[Senate Hearing 116-496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 116-496

                 OPEN HEARING: DECLASSIFICATION POLICY
                        AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                      WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
      
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        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

           [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
                MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS KING, Maine
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                 MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                  CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                   JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
                  JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                              ----------                              
                      Chris Joyner, Staff Director
                 Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                           SEPTEMBER 9, 2020

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page

Moran, Hon. Jerry, a U.S. Senator from Kansas....................     1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida...................     3
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia...............     5
Wyden, Hon. Ron, a U.S. Senator from Oregon......................     6

                               WITNESSES

Koch, Gregory M., Acting Director, Information Management Office, 
  Office of the Director of National Intelligence................     7
Tierney (Fmr.), John F., Congressman, Member, Public Interest 
  Declassification Board.........................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    32

                         SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Responses of John F. Tierney (Fmr.) to Questions for the Record..    38
Responses of Mr. Gregory M. Koch to Questions for the Record.....    52

 
     OPEN HEARING: DECLASSIFICATION POLICY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m. in Room 
G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio (Acting 
Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Rubio, Warner, Risch, Collins, Blunt, 
Cornyn, Sasse, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, and King.
    Chairman Rubio. This hearing will come to order.
    This afternoon, we're going to welcome Mr. Greg Koch from 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who, I 
advise our members, we're having trouble getting linked in, but 
hopefully we'll be able to resolve that here at some point. 
Everyone knows we have a third vote here that's pending as 
well.
    Former Representative John Tierney from the Public Interest 
Declassification Board will discuss declassification policy. In 
particular, we'll be discussing striking a balance between 
protecting our Nation's classified material and ensuring 
historical documents can safely get their moment in the sun.
    I'm prepared to defer my opening statement for the 
following reasons. Senator Moran has the chair hearing at 3:30 
and in-between has to go vote. If it's okay with both of you, 
I'll just give my time to Senator Moran so he can open with 
some comments since he's joined us here today on this issue. 
And then, that way, he doesn't have to miss a vote and can 
chair his important hearing at 3:30 where hopefully your WebEx 
is working.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Chairman, can I reserve some 
special chit or favor from Jerry?
    Chairman Rubio. Absolutely. You should take him for 
everything he's got in that bag of chits.
    So, Senator Moran, do you want to provide your comments so 
you have plenty of time to vote and not miss your hearing?

   STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

    Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's a 
real privilege to testify--to be in front of this Committee. I 
hold the Intel Committee in high regard and recognize its 
important role in securing the security of our citizens. And I 
appreciate the consideration that you and Senator Warner 
provided--and the timing.
    Members of the Committee: Thank you very much for the 
opportunity to advocate for declassification reform and for 
having this open setting, Mr. Chairman. As you may be aware, I 
am a sponsor, alongside a member of this Committee, Senator 
Wyden, of Senate Bill 3733, the Declassification Reform Act.
    Senator Wyden and I worked on this issue for a long time. 
It is surprising to me that the end result is so 
straightforward and relatively simple, but it is an attempt to 
begin the process of modernizing declassification by 
designating the director of National Intelligence as the 
executive agent responsible for promoting programs, processes, 
and systems related to declassification.
    Though the bill itself rests within the jurisdiction of 
another committee, this Committee has previously considered 
this bill as an amendment offered by Senator Wyden to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act. I appreciate the discussion of 
this bill, which many of you have personally visited with me on 
the floor and throughout the Capitol complex.
    The conversations in today's hearing underscore recognition 
that the process which guides our Nation's release of 
declassified information are antiquated and are unable to keep 
up with the overwhelming flood of digital data that is 
classified on a daily basis.
    Congress has been told repeatedly over the years that the 
system is unsustainable. Last year, the Director of the 
Information Security Oversight Office wrote to the President 
that, ``The current framework is unsustainable and desperately 
requires modernization.''
    In 2016, the Public Interest Declassification Board 
reported the classification system is, ``No longer able to 
handle the current volume and forms of information, especially 
given the exponential growth of digital information.''
    Four years later, there's little evidence that the problem 
is on a path to being solved. The current system holds on to 
records that no longer require classification and its impacts 
to taxpayers is estimated to be $18 billion per year. And it 
denies public access to information that can be used to hold 
the Government accountable.
    As the Public Interest Declassification Board notes, the 
overwhelmed system hurts us policymakers as well. Senator Wyden 
approached me in late 2018 and asked me to join him in an 
effort to craft legislation that would begin to address this 
problem.
    While I indicated my great regard for members of this 
Committee, I am not one of them. And so, there might be a 
question as why is this an interest to me. And certainly, the 
ability to save taxpayer dollars is of interest to me. The 
ability to be more transparent to the American public is of 
interest to me. And the ability for us as policymakers to have 
the necessary information available to us is important to me.
    Protecting those taxpayers to the tune of billions that is 
spent on classification and ensuring transparency from the 
Federal Government and the ability to do that without 
jeopardizing national security is a priority.
    For well over a year, we've consulted with experts from the 
Public Interest Declassification Board, Information Security 
Oversight Office, the National Archives, other outside experts, 
the officials from our Nation's intelligence agencies as well 
as staff from this Intelligence Committee. We know technical 
solutions, such as artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, exist to facilitate bringing our system into the 21st 
century. And we know individual agencies are taking steps with 
some of this technology to address the issue, but more 
coordinated effort that implements best practices is clearly 
required.
    The final product, the Declassification Reform Act, adopts 
the key recommendation from the latest report issued in May by 
the Public Interest Declassification Board. Senator Wyden and I 
are not under the impression that naming an executive agent 
will resolve every problem associated with classifying and 
declassifying information, but we do believe appointing an 
official with sufficient authority to implement changes across 
the Federal Government is a really good first step.
    From our consultations over the past year, we know that 
there is resistance, and suggested improvements to the 
Declassification Reform Act. And we also recognize there are 
other ideas that can facilitate reform. I'm pleased today's 
hearing will seek to flesh out our bill and other ideas to 
address the problem of this magnitude.
    Whatever the direction that this Committee determines to 
move forward with reform, resources will be necessary to 
implement it. As a member of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee, please consider me an ally in this endeavor. I've 
been pleased to join Senator Wyden in this effort and I'm 
equally eager to work with the members of this Committee in 
achieving declassification reform that is long overdue and yet 
protects American citizens and our national security.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for having this open 
hearing that allows me to testify. And I thank you and the 
Committee members for their time and the opportunity to be here 
today.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            FLORIDA

    Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Senator Moran. And thank you for 
being here. I'm going to sort of condense my opening statement 
in the interest of time.
    You know, the Congress established the Public Interest 
Declassification Board to advise the Executive Branch on the 
identification, the review, and the release of records. In May 
2020, they released a report on reforming this process and it 
recommended sweeping changes to the way that we declassify 
records. And today, we're going to look to our witness, former 
Congressman Tierney, to explain those recommendations.
    Let me just say broadly, the Intelligence Community agrees 
that reform is needed. The backlog of historical documents is 
large. The system for moving documents to review is completely 
outdated, and the standards, quite frankly, are sometimes 
inconsistent throughout the national security establishment.
    I am concerned, however, that the recommendations don't 
align with the ODNI's current role, given that they have 
neither the authority nor the expertise to serve as the leader 
of the declassification enterprise for the entire government, 
which is one of the issues that we've discussed in terms of 
jurisdiction for this Committee. For example, they are not and 
they should not be in a position at the ODNI to set the 
declassification rules for the Department of Defense's war 
plans or nuclear programs.
    So, we look forward to talking to our witnesses about 
ODNI's view of the declassification process and business 
practices, including the prospects of achievable reform within 
the context of the limits of the ODNI's authority. Separately, 
I think the subject of this hearing allows us to emphasize a 
related point, and that's the difference between a process of 
responsible declassification of secrets that don't need to be 
secret and selfish, irresponsible leaks.
    The reason we classify things is not because you try to 
keep things from people. It is because if it is revealed, you 
will reveal how you learned about those things, and the people 
or entities you're collecting on will realize that you have 
accesses to information and cut you off from more important 
information in the future. So, this is one of the main reasons 
why things are kept secret.
    That is, of course, balanced with the default position, 
generally, of transparency from government. And it's necessary. 
We need transparency in order to have accountability that our 
system of government requires. So, it has to be balanced 
between these two equities, protecting the safety and security 
of the American people through our ability to learn valuable 
information about adversaries and potential adversaries, with 
the need of the American people for transparency on everything 
the Government does.
    I would say that those who--and by that, I'm actually very 
proud of this Committee that by and large has been very 
responsible in my 10 years on this Committee with the 
information we come across. No matter where we fall on the 
issues, I think it's fair to say this Committee has never been, 
in my time on it, a source of these sorts of things.
    But, there are those who do, outside of this Committee, 
casually dismiss the responsibility of holding classified 
information. Many of them have, frankly, either never sat 
through a briefing or been read into billion-dollar programs 
that if revealed, would leave our Nation blind and deaf to the 
threats that we faced. They've never met and heard about the 
brave men and women who risk their lives every single day to 
prevent the next terrorist attack or to steal the plans for a 
deadly new weapons system.
    These are the secrets that Al-Qaeda, that China, that Iran, 
that Russia, and others seek--and they would use that 
information to do us harm. These secrets need to stay secret, 
but not forever. An agreed-upon declassification process that 
allows review of secret documents to be sure that those secrets 
can be given their day in the sun without harming people or 
programs or the American taxpayer. Done responsibly, that would 
build trust between the American people and their government. 
So, Mr. Koch and his colleagues make sure that that happens for 
the Intelligence Community.
    But, some are not willing to play by the rules, 
unfortunately. People who have put their lives on the line to 
give us information deserve better. And to see their hard won 
secrets splashed across the pages of the New York Times or the 
Washington Post just because a bureaucrat or a politician 
wanted to score some cheap political point for their own 
benefit.
    Our Nation deserves better than that. Our people deserve 
better than that. They pay taxes so their government can 
provide for a common defense. And we spend those taxes on 
technological breakthroughs, on brilliant mathematicians, and 
clever computer scientists who could make 10 times their salary 
by working somewhere else.
    These people work for years to gain access to these 
secrets, the secrets that keep us safe from a terrorist attack, 
or from the next enormous hack from China or somewhere else, or 
to stop an oligarch's plans to try to influence and steal an 
election.
    Then, they see that access evaporate when someone decides 
that they are above that higher mission and that scoring a 
political point is more important than protecting our country 
and honoring our taxpayers. And then, the trust is destroyed, 
those dollars dissolve as they never existed, our allies 
suddenly consider us a security risk, and it is no 
overstatement to say that people die.
    From Edward Snowden to a politician who wants to be the 
first to break news, we the American people suffer for their 
selfish acts. And who benefits? Maybe the politicians snag a 
few headlines for a few hours on an interview on cable news, 
but the real winner ultimately is our adversaries.
    All that said, I want to take a minute to thank the 
professionals on whose shoulders these declassification 
decisions rest. Our ODNI briefer, Mr. Koch, represents a very 
small group of people who, in the last three years, has been a 
vital partner for this Committee. We sought to reveal 
information the right way, after working with the Intelligence 
Community to ensure we were doing no harm.
    All five volumes of the Russia report passed through his 
shop for declassification review. And we greatly appreciate his 
efforts, their efforts, to protect our secrets and yet ensure 
the American people were able to see our work.
    I also want to thank Senator Sasse for his perspective, as 
an historian and an academic, and his leadership in ensuring 
that declassification is done properly, while again protecting 
our investment in our Intelligence Community.
    Of course, the Vice Chairman, who has taken an interest in 
this, and Senator Moran who was here today. And on this 
Committee, especially Senator Wyden, who has been a leader, 
perhaps the leader, on trying to reform. Not ``perhaps''--is 
the leader on trying to reform the declassification process. 
So, again, thank you, Senator Moran, for being here.
    And let me just say, as a housekeeping item, we'll let 
everyone know when the votes are coming and so forth. This is 
our first experience with WebEx.
    We are not, by nature, a very open-to-the-public kind of 
Committee. So, we are struggling with that as well. But, we'll 
do the best we can as we hope to work through some of these 
technical glitches in the interim. So, I do ask everybody for 
their patience. It has nothing to do with keeping something 
secret or declassified, we promise that, on this one.
    So, thank you. To the Vice Chairman.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            VIRGINIA

    Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 
let me thank my friend, Senator Moran, my friend, Senator 
Wyden, for taking on this issue. I think it is extraordinarily 
timely. I do hope we're going to get to hear from Congressman 
Tierney and Mr. Koch. I've got a number of questions for him.
    I know declassification is a bit more technical than some 
of the issues that we grapple with, but it is fitting that we 
should have an open session to discuss it.
    I think we all would agree that today's declassification 
system is broken. It's outdated, slow, bulky, costly, and 
almost hopelessly inadequate for the digital age.
    Agencies are using a fragmented, paper-based system that 
lacks the resources, uniformity, and technology to keep pace 
with the exploding volume of digital records. This leads to 
errors, puts classified information at risk, and erodes 
Americans' trust in the system.
    A quarter of a century ago, a commission led by the late 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former Member of this 
Committee, found that while secrecy is important for security 
operations, policy discussions, and weapons systems, and also 
found that excessive secrecy has significant negative 
consequences when the public cannot be engaged in informed 
debate, which is extraordinarily timely now in terms of 
election security. When policymakers are not fully informed and 
government cannot be held accountable for its actions.
    Furthermore, excessive classification saps resources needed 
from protecting those secrets that truly must be kept. I agree 
with the Chairman. Those secrets that are critical, they must 
be kept and honored in, I think, a greater way.
    But, my fear is in today's digital age, if anything, the 
new solution seems much worse--the ease with which tens of 
millions of new documents are classified every year. So, I'm 
going to be anxious to hear from our witnesses on how the 
declassification system is functioning. And I'm sure we'll have 
questions.
    And I want to, like the Chairman, recognize the very 
important work of Senator Wyden, who, without his constant 
persistence, I'm not sure we'd even be at this point.
    I would like to now cede the balance of my time to Senator 
Wyden for some opening comments as well.

    STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

    Senator Wyden. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman. And I especially want to thank my co-sponsor, Senator 
Moran, who I know is getting out the door, and also Chairman 
Rubio. Open hearings are rare, and I very much appreciate him 
doing this.
    Let me start by saying that when our country's safety is at 
stake, there is a very real need to classify documents 
essential to protecting American lives. What there is no need 
for is a dilapidated, out of control classification system that 
costs taxpayers more than $18 billion a year and--get this, 
colleagues--cannot even distinguish between what should and 
should not be kept secret.
    The classification system is so outdated and dysfunctional 
that when it comes time to declassify a document, the agencies 
that have to sign off don't even have the ability to 
communicate about it securely online.
    So, here's what happens, colleagues. Intelligence officials 
have to print out the documents. They put them in a bag and 
drive around from agency to agency. And if they get stuck in 
traffic, they better bring a bag lunch.
    Now, watching these intelligence officials march around 
with their documents might make for a funny ``Saturday Night 
Live'' skit, but it is an absurd waste of taxpayer money and 
it's damaging to our national security and our democracy. 
Documents that should not be classified are just piling up in 
secret databases. The system is choking on itself and it's 
getting worse each year as a flood of new information gets 
classified digitally.
    As the Chairman said, there is widespread consensus there 
is a serious problem here. There's a widespread consensus that 
modernizing the declassification system is the only solution. 
There are lots of good ideas for how to do it. The only thing 
missing is somebody to take responsibility and get it done.
    So, that's what Senator Moran and I are doing: bipartisan 
legislation that would implement the privacy board's 
recommendations and direct the Director of National 
Intelligence to take the leadership role. They're already 
responsible for information management, information technology, 
and the protection of sources and methods. The DNI is already 
responsible for developing uniform policies within the 
Intelligence Community across the Government. Solutions to this 
longstanding problem are at hand.
    One last point. And Chairman Rubio, I'd like just to make 
sure that I impart this to you because I think you raised the 
central concern that I've heard about, the Department of 
Defense. The reform Senator Moran and I are urging does not put 
the DNI in charge of deciding what DOD secrets are 
declassified. It's about modernizing systems for declassifying 
information that the Department of Defense and other agencies 
have already determined are no longer classified.
    So, I'm sure we're going to have a good discussion. Mr. 
Chairman, again, thank you for your courtesy and the 
opportunity to be here.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you. So, my understanding Mr. Koch is 
on.

  STATEMENT OF GREGORY M. KOCH, ACTING DIRECTOR, INFORMATION 
     MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                          INTELLIGENCE

