But we
will do that, and I know that Senator Reed will also have some
additional questions for the record.
I want to thank each of you for being here today. I want to
follow up on a comment that Senator Durbin made earlier about
the Government shutdown, and I want to applaud the work of the
FAA during the shutdown. That was an extremely difficult period
of time, and the FAA really rose to the challenge, and so I
want to thank you for that.
The FAA did not cause the shutdown. The shutdown never
should have occurred. Shutdowns never produce good results, and
they are never worthwhile. And I, for one, appreciate how hard
your agency worked to get us through that very difficult
period.
I know that it did set back one of the contracts for the
NextGen by I believe around 7 months, and that is the unseen
consequences. Those are the unseen consequences of Government
shutdowns is that it prevents agencies from going forward with
needed projects. And the irony is, we end up spending more in
many cases than if Government had remained open. So I just
wanted to add my comment on that.
I do appreciate each of you being here today and candidly
answering our questions. We are going to know more after the
investigations are finished. I know that you are committed to
finding out exactly what happened with the MAX and making sure
that we have procedures and the staff and the resources in
place to try to prevent such an accident from ever happening
again and claiming not only 346 lives, but also causing
tremendous heartache for the families and friends of those who
were killed.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Collins. This hearing record will remain open until
next Friday, August 9th, and the hearing is now adjourned.
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
airport improvement grants
Question. As I mentioned in my opening statement, this committee
has provided $1.5 billion in supplemental AIP funding over the last 2
years. We directed the FAA to give priority consideration to small and
rural airports in making awards, and the FAA has already awarded $1
billion of this funding to critical airport infrastructure projects
across the country. In Maine, this funding has been beneficial to
several airports, and I am particularly proud of the runway extension
project in Rangeley, Maine that will allow increased access to
aeromedical services in rural Maine. However, we have a similar project
in Jackman, Maine, where the local airport needs additional funding to
extend their runway.
Ms. Lenfert, can you tell us the status of the FAA's work with
Jackman's runway extension project?
Answer. The town of Jackman is completing the environmental work
required for permitting a proposed runway extension. The Environmental
Assessment is expected to be completed by early Fall 2019. They are
also refining the scope of the runway reconstruction that will use the
funds we identified from the fiscal year 2018 Supplemental
Appropriations.
Question. My understanding is that there were nearly eight times as
many applications as available funding for the supplemental AIP.
Ms. Lenfert, can you tell us what criteria the FAA used to award
the limited funding?
Answer. The FAA carefully considered the congressional direction in
the 2018 appropriations legislation. This included the requirement to
give ``Priority Consideration'' to certain types of airports (generally
smaller and non-primary airports), as well as the 100 percent Federal
share for non-primary airports. Congress also gave us more than 2 years
to fully obligate the funds. This unprecedented combination of factors
meant that many airports could request funding for projects that they
would not have normally considered pursuing--and in many cases that
included projects for which the airports had not yet completed the
necessary planning, environmental review, engineering design, etc. The
FAA still had to apply the usual criteria of eligibility,
justification, and National Priority Ranking, as well as the airport's
ability to implement the project in a timely manner.
Question. As you know, airports like Jackman are eager to receive
the remaining funding.
What is the timing of awarding the $500 million from fiscal year
2019 to the airports?
Answer. We anticipate announcing the fiscal year 2019 supplemental
discretionary grants by the end of fiscal year 2019. The FAA
anticipates being able to start awarding some of the grants late in
fiscal year 2019, with the remainder being issued throughout fiscal
year 2020 and 2021 (when the selected airports have completed the
remaining steps necessary to be able accept the grants).
uas integration
Question. The integration of UAS, or drones, into our national
airspace remains a challenge, particularly with the accelerating pace
of technology development. What is particularly concerning are the
growing use of drones operating near unauthorized locations such as
airports. The FAA receives about 100 such reports every month, and has
the authority to issue fines and criminal charges for unauthorized
drone operators. However, FAA recently sent a letter to the airports
saying that the agency does not support the use of counter UAS systems
to detect and interdict unauthorized drones.
Ms. Stubblefield, why is the FAA is not supportive of airports
developing counter UAS systems at this time?
Answer. We appreciate the level of focus that Congress has brought
to this issue, including the provisions of section 383 in the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018. The FAA understands that many airports
have safety and security concerns with regard to the errant or
malicious use of UAS on and around airports, and is taking steps to
address them. Counter UAS (C-UAS) technologies implicate an assortment
of laws, many of which are not within the FAA's jurisdiction. In
addition, the FAA is exploring the possible unintended consequences of
using detection or C-UAS technologies near airports. The FAA is
coordinating with government partners and industry to properly address
these concerns.
On May 7, 2019, the FAA sent a letter to more than 500 U.S. airport
sponsors explaining the agency's approach to the use of UAS detection
and mitigation systems and some of the legal and operational issues
involved. We also posted this letter on our website. The FAA continues
to work closely with airports that are considering installing UAS
detection systems or have already installed such systems on or near
their airports. The agency expects to supplement this information with
additional information related to UAS detection system coordination as
we refine our processes and procedures for safe UAS detection system
use at or around airports. The use of certain detection and any C-UAS
mitigation systems in the United States is currently restricted by
Federal criminal laws without express congressional authorization,
which has only been granted to four Federal Departments for specific
covered facilities, missions, and assets.
In the May 2019 correspondence, the FAA also provided information
regarding some areas of Federal law prohibiting the use of certain
detection and any C-UAS (mitigation) technologies at or around
airports. These systems could introduce unwarranted safety risks to the
Nation's aviation system by interfering with aircraft equipment and air
navigation services infrastructure; disrupting targeted as well as
legitimate drone operations leading to hazardous flight behavior; and
prompting operational responses that may not be adequately risk-based
and coordinated. The FAA has been working closely with the Federal
Departments--Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of
Justice, Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Energy--which
Congress granted explicit authority to use C-UAS systems. The
requirements for close coordination and collaboration with the FAA in
those statutory grants of authority underscore the need to sustain the
safety of our National Airspace System through carefully considered and
coordinated actions. The FAA does not see a viable way for the risk
analysis and mitigation work being carried out by the FAA and the
authorized Federal Departments to be replicated across public airports
in the foreseeable future without introducing unacceptable safety
consequences. It is worth noting that airports have available to them
other means of mitigating risks posed by errant and malicious UAS
activity. For instance, the combined use of UAS detection capabilities,
coordinated response plans for UAS incidents, as well as the
development of incident-specific C-UAS plans with our Federal security
partners, may prove to be effective strategies to mitigate the risk
posed to airports by errant and malicious UAS activity.
Question. It's my understanding that there are already FCC-licensed
radar technologies that airports would like to use, but do not have
clear guidance from the FAA on whether they are permissible or not.
Can we get your commitment that the FAA will provide clear guidance
on the use of these technologies to detect unauthorized drone
operations?
Answer. Entities seeking to evaluate or deploy UAS detection
systems should be aware of legal considerations around such systems,
even systems that are marketed as passive detection systems may
implicate provisions of law (such as title 18 of the United States
Code) on which the FAA cannot authoritatively opine. Therefore, the FAA
cannot confirm the legality of any UAS detection system. An entity
considering installation of a UAS detection system may wish to seek
system-specific and site-specific guidance from its legal counsel and/
or the appropriate authorities in considering Federal, state, and local
laws.
The FAA is working with airports, as well as key industry
associations, including the American Association of Airport Executives
and Airports Council International-North America, to ensure compliance
with the FAA's requirements on the installation of equipment, such as a
radar system or similar technology, as well as to mitigate safety
concerns with the installation of a detection system. It should be
noted that radar systems cannot have national spectrum licensing
approval, as approvals are site-specific. Licensing through FCC
approval and in coordination with FAA's Spectrum Office is required for
each site. The FAA is committed to expanding on those established
processes to clarify how UAS detection systems may be installed and
used at airports without undue, unacceptable safety and efficiency
impacts to the Nation's aviation system. The publication of information
on the FAA's website on May 7, 2019 is part of the FAA's effort to
provide clarifying information. As stated above, the agency expects to
supplement this publication with additional information related to UAS
detection system coordination as we refine our processes and procedures
for safe UAS detection system use at or around airports.
