[Senate Hearing 116-314]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-314
VENEZUELA IN MADURO'S GRASP: ASSESSING
THE DETERIORATING SECURITY AND
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 4, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
42-238 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio TIM KAINE, Virginia
RAND PAUL, Kentucky EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
TODD YOUNG, Indiana JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TED CRUZ, Texas CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Prepared Statement........................................... 2
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 4
Abrams, Hon. Elliott, Special Representative for Venezuela, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Hodges, Joshua, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin
America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 10
Prepared Statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions Submitted by Chairman
James E. Risch................................................. 39
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 39
Responses of Joshua Hodges to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 47
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions Submitted by Senator
Chris Murphy................................................... 49
(iii)
VENEZUELA IN MADURO'S GRASP: ASSESSING
THE DETERIORATING SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
----------
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SR-325, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Romney, Young,
Paul, Cruz, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order, please.
I want to thank Special Representative Abrams and Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator Hodges for their service and for
appearing here today to discuss the worsening crisis in
Venezuela.
It is hard to imagine a more pressing national security
concern in the Western Hemisphere than the political,
humanitarian, and economic crisis provoked by Maduro and his
cronies in Venezuela.
In the last 7 years, Nicolas Maduro has dramatically
deepened relations with the most dangerous forces in the world,
which were first established by his predecessor, Hugo Chavez.
On his watch, Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, transnational
criminal organizations, and U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organizations have turned Venezuela into their playground.
Their activities are intolerable security threats to the
United States and the hemisphere at large and prolong a
humanitarian crisis provoked by the socialist policies of the
regime.
Nearly 5.2 million Venezuelans have fled their homeland,
placing a huge burden on the neighboring countries that have
generously accepted these refugees from Maduro's regime.
Ninety-six percent of those who have stayed behind live in
poverty, with 80 percent facing extreme poverty. Chronic food
shortages and the dysfunctional public health care system have
condemned an entire generation to hunger and stunted growth.
A series of unsuccessful attempts to restore freedom in the
last year, compounded by Maduro's desire and ability to stay in
power by perpetuating corruption and torture have emboldened
the regime and left democratic forces facing daunting
challenges.
President Trump's campaign of maximum pressure is a welcome
improvement. We should leave no stone unturned in support of
the Venezuelan people's efforts to rid themselves of this evil.
It is also appropriate to continue providing assistance to
enable Venezuela's neighbors to help the millions of Venezuelan
refugees that they are hosting.
The international community, especially the European Union
and Spain, must increase economic pressure on Maduro if they
are serious about the return of democracy to Venezuela and the
end of the humanitarian nightmare there.
We must make clear to Maduro's mentors in Havana and Moscow
that this game is over.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about the
steps the U.S. government is taking to counter the malign
influences in Venezuela.
With that, I know our ranking member has strong feelings on
this, and I will yield the floor to him.
[The prepared statement of Senator James E. Risch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator James E. Risch
This hearing will come to order.
I would like to thank Special Representative Abrams and Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator Hodges for their service and for
appearing today to discuss the worsening crisis in Venezuela.
It is hard to imagine a more pressing national security concern in
the Western Hemisphere than the political, humanitarian, and economic
crises provoked by Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela.
In the last 7 years, Nicolas Maduro has dramatically deepened
relations with the most dangerous forces in the world, which were first
established by his predecessor Hugo Chavez.
On his watch, Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, transnational criminal
organizations and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations have
turned Venezuela into their playground.
Their activities are intolerable security threats to the United
States and the hemisphere at-large; and prolong a humanitarian crisis
provoked by the socialist policies of the regime.
Nearly 5.2 million Venezuelans have fled their homeland, placing a
huge burden on the neighboring countries that have generously accepted
these refugees from Maduro's regime.
Ninety 6 percent of those who have stayed behind live in poverty,
with 80 percent facing extreme poverty. Chronic food shortages and a
dysfunctional public healthcare system have condemned an entire
generation to hunger and stunted growth.
A series of unsuccessful attempts to restore freedom in the last
year, compounded by Maduro's desire and ability to stay in power by
perpetrating corruption and torture, have emboldened the regime and
left democratic forces facing daunting challenges.
President Trump's campaign of maximum pressure is a welcome
improvement from 8 years of halfhearted measures by the last
administration.
We should leave no stone un-turned in support of the Venezuelan
people's efforts to rid themselves of this evil. We must also continue
providing assistance to enable Venezuela's neighbors to help the
millions of Venezuelan refugees that they are hosting.
The international community, especially the European Union and
Spain, must increase economic pressure on Maduro if they are serious
about the return of democracy to Venezuela and the end of the
humanitarian nightmare there.
We must make clear to Maduro's mentors in Havana and Moscow that
this game is over. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses
about the steps the U.S. Government is taking to counter their malign
influence in Venezuela.
With that, I will ask Ranking Member Menendez if he wishes to make
any opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for working with me on this hearing. I appreciate it.
Mr. Abrams, you come before the committee at an urgent
moment for Venezuela, one with implications for the United
States and our entire hemisphere.
We face a critical moment for Venezuela's interim
government as the Maduro regime seeks to consolidate a criminal
dictatorship with a helping hand from Havana.
This crisis directly affects U.S. national security
interests and our geopolitical competitors. Russia and China
and Iran seek to undermine American influence.
Moreover, the people of Venezuela continue suffering grave
human rights abuses, a humanitarian catastrophe worsened by the
COVID-19 pandemic, and mass displacement across the hemisphere.
As Venezuelans struggle, I should say, to survive and
restore their democracy, legislative elections are scheduled
this year.
Not surprisingly, the Maduro regime has rigged every aspect
of the electoral process, thereby ensuring increased
instability and more widespread suffering. The evidence is
already there.
After two decades of U.S. investment in Colombia's
security, we now see Colombian guerrillas operating openly
across Venezuela in large swaths of ungoverned territory.
They join a wide range of armed actors promoting and
profiting from the drug trade, illegal gold mining, and human
suffering.
Most tragically, of course, is the daily suffering that
Venezuelans endure. Femicide, sexual violence, and trafficking
of Venezuelan women and girls are, reportedly, on the rise.
Dramatic increases in maternal and infant mortality reflect
the dire state of Venezuela's health system, and the World Food
Program assessed in February that one-third of Venezuelans face
moderate or severe food insecurity.
Additionally, Maduro's brutal regime has perpetrated more
state-sponsored murders--state-sponsored murders--than any
Latin American government since the dirty wars of the 1970s and
'80s.
In the last 2 years, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights has reported over 8,000 extrajudicial killings by
Maduro's security forces as well as grotesque patterns of
torture and rape.
These conditions have forced more than 5.2 million
Venezuelans to flee their country in search of protection and
assistance.
I traveled to Cucuta, Colombia, a year ago, where I heard
heart-wrenching stories from individuals fleeing the
humanitarian tragedy in Venezuela.
With the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic downturn
converging on the crisis of Venezuelan refugees and migrants,
the United States must mobilize international partners to
further expand assistance and protection for the Venezuelan
people.
If the current trajectory continues, more Venezuelans will
be displaced from their homes than the number of Syrians
displaced during that devastating nearly decade-long conflict.
Yet, while other countries are generously hosting millions
of Venezuelans, the Trump administration has ignored my
repeated requests to grant Temporary Protected Status to some
200,000 Venezuelans in the United States.
It has turned away Venezuelan asylum seekers at our
southern border, and that is absolutely unacceptable. The
Administration must change course.
Through my VERDAD Act last year, Democrats and Republicans,
in concert with the Administration, united in our recognition
of interim President Juan Guaido.
However, in June, President Trump stated that he did not
think this decision to recognize President Guaido was, ``very
meaningful,'' sending the wrong signal to our allies and our
adversaries.
We must be purposeful and lead the formidable coalition we
helped build to support President Guaido. So I expect to hear a
strategy about how we will work with our partners to ensure
that Maduro does not use fraudulent elections to strengthen his
dictatorship.
Moreover, with Maduro and his cronies facing charges in the
United States for drug trafficking and graft, there should be
no doubt about their criminal credentials. We are dealing with
a massive law enforcement challenge in Venezuela.
Never have so many in our hemisphere fallen victim to a
cabal of criminals so willing to destroy their own country for
the sole purpose of enriching themselves and avoiding justice.
We must coordinate an international campaign to confront
the regime's criminality, and I look forward to hearing from
you, Special Representative, on what changes we will make to
increase our chance of success in the next 6 months.
And yes, I said changes. There has been bipartisan support
for most of our sanctions and the $600 million in foreign
assistance we have used for humanitarian aid.
But Maduro remains entrenched in power and humanitarian
access into Venezuela is extremely limited. We cannot continue
on the same course and expect to achieve different results.
I fear the Administration may very well have squandered a
limited window of opportunity, crafted by valiant Venezuelans,
and I hope it is not too late to open that window again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Robert Menendez
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Robert Menendez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for working with me on this hearing. Mr.
Abrams, you come before this committee at an urgent moment for
Venezuela--one with implications for the United States and our entire
hemisphere.
We face a critical moment for Venezuela's Interim Government, as
the Maduro regime seeks to consolidate a criminal dictatorship, with a
helping hand from Havana. This crisis directly affects U.S. national
security interests, and our geopolitical competitors--Russia and China
and Iran--seek to undermine American influence.
Moreover, the people of Venezuela continue suffering grave human
rights abuses, a humanitarian catastrophe worsened by the COVID-19
pandemic, and mass displacement across the hemisphere.
As Venezuelans struggle to survive and restore their democracy,
legislative elections are scheduled for this year. Not surprisingly,
the Maduro regime has rigged every aspect of the electoral process,
thereby ensuring increased instability and more widespread suffering.
The evidence is already there.
After two decades of U.S. investment in Colombia's security, we now
see Colombian guerillas operating openly across Venezuela in large
swaths of ungoverned territory. They join a wide range of armed actors
profiting from the drug trade, illegal gold mining, and human
trafficking.
Most tragically, of course, is the daily suffering that Venezuelans
endure. Femicide, sexual violence, and trafficking of Venezuelan women
and girls are reportedly on the rise. Dramatic increases in maternal
and infant mortality reflect the dire state of Venezuela's health
system. And, the World Food Program assessed in February that one third
of Venezuelans face moderate or severe food insecurity.
Additionally, Maduro's brutal regime has perpetrated more state-
sponsored murders than any Latin American government since the dirty
wars of the 1970s and 80s. In the last 2 years, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights has reported over 8,000 extrajudicial
killings by Maduro's security forces, as well as grotesque patterns of
torture and rape.
These conditions have forced more than 5.2 million Venezuelans to
flee their country in search of protection and assistance. I traveled
to Cucuta, Colombia a year ago, where I heard heart-wrenching stories
from individuals fleeing the humanitarian tragedy in Venezuela.
With the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic downturn converging
on the crisis of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, the United States
must mobilize international partners to further expand assistance and
protection for the Venezuelan people. If the current trajectory
continues, more Venezuelans will be displaced from their homes than the
number of Syrians displaced during that devastating, nearly decade-long
conflict.
Yet, while other countries are generously hosting millions of
Venezuelans, the Trump administration has ignored my repeated requests
to grant Temporary Protected Status to some 200,000 Venezuelans in the
United States. It has turned away Venezuelan asylum seekers at our
southern border. This is absolutely unacceptable.
The Administration must change course.
Through my VERDAD Act last year, Democrats and Republicans, in
concert with the Administration united in our recognition of Interim
President Juan Guaido. However, in June, President Trump stated that he
did not think this decision to recognize President Guaido was ``very
meaningful''--sending the wrong signal to our allies and our
adversaries.
We must be purposeful and lead the formidable coalition we helped
build to support President Guaido. So, I expect to hear a strategy
about how we will work with our partners to ensure that Maduro doesn't
use fraudulent elections to strengthen his dictatorship.
Moreover, with Maduro and his cronies facing charges in the U.S.
for drug trafficking and graft, there should be no doubt about their
criminal credentials. We are dealing with a massive law enforcement
challenge in Venezuela. Never have so many in our hemisphere fallen
victim to a cabal of criminals so willing to destroy their own country
for the sole purpose of enriching themselves and avoiding justice.
We must coordinate an international campaign to confront the
regime's criminality, and I look forward to hearing from Special
Representative Abrams on what changes we will make to increase our
chance of success in the next 6 months. Yes, changes.
There has been bipartisan support for most of our sanctions and the
$600 million in foreign assistance we have used for humanitarian aid.
But, Maduro remains entrenched in power and humanitarian access into
Venezuela is extremely limited.
We cannot continue on the same course and expect to achieve
different results. I fear the Administration has squandered a limited
window of opportunity crafted by valiant Venezuelans. I hope it is not
too late to open that window again.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez. Those remarks
are well taken. I think out of all the things that are going on
in the Congress today that divides us, probably nothing bring
us together more than a sense that Maduro has to go and that we
are united, if not universally, very close to universally in
that effort. So we are anxious to hear what these witnesses
have to say.
Today, I am pleased to welcome to the committee U.S.
Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams and Mr.
Joshua Hodges, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin
America and the Caribbean at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, USAID.
Mr. Abrams is a scholar and experienced foreign policy
expert. He has served in two administrations on the staff of
Senators Henry Jackson and Dan Moynihan. He has written five
books on American foreign policy and teaches on the subject at
Georgetown University's Edmond A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service.
Mr. Hodges oversees USAID programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean. He previously served on the staff of Congressman
Mike Johnson and Senator David Vitter of Louisiana, at the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
and the National Security Council in the White House.
We will start with Mr. Abrams.
Mr. Abrams, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
VENEZUELA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Menendez, and members of the committee----
The Chairman. Your microphone is not on, Elliott. It is
very complicated.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Abrams. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez,
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify on our efforts in support of the Venezuelan people.
This policy has, with broad bipartisan support, been
successful in supporting the democratic opposition, maintaining
a broad international coalition, and denying revenue to
Maduro's brutal regime.
But we have yet to see the convoking of free and fair
presidential elections nor do we see the conditions that would
permit such elections.
In January 2019, the U.S. was the first country to
recognize interim President Juan Guaido. Since then, he has
secured the support of nearly 60 countries. We remain steadfast
in our support for interim President Guaido.
We have proposed a democratic transition framework for
Venezuela as a path to establish a broadly acceptable
transitional government to oversee free and fair presidential
and parliamentary elections.
We are prepared to work with all Venezuelans and with other
nations to achieve this goal and to lift sanctions when the
necessary conditions are met.
I want to thank this committee and Congress for its support
through legislation and funding. The U.S. is the single largest
donor of humanitarian assistance for Venezuela.
From 2017 to now, the U.S. has provided more than $856
million to Venezuelans suffering inside Venezuela and in
neighboring countries, and we should recognize those that have
welcomed 5 million Venezuelans, especially Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador for their continued support as well.
Criminal dictatorships like Maduro's are hard to defeat.
The Maduro regime's relentless attacks on dissidents and
against Venezuela's last remaining democratic institution, the
National Assembly, demonstrated its obsession with retaining
power regardless of the cost to the nation and its people.
In July, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Michelle Bachelet, released two reports on human rights
violations in Venezuela. She reported that Maduro and his thugs
continue intimidation, repression, arbitrary detentions,
torture, and murder.
This includes 1,324 extrajudicial killings from January to
May of this year. For more than 2 and a half years, the regime
has unlawfully detained six U.S. oil executives: Tomeu Vadell,
Alirio Zambrano, Jose Luis Zambrano, Gustavo Cardenas, Jorge
Toledo, and Jose Angel Pereira.
We were relieved to hear July 30th that Mr. Cardenas and
Mr. Toledo were moved to house arrest. This is a positive first
step and, of course, we hope for more.
The regime also continues to detain nearly 400 political
prisoners, including military officers, medical professionals,
journalists, dissident Chavista Nicmer Evans, Guaido's chief of
staff, Robert Marrero, National Assembly Deputies Juan
Requesens, Gilber Caro, Ismael Leon, Renzo Prieto, and Antonio
Geara, and labor rights activist Ruben Gonzalez.
We remain concerned over foreign malign influence in
Venezuela and the Maduro regime's collaboration with non-state
armed groups such as the ELN and FARC.
Illegal armed groups are forcibly recruiting vulnerable
Venezuelan children into armed conflict, compelling many into
forced labor. Cuba treats Venezuela as a colony, shipping food,
medicine, diesel, and gasoline from Venezuela to Cuba, even as
the Venezuelan people suffer shortages of all of them.
Cuban security personnel surround Maduro. Cuban
intelligence officers are embedded in the military. China helps
the Maduro regime with cyber operations.
Russian military aid and loans have helped the regime
maintain its security forces, and now we are seeing a
rekindling of the relationship with the world's worst state
sponsor of terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Maduro's recent hijacking of the National Electoral Council
and of the major democratic political parties foreshadow how
the regime plans to take control of the National Assembly
through fraudulent elections in December.
