[Senate Hearing 116-263]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-263
CHINA AND RUSSIA
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 29, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-302 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma,
Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
January 29, 2019
Page
China and Russia................................................. 1
Colby, Elbridge, Director, Defense Program, Center for a New 4
American Security; and Former Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Force Development.
Ratner, Ely, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, 17
Center for a New American Security; and Former Deputy National
Security Advisor to the Vice President.
Wilson, Damon M., Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council..... 26
Appendix A....................................................... 67
(iii)
CHINA AND RUSSIA
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, McSally,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth,
and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. The hearing will come to order.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on strategic
competition with China and Russia.
I would like to welcome our witnesses. We have the right
witnesses this time. We appreciate your attendance.
We have Elbridge Colby. He is the former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. He is
what I consider to be probably one of the or maybe the key
person in developing the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
Ely Ratner, a China expert, co-author of a major article,
``The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American
Expectations.'' It is well worth your time to read that.
Damon Wilson is a Russian expert, as well as an expert on
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and going all the way
into East Europe and the Balkans.
I welcome all of you here for this hearing. I had a chance
to talk to the three of you and kind of explained my concern.
One of the problems that I have--and it is a problem that we
all have but we do not talk very much about it--and that is the
threats that we are facing, the seriousness of the threats.
There is this euphoric attitude that people have had since
World War II that somehow we have the best of everything. We
were listing some of the things--General Milley talking about
how we are outgunned and outranged with our Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, was talking about how our quantitative
and qualitative advantages have eroded. Nuclear modernization--
we were out of business for a long period of time. All of a
sudden now we have even China with a triad system. It is
working on hypersonics. You know, the average man on the street
does not know what we are talking about, but that is something
that is entirely new. I am convinced that both China and Russia
are ahead of us.
And so I see this hearing as a way to maybe give us some
credibility up here because you are all three recognized
experts in this area.
We are also right now having another good thing. We have
had hearings to this effect to show and demonstrate very
clearly that our people in uniform are willing to talk about
these things that they were not willing to talk about before.
So that which we all remember so well that was so
successful in the Cold War is something that perhaps is not as
successful right now. Peace through strength is really
something we need to be doing and emphasizing and telling the
American people where we are right now.
The reason it is important--we are going to be looking at
the budget that it takes to run this thing. We know what
happened just a few years ago, and we know that we were down
inadequately. You have to get the support of the American
people before you can do a good job of defending America. And
that is what this is all about.
So I appreciate very much all of you being here today.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this very important hearing on the strategic security
challenges posed by Russia and China.
I also want to join you in welcoming the witnesses who are
distinguished experts. Thank you, gentlemen.
Revisionist powers Russia and China are actively working to
undermine the rules-based international order that has been the
cornerstone of peace for decades. As the recent National
Intelligence Strategy states, ``Traditional adversaries will
continue to gain and assert influence, taking advantage of
changing conditions, in the international environment,
including the weakening of the post-World War II international
order and dominance of Western democratic ideals, increasingly
isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global
economy.'' Moscow and Beijing are using all tools of national
power to challenge the international order and advance their
own strategic interests at the expense of others.
This morning's hearing is an opportunity to hear from our
witnesses regarding their assessments of the emerging strategic
competition with these near-peer rivals and their
recommendations for ensuring that the United States is able to
deter aggression and deploy the right elements of national
power, both military and non-military elements, to prevail in
the competition with Russia and China.
In the case of Russia, President Putin has rejected United
States-led international order that he considers incompatible
with his strategic objective of returning to great power
status. Russia's military modernization, nuclear saber-
rattling, and violations of its arms control and other
international obligations threaten to undermine the strategic
security architecture that has prevented high-end conflict.
Putin also seeks to operate unconstrained in the ``near
abroad'' countries of the former Soviet Union and has shown his
willingness to use military force to violate the sovereignty of
his neighbors if not deterred.
Russia is also conducting a campaign of hybrid warfare
below the level of direct military conflict to harm Western
nations without firing a single shot. Our democracy was
attacked in 2016 and such attacks continue to this day with
increasing sophistication. Russia has used political, military,
diplomatic, economic, informational, cyber, and other tools of
national power to try to divide us from our allies and paralyze
our ability to unite in our common defense. These Russian
operations are no less a threat to our national security than a
military attack would be, yet we have failed to respond to them
with the same level of seriousness and resolve. I am interested
in hearing our witnesses' assessment of the national security
threat posed by Russia's hybrid warfare campaign and their
recommendations for how we should prioritize our resources to
counter Russia's malign aggression.
China is engaging in a global economic and military
expansion that will challenge United States primacy and
influence in the decades to come. President Xi's determination
to undermine international norms, engage in coercive and
predatory policies toward smaller and weaker countries, and
undermine the national security of the United States and its
allies and partners makes this expansion particularly
concerning. We are now in a long-term strategic competition
with an autocratic regime that has the resources and the intent
to challenge and potentially supplant U.S. leadership. How we
respond to this challenge will be critical for our national
security and the security of our partners and allies in the
region.
I am interested in hearing from the witnesses how we should
be meeting this challenge across all domains, diplomatic,
military, economic, and trade. I am especially concerned about
China's Belt and Road Initiative, which has left several
countries, notably Sri Lanka and Malaysia, severely indebted to
China. It is an economic initiative with significant national
security implications for the United States.
In addition, I have grave concerns about the internal
stability of China. President Xi's crackdown of the Uighurs in
the west and bellicose statements about Taiwan present serious
human rights problems for the international community. As the
leader of the free world, the United States should not shy away
from confronting the Chinese Government for its brutal and
systematic crackdown on ethnic minorities and human rights
activists within its own borders.
The National Defense Strategy has laid out, I think, a
compelling argument, and I am glad we have our experts today to
supplement that argument with their detailed and very wise
observations.
With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you for the excellent opening
statement.
We are going to interrupt this since we now have a quorum
that is present.
I ask the committee to consider a list of 385 pending
military nominations. All these nominations have been before
the committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 385
pending military nominations?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman Inhofe. Is there a second to the motion?
Senator Wicker. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
Chairman Inhofe. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on January 29,
2019.
1. Col. Frank A. Rodman, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 25)
2. BG Robert D. Harter, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
27)
3. Col. Charles M. Schoening, ARNG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 28)
4. In the Army Reserve there are 3 appointments to be major
general and below (list begins with David W. Ling) (Reference No. 29)
5. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Saleh P. Dagher) (Reference No.
35)
6. In the Marine Corps there are 375 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Rico Acosta) (Reference No. 36)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 385
All right. We will start, Mr. Colby, with you. And we want
to hear from all three of you, and try to keep your remarks
somewhere around 5 minutes so we will have time. We have good
attendance this morning. We want to have time for questions.
So, Mr. Colby, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ELBRIDGE COLBY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY; AND FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity
to appear before you. It is a great honor to testify before
this body on a topic of the highest importance to our Nation:
the implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.
This strategy entails a fundamental shift in the
orientation of our Nation's Armed Forces toward preparing for
war against China or Russia precisely in order to deter it.
This shift is urgently needed as our military advantages
against both have substantially eroded in recent decades. It is
a strategy that reflects not only the right priorities but also
the hard choices needed to realize this goal and is a
testament, in particular, to the leadership of former Secretary
Mattis and Acting Secretary Shanahan.
The NDS is predicated on a clear vision, as expressed in
the National Security Strategy. America has an enduring
interest in ensuring that the key regions of the world,
especially Asia and Europe, do not fall under the sway of a
potentially hostile power. Great powers, especially China and
to a lesser degree Russia, are the only states that could
realistically establish such hegemony. To prevent such an
outcome, we need a whole-of-government strategy to sustain
favorable regional balances of power through our alliance
system.
To make this alliance system work, however, we and our
allies need to be able to effectively defend its members
against plausible Chinese or Russian theories of victory. This
includes the members of that network most vulnerable to such
strategies such as Taiwan and the Baltic States. Thus, while we
will not succeed without an effective whole-of-government
strategy, we will certainly fail without a sufficiently strong
defense, and this is clearly in question.
What are these potential Chinese or Russian theories of
victory? Because of America's greater total power and the
existence of nuclear arsenals on both sides, these states' most
pointedly menacing theory of victory is the fait accompli. That
is, Russia could seek to create propitious circumstances
through disinformation, rapidly overrun the Baltic States and
eastern Poland with its conventional forces, and then rely on
the threat of its nuclear arsenal to check or neuter our
counteroffensive to liberate our NATO allies. China, meanwhile,
could use similar methods to isolate Taiwan or eventually parts
of the Philippines or Japan, launch an air and sea invasion,
and then make an American counteroffensive too costly and risky
to countenance.
These are not merely military strategist parlor games. They
are real and gravely serious and will become more threatening
if we fail to adapt. They are particularly real for states in
East and Southeast Asia, as well as in Eastern Europe,
wondering whether it is prudent to stand up to Chinese and
Russian domineering. These countries will look carefully to see
whether affiliating with us will result in an adequate defense.
If they do not see this, they will be incentivized to cut a
deal with Beijing or Moscow in ways that will make it very
hard, if not impossible to maintain those favorable balances of
power.
The problem is that our legacy defense approach is not
suited to dealing with these theories of victory. Rather, our
Armed Forces for the last generation have largely been formed
on what might be called the Desert Storm model. This involved
reacting to an opponent's attack on an ally with a time-
consuming construction of an iron mountain of armed might. Once
that was done, the United States would launch a withering
assault to establish all-domain dominance and only then eject
the enemy from our allies' territory. This model was
tremendously successful against Iraq and also employed against
Serbia, but it is precisely the model on which China and Russia
have so assiduously gone to school in the last 2 decades or so.
We need a new approach. We need our military to be able to
contest Chinese or Russian forces from the very beginning of a
war, blunting their advances so they cannot establish the fait
accompli, and frustrating their assault without our forces ever
expecting to gain the all-domain dominance that they could
attain against Iraq. With its invasion blunted or readily
reversed, neither China nor Russia would have a way to end a
war favorably. Rather, Beijing or Moscow would face the awful
choice of expanding the war in ways that play to United States
and allied advantages or swallowing the bitter but tolerable
pill of settling on terms the United States could accept. This
will make them far less likely to try it in the first place.
As the NDS makes clear, this requires a joint force that is
more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready, meaning forces that
can, at short notice, operate through withering enemy attacks
and still strike effectively at the assaulting forces of these
near-peer adversaries even without full control of the air,
land, sea, space, or electronic domains. This strategy has very
substantial implications for force structure, employment, and
posture, as well as for how our Armed Forces interact with our
allies and partners. I laid some of these out, as well as how
Congress can contribute to realizing the strategy, in my
written statement.
Fundamentally, however, the strategy's logic is very
simple. Our military advantage in key regions has eroded and
will continue to do so absent increased and sustained attention
and resources. If we fail to do this, we jeopardize the
alliance architecture that is crucial for denying Beijing or
Moscow dominance in their regions.
Our Armed Forces must, therefore, above all concentrate on
preparing to fight and defeat China or Russia in strategically
significant plausible scenarios like Taiwan or the Baltics
precisely in order to deter such a war from happening.
Crucially, because this is so demanding, it means doing
less of everything else or doing it much more efficiently.
Everything not directly connected to readying our forces to
fight China or Russia should be considered under a harsh and
skeptical light. Elective wars in the Middle East, assurance
and presence activities, subordinate departmental plans
optimized for the gray zone, continued investment in suboptimal
legacy systems, all of these directly detract from our ability
to head off the most serious threats to our national interests.
If something does not relate to improving the joint forces'
warfighting effectiveness in a key scenario against China or
Russia or more efficient ways of doing things in places like
the Middle East, then it must be made to meet a very high bar.
Given all this, recent indications the Department of
Defense has lagged in implementing the strategy are especially
troubling. The National Defense Strategy Commission, chartered
by Congress, found that there are confusing and incompatible
signals being transmitted within the Department, resulting in a
lack of coherence in implementing the strategy. There is no
time for misalignment. Our military advantage is eroding
against our most powerful competitors. Nor is there need for
confusion. The strategy lays out a clear path for how to
address this challenge. It is not, nor was it in any way
intended to be the last word on the subject. To the contrary.
But it provides, however, a clear framework within which the
crucial future work needed to realize it should take place.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Select General Milley has
eloquently put it, the Army--and I am confident the
Department--is aligning itself with Secretary Mattis' National
Defense Strategy and will not walk away from it.
The National Defense Strategy is a strategy informed by our
Nation's proud past but with its sights set firmly on the
future of preparing for war in order to preserve a favorable
peace and of principled realism so that we might live in a
world of right not might. Now is the time to put the strategy
into effect without delay.
