    [Senate Hearing 116-300]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 116-300

                 ADVANCING EFFECTIVE U.S. COMPETITION WITH CHINA:
                     OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES, AND NEXT STEPS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JULY 22, 2020

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                       Available via the World Wide Web:
                             http://www.govinfo.gov

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    42-191 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2020

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia
                  Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
                Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
                        John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

        Prepared Statement...........................................     3

    Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     5

    Biegun, Hon. Stephen E., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
      Department of State, Washington, DC............................     8
        Prepared Statement...........................................    11

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to
      Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez.................    55

    Personal and Official Use Social Media Handbook--August 13, 2019.    63

    Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to
      Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin......................    74

    Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to
      Questions Submitted by Senator Edward Markey...................    76

    Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to
      Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz........................    77

                                     (iii)

                      ADVANCING EFFECTIVE U.S. COMPETITION
               WITH CHINA: OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES, AND NEXT STEPS

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 2020

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in room
    SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch,
    chairman of the committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Johnson, Gardner,
    Romney, Barrasso, Portman, Young, Cruz, Perdue, Menendez,
    Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, and
    Booker.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        Thank you all for coming today, and I want to thank all of
    you for being here. It is our honor to have Deputy Secretary of
    State, Steve Biegun, here today to testify on U.S. policy
    regarding the People's Republic of China.
        I had originally planned to hold this hearing back in
    March. However, the need to focus on COVID-19 prevented us from
    doing that. Even as we continue to address the pandemic and its
    impact on U.S. citizens, it is important that this committee
    continue its work on the world's most pressing foreign policy
    challenges. Obviously, China is one of those.
        This is especially the case for the topic we are discussing
    today. As the Trump administration has correctly recognized,
    China is a strategic and global competitor of the United
    States. It will be the greatest foreign policy challenge the
    United States faces in the decades to come. The policies of the
    Chinese Communist Party undermine U.S. interests and values,
    including those we share with allies and partners around the
    world.
        COVID-19 has brought this challenge to the forefront of
    American life. We now know just how much the Chinese Communist
    Party's decisions and actions directly affect U.S. citizens,
    our allies and partners, and the entire world. And we know that
    not even a global pandemic will stop China's aggressive
    behavior, whether that is in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, or
    the Indian border.
        Over the last 3 years, the Trump administration has taken
    numerous steps to put the United States on a stronger path to
    competing with China. Last week I was glad to see long overdue
    sanctions on Chinese Communist Party officials for human rights
    abuses in Tibet and elsewhere.
        I was also pleased that we declared China's claims in the
    South China Sea as unlawful and deployed two carrier battle
    groups there for exercises. And after the Chinese Communist
    Party crushed Hong Kong's autonomy, the President made the
    tough but necessary decision to end certain types of special
    treatment for Hong Kong.
        In May, the Administration published a report on the
    implementation of its China strategy that goes into more
    detail.
        So this is a good time for this committee to conduct
    oversight regarding our objectives, what we have done, and
    where we go from here.
        This is also an opportunity to discuss China legislation
    put forward by members of this committee and others. This week,
    I introduced the Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances,
    Technology, Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives concerning
    China, or the STRATEGIC Act. It is a comprehensive approach to
    China with concrete policies in several key areas of the
    competition. I will describe some of them briefly.
        We must continue our focus on China's anti-competitive
    economic policies. The Chinese Government engages in
    intellectual property theft and massive financing of Chinese
    companies and the most abusive anti-free market tactic of
    forced technology. This is a horrible practice, forced
    technology transfer. It is reprehensible. These policies are
    designed to push others out of the market and create
    monopolies. Innovative American companies like Micron
    Technologies based in my home state of Idaho know these
    challenges well. Their intellectual property was stolen by a
    Chinese company who then patented that technology in China and
    sued Micron.
        The STRATEGIC Act authorizes new tools for U.S. companies
    to address the harms caused by such policies, among several
    other provisions. To maintain our economic and technological
    edge, it is not enough to just push back on what China is
    doing.
        We also have to strengthen and invest in ourselves. In
    other committees, I have focused on this issue by supporting
    legislation promoting U.S. manufacturing of critical
    technologies, fortifying cybersecurity for our infrastructure
    and small businesses, and strengthening our technology
    workforce. The STRATEGIC Act focuses on increasing technology
    collaboration with allies and partners.
        America is the world hub for innovation, and we can boost
    that innovation further by working with our highly capable
    partners. If we do, we will all be in a better position to
    develop the technologies of the future and ensure they are used
    to uphold individual freedom, human rights, and prosperity.
        Finally, I want to stress the importance of deterrence. The
    United States, of course, does not seek any sort of military
    confrontation with China. However, China's military is getting
    bigger, more capable, and becoming more aggressive. In the
    Indo-Pacific region, we should all be a lot more worried about
    the Chinese Communist Party's plans for Taiwan, given what it
    just did to Hong Kong. In addition to the South China Sea,
    Japan faces almost daily incursions and pressure in the East
    China Sea. Beyond the region, China's Belt and Road Initiative
    is also helping the Chinese military expand its presence.
        We have to make it completely clear to the Chinese
    Communist Party that we are willing and able to defend our
    interests. That means we are affirming our commitments to our
    Indo-Pacific allies even as they need to take on a larger role
    in defending the interests we share. The STRATEGIC Act focuses
    on key steps for advancing defense cooperation with our allies,
    including advocating for several difficult but important policy
    changes.
        I want to stress that this bill that I have introduced does
    not--does not--seek to block China. Rather, what it does is it
    offers prosperity. It offers an invitation to join the
    international community and operate under the rule of law and
    under international norms. If that happens, we all will
    prosper. We should not miss the bipartisan opportunity that we
    have today to address these things.
        I will close with a note about bipartisanship. Time and
    time again on everything from human rights to investment
    screening, the Senate has worked across the aisle on China.
    Unfortunately, in recent months, that has become a lot harder.
    We have a long road ahead of us in this competition. We cannot
    allow partisanship to get in the way even in an election year.
    Whatever happens in November, China will remain an issue. If we
    do not work together, the United States as a whole will be
    weaker.
        I introduced this bill to push forward a serious and
    bipartisan conversation about the Senate's role in advancing an
    effective strategy of competition. I want to thank several of
    my colleagues on this committee from both sides of the aisle in
    joining me on that effort. There is both Republican and
    Democrat input into this bill not only from this committee,
    also from the think tanks around Washington, DC, including
    Democrat think tanks. And I hope this will be the start of more
    cooperation to come. When we get to a final bill, I am very
    hopeful that that bill will contain items that everyone has an
    interest in.
        There has been a number of people that have introduced
    bills. I know the ranking member is about to introduce a bill.
    I have no doubt that there will be things in there that we can
    all embrace, and I hope as we get to a final bill, we will have
    things that we can embrace on a bipartisan basis.
        With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member,
    Senator Menendez.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Risch follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator James E. Risch

        Thank you all for coming today. It is an honor to have Deputy
    Secretary of State Steve Biegun here today to testify on U.S. policy
    regarding the People's Republic of China. I had originally planned to
    hold this hearing back in March. However, the need to focus on COVID-19
    prevented us from doing that. Even as we continue to address the
    pandemic and its impact on U.S. citizens, it is important that this
    committee continue its work on the world's most pressing foreign policy
    challenges. Obviously, China is one of those.
        That is especially the case for the topic we are discussing today.
    As the Trump administration has correctly recognized, China is a
    strategic and global competitor of the United States. It will be the
    greatest foreign policy challenge the United States faces in the
    decades to come. The policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
    undermine U.S. interests and values, including those we share with
    allies and partners around the world.
        COVID-19 has brought this challenge to the forefront of American
    life. We now know just how much the CCP's decisions and actions
    directly affect U.S. citizens, our allies and partners, and the entire
    world. And we know not even a global pandemic will stop China's
    aggressive behavior--whether that's in Hong Kong, the South China Sea,
    or along the Indian border.
        Over the last 3 years, the Trump administration has taken numerous
    steps to put the United States on a stronger path to competing with
    China. Last week I was glad to see long overdue sanctions on CCP
    officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet. I was also
    pleased that we declared China's claims in the South China Sea as
    unlawful, and deployed two carrier battle groups there for exercises.
    And after the CCP crushed Hong Kong's autonomy, the president made the
    tough but necessary decision to end certain types of special treatment
    for Hong Kong.
        In May, the Administration published a report on the implementation
    of its China strategy that goes into more detail. So this is a good
    time for the Committee to conduct oversight regarding our objectives,
    what we've done, and where we go from here.
        This is also an opportunity to discuss China legislation put
    forward by members of this committee and others. This week, I
    introduced the Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and
    Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives Concerning China Act (STRATEGIC
    Act). It is a comprehensive approach to China with concrete policies in
    several key areas of the competition. I'll describe some of them
    briefly.
        We must continue our focus on China's anti-competitive economic
    policies. The Chinese government engages in intellectual property theft
    and massive financing of Chinese companies, and the most abusive anti-
    free market tactic of forced technology transfer. This is a horrible
    practice--it's reprehensible.
        These policies are designed to push others out of the market and
    create monopolies. Innovative American companies like Micron
    Technologies, based in my home state of Idaho, know these challenges
    well. Their intellectual property was stolen by a Chinese company, who
    then patented that technology in China and sued Micron. The STRATEGIC
    Act authorizes new tools for U.S. companies to address the harms caused
    by such policies, among several other provisions.
        To maintain our economic and technological edge, it's not enough to
    just push back on what China is doing. We also have to strengthen and
    invest in ourselves. In other committees, I have focused on this issue
    by supporting legislation promoting U.S. manufacturing of critical
    technologies, fortifying cyber security for our infrastructure and
    small businesses, and strengthening our technology workforce.
        The STRATEGIC Act focuses on increasing technology collaboration
    with allies and partners. America is a world hub for innovation, and we
    can boost that innovation further by working with our highly capable
    partners. If we do, we will all be in a better position to develop the
    technologies of the future, and ensure they are used to uphold
    individual freedom, human rights, and prosperity.
        Finally, I want to stress the importance of deterrence. The United
    States, of course, does not seek any sort of military confrontation
    with China. However, China's military is getting bigger, more capable,
    and becoming more aggressive. In the Indo-Pacific region, we should all
    be a lot more worried about the CCP's plans for Taiwan, given what it
    just did to Hong Kong. In addition to the South China Sea, Japan faces
    almost daily incursions and pressure in the East China Sea. Beyond the
    region, China's Belt and Road Initiative is also helping the Chinese
    military expand its presence.
        We have to make it completely clear to the CCP that we are willing
    and able to defend our interests. That means reaffirming our
    commitments to our Indo-Pacific allies--even as they need to take on a
    larger role in defending the interests we share. The STRATEGIC Act
    focuses on key steps for advancing defense cooperation with our allies,
    including advocating for several difficult but important policy
    changes.
        I want to stress that this bill that I've introduced does not seek
    to block China. Rather, what it does is it offers prosperity. It offers
    an invitation to join the international community and operate under the
    rule of law and under international norms. If that happens, we all will
    prosper.
        We should not miss the bipartisan opportunity that we have today to
    address these things. I'll close with a note about bipartisanship.
        Time and time again--on everything from human rights to investment
    screening--the Senate has worked across the aisle on China. But
    unfortunately, in recent months, that has become a lot harder. We have
    a long road ahead of us in this competition. We cannot allow
    partisanship to get in the way, even in an election year. Whatever
    happens in November, China will remain an issue. If we do not work
    together, the United States as a whole will be weaker.
        I introduced this bill to push forward a serious, and bipartisan,
    conversation about the Senate's role in advancing an effective strategy
    of competition. I want to thank several of my colleagues on this
    committee, from both sides of the aisle, for joining me in that effort.
    There is both Republican and Democrat input into this bill, not only
    from this committee, but also from think tanks around Washington, DC,
    including Democrat think tanks. And I hope this will be the start of
    more cooperation to come.
        When we get to a final bill, I'm very hopeful that that bill will
    contain items that everyone has an interest in. There's been a number
    of people that have introduced bills. I know the ranking member is
    about to introduce a bill--I have no doubt that there will be things in
    there that we can all embrace. And I hope that as we get to a final
    bill, we will have things that we can embrace on a bipartisan basis.
        With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Senator
    Menendez.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Biegun, my thanks for joining us here today,
    especially as it has been so long since we have had a senior
    administration witness before the committee.
        As you and I have discussed in the past, I think the
    Administration is asking the right questions about China and
    the U.S.-China relationship. Unfortunately, however, I find
    that the Administration's strategies and policies fall well
    short of answering the enormity of the challenge. We need
    instead, as the title of this hearing suggests, an effective
    China strategy.
        The China of 2020 is not the China of 1972 or even the
    China of 2000 or 2010. China today is challenging the United
    States across every dimension of power--political, diplomatic,
    economic, innovation, military, even cultural--and with an
    alternative and deeply disturbing model for global governance.
        China today, led by the Communist Party and propelled by Xi
    Jinping's hyper nationalism, is unlike any challenge we have
    faced as a nation before. Emboldened by the retrenchment,
    shortcomings, and sometimes enablement of the Trump
    administration, China today is more active and more assertive
    in the region and in the international community than ever
    before.
        Indeed, just since this past March, China has increased its
    patrols near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, as well
    as its coercive activities in the South China Sea, conducted
    air and maritime patrols intended to threaten Taiwan, clashed
    with India along the actual line of control--the People's
    Liberation Army's first use of force abroad in 30 years--
    continue to implement a morally repugnant campaign of genocide
    in Xinjiang, its cruel oppression of the Tibetan people, and
    the crushing of its own civil liberty.
        Just yesterday I released a report, the New Big Brother,
    looking at how China has stepped up its game in seeking to
    export a new model of digital authoritarianism and manipulate
    new technologies to control its own citizens and people
    worldwide.
        But aside from bluster rhetoric and some hastily written
    sanctions, what has the response been from the Administration?
    The Administration is now taking strong action on Hong Kong,
    but for months when the people of Hong Kong needed us, the
    President was silent and complicit in China's erosion of Hong
    Kong's autonomy, happy to trade Hong Kong for his so-called
    trade deal.
        Along with the chairman, I welcomed regular freedom of
    navigation assertions and the Administration's recent
    clarification of our approach to claims in the South China Sea,
    but the reality is that over the past 3 years, China's
    aggression and coercion in the South China Sea has continued
    completely unchecked.
        The United Kingdom's change of policy on Huawei, while
    welcomed, was I would suggest, despite us not because of us.
        And on trade and economics, this Administration has walked
    away from building regional architecture, embraced a so-called
    phase one trade deal which seemingly achieves nothing.
    Certainly it does not address the core structural issues in the
    relationship and leaves us, in the words of your own U.S. Trade
    Representative, wondering what the end goal of your trade
    policy is. If he does not know, then we all have a real
    problem.
        On Taiwan, I note that in every year of the Obama-Biden
    administration, Taiwan was invited to the World Health
    Assembly. In no year of the Trump administration has that been
    the case. And I could go on.
        In short, I am deeply concerned that the Administration's
    approach is one which labors under the mistaken belief that
    just being confrontational is the same thing as being
    competitive. And that is my question, in fact, about the action
    announced today in Houston. I am all for safeguarding our
    national security. I understand the importance of being tough
    with China, but being tough as the means, not the ends. So
    while there may be reason for taking this action--and I look
    forward to a briefing on it in an appropriate setting--I want
    to understand better not just the tactical considerations, but
    how this measure advances our strategy. What is the effect we
    expect this to have on China's behavior? When China retaliates,
    as they have said they will, what will be our next move and our
    next after that? I am obviously not asking you to disclose
    specific actions, which I know you will not and should not, but
    this is not a simple two-step dance. So help me understand
    where you think this is all going.
        I ask this because there should be little doubt that we
    are, indeed, in a new era of strategic competition with China,
    and the United States needs a new strategic framework and a new
    set of organizing principles to address the challenges of this
    new era. So far, and despite all the bluster, that effective
    new strategy has been utterly lacking from this Administration.
        One of the core organizing principles I would suggest is
    the importance of working in close coordination with our allies
    and partners to develop a shared and effective approach to
    China. And I have to say, Secretary Biegun, that the
    Administration's disastrously wrong-headed, alienating, and
    attacking approach to our alliances has been one of the most
    disheartening to witness these past several years. Our
    alliances, our partnerships, and the shared values on which
    they stand and our reliability in the face of adversity are our
    special source for effective global leadership. This value-
    driven diplomacy is one of the reasons why Senator Rubio and I
    have joined colleagues around the globe to form the
    International Parliamentary Alliance on China, IPAC, to provide
    the vision and leadership and build the relationships needed
    for our strategic success.
        I know you argue that this President and the Administration
    have been uniquely successful with China, and I know you are
    good at your job. But facts are indeed stubborn things.
        Now, before the hearing devolves into a hearing bashing
    China and the World Health Organization for the COVID pandemic,
    let me assure you, one, I stand second to no one in this body
    regarding concerns over how China's paranoid totalitarianism
    contributed to its spread. But blame game politics will not
    save American lives. Instead of relying on science and
    knowledge, the Administration has spent its energy towards
    finding fault and racially inflammatory rhetoric that both
    threatens the safety and well-being of Asian Americans and
    further alienates us on the global stage, including at the G-7
    and the U.N. Security Council.
        If the Administration is truly concerned about China's
    malign intent at the World Health Organization and elsewhere,
    there is a simple solution: show up, take action. If the U.S.
    leads, others will follow. If we leave the field open, if our
    own country cannot develop the serious strategy at home, others
    like China are only too eager to step into the vacuum.
        I know the chairman, as he has mentioned, has introduced
    legislation today on China. I welcome his effort. As I
    mentioned at another hearing this morning, I am also working
    with colleagues on a bill to create a comprehensive China
    strategy, cross cutting jurisdictions beyond, including this
    committee, including trade and economic issues and investments
    here at home, which we plan to shortly introduce. Given the
    shortcomings of the President's bluster and tactics but no
    strategy approach to China, a comprehensive and integrated
    approach is needed. I suspect there will be many areas of
    agreement between my bill and the chairman's, and so I look
    forward to working with him on a combined approach.
        And it is in this spirit, Mr. Secretary, that I implore you
    today beyond this hearing in a genuine conversation with us
    about how we work together to develop a comprehensive approach
    to China, to reset our strategy and our diplomacy, to reinvest
    and replenish the sources of national strength and
    competitiveness at home, to place our partnerships and allies
    first that reflects our fundamental values as Americans.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez. I think in
    comparing our two statements, we have much to agree on, and
    overall I think we both agree that this comprehensive strategy
    is needed as we go forward. And I can assure you when you do
    get that briefing on the closing, you certainly will agree that
    the closing was appropriate under the circumstances.
        So with that, I want to turn to our witness. The Honorable
    Stephen Biegun was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of State in
    December of 2019. Immediately prior, he served as U.S. Special
    Representative for North Korea. Mr. Biegun has three decades of
    experience serving in both the executive and legislative
    branches, including a stint as Chief of Staff for the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee.
        Deputy Biegun, we appreciate your being here today, and I
    invite you to have the floor.

    STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
                U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
    Menendez.
        If I may ask for my full statement to be submitted to the
    record. I would like to give a shorter version in order to
    leave maximum time for members' questions today.
        The Chairman. That is certainly agreeable, and we will
    include your full statement in the record.
        Mr. Biegun. Again, thank you both for the invitation to
    testify today. It truly is a pleasure and I am pleased to be
    back. As you both pointed out, this is an important moment in
    U.S.-China relations, and the Secretary and I appreciate your
    serious focus and that of the whole committee in trying to
    shape a bipartisan approach to this vital policy matter. We
    recognize that to be successful, U.S. policy towards the PRC
    must be grounded in consensus across our governing institutions
    and across our society.
        Mr. Chairman, for this reason we welcome the legislation
    you introduced today, and Senator Menendez, we look forward to
    seeing yours as well. These are designed to frame the U.S.
    strategic approach towards the People's Republic of China, and
    this, along with all the other recent legislation passed by the
    Congress, have provided us with crucial tools to advance our
    policies against the challenges that we face.
        Across multiple administrations, the United States has
    supported China's entry into the rules-based international
    order in hopes that China would be a partner in upholding
    international law, norms, and institutions, and that the United
    States and China could develop a friendly relationship with
    reciprocal benefit. Over more than three decades, U.S. policies
    towards the PRC have advanced that goal through a massive
    outpouring of international assistance and lending through
    foreign investment, facilitation of Chinese membership in
    global institutions, and the education of millions of China's
    brightest scholars at our best universities.
        Where this Administration diverges from previous
    administrations is in the will to face the uncomfortable truth
    in U.S.-China relations, that the policies of the past three
    decades simply have not produced the outcomes for which so many
    had hoped, and that the United States must take decisive action
    to counter the PRC at this moment.
        As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, despite
    the huge dividends to the PRC in terms of prosperity, trade,
    and global influence that the United States supported and its
    engagement had delivered, Beijing has instead chosen to take
    increasingly a hard line and aggressive actions both at home
    and abroad. And China has emerged as a strategic competitor to
    the United States and to the rules-based global order.
        We find the China-U.S. relationship today weighed down by a
    growing number of disputes, including commercial espionage and
    intellectual property theft from American companies, unequal
    treatment of our diplomats, businesses, NGOs and journalists by
    Chinese authorities, and abuse of the United States' academic
    freedom and welcoming posture towards international students to
    steal sensitive technology and research from our universities
    in order to advance the PRC's military capabilities.
        It is these factors which has led the President to direct a
    number of actions in response, including yesterday's
    notification to the PRC that we have withdrawn our consent for
    the PRC to operate its consulate in Houston, Texas.
        There is also growing alarm around the world about the
    dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy, liberty, and democratic
    institutions, the arbitrary mass detentions and other human
    rights abuses in Xinjiang, efforts to eliminate Tibetan
    identity, military pressure against Taiwan, and the assertion
    of unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea. Other
    areas of concern include China's increasingly assertive use of
    military and economic coercion and state-sponsored
    disinformation campaigns including, among others, against
    India, Australia, Canada, the UK, ASEAN members of the European
    Union, and several other European countries.
        At the Department of State, both Secretary Pompeo and I are
    involved day to day in the full range of policy matters related
    to the PRC, an issue that touches upon every dimension of the
    Department of State's work. The Department has launched a
    number of diplomatic and economic policy initiatives described
    in more detail in my written testimony to uphold and defend our
    interests and those of our friends and allies in areas such as
    global infrastructure development, market access, and
    telecommunications security. Much of what we are doing would
    serve our global interests under any circumstances, but the
    unfortunate trends we see in China make our actions all the
    more urgent.
        We have organized internally, through the leadership of the
    Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific,
    along with the Directors of Policy Planning and our Global
    Engagement Center, to align internal policymaking in virtually
    every single bureau and office in the Department. We are
    likewise organizing our diplomats to focus on competition with
    China around the world.
        As part of a comprehensive approach, we are engaged with
    allies and partners in the G-7, the G-20, and NATO to highlight
    the threat that the PRC poses not just to the United States'
    interests but also the interests of our allies and partners. We
    are broadening partnerships across the transatlantic community,
    the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and the western
    hemisphere.
        Across the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is
    deepening relationships with the countries that share our
    values and interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific. Last
    September, we held a ministerial level meeting of the United
    States, Australia, India, and Japan marking a new milestone in
    our diplomatic engagement in a new Indo-Pacific Quad in the
    region.
        We are enhancing our alliances with Australia, Japan, the
    Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, which have
    helped sustain peace and security for generations, and we are
    furthering our cooperation with ASEAN, an organization central
    to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
        Our security assistance to South China Sea claimant states
    and our recent rejection of the PRC's maritime claims helps
    partners protect their autonomy and maritime resources.
        We are working with the Mekong countries to ensure
    sustainable development in energy security, and we have doubled
    development assistance to our Pacific island partners through
    the Pacific Pledge.
        On the other side of the world, China has increasingly
    become a topic of transatlantic and Five Eye discussions. The
    Secretary recently announced that the United States has
    accepted the EU's proposal to create a U.S.-EU dialogue on
    China to discuss our common concerns about the threats that the
    PRC poses to our shared democratic values. Similarly, the PRC
    is a core topic of our security dialogues with the United
    Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.
        In our hemisphere, the United States is working with
    neighbors to reaffirm the region's longstanding dedication to
    free societies and free markets. We are working on improving
    the investment climate for all types of infrastructure,
    including energy, airports, ports, road, telecom, and digital
    networks. In addition to USAID development and humanitarian
    assistance, we expect the United States International
    Development Finance Corporation to deploy $12 billion to the
    western hemisphere in the coming years, all towards this effort
    of making a priority of promoting transparency and privacy in
    particular in the digital economy.
        Though the PRC has made extensive inroads across Africa
    over the past decade, encouragingly some African governments
    have begun to monitor Chinese projects, require Chinese firms
    to employ more African labor, and demand protection of Africa's
    fragile ecosystems. Our diplomatic engagement on the continent
    will continue to highlight the perils of opaque and
    unsustainable PRC lending practices.
        In the Middle East, we have successfully engaged with
    partners to recognize the core costs that come with certain
    commercial engagements with the PRC especially
    telecommunications infrastructure.
        And finally, we are working with allies and partners to
    prevent the PRC from undermining international organizations
    through undue influence.
        Mr. Chairman, consistent with the priorities of your
    legislation, I should also underscore that engagement between
    the United States and China remains of central importance in
    managing tensions and exploring areas of mutual interest where
    efforts might align. But we will only make a difference if our
    engagement produces real progress on the many issues that I
    have enumerated today.
        Last month, I joined Secretary Pompeo in Hawaii to meet
    with our Chinese counterparts. In the 2-day discussion, the
    Secretary stressed that deeds, not words, were the pathway to
    achieve mutual respect and reciprocity between our countries
    across commercial, security, diplomatic, and people-to-people
    interactions. He made clear our determination to push back
    against Beijing's efforts to undermine democratic norms,
    challenge the sovereignty of our friends and allies, and engage
    in unfair trade practices. But at the same time, he outlined
    areas where the United States and the PRC could cooperate to
    solve global challenges.
        Among the issues that we could start with are strategic
    stability around nuclear capabilities and doctrine, coordinated
    efforts to identify the origins and spread of COVID-19, a
    denuclearized North Korea that ensures peace and stability for
    all who live on the Korean Peninsula, peace-building in
    Afghanistan, international narcotics production and
    trafficking, and as evidenced by the phase one trade deal
    earlier this year, balanced and reciprocal economic policies
    that will benefit both countries. The United States also
    welcomes people-to-people exchanges, including the hosting of
    each other's students, provided that they are here exclusively
    for the purpose of study.
        We would also welcome Members of Congress from both sides
    of the Capitol and both sides of the aisle to not only work in
    partnership with the executive branch, but to also extend your
    own engagement to better understand the aspirations of the
    Chinese people. Of course, this includes meeting with your
    Chinese Government counterparts, but it must also include
    reaching out to the many voices of China that are found outside
    of China, those not free to be heard at home and therefore
    requiring our assistance to be heard.
        Let me be clear. The United States supports the aspirations
    of those Chinese people who seek to live in peace, prosperity,
    and freedom. Secretary Pompeo has met with pro-democracy
    leaders from Hong Kong, with Chinese dissidents and survivors
    of repression in Xinjiang, and last month I was honored to
    present the International Women of Courage Award to the Mothers
    of Tiananmen. The bravery of many Chinese people who seek to
    advance human rights and universal freedoms inspires us all in
    our work.
        Mr. Chairman, we are urgently taking the necessary steps to
    defend the interests of the United States. As we seek to
    correct the imbalance in our relations with China, we must
    address today's realities while, at the same time, leaving open
    tomorrow's possibilities. With our friends and allies, we are
    standing up for universal rights and the rules-based
    international system, the system that has provided the world's
    collective peace, security, and prosperity for generations to
    the benefit of the United States, the People's Republic of
    China, and the entire world.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Biegun follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Stephen E. Biegun

        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, Members of the Committee,
    thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify today regarding
    United States policy towards the People's Republic of China, or the
    PRC. This is an important moment in the U.S.-China relationship, and
    the Secretary and I appreciate the serious focus that your Committee is
    taking to shaping a bipartisan approach to this vital policy priority.
    As the Secretary has said, China is the first foreign policy challenge
    he thinks about each morning, and every one of us at the Department of
    State is focused on succeeding in this critical effort.
        I want to begin by restating what Secretary Pompeo made clear in
    October. He said, ``We have a long-cherished tradition of friendship
    with the Chinese people. We continue to do so today. We have a Chinese-
    American community here in America that we love and treasure . . . The
    Chinese Communist Party today is not the same as the Chinese people.''
    Let me be clear: the United States supports the aspirations of those
    Chinese people who seek to live in peace, prosperity, and freedom.
        Over the course of many years and across multiple administrations,
    in our relations with Beijing, the United States has sought to spur
    China's integration into the rules-based international order by
    strengthening, not undermining, international law, norms, and
    institutions. Over more than three decades, U.S. policies towards China
    have been aimed at that goal--by supporting China's economic
    development through the massive outpouring of international assistance
    and lending to develop infrastructure and economic institutions; by
    beneficial trade treatment and robust foreign investment; by
    facilitation of Chinese membership in global institutions such as the
    World Trade Organization; by development and humanitarian assistance,
    by the education of millions of China's brightest scholars at our best
    schools; and by intensive commercial diplomacy to address strategic and
    sectoral economic concerns. We anchored economic and diplomatic
    policies toward China in the expectation that they would produce the
    gradual but eventual opening and liberalization of China and its
    peaceful rise in a manner that would enhance stability in the Indo-
    Pacific and beyond, increase the freedoms of its own people, and expand
    global prosperity in a mutually beneficial manner.
        Where this Administration diverges from previous Administrations is
    in the will to face an uncomfortable truth in the U.S.-China
    relationship--the policies of the past three decades have simply not
    produced the outcome for which so many had hoped. As stated in the 2017
    National Security Strategy: ``(f)or decades, U.S. policy was rooted in
    the belief that support for China's rise and for its integration into
    the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to
    our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty
    of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and
    spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and
    the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-
    funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is
    growing and diversifying. Part of China's military modernization and
    economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy,
    including America's world-class universities.''
        As further stated in the National Security Strategy, ``(a)lthough
    the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is
    using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and
    implied military threats to persuade other states to further its
    political and security agenda. China's infrastructure investments and
    trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to
    build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free
    flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine
    regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization
    campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China
    a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually
    beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of
    many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are
    calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that
    upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.''
        Secretary Pompeo summed up this strategic shift in his October 30
    speech: ``It is no longer realistic to ignore the fundamental
    differences between our two systems and the impact that . . . the
    differences in those systems have on American national security . . .
    Today, we are finally realizing the degree to which the Communist Party
    is truly hostile to the United States and our values.''
        An honest assessment of trends in the U.S.-China relationship
    suggests that reconsideration of U.S. policy toward China is urgent and
    overdue. The United States must respond with the full toolkit of policy
    instruments. These instruments will be adapted to defend against PRC
    efforts to undermine U.S.-supported institutions, respond to actions
    that encroach upon the sovereign interests of our allies and partners,
    hold the PRC accountable for its human rights violations and abuses,
    and respond to Chinese policies that fail to provide reciprocal
    opportunities for equivalent U.S. entities.
        Concerns about Beijing's policies are fueled by a growing number of
    disputes and areas of concern. These longstanding areas of concern
    include intellectual property theft and commercial espionage (including
    through cyber-enabled means), unequal treatment of U.S. diplomats,
    exporters and investors, non-governmental organizations, social media
    companies, and traditional media outlets and journalists in China, as
    well as the abuse by PRC security services of the United States' open
    and welcoming posture toward Chinese students and researchers.
    Additional areas of concern include the dismantling of Hong Kong's
    autonomy, liberty, and democratic institutions, military pressure
    against Taiwan, arbitrary mass detentions and other human rights abuses
    in Xinjiang, efforts to eliminate Tibetan identity, and the assertion
    of unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea. Finally, there is
    growing alarm in the United States and around the world with the
    Chinese government's use of military and economic coercion and state-
    sponsored disinformation campaigns against the United States and our
    allies and partners, including, among others, India, Australia, Canada,
    the European Union, and several individual European governments.
        United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China
    roughly falls within five broad areas:

       First, using the full toolkit of United States foreign
            policy instruments including diplomatic engagement, public
            diplomacy, foreign assistance, commercial diplomacy, trade law,
            law enforcement, export controls and sanctions, and military
            deterrence;

       Second, steady application of pressure to push back the
            PRC's attempt to change and replace the U.S.-led free and open
            international order in areas of dispute or competition;

       Third, reciprocal and transparent treatment of PRC
            institutions and organizations commensurate with PRC treatment
            of equivalent U.S. entities;

       Fourth, close cooperation among all U.S. stakeholders in the
            relationship with the People's Republic of China, including
            bipartisan engagement, Congressional-Executive coordination,
            the expert and think tank community, academia, business and
            civil society;

       And fifth, strengthening international cooperation with
            allies and partners on shared concerns with the conduct of the
            Chinese Communist Party, with special emphasis in the Indo-
            Pacific.

        The United States and the PRC are likely for the foreseeable future
    to remain competitors, but this does not mean our two nations need to
    be enemies. As the Administration has reiterated, we seek a
    constructive and results-oriented relationship with Beijing, and we
    will cooperate with China where our interests align. U.S. policies are
    designed to protect our interests, we do not envision a zero sum game
    as long as China abides by the key principle of reciprocity and
    transparency. Indeed, we want to see a prosperous China that is at
    peace with its own people and with its neighbors. Historically, in
    shaping the U.S.-China relationship, numerous Presidents have engaged
    with China's leaders in direct diplomacy and held any number of
    strategic dialogues, sectoral dialogues, and security dialogues over
    the past several decades to resolve problems and advance mutual
    interests.
        While the days of high-level ceremonial dialogues that didn't
    produce concrete results are over, we still continue to advance our own
    interests by remaining directly engaged at every level with the PRC
    from the President on down, under the principle of reciprocity and
    transparency. Such engagement remains an important means to manage
    tensions and explore areas of mutual interest where cooperation might
    flourish. Among the issues that we could start with are strategic
    stability around nuclear capabilities and doctrine; coordinated efforts
    to identify the origins, and spread of COVID-19; a denuclearized North
    Korea to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; peace
    building in Afghanistan; efforts to stem international narcotics
    production and trafficking; locating and returning the remains of our
    service members from the World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
    War; and, as evidenced by the Phase One trade deal agreed earlier this
    year, balanced and reciprocal economic policies.
                             using the full toolkit
        The China challenge is serious and of grave consequence to the
    United States. Government leaders are therefore responsible for
    explaining to the American people the key aspects of the threats posed
    by the PRC to our freedoms and democratic way of life. Initiated by
    Secretary of State Pompeo, the senior-most U.S. officials, including
    National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien, FBI Director Christopher
    Wray, and Attorney General Bill Barr, delivered a series of important
    speeches on this topic. Tomorrow, Secretary Pompeo will continue the
    series in a China policy address at the Nixon Library to rally the
    American people to confront the daunting threat posed by the Chinese
    Communist Party.
        As Secretary Pompeo will detail, the U.S. approach utilizes the
    full toolkit of United States foreign policy instruments to push back
    the PRC's attempt to export its Communist model of governance. The
    United States is actively pursuing our policies through diplomatic
    engagement, public diplomacy, export controls and sanctions, countering
    disinformation and propaganda, foreign assistance, commercial
    diplomacy, trade law, law enforcement, and military deterrence.
        The core of our diplomatic work is to reinforce the principles of
    democratic governance, the rule of law, and sustainable development,
    including by shining a spotlight on PRC behavior that is out of line
    with internationally recognized norms, standards, and best practices.
    Too often, the PRC, through its state-owned enterprises, has enabled
    corruption, eroded good governance and the rule of law, weakened labor
    rights, and damaged the environment. We are working with allies and
    partners to press Beijing to meet high standards in terms of
    transparency, adherence to the rule of law and anti-corruption
    practices, debt sustainability, labor rights, environmental best
    practices, and the concerns of local communities.
        Attorney General Barr and FBI Director Wray have been active in
    leading our efforts to counter PRC malign actions here at home. They
    have recently outlined for the American people their China Initiative
    and are raising awareness of the threats we face from CCP activities.
        An integral component of this global effort is on the economic
    front, where the PRC has leveraged its state-led economic model to
    undercut fair competition and advance its own goals. Beijing's statist
    model and massive corporate subsidies mean any economic initiative,
    such as the PRC's One Belt One Road initiative, will have distorting
    effects while also potentially advancing malign PRC political
    objectives. Further, the PRC's billions of dollars of opaque loans to
    emerging-market economies undermine the governance and autonomy of
    vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and
    autocratic behavior in struggling democracies.
        The United States has been on the forefront of raising global
    awareness about the dangers of PRC lending and investment. Untrusted
    PRC telecommunications vendors such as Huawei and ZTE benefit from
    substantial market distorting subsidies and are beholden both legally
    and extra-judicially to the PRC. The President recently released the
    National Strategy to Secure 5G outlining lines of effort the United
    States is taking both at home and in its engagement overseas. The State
    Department is implementing the national strategy through the Clean
    Networks initiative to address the threat posed to the United States,
    our allies, and partners by untrusted vendors including to critical
    infrastructure, privacy, security, and human rights. Under the umbrella
    of our related Economic Prosperity Network, the United States is
    advancing initiatives to promote the principles of trust, reciprocity,
    accountability, integrity, and respect among a voluntary coalition of
    partner countries, companies, and civil society organizations. Some key
    initiatives include:

       Clean Networks: This is a comprehensive effort by a
            coalition of like-minded countries and companies to secure
            their critical telecommunications, cloud, data analytics,
            mobile apps, Internet of Things, and 5G technologies from
            malign actors by relying on only trusted vendors who are not
            subject to unjust or extra-judicial control by authoritarian
            governments, such as the Chinese Communist Party. Clean
            Networks consists of multiple lines of effort all rooted in
            Digital Trust Standards.

       Investment Screening Outreach: The Department of State,
            together with the Department of Treasury, works closely with
            foreign governments to encourage the adoption and full
            implementation of factually rigorous, transparent, and national
            security focused investment screening mechanisms.

       Deal Teams: Through the Deal Team initiative launched by the
            Departments of State and Commerce in February, we helping U.S.
            firms more effectively compete and win projects abroad.

       Strategic Infrastructure: The Infrastructure Transaction and
            Assistance Network (ITAN) is a great example of a specialized
            deal team in action. This group of 11 agencies has identified
            and advanced more than $125 billion in infrastructure deals in
            the Indo-Pacific. Alongside partners such as Japan and
            Australia, we are providing credible, collective alternative to
            Beijing's One Belt One Road offerings.

       Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership: The
            Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership is a whole
            of government effort to promote a vibrant digital economy in
            developing countries, based on transparency and privacy. This
            initiative is a direct challenge to Chinese government's
            efforts to export its authoritarian approaches to internet
            governance.

       Blue Dot Network: The Blue Dot Network, launched at the
            Indo-Pacific Business Forum in November 2019 with Japan and
            Australia, is a multi-stakeholder initiative to certify quality
            infrastructure investment projects. The Blue Dot Network is
            another example of how we use a positive approach to show case
            the infrastructure investment best practices employed by the
            United States and our partners.

       Debt Service Suspension Initiative: With like-minded
            partners, the World Bank, and the IMF, we are leveraging the
            G20-Paris Club Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to
            increase debt transparency and address opaque and unsustainable
            PRC lending. The United States is faithfully implementing the
            DSSI by suspending official bilateral debt payments from the
            poorest countries to year-end 2020, providing those countries
            fiscal space to fund social, health, and other measures to
            respond to the pandemic.

        The UK's recent commendable decision to ban Huawei gear from its 5G
    networks is an indication of a growing international consensus that PRC
    government control over all aspects of society--including private
    industry--is a security risk. The UK joins the United States and many
    other democracies in putting in place strong measures to mitigate the
    security risks posed by untrusted suppliers. In the same way, many
    major telecom companies like Spain's Telefonica and Japan's NTT have
    committed to only using trusted vendors. We are glad to see that many
    of our allies and partners, including the UK, recognize this threat.
        On April 29, Secretary Pompeo announced that the Department of
    State will require a 5G Clean Path between the United States and U.S.
    diplomatic facilities for secure 5G standalone end-to-end
    communications so that they do not use any transmission, control,
    computing, storage equipment, or services from an untrusted 5G vendor,
    such as Huawei or ZTE. A number of countries such as Poland are joining
    us in requiring a clean path for their own diplomatic facilities.
        Further, the Peruvian government's recent decision to select the UK
    as Peru's Infrastructure Delivery Partner to rebuild facilities damaged
    by El Nino--excluding the PRC by default because it couldn't meet
    international standards--is an excellent example of how our promotion
    of international standards is being adopted by countries around the
    globe, even when the United States is not directly involved.
                         steady application of pressure
        We at the Department of State are working hard every day to counter
    Beijing's threatening and malign activities around the world. Put
    simply: we are holding the PRC to its commitments, both to us and to
    international law and standards. We are challenging PRC behavior and we
    will call Beijing out publicly when it falls short. We will defend our
    interests and those of our friends and allies when they are threatened.
        The past few weeks alone have seen particularly egregious examples
    of PRC dangerous and malign actions: violence on the border with India;
    aggressive moves in the South China Sea and around Taiwan and the
    Senkakus Islands; and the unilateral imposition of draconian ``national
    security'' legislation on Hong Kong, in clear violation of its treaty
    law obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Contravening
    the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which the PRC is a
    signatory, the PRC has perpetuated a years-long brutal campaign of
    repression against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups
    in Xinjiang, including arbitrary mass detention, forced labor, coercive
    family planning practices, and restrictions on cultural and religious
    expression, reminiscent of its longstanding mistreatment of Tibetans.
        On July 13, Secretary Pompeo announced an important step to
    strengthen U.S. policy on maritime claims in the South China Sea. That
    announcement made clear: Beijing's claims to offshore resources across
    most of the South China Sea are unlawful, as is its campaign of
    bullying to control them. We are standing with Southeast Asian coastal
    states to uphold their sovereign rights under international law. We
    welcomed your bicameral joint statement on the South China Sea,
    Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Menendez, reflecting American resolve
    in clarifying the United States' position that the PRC's maritime
    claims in the South China Sea are unlawful.
        The Department of Defense is actively continuing to sail, fly, and
    operate wherever international law allows. In the South China Sea,
    Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of
    Southeast Asian coastal states, bully them out of offshore resources,
    assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with ``might
    makes right.'' Beijing's approach has been clear for years. In 2010, a
    senior PRC official told his ASEAN counterparts that ``China is a big
    country and other countries are small countries and that is just a
    fact.'' The PRC's predatory worldview has no place in the 21st century.
        Countries large and small, such as Australia, Canada, the member
    states of the EU, Vietnam, and others, are standing up to PRC tactics.
    In retaliation for Australia's strong push back on PRC actions, Beijing
    has taken to imposing punitive tariffs on Australian exports to the
    PRC, and ``warning'' Chinese tourists and students to avoid Australia
    for fabricated reasons. Shortly after Canadian police arrested Huawei
    Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. arrest warrant in
    December 2018, Beijing detained two Canadian men on politically
    motivated security charges. Last month, Canadian Prime Minister Justin
    Trudeau rejected a call to swap Meng for the two Canadian citizens held
    by Beijing, saying such a move would set a bad precedent and harm
    Canada.
        The PRC has been particularly aggressive in using U.S. academic
    freedoms to co-opt U.S. expertise and steal intellectual property. This
    is a key aspect of its Military-Civil Fusion strategy that includes a
    campaign to acquire sensitive U.S. technologies and intellectual
    property to bolster its military modernization efforts. To protect the
    integrity of our open and collaborative research system and ensure that
    the United States remains the global leader on cutting-edge research,
    last month President Trump issued a proclamation suspending the entry
    of graduate and post-graduate students and researchers associated with
    entities that support the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy.
        The Department of Justice and FBI continually announce new cases
    involving investigations and indictments of Chinese nationals
    attempting to steal U.S. technology, trade secrets, and even
    individuals' personal data. This week's indictment of Stanford
    researcher Song Chen, who lied about her status as an active member of
    the PRC military, is but a latest example. As FBI Director Christopher
    Wray said earlier this month, if you are an adult U.S. citizen, it is
    more likely than not that the PRC has stolen your personal data, and
    the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about
    every 10 hours.
        A key element of the PRC's strategy is to provide political,
    technological, and economic support to those who are willing to turn a
    blind eye to the PRC's lucrative deals at the expense of the citizens
    of developing nations, thereby enabling the rule of autocrats and
    kleptocrats globally. Specifically, the PRC exports technological know-
    how that can help authoritarian governments track, reward, and punish
    citizens through a system of digital surveillance. We have seen more
    than a dozen nations in Africa alone import Huawei's AI surveillance
    technology that can reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
    authoritarianism. Moreover, we are carefully tracking a sweeping
    economic and security partnership between China-Iran that, if finalized
    and funded, could enable Iran to expand funding to its nuclear and
    military ambitions and malign activities in the Middle East region.
        The United States has steadily applied pressure to prevent and
    respond to the full range of PRC malign actions as part of our
    systematic realignment of the relationship. For example, on June 26,
    Secretary Pompeo announced visa restrictions on Chinese government
    officials who have undermined Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and
    liberty. On July 9, the Secretary imposed visa restrictions on three
    senior PRC officials and their immediate family members for their role
    in human rights abuses in Xinjiang; in parallel, the Treasury
    Department imposed financial sanctions on those officials, one
    additional official, and the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau. And on
    July 15, the Secretary announced visa restrictions on certain personnel
    from Chinese technology companies, such as Huawei, which provide
    material support to regimes perpetrating human rights violations
    globally. These and other measures demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect
    our interests and uphold our values.
                   restoring reciprocity in the relationship
        A key principal underpinning international relations is reciprocity
    between nations. For many years, the United States tolerated imbalance
    in its relationship with Beijing. While the space for U.S. diplomats
    and journalists to engage with civil society and local leaders in China
    has decreased, PRC diplomats continue to have access to all levels of
    U.S. government and educational institutions. As U.S. companies
    operating in China face unfair and discriminatory treatment, PRC state-
    owned and private companies continue to invest in the United States. As
    part of our strategy to achieve more reciprocal relations and ensure
    that U.S. interests are safeguarded, we are pressing Beijing to reverse
    these trends and increase access for U.S. companies, media outlets, and
    diplomats.
        The PRC's abuse of public diplomacy programs is particularly
    egregious. Last year, Senators Portman and Carper completed an in-depth
    study of this imbalance in public diplomacy, and we welcomed the
    bipartisan Congressional call for more reciprocity in the U.S.-China
    relationship. In most countries around the world, a U.S. ambassador
    would be welcomed on a university campus, usually with quite a bit of
    fanfare. The story is quite different in China, where the Communist
    government fears a free exchange of ideas. While Chinese professors and
    students might seek to engage with China-based foreign diplomats,
    Chinese authorities often make such engagements difficult or
    impossible. The PRC has increasingly impeded U.S. access to segments of
    Chinese society, including in academic settings. In contrast, the
    Chinese Ambassador to the United States and Chinese diplomatic staff
    regularly address U.S. audiences, including on university campuses,
    free from obstruction by the U.S. government.
        At the height of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, the PRC used
    government-controlled media outlets to sow propaganda and
    disinformation. China expelled respected independent journalists from
    the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post at
    precisely the moment when the world most needed objective reporting.
    While Beijing has imposed increasingly harsh surveillance, harassment,
    and intimidation against American and other foreign journalists
    operating in China, it fashioned its media presence in the United
    States and abroad into propaganda outlets that have operated with free
    rein. To reflect these institutions' actual relationship with the state
    and to gain greater insight and visibility into Chinese propaganda
    operations in the United States, since February the United States has
    designated the U.S.-based operations of nine PRC propaganda outlets--
    including Xinhua, People's Daily, and China Global Television Network--
    as foreign missions. This decision officially recognizes these outlets
    for what they are--entities under Beijing's control and outlets for
    Chinese propaganda. It also makes clear to ordinary Americans what they
    are not--independent media.
        In March, the United States clearly communicated the severity of
    our concern about the abusive, unfair, and non-reciprocal treatment of
    international press in the PRC. We capped the number of Chinese citizen
    personnel allowed to work for U.S. offices of four of these designated
    PRC propaganda outlets. The number of Chinese personnel allowed now
    more closely matches the number of American journalists that Beijing
    allows to operate in the PRC. This long overdue step towards achieving
    greater reciprocity with the PRC is designed to spur Beijing to adopt a
    more fair and reciprocal approach to U.S. and other foreign independent
    press in China.
        Reciprocal treatment is also a challenge for non-governmental
    organizations. In China, a 2017 Foreign NGO Management Law required
    foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to
    find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations. NGOs that fail to
    comply face possible civil or criminal penalties. Not surprisingly, the
    number of foreign NGOs operating in China has dropped sharply. In
    contrast, in the United States we recognize that NGOs, think tanks, and
    other organizations are vital to a vibrant civil society. Our
    regulations are designed to facilitate and support their formation.
                                 unity at home
        We recognize that to be successful, U.S. policy towards the PRC
    must be grounded in shared commitments across our society. In short, we
    as a nation must be unified in purpose and coordinated in our efforts
    to address the challenges posed by Beijing. Congress is essential to
    building this shared approach. Mr. Chairman, for this reason, the
    legislation you introduced this week designed to frame the U.S.
    strategic approach to China is very important and we look forward to
    working with you and this Committee.
        Today's hearing is a good opportunity for further dialogue as we
    look to strengthen unity of purpose between the Executive Branch and
    Congress. Beijing's recent decisions to restrict visas on some members
    of this Committee and the China Commission is an example of how the PRC
    is seeking to divide us and target those who might speak up about
    issues like human rights. Since its inception, Congress has led the way
    in advocating and reflecting the values of the American people. An
    essential component of U.S. policy towards the PRC is upholding the
    rights and freedoms the United States has always stood for, whether by
    exposing human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, fighting for press
    freedom, or supporting the rights of peaceful protesters and democratic
    institutions in Hong Kong.
        Recent bipartisan legislation is crucial to calling out and
    combating Beijing's predatory actions. The Foreign Investment Risk
    Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) expanded the authorities of the
    Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States' (CFIUS), better
    protecting national security by allowing for a review of non-
    controlling investments that involve critical technology, critical
    infrastructure, or sensitive personal data, and certain real estate.
    The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA), Hong Kong
    Autonomy Act (HKAA), and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act underscored
    to Beijing the U.S. Government remains united with respect to our human
    rights concerns. And Senators Gardner and Markey's Asia Reassurance
    Initiative Act (ARIA) is an important bipartisan framework for U.S.
    leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
        Our unity of approach also relies on our thought leaders and their
    ideas and engagements. The foreign policy think tank communities in our
    country, and around the world, are engaged in open debate on the future
    of China. Many of our keenest foreign policy observers and China
    experts are asking probing questions about the PRC's goals and
    ambitions and what they mean for the United States. We welcome this
    dialogue as we build an American consensus about U.S. policy towards
    China.
        U.S. non-governmental organizations are similarly grappling with
    the PRC's increasingly assertive actions around the globe. This spring,
    I asked two leading democracy NGOs on each side of the U.S. political
    spectrum to share their thoughts on the state of democracy around the
    world in the wake of the initial COVID-19 shock. Not surprisingly, many
    of their concerns and recommendations centered on China and what the
    U.S. should do to shore up democratic principles globally. As one of
    the organizations recommended, the PRC must be held to account for
    hiding data, silencing internal critics, and engaging in a
    disinformation campaign. The other organization suggested creating
    programs to promote transparency by aggressively supporting local
    independent media, citizen bloggers, and watchdog groups to identify
    CCP propaganda and disinformation. While these organizations
    represented different U.S. political views, their commitment to
    supporting American policies that counter the PRC's growing
    disinformation and propaganda efforts were remarkably like-minded. The
    Department and USAID are doubling support for American and local NGOs
    to strengthen the voice of civil society and independent media, demand
    transparency and accountability, and combat disinformation.
        The business community remains a lynchpin of an effective U.S.-
    China policy. We are consulting with U.S. business and taking a range
    of actions designed to right the distorted economic relationship that
    has deteriorated over time. While so-called ``decoupling'' of the
    relationship is a false choice, there is much room to demand fairness
    from China, to diversify supply chains, and protect sensitive
    industries. On July 1, Secretary Pompeo announced the Xinjiang Supply
    Chain Business Advisory, which highlights the risks for businesses with
    supply chain links to entities complicit in forced labor and other
    human rights abuses in Xinjiang and throughout China. The Phase One
    trade agreement with Beijing aims to resolve some of our longstanding
    and significant structural concerns related to agriculture, technology
    transfer, intellectual property, financial services, and currency and
    foreign exchange, while also committing China to make significant new
    purchases of U.S. exports. It also includes an unprecedented
    enforcement mechanism. It does not resolve all of our key concerns with
    the PRC's non-market economic system, including state industrial
    policies, excess capacity, and unfair subsidies that harm both the U.S.
    and global economies. Tariffs on $370 billion in Chinese products will
    remain in place as we pursue resolution of outstanding issues in a
    second phase of negotiations.
              building and strengthening international cooperation
        At the Department of State, our China strategy is not just the work
    of a single office or bureau, but rather part of a comprehensive
    approach across the Department and our embassies and consulates around
    the world. The United States is working with governments to create a
    common understanding of the PRC's actions, to build a unified response,
    and to shape a long-term approach. This foundation is key to the
    growing recognition of Chinese actions that undermine global
    institutions and shared values; manipulate international organizations
    and silence of critics abroad; surreptitiously acquire high technology
    to further its military and economic ambitions; and spread of
    disinformation.
        Our dialogue and engagements take many forms, but all benefit from
    the fact that many states are waking up to the reality that economic
    opportunity with China over the past decades has come at significant
    cost and risk.
        The Indo-Pacific is our primary region of competition with the PRC.
    Across the region, the United States is deepening relationships with
    the countries that share our values. In September 2019, the first
    ministerial-level meeting of the United States, Australia, India, and
    Japan at the Quadrilateral Consultations marked a new milestone in our
    diplomatic engagement in the region. Our alliances with Australia,
    Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have helped
    sustain peace and security for generations. ASEAN is central to our
    vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our security assistance
    to South China Sea claimant states helps partners protect their
    autonomy and maritime resources. Together with USAID, we are working
    with the Mekong countries to ensure sustainable development and energy
    security, even as the PRC continues its extensive dam building and
    threatens the food security of its downstream neighbors along the
    Mekong River. The United States doubled development assistance to our
    Pacific Island partners through Pacific Pledge.
        On June 25, the Secretary announced the United States has accepted
    EU High Representative Josep Borrell's proposal to create a U.S.-EU
    Dialogue on China--a new mechanism for discussing the Transatlantic
    community's common concerns about the threat the PRC poses to our
    shared democratic ideals. We anticipate it will be action-oriented and
    lead to more coordinated policy outcomes that will advance our shared
    interests. The United States is engaged with allies and partners in the
    G7, the G20, and NATO, and we are broadening partnerships across the
    Transatlantic, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and the
    Western Hemisphere. Similarly, China is a core component of our
    security dialogues with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and
    Canada.
        Beijing's growing assertiveness also shows in its military actions,
    and we are collaborating with countries around the world to deter
    Chinese military expansion. Beginning in May 2020, new PLA incursions
    along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh led to fatal clashes
    between India and China. Beijing's actions along the LAC are part of a
    broader, disturbing trend of aggressive PRC behavior throughout Asia.
    We are working with India on increasing information sharing and
    bilateral defense cooperation, including through rapid completion of
    the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on geo-spatial information
    sharing. Our governments share a vision for a free and open Indo-
    Pacific, offering security and prosperity for all.
        In our own Hemisphere, the United States is working with its
    neighbors to reaffirm the region's longstanding dedication to free
    societies and free markets. We are working with like-minded democratic
    partners to strengthen governance that is inclusive, responsive, and
    transparent; generate prosperity and economic development; and ensure
    respect for human rights--the values that define our hemisphere. In
    December 2019, the White House launched an expanded initiative called
    Growth in the Americas. This whole of government initiative aims to
    catalyze the private sector as the primary engine of growth to develop
    infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean. The focus is on
    improving the attractiveness of the investment climate for all types of
    infrastructure including energy, airports, ports, roads, telecom, and
    digital networks, among others. The U.S. International Development
    Finance Corporation (DFC) is a critical tool in these efforts. We
    expect the DFC to deploy at least $12 billion in financing in the
    region. We are also expanding the Digital Connectivity and
    Cybersecurity Partnership to the region, modeled on the work it has
    already done in the Indo-Pacific.
        China has made extensive inroads across Africa over the past
    decade. However, this does not mean that African leaders are oblivious
    to the risks of partnering with the PRC. Some African governments have
    instituted review panels to monitor Chinese projects while others are
    requiring Chinese firms to hire more African laborers and provide
    protections for Africa's fragile ecosystems.
        In the Middle East we similarly continue to engage countries to
    recognize the costs that come with certain engagements with China--
    costs to their own sovereignty, costs to regional stability, and costs
    to the rule-based international order that has provided security and
    prosperity for decades. A few recent decisions reflect this growing
    consensus. In Oman, Ericsson signed a Letter of Award with Vodafone
    Oman on May 21 to be its sole operator for Oman's radio, cloud, and
    core networks, reversing an earlier decision to award the contract to
    Huawei. Kuwait's recent reversal of its decision to award a Kuwaiti
    National Guard network infrastructure contract to Huawei is a first
    step despite Huawei's continued key role in Kuwait's commercial
    network. Israel's June 15 decision to bar Huawei from its 5G network is
    also welcome, as is Israel's decision to award a $1.5 billion tender
    for a water desalinization plant to Israeli firm IDE Technologies on
    May 26, instead of Chinese firm CK Hutchison Holdings.
        We are also working with allies and partners to prevent the PRC's
    growing influence in international organizations. U.S. efforts to
    counter the PRC's moves to assume controlling positions to advance its
    parochial interests in these multilateral fora have accelerated over
    the past several years. Our efforts have included close cooperation
    with allies and partners around the world in the World Intellectual
    Property Organization's leadership election and shared interests in
    rejecting Beijing's efforts to insert language promoting the PRC's
    foreign policy and its core communist ideology into U.N. documents. The
    United States will also continue to pursue reforms that promote good
    governance, accountability, and transparency, which have the added
    benefit of making the U.N. more resilient to the PRC's malign
    influence.
        Finally, let me highlight the importance of Taiwan, an example of
    freedom and democracy for all Chinese people and the world. On May 20,
    Secretary Pompeo sent an official congratulatory message for Taiwan
    President Tsai's inauguration. We and our allies and partners will
    continue to vigorously support Taiwan's meaningful participation in
    international organizations, especially where public health, safety,
    and security are concerned. Taiwan's commendable COVID-19 response
    demonstrates it has much to offer to the global community. On July 9,
    the Administration formally notified Congress of a defense arms sale to
    Taiwan. The sale, worth an estimated $620 million, is for the
    recertification of Taiwan's existing Patriot Advanced Capability-3
    (PAC-3) Missile capability. This is just one recent example of how,
    consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), we will continue to
    provide Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to
    maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The U.S. commitment to
    implementing the Taiwan Relations Act is firm, as is our commitment to
    the U.S. One China policy, including our insistence that cross-Straight
    issues be resolved peacefully and without coercion or intimidation.
                       finding common ground where we can
        Even as we build a unity of action and purpose here at home and
    with our allies and partners to push back firmly and consistently
    against challenges from China, we also seek to maintain communications
    with Beijing and welcome PRC cooperation where we can find common
    ground. Chairman Risch, your legislation calls for a prioritization of
    cooperation and that is welcome guidance that remains the central
    pillar of the U.S. approach to China.
        The United States has publicly welcomed Beijing to engage in arms
    control negotiations. It is time for dialogue and diplomacy between the
    three biggest nuclear weapons powers on how to prevent a new arms race.
    As such, the next prudent step is face-to-face meetings between the
    United States and China. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control
    Marshall Billingslea has invited the PRC to join in good faith
    negotiations in Vienna. The United States also recommends that China
    meet with Russia at an early date to consider next steps for trilateral
    arms control negotiations. While we will all bring different
    perspectives and objectives to the negotiating table and will surely
    have disagreements, we believe this strategic dialogue is essential, as
    the consequences of a miscommunication between the three major nuclear
    powers would be catastrophic for humanity.
        One issue that can be a continued area of cooperation between the
    United States and China is North Korea. North Korea's weapons of mass
    destruction and ballistic missile programs undermine our shared
    strategic interest in peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
    China agrees that diplomacy is the preferred approach to resolving the
    issue of North Korea's denuclearization. While there is much more China
    could do to enforce binding sanctions and prevent sanctions evasion--
    and we will continue to engage the Chinese on that issue--China has
    also drastically reduced trade with North Korea and has made efforts to
    urge North Korea to engage with the United States on a diplomatic
    process to bring peace and prosperity to all who live on the Korean
    Peninsula.
        We also seek common ground with Beijing in our efforts to combat
    the opioid crisis here in the United States. The United States welcomed
    the PRC's regulatory action in 2019 to class schedule all fentanyl-
    related substances. This action, combined with heightened U.S.
    regulatory and enforcement efforts, has decreased the amount of
    fentanyl and fentanyl analogues coming directly from China into the
    United States. The PRC's November 2019 prosecution of an international
    fentanyl trafficking ring, after a joint U.S.-China investigation, was
    another positive step. However, our job is far from complete.
    Significant amounts of chemical precursors used to produce illicit
    synthetic opioids and methamphetamine that kill Americans continue to
    originate in China. Since the PRC's class scheduling of all fentanyl-
    related substances, there have been several shipments of illicit
    synthetic drug precursors from China to cartel-controlled entities in
    Mexico, indicating a pronounced shift in how fentanyl is trafficked
    from China into the United States. Cooperation to address emerging
    aspects of the problem, including more strict regulation of China's
    chemical and pharmaceutical industries, will mark the next phase of
    bilateral and multilateral effort. President Trump is unequivocal on
    the need for China to take a more proactive role in disrupting the flow
    of illicit fentanyl trafficked globally--even as the PRC's role in the
    problem has evolved.
       building ties with civil society and supporting the chinese people
        The United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights
    guarantees everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
    religion, of opinion and expression, and of peaceful assembly and
    association. Unfortunately, today no Chinese citizen is able to
    practice religious beliefs freely, speak opinions freely, or peacefully
    seek changes from the government. Secretary Pompeo has prioritized
    support for representatives of the Chinese people seeking freedom and
    democracy by meeting with Chinese dissidents from the generations of
    the 1979 Chinese Democracy Wall movement, the 1989 Tiananmen Square
    protests, and the 2019 Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. He has also
    met the survivors of repression in Xinjiang and the Tiananmen Massacre.
        Despite the obstacles, American diplomats continue to meet and
    engage with a broad cross-section of the Chinese population through a
    variety of programs, both in U.S. diplomatic facilities and outside
    them. Last month, I was honored to present the honorary Women of
    Courage Award to the Mothers of Tiananmen. On June 4, 1989, thousands
    of brave Chinese citizens gathered in Beijing's Tiananmen Square,
    calling for freedom, democracy, human rights, and a corruption-free
    society. Their peaceful calls for change came to a violent end when the
    Chinese Communist Party sent the People's Liberation Army into
    Tiananmen Square armed with tanks and guns. Thirty-one years later, the
    United States continues to honor the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement
    and its legacy of peaceful advocacy. The bravery of the many Chinese
    people who seek to advance the cause of human rights and universal
    freedoms inspires us.
        The United States remains committed to active support for the
    Chinese people. To raise awareness of human rights abuses in China, the
    United States regularly holds public events highlighting the abuses
    committed by the PRC and the bravery of human rights defenders. For
    example, the President chaired a global call to action on protecting
    international religious freedom at the 74th U.N. General Assembly; the
    past two Ministerials to Advance Religious Freedom have shone a
    spotlight on egregious conditions in China; a side-event at the U.N.
    General Assembly drew attention to abuses in Xinjiang; and a survivor
    of the detention camps in Xinjiang was recognized as an International
    Woman of Courage.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, consistent with the priorities in your legislation, I
    should underline that engagement between the United States and China
    remains of central importance in managing tensions and exploring areas
    of mutual interest where efforts might align or cooperation might
    flourish. But we will only make a difference if our engagement produces
    real progress on the many issues of concern which I have enumerated
    today.
        Current trends in U.S.-China relations do not seem promising. Many
    Chinese officials continue to be trapped in a mindset that shapes its
    narrative of China as victim at the hands of foreign powers, thus
    requiring China's hardline actions in response. This despite decades of
    efforts by the United States and our allies to bring China into the
    global community. Through trade and participation in the World Trade
    Organization and through increased engagement, we have sought to smooth
    China's rise in the global system. Unfortunately, while some in China
    wanted to be seen as a responsible great power, the realities of
    China's rise are not that of responsible global leadership.
        Last month, I joined Secretary Pompeo in Hawaii to meet with our
    Chinese counterparts. In the 2-day discussion the Secretary stressed
    that deeds, not words, were the pathway to achieve mutual respect and
    reciprocity between our two countries across commercial, security,
    diplomatic and people-to-people interactions. He made clear our
    determination to push back against Beijing's efforts to undermine
    democratic norms, challenge the sovereignty of our friends and allies,
    and engage in unfair trade practices, but at the same time, he outlined
    the areas where the United States and the PRC could cooperate to solve
    global challenges, including those I have enumerated today.
        We would also welcome members of Congress from both sides of the
    Capitol to not only work in partnership with the Executive Branch but
    to also extend your own engagement to better understand aspirations of
    the Chinese people. Of course this includes meeting with your Chinese
    government counterparts and other officials, but as much as possible it
    must also include reaching out to the many voices of China that are
    found outside China; those not free to be heard at home and therefore
    requiring our assistance to be heard.
        Beyond government-to-government interactions, the United States
    also maintains the goal of expanded trade and investment with China
    provided it is conducted on a fair and reciprocal basis. We welcome
    people-to-people exchanges, including hosting of each other's students,
    provided that they are exclusively for purposes of study. As we seek to
    correct the imbalance in our relations with China we must address
    today's realities while at the same time leaving open tomorrow's
    possibilities.
        The United States is urgently taking the necessary steps to defend
    tour security and long-term economic well-being. With our friends and
    allies we are standing up for universal rights and the rules-based
    international system that have provided for the world's collective
    peace, security, and prosperity for generations. This is the foundation
    for the peace and stability that has allowed the United States, the
    People's Republic of China, and the world to advance toward ever
    greater peace and prosperity.

        The Chairman. Thank you.
        With that, we are going to do a round of questioning. I am
    going to reserve my time. Senator Menendez, I will turn it over
    to you for a round of questioning.
        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As I said earlier, I welcome the Administration's
    clarification of our legal position on China's unlawful claims
    in the South China Sea. But as you know, international law is
    not self-enforcing. And having now taken this position, it is
    critical that we give reality to our legal position or we may
    find that a gap between rhetoric and reality produces
    counterproductive and destabilizing.
        So what does the Administration intend to do to implement
    this new approach?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
        So as you are aware, the United States had for some time
    rejected Chinese claims without endorsing alternative claimant
    positions, but in the recent iteration, Secretary of State
    Pompeo at the direction of President Trump has declared the
    United States to not recognize Chinese declarations, and in
    fact, we would seek to uphold the rulings of international
    tribunals that have determined that China's maritime claims in
    the South China Sea are improper.
        You know, I harken back to 2015 when President Xi Jinping,
    standing at the White House with President Obama, announced
    that China had no intention to militarize the South China Sea.
    Just recently I typed into the search engine on my computer the
    words ``Chinese bases, South China Sea'' and looked at the
    images of what has grown up in the South China Sea in the
    corresponding 5 years. It is an astonishing military buildup
    that China has undertaken, and China is currently in the midst
    of major military exercises in the region as well. They have
    completely militarized the South China Sea.
        For our part, sir, we will continue our freedom of
    navigation operations, which are continuing on an ongoing
    basis. We are providing assistance, including security
    assistance, to many of our friends and allies in the region. We
    are making this a subject of discussion in our alliance
    relationships in the region, not just the South China Sea I
    might add, but the East Sea as well where there are also
    Chinese claims on the territory of other countries. We are
    providing substantial security assistance to many of our
    partners in the region, and we are working very hard to find a
    common position with our friends and allies in the region, most
    recently successfully overcoming some of the differences we had
    with the Government of the Philippines in order to reach common
    cause with the Philippines as well as with many other countries
    in ASEAN to push back decisively against Chinese claims.
        Senator Menendez. All right. Thank you very much.
        So I am looking forward to hearing further discussion of
    what are the consultations you had with partners and allies on
    their statements and actions. You just mentioned the
    Philippines is one of them.
        As you know, Mr. Secretary, the Chinese Communist Party's
    (CCP) so-called national security law for Hong Kong, which
    undermines Hong Kong's autonomy, encourages the crackdown on
    pro-democracy protesters and effectively ends its one country,
    two systems policy, recently went into effect. Along with my
    colleagues on both sides of this dais, I introduced the Hong
    Kong Safe Harbor Act, which would provide those Hong Kongers
    who peacefully protested Beijing's corrupt justice system and
    could have a well founded fear of persecution to be eligible
    for priority to refugee status.
        What efforts other than some harsh words and criticism
    aimed at the CCP for their erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy is
    the State Department actively pursuing?
        Mr. Biegun. So, Senator Menendez, as you are probably
    aware, we have used the existing authorities we have in the
    Department of State under the Immigration and Naturalization
    Act to impose visa restrictions against some of the leading
    actors who have played a role in imposing the National Security
    Act upon the people of Hong Kong in order to strip them of
    their democracy.
        Likewise, we have suspended the extradition treaty that we
    had with Hong Kong in recognition of the fact that the rule of
    law is unlikely to be found any further under the legislative
    authorities that the Chinese put in place.
        We are comprehensively reviewing benefits that are extended
    to the region of Hong Kong to assess whether or not those
    should be continued. They are not in a single place in law.
    They are sprinkled across U.S. code, and we are taking a
    comprehensive look at all those benefits as we go forward.
        And finally, as you may know, the President has also
    extended refugee quota to any travelers coming out of Hong Kong
    who are fleeing the repression there.
        The Secretary had a chance himself to meet with Joshua Wong
    in London just yesterday where he had a good discussion about
    the current state of affairs in Hong Kong, and we will continue
    to press very hard in order to preserve the democratic voice of
    the people of Hong Kong.
        Senator Menendez. Well, I hope the refugee status that the
    legislation that we have bipartisan support for is something
    the Administration will support.
        A final question. We have seen authoritarian nations such
    as China and Russia utilizing emerging technologies in new ways
    to surveil and repress both domestic and foreign populations,
    as well as manipulate democratic elections. Now these countries
    are spreading their models of digital authoritarianism to other
    countries who may be attracted to these new modes of social
    control.
        What is the Administration's strategy to counter the spread
    of digital authoritarianism and the malign use of digital
    products and services? And how are we engaging our allies in
    that context?
        Mr. Biegun. The same technologies that are being used to
    repress populations are also used in many countries in the
    world in order to conduct routine screening and security. And
    so it is a very thorny and complicated issue to sort out the
    use issues.
        One of the first and positive steps we have taken is in
    relation to Xinjiang where Chinese companies who have, in fact,
    provided those tools to the Communist Party in order to be used
    to enforce the Chinese repression against the Uyghurs are now
    sanctioned under U.S. law and unable to do business with the
    United States or with United States companies. We will continue
    to extend that kind of protections when we see these
    technologies used for repressive purposes, but it is an
    important and worrisome area of technology and one of many that
    we are having to grapple with in the world in which social
    media, telecom, and new technologies challenge freedoms around
    the world.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Gardner.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Secretary Biegun.
        Since 2015, I have had the privilege of serving as the
    chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee
    on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity
    Policy, where Senator Markey and I have led efforts to shape a
    new policy toward the Indo-Pacific region, including through
    the passage of the landmark Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
    (ARIA) in December of 2018.
        As part of our work in the 115th Congress, the East Asia,
    Pacific Subcommittee also held a three-part series of hearings
    titled ``The China Challenge,'' which examined in a
    comprehensive manner how the United States should respond to a
    rising China that seeks to upend and no doubt supplant the
    U.S.-led liberal world order in their minds. Our first two
    hearings focused on security and economic aspects of China's
    authoritarian rise, including China's debt trap diplomacy and
    military modernization programs. Our third hearing focused on
    democracy, human rights, and rule of law, values that have been
    fundamental to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy for
    generations.
        Our witnesses testified that we were in the midst of the
    so-called authoritarian closing that under President Xi Jinping
    has resulted in an unprecedented and intensifying crackdown on
    civil society, ethnic minorities, and religious freedom in
    China. We found that the mass concentration camps for Uyghur
    Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region shocks the
    conscience and necessitates a serious response from the United
    States and the international community, including sanctions
    against top officials.
        We found that the crackdowns in the Tibet Autonomous Region
    are intensifying while Beijing continues to refuse negotiations
    with the Central Tibetan Administration.
        We found that human rights defenders in China are routinely
    jailed, tortured, and otherwise deprived of liberty.
        We found that genuine freedom of speech and assembly are
    nonexistent, that corruption and abuse of power are rampant.
    Just look at Hong Kong and the violations of international
    agreements registered with the United Nations and the lengths
    that the Communist Party in China will go to deprive its people
    of what China itself not too long ago had agreed to.
        And now in the midst of the unprecedented outbreak of
    COVID-19 coronavirus, the Communist Party of China continues to
    hide and obscure critical information that has imperiled a
    truly global response to the crisis.
        This is the China that we must deal with not just now but
    for the long run as well.
        I look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary Biegun
    today on how we can best address the China challenge together
    in a series of questions.
        I want to talk about the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
    and what it means to the framework as you identify in your
    opening statement, but just a few quick questions.
        Is China torturing the Uyghur Muslim population in China?
        Mr. Biegun. I am sorry, Senator. Could you repeat the
    question?
        Senator Gardner. Is China torturing Uyghur Muslims in
    China?
        Mr. Biegun. We certainly believe that there is a severe
    mistreatment. In fact, we and many other countries are
    demanding access to Xinjiang and----
        Senator Gardner. You are not willing to say whether or not
    they are torturing?
        Mr. Biegun. Torture is a legal definition, and I do not
    simply have the evidence available to me to make that statement
    as a legal matter. I do believe they are severely mistreating
    those people and----
        Senator Gardner. And you would agree there have been public
    reports that Uyghur populations have been tortured.
        Mr. Biegun. I certainly find it believable, sir.
        Senator Gardner. Is China disappearing scientists and
    dissidents, scientists dealing with the coronavirus, dissidents
    speaking out against Chinese repression?
        Mr. Biegun. China has been arresting dissenting voices for
    my entire career, but in recent months, we have seen in
    particular this focus has turned against those who spoke up
    particularly early on regarding the COVID virus in Wuhan.
    Absolutely.
        Senator Gardner. Is China stealing U.S. coronavirus
    research?
        Mr. Biegun. As the Department of Justice unveiled in two of
    its indictments yesterday, we have firm evidence to suggest
    that Chinese hackers, working in close association with Chinese
    national security institutions, have in fact been trying to
    steal information related to the development of technologies to
    treat the coronavirus.
        Senator Gardner. Is China breaking the Rose Garden promise
    of no militarization of the South China Sea?
        Mr. Biegun. As I mentioned in my earlier comments, one only
    needs to type into your search engine on your computer ``South
    China Sea military bases,'' and you will see how substantial
    China has broken the pledge that President Xi Jinping made to
    President Obama.
        Senator Gardner. Is China persecuting other religious
    minorities like Christians?
        Mr. Biegun. Absolutely.
        Senator Gardner. Is China breaking international agreements
    in Hong Kong?
        Mr. Biegun. They have broken their international agreement
    in Hong Kong.
        Senator Gardner. This obviously is something that must be
    dealt with swiftly, strongly, and not just by the United
    States, but global condemnation and actions subsequent to that
    condemnation that will show China and the Communist Party of
    China that their actions are unacceptable if they wish to be
    deemed or seen as a responsible nation.
        The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which passed in 2018,
    sets a framework. In your testimony, you state that the Asia
    Reassurance Initiative Act is a framework for U.S. leadership
    in the Indo-Pacific. It is based on the National Defense
    Strategy, National Security Strategy.
        Just out of curiosity, how can we use ARIA, that framework,
    to address the challenges and the consequences of the actions
    China has taken as it relates to the questions you just
    answered?
        Mr. Biegun. Similar to what we welcome in Chairman Risch's
    legislation, laying out a strategic framework and knowing that
    it is creating a space for us to make proposals here to Capitol
    Hill on budgets and priorities is very helpful. The authorizing
    committees do play an important role in telegraphing to the
    entire Department set of professionals the space that we can
    move into as we go annually through our budgets and staffing
    issues. Your legislation, which has already been in place for
    several years, was very useful in that regard. We have seen a
    complete reorientation of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-
    Pacific, consistent and even in some ways through the openings
    that were suggested in the ARIA legislation. The more focused
    efforts on China are going to likewise need close congressional
    and executive cooperation, Senator. And I want to thank you and
    members of the committee for a number of pieces of legislation
    that I highlight in my written testimony that have come out in
    recent years.
        Senator Risch, if I may also for a moment. I misspoke a
    moment ago. It was not Joshua Wong that the Secretary met with.
    It was another brave democracy activist named Nathan Law that
    he met with in London yesterday, and I just wanted to correct
    that for the record.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
        Senator Cardin.
        Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Biegun, thank you for your service. We appreciate
    it very much.
        There is a common theme from all of us. We get 5 minutes
    and we cannot list all of our concerns about China in 5
    minutes. There are so many issues of major concern.
        But I want to follow up on Senator Gardner's point that we
    need a global response, at least a regional response. The Trump
    administration--one of the first policies it initiated was to
    pull out of the TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a
    trading bloc that was to stand up in some respects against the
    economic power of China on a regional basis.
        The President then initiated trade policy talks with China
    that were unilateral with the United States and China, not
    engaging our other trading partners. And as those discussions
    have taken place, it is becoming a concern to many of our
    trading partners that the United States is looking for an
    agreement where they can point to some progress on specific
    commodities rather than dealing with the fundamental problems
    of the Chinese economy, the fact that it is government
    controlled, that it steals our intellectual property, that it
    manipulates currency, that there is government control, and the
    list goes on and on and on.
        So can you share with us what steps you are taking to
    develop a regional approach so that we have support from other
    countries to deal with the malignant activities of China?
        Mr. Biegun. Yes. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
        The United States is collaborating very closely with
    countries in the Indo-Pacific for a regional approach and
    globally. As I mentioned in my testimony, we have initiatives
    that have been launched in every continent of the world, even
    in the Arctic. The United States is actively advancing a
    strategy to pursue our interests. Secretary Pompeo today is in
    Denmark meeting with our allies there to discuss those very
    issues.
        Specifically in relation to the Indo-Pacific, we are
    working very closely with our ASEAN partners. We have launched
    a robust cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Quad with India,
    Japan, the United States, and Australia.
        Senator Cardin. Explain to me what the focus of that
    partnership is as it relates to China. What strategic actions
    are we planning as a regional approach to counter China?
        Mr. Biegun. We undertake military exercises together. We
    train for worst case scenarios and include deterrence in the
    suite of our strategies. We collaborate very closely on
    combating disinformation campaigns out of China. In fact, we
    have a regular coordinating discussion between me and my Indo-
    Pacific counterparts. We started, in the early stages of the
    COVID crisis, a weekly conference call with deputy-level
    officials in the foreign ministries of six other Indo-Pacific
    countries, along with the United States all towards both
    sharing best information on the challenges posed by China and
    providing support for efforts to comprehensively combat it.
        Of course, our Five Eyes intelligence coordination is a key
    part of this, along with our military alliances.
        We are every day, Senator, working in close cooperation
    with allies in the Indo-Pacific. And the central issue that all
    of them are considering in that relationship is China.
        Senator Cardin. Let me sort of challenge that and ask that
    you keep us informed on it because I hear messages coming out
    from the White House, but it does not seem to be coordinated
    with any of the other countries that are allied with us in that
    region.
        The One Road, One Belt policy of China is aimed at
    exercising its economic power globally.
        Senator Menendez talked about Hong Kong and our major
    concern in Hong Kong are the rights and freedom of the people
    of Hong Kong. And it is very clear to many of us that China has
    violated that agreement, and the special status that we give
    that territory should be reviewed and seriously consider
    eliminating their special status.
        One of the reasons why Hong Kong was given that status was
    not just to respect the human rights of the people that live
    there, but to develop a more market economy in that region,
    which was the hallmark of Hong Kong.
        Are we now in jeopardy of seeing Chinese influence, as is
    shown in Hong Kong, to try to dominate with government-
    controlled economies rather than allowing more market-driven
    economies?
        Mr. Biegun. I would say that most of China's economic
    policies are in fact incompatible with a rules-based market
    economy. There are some dimensions of the market that one can
    find in the Chinese economy and in other countries where China
    operates. The essential factor that made Hong Kong distinct
    from the remainder of China is the economy was governed under
    the rule of law with an independent court system in which fair
    justice could be applied. The two have to move hand in hand
    together.
        China is dismantling the democratic government and
    eliminating the rule of law in Hong Kong in manner that not
    only is eliciting a reaction from the United States and, by the
    way, many other countries around the world, but it is actually
    eliciting a reaction from many of the investors and businesses
    that chose to operate in Hong Kong as well. They are there
    because of the rule of law. They are there because of
    democratic governance, and the absence of that is going to do
    more damage to the fabric of Hong Kong's economy than any
    sanctions that we could conceive of.
        Senator Cardin. And I would suggest, just in closing, that
    there is an area where the U.S. in leadership working with
    countries of like mind should have a common response to what is
    being done by China in Hong Kong, a very definitive, strong
    response. That is where I think the U.S. would show its
    leadership and effectiveness in dealing with what China is
    doing.
        Mr. Biegun. So in the near term, Senator, under the
    presidency of the United States, the G-7 has released a
    coordinated statement on exactly that.
        Senator Cardin. A statement or action?
        Mr. Biegun. Well, the G-7 statement is a commitment to
    action.
        But what we are doing in the State Department is outlined
    in more detail in my written testimony. I will not go into
    significant detail, but the economic policy network that we are
    coordinating with many of our Indo-Pacific allies is intended
    to address these issues across the region in exactly the manner
    that you are describing.
        Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
        Senator Young.
        Senator Young. Mr. Biegun, welcome to the committee.
        China has combined taking advantage of a mercantilist
    economic approach, sometimes predatory economic policies, a
    strong position in a growing level of influence within
    development banks and international regulatory organizations
    with its Made in China 2025 initiative to create what seems to
    be a pretty potent economic statecraft arsenal. This is going
    to have long-term consequences for many countries around the
    world, but especially the United States as it relates to our
    relationship to allies and partners, as it relates to our own
    economic policies, our own good faith development efforts, and
    the future of American innovation and expertise. So it is
    really impacting so much of our own foreign and domestic
    policy.
        Having laid that foundation, how is the Department of State
    thinking about the issue of decoupling with China?
        Mr. Biegun. So our goal with China is not decoupling. Our
    goal is to present a set of pressures on China that has not
    lived up to the expectations that the world laid out two
    decades ago when China was welcomed into the World Trade
    Organization (WTO) and the years since when they were welcomed
    into full partnership with many countries around the world in
    economic relations. That is, that China becomes a net
    contributor and a responsible stakeholder in upholding global
    rule of law and institutions. China's efforts have been by
    design aimed at dismantling that consensus in a manner that has
    created huge imbalances in the global economy and has led to a
    number of predatory behaviors as you describe.
        I would not say that it is to our advantage to decouple
    from the Chinese economy, and that is not our specific policy
    goal. Our goal is to see China resume a full commitment to the
    path that they were on 20 years ago when they were trusted by
    the global community.
        Senator Young. Understood. I regret I have some follow-up
    questions and I have 3 minutes left.
        Mr. Biegun. I am sorry.
        Senator Young. No. That is fine, sir.
        So just very briefly, you mentioned China's entry into the
    WTO. Is it pretty clear to you and to the State Department
    generally that China has not followed the commitments, either
    the letter or the spirit of the law as it relates to their
    commitments, as a WTO member nation?
        Mr. Biegun. China severely abused its membership in the
    WTO, and more importantly, it missed an important moment to
    pivot in the Doha development round when it could have been an
    advocate for improving and strengthening the global trading
    system. It is to all of our detriment that they chose to take
    that role, but they did it to preserve the singular benefit
    that they derived from entering the WTO as a poor country,
    despite the fact that they are now one of the two largest
    economies in the world.
        Senator Young. Do you and should we envision a future in
    which countries are forced to choose between an alliance, or a
    strong partnership, with China on one hand or with an American-
    led system on the other?
        Mr. Biegun. That is not our intention, nor are we going to
    apply that litmus test to our relations with other countries.
    What we are going to do is seek to educate them on the
    challenges that come from an economic relationship with China
    and suggest and coordinate with them prudent steps in order to
    limit China's ability to disrupt the technology, privacy, or
    safety of their own citizens.
        Senator Young. Would it give the United States more
    leverage if our government invested in large-scale innovation
    efforts to ensure American leadership in key technologies,
    perhaps partnering with our allies and strong and trusted
    partners?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, I know that you are one of the several
    members of this committee who have worked with our Economic and
    Business Affairs Bureau on the global economic security
    strategy that is designed to do just that. We cannot be strong
    abroad if we are not strong at home, and we have to design our
    own strategies within our economic traditions within the free
    market to allow our innovators and our companies to produce the
    best and most competitive outcomes.
        I am confident we can do that. That has been one of the
    enduring strengths of the United States of America. We just
    have to recognize that we are doing it in an environment now
    where we have a near-peer competitor that is seeking to
    undermine the very ecosystem in which that economic progress
    was made.
        Senator Young. Thank you.
        With 30 seconds left, in summary fashion can you assess for
    me Xi Jinping's current standing within the Chinese Communist
    Party?
        Mr. Biegun. In taking power, one of the first things he did
    using an anticorruption initiative was to eliminate nearly all
    competitors inside the party. While I do not know the bona
    fides of those individuals or whether they were in fact
    involved in corruption. I can say that the selective
    prosecution of those individuals eliminated all significant
    political challenges. And I think he has a strong hold on power
    in China.
        More worrisome to us is the decision of the Chinese
    leadership also to dissolve a customary two-term limit on
    Chinese leaders which now leaves them potentially with a leader
    for life, which is problematic for any system. That means that
    any challenge to the decisions of the government is an
    existential threat to the leadership because of the absence of
    turnover, because of the absence of elections, and because of
    the absence of a rotation at the top level of Chinese
    leadership. I am afraid many of the behaviors that we have seen
    can be directly attributed to that factor.
        Senator Young. So you have just identified an interesting
    paradox which we see play out again around the world and
    throughout history, which is if you eliminate opposing forces,
    those competitive power centers within your government, in a
    way that makes you stronger but also makes you far more
    vulnerable to blowbacks.
        Mr. Biegun. There is a reason why democracy has served this
    nation so well for the last 240 years.
        Senator Young. Yes. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Young.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Secretary Biegun, thank you for being here.
        As you know, China's Belt and Road Initiative has allowed
    the Chinese to take a controlling stake in 13 European ports.
    Last year, we had a hearing before the Armed Services Committee
    where Admiral Davidson, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific command,
    testified that Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Maldives have all
    handed over control of their ports or territory to China. We
    know that 40 out of 55 African countries have gotten financing
    through the Belt and Road Initiative. More than 130 countries
    around the world.
        So given the clear benefits, advantages that China is
    taking through that initiative and the challenge that that
    presents to the United States, help me understand the
    Administration's logic in cutting U.S. diplomacy and
    development funding for 3 consecutive years.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        The most important tools that we have to use against that
    are a combination of the resources provided to the
    International Development Finance Corporation paired with the
    strong U.S. international business community that is more than
    prepared to seek business opportunities in every corner of the
    world.
        What we have tried to do in order to address the specific
    challenge to the Belt and Road Initiative is work on both ends
    of the equation. So not only are we seeking to provide more
    infrastructure support and assistance and facilitate through
    the active cooperation of our embassies, which now maintain
    what we call deal teams which bring together the interagency
    components of U.S. commercial diplomacy in order to support
    American companies competing with Chinese companies, but also
    on the other end of the equation, we have created a program
    called the Blue Dot Network, which is basically a Good
    Housekeeping Seal of Approval on major global infrastructure
    projects to make sure that they are done in a transparent and
    noncorrupt manner, that they are done with appropriate economy,
    and also that they are not financed in a manner that makes the
    recipient of the project fall into debt trap diplomacy, which
    China has used in several of the countries that you identified.
        Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that, but is it
    your contention that our efforts are as effective in terms of
    getting support from other countries, particularly in Africa
    and Asia, as the Chinese efforts?
        Mr. Biegun. As I highlighted in my testimony and as we have
    seen in recent months, there has been quite a backlash against
    China's debt trap diplomacy. In fact, the United States and
    many other countries in the G-20 have strongly advocated debt
    relief at this point in order to help many of these countries
    that are severely impacted by the COVID-19 crisis. The Chinese
    Government has been foot-dragging and reluctant in many cases
    to allow that debt relief because it is a major tool of policy
    that they have used to assert their influence in those
    countries.
        So I think the Chinese actually are facing a backlash, but
    I think our efforts are actually enjoying success as well. We
    are seeing business opportunities open up for the United States
    and our international trading partners in parts of the world
    that we had previously surrendered under the Belt and Road
    Initiative to China. And that no longer is the case.
        Senator Shaheen. In the end of June, this committee held a
    hearing on the international aspects of the coronavirus
    pandemic. And one of the things that we heard from both
    minority and majority witnesses, so virtually everybody who
    testified before us said that it was a mistake to withdraw from
    the World Health Organization (WHO). And one of the reasons
    they cited was because it provided a vacuum that the Chinese
    have been filling in terms of providing assistance and guidance
    to countries who are affected by the pandemic.
        Do you share that view?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, the President made the decision to
    file notification of withdrawal from the World Health
    Organization. We have not withdrawn from the Health
    Organization and are not allowed to for a full year after
    notification is filed.
        Senator Shaheen. No. I understand that. I am asking if you
    share the view that we heard from those witnesses that it would
    be a mistake for the United States to withdraw from WHO
    particularly at this time.
        Mr. Biegun. So, Senator, let me tell you why the President
    made the decision, and I assure you that I have given the
    Secretary of State and the Secretary of State has given the
    President benefit of our perspectives on this.
        Senator Shaheen. That is okay. I have read the reports on
    why the President made his decision. I happen to disagree with
    it, but you do not need to repeat it for me.
        Mr. Biegun. But, Senator, let me also highlight that one of
    the roles I played at the Department because I have had lead
    responsibility for many of the international dimensions of the
    COVID-19 crisis is in marshalling the substantial foreign aid
    effort that the United States is undertaking.
        But the debate over the WHO is a debate over less than 4
    percent and really in the mandatory contribution, less than
    half of 1 percent of the entire budget the United States
    provides----
        Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt. But the point
    that they were making was not just about the World Health
    Organization. It was about the failure of the United States to
    provide global leadership to respond to this pandemic. And I am
    not going to ask you to respond to that because I am out of
    time.
        But I do want to point out something that I think is
    positive and note that I was very pleased to see the recent
    actions that the State Department took against Russia and its
    malign efforts. Last week's Magnitsky designations of
    subsidiaries of Russia's paramilitary arm Wagner in Hong Kong,
    in Sudan, and in Thailand I think were a very important step
    forward. And I appreciate that the State Department took those
    actions.
        I wonder if you could clarify. Was that in response to any
    particular event that we have seen? Was it a response to the
    news or the reports that Russia had provided a bounty for the
    Taliban to kill American troops?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, the recent steps that we have taken in
    relation to Russia are simply a part of our pushback against a
    longstanding pattern of behavior that has made it virtually
    impossible for us to make progress in any way, shape, or form
    with the Russians.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Romney.
        Senator Romney. Deputy Secretary Biegun, I appreciate the
    work that you and members of the State Department are doing to
    secure our interests as they relate to China. But I am
    concerned that we are using the traditional techniques that we
    have long had, we are using them in more aggressive ways than
    we have to push back against China and their ambitions. But
    they are not working.
        China has not been diverted from the course that they are
    on. China is more assertive than I have ever seen in my life.
    During the years of Deng Xiaoping, he talked about keeping your
    head down and China would become stronger until the world was
    finally able to see how strong they were. Well, that has
    happened. They are not backing down. Look at what they are
    doing to the Uyghurs. Look at what they are doing with the
    South China Sea bases. Look at how they are cracking down on
    Hong Kong, how they saber rattle with regard to Taiwan. The
    Belt and Road Initiative. The number of ports they have and
    bases, extraordinary. The fact that the Philippines, the
    Solomon Islands are changing their course with regard to the
    relative relationship that we have had. Their cyber theft.
    Putting people in our universities to steal technology. The
    list goes on and on. It is not working.
        The normal approach that we take with countries that we are
    not happy with is not working. China represents a threat to
    freedom, to our economy, to our military capability, to our
    national security of an entirely different nature than what we
    have faced before. This is an extraordinary assault, and simply
    employing the normal techniques that we employ in normal
    circumstances is, in my opinion, not going to work.
        And actually the United States flexing all of our muscles
    alone is not strong enough because we have 330 million people
    and they have 1.4 billion people. Their economy will be bigger.
    They are already procuring as much military hardware as we are.
    They are going to be an enormous powerhouse. They are blasting
    ahead, and we will increasingly by in the rear view mirror
    unless we combine with other nations that abide by the rule of
    law, unless we link arms in a very dramatic and aggressive way
    and lay out rules of the road that they must follow or they
    will find themselves disconnected, as Senator Young has
    described, disconnected from the economy of the rest of the
    world.
        And we are not doing that. Instead we are saying America
    first, everybody go off and do your own thing. Great for
    Brexit. Let us blow up Europe. Everybody pursue your own
    interests. And America looks like we do not care about bringing
    the world together in a dramatic way.
        I would suggest a summit of the leaders of the major
    nations of the world and laying out a process to approach China
    in a very dramatic way. It strikes me when it comes to China
    strategy, we are like the Titanic. We are all running around
    straightening deck chairs and playing the music as loud as we
    can. But we are losing.
        And I look to you and ask am I wrong on that? Do we need to
    take a wholly different level of approach to combining with our
    friends around the world and confronting China to let them know
    they may not pursue the course they are on and continue to have
    free access to our marketplaces?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        You are not wrong, and I agree with you and virtually every
    senior official in this Administration agrees with you on the
    magnitude of this challenge.
        The one thing that I do not think any of us should expect
    are fast results. We are up against a generational challenge
    here. This is a formidable challenge in virtually every
    dimension of our economic, political, and social and military
    existence. We are up against a significant challenge in China.
        You likened it to the Titanic, but I would liken it more to
    an aircraft carrier that slowly begins to turn and reorient
    itself in a different direction. And that is what I have seen
    in the United States of America myself over the course of the
    last 5 to 7 years, that is, that different sectors of the
    United States, our NGOs, our think tanks, our China experts,
    our businesses, our Congress, our executive branch have slowly
    begun to reorient on the issue of China. And it was not easy
    for us to do. We invested quite a bit in the last three decades
    in a very different outcome. And sometimes wishful outcomes are
    hard to let go of, and many still have not. This Administration
    is equally criticized for moving too abruptly and too harshly
    against China or for precipitating a new Cold War. Not our
    intention.
        So, Senator Romney, you are absolutely right. It requires
    every bit of our energy and every bit of cooperation we can get
    from other countries. And it also requires strong unity here at
    home. I hope through discussions like this we can not only
    converge our views and come to a common approach on our
    strategy, but also that we can take that same sentiment abroad
    to our friends and allies both from the executive branch and
    the Congress to impress upon them how important it is that we
    partner on this issue. We are doing quite a bit in that regard
    but we can do more.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Risch and Ranking Member
    Menendez for this important hearing.
        Deputy Secretary, thank you for your service and for your
    testimony today.
        I will simply add to the conversation that has been going
    on about the significance of the challenge that China poses to
    our security, our prosperity, our place in the world, and the
    critical role of alliances and a strong and broad and sustained
    strategy. I want to commend members of this committee who have
    worked hard to develop legislation. I think there is an urgency
    about our developing a thoughtful and bipartisan approach to
    managing our strategic competition with China, to confronting
    its digital authoritarianism, and to strengthening our allies
    and our joint approach to China for the years ahead.
        So let me move, if I could, to a question, Mr. Deputy
    Secretary. Earlier this month, the ``Wall Street Journal''
    reported the Pentagon has presented the White House with
    options to reduce the American military presence in South
    Korea. This information comes as our President has also
    unnerved NATO and European allies and appeased Putin by
    deciding to remove a third of our troops from Germany.
        You continue to serve, Deputy Secretary, as Special
    Representative for North Korea. You have experience working on
    the Korean Peninsula. I am interested in whether you have been
    a part of these interagency discussions and how you think China
    would view the removal of a sizable portion of U.S. troops from
    the Korean Peninsula.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator Coons.
        The Secretary of Defense actually made some public remarks
    yesterday addressing the exercise that they have been going
    through and looking at force structure in South Korea and other
    places around the world, but also was quite emphatic that he
    has made no recommendation to the President nor presented no
    particular proposal to reduce troops.
        In general, the U.S. alliance on the Korean Peninsula plays
    an incredible role in anchoring our strategic interests in the
    region not only in relation to North Korea but also potentially
    in relation to the challenges that could emanate from the
    People's Republic of China. I will say that it is an alliance
    that I spend a lot of time engaged with because of my dual hat
    on North Korea policy, and this is an issue that I had the
    opportunity to discuss with my South Korean counterparts just 2
    weeks ago when I visited Seoul.
        There is a consensus in both Seoul and here in the United
    States that we need to rejuvenate the alliance. The purpose of
    the alliance between the United States and South Korea has for
    70 years been to enforce an armistice on the Korean Peninsula
    against a country, North Korea, of 25 million people and to
    defend South Korea, a country of 50 million people and a
    hundred times the economy.
        Senator Coons. Is it your view, Mr. Deputy Secretary, that
    reducing troop levels would help rejuvenate that alliance or
    put it at some risk?
        Mr. Biegun. I think what we need to do with the alliance,
    Senator Coons, is settle the issue of burden sharing and how we
    fund the alliance and then have also at the same time a
    strategic discussion to create a sustainable footing for that
    alliance for the next 75 years. If we were able to do so, I
    think a substantial presence in that region would strongly
    advance America's security interests in East Asia.
        Senator Coons. Thank you. I have two more questions I want
    to get to quickly. So forgive me. I appreciate your answer.
        I am deeply concerned about the Administration's
    consideration of deporting or refusing to allow the return of
    foreign students. And it was initially phrased as unless they
    are doing in-person classes. And I heard from presidents of
    every college and university in my State and regionally.
        There are about 350,000-370,000 Chinese students in the
    United States. And I recognize the security risks associated
    with students from a range of countries, but much more broadly,
    the overwhelming majority of them have an opportunity to be
    exposed to our ideals, to freedom, to academic inquiry. And I
    think on balance they are an enormous contributor both to our
    academic enterprise and many take back to their home countries
    a view of the United States that is much more positive.
    Obviously, if there are cases where they abuse the privilege of
    our openness, they should be investigated, removed, or even
    prosecuted.
        But I am concerned that the Administration will continue to
    flirt with blocking or deporting foreign students. You may well
    have influence over decisions on foreign students. But would
    you remind the Administration that our ability to persuade and
    attract other nations is a tool almost as valuable as our
    ability to compel?
        Mr. Biegun. I could not agree more with you, Senator Coons.
    And in fact, we settled out in the right place on our policies.
    I have to say that there was a little bit of a turbulence
    there, and not surprisingly, many university presidents weighed
    in. I strongly agree with you on the importance of these
    student programs. And in fact, the State Department has made an
    urgent priority of not only administering where we have travel
    restrictions due to COVID still, the issuance of visas, but
    with the highest priority being on allowing student travel to
    be facilitated in order to get those young men and women here
    to the United States of America for the fall semester. So we
    very much welcome those students, and we welcome students from
    China too, as I said in my opening statement, although
    expressly for the exclusive purposes of study.
        Senator Coons. There are reports China and Iran have
    reached a broad-based 25-year agreement which would allow China
    the opportunity to invest billions in energy infrastructure,
    provide them with reliable access to lower cost Iranian oil,
    and obviously then be a major challenge to the maximum pressure
    campaign.
        Does the Administration have a coordinated strategy
    internally and with our allies to respond to deepening China-
    Iran ties and China's increasing influence as a result in the
    Middle East?
        Mr. Biegun. So, Senator, the reports of that agreement are
    a little bit premature. Although the Iranians and the Chinese
    have been having a discussion for some time, there is no 25-
    year agreement in place at present. That is not to say that
    they could not possibly move forward. But at this point, they
    are closer to discussing it for the past 25 years than agreeing
    on the next 25 years.
        I will say that one of the worrisome elements of China's
    behavior is it is willing to consort with undemocratic
    countries like Iran or adversaries of the United States, and
    that is a general worry that we have across the board. In the
    case of Iran, we have a comprehensive strategy toward Iran and
    that would affect China if China engages with Iran in economic
    activities that are in violation of U.S. law.
        Senator Coons. Thank you for your answers.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
        Senator Barrasso.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate it.
        I want to just tell you how much I agree with what Senator
    Romney had to say, the concerns about China, the cover-up and
    disinformation campaign on the coronavirus, destruction of Hong
    Kong's autonomy, unlawful military activities in the South
    China Sea, theft of American intellectual property, and then
    the terrible human rights abuses that we continue to see today
    against the Uyghurs and minorities across the country.
        In terms of human rights, China is engaged in truly serious
    human rights abuses, including political, religious repression.
    These are attacks on human dignity, on religious freedoms. As
    Americans, we cannot tolerate this.
        So recently the Administration has taken strong actions to
    sanction China for its human rights abuses. And I strongly
    support the efforts of the Administration.
        Are there ways that we can better increase our support for
    the rights and the freedoms of the people of China along the
    line of democracy, opportunity, liberty, equality, the things
    that we hold dear?
        Mr. Biegun. Yes, absolutely, Senator. And thank you very
    much. Again, I want to emphasize I agree with Senator Romney's
    characterization of the magnitude of this challenge as well.
        In the case of repressions and human rights violations in
    Xinjiang, we actually used the Global Magnitsky Act, which many
    members of this committee contributed to its passage, and that
    provided us a very important tool that we could use in order to
    address those very specific human rights abuses that were
    identified in that legislation.
        But more generally, I think we need more interaction with
    Chinese civil society. And here I emphasize the point I made in
    my opening statement that we have to talk to the Chinese
    outside of China, the ones who really need to be heard and give
    voice to the aspirations of the Chinese people. But we also
    have to use a lot of the tools we have at our disposal to reach
    the people inside China to communicate with them, and I think
    that ultimately will be to our benefit.
        Senator Barrasso. With regard to--moving to the next
    topic--stealing intellectual property, one on the list that I
    have talked about, China continues to infiltrate top U.S.
    companies, laboratories, universities. It seems their goal is
    stealing valuable American intellectual property, trade
    secrets, the Chinese Communist Party clearly attempting to
    surpass us in economic strength, military capabilities, and
    international influence. It is their game plan. They are
    funding criminal hackers to target U.S. research in sectors
    ranging from agriculture to COVID-19-related biomedical
    research.
        Just yesterday--yesterday--the U.S. Department of Justice
    charged two Chinese nationals working on behalf of the
    Government of China with stealing trade secrets, hacking
    computer systems of companies who are working on a coronavirus
    vaccine. Just yesterday.
        You know, the FBI estimates that they open a new China-
    related counterintelligence case not every 10 weeks or 10
    months or 10 days. Every 10 hours they are having to open a new
    China-related counterintelligence case. So the FBI Deputy
    Director believes China's economic coercion is like that, he
    described, as an organized criminal syndicate.
        So what steps must we as a nation take along with our
    international partners, as you have talked about an
    international group? What must we do to end China's economic
    espionage?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        The State Department works very closely with the FBI. In
    fact, just before this hearing, I had a phone conversation with
    the individual who you quoted a moment ago, Deputy Director
    Dave Bowdich. We are doing an enormous amount to challenge this
    as we speak. The fact that those indictments were unsealed, as
    well as two others that were unsealed in the State of
    California just a few days before, are a suggestion of the
    degree of effort that we are applying to this. And I would not
    in any way dissociate the direction that the President gave to
    the Department of State yesterday to notify the PRC about the
    removal of diplomatic status of the consulate in Houston is
    very much related to this. You will be getting more briefings
    in a different setting on these topics, but suffice it,
    Senator, it is a set of challenges that we take very seriously
    and it is one that we and our domestic law enforcement partners
    are working very hard to address.
        Senator Barrasso. My final question has to do with Huawei.
    The Trump administration continues to raise the alarms with our
    allies and partners about the national security risks of Huawei
    and the Chinese Communist Party. To me, Huawei is a Trojan
    horse. Its deep links to the Communist regime are impossible to
    ignore. They are attempting to infiltrate communications
    networks around the world and for no good. It poses a serious
    risk, I believe, not only to our national security, but also to
    privacy, to intellectual property, and to human rights.
        You know, recently the United Kingdom recognized the
    serious security threat and is taking action to ban Huawei from
    their 5G networks. It sounds like Germany is going to make a
    decision. All eyes are on Germany with regard to what they
    decide on Huawei.
        Is it your impression we are making some headway and that
    our allies are understanding the dangers that are posed by
    having Huawei and ultimately China so involved in their
    telecommunications infrastructure?
        Mr. Biegun. Absolutely, Senator. We are seeing countries
    around the world recognize the risks of bringing unreliable
    technology like Huawei or ZTE into their networks. I know that
    Senator Menendez is a bit grudging about giving us credit for
    the decision of the UK, and I will give the UK Government first
    credit of course on this. But I can assure you, Senator, that
    decision was the product of lengthy and numerous discussions
    all the way up to the level of the President and the Prime
    Minister over the course of the last several months.
        Just today, we saw France mirror the UK's decision. France
    has now announced that all Huawei technology has to be removed
    from the French telecom system by 2028, a year later but with
    the same effect. This technology will rapidly be removed from
    those networks because it will be obsolete. The systems will be
    obsolete if they incorporate it now in advance.
        So we are seeing significant success in this effort, and we
    will continue to emphasize to partners around the world that we
    will not conduct secure communications on networks that are
    supplied by these Chinese technologies.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
        Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Secretary Biegun, good to see you again.
        I will start off by saying I think this is a very hard
    problem, and I also agree with both your opening testimony and
    Senator Romney's that there was a very well-intentioned
    strategy for the last three decades, really beginning with
    Nixon opening to China that we had every reason to try and hope
    it would work out. It had not. So that is unfortunate. I also
    do not give earlier administrations great credit for the way
    they handled this relationship either.
        But I will tell you the three critiques that I have about
    the Trump administration policy with China, and I want to ask
    you about the third one.
        Number one, I see a lot of action, but I sometimes have a
    hard time connecting the action to any strategy. So I mean,
    obviously, it is a massive relationship, so there is trade and
    there is diplomacy and there is human rights and there is
    military. There are a lot of things going on. But I have a hard
    time connecting the actions to a strategy.
        Number two, I think the U.S. under this Administration has
    squandered a natural advantage that we have that China does not
    have, which is a deep network of alliances, often by casting
    the alliances aside. I will go back to Senator Romney's point.
    When we want to confront China on trade, we cannot confront
    them one on one with the strength that we could confront them
    with if we linked arms with our allied nations that have the
    same concerns about China's trade practices as we do. So when
    the President started off with trade sanctions against Canada
    and Mexico and the EU, I think it made it much more difficult
    for us to try to go mano-a-mano against China. We should have
    been working with those strong allies to link arms and form a
    comprehensive strategy.
        But what I want to ask you about is my third critique. My
    third critique is I think the President's foreign policy is
    often chasing our adversaries into each other's arms. Senator
    Coons asked about the reports that are in the news. There is a
    ``Newsweek'' piece today about Iran and China doing a
    negotiation for economic infrastructure and defense
    cooperation. We have seen Iran and China do joint military
    exercises in the Gulf. We have seen China and Russia do joint
    military exercises on their border in some ways that are
    troubling to me.
        As a member of the Armed Services Committee, we get
    briefings every year, and they are often classified so I will
    not give you the info. But what I can tell you is we tend to
    get briefings about U.S. capacity, and then we get briefings
    about the capacity of China and the capacity of Russia and the
    capacity of Iran. But those are all separate briefings about
    their separate capacities.
        These are nations that have longstanding difficulties and
    challenges with each other. Iran has been in the revolutionary
    period very anti-great power, any great power. China and Russia
    have had a very, very difficult relationship. And President
    Nixon realized that and pretty much counted on the fact that
    they could not agree on anything. But as we see and in the
    article in ``Newsweek'' today, there is a Wilson Institute
    comment that says President Trump is driving our adversaries
    into each other's arms as they seek to amass power at a moment
    of apparent American indecision.
        How much of the State Department are you guys looking at
    this question, the relationships between these adversaries,
    China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, whether they are getting closer,
    how much a combination of capacities, military, economic,
    diplomatic, pose a multiplied threat to the United States?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        Just very quickly on your first two points. Let me assure
    you that we seek the same goals of a coherent strategy and
    closest possible cooperation with our allies. The United States
    is a big and sprawling democracy and occasionally we get in our
    own way on both of those. But it is our aspiration, and it is
    something that we work on at the State Department every day.
    And the President has given us clear direction on the China
    strategy that is going to help us move I think in a more
    orderly way across the Administration in that direction.
        On your question, I have to tell you honestly we spend less
    time worrying about our adversaries working in concert with
    each other, although it is worrisome, and more about countries
    maybe in the middle. So it is inconceivable to me that we are
    going to have a cooperative relationship with a Venezuela ruled
    by Maduro, a Syria ruled by Assad, unfortunately a Russia ruled
    by Putin, or an Iran ruled by the ayatollahs. It is the other
    countries, the Belt and Road Initiative countries that were
    previously mentioned and also countries that have been in
    discussions with the Chinese about military basing or presence,
    countries like the UAE or Djibouti where we really have to
    apply ourselves and we do.
        As I mentioned, I did a weekly phone call with my Indo-
    Pacific partners, India, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand,
    Australia, and the United States, my counterparts. And one
    night after that weekly call--it happens late on Thursday
    evenings--I turned to my team and I asked do you suppose--what
    do you wonder what that call would have sounded like tonight if
    it was China, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, and Iran? I can tell
    you from our allies' point of view, it is a rich discussion
    anchored in historic shared interests and shared values that
    allow us to build natural cooperation, as long as we can get
    out of our own ways. And it is not just us incidentally. Many
    times our challenges come from our partners as well. But we
    work through those as friends and allies.
        We have to do that with friends and allies. We have to do
    that with the countries in the middle. I am less optimistic
    that we are going to find common cause with the adversaries.
    Unfortunately, it is the case that they will find common cause
    with each other.
        Senator Kaine. That is an illuminating answer. And I just
    would hope--and I do not need to ask it because I am sure you
    are doing it--as we watch these adversaries who have
    traditionally been opposed to each other get closer and closer
    and closer and do more and more together, we do need to be
    paying attention to them.
        Mr. Biegun. We do. And just as our relationships are based
    upon shared interests and shared values, theirs are very
    transactional. The United States has been a longstanding
    partner of countries like Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan,
    South Korea, and there is no doubt in the minds of those people
    what the long-term orientation of the United States is in our
    interests and values with them.
        Russia and China, maybe not so much.
        Senator Kaine. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Perdue.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Secretary, thank you for being here.
        The Chairman. There is a weather warning.
        Senator Perdue. That was Huawei checking in on our hearing.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Perdue. You know, I find myself always in these
    hearings, Mr. Chairman and Secretary, agreeing with my good
    friend from Virginia, Senator Kaine. We disagree on some things
    in terms of causative factors, but this is a very complicated
    relationship we have. We got it wrong for the last 30 years, 40
    years really. I have lived over there. I have got a background,
    and I have watched this develop. Deng Xiaoping, I think, sold
    us a bill of goods. Michael Pillsbury has written a book, ``The
    Hundred-Year Marathon,'' that acknowledges that we all got it
    wrong. All of us. It has nothing to do with policies or
    politics or anything else. It is just we got it wrong. We now
    see what they are trying to do.
        And the vacuum that was created in the last administration
    frankly in foreign policy created a vacuum that he stepped
    into. The Chinese culture never tells you what they are going
    to do unless they have decided you do not have the wherewithal
    or the will to stop them. In 2013, they put out the Made in
    China 2025 where they told the world they are going to dominate
    us in 12 areas of technologies, and they are making huge
    investments to do that. They developed the Belt and Road
    Initiative. Why? Because there was a vacuum.
        And I want to come back to the thing Senator Kaine talks
    about every time we talk about China, and that is allies.
    Senator Coons does the same thing. I think we all see this as
    our huge advantage. I want to talk about the Quad today, but
    before I do that, I want to make a comment.
        If we sat here and worried about what China is doing, we
    would worry about the Shanghai Cooperative Organization where
    they have got four nuclear powers in a defense-type
    organization, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. Now, that is
    an odd group of partners there. So I do not really worry a lot
    about that.
        What I am looking at is that the world has become very
    binary. You have state-controlled countries, Russia, China,
    Venezuela, Cuba, others, Syria, and you have the other
    countries of the world that are self-determinant. Countries
    like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore are all beginning to pay
    attention to what China's ultimate goals are, and that is to
    dominate the economic and political relationship. So they are
    very concerned about that. They are actually trying to turn
    back to us.
        I do think, though, the Quad is a specific, targeted effort
    right now that we could put a lot of energy behind. I would
    like you to respond to this that Australia, India, Japan, and
    the U.S. are beginning to look at how we might pull together.
        Our economic value--and that is how we defeated the Soviet
    Union without firing a bullet was that we ground them into the
    dirt with our economy, I believe, and we bankrupted their
    ethos. We have the same opportunity here in that the economic
    power of China today is about $14 trillion unadjusted. If you
    take just the Quad, it is over $30 trillion of economic power.
    So we have the ability today to dominate the economic, military
    relationship just with those four countries. I am not including
    Europe or any of the other countries in Asia that are already
    beginning to lean our way.
        How is the State Department looking at the Quad as an
    example of a relationship that we could build and actually
    encourage others to see how they might participate to stand up
    against the bully of the next 50 years?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        If I could add your description of the global environment
    that we face to Senator Romney's description of the challenge
    we face from China, I think we would have a complete picture of
    what we see every day when we wake up at the Department of
    State.
        I agree with you that the Quad is an incredibly important
    institution. The ministerial that we held last year marked a
    milestone in how we are going to approach organizing our
    security interests and other interests in the Indo-Pacific.
    India just recently invited Australia to participate in the
    Malabar exercises, which is now going to allow all four members
    of the Quad to participate in a military exercise together that
    will be hugely beneficial to reinforcing the behaviors that are
    going to be necessary for us to defend our mutual interests.
        Just stepping back, it is not quite your question and I
    apologize for using your time. But I see our policies
    successful if they stand on four pillars. First is unity at
    home. Second is close partnership with our friends and allies
    around the world. Third is effective military deterrence, and
    fourth is a powerful economic alternative to China. We have to
    work on all four of those together. But the part about
    international cooperation will be fundamental.
        I actually think if we get all four of these right, we
    produce the best outcome with China as well because if China
    sees that that is how the world is aligned against its efforts,
    it will have the best incentive to change its behavior in a
    peaceful manner as well.
        Senator Perdue. Thank you.
        I will yield my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        And I would just like to make a comment that I think this
    type of meeting with someone at this level in the State
    Department and in the Administration is so critical to have us
    develop more of a nonpartisan view of China that could
    transcend administrations. That is the problem with dealing
    with China. You cannot yo-yo your relationship with a country
    like that because they are going to be much more monotone over
    a longer period of time.
        Thank you for having this hearing.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, could I just tell Senator Perdue
    that that noise was a flash flood warning that started just
    when he started to speak.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Kaine. I do not know if there is any connection,
    causal----
        Senator Perdue. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. Fortunately, we are not on the ground floor.
    Thank you, Senator Perdue.
        Senator Murphy.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
        U.S. foreign policy for much of the last 40 years has been
    about studying the interactions of China, Russia, and the
    United States, and two of that three trying to play off one
    against the other.
        I want to ask two questions today that get at what I think
    is a continued priority for this committee and this
    Administration to understand how that interplay works in modern
    times.
        The first is this. You have laid out a series of actions
    that the Administration is taking with the hope of sending
    clear messages to China about the consequences of its actions
    especially when it comes to ways in which they infringe on the
    rights of the United States at home and abroad. But China does
    not pay attention only to the messages we send them. They also
    pay attention to the messages that we send to other nations.
    And Russia is at the top of that list.
        I do not think we have gotten a chance yet to get a member
    of the Administration on the record with respect to very
    credible reports that suggest the Russian Government was paying
    what would commonly be referred to as bounties for the murder
    of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That, of course, crosses a line.
    It is a fairly unprecedented abuse of one Security Council
    permanent member by another. And thus far, the American public
    and the world have not seen any consequences, not even a public
    acknowledgement of that abuse having been committed against the
    United States. I worry that China watches that and takes
    signals from it.
        So I wanted to just ask you to tell us for the record today
    whether any action has been taken or is planned to be taken
    with respect to these, I think we would all agree, very
    credible reports.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        I will answer your question, but I am also going to be
    mindful of the fact that the information that you are
    discussing comes from sensitive sources and methods.
        But let me say this. Any suggestion that the Russian
    Federation or any part of the Russian Government is employed in
    providing resources to fighters from other countries to attack
    American soldiers will be met with the most severe
    consequences, including those individuals and their movements
    in the areas in which they are undertaking those activities.
    Were that to happen, they should expect a full and robust
    response.
        I will also say that any such report that came into the
    United States of America would be treated in two manners.
    First, it would immediately be notified to the force commander
    and all necessary steps would be taken in order to protect U.S.
    soldiers anywhere in the world, particularly in a place like
    Afghanistan in which they serve every hour of the day in a
    hostile environment. But it would also be the subject of a
    conversation between very senior officials in both governments
    in no uncertain terms.
        Senator Murphy. I think the horse is out of the barn with
    respect to these reports being solely classified, and thus,
    while you may be suggesting that there are actions being taken
    that have not been made public, I think we are at the point
    where the world and this country wants to know what those
    consequences are. And I think it does have impact with respect
    to our relationship with other great powers.
        Which leads me to my second question with respect to the
    interplay of the United States, Russia, and China, and that is
    with respect to the negotiation of an extension of New START.
    The Administration has laid down some priorities in order to
    get to a new agreement. One of them is the inclusion of China
    in those discussions and ultimately in a new agreement. Were we
    to all live in a perfect world, of course we would want China
    at that table. Of course, it is in our interest to have China
    right now before they acquire the same number of arms and
    warheads as the United States agree to some limitation. But it
    likely does not stand to reason that China is going to enter
    into those negotiations because they would likely want time to
    catch up before they sat at a table with us.
        And so I think I would just love some assurance that we are
    not going to give China the veto power as to whether we engage
    in a renewal of an agreement with China that, I think we can
    all agree, the confines of that agreement has worked to limit
    the arms race. I just want to make sure that China is not going
    to be the one that decides whether the United States and Russia
    decide to renew that agreement.
        Mr. Biegun. I appreciate that take, and Senator, I think
    you can see the evidence in front of you. I know that our
    Special Envoy for Arms Control testified in his additional
    capacity yesterday as the nominee to be Under Secretary for
    Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and also he
    was up here a few weeks ago I believe to brief members of the
    committee on the progress in our discussions with the Russians.
    Those are ongoing. We are imminently going to be dispatching
    the technical teams to continue a deeper level discussion in
    Vienna with the Russians, and that decision is ongoing.
        There is still a seat at the table reserved for China, but
    those conversations between the United States and Russia are
    going.
        I believe my colleague at the Department of State has
    emphasized this point in his discussions with you, but let me
    say it publicly as well. Russia has every reason to want China
    at those discussions as well. Russia faces a far more
    formidable challenge from China's presence on its southern
    border than the United States does.
        And this goes to the transactional nature of the
    relationship that I think exists between the two countries. The
    history between Russia and China is one of significant tension,
    and the fact that it is papered over today because of a shared
    adversarial relationship with the United States is not an
    enduring basis for China-Russia relations. And I think many of
    the experts in Russia who work on these issues know full well
    that China should be at the table as well not only because of
    its potential strategic challenge that it could pose to the
    Russian Federation but because China as a P-5 member and is a
    recognized nuclear weapons state under the Non-Proliferation
    Treaty is obliged to participate in good faith negotiations to
    reduce the level of nuclear forces that it holds. The Non-
    Proliferation Treaty does not say in proportion to other
    countries in the world. It says good faith efforts on reduction
    of nuclear forces, and that is what we are requesting of the
    People's Republic of China.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy, for that line of
    questioning too.
        Senator Merkley.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for your testimony, Deputy Secretary.
        The trade deficit between the United States and China has
    had a huge impact in transferring wealth and jobs from America
    to China, and in the course of that unfolding, we have watched
    in a short period of time China go from bicycles to traffic
    jams to bullet trains. It is not that many years ago that we
    had a congressional delegation go to China. They had their
    first bullet train, 200 miles, Beijing to Tianjin on the coast.
    Now they have 16,000 miles.
        President Trump made this point, campaigned on this point,
    has continued to make this point, and yet between 2015 and
    2018, our trade deficit increased over 14 percent in
    manufactured goods, in a higher level of disparity between the
    two economies.
        Is this a topic that the team is deeply engaged in? Because
    here we are talking about the surging China, and yet it is the
    very policy of the United States that provided the economic
    foundation for that surge.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        Yes, this absolutely remains one of the President's top
    priorities and one that particularly our counterparts in our
    economic agencies pursue aggressively but also certainly
    remains a priority for the Department of State as well.
        We have a lot of progress that we have to make in order to
    rebalance our trade relations. The phase one trade deal was
    just that. It was phase one. It was an early harvest. It was an
    attempt in a few sectors to begin to right the balance, but
    there is much, much more work that needs to be done in order to
    eliminate the structural impediments to a more balanced U.S.-
    China trade relationship, and we are committed to pursuing
    those.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you. Well, I am glad you are
    committed to it. You are working on it. Mitt Romney proceeded
    to note that free access to our market has been a significant
    factor in China as well.
        But here is the thing. The efforts proceeded in such a
    fashion that the trade deficit actually has grown in
    manufactured goods. A kind of chaotic throwing of rocks at
    China and them throwing rocks back at us does not get us to a
    reduced trade deficit. So it has to be a much more coherent,
    strategic strategy than the one we have seen so far.
        I have been very concerned about China's enslavement of a
    million Uyghurs using all kinds of facial recognition
    technology, other IDs, surveillance, producing an enormous
    amounts of goods, many bound for the United States.
        Should the United States completely end the ability of
    China to send goods manufactured under this slave labor
    strategy with a million Uyghurs to the United States?
        Mr. Biegun. We should import no goods from any country,
    including China, made with slave labor. And, Senator, the
    recent series of sanctions that we imposed upon several Chinese
    companies operating in Xinjiang were precisely for that
    purpose.
        Senator Merkley. Well, of course, it is not just Chinese
    companies. It is American multinationals as well that have
    operations in this area. It has been sometimes hard to get the
    clear facts. I understand it is difficult.
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, we have sent out a business advisory
    to the CEOs of the 500 major U.S. companies, as well as every
    business association in Washington, DC and specifically the
    ones operating in China, that they will be held accountable if
    materials or components made through forced labor or slave
    labor in Xinjiang appear in their products.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you. I will say I was extremely
    disturbed to hear that President Trump had dismissed this slave
    labor, this enslavement of the Muslim community as unimportant
    in his conversations with Chinese leaders.
        I want to talk about Taiwan. I do not think it has been
    discussed here today. We have had essentially a position going
    from our early opening of the relationship with China where we
    have accepted the concept of their sovereignty over Hong Kong
    and over Taiwan. Well, they have now dramatically violated the
    terms of the agreement of two systems, one country for Hong
    Kong. And Taiwan has essentially been operating as an
    independent country for a very long time.
        Is it time for us to start looking seriously at starting to
    treat Taiwan as a country, not an extension of China?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, the policy of this Administration is
    to uphold the One-China policy, but consistent with that, also
    to fully enact the protections underneath the Taiwan Relations
    Act and the Three Communiques.
        In the case of Taiwan, we commend them for building a
    robust democracy. A recent election represented the true will
    of the Taiwanese people. And it is a tremendous accomplishment
    and it is a demonstration to the people of China that a
    Confucian-based society is capable of operating fully within
    democratic norms.
        I will point your attention to a series of high profile
    public remarks that have been made by senior administration
    officials, including the Attorney General, the National
    Security Advisor. Tomorrow, Secretary Pompeo will be giving
    some remarks out at the Nixon Library in California, and he
    will be talking about some of these issues.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I really appreciate you being here, Mr. Secretary.
        Like many here and in the Administration, I am very
    disturbed by the recent authoritarian turn in China from Hong
    Kong to the Uyghurs to Tibet and across their civil society.
        And while this is happening, I am also deeply concerned
    about our own moral authority on these matters and it eroding
    here at home, limiting our ability to rally the world to put
    pressure on China, as many others have spoken about today. The
    sad fact is this Administration has taken a hostile attitude
    towards asylum seekers, separating children, some of them very
    young, from their families. They are doing it on purpose as a
    cruel deterrent to tell others to stay away from America when
    fleeing violence.
        Last month, we saw the National Guard members using pepper
    spray, rubber bullets, and other blunt instruments against
    peaceful protesters in the streets of our nation's capital.
        This week in Portland, camouflaged federal agents have been
    taking peaceful protesters into custody in unmarked vans and
    beating protesters, including a 57-year-old nonviolent Navy
    veteran.
        These scenes echo those on the streets of Hong Kong. This
    is a moment that cries out for national leadership, but this
    President only offers unhinged threats of violence against
    Americans exercising their First Amendment rights. Many are
    increasingly concerned that the President's behavior and those
    of his loyalists creates divisions at home. This committee
    needs to consider how that weakens us abroad as well.
        Let me be clear. We should oppose any such behavior from
    the Chinese or any government that represses their people.
    Their treatment of Tibet and the Uyghurs is in particular
    totally unacceptable. But authoritarian crackdowns here at home
    and the hawkish saber rattling are not going to help those in
    Hong Kong or repressed religious minorities. Sanctions have not
    worked in Cuba and they are unlikely to work with China. There
    is no good military solution here. Like with the Soviet Union,
    we can overcome repression with openness, welcome asylum
    seekers, foster freedom of speech, show a better example.
        What has been the response of our adversaries and our
    allies to this Administration's actions like child separation,
    cutting off asylum, and now paramilitary crackdowns on mostly
    nonviolent protesters? How is that impacting our efforts to
    build coalitions to push back on China's authoritarianism, and
    are we facing more accusations of hypocrisy?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, I generally am an agreeable person,
    but I have to say I cannot agree with nearly anything that you
    just laid out.
        I think the type of protests that you see playing out in
    the streets of the United States of America within a democratic
    system with the rule of law and democratic rights guaranteed to
    all, the ability to choose officials who govern them and the
    responsibility of law enforcement authorities themselves to be
    answerable to the law represents an entirely different
    situation than what we are seeing play out in Hong Kong.
        I understand the temptation, and certainly the Chinese----
        Senator Udall. How about the part where you have the
    President going for a photo op and clearing peaceful
    protesters? I mean, that does not sound to me like the America
    I know, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, I understand that this moment has
    excited strong emotions and some of them we see playing out in
    the streets, some in an orderly way, which is part of a robust
    democracy, and some of it in a disorderly way that does require
    some level of enforcement and authority in order to protect
    private property and the safety of individuals. That is the
    moment we are in.
        But we are in that moment in a democratic society, Senator,
    in which you and I can have this discussion openly. And to
    suggest that there is any comparison with the environment in
    which we are having this discussion and the one that brave
    democracy leaders like Joshua Wong and Nathan Law face in Hong
    Kong is simply wrong. This is a moment that has excited a lot
    of passions here in the United States, and it is an
    uncomfortable moment for us because of that. But it does not
    indict our democracy. The resolution of these issues through
    the rights and liberties that all citizens in this country are
    guaranteed under our Constitution and by our courts is exactly
    how we move forward as a society. And we will.
        Senator Udall. One quick question on the health care front.
    Are the CDC, NIH, and others in the United States being allowed
    to share scientific information about COVID-19 with their
    respective Chinese counterparts?
        Mr. Biegun. So, Senator, we are very interested--and I laid
    out in my opening testimony deeper cooperation with the health
    authorities in the People's Republic of China to understand
    both the origins and characteristics of the COVID-19 virus, as
    well as cooperation, as the President said, on potential areas
    of addressing or treating it.
        I will say that it has been a stubborn resistance we have
    faced from the People's Republic of China dating back to mid-
    January when I was first engaged in this issue and the Chinese
    Government over several weeks refused to allow a WHO delegation
    into China in order to examine these very issues at the
    beginning of the crisis.
        At present, we are now in an environment in which the World
    Health Assembly has overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling
    for that exact kind of investigation under independent
    leadership. The WHO has appointed two respected leaders to lead
    that effort, and they are deeply frustrated by their inability
    to gain access to China in order to do the work that the World
    Health Organization has appointed them to do.
        We would be prepared to have that kind of discussion, and I
    highlighted it in my opening testimony as one of the potential
    areas that we could potentially open some areas of cooperation
    with China that would be to the benefit of the entire world.
        Secretary Pompeo likewise framed these issues with his
    counterpart in Honolulu approximately a month ago when we met
    there. Unfortunately, the Chinese have not taken us up on that
    proposal.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Steve, thank you for being here. When you decided to
    step up and come back into public service, I said this was an
    important time in our country's history. I was glad you were
    stepping up. I had no idea how important it would be.
        So here we are talking about one of the great challenges we
    face now as a country with China having an increasingly
    aggressive posture toward us in so many areas. And I know this
    has been discussed today, certainly in trade where I am hopeful
    we can finish phase one, but phase two seems unlikely, and they
    continue to not play by the rules. Military adventurism in the
    South China Sea and elsewhere. The saber rattling we have seen
    recently vis-a-vis Taiwan and elsewhere. The human rights
    abuses as it relates to the Uyghurs. I was in Tibet a couple of
    years ago and got to see some of what goes on there. And then
    recent passage of this new national security law with regard to
    Hong Kong, I mean, so many troubling things.
        And I am going to ask you about another one this afternoon
    which relates to China systematically targeting U.S.
    researchers and good research and then taking that research.
    And we have new legislation we just had marked up in committee
    today to combat that.
        But with this long list, this sort of list of
    ``horribles,'' tell me something good that is happening in
    respect to our relationship with China.
        Mr. Biegun. An issue that I know is near and dear to you,
    Senator, and one that you have shown leadership in, the Chinese
    just in the past several days invited the DEA to establish a
    presence in one of our consulates in China in order to deepen
    our collaboration on fighting against not only the trade in
    fentanyl but the trade in the precursors that we have seen
    being used to evade some of the restrictions that have been put
    in place. It is a small issue but it is one that we can
    potentially work on with the Chinese.
        I stay in regular contact with my Chinese counterparts on
    North Korea. It is an important area of shared interest between
    the United States and China. I would not say that they are
    completely faithful in fulfilling their responsibilities under
    the international sanctions regime, but still they do generally
    push in the right direction and it is an area at least where we
    can have discussions.
        We stay in close touch with the Chinese Government on the
    peace process in Afghanistan. Like many other countries in the
    region, China has a shared interest in a stable outcome in
    Afghanistan. Of course, we do not want to see the territory of
    Afghanistan surrendered to terrorist rule again and, frankly,
    neither does the People's Republic of China.
        There are several areas that I highlight in my testimony
    where there are at least areas of potential cooperation between
    us.
        I will say, Senator, that my 16-page testimony had to be
    cut back one-third, and in doing so, we had to remove a litany
    of the issues that you have raised and many of them still are
    enumerated there. It is a long list and a formidable challenge,
    a generational challenge that we face with China. And
    notwithstanding these smaller areas of cooperation that I have
    highlighted, we have an enormous task ahead of us to turn back
    the challenge from China.
        Senator Portman. I agree. The challenge is only growing
    every day, as I see it, and that is one reason I wanted to ask
    you about some of the positive lines of communication that we
    do have open with China. It is important to have that.
        I believe that, with regard to the stealing of technology
    and innovation, that we are finally waking up as a country. I
    think that we typically tend to point the finger at China when
    in fact we need to get our own house in order in many respects,
    and one is not to be naive about what the Chinese have been up
    to through the Chinese Communist Party, which is really what is
    behind this, and their relationship with their own
    universities, their own research. For 20 years, as you know,
    for two decades, they have been systematically taking our good
    research, much of it paid for by the U.S. taxpayer, $150
    billion a year, and using it to help fuel their own economic
    rise and their military rise because some of it is military
    technology.
        I think you are aware of the fact that we have legislation
    again that was marked up today in the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee. We have worked very closely
    with your people because one of the five major elements of this
    legislation has to do with the visa process and the ability to
    deal with the current loophole in law as it relates to export
    controls and as to being able to deny a visa based on somebody
    coming to this country in order to take some of our most
    sensitive information. So, one, I want to thank your people.
    They testified before us. They have worked closely with us.
    They have helped us to address concerns that some in the
    university community had.
        But do you have any thoughts on this broader issue? Our
    legislation is called the Safeguarding American Innovation Act
    because that is what it is about. And again, there are several
    elements to it, but one that is very important relates directly
    to your Department.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator.
        First, we are in complete agreement on the gravity of the
    problem, and it has been a persistent problem ongoing for a
    very long time. We now have more tools that we can use to push
    back against it. And as I said earlier in the hearing, the
    State Department is working closely with our domestic law
    enforcement partners in order to address these issues.
        In the coming days, you are going to be the recipient of
    some additional briefings on these matters related to some of
    the steps the President directed the Department to take this
    week, as well as some of the indictments that have been
    unsealed by the Department of Justice. I will only say that you
    will get more detail on the full effort that we have undertaken
    in order to push back against those predations.
        Senator Portman. That is great. Well, the indictments and
    the arrests have increased substantially since our report came
    out at the end of last year. And we called for DOJ and the FBI
    to step it up and they have, to their credit. But I think we
    have just seen the tip of the iceberg, including 54 scientists
    just being relieved of their duties at the National Institutes
    of Health. They are researchers they had been providing grant
    funding to; some had resigned and some were fired. We have
    countless examples now, including in my own state of Ohio of
    people who have, shall we say, a conflict of commitment, taking
    millions of dollars from China, taking millions of dollars from
    the U.S. taxpayer, not revealing the Chinese money, setting up
    replicate labs in China and taking the research, taking
    innovation, really leapfrogging us by taking advantage of our
    relatively open research enterprise.
        So we appreciate your work on that, and again, thanks to
    the State Department visa folks working with us on an important
    element of that legislation to counter this.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Portman.
        Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, these are very divided times for our country. I
    have to say just a few minutes ago, this committee heard a
    Democratic Senator compare federal law enforcement agents to
    Chinese Communist oppressors, silencing and brutalizing
    protesters in Hong Kong. Political disagreements are fine, but
    let me say for the record that comparison is obscene. It is
    false and it is grotesque.
        I recognize we are 104 days out from an election, but last
    week the Speaker of the House tweeted out a statement calling
    federal law enforcement officers storm troopers, a term
    typically reserved for Nazis and other such oppressive thugs.
    She alleged that the storm troopers were kidnapping people on
    the streets. She described those people as innocent and
    peaceful protesters. Cops are not storm troopers. And an arrest
    is not kidnapping. And people who are engaged in violent acts
    of riot, who are assaulting innocent citizens, who are fire-
    bombing police cars, who are attacking federal buildings and
    courthouses, who are murdering police officers are not engaged
    in peaceful protests.
        So I would just encourage members of this committee and
    Members of the Senate--you may not like the President. That is
    your prerogative in a democratic system, but slandering federal
    law enforcement officers for protecting courthouses and federal
    properties by calling them, analogizing them to Communist
    thugs, those are not comments befitting the Senate of the
    United States.
        Now, Mr. Biegun, speaking of Communists, this morning it
    was announced that the State Department asked the Chinese
    consulate in Houston to vacate the premises within 72 hours. I
    was wondering if you could tell this committee what the reason
    for that was and what the basis was for it.
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        In my earlier remarks, I highlighted three areas of
    particular concern the United States has that led the President
    to make these decisions.
        One is the persistent theft of U.S. technology by Chinese
    Government representatives and agents.
        The second is the degree to which that is being done
    through abuse of our student exchange systems.
        And the third is the behavior of Chinese diplomats in the
    Houston consulate in a manner that it is incompatible with the
    standard practice of diplomacy.
        There will be sensitive briefings given to members of the
    committee. They have been arranged now and our counterparts in
    domestic law enforcement have likewise been in touch with their
    oversight entities. I want to assure you that you will have
    more detail on this, but for purposes of an ongoing process and
    also an ongoing investigation, I would prefer to leave further
    detail for that discussion.
        Senator Cruz. And I have that classified briefing already
    scheduled this week. But I would encourage the State
    Department, to the extent possible and consistent with
    protecting sources and methods, to make the basis public. I
    think it is beneficial. I have no reason to doubt your
    representations that the personnel at the Chinese consulate in
    Houston were behaving in ways harmful to U.S. national security
    interests, but I think it is beneficial for both Americans and
    the world to understand some of the evidence about what those
    threats were.
        Let us shift to a different topic and that is Taiwan and
    what the U.S. can do substantively and symbolically to
    emphasize support for our ally.
        In 2015, the Obama administration responded to a request
    from China and banned Taiwanese officials and military members
    from displaying their flags or insignia on U.S. Government
    property and bases. I have introduced legislation that would
    reverse these guidelines. But that decision could also be made
    within the State Department by the Administration.
        Can you speak as to how the Administration views this
    specific issue, whether Taiwanese officials should be able to
    display their flags and insignia, and also address more broadly
    the issue of supporting Taiwan in the face of Chinese
    aggression?
        Mr. Biegun. So on the specific question, I was unfamiliar
    with that policy pronouncement in the previous Administration,
    and it is one that we are more than happy to take a look at
    with an eye toward reversing it.
        Senator Cruz. I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Biegun. In regard to our broader relationship with the
    people of Taiwan, the Secretary commended President Tsai on her
    very successful election, as I said earlier, demonstrating that
    Chinese heritage, a Confucian society, is not incompatible with
    democracy, and we should never forget that. And we should only
    hope that the people of China can all enjoy the fruits of
    democracy.
        In the meantime, the United States remains fully engaged in
    our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Three
    Communiques. We are providing ongoing support for the defensive
    capabilities of the people of Taiwan and, in fact, just
    recently some additional sales on top of already the largest
    arms sale to Taiwan by any administration since the United
    States recognized the People's Republic of China.
        We expect China to uphold its commitments to peacefully
    resolve any dispute with Taiwan, and we watch very closely over
    that fact.
        We also believe that there is an important place for
    Taiwan, for example, in the World Health Assembly as an
    observer and participating in the global dialogue on protecting
    the international community from the ravages of pandemics like
    COVID-19. The Taiwanese authorities enjoyed tremendous success
    in containing COVID-19 because perhaps they, even more so than
    many of us, were aware of exactly what they were contending
    with, not just in terms of the virus but in terms of the
    country from which it originated.
        So we have a very high esteem for Taiwan, and Senator, I
    will take a look at the issue that you asked us about.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        Senator Menendez.
        Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said a man must be
    judged by the passions of his time. And I would simply say that
    when we have federal agents sweep up innocent and peaceful
    protesters in Lafayette Park so that the President can have a
    photo op, it does not serve our cause of promoting in the world
    democracy and human rights as an example. And so I think that
    the Senator from New Mexico, as his last question, was pursuing
    that with the Secretary. And I think we could all agree there
    was a lot of silence when that took place. But I think we could
    all agree that is not in our collective interest.
        Mr. Secretary, there are consistent reports that U.S.
    companies failed to undertake basic labor and human rights
    assessments in Xinjiang, in essence, willfully ignoring the
    horrific conditions of forced labor in Xinjiang. This is a
    particular problem for clothing and garment manufacturers,
    given that 84 percent of Chinese cotton comes from Xinjiang.
        Further, recent reports have indicated that a wide array of
    U.S. companies, including Apple, Kraft, Heinz, Coca-Cola, and
    the Gap, among others, have sourced or continue to source from
    Xinjiang.
        Other international firms with considerable U.S. presence
    also have operations in Xinjiang, including those who have
    partnerships with state-owned military contractors that
    manufacture and supply the Chinese Government with the mass
    surveillance tools it uses in its new digital authoritarianism
    and other tactics of repression.
        So given the ongoing threat that the sourcing of goods and
    services produced by forced labor from Xinjiang poses to the
    global supply chain, what is the Department doing to make U.S.
    companies aware of the glaring human rights issues that they
    are contributing to by sourcing goods from Xinjiang?
        Mr. Biegun. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
        I can assure you that we share 100 percent the concerns
    that you laid out and we are actively engaging with the private
    sector in order to ensure that they put in place the mechanisms
    to detect any entry into their supply chain of goods made in
    Xinjiang from forced labor, slave labor.
        Senator Menendez. How so?
        Mr. Biegun. Just 2 weeks ago, the Under Secretary for
    Economics, Keith Krach, sent a personal letter to 500 CEOs
    across the country, as well as to every trade and business
    association operating in China, laying out the supply chain
    dimensions of this, how companies need to pursue and look at
    their own supply chains in order to determine to remove this.
        It is not the first time we have confronted issues like
    this, Senator. I think you are well aware and you probably have
    also been supporter of initiatives like the blood diamonds
    restrictions or the conflict minerals out of the Great Lakes
    region. It requires steady pressure and a setting of the bar by
    the government, which we have done with these companies, and it
    will include enforcement, including using tools and mechanisms
    like the Security and Exchange Commission to hold companies
    accountable if they in fact do not expunge these goods from
    their supply chains. That is our clear message.
        Senator Menendez. What is the priority for the Department
    on this issue?
        Mr. Biegun. Very high. One of the senior-most officials in
    the Department has taken the personal initiative to try to
    persuade companies around the country to take this action
    before enforcement.
        Senator Menendez. We look forward to continuing to engage
    with you on that, including with the private sector. They need
    to be responsible in this regard.
        Mr. Biegun. I agree with you, and this conversation here
    hopefully will help further illuminate and create the
    expectations that those companies need to abide by.
        Senator Menendez. Finally, last week the State Department
    released a 2018 diplomatic cable noting that the Wuhan
    Institute of Virology had ``a serious shortage of appropriately
    trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate
    this high containment laboratory.''
        First, as you may be aware, I have been asking since March
    of this year repeatedly for these cables and for engagement and
    a briefing from the Department for this committee on the
    question of COVID origins, a vital national security issue, to
    which I have received no response, no briefing, nothing.
        Given all the statements by senior level administration
    officials on this issue, I find it perplexing that the
    Administration has been unwilling to engage with Congress as to
    these simple requests as I am sure you would were you still
    here as a senior staff member of this committee.
        Can you pledge to me that the Department by the end of this
    week will schedule this long-requested classified briefing and
    discussion for the committee to take place before the end of
    this work period, which is ending in another 2 weeks?
        Mr. Biegun. I will pledge to try, Senator. And I will be
    back in touch with your team through our Legislative Affairs to
    seek to schedule such a briefing. Certainly the level of safety
    at Chinese laboratories around the breadth of the People's
    Republic of China is an ongoing issue of concern. It has been
    written about extensively in any number of public journals,
    including a well-known Science magazine story about several
    cases in which viruses----
        Senator Menendez. I hope we can get the briefing so we can
    make an independent judgment of what you have or do not have.
    So I will look forward to hopefully getting a--this has been
    going on since March. Yet, I see Peter Navarro on TV, of
    course, the President himself, and other senior administration
    officials constantly refer to these things in public for the
    press, for the consumption. But members of the United States
    Senate and of this committee cannot get access to something as
    critical to understanding the nature of the veracity, the depth
    of the understanding, and whether or not this is the case that
    is being promoted by the President.
        So let me ask you this in the open, which is not a question
    of a classified. Does the United States Government have clear
    and convincing evidence that this pandemic originated in and
    was released from the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
        Mr. Biegun. Senator, like any matter that happens well
    outside the reach of our ability to see and touch and feel,
    there is some uncertainty around that matter. I have been part
    of the discussion on COVID-19 since mid-January. I have had the
    opportunity to discuss this very question with some of the
    leading experts in the United States, including fellow members
    of the Vice President's Coronavirus Task Force, such as Dr.
    Redfield, Dr. Fauci, as well as our own operational medical
    experts in the State Department. I will say that it is
    inclusive, but that only highlights the extreme urgency for the
    World Health Organization inquiry that was authorized at the
    World Health Assembly meeting earlier this year to be able to
    get on the ground in Wuhan, to have access to the Wuhan
    Virology Institute, and make that firm determination.
        Senator Menendez. So I hear you say that it is inclusive. I
    asked you whether there was clear, convincing evidence. You
    said it was inclusive. I share with you that we should have all
    of the facts, but until we do have all of the facts, making
    statements and assertions that are as if they were fact does
    not serve us well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
        For members, the record will remain open until 5:00 p.m. on
    Friday for questions.
        Secretary, thank you so much for being here. Thank you for
    being so generous with your time. I can tell you we sit through
    a lot of these, and I really appreciate your good faith effort
    to address the questions sincerely and as best you can.
        So with that, the committee will be adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                  ----------

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

     Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

                                       5g
        One of the major issues playing out in public currently is how
    Chinese companies are playing an increasingly dominant role in
    development and implementation of 5G mobile communications
    technologies. We are increasingly seeing the implementation of products
    from companies such as Huawei around the globe, ranging from Europe to
    Asia to Latin America to Africa:
        Question. What security concerns does the Administration see in the
    proliferation of Chinese made 5G technologies around the globe?

        Answer. The Administration is deeply concerned about the dangers of
    networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by
    authoritarian governments that have no democratic checks and balances
    and no regard for human rights, privacy, or international norms. U.S.
    security concerns are much broader than industrial and political
    espionage. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could
    provide the PRC's Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the
    capability and opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical
    applications and infrastructure or provide technological advances to
    the PRC's military forces.

        Question. What is the Administration doing to counter this spread?

        Answer. The Administration is taking strong action at home and
    abroad to confront this challenge. Domestically, President Trump signed
    an Executive Order May 15, 2019 entitled ``Securing the Information and
    Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,'' and a national
    emergency continuation notice on May 13, 2020. The E.O. empowers the
    U.S. Department of Commerce to prohibit transactions involving
    information and communications technology or services designed,
    developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled
    by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,
    and that pose an undue risk of sabotage or subversion to the U.S.
    information and communications technology and services.
        Abroad, the Administration is implementing a coordinated set of
    measures to 1) encourage countries to put in place risk-based security
    measures that prohibit the use of untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE
    in 5G and other next generation networks; and 2) level the playing
    field for trusted vendors to compete and win.

        Question. Have our efforts to pressure countries to not use Huawei
    products been successful in light of the fact that so many countries
    continue to integrate their technologies into their infrastructure?

        Answer. Yes, we are seeing the tide turn against Huawei and
    untrusted technology vendors as additional countries put in place
    restrictions and a growing list of carriers choose to procure from
    trusted vendors. Australia and Japan were two of the earliest countries
    to put in place security measures to protect their 5G networks.
    Recently, a growing number of countries have likewise put in place
    strong security measures to protect their networks against untrusted
    vendors, including: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia,
    Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In addition, some of
    the largest telecom companies around the globe are also becoming
    ``Clean Telcos'' by choosing to work only with trusted vendors. We've
    seen this with Orange in France, Jio in India, Telstra in Australia, SK
    and KT in South Korea, NTT in Japan, and O2 in the United Kingdom. In
    June, the big three telecommunications companies in Canada decided to
    partner with Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung.

        Question. How will a Chinese centric 5G ecosystem affect U.S. and
    allied security?

        Answer. The risks from a PRC 5G ecosystem to the security of the
    United States and our allies and partners are numerous, including
    espionage, disruption, and/or manipulation of networks enabling
    critical infrastructure and services. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like
    Huawei and ZTE could provide the PRC's Communist Party-led,
    authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or
    weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide
    technological advances to the PRC's military forces.

        Question. Did the President of the United States give a green light
    to the President of China to build his concentration camps?

        Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken
    concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang,
    to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions,
    import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have
    also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these
    human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist
    Party to immediately end their horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask
    all nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these
    dehumanizing abuses.

        Question. How has the Department engaged with the Indian government
    to develop a diplomatic strategy against Chinese efforts to violate the
    sovereignty of countries in South Asia?

        Answer. The United States' comprehensive global strategic
    partnership with India is central to achieving our shared vision of a
    free, open, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, in
    which the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are
    respected. The United States is deeply concerned by China's recent
    pattern of aggressive actions, including along the Line of Actual
    Control with India, and by predatory trade, investment, and lending
    practices that are undermining the economies and sovereignty of other
    South Asian nations.
        We regularly engage with India at the highest levels regarding
    these concerns, including recently through Under Secretary for
    Political Affairs Hale's July 7 Foreign Office Consultations with
    Indian Foreign Secretary Shringla, through our Ambassador in New Delhi,
    who has met regularly with key Indian counterparts, and in our joint
    State-DoD 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues.
        We also work closely with our other partners in South Asia,
    maintaining strong lines of communication with government counterparts
    and underscoring U.S. support for the principles of sovereignty and
    territorial integrity.
                                 belt and road
        Question. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has made inroads
    into Europe and has even signed an MOU with EU member Italy. I applaud
    the recent work done by the Development Finance Corporation and
    Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the Elfasina Shipyard in Greece which
    I think shows how investment and diplomacy can be married to counter
    BRI. I don't however have a sense that there is an overall strategy to
    counter BRI in Europe, including working with Brussels and other key
    capitals across the continent. Do we have one? If so, what are its
    component parts?

        Answer. As part of the Department's strategy to counter the
    People's Republic of China's (PRC) malign influence, we have stepped up
    cooperation with our European Allies and partners and implemented a
    number of initiatives aimed at addressing the Belt and Road Initiative
    in Europe. Over the last 2 years, our diplomatic posts and interagency
    partners have greatly expanded outreach on risks to critical
    infrastructure and provided support to European countries in
    establishing or strengthening existing investment review mechanisms. We
    are working with our partners in the Western Balkans and Eurasia to
    ensure all potential projects are vetted to ensure commercial
    viability, transparency and fairness, and that national security
    concerns are taken into account.
        In February, Secretary Pompeo announced a commitment from DFC of up
    to $1 billion to the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Fund in support of
    energy infrastructure projects, made possible in part by Congressional
    legislation adding flexibility to the DFC's mandate and allowing it to
    operate in high income countries in Europe within the energy sector.
    The Three Seas Initiative is a partnership of 12 democratic nations in
    Central and Eastern Europe intended to improve energy,
    telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure that bonds its
    members together and with the rest of Europe; the United States is a
    strong Three Seas supporter and partner, but not a member. The Three
    Seas Initiative is also designed to offer Western alternatives to
    infrastructure development that communist China might otherwise use to
    extend its malign influence via such projects.
        As needed, we are prepared to use foreign assistance funding from
    the Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account as
    well as other accounts to assist our partners in resisting
    unsustainable investments and loans, disinformation, and other forms of
    malign Chinese activity. The Department is reviewing over 50 proposals
    to counter malign Chinese influence from U.S. Embassies for projects
    from the current Congressionally-mandated Countering Chinese Influence
    Fund (CCIF). Ongoing projects funded by AEECA are already beginning to
    address this issue in several arenas, including working with energy
    sector counterparts to provide technical assistance and facilitate
    access to finance for key interconnection projects; helping to promote
    cybersecurity capacity development as well as greater cyber critical
    infrastructure defenses; promoting alternatives to Chinese goods in 5G
    and other emerging technologies; and helping to strengthen cooperation
    on nuclear energy with several European allies, in the hopes of
    cementing commercial relations with U.S. or other western firms in lieu
    of significant reliance on Russian or emerging Chinese nuclear
    technology.

        Question. The Administration reportedly is considering barring
    Communist party members and their families from getting visas. That
    might mean about 200 million people, some with important power with
    whom we need to interact and some just ordinary citizens. What is the
    logic of such a move? What do you hope the effect will be?

        Answer. The Department refers questions about potential
    presidential actions to the White House.
                                 trade policy:
        Question. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Ambassador
    Lighthizer commented the other day that he has no idea what the end
    game is on China with this Administration's trade policy: Do you? And
    if so, what is it?

        Answer. Under President Trump's leadership, the United States is
    confronting China's unfair and market-distorting trade policies and
    practices to achieve a fair and reciprocal trading relationship. Since
    negotiations with China began, the Administration has focused on
    concluding high-quality fully enforceable terms for trade between our
    countries. The Phase One Agreement concluded earlier this year is the
    first step in rebalancing our trade relationship. It incorporates
    meaningful, fully enforceable commitments to resolve structural issues,
    including those identified in the Section 301 investigation.
        Many, but not all, concerns regarding China's problematic trade
    policies and practices could be resolved with full implementation of
    the Phase One Agreement. We continue to have outstanding concerns,
    including in the areas of technology transfer, non-tariff measures,
    intellectual property rights, and services. We will continue to urge
    China to resolve these issues in future negotiations. As we work
    towards this outcome, the United States is maintaining 25 percent
    tariffs on approximately $250 billion of Chinese imports, along with
    7.5 percent tariffs on approximately $120 billion of Chinese imports.

        Question. Can I have your word that you will not use and that you
    will tell Secretary Pompeo and others that you do not think it
    appropriate to use racially stigmatizing language when discussing this
    pandemic in public or private?

        Answer. The United States condemns all forms of racial
    discrimination. State Department representatives speak out to condemn
    hate speech and to encourage other governments to do the same--while
    also promoting strong protections for freedom of expression. We
    continue working to counter racial discrimination, xenophobia, and
    other forms of intolerance.

        Question. What other tools does the Trump administration have to
    counterbalance China's growing influence around the world, including in
    contentious regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?

        Answer. We have, and will continue to, increase pressure on the PRC
    government and take action to protect U.S. interests and values by
    imposing proportional costs when appropriate. In addition to publicly
    calling out malign PRC conduct, the United States has used visa
    restrictions under various authorities, financial sanctions, and policy
    announcements, among other tools, to address our concerns about
    Beijing's behavior. Additionally, the Department of State continuously
    engages with our partners and allies around the world to encourage them
    to take similar steps.

        Question. The Administration has repeatedly touted the success of
    its ``maximum pressure campaign'' as evidenced by Iran's economic
    decline. Do you see this economic devastation as making a partnership
    with China more appealing to Iranian leaders?

        Answer. For the Iranian regime, a closer partnership with China is
    a partnership born of desperation. Because the regime has been severely
    weakened, in part by U.S. sanctions but also through its own
    mismanagement and corruption, it is willing to negotiate a bad deal for
    the Iranian people as long as the regime gains access to much needed
    capital. The regime has been reluctant to publicly share details of the
    agreement for this very reason. The Iranian people know this, and they
    are rightly outraged by this hypocrisy.

        Question. What are your current bilateral and multilateral
    engagements with China regarding its potential investments and
    cooperation with Iran?

        Answer. We are closely monitoring reports of a draft 25-year
    agreement between China and Iran. The scale of the supposed Chinese
    investment in the deal deserves healthy skepticism. However, Chinese
    entities continue to provide financial support to the Iranian regime,
    including through the continued purchase of sanctioned Iranian
    petrochemicals and metals. We have made clear to the Chinese government
    that we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions regime with
    respect to Iran, including on Chinese individuals and entities that
    engage in sanctionable conduct. By allowing Chinese companies to
    conduct sanctionable activities with the Iranian regime, the PRC is
    undermining its own stated goal of promoting stability in the Middle
    East.

        Question. Does an increased security relationship between Iran and
    China help or hinder American interests in both the Middle East and
    Asia?

        Answer. In the near term, an increased security relationship
    between Iran and China would principally take the form of Chinese
    weapons sales to the Islamic Republic. As the number one state sponsor
    of terror and a key source of regional instability, no nation should be
    willing to provide Iran with even deadlier weapons until there is a
    fundamental change in the regime's behavior. Safeguarding regional
    security and the free flow of commerce is not only in the United States
    interest; it is a global responsibility.

        Question. What is the U.S. Government position on the right of
    Tibetan Buddhists in selecting a future Dalai Lama without the
    interference of any government, and what is the plan to push back
    against the planned interference of the Chinese government?

        Answer. The United States has made the promotion and protection of
    religious freedom a priority, especially in China, where people of all
    faiths face severe repression and discrimination. We remain concerned
    by the People's Republic of China's interference in the selection,
    education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The
    U.S. government believes that Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all
    faith communities, must be able to select, educate, and venerate their
    religious leaders in accordance with their beliefs and without
    government interference. This human right to religious freedom dictates
    that the succession or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas,
    including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, should occur without any
    external interference, in a manner consistent with their beliefs.

        Question. Would you recommend and make sure that President Trump
    calls publicly on the Chinese President to address the legitimate
    grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

        Answer. The United States encourages the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
    representatives, without preconditions, leading to a negotiated
    agreement on Tibet. The Administration will continue to call on Beijing
    to ensure meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improve respect for their
    human rights, including religious freedom, and preserve their unique
    religious, cultural, and linguistic identity.

        Question. At a time when the relationship is facing increasing
    friction and when the risk of conflict is rising, do we need such a
    process?

        Answer. The Administration sees no value in engaging with Beijing
    in high-level dialogues when the PRC offers no prospects for tangible
    results or constructive outcomes. We remain open to constructive,
    results-oriented engagement and cooperation with the PRC government
    where our interests align, even as we continue to compete vigorously
    when necessary.

        Question. Secretary Tillerson proposed a good framework at the
    beginning of the Administration, but obviously it has been abandoned.
    Why?

        Answer. We will continue to engage with PRC leaders in a respectful
    yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.

        Question. Given China and Russia's opposition to extending the U.N.
    arms embargo on Iran that it set to expire in a few short months, how
    do you see increased bilateral tension with China impacting its posture
    towards extending the arms embargo at the Security Council?

        Answer. The United States has called for an extension of the U.N.
    arms embargo on Iran due to the Islamic Republic's behavior. The
    Islamic Republic has done nothing to deserve the lifting of the embargo
    and continues to send weapons to armed militias and proxies all across
    the region in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Combating Iranian malign
    influence in order to foster regional stability and safeguard the free
    flow of commerce is a global responsibility. Irrespective of
    differences that may exist between members of the Security Council,
    allowing Iran to purchase and proliferate weapons would be an
    abdication of the U.N. Security Council's mandate to maintain
    international peace and security.

        Question. What are you doing to combat Chinese and Russian
    influence at the U.N. Security Council regarding Syria?