Question. In two specific incidents at Gatwick last year and in
Newark this year, pilots reported drones flying near their planes, but
the existence of these unauthorized drones were never confirmed.
What guidance is the FAA providing to pilots so they can better
identify and avoid drones?
Answer. The agency provides pilots with several resources to better
prepare and assist them in identifying and avoiding drone activity in
an effort to reduce potential flight hazards and safety risks. These
resources include:
--Notices to Airmen that notify pilots of potential hazards along a
flight route or at a location that could affect the safety of
the flight to include known drone operations;
--Alerts by Air Traffic Control (ATC) that notify pilots of
potentially hazardous drone activity;
--Ongoing development of geospatial maps that depict areas where
recreational drone operators may be flying; and
--The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, which is the FAA's
official guide to basic flight information and ATC procedures,
and includes a section on drones that highlights several
factors for pilots to consider in an effort to reduce potential
flight hazards.
In addition, the FAA's regulations require drone operators to yield
the right of way to all other aircraft, airborne vehicles, and launch
and reentry vehicles. Yielding the right of way means the drone
operator must give way to the aircraft or vehicle and may not pass
over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. The regulations also
prohibit the drone operator from operating so close to another aircraft
as to create a collision hazard. The FAA has provided guidance to drone
operators on yielding the right of way and on avoiding interference
with manned aircraft operations. This guidance is contained in Advisory
Circular No. 107-2, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS).
The FAA is also working on a notice of proposed rulemaking for the
remote identification of UAS flying in the national airspace. Remote
identification will enhance safety, security, and privacy while serving
as an important tool in responding to illegal and unauthorized drone
operations. The FAA considers this technology essential for the safe
integration of UAS into the national airspace system.
uas traffic management
Question. The FAA is currently working to safely integrate drones
into the national airspace through the UAS traffic management system,
or UTM This approach is similar to how the FAA controls the airspace
through air traffic control.
Ms. Stubblefield, can you explain what level of control the FAA
will have over drone operations through the UTM?
Answer. The FAA works as both the regulator and Air Navigation
Service Provider (ANSP) for the National Airspace System (NAS). The
regulatory side of the FAA will maintain safety oversight over all
aircraft operations through operational regulations. The Air Traffic
Organization (ATO), as the ANSP, will continue to provide select
services to ensure safety and efficiency in the NAS. We do not expect
to control small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at low altitudes as we
do for manned aircraft. In airspace where ATO does not actively provide
separation services to UAS, UAS Traffic Management (UTM) will allow
airspace users to cooperatively manage their operations based on
specific principles of operation identified in FAA policy and
requirements. These principles will ensure interoperability through
industry standards while supporting industry innovation, allowing
technology and automation-driven solutions to lead the way. Currently,
in controlled airspace, UTM operators, where authorized, cooperatively
manage their operations; however, the ATO maintains its authority over
the airspace and can intervene as necessary.
Question. Last year, Sec. Chao announced the formation of a UAS
Integration Pilot Program, which has now been on-going for over a year.
What has the FAA learned from the IPP that will be useful in the
development of the UTM?
Answer. Through the UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP), we
continue to engage in meaningful dialogue with local and national
governments and the UAS industry on issues related to drone
integration.
IPP participants are gathering data on radio frequency transmission
capabilities from handheld radios and cellular networks. This
information will be used to inform UTM communication requirements,
specifically the capabilities and limitations associated with the
transmission of data between unmanned aircraft, operators, and UAS
Service Suppliers (USS). This data also enables the development of
testing requirements and performance-based standards that will be used
broadly across the UAS regulatory community.
On a broader note, through our work with IPP partners we have
learned that public engagement will be critical for routine operations,
especially those enabled by UTM solutions. We have also observed that
there is an overall positive sense toward integrating drones into
communities. Societal acceptance will be predicated on the public
expectation for safety in these new types of operations, just as in the
airline industry. Working together, we can accelerate the development
of the UTM ecosystem and usher in the necessary social transformation.
Question. Ms. Stubblefield, can you tell us what specific FAA
programs in the budget request are critical to further your work on
drones and establishment of the UTM?
Answer. Several programs in the fiscal year 2020 President's budget
request are critical to further our work on drones and establish UTM.
In the Facilities and Equipment account, the budget request includes
$68.4 million under the heading ``NextGen--Unmanned Aircraft Systems''
and another $58.4 million under the heading ``Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) Implementation.'' In addition, the budget request includes $7.5
million for ``Unmanned Aircraft System Research'' in the Research,
Engineering and Development account.
cybersecurity
Question. In February, Sen. Reed and I asked the GAO to conduct an
assessment of cybersecurity risks associated with certification of
aircraft avionics. GAO's assessment is currently underway, but I think
it is important to know what the FAA is doing today on this issue.
I would like to ask each of the panelists, what efforts is the FAA
already undertaking to reduce its cybersecurity vulnerabilities?
Answer. The FAA requires the applicant and/or manufacturer of
transport category airplanes to ensure critical systems are protected
against unauthorized intentional electronic interaction. As part of the
certification process, applicants perform a security risk assessment
and show the FAA how they are mitigating the identified risks or
reducing the risks to an acceptable level. The FAA must agree that the
applicant's assessment and mitigations are adequate. Examples of
mitigations are physical control of maintenance, system separation,
system error recognition, system redundancy, automatic access logging
and pilot intervention against unusual behavior.
The FAA has updated its policy, guidance material, and standards on
safeguarding critical airplane systems. We have partnerships in place
with the DHS and DoD for sharing information on identified aviation
cyber vulnerabilities. We are forming partnerships with industry to
implement cyber hygiene and best practices on a voluntary basis. We are
also conducting research at the FAA Technical Center to develop a
cyber-risk assessment methodology. This methodology will be used as new
vulnerabilities arise to inform potential new requirements or
mitigation strategies.
Question. This Committee has provided increased funding over the
last 2 years for the FAA to develop and implement an integrated Cyber
Testbed at the FAA Technical Center.
Mr. Burleson, can you tell us the status of work on the testbed?
Answer. The integrated cyber testbed at the FAA Technical Center
has been completed and is fully operational. The Cyber Test Facility,
or CyTF, is used to test new cybersecurity products and technologies,
perform penetration testing of FAA infrastructure, conduct incident
response exercises, and support our cyber research and development
efforts. We are currently expanding the facility, adding a new
classified lab. The classified lab will allow the FAA to participate in
classified exercises directly from the Technical Center, and conduct
research and testing of FAA systems that interface with DoD and DHS
systems. It will also give staff in New Jersey direct access to
classified threat databases. The classified lab should be operational
in the spring of 2020.
Question. One of the concerns with cybersecurity that I hear about
from virtually every Federal agency is the lack of technical expertise
and difficulty in hiring the appropriate experts to work on these
issues.
Mr. Burleson, does FAA have the technical expertise to provide
cybersecurity oversight of manufacturers as they development new
avionics?
Answer. Yes, the FAA has the technical expertise to oversee
avionics manufacturers as well as the airplane manufacturers that
install avionics in their flight decks. The FAA ensures manufacturers
meet all FAA safety requirements as part of the certification process,
and the FAA is directly involved with the introduction of new avionics
and technologies. In addition, the FAA leverages the industry's
technical expertise, when needed.
The FAA continues to make progress in improving information sharing
with DHS and DoD. Information on possible cybersecurity vulnerabilities
are shared and assessed, and mitigations are developed, when necessary.