On Sunday, 27 democratic political parties in Venezuela
joined in unity to say they refuse to participate in that
farce, and I am sure democracies around the world will also
refuse to recognize such a fraud.
We look forward to the day when free and fair elections are
held, a new democratically-elected government is in place, U.S.
sanctions can then be lifted.
We look forward to restoring once close Venezuela-U.S.
relations to helping Venezuelan migrants and refugees return to
their beloved country and to seeing Venezuela's children share
in the beauty and bountiful natural wealth of their country.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Menendez, thank you for inviting me
here today and for your continuing interest and the strong
bipartisan support this committee has shown toward the struggle
for freedom in Venezuela.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elliott Abrams
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and Members of the
Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our efforts in
support of the Venezuelan people. The ongoing crisis and the defense of
democracy in Venezuela remain key U.S. strategic priorities. This
policy has, with broad bipartisan support, been successful in
supporting the democratic opposition, maintaining a broad international
coalition, and denying revenue to Maduro's brutal regime, but we have
yet to see the convoking of free and fair presidential elections, nor
do we see the conditions that would permit such elections.
In January 2019, the United States was the first country to
recognize interim President Juan Guaido, and since then we have secured
the support of nearly 60 countries, the OAS, and the Inter-American
Development Bank in recognizing him as the constitutional president of
Venezuela. The United States also joined other countries to invoke the
Rio Treaty, a collective security agreement, which resulted in a
resolution mandating travel restrictions for 29 regime collaborators.
This is the first time in more than 50 years the Rio Treaty has been
used to impose such measures. U.S. sanctions continue to deny the
regime access to spoils, and we have implemented visa restrictions and
revoked visas for over one thousand regime officials and their family
members. These measures are intended to increase pressure on the Maduro
regime and its affiliates to agree to a broadly acceptable political
transition.
Criminal dictatorships like Maduro's are hard to defeat. The Maduro
regime's relentless attacks on dissidents and against Venezuela's last
remaining democratic institution, the National Assembly, demonstrate
its obsession with retaining power regardless of the cost to the nation
and its people.
In July, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle
Bachelet released two updated reports on human rights violations in
Venezuela. She reported that Maduro and his thugs continue committing
the most serious violations and abuses of human rights through systemic
intimidation, repression, arbitrary detentions, torture, and murder.
This includes 1,324 extrajudicial killings from January through May of
this year. The reports also focused on how the regime is twisting the
rule of law and presiding over a violent campaign of repression in the
Arco Minero, Venezuela's mining belt. This region is increasingly a
source of revenue for the regime as U.S. sanctions effectively limit
income from more traditional sources, and Maduro's mafias are using
violence to grab every last ounce of gold.
The regime also continues to detain nearly 400 political prisoners,
including military officers, medical professionals, journalists, and
dissident Chavista Nicmer Evans, Guaido's Chief of Staff Roberto
Marrero, and National Assembly deputies Juan Requesens, Gilber Caro,
Ismael Leon, Renzo Prieto, and Antonio Geara. Even after a series of
health crises during detention, the regime continues to detain labor
rights activist Ruben Gonzalez.
For more than 2 and a half years, the regime has unlawfully
detained six U.S. oil executives--Tomeu Vadell, Alirio Zambrano, Jose
Luis Zambrano, Gustavo Cardenas, Jorge Toledo, and Jose Angel Pereira.
We were relieved to hear July 30 that Gustavo Cardenas and Jorge Toledo
were released from prison and granted house arrest in Venezuela. This
is a positive first step and of course we hope for more.
The regime's repressive practices also have directly worsened the
COVID-19 pandemic in Venezuela. We have countless examples of ongoing
regime intimidation of doctors and medical workers fighting to counter
the spread of COVID-19. The regime has arrested nearly a dozen
independent journalists and respected medical providers who have
attempted to report suppression and manipulation of COVID-19 case data
or who voiced concern with the regime's negligent response to the
pandemic. We are concerned by the regime's criminalization of returning
refugees and the reports of the shameful conditions of their
quarantine.
Venezuela's Maduro-made crisis has led to serious humanitarian
consequences which are well-known and documented; and, along with
Congress, we are deeply concerned about the human cost of his regime's
mismanagement, corruption, and deliberate abuse of the population.
Venezuela's health system, infrastructure, and social services are
collapsing. Decades-long economic mismanagement and neglect of
infrastructure while looting state resources have led to the collapse
of nearly every sector of the economy. Crude production has fallen to
the lowest point in nearly eight decades to under 400,000 barrels per
day. The World Food Program (WFP) reported this year that 9.3 million
Venezuelans are moderately or severely malnourished. The recent
National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) in Venezuela stated
children born in Venezuela since 2015 are likely to have a 3.7 year
shorter life span than official projections, and infant mortality rates
have regressed 30-35 years. All of these factors have forced more than
5 million Venezuelans to flee in search of a better life outside of
Venezuela and away from Maduro's man-made disaster.
I want to thank Congress for its support through legislation and
funding. The United States is the single largest donor of humanitarian
assistance for the Venezuela regional crisis. From 2017 to today, the
United States has provided more than $856 million in humanitarian and
development aid, including nearly $611 million in humanitarian
assistance, to Venezuelans suffering inside Venezuela and across 17
neighboring countries, supported by a recent commitment of $13.7
million in COVID-19 specific support inside Venezuela. We maintain
close cooperation with U.N. agencies and NGOs that are committed to
providing lifesaving resources to Venezuelans. We also recognize the
neighboring countries that have welcomed so many Venezuelans,
especially Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, for their continued support as
well. The United States will continue to call upon other donors to make
or increase contributions to help address the crisis.
We have taken significant steps to address Maduro's use of
narcotics as a financial lifeline for his illegitimate regime. On April
1, President Donald Trump launched an historic counternarcotics
operation--deploying additional military and law enforcement assets to
the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific--to disrupt the flow of dangerous
drugs to the United States. The narco-traffickers include the
illegitimate regime of Nicolas Maduro. The enhanced operation is a
``whole of government'' effort that has led to the disruption and
seizure of over 100 metric tons of cocaine and marijuana. One thousand
traffickers have been arrested over the past several months. This
operation has cost the cartels and the Maduro regime over $3 billion in
revenue.
We remain concerned over foreign malign influence in Venezuela and
the Maduro regime's collaboration with nefarious non-state armed
groups. Cuba treats Venezuela as a colony shipping food, medicine,
diesel, and gasoline from Venezuela to Cuba even as the Venezuelan
people suffer shortages of every single one of them. Cuban security
personnel surround Maduro, and Cuban intelligence officers are embedded
in the military. China works with the Maduro regime to refine digital
authoritarianism, helping the regime with cyber operations. Russian
military aid and loans have helped the regime maintain its security
forces and thus its provision of safe haven in Venezuela to FARC
dissident and ELN terrorists. And now we are seeing a re-kindling of a
relationship with the world's worst State sponsor of terrorism, the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
looking ahead
Maduro's recent hijacking of the National Electoral Council and of
the major independent political parties foreshadow how the regime plans
to take control of the National Assembly through fraudulent elections
in December. We are supporting the opposition as they consider a
concerted response, and we remain steadfast in our support for interim
President Guaido and a resolution to Venezuela's crisis via a broadly
acceptable transitional government organizing free and fair
presidential elections.
Free and fair presidential elections are required for Venezuela to
regain its democracy and prosperity peacefully. The United States will
recognize the results of a free and fair election, no matter which
party wins; what we oppose is the abuse of state power that enables one
party to rule indefinitely regardless of the will of the people. We
have proposed a Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela as a path
to establish a broadly acceptable transitional government to oversee
free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. We are prepared
to work with all Venezuelans and with other nations to achieve this
goal, and are prepared to lift sanctions when the necessary conditions
are met.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, the Maduro regime
has survived by relying on classic autocratic tools coupled with its
callousness and criminality. This has only strengthened our resolve,
and the resolve of other democratic states, to see Venezuela once again
become a free and prosperous nation. Until this objective is achieved,
our pressure will continue and will increase. We look forward to the
day when free and fair elections are held, a new democratically-elected
government is in place, and U.S. sanctions can be lifted. We look
forward to restoring once-close Venezuela-U.S. relations, to helping
Venezuelan migrants and refugees return to their beloved country, and
to seeing Venezuela's children share in the beauty and bountiful
natural wealth of their country.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for inviting me here today
and thank you for the continuing interest and the strong bipartisan
support this Committee has shown toward the struggle for freedom in
Venezuela. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Abrams.
Mr. Hodges.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HODGES, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hodges. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity and honor to be here to testify on behalf of USAID.
We are grateful for your bipartisan support for the response to
the Venezuela regional crisis.
Eighteen months ago, the Trump administration recognized
Juan Guaido as the legitimate and legal interim president of
Venezuela in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution.
As you know, this crisis has been manufactured by an
inability to govern and rampant corruption, which has resulted
in an economic collapse with severe humanitarian consequences
and a culture of repression that the regime continues to use to
jail, torture, and even murder the Venezuelan people.
Today, the Guaido interim government and National Assembly
continue to push forward, despite very challenging
circumstances, including the humanitarian and economic crisis,
the illegitimate Maduro regime's radical oppression and, most
recently, COVID-19.
Because of these dire realities, more than 5.2 million
Venezuelans have left home and relocated to neighboring
countries, extending the crisis across borders.
To address this crisis inside Venezuela and throughout the
region, the United States government interagency process is
providing substantial coordinated humanitarian and development
assistance.
Inside Venezuela, USAID's humanitarian assistance is saving
lives through health care that stems the spread of infectious
disease, meals for vulnerable families, and vital water,
sanitation and hygiene supplies.
A few tangible examples of this assistance includes serving
more than 1.4 million hot meals to vulnerable Venezuelans and
delivering enough medical supplies to health facilities to help
160,000 people.
In addition to the previous existing challenges, COVID-19
is exacerbating an already dire situation inside Venezuela. In
response to the pandemic, USAID is providing COVID-19-related
emergency assistance inside Venezuela and throughout the
region.
While our efforts are making an impact, Maduro has stood in
the way of allowing more help to Venezuelans in their time of
need by creating numerous obstacles and barriers for
international NGOs.
Humanitarian organizations face constant harassment from
security personnel affiliated with Maduro and the illegitimate
regime continues to impede international expert staff from
obtaining visas and registry in certain organizations.
Let me be clear. USAID condemns any efforts to intimidate
or threaten humanitarian workers who are seeking to save lives.
Throughout the region, USAID's priority is to support
communities that are generously hosting Venezuelans in their
time of great need, especially in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru.
We are aiming to provide approximately 943,000 Venezuelan
refugees and migrants in these countries with food assistance,
health care, and clean water.
While humanitarian assistance is saving lives, the agency
recognizes that a balanced mix of medium and long-term
development assistance is also needed.
Our regional development programming is aligned to help the
receiving host country governments address areas impacted by
the Venezuelan migration such as education systems, health
care, economic development, and vocational support as well as
government capacity building.
Back inside Venezuela, we are using development assistance
to support the interim government and the National Assembly
with technical training, staffing support, equipment, and
communications efforts.
USAID support bolsters the interim government's abilities
to effectively operate and interact with their constituents.
Despite the increased repression from the illegitimate regime,
our assistance has enabled increased participation with
legitimate officials.
Our commitment to democracy and the rule of law is
essential to our engagement in the hemisphere. In addition to
the Guaido administration and National Assembly, USAID strongly
supports those who defend human rights and serve as civil
society watchdogs.
Our help each year to dozens of NGOs has been critical to
investigating and then document rampant corruption, flagrant
electoral fraud, and wide-ranging human rights abuses.
With our support, independent news outlets are able to
better operate so they can share information with Venezuelans
through online reporting, radio and other forms of
communications.
USAID is also helping democratic forces plan for the day
the Maduro regime gives way to freedom and authentic change can
take place.
When change does occur, funding through our bilateral
agreement will position us to be ready to expand our work
quickly into other sectors.
For the time being, though, the effort continues to support
the people of Venezuela, the Guaido administration, the
National Assembly, scores of NGOs, and activists who bravely
continue their struggle, despite repression and despite the
very difficult situations on the ground.
One critical step must be taken for a free and prosperous
Venezuela. The world must continue to pressure Maduro to
relinquish control and allow for Democratic change. This
includes truly free elections, not the rigged so-called
elections Maduro is planning for in December.
Venezuelans have suffered long enough under the brutality
of Nicolas Maduro. We look forward to the day when we can
celebrate with all Venezuelans as they meet their potential as
a free, prosperous, and democratic society, and thank you today
for the invitation to testify.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hodges follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joshua Hodges
introduction
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and Distinguished Members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). It is an honor to be here with you today. USAID is
grateful for your ongoing, bipartisan support for our work in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and especially our response to the Venezuela
regional crisis.
Eighteen months ago, the Trump administration, along with nearly 60
other governments around the globe, recognized Juan Guaido as the
legitimate and legal Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, in accordance with the Venezuelan Constitution. President
Trump recognized Guaido's interim presidency on January 23, 2019. The
United States and the international community based our swift
recognition of Guaido upon respect for the rule of law.
Since 2019, USAID has coordinated with Interim President Guaido to
implement democracy and governance programs, to support the interim
government and the National Assembly structurally operate as best as
possible under these challenging circumstances. In 2019, we formally
established our cooperation when then USAID Administrator Mark Green
signed a Development Objective Agreement (DOAG) with the Interim
Government. However, USAID began our support for democracy in Venezuela
long before this Agreement. For the past several years, with your
bipartisan support, we have been assisting human-rights defenders,
independent media, and civil society inside Venezuela. The United
States, along with several other governments, has provided technical
and financial support to the National Assembly, which helps this body
remain operational as the sole source of legitimate, democratic,
citizen-responsive governance in Venezuela.
Since January 2019, Interim President Guaido and other democratic
actors have faced innumerable challenges in their fight for freedom.
Compounding factors that have complicated their struggle are the depths
of the Maduro-made humanitarian and economic crisis; the radical steps
the illegitimate regime has taken to oppress the Venezuelan people;
and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. Nicolas Maduro's use of
repressive tactics and assistance from malign foreign actors further
complicate the situation. This chaos has eroded Venezuelan citizens'
ability to feel safe when leaving their homes to organize and stand up
to the injustices and corruption of the illegitimate regime. A weak and
isolated population is precisely what the regime needs for it to appear
that Venezuelans have lost their will or interest in change. As I am
sure the Committee will agree, based on your own engagement with them,
the Venezuelan people have neither lost their will nor desire for
freedom and prosperity. Millions of brave men and women in Venezuela
continue to demand and advocate for transparent elections, a respect
for human rights, and a restoration of democracy.
This prolonged crisis has been manufactured by Maduro's inability
to govern and his corruption, which has resulted in an economic
collapse with severe humanitarian consequences and the culture of
repression that the regime uses to jail, torture, and even murder the
Venezuelan people. This situation, and other sinister steps taken by
the illegitimate Maduro regime to undermine democracy and rule of law,
have prolonged the effort needed for a democratic transition.
Because of the dire realities within Venezuela, more than 5 million
Venezuelans have fled the tyranny and deprivation in their homeland--
mostly into neighboring Andean countries like the Republics of Colombia
and Peru. These desperate people have left their homes, families, and
communities behind, often with nothing but the clothes on their bodies.
The United States is cognizant of the burden this places on our
hemispheric allies and host communities, and the emotional burden it
has on those who have fled and the family members they left in
Venezuela. COVID-19 has only complicated this tragic situation. Until
Maduro departs, many of these Venezuelans either will not or cannot
return home; their country will need them to rebuild as a democratic
and prosperous state.
humanitarian assistance: addressing maduro-made crisis inside venezuela
and across the region
Mr. Chairman, I know this Committee cares deeply about the
humanitarian crisis that is facing millions of Venezuelans, so I would
like to talk specifically about our response. Inside Venezuela, USAID
has provided nearly $44 million in humanitarian assistance since 2017.
With this funding, our partners have served more than 1.4 million hot
meals to vulnerable Venezuelans--especially women and children--across
nearly 100 community kitchens and schools. Our assistance has helped
save lives through primary health care, immunizations against
infectious diseases, treatment for malaria, and training health care
workers. We have also brought safe drinking water to health facilities
and schools, which has benefited more than 7,000 Venezuelans. USAID has
helped provide women and children with safe spaces and protection
against violence and exploitation, as well as coordinated with the
humanitarian community to improve the effectiveness of the response to
the economic collapse in Venezuela.