I look forward to your questions and thank you for your
time and attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Colby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Elbridge A. Colby
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
members of this Committee, for the invitation to appear before you. It
is a great honor to testify before this body on a topic of the highest
importance to our Nation--the implementation of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy (NDS), a Strategy which entails a fundamental shift in
the orientation of our Nation's Armed Forces toward great power
competition.
i. personal involvement
During 2017 and 2018, I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy and Force Development. In this capacity, I led a
superb team of civilian and military officials from key parts of the
Department tasked with developing the National Defense Strategy,
reporting to Secretary Mattis and Deputy Secretary Work and Deputy
Secretary (now Acting Secretary) Shanahan. In light of this experience,
there are a number of distinctive attributes of this Strategy that I
believe it is useful for the Committee to know.
This Strategy is a result of the leadership and deep
personal engagement of Secretary Mattis as well as Deputy Secretaries
Work and Acting Secretary Shanahan. The Department's top leadership
engaged regularly and in depth with the Strategy team and reviewed the
document numerous times. Secretary Mattis met repeatedly with the team
for long sessions; he considered the hardest issues in the Strategy and
made clear choices about them in close consultation with then-Deputy
Secretary Shanahan, who made the Strategy his priority in his first
months in office and played a crucial, personal role in bringing the
Strategy to fruition. The Strategy therefore reflects the considered
judgment of those charged with leading the Nation's defense.
At the same time, this Strategy was not a purely top-down
document. As Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson has related, the
last version of the Strategy she recalls reviewing was on the order of
the sixty-sixth version of the draft. From the earliest stages of its
development, the Strategy received input from across the Department,
and the range of Department leaders had the opportunity to review and
comment on the Strategy as it evolved. Essentially everyone had their
say. While the Strategy is--by design--a reflection of leadership
judgments rather than a consensus or lowest-common denominator
document, it benefited from the collective wisdom of the U.S. defense
enterprise as well as from input from the Intelligence Community and
other relevant organs of the U.S. Government.
The Strategy team and Department leadership received
input from Congress and outside experts from the beginning of the
document's development, and it was red-teamed several times by leading
defense experts.
The Strategy was also informed by both strategic and
operational-level wargaming.
ii. a recap of the national defense strategy
This hearing has been called to ascertain how the implementation of
the Strategy is faring. I believe there is no more important issue on
which the Committee can focus oversight, as the Strategy requires
``urgent change at significant scale'' for our national interests to be
effectively protected. \1\ This is especially pressing because the
National Defense Strategy Commission, a body chartered by Congress and
composed of leading defense experts who had unparalleled access to the
Department, reported that its members are ``skeptical that DOD has the
attendant plans, concepts and resources needed to meet the defense
objectives identified in the NDS, and [they] are concerned that there
is not a coherent approach for implementing the NDS across the entire
DOD enterprise . . . [The Commissioners] came away troubled by the lack
of unity among senior civilian and military leaders in their
descriptions of how the objectives described in the NDS are supported
by the Department's readiness, force structure, and modernization
priorities...'' \2\ This is cause for significant concern.
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\1\ Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America: Sustaining the American Military's Competitive
Edge,'' Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, 11.
\2\ Eric Edelman, Gary Roughead, et al, Providing for the Common
Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense
Strategy Commission. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2018, 18.
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Before discussing the Department's progress in implementing the NDS
and how Congress can facilitate it, however, I believe it is valuable
first to recap concisely what the Strategy, in concert with the 2017
National Security Strategy (NSS) with which it is so closely tied,
assesses and directs.
The National Defense Strategy can be summarized as follows:
U.S. Defense Strategy in our Broader Grand Strategy
The United States has a lasting interest in maintaining favorable
regional balances of power in the key regions of the world, especially
East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. These favorable balances
preserve our ability to trade with and access the world's wealthiest
and most important regions on fair grounds, and prevent their power
from being turned against us in ways that would undermine our freedoms
and way of life.
Alliances are the critical mechanism for maintaining these
favorable balances, and it is in the United States interest to continue
to be able to effectively and credibly defend our allies and
established partners such as Taiwan, in concert with their own efforts
at self-defense.
The Particular Threat Posed by China and Russia
China in particular and to a lesser extent Russia present by far
the most severe threats to our alliance architecture. The once
overwhelming U.S. conventional military advantage vis a vis these major
powers has eroded and will continue to erode absent overriding focus
and effort by the United States and its allies and partners.
China and Russia pose a particular kind of threat to United States
allies and established partners like Taiwan. Beijing and Moscow have
plausible theories of victory that could involve employing a
combination of ``gray zone'' activities (such as through the use of
subversion by ``little green men,''), robust anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) networks, lethal and fast maneuver forces, and strategic
capabilities, especially nuclear arsenals. The adept integration of
these assets could enable Beijing or Moscow first to overpower United
States allies and seize their territory while holding off U.S. and
other allied combat power. China or Russia could then, by extending
their A2/AD and defensive umbrella over these new gains, render the
prospect of ejecting their occupying forces too difficult, dangerous,
and politically demanding for Washington and its allies to undertake,
or undertake successfully.
The fait accompli is not the only but it is the most severely
challenging of the theories of victory the Chinese or Russians could
employ--especially against Taiwan in the Pacific or the Baltics and
Eastern Poland in Europe.
Particularly in the case of China, these threats will worsen and
expand as the power of the People's Liberation Army grows. Taiwan is
the focal point today; before long, unless the ongoing erosion of our
and our allies' military edge is reversed, the threat will be to Japan
and the Philippines and thus to our whole position in maritime Asia,
the world's most economically dynamic region.
The Need to Focus on Great Power Competition and its Implications
Accordingly, as Secretary Mattis put it in January 2018, ``Great
power competition--not terrorism--is now the primary focus of U.S.
national security.'' \3\ The United States' defense establishment must
therefore focus on and adapt to this top priority--at scale and
urgently, as the Strategy emphasizes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Speech by Secretary of Defense James Mattis at Johns Hopkins
University, School of Advanced International Studies, January 19, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What does this new prioritization mean and what does it entail?
At its deepest level, it requires a fundamental shift in the way
the Department of Defense conceives of what is required for effective
deterrence and defense. This is because the United States and its
allies will be facing great powers--especially in the case of China.
This is a dramatically different world than that which characterized
the post-Cold War period, in which our Armed Forces could focus on
``rogue states'' and terrorist groups due to the lack of a near-peer
competitor. Today and going forward, however, China in particular will
present us with a comparably-sized economy and a top-tier military
operating in its own front yard.
Above all, this requires a change in the mindset of our defense
establishment. We have left a period of overwhelming American dominance
and have entered one in which our Armed Forces will have to prepare to
square off against the forces of major economies fielding the most
sophisticated conventional and survivable nuclear forces. Our Armed
Forces will therefore need to shift from an expectation that they could
dominate the opponent to one in which they must expect to be contested
throughout the fight--and yet still achieve the political objectives
set for them in ways that are politically tenable.
Fortunately, our political-strategic goals, as indicated in the NSS
and NDS, are defensive. We hope only to prevent our allies and partners
like Taiwan from being suborned or conquered by our opponents. We
therefore must defeat Chinese or Russian invasions or attempts at
suborning our allies, and force Beijing or Moscow to have to choose
between unfavorably escalating--and demonstrating to all their
aggressiveness and malign intent by doing so--or settling on terms we
can accept. This, to emphasize, is a different goal than regime change
or changing borders. Rather, it is about preserving the status quo by
favorably managing escalation to win limited wars.
How our forces achieve this objective in the event of conflict will
be of the essence. Our forces must be exceptionally lethal and capable,
optimized to defeat China or Russia. At the same time, however, wars
with China or Russia must remain limited because the alternative is
apocalypse, which neither side wants--thus we must plan and prepare for
them as limited wars. Above all, this requires focusing on defeating
the other side's theory of victory, and particularly the fait accompli
strategy.
The NDS is specifically designed to deal with this challenge. Its
military and force implications proceed from the political-strategic
demands the NSS and NDS set out. As a core concept, the NDS calls on
the Department to expand the competitive space--meaning above all to
adopt a competitive mentality in everything that Department personnel
do, one that refuses to take American superiority for granted, that
searches for new or untapped sources of advantage, and that ensures
that it is China and Russia that fear more what we might what do--
rather than the other way around. \4\
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\4\ ``Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America'', 4.
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The NDS therefore directs substantial changes in the following
elements of our Armed Forces:
Warfighting approach;
Force structure: size, shape, and composition;
Force employment;
Posture; and
Relationships with allies and partners.
Warfighting Approach
The Strategy calls for a different approach to warfighting from the
post-Cold War era. This call stems from the political-strategic
requirement to defeat the adversary's theory of victory by, at a
minimum, rapidly delaying and degrading or ideally denying China or
Russia's ability to impose the fait accompli on, for instance, Taiwan
or the Baltics.
This necessitates a change from what might be called ``the Desert
Storm model'' of warfighting. This model involved the time-consuming
construction of an ``iron mountain'' of U.S. military capability in the
region of conflict before the United States launched a withering
assault to establish all-domain dominance and then ejected the enemy
from our ally's territory. The Desert Storm model was enormously
successful against ``rogue state'' adversaries--but it is also exactly
the model on which China and Russia have ably and assiduously gone to
school. By the time the United States constructs this iron mountain in
response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan or Russian invasion of the
Baltics, the war may already be lost because the costs and risks of
ejecting an enemy now fortified in its new gains may be too prohibitive
or because allies will not support the massive and terrifying
counteroffensive needed for victory.
The United States consequently needs a new warfighting approach
adapted to this threat. This new warfighting approach involves United
States forces resisting Chinese or Russian attacks from the very
beginning of hostilities, fighting in and through enduringly contested
operational environments to first blunt Beijing or Moscow's assault and
then defeat it--without ever gaining the kind of all-domain dominance
that the United States could establish against Iraq or Serbia. With its
invasion blunted or readily reversed, neither China nor Russia would
have a way to end the war favorably; rather, Beijing or Moscow would
face the awful choice of expanding the war in ways that play to United
States advantages or swallowing the bitter but tolerable pill of
settling on terms the United States can accept. Such a posture should
deter a minimally rational adversary from choosing to pursue such a
course.
The National Defense Strategy's Global Operating Model represents a
new conceptual paradigm designed to help frame the Department's efforts
to realize this new warfighting approach. This Global Operating Model
is designed to defeat Chinese or Russian theories of victory, and
especially the fait accompli.
Its ``Contact'' Layer is designed to orient activities in
the ``gray zone,'' especially in concert with allies, to prevent Russia
or China from dominating the crucial perceptual landscape or surprising
the United States and its allies by augmenting allied defenses,
collecting intelligence, and challenging salami-slicing activities.
Its crucial ``Blunt'' Layer is designed to focus U.S. and
allied force development, employment, and posture on the crucial role
of ``blunting'': delaying, degrading, and ideally denying the enemy's
attempt to lock in its gains before the United States can effectively
respond. Crucially, blunting is a function--not an attribute--of the
force. The central idea is to prevent China or Russia from achieving a
fait accompli--it does not require a fixed force. Indeed, blunting is
likely to be done best by a combination of munitions launched from afar
as well as forces deployed and fighting forward.
The ``Surge'' Layer is designed to provide the decisive
force that can arrive later, exploiting the operational and political
leverage created by the ``Blunt'' Layer to defeat China or Russia's
invasion and induce them to end the conflict on terms we prefer.
The ``Homeland'' Layer is designed to deter and defeat
attacks on the homeland in ways that are consistent with the Joint
Force's ability to win the forward fight and favorably manage
escalation.
Likewise, the Strategy's core attributes of the future Joint Force
also point to this new warfighting approach. The Strategy directs U.S.
Armed Forces to become more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready. These
terms have specific meanings, all designed to shift to a force able to
fight through contested operational environments to deny the opponent's
theory of victory:
Lethality refers to the Joint Force's ability to strike
at enemy maneuver forces without the kind of all-domain dominance the
United States military has enjoyed over the last generation. Going
forward, the Joint Force must be increasingly lethal in its ability to
strike at key Chinese or Russian forces from the beginning of
hostilities, even through dense air defense and other A2/AD networks.
Resilience refers to the ability of the Joint Force and
its enabling infrastructure to operate and achieve its objectives even
in the face of determined and sophisticated multi-domain attack.
Agility refers to the Joint Force's ability to become
more operationally unpredictable while remaining strategically
predictable, forcing the opponent to fear when, where, and how U.S.
Forces might appear and act rather than being able to anticipate when,
where, and how they will perform.
Readiness refers to the preparedness of the Joint Force
on short notice to contest Chinese or Russian attempts to implement
their theories of victory. This is a more narrow definition of
readiness than that often used in defense discussions, one focused more
on readying the Joint Force more for specific missions rather pursuing
full-spectrum preparedness. Under the NDS approach, some units may not
need to be highly ready; those crucial to blunting Chinese or Russian
attacks against vulnerable allies, on the other hand, will need to be
at a high pitch of preparedness.