The FAA is collaborating with the Aerospace Industries Association to
establish an industry stakeholder committee that will encourage
voluntary adoption of cybersecurity best practices and, if necessary,
mitigations. To properly address cybersecurity threats to aviation,
partnering within the U.S. Government and with aviation stakeholders is
essential.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Ms. Lenfert--Recently there has been much debate and
press coverage regarding Chinese state sponsored companies building
rail cars and busses that serve passengers around the county and, in
particular, rail cars in the Washington D.C. area--rail cars that
consistently stop in highly sensitive and secure areas such as the
Pentagon and Reagan National Airport. These companies have an unfair
monetary advantage over others and create concerns regarding our
national security interests and intellectual property theft when
conducting business with any state subsidized entity.
It is my understanding that some foreign state-owned enterprises
have attempted to enter into the U.S. market of passenger boarding
bridges, which could have a number of cyber and data privacy concerns.
Has your office been made aware of these concerns? If so, please share
the efforts that you and your team are putting in place to ensure the
safety of our transit systems and airport bridges across the country.
Answer. The FAA is aware that there are concerns regarding a
particular foreign-owned boarding bridge manufacturer, which had at one
time entered into a joint venture with a U.S.-based manufacturer. That
relationship has subsequently ended, but not before a U.S. airport
entered into an agreement that appeared to make a commitment to
purchase a minimum number of boarding bridges from the non-U.S. entity.
That agreement has now sunset with no such purchase being made.
The FAA is required to abide by the ``Buy American'' requirements
in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 50101 in administering Airport Improvement Program
(AIP) grants. The FAA also actively uses the Federal Suspension and
Debarment system administered by the Office of Management and Budget
through 2 CFR part 180. Under this system, businesses that have been
suspended and/or debarred cannot receive federally funded contracts for
a designated timeframe. For example, if the United States Trade
Representative or other Federal Agency finds an entity to be in
violation of Federal law, the agency may pursue suspension and
debarment. This would prohibit AIP awards to those entities either
directly or via contract at any tier.
After careful consideration, the FAA does not believe that boarding
bridges represent a cybersecurity vulnerability. Even the most
sophisticated boarding bridges are rather limited in terms of actual
integration with airport or FAA information technology systems. The
boarding bridge itself is little more than a conduit for such data-
management systems, without a built-in data management capability or
access points. Even if the boarding bridge were to be equipped with
doors (near the aircraft-end of the bridge) that are linked to the
airport's overall access-control system, this would still involve
relatively simple cabling and local equipment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Boozman
Question. Taxpayers across the country, including in Arkansas,
point to government inefficiency in the delivery of infrastructure
investments. Projects that should reasonably be completed in a few
years typically last decades, delaying public benefits and
exponentially increasing costs.
How, if at all, can public-private-partnerships help accelerate
infrastructure delivery and create better value for taxpayers?
Answer. In the FAA's experience, most projects that face
significant delays are due to either local community opposition, lack
of consensus among the governing body, inability to secure critical
real estate, or other similar circumstances.
It is true that some airports face challenging local procurement
rules, and highly complex projects can sometimes be impacted by
miscommunication or disputes between owners, engineers, and
contractors. There are a variety of alternative project-delivery
methods that can help, including several forms of public-private
partnership (P3) structures.
The fundamental feature of a P3 is that the public agency grants a
private entity the right to design, build, operate, maintain and (in
many cases) finance major facilities or infrastructure for a specific
period of time, while the public agency retains ownership of the asset.
Key advantages include increased likelihood of project completion on
time and within budget; single point of accountability; and increased
likelihood of innovation (especially if there is a financial incentive
to do so), all while retaining public ownership and control.
The FAA is working closely with the Build America Bureau to educate
the airport industry on the value of P3 strategies. We have jointly
participated in conferences dedicated to this subject. Moreover, the
Airports Cooperative Research Program (which the FAA administers in
cooperation with the Transportation Research Board of the National
Academies) held a three-day conference on P3 strategies. The FAA has
also supported a number of case studies highlighting P3 projects, and
is developing a consolidated web presence to address the subject.
Question. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program is vitally
important to Arkansas, along with every other rural state in the
country, giving small towns access to air service. Not only does the
Essential Air Service program provide safe and reliable transportation,
but it also boosts the country's economy by providing access to
businesses in rural areas. Historically, many presidents have chosen to
reduce funding for the Essential Air Service program in their yearly
budget requests to Congress.
Can you please explain what a reduction of funding of the Essential
Air Service program would mean for rural America?
Answer. The requested fiscal year 2020 program level of $270
million is required to maintain continuous, regularly scheduled air
service to about 170 small communities across the nation, including
about 60 in Alaska. DOT would use $20 million in carryover funds to
maintain continuous operation of the program.
Question. Section 242 of the most recent FAA reauthorization
permits the FAA to accept foreign airworthiness directives under
certain circumstances if the foreign regulator, like the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), is transparent and the FAA is confident
in their capabilities as a regulator. As we were working on the FAA
reauthorization last year, I understood this provision would, when
implemented, improve safety and allow for a more efficient use of FAA
resources.
Would you agree with that assessment?
Answer. The FAA appreciates the Committee's efforts to assist the
FAA in maximizing the efficiency of our continued operational safety
process. While section 242 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
allows the Administrator to accept an airworthiness directive issued by
a foreign civil aviation authority, it is not self-executing and will
require additional action to implement.
Question. Further, could you provide an update on the work being
done to get this process in place given its safety benefits?
Answer. The FAA is working to determine how the authority granted
in section 242 can best be used, given other statutory constraints
imposed by Congress upon the agency, to contribute to the efficient and
timely incorporation of Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information
from qualified foreign authorities.
Question. As Co-Chair of the Senate General Aviation Caucus, I know
many communities across the country rely on small and medium sized
airports. In fact, in Arkansas, general aviation contributes 2.4
percent of state GDP and supports more than $597 million annually in
economic activity.
One particular issue the general aviation community has been
working to address is pricing and ramp transparency. Without it,
private pilots have a hard time knowing what they will be charged
before they land at an airport.
What is the FAA's position on some sort for standardization of
labeling airport ramp areas so general aviation pilots can easily
identify these areas when looking to park their planes. Is the FAA
currently taking any actions to ensure these ramps are transparent,
standardized, and clearly identified on airport diagrams?
Answer. Comparative pricing of airport services (other than fuel
sales) has always been difficult because many Fixed Base Operators
(FBOs) often discount prices or bundle services. Fuel prices are
readily available on the Internet.
After some encouragement by advocacy groups, some FBOs are posting
their basic services and pricing. We believe the Government
Accountability Office will be addressing this subject later this year
when they release their report on FBO practices.
On the subject of transparency and ramp charting, several
associations (including the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association,
National Business Aviation Association, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association, Experimental Aircraft Association, and the Helicopter
Association International) met with the FAA's aeronautical charting
staff to discuss the possibility of designating the types of ramps that
would be available on an airport. The FAA was concerned that the
discussion did not include airport representatives. As a result, the
American Association of Airport Executives and the Airports Council
International-North America are now engaged in the dialogue. The FAA
also wants to ensure that additional information on ramp charts does
not lead to confusion that creates potential safety risks.
The FAA has encouraged the industry stakeholders to work together
to come up with a solution. The FAA has no objection to the
standardization of labelling airport ramp areas, but strongly prefers
that industry work together to develop a consensus, voluntary solution.
We are concerned about trying to establish and impose mandatory
requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Steve Daines
Question. I remain a supporter of the Contract Tower Program, as it
is a cost-effective way to provide air-traffic control services at
small and rural airports. However, the tower in my hometown of Bozeman
continues to have staffing issues due to its rapid growth and location
in a region that experiences heavy snowfall for more than half the
year. Bozeman is currently the largest airport in the state in terms of
both passengers and tower operations. Bozeman has seen a 24 percent
increase in passenger traffic in just the first 6 months of this year
compared to the same time last year. The airport supports the operation
of the tower by paying about $200,000 annually to maintain and equip
the tower and pay for additional staffing hours to provide 20-hour
daily tower service.