Humanitarian efforts in Venezuela face many challenges because of
the ongoing repression, obstruction, and intimidation tactics of the
regime. Maduro has created obstacles for international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that are seeking to provide assistance and reach
places in need, such as impeding them from legally registering inside
Venezuela and preventing their employees from obtaining visas. These
restraints, coupled with NGOs' ongoing concerns for their safety to
operate and logistical impediments, hinder the ability to respond at a
scale that matches the needs created by this Maduro-made economic and
political crisis. Another impediment to relief efforts is the continued
harassment of humanitarian organizations and health workers by security
personnel affiliated with the illegitimate Maduro regime.
USAID condemns any efforts to intimidate or threaten humanitarians
who are working to save lives, and we know this Committee strongly
supports us on this front. In Venezuela and everywhere else in the
world, humanitarian organizations must have full and unhindered access
to reach people in need.
Despite the obstacles to applying full-scale operations with
qualified international staff, USAID continues to provide humanitarian
assistance where possible. However, humanitarian efforts, while the
right thing to do, are not a solution that will end the crisis in
Venezuela. As the members of this Committee are aware, humanitarian
assistance cannot, and is not intended to, address the root causes of
Venezuela's instability and desperation. The only way to address these
root causes is through political and economic change.
As this Committee knows, the U.S. Government has made it a
hemispheric, and even global, priority to support the communities that
are generously hosting Venezuelans in their time of need. We understand
that responding to this crisis is no easy task, and has put our
neighbors under great strain. The influx of Venezuelans has especially
affected countries across South America. To help address their needs,
since Fiscal Year 2018 USAID has provided nearly $297 million in
humanitarian funding in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru and
regionally, excluding coronavirus supplemental funding. Our assistance
on the humanitarian side has included nutritious meals, health
assistance, and clean water for approximately 943,000 Venezuelan
refugees and migrants.
The U.S. Government is working throughout the region to combat
efforts that would seek to undermine international or regional support
for Venezuelans who have had to flee their homeland because of the
crisis caused by Maduro. Through close coordination, U.S. Department of
State and USAID's combined humanitarian assistance has been vital in
meeting life saving needs and supporting protection for those fleeing
Venezuela. At the same time, neighboring countries, especially
Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, have welcomed Venezuelans, and State and
USAID share the goal to work to ensure that other donors to provide new
or increased assistance to address this regional crisis.
In addition to the pre-existing challenges, COVID-19 is
exacerbating an already-difficult humanitarian situation, both inside
Venezuela and across the region. More than 4.2 million cases of the
disease have been reported in Latin America and Caribbean to date. That
number, which we believe is likely low because of underreporting in
places like Venezuela, continues to grow. In Venezuela and the rest of
the region, economic distress, mass school closures, disruption of
access to regular health care, and significant increases in gender-
based violence have been compounded by the pandemic. As a result, many
Venezuelans who have fled to neighboring countries are concerned about
how they will afford rent, food, and other basic necessities during
lockdowns related to containing the novel coronavirus, and more people
than ever before are in need of humanitarian support to make ends meet.
This is in addition to other challenges, such as lack of access to
legal status. Also, to address the combined challenges presented by
COVID-19 and the Venezuela regional crisis, the U.S. Government's
partners continuously are examining the impact of our existing
programming to help ensure Venezuelans have the resources they need.
Due to job loss and general familial concerns during the COVID-19
pandemic, about 100,000 Venezuelans have made the tough choice to
return to Venezuela, and our Department of State and USAID humanitarian
partners have scaled up food, shelter, health, and sanitation
assistance to help these Venezuelans on the move, as they face real
vulnerabilities while in transit across borders. We are also working
with our partners inside Venezuela to provide assistance to the COVID-
19 pandemic. USAID and our partners have distributed nearly 4,500
hygiene kits and supplied personal protective equipment to 15 health
facilities to prevent the spread of the virus.
development assistance: promoting democracy and addressing long-term
challenges
As we monitor and respond to the immediate humanitarian needs of
Venezuelans who have fled the chaos in their home country as well as
the countries and communities that are hosting them, USAID recognizes
that this prolonged regional crisis requires a balanced mix of medium-
and long-term development assistance. In Colombia, Peru, the Federative
Republic of Brazil, and the Republic of Ecuador, we are working
alongside other parts of the U.S. Government with a variety of
partners, such as host-country governments, NGOs, civil society, and
faith-based organizations, to help communities absorb the influx of
vulnerable Venezuelans. In total, USAID has invested more than $102
million in the region to address these longer-term needs since Fiscal
Year 2017. Development initiatives in parts of the region include
strengthening primary education and health care; improving government
agencies' capacity to manage migration and socioeconomic integration;
protecting human rights; expanding access to justice; and offering
vocational training, linked to employment and entrepreneurship
opportunities in the private sector.
Moving back to Venezuela, President Guaido and his Interim
Government, the democratically elected National Assembly, and civil
society continue to push for a peaceful democratic transition. USAID
provides direct technical training, staffing support, equipment, and
communications support to the Interim Government and the National
Assembly. Our technical support to the Interim Government has bolstered
its ability to have administrative infrastructure, media operations,
planning systems, and improved strategic decision-making. Additionally,
our support to the National Assembly has ensured that its important and
legitimate legislative work continues. Our funding has enabled 101
Deputies and 60 Alternate Deputies to participate in plenary sessions
despite the increased repression from the illegitimate regime. A total
of 79 Deputies and 15 Alternate Deputies from 10 democratic political
parties have taken part in other initiatives, such as international
policy exchanges, training, in-person events, and social-media
communications efforts. Through these initiatives, the members of the
National Assembly have increased their visibility with Venezuelan
citizens, and their ability to engage with their local constituents.
For example, with USAID`s funding, National Assembly Deputies have held
almost 800 constituent-engagement fora to promote dialogue with civil
society. The members of the National Assembly have been subject to
constant harassment and undermining, and our programming helps them
overcome challenges, such finding meeting places, providing alternative
communications platforms, or providing supplies the regime has
illegally seized.
USAID also supports Venezuelan citizens who continue to assert
their rights and maintain a democratic voice in the face of
dictatorship. For years, the Agency has empowered Venezuelan human-
rights defenders, civil-society organizations, and independent media
who expose and document rampant corruption, flagrant electoral fraud,
and wide-ranging abuses in the country. Our funding helps these groups
define, discuss, and advocate for a free and democratic Venezuela. Our
$128 million in development assistance inside Venezuela includes the
more than $98 million in our 2019 bilateral agreement, which is
critical to our work in the country. Not only does the DOAG allow us to
continue to finance our current activities, but it positions us to be
ready to expand our work quickly into other sectors once the democratic
transition occurs.
To bring that day closer, our current efforts bring accurate and
unbiased news and information to the people of Venezuela. To help 18
local civil-society organizations improve their reporting on human-
rights abuses, USAID has funded the training of more than 2,300 people
on the proper protocols for investigating, documenting, and reporting
violations. This investment resulted in the production of more than 570
documented, verifiable reports during Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. With this
documentation and evidence, these organizations are able to share
essential information with the rest of the world.
To raise awareness of the Maduro's kleptocracy corruption and
unconstitutional actions, the conditions of the failing Venezuelan
state, and the environmental and human catastrophe caused by regime-
sponsored illegal gold mining in the Arco Minero in the South of the
country, USAID-funded civil-society organizations produced and
distributed almost 950 reports, analyses, and videos in FY 2019.
Additionally, these groups leveraged the power of the Internet to push
out vital information. Collectively, their websites received more than
672,500 unique visitors in FY 2019 alone, which increases widespread
awareness of the tragic situation in Venezuela.
Those who are pushing for democratic change and citizen-responsive
governance face dangerous obstacles at the hands of the illegitimate
Maduro regime and the nefarious actors that are keeping him in power.
Malign actors such as Cuba, the Russian Federation, the People's
Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran actively are
propping up the corrupt Maduro regime and encouraging efforts to stifle
the Venezuelan people by spreading their own disinformation and lending
best practices in how to oppress democracy. The United States is
committed to working with our partners to stop these cynical attempts
to erode democratic and economic progress. USAID will continue to
promote and demonstrate democratic values in Venezuela and the region
to advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous Hemisphere and world.
vision for the future: democratic transition
The United States continues to support the people of Venezuela in
their quest for freedom and prosperity even as we address the ongoing,
man-made humanitarian, economic, and political crisis, and, of course,
COVID-19. We know this Committee shares these goals. Venezuelans are
appreciative of this shared unity and support, from the Administration
and Congress--they remember the active participation of many Members of
Congress and staff who have made numerous visits to Colombia, Brazil,
Peru, and other countries to see first-hand the effect of the crisis on
Venezuelans who have fled the chaos in their homeland.
With the support of Congress, USAID will continue to support the
Venezuelan people as they work hard to steer their country back on a
path to prosperity and create the opportunities, dignity, and stability
that they deserve. For the sake of the Venezuelan people, the world
must continue to pressure Maduro to relinquish control and allow for
democratic change. One step in the process will be truly free
elections--not the rigged so-called ``elections'' Maduro is planning
for December. Far from solving the political crisis, this process will
end up aggravating the current political and humanitarian crisis in
Venezuela. Like the fraudulent vote in 2018, the regime plans to hold
the December ``elections'' under false pretenses and without any
respect for Venezuelan rules and regulations, and seeks to undermine
the last truly democratic voice of the people.
When the illegitimate Maduro regime has given way to freedom and
authentic change, funding through our bilateral agreement will be able
to finance recovery efforts led by a democratically elected Venezuelan
administration. USAID will be a key part of the U.S. Government's
support to the new democratic Government of Venezuela as it works to
restore a crumbling health sector and shattered economy, and
reinvigorate critical work in agriculture to rebuild the private-sector
production and distribution of food in Venezuela. We already are
supporting the construction of ideas and discussions about those
visions and the change that is needed, partly through our support to
the Interim Government's recovery strategy, Plan Pais.
conclusion
The Venezuelan people deserve to live in peace and prosperity, and
we are grateful for Congress' bipartisan support for this endeavor. The
Interim Government of Juan Guaido and the National Assembly are working
very hard--even under the added hardship of the pandemic--for a
peaceful transition to democracy that will enable Venezuelans to
rebuild their country.
For too long, Venezuelans have suffered at the hands of the late
Hugo Chavez and now Nicolas Maduro and their kleptocracy. I look
forward to the day when we can celebrate with all Venezuelans as they
meet their potential as a free, prosperous, and democratic society that
is once again a leader in the region and the world.
Thank you for the invitation to testify before you. I look forward
to taking your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We will do a round of
questioning now. I am going to start, briefly, and then turn it
over to Senator Menendez.
You mentioned these elections that are coming up. Mr.
Abrams, this question is for you. It is my understanding that
Maduro has taken a page out of the Iranians' book where they
have an election commission that decides who can run and who
cannot run.
Anything that happens like that, of course, immediately
takes away any legitimacy that the election would have, and I
think it is important that this be highlighted and that the
people understand this.
I mean, if you can pick your opponent or opponents there is
no question how the election is going to come out.
Your thoughts?
Mr. Abrams. Mr. Chairman, I agree with that. They have
prevented a large number of people from running. They have
taken over several of the largest political parties, simply
replaced the leadership of the parties and given all the
parties' assets--offices, the parties' symbols--to people that
their regime chooses.
They are going to hold this election, they say, December
6th. There are today in Venezuela zero voting machines. Zero.
So how they are going to do this, you know, I think defies
comprehension and, like the 2018 presidential election, this is
going to be another fraud.
The Chairman. Thanks. I think that is critical for
everybody to understand, and I also think that we need to
underscore that this is not an election at all. It is just a
facade that has no legal or practical authority whatsoever.
Secondly, you did not mention the military's role in all of
this. We all know there is a robust military in Venezuela. I am
told there are 3,500 generals. I am not exactly sure how you
discipline a military that has got 3,500 generals.
But your thoughts on where they are and where they are
going?
Mr. Abrams. There are more generals in Venezuela than in
all the NATO countries put together.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Abrams. I think there is a lot of worry in many ranks
of the military about the condition of the country. You know,
you are a soldier. You are an officer. You have a mother and
father, aunts, uncles, cousins. You see how they are living.
You know what is happening to the country.
But you are being spied on by these thousands of Cuban
intelligence agents, and at the very top you have got a lot of
people who are quite corrupt and are profiting from this
regime.
So the military has at least up to now been unwilling to
separate itself at all from what the regime is doing to the
country, and it is tragic because a democratic Venezuela is
going to need a professional military. They have a lot of
security problems that they are going to need to deal with.
Our hope, of course, would be that they would try to
reestablish the honor of the military and distance themselves
from the crimes of this regime.
The Chairman. Thank you much.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abrams, on Sunday, Venezuela's opposition coalition
announced that it will not participate in Maduro's fraudulent
undemocratic legislative elections.
Yet, this decision carries implications for Venezuela's
currently democratically-elected National Assembly and the
government of interim President Juan Guaido.
Venezuela's beleaguered constitution, to the degree that it
still exists under Maduro's dictatorship, calls for a new
National Assembly to be seated the first week of January 2021.
So I am deeply concerned that Maduro will use the moment to
fully consolidate his criminal dictatorship in Venezuela.
Given the opposition's decision not to participate in
Maduro's fraudulent legislative elections, how will this impact
the interim government in the first week of January when there
is supposed to be a new National Assembly? What is the
implications for U.S. policy and our recognition of the Guaido
government?
Mr. Abrams. Thanks, Senator.
Juan Guaido occupies the office of interim president
because it was vacant as a result of the May 2018 corrupt and
fraudulent presidential elections.
In our view, nothing changes on January 5th with respect to
Juan Guaido. That office of the presidency is still vacant
because of the 2018 election.
It cannot be that Maduro can improve his situation legally
or practically by holding another corrupt and fraudulent
election.
So in our view, the constitutional president of Venezuela
today and after January 5th, 2021, is Juan Guaido, and the
National Assembly that has been meeting until about, I guess,
about March is not going to be able to meet.
I think you can expect that if they tried to meet,
everybody in it would be arrested by this regime.
So I do think that there is the danger that Maduro is going
to be able to shut down the operations of any kind of
independent National Assembly. But he will not change the legal
status, I think, for many, many countries around the world and
especially for us.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you about that. What
efforts are we taking with our international partners to push
both against Maduro's undemocratic elections and then their
continuing recognition of Guaido after January, assuming this
plays out the way we envision it?
Mr. Abrams. Well, on the question of recognition of Guaido
and on the recognition of this fraudulent parliamentary
election, we have been discussing this with lots of partners.
There are about 60 countries that have recognized Guaido
and I do expect that all of them, and we will be in touch with
any we have not been yet, will continue to recognize him and
will not recognize this fraudulent election.
Senator Menendez. Well, I hope that there is a more robust
engagement with our international partners because my personal
sense of conversations I have had is that it is framed, and I
think we can ill afford that at the end of the day.
Let me turn to illegal mining and what I call blood gold.
As Venezuela crises deteriorates, there is growing evidence
that violent groups are competing for control of the country's
mineral resources, which has resulted in a boom of illegal gold
mining.
That blood gold industry is destroying vast areas of the
Amazon rain forest, fueling human rights abuses, particularly
among indigenous populations, and generating illicit income for
illegal armed groups that threaten the stability of the country
and the region.
What specific steps is the United States taking along with
other international actors to ensure that companies that
purchase, sell, and trade gold that are being extracted in this
way are following regulations and not unwittingly supporting
illegal gold mining operations in Venezuela?
Mr. Abrams. Senator, there is more illegal mining, and the
July 15th report of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights
has a whole section on the Arco Minero.
What we have been doing is following every single case we
can find of the shipment of gold out of Venezuela and the
purchase of gold by anybody, and as we find it we go after both
the country and the company.
And in a number of cases we have gone to governments and
said, this is happening in your territory and you have got to
prevent it, and we have been successful and we find, for
example, people doing this last year have now stopped.
But there is more of it now, and so we are stepping up our
activities, we being the State Department and the Treasury
Department, to go after every single case of this we find.
Senator Menendez. Well, I would be interested to know if
you need any other legislative or regulatory assistance to do
this because, obviously, a lot is getting out and the country's
national patrimony is being used in a way that is so corrupt
and so pervasive against its own people.
A final question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Does the Trump administration have the authority to grant
TPS to eligible Venezuelans?
Mr. Abrams. The authority, yes.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree that it would not be safe to
deport Venezuelans back to Maduro's dictatorship at this point
in time?
Mr. Abrams. Yes, and we are not doing that.
Senator Menendez. So then why has not the president
designated Venezuela for TPS?
Mr. Abrams. I think the answer to that question is in court
decisions that have, in essence, removed the T. That is, that
it seems irreversible now, and I think that makes for some
reluctance to do it.
So what would be better----
Senator Menendez. I do not think court decisions can
undermine the statutory realities of TPS. It depends upon how
one undoes TPS.
So it just seems to me that we applaud Colombia, we applaud
Ecuador, we applaud all these countries that have taken
millions of people, and we cannot even give a temporary
protected status to those Venezuelans who are already here.
That is not leadership. It is not sending a global message
that what we ask others to do we are willing to do ourselves.
Mr. Abrams. Well, we are not deporting Venezuelans back to
Venezuela, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Well, I am glad to hear that. But at the
end of the day, they are in an indefinite limbo in their lives
here.
There is no reason for that when you have a process that
can give you a temporary protected status, give you a pathway
forward to regularize your life while you are waiting for the
moment to return to your country.
I just do not get it. The aversion to this is beyond the
imagination.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
And, Mr. Abrams, I am going to join in Senator Menendez's
invitation to you. If you need statutory assistance regarding
the illegal gold or oil, for that matter, I think we are all
in.
These countries and these dictators survive because they
have a flow of cash and that cash comes from those products. So
I think Senator Menendez and I would be glad to join in any
efforts to assist you legislatively.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
Mr. Abrams, without a doubt, Venezuela is a socialist
nightmare. It is, indeed, a vivid indictment of the economic
system of socialism.
It is appalling that a country like Venezuela that sits
atop more oil than Saudi Arabia is in such a dire state that
people actually eat their pets. No one disputes the disaster
that is Venezuelan socialism.
However, when it comes to regime change, the U.S. track
record is less than stellar. It has been largely ignored that
the possible replacement for Maduro, Guaido, is also a
socialist. His political party is recognized by the Socialist
International.
My fear is that even if you get a kinder, gentler form of
socialism, it is still socialism, and the results will be
similar economic malaise and economic disaster.
What do you say as to replacing one socialist with another
in Venezuela?
Mr. Abrams. I do not think the main problem in Venezuela is
that one party or another is a member of the Socialist
International, which a lot of partners of ours in Europe are
and have been.
It is that it is a vicious brutal murderous dictatorship
and that is the real reason that we are engaged there. He has
driven 5 million people out of the country----
Senator Paul. I guess that response sort of somehow
alleviates the stigma of socialism from being a problem--you
know, that socialism is not the problem there.
And I guess many others who have watched socialism through
the years have argued that you really cannot have a kinder,
gentler form of socialism, that what happens with democratic
socialism is that when you want to have the state own the means
of production or when you want to have the state own property,
that, ultimately, it devolves into a cronyistic system--that
what Chavez and Maduro started out as is not what it ended up
as.
When you have a more complete form of socialism, as
socialism evolves, that perhaps authoritarianism is a side
effect of socialism.
You know, when Batista was rooted out, you know, he was a
so-called cronyist or whatever. There were people who supported
Castro. Many well-intended people supported Castro in the
beginning, and it turned out Castro was not any better than
Batista but was actually probably worse than Batista.
So I think that we ought to be careful with this, and I
think that discounting that socialism has anything to do with
it is really discounting an economic nightmare that has
happened in Venezuela and saying it is just because you got a
bad socialist; if we had better socialists, we would not have
so much of a problem.
Do you think that the President has the right to militarily
bring about regime change in Venezuela without the authority of
Congress?
Mr. Abrams. That is not our policy.
Senator Paul. Do you think the President has the right to
do that?
Mr. Abrams. I think the President has the right to conduct
the foreign policy of the United States under the Constitution
and we, certainly, would like to see a democratic Venezuela.
Senator Paul. Sounds like a non-answer. But, I mean, the
question is do you believe that the President has the right to
do so without congressional authority? This is a very important
constitutional question.
Also, if the answer is that socialism is not the problem--
we think one socialist is a little bit more benign than another
socialist and we think the President has the right to do it--we
could very much be involved in this.
And the reason why this is important and why the discussion
of regime change is important is that President Trump gets it
more than almost anybody else that the Iraq war, which I know
you were a big proponent of, was an utter disaster, that in
getting rid of one bad person we were left with something maybe
even worse and that is the vacuum, the chaos, and the terrorism
that comes from having no government.
This happened again in Libya. So the real question of
whether or not we want to always think we know what is best for
another country and we are going to replace one leader with one
less bad is an important one.
Do you still believe that the Iraq war is something that
you would support today? Do you still think the Iraq war was a
good idea?
Mr. Abrams. Senator, I have not thought about the Iraq war
in years because I am in this job trying to deal with----
Senator Paul. Sounds like another non-answer. But it would
be nice to know if the President had people around him who
actually agreed with him.
The President thinks it is the worst public policy decision
of the last generation, that it led to a vacuum that actually
led to chaos and more terrorism but also led to more of the
emboldenment of Iran.
So the same hawks that wanted to go after Hussein now want
to go after Iran, but now Iran is worse because Hussein is
gone.
So, see, one thing leads to another, and there are
unintended consequences, and I think the discussion of regime
change is an important one, and I think we should not so
casually dismiss socialism as being the problem in Venezuela.
Mr. Abrams. Well, I am not casually dismissing it, and I
think that it is a very bad economic policy. But we have had
allies--I mean, England has had socialist governments. France
has had socialist governments. Germany has had socialist
governments. They were allies of ours throughout the Cold War.
That was not the problem as long as they were democrats.
Whether they pursue a terrible economic policy is essentially
theirs to decide because it is their country.
The problem with Venezuela is that it has a murderous
corrupt regime that is having an impact not only inside but on
all the neighbors.
Senator Paul. Then the question is whether murderous thugs
are an accident of history or whether they are a consequence of
socialism.
Why does it seem that time and time again socialism leads
to autocracy? And that is an important thing because if you get
a benign democratic socialism how long does that last until it
devolves into authoritarianism? I think it is a question worth
asking.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Paul.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for being here.
As you know, Ambassador Abrams, foreign powers like Russia,
China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey have not only publicly supported
the Maduro regime but through a network of shell corporations
and sanction evasion schemes they have significantly enriched
Maduro and his cronies while ordinary Venezuelans continue to
suffer.
So I know that a number of sanctions have been taken in
response to illegal activities stemming from adversaries like
Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
But Turkey, on the other hand, is engaged in these same
activities as a NATO ally. Now, Venezuelan government
associates have established numerous front and shell companies
in Turkey.
For example, and I may not be pronouncing this correctly,
Grupo Iveex Insaat, a tiny Turkish company tied to Maduro, has
capital of just $1,775 and no refineries. Yet, it was
responsible for 8 percent of Venezuela's oil exports in 2019.
So given what is going on with Turkey, is not there more
that we should do to disrupt President Erdogan and Turkey's
support of Maduro and those corrupt links?
Mr. Abrams. Yes, Senator. It is a real problem.
Turkey is not doing in Venezuela what the Russians and the
Cubans are doing. Their presence is not so great. But they are
lending themselves to this kind of corrupt activity. Also gold.
We see a lot of gold passing through Turkey.
We saw earlier this year some of these front companies
develop in Mexico. But with the help of the Mexican government,
we are shutting them down. We just have not had that kind of
help from the Turkish government.
Senator Shaheen. Well, that is why I ask if we do not think
there is more that we should be thinking about in terms of
sanctioning Turkey.
Mr. Abrams. Well, we keep trying. We, again, is the
Treasury--OFAC. We keep going after companies as we find them.
Senator Shaheen. And so can you give us a list of those
companies that we have gone after in Turkey that--and what
success we have had at doing that?
Mr. Abrams. I cannot today, but I would be happy to supply
it to you, and some of it for investigations that are ongoing
we would not be able to do it--we would do it--or we would do
it in a classified form. But be happy to do it.
Senator Shaheen. I think that would be helpful, Mr.
Chairman, if perhaps that could be something that is shared
with the whole committee.
The Chairman. I agree with that.
Mr. Abrams, if you could provide that list, or what you can
that is not classified for the record, that would be much
appreciated. Senator Shaheen's points are well taken as it
relates to Turkey.
[The requested information referred to above follows:]
In July 2019, the Treasury Department designated the Turkish-
registered company Mulberry Proje Yatirim Anonim Sirketi in light of
its role in the sale of gold in Turkey in connection with Alex Saab's
corruption network. We will continue to review all tools available to
deny the illegitimate Maduro regime access to illicit income streams,
including those from gold sales abroad.
Senator Shaheen. Now, during the last hearing that the
committee held on Venezuela in March of 2019 we discussed the
impact that this conflict is having on women, and several
people have mentioned that already.
Then USAID Administrator Mark Green stated that the
disproportionate humanitarian effects on women and girls is the
darkest and gloomiest part of Venezuela's crisis.
So can you, either one of you, give us an update on the
humanitarian assistant efforts that we have undertaken with
respect to women and girls, particularly given what is
happening with the coronavirus?
Mr. Hodges. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
And so this is an issue we are tracking closely sort of
across the region, just stemming from the pandemic and its
impacts to different countries.
But specific to Venezuela, USAID promotes these types of
promotion activities that are streamlined through all of our
programming.
To date, we have focused on the most immediate lifesaving
assistance first and foremost, primarily health and food, and
the prevention of gender-based violence and response to gender-
based violence is, as I stated, sort of covered under the
protection activities writ large throughout all of our
programming.
It is an area, given the pandemic, we are looking to step
up and make sure that within Venezuela and throughout the
region we are more directly addressing.
But it is part of all of our programming and with regards
to inside of Venezuela as access becomes available to funding,
additional funding, we will make sure to incorporate this
further.
And, again, just to highlight the number, to date the U.S.
Government has provided $611 million in humanitarian assistance
and so portions of that funding impact this, and it is an area
I know we need to do more and we are working on that.
Senator Shaheen. So when you say we need to step up, are
you suggesting that more money needs to be provided? We need to
be engaging in different kinds of activities?
We need to be working more with the international
community? What do you mean specifically when you say step up?
Mr. Hodges. Yes, ma'am. So we are already working
aggressively with the international community on this. In fact,
there are some specific programs that are funded through USAID
that directly address this.
What I mean by that is to make sure that as we are pushing
this. As we are seeing these trends emerge because of the
pandemic, we are having discussions with our implementing
partners to ensure it is not just a part of their program where
it becomes something they do as one a number of things.
But rather, that it be an area of focus that they are
taking seriously, that they are actually coming up with new
ways to address it.
And I can speak to COVID writ large across the region. We
have already had conversations to ensure that we have specific
programs in place that are addressing gender-based violence and
helping women and minorities who are being targeted.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Mr. Abrams, thank you, and both of our
individuals this morning who have testified. I appreciate your
work and your perspective.
Mr. Abrams, in June, the President took a surprising tack
with regards to Mr. Guaido. He said, ``Guaido was elected. I
think that it was not necessarily--I think that I was not
necessarily in favor but I said, some people that liked it,
some people did not.
``I was okay with it. I do not think it was--you know, I do
not think it was very meaningful one way or the other.''
And I think that was a surprise in that the policy of our
nation had been pretty consistently saying that we recognized
Mr. Guaido as the President of the country and someone whom we
firmly supported.
There really is only once voice that matters when it comes
to speaking the nation's foreign policy. The State Department
and all of us can express our various views, and I am sure
those have some weight. But to the world and to the people of
Venezuela, it is the President who speaks for the nation.
Perhaps he shares Senator Paul's comment that all
socialists are pretty much the same and whether it is Guaido or
whether it is Maduro does not make a big difference.
But what is the posture of the United States of America
with regards to the presidency of Venezuela and will that ever
be communicated to the world unless the President expresses it
himself?
Mr. Abrams. The policy, Senator, is that we recognize Juan
Guaido as the interim President of Venezuela and have since
January 5th, 2019. We continue to do so.
We will continue to do so after these corrupt parliamentary
elections and we try to say that in many different ways every
day.
Senator Romney. Yes, and my question was until the
President says it, will that ever break through?
Mr. Abrams. Well, I think the President has said it, and
you remember the State of the Union when Guaido not only met
with the President but was the guest in the balcony there and
got happily bipartisan ovations.
So I think the President has said it.
Senator Romney. Without Russia and Venezuela and Cuba
supporting Maduro, do you believe he would be able to hang on?
Mr. Abrams. I do not. I think those maybe 2,500 Cuban
intelligence agents and the Russian veto in the Security
Council are really important in keeping Maduro in power.
Senator Romney. What then could we do with regards to
Russia, China, Cuba? If we were really serious about removing
Maduro and seeing a democratically-elected president in that
country, what would we be doing?
Would the President not be having this at a call with Putin
and Xi Jinping and would we not be blockading, perhaps, fuel
coming in from Cuba and Venezuela?
What actions could we take if we were very serious about
removing Maduro and seeing 5 million people be able to return
to their homes?
Mr. Abrams. There is a spectrum, Senator, and I suppose at
the far end of it you could blockade Venezuela. That is an act
of war, but you could do it and you could prevent ships from
going in and coming out.
We have, obviously, chosen not to do that. We do talk to
the Chinese about this. We talk to the Russians about this. I
do not think either of them has very great confidence in
Maduro.
If you look at the amount of money China has put into
Venezuela this year, it is, basically, zero. They are backing
away. The Russians are taking money out of Venezuela, trying to
get their money back. But they maintain the political
protection and the protection in the U.N.
Senator Romney. Given your expression of their timid
support for Maduro, would it not be possible for us to exert
sufficient incentive for them to walk away from him as opposed
to continuing to support him in such a substantial way were
this not a high priority for our nation?
Are we so incapable of use of soft power to get two
nations, which you suggest do not have a great commitment to
Maduro, to back away?
Mr. Abrams. Well, it has not worked so far. I think from
the point of view of Putin, you know, this is a kind of freebie
in the sense that it is not costing him any money now and,
obviously, he has got a kind of base in South America.
But as you start to weigh what are the things you would
actually do in that bargain with Putin, we have not found
anything attractive.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will return the time. But your point that
it is a freebie for Russia I would suggest that it is in our
interest to make sure it is not a freebie for Russia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney, for returning the
time. We will put it in a bank, but it is a minus seven.
[Laughter.]
Senator Romney. Is there a per, you know, minute charge for
that? A per second charge, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. We will talk.
Senator Romney. All right.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I feel like it is Groundhog Day in this
committee. We have been told by the Administration, frankly,
multiple administrations for years that Russia's support for
Assad and Iran's support for Assad is tepid. It is fragile. It
is just a matter of time before he falls.
The truth of the matter is they were always willing to do
more than we were in Syria to protect their interests and that
is likely the exact same case here in Venezuela, and so our
policy has been misguided by fundamentally flawed assumptions
from the beginning.
And I have deep respect for both of you who are testifying
before this committee. But we just have to be clear that our
Venezuela policy over the last year and a half has been an
unmitigated disaster, and if we are not honest about that then
we cannot self-correct.
We have to admit that our big play, recognizing Guaido
right out of the gate and then moving quickly to implement
sanctions, just did not work. It did not.
All it did was harden Russia and Cuba's play in Venezuela
and allow Maduro to paint Guaido as an American patsy, and a
lot of us warned that this might happen.
We could have used the prospect of U.S. recognition or
sanctions as leverage. We could have spent more time trying to
get European allies and other partners on the same page. We
could have spent more time trying to talk to or neutralize
China and Russia early before we back them into a corner, a
corner from which they are not moving. They are not moving. But
all we did was play all our cards on day one and it did not
work, and it has just been an embarrassing mistake after
mistake since.
First we thought that getting Guaido to declare himself
President would be enough to topple the regime. Then we thought
putting aid on the border would be enough. Then we tried to
sort of construct a kind of coup in April of last year and it
blew up in our face when all the generals that were supposed to
break with Maduro decided to stick with him in the end.
We undermined Norway's talks last summer and then this
March we released a transition framework that, frankly, is
almost a carbon copy of the very one that was in front of the
parties last year.
And now, after wasting all of this time, we are stuck with
elections about to happen, that is, we have talked about today,
Guaido and the opposition refuse to enter.
And then we are going to be in a position where we are
recognizing someone as the leader of Venezuela who does not
control the government, who does not run the military, and who
does not even hold office, and we do not do this in other
places, right.
Nobody knows the name of the guy who finished second in the
2018 Russian presidential election. We do not recognize that
person as the President of Russia no matter how corrupt those
elections are because doing that makes us look weak and
feckless if we cannot actually do anything about it.
And so I do think it is important to ask some questions
about what comes next, and I might have time for only one but I
have two.
The first is this question of what do we do with Guaido. So
you are saying we are going to recognize him because he is the
former leader of the National Assembly. You know, Mr. Abrams,
there are contests for supremacy within the opposition.
What happens if 6 months from today someone else emerges as
a more legitimate voice for the opposition than Juan Guaido?
What criteria do we use to recognize someone new or is Juan
Guaido going to be the recognized leader of Venezuela
permanently no matter how conditions change on the ground?
Mr. Abrams. I think the situation with Guaido is unique
because he is the President of the National Assembly. They are
going to have a corrupt election now, which no one, I think--no
democratic country is going to recognize, and that corrupt
election, that fraud, is not going to change Guaido's status,
and I do not think you will find anybody in the opposition
leadership who will claim otherwise.
Also, I would just like to say, Senator, you know, that was
not the vote of confidence in the policy I would have liked.
Senator Murphy. I understand, you dispute my premise. I
will stipulate to that.
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Murphy. I will stipulate to that. Okay. I think
that that is a fallacy to suggest that no one is going to step
forward and replace Guaido, and I think we have to sort of at
least think through the criteria by which we may recognize
somebody else.
Let me ask a quick second question, which is this. Guaido's
prerequisites for participating in the election did not include
Maduro stepping down, and yet, you have said as recently as a
week ago that the only thing we want to talk to Maduro about is
his removal from power.
Are we open, the United States of America, to a discussion
with Maduro in which he stays in power as a transition to an
election that is actually free and fair? Because, frankly, even
if he is not in power there is no guarantee that his allies
could rig an election. So why are not we open to that as a
possible path forward?
Mr. Abrams. Because we do not believe that a free election
in Venezuela is possible with Maduro in power, in control of
the army, in control of the police, in control of the colectivo
gangs, with 2,000 or 3,000 Cuban intelligence agents. We do not
see that that is a possibility of a free election.
Senator Murphy. I would say Guaido does not share that view
because his preconditions for taking part in the elections did
not require the removal of Maduro, and it is also not clear
that even without Maduro there could be a free and fair
election.
And so I think this is just a prescription to get stuck in
a downward spiral of American policy from which we cannot
remove ourselves. We have got to be more nimble, more creative,
more open to solutions by which we could get to an election
even with Maduro there as a transition.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over my time.
Mr. Abrams. Could I respond for just a few seconds?
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Abrams. You know, we presented this Framework for a
Democratic Transition precisely to show what we would like to
see happen, and in the Framework, both sides, the Chavistas and
the opposition, in the National Assembly, elect a transitional
government.
Each side has veto power. Guaido and Maduro would not
participate in the transitional election. Both could run for
president in a future free presidential election.
We thought we were putting out, and many, many countries
have looked at this, have said this is a positive formula and
we showed the way to the lifting of U.S. sanctions.
And I would just say, again, just under 60 countries
support Guaido. So the notion that we have done this alone and
without international support, Senator, I would submit is not
accurate.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. On that point, thank you both for being
here.
How many countries in Latin America recognize Guaido as the
legitimate interim president?
Mr. Abrams. Every country except, I think, Cuba, Argentina,
and Mexico.
Senator Rubio. I imagine Nicaragua?
Mr. Abrams. Yes, Nicaragua. Sorry.
Senator Rubio. Let me ask you, we did not just pull Guaido
out of the air and say, this is who we will recognize.
The basis of our support for Juan Guaido as the legitimate
interim President and the basis for why all these other
countries have also recognized him is because he is the
democratically-elected member of the National Assembly who the
democratically-elected members of the National Assembly have
made the President of that assembly that, under the Venezuelan
constitution, fills the role of president when there is a
vacancy in that office. Is that not the reason why we
recognized him?
Mr. Abrams. That is correct. We did not choose Juan Guaido.
The constitution of Venezuela chose Juan Guaido.
Senator Rubio. As interim President until the next free and
fair election?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Rubio. Because I also heard a comment earlier by
one of my colleagues--I believe that was Senator Paul, who is
no longer here--but he said that our policy of replacing Maduro
with Guaido, that is not the policy of the United States.
The policy of the United States is to try to promote a
transition to free and fair elections where the people of
Venezuela choose who the next president of Venezuela is.
Mr. Abrams. That is exactly right.
Senator Rubio. Let me ask you another thing you hear a lot
about: is he still clinging to power. First of all, I think it
is fair to say that the Maduro regime is not really a
government in the traditional sense of the word.
It is an organized crime ring. Is that a fair
characterization?
Mr. Abrams. It is, and I think it is what distinguishes it
from many Latin American cases of military juntas, which were
replaced by democratic government.
Senator Rubio. And as a criminal enterprise, basically,
what it is comprised of, these individuals that allow Maduro to
remain, ``in power,'' much of the country they do not really
exercise much government writ any longer but heavily focused in
Caracas.
But to the extent that they are in control of national
territory, the people that allow them to do it, the reason why
they do it is not--it is fair to say most of them it is not
either ideological or a personal affinity towards Mr. Maduro.
It is actually the fact that these people have become very
rich and want to maintain power that allows them to keep their
money and their personal freedom. Would you not say that is the
glue that holds together this criminal enterprise?
Mr. Abrams. I would, Senator, and I think that explains
part of the difficulty in getting them out.
Senator Rubio. And the reason why they will not leave is
not because they love Maduro. Some of them want to replace him.
The reason why they cannot leave is because right now he is
their best bet, at least for this moment. In essence, of all
the options before them, this is the one that most guarantees
them the power for the time being to protect their wealth and
their personal freedom.
Mr. Abrams. Senator, I think that is right, and I think,
again, it explains the great difficulty of Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. Is it not also fair to say that one of the
things that a lot of those folks in there are probably thinking
about is, let us see what happens, moving forward, in American
politics. Maybe there will be a change in policy.
To me, this is an issue that has had pretty strong
bipartisan support. I think it is a bad assumption on their
part.
But there are some that are sort of standing around saying,
well, let us wait and see because maybe after the elections
there will be a change in policy that will take the pressure
off of us.
Mr. Abrams. That is our calculation, too, that Maduro is,
to some extent, watching and waiting.
Senator Rubio. I think it is a bad bet. I do not think he
has very many supporters here that are in favor of him
remaining in power.
The last point is a pretty straightforward question. You
have answered it many different ways and times but I want to
reiterate once more.
Whether it is the President or anybody else, when they
discuss talking to Maduro, that means a negotiation with Maduro
about how he leaves his current position and allows for there
to be free and fair elections. We are not discussing talks. We
are not open to talks about how he remains in power.
Mr. Abrams. That is right. We are open to talks about his
leaving power. Does he want to stay in Venezuela? Does he want
to leave Venezuela? What happens to the sanctions? That sort of
thing, for him and other people.
Those discussions we are willing to have. But a negotiation
about his remaining in power in Venezuela, we are not going to
have.
Senator Rubio. And my last question is we see them buying
all of this gasoline from the Iranians. One of the most oil-
rich countries in the world no longer has any refining capacity
and that has been the case for a long time, way even before
these sanctions took hold. How are they paying for it?
Mr. Abrams. They are paying Iran with gold, as far as we
are aware.
Senator Rubio. From both their reserves and from illegal
mining?
Mr. Abrams. Yes. The gold reserves--the value seems to be
rising because the price of gold is rising. But we are able to
see sometimes the movement of gold out, which we think is to
Iran, and they are trying to refill it in part through current
gold mining in the Arco Minero.
Senator Rubio. So, in essence, they are depleting their
national gold reserves to buy time to provide even very limited
amounts of fuel?
Mr. Abrams. They are.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. This is a very hard problem, and I think the
situation we all acknowledge in Venezuela is disastrous from a
humanitarian standpoint.
I think the Trump administration has gotten some things
right and I think the Trump administration has gotten some
things wrong. I do not think it was easy to get 70 nations to
recognize the Guaido government.
I think that was a good bit of diplomacy, and I do not
think anybody should take for granted that that was simple. And
so that I would put in the positive side of the ledger with
respect to the efforts.
I think the early suggestion that military options were on
the table meant that many of the nations that recognized the
Guaido government would not also embrace the sanctions that we
wanted them to, and I have had conversations with leadership in
some of the nations that have been with us on the recognition
but not on the sanction, where they expressed reticence and
used that as a reason.
But, fundamentally, I do not think the Venezuelan reality,
you know, is bad because of the United States or bad in spite
of the United States. It is a brutal dictatorship, and it is a
dictatorship that is propped up by the world's leading
authoritarian nations.
And, in a way, I almost think Venezuela is like the perfect
example to the world, if you want to live under an
authoritarian government, take a look, because you got Iran
there and Russia there and China there and Turkey there and
Cuba there, and if this is the form of government you want then
take a look at what it has done.
So what should we do now? I, first, think we have to be
realistic. One of my concerns has been from the very beginning
that from the witness side of the hearing rooms in this
committee we have often heard optimism expressed about what the
recognition of Guaido might do and we are right around the
corner from a transition.
And it has been interesting to me because when I have had
conversations with the Colombians they have never been
optimistic about anything quickly. They are right on the
border. They have dealt with Venezuela under so many challenges
over so many years. They were never optimistic that a
transition would be quick.
And so this is not just a Venezuela issue. I think it is an
issue that, you know, for a whole series of reasons including
some good ones. We are a can-do optimistic people. We often
overestimate our ability to affect the internal reality of a
country, and we have to be a little more humble about that. So
maybe a little humility would be important.
Second, the humanitarian challenges. There are now 40,000
to 50,000 Venezuelans that have crossed the border from
Colombia back into Venezuela because when Colombia had to shut
down the economy due to COVID it put so many people in
desperate situations that even though they were going to be
desperate in Venezuela they would have a roof there with
family, and so you see people crossing back.
I am really interested in Colombia. I am really worried
about the effect that the Venezuelan reality has on Colombia,
and so I would put as a very top priority, first, continuing to
do everything we can to get humanitarian aid to Venezuelans,
and you cited the number. We should do even more.
Second, do everything we can to protect the hard-won gains
that administrations in both parties have made in terms of
turning Colombia around because Colombia, right on the border
of Venezuela, offers the antidote.
If Venezuela stands as the example of you want to live
under authoritarians this is what your life is going to be
like. Colombia can offer the opposite.
If you embrace democratic norms and work over time, look at
the positive arc you can be on. And I think we have an enormous
amount invested in that arc that is fragile, that is at risk,
and the Venezuelan situation puts it at risk.
So I think the second element of a strong Venezuelan policy
in addition to humanitarian support needs to be continued
support for Colombia, and I want to ask about that in my last
minute after I say this third thing.
I do think the third thing that would be really important
is TPS. I echo what Senator Menendez said before I came into
the room. If our critique is this is a brutal dictatorship and
these people are living under intolerably bad conditions, to
say all of that and we want to change but we do not want to let
you come into our country it undercuts our message, in my view,
and suggests we are not that worried about them. And I think
this is the perfect example of how TPS should be used.
My question is, tell me how we are doing in Guatemala right
now and what more we can do to support that government as they
deal with this Venezuelan challenge.
Mr. Abrams. Well, thanks, Senator.
First, I agree with you about the importance of making sure
that this multi-decade bipartisan effort in Colombia stays on
track, and the Colombians have been, you know, amazing in
welcoming now about 2 million Venezuelans, and you can see the
burden on the hospital system, the educational system. But they
are doing it.
So I think money is part of what we should be doing to help
Colombia, and they are doing this, by the way, as they continue
even in the context of COVID to eradicate coca. It is really
extraordinary. I think, you know, hats off to President Duque
and his government.
So I think we need the bipartisanship to continue. We need
political support from the Administration, which we have, and
we probably need to look again at the aid levels because, you
know, we come up with these numbers before this surge of a
couple of million Venezuelans into Colombia.
Mr. Hodges. And, sir, I would add to that I completely
agree with your comments and the Special Representative. This
is an area where we are definitely engaged.
We are engaged directly with the Colombians throughout the
interagency on both the coca eradication, on the Venezuela
crisis, and, in addition, making sure all of those
conversations are connected back to the response to the COVID
pandemic.
And so we have taken a series of steps from the USAID side
to make sure that the pandemic is not going to wash away the
gains that we have made within Colombia. Obviously, the
pandemic sets new realities in country for some of the
assistance that we have going on there.
But we are continuing to evaluate our programs, update them
to make sure they are based on the current reality, and not
where we were 6 weeks ago or 4 months ago.
And so we are actively doing that and we are working
closely with the State Department interagency on all of this.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your good work, your service, your
testimony.
Mr. Abrams, does Maduro survive the year and what can we do
to maximize the chances that the answer to that question is no?
Mr. Abrams. Well, we, obviously, hope he does not survive
the year and we are working hard to make that happen.
What needs to happen for that to occur? The Venezuelan
people have to react against this election. International
support of the--I think it is 59 countries, and we hope to add
to that, have to reject this election as a complete fraud.
We need more sanctions, personal sanctions, of the sort the
EU, Canada, the Rio Treaty countries have done--travel
restrictions.
Here is a case where more is better because they put more
pressure on the regime, and we need to continue in the case of,
particularly, the Iran-Venezuela relationship, to try to
prevent it from growing.
Senator Cruz. So do I understand correctly that Maduro was
on a plane, he was ready to leave, he had given it up, and the
Russians called him and convinced him to stay? Is that right
and what changed in his calculus that caused him to get off
that plane?
Mr. Abrams. I do not know if it is right. I have heard
several stories about it. One version is it was his wife who
actually did leave.
Another is that he was not on a plane but was going to get
on a plane and the Russian ambassador met with him and
persuaded him to stay, we are behind you.
I do not have firm intelligence of that. Those are
different stories. I think, you know, the day will come when he
is going to have to make the decision of where he is safest--
fleeing to a place like Cuba or Russia, or is he safest staying
in Venezuela because then we cannot extradite him.
Senator Cruz. I would think one of the important questions
on that is where the Venezuelan military lines up and, in
particular, their generals and admirals. What do we know in
terms of the calculus those military leaders are engaging in
right now about what is good for their future, what is good for
their families, what is good for their country, although I am
not sure with many of them that third question is the
predominant question.
Mr. Abrams. Our impression is they are thinking. Some of
them are ideologically Chavistas. Most are not. Some of them
are criminals. Most are not.
They are on a spectrum here in how that view that regime.
Many are trying to figure out ``what happens to me,'' and it is
probably the case--we have heard this from a lot of people--
that the opposition has not spoken clearly enough about the
questions of guarantees and amnesty and so forth for some
behavior.
There have been those kinds of amnesties in every country
that has gone from dictatorship to democracy in Latin America,
for that matter, in Europe, South Africa.
So they are thinking about that and we do try to get
messages through to the people in the high command, sometimes
publicly saying, look, Venezuela needs a modernized paid
military, and you are not going to get it from Maduro. We need
to reestablish the kind of mil-to-mil relationship we once had.
Senator Cruz. So what more in terms of carrot and stick can
Congress do and can the Administration do to change the
calculus for the generals and admirals so that they come to the
unequivocal conclusion it is much, much worse for me if Maduro
stays in power than if this illegitimate regime is toppled and
if, instead, you have democratically legitimate government in
Venezuela?
Mr. Abrams. Actually, I think the best thing we could do
would be a bipartisan expression that this policy is not going
to change. It has support in both parties.
We are not going to let up on the sanctions. We are not
going to let up on the criminal prosecutions. We are going to
stay with it. So this is going to keep on going year after year
until this regime is replaced.
Senator Cruz. Well, I think that is a good invitation, and
I know this committee has acted in a bipartisan manner before.
I think that would be a very positive thing if this committee
were able to come together and do that again to make clear that
Maduro will have no friends regardless of what happens in an
election 91 days from now.
Let me ask about a different aspect of Venezuela, which is,
as you know, for over 2 years six Americans and five of them
from Texas have been imprisoned in Venezuela related to charges
manufactured about their work for CITGO. They have missed
birthdays, they have missed weddings, they have missed
funerals. They are imprisoned in inhumane conditions. They are
subject to abuse. Their families continue to live in fear for
their health and well-being.
Last week, two of the men were rereleased to house arrest.
But a lot more needs to be done. What is the status of your
efforts to make sure that the CITGO 6 are brought home?
Mr. Abrams. We are in touch with the families. We are in
touch with anyone who is trying to help, and that would include
Governor Richardson, who was down there a couple of weeks ago.
We have made and we continue to make a--I guess I would
call it a global diplomatic effort with the governments, for
example, of Mexico, of Spain, of Argentina, with the Vatican.
We keep asking ourselves who could we go back to? Who is
somebody new who has influence in Caracas? What can we do to
increase the pressure or the inducements on the regime?
Moving two to house arrest, again, is a positive step. We
hope that the next step is the other four go to house arrest as
a step toward getting home. It has been since 2017. It is
getting on to 2 and a half years now and they belong home with
their families. These men have never had a trial.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hodges, 40 percent of hospitals in Venezuela lack
electricity. Seventy percent of hospitals lack access to water.
The U.N. estimates 7 million people in Venezuela are in need of
humanitarian assistance but only able to address 10 percent of
that.