To be realized and translated from concept into prepared forces,
however, the Global Operating Model and these attributes require new
operational concepts focused on these objectives and derived through
rigorous gaming, experimentation, and training. These new concepts
should be designed to overcome the operational problems laid out in the
classified version of the Strategy.
Force Structure: Size, Shape, and Composition
The Strategy has marked implications for the size, shape, and
composition of the Joint Force. Most significantly, the Strategy places
a clear prioritization on being able to deter and, if necessary, to
prevail over a major power adversary like China or Russia in a
strategically significant, plausible scenario. Consequently, it
prioritizes ensuring that the United States Armed Forces are able to
win a fight over Taiwan or the Baltics before investing in the capacity
to fight two wars simultaneously. This is only logical; losing the war
in the primary theater would render success in any secondary theaters
either fleeting or futile. Being able to fight two or more wars
simultaneously is a good, but it is a good subordinate to that of
winning in the primary, decisive fight.
Accordingly, the Strategy, as Secretary Mattis put it, prioritizes
``capability over capacity''--or, put another way, ``capable
capacity.'' That is, the Joint Force must focus on what it takes to
beat China or Russia in a key, plausible scenario--and this means
enough forces of high caliber combined with attritable lower-end
assets. This in turn requires budgets that prioritize manned and
unmanned forces optimized to fight China or Russia over increases in
personnel, force structure, and legacy systems best suited for taking
on Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. At the same
time, it puts high emphasis on developing and fielding lower-cost and
more sustainable ways of conducting secondary missions, such as
operations against non-state actors in places like the Middle East.
Force Employment
The Strategy focuses on readying the Joint Force for plausible
conflicts with China or Russia--precisely in order to deter them. The
problem is that the Joint Force is not as ready for such conflicts as
it should be. Instead, United States Forces have been focused on
operations in the Greater Middle East and a wide variety of ``shaping''
missions, especially since 2001.
This must change. The Joint Force needs to prioritize readying for
major war against China or Russia--through realistic exercises
(including with allies) and training at places like Red Flag, Top Gun,
and the National Training Center, as well as through needed rest and
recuperation amidst a demanding readiness improvement schedule.
By necessity, this requires that the Joint Force also do less of
these ``shaping'' and other secondary activities, and especially that
the primary forces needed for major war be largely spared such duties.
Continuing the current pace of operations and patterns of employment,
such as using F-22s and B-1s over Syria and Afghanistan, will expend
the readiness of the Joint Force on these peripheral missions rather
than augmenting it against China and Russia.
In summary, U.S. Armed Forces should become, as in most of the Cold
War, primarily a training and readiness-oriented force prepared for war
against a near-peer opponent, and not, as in the post-Cold War period,
a military largely focused on operations in the Middle East and on
``shaping'' activities.
Posture
The Strategy represents a reemphasis on forward presence--but a
forward presence of a particular kind. It is not about presence for its
own sake or for symbolic or reassurance purposes. Rather, it is about
combat-credible forward forces--that is, forces that are or can rapidly
get forward, survive a withering Chinese or Russian assault, and blunt
the adversary's aggression. And it about is bases, operating locations,
and logistic networks that can perform their missions in support of
these goals even under heavy and sustained enemy attacks.
In the Pacific, this means investing in base defenses--including
not only missile defenses but also camouflage, hardening, deception
techniques, and other passive measures--that can make our relatively
small number of bases more resilient, while also investing in a wider
range of primary bases as well as secondary and tertiary operating
locations throughout maritime Asia.
In Europe, posture is crucial. Much of the threat posed by the
Russian theory of victory is due to the anachronistic placement of
United States and allied forces, which reflects a pale fraction of the
pre-1989 force laydown trapped in amber. Accordingly, the Strategy
calls for a substantial near-term investment in rectifying the
deficiencies in our deterrent and defense for Eastern Europe. This
includes posturing more heavy equipment and advanced munitions in key
places in Europe and readying allied infrastructure in Eastern Europe
for rapid reinforcement.
Relationships with Allies and Partners
Another category of crucial changes initiated by the NDS is in our
defense relationships with our allies and partners. The Strategy is
clear: the era of untrammeled United States military superiority is
over, yet we face not only high-end threats from China and Russia but
also serious threats from North Korea, Iran, and terrorists with extra-
regional reach. We simply cannot do this all by ourselves. This means
that rebalancing our alliances and empowering new partners is not only
a matter of equity--as important as these are--but of strategic
necessity. We need our allies and partners to contribute real military
capability both to deterring China and Russia directly as well as to
handling secondary threats.
This entails significant changes in how we deal with our allies and
partners. We need to empower our allies as well as partners like India,
Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates to be able to defend
themselves better from Chinese or Russian coercion, to handle secondary
but still important shared threats with less United States involvement,
or both.
Accordingly, we should see much more streamlined and liberalized
procedures for arms and technology sales and transfers as well as for
more intelligence sharing. States that share our broad interests,
including ones, like Vietnam, with which we do not always agree, should
be able to purchase military equipment more rapidly and with greater
confidence in the sustainability and reliability of purchasing from the
United States.
iii. what should successful implementation of the nds look like in the
near term?
What, then, should successful implementation of the NDS look like
in the near term? The measures laid out below, while by no means
exhaustive, would represent meaningful progress toward the fulfillment
of the Strategy.
Warfighting Approach
The Department must make progress on developing innovative
operational concepts. These must be oriented on overcoming the
operational problems identified in the Strategy in ways that favorably
manage escalation and achieve our national political-strategic ends.
Unfortunately, as the NDS Commission noted, there is little
evidence that the Department has yet made meaningful progress on
developing these new operational concepts. \5\ Congress cannot make
informed judgments about the Department's budget request and other
authorization issues without understanding the Department's approach to
developing such concepts, however, since they are vital to determining
what capabilities the Department needs and what the Joint Force's
composition and size should be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Providing for the Common Defense, vii.
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In this context, Congress might request a formal report
from the Department on the state of its progress on developing novel
operational concepts designed to deal with the operational problems
identified in the Strategy.
Force Structure/Budget
The Department's fiscal year 2020 budget proposal is the first
designed from its inception under NDS guidance. As Acting Secretary
Shanahan has indicated, this should be the ``masterpiece'' budget in
terms of implementing the NDS. The budget should therefore reflect
measurable progress in realizing the NDS vision. This in particular
means budgets and programs should be demonstrably linked to improving
the Joint Force's performance in the most stressing, strategically
significant potential warfights against China or Russia. In practice,
in the near term this should mean significant investments in augmenting
capability rather than growing the size of the Joint Force, including
in the FY20 budget. \6\
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\6\ I highly commend to the Committee's attention an excellent
short list of key top priority investment areas designed to address the
National Defense Strategy's requirements in David A. Ochmanek,
``Restoring U.S. Power Projection Capabilities: Responding to the 2018
National Defense Strategy,'' Arlington, VA: The RAND Corporation, 2018,
10-11.
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Key indicators of progress in the budget request toward
implementing the NDS would include, but are not limited to:
Rectifying clear, major shortfalls for key scenarios
(especially Taiwan and the Baltics) through:
o Procurement of substantial numbers of munitions designed to
increase the existing Joint Force's lethality against Chinese invasion
or Russian maneuver forces, such as longer-range anti-ship missiles
(e.g., the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile), longer-range air-launched
cruise missiles (e.g., the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-
Extended Range), and guided anti-armor weapons for attacks on ground
maneuver forces. These types of munitions are must-buys to increase the
defensibility of Taiwan and the Baltics.
o Sustained and substantial investment in augmenting threatened
base and logistic network defense and resilience. This includes
adequate active defenses for key bases and nodes (e.g., the Army's
Indirect Fire Protection Capability, Increment 2) but also especially
passive defenses to increase their resilience (e.g., funds for
hardening, decoys, camouflage, deception techniques, et al).
More robust space-based, airborne, and terrestrial assets
for conducting surveillance and reconnaissance to support situational
awareness, battle management, and targeting in heavily contested
environments.
Funding for a ``high-low'' mix of highly capable, lethal,
and survivable platforms (e.g., penetrating aircraft and munitions,
space systems, and attack submarines) and more attritable systems
designed to complement and enable these more expensive platforms (e.g.,
lower cost unmanned aerial and underwater systems and smaller
satellites).
Investment in lower-cost systems and formations for
secondary and tertiary missions. These include but are not limited to:
o Light-attack aircraft, including potentially unmanned such
platforms.
o Smaller, tailored Army formations on the model of the Security
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) optimized for training and assisting
partner militaries.
Reduction and, wherever possible, elimination of forces
that are not survivable and useful in a high-end scenario and are too
expensive for economical employment in low-end operations.
o The Department's cancellation in FY2019 of JSTARS--a platform
of dubious utility in a potential conflict with China or Russia--was an
important step forward in this vein.
The Congress should consider providing authorization and
resourcing to enable the Secretary of Defense to reserve a substantial
fund of money to be awarded to Services and other entities based on
proposals they submit that hold promise in addressing the key
operational problems laid out in the Strategy. \7\ This would encourage
the development of innovative programs to deal with the challenges
prioritized in the NDS.
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\7\ David A. Ochmanek, ``Improving Force Development Within the
U.S. Department of Defense: Diagnosis and Potential Prescriptions.''
Arlington, VA: The RAND Corporation, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Force Employment
The Joint Force is not ready enough for major war with China and
Russia. As this is the most important and dangerous security threat
affecting our national interests, rectifying this shortfall must be the
primary goal of the Joint Force's activities. Such activities should
include:
Focus Joint Force activities on high-end training and
invest in improving training facilities and techniques to prepare the
Joint Force for high-end combat against China and Russia.
Conduct exercises, including with allies in Europe and
Asia, designed to actually test the Joint Force and allies' readiness
to fight and prevail against Russia or China.
o Such exercises should be designed in light of the Global
Operating Model's framework to demonstrate the ability of United States
and allied forces to blunt Chinese or Russian fait accompli strategies,
including through falling in on prepositioned stocks and engaging the
adversary quickly.
For example, in EUCOM, focus NATO alliance exercises
much more on high-end fighting.
Given how demanding improving the Joint Force's readiness for major
war with China or Russia will be, United States forces must
consequently do less of everything else not connected to that goal.
Accordingly, the Congress should expect the Department to propose to:
Reduce activities not connected to this priority goal,
including a wide range of exercises; shaping, assurance and presence
missions and operations.
Posture
In both Europe and Asia, United States posture is not optimized to
deal with our potential adversary's theories of victory. Accordingly,
the NDS calls for a substantial increase in investment for European
posture designed to quickly and materially address the imbalance in
military power on NATO's Eastern flank and improve the Alliance's
ability to defeat a Russian fait accompli strategy, followed by a
plateauing of this investment in the medium term to focus on the more
substantial long-term Chinese threat. In Asia, in addition to resources
for making bases and operating locations more defensible and resilient,
investment should focus on increasing options for operating locations
throughout maritime Asia and the Western and Central Pacific.
Congress should expect and require investments in the
European Deterrence Initiative and within Service budgets to continue
to go toward enhancing the combat-credibility of United States forces
in Europe and the ability of Surge Layer forces to fall in on
prepositioned stocks in the event of crisis or conflict.
o This should include prepositioning heavy equipment and
advanced munitions.
Congress should expect near-term growth in investments in
our European deterrent and defense posture but a plateauing of this
investment over the coming years as United States and NATO posture,
capability, and readiness against the Russian threat improves.
Ensuring Clear and Consistent Guidance for the Department
There is a significant problem within the Department of Defense
with the proliferation of strategic guidance. Candidly, there is too
much guidance and it is not as rigorously aligned as it should be. Too
much guidance is redundant at best and at worst confusing, conflicting,
and detrimental to effectively aligning the Department behind
leadership intent.
The National Defense Strategy, the document established by Congress
and embraced by Secretary Mattis and Acting Secretary Shanahan as the
Secretary of Defense's preeminent strategic guidance, provides clear
guidance not only at the high political level but also in terms of
force structure and composition, development, employment, and posture.
It establishes clear priorities and identifies areas for reducing
emphasis. In addition, the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance (for
budget and force development) and Guidance for the Employment of the
Force/Contingency Planning Guidance (for force employment) provide
clear follow-on specialized guidance.
Every other document issued by subordinate officials--civilian and
uniformed--in the Department should closely and clearly reflect these
priorities. Yet this is not always the case, resulting in confusion,
stasis, or misaligned activities.
Congress can help rectify this problem by:
Expressing its view that the Defense Planning Guidance
and Guidance for the Employment of the Force/Contingency Planning
Guidance clearly and effectively ensure the implementation of the
National Defense Strategy in their respective domains.