It is my understanding that Bozeman has submitted a request for the
FAA to pay for the additional staffing hours. Will the FAA commit to
reviewing the proposal and taking into account the uniqueness of
Bozeman's situation mentioned above?
Answer. Yes, the FAA has reviewed the Bozeman request. We
understand Bozeman has experienced a 24 percent increase in passenger
traffic in the first 6 months of this year. However, the tower
operations count during the same period has increased by 15 percent.
The increase in tower operations occurred during the core hours of
operation, which are sufficiently staffed to handle the increases.
FAA Order JO 7232.5G provides guidance on increasing or reducing
hours of operation for air traffic control towers. The order lays out
the criterion for an increase in hours as being ``more than 4
operations per hour.'' Staffing hours for all towers--FAA and Federal
contract towers (FCT)--are determined using hourly traffic count and
current data. This data shows that additional hours of operation at
Bozeman are unnecessary. If traffic at Bozeman at the times of interest
were to increase to average 4 operations per hour then it would qualify
to be funded for additional time. The current staffing plan provides
adequate staffing for its hours of operation and traffic activity.
An increase in traffic alone does not mean there is enough workload
to justify an increase in staffing. FCTs provide visual flight rule
(VFR) services similar to FAA VFR air traffic control towers. When
comparing staffing between FAA facilities and FCT facilities, the same
information is used to justify added staff. We analyze the category of
traffic count, the airport complexity, airspace complexity, hours of
operation, and single controller coverage. Traffic and staffing at
Bozeman was evaluated at the beginning of this year. One of the factors
considered was the opening of a new Runway 11/29--which has helped de-
conflict local pattern traffic from itinerant aircraft using Runway 12/
30 and reduced some of the controller workload. Overall, our analysis
does not support increasing staffing hours at Bozeman.
Question. FAA Order JO 7232.5G deals with increasing or reducing
hours of operation for air traffic control towers. The order lays out
the criteria for an increase in hours as being ``more than 4 operations
per hour''. Bozeman is a small hub airport with significant terrain
challenges that also lies in a region that experiences heavy, sustained
snowfall. There have been numerous instances of conflicts between
aircraft and snow removal equipment over the last 20 years. When it
comes to the four operations per hour standard, given that clearance
and coordination by the tower with snow plows and sweepers is similar
to what occurs with aircraft, why hasn't the FAA considered including
snow removal activities on the runways, etc. as an ``operation''?
Answer. For the purpose of determining staffing FAA uses hourly air
traffic operations to make the determination. Ground operations such as
snow removal, sweeper operation, airfield lighting checks, runway
checks, etc. are not considered special circumstances for determining
staffing. Airports have procedures to allow for ground operations and
an extensive training program for the operators. Ground operations are
normal operations that occur at airports across the nation after tower
closures and at uncontrolled airports with no towers.
Question. Additionally, Joint Order 7232.5G specifically mentions
in Service Hours that ``Occasionally, early opening or late closing of
the facility may be necessary to accommodate special circumstances.''
Do snow removal operations constitute a ``special circumstance'' that
FAA would accommodate for additional hours? If no, what is FAA's
reasoning?
Answer. No, snow operations are ground operations, similar to
sweeper operations, runway checks, runway and taxiway light checks,
etc., which are considered normal operations. Special circumstances
arise when non-recurring unscheduled activities or events occur and
require staffing to accommodate the special operations, which could
include the tower remaining open late (at no cost to the government)
for a special event or weather incident. Additionally, Joint Order
7232.5G specifically mentions in Service Hours that ``Occasionally,
early opening or late closing of the facility may be necessary to
accommodate special circumstances.'' The guidance for ``occasionally''
is covered in Order JO 7210.3BB, Subject: Facility Operation and
Administration. ``Early opening or late closing may be occasionally
necessary to accommodate traffic which may otherwise divert or cancel
its operation because air traffic control is not available at the
airport.'' This guidance is not applicable for permanent operations,
which refers to the tower remaining open for the specified hours 365
days, as requested by Bozeman.
Question. Section 327 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (PL
115-254) mandated that the FAA develop and implementation plan to
provide approach control radar to airports currently served by FAA
towers with nonradar approach and departure control. The Helena
Regional Airport in Helena, Montana is one such airport for which this
section was included. Could you please provide an update on the status
of implementing this section, particularly with respect to Helena?
Answer. Section 327 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (PL 115-
254) mandated that the FAA develop an implementation plan to provide
approach control radars to airports currently served by FAA towers with
non-radar approach and departure control. The Helena Regional Airport
in Helena, Montana is one such airport for which this section was
included. We are now looking at the budgetary and flight volume
considerations of providing Helena with approach control radar
services. A determination will be complete by the end of 2019.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
Question. Ms. Lenfert, I want to thank you for the grant that the
T.F. Green airport received out of the 2018 competition to address its
runway safety needs. While the grant was substantial, it is only half
of what is needed to complete the overall project. When awards were
made, there was a footnote that the FAA would work to identify
resources in order to complete partially funded projects.
Will there be an opportunity in the remaining discretionary awards
that have yet to be released this year, or the next general fund
competition for fiscal year 2019, or both?
Answer. The FAA reviews AIP discretionary funding requests on a
recurring basis. The $30 million grant that the FAA gave to Providence
T.F. Green was the single largest grant made under the 2018
Supplemental Appropriation, and fully funded the Runway 16/34
reconstruction project. The sponsor did request funds for taxiway work
as well, and the FAA will be able to consider those elements for future
Federal funds after the planning and environmental work are completed.
Question. With the budget agreement in 2018, this Subcommittee was
able to increase the funding levels for AIP grants by $1.5 billion over
2 years making a total of $8.2 billion available to airports to make
critical safety improvements.
As we evaluate infrastructure investments for the 2020 fiscal year,
what have airports reported to you on their needs and capacity to spend
in a timely manner?
Answer. As required by law, the FAA published the biennial National
Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) Report in September 2018,
showing $35.1 billion in AIP-eligible projects for 2019-2023. That
translates to about $7.02 billion annually. The funding requests the
FAA received in response to the 2018 Supplemental Appropriation
validated this figure, with more than $8.4 billion in eligible
requests. The FAA is confident that the Nation's airports can use any
available funds quickly, efficiently, and cost-effectively, if the
funds are available early enough each fiscal year to enable the
airports to take advantage of the full construction season.
Question. With the expanded authorities of the most recent FAA
authorization bill making a broader category of terminal projects
eligible for general fund AIP grants, how does that impact program
demand for these limited resources?
Answer. The FAA's September 2018 NPIAS report identified $35.1
billion in total unfunded needs for AIP projects. Of the unfunded
needs, the report identified $25 billion (73.4 percent) for safety,
security, reconstruction, and standards projects and $4.1 billion (11.6
percent) for terminal development. However, the FAA believes this
figure for terminal development may be low. Although the FAA recognizes
the importance of terminal projects, their priority is low when
compared to safety, security, reconstruction, and standards projects.
As a result, some airports may not include all needed terminal work in
their capital improvement plans, especially when prioritizing larger
safety, capacity, or standards projects.
Many larger airports increasingly rely on Passenger Facility
Charges (PFCs) for terminal projects for several reasons: limited
amount of AIP funds available for lower priority projects; a greater
degree of local control; better predictability in terms of timing;
broader flexibility on procurement processes, including alternative
project delivery methods as well as public-private partnerships; and
the ability to leverage the funds by using them as a dedicated funding
source for repayment of bonds.
The FAA will continue to work with airport sponsors to identify
terminal development needs. The FAA will also consider and prioritize
them where possible among the many competing requests for funding for
any supplemental appropriations.
Question. Have you notified your field offices of this new
authority so that they are properly communicating with airports that
are planning to compete for funding in the next competition?
Answer. The FAA has notified its field offices of the new
authority, and those offices are in constant communication with both
airports and state aeronautical agencies about airport capital
improvement planning. Additionally, the FAA posted information on its
public website related to the new authority associated with the most
recent supplemental appropriation and future appropriations that may be
made available under this provision of the statute.