        Answer. This year marks the 10th consecutive year of a conflict
    that has caused massive suffering for the Syrian people. Working with
    our partners and the United Nations (U.N.) in support of the Syrian
    people, the United States is combatting People's Republic of China
    (PRC) and Russian malign influence on three different fronts:
    political, humanitarian, and chemical weapons. Over eleven million
    people currently remain in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria,
    including 6.6 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs). However,
    Russia has used its Security Council veto to support the Assad regime
    no less than 16 times, including 10 occasions on which it voted jointly
    with the People's Republic of China. The Assad regime continues to
    commit mass atrocities, some of which rise to the level of war crimes
    and crimes against humanity. Recent efforts have demonstrated that the
    Security Council is increasingly united in its support for the Syrian
    people, and in the process the United States and its allies are
    isolating both Russia and the PRC in their continued support of the
    Assad regime.
        The United States continues to support the efforts of U.N. Special
    Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen in implementing a credible political
    process to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict in Syria as
    outlined in Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), and we welcome his
    plan to convene the third meeting of the Constitutional Committee in
    August. U.N. reporting continues to contradict the lies and propaganda
    of the Assad regime. The July 7 Commission of Inquiry notes the
    devastating impacts of assaults on Syrian civilians in Idlib Province
    by the regime and Russia, concluding that the attacks are responsible
    for 534 of the 582 confirmed civilian casualties and also finding
    numerous instances where attacks led to mass displacement. Working with
    interagency partners, the Department is aggressively implementing
    Caesar sanctions aimed at deterring malign actors who continue to aid
    and finance the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people
    while enriching themselves and their families. The Department also
    continues to combat the PRC's attempts to insert its ideology and
    references to the Belt and Road Initiative into U.N. Security Council
    resolutions.
        With the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2533
    (2020), essential food, shelter, and medicine and supplies to prevent
    the spread of COVID-19 continue to flow to Syrians in need in the
    northwest. Resolution 2533 allows U.N. access to Bab al-Hawa for 12
    months, a significant improvement to the Russian proposal of only 6
    months. An overwhelming majority of the Security Council worked in good
    faith with Belgian and German drafters to overcome Russian and Chinese
    intransigence to adopt a resolution that would enable life-saving
    humanitarian assistance to reach those in need in Syria. Having
    provided more than $11.3 billion in humanitarian assistance since the
    beginning of the crisis, the United States remains the world-leader in
    ensuring that life-saving assistance reaches all Syrians in need.
        The 2017 attacks in Ltaminah make clear that the Assad regime will
    stop at nothing to pursue a military victory. As the Assad regime
    remains in non-compliance with its obligations under the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC) and Security Council resolution 2118, the
    United States continues to lead efforts making it clear that the use of
    chemical weapons will not be tolerated and those who use chemical
    weapons will be held to account. To that end, the United States, along
    with its allies and partners, recently took strong action to address
    the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
    Investigation and Identification Team's findings. On July 9, the OPCW
    Executive Council adopted a decision demanding that Syria immediately
    cease its use of chemical weapons and requesting that Syria declare,
    among other things, the facilities where the chemical weapons used in
    the March 2017 attacks in Ltaminah were produced, stored, and deployed
    for delivery. Only Russia, the PRC and Iran voted against these
    findings, as all 29 other members voted in favor.
                               china and the gulf
        China has made significant investments into Arab Gulf countries
    with whom the United States has significant security relationships.
    Last month, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated: ``We see China
    moving in, principally economically--but not completely--to establish a
    beachhead.''

        Question. What are the implications of increased Chinese investment
    in critical infrastructure projects in the Arab Gulf States?

        Answer. Over the last 2 years, one-fifth of global Chinese overseas
    construction projects took place in Arab Gulf countries as the
    countries looked to expand their critical infrastructure and diversify
    away from heavy reliance on hydrocarbons in their economies. Currently,
    roughly half of China's oil imports come from the Middle East and North
    Africa, and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Energy
    Agency had predicted that imports from the region would double by 2035.
    The expansion of economic ties and People's Republic of China (PRC)
    state-owned-enterprise involvement in large-scale, complicated
    infrastructure projects has allowed U.S.-sanctioned technology firms
    such as Huawei, Hikvision, Hytera, and others to gain footholds
    supporting these major investments.
        Given Beijing's increasing use of economic leverage to extract
    political concessions from--or exact retribution against--other
    countries, the PRC may attempt to convert its deep investments in
    critical infrastructure into undue political influence and military
    access, while the energy exporters who rely on sales to China will be
    at heightened risk of malign influence. As countries attempt to shore
    up their balance sheets in the aftermath of COVID-19, they may become
    more receptive to an expanded Chinese footprint within their borders.
    Ultimately, the resulting deeper economic ties will create future
    opportunities for PRC firms to gain influence. In response, the
    Department of State is engaging regularly with leaders in the Middle
    East on a variety of critical issues, including problematic Chinese
    investments.
                               china and the gulf
        China has made significant investments into Arab Gulf countries
    with whom the United States has significant security relationships.
    Last month, CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie stated: We see China
    moving in, principally economically--but not completely--to establish a
    beachhead.''
        Question. Please describe your engagement with relevant leaders in
    these countries regarding Chinese investment.

        Answer. The Department of State engages regularly with leaders in
    the Middle East on a variety of critical issues including problematic
    Chinese investments. Top Department leadership has traveled to the
    region in the last year to raise concerns about Huawei, high-tech
    acquisitions, and inroads in strategic infrastructure. Recently we have
    also increased our engagement with the Arab League and Organization of
    Islamic Cooperation (OIC), including the redesignation of our Consulate
    General in Jeddah as our official representative to the OIC. We have
    also urged countries to protect their own sovereignty and security by
    enacting CFIUS-type measures to restrict foreign investments in local
    companies that might pose national security risks.

        Question. In what areas do you see Chinese investment as presenting
    direct threats to U.S. interests or equities?

        Answer. While many Chinese investments present risks to the host
    nation, not all Chinese investments directly threaten U.S. interests.
    Chinese investment that undermines a level playing field for U.S.
    companies or undermines the rules-based international order is of
    concern. Chinese investments in the Middle East that potentially
    threaten U.S. interests and equities include those that threaten the
    security of telecom networks by companies like Huawei, as well as
    investments into strategic industries such as energy, logistics, and
    defense. In response, we are leading efforts with our partners in the
    region to counter malign Chinese investments and to promote American or
    partner alternatives whenever possible.

        Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed
    or unarmed drones, been used by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar or
    Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have any of those
    uses resulted in civilian casualties?

        Answer. China has sold multiple weapons systems to Saudi Arabia,
    the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, including armed drones to Saudi
    Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. Available reporting suggests that Saudi
    Arabia employed its China-origin drones in Yemen, and the UAE used them
    in Yemen and Libya. Saudi Arabia has also reportedly employed Chinese
    artillery pieces in Yemen. We cannot establish if any of these reported
    drone or artillery strikes resulted in civilian casualties.

        Question. Have any Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed
    drones, been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
    Egypt, Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya? If so, have
    any of those uses resulted in civilian casualties?

        Answer. No reports indicate that any Chinese-origin weapons have
    been provided to non-state actors by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt,
    Qatar or Turkey in the conflicts in Yemen or Libya.

        Question. What steps has the U.S. taken to prevent the purchase of
    Chinese-origin weapons systems, including armed drones by countries
    included in the NEA bureau?

        Answer. The United States has urged countries to beware of
    unscrupulous actors like China offering deceptively cut-price defense
    systems and equipment. Such acquisitions are no bargain, and are often
    accompanied by the loss of sovereignty, resource extraction or debt-
    trap diplomacy, the signing away of rights to critical physical or IT
    infrastructure, or the exploitation of intellectual property due to
    espionage or outright theft. We have emphasized to our partners
    globally that acquiring these systems does not strengthen their
    security, but rather undermines their interoperability with U.S.
    forces, and should rightly be avoided. The United States will continue
    to offer assistance to allies and partners in need, and we will do so
    without those harmful strings attached.

        Question. What steps did the U.S. take to try to prevent these and
    other countries from signing such a letter whitewashing China's crimes
    against its own Uighur population? What steps will the U.S. take to
    push these countries to recant their signatures and prevent future
    letters from being signed?

        Answer. The United States consistently urges third countries to
    condemn the PRC's human rights abuses in Xinjiang. We will continue to
    publicly and privately call on the PRC to immediately end its horrific
    practices in Xinjiang and ask all nations, including Muslim-majority
    ones, to join the United States in demanding an end to these
    dehumanizing abuses. In September 2019, on the margins of the 74th
    General Debate of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States co-
    hosted a high-level event on the human rights crisis in Xinjiang with
    four allies, which was widely attended by member states from all
    regions of the world . In October 2019, we were proud to join a cross-
    regional group of 23 countries in signing a joint statement on Xinjiang
    in the U.N. General Assembly, which drew on the concluding observations
    of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to urge
    the PRC to reverse course in Xinjiang. The United States has been
    disappointed to see Muslim countries not respond when there are
    significant Muslim populations being impacted in western China, and we
    continue to urge them to take this on in a serious way.
                       social media account working group
        Last year, in February 2019, the State Department Inspector General
    revealed that more than 20 ambassadors were likely in violation of the
    State Department's social media policies. In addressing the Inspector
    General's recommendations from the report, the Department indicated it
    recently established a Social Media Account Working Group to reexamine
    the Department's policies, which I understand you lead. During your
    confirmation process last November, you made a commitment to review all
    allegations of potential violations of the Department's social media
    policies. You also indicated that the Department was in the midst of
    finalizing a standard operating procedure and a set of recommendations
    to assess and address potential violations. I understand that these
    recommendations are still currently awaiting your review, even as
    Ambassadors continue to post controversial and insensitive posts on
    both personal and official social media accounts. As such, please
    answer the following:

        Question. Why has it taken the Department more than a year and a
    half to fully address the still outstanding Inspector General's
    recommendations from the February 2019 social media report?

        Answer. The Department has implemented two of the three
    recommendations from the Inspector General's February 2019 report. We
    have clarified the social media use policy with specific examples and
    have sent reminders to all employees on the social media use policy on
    a regular basis. The outstanding recommendation asked the Department to
    develop and implement a review process for compliance with the social
    media use policy. The Department is working toward addressing this
    recommendation.

        Question. When did the Social Media Account Working Group provide
    you with its recommendations on the Department's social media policies?

        Answer. In July 2019, the Social Media Accounts Working Group
    provided Deputy Secretary Sullivan with an update on the progress for
    implementing the OIG recommendations. Following my confirmation as
    Deputy Secretary, in February of this year I was briefed on the work of
    the Social Media Accounts Working Group.

        Question. Please provide an explanation as to why the Social Media
    Account Working Group's recommendations are still currently under your
    review, 7 months after your confirmation, and when the Department will
    implement changes to its policies.

        Answer. The Department has already implemented two recommendations
    from the Inspector General's February 2019 report. The third
    recommendation is being addressed with the development and
    implementation of a standard operating procedure for reviewing accounts
    for compliance with the social media use policy (10 FAM 180). The
    development of the standard operating procedures required broad
    coordination and collaboration across the Department to include records
    management, legal, human resources, and other subject matter experts.

        Question. How has the Department's enforcement of social media
    policies improved since February 2019?

        Answer. Based on the OIG recommendations, the Department published
    the Personal and Official Use Social Media Handbook in August 2019. The
    handbook includes detailed information that is intended to assist
    employees in separating official and personal capacity communications
    on social media accounts. The handbook is routinely distributed to and
    discussed with participants in the Foreign Service Institute's
    Ambassadorial Seminar and in public diplomacy social media classes. The
    annual, and additionally as needed, publication of reminders on social
    media policies has been formalized and is managed by the Under
    Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' Office of Policy,
    Planning and Resources.
        [The information referred to above can be found at the end of this
    section.]

        Question. What steps are you taking to hold all Department
    employees who run afoul of the Department's social media policies
    accountable?

        Answer. The Department takes seriously any reports that Department
    officials may be in violation of social media policies. In cases in
    which the Department discovers a violation of any agency policy,
    including the social media policy, the Department may consider a broad
    range of disciplinary or other administrative actions. For reference,
    the Department's discipline policies for employees are described in 3
    FAM 4100, 4300 and 4500, among others, and apply to violations of
    statutes, regulations, or Department policy, as stated in the FAM,
    Foreign Affairs Handbooks, Department notices or ALDACs, or bureau or
    post policy documents. The Department does not discuss individual
    personnel actions.

        Personal and Official Use Social Media Handbook--August 13, 2019

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

     Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin

        Question. What is the U.S. Government position regarding the right
    of Tibetan Buddhists to select a future Dalai Lama without the
    interference of any government?

        Answer. The United States has made the promotion and protection of
    religious freedom a priority, especially in China, where people of all
    faiths face severe repression and discrimination. We remain concerned
    by the People's Republic of China's interference in the selection,
    education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. The
    U.S. government believes that Tibetan Buddhists, like members of all
    faith communities, must be able to select, educate, and venerate their
    religious leaders in accordance with their beliefs and without
    government interference. This human right to religious freedom dictates
    that the succession or identification of Tibetan Buddhist lamas,
    including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, should occur without any
    external interference, in a manner consistent with their beliefs.

        Question. The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 established the position
    of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues within the State Department.
    It has remained unfilled throughout the Trump administration. What
    signal, if any, is the Administration sending by keeping this position
    vacant?

        Answer. U.S. government policy on Tibet has not changed. Our
    longstanding concerns over Tibet have been shared by multiple
    administrations and are codified by law within the Tibetan Policy Act.
    We remain committed to supporting meaningful autonomy for Tibetans,
    improving respect for their human rights, including religious freedom,
    and preserving their unique religious, cultural, and linguistic
    identity. We are carefully considering candidates to fill the role of
    Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues at the Department of State.

        Question. What is the plan to push back against the interference of
    the Chinese government in Tibet?

        Answer. We remain committed to supporting meaningful autonomy for
    Tibetans, improving respect for their human rights, including religious
    freedom, and preserving their unique religious, cultural, and
    linguistic identity. The United States remains concerned that People's
    Republic of China (PRC) authorities continue to take steps to eliminate
    this unique identity. We will continue to press the People's Republic
    of China to respect meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and to halt
    actions that threaten Tibetan culture and religious traditions. We also
    remain committed to enhancing the sustainable economic development,
    environmental conservation, and humanitarian conditions of Tibetan
    communities.

        Question. Would you recommend and ensure that President Trump calls
    publicly on the Chinese President to address the grievances of the
    Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

        Answer. The United States encourages the People's Republic of China
    (PRC) to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
    representatives, without preconditions, leading to a negotiated
    agreement on Tibet. The Administration will continue to call on Beijing
    to ensure meaningful autonomy for Tibetans, improve respect for their
    human rights, including religious freedom, and preserve their unique
    religious, cultural, and linguistic identity.

        Question. What efforts or reforms is the State Department making to
    protect other participants in IVLP and other State Department exchange
    programs in authoritarian states?

        Answer. Department of State is committed to the safety and security
    of more than 300,000 U.S. and foreign citizens who participate in
    exchange programs abroad and here in the United States each year.
        Safety and security considerations are incorporated into every
    aspect of the development and implementation of our exchange programs.
    This includes the careful selection and screening of participants,
    program partners, host families, universities and schools, fellowship
    sites, and other stakeholders.
        Furthermore, programs utilize pre-departure and arrival briefings,
    monitoring and oversight, health benefits programs, 24/7 assistance
    hotlines, and other tools to provide active and compassionate responses
    when emergencies arise.
        Ensuring the safety and security of all exchange program
    participants--regardless of where the programs take place--is a weighty
    responsibility the Department takes very seriously. We understand it
    requires a collective and sustained focus as well as cooperation with
    others across the interagency. By working together, we will keep safety
    and security among our highest priorities and ensure the best
    experience for all exchange participants.

        Question. What is your department's plan to effectively counter
    China's culture of high-tech authoritarianism that has been brought to
    bear in Xinjiang?

        Answer. The State Department has taken concrete action and remains
    committed to combating the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang.
    The Department imposed visa restrictions on three senior CCP officials
    under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2020 Department of State, Foreign
    Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, for their
    involvement in gross violations of human rights and supported the
    Treasury Department's imposition of economic sanctions on the same;
    announced visa restrictions on PRC government and Chinese Communist
    Party officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit
    in, the unjust detention or abuse of members of Muslim minority groups
    in Xinjiang and on corporate officials in Chinese companies responsible
    for contributing to human rights abuses globally, including in
    Xinjiang; and issued a business advisory to caution businesses about
    the risks of supply chain links to human rights abuses, including
    forced labor, in and connected to Xinjiang. We have also joined with
    like-minded partners in publicly condemning these human rights abuses.
        The State Department has also paid particular attention to the
    PRC's use of digital technologies to support repressive rule--
    particularly in Xinjiang. Many Department initiatives aim to address
    the increasing trend of authoritarian governments using new technology
    applications to violate or abuse human rights by imposing costs on
    repressive governments and promoting the development and adoption of
    norms in technology applications.
                                     ______

     Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions
                       Submitted by Senator Edward Markey

        Question. Have you been briefed on any transcript, diplomatic
    cable, or any other form of communication that supports media reports
    that President Trump gave approval, tacit or otherwise, to President Xi
    Jinping of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to construct mass
    internment camps to imprison Uyghur and other minorities in Xinjiang
    Province?

        Answer. The Administration's actions to stop human rights abuses in
    Xinjiang speak volumes, and the President himself has personally heard
    from those affected, including Jewher Ilham, who is the daughter of
    prominent Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti, who was given a life sentence in
    2014. More than any other government, the United States has taken
    concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang,
    to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions,
    import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have
    also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these
    human rights abuses.

        Question. Do you have knowledge of any similar communications
    described in the previous question between U.S. Government officials
    other than the President and Chinese government officials?

        Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken
    concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang,
    to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions,
    import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have
    also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these
    human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist
    Party to immediately end its horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask all
    nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these
    dehumanizing abuses.

        Question. Has President Trump indicated to the Chinese government a
    willingness to refrain from commenting on or acting against human
    rights violations, including on a June 2019 call during which he
    reportedly promised President Xi that he would not speak out on China's
    response to pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong while trade talks
    continued?

        Answer. More than any other government, the United States has taken
    concrete action to combat the PRC's campaign of repression in Xinjiang,
    to include visa restrictions, financial sanctions, export restrictions,
    import restrictions, and the release of a business advisory. We have
    also joined with like-minded partners in publicly condemning these
    human rights abuses. We will continue to call on the Chinese Communist
    Party to immediately end their horrific practices in Xinjiang and ask
    all nations to join the United States in demanding an end to these
    dehumanizing abuses.

        Question. August 25, 2020 marks the third-year anniversary of the
    start of a systematic campaign by Burma's security forces that the
    State Department has referred to as the ``ethnic cleansing'' of the
    Rohingya Muslim minority. What additional documentation would be
    required for the State Department to reach the same genocide
    determination that the United Nations Fact Finding Mission (FFM),
    Fortify Rights, and the United States Holocaust Museum all separately
    reached in 2018?

        Answer. The United States has repeatedly expressed its deep concern
    about the horrific violence against members of the Rohingya community
    in 2017 and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. Then-
    Secretary Tillerson determined in November 2017 that the atrocities
    against Rohingya constituted ethnic cleansing. We have taken strong
    actions to promote accountability for those involved in abuses against
    Rohingya during the ethnic cleansing, designating top military leaders
    for their roles in serious human rights abuses under the Global
    Magnitsky Act and imposing visa restrictions for their involvement in
    gross violations of human rights under Section 7031(c) of the
    Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
    Appropriations Act. We also continue to support relevant multilateral
    investigative and justice processes.
        Our top priorities on this issue are changing behavior and
    preventing additional atrocities. The Secretary has said that our
    actions will continue to be reviewed with these goals in mind.
                                     ______

     Responses of Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun to Questions
                         Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

        Question. In 2015, the Obama administration responded to a request
    from China and banned Taiwanese officials and military members from
    displaying their flags and insignia on government property and bases.
    This policy is described in the periodic memorandum entitled
    ``Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan.'' I have introduced legislation
    mandating the reversal of those guidelines, the Taiwan Symbols of
    Sovereignty (SOS) Act, S. 3310. Nevertheless the guidelines can be
    changed unilaterally by the Administration in the absence of a
    Congressional mandate. I would like a commitment from the
    Administration to change those guidelines so as to allow members of the
    armed forces and government representatives from the Republic of China
    (Taiwan) or the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
    (TECRO) to display the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the
    corresponding emblems or insignia of military units for official
    purposes: Can you commit to securing such changes?

        Answer. As I said during the hearing, I am happy to review this
    policy in more detail. The key issue relates to the nature of the
    relationship between the United States and Taiwan, as defined by the
    Taiwan Relations Act. Within these guidelines, the Administration
    continues to take steps to deepen our relationship and broaden our
    support for Taiwan to reflect the deepening ties of friendship, trade,
    and productivity between the United States and Taiwan. However,
    inviting use of symbols of sovereignty, such as the display of the
    flags of the Republic of China (China) would not be consistent with the
    TRA. The Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan allow the Executive Branch
    to maintain a strong relationship with the Taiwan authorities
    consistent with that policy while avoiding activities that are
    inconsistent with the nature of this unofficial relationship.

        Question. We have seen China systematically work its way through
    international organizations, in different ways. Sometimes they outright
    seize control of those organizations and subvert them. Other times they
    take a different route, pushing organizations to adopt technology from
    Chinese companies answerable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
    Earlier this year, the U.N. was planning to sign a contract with
    Tencent, a company that State Department officials have told Congress
    cannot say ``no'' when CCP officials come knocking. State Department
    officials have also named Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Baidu as other
    companies that are vulnerable to coercion by the CCP and constitute
    espionage risks: What is the State Department's policy regarding
    international organizations that use such technology? How can the State
    Department use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to
    prevent such technology from being used by international organizations?

        Answer. The State Department opposes international organizations
    using technologies that put users at risk from nefarious activities or
    could enable abuses or violations of their human rights. The U.N.
    Secretary-General recently announced that the U.N. would develop
    ``system-wide guidance on human rights due diligence and impact
    assessments in the use of new technologies.''
        The State Department was dismayed by the U.N.'s announcement of a
    partnership with Chinese media conglomerate Tencent to host global
    conversations related to the U.N.'s 75th anniversary on its web
    platforms. The United States communicated its concerns about this
    partnership and the manner in which it was formed directly to U.N.
    leadership.

        Question. The U.S. has spent billions of dollars investing in
    research battling infectious diseases in Africa. Last year it was
    announced that China is funding and building the new African Center for
    Disease Control in Ethiopia. That Center will be the site where U.S.
    research from across the continent will be consolidated, ceding
    billions of dollars and many years of U.S. research and funding to the
    Chinese: What is the State Department doing to stop China from building
    this new CDC? Do those activities include direct engagement with the
    Ethiopians on this topic?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned about China's plans to build a new
    headquarters for the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
    The United States has supported the Africa CDC since it was established
    in 2017. We are directly engaging the African Union Commission, African
    Union member states, and non-African allies and partners on this matter
    in a robust diplomatic campaign to make our concerns clear and
    underscore that African Union member states should make important
    decisions about where institutions are based, through an open and
    transparent process. As I mentioned in my testimony, we will continue
    to highlight the pitfalls of Chinese funding in our diplomatic
    engagement with African countries. It is in the interest of the United
    States to strongly support a robust Africa CDC, free of malign
    influence, that can help prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
    disease threats on the continent.