Providing for clearer lanes in the road for the documents
issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. In particular:
o Providing a clearer, more narrowly scoped purpose for the
National Military Strategy, and specifically providing that it focus on
realizing the military dimensions of the National Defense Strategy.
This should include a clear focus on operational concept development, a
core military responsibility.
o Clarifying that the Chairman's Program Recommendations and
Global Campaign Plans should be derived from the Defense Planning
Guidance and Guidance for the Employment of the Force/Contingency
Planning Guidance, respectively.
Allies and Partners
Allies and partners are key to the success of the Strategy. They
must understand and buy in to the Strategy for it to succeed. And they
must be able to obtain the arms, technologies, and intelligence
necessary to integrate with our Strategy.
Congress can help encourage this crucial element of the Strategy
by:
Advocating for a releasable version of the classified
Strategy to be shared not only with close allies but also the broader
set of allies and partners crucial to the Strategy's success.
Reduce barriers to selling or providing financing for
purchases of arms consistent with the Strategy (such as systems useful
for developing indigenous A2/AD networks) to the wider range of allies
and partners identified in the Strategy, such as India, Vietnam, and
Indonesia. To realize this goal, Congress could:
o Ensure that strategic considerations predominate in
interagency and congressional decisions and authorizations about
whether to sell arms and transfer technologies (consistent with
security concerns).
o Remove CAATSA penalties and barriers for partners such as
India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. China is the most significant strategic
challenge the United States faces. Penalizing partners crucial to
helping us check Chinese assertiveness not only inhibits their ability
to do so, but actively alienates them. It also undermines our long-term
ability to shift these states away from their historical reliance on
Russian arms sales toward our own and friendly states' defense
industries.
Moreover, the best way to deal with the military
threat posed by Russia is to augment our posture and forces in Europe,
not to penalize partners that have historically relied on Soviet/
Russian arms.
There are several allies and partners on which the Committee could
most productively focus in light of their unique importance. Taiwan is
especially significant because it is the most vulnerable member of the
United States alliance and partnership architecture, especially over
time, and because its own behavior is crucial to its defensibility.
Japan and Germany, meanwhile, are the largest economies among United
States allies. Greater and more focused defense effort from Tokyo is
essential to the allied defense posture in the Indo-Pacific in light of
the continuing military build-up by China. A cognate increase in effort
by Berlin, meanwhile, is crucial to developing a more equitable and
thus more politically sustainable NATO defense posture.
The United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan
against unprovoked aggression, but Taiwan itself must demonstrate much
greater commitment and seriousness in providing for its own defense.
Congress can help by ensuring the Administration provides and
implements substantial defense sales to Taiwan that are in conformity
with an asymmetric strategy along the lines of Taiwan's new Defense
Concept.
o While Taiwan's defense spending has inexcusably lagged,
President Tsai Ing-wen's administration has committed to increased
defense spending. Congress should encourage this and urge Taipei to
fulfill its pledge.
o Taiwan needs help from the United States to help defend
itself. The Congress should therefore ensure defense sales and
transfers to Taiwan are regular and actually useful for Taiwan's
defense.
o In particular, Taiwan needs to shift from a legacy force
toward an asymmetric one capable of blunting and degrading a Chinese
invasion or blockade. In particular, this means a shift from a focus on
procuring vulnerable, big-ticket items like short-range aircraft and
surface ships to an emphasis on A2/AD systems that can degrade a
Chinese invasion or blockade and buy time for United States
intervention. This entails Taiwan focusing on procuring short-range
UAVs, coastal defense cruise missiles, sea mines, mobile air defense
systems, and rocket artillery.
o Taiwan's Tsai administration has endorsed this approach but
faces internal resistance, often political or bureaucratic in nature.
To help, Congress should applaud Taiwan's shift to this new Defense
Concept and ensure United States defense sales and transfers to Taiwan
are consistent with the asymmetric strategy.
Congress can applaud and support allies and partners that
are working to align with the National Defense Strategy, and encourage
others to do so. It can do so through direct engagements both here and
on Congressional Delegations (CODELs). In particular:
o Japan's level of defense spending is far too low for the
threat environment it faces, and inconsistent with a mature, equitable
alliance relationship with the United States. The administration of
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has, however, been working hard to change
this, and deserves support.
Moreover, Japan's new National Defense Planning
Guidelines are a cardinal example of an allied strategy that is very
much in line with the National Defense Strategy.
Thus, while Congress should continue to press Japan
to increase its defense spending, it should applaud Japan for its new
Guidelines and its efforts to bring Japan's defense efforts into
conformity with the security conditions it faces and an appropriate and
sustainable alliance relationship with the United States.
o Germany has lagged behind its obligations to NATO collective
security for several decades. During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr was
the most capable NATO military, save that of the United States. Yet
Germany effectively almost demilitarized after the Cold War, and today
is incapable of meaningfully contributing directly to the collective
defense of NATO's newer entrants--a collective defense from which the
Federal Republic benefited so greatly during the Cold War.
But Germany appears to have turned a corner, and
Berlin has recommitted its military to the NATO collective defense
mission and to increasing its defense spending from 1.2 percent to 1.5
percent of GDP by 2031. This is not enough, but it is a start that
deserves support.
Congress could, while encouraging Germany to continue
to increase defense spending, applaud the Federal Republic for its
commitments and renewed seriousness in the service of NATO defense.
Defense Spending
Adequate funding is crucial for successful implementation of this
Strategy, and thus for defending America's interests abroad. Hard
choices in the Department's programs and operations are necessary
simply to keep up with the Chinese and Russian military challenge; they
are not a basis for a smaller defense budget.
As Secretary Mattis regularly put it, ``the United States can
afford survival.'' \8\ The Congress should therefore insist that the
Department follow through on the hard choices laid out in the Strategy
but also provide the substantial and consistent funding needed to
realize it.
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\8\ Speech by Secretary of Defense James Mattis at The Reagan
National Defense Forum, December 1, 2018.
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An Active Congress and Senate Armed Services Committee
Congress--and especially this Committee--played a crucial role in
setting the conditions for success for the NDS, including by sending a
clear signal of the importance of prioritization and providing for a
classified version of the Strategy. The NDS is as much Congress'
Strategy as the Department's.
Because of Congress' tremendous importance in the Nation's defense,
realizing the strategic shift initiated by the NDS will require
Congress to play a central role.
Most importantly, Congress and especially this Committee can
continue to make clear, as Chairman Inhofe has already indicated, its
strong and continued support for the National Defense Strategy. This is
especially important and timely in light of the leadership transition
in the Department.
In this vein, the Committee should ensure that the next
nominee for Secretary of Defense commits to advancing and implementing
the National Defense Strategy.
Congress can also support and enable the implementation of the
Strategy by both supporting the Strategy's hard choices and providing
adequate and consistent levels of funding to the Department.
This is central because what differentiates the NDS from run of the
mill strategic documents is not only its clear, overriding focus on the
major contemporary security challenge the Nation faces--great power
competition--but also the hard choices reflected in the Strategy that
Congress demanded and that the Department's leadership made. The
Strategy reflects the understanding that the demands of preparing for
great power competition require conducting secondary missions in a more
economical way.
Saying that great power competition is important but failing to
delineate clearly what not to do effectively undermines the ability to
genuinely prioritize on this most pressing challenge. If the political
leadership of the Department is unwilling to say with some precision
not only what the Department's priority is but also where risk can be
taken and cuts can be made, no one below them will do so--nor should
they be expected to do so. It is the job of the political leadership of
the Department to assume responsibility for those hard calls and
credibly communicate those decisions to subordinate echelons. Secretary
Mattis and Acting Secretary Shanahan--in what is probably an
unprecedented act (at least in the post-Cold War era) of leadership--
did exactly this.
Congress' support for these hard choices--and thus for actually
prioritizing great power competition--is crucial and equally
commendable.
Congress should therefore work with the Department to
support and authorize, as appropriate, the Department's implementation
of the hard choices reflected in the Strategy.
There is no better forum than this Committee for ensuring that
serious deliberation over the Nation's crucial defense matters receives
the official and national attention it deserves. This Committee does
not need to attempt to dictate the right answers to the Department, but
it can ensure the right issues are being soberly and expertly discussed
and highlighted, as it did during the 1970s and 1980s.
In this vein, the Committee could hold both closed and
open hearings on key issues that require attention, featuring both
Department officials and outside experts, such as:
o The results of the most recent and authoritative assessments
of key conflict scenarios;
o New operational concepts;
o New ways of performing missions in secondary theaters, such as
the Middle East, more economically; and
o Improving interoperability with allies and partners to defeat
Chinese and Russian theories of victory.
In addition, the Committee could help communicate more
effectively to and with the American public concerning the serious and
growing threat posed by great power military competition--and, given
its size and sophistication, China in particular--and why this
challenge demands priority even as our national security infrastructure
continues to manage threats from terrorists and ``rogue states.''
At the same time, it is crucial that the National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy priorities be reflected
across government. The Committee could therefore work with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
to ensure strategies and efforts are aligned, a crucial part of
ensuring the United States effectively expands the competitive space.
Conclusion
The 2018 National Defense Strategy represents a fundamental shift
in our country's defenses. Its core purpose was to identify and
anticipate the most consequential and dangerous threats to our Nation's
interests, provide clear and actionable guidance to the Department of
Defense as to how to maintain effective deterrence and defense against
those threats, and by implementing these decisions stand the best
chance of preserving a favorable peace in the coming years. It is a
Strategy that directs hard choices and rigorous prioritization now, so
that we may balance the power of a rising China and check a revanchist
Russia. Failing to make those hard choices and investments now will not
relieve us of the obligation to make them--it will only make them
harder and costlier in the future.
Chairman Inhofe. Excellent statement. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ratner?
STATEMENT OF ELY RATNER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR
OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY; AND FORMER
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
Dr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss a topic of vital
importance to the United States.
For today's hearing, I was asked to provide a comprehensive
assessment of United States strategic competition with China
across all of its manifestations, and my written testimony
includes 20 recommendations for Congress, including in
economic, ideological, and military domains.
I would like to use my opening statement, however, to talk
about the big picture because if we aspire to do what is
necessary as a Nation to rise to the China challenge, it is
imperative that our leaders and the American people have a
clear understanding of what is at stake. Let me begin with five
top-line observations.
First, the United States and China are now locked in a
geopolitical competition that will endure for at least the next
decade. United States-China competition is structural and
deepening. What we are experiencing today is not an episodic
downturn in the United States-China relationship, nor is the
current rise in tensions primarily due to President Trump or
his administration. The United States, the United States
Congress, and the American people should be preparing now for
long-term competition with China.
Second, the United States, on balance, is currently losing
this competition in ways that increase the likelihood not just
of the erosion of United States power, but also the rise of an
illiberal Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and beyond. The
emergence of a China-led order would be deeply antithetical to
United States values and interests, and the net result would be
a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able
to exert power and influence in the world.
Third, to avoid these outcomes, the central aim of United
States strategy in the near term should be preventing China
from consolidating an expansive and illiberal sphere of
influence. It is essential that the United States stop China
from exercising exclusive and dominant control over key
geographic regions and functional domains.
Fourth, the U.S. Government is still not approaching this
competition with anything approximating its importance for the
country's future. While I support the overall thrust of the
Trump administration's China policy, as articulated in the
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy,
it is also the case that many of the Trump administration's
foreign and domestic policies, for instance, on alliances,
international institutions, trade, human rights, and
immigration, do not reflect a government committed to enhancing
American competitiveness or sustaining power and leadership in
Asia and the world. In key areas, I would characterize the
Trump administration's China policy as being confrontational
without being competitive.
Fifth, despite current trends, the United States can still
prevent the growth of an illiberal China-led order. Continued
Chinese advantage in the overall competition is by no means
inevitable. The United States can successfully defend and
advance its interests vis-a-vis China if Washington can muster
the right strategy, sustained attention, and sufficient
resources.
With that context, I would like to use the balance of my
time, Mr. Chairman, to describe four essential tenets that
should guide U.S. strategy going forward.
First, the foundations of American power are strong, and we
should be approaching this competition from a position of
confidence. The United States continues to possess the
attributes that have sustained our international power and
leadership for decades. Our people, demography, geography,
abundant energy resources, dynamic private sector, powerful
alliances and partnerships, leading universities, democratic
values, and innovative spirit give us everything we need to
succeed if only we are willing to get in the game.
Second, rising to the China challenge is ultimately about
us, not them. Preventing China from developing an illiberal
sphere of influence does not require mounting a Cold War-style
containment strategy. Instead, the United States Government
should be focused on enhancing American competitiveness to
defend and advance U.S. interests in key geographic regions and
functional domains. How the United States fares in its
competition with China will ultimately depend on America's own
competitiveness.