Question. A great deal of work is required from your office to
evaluate and award funding, as well as to oversee the effective use of
taxpayer resources.
How has this increased tempo affected your staff resources?
Answer. The additional funding has increased the workload for our
staff. We deeply appreciate that the appropriations bills have allowed
a small percentage of the funds (half of one percent) to be used for
administrative purposes, to garner the additional resources needed to
oversee the effective use of public funds. One of the key reasons that
our people are so effective in managing AIP grants is that most of the
people involved are either airport planners, engineers specializing in
airfield pavement or electrical systems, or other categories of
technical experts. The additional funding does force these employees to
defer other time-critical work within their range of competencies.
Therefore, if supplemental appropriations are going to become a long-
term reality, then we may at some point need to consider supplementing
the staff that administers the program.
counter unmanned aircraft system (uas)
Question. Ms. Stubblefield, based on your work with other Federal
agency partners and the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Task Force
on UAS mitigation, what steps are you pursuing to authorize additional
users to mitigate UAS threats to airports and commercial aviation?
Answer. The FAA understands the safety and security concerns of
many airports relative to the errant or malicious use of UAS on and
around airports, and is taking steps to address them. In early May, the
FAA provided information to airport sponsors to explain some of the
legal and operational issues they may want to consider and our approach
to the use of UAS detection and mitigation systems.
There are currently available options for government and private
sector entities to use certain UAS detection technologies. In order to
support the safe integration of UAS detection systems into the airport
environment, the FAA published important information for airport
sponsors on May 7, 2019--it is available on the FAA website--and
continues to work closely with airports who are considering installing
UAS detection systems or have already installed such systems on or near
their airports. The agency expects to supplement this information with
additional information related to UAS detection system coordination as
we refine our processes and procedures for safe UAS detection system
use and coordinated operational response at or around airports. Some
detection systems also permit the location of the operator, which
enables law enforcement to conduct real-time response. Detection is a
necessary and, sometimes, sufficient tool to be able to mitigate
potential UAS threats.
In that May 7 correspondence, the FAA also provided information
regarding the prohibition on the use of Counter-UAS, or C-UAS,
(mitigation) technologies at or around airports. These systems could
introduce unwarranted safety risks to the Nation's aviation system by:
interfering with aircraft equipment and air navigation services
infrastructure; disrupting targeted as well as legitimate drone
operations leading to hazardous flight behavior; and prompting
operational responses that may not be adequately risk-based and
coordinated. Although the FAA does not have authority to deploy C-UAS
technology, nor to delegate such authority, the agency has been working
closely with the four Federal Departments, to which Congress has
granted explicit authority to use C-UAS systems. The requirements for
close coordination and collaboration with the FAA in those statutory
grants of authority underscore the need to sustain the safety of our
National Airspace System through carefully considered and coordinated
actions. Further, the FAA sees the combination of the expanding usage
of UAS detection capabilities, development of coordinated response
plans for UAS incidents, and the movement toward Remote Identification
and other UAS Traffic Management (UTM), as well as development of
incident-specific counter-UAS plans with our Federal security partners,
as an effective strategy to mitigate the risk posed to airports by
errant and malicious UAS activity.
Question. What additional authorities, including criminal
penalties, should be considered to guard against the use of drones as
weapons or instruments of terrorism?
Answer. The FAA does not currently anticipate the need for
additional civil authorities as it relates to the use of unmanned
aircraft as weapons. We defer to our security partners regarding any
additional criminal provisions that should be considered.
emergency medical kits (emks) and opioid overdoses
Question. Opioid-related overdoses continue to be a significant
public health challenge and hazard. In February, the Association of
Flight Attendants wrote to urge the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to issue regulations requiring that the Emergency Medical Kits
include naloxone nasal spray to treat opioid overdoses.
Sadly, a few weeks ago, a passenger died of an overdose on a
domestic flight. The airline in that case announced in March that it
would begin the process of adding naloxone to its enhanced Emergency
Medical Kits, although it is not required by the FAA. Unfortunately, in
this case, it appears that the aircraft was not equipped with a new
medical kit.
Mr. Burleson, is the FAA considering requiring the addition of
naloxone to emergency medical kits?
Answer. The FAA last revised emergency medical equipment
regulations prior to the onset of the opioid crisis. As such, the
opioid antagonist (naloxone) did not flag as an item for potential
inclusion in the kits. The FAA periodically reviews the kits and most
recently requested the Aerospace Medical Association (ASMA) to review
the existing content of required kits and make recommendations about
revisions. The FAA received recommendations from ASMA and completed its
review of them in late August. ASMA has recommended that naloxone be
added to the kit. The FAA would agree that any revision should include
an opioid antagonist.
Updating the kits would require rulemaking. A new regulation would
impose cost on the air carrier operators and their kit suppliers to
procure new kits and retrofit their fleets with them. It also would
require new familiarization training for crewmembers. For past
revisions of the kits, the FAA set a 3-year compliance date as it takes
time to refurbish the fleets and retrain crewmembers.
Question. How quickly could such a change be made? And what are
airlines doing on their own?
Answer. Some air carriers carry naloxone voluntarily and more may
be considering it. Although an opioid antagonist is not specifically
required, air carriers certainly are not precluded from carrying it. As
mentioned in our response to the previous question, a change to require
naloxone in the emergency medical kits would require the FAA to engage
in rulemaking to comply with APA requirements. For past revisions of
the kits, the FAA set a 3-year compliance date as it takes time to
refurbish the fleets and retrain crewmembers.
pfas/airport firefighting foam
Question. Ms. Lenfert, airports and local communities are
struggling to eliminate the category of chemicals known as PFAS, which
has been shown to have negative impacts on public health and the
environment. Because of the widespread use of firefighting foam, we are
attempting to address a host of issues related to PFAS in the NDAA bill
currently in conference. This includes everything from research and
monitoring to clean-ups. In the 2018 FAA Authorization law, Congress
also granted the FAA authority to approve alternative types of
firefighting foam, but FAA regulations still require airports to use
foam containing PFAS.
Can you explain what the FAA is doing to assess and approve
alternative firefighting foam that does not pose a risk to public
health or the environment?
Answer. The FAA shares your concern on the environmental impact of
PFAS. We are aware that the NDAA provision has sparked some concerns
from airport associations and individual airports especially regarding
environmental cleanup responsibility. The FAA is working diligently on
solutions involving aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) alternatives. For
example, the FAA's Technical Center is currently building a dedicated
Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) research facility to be
completed in the fall of 2019, with the focus on testing AFFF
alternatives. One of the goals is to find alternative firefighting
agents that are environmentally friendly, while providing the same
level of safety currently offered by MIL-PRF-24385 AFFF. FAA
researchers have developed a research plan, which outlines the tasks
necessary to reach a goal of eliminating PFAS from firefighting foams.
This tasks included in the research plan are a literature review, gap
analysis, and selection of candidate products to be live-fire tested in
the FAA's new facility. We recently finished the gap analysis that
examined current research and regulations regarding the use of
fluorinated AFFF at airports, fluorine-free foams, and associated
chemical compounds. The results are under review.
We are also working closely with the Department of Defense (DoD)
and their research into AFFF. We have a research agreement with the
United States Air Force research center at Tyndall Air Force Base,
where we are able to utilize their chemists to perform chemical
composition analysis. An essential part of the research is to ensure
that no emerging chemicals of concern are being used to replace current
fluoro-chemical formulations.
DoD is also setting up a task force dedicated to this issue and the
FAA requested to be included, but it is internal to DoD. DoD has
assured us they will keep the FAA apprised of status and progress. We
have been invited (and have agreed) to participate on other DoD AFFF
Working Groups, both at the action officer and executive level.