What are we doing--State Department, USAID--to expand
access inside Venezuela for organizations seeking to deliver
lifesaving assistance along the lines with our respect for
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and
independence? Are we building on the recent agreement between
Guaido and Maduro health officials to support the Pan American
Health Organization's work in Venezuela? Is that a one-off
deal?
I mean, I am very focused on creating democracy in
Venezuela. But in the interim, there is a humanitarian
catastrophe happening.
Mr. Hodges. Absolutely, sir. And from a humanitarian
assistance perspective, it is less a question in my mind of
whether or not we remain committed to the bipartisan support
for this issue. As you have all stated, the reality is this is
Maduro against the Venezuelan people, the Venezuelan families
who are suffering day in and day out.
And just to cite some specific examples of funding
regarding what is inside Venezuela, as the committee knows, we
have provided $128 million in support of longer-term
development programs, but, more specifically, $43 million for
critical health, water, food assistance.
And within that, we have reached----
Senator Menendez. This is inside of Venezuela?
Mr. Hodges. Inside Venezuela. Yes, sir.
And we have reached 9 million people if we include sort of
the totality of our programs within Venezuela. That does
include vaccination campaigns.
But in our strictly day-to-day health support, we have
reached around 600,000 people. We continue to seek ways to do
exactly what you are saying, sir, and it is an area where we
know more needs to be done. We call on the international
community to----
Senator Menendez. And what about the Pan American Health
Organization agreement that Guaido and Maduro's people have?
Mr. Hodges. Yes, sir. We are supportive of this and we are
working, as you are aware, with PAHO with the State Department
and others over the course of the last several months to
overcome several obstacles to make sure that the U.S. taxpayer
funds that were provided to PAHO would be used in the manner
that----
Senator Menendez. Well, I would like you to follow up with
our office to get the totality of what you are doing in this
regard.
Mr. Hodges. Absolutely, sir, and it is----
Senator Menendez. And one other question. Of the $611
million that has been provided for humanitarian assistance in
response to the Venezuela crisis, how much is supporting
efforts to prevent and respond to gender-based violence?
Mr. Hodges. So, sir, I will have to follow up with a
specific figure on that. As I mentioned earlier, all of our
programming throughout the region includes aspects that deal
with this.
But we do not have specific line items or earmarks
designated for gender-based violence.
Senator Menendez. Well, I would like to know what is being
spent because we have a horrific situation where violence
against women, girls, LGBTI individuals, persons with
disabilities, and we know that women and girls fleeing
Venezuela are facing grave threats of sexual violence and
trafficking by armed groups.
This committee has a long history of supporting efforts on
trafficking against persons against--obviously, against their
will and human trafficking, sexual trafficking, and what not. I
would like to know what we are doing in that regard.
Mr. Hodges. Absolutely, sir, and we will get you those
specific funding numbers. And one thing I do want to state here
is that inside Venezuela we do have funding that is dedicated
to protection.
That is protection for all, and with that figure, I think,
is right under $4 million. But we will follow up with an exact
figure sort of across all programs.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Abrams, let me ask you a question.
As mentioned in my opening statement that the U.N. has
documented over 8,000 extrajudicial killings in the last 2
years alone within Venezuela, Canada and several countries have
mounted evidence of Maduro's regime crimes against humanity.
Under Section 142 of the VERDAD Act, which I wrote, when
Congress required the State Department to conduct an assessment
of the regime's role in potential crimes against humanity, you
sent us a report that contained ``a list of allegations,'' a
list that failed to include any mention, any mention, of the
U.N. report.
By every standard, that report failed to contribute to an
indelible record of the Maduro regime's crimes, a record I know
that you and I both agree about.
So do you believe a state-sponsored campaign of more than
8,000 murders in 2 years should be considered a crime against
humanity?
Mr. Abrams. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Would you go back to the department and
ask them to resubmit Section 142 of the report and treat it
with the seriousness it deserves?
This is a compelling reality. We got a U.N. document, 8,000
extrajudicial killings. We do not even mention it our statement
and we did not do anything more than a list of allegations. We
can do much better than that.
Mr. Abrams. Yes, sir.
[The requested information referred to above follows:]
I reviewed the Department's ``Report on the Former Maduro Regime's
Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity'' submitted February 2020
and believe that it appropriately responds to the relevant reporting
requirement in the VERDAD Act. The report does not merely provide a
list of allegations; it specifically provides detailed information
about the degree to which the former Maduro regime and its officials
have ``engaged in actions that constitute possible crimes against
humanity,'' including the constituent acts of murder, imprisonment,
torture, and certain forms of sexual violence, and other serious abuses
of human rights. Such acts can, under certain circumstances, constitute
possible crimes against humanity. The report also included options for
holding the perpetrators of such acts accountable.
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
is the most cited organization in the Department's report and is
mentioned more than 10 times. For example, the subsection on 2019
unlawful killings states that the NGO Observatorio Venezolano de la
Violencia (OVV) ``reported at least 2,124 unlawful killings for murders
committed by the former Maduro regime identified as resistance to
authority over the same period. Information analyzed by the OHCHR
suggests that many of the former Maduro regime resistance to authority
killings may constitute unlawful executions. In September 2019,
Bachelet stated that regime-aligned security forces had probably
committed 57 additional murders since her July 2019 report.''
The Department looks forward to working closely with Congress on
future reports involving this legislation.
Senator Menendez. Now, lastly, I just want to go through a
series of things, and you tell me yes or no whether they are
the case.
We see Colombian guerillas operating openly across
Venezuela in large swaths of ungoverned territory. Is that
true?
Mr. Abrams. We do, including even in eastern Venezuela.
Senator Menendez. We see a wide range of armed actors
profiting from drug trade, illegal gold mining, and human
trafficking. Is that true?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. We see femicide, sexual violence,
trafficking of Venezuelan women and girls reportedly on the
rise. Is that true?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Is it fair to say that Maduro's regime
has perpetrated more state-sponsored murders than any Latin
American government since the dirty wars of the '70s and '80s?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And you have already acknowledged the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights report of 8,000
extrajudicial killings as well as grotesque patterns of torture
and rap. That is true as well, right?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. It is true that 5.2 million Venezuelans
have fled their country, is it not?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And at the rate it is going, it is
possible that more Venezuelans would flee Venezuela than
Syrians fled that horrific war?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. It is true that Maduro and his cronies
face charges in the United States for drug trafficking and
graft?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And that we are dealing with a massive
law enforcement challenge in Venezuela. Is that true as well?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. And it is also true that, in fact, what
we have here is the challenge in a regional context. While
Colombia has been a great neighbor and a good hemispheric
leader, it has consequences.
It has consequences to Colombia's stability if, in fact,
the demand continues, several million, to smaller countries
like Ecuador and others. Is not that the potential for regional
instability if this continues to hemorrhage?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Well, if I look at all of that, it sounds
to me that Venezuela is a clear and present danger to the
United States.
Mr. Abrams. To the United States and to its neighbors.
Senator Menendez. So in my mind, if all of that rises to a
clear and present danger to the United States, then we would be
far more serious in our engagement. We would be following and
sanctioning the Turkish companies that are making it profitable
for Maduro to benefit.
We would be proactively seeking out the transfers of oils
that are going to Cuba, which is why Cuba is keeping several
thousand of its security agency around Maduro to prop him up.
We would be sanctioning Russian companies that specifically
are providing assistance to the Maduro regime inside of it and
we would use, to take a page from Senator Murphy, clearly, we
would be engaging with the Russians and Chinese as well as the
Turks and others in ultimately making it something of value to
them to undermine Maduro, because right now they are propping
him up and they see no consequence to them of keeping him
propped up.
In our own hemisphere, in our front yard, to have a clear
and present danger to the United States is pretty amazing.
There is a lot more that should be done here and I just
fear that, at the end of the day, we are on auto pilot and that
auto pilot is not going to get us to where we want.
Mr. Abrams. Senator, I would only respond that we have
already done and are doing many of the things that you have
mentioned. It was our sanctions on Rosneft that got it out of
Venezuela.
It was our move against Greek-owned ships that turned them
away from bringing Iranian gasoline to Venezuela. We have
sanctioned over a thousand different people and entities.
So we are doing this. It has not had the impact that you
and the members of the committee and, of course, all of us
wanted to have, which is the restoration of democracy in
Venezuela, yet.
Senator Menendez. Well, you know, I would engage with the
Spanish, who seem to be a problem in helping us in this regard.
You know, they have influence with other countries in the
hemisphere.
I could lay out for you a dozen different initiatives that
if we are really serious and focused on getting rid of Maduro
and restoring democracy to Venezuela and stability to the
region as a result of the hemorrhaging that is going on. I
mean, the lawlessness that is taking place in Venezuela is
alarming. Even if Maduro leaves you are going to have a real
challenge at the end of the day.
So yes, there is bipartisan support here to get us to where
we need to be. But some of us have a sense that, again, we are
on autopilot and we are not engaging in ways and with others in
order to bring this to a successful conclusion, one that I know
we both share in terms of a vision but one which I honestly say
I think we have different views.
And I appreciate the chairman's willingness to give me this
extra time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Good points all along. I, however, do question whether or
not either the Russians, the Chinese, the Cubans, or anyone
else that is engaged there are going to listen to us as far as
trying to convince them that it is in their best interest to
leave when they enjoy putting a stick in our eye.
Nonetheless, I think, perhaps, you have made some good
suggestions. I think, perhaps, some bipartisan legislation
urging the kinds of things that you have laid out might be
appropriate, and I really think that everybody is pulling the
wagon the same here. And I think perhaps some bipartisan
legislation in that regard and I will be happy to join in that
regard.
Senator Murphy or Senator Kaine, anything else for the good
of the order?
Senator Murphy. There we go. Just one additional question.
Much of our policy over the course of 2019 was predicated
on the idea that we could force a fissure between Maduro and
military leadership and, in fact, the episode in April in which
we had hoped that there would be a substantial break did not
pan out, in part because many of those leaders at the last
minute appeared to get cold feet.
I guess sort of just two questions on that. One, when you
say to Senator Cruz you hope he is not there at the end of the
year, how much of that is predicated on a continued belief that
you can split the military leadership away from Maduro?
And second, what did we learn from 2019 about the ways in
which Maduro has successfully and perhaps, surprisingly, to
American diplomats been able to hold together his leadership?
Mr. Abrams. I think we learned, one, that there are a
number of people in the military who, unlike military leaders
in previous Latin American dictatorships, are really part of a
criminal gang, and they are going to be extremely difficult to
dislodge.
I think we learned that a lot of people in the military are
concerned about the questions of guarantees and an amnesty and
want to hear about it more quickly.
I think we learned that they want more of a sense of what
happens after Maduro, which is one of the reasons we put
forward the framework to show here is how we see it playing
out.
I think we learned that we need to keep trying to reach out
to military leaders in every possible way directly, indirectly,
in public to get our messages across and we try to do that.
SOUTHCOM, for example, tries to do that in their communications
as well.
I would also say that we learned that there is no
substitute for keeping the pressure on. And I would say the
last thing the policy is is on auto pilot. We are constantly
trying to think, who have we not reached out to? Who should we
go back to again? What have we not tried that we should try?
Because, like you, we all want this policy to work to
restore democracy to Venezuela or, better said, to help
Venezuelans restore democracy to their own country.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hodges. If I may, on that, I just want to add that
USAID is actively engaged on this with the State Department.
We are actively working with civil society groups to raise
awareness of the brutality, of the repression, of the real-life
situation on the ground so that everyone throughout Venezuela
can have access to that information.
We know the regime does not want that information getting
out and we are trying to break through by various different
means.
And so we are very proud of the work we are doing in this
space to increase that access to information to everyday
Venezuelans including folks in different security sectors.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Well, Mr. Abrams, Mr. Hodges, thank you so much for your
service. I think this has been a hearing that will help
enlighten Americans to where we are on all these very difficult
issues, been appropriate discussion of some of the real knotty
problems that we face in trying to do what we all want to see
done.
For information, members, the record will remain open until
Thursday. We would ask witnesses to respond as promptly as
possible.
To questions that are raised and we had some discussions
here about things that would be supplied to the record, for the
record we would ask you to do that as promptly as possible.
And with that, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions
Submitted by Chairman James E. Risch
Question. Cuban military and intelligence support is the linchpin
to Maduro's survival. What more can be done to drive up the cost to the
Cuban regime? What options are there to block the oil shipments between
the two?
Answer. Cuba provides support that allows Maduro to cling to power
and gives him the false sense that he can be shielded from some of the
effects of international economic and diplomatic pressure while the
Venezuelan people suffer. The U.S. government targeted for sanctions
firms, vessels, and state-owned enterprises engaging in transporting
Venezuelan oil to Cuba. We consistently pursue new actions to raise the
costs to Cuba for its support of Maduro, its destabilizing role in the
hemisphere, and oppression of its own people by focusing on the
Venezuela-Cuba oil trade as well as the Cuban regime's primary sources
of hard currency revenue.
Question. Considering the well-documented ties between the Maduro
regime and the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and Cuba's
harboring of ELN terrorists, should the Cuban regime be listed as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism?
Answer. As a matter of law, in order to designate any country as a
state sponsor of terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that
the government of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism.
The Department of State consistently, and on an ongoing basis,
reviews available information and intelligence, from many sources, on
possible state support for acts of international terrorism, evaluating
all credible, verified, and corroborated information in its entirety.
In 2015, Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation was
rescinded after careful review of all available evidence. We continue
to review new evidence as it arises, but to date the Secretary has not
made a determination for another change.
Question. In February 2016, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
allowed the Cuban regime to register the Havana Club rum brand in the
U.S. What is stopping the Administration from reversing this decision?
Answer. The Department routinely works with OFAC to provide foreign
policy input into OFAC's licensing decisions. Regarding specific
licensing issues, we defer to the Department of Treasury for further
information. Similarly, we refer questions regarding trademark
registration to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
______
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What is your assessment of specific states and/or
territory in Venezuela that are not under the complete control of the
Interim Government or the Maduro regime--i.e. ungoverned territory in
Venezuela?
Answer. Venezuela's ungoverned territory is growing and disputed
among armed actors. The illegitimate Maduro regime and local criminal
organizations, and infrequently dissident forces, share control in many
parts of the country. Regime control is probably weakest in Amazonas,
Apure, Bolivar, Tachira, and Zulia because of their distance from the
capital, the prevalence of illegally armed groups like the ELN and
FARC, the impact of illegal mining, and security force manpower
shortages. In some instances, we have seen how the Maduro regime has
actively empowered illegally armed groups, gifting them mines, weapons,
or medications to enforce their control over territory in exchange for
political support. This landscape is constantly changing, in part
depending on the regime's ability to fund and shield the groups and
sporadic operations to bring them back under regime influence. Armed
colectivos--armed groups that are largely regime sponsored--operate in
15 of Venezuela's 23 states, according to a 2019 InSight Crime report.
As we plan for a transition scenario, focusing on the challenges
presented by these ungoverned territory is a priority.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of members of
Colombia's ELN that operate in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. According to local and international media, ELN was present
in 12 of Venezuela's 24 states (with particular strength in Anzoategui,
Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Zulia, and Tachira states). The ELN's
presence has expanded beyond its historic base in the border zone with
Colombia. Colombian authorities estimate there are around 3,000 active
members of the ELN in total, 1,400 of whom the government assesses are
camped across the border in Venezuela. Colombian authorities have also
assessed there are 36 ELN camps strategically located on the Venezuela
side of the Colombia-Venezuela border.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations conducted by
Colombia's ELN operating in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. The ELN engage in narcotrafficking, illegal mining, money
laundering, extortion, and kidnapping in Venezuela. Media reports
indicate an increasing role for the ELN in regime-subsidized food
distribution, contraband (gas, basic goods, meat), extortion, illegal
mining, and recruitment propaganda, at times via control of radio
stations. The ELN is increasingly recruiting vulnerable Venezuelans,
including children and those seeking to migrate, to join its ranks.
There were also reports noting sporadic activity by ELN in the areas of
road/border checkpoints. These activities contribute to instability in
the region--one of many reasons why the Maduro regime needs to go as it
is unwilling and unable to counter the ELN's illegal activities.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of members of former
members of Colombia's FARC that operate in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents (FARC-D)
are present in Venezuela, but we do not have reliable estimates of
their numbers at this time, in part because Venezuela permits criminal
groups to transit easily and to operate in the border regions of either
side. Maduro stated publicly in July 2019 that former FARC commanders
Ivan Marquez and Jesus Santrich are ``leaders of peace'' and ``welcome
in Venezuela,'' shortly before the two announced a return to armed
conflict as FARC dissidents. In 2019 in Colombia, an estimated 2,600
FARC dissidents who never demobilized, left the peace process, or are
new recruits, continued violent attacks, primarily to enable narcotics
trafficking and other criminal activities particularly in border
regions and areas previously controlled by the former FARC.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations conduct by
former members of Colombia's FARC operating in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. The dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC-D) engage in narcotrafficking, illegal mining, money
laundering, extortion, and kidnapping in Venezuela. Financial ties with
FARC-D and Venezuelan paramilitary groups facilitate the public
corruption and graft schemes of the regime to include members of the
armed forces acting at the behest of Maduro and his inner circle or in
their own personal interest. Of concern, there were reports noting
sporadic cooperation with FARC-D in the areas of road/border
checkpoints, subsidized food distribution, recruitment and forced
displacement of vulnerable indigenous communities, and trafficking of
illegal narcotics and gold. These activities contribute to instability
in the region--one of many reasons why the Maduro regime needs to go.
Question. Is it your assessment that there are paramilitary groups
operating in Venezuelan territory? If yes, please provide a description
of their numbers, organization, and operations.
Answer. I assess there are paramilitary groups operating in
Venezuela. The groups probably range in size from a few dozen to
several thousand members, are typically hierarchical in structure, and
often have some linkage to the Maduro regime or other armed groups
through alliances or non-aggression pacts. A few of the larger groups
are likely to oppose a transition from the Maduro regime because of
their mutually beneficial relationship for maintaining power and money,
even if there are no ideological ties. They most commonly fund
themselves with extortion, drug trafficking, and illicit mining.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of members of
colectivos operating in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. There are roughly a dozen armed colectivos operating in the
country with smaller groups operating within them. It is impossible to
provide an estimate because the groups evolve and combine or divide
frequently, depending on their loyalty or resistance to the Maduro
regime and their ability to control territories.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations of colectivos
operating in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. Armed colectivos are more likely to be legitimized and
funded by the regime and be more ideologically consistent with it than
other non-state armed groups. Some colectivo members have overlapping
membership in a Venezuelan security service or are politicians. Thus,
colectivos are most likely to take up arms to defend the regime in a
transition. The groups are the most powerful in Caracas and the greater
capital district and near the border. While most armed colectivos
operate in cahoots with regime authority, some are an expression of
their community and may accept a transitional government if they are
allowed full political participation.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of Cuban intelligence
personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in Venezuelan territory?
Answer. Media reports that the total Cuban presence, including
medical doctors, probably reaches between 20,000 and 25,000. It is not
just the number that is significant, however, but also their role. We
assess Cuban elements are pervasive in Maduro's security and
intelligence forces, and conduct training exercises and loyalty checks
to root out anyone who is seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. I
have made statements to the press that there are more than 2,000 Cuban
intelligence personnel in Venezuela.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations of Cuban
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. Cuban military and intelligence advisors actively support
Maduro through the provision of security forces, intelligence officers,
and providing direction to Venezuelan authorities. They equip the
regime with the tools they need to repress any domestic or internal
dissent, including in his military. In its 2019 annual report, the
Casla Institute, a Czech human rights body, revealed the ``systematic
repression and torture, Cuban influence, and significant changes in the
methods of torture in Venezuela.'' The Cuban intelligence personnel are
also, in my view, critical to Maduro in heading off coups, by spying on
military officers and hindering lateral communication among them.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of Russian
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. The State Department does not have an estimate for the
number of Russian intelligence personnel in Venezuela. The Department
would be willing to provide a classified briefing on this issue.
Nevertheless, according to media reports, as many as 100 Russian troops
are present in Venezuela, without the constitutionally required consent
of the legitimate National Assembly.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations of Russian
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. Russian support for the Maduro regime includes military
advisors and proxies, disinformation mechanisms, political influence on
the world stage, and financial backing. In return, Russia receives
access to Venezuela as a potential military power projection platform
in the Western Hemisphere, a foothold for disinformation and influence
campaigns against the United States and our allies, and investment
payoffs from foreign military sales and the exploitation of Venezuela's
oil and other natural resources.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of Chinese
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. We do not have an estimate for the number of People's
Republic of China (PRC) intelligence personnel operating in Venezuela.
The Department would be willing to provide a classified briefing on
this issue.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations of Chinese
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. We do not have an estimate for the number of People's
Republic of China (PRC) intelligence personnel operating in the
country. However, media reports note that the Chinese
telecommunications firm ZTE has played a critical role in the
illegitimate Maduro regime's ``fatherland card,'' a national
identification card program that enables the regime to deliver social
services, while also surveilling the Venezuelan people to channel a
subsidized food program to political supporters. More broadly, we
assess that the PRC's support for the regime is grounded in protecting
its economic interests. The State Department is willing to provide a
classified briefing on this issue.
Question. What is your estimate of the number of Iranian
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. We do not have an estimate for the number of Iranian
intelligence personnel operating in Venezuela. The Department would be
willing to provide a classified briefing on this issue.
Question. What is your assessment of the operations of Iranian
intelligence personnel (military and/or civilian) operating in
Venezuelan territory?
Answer. We have seen cooperation between Venezuela and Iran
increase as the economic and social conditions within Venezuela
deteriorate. Venezuela and Iran have established joint military
ventures, including for the manufacture of munitions, though the
factory to produce such munitions is incomplete.
Question. What is your understanding of the value of assets stolen
from the Venezuelan people by the Maduro regime and the Chavez
government?
Answer. Though it is impossible to precisely quantify how much
public money has been stolen by these regimes, we currently estimate
the total value of stolen and misspent assets is hundreds of billions
of dollars.
Question. What is the total value of blocked assets in the United
States as a result of U.S. sanctions and/or legal cases against the
Maduro regime, members of the regime, regime intermediaries, and/or
legal entities related to the regime?
Answer. We refer you to the Department of the Treasury for details
on U.S.-based assets blocked under our sanctions. We refer you to the
Department of Justice for details on the disposition of any assets
associated with legal cases involving members of the Maduro regime or
its associated entities.
Question. Outside of the United States, which three countries have
blocked assets of the greatest value as a result of sanctions and/or
legal cases against the Maduro regime, members of the regime, regime
intermediaries, and/or legal entities related to the regime? (Note:
please provide the name of the country and the estimated value of the
assets.)
Answer. Our Venezuela sanctions program has helped block malign
individuals and entities from accessing the U.S. financial system,
which, in turn, has dissuaded third countries from conducting business
with the Maduro regime. We do not have an estimate for the size of
third country commercial activity that was suspended as a result of
sanctions. As identified in our recent report to Congress on recovering
assets stolen from the Venezuelan people, a number of public cases
related to corruption of Venezuelan officials have been brought in
other countries, including Andorra, Liechtenstein, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.
Question. What is your assessment of which individual countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean have the most developed legal
frameworks to impose targeted sanctions (visa revocations and/or asset
blocking) that could be and/or have been used against members of the
Maduro regime? (Note: please provide the names of the countries and a
description of their respective sanctions capacities.)
Answer. Despite the resolutions adopted late last year under the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) addressing
sanctions in connection with persons associated with the Maduro regime,
some countries in the region lack the legislation and/or do not have
sufficiently-developed frameworks to apply targeted sanctions. However,
many TIAR countries have transmitted TIAR sanctions lists to the
appropriate domestic migratory, legal, and financial authorities to
ensure implementation of travel restrictions and consider opening
investigations into illicit Venezuelan activities. Brazil, for example,
has implemented travel/entry restrictions against 100 Venezuelan
officials affiliated with the illegitimate Maduro regime. While
implementing targeted financial sanctions such as asset blocking will
require technical capacity-building, we believe Western Hemisphere
countries can do even more to implement travel and visa restrictions.
We continue to work with all willing nations to leverage all available
tools against the Maduro regime.
Question. Please provide a brief overview of all active legal cases
against current and former Maduro regime officials, as well as
individuals affiliated with the Maduro regime.
Answer. For specifics on active legal cases against current and
former Maduro regime officials, we would refer you to the Department of
Justice.
Question. Please provide a list of all completed legal cases
against current and former Maduro regime officials, as well as
individuals affiliated with the Maduro regime.
Answer. For a list of all completed legal cases against current and
former Maduro regime officials, we would refer you to the Department of
Justice.
Question. Please provide a detailed summary of all settlements and
judgments against current and former Maduro regime officials, as well
as individuals affiliated with the Maduro regime.
Answer. For a detailed summary of all settlements and judgements
against current and former Maduro regime officials, as well as
individuals affiliated with the Maduro regime, we would refer you to
the Department of Justice.
Question. Please provide a summary of the financial value of all
assets recovered or in the process of being recovered through civil or
criminal forfeiture proceedings as a result of the previous two
questions above, including the total combined value of all such assets.
Answer. For a summary of the financial value of all assets
recovered or in the process of being recovered through civil or
criminal forfeiture proceedings, we would refer you to the Department
of Justice.
Question. Please identify the current location of all such assets
described in the previous question, specifically whether they are
located in a DOJ managed fund and/or a Treasury managed fund,
including, but not limited to the Treasury Forfeiture fund.
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Justice and the Department
of Treasury for specifics on the size and nature of funds deposited in
the Treasury Forfeiture Fund or other holdings.
Question. Please provide a detailed summary of how DOJ/Treasury are
managing such funds described in the previous two questions above,
including a review of accounting procedures to keep track of such funds
and intention for use of such funds.
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Justice and the Department
of the Treasury for details on accounting procedures associated with
criminal and civil asset forfeitures and the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.
Question. Please provide a detailed review of whether such funds
described in the questions above have already been used, allocated, or
obligated for any U.S. Government programs, projects, initiatives and/
or activities.
Answer. Any funds in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund recovered from
Venezuelan cases are held in conjunction with funds recovered from all
other asset forfeiture cases. I refer you to the Department of the
Treasury for specific rules and processes for disposition of resources
from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.
Question. Please provide an overview of any plans or provision the
executive branch has made for the return of such assets described in
the questions above to the Interim Government and/or people of
Venezuela.
Answer. In our recent Verdad Act report on asset forfeiture, we
explained the processes and procedures under U.S. law that exist for a
foreign country to request forfeited funds. The U.S. Government relies
on licenses to enable the Interim Government to access assets blocked
under our sanctions program, and we believe that funds subject to
forfeiture should be returned to the people of Venezuela to the
greatest extent possible provided that doing so can be done in
accordance with operative U.S. laws, regulations, and processes.
Question. Have any of the funds described in the questions above
been utilized for any expenditures or obligations related to the
construction of a border wall on the southwestern border of the United
States?
Answer. Any funds in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund recovered from
Venezuela are held in conjunction with funds recovered from all other
asset forfeiture cases. As a result, it is not possible to determine
the origin of the funds used to support Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) security work at the border.
Question. What specific steps are the State Department and USAID
taking to expand access inside Venezuela for organizations seeking to
deliver life-saving assistance, with respect for the humanitarian
principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence?
Answer. State and USAID have provided more than $76 million in
funding to humanitarian partners for critical health, water, food, and
other life-saving assistance inside Venezuela. Maduro has made it
extremely difficult for international NGOs to register, and for
humanitarian workers to obtain entry visas to deliver aid. State and
USAID are working with the U.N. humanitarian country team to advocate
for increased access to beneficiaries. As an example, State has pressed
hard, including enlisting other governments with friendlier relations
with the Maduro regime, to get Maduro to approve the opening of World
Food Program activities in Venezuela. Despite all the constraints,
partners continue to provide life-saving assistance where possible, and
we commend them for these efforts in such difficult circumstances.
Question. What is the status of the Lima Group and what specific
diplomatic efforts have U.S. officials made to support its agenda in
the past 3 months?
Answer. The Lima Group remains active and continues to be a close
partner of the United States in denouncing the illegitimate Maduro
regime, bolstering support for Interim President Juan Guaido, and
calling for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in
2020. On April 2, the Lima Group announced its backing for the U.S.
proposed Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela. On June 16, the
Lima Group issued another statement strongly rejecting the illegitimate
naming of a new National Electoral Council (CNE) and reiterating its
call for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. We
also are working with concerned members of the Lima Group, the
International Contact Group, and the European Union on a joint
declaration on democracy in Venezuela. The United States continues to
engage with the Lima Group toward our shared goal of a democratic
transition in Venezuela.
Question. What is the status of the Quito Process and what specific
diplomatic efforts has the United States made to support this forum in
the last 6 months?
Answer. The United States continues to support the Quito Process as
it enhances coordination among key host countries of Venezuelan
refugees and migrants, fosters region-led solutions to the Venezuela
situation, and promotes greater burden sharing in the humanitarian
response to Venezuelan outflows. The United States recently joined the
``Group of Friends'' of the Quito Process and participated in the first
meeting on August 6, 2020. The United States will participate in the
sixth Quito Process meeting, hosted by Chile, in late September, and
will continue advocating for a regional solution to the Venezuela
situation.
Question. Please describe specific diplomatic efforts U.S.
officials have undertaken in Colombia to improve protection for
Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
Answer. Colombia has borne the largest share of refugees fleeing
the Venezuelan crisis, welcoming over 1.8 million refugees. Supporting
Colombia in this crisis is a significant U.S. priority. Since FY 2017,
the United States has contributed more than $265 million in
humanitarian assistance to international and non-governmental
organizations in Colombia to assist with emergency response efforts,
including protection from gender-based violence and trafficking in
persons. We also welcomed a Colombian initiative to confer Colombian
nationality on Venezuelan children born in Colombia and applauded its
constructive efforts in regional refugee forums. U.S. officials
regularly engage other key donors to highlight the importance of
protection and encourage increased burden sharing in the humanitarian
response.
Question. Please describe specific diplomatic efforts U.S.
officials have undertaken in Ecuador to strengthen protection of
Venezuelan refugees and migrants, particularly to improve access to
asylum and legal status?
Answer. Ecuador has accepted over 362,000 Venezuelan refugees since
the start of the Venezuelan migration crisis. Since FY 2017, the United
States has contributed more than $80 million in humanitarian aid to
international and non-governmental organizations in Ecuador to assist
with emergency response efforts, including protection from gender-based
violence and trafficking in persons. Through our partners, the United
States has also supported the Government of Ecuador's efforts to
register and grant legal status to Venezuelans in the country as well
as strengthen asylum and refugee adjudication processes. U.S. officials
regularly engage other key donors to highlight the importance of
protection and encourage increased donor burden sharing in the
humanitarian response.
Question. Please describe specific diplomatic efforts U.S.
officials have undertaken in Peru to improve protection for Venezuelan
refugees and migrants.
Answer. Peru has welcomed close to 830,000 Venezuelan refugees
since the start of the Venezuelan crisis. Since FY 2017, the United
States has provided nearly $59 million in humanitarian aid to support
Peru's efforts to respond to the influx of Venezuelans, including
support for protection from gender-based violence and trafficking in
persons. The United States prioritizes efforts that strengthen Peru's
capacity to provide protection and identify and assist the most
vulnerable Venezuelans, and we advocate for measures to register and
regularize the status of undocumented Venezuelans. U.S. officials
regularly engage other key donors to highlight the importance of
protection and encourage increased donor burden sharing in the
humanitarian response.
Question. Please describe specific diplomatic efforts U.S.
officials have undertaken with governments in Caribbean island nations
to improve protection for Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
Answer. Since FY 2017, the United States has contributed more than
$19 million in humanitarian aid to international and non-governmental
organizations in the Caribbean to assist with emergency response
efforts, including protection from gender-based violence and
trafficking in persons. U.S.-funded programs also help host governments
develop contingency plans and build institutional capacity. As a
result, for example, in May 2019, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago
registered more than 16,000 Venezuelan asylum seekers in 2 weeks.
Previously, the government had treated asylum seekers as illegal
entrants. U.S. officials regularly highlight the importance of
protection and encourage increased donor burden sharing.
Question. Given the U.N. Population Fund's leadership in
humanitarian response to gender-based violence, its critical role
supporting maternity hospitals in Venezuela, and its provision of
reproductive health care for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, what is
the impact on Venezuelan women of this Administration's prohibition on
funding UNFPA?
Answer. In light of the UNFPA funding prohibition, the State
Department has focused its resources on funding a variety of programs
aimed at strengthening health services for Venezuelan refugees,
particularly women. This is especially important in Venezuela, given
the disproportionate impact on women caused by the regime's support of
illicit mining. In doing so, there are many organizations we work with
to prevent and respond to gender-based violence (GBV), and which
support maternal health care, voluntary family planning, and
reproductive health programs. Venezuelan partners work to provide
survivors of GBV access to case management, legal assistance, health
services, and humanitarian aid. All of USAID's programming in Venezuela
includes components to address GBV.
Question. How is the financial crisis resulting from COVID-19
affecting the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank's proposed
concessional financing for Colombia, Ecuador, and other countries
hosting Venezuelan refugees and migrants?