Third, we have to compete across all domains of the
competition, including military, economics, diplomacy,
ideology, technology, and information. It would be a mistake to
approach our China policy as siloed and tactical responses to
particular problems. Whether we are talking about the South
China Sea, intellectual property theft, or human rights,
succeeding on any individual issue will require strength and
sophistication across all areas of the competition.
Fourth and finally, maintaining a bipartisan consensus on
China will be essential to America's long-term success.
Fortunately, there appears to be strong and growing bipartisan
support for a more competitive U.S. response. It is imperative
that this bipartisanship endure in the years ahead. U.S.
leaders, including on Capitol Hill, should view bipartisanship
as a necessary and core feature of United States-China policy.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions and to
discussing my policy recommendations in more detail. Thank you
again for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ely Ratner
i. strategic assessment
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss a topic of vital
importance to the United States. I want to begin with five key
observations on the current state of strategic competition between the
United States and China:
1) The United States and China are now locked in a geopolitical
competition that will endure for at least the next decade. United
States-China competition is structural and deepening across the central
domains of international politics, including security, economics,
technology, and ideology. What we are experiencing today is not an
episodic downturn or cyclical trough in the United States-China
relationship, nor is the current rise in tensions primarily due to
President Trump or his administration. The United States, the United
States Congress, and the American people should be preparing for long-
term competition with China.
2) The United States, on balance, is currently losing this
competition in ways that increase the likelihood not just of the
erosion of United States power, but also the rise of an illiberal
Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and beyond. How this competition
evolves will determine the rules, norms, and institutions that govern
international relations in the coming decades, as well as future levels
of peace and prosperity for the United States. There is no more
consequential issue in U.S. foreign policy today. Should the United
States fail to rise to the China challenge, the world will see the
emergence of a China-led order that is deeply antithetical to United
States values and interests: weaker United States alliances, fewer
security partners, and a military forced to operate at greater
distances; U.S. firms without access to leading markets, and
disadvantaged by unique technology standards, investment rules, and
trading blocs; inert international and regional institutions unable to
resist Chinese coercion; and a secular decline in democracy and
individual freedoms. The net result would be a less secure, less
prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence
in the world.
3) To avoid these outcomes, the central aim of United States
strategy in the near term should be preventing China from consolidating
an illiberal sphere of influence in vital regions and key functional
domains. It is imperative that the United States stop China's advances
toward exerting exclusive and dominant control over key geographic
regions and functional domains. Only once the United States halts
China's momentum--and in doing so reassures the world about America's
commitment to its traditional leadership role--can Washington
conceivably construct a durable and favorable balance of power. This
does not mean mounting a Cold War-style containment strategy that seeks
to roll back or weaken China. Instead, where China would otherwise
develop harmful forms of dominant control, the United States should
seek to build ``spheres of competition'' to contest strategic areas.
U.S. policy should focus on enhancing American competitiveness to
defend and advance U.S. interests within these vital spheres of
competition.
4) The U.S. Government is not approaching this competition with
anything approximating its importance for the country's future. Much
of Washington remains distracted and unfocused on the China challenge.
The Trump administration sounded some important notes in its first
National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and there are
strategic thinkers and sophisticated analysts inside the Trump
administration who are attempting to piece together a more competitive
strategy. That being said, many of the Trump administration's foreign
and domestic policies (for example on alliances, international
institutions, trade, human rights, and immigration) do not reflect a
government committed to enhancing American competitiveness or
sustaining power and leadership in Asia and the world. In key areas,
the Trump administration's China policy is confrontational without
being competitive.
5) Despite current trends, the United States can still prevent the
growth of an illiberal order in Asia and internationally. Continued
Chinese advantage in the overall strategic competition is by no means
inevitable. In fact, the United States can successfully defend and
advance its interests with a concerted effort that brings together the
right strategy, sustained attention, and sufficient resources.
Moreover, China has its own substantial vulnerabilities, particularly
compared to the robust and enduring foundations of American power. As
much as China's diplomats and propaganda organs have complained
bitterly about United States officials speaking in more competitive
terms, it is no secret that Beijing has been intensely focused on
strategic competition with the United States for decades. In fact,
China has been gaining ground across the geopolitical competition
primarily because it has most often been the only side competing.
ii. how we got here and what's at stake
United States policy toward China since the end of the Cold War was
predicated on steering its development and shaping the regional
environment such that Beijing would ultimately decide not to challenge
United States dominance in Asia. At its core, it was a strategy for
preventing a China challenge from ever surfacing in the first place.
This approach was guided by the promise that economic modernization and
interdependence would lead to political and market reforms internally,
while also creating overwhelming incentives for China to integrate into
the prevailing international order. At the same time, given
uncertainties about China's intentions, the United States and its
allies developed military capabilities to deter Chinese aggression and
dissuade Beijing from aspiring to regional hegemony. There have been
ongoing debates in Washington about which element merited greater
emphasis, but this combination of ``engagement'' and ``balancing''
served as consensus United States strategy toward China for decades
after the end of the Cold War.
This policy approach was valid as long as there were indications
that it was working--or at least enough ambiguity and uncertainty about
China's future behavior. Such was the case throughout most of the 1990s
and early 2000s, when China adhered to a fairly cautious and
conservative foreign policy. But that era has ended, and the results
are deeply troubling. Contrary to United States aspirations, China is
becoming more authoritarian, the regime is tightening its grip on the
economy, and its foreign policies are increasingly ambitious and
assertive in seeking to undermine and displace the United States-led
order in Asia. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, ``The China Reckoning: How
Beijing Defied American Expectations,'' Foreign Affairs, March/April
2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/
china-reckoning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is not to say that Beijing does not deserve greater voice or
influence commensurate with its position as a major power. But there is
a difference between greater Chinese power (even China being the most
powerful country in the region), and a situation in which Beijing
exerts hegemonic control over Asia. The latter would include: the
Chinese military administering the South and East China Seas; regional
countries sufficiently coerced into not questioning or challenging
China's preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; the
de facto unification of Taiwan; Beijing with agenda-setting power over
regional institutions; a China-centric economic order in which Beijing
sets trade and investment rules in its favor; and the gradual spread of
authoritarianism, including proliferation of China's model of a high-
tech surveillance state. Preventing that future should serve as the
central near-term aim of United States-China strategy.
iii. guiding principles for u.s. strategy
As the United States embarks on blunting China's efforts to
establish an illiberal order, it should do so with the following four
tenets:
1. The foundations of American power are strong: We should be
approaching the China challenge from a position of confidence. Despite
all the pessimism about American dysfunction and decline, the United
States continues to possess the attributes that have sustained its
international power and leadership for decades. Our people, demography,
geography, abundant energy resources, dynamic private sector, powerful
alliances and partnerships, leading universities, democratic values,
and innovative spirit give us everything we need to succeed if only
we're willing to get in the game.
2. Rising to the China challenge is ultimately about us, not them:
Since the end of the Cold War, United States policy toward China has
sought to open its society and economy, while also encouraging it to
become a responsible member of the international community. Instead, we
find ourselves today confronting an increasingly illiberal,
authoritarian, and revisionist power. We should expect that China will
continue heading in this direction (at least) as long as Xi Jinping and
the Chinese Communist Party are in charge. It is therefore no longer
viable for the United States to predicate its strategy on changing
China. Rather, how the United States fares in its strategic competition
with China will ultimately depend on our own competitiveness, which
means we need to be committed and focused on enhancing our national
strength and influence. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Daniel Kliman, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Ely Ratner, ``The China
Challenge,'' 2018 CNAS Annual Conference, June 21, 2018, https://
www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-china-challenge.
\3\ Ely Ratner, ``Rising to the China Challenge,'' Testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, February 15, 2018, https://
www.cfr.org/report/rising-china-challenge.
3. We need a comprehensive China strategy across all domains of the
competition: Regardless of the specific topic--Chinese economic
coercion, human rights, or the South China Sea--the United States needs
a comprehensive strategy that enhances U.S. competitiveness across all
domains of the competition, including military, economics, diplomacy,
ideology, technology, and information. \3\ It would be a mistake to
approach our China policy as siloed and tactical responses to
particular problems. Succeeding on any individual issue will require
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strength and skill across all areas of the competition.
4. Building and sustaining a bipartisan consensus on the China
challenge will be of utmost importance to America's long-term success:
Fortunately, there currently exists a strong degree of bipartisan
support for a more competitive U.S. response. It is imperative that
this bipartisanship endure in the years ahead. Political fissures on
China will have at least three negative consequences: inhibiting the
ability of the United States Government to focus attention and
resources on the China challenge; undermining the necessary confidence
of United States allies and partners that they should side with an
America willing to confront China's revisionism; and creating openings
for Beijing to divide and conquer within the United States political
system. U.S. leaders, including on Capitol Hill, should view
bipartisanship as a necessary and core feature of United States-China
policy.
iv. recommendations for congress
This section contains 20 recommendations for Congress divided
between the economic, ideological, and security domains of the
competition.
Economic Competition
1. Congress should hold hearings to re-examine the costs and
benefits of rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now known as
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP).
United States exclusion from regional trade agreements in Asia will
have both economic and strategic consequences for the United States.
Now that the CPTPP is in force, U.S. businesses and workers will begin
to suffer the costs of trade diversion away from the United States. At
the same time, the negative externalities of China's expanding power
and influence are growing larger in the absence of United States
economic leadership. With no viable alternative to a future defined by
China-led economic order, countries in the region are increasingly
reluctant both to partner with the United States and to resist China's
acts of coercion, most notably in the South China Sea. Similar dynamics
are emerging elsewhere, where this trend is repeating itself in South
Asia, the Middle East, and even parts of Europe and Latin America.
United States efforts to set high-standard trade and investment rules,
knitting together TPP with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) with Europe, would bracket both sides of the
Eurasian continent, thereby reducing China's coercive leverage,
resisting the spread of illiberalism, and creating political space for
continued security cooperation with the United States. The Trump
administration's strategy of pursuing a ``free and open Indo-Pacific
region'' is the right framework, but it will fail without an economic
component on par with the scale and scope of TPP. The politics of this
are obviously difficult right now in the United States, but both
political parties need to find a way back to supporting fair and high-
standard multilateral trade deals. Congress should revisit the costs
and benefits of remaining outside these agreements, while also
articulating what specific adjustments would be required to garner
political support in Washington. By refusing outright to join regional
trade agreements, the United States is inviting continued Chinese
economic coercion and, ultimately, Chinese dominance of Asia and
beyond.
2. Congress should support and enhance non-tariff tools of economic
statecraft to respond to China's illegal and unfair trade and
investment practices.
The Trump administration is rightly seeking to address a wide range
of unacceptable trade and investment practices by China, including
forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and market
access restrictions. If current negotiations fail, the Trump
administration has threatened to widen the scale and scope of United
States tariffs on Chinese goods. This would be a mistake. Blanket
tariffs are not an effective tool because they are indiscriminate and
serve as a tax on American businesses and consumers. Moreover, there is
real potential for escalating tariffs to negatively impact the United
States 1.economy and financial markets, which would likely spur
political divisions and commensurate calls for a return to a less
competitive approach toward China. To avoid these outcomes, even when
China inevitably falls short in making structural economic reforms,
Congress should support the Trump administration's efforts to freeze
the tariff war. At the same time, however, the United States Government
should also vigorously pursue other tools that include targeted
tariffs, investment restrictions, export controls, regulatory changes,
greater information sharing with the private sector, and law
enforcement actions that curb China's ability to profit from its
illicit and unfair behavior. As part of that, Congress should urge the
Trump administration to employ Executive Order 13694, which provides
authorities for sanctions against companies that have used cyber means
to steal intellectual property for commercial gain.
3. Congress should limit the ability of the Executive branch to
levy Section 232 tariffs against U.S. allies and partners on national
security grounds.
The United States should be working with--not alienating--allies
and partners to address the China challenge, including sharing
information on China's activities, coordinating on trade and investment
restrictions, and rerouting global supply chains. It will be
exceedingly difficult to address China's coercive, unfair, and illegal
trade and investment practices on our own. It was a mistake for the
Trump administration to lead with Section 232 tariffs on some of our
closest allies, and similarly misguided to threaten auto tariffs
against the European Union or withdrawal from NAFTA or KORUS. Instead,
the United States needs an international economic strategy that
differentiates between allies and strategic competitors. Congress
should therefore set limits on the ability of the Executive branch to
levy damaging tariffs on close U.S. allies and partners on national
security grounds. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Peter Harrell, ``Congress must rein in White House economic
national security powers,'' The Hill, June 7, 2018, http://thehill.com/
opinion/national-security/390958-congress-must-rein-in-white-house-
economic-national-security-powers.