While we are researching alternative AFFF products, in the interim,
we have made immediate changes to greatly reduce the exposure of PFAS
into the environment. In January 2019, we evaluated and approved three
input-based foam proportioner testing systems as replacement test
methods for discharging foam from ARFF vehicles. Input-based testing
does not discharge AFFF into the environment. Furthermore, in June
2019, we issued a program guidance letter explaining AIP funding
eligibility determinations and justifications for purchasing these
systems.
Question. Do we need to accelerate research and testing for this
activity in the FAA's Research and Development account?
Answer. Construction of the ARFF research facility is well
underway, and full-scale testing of potential replacement agents will
begin after completion of the facility. In the meantime, the FAA has
been preparing for future testing by conducting the gap analysis and
associated research, as previously described. Both of these efforts
were necessary before the start of the live-fire testing portion of the
research program. Discussions with foam manufacturers on partnering on
the research program have also begun and will continue throughout the
program. We do not believe additional resources are needed at this
time.
faa network modernization
Question. The FAA's existing network is a patchwork of customized
solutions that is a generation behind modern telecommunications
networks.
How will the FAA's evaluation criteria ensure their new network
contract will promote continual modernization efforts and will
encourage the adoption of commercial networking capabilities over
highly customized solutions?
Answer. A fundamental objective of the FAA Enterprise Network
Services (FENS) program is to better align the FAA with the direction
of the commercial marketplace relative to networking capabilities and
technologies. The evaluation criteria defined for the FENS source
evaluation emphasize the ability of offerors to meet the FAA's
requirements for communication services as they evolve through 2035 as
FAA systems modernize their communications interfaces. In addition, the
FAA is providing offerors with the flexibility to propose the
categories of services that will comprise the FENS Service Catalog so
they can leverage their standard commercial offerings rather than
forcing them into an FAA-defined construct. Lastly, the FENS evaluation
criteria will promote the introduction of new service offerings and
technologies throughout the contract period of performance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
noise disruption
Question. Many of the communities neighboring airports in my state
have been impacted by implementation of Metroplex. What has FAA done to
minimize noise disruption for those impacted by changing flight
patterns and ensure that collaboration with these communities
continues?
Answer. The FAA remains committed to engaging with communities in a
meaningful way around airspace changes. Through the Regional
Administrator's office, the FAA engages with communities through
community roundtables and community workshops. The FAA also stays
closely engaged with airports and airlines to educate stakeholders and
communities on all of the challenges as the demand on our system
continues to grow. The aviation sector is experiencing very strong
growth. In the Bay Area, operations at San Francisco International
Airport (SFO), Oakland International Airport, and San Jose
International Airport (SJC) have increased 27 percent over the last 4
years (2014-2018)--which equates to more than 141,000 additional flight
operations.
The FAA Regional Administrator's office along with technical
support from air traffic services and the service center regularly
attends the SFO Technical Working Group and full Roundtable meeting,
the Oakland Noise Forum, and the Santa Clara Santa Cruz Ad Hoc
committee meetings, which represents communities adjacent to SJC.
In addition to engaging with communities, the FAA has a research
program to both understand and mitigate the impacts of aviation noise
on communities. The research program includes the development of the
Aviation Environmental Design Tool (AEDT), which can simultaneously
calculate noise, emission and fuel burn based on radar tracks and
aircraft performance data. AEDT is used not only in the U.S., but also
by aviation professionals in 35 other countries, as well as the
International Civil Aviation Organization to inform international
standard setting. Through the ASCENT Center of Excellence and the
Airport Cooperative Research Program, the FAA is also supporting
research to understand the impacts of aviation noise on health, sleep,
annoyance, and children's learning. Through the Continuous Lower
Emissions Energy and Noise (CLEEN) Program, a public private
partnership between FAA and industry, we are accelerating the
development of technologies to reduce noise and emissions while
improving energy efficiency. The research program provides the data
that is used to inform the development of policies and standards such
as noise stringencies for noise certification. Through ASCENT, it is
also supporting the exploration of ways to improve operational
procedure concepts to reduce noise exposure from both aircraft and
helicopters. The FAA also continues to provide both financial and
technical support for collaborative noise compatibility planning
through the Part 150 program, which provides a structured process for
airports, airlines and other aeronautical users, neighboring
communities, and the FAA to work together to reduce incompatible land
uses around airports.
safety certification
Question. What actions will you take to remedy the weaknesses in
our certification process?
Answer. Continuous improvement is part of the FAA's safety culture.
Our commitment to safety demands that we continuously strive to learn
from our experiences and use those lessons to strengthen our processes.
To this end, the FAA has invited external review and scrutiny of our
certification process in general, and the certification of the 737 MAX
specifically. These include reviews by the Joint Authorities Technical
Review and the Special Committee on Aircraft Certification, among
others. The findings and recommendations from these reviews, the
accident investigations, and other sources of relevant information will
provide important input as we continue to pursue improvements in our
processes and policies.
Question. What actions will you take to strengthen whistleblower
protections? The Boeing 737 MAX crashes likely would have been avoided
had FAA and Boeing employees felt free to frankly express their
concerns not only to their superiors but publicly.
Answer. Safety requires the open and transparent exchange of
information. We know that it takes communication, and common safety
objectives to allow the FAA and the aviation community to identify
system hazards and quickly implement safety solutions. This approach
gives us knowledge that we would not otherwise have about events and
risks in almost real time. Sharing safety issues, trends, and lessons
learned is critical to recognizing whatever might be emerging as a risk
in the system. The more data we have, the more we can learn about the
system, which in turn allows us to better manage and improve the
system.
The FAA takes seriously safety reports and thoroughly investigates
all allegations, including disclosures by employees. FAA employees have
the right to raise concerns internally and externally if they feel
safety is being compromised. There are separate processes to ensure
whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and if retaliation
occurs, corrective action is taken including disciplining the manager.
The FAA maintains a hotline through which FAA employees can and do
report safety concerns. The FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation has a
staff of investigators and subject matter experts who investigate and
make findings on claims of whistleblower retaliation for making safety
disclosures.
Additionally, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provides
a protected avenue for anyone to share safety information. NASA
maintains the ASRS and ensures that ASRS reports are redacted for any
identifiable information of the reporter making a disclosure. The focus
is on the disclosure itself and not the identity of the person making
the disclosure. More than one million reports have been submitted to
ASRS and not once has a reporter's identity been revealed. After the
recent 737 MAX crashes, the FAA reviewed ASRS reports that referenced
the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and/or
controllability issues with the Boeing 737 MAX. In no case did the
reporting party state that the problems experienced were due to the
MCAS system.
In addition, the FAA regulations require Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) holders to ensure that no conflicting non-ODA unit
duties or other interference affects the performance of authorized
delegated functions by ODA unit members. Processes for addressing undue
pressure are contained within the FAA-approved procedures manual. FAA
inspectors regularly perform oversight on the ODA to ensure they adhere
to these processes and that reported employee complaints are properly
documented, investigated, and resolved. Additionally, ODA employees use
the FAA hotline to report safety concerns, including concerns about
undue pressure from companies. ODA employees also have the option to
submit safety reports via the ASRS.
Question. Will you ask for increased funding specifically for
increasing the number of FAA engineers and other FAA safety and human
factors experts and their technical expertise to be able to effectively
oversee aircraft design and certification?
Answer. Safety oversight is our top priority. We strive to maintain
adequate staffing numbers so we can execute our statutory and
regulatory responsibilities. We believe we currently have the necessary
number of engineers, safety, and human factors experts to ensure our
oversight role is effective. In addition, the FAA leverages the
industry's technical expertise, when needed.
It is possible that recommendations from the various reviews and
investigations may indicate a need for additional staffing. Upon
receiving these recommendations, the FAA will determine if there are
any additional resource needs.
faa and boeing relationship
Question. Can you explain how FAA's outsourcing of aircraft
certification affected the determination of the dangers that MCAS
posed?