Answer. Despite the financial crisis due to COVID-19, the World
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank continue to offer loans to
Colombia, Ecuador, and other countries hosting Venezuelan refugees and
migrants. In April, the World Bank approved for Ecuador the $500
million Second Inclusive and Sustainable Growth Development Policy
Loan, which was supplemented with $6 million from the Global
Concessional Financing Facility. In June, the World Bank approved for
Colombia the $700 million ``COVID-19 Response Development Policy
Financing'' project.
Question. How many Venezuelans have requested asylum in the United
States to date in FY 2020?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans have been granted asylum in the
United States to date in FY 2020?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans requested asylum in the United
States in FY 2019?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans were granted asylum in the United
States in FY 2019?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans has the United States returned to
Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans has the United States expelled to
Mexico under Title 42?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. We understand that representatives of Venezuela's Interim
Government have visited Venezuelans in immigration detention
facilities. How many Venezuelans are currently in immigration detention
in the United States?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans have been deported from the United
States to date in FY 2020?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. How many Venezuelans were deported from the United States
in FY 2019?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. When was the last date that a Venezuelan national was
removed from the United States?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. During the course of FY 2018, FY 2019 and/or FY 2020,
were any Venezuelan nationals deported, removed, or transferred from
the United States to any country other than Venezuela?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. During the course of FY 2018, FY 2019 and/or FY 2020, if
there were any Venezuelan nationals deported, removed, or transferred
from the United States to any country other than Venezuela, which
countries were they deported, removed, or transferred to?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. If countries were affirmatively identified in the
response to question #50, what diplomatic outreach did the State
Department conduct in order to arrange for and such deportation,
removals, and/or transfers?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. During the course of FY 2018, FY 2019 and/or FY 2020, if
there were any Venezuelan nationals deported, removed, or transferred
from the United States to any country other than Venezuela, how many
Venezuelan nationals were deported, removed, or transferred to such
countries?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. If a number of individuals was affirmatively identified
in the response to the question above, what happened to any such
Venezuelan nationals once they were deported, removed, or transferred
to such countries?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the
statistics on these programs; we refer your question to DHS for more
information.
Question. What additional steps do we need to take to counter the
Cuban regime's continued activities inside Venezuela?
Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime has destroyed Venezuela's
institutions, economy, and infrastructure through its abuse of power
and by welcoming malign support from outside nations, including Cuba.
The Department and White House have condemned Cuban involvement in
Venezuela and have encouraged our partners to do the same. Among
responses to Cuban individuals and/or entities supporting the
illegitimate Maduro regime, the U.S. Government has targeted for
sanctions firms, vessels, and state-owned enterprises engaging in the
trade of Venezuelan oil to Cuba, giving away a natural resource at the
expense of the Venezuelan people. We will seek additional opportunities
to implement appropriate measures in connection with Cuban individuals
and/or entities responsible for funding or otherwise enabling the
Maduro regime.
Question. What changes do we need to make to address Putin's
continued maneuvering in Venezuela?
Answer. The Department and White House have condemned Russian
involvement in Venezuela and encourage our partners to do the same.
Moreover, the U.S. Government has designated Rosneft Trading SA and TNK
Trading International, indicating that we no longer are merely going to
message on Russia's malign activities, we are going to take clear
action. We must continue to raise the costs for Putin's continued
maneuvering in Venezuela and we will seek additional opportunities to
implement appropriate measures in connection with Russian individuals
and/or entities responsible for funding or otherwise enabling the
illegitimate Maduro regime.
Question. What additional steps do we need to take to put a stop to
Turkey's transactions in Venezuelan gold and oil?
Answer. The Department of the Treasury last year designated a
Turkish company that was used as part of Alex Saab's corruption network
for the illicit sale of gold to Turkey. The Administration's maximum
pressure campaign includes commercial and economic sanctions, deterring
all activities that benefit the illegitimate regime, and cutting off
the financial lifelines that sustain it. This maximum pressure campaign
will continue until a democratic transition is in place. The
international business community should already be aware of the legal
risk of any transactions with the illegitimate and tyrannical regime of
Nicolas Maduro. The Department is working to uncover other networks for
disruption through sanctions and other actions.
Question. What additional steps do we need to take to better
counter Iran's support for Maduro?
Answer. The President has made clear the United States will not
tolerate continued meddling in Venezuela by supporters of an
illegitimate regime, including Iran. The Administration's maximum
pressure campaign includes commercial and economic sanctions, deterring
all activities that benefit the illegitimate regime, and cutting off
the financial lifelines that sustain it. This maximum pressure campaign
will continue until a democratic transition is in place. The
international business community should already be aware of the legal
risk of any transactions with the illegitimate and tyrannical regime of
Nicolas Maduro. The Department continues to work with regional partners
to counter Iran's influence in Venezuela.
Question. How can we make it clear to Beijing that continued
support for Maduro will not be overlooked and will come with a cost?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) support for the
regime is grounded in protecting its own economic interests. The PRC
could play a constructive role in helping end the misery, but declines
to do so, instead taking hundreds of millions of dollars from the
Venezuelan people and providing the regime diplomatic support. We will
continue to work with our regional allies to demonstrate that PRC
support for Maduro comes at a cost for the PRC in the region, and we
will seek additional opportunities to implement appropriate measures to
prevent the PRC from further enabling the illegitimate Maduro regime.
______
Responses of Joshua Hodges to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What are the State Department and USAID doing to expand
access inside Venezuela for organizations seeking to deliver life-
saving assistance, with respect for the humanitarian principles of
neutrality, impartiality, and independence?
Answer. USAID and State continue to advocate for the illegitimate
Maduro regime to provide unrestricted access to the global humanitarian
community to safely deliver aid directly to those who need it, to
assess situations in real time, and to be able to monitor the results.
In addition, USAID is working with international partners on pathways
to increase access inside Venezuela. Maduro should allow all
humanitarian actors to work in Venezuela under the humanitarian
principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
To date, Maduro has made it extremely difficult for international
NGOs to legally register and for humanitarian workers to obtain visas
to enter the country. This, coupled with ongoing logistical impediments
and security concerns for our partners, prevents humanitarian
organizations from responding at a scale commensurate with the
magnitude of the needs created by this economic, political, and social
crisis. Despite these constraints, partners continue to provide life-
saving assistance where possible, and we commend them for these efforts
in such difficult circumstances. State and USAID have provided more
than $76 million in funding to humanitarian partners for critical
health, water, food, and other life-saving assistance inside Venezuela.
USAID is supportive of the humanitarian architecture that has been
established by UN OCHA in 2019, including the appointment of a
Humanitarian Country Team, activation of the cluster system for
coordinating the response, and release of the Humanitarian Needs
Overview and Humanitarian Response Plans. We continue to work to ensure
that funding is used in an effective and qualitative manner.
We will continue to provide humanitarian partners with support as
they work to operate on the ground inside Venezuela, to help save lives
and mitigate suffering.
Question. What steps are you taking to help the World Food Program
negotiate access to deliver humanitarian assistance in Venezuela?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to call on the illegitimate
Maduro regime to provide unrestricted, safe, and continuous access to
the global humanitarian community to deliver aid directly to those who
need it, to assess situations in real time, and to be able to monitor
the results.
USAID has supported the World Food Program's (WFP) negotiations for
access to Venezuela for over a year. At this point, WFP has informed
USAID that access negotiations are nearing a successful breakthrough;
however, the agency continues to proceed with necessary caution to
ensure full independence and neutrality are secured in their agreements
with the regime. Ensuring an agreement adheres to United Nations
policies and principles, and the general restrictions due to the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, continue to affect the timeline for
establishing operations in the country. As background, in 2019 USAID
provided $15 million to WFP to support their Multi-Country Limited
Emergency Operations for Venezuela and countries impacted by the crisis
in Venezuela. This funding supported WFP's Emergency Food Security
Assessment in 2019 and planning efforts for the Venezuela response.
Question. Please describe the factors preventing NGOs from
registering and/or expanding assistance in Venezuela and what specific
steps the State Department and USAID are taking to address these
challenges.
Answer. Maduro and his illegitimate regime have continued to impede
relief efforts and limit access of critical needs to the Venezuelan
people, and have made it extremely difficult for international NGOs to
legally register and for skilled foreign aid workers to obtain visas to
enter the country. This, coupled with ongoing logistical impediments
and security concerns for our partners, prevents humanitarian
organizations from responding at a scale commensurate with the needs
created by this economic and political crisis. While the illegitimate
Maduro regime has impeded relief efforts and made it extremely
difficult for international NGOs to register and for international
humanitarian expert staff to enter the country, partners continue to
provide life-saving assistance where possible, and we commend them for
these efforts in such difficult circumstances. As long as it is
possible for U.S. Government (USG) partners to operate on the ground
inside Venezuela, we will continue to provide them with support to help
save lives and mitigate suffering.
The main factors preventing NGOs from registering in Venezuela are
the fabricated bureaucratic impediments and restrictions imposed by the
illegitimate Maduro regime. Even after a year of advocacy from the
United States, United Nations and the NGO community, the regime has not
established a legal process or mechanism at the national level in
Venezuela to recognize international NGOs. The regime is not creating
this legal mechanism because it has an aversion to NGOs setting up
operations and expanding operations.
Without a national level mechanism, select NGOs are opting to
register at the municipal level as a work-around. If they obtain this
municipal level registration, NGOs are able to function at some level.
While municipal level registration does not provide NGOs with the legal
agreements required to obtain humanitarian staff visas or import
permits; it does allow them to set up offices, hire domestic staff, and
work inside Venezuela.
USAID has been advocating with UN OCHA since 2019 to pressure the
Maduro regime to stop inhibiting NGO registration and legal entry as
international entities.
Question. Are gender-based violence and reproductive health
priorities for U.S. humanitarian assistance inside Venezuela? If so,
how is this reflected in U.S. programs on the ground?
Answer. The United States is committed to helping ensure the safety
and well-being of women around the world.
Health, protection, and gender-based violence (GBV) are priorities
for USAID-funded assistance in Venezuela. USAID humanitarian funding
supports protection activities that seek to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to harm, exploitation, and abuse for crisis-affected
populations, prioritizing the most vulnerable. Through humanitarian
partners, protection activities may include a specific focus on the
needs of children, prevention and response to GBV, psychosocial support
services for individuals or groups affected by trauma, and data
collection and reporting to strengthen advocacy efforts. USAID supports
stand-alone protection activities as well as incorporating protection
into other forms of assistance, and ensuring the assistance is
delivered to minimize the risk of violence, exploitation, and abuse.
USAID health activities may also include support for survivors of GBV,
such as clinical management of rape, prevention, and treatment of
sexually transmitted infections, and mental health services.
In Venezuela, one partner works with survivors of GBV to ensure
they have access to case management, legal assistance, health services,
and humanitarian aid to meet basic needs. Given the relative lack of
services available to GBV survivors in Venezuela, the partner also
focuses on prevention activities to include awareness raising,
providing referrals, and capacity building of local partners. Over the
next 12 months, the partner is expected to reach 24,400 beneficiaries,
primarily women and children.
In Venezuela, another humanitarian health program managed by a U.N.
agency is targeting 600,000 beneficiaries and includes the procurement
and distribution of supplies, including midwifery and obstetric and
neonatal kits and equipment. Across 10 states, this program supports
the training of health workers in antenatal, maternal, and neonatal
care practices.
Question. How is USAID adjusting development plans in Colombia,
Ecuador and other countries to integrate the needs of Venezuelans and
their host communities? What resources is USAID devoting to health and
education infrastructure in communities hosting Venezuelan refugees and
migrants?
Answer. In Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador, USAID is working
alongside other U.S. Government agencies and with a variety of
partners, such as host-country governments, NGOs, civil society, public
international organizations, and faith-based organizations, to help
communities absorb the influx of vulnerable Venezuelans. In total,
USAID has invested more than $102 million in development funding across
the region to address these longer-term needs since Fiscal Year 2017.
While USAID does not have development programming that specifically
targets health and education infrastructure, we are working in the
health and education sector in Colombia.
In Colombia, USAID has strategically focused part of its new
country strategy to support the medium to long term response to the
Venezuela regional crisis. By doing so, USAID will work to increase
stability in areas impacted by migration from Venezuela by fostering
socio-economic integration in migrant receptor communities. Projects
supporting these efforts include the Agency's recently launched health
system strengthening program. This program will support the Government
of Colombia to integrate refugees and migrants into the health system
and provide sustainable health services to migrants. In May 2020,
USAID/Colombia also launched an activity to protect migrant human
rights and expand their access to justice (Conectando Caminos por los
Derechos). USAID is also planning to initiate a new education activity
targeting refugees and migrants in the coming months.
Development initiatives in Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador for refugee
and migrant populations in the region include support for socioeconomic
integration through job training and placement programs, support for
small business and entrepreneurs, and facilitating access to financial
services. While these programs do not directly target the health or
education sectors, there have been some tangible benefits. For example,
our development assistance supports the local recognition of
professional degrees, which has resulted in nearly 100 Venezuelan
doctors in Peru obtaining their local medical license. These Venezuelan
doctors are now able to contribute their medical expertise to Peru's
health system.
______
Responses of Elliott Abrams to Questions
Submitted by Senator Chris Murphy
Question. When asked about the May 3-4 raid attempted by Venezuelan
expats and the security contractor Silvercorp USA, Secretary Pompeo
said, ``This was not an American effort. This wasn't something that we
directed or guided.'' When did the Administration become aware of
Silvercorp USA's planned activities? Please provide a date.
Answer. To the best of our knowledge and belief, the State
Department and I became aware of Silvercorp USA's planned activities
the day of the raid, May 3, 2020. A member of the media contacted
Department press officers on a handful of occasions prior to May 3, but
there were no questions or indications of ongoing activities and
Operation Gideon was not referenced.
Question. When asked about the May 3-4 raid attempted by Venezuelan
expats and the security contractor Silvercorp USA, Secretary Pompeo
said, ``This was not an American effort. This wasn't something that we
directed or guided.'' Did Silvercorp USA obtain its weapons or
equipment without any knowledge within the U.S. intelligence or
diplomatic community?
Answer. To the best of our knowledge and belief, the State
Department was not aware of Silvercorp USA's efforts to obtain weapons
or equipment.
Question. According to the Wall Street Journal,\1\ the CIA was
monitoring the would-be raiders' activities in La Guajira, Colombia.
Was the State Department unaware of this intelligence?
Answer. As a matter of policy and practice, the Department does not
comment on such intelligence matters in unclassified communications.
Question. According to the Wall Street Journal,\2\ the CIA was
monitoring the would-be raiders' activities in La Guajira, Colombia.
Secretary Pompeo has emphasized that the U.S. did not provide
``direct'' support to the raid, but did the Administration make any
effort to prevent this diplomatic disaster from occurring?
Answer. To the best of our knowledge and belief, the State
Department and I became aware of Silvercorp USA's planned activities
the day of the raid, May 3, 2020. More broadly, the State Department
and other USG agencies have repeatedly emphasized to all actors who
have expressed an interest in the violent toppling of the Maduro regime
that we support a peaceful resolution and would not back their efforts,
either quietly or overtly.
Question. According to the Washington Post,\3\ Juan Guaido's
appointed ``Strategic Committee'' was tasked last August with exploring
``under the table'' regime change strategies, including kidnapping
Maduro and his associates. To that end, the committee reportedly met
with ``a handful'' security contractors in separate meetings in U.S.
territory, some who wanted as much as $500 million for the job. Was the
Administration aware of meetings between Guaido representatives and
security contractors on U.S. soil?
Answer. I was not made aware of meetings between Guaido
representatives and security contractors on U.S. soil related to this
effort.
Question. Has the State Department conducted any assessment of U.S.
sanctions to determine their unintentional humanitarian impacts?
Answer. We routinely assess the effects and consequences of
sanctions to ensure our actions are targeting the true perpetrators of
Venezuela's misery: the Maduro regime. We mitigate unintentional
impacts of our sanctions program by continuing to support exemptions
and carve-outs for all medical and humanitarian aid, and to date there
has not been an instance of U.S. sanctions preventing the delivery of
food or aid. It is also true in this as in all cases that our sanctions
exempt food and medicine, and the regime fully understands this: from
October 2019 through April, the latest data we have available, the
United States was the second-largest supplier of food to Venezuela. In
April 2020, the United States was the largest exporter of food and
agricultural products to Venezuela.
----------------
Notes
\1\ https://www.wsj.com/articles/poorly-organized-and-barely-
hidden-venezuela-invasion-was-doomed-to-fail-11589122800
\2\ https://www.wsj.com/articles/poorly-organized-and-barely-
hidden-venezuela-invasion-was-doomed-to-fail-11589122800
\3\ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/from-a-miami-
condo-to-the-venezuelan-coast-how-a-plan-to-capture-maduro-went-rogue/
2020/05/06/046222bc-8e4a-11ea-9322-a29e75effc93_story.html