[Senate Hearing 116-499]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 116-499

                       NUCLEAR POLICY AND POSTURE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 28, 2019

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
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                 Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

 JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman	JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JONI ERNST, Iowa			TIM KAINE, Virginia
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida			TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee		DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri             
                                    
   		 John Bonsell, Staff Director
            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director


                                  (ii)

                         C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

                           February 28, 2019

                                                                   Page

Nuclear Policy and Posture.......................................     1

                 Statements of Members of the Committee

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     2


                           Witness Statements

Creedon, Honorable Madelyn R., Former Principal Deputy                6
  Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

Miller, Honorable Franklin C., Former Special Assistant to the        8
  President of the United States, and Former Senior Director for 
  Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council 
  Staff.

Kehler, General C. Robert, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, United     10
  States Strategic Command.

                                 (iii)

 
                       NUCLEAR POLICY AND POSTURE

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, 
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, 
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, 
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Okay, our meeting will come to order, and 
I would ask our witnesses to be seated.
    I had a chance to visit with them, and we've had 
experiences in the past. I always remember, Ms. Creedon, during 
the years that she was with Carl Levin, was one of real heroes 
of this Committee, and I always enjoyed the time that we had 
spent together.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony from the 
experts outside of government. We've had a lot of the same 
questions, a lot of the same issues, just last Tuesday, for 
example, with General Hyten and Scaparotti and--no, who was the 
other one that was----
    Senator Reed. That was General O'Shaughnessy.
    Chairman Inhofe.--O'Shaughnessy, yeah. So, now we have 
people that are outside of the military, and we'll see what 
their thoughts are on some of the same issues that were there.
    The Committee is focused on implementing the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS). That's this thing that we've been 
talking about. We've had two hearings on it. It's one of the 
few things Democrats, Republicans, everyone agrees what our 
mission should be. That's what we're talking about.
    Now we need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear 
triad, as well as the warheads and infrastructure in the 
Department of Energy. There has been bipartisan support for the 
programs in the past. I'm hopeful that we're going to be able 
to continue that bipartisan spirit as we try to continue 
defending America.
    Yet, we've heard proposals recently for dramatic changes in 
our nuclear policy and our force posture. Some believe that we 
could scale back modernization programs and still deter our 
adversaries. Others propose that we intentionally make our 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) slower to respond 
or require Congress to intervene before the Commander in Chief 
could use a nuclear weapon, even in the most extreme 
situations.
    So, we are going to have to make some decisions. We're 
going to be doing our defense authorization bill. We're going 
to try to get everything on schedule, as we did last year. But, 
we're going to have to resolve these things. We want to get the 
best experts around. And that's why we're doing it with the 
uniforms and with those outside.
    Some have even suggested cutting the entire leg of our 
nuclear triad, or two. Today, I hope that you'll be able to 
help us understand the importance of tying the nuclear 
modernization and sensible policy to the overall national 
security of the United States.
    So, I think this is something that we recognize. We really 
failed to keep up with our nuclear modernization over the 
years. Consequently, our peer competitors, Russia and China, 
were doing things. So, the question is, have they passed us in 
some areas? I think the answer to that is yes.
    We are also faced with several current issues related to 
arms control. While our colleagues on the Foreign Relations 
Committee will no doubt discuss these issues at length, the 
implementation of the withdrawal from the Intermediate Range 
Forces (INF) Treaty is a great interest to this Committee, so 
is this Committee's decision on whether or not we extend our 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). I'm interested in 
your opinions on these questions.
    The three of you have broad expertise on nuclear operations 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy 
(DOE), nuclear programs and arms control. This is a very well-
informed panel, and I look forward to your testimony.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
    Ms. Creedon, you have a long history serving this 
Committee, including as the lead professional staff member of 
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee when I had the privilege of 
chairing the Committee. Thank you for your help. You've also 
served the Nation as a senior official in the executive branch 
pertaining to nuclear policy.
    Mr. Miller, you've served 31 years in the Federal 
Government as an expert on matters of nuclear policy and the 
strategy under both Republican and Democratic Administrations. 
You worked extensively on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties 
at the end of the Cold War and on the Strategic Offensive Arms 
Reduction Treaty in 2003. Thank you.
    General Kehler, you commanded U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) from 2011, when New START took effect, until your 
retirement in 2013. You are a trusted voice on all matters of 
nuclear strategy.
    I want to thank all of you for the service to the country. 
Thank you.
    I'd like to hear from our witnesses on a number of issues 
that have evolved since the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR). First and foremost is the Administration's 
notification of withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, with nothing to replace it. While 
I understand that Russia was in noncompliance and that China 
also poses a threat, I am concerned that the United States did 
not redouble efforts to pressure Russia back into compliance or 
seek modifications to the treaty, if necessary. Treaties are a 
major component of our security strategy. We build and 
modernize nuclear weapons, but we also have treaties, which 
prescribe numbers and use. By withdrawing from the treaty 
without a strategy for what comes next, the Administration now 
has freed Russia to produce as many noncompliant SSC-8 missiles 
and their cruise missiles and their launches as they wish. 
These are small, highly mobile systems capable of hiding within 
Russia's large interior landmass while holding at risk targets 
across western Europe. The issue for the United States and 
allies is how to respond to these Russian deployments and 
whether we are entering a new destabilizing arms race.
    A second issue I'd like the panel to address is the 
decision in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, to pursue 
two new capabilities. One capability is to develop a low-yield 
warhead for the submarine ballistic missile to counter the 
Russian ``escalate to de-escalate'' strategy, which calls for 
Russia to use a low-yield weapon first in a conflict. In 
addition, the 2018 NPR called for a study on bringing back the 
submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) we retired in the 2010 
NPR to also counter the Russian ``escalate to de-escalate'' 
strategy. While the threats may be changing, creating or 
renewing nuclear capabilities is not without controversy. I'm 
interested in hearing your views on whether these capabilities 
are necessary to protect our national security, if there are 
alternative responses to the threats, and what are the 
consequences to developing these new capabilities.
    A third issue for our panel is the question of whether or 
not to adopt a policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons. 
The United States has never adopted such a policy, and has 
preferred a stance of strategic ambiguity. I understand that 
this issue was debated at length during the Obama 
Administration, and the decision was ultimately made not to 
adopt such a policy, for strategic security reasons and to 
support our allies. However, I believe that a robust debate on 
this issue is always good, and I would like to know each of 
your views on a ``no first use'' policy.
    Finally, I'm concerned that we are on the verge of breaking 
the longstanding linkage between arms control and nuclear 
modernization. In December 2010, when the Senate approved New 
START for ratification, part of the context surrounding that 
ratification was a bipartisan consensus that the nuclear triad 
would be modernized. President Obama affirmed this commitment 
to modernization in February of 2011. I'm worried that we are 
now breaking that linkage. We are moving forward on 
modernization, but have withdrawn from the INF Treaty, and 
there appears to be a growing reluctance to extend New START 
for 5 years past its expiration date of 2021. Arms control and 
nuclear modernization work should proceed hand-in-hand to 
increase our overall security posture. I would like to hear 
from our witnesses about whether they support extending New 
START and what other arms control measures we might take with 
respect to nuclear weapons not covered by the New START.
    Former Secretary of Defense Carter often stated that our 
nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of every national security 
action we take. It serves as the backstop to containing further 
conflict among nuclear-armed states. But, with that 
responsibility comes a commitment to engage, if possible, on 
reducing the level of risk these weapons might pose to the 
world at large. Every President since the dawn of the Nuclear 
Age has accepted this moral responsibility. I am deeply 
concerned today that the Administration is not pursuing the 
U.S. commitment as a responsible nuclear power to reduce the 
risk of nuclear confrontation. I look to this panel for 
recommendations on how best to engage on this commitment.
    I think it's well to recall what President Reagan stated, 
``A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The 
only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to 
make sure they will never be used.'' As much as President 
Reagan valued a strong nuclear deterrence, he also valued the 
importance of arms control as an essential part of the security 
architecture to lessen the risk of these weapons being used. 
These two are linked and we must not forget that linkage.
    Again, let me thank our witnesses for being here today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    So, we'll start with opening statements, and try to keep 
them around 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made a 
part of the record.
    Ms. Creedon, we'll start with you.
    Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, may I ask unanimous 
consent to submit a letter from former Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter with respect to these issues of nuclear posture?
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Without objection, so ordered.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    [The information referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Inhofe. Ms. Creedon, we'll start with you. Welcome 
back.

  STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MADELYN R. CREEDON, FORMER PRINCIPAL 
 DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Ms. Creedon. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe and 
Senator Reed. It is truly a pleasure to be back before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss nuclear modernization and policy.
    It's also a particular honor to be here today with General 
Kehler and Frank Miller, both of whom bring years of experience 
and wisdom to the table.
    To start off the discussion, I would like to make five 
points:
    First, one of the most important things that this 
Administration could do is extend New START from its current 
2021 expiration date to 2026. The treaty allows a 5-year 
extension by mutual agreement. It is a simple matter of saying 
yes. The Senate, because it provided its consent to the treaty, 
has no further role in the actual extension, but it would be 
very helpful if the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, could 
indicate not only broad support for the treaty, but actually 
urge the 5-year extension.
    Extension of New START is in the best interests of the 
United States, as it provides strategic stability, certainty, 
and transparency. Moreover, a 5-year extension would allow an 
opportunity for discussions of what comes next in the United 
States-Russia relationship and in arms control. This could 
include nonstrategic nuclear weapons or some of the more novel 
systems that Russia has recently unveiled.
    Point two is, support the triad. The current multi-decade 
program to replace the triad of U.S. delivery systems--a new 
ballistic missile submarine, a new ICBM, known as the ground-
based strategic deterrent (GBSD), a new bomber, the B-21--are 
all important to the U.S. national security and that of our 
allies and partners. Similarly, the warhead life extension 
programs undertaken by the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) will allow the smaller active stockpile 
to be maintained safely, securely, and reliably into the 
future.
    President Obama, in seeking a world without nuclear 
weapons, said clearly in his 2009 Prague speech that, quote, 
``As long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, 
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and 
guarantee that defense to our allies.''
    As a Nation, we dropped the ball on replacing these 
systems. The United States fought the long war in the Middle 
East and elsewhere, and nuclear deterrence was not a priority. 
As a result, President Obama laid out a program of delivery 
system and platform modernization along with warhead life 
extensions in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. For the most 
part, this effort was continued in President Trump's 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review.
    My third point is, focus on replacing the infrastructure at 
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security 
Administration, and supporting the science that underpins these 
life extension programs. Over the last 25 years, NNSA has made 
a significant investment in the science of nuclear weapons, 
allowing the weapons to be maintained and now life-extended 
without the need for testing. The scientific achievements are 
remarkable and were thought not to be achievable when the 
program started. The naysayers that were certain a return to 
underground nuclear weapons testing would be needed have been 
proven wrong.
    While the science has excelled and still needs to be 
supported, the manufacturing side of the NNSA complex, however, 
was largely ignored. Many of the manufacturing buildings date 
back to the era of the Manhattan Project. Even with the 
inclusion of the new science facilities, 54 percent of the 
facilities are either inadequate or substandard. The NNSA 
complex is roughly the size of Delaware, has over 2,000 miles 
of roads, and has about six Pentagon equivalents of active 
space under roof. Replacing and upgrading the NNSA complex will 
be difficult and expensive, but, in the end, it will be the 
smaller, more modern, safer, and more secure complex that the 
Nation needs.
    Fourth is people. DOD, the services, and NNSA don't have 
enough people. Getting the right people is very difficult, as 
there's a lot of competition. Developing and adopting more 
creative ways to attract, train, hire, and retain employees is 
critical. This could include scholarships, on-the-job training, 
and retention pay, for example, but, whatever is the answer, 
hiring has to be easier and faster. Of course, the backlog in 
getting new security clearances, updated security clearances, 
and even getting security clearances transferred from one 
agency to another has an enormous detrimental impact on the 
nuclear and national security enterprise, as well as the morale 
of the workforce.
    Finally, I would like to highlight the need for a national 
discussion on deterrence, including nuclear deterrence. U.S. 
nuclear capabilities are the ultimate deterrent for the United 
States, but also many of our allies and partners. Their belief 
that the United States maintains a credible deterrent is 
critical to sustaining the alliances and avoiding the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finding the right balance 
between reductions and modernization, and building the 
consensus to support both, was a major achievement of the Obama 
Administration. Sustaining that consensus will be difficult. 
Nuclear deterrence is not a popular topic of discussion, and 
one that is not well understood. President Obama tried to lead 
the way down the road that would head to a world without 
nuclear weapons. Sadly, the world didn't pick that path, and 
the threat of nuclear use is increasing.
    Ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for 
the United States and our allies can help to prevent nuclear 
use until the time when there is an opportunity to reduce the 
threat and resume work to set the conditions that will 
ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. In the meantime, while 
the nuclear deterrent programs will vary and evolve over time, 
consistency in support and funding is necessary to ensure a 
safe, secure, and reliable deterrent for the United States, our 
allies, and our partners.
    I look forward to any questions. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Ms. Creedon.
    Mr. Miller.