Answer. The FAA does not ``outsource'' certification or allow
applicants to ``self-certify.'' Delegation has been a vital part of our
safety system since the passage of the Air Commerce Act in the 1920s,
which created the foundation for the Civil Aeronautics Administration
and eventually the FAA. The FAA utilizes delegation to leverage outside
technical expertise, enabling us to focus on areas of highest risk.
The aircraft certification process comprises 4 functions: 1)
determination of the applicable design standards (certification basis);
2) planning and standards; 3) analysis and testing; and 4) final
decision and certification of design. The FAA determines the
certification basis, identifies the standards, makes all key and final
decisions, and is directly involved in testing of new and novel
features and technologies. The work FAA delegates primarily relate to
analysis and testing and involve lower risk and routine items. The FAA
does not delegate the other functions.
Following its standard procedures, the FAA determined that the 737
MAX project would qualify as an amended type certificate project. The
FAA identified what items would be delegated to the Boeing ODA to
approve and which would be retained by the FAA for approval. Boeing
first applied for an amended type certificate for this aircraft in
January 2012. As a result, of regular meetings between the FAA and
Boeing teams, the FAA determined that the project qualified as an
amended type certificate project eligible for management by the Boeing
ODA. The FAA was directly involved in the System Safety Review of MCAS.
The process from initial application to final certification took 5
years; the FAA added the 737 MAX to the 737 type certificate in March
2017. The process included 297 certification flight tests, some of
which encompassed tests of the MCAS functions. FAA engineers and flight
test pilots were involved in the MCAS operational evaluation flight
test. The certification process was detailed and thorough, but, as is
the case with newly certified products, time yields more data to be
applied for continued analysis and improvement. As we obtain pertinent
data and information, identify potential risk, or learn of a system
failure, we analyze it; find ways to mitigate the risk; and, if
necessary, require operators to implement the mitigation.
The FAA focused significant resources on certification of the 737
MAX--over 110,000 hours of FAA staff time were devoted to this effort.
Continuous improvement is part of the FAA's safety culture and we
are always looking to improve our processes. To this end, Secretary
Chao and the FAA have invited external review of our certification
process in general, and the certification of the 737 MAX specifically.
The findings and recommendations from these reviews, the accident
investigations, and other sources of relevant information will provide
important input as we continue to pursue improvements in our processes
and policies.
Question. How are you ensuring the FAA internal analysis, including
the Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology, be taken seriously
and more promptly for future actions, including grounding until design
or operational changes are undertaken for unacceptably high risks?
Answer. Safety is the agency's first priority. We use a risk based,
data-driven process to assess aircraft safety when we receive reports
of high-risk service difficulties in the fleet. Tools such as the
Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) are an integral
part of the process. We use TARAM whenever there is a serious safety
issue on transport-category U.S. manufactured aircraft. The results of
the TARAM process provide our specialists with key information about
how best to manage the risk posed by a specific issue, including
guidance on the urgency of the action needed. The FAA acts promptly
based on that information and works diligently to provide the aviation
community with the information they need to correct the unsafe
condition.
Question. What actions will you take to align incentives
consistently for the safety of the traveling public and aircrews, and
correct for the inherent conflicts of interest in the current process?
Answer. The use of designation, in some form, has been a vital part
of our safety system since the 1920s. Congress has continually expanded
the designee program since creation of the FAA in 1958, and it is
critical to the success and effectiveness of the certification process.
Under this program, the FAA may delegate a matter related to aircraft
certification to a qualified private person or organization. This is
not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority. The
program allows the FAA to leverage its resources and technical
expertise while holding the applicant accountable for compliance.
During the past few years, Congress has endorsed the FAA's delegation
authority, including in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which
directed the FAA to delegate more certification tasks to the designees
we oversee.
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) is a privilege granted
to certificate holders who meet stringent eligibility requirements,
including technical capability, professional integrity, and a history
of compliance. The FAA routinely conducts oversight of ODA holders and
may modify or terminate the delegation for a variety of reasons,
including improper performance. While the FAA is not involved in how
aviation manufacturers compensate their employees, with respect to ODA
holders, the FAA can intervene if we see any evidence that the safety
of the product may be in jeopardy due to financial pressures.
Question. Will you commit to mandating that those manufacturer
employees who do work on behalf of FAA for aircraft certification
include FAA during the hiring process and not solely the companies FAA
oversees? What steps will you commit to take to ensure that they can
have the independence to act in the public interest free from
inappropriate pressure?
Answer. An ODA is the means by which FAA grants authority to
organizations or companies to conduct various functions on the agency's
behalf using FAA approved certification standards. Unit members (or
company employees) of an ODA are not FAA employees. However, in their
delegated capacity, the ODA members perform certification functions on
behalf of the FAA. For newly established ODAs, the FAA evaluates all
proposed unit members. Often the individuals selected have prior
engagement and experience with the FAA. As the FAA gains experience and
confidence with an ODA, the FAA gradually reduces the review of new
members. In addition, during our regular audits we evaluate how the ODA
follows their FAA-approved process for selecting and vetting new
members.
FAA retains strict oversight authority of ODAs. Our oversight
consists of supervising and evaluating the ODA's personnel, procedures,
projects, activities, and overall performance.
In their FAA-approved procedures manual, we require ODA holders to
have processes that mitigate undue pressure. FAA inspectors perform
oversight on the ODA to ensure they adhere to the process and that
reported employee complaints are properly documented, investigated, and
resolved. Additionally, ODA employees can and do use the FAA Hotline to
report safety concerns, including undue pressure from companies.
fuel efficiency
Question. What has FAA done to ensure airlines are using more fuel
efficient designs and newer, lower carbon fuels?
Answer. The FAA is ensuring airlines use more fuel-efficient
designs by regulatory action and by working with industry to advance
the development of more efficient technologies and sustainable aviation
fuels.
From a regulatory perspective, the FAA developed, with other
nations, through the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO)
Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection, an airplane fuel
efficiency standard for civil subsonic jet and propeller-driven
airplanes (a.k.a. CO2 standard). This international standard, if
adopted, would establish a minimum fuel efficiency that all commercial
airplanes will have to meet. Aircraft types that are currently in
production would need to meet a minimum fuel efficiency standard by
January 1, 2028. New aircraft types (i.e., those that are certified for
airworthiness after January 1, 2020) would have to meet a more
stringent fuel efficiency requirement. The FAA anticipates promulgating
the international standard into U.S. regulations in the near future.
The FAA is also working with industry through the public-private
partnership of the Continuously Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise
(CLEEN) Program (http://faa.gov/go/cleen), to accelerate the
development of technologies that improve fuel efficiency while lowering
noise and emissions. The technologies being pursued under the CLEEN
Program often both provide fuel efficiency improvements while also
yielding benefits to noise and/or emissions. Once entered into service,
the CLEEN technologies will realize their fuel efficiency and
environmental benefits throughout the fleet for years to come.
The FAA is supporting airlines in their pursuit of sustainable
aviation fuels by funding testing to ensure the fuels are safe for use;
funding research to quantify the environmental benefits of the fuels to
support their inclusion within the ICAO Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation; and supporting public-private
coordination between the aviation and energy industries and government
agencies. These efforts are conducted through our Center of Excellence
(www.ascent.aero) and via FAA co-sponsorship, alongside the aviation
industry, with the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative, or
CAAFI (www.caafi.org).
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Durbin
Question. The five year FAA reauthorization bill passed by Congress
last year required the FAA to issue a new regulation by this fall
mandating secondary cockpit barriers on all newly manufactured
aircraft. Installing secondary cockpit barriers was a key
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Stakeholders, including the
airline pilots and flight attendants union, had been pushing for
Congress and the FAA to require those barriers since the Commission's
recommendation, and they were finally successful in getting the
provision included in last year's FAA reauthorization. Now, the FAA is
signaling that it will delay issuing the new regulation. Instead, they
have said that the issue requires further study and have created an
advisory committee to look into the issue despite already studying the
issue in 2011. The unions are now concerned that the FAA may recommend
applying the barriers to only new types of aircraft or creating an
alternative means of compliance, which could delay the mandate by
decades. I want to be clear: the FAA must comply with Congress' clear
intent to have these barriers installed on all new passenger aircraft
by October of this year.