    Mr. Koch. Acting Chairman Rubio, Vice Chairman Warner, and 
Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you 
on this panel to present the Intelligence Community's 
perspective on declassification reform.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you 
declassification, one of the most important, often overlooked, 
oversubscribed, and misunderstood areas of the information 
security program. Today, I hope to give you a better 
understanding of the current declassification landscape, share 
an IC perspective on proposed government-wide reform, and 
discuss the level of effort that real reform will require.
    As the Committee is likely aware, the U.S. Government's 
declassification review processes are not ideal for the digital 
age and likely require significant change in order to keep pace 
with the massive increase in digital information eligible for 
declassification. With limited resources and subject matter 
expertise dedicated solely to declassification review, a 
relatively small workforce faces a daunting task in processing 
requests from the massive repositories of records, which by 
some estimates exceeded the equivalent of four million cubic 
feet of paper in the IC alone.
    Facing those kinds of numbers, Federal agencies undoubtedly 
need and support classification reform.
    Modernization must occur to meet the demands of the digital 
age as well as support transparency to the public, while 
simultaneously safeguarding national security information.
    IC recognizes the critical importance of public interest in 
our efforts to be transparent with the American people. As 
such, the ODNI, in consultation with IC elements, works 
diligently to support declassification and public release 
requests for national intelligence information, not only from 
the public but also from congressional committees and the 
President, including, but not limited to, a large volume of 
information related to Argentinian human rights abuses; 
information relating to use of our surveillance authorities; 
intelligence information related to Department of Justice 
Inspector General investigations; and the five volumes of this 
Committee's report on its Russian active measures 
investigations.
    In addition, ODNI facilitated an IC review for release of 
national intelligence information on a wide range of topics, 
including materials on the 50th anniversary of the Tet 
Offensive. IC elements also continue to process thousands of 
Freedom of Information Act, Mandatory Declassification Review, 
and Privacy Act requests each year. The IC invests in and 
continues to prioritize these efforts because they are 
important to the public's understanding of the challenges 
facing our Nation.
    While the ODNI continues to work across the IC to improve 
internal declassification processes and systems, larger 
investments in people and technology are required to see real 
change. In that vein, the IC appreciates the goals and 
objectives of the Declassification Reform Act. However, an 
initial review of the legislation surfaced multiple concerns.
    First and foremost, any proposed reform must be consistent 
with the IC's obligation to protect sources and methods and our 
most sensitive classified information from unauthorized 
disclosure. Reform efforts must also address the individual 
departments and agencies, such as Departments of Defense and 
Energy, which also have significant classification and 
declassification equities.
    Additionally, the required investment and wide sweeping 
whole-of-government change envisioned by the PIDB report and 
the legislation it informed requires more agency program 
analysis to understand and account for all equities.
    The IC agrees modernization is imperative and looks forward 
to more discussion on capability, capacity, and the actual 
price tag of accomplishing the intended objectives of the 
proposed legislation.
    A specific concern to the IC is the recommendation to make 
the DNI the government-wide executive agent for 
declassification, responsible for all policies and processes of 
the U.S. Government. ODNI believes that such an approach takes 
the ODNI well beyond its intended role. The DNI is a delegated 
authority from the President to classify information as are 
other agencies in accordance with Executive Order 13526--
Classified National Intelligence Information.
    The DNI classification and declassification 
responsibilities and competencies apply to intelligence and 
intelligence-related information within the 17 agencies and 
components that make up the IC, not to information located 
throughout the entire Federal Government. As you know, the 
DNI's authority generally does not extend beyond the IC.
    A government-wide EA role for declassification is not only 
resource intensive, it also supposes that one EA is responsible 
for classification and that all information is treated the 
same. That assumption is false and will likely lead to 
unintended consequences.
    Many agencies have delegated original classification 
authorities specific to their holdings. The ODNI does not have 
the capacity or the expertise to govern declassification of 
information created, collected, classified, and held by the 
entire Federal Government. As such, charging the ODNI with this 
broader mandate would have negative consequences and distract 
from our core mission of protecting its intelligence sources, 
methods, and activities.
    This expanded role for ODNI is also in conflict with, and 
contrary to, the ODNI's constitution as a smaller integration 
body, rather than a larger operational organization. The 
proposed legislation describes an enormous endeavor to reform 
declassification, and the likelihood of success cannot rest 
with one lead agency. Any government structure must address the 
equities of all of the owning government agencies who have 
individual experience and inherent authority over their 
classified information.
    Consistent with the concerns outlined regarding the EA 
role, we also believe the DNI is not well suited to chair a 
committee overseeing government-wide declassification efforts. 
While the ODNI would welcome further discussion on the proposed 
creation of an Executive Committee on Declassification Programs 
and Technology, the ODNI recommends the Committee also engage 
with other federal agencies with longstanding declassification 
programs, such as DOD, DOE, and State, on proposals for 
declassification reform.
    In the midst of discussion about declassification 
governance reforms, we must not lose sight of the way the 
declassification mission is changing fundamentally. As I 
mentioned previously, the overall volume of information 
requiring declassification review is growing exponentially as 
agencies produce more and more digital information.
    With such a flood of information production, the IC agrees 
that investments in IT will be required to deal with the 
growing volumes of information collected and produced in the 
digital age, along with many years' worth of existing analog 
and digital holdings that may hold valuable historical 
insights.
    There are opportunities to apply advanced technologies, 
such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, to 
augment declassification specialists. Incorporating new 
technology would reduce some labor-intensive steps, support 
consistency and referrals during the review process, and 
possibly identify sensitive sources and methods.
    However, it is important to note that technology is not a 
panacea. Human expertise on information holdings and routinely 
validating that technology will always be necessary.
    Finally, coordination of declassification efforts 
throughout the U.S. Government would require something that has 
been exceedingly difficult to do, even within the much smaller 
group of the IC: get all declassification stakeholders on the 
same IT system, network, and platform so that coordination can 
occur smoothly and securely.
    Most agencies have their own individual IT systems. 
Bringing these networks together beyond the level of exchanging 
emails has proven to be a monumental task and requires 
significant resources to deliver the proper secure environment. 
An even greater level of effort will be needed to accomplish 
similar goals throughout the U.S. Government.
    While the ODNI continues to work diligently to address 
timeliness and consistency in the review process, extending 
that process beyond the IC without first creating the 
infrastructure to support it simply wouldn't work.
    The challenges to reform are immense, but ODNI agrees with 
the PIDB that the need for reform cannot be ignored. While we 
differ on the advisability, feasibility, and the obstacles to 
making the DNI the EA for declassification, we look forward to 
working with this Committee, the overall U.S. Government, and 
the PIDB on ways in which the IC can contribute to meaningful 
reforms.
    Acting Chairman Rubio, Vice Chairman Warner, and Members of 
this Committee, thank you for your time and attention on a very 
important topic. I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
    Congressman Tierney.

 STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN F. TIERNEY (FMR.) MEMBER OF THE 
             PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD

    Mr. Tierney. Thank you Acting Chairman Rubio and Vice 
Chairman Warner and also the Members of the Committee. I want 
to thank you for the invitation to testify on the important but 
mutually neglected issue of modernizing the Government's 
national security classification and declassification system. 
I'd also like to thank the Committee staff for their assistance 
on making it possible for me to appear before the Committee by 
video.
    I'm speaking to you today as a member of the Public 
Interest Declassification Board, or the PIDB, and my remarks 
reflect the views of our members. Our staff previously provided 
a much more detailed prepared statement to the Committee staff.
    Congress recognized the critical importance of 
declassification in our democracy and in our Nation's security 
when it created the PIDB in 2000. It recognized the role the 
PIDB can play and should play in improving the health of the 
national security classification and declassification system by 
making recommendations for reform.
    We're gratified with Senators Moran and Wyden cosponsoring 
and introducing The Declassification Reform Act of 2020. This 
proposed legislation includes many of the recommendations for 
our recent report to the President entitled, ``A Vision for the 
Digital Age: Modernization of the United States Classification 
and Declassification System.''
    We're also grateful for the Congress passing and the 
President signing legislation last year, permanently 
authorizing the PIDB and looking forward to continuing our 
advocacy on the imperative to modernize today's antiquated 
classification and declassification systems.
    We've written five reports to the President over the past 
12 years. Each report documented challenges facing the 
Government and recommended new policies to address them. 
Modernization of the classification and declassification system 
is an imperative. It is a necessity for our national security 
and our democracy to operate effectively in the digital age.
    Since issuing our first report in 2008, the Government has 
made little progress. It has not invested nor integrated 
information technology into classification and declassification 
processes. We purposefully designed our most recent report to 
serve as a roadmap for the Government to overcome collective 
individual agency inaction, to harness uncoordinated efforts by 
a few individual agencies, and to integrate them into a 
Government-wide solution.
    We stress the critical importance of sustained leadership 
in driving change by having a senior-level executive agent 
oversee implementation of reforms. We felt that an integrated, 
federated-systems approach would ensure interoperability, allow 
for effective use of advanced technologies, and lead to 
solutions to declassifying large volumes of digital data.
    Our recommendations align with the Administration's 
information technology modernization and artificial 
intelligence strategies, and its efforts to integrate IT across 
agencies to improve performance and reduce cost. They align 
with the DNI's 2019 national intelligence strategy to do things 
differently. And the National Solarium's recommendation to 
reform the United States Government's structure and operations 
for cyberspace.
    There's a widespread agreement that the declassification 
system is at a breaking point. It simply cannot effectively 
handle the volume of digital data generated every day. It 
cannot handle the volume of records requiring declassification 
review. Declassification processes remain much the same from 
what they were when first developed in the Truman 
Administration in an era when secrets were created on paper and 
secured in safes. Without reform, it will be far worse in the 
future.
    I will share one example. In 2012, we learned that one 
intelligence agency estimated it created approximately one 
petabyte of classified data every 18 months. This is the 
equivalent of approximately 1 trillion pieces of paper.
    This agency estimated that using current manual 
declassification review processes, it would take 2 million 
employees one year to review this volume of information. This 
is just one agency eight years ago. The problem has undoubtedly 
grown exponentially since 2012.
    Just as the declassification system was about to collapse, 
over-classification is getting worse and harming current 
government national security operations. Lieutenant General 
James Dickinson, the President's nominee to lead the United 
States Space Command, testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that over-classification was making it more 
difficult for us to support the warfighter.
    In this example, over-classification not only effects 
operations ambitions, but it can lead to costly duplication of 
space systems, limit innovation, diminish private sector 
support, and reduced development of new technologies on 
projects that could aid U.S. space dominance.
    Agencies must reevaluate the needs of their customers to 
maximize their support. For example, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the NGA, created a Consolidated Security 
Classification Guide it calls CoNGA. It is integrated into NGA 
work processes, uses advance technology to automate 
classification decisions, and ensures decisions align with 
mission and customer needs.
    Policy modernization, interagency integration, and 
technology use are critical to the security of our Nation. 
Technology, such as artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, are revolutionizing operations. Specific tools and 
technology solutions exist at agencies now. They can and must 
be used to revolutionize the management of classified data.
    Agency programs currently operate independently in a silo. 
They are duplicative and they only focus on identifying and 
reviewing their own equity information. Many lack the ability 
to communicate securely with each other, including the National 
Declassification Center. This leads to added cost and reduced 
efficiencies as agencies duplicate processes.
    We recommend an executive agent to oversee declassification 
reform and integrate it into a federated system. First, the 
executive agent has the authority to oversee implementation of 
new policies and processes across the agencies, including 
developing precise declassification guidance and metadata 
standards that can be used across agencies.
    The executive agent has authority to direct and organize 
research into advanced technology solutions, ensure its 
interoperability across the federated enterprise system, and 
coordinate technological acquisition.
    We believe the ODNI is strategically empowered to take on 
the coordination role as executive agent. The ODNI has the 
experience. It overcame bureaucratic roadblocks and integrated 
the 17 organizations that comprise the Intelligence Community. 
The ODNI is a proven leader in developing, implementing, and 
managing technological solutions and acquisitions to support 
missions and operations across agencies.
    Implemented development and deployment of the Intelligence 
Community information technology enterprise, ICITE, and it 
manages the joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.
    The ODNI is a leader in overseeing and managing research in 
advanced information technology, artificial intelligence, and 
other machine-learning technologies. It can leverage expertise 
of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, National 
Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, other 
Intelligence Community agencies, and In-Q-Tel and other private 
sector partners.
    Lastly, the DNI has the stature to bring about change. The 
2019 National Intelligence Strategy recognized the DNI's 
leadership role in getting the Government to do things 
differently by increasing integration and coordination, 
bolstering innovation, and increasing transparency. We felt the 
ODNI was the clear choice to serve as the executive agent.
    ODNI's leadership in establishing a common IT architecture 
can also provide opportunities to gain efficiencies, better 
support missions, and increase cost savings by expanding the 
common IT infrastructure, processes, and data strategy already 
in place to improve classification and declassification.
    We're at a precipice. The declassification system can no 
longer keep pace with the volume of paper records created 25 
years ago; and the exponential growth of digital data will 
cause it to collapse without radical change. The impact of a 
failure to reform the classification and declassification 
system will be felt widely in our democracy and in our national 
security.
    We authorized five reports offering recommendations and 
possible solutions to this challenge. However, they have not 
yet led to a coordinated government effort to radically rethink 
what classification and declassification mean in a digital age, 
how it impacts our national security, and how it impacts our 
democracy. Our board remains hopeful that change is coming.
    The President signed Senate Bill 1790 last year. It 
required the Department of Defense to report to the Congress on 
its plan to integrate advance technologies into 
declassification processes and what it is doing to reduce 
declassification backlogs.
    There is also unanimity among all stakeholders this system 
will not work with digital age. I appreciate the ODNI 
representative's statement that the system is outdated, 
recognizing that there is a problem is a step forward.
    We support Senator Moran's and Senator Wyden's recently 
proposed legislation to modernize declassification and we're 
grateful to this Committee for hosting a hearing on this issue. 
These are also important steps forward.
    There are important steps that will lead to reform. The 
Government is already modernizing information technology 
policies and practices. It is reforming acquisition policies 
and practices for efficiency and reduced costs. It is 
integrating the use of advanced technology across agencies to 
address mission imperatives.
    Adopting the recommendations in our vision report either 
within the executive branch or through legislation are the next 
steps. Appointing the DNI as the executive agent will bring 
needed experience and expertise. It will facilitate development 
of a federated systems approach across agencies. It will 
facilitate the integration of advance information technology 
into new classification and declassification processes.
    Let me again express my appreciation to the Committee for 
addressing this esoteric, yet critically important topic. 
Modernizing the classification and declassification system is 
important for our 21st century national security and it is 
important for transparency and our democracy.
    The time for action is now. The Government must move beyond 
saying, ``it's too costly'' or saying, ``some other agency 
should be responsible.'' Instead, the roadmap in our report 
offers opportunities for reform. It offers possible solutions 
for the Government to engage with stakeholders to truly address 
this challenge, to identify solutions, and to implement them.
    Thank you, again, for your interest and your support. I 
look forward to answering your questions and continuing this 
discussion.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you both for being here. The Vice 
Chairman went to vote. I'm going to go as soon as he comes 
back. Senator Feinstein is still getting ready.
    So, Senator Blunt, you're next. Are you ready?
    Senator Blunt. Yes, I am, Chairman. Thanks for letting me 
go. I've got a couple of questions.
    You know, clearly, as my former colleague, Congressman 
Tierney, mentioned in his remarks, Congress has asked the ODNI 
to come back with a plan on classification. We all believe that 
we over-classify now. I think that's more likely than not the 
default position. If you don't have a lot of time to think 
about the thing you're classifying and decide there may be 
something in there that possibly should be classified at a 
higher level, it goes there. And it goes there for a long time.
    So, I don't know how much of that we need to establish 
here. We need to get back to where the classification is as 
open as possible and available in the future as quickly as 
possible.
    I would say this is a question for Mr. Koch. You know the 
Pentagon leaders themselves have been pressing pretty 
aggressively for this. The secretary of the Air Force, 
Secretary Barrett, General Hyten, Vice Chair of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, have pointed out how hard it is to make the 
case publicly without access to information that is widely 
available now, particularly the overhead architecture 
information. So much of it is virtually available at the 
commercial level, if not absolutely available at the commercial 
level.
    And to make the case for Space Command or to make the      
case--. Senator Moran and I both serve on the Defense 
Appropriating Committee. You know, his challenge is there are 
things that that Committee needs to know that truly aren't at 
the intel level but are at a level to where Members of Congress 
should have more access to them than they have now.
    So, I guess the question, Mr. Koch, is what kinds of things 
would make it easier to explain the needs of Space Command and 
other defense needs if they were classified at a level beyond 
the likely current classification level?
    Mr. Koch. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 
Unfortunately, I don't think I can speak intelligently to what 
Space Command and Space Force is doing. That's a DOD equity. I 
can speak for the IC and what ODNI's doing.
    But, if you're concerned about how agencies in the IC over-
classify things, I share that concern with you. And you have to 
understand that we are collectively working on updating our 
security classification guides to be more tailored for very 
specific information.
    So [Inaudible] are not [Inaudible] level when they--when 
there's a question. We're preparing better training for our 
workforce and I have utmost confidence that we will get to a 
point where over-classification will not be an issue going 
forward.
    Senator Blunt. Well, I hope so. And I guess, again, part of 
my question was that there is so much that's available at the 
commercial level now and we wind up classifying government 
documents that are widely available at almost the level we have 
them in other ways. But, I think people are reluctant, if it's 
a classified document, to use it and often don't have the time 
to go somewhere else to find it.
    So, a lot of people have, during the COVID period, really 
figured out that there's lots of unclassified material that 
they could access from home. Some agencies better prepared than 
others to work in that unclassified space.
    But, given your declassification background, what have you 
done to assist the various IC agencies as to how they could use 
more unclassified documents during the time that they were 
working remotely? I think that also would be a question, Mr. 
Koch, for you.
    Mr. Koch. Senator, thank you. Thank you for the question. 
To be honest, I have not been personally involved with that.
    As you know the IC works at the classified level for the 
vast majority of the time. So, not only during COVID, but pre-
COVID it's incredibly difficult for any officer in the IC to 
work in an unclassified setting when they deal with classified 
material. So even if I had been involved with that----
    Senator Blunt. Are you telling you me you didn't have 
people working from home in an unclassified setting during the 
time that the headquarters was man down?
    Mr. Koch. No, we have had people working from home but we 
can't have them working on any kind of declassification 
initiatives or requests.
    Senator Blunt. I guess maybe I'm not making the case here 
right. But the case says that a lot of people have found a way 
to use declassified commercially available material that 
allowed them to do most of what they were doing with the 
classified material. And I guess your answer is you've given no 
advice in that.
    John Tierney, on the move toward more declassification from 
your oversight, you're looking at that. What have you seen that 
you're most encouraged about and what have you seen that you're 
most concerned about as we try to get our hands around this 
whole issue of over classifying.
    Mr. Tierney. Senator, what we've seen is a lack of ability 
to work across the agencies and find standards that can apply 
for anybody on that. And I think that goes back in the form of 
a lack of leadership. We're not asking that the ODNI actually 
go in there and tell people what they're going to classify and 
not classify. But we need somebody to make sure everybody is 
working on updating those and to the extent that it even can be 
uniform making sure that they are.
    And I think what's probably most uncertain to us is that 
there's no activity going on in that realm. Everybody seems to 
just be saying well it's too expensive or it's too much for us 
to do. When in fact somebody has got to do it if it's going to 
be done at all and it is incredibly expensive to not have it 
done, as Senator Warner indicated and also Senator Wyden. Some 
$18-plus billion dollars a year are being spent and we're not 
really on top of the issues here.
    So I think that we need the leadership and we need a set of 
standards that will take care of as much as can be done while 
still leaving the individual agencies the ability to take care 
of their own equities.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you, Congressman. Chairman, I'm out of 
time. Thanks for the time.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I think as 
Chairman Rubio indicated, we're going to do five-minute rounds. 
I'll go. I think Senator Cornyn's up next. Then I understand 
we're doing it this time by seniority. So you'll be right after 
Senator Cornyn. It's Warner, Cornyn, Feinstein next.
    Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, there's lot of detail here but 
if I could sort of pull us back to a 30,000-foot level or 
above. I'm not really exactly sure there's a common 
understanding about the problem we're trying to solve both 
through the classification system and the declassification 
system. I start from the premise that public information should 
be available unless there is a good reason not to make it 
available.
    And I'm told that there are about four million people with 
security clearances in the United States and it seems to me 
that not only do we over-classify, but that it's so burdensome 
to come up with a method of declassification that it just 
simply--we need to sort of think over again what is the goal 
here?
    We all understand being consumers of classified 
information--the importance of protecting things like sources 
and methods. But just like under the Freedom of Information 
Act, it's too easy for government officials to hide their 
mistakes to prevent public scrutiny and accountability for 
their actions on behalf of the taxpayer. And I wonder maybe I 
could start with you, Mr. Tierney.
    I'd like to get a little bit of your perspective and 
feedback about how we should conceptualize the problem we're 
trying to solve here. And how do we reconcile that with another 
important law, which is the Freedom of Information Act and the 
presumption of openness, along with pretty clear criteria that 
are applied to keep it secret or keep it in the hands of the 
Government rather than to make it available.
    Do you think that's a fair contrast to make and should we 
all be focused--should both systems be focused on the same 
goal?
    Mr. Tierney. Well that's a tough question Senator. I 
appreciate your throwing it to my ballpark.
    You know, I had some of the same frustrations when I was on 
the Intelligence Committee in the House and on the Oversight 
Committee with National Security--that you're never quite sure 
that people are applying the proper standards to anything that 
they're classifying. And sometimes you get the notion that they 
might be classifying something for reasons of avoiding 
embarrassment or just because they're not sure whether it 
should be or not on that.
    I don't have the magic bullet on that and I don't think 
that our PIDB necessarily does either, except to say that it is 
something that has to be done across agencies and that it needs 
some leadership. Somebody has to take charge of saying this is 
a problem and we're going to get a working group together, 
which is one reason we have the executive committee working 
with the executive agent in our recommendations to deal with 
just this sort of a problem.
    There's identifying what is the glitch that is over-
classifying things and what to do while setting standards that 
will allow people to apply them readily so that we don't get 
into that situation and make the clearness there. I think it'll 
be a decision that the communities make working together and 
that the Congress then will have to assess and make sure that 
they think that they're appropriate, as with the Executive, on 
that.
    We don't have the magic bullet on how to tell right now--
how to classify one item and not classify another within the 
equities of each individual agency. But nobody seems to be 
doing it yet and nobody seems to be really pushing down on the 
pedal to make sure that they do. And that's where the lack of 
leadership comes in on that. Why I think it's so essential that 
somebody lead the project.
    Senator Cornyn. Well thank you for your answer. I wonder, 
do you as a former Member of Congress, do you see this as a 
legislative branch responsibility for identifying what 
information's classified or not? Or exclusively an executive 
branch decision?
    Mr. Tierney. I think that the Congress has an oversight 
role to play on that. I think that initially, particularly 
within the Intelligence Community, it is an Executive situation 
and that they have to be responsible for it. But I think that 
the Congress has an oversight view to make sure that it isn't 
overly broad and that it serves the underlying purpose of 
making sure there's transparency and that the public does get 
as a default mechanism those things which should not absolutely 
be classified.
    So while, again, the Executive can certainly take a lot of 
leeway on that and be very active in making sure that this 
moves forward, I don't think that Congress can abdicate its 
responsibility of oversight to make sure that it's being done 
properly and that classification does not continue to be over-
broad in its application.
    Senator Cornyn. And again, Mr. Tierney, have you seen a 
construct or a reform in this area with regard to the 
classification system that you think is useful or something we 
ought to--? Or that gets it right? Or is it just simply an 
absence of proposals that would help us get our arms around 
that?
    Mr. Tierney. With respect to the classification versus 
items that shouldn't be classified, I don't think that I've 
seen a construct on that. I'd check with the other board 
members to see if they have or not. But I do think that there's 
a construct of having leadership in an agency that makes sure 
people are moving toward that goal and meeting benchmarks.
    And then working together to make sure there's as much 
standard application as possible. And that's the ODNI itself 
and the work that it did amongst the 17 agencies in the 
Intelligence Community. And some of that, of course, reaches 
outside the Intelligence Community where people have access to 
some of that information and they need to know.
    So, in that sense, there is a good example of how you can 
provide the leadership and it can work across agencies and even 
outside of the Intelligence Community is in the ODNI, the 
actual construct of classification versus don't classify 
something--I've not seen that prototype yet.
    Senator Cornyn. Well thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. 
I'll yield back.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. And there are five minutes 
left on the vote if you've not voted on the last one.
    Mr. Tierney, let me start with you and let me get both you 
and Mr. Koch on this one. This Committee has wrestled for two 
or three years on what I think is an analogous problem. And 
that is security clearance reform.
    We worked closely with the Administration. Took the backlog 
on clearances down from over 700,000 to about 200,000. Still 
waiting for an EO called the Trusted Workforce 2.0. But I guess 
I'm interested in both the witnesses.
    One is that there are the lessons learned from security 
clearance reform--and you may not be as familiar. But I'd like 
to have your comment there. And then what does a 
declassification system look like in a digital era? Since we 
obviously, I think, all agree that we're still kind of paper 
based. Either one of the witnesses. I guess I'll start with Mr. 
Tierney.
    Mr. Tierney. Okay. Well on the declassification in the 
digital age it looks like, again, the need for there to be 
technologies that are identified and methods of machine 
learning. The architecture we put together to even to work on 
that. And again, that's going to take somebody with experience 
in doing that. The ODNI fits that bill in terms of this idea. 
And I think it's going to be very important.
    And could you remind me the first part of your question 
Senator?