   STATEMENT OF HONORABLE FRANKLIN C. MILLER, FORMER SPECIAL 
  ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND FORMER 
 SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL, NATIONAL 
                     SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

    Mr. Miller. Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, Members of the 
Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you this 
morning.
    We live today in an increasingly dangerous time. As the 
National Defense Strategy and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
make clear, the United States faces a revanchist Russia and an 
expansionist China, and both authoritarian governments are 
aggressively challenging United States and allied interests 
around the world, both are modernizing their conventional armed 
forces and expanding their nuclear capabilities. Given these 
threats, the peace and security of the United States and our 
allies depends on a posture which makes clear that we will 
deter any attack from Russia or China.
    The bedrock of our deterrent capability rests on our 
nuclear forces, and the nuclear deterrence policy posture set 
forth in the 2018 NPR is squarely in the mainstream of U.S. 
deterrence policy as it has existed in Democratic and 
Republican Administrations for almost 60 years. It is not, as 
alleged by some, a warfighting policy. It is a deterrence 
policy. That policy is based, as Senator Reed said, on the very 
firm belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be 
fought. But, our recognizing this is not sufficient. It's 
essential that potential enemy leaders recognize and understand 
this, as well. The greatest risk of nuclear war and to 
deterrence stability lies in a potential enemy miscalculating 
and believing it can carry out a successful attack.
    As the Committee is aware, the United States has 
accomplished this goal since the early 1960s, principally by 
maintaining the nuclear triad undergirded by a command-and-
control (C2) infrastructure and by a nuclear weapons complex. 
General Hyten spoke to all of you, 2 days ago, about why we 
need a triad, so I don't need to go there, except to say, as 
Ms. Creedon said, due to past neglect, the modernization of our 
nuclear forces and their associated command-and-control and 
warning systems is now of critical national importance.
    With respect to modernization, there are two points I would 
like to make:
    First, the program is not creating a nuclear arms race. 
Russia and China began modernizing and expanding their nuclear 
forces in the 2008 to 2010 timeframe, and, since then, have 
been placing large numbers of new strategic nuclear systems in 
the field. The United States has not deployed a new nuclear 
delivery system in this century, and the first products of our 
nuclear modernization program will not be deployed until the 
mid-to-late 2020s. Any notion that our program has spurred a 
nuclear arms race is counterfactual.
    Second, modernization of the triad is affordable. Critics 
like to throw around a 30-year lifecycle cost to produce a 
sticker shock, but, as the Committee knows, 30-year lifecycle 
costs are always expensive. The cost of the modernization 
program, even when it's in full swing by the 2020s, is not 
expected to exceed 3 to 4 percent of the defense budget. If you 
couple that with the 3 percent of the defense budget that goes 
to operating the nuclear forces, the total cost of protecting 
the United States and our allies from nuclear attack is between 
6 to 7 percent of the defense budget. That's 6 to 7 cents on 
the defense dollar. Not too much to pay for preventing an 
existential threat.
    Perhaps the most controversial and misunderstood element of 
the modernization program is the decision to deploy a very 
small number of low-yield warheads on Trident II missiles. As 
Senator Reed said, this relates directly to Russia's deployment 
of a military doctrine that envisages the threat or actual use 
of low-yield nuclear weapons to win a conventional war. 
Building and deploying a limited number of modified Trident II 
warheads counters that Russian strategy and dispels 
miscalculation and misperceptions in Moscow about our will and 
capability. The pernicious and contrived criticism that the 
low-yield warhead is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, 
thereby making nuclear warfighting possible, flies in the face 
of strategic logic and official policy, which is clearly and 
unambiguously stated in NPR 2018.
    In closing, let me address the ``no first use'' issue. It 
is a superficially appealing policy, but, in practice, it is 
destabilizing. First, should the United States adopt such an 
approach, it will be read by our allies as removing our 
longstanding pledge to deter massive conventional attack 
against them. Withdrawing that promise would shake the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, particularly now, 
given growing transatlantic tensions and Russia's violation of 
the INF Treaty. It could also cause some allies who don't build 
nuclear weapons today to consider building their own.
    Furthermore, if ``no first use'' became U.S. policy, the 
Department of Defense would ensure that it was enforced in the 
planning process. But, potential enemies have a different view. 
Russia's policy today is ``first use.'' China has a ``no first 
use'' policy, but it's highly nuanced and may suggest that 
China would feel entitled to attack preemptively if its leaders 
felt threatened. That Chinese policy could change in an 
instant.
    Finally, if the United States were to adopt such a policy, 
it's highly likely that the leaderships in Moscow and Beijing 
would not believe it, thereby vitiating any change in crisis 
behavior such a policy might hope to employ.
    I don't have time in my opening remarks to address the arms 
control issues, but I have views on INF and on New START which 
I would be happy to share.
    Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I can assure you, 
with the Members up here, that you will have an opportunity to 
be heard.
    General Kehler, you retired in 2013. You've rested long 
enough. Get to work.
    [Laughter.]

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.), FORMER 
           COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    General Kehler. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Thank you. Good 
morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished Members of 
the Committee. It's a real privilege to be here with you this 
morning, as well as to be here with my longtime colleagues to 
the right.
    I want to emphasize that you're going to hear my personal 
views this morning. I'm not representing the Department or 
STRATCOM or the Air Force. In the interest of time, let me just 
offer a few points for you to consider.
    First, as you are considering investment priorities, I 
would remind you that deterring the actual or coercive use of 
nuclear weapons against the United States and our allies 
remains the highest national security priority. There is no 
higher priority. While we don't have to rely on nuclear weapons 
to deter some of the same threats that we did during the Cold 
War, nuclear weapons continue to perform a critical 
foundational role in our defense strategy and the strategies of 
our allies. No other weapons carry the same risks and 
consequences, and no other weapons have the same deterrent 
effect.
    Second, in my view, current U.S. nuclear policy is sound. 
Our nuclear policy has remained remarkably consistent over the 
decades and, when necessary, has changed in an evolutionary, 
not a revolutionary, way. The latest Nuclear Posture Review 
retains this consistency, but it evolves to address a resurgent 
great-power threat, and it raises the priority of deterrence 
and force modernization as a result. This NPR highlighted the 
need for tailored deterrence. That's a recognition that the 
United States must shape its deterrence strategies to 
individual actors that are all very different, and that we must 
apply all the strategic tools, not just nuclear weapons, to 
today's complex global deterrence problems.
    As you heard, the Nuclear Posture Review also called for a 
small number of low-yield weapons to credibly deter Russia's 
new doctrine and their deployment decisions that back that 
doctrine up. Regarding declaratory policy, the last two Nuclear 
Posture Reviews have agreed that the potential conditions for 
the United States to consider nuclear use are extreme 
circumstances, where vital national interests are involved. I 
think that context remains valid.
    My third point, the triad of ICBMs and ballistic missile 
submarines and long-range bombers and their supporting command-
control-communications (C3) has served us well for over 50 
years, and it remains the most effective and the most cost-
effective means to deter attack and prevent coercion. The triad 
provides the mixture of systems and weapons necessary to hold 
an adversary's most valuable targets at risk with the 
credibility of an assured response if it's ever needed. Those 
attributes are the essence of deterrence. But, the triad also 
allows political leaders to signal intent and enhanced 
stability in a crisis or a conflict, it forces an adversary to 
invest in defenses, and it provides a hedge against unforeseen 
geopolitical or technical changes.
    Some have recommended eliminating the ICBM leg of the 
triad. I believe that would be a serious mistake. We use the 
triad differently today than we did during the Cold War. Since 
President Bush removed bombers and tankers from their daily 
nuclear commitment in 1992, we have relied on a relatively 
small diad of ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines to meet 
our daily deterrence requirements. The constant readiness of 
our ICBMs has allowed us to adjust the number of submarines 
routinely at sea. Together, ICBMs and Nuclear-Powered Ballistic 
Missile Submarines (SSBNs) have freed bombers for use by 
commanders in a conventional role, with great effect. 
Eliminating the ICBM leg would effectively leave us with a 
monad of ballistic missile submarines for daily deterrence.
    Now, you might ask, ``So, what?'' Well, as a practical 
matter, relying only on ballistic missile submarines for daily 
deterrence means that an unforeseen advance in enemy capability 
or a technical failure would force a President to choose 
between having no readily available nuclear deterrence forces 
or rapidly returning bombers to nuclear alert. And that's a 
step that carries its own risks and costs. Eliminating ICBMs 
also greatly simplifies an enemy's attack problem, with 
implications for both stability and deterrence.
    My fourth point. As you've heard from my colleagues, the 
time has come to modernize our nuclear delivery platforms, the 
weapons, the C3, and the infrastructure. The last concentrated 
investment came during the 1980s. Now, we continue to rely on 
that era's ballistic missile submarines, the missiles that are 
on them, and the B-2 bombers, as well as B-52s and Minuteman 
ICBMs and air-launch cruise missiles, and command-and-control 
systems that were designed and fielded much earlier than the 
1980s. While all have been maintained and periodically updated, 
these systems have either passed or are reaching the end of 
their service lives. That is not the case with Russia and 
China, who have invested heavily and deployed modern nuclear 
systems as part of strategies intended to diminish our power 
and prestige.
    So, as I close, I want to emphasize that clarity and 
consistency are as important now as they were during the Cold 
War. Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers across 
Administrations have sent conflicting signals regarding the 
continued value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the necessity 
and cost of its modernization. While I was still in uniform, a 
basic consensus had emerged regarding the need to modernize and 
the plan to do it. Mr. Chairman, I would argue we are out of 
time. Committing to the plan and moving forward to execute it 
will do much to demonstrate our resolve, and deterrence 
credibility demands it.
    Thanks again for inviting me, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you. Excellent statement. All 
three statements were excellent.
    The only thing I would disagree with a little bit, Mr. 
Miller, was when you made the comment that we don't need to go 
there, because General Hyten already responded to this. The 
whole purpose, or major purpose, of this meeting is to get your 
perspectives, in addition to the other perspectives. From your 
opening statements, I think a lot of those are the same, but 
they need to be repeated.
    So, what I want to do is take a couple of the comments that 
have been made outside and ask, just to set the stage, your 
response to those things that were said.
    This would be for all of the witnesses: Some have proposed 
a variety of cuts in the nuclear modernization program. They 
argue that two or three of the triad are too expensive, 
unnecessary, and redundant. They also suggest that we might 
save money by life-extending current systems for several more 
decades. This is what we've been doing in the past. The band-
aid approach. I would ask each one of you to say, do you agree 
with these suggestions I've just articulated? Starting with 
you, Ms. Creedon.
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Almost all of our delivery systems are extraordinarily old 
and have been extended pretty much to the end of their viable 
life. The one exception is probably the B-52. I don't mean to 
be flippant, but that will probably be with us forever.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, it already has been, yeah.
    Ms. Creedon. Oh. But, with respect, certainly, to the 
ground-based strategic deterrent, the new system that will 
replace the Minuteman-3 ICBMs and the Columbia-class 4, the 
Ohio-class, and the B-21, all of those are absolutely necessary 
and have to be replaced.
    Chairman Inhofe. Good.
    Mr. Miller.
    Mr. Miller. Sir, the triad, we all acknowledge, came about 
because of interservice rivalry in the 1950s. But, ever since 
it has been in force, it has been recognized by every 
successive Administration since President Eisenhower's, 
Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, as serving a 
unique feature. The various different vulnerabilities and 
various different offensive capabilities that the triad brings 
totally confound an enemy planner who would try to create a 
viable strategic surprise attack on the United States. As my 
colleagues have said, those forces, which were built in the 
1960s, were modernized by President Reagan. They should have 
been modernized in the George W. Bush Administration, but have 
not been. We've had two successive Strategic Command 
commanders, Admiral Haney, now retired, and General Hyten, who 
have said those forces are going to have to be retired soon, in 
the next decade, with or without replacement. We've got to 
modernize the triad and its command-and-control and, as Ms. 
Creedon said, the nuclear weapons infrastructure.
    Chairman Inhofe. Sure.
    General Kehler.
    General Kehler. I agree with my colleagues. Each leg of the 
triad contributes something important, and together they 
provide us with a deterrent effect that you're not going to 
duplicate with a missing leg. I would only highlight one other 
thing, because it doesn't get enough attention, and I'm sure 
General Hyten mentioned this in his testimony the other day. At 
least I hope he did. That's the necessity of modernizing our 
nuclear command-control-communications (NC3) that support the 
triad. That has equal importance. We've often called it sort of 
a hidden leg of deterrence. I think it's true. It doesn't get 
enough attention. I would just urge you to make sure that the 
investment in nuclear C3 is commensurate with the investment in 
the forces. We can't overlook it any longer.
    If you want to look at, maybe, some of the oldest pieces of 
the nuclear deterrence system, I think you would probably find 
that, in the C3 system, we have some of the oldest elements. 
So, please don't ignore the C3 piece.
    Chairman Inhofe. Excellent.
    Yeah, I'm going to have to hurry to get to the other 
question that I'm asking all of you. Some of the suggestions 
that have been proposed are cutting the new cruise missile, the 
long-range standoff weapon, which is the LRSO, because it's 
destabilizing. If we were to cancel the LSRO program, do you 
believe that the air leg of the triad would still be an 
effective deterrent, a decade from now?
    Let's start with you, Ms. Creedon.
    Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator.
    The LRSO was a decision that was made during the Obama 
Administration to replace the existing air-launched cruise 
missile, which, again, like the other systems, had far outlived 
its usefulness. It was extraordinarily hard to maintain. So, in 
this instance, it's a one-for-one replacement. It continues a 
capability that has been with us for a long time. And because 
of the increase in integrated air defenses (IADs), having a new 
stealthy cruise missile to go along with the new air 
capabilities is essential.
    Chairman Inhofe. Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. I agree with everything that Ms. Creedon has 
said, and I do want to address your comment that some people in 
this town believe that it's destabilizing. That's an 
interesting concept, because, throughout the 1980s and beyond, 
the United States deployed nuclear-armed and conventionally-
armed cruise missiles. They were not seen to be destabilizing. 
And if they're destabilizing, then the question has to be 
asked, in whose eyes? Russia is busily deploying both nuclear- 
and conventionally-armed cruise missiles today, as are the 
Chinese. So, while I understand that some people in Washington 
think it's destabilizing, the fact is that the potential 
adversaries do not and are putting these systems in the field.
    Chairman Inhofe. Excellent comment.
    Anything?
    General Kehler. I would only add that whether or not 
something is a new weapon, I think is in the eye of the 
beholder. I don't view any of the capabilities we've talked 
about here as new weapons, in that they are not new 
capabilities. The one thing that hasn't been said, an air-
launched cruise missile--a nuclear-capable air-launched cruise 
missile makes our long-range standoff bombers viable well into 
the end of their service lifes, in another 20 or 30 or 40, or 
maybe longer, years, and it makes a penetrator like the B-2 or 
the B-21, which is what it will be intended to arm, as well--
makes it more lethal, because it extends its range. So, I think 
that continuing to have a long-range nuclear-capable missile 
that our bombers can deliver is essential for deterrence in the 
future.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you very much.
    We're going to try to stay on course here. The other two 
questions I was going to ask all three, I'm going to ask for 
the record unless they are addressed by my colleagues.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, thank you all for your excellent testimony.
    Let me ask everyone to comment on the INF withdrawal. Let 
me suggest a couple of potential issues that are involved in 
this.
    First is the potential for proliferation of the Russian 
SSC-8 missile, since now, there's no even formal document to 
constrain them, even though they broke the document. Second, 
it's the proliferation of medium-range missiles in other parts 
of the country, places like Ukraine, who might see this as an 
advantage. There's no longer an international rule governing 
that. Third, the potentially serious and detrimental effects to 
New START. In that context, there doesn't appear to me to be, 
at this point, any significant diplomatic activity to engage in 
a New START discussion. Time is running out.
    So, let me start with Ms. Creedon, who was actually in here 
in 2014, when the Russians were called out.
    Ms. Creedon. Senator Reed, first, obviously the Russians 
were in violation of the INF Treaty. That said, I think the way 
that this Administration pulled out of the treaty was a 
mistake. I think there were opportunities not exercised for 
discussions. There's a lot of arguments that this is a treaty 
that has outlived its usefulness, but whether that's true or 
not, that is the sort of thing that should have been discussed. 
I think the unilateral decision to pull out of this treaty was 
a mistake. It's not clear that there is a strategy as to what 
comes next. I think, in some respects, it was a bit of a 
surprise to some of our allies. There's a huge amount of work 
to be done to understand what is the next move for the United 
States, with no limitations now on anybody.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Mr. Miller, please.
    Mr. Miller. Senator, first, let me say, I do believe that 
effectively enforced arms control treaties strengthen our 
national security.
    The second thing I would say is that, sadly, Russia is on 
record as a serial violator of arms control treaties. There are 
nine separate arms control treaties or agreements that the 
Russians currently are in violation of.
    Third, as with Ms. Creedon, I think the way the 
Administration rolled out its decision was a huge mistake. But, 
that said, I also believe that the treaty was dead, that the 
treaty had been killed by a cynical decision made by the 
Kremlin sometime in the 2011-2012 timeframe to proceed with a 
program that they wanted to do but that the treaty prevented 
them from doing. United States diplomacy on this issue started 
with the Russians in 2013, and, in the period from 2013 to 
2018, while we talked, this cruise missile went through its 
final research, development, and testing phases, and all that 
that diplomacy has bought us now is 100 of these things in the 
field. So, I don't think the Russians felt constrained. It's a 
black program. They have hidden it. I think that if we 
negotiated for another 5 years, there would only be more of 
these systems in the field.
    Senator Reed. Just to follow up, if we lose New START, then 
we would effectively have, for the first time since really, the 
1950s, no nuclear treaties even pretending to control the 
growth of nuclear weapons in the world.
    Mr. Miller. I believe that we ought to be approaching the 
Russians with a new treaty concept that would cover all United 
States and Russian nuclear weapons. I understand that General 
Hyten had that same idea.
    Senator Reed. But, you can repeat it.
    Mr. Miller. But, it is, I think, very important, because 
right now New START caps conventional strategic systems.
    Senator Reed. Right.
    Mr. Miller. But, Mr. Putin has all of these exotic systems 
on the side that aren't covered, and he's got several thousand 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including the treaty-buster. I 
think we ought to finally get our hands around all of these. My 
personal view would be to cut a deal where we extend New START, 
on the condition that we begin serious negotiations on getting 
our arms around all United States and Russian nuclear weapons.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Kehler, your comments, please.
    General Kehler. Sir, I would just add that the purpose of 
arms control is to make us more secure. I think that we can 
point to examples where that has been exactly the output of 
arms control, both the process and some of the treaties 
themselves. I would offer that the United States may find 
itself in a position from time to time where it has to withdraw 
from a treaty, but we should not withdraw from the process, 
because I believe that we have gained a great deal of insight 
over the years with our potential adversary over how they 
operate, what they think is important, and lots of other 
attendant issues. I would not withdraw from the arms control 
process. I do agree that, as we consider what should happen 
next, there are other issues that should be on the table that 
are considered as part of what we do next.
    Senator Reed. A final comment, because my time is running 
out--I concur, it just seems that there's no really strong, 
visible commitment to the process from the Administration. If 
you told me who was the chief negotiator, that they have a 
team, they've scheduled meetings with the Russians, et cetera, 
I haven't seen that. If you see that, let us know, please, 
because I think that's a step where we're missing, at the 
moment.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. General Kehler, explain what you mean by 
withdrawing from the treaty and not withdrawing from the 
process.
    General Kehler. Senator, what I mean is, my knowledge of 
New START is that both parties have been complying with it, and 
I think that it has helped us to reduce a number of 
operationally deployed weapons that could be aimed at us. I 
think that's a positive outcome. I also think that the 
engagement, to include the verification regime, gets us on the 
ground, face-to-face, with the Russians, and vice versa. I 
think that's positive. In the INF Treaty, I think it's clearly 
violated, and we should not be in arms control treaties that 
are being violated.
    So, I think that there's a balance, here. There is an 
overarching arms control process, though, an intent to want to 
have arms control, that I believe is valuable. I think that, 
because of all the things that I just mentioned, to include the 
benefits we get from face-to-face contact, I would continue to 
make sure that we have a process where we are engaging with the 
Russians. I think it's time for us to think about others with 
nuclear arms, and how they should play, as well. But, I would 
not turn my back on arms control, writ large.
    Senator Wicker. A number of us just got back from the 
Munich Security Conference, and I just got back, also, from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
Parliamentary Assembly. It is correct that not all of our 
allies are alarmed about our withdrawal from the INF. As a 
matter of fact, some of them are prepared to support that 
publicly. Are you aware of that?
    General Kehler. No, sir, I'm really not. I'm not current, 
in terms of where the allies are on these things. I do believe 
that this is an alliance issue, though.
    Senator Wicker. Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, the NATO alliance has formally endorsed 
the fact that Russia is in violation, and supported the fact 
that, if they are not back in compliance with the treaty in 6 
months, which is an almost impossible task, that they support 
the fact that the United States believes that the treaty is 
null and void, because it only controls us, but not the 
Russians.
    Senator Wicker. What was the inartful thing that we did, in 
terms of the way we got out?
    Mr. Miller. We should have said, from the beginning--and I 
think this was the plan--that Russia was in violation, that we 
have been talking to them for 5 years, that there is evidence 
that the system is out there--I think it was probably about 70 
or 80 missiles at the time--and that we needed to take action 
to either bring them back or to withdraw. Instead, the way it 
rolled out was, ``We are getting out of the treaty.'' The 
burden shifted from the Russians, who were cheating, to the 
United States, publicly. So, a lot of diplomacy had to be 
exercised to correct that impression. It's still not completely 
corrected.
    Senator Wicker. Now, General Kehler says that the Russians 
are complying with New START. Mr. Miller and Ms. Creedon, do 
you both agree with that?
    Mr. Miller. I have not seen anything that suggests that 
they are not now complying.
    Ms. Creedon. Yes. Everything I've seen says they are 
complying. I think there was testimony earlier, by General 
Hyten, that they are also in compliance. So, everything I've 
seen, that they are.
    Senator Wicker. Okay. With regard to ``no first use,'' Mr. 
Miller has expressed his opinion, so I'm going to ask that 
question to Ms. Creedon and General Kehler.
    Ms. Creedon. Senator, I think the ``no first use'' is a 
very difficult topic, and a serious topic, and it really needs 
discussion. It is an idea that we will not be the first ones to 
use nuclear weapons. The history of the United States has been 
that our policy has been that of ambiguity, that we will 
maintain ambiguity so that our potential adversaries will not 
know how we will respond.
    Senator Wicker. That we don't rule out options.
    Ms. Creedon. We don't rule out options. I think that has 
served us very well.
    Now, that said, there was a substantial discussion, as you 
all know, at the end of the Obama Administration, and I think 
it's a discussion that needs to be continued.
    Senator Wicker. Okay, so you're not entirely on the same 
page with Mr. Miller. You're a little more open to the idea.
    Ms. Creedon. So, I don't think it's a good idea right this 
minute. I do not----
    Senator Wicker. Okay.
    Ms. Creedon.--think ``no first use'' is----
    Senator Wicker. Good, then. Well, let me just turn----
    Ms. Creedon.--but it's one that----
    Senator Wicker.--then, to General----
    Ms. Creedon.--you should talk about from an ambition 
perspective.
    Senator Wicker. General Kehler.
    General Kehler. I would not establish a ``no first use'' 
policy. I think one of the things we forget sometimes is that 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent is unique among all the nuclear 
powers, in that we extend a deterrent umbrella to our allies. 
We do so publicly. We've done so since almost the dawn of the 
Nuclear Age. I think that we need to be very careful that 
establishing such a policy doesn't harm the credibility of the 
extended deterrent, as well.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to our witnesses here today.
    Ms. Creedon, I want to ask you this question. Earlier this 
week, General Hyten raised some concerns about some of the 
other strategic weapons that Russia is developing. I think you 
alluded to that in your opening comments, things such as the 
nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles, globe-circling 
nuclear-powered cruise missiles, long-range nuclear torpedoes 
that can be used against U.S. coastal cities. How concerned 
should we be by these weapons? Do you believe that that 
strengthens the case to extend New START?
    Ms. Creedon. Yes, I think we should be very worried about 
these systems. I do think it absolutely is one of the reasons 
why we should extend New START for the 5 years, because I do 
agree with the plan, with the idea, that we need to have 
discussions with Russia to understand how those systems can be 
limited, how they can be made more transparent. The 5-year 
extension of New START would allow us that opportunity to have 
those discussions. Resuming discussions with Russia is 
incredibly important, and it's just something that has not been 
able to be done right now. But, we've got to make progress on 
these issues.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    To our other witnesses, do you share those concerns?
    Mr. Miller. Senator, those systems that you mentioned are 
not covered by New START. That's one of the reasons why I 
believe a new approach to arms control with Russia that 
encompasses those systems, as well as the ones that are taken 
up by New START, is terribly important. All of those systems 
are outside the treaty, as are the short-range ones. Therefore, 
if arms control is supposed to provide security, we're only 
doing it at halfway, which is not a sufficient way to do arms 
control.
    Senator Peters. Although it's not in the treaty now, does 
the treaty give us a hook to bring those in, or does it not?
    Mr. Miller. No, sir. It would have to be a new negotiation.
    Senator Peters. General?
    General Kehler. I agree. From a military standpoint, at 
least, I am always concerned by new capabilities that are being 
introduced that are not covered. So, I would be very careful 
about how we view the extension of New START and how we manage 
the conversation about new capabilities. We have to remember 
that our deterrent is both to prevent the actual use of the 
weapons and the coercive use of the weapons, as well. I think 
that's something that sometimes we overlook.
    Senator Peters. Right.
    The other issue that I'm concerned about is the development 
of new low-yield nuclear weapons that are going to be deployed. 
I know nuclear theory has a lot of terms used to discuss how a 
war may be fought using nuclear weapons: escalation dominance, 
tailored deterrence, counter-force targeting. I think there's a 
long list of those. But, we also understand the fog of war is a 
real factor in conventional warfare, and likely would be even 
more so if there's any kind of nuclear conflict.
    So, my question to you is that, if Russia were to use a 
low-yield nuclear weapon, the United States, under the theory, 
could respond using another nuclear low-yield weapon. But, 
certainly folks would argue that that may lead to a certain 
escalation. Some have argued that maybe just having very large-
yield weapons is more of a deterrence than trying to match low-
yield to low-yield. Certainly would like to kind of get your 
thoughts unpacking those thoughts.
    We can start with Ms. Creedon.
    Ms. Creedon. If, under your question, Russia were to use a 
low-yield nuclear weapon, the United States would have 
available the full complement of its response; and, whatever 
the circumstances were as a result of that use, the United 
States should take a response that is appropriate under those 
circumstances. Whether that's a lower-yield nuclear weapon, 
whether that's a conventional response, whether that's a 
higher-yield nuclear weapon, I think is very situationally 
dependent. I guess I'll just leave it at that. I think we have, 
in our arsenal right now, the full range of systems to be able 
to respond to whatever Russia does.
    Senator Peters. Without developing a new low-yield weapon.
    Ms. Creedon. Without developing a new low-yield.
    Senator Peters. Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. So, Senator, I think the first point is, the 
risk of escalation is, in fact, what stops leaders short from 
using nuclear weapons in the first place. My concern is that 
the Russian development of this ``escalate to win'' strategy 
and the weapon systems that they have put in the field, the new 
ones, to sustain that strategy, was done in full recognition of 
our current capabilities, which leads me to believe, and others 
in the intelligence community, that the Russians don't believe 
that our current arsenal provide a sufficient response. The 
small number of low-yield Trident II weapons provide a response 
to that, thereby preventing the Russians from thinking they 
could use a low-yield nuclear weapon in the first place. The 
Russians have a full set of tactical nuclear weapons. The 
United States is not seeking to mirror that posture. We're 
talking about a small number of Trident II weapons that would 
do the job.
    Senator Peters. Briefly, General?
    General Kehler. Senator, I think you're right, there's a 
theology that goes with all of this. Unfortunately, it's never 
been tested. So, it's hard to say, ``Well, this would happen, 
and that would happen, and this would happen.'' I think the 
objective, though, is to remember that deterrence is based on 
two things: one, it's in the mind of the adversary and the 
adversary believes that they can't achieve their objectives; 
or, two, they're going to suffer unacceptable consequences if 
they try. So, that's the foundation, here, that we're trying to 
continue to pursue. The paradox of the Nuclear Age is that, in 
order to prevent their use, you have to be prepared to use 
them. That's been a paradox forever. And all the theologians 
talk about the big paradox.
    I think the important point to remember here is, you want 
to be able to provide the future policymakers options. In that 
kind of a scenario, you want options that are below the nuclear 
threshold, you want to be able to use conventional, precision-
strike weapons when you can, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, 
but you don't want to have to go from there to offer the next 
option to be a high-yield nuclear weapon. Something in between 
is required, we believed, for deterrence credibility. That's 
the objective, here. It's not about nuclear warfighting, as Mr. 
Miller said earlier on, but the paradox is, in order to prevent 
it, you have to be ready to confront it.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to begin by looking at unilateral reductions. 
Sometimes that's been a proposal that's put out there. I would 
just ask for a yes-or-no from the panel, to begin with. Do any 
of you support unilateral reductions by the United States? 
Everyone's indicating no.
    We heard from General Hyten, a couple of days ago, that 
doing so would be inconsistent with the current security 
environment. He stated, quote, ``The only way to change our 
strategic deterrent is to convince our adversaries to reduce 
the threat. And this is not occurring.'' Would you agree with 
that assessment?
    General Kehler, why don't we begin with you?
    General Kehler. Yes, I would.
    Senator Fischer. Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am, I would.
    Ms. Creedon. Yes.
    Senator Fischer. Okay.
    I thank you for the information that you provided to us 
about the triad. I think the triad is extremely important to 
our national security. There has been some talk out there that 
the United States should possibly begin to mimic the Chinese in 
their smaller approach to nuclear weapons. They are rebuilding 
their force, is information I have. They're expanding from a 
diad to a triad. They are in a different position than the 
United States. You touched on the fact that we have a nuclear 
deterrent that has an umbrella effect, because we do protect 
allies, et al. Would you continue to support the posture that 
the United States has with regard to the umbrella effect we 
have with our allies?
    Mr. Miller. I think that that posture is extremely 
important, not only for providing stability in Europe and in 
northeast Asia, but it also serves as an antiproliferant, if 
you will. Some of our allies could build nuclear weapons. They 
don't, because we provide the umbrella over them. If we 
withdraw that umbrella, then the situation changes for them 
dramatically. So, as I said in my remarks, the policy we have 
has served the country well for over 60 years, and I support 
that policy.
    Senator Fischer. Okay.
    Ms. Creedon?
    Ms. Creedon. Yes, Senator, I also feel that our 
responsibility to our allies to provide that umbrella is 
absolutely essential. It does have a nonproliferation benefit, 
and it's one of the reasons why we have to make sure that our 
own deterrent, because it's their deterrent as well, is 
credible and well maintained.
    The longer-term question is, how do we introduce a 
discussion in China? How do we introduce a discussion about 
arms control in that region that has no history and no 
incentive and apparently no interest in it? So, that's the 
longer-term question that we have to think about.
    Senator Fischer. Do you think the possibility for opening 
up discussion with the Chinese could occur now, since we are 
pulling back from INF Treaty, and the Russians are? Do you 
think that we can bring other members of the nuclear club into 
that discussion now?
    Ms. Creedon. It would be a good thing to see if we can 
start having some very preliminary discussions, bring our 
allies in the region to the table; understand what their views 
are first, make sure that we are closely aligned with all of 
our allies and partners in the region, and to see if we can 
develop some sort of a dialogue that could be presented to the 
Chinese to begin some sort of stability talks. I think it would 
be useful. I'm not terribly hopeful, but I think it would be 
useful to at least start.
    Senator Fischer. But, you don't believe there is any 
indication, so far, from the Chinese that they would be 
interested in being involved in the process?
    Ms. Creedon. We haven't seen it, but I'm also not sure if 
there have been any real overtures in that effect. But, I think 
we should still start working on it and start planning for the 
possibility that it might be an option.
    Senator Fischer. Do you believe that pulling out of the INF 
Treaty gives the United States more latitude in addressing some 
of the weapons that the Chinese are developing?
    Ms. Creedon. Certainly, it does. One of the discussions 
really is conventional systems in Asia Pacific, in the Indo-
Pacific region, and whether or not those are going to be 
needed.
    Senator Fischer. Okay.
    General Kehler, did you have comments?
    General Kehler. No, I would just agree with my colleagues. 
I would add one other thing to your comment. The Russians and 
the Chinese will deploy the nuclear forces that they think are 
necessary for their own security. Significantly, though, I 
think it's important to remember that neither one of them 
deploys nuclear systems with the idea that they have allies to 
provide an umbrella for. The Warsaw Pact is extinct.
    Senator Fischer. You know, there is a group that seems to 
be promoting the idea that the United States is the 
destabilizing force when it comes to arms race. We hear about 
destabilizing in arms racing. What are your thoughts on that 
narrative? Is the United States provoking that arms race? Are 
we undercutting the nonproliferation regime that's out there?
    Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. Senator, as I said earlier, since 2008-2010, 
Russia and China have been placing new systems in the field--
new ICBMs, new strategic submarines, new submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, new bombers, new air-, sea-, and ground-
launched cruise missiles. The modernization program before this 
Committee, before the Congress, will not produce a new system 
until the mid-2020s and beyond. Former Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter, said, ``There is a nuclear arms race, but the United 
States is not in it.'' We in no way are spurring Russian and 
Chinese developments. They're marching to their own drum, as 
General Kehler said, and they started doing that 10 years ago.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here today.
    The nuclear deal between the United States, five other 
countries, and Iran placed Iran's nuclear program under limits 
and inspections so that it cannot develop a nuclear weapon. So 
far, this deal has worked. But, President Trump put it at risk 
when he unilaterally withdrew the United States and reimposed 
all the sanctions on Iran that were meant to be waived as a 
condition of Iran's compliance with the agreement.
    While the United States has violated the nuclear agreement, 
Iran has kept its part of the deal. Last month, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director said, in reference to Iran, 
and I'll quote here, ``At the moment, technically they are in 
compliance.''
    Ms. Creedon, do you agree with the CIA Director that Iran 
is complying with the nuclear agreement?
    Ms. Creedon. Senator, obviously I don't have access to all 
the intelligence----
    Senator Warren. Based on what you know----
    Ms. Creedon.--but just recently, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency confirmed that they were in compliance.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So, staying with the nuclear deal, 
also called the JCPOA, last month the Director of National 
Intelligence released a Worldwide Threat Assessment, and it 
says, ``Iran's continued implementation of the JCPOA has 
extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to more 
than 1 year.''
    Ms. Creedon, based on your understanding from publicly 
available information, is that correct?
    Ms. Creedon. My understanding, Senator Warren, is, that is 
correct, and there have been other articles to that effect, as 
well, that have been in the public.
    Senator Warren. Okay. This month, Vice President Pence 
urged our European allies to abandon the Iran nuclear deal. If 
this agreement collapses, would that complicate efforts to 
prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon?
    Ms. Creedon. Senator, the whole purpose of the Iran deal 
was to ensure that Iran wasn't able to produce the fissile 
materials necessary to get a nuclear weapon. It was the most 
challenging thing and why the Obama Administration focused on 
that one aspect. And so, if that deal were to unravel and Iran 
were not constrained under the JCPOA, then the only thing you 
can conclude is, they would go back to what they were doing 
before, which is making fissile materials.
    Senator Warren. So, just to summarize it here, our 
intelligence community says that Iran is complying with the 
only agreement that prevents Iran from getting a nuclear 
weapon. This agreement has made it harder for Iran to get a 
nuclear weapon. And then President Trump walks away from the 
deal, with no backup plan. This just doesn't make any sense.
    The nuclear deal is still working, so I think enforcing the 
current deal to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is a 
whole lot better than no deal at all.
    Thank you.
    I have one other question, in my time remaining, that I'd 
like to follow up on, and that follows up on Senator Peters' 
question. The New START with Russia currently imposes limits on 
our two countries' strategic nuclear arsenals, and it provides 
us with valuable information on Russia's strategic forces. This 
treaty can be extended for another 5 years, until 2026, if both 
of our governments agree to it. In a hearing on worldwide 
threats last month, the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency 
said that Russia is complying with New START. The State 
Department has reached the same conclusion.
    Ms. Creedon, based on publicly available information, do 
you agree with the Defense Intelligent Agency Director and the 
State Department?
    Ms. Creedon. Yes, Senator. Everything that I have heard 
indicates that Russia is still in compliance with New START, as 
is the United States.
    Senator Warren. And you once served as a high-ranking 
official at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Can 
you briefly describe how New START enhances our national 
security?
    Ms. Creedon. So, New START covers strategic warheads and 
delivery systems, and it counts operationally deployed 
strategic systems. It provides that limitation both to the 
United States and to Russia, so it provides stability. It 
provides transparency through the various mechanisms of 
inspections. It also provides additional transparency and the 
ability to discuss issues associated with implementation 
through the Bilateral Consultative Commission. This Commission, 
provided under the treaty, meets on a regular basis, and this 
is where the relationship, the discussion, the inspections, and 
the transparency all get discussed, as well as exercised in the 
field. It provides immense intelligence. I think, even General 
Hyten, last week, said, ``Although our own national 
intelligence means are quite good, the on-the-ground, seeing-
with-your-own-eyes is never a substitute for national technical 
means.''
    Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, and that's very 
helpful, and it helps explain why it's in our national 
interest.
    I don't trust Putin, but New START is a verifiable arms 
control agreement, and it expires in just 2 years. President 
Trump has already ripped up another nuclear arms treaty with 
Russia, the INF Treaty, and appears to be running out the clock 
on New START, without any plans for a follow-on agreement. We 
have a strategic and a moral responsibility to do everything in 
our power to prevent another nuclear arms race. This means 
commonsense arms control, which helps make America safer.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Scott.
    Senator Scott. With regard to Russia, Iran, and China, do 
they have any internal pressure to reduce their nuclear 
research or any existing capability? Do they have any internal 
pressure, like we do? We have to worry about how we spend our 
dollars and things like that. Do you feel like they have any 
internal pressure? Any of you?
    General Kehler. We've debated, for a long time, Senator, 
when I was still wearing a uniform, about how internally, what 
the dynamics are in those three places. I can't really say 
whether there's internal pressure that we just never get to see 
on these matters. The intelligence community, I think, would 
have a better sense of all of that.
    What I do know is that, from outward appearances, anyway, 
Russia and China have prioritized their nuclear forces at the 
top of their lists, and they've done so as part of strategies 
that are intended to diminish our power and prestige, to 
separate us from our allies, and to make it too hard for us to 
interfere in what they believe are their affairs in their 
regions. So, I think, by their actions, it would indicate to 
me, looking at it from the outside, that, if there are voices 
inside that are objecting, they're not being influential. A 
mentor of mine has always said, ``When we're talking about 
deterrence, you have to look at an adversary's intent and 
capability.'' You can change intent in the next 10 minutes. 
What you can't change is capability over a short period of 
time. I used to look at their capability, and their capability 
is formidable, it's modernized, and it's getting better.
    Senator Scott. Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. I'd agree with General Kehler.
    Senator Scott. Okay.
    Ms. Creedon?
    Ms. Creedon. Yeah, I would agree. The other aspect is, we 
are a very open and transparent society, and the same cannot be 
said of either Russia or China. So, it's very hard to 
understand what the population would know and whether or not 
they even have the ability to raise issues internally.
    Senator Scott. Right.
    So, they have no internal pressure to stop. Do you trust 
any of those three countries? Do you trust the leadership of 
any of those countries?
    Mr. Miller. I trust the leadership of Russia and China to 
be pushing us around the world. I think that the statements 
coming out of Mr. Putin and his cronies about nuclear attacks 
on ourselves and our allies are outrageous and haven't been 
heard since the Khrushchev era. I think that the building up of 
new islands in the South China Sea, a claim to try to block 
commerce using the South China Sea as an internal lake, the 
close-aboard incidents of Chinese and Russian aircraft to our 
ships and our own aircraft indicate a dangerous sense of 
adventurism. So, no, I would not trust either of those 
leaderships one bit.
    Senator Scott. Anybody else? No way, right?
    General Kehler. I always liked the trust-but-verify line.
    Senator Scott. Yeah. I agree with you.
    General Kehler. So, I think that's still a good one.
    Senator Scott. So, step one, they don't have internal 
pressure. Step two, we don't trust them. Okay? Then the next 
thing is, when we watched the INF, they didn't comply with the 
INF Treaty--can you actually do something when you have 
somebody on the other side of the table from you, can you 
actually do something with them that you feel any comfort that 
they're going to comply with it?
    Mr. Miller. Yes, I think you can, if you have intrusive 
verification measures. The INF Treaty, for its first several 
decades, had very intrusive verification measures, and we were 
confident that the Russians were not cheating. The same thing 
was true of the original START treaty. New START provides 
somewhat less verification capabilities, but we are confident 
of that one treaty, alone. But, as I said in my other remarks, 
the Russians are currently in violation of nine other treaties 
where we do not have adequate verification capabilities, but 
the results are plainly seen.
    Senator Scott. Anybody else?
    Ms. Creedon. Yes, Senator. New START is extraordinarily 
important because of the inspection regime that goes with it. 
That's what allows us to have the confidence that Russia is, in 
fact, in compliance with New START. It's also why the treaty 
should be extended, because, without it, we lose those 
intrusive inspections, we lose that knowledge. The other reason 
for extending that treaty is to provide us the opportunity to 
tackle those things which are not covered by the treaty, the 
nonstrategic weapons, some of these novel systems, and trying 
to devise a treaty that would cover those and also have those 
same intrusive-type inspections, which would provide the 
confidence.
    Senator Scott. So, did the Iran treaty have the same 
opportunity to guarantee that the Iranians were complying? Any 
of you.
    Ms. Creedon. Under the JCPOA, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency was assigned that responsibility. They continue 
to provide those inspections and, just recently, issued a 
report, that's not yet public, but the press covered it, that 
they continued to find that Iran was in compliance.
    General Kehler. Senator, I would only add that I think you 
have to think about verification in terms of layers--we have 
always said that verification is layers that range from 
national technical means that might be flying in space down to 
intrusive onsite inspections. I think the more elements of that 
you have, the more confidence you have in verification. The 
fewer elements you have, the less confidence you should have in 
verification.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    To follow up on this line of questioning, my understanding 
is that the layers that you talked about with regard to Iran 
were the most vigorous of any treaty that we've ever 
negotiated. Is that accurate, Ms. Creedon?
    Ms. Creedon. The authorities that the IAEA, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has--were extraordinarily 
intensive and extraordinarily invasive, more so than IAEA's 
relationship with any other country.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    I want to follow up on Senator Fischer's good questions. 
Ninety percent of this hearing has been about Russia and the 
United States, a little bit about Iran. But, we're talking 
about major new nuclear powers; China, for example. Shouldn't 
we be very actively thinking about how to bring them into these 
discussions? We could have a great treaty with Russia, but it 
doesn't necessarily protect us if China is just moving apace.
    Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. As Ms. Creedon said, I think it's important to 
try to have outreach to China. China has shown no interest in 
any sort of arms-reduction talks with us at all. So, while it's 
important to keep trying, I think the record, so far, suggests 
that it's been pretty fruitless. Doesn't mean we should stop, 
but there's no joy there.
    Senator King. An implicit assumption that's been going 
around in this hearing is that the Administration is not 
actively pursuing the necessary preliminary steps to renewing 
New START. Is that true? Is there any evidence of that? Is 
there implicit hostility in the Administration to the extension 
of New START? Is there evidence of that?
    Mr. Miller. I believe that the Administration, in its 
internal deliberations among the key players--State, Defense, 
National Security Council (NSC), Energy--is looking at means of 
dealing with the kinds of questions that we've been talking 
about.
    Senator King. I'm sorry, reinterpret that for me. Are they 
looking at the steps necessary to extend New START?
    Mr. Miller. I believe they are looking at the steps to 
extend New START, in the context of trying to get a handle on 
all Russian and United States nuclear weapons.
    Senator King. You said the Chinese were uninterested. Are 
we interested? Have we reached out to them, in terms of opening 
a discussion on this issue?
    Mr. Miller. I'm not aware of any official openings. I know 
a great deal of unofficial openings that have been pretty 
fruitless.
    Senator King. I think it was, early on, mentioned: command 
and control. That's one of the most serious parts of this 
issue, and I don't think it gets significant attention. Mr. 
Miller, give me your thoughts on that as a triad-plus, I think 
I would call it.
    Mr. Miller. I will defer to General Kehler. But, the 
command-and-control system is antiquated, and it's got to be 
replaced. It's the absolute backbone of our deterrent. If a 
potential enemy believes that they can cripple the command-and-
control system, they----
    Senator King. Then the rest of the triad is not useful.
    Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, that's correct.
    General Kehler. I completely agree.
    Senator King. Any response to Putin's recent statements 
about our placing of missiles in Europe? Could we discuss that?
    Start with you, Mr. Miller.
    Mr. Miller. First, Putin is showing a degree of hypocrisy, 
which is astonishing even for him. He breaks the INF Treaty, he 
puts missiles in Europe, in the European part of Russia----
    Senator King. That places Europe at risk.
    Mr. Miller.--and then says, ``By the way, if NATO responds, 
we're really going to target you.'' That's absurd.
    The second thing is, the kind of rhetoric that's been 
emerging from the Putin Administration since the early 2010-
2013 period, where they talk about holding western European 
cities at risk, holding the United States at risk, has no place 
in the current international environment. This kind of nuclear 
intimidation, trying to cow us and allied leaders, I think is 
utterly out of place. It goes back to the point that General 
Kehler said, you've got to have a strong deterrent.
    Senator King. Well, and this whole articulation of the so-
called ``escalate to de-escalate,'' which I think you better 
characterized as ``escalate-to-win"--that's really what it is--
is a very aggressive policy.
    Mr. Miller. The more important thing about that, Senator 
King, is that, not only is there a doctrine to do that, they've 
fielded new weapon systems to do that, and they've exercised 
those weapon systems. So, one can talk about Putin's rhetoric, 
on the one hand, but this is a very real Russian military 
capability that they practice.
    Senator King. Which gets to the General's comment about 
capability plus will.
    Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. They're in the position of having both.
    Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
    Senator King. Which, again, brings me back to where we 
started. I like what you're suggesting of talking about 
extending New START, but broadening it and trying to recapture 
some of the general arms control momentum.
    Thank you all very much.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. This has been 
very illuminating and important.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Cramer.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, to all of the witnesses, for helping us continue 
this very stimulating topic that is important to me and my home 
State of North Dakota, as well as to the security of the 
country. This has been fascinating.
    You know, one of the things we haven't talked about, and I 
hear a lot about, particularly in my terms in the House, that 
some in the arms control community has talked about de-alerting 
or, lengthening the time before an ICBM would be fired. They 
argue that somehow if we de-alerted our missile system, that 
that would have a stabilizing effect. And, by the way, I was 
just in Minot last week in a launch facility. I even accused 
the wing commander of hiring actors. They were so good. I was 
so impressed, when I left there, with the airmen and the 
officers. I couldn't feel more confident than I do today, 
having met those professionals. General, do you think that we 
have a destabilizing control in those bunkers, or do you think 
this is all silly?
    General Kehler. Well, Senator, I don't think that the 
debate is silly. I think that it's good for us to have this 
conversation from time to time. First of all, I agree with you 
completely. I think the men and women that are in our nuclear 
forces are extraordinary. Sometimes we overlook talking about 
them and their professionalism and the discipline that's 
required to be in that force. It's significant.
    I believe--again, it gets back to capability and intent. I 
do not think that the Russians intend to launch a no-notice, 
massive nuclear strike on the United States. But, they have the 
capability to do it. As long as they do, my view is, we have 
got to be able to respond to that kind of an attack quickly, if 
that's the decision that we need to make. As you point out, the 
ICBMs are the force that happens to be the most responsive. 
There are layers of safeguard, here. People talk about hair 
triggers. Our forces are not on any kind of a hair trigger. 
That's, I think, a very unfortunate characterization that we 
hear a lot. It's not true. There are layers of safeguards, and 
there are certainly processes in place that ensure that those 
forces that are in a ready-to-use kind of a configuration would 
need to get unlock codes before they could be used. So, it 
isn't the same thing at all as thinking about a Wild West hair 
trigger on, a pistol somebody would pull from a holster. It's 
not the way it works.
    Senator Cramer. Yeah.
    General Kehler. So, I never lost any sleep, as the 
Commander of STRATCOM, worrying about whether or not our forces 
were on a hair trigger, or whether or not that contributed to 
instability or some likelihood of an unauthorized or 
inadvertent launch. I think, again, the safeguards are in 
place. They reassure me. I think that our deterrent would not 
be as effective if the Russians or anyone else believed that 
they could launch some kind of an attack that would enhance 
their ability to think that they could achieve their 
objectives.
    I would leave our force posture alone. It is far less 
aggressive than it was during the Cold War. The Cold War has 
been over for almost 30 years. We should stop looking back over 
our shoulder. This is a new era. We have the triad configured 
in a certain way that I think matches this era. We've changed 
the mixture of the weapons, so we're not in a use-or-lose kind 
of an environment. I think that we need to recognize that we, 
essentially, have a diad today. So, I would not change our 
force posture.
    Senator Cramer. Well, that was both an intelligent and 
passionate response to the question. I wish you could bring 
every American down into a control center in a launch facility 
so they could see what you're describing, could see the 
safeguards that are in place, as well as the professionalism of 
the folks in charge. It gives me a great sense of confidence.
    Mr. Miller. Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Yes.
    Mr. Miller. May I add add one other point?
    Senator Cramer. Please. Mr. Miller, yes.
    Mr. Miller. This is another one of these superficially 
attractive ideas, like ``no first use,'' which is truly 
dangerous. We've studied this issue in the Department of 
Defense for decades. There is no way of verifying that missiles 
are off alert. There is just no way of doing it. But, if you 
pass a magic wand and assume that you can put missiles 
verifiably off of alert, and a crisis develops, now you're in a 
race to re-alert, and that becomes a hugely destabilizing 
situation. So, again, it's a great bumper sticker, but it's a 
terrible, terrible policy.
    Senator Cramer. Ms. Creedon, I know you want to say 
something about it, and then I'll yield----
    Ms. Creedon. Sorry, Senator, I completely agree with my 
colleagues, but I want to add one additional concept to this. 
This is the idea of providing the President adequate decision 
time. This is one of the reasons why the nuclear command and 
control, as well as our early warning systems, are absolutely 
essential. I know we've talked a lot today about the need to 
modernize our nuclear delivery systems and our nuclear command 
and control, but the other piece of this is our early warning 
systems, where they're mostly overhead, there's some ground, 
but they, too, are looking at the need for additional money-
funding support. Those are the systems that actually provide 
the President and the national command authority with the 
additional time needed to make an informed decision in a time 
of crisis.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer. I agree with 
you, everyone should have that experience. They'd feel 
differently about it, perhaps.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to the witnesses.
    I want to just open by just making a comment about the news 
from Vietnam today, since we're having a discussion about our 
nuclear posture. I, for one, am happy that, if the President 
did not feel like there was a deal to be had that was in 
America's interest, that he walked away from the table. No deal 
is better than a bad deal. I think the way they ended it--
apparently, each talking about the possibility of continuation 
of discussions, is very positive. So, I just want to put on the 
record that, when I read the news and I read the circumstances, 
I was relieved that we walked away. It was pretty clear we 
weren't going to get the first thing that we need to get to 
determine whether North Korea is serious at all, which is a 
disclosure of its arsenal and assets. If they disclosed, they 
might be serious. Until they do that, we have no way of knowing 
whether they're serious.
    So, I will say, while I support this Administration walking 
away from a bad deal or a scenario where no deal is possible, I 
really, really object to the characterization about the death 
of the Virginia student, Otto Warmbier, as something that Kim 
Jong-un didn't know about. It reminds me of what the 
Administration said about the assassination of the Virginia 
resident journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, that Muhammad Bin Salman 
(MBS) didn't know about it, or what the Administration has said 
about Russian election interference, that Putin didn't know 
about it. I have no idea why this President continues to be the 
defense lawyer for dictators who do horrible things, contrary 
to the advice and the intelligence of our own intelligence 
community. Our intelligence community is telling us what Putin 
knew about the election, what MBS knew about the murder of 
Jamal Khashoggi, and what Kim Jong-un knew about the 
brutalization and murder of Otto Warmbier. I don't know why the 
President would want to come to the aid of people who have done 
these horrible things.
    I want to ask about command and control, because I want to 
dig into this. I think we're nervous about the various points 
that you all make, the antiquated nature of the command-and-
control system. General Hyten gave us good testimony about 
that. He did say, ``You don't need to worry, I've never had 
gaps in command and control and communications.'' So, he gave 
us an assurance. Before I ask you, ``What should we be looking 
for, what kind of investment should we be making, is our 
acquisition system such that we can do the right thing?"--is 
there any virtue at all to an antiquated system, that it might 
be harder to cyberhack into? I mean, if we could keep the 
antiquated system going, is it a little more invulnerable to 
the kinds of digital hacking that's going on now, or is that 
sort of a pipedream?
    General Kehler. Senator, I'll take a stab at that. With 
tongue in cheek, those of us that have looked at this say, 
``Well, there's sort of a good-news/bad-news story here.'' But, 
I think that the bad news outweighs the good news in that case, 
because I think ``antiquated'' is the operative word here. And 
yes, while antiquated things may provide some additional 
cybersecurity at a system level, I think it's almost a wash.
    Senator Kaine. Yeah.
    General Kehler. So, I believe that this is another area 
where we have to get on with both investment in things that are 
necessary now while we look at the future and apply sort of all 
of the lessons that are being learned, in the commercial world 
and elsewhere, about how you really provide resilient systems 
against cyberattacks or other kinds of attacks, that will be 
unique--in addition to cyberattack, unique to the nuclear 
command-and-control part of our enterprise.
    So, yes, I take the point. Yes, some of those older systems 
don't have the same open portals into them, because they're 
antique. But, I think they are antique, at the end of the day, 
here, and they will not last forever. In some cases, I think 
they're on a thin edge now.
    Senator Kaine. If the two of you agree with that point, 
that the antiquated is worse than some invulnerabilities that 
it may present, what should we be looking for, as a committee, 
as we're working on the NDAA, in terms of the command-and-
control investment, recapitalization?
    Mr. Miller. When I entered the Pentagon in 1979, and we 
started to modernize the strategic systems under Harold Brown, 
and later under the Reagan Administration, we had new systems, 
and we had robust and redundant systems. Now we don't have as 
much redundancy or resilience. I think what you should be 
looking for is, are the sensors survivable? Are the 
communications lanes survivable? The aircraft platforms that we 
have, the TAKE Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft and the 
doomsday plans are quite old. Their communications circuits 
have been upgraded, but the planes are old. The communications 
circuits are vulnerable, and the resiliency isn't there. So, I 
would focus on those elements and on the warning systems.
    Senator Kaine. Ms. Creedon?
    Ms. Creedon. I would add on the redundancy and really focus 
on how to make sure that these new systems not only are 
resilient, but we also have multiple redundant paths so that, 
if a path fails or is compromised, that we have other 
opportunities to maintain that connectivity between our forces. 
In some instances, this connectivity is going to have to be a 
provider of both nuclear forces and will also be involved in a 
conventional force. I don't think this is something we should 
be afraid of, frankly, but I think we need to really fully 
explore all of the different opportunities for the redundancy 
as well as the resiliency. Because sometimes I think we lose 
that.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you so much.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to all of you, for being here today. Forgive me 
if one or more of my questions is slightly redundant, having 
not been here for the earlier part of the hearing.
    I want to ask you about some of the recommendations of the 
Nuclear Posture Review and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, 
such an important part of our modernization efforts, 
particularly in light of what we heard from this Committee 
earlier this week, in light of what Russia and China are doing, 
and our need to modernize our nuclear triad in order to 
maintain our competitiveness with our near-peer competitors.
    So, the Nuclear Posture Review, of course, called for the 
United States to deploy a low-yield nuclear warhead. Shortly 
thereafter, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis told our 
counterpart in the House, the House Armed Services Committee, 
that there's really no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon, 
and went on to say that any nuclear weapon used anytime is a 
strategic game-changer.
    Let me just ask you, General Kehler and Mr. Miller. Can you 
help us understand how deploying low-yield weapons, as 
recommended by the NPR, will actually help reduce the risk of 
escalation, not increase it?
    Go ahead, General.
    General Kehler. Senator, I think you have to understand 
that the objective, here, is to make sure an adversary 
understands that there's nowhere they can go to gain an 
advantage, so there's no part of the military spectrum, here, 
particularly around the nuclear threshold, that they can go 
that won't be met by a credible response. The concern was that, 
if the Russians intend to go to some place around the nuclear 
threshold, or cross the nuclear threshold with low-yield 
weapons, because they believe that the only way the United 
States can respond is with a high-yield weapon, and somehow we 
would be deterred, that there is a hole there, a gap that we 
need to make sure that we are addressing. That was what led to 
the notion that, not only would we be able to offer a President 
a range of conventional ways to respond to such a low-yield 
use, but we could also respond with a low-yield weapon of our 
own.
    Mr. Miller. If I could follow up on that. I think it's 
critically important, as we've been talking about an 
adversary's view of nuclear weapons, that we noticed that the 
Russian buildup of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons began 
about 10 years ago, maybe 15 years ago, along with the doctrine 
and the exercises that implement that. This was done in full 
recognition of our then-and-now current nuclear capability. So, 
somehow the Russian general staff seems to perceive we lack an 
adequate response. They must have sold that to the political 
leadership, because they've invested a lot of money in that.
    The low-yield Trident weapon is a counter to their thought 
that they could use tactical nuclear weapons on the 
battlefield. Secretary Mattis was right that the Russians seem 
to think they can use them in a tactical sense. What a Trident 
says is, ``We have an escalatory response that's not high-
yield, that is credible, and, Mr. Putin, are you prepared to 
bet Mother Russia and the possibility of endless escalation 
against the use of a tactical weapon to achieve a land grab in 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe?'' I think 
that's the essence of this issue.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much for that. Can I just 
pick up on that last point? The National Defense Strategy talks 
a lot, and worries a lot, about the possibility of a fait 
accompli, aggression that changes facts on the grounds that 
then is very hard for us to reverse, given the time it may take 
to move sufficient forces in theater, et cetera. Can you just 
say a word about how having these weapons and these options in 
our arsenal, these low-yield tactical weapons, might help deter 
and prevent a fait accompli from happening so that we don't get 
into that position?
    General, maybe I'll start with you.
    General Kehler. Senator, there have been some things 
written over the last several years, some books, as a matter of 
fact, about what's red's theory of victory, here? What is their 
strategy? What are they aiming toward? And you've identified 
the pieces that you can find in open literature about what it 
is that the Russians and the Chinese, in their own way, are 
trying to achieve. And that's, present us with a fait accompli 
in their own neighborhood, make the costs and risk of 
intervention too high, from deploying strategic threats, not 
only nuclear threats, but threats against the Homeland, for 
example, through cyberspace, and let us know that the risk 
would be very great to intervene. I think one of the major 
changes is being able to threaten the Homeland below the 
nuclear threshold, through cyberspace. That's a part of their 
strategy. Nuclear weapons are foundational to their strategy.
    As we think about what does it take to deter such a 
strategy and make it ineffective, we need to make sure that 
there isn't some place on this spectrum that they can go, where 
they believe we do not have a credible way to respond. That has 
led to some of these conversations that includes our own 
deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons, which, by the way, is 
not new for us. We've had low-yield nuclear weapons in the 
past. The question is the small numbers and the way we'll 
deploy those. I think, in every case, it's done strategically 
to enhance our deterrent.
    Mr. Miller. If I could just carry that one step further. I 
think, putting it simplistically, deterrence involves going to 
a potential enemy and taking options out of their basket. This 
is one way of taking their ``escalate-to-win'' strategy out of 
their basket. As General Kehler says, deterrence now is highly 
complex. It involves a mix of space and cyber and conventional 
and nuclear capabilities. But, we have to take the options out 
of the Russian basket, one at a time. This is a way of doing 
that without trying to field our own tactical nuclear forces 
that we used to have and don't have the need to do anymore.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today. Very interesting panel.
    Ms. Creedon and Mr. Miller, you have both said that you 
think that the United States should be trying to get other 
nuclear-armed nations to the table to discuss arms control. How 
do we do that? What kind of levers do we have? What kind of 
leverage does the United States have to bring in some of these 
nations to the table and let's have a discussion about what 
we're doing and where the future is headed? How do we do that?
    Ms. Creedon. So, Senator, I'll start with the Indo-Pacific, 
because that's the most challenging region. I think we start 
that by having serious conversations with our allies in the 
region. They know this region, they live in this region. Have 
conversations with Australia, with Japan, with Korea about how 
to be effective with not only using them in these discussions, 
but how to go forward with China on these talks. It's going to 
take a while, but it's got to have the participation of our 
allies in this.
    The other thing is, China still has far fewer warheads and 
delivery systems than does Russia. So, we have the ongoing 
effort to try and figure out how to approach the Indo-Pacific 
region--and, frankly, it could be a very new methodology for 
arms control. It may not be limitations, it may just be even 
things like transparency. That would be a substantial leap 
forward in that region, because we know very little about the 
Chinese systems. So, there are ways to do that.
    But, in the meantime, because the United States and Russia 
still continue to have the bulk of the nuclear weapons, we 
can't lose sight of continuing to have discussions, having new 
discussions with Russia on the nonstrategic and New START.
    Senator Jones. Great.
    Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. Senator, I think that we have tried, through 
unofficial means, for well over a decade, to engage the 
Chinese, and the Chinese are not interested. The Chinese know 
we would like them to be more transparent, and they have 
maintained an opacity about their force. They have the most 
dynamic ballistic missile development and deployment program in 
the world. They have created barriers to open discussions with 
what they are building in the created islands in the South 
China Sea. If, at some point, the Chinese leadership decides 
it's in their interest to begin a discussion with us, I think 
they will. But, we sometimes labor under the illusion that 
because we think it's a good idea, another government will 
agree to that. I'm afraid that we are not there right now with 
Xi Jinping and his leadership.
    Senator Jones. Is there anything that we can do to try to 
convince them, though? Is there something out there that you 
might have in mind, other than talking to our allies? Is there 
something that we can show, demonstrate, or do? I agree, I 
share the frustration. I understand the frustration that you 
can always take that horse to water, but you can't make him 
drink. But, anything that we've got, any leverage at all?
    Ms. Creedon. One of the levers that I think we could use, 
and could use effectively--actually, maybe there are two 
things. One is how to get other things in the context of this. 
So, not just arms control, but maybe economics, maybe 
technology-sharing, maybe other avenues of cooperation to kind 
of break the ice, to get into this arms control. So, not take 
it on frontally, but go at it in some other ways. Maybe there 
were ways to do space cooperation, in terms of human 
spaceflight. We foreclosed a lot of our opportunities with 
China, and I think we just need to be way more creative, in 
terms of how to open that door.
    Senator Jones. Great.
    Mr. Miller. Senator, I will be the pessimist in this one. 
We have been restrained in our nuclear modernization program 
for two decades. The Chinese have been running ahead. We have 
been restrained in what we do in outer space, and there are two 
new publications out from the Department of Defense in the last 
2 months that show how China has moved ahead with offensive and 
defensive space. What we need is a change of attitude in the 
Chinese leadership that it is not looking to expand and become 
a more regional power, but a power that will work with us. And 
I can't predict when that might happen, sir.
    Senator Jones. All right. Real quick. My time is running 
out. But, we've got new tensions between India and Pakistan. 
There is obviously a lot of concern whenever that happens. 
India has a ``no first use'' policy. Pakistan does not. What's 
that situation like now? What do you perceive? Should be 
concerned? What should the United States be doing about it?
    Mr. Miller. I think that's the most dangerous situation in 
the world. I think that the way that the two countries interact 
has the potential to create a nuclear war. There have been 
various kinds of outreach for two decades, to both governments, 
to talk about nuclear strategy, nuclear policy. But, I think 
we've made more headway with the Indians than the Pakistanis. 
But, I would say that both countries remain a source of 
significant worry for me, personally.
    Senator Jones. Right.
    Ms. Creedon. I agree with that. Both of them are increasing 
their nuclear arsenals, not only in terms of numbers, but also 
in terms of their overall capabilities. It's a very dangerous 
part of the world. So, whatever the United States can do to be 
an honest broker, or find others to be honest brokers, is 
really essential. This is a very dangerous situation.
    Senator Jones. Right.
    Well, thank you all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here.
    I apologize to all of y'all for not being here in person. I 
think some of you know the drill here. We have three committees 
going on simultaneously. One was a markup. So, I also 
apologize, Mr. Chair, for not being here for the whole hearing.
    I have one question that is probably off-subject or hasn't 
been asked to this point. Then I want to come back to a few 
comments in the opening statements. When we get into the 
discussion about our current arsenal, we talk about some of it 
aging, unlikely to be deployed. Yet, some view decommissioning 
it as a sort of unilateral disarmament. Where are you all on 
that? I think we have certain assets that I personally believe 
would be better positioned for future investment into the same 
enterprise. So, just down the line, where are you all on that 
issue?
    Ms. Creedon, we can start with you.
    Ms. Creedon. Senator, right now our deterrent is, in fact, 
safe, secure, and reliable, but it's old. And I mean that from 
the warheads, from the delivery systems, from the platforms. 
So, they all need to be upgraded. There's a good start. The 
start has happened, some 10 years ago. The life-extension 
programs on the warheads are going along. The second one was 
just finished, another one has started up. There's also another 
one that's in the works. There's plans for more. So, those 
things are what need to be supported. The science that 
underpins that needs to be supported, as well as the actual 
funding for the delivery systems. As these things age out, they 
will be retired, but it's a very close line between when they 
age out and when the new ones come in. There's no room for 
delay.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Mr. Miller?
    Mr. Miller. Senator, the various parts of the triad are 
aging. The Air Launched Cruise Missile-B (ALCM-B) was deployed 
in about 1980, with an expected lifespan of 10 years. It's 
still there. It must be replaced soon, or retire without 
replacement. If you don't replace it, the B-52 part of the 
triad and the standoff system is gone.
    The SSBNs, the Ohio-class magnificent submarines, as they 
retire in series, in the late 2020s and beyond, will have 
served longer than any U.S. ballistic missile submarine ever. 
The problem there is, the reactor gets brittle, the piping gets 
brittle, the submarines become unseaworthy. The Minuteman 
system has been around since the 1970s. Then there's the 
command-and-control system, which we spoke about, sir, when you 
weren't here.
    We should have modernized this in the Bush-43 
Administration, and we did not, for a variety of different 
reasons. But, the fact is, the systems are aging out and will 
retire, with or without replacement.
    Senator Tillis. General, as you answer that question, in 
your opening comments you talked about stepping away, basically 
taking one of the legs of the stool out, making it a two-legged 
stool with ICBMs not being a part of our strategy. Isn't some 
of our modernization also undermining that component of the 
triad?
    General Kehler. It is, unless we decide to invest in ICBMs 
again. There's a proposal, of course, as part of the 
modernization effort, to invest in the ICBM force. I would 
strongly encourage you to approve that.
    I would take the same kind of an approach. I agree with 
Madelyn that the current force is safe, secure, and effective. 
I had to certify to that. It's already been 5 years ago since I 
took my uniform off. But, I believe that's the case. Now I 
believe that General Hyten testifies to that, as well. But, I 
think that there's an important point here. We need to remind 
ourselves that these systems are really at the end of their 
service lives. One of the things that we talk about, 
particularly in the nuclear business, is our systems were built 
in such a way that they always have margin at the end of that 
life. My view is, we're about out of margin here.
    Senator Tillis. Outside of the margin.
    General Kehler. And so, I think we're out of time. If we 
don't act, a friend of mine has been whispering this in my ear 
for many years, that we are ``rusting to zero'' if we're not 
careful, here.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    In my final minute, I'm kind of curious--Ms. Creedon, I 
heard your comments about New START. I tend to agree with it. 
But, we've got this odd relationship with Russia, where, on the 
one hand, it makes sense to do that; on the other hand, they're 
virtually violating every other agreement we have. How do we 
reconcile the two?
    Ms. Creedon. Well, it is true, and it is a hard thing to 
reconcile. But, this is a treaty that is extraordinarily 
important to both the United States and to Russia, and both 
sides are in compliance, and it really should be extended. It's 
a simple act to extend it. Both sides just simply have to agree 
to extend it. When that extension happens, then there is time 
to have the discussions, which we must have, about the 
nonstrategic systems.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Do the two of you agree?
    Mr. Miller. I think it's necessary, but not sufficient. I 
do think it's time to bring the other systems in, and I would 
like to see some sort of a deal whereby we agree to extend it, 
on the condition that real negotiations take place to bring in 
the exotic systems and the shorter-range systems.
    Senator Tillis. That's where I am.
    General?
    General Kehler. I would agree that it's effective today. I 
believe that it should remain as long as it's effective. I 
would like to see it extended, but I also believe that, as part 
of that process, we need to wrap some of these other concerns 
into it.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to begin by thanking the witnesses for your 
testimony today. The perspective and experience you bring to 
this topic will greatly assist the members here in our task of 
ensuring long-term security and prosperity for our country.
    On Tuesday, this Committee held an open hearing with the 
commanding general of U.S. Strategic Command. In that hearing, 
I asked General Hyten about his views on non-nuclear strategic 
systems. I want to ask the same thing of our witnesses here 
today. I do agree, we need to modernize our nuclear arsenal, 
but I want to talk about the non-nuclear strategic arsenal.
    Could each of you briefly discuss your views on the 
potential effectiveness of non-nuclear strategic weapons? Would 
increased investment on our end in hypersonics, cyber, 
conventional, prompt global strike, or electronic warfare 
weapons create a credible deterrent against Chinese or Russian 
nuclear threats? Would they deter other nuclear threats, such 
as Iran or North Korea?
    Ms. Creedon. The answer is yes. I mean, to have an 
effective deterrent, we have to be able to deter and defend in 
all regimes and in all domains. So, investment in all of those 
assures that we have the technological prowess to be ahead of 
the game in the future.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Mr. Miller. Let me agree with Ms. Creedon and say that I am 
a strong believer in Bomb Live Unit (BLU) squad vehicles and 
hyperglossy glide vehicles. The Committee has talked, for many, 
many years, about the problem of area denial. I think these are 
the classic weapons to break down the door in an area denial 
situation, where you destroy an enemy's anti-ship systems and 
anti-air systems and allow us to move back in. So, I firmly 
support those initiatives.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    General?
    General Kehler. Senator, combat experience has shown that 
we can now use conventional weapons in places and in 
circumstances where perhaps, once, nuclear weapons were the 
only thing that would have been possible. So, I fully support, 
and strongly support, the addition of conventional alternatives 
for a range of options we would offer to decisionmakers if we 
were considering sort of extreme circumstances.
    But, what conventional systems cannot do, is serve as a 
large-scale replacement for nuclear weapons. That's for a 
couple of reasons. One is, they do not have the same deterrent 
value in large scale. Second, when you look at the potential 
target bases out there that are involved in some of our 
strategic concerns, we don't have sufficient conventional 
weapons in the entire inventory to cover those kinds of target 
bases.
    So, they can't be a large-scale replacement for nuclear 
weapons, but, on a case-by-case basis, we have found that 
conventional weapons can be far more effective, far more 
useful, and offer far more options for decisionmakers.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Shifting gears with just a bit, I wanted to discuss the 
current state of arms limitation agreements. Obviously, the 
trend in recent years has not gone in the right direction, and 
there's much discussion on trying to revitalize established 
bilateral arms limitation agreements with our global 
competitors, but--on that idea of multilateral arms reduction. 
We've discussed this a little bit already here today. I want to 
hear from each of you your opinions on this topic. Should we be 
looking to simply keep our legacy arms limitation agreements on 
life support, given historically high levels of mutual 
distrust, or would a multilateral framework among, say, the 
United States, Russia, China potentially breathe new life into 
arms control nonproliferation? You sort of touched on this 
already. But, is this something where we need to sort of do 
more than just maintain what we've got and perhaps be a little 
bit more bold?
    Then, I'd like to hear also about the current sort of 
policy debate surrounding nuclear weapons, in terms of the 
links between nuclear policy and posture and space and 
ballistic missile defense, as potential examples. I want to 
make sure that we're discussing, in the media and in general 
conversation, the linkages between the different systems in an 
intelligent way.
    So, let's start with the bilateral/multilateral agreements.
    Mr. Miller. Well, I think that the nonproliferation treaty, 
which is a multilateral--190 nations, is truly important. It's 
in the security interests of all of those nations, and it's 
something we ought to continue to preserve.
    I think that if we can come up with regional stability 
talks, that would be a good thing to do; rather than having 
Chinese aircraft come within 2 or 3 feet of our own, that we 
have an agreement in place. They need to respect that 
agreement.
    So, I think that, as far as nuclear talks, right now it 
really is between the United States and Russia. Where Russia is 
violating treaties, there are places we absolutely should 
maintain where we are. They may be using chemical weapons in 
the United Kingdom and in Syria. We should not be breaking the 
chemical weapons treaty. We should be maintaining the Vienna 
document, where we are transparent on our exercises.
    I'll yield to colleagues.
    Ms. Creedon. I'll just go back to New START. That is the 
treaty that is still alive, it's well, it's being enforced, 
it's working on both sides. But, the rest of the bilateral, 
they're at risk. There's not good cooperation on both sides. 
But, we have to figure out ways to go forward. The next avenue 
really is on multilaterals and how you think about 
multilaterals. So, while I would probably admit that, in some 
respects, arms control is in a period of hibernation, we have 
to figure out how to wake it up over time.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Ms. Creedon. Oh, and on your last thing, just looking 
across the board on deterrence is absolutely essential. All of 
the instruments in the tool kit.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. All right. Well, thank you, Senator 
Duckworth.
    Thank all three of you, for being here, and the 
straightforward way that you're answering the questions. It's 
been really good. In fact, there's a lot of the same 
conclusions we come to with our uniformed people. It's been a 
very helpful committee hearing.
    Thank you very much.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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