Will the order for secondary barriers be issued by the FAA this
October?
Answer. The applicability of section 336 of the Act is not limited
to new designs, but applies to each new manufactured aircraft operating
under 14 CFR part 121, ranging from regional to very large transport
aircraft.
The FAA has tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to
provide recommendations for the implementation of this provision. The
advisory committee's advice will help the FAA develop a rule that
provides the technical information that manufacturers can follow to
meet the legislation, as well as other information on costs and
benefits required by the rulemaking process. While the October 2019
timeframe will not be met, the FAA believes the recommendations made by
the advisory committee will allow for the most effective approach to
implementation.
Question. Over 3,000 aviation safety professionals were furloughs
during the harmful 35-day government shutdown caused by President Trump
earlier this year. Another 15,000 controllers and aviation safety
professionals worked without pay. It's been 6 months since the
government reopened, and we're still feeling the impacts of the
shutdown on our air traffic control system. The air traffic
controllers' union reports that the shutdown led to early retirements
and delayed classes at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Academy, causing some students to drop out. For an organization already
experiencing a worker shortage and for controllers who have been forced
to work longer hours for too long, the shutdown caused serious damage;
and, the FAA has reportedly had to lower its hiring target from 1400
this year down to 900. The shutdown also negatively affected the
implementation of new safety systems including the Arrival Prediction
Alerting System (ATAP), a safety system that can alert a pilot if they
are about to land on the wrong runway and need to circle the airport.
Six months after the shutdown, can you give us an update on the size
and scale of the impacts to air traffic control? How much ground did we
lose when it comes to controller hiring and safety upgrades?
Answer. The shutdown itself was not a significant driver for FAA to
change staffing plans, as most FAA program offices review and adjust
staffing plans on an annual basis, including our two largest mission
critical programs, air traffic and aviation safety. Both of these
programs made changes to their staffing plans that were based on
specific workforce planning factors, such as analysis of current and
future state requirements, alignment of mission and staffing, and
identifying workforce gaps in staffing, hiring, training and
development, and retention. The unprecedented length of the last
shutdown did create a need for FAA to immediately re-examine the agency
furlough plans to ensure we took steps to adjust our shutdown plans
based on lessons learned.
On an annual basis, the FAA conducts a comprehensive review of all
agency functions, positions, and staff in place to support those
functions. The review also aligns functions by their funding and budget
categories. The purpose of this review is to identify which functions
and supporting positions are designated as essential for protection of
life and safety. The FAA uses this information during a funding lapse
to place employees in a furlough status or non-furlough status. The FAA
notifies employees who are funded by a lapsed budget category and work
in positions designated as essential (or excepted), of the requirement
to report to work during the funding lapse, in accordance with the
Antideficiency Act and position designations. This practice allows the
FAA to continue critical operations with adequate staff during the
funding lapse. In addition, the FAA has a process to recall employees
from furlough during an extended lapse and when critical safety
operations require additional resources to maintain operations.
In the Air Traffic Organization, the lapse in appropriations
disrupted the hiring and training of new air traffic controllers.
--Hiring and training enough air traffic controllers is a challenge
the FAA faces each year. Controlling air traffic is a
difficult, stressful job, and the agency needs to find
candidates who can do the job consistently day after day.
--The FAA also needs to get our new hires trained and ready to fill
vacancies at our facilities across the country.
--The lapse in appropriations added another hurdle to this process.
Our recruitment efforts and training of air traffic controllers
were put on hold during the shutdown as only safety essential
operations were authorized.
--Despite these challenges, the agency will continue to maintain a
controller workforce that can safely manage the national
airspace.
Question. I support my colleague Senator Moran's Aviation Funding
Stability Act, which would provide pay for air traffic controllers and
funding for FAA programs during a government shutdown by authorizing
the FAA to draw from the Airport & Airway Trust Fund. Does the FAA
leadership support this bill to protect air traffic controllers and
their families in the event of another shutdown?
Answer. The Administration has not taken a position on the various
pending proposals that would authorize the FAA to draw from the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund during a government shutdown. We look forward to
working with Congress as it considers an appropriate mechanism to
protect the traveling public from disruptions that can occur from a
lapse in appropriations.
Question. While I recognize the hard work that the FAA is doing to
resolve the safety challenges with Boeing's 737-MAX, it has now been
over 4 months since the FAA moved to ground the aircraft. The safety of
the flying public is and must always be the number one priority of the
FAA. We cannot allow these planes back in the air unless this safety
flaw is fixed and the FAA can verify the safety of the aircraft and the
changes that Boeing is making to it; however, neither Congress nor the
airline industry has been given any real timeline for when the FAA
expects to have the MAX fixed, certified, and back in the air.
Meanwhile, the sustained grounding is impacting the flying public.
Chicago's hometown airline, United, is currently being forced to cancel
40-45 flights per day because of the Boeing grounding. Those
cancellations are expected to increase the longer that the MAX is
grounded. If still grounded in October, United estimates that it will
need to cancel 95 flights per day. That translates to less choices and
higher prices for consumers. Can the FAA provide the public with an
estimate on when they expect to certify the Boeing MAX safe to fly
again?
Answer. Safety is the core of the FAA's mission and our top
priority. With the support of this Committee, the FAA has worked
tirelessly to take a proactive, data-driven approach to oversight that
prioritizes safety above all else. The FAA recognizes the impact that
the grounding of these aircraft has had on airlines and the flying
public. However, the FAA will return the 737 MAX to service for U.S.
carriers and in U.S. airspace only when the FAA's analysis of the facts
and technical data indicates it is safe to do so.
Question. Since the grounding, the FAA in coordination with DOT
Inspector General, a special committee of experts convened by Secretary
Chao, and the FAA's Technical Advisory Board have been working to both
investigate what went wrong with the FAA's certification of the MAX and
to determine what changes to their certification process are needed.
When is Boeing expected to submit its changes to the FAA and what steps
will the FAA take to verify that those changes will solve the problem?
Answer. Boeing has been working to develop the necessary design
changes and the FAA certification team has been monitoring and
evaluating their progress. There is no firm date for Boeing to submit
the final design changes.
FAA is retaining all approvals on the proposed 737 MAX design
changes--no aspects will be delegated. As part of an unprecedented
level of review by foreign authorities, all changes will be validated
by the other members of the Certification Management Team--the European
Union Aviation Safety Agency, Transport Canada Civil Aviation, and the
National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil.
In addition, the FAA initiated the multi-agency Technical Advisory
Board (TAB) review of the MCAS software update and system safety
assessment in order to determine sufficiency. The TAB consists of a
team of experts from the U.S. Air Force, NASA, Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center, and the FAA. The TAB experts have not
been involved in any aspect of the Boeing 737 MAX certification. The
TAB has worked to evaluate Boeing and FAA efforts related to the
software update and its integration into the flight control system, and
its recommendations will inform FAA's return to service decision.
Question. Why wasn't appropriate attention given to the MAX's
certification by FAA management the first time around, and what is the
FAA planning on doing differently in certifying the MAX's safety this
time?
Answer. The certification of the 737 MAX took 5 years, and the FAA
focused significant resources--over 110,000 hours of FAA time--on this
certification effort.
Going forward, the FAA will retain all approvals on proposed design
changes to the 737 MAX. FAA management will again be involved in the
approval process and will make the final decision as to whether or not
the 737 MAX is safe to operate and can be safely returned to service.
In addition, the FAA has initiated a Technical Advisory Board (TAB) to
evaluate Boeing and FAA efforts related to the software update and its
integration into the flight control system. The TAB recommendations
will inform the FAA's return to service decision.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Collins. [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., Wednesday, July
31, the hearing was adjourned, and the subcommittee was
recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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