\5\ These recommendations were designed by Daniel Kliman, senior
fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
4. Members of Congress should organize bipartisan Congressional
Delegations and parliamentary exchanges to engage with key partners on
China.
Recent legislative efforts by the U.S. Congress, particularly on a
new investment screening regime, provide important lessons learned for
partner governments. Congress can play an essential role in sharing
strategies, information, and expertise with partner legislatures that
are only beginning to grapple with the issues and complexity associated
with confronting China's illiberal and revisionist actions, including
on trade and investment. Moreover, doing so in a bipartisan fashion
will send a particularly important signal to the world and to China
that the United States is politically united on this issue.
5. Congress should call for bureaucratic reforms inside the U.S.
Government, accompanied by an official strategy, to help the United
States better organize for China's economic challenge.
The United States Government is not institutionally configured to
deal with the China economic challenge. Congress can help rectify this
shortcoming by passing two pieces of proposed bipartisan legislation:
one requiring the administration to publish a National Economic
Security Strategy; and another that creates a new Office of Critical
Technologies and Security to coordinate United States policies in the
technology competition with China.
6. Congress should play an active oversight role in the creation of
the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC). \5\
The Trump administration and Congress deserve credit for taking
steps to use development finance more strategically. To that end,
Congress can play an important role in shaping the new USDFC (stood up
as part of the BUILD Act) by ensuring it is optimized for United States
competition with China. For example, Congress should encourage the
USDFC to: 1) include a strategy office that coordinates with U.S.
defense and intelligence agencies; 2) tolerate a degree of risk in high
priority regions; and 3) have authority for surge funding for the rapid
delivery of development finance when political circumstances warrant.
7. Congress should appropriate resources for the United States
Government to provide technical assistance to potential recipients of
Chinese Government financing.
China's economic carrots and sticks--particularly under the rubric
of its Belt and Road strategy--are giving Beijing considerable leverage
over security and political issues in third countries, including in
Latin America and Europe. It bears underscoring that there is
significant global demand for infrastructure, and no viable alternative
to replace entirely China's potential provision of resources. That
being said, it will run counter to United States interests if recipient
countries are subject to corruption and coercion, burdened with
commercially non-viable development projects, or caught in debt traps
that China exploits for political and strategic ends. The United States
should team up with like-minded countries (including Australia, India,
Japan, and Singapore) to provide technical assistance to help recipient
countries evaluate proposed loans and infrastructure projects.
Washington should also consider which existing multilateral
institutions could act as a clearinghouse of best practices or a
neutral forum to assess Belt and Road projects. \6\ Cognizant of
potential moral hazard, the United States could also consider working
with other advanced economies to make funds available at affordable
interest rates for governments stuck in China-induced debts traps.
Countries like Sri Lanka and Myanmar should have alternatives to
handing over strategic infrastructure to Beijing if they find
themselves indebted to China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Daniel Kliman and Abigail Grace, ``Power Play: Addressing
China's Belt and Road Strategy,'' Center for a New American Security,
September 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/power-play.
\7\ Elsa Kania, ``China's Threat to American Government and Private
Sector Research and Innovation Leadership,'' Testimony before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 19, 2018, https://
www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-
house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence.
8. Congress should focus on enhancing American competitiveness by
continuing to support increases in funding for basic research,
formulating strategic immigration and visa policies, and investing in
education, among other priorities.
Ensuring America's continued economic strength and technological
leadership is vital to sustaining U.S. competitiveness. \7\ The U.S.
Government should therefore continue its long tradition of providing
seed funding for critical technological breakthroughs. Additional
domestic policies focused on enhancing American competitiveness will be
critical to the strategic competition with China, including responsible
fiscal policies, strategic immigration and visa policies that attract
and retain top talent, skills retraining for workers adversely affected
by China's predatory economic policies, emphasis on improving STEM
education, and efforts to build a bipartisan consensus on the China
challenge.
ideological competition
9. Congress should pass the bipartisan Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act.
China has placed upwards of a million Muslims in internment camps
in the western province of Xinjiang, while also instituting an
Orwellian surveillance state that interferes and monitors nearly every
aspect of private life. These actions are both morally repugnant, and
represent a harbinger of a high-tech authoritarian governance model
that China is already actively exporting. Holding Beijing to account
for this behavior should be a priority for the United States. The
United States Congress should therefore pass proposed legislation to
ensure that this issue receives the attention it deserves
internationally, and to hold both Chinese officials and private
companies accountable if they contribute to these unconscionable human
rights abuses.
10. Congress should provide resources and direct the Defense
Department to develop the means to circumvent China's ``Great
Firewall'' and make it easier for Chinese citizens to access the global
Internet.
At times, it will be important for the United States to be able to
communicate directly with the Chinese people. The United States
Government should therefore invest in developing and deploying the
technologies necessary to circumvent authoritarian firewalls, including
in China. This would involve both developing cyber capabilities to
disrupt China's censorship tools, as well as finding new ways for
citizens inside China to access a free and open Internet.
11. Congress should review declassification processes and
authorities to ensure timely release of relevant intelligence.
United States intelligence agencies regularly acquire information
about China's illiberal, illegal, and otherwise counter-normative
behavior against its own people and abroad. Too often, this information
is unnecessarily classified and withheld from U.S. policymakers, the
American people, and U.S. allies and partners. Selective
declassification of certain information would better inform the United
States public and the international community about the often corrupt
and abusive domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist
Party. Congress should therefore consider when it may be appropriate to
loosen declassification processes and authorities to engage in more
effective U.S. information operations.
12. Congress should take measures to undermine the Chinese
Communist Party's influence operations in the United States.
There are a number of measures the United States Congress can take
to expose and weaken the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to
shape discourse and attitudes in the United States. For example,
Congress could amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) to
require greater disclosure of foreign influence operations, while
providing additional resources to the Department of Justice for FARA
enforcement. \8\ Congress should also urge universities, think tanks,
and media companies to provide greater transparency and disclosure of
projects, institutes, and other resources that are attached to Chinese
Government funding. In doing so, it is vitally important that Congress
and the United States Government differentiate between the Chinese
people and the Chinese Communist Party, targeting counter-influence
activities squarely at the latter in rhetoric and practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Peter Harrell, ``China's Non-Traditional Espionage Against
the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses,''
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, December 12, 2018.
https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/chinas-non-
traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states-the-threat-and-
potential-policy-responses.
13. Congress should explore reconstituting a 21st Century version
of the U.S. Information Agency.
The United States should revive its ability to engage in
information operations and strategic messaging, which have not featured
prominently in United States-China policy for decades. The goal should
be to provide a counterpoint to the billions of dollars China spends
each year in propaganda to sell a vision of its own ascendancy and
benevolence, alongside U.S. decline and depravity. The resulting
perceptions of the inevitability of China's rise and of future
dependence on China have reinforced Beijing's coercive toolkit. More
United States media and information platforms could provide a degree of
level setting about the facts and fictions of China's power, expound
the strengths of the United States, and cast a more skeptical shadow on
certain expressions of Chinese influence, including its governance
model, its ideological assertions, and the overall strength of its
economy. U.S. information operations could also highlight Xi Jinping's
deep unpopularity around the world, as well as his mismanagement of
China's economy and failure to deliver on much-needed economic reforms.
If creating a new institution like the U.S. Information Agency is not
feasible, the U.S. Government will still need more modern and
sophisticated information dissemination tools. As part of that effort,
Congress should ensure that Radio Free Asia and the Global Engagement
Center at the State Department are sufficiently resourced.
Alternatively, failing to augment U.S. resources in the information
space will make it much more difficult to succeed in other areas of the
competition.
14. When appropriate, Congress should reinforce the Trump
administration's public reproach of China by passing sense of the
Senate resolutions criticizing China's actions.
It is essential that the United States Government publicize and
criticize China's revisionist behavior. If the United States remains
silent during incidents of Chinese coercion and intimidation against
foreign governments and private businesses, it is far more difficult
for others in the international community to stand firm. Congress can
help by naming and shaming acts of Chinese aggression, supporting
United States allies and partners, and holding private companies
publicly accountable if they are compromising U.S. values and interests
for commercial gain.
security competition
15. Congress should shift and prioritize defense resources for the
China challenge.
The Trump administration's January 2018 National Defense Strategy
included the critically-important insight that: ``Inter-state strategic
competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national
security.'' Congress should endorse this formulation and prioritize
defense spending accordingly by supporting a more lethal force,
strengthening alliances and partnerships, and reforming the Defense
Department to enhance performance and affordability. At the same time,
the United States will have to be judicious in how it uses the force.
This means being willing to make hard tradeoffs that shift limited
United States resources--for example intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets--from the Middle East and Africa to the Indo-
Pacific, and from the war on terror to strategic competition with
China. Finally, to sustain America's military advantage in the Western
Pacific, Congress should ensure that the future force also includes
platforms that are smaller, lower-cost, more expendable, unmanned, and
autonomous.
16. Congress should urge the Trump administration to revise United
States declaratory policy in the South China Sea.
China is steadily moving toward dominance of the South China Sea.
China's control of the South China Sea, one of the world's most
important waterways, would pose a significant threat to United States
commercial and national security interests. China's track record in
recent years--willfully blocking freedom of navigation and using
economic coercion over political and security issues--is a troubling
indicator of how Beijing would likely exploit administrative control
over commercial and military access to the area. Moreover, as the main
artery between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the South China Sea is a
critical military arena in which a dominant China would have
significant leverage over vulnerable chokepoints and sea-lanes, as well
as launching pads to project military power beyond East Asia. Despite
the stakes, United States policy in the South China Sea remains
insufficient, defined primarily by freedom of navigation operations and
episodic shows of force. The United States needs a new approach that
includes a combination of economic, military, informational, and
diplomatic measures. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Ely Ratner, ``Course Correction: How to Stop China's Maritime
Advance,'' Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/course-correction. 6
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In the near term, Congress should examine and urge two important
changes to U.S. declaratory policy. First, the United States should
clarify that the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines covers the
South China Sea. In the absence of this change, Philippine officials
have indicated that they may seek to renegotiate or even scrap the
treaty. It should go without saying that the United States alliance
with the Philippines is an essential component of United States
strategy in the region (which is also why Beijing is working so hard to
break the alliance apart). In exchange for this act of reassurance, the
United States could request more robust implementation of the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014 by Washington and
Manila.
Second, in the context of China's blatant revisionism, the United
States should reexamine its position of neutrality on sovereignty
claims in the South China Sea. One option worthy of consideration would
be to adopt a ``Senkaku model,'' whereby the United States would
recognize administration of certain islands without taking a formal
position on the sovereignty claims. This would allow the United States
to partner with and support the efforts of other claimants to defend
the features they administer, and prevent Chinese administrative
control of the South China Sea.
17. Congress should provide greater resources to help build more
capable and independent U.S. allies and partners.
The U.S. Government should work to boost the military power of
United States allies (especially Japan, South Korea, and Australia) and
critical partners (including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Vietnam) by, for instance, loosening restrictions on
certain technology transfers and investing more to enhance partner
capacity and interoperability. Frontline states should have independent
capabilities to act as a first line of deterrence and defense, and the
United States should assist partners in developing their own counter-
intervention capabilities to ward off Chinese coercion. To do so,
Congress should ensure that United States allies and partners
associated with the China challenge are receiving an appropriate
proportion of United States defense trade and arms transfers, including
through foreign military financing, foreign military sales, and excess
defense articles. \10\ The new Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA)
was a step in the right direction and should be fully funded, but
United States capacity building in the region still pales in comparison
to current United States resources going toward building foreign forces
in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
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\10\ For example, see Eric Sayers, ``Assessing America's Indo-
Pacific Budget Shortfall,'' War on the Rocks, November 15, 2018,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/assessing-americas-indo-pacific-
budget-shortfall/.
18. Congress should support exemptions under CAATSA for countries
seeking to balance against China.
It is appropriate for the United States to seek to reduce Russian
revenue from overseas arms sales. In certain instances, however, the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is
undermining the ability of the United States to create a favorable
balance of power in Asia. To be more specific, Russia's diversified
security partnerships in Asia (including with India and Vietnam) are
strategic assets for the United States. Sanctioning or threatening to
sanction these partners undercuts their ability to provide frontline
deterrence and defense against China, and damages United States
relations with important partners. Moreover, it is not in the interest
of the United States to isolate Russia in Asia, which, if successful,
could have the effect of forcing China and Russia into a strategic
security partnership that would not otherwise exist. Congress should
therefore support CAATSA exemptions for Asian powers that are procuring
Russian weapons to balance against China. In the longer term, the
United States Government should explore what kinds of policies or
incentive structures might lead regional partners to willingly
diversify away from reliance on Russian systems.