    Vice Chairman Warner. The first part of my question was--
and you may not be as familiar with this part--but we worked 
quite closely with the Administration on a security clearance 
reform process. It's taken us three years but it seems like 
there were at least some similarities in terms of type of 
problem. And I don't know if you have observed any of that.
    Mr. Tierney. No, I haven't. I'm not familiar with it 
Senator, although I will note that I had a security clearance 
serving on the Intelligence Committee in the House. But when I 
went to work on this board they started the process and that 
was what three years ago? And I'm proud to say that last week 
they finished it. So if there's reform, it certainly has----
    Vice Chairman Warner. So much for that reform playing out 
in your case.
    Mr. Tierney. [Inaudible]
    Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Koch, do you have any questions--
either analogy--to security clearance reform and what are the 
metrics in a digital age?
    Mr. Koch. Sure Senator. So first let me say I'm not an 
expert at all in security classification reform. But the 
processes for security clearance investigation and access to 
classified information are fairly uniform. But when you're 
talking about the classification declassification system 
they're not. Because OCAs are delegated to departments and 
agencies from the President. And each agency develops their own 
security classification guides.
    So federating that is not the same as dealing with security 
EA processes and issues. On the digital front, I know that 
there are multiple working groups at the national level 
interagency level that are already dealing with these issues 
and have been over the past few years. And we are continuing to 
do that.
    Hopefully, after COVID finishes, we can get back to doing 
that business. But I will point out that the director of the 
ISOO already has the authorities that the PIDB suggests the DNI 
take over for declassification.
    Specifically, the ISOO is directed by the President to 
establish standards for classification/declassification marking 
principles. And they should be the ones in our view that should 
continue doing those things in this area and not just shift 
those responsibilities to another agency.
    Vice Chairman Warner. But when we're talking about a 
digital era, though, isn't there almost an immediate bias 
toward over-classification when you've got so much voluminous 
digital product at this point? Is there any kind of guidepost 
you'd give us on how you could stop that--that proclivity? 
You've got so much data at this point, it's just easier to 
declassify and sort--or easier to classify--then even try to 
sort through.
    Mr. Koch. Well, Senator, that's a hard question to answer. 
There's just so much out there. When you have humans making 
their own decisions on whether something should be classified 
or not, they're basing their decision on their own experience 
as well as following specific security classification guidance 
on what should and should not be classified.
    However, I do agree that we should get automation in this 
area, which would definitely cut down the over-classification 
issues that we have seen over the years. I know that there are 
some efforts underway throughout the IC to come up with some 
kind of program that can help automate as you're typing 
something that is immediately recognize as classified or not 
and therefore can mark a document for you so you don't have to 
do it yourself.
    I don't think that we're there yet, but we've definitely 
made some progress in that area.
    Vice Chairman Warner. I do think AI will be an important 
tool. When Senator Rubio was making his opening comments he 
singled out--in addition to Senator Wyden--he singled out one 
of our newer Members as the philosopher-scholar. So maybe 
Senator Sasse has got the answers. He's up next.
    Senator Sasse. It's unfortunate that you begin with an 
insult, but thank you Vice Chairman for chairing today.
    Senator Wyden, thank you for your work on this, and Senator 
Moran for your earlier statement. To the folks on the PIDB, 
thanks for your work in an area that's really important. It 
obviously sounds like a niche topic but I think it's incredibly 
important.
    I want to associate myself with comments from Members on 
both sides of the aisle today about the risks of over-
classification, because it fosters public distrust. For all 15 
of us who serve on this Committee, I really appreciate the work 
of all the hard working men and women who often labor in the 
shadows. And even their families don't always get to know what 
they're going through and all the suffering and sacrifices that 
they do.
    We obviously value the classified product that we get on a 
regular basis. But I would push back a tiny little bit, Mr. 
Koch, against your last answer when you said people are making 
decisions about classification based on their individual 
histories and assessments. I think in addition they make 
decisions based on the structural incentives in the system 
where, if you over-classify something, there's no way you get 
in trouble. If you under-classify something, you can get in 
trouble.
    So the easy move--this is not to say that the people doing 
this work are lazy. It's that they're risk averse because all 
humans are. The easy move is to over-classify when you can't 
decide what to do. And so one of the things that I think, Mr. 
Tierney, your group has done so much important work on is just 
providing some simple ways for us to get our hands around it, 
and for the broader public to understand what problem we're 
dealing with.
    And so one piece of your report talks about how we spend 
about $18 billion a year on these classification/
declassification systems that aren't really working because we 
have millions of pages of documents even from the Reagan 
administration. And I say as a historian, not just as a regular 
consumer of intelligence--as a historian, I think it's really 
important for the public and for scholars to be able to get 
access to all of this information.
    And instead of even wrestling around the hard dividing-line 
about what should or shouldn't still be declassified, I think 
Mr. Tierney what your report showed was that millions of pages 
of documents from the Reagan administration that should have 
already been declassified have not been simply because they 
require manual review. I think the bias for these older 
documents should be toward an inertia of motion path toward 
declassification.
    And if a manual review is required, then these documents 
don't get declassified. The incentives in the system are 
rewarded to having over-classified. Historians and other 
scholars can't get access to them. There's not enough scrutiny 
and that fosters public distrust.
    So Mr. Tierney, first of all thank you again for all of 
your hard work in this space. But as you arrived at the 
recommendation to make the ODNI--the DNI--the executive agent 
for declassification, could you walk us through a little bit of 
the process of how you landed there? What other alternatives 
you considered and how you decided that the DNI is the best or 
the least bad agent to be responsible here? That was directed 
at Congressman Tierney.
    Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much Senator.
    Senator Sasse. Thank you.
    Mr. Tierney. Look, a prioritization on declassification is 
very important. I'm glad you brought that up. And the last 
report we made, we recommended that the National 
Declassification Center and the agencies of public discuss 
which to be reviewed so that others essentially would have an 
insight into what records the public or other agencies want to 
see. And by the fall those records that has no interest in 
seeing or very little interest in seeing. And that 
prioritization would allow for a coordinated government-wide 
approach to declassifying information based on the records most 
sought and the most historical significance to the public.
    So those things are certainly important; and for the bond 
digital records in particular, the advanced technology would be 
able to assist in that declassification effort. It is costly, 
what's going on now. Some $18.5 billion are already being spent 
on an annual basis on that and it is more than a little crazy 
on that. There are 46 million pages in 2017 that were 
declassified. And each page costs about $2.23 per page.
    So we went through a process of recognizing just what the 
expense was to the citizens and taxpayers and the need for our 
prioritization. And we kept coming back to the notion that 
there needed to be somebody driving the train. There had to be 
some leadership here. Because everybody recognizes the problem. 
Everybody will admit right away that it needs to have some 
technology involved in it. Different infrastructure 
architecturally. It needs to have action taken cooperatively 
amongst agents as we see interoperability.
    All of those things people agree to but nobody seems to 
want to take the challenge on. We did at first look at the ISOO 
group and decided whether or not that would be a group that 
would be appropriate to take it. But unfortunately, ISOO is 
only 18 people. And it has a huge responsibility to do many 
other things that the executive orders have put on it. And I 
just can tell you some of them.
    It supports several executive orders including Executive 
Order 13526, to classify national security information; 18-
12829, the National Industrial Security Program; 3549, to 
classify National Security Information Program with State, 
local, tribal, and private--and so on and so on. You get to see 
the issue on that.
    With only 18 people and its budget of $360 million this 
year, is $40 million decreased over the past 5 years. So we 
really couldn't, by a process of elimination, couldn't find an 
agency that would have the power and the respect in the 
community and that came from the ODNI's office.
    They do command the respect and the authority that's going 
to be needed for somebody to be able to say to the other 
agencies: you need to address this problem. You need to focus 
on it and get an answer. You need to work with us on 
identifying technologies. You need to work with us on getting 
answers about the machine learning. And then those agents--you 
need somebody who's had experience doing it. We didn't have any 
other organization that we were able to come across that had 
the kind of experience that the ODNI had.
    And even with the NGA--the Geospatial Agency--the work that 
they've done in CoNGA, solved some of the problems that were 
mentioned by you, Senators, earlier on that. But mostly looking 
back on that, a process of elimination of other agencies not 
having any experience, not having the authority perceived by 
other people to do that. And those things were very important 
and driven to us to say that this is what we need. We need 
somebody that--move on.
    Senator Sasse. Congressman, I'll cut in here just to say 
thank you because we're at time, and I know that I need to give 
the microphone back to the Chairman. But Mr. Chairman, I would 
note for the record that I'm going to followup with a letter as 
well, asking about how the pilot project is going with the 
applied research lab at the University of Texas at Austin, 
which is trying to figure out how to use artificial 
intelligence and machine learning to expedite the 
declassification process. But I'll do that by letter. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Rubio. Excellent. Senator Wyden.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For 
colleagues that have just joined us, I want to mention one 
issue that the Chairman raised that I also did some research on 
during the break. The reforms Senator Moran and I are urging do 
not put the DNI in charge of deciding what DOD secrets are 
declassified. The same principle is true of Department of 
Energy secrets, State Department secrets; those agencies are 
going to decide what they're going to declassify.
    What our bill's about is modernizing the systems for 
declassifying information that these agencies would use and 
have already determined are no longer classified. So that's an 
important issue, and I think we're going to have a dialogue on 
this. So Senator Moran and I very much want to work to develop 
a bipartisan coalition in this Committee to modernize the 
bureaucracy and we've proposed an approach that we think makes 
some sense.
    So I'd like to start by having Mr. Tierney--because he's 
got a chance to respond to Mr. Koch. I think it would be good 
to have Mr. Tierney paint for the Committee a picture of the 
declassification process five, 10 years from now--if this 
Committee can't get that bipartisan coalition for reform. What 
would be withheld from the American people simply because we 
didn't get a bipartisan coalition to modernize the bureaucracy?
    Congressman?
    Mr. Tierney. Well, Senator, it certainly won't be a pretty 
picture. I can tell you that. We don't know right now how many 
classified documents agencies create. And we can't tell exactly 
how big the problem is. But we do know that the figure 
continues to grow exponentially. I cited one example in my 
remarks. We also know the Government will be unable to 
declassify any large volume of digital data that--. The 
abilities just aren't there.
    Here's an example of a body of records that has or will 
have significant historical interest. The National Archives 
receive all the Presidential records at the conclusion of each 
Administration. It's an accession between one and two 
terabytes, I'm sorry, of data in the 12-year span of the Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.
    The volume increased to four terabytes in the Clinton 
administration, mostly emails and structured data. And the 
archives received 80 terabytes from the George W. Bush 
administration. Eight years later the National Archives 
accessioned an astonishing 250 terabytes of data from the Obama 
administration including a complex array of structured and 
unstructured data.
    So you just see how exponentially it grows in that one 
single category. And you take that and you blow it out amongst 
all the different agencies and aspects on that you get a 
picture of how ugly it's going to be years down the road when 
you don't have machine learning--you don't have the technology 
involved, you don't have some sort of coordinated effort.
    Senator Wyden. Now on the question of essentially how you 
handle this, how important--and this was very important to 
Senator Moran and I--is that declassification reform not be 
stove piped in different parts of the U.S. Government.
    Mr. Tierney. Well it's very important on that. How to 
encapsulate that is difficult. I mean, you have so many 
different agencies classifying. You have so many different 
aspects of ways now that it's almost impossible for people to 
do it. I mean there's one example of--it was mentioned 
earlier--that when somebody may declassify a document that is 
also involved with the equities of another agency. If you're 
doing it manually then you have to get it from one point to 
another.
    If there's no ability to get it technologically one point 
to another, it has to be physically brought from one place to 
another or somebody has to come in and visit and review the 
document in a secure setting to do it.
    So it just gets completely out of control. And I think it 
just moves on from there.
    Senator Wyden. One last question if I might, Mr. Tierney.
    So, Mr. Koch basically--and this is a common refrain--said 
well let's look somewhere else to do this important job of 
really cleaning up declassification. And he seems to think that 
ISOO and NDC--the National Center--are able to play the role to 
really bring about declassification reform. We were concerned 
that these offices don't really have the kind of bureaucratic 
heft--the kind of bureaucratic muscle--to actually get federal 
agencies to integrate and modernize their declassification 
systems. What's your take on that?
    Mr. Tierney. My take is exactly that, Senator. You're 
right. They can do it either way. You can say why did the DNI--
should serve as executive agency or I can come in and say why--
you know--the Information Security Oversight Office is not as 
suited to serve. But if it comes right down to it, one is the 
authority issue as you point out.
    I've heard all wonderful things the people at ISOO do and I 
want to thank them for all the work they do. They don't carry 
the kind of authority and weight that the ODNI does when it 
says something should be done or people should work together 
and get it done by a certain time in a certain way.
    And it's not equipped in that manner to serve. Also, as I 
mentioned, it has a quite heavy workload for 18 staff people 
and a budget that is shrinking instead of growing. The things 
that it can't do, it doesn't have the technical expertise that 
the ODNI has. It doesn't have access to the advanced technology 
that is already in place at the Intelligence Community 
agencies.
    Unlike the ODNI, it doesn't have the experience of 
developing or deploying or managing large multi-agency secure 
cloud based enterprise systems like the ICITE system I 
mentioned that is run by the ODNI.
    Unlike ODNI, it does not have the experience managing a 
secure communications network like JWICS. In fact, the National 
Archives only has two JWICS terminals for the entire agency.
    Unlike ODNI, it does not have the experience of focus on 
protecting sources and methods, something the ODNI has 
highlighted to us in 2018.
    And one reason I would think ODNI would want to be taking 
on this leadership role so it does have a good say in 
protecting sources and methods and be able to do that.
    And unlike the DNI, the director of ISOO does not have the 
same stature and ability to corral those agencies that I 
mentioned on their policies. And it probably would be in 
conflict with their main oversight mission to boot.
    So we've had discussions with Archives, leaders, 
historians, researchers, civil societies, organizations, 
records managers, or other agencies. We found that the National 
Archives is not the appropriate organization to serve as 
executive agent or to lead the reform of classification and 
declassification.
    And we have tried to have discussions on this with the 
folks at the ODNI's office and we've not been successful to 
date. But we're open to more discussions with them on that. 
Because all the things I mentioned ISOO doesn't have, the ODNI 
does have. And I'm not aware of another agency that has it to 
the extent that the ODNI does.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you. I'm well over my time. And Mr. 
Chairman and Vice Chairman Warner, thank you both very much for 
scheduling this hearing and giving Senator Moran and I this 
opportunity.
    Chairman Rubio. Important topic. I'm glad we were able to 
get to it in an open setting.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Representative Tierney, welcome. And I want to thank not 
only you, but your fellow Public Interest Declassification 
Board members for your most recent report on modernizing and 
reforming our declassification system. I really worry very much 
about the stakes of inaction in this field. And as you 
mentioned, a lack of reform means that we'll continue to spend 
an outrageous amount of money--$18 billion or more per year on 
a Fifties-era paper-based declassification system.
    So Representative Tierney, while many say that 
modernization is too costly, I think there is clearly a risk of 
not making these kinds of investments now in a modernized 
system that'll bring cost savings down the road. What 
investments do you think are needed to modernize 
declassification? And do you think that there is the potential 
for actual cost savings in the future based on a more 
streamlined technology dependent modernized system?
    Mr. Tierney. Well thank you, Senator. Nice to see you again 
as well. I do believe that and we--the Board--do believe that 
there'll be significant savings on this. The estimate of $18-
and-a half-billion may actually underestimate the cost to the 
American public at the present time. We need to evaluate those 
costs and we obviously can't afford to continue on the way that 
we're going.
    We need to, I would say, get an information technology 
architecture that is going to be somewhat costly. You need to 
have a lot more machine learning and the research and ability 
to do on that. There are some pilot programs out there, as 
Senator Sasse mentioned, that we can learn from.
    And those are going to be costly. But they're one-time 
costs with a minimal sort of maintenance cost going forward, 
versus this continually growing cost and the cost of not 
getting the information out for use by this--, whether it's the 
Space Command or other government agencies or access to the 
public for their need to know and to Congress for its need to 
know.
    So with the cost both in dollars and ability to access this 
information, it's huge. And while the outlay on these 
technologies and machine learning aspects of everything may be 
significant initially, I think over time there will be a big 
cost saver on that and we'll get the information to people when 
they need it both inside government and out.
    Senator Heinrich. Congressman Tierney, one of the things 
that I find ironic is that this is a committee that really 
understands the utility of using machine learning, using 
artificial intelligence, so that the same set of eyes doesn't 
have to go over the same product over and over and over all day 
long. Because humans don't do well in that environment. And so 
weeding that down to a few documents that need to be looked at 
is something that I think, almost in our entirety, we 
understand the power of that to change how we evaluate 
intelligence product.
    How can we scale up those pilots that you mentioned in AI 
and machine learning and begin to take the same, I guess, zeal 
for utilizing those tools in declassification that you already 
see in terms of analysis of other intelligence product?
    Mr. Tierney. Well, we have the ability and experiences that 
we have to date. And it sounds a little bit like a broken 
record. Most of those are within the Intelligence Community in 
fact. So we have to acknowledge those and learn from them and 
build upon them. But then we have to do it in a coordinated 
fashion so that we're not duplicating everything we do. We're 
not doing the research twice; we're not giving the same 
technology twice. And that we're making sure that when we do 
get it that it's applicable and usable by everybody across the 
way.
    So that again takes leadership--and to be the right 
person--to be able to say that this is what we're going to do. 
At the end, this is the decision. Everybody's going to move, 
march in that direction.
    So we suggested the executive agent. We suggested the 
executive committee for that. And I think those are the 
important factors to take into consideration and to get those 
types of things done in a way that makes sure you're not 
duplicating cost and energy.
    Senator Heinrich. The new Commander of Space Command 
recently testified that over-classification is making it more 
difficult for Space Command to support the warfighter.
    Congressman Tierney, can you talk a little bit about how 
over-classification affects operations and missions, not just 
the public's right to know, but also very real day-to-day, 
risk-laden scenarios?
    Mr. Tierney. I can, Senator. I'm looking for some notes 
that I have on that, because it was not just Lieutenant General 
Dickinson that talked about that. It was also General Hyten, 
who's the predecessor on that, and talked about the fact that 
they were just duplicating things when they shouldn't and 
didn't need to be doing that. It has a serious effect on it, 
and I think those were the two best examples that we had. And 
let's see if I can find that.
    Well, General Hyten was talking about just the over-
classification of information within the Defense Department. In 
his own--and I quote him--what he said was it was unbelievably 
ridiculous. The officials, he said, like so many others who are 
worried by classification's effect on operations, has an effect 
there; has an effect on costs; has an effect on innovation and 
the ability to partner with industry in the private sector. So 
all those things were impacted.
    So he worries about the over-classification limits, the 
public's insight of the Government operation and programs and 
especially the costly ones like the defense program. So all of 
those things had to come in. Not just the dollar costs, but the 
costs and operations, innovation, and the ability to partner 
with private industries--impact our ability to carry on as a 
government in all fields.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Senator King, are you on? Is he 
still with us? Senator King?
    Senator King. Okay. I come at this unburdened by a great 
deal of knowledge. But one question, Mr. Tierney, is are we 
swamped by declassification because we are trying to declassify 
everything? Or what about a system that just said, we're just 
going to work on the declassification of things that people ask 
for? It seems to me that cuts the universe of declassification 
down considerably. Or are we swamped even in terms of what 
people are asking for? Do you see where I'm going here?
    Mr. Tierney. I do see what you're saying and I agree. There 
are certain statutes and executive orders that require that 
things be declassified on timetables, and that can always be 
adjusted when somebody takes a look at it. But I think you're 
right on the money when you talk about prioritization.
    It's one of the things we've said, that there has to be a 
system put in place that, prioritizing what we need in the 
government agencies in order to avoid all those costs that I 
talked about--the inability to work in the private sector, the 
innovation and all of that. And also when the public, be it 
historians, Congress, or the public at a large, can take those 
issues of what people want and put them at the top of the list. 
Then work it down to those things least claimed for and then 
the ones that aren't being sought at all.
    Senator King. Well, and another idea along that same line 
is to just say, everything is going to be declassified after 
five years or 10 years or whatever, and that's the fallback. 
And then the burden is on the agencies to reclassify if they 
feel it's justified. In other words, it would be an automatic 
declassification. And again, the burden would be on those who 
did the classification in the first place to say, yes, we've 
got to keep this classified. Or we'll just let it go along with 
these other million pages.
    Mr. Tierney. Well, I'll leave it to my friend at ODNI to 
respond with what I think will be the obvious intelligence 
reactions to that, in terms of, at present at least, the lack 
of manpower and technology to actually make the kind of review 
that it would require to see whether or not they should 
continue with the declassification status they're at, or be 
reduced or be released on that.
    I know that we just went through the Kennedy pages, for 
instance. It was 50 years after the incident on that. There was 
a great deal of discussion with the FBI and the CIA as to what 
would release sources and procedures and things of that nature 
on that, and that was after that many years. So that was a 
great way to do it. That would presume that everybody had the 
ability to do it and protect what really needed to be 
protected.
    Senator King. Well, let me in my limited time--Mr. Koch, 
you, not surprisingly, said, ``Not me. I don't want to be 
asked.'' But if not the DNI, then who? My experience in 
management is you need somebody who's responsible. My 
management principle is one throat to choke.
    And one of the problems with this whole issue is it's 
scattered throughout the Government and there's nobody that can 
be held accountable for backlogs and delays. So if you don't 
think it should be the DNI, who do you think it ought to be?
    Mr. Koch. Well, thank you, Senator, for the question.
    So as I mentioned previously, the President has already 
authorized both the ISOO and the NDC to coordinate across the 
executive branch on all declassification activities. The NDC, 
for example, has been given authority from the President to 
streamline declassification processes, as well as to prioritize 
what should and should not be reviewed by agencies.
    I think that they should continue that process. And for 
your awareness, we have been working in multiple national level 
and interagency groups over the past few years to specifically 
address that prioritization issue. So we can get down to 
exactly what the American people really want to know, as 
opposed to reviewing in some ways meaningless information that 
no one cares about and our agency is spending so much time 
reviewing in the first place.
    Senator King. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Again, I want to express my appreciation to Senator Wyden and 
Senator Moran for leading on this issue, and thank you to you 
and the Vice Chair for holding this hearing. I think it's an 
important issue.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator King, you look comfortable. There's 
some people here saying that you have a brandy and a cigar that 
we can't see that's not in sight of camera.
    Senator King. I'm somewhere in the bowels of the Capitol, 
but in an undisclosed location.
    Chairman Rubio. I didn't see any smoke. I defended you, 
just wanted you to know.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
    Is there anybody else online, or am I the last one? Okay, 
so then I think a lot of the topics have been covered. I did 
want to get to a couple things.
    Congressman, if I could first just briefly ask you to 
explain the methodology of the report, because I didn't 
personally review it, but our staff looked at it again last 
night. It's not outlined in the document.
    I'm just curious, you know, who did you interview? What's 
the data we gathered, and then how was that all incorporated in 
the recommendations? It looked like a lot of work, so I'm just 
curious.
    Mr. Tierney. It was a tremendous amount of work, and a lot 
of it, of course, was done with the help of our staff, which 
has been tremendous on that. I would be happy to have us 
respond to you with a longer list of who exactly we spoke to 
and when, to try to give you a real good idea of what the 
methodology [Inaudible].
    Chairman Rubio. What I'm getting at with the question is--
you'll understand in a moment--is we're trying to sort of 
understand what the reforms would cost. And I'll tell you why 
I'm asking that, not because we shouldn't do it. But I think 
from what you've heard here today, I think there's broad-based 
support for the idea that the system we have in place now is 
Byzantine and confederated and broken and it needs to be 
modernized. And it needs to be brought in the 21st century and 
fully utilize all of the technology that's now available to us.
    It seems to me that there seems to be not much controversy 
around the idea that there needs to be an executive agent, 
someone who has ball control on this in terms of overseeing 
strategy, implementing the plan, driving the investments. Where 
I think sort of the debate on the topic is who's going to be 
that agent who sort of runs it. And it would appear that in 
order to design and implement and drive the investment, you 
would need a pretty substantial investment above what we are 
doing now, at least at the design phase, because there's a lot 
of new pieces to move in.
    And so I guess the question I'd have for Mr. Koch is given, 
obviously, the resources you have now are not--I think the 
answer to this question is going to be an easy yes--the 
resources you have available now to you would not be enough to 
drive this. It would require additional resources if, in fact, 
you are tasked with this or your office was tasked with this 
[Inaudible] given the personnel you have now?
    Mr. Koch. Senator, yes. I would absolutely say yes, that's 
correct.
    Chairman Rubio. Because, Congressman, the estimate of 
$18.39 billion for 2017, was that the cost for the current 
system, and does it include the cost of evaluating the 
documents for public release? Or do you know if that number 
just reflected maintaining the current classified system?
    Mr. Tierney. That is the current maintenance of the system, 
the $18.5 billion on that. It does not take into account what 
would be needed to give the ODNI in order to be able to do the 
types of things that we've requested that they've done.
    Just to broadly address some of your issue on it, we had 
discussion with National Archives leaders. A lot of them you'll 
see when we give you the information. Historians, researchers, 
civil society organizations, the record managers at other 
agencies. And obviously, we've met with the ODNI office and 
others in the Intelligence Community, but we offered to meet 
with them more once we hear their resistance on that; and we 
still remain willing to do that.
    And we were able to make the comparison why ISOO and the 
National Declassification Center weren't the appropriate ones 
for lack of experience, for lack of resources, for lack of 
authority, and all of those things which the ODNI had. But we'd 
be more than happy to go into that in more detail with them, 
should we be able to effect a meeting with them.
    Chairman Rubio. Okay, yes. No, and again, it's not because 
it wouldn't be money or an investment worth spending. Just to 
be clear, this is not a plug-and-play where we could just 
use--. I mean no matter who gets this assignment, they're going 
to need resources, especially at the front end, to sort of 
implement it. Hopefully, at that point like anything else, 
there's front-end investments and the maintenance on the back 
end.
    And just in terms of the notion that--and I guess, Mr. 
Koch, I want to accurately represent what the ODNI's position 
is on this recommendation. It's not that you're against a 
reform or even against a notion of an executive agent. It is a 
level of discomfort in particular with designing a system that 
other agencies you don't have authorities over would have to 
abide by. Even if you're not making the specific decisions, 
you're designing a system they would have to live by.
    Is that an accurate assessment of some of the angst or, I 
guess, some of the resistance to this recommendation of the 
ODNI being the executive agent?
    Mr. Koch. Yes, Senator, that's correct.
    But I think part of the point is just simply transferring 
the authorities that already exist with both ISOO and NDC to 
another agency just doesn't make sense. I mean, if the issue is 
resources and money at both ISOO and NDC, why can't those 
agencies be given the same type of resources that it's being 
proposed for the DNI?
    I don't think that we're actually suggesting that an EA is 
needed, but we are agreeing that significant reform is 
necessary in this area, and we have been working toward that in 
multiple working groups across the executive branch.
    Chairman Rubio. All right, yes, go ahead, Congressman.
    Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
    I think we covered that in fairly good ground, and I'll be 
happy to do it again. But there are so many things that the 
ODNI has that ISOO and the National Declassification Center 
don't have, in terms of experience in developing and deploying 
and managing multiagency cloud-based enterprise systems, 
securing a communications network like JWICS, protecting 
sources and methods. And the ISOO doesn't have that stature 
that the ODNI has. It doesn't have the ability to corral 
agencies.
    It also has an oversight mission that it would be in direct 
conflict with this. So it's not authorized by the President to 
do this, nor is the National Declassification Center with those 
types of authorities. So some executive agent will have to be 
given it, and we just think it should be the one with the 
experience and the authority and the capabilities that have 
been exercised and shown to be so effective in other settings 
with those outside the Intelligence Community, and some of them 
worldwide.
    Chairman Rubio. Yes, I think what it boils down to at this 
point is--I think there's widespread agreement that it needs to 
be reformed, and someone needs to be in charge of the reforms. 
And really, the question we have to work through is who is that 
right entity to be responsible for designing it, implementing 
it, and then maintaining it on an ongoing basis. And then from 
us here, in an internal perspective, there's obviously some 
jurisdictional grounds, because if it touches on State 
Department or DOD, then this Committee's probably not going to 
be the sole place that will have oversight over it.
    But look, it's a topic that I think, as you've seen, I 
think there's strong bipartisan widespread support for 
pursuing. And this report certainly, and the bill that's been 
filed, certainly gives us a baseline upon which to work. And I 
hope we fleshed out a little bit through this public hearing 
today some of the remaining outstanding topics about where our 
options are.
    I want to thank both of you for being patient with us and 
contributing today to this hearing. It's one we have been 
trying to get on the books for a couple months, and I'm glad we 
were able to do. And again, I thank you both for being willing 
to come online and be with us as a part of this today.
    There may be some followup questions that members might 
send in writing. We would ask that if we have some of those, if 
you would just help get us answered. Some people may not have 
been able to come over today. But again, I want to thank both 
of you for being a part of this and everyone who came.
    And with that, our hearing is adjourned.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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