19. Congress should encourage active ``burden-shifting'' to China,
including in Afghanistan.
China's interests in security and stability are growing in regions
where the United States is expending considerable resources. United
States policymakers should map areas where China's interests are rising
and, concurrently, the United States is overextended or bearing
disproportionate costs. Rather than imploring Beijing to ``burden-
share'' or be a ``responsible stakeholder,'' the United States should
consider unilateral measures to reduce its outlay of resources where
United States and Chinese goals sufficiently overlap and where China's
interests are sufficiently large such that Beijing would be forced to
pick up the slack. Afghanistan is the most obvious example. It is no
longer justifiable that the United States is sacrificing American lives
and spending several billions of dollars a year in Afghanistan while
China provides only tens of millions of dollars.
20. Congress should not support new wars of choice.
It will be far more difficult, if not impossible, for the United
States to succeed in a strategic competition with China if Washington
initiates a new war of choice, including against North Korea or Iran.
In addition to the horrendous human costs, America's strategic position
in Asia and globally would be significantly diminished. United States
attention and resources would be devoured at the expense of United
States interests in Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea,
and the Indian Ocean. To put it bluntly, starting a war of choice with
North Korea or Iran would also be a decision to forfeit strategic
competition with China.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Ratner.
Mr. Wilson?
STATEMENT OF DAMON M. WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I plan to focus on how our allies fit
into our strategy.
In an era of great power competition, the United States
should adopt a more permanent deterrence posture and bolster
its alliances as a strategic comparative advantage over our
adversaries. If we are concerned about near-peer competition,
rightly so from Russia and China, the United States must not
only invest in its own capabilities but also in its global
alliance structure.
Polarization within our Nation and tumultuous relations
within our alliances risk making the United States look
vulnerable to our adversaries. While some of these divisions
are real, the United States and its allies are in fact more
strategically aligned in grand strategy enjoying the support of
Republicans and Democrats than they have been, I would argue,
since perhaps 9/11, if not 1989.
Our Nation and its closest friends agree that the great
challenge of the 21st Century will be the competition between
the free world and authoritarian, corrupt, state-led
capitalism, chief among them China and Russia. The National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy articulate this
great power competition clearly, but we still have work to do
to implement policies to achieve this strategy. Specifically,
we are not as focused on how to bolster our alliances as a key
component of our strategy to compete effectively.
To better address the Russian threat, the United States
needs to bolster its military presence in Europe to establish
what an Atlantic Council task force on the U.S. force posture
in Europe calls ``permanent deterrence,'' especially in the
Baltics, Poland, and the Black Sea region. Our allies need to
be part of this force posture with us. Our policies need to
prioritize arms and technology sales and transfers to our
allies, and divisions among us cannot become opportunities for
Russia to weaken NATO cohesion or resolve.
Our task force argues that Europe has once again become a
central point of confrontation between the West and a
revisionist Russia. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is determined
to roll back the post-Cold War settlement, undermine the
sovereignty of Russia's neighbors, shatter the alliance, and
overturn the United States-led rules-based order that has kept
peace. Moscow's invasion and continued occupation of Georgian
and Ukrainian territories, its military build up in the west,
and its hybrid warfare against democratic societies have made
collective defense and deterrence an urgent mission.
Today, NATO is in the midst of its greatest adaptation
since the Cold War. The United States is playing its part,
including through generous funding of the European Deterrence
Initiative.
Last July's NATO summit was, at the same time, among the
most acrimonious and the most productive in recent history,
bolstering the alliance's rapid reaction capabilities and
hybrid warfare defense, and promising to enlarge the alliance
into the Balkans. While much more remains to be done, allies
are making strides towards their defense investment pledges.
Since 2016, European allies have spent an additional $41
billion in defense. Through 2020, they will spend an extra $100
billion, and their plans submitted to NATO call for an
additional $350 billion through 2024. By 2024, Germany is
projected to have the largest defense budget in Europe.
Furthermore, the United States-backed Three Seas Initiative
is advancing cross-border infrastructure to wean Central Europe
and the Baltic states off of Russian energy dependency while
providing alternatives to Chinese investment, making the
region's economies more resilient.
In the case of Russia, there can be no successful strategy
to confront Putin's aggression without a strong NATO. The
questioning of our commitment to the alliance is dangerous and
only weakens our position. This body's strong support for NATO
sends an important signal.
And for Europe, China is becoming a greater geopolitical
reality as it comes closer via cyberspace, trade and
investment, and now military presence close to Europe's shores.
The United States should confront any Chinese challenge with
Europe, as well as its Asian allies, by its side.
The current tensions between Washington and its allies,
ranging from burden sharing to trade, are real. But these
should not overshadow the shared challenges we face together.
Unenforced errors that unnecessarily divide Washington from
its friends should be avoided, such as the trade tactics that
have now seen Europe and Canada join common cause with Moscow
and Beijing at the World Trade Organization. The United States
should limit its trade challenges on national security grounds
to our adversaries rather than our allies.
The acceptance of Russia and China as the main geopolitical
challenge of the 21st Century leads to the conclusion that U.S.
interests are best served when Washington and its allies act
together. The United States is much better positioned if it
does not assume the burden of countering Beijing and Moscow
alone. Implementing a National Defense Strategy focused on
near-peer competition with Russia and China requires that we
put our alliance at the core and not the periphery of our
strategy.
We have already seen what can happen when Moscow and
Beijing engage in bilateral negotiations with their neighbors,
using their power and their leverage to extract concessions,
lock weaker partners into exploitative economic deals, or even
to rewrite borders.
The United States leading a global set of alliances can
deter this threat.
Thank you for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Damon M. Wilson
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
implementation of the National Defense Strategy. I will offer strategic
remarks today and submit more detailed work we've undertaken at the
Atlantic Council for the record.
In an era of great power competition, the United States should
adopt a more permanent deterrence posture--one that features a mix of
permanent and rotational capabilities in Europe and Asia--and bolster
its alliances as a strategic comparative advantage over our
adversaries. If we are concerned about near-peer competition from
Russia and China, the United States must invest not only in its own
capabilities, but also in its global alliance structure.
Intense polarization within our Nation and tumultuous relations
within our alliances risk making the United States look vulnerable to
our adversaries. While some of these divisions are real, the United
States and its allies are more strategically aligned in grand
strategy--enjoying the support of Republicans and Democrats--than they
have been since 9/11, if not 1989. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Damon Wilson, Washington and Its Friends Are More United Than
You Think, Atlantic Council, January 2, 2019; https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/washington-and-its-
friends-are-more-united-than-you-think
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our Nation and its closest friends agree that the great challenge
of the 21st Century will be the competition between the free world and
authoritarian corrupt state-led capitalism, chief among them China and
Russia. The National Security Strategy and the subsequent National
Defense Strategy articulate this great power geopolitical competition
clearly, but we still have work to do to implement policies to achieve
this strategy. Specifically, while implementation is focused on China
and Russia, we are not as focused on how to bolster our alliances as a
key component of our strategy to compete effectively.
For the purposes of today, I will primarily focus on Russia.
To better address the Russian threat, the United States needs to
bolster its military presence in Europe to establish what the Atlantic
Council Task Force on U.S. Force Posture in Europe calls ``permanent
deterrence,'' especially in the Baltics, Poland, and the Black Sea
region. Our allies need to be part of this new force posture with us,
our policies need to prioritize arms and technology sales and transfers
to our allies, and any divisions among us cannot become opportunities
for Russia to weaken NATO cohesion or resolve.
The Atlantic Council task force argues that Europe has once again
become a central point of confrontation between the West and a
revisionist Russia. Rather than the Fulda Gap, this time the
confrontation takes place along the Suwalki Gap--and in the Baltic,
Black, and Arctic Seas. ``Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia is
determined to roll back the post-Cold War settlement, undermine the
sovereignty of former Soviet states, and overturn the US-led rules-
based order that has kept Western Europe secure since the end of World
War II and enlarged to countries of Central and Eastern Europe after
1989. Moscow's invasion and continued occupation of Georgian and
Ukrainian territories, its military build-up in Russia's Western
Military District and Kaliningrad, and its ``hybrid'' warfare against
Western societies have heightened instability in the region and have
made collective defense and deterrence an urgent mission for the United
States and NATO.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ General Philip Breedlove and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow,
Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the U.S. Military Presence in
North Central Europe, Washington, DC, Atlantic Council, December 2018,
1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the height of the Cold War, the United States deployed 300,000
personnel to Europe, including four divisions and five Brigade Combat
Teams (BCT). In 2012, the U.S. removed the last two heavy armor
brigades, and withdrew all U.S. tanks and other heavy vehicles. By
2014, the U.S. Army retained two light BCTs and 65,000 U.S. personnel
stationed in Europe. U.S. posture in Europe now emphasizes deterrence
by reinforcement and the rotational presence of forward deployed combat
units.
Today, NATO is in the midst of its greatest adaptation since the
Cold War. The United States has played its part, including through
generous funding of the European Deterrence Initiative.
Last July's NATO summit was at the same time among the most
acrimonious and the most productive in recent history, bolstering the
Alliance's rapid reaction capabilities and hybrid warfare defense, and
promising to extend the Alliance's reach into the southern Balkans
through further enlargement. \3\ Importantly, allies are making strides
toward their defense investment pledges: since 2016, European allies
have spent an additional $41 billion in defense; through 2020, they
will spend an extra $100 billion; and their plans call for an
additional $350 billion through 2024. By 2024, Germany is projected to
have the biggest defense budget in Europe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ David Wemer, Here's What NATO Achieved at Its Brussels Summit,
Atlantic Council, July 12, 2018; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/here-s-what-nato-achieved-at-its-brussels-summit
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the US-backed Three Seas Initiative is advancing
cross-border infrastructure to wean Central Europe and the Baltics off
of Russian energy dependency while providing alternatives to Chinese
investment, making the region's economies more resilient.
Despite these efforts, we face a formidable and evolving adversary.
Ahead of NATO's seventieth anniversary this April, there is more that
can and should be done to enhance the Alliance's deterrence posture in
Europe.
Our task force agrees that significant enhancements to the existing
U.S. presence could and should be undertaken to bolster deterrence and
reinforce Alliance cohesion consistent with the National Defense
Strategy. We propose a package of permanent and rotational deployments,
which would build on significant U.S. capabilities already deployed in
Poland and should be complemented by NATO Allied capabilities. Our
recommended package would make elements of the current U.S. deployment
in Poland permanent, strengthen other elements of that deployment by
reinforcing the BCT deployed there with various enablers, assign
another BCT on a permanent or rotational basis to Europe, reestablish a
continuous rotational presence in the Baltic States, and increase the
U.S. naval presence in Europe. The task force members are confident
this can all be done while maintaining NATO solidarity and enhancing
burden-sharing among allies.
We must also bolster our presence in the Black Sea region, help our
allies replace Soviet-era equipment, and continue to arm close partners
including Finland, Georgia, Sweden, and Ukraine.
Even if we periodically differ with our allies, the U.S. strategy
should inevitably drive Washington to bolster and expand its alliances
in the coming years. In an era of geopolitical competition, America's
friends and allies are the United States' best competitive advantage.
Viewing our alliances that way would compel consistent policies to lead
our alliances to ensure coherent, united fronts in standing up to
Russian and Chinese aggression.
In the case of Russia, there is no possible successful strategy to
confront Putin's aggression without a strong NATO. The public
questioning of our commitment to the Alliance is dangerous and only
weakens our position. This body's strong support for NATO sends an
important signal.
And for Europe, China is becoming a greater geopolitical reality as
it comes closer via cyberspace, trade and investment, and now military
presence close to Europe's shores. The United States should confront
any Chinese challenge with Europe as well as our Asian allies by our
side.
The current tensions between Washington and its European, Canadian,
and Asian allies are well-documented, running from burden-sharing to
trade. They are real. But these should not overshadow the shared
challenge we face together: the coming struggle between a free world
and great power authoritarians.
Unforced errors that unnecessarily divide Washington from its
friends must be avoided, such as the trade tactics that have now seen
Europe and Canada join common cause with Moscow and Beijing at the
World Trade Organization. \4\ The United States should limit its trade
challenges on national security grounds to our adversaries rather than
our allies. Unnecessary division plays into the hands of Washington's
geopolitical competitors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Jakob Hanke, EU and China break ultimate trade taboo to hit
back at Trump, Politico, November 21, 2018; https://www.politico.eu/
article/eu-and-china-break-ultimate-trade-taboo-to-hit-back-at-trump/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The acceptance of Russia and China as the main geopolitical
challenge of the 21st Century leads to the conclusion that United
States interests are best served when Washington and its allies act in
unison. The United States is much better positioned if it does not
assume the burden of countering Beijing and Moscow alone. Implementing
a National Defense Strategy focused on near-peer competition with
Russia and China requires that we put our alliances at the core, not
the periphery, of our strategy.
We have already seen what can happen when Moscow or Beijing engage
in bilateral ``negotiations'' with their neighbors, using their power
and leverage to extract concessions, lock weaker partners in
exploitative economic deals, or even to rewrite borders.
The United States leading a global set of alliances can deter this
threat.
See Appendix A: ``Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the U.S.
Military Presence in North Central Europe''.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. Those are
excellent opening statements.
Mr. Colby, I think you commented a little bit about this
without identifying anybody out there doing it, but I
remember--I think it was in March--the RAND Corporation did, I
thought, a very effective article that woke up a lot of people,
saying that if Russia should take on NATO, including our
contribution to NATO, we would probably lose. That is the type
of thing that people need to be talking about.
I know it is a little bit controversial. I had this
discussion with some of the uniformed people who say that we
should not be talking so much about the capabilities of our
opponents. On the other hand, you have got to do that if you
are going to end up getting the resources necessary for us to
combat that. So that is a little bit of a problem that we have.
Let us start with you, Mr. Colby. First of all, I think you
are probably aware that we have kind of adopted this as our
blueprint, which you had a lot to do with, and we appreciate
the good work that you did there.
Sometimes the debate about a defense budget is posed as a
choice between an increased budget on one hand and making tough
choices on the other hand. When I listened to all three of you
and the committees that we have had, I think the challenge is
so great that we need everything. I would like to have you
comment about that choice argument that is being made.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. I
think we are going to have to maintain an increased, as
necessary, spending just to stay competitive. I mean, if you
look at the scale and scope of the Chinese military buildup
over the last 20 to 25 years, it has slowed a little bit, but
it is basically almost a 10 percent year on year increase.
Meanwhile, our allies have lagged, which some of them are
starting to improve.
But, no, I think we are going to have to make hard choices
and maintain very robust spending just to keep up.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, I agree with that. I am concerned
that our message is not getting across.
Mr. Ratner, you talked about the South China Sea. We were
in the South China Sea watching the initial stages of the
building of the islands by China. And our allies over in that
part of the world are very much aware of what China is doing
there. They have won the argument in my opinion. I mean, if you
look and analyze what they are doing with the islands, it is
like you are preparing for World War III. When you are talking
to our allies over there, you wonder whose side they are going
to be on.
I think it is working in that part of the world and other
parts of the world. They are now involved in places in Africa
that they never even thought about before. So I do not think we
are making a lot of headway at that thing.
What I would like to do, in terms of educating the American
people, I would like to get from all three of you, first of
all, do you agree with our discussion here that it is necessary
that there needs to be a wakeup call as to the talent that is
out there from our adversaries and, secondly, what we can do to
bring this up to the public's attention. It is a difficult
thing to deal with. Any thoughts on that?
Mr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I actually completely agree
with you, and I think the benefits of trying to hide these
things is far outweighed by the importance that you and other
Members of Congress and the political leadership of this
country can have in helping the American people understand the
gravity and severity of the threat. I think there are two
things going on here.
One is great powers, particularly China, are the only
countries that could really change the way our whole world
operates and ultimately our country. You know, the American
military could lose a war. That is the reality. The Chinese and
the Russians know that. They have sophisticated satellites.
They have various means of electronic communication. They pick
up a lot of stuff. I am more concerned that the American people
understand that and have the urgency so that we can stay ahead
of this threat which is very urgent.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Ratner, what is your feeling about that?
Dr. Ratner. Sure. I would just add two comments.
The first, I think what is lacking today in American
discourse, including from our leaders, is a clear articulation
of what is at stake. I think bringing this all together, not
thinking of it as just islands in the South China Sea or
intellectual property theft, but bringing it together in terms
of a comprehensive, in the case of China, challenge to the
international order and the threats posed to United States
peace and prosperity associated with a Chinese sphere of
influence is something we need to paint a picture of, work from
the end, look at the end, and work backwards. That would be the
first thing I would say. So I think we need to be clear about
the stakes.
The second thing is, as I mentioned in my testimony, I
think the importance of a bipartisan message on this could not
be more important because I think the American people can get
confused sometimes that what we are seeing today is a product
of the Trump administration, and having Members of Congress and
others going out together, Republicans and Democrats, with a
clear message on this issue could not be more important to
sending a signal that the country as a whole is in it to get
this right.
Chairman Inhofe. That is good.
Mr. Wilson, I am going to do the rest of my questions for
the record to try to keep our timing right. But I will be
asking the same question of all three of you. So that will be
forthcoming.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Mr. Wilson made a very compelling argument about the
international collaboration and cooperation as essential. And
just, Mr. Colby, your comments too. Do you agree?
Mr. Colby. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I am not sure
everything in particular, but nothing pops up to mind as
disagreeing. But absolutely, collaboration is essential and
alliances are essential.
Senator Reed. And NATO particularly with respect to Russia?
Mr. Colby. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. And, Mr. Ratner, your views too.
Dr. Ratner. Yes, fundamental to the China challenge
cooperating with allies and partners.
Senator Reed. One of the points in your testimony was a
notion--and if you could elaborate--that we have to make
investments to compete with China, not just in the Department
of Defense but in many other areas, research and development,
building an economy that can not only compete but outdistance
the Chinese. Can you elaborate on that? Because I think that is
a very important point.
Dr. Ratner. Sure, Senator. And it is no accident that the
economic and ideological recommendations in my testimony come
first before the military because I agree with Mr. Colby that
the military is absolutely essential, but it has to be
integrated into a broader strategy.
So in terms of domestic policies to enhance American
competitiveness, I would look toward increasing science and
technology research, STEM education among our youth, visa and
immigration policies that are devised to attract and retain
talent in this country as part of a human capital strategy,
enhancing American infrastructure, improving our health care
system, having sound fiscal policies, and getting our
bureaucracy organized to implement this challenge as well. So I
think all of these play an important role.
Senator Reed. In a sense, we need to make investments not
only in our traditional defense and national security agencies,
but also in many other aspects of American governance. Is that
your position?
Dr. Ratner. No doubt. Investments in those other areas will
enhance our military competitiveness as well.
Senator Reed. Mr. Colby, do you agree?
Mr. Colby. Yes, absolutely, Senator. The only thing I would
say is I think the military is kind of a cornerstone because I
think if the Chinese or the Russians see that they can use
military power--and that is I think what Senator Inhofe might
have been getting at--if people feel that they are going to be
subject to military coercion, the rest is not going to be as
helpful. But absolutely, all are crucial.
Senator Reed. And again, Mr. Wilson, you made a very
compelling case for NATO and for engagement. One of the other
aspects I think--your comments first and then the others--is
that we seem to be already engaged with the Russians, I mean,
the constant sort of below the radar and sometimes above the
radar, if you will, cyber operations, political operations, et
cetera. It is in some respects the phase one or the phase zero
of the next battle. Can you comment on that? And then I will,
if there is time, ask your colleagues also.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Senator. I think that is exactly right,
that we are facing both an increasing capability and intention.
If you look at Russian behavior in the invasion of Georgia
versus Ukraine, it shows intention in both, but the
capabilities they have brought to bear certainly increased. And
so what I think we face with an adversary, particularly in the
case of Russia, our near-peer competitors, is there a
calculation of what they can get away with. Therefore, our
deterrence posture is both about--I used to work for Lord
Robertson at NATO, and he would always say it is about both our
capability and our credibility. And so it is that match on our
side. Do we have the capabilities that are brought to bear to
draw them to conclude that it is not worth it, matched with
that sense of credibility that deterrence is about the
psychology of the adversaries, they believe we have the resolve
that we stand clearly by things like article 5? I think what we
are seeing is a probing and a testing and a Russian strategy
that is consistent. As they make gains without pushback, they
pursue further gains.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
And that line, Mr. Colby, your comments about this hybrid
warfare and constant interaction at the cyber level and other
levels with Russia--and then I will ask quickly, Mr. Ratner,
about China.
Mr. Colby. Sure, Senator Reed. I think that is a crucial
point. I mean, obviously, there is an ongoing level that I
think is probably mostly met with by other elements of national
power. I think the most concerning aspect is if the Russians
could use that to shape the narrative in Europe and here even
about their use of military force being advantageous. My
favorite example of this--pick your poison--is Fort Sumter. The
south having fired on Fort Sumter first, would the union have
had the degree of resolve? So it is very important that we have
a military posture that is interrelated with our kind of
political and information side, but that does require really a
focus on the military side.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
And, Mr. Ratner, finally, any comments on China in this
venue?
Dr. Ratner. Only that I agree with the point that this is
an important tactic they are using, and our response has been
inadequate to date. I would be happy to provide a longer answer
about what we should do in response at another time.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
a vitally important hearing. Thank you for calling it.
Senator Reed, thank you for emphasizing the importance of
NATO. To the extent that your question reemphasizes our
commitment as a Senate and as a Congress to that vital
alliance, I want to associate myself with those sentiments.
I do want to get back to the China question. Yesterday, the
Justice Department unsealed sweeping criminal charges against
Huawei: violation of United States sanctions, as well as
outright intellectual property theft. I want to offer into the
record at this point, Mr. Chairman, an op-ed from today's
``Wall Street Journal,'' ``The 5G Promise and the Huawei
Threat,'' authored by former House Intel chairman Mike Rogers.
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
the 5g promise and the huawei threat
Big Brother is coming to your home via cheap Chinese goods.
By Mike Rogers
Jan. 28, 2019 7:47 p.m. ET
Federal prosecutors unsealed a pair of indictments Monday, charging
the Chinese technology company Huawei with crimes including bank fraud,
sanctions violations and theft of trade secrets. Huawei's behavior is
finally being recognized for what it is. Beijing is using companies
like Huawei and ZTE as an extension of its intelligence network,
engaging in criminal behavior to advance not only the bottom line but
the interests of the Chinese state. With the 5G future close at hand,
this realization can't come a moment too soon.
This isn't a new problem. In 2012, after a yearlong investigation,
the House Intelligence Committee raised the alarm about Huawei and ZTE
in a bipartisan report. The report focused the attention of the
intelligence community on the criminal and espionage threat.
Huawei calls our concern ``little more than an exercise in China-
bashing,'' but it's widely shared internationally. From Poland to
Canada, Australia to France, Western countries are waking up to the
threat of Chinese state and commercial espionage, and are taking
countermeasures.
Why does this matter to you? Because the next-generation
communication network, 5G, will revolutionize the way we use
technology, and China wants dominance from the start. Rather than
operating from a central location, 5G network sensors are pushed to
endpoints such as networked refrigerators, thermostats, aircraft,
factory machines, autonomous vehicles and things we haven't yet
conceived that will be tied into the 5G network.
This requires a radical rethinking of how we secure our data. It's
pointless to lock the doors of your house if you leave every window
open and add a few new ones for good measure. China has made it clear
that it wants to dominate 5G technology and its deployment. Through
Huawei and the products it manufactures, Beijing is working to control
the 5G network rollout, control the international standards for its
deployment, and infect the foundation of the 5G system for its own
benefit. Big Brother is coming into your home thanks to cheap products
from China.
As the indictment demonstrates, and as our allied intelligence
services have agreed, China's control of 5G is a very bad idea. We must
recognize that Huawei and other Chinese companies care nothing about
free-market competition. Their aim is to control, access and exploit
data.
Beijing must be put on notice that its use of Huawei and ZTE as
extensions of its intelligence apparatus is unacceptable. China must be
prevented from dominating 5G and made to see that there are
consequences for violating international norms.
Businesses and governments must stand up to Beijing. Failing to do
so compromises the national security of America and its allies.
The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act bans federal agencies
and contractors from using Huawei and ZTE technology. Last year the
Federal Communications Commission proposed excluding companies that buy
from Huawei and ZTE from receiving certain federal funding. These
actions are a start, but not enough. Huawei is a security risk we can't
afford at any price.
Senator Wicker. Chairman Rogers says this in the second
sentence of his op-ed. Huawei's behavior is finally being
recognized for what it is.
So help us, Mr. Ratner and Mr. Colby, understand what China
is up to with regard to Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE. Mr.
Ratner, you mentioned on page 4 of your testimony a
comprehensive strategy that includes a lot of things, military,
economics, diplomacy, ideology, and technology. Is that what
you are talking about here? Mr. Colby, you talk about the
enemy's theory of victory is dominance of this new 5G level of
just very advanced technology is going to be part of China's
theory of victory. Mr. Ratner first.
Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Senator.
I would look at the Huawei issue through four separate
lenses, the first being the legal. Of course, the company is
engaged--and this is what the indictment was about--in illegal
activities, stealing trade secrets, obstructing a criminal
investigation, evading sanctions and ought to be dealt with
from a law enforcement capacity. That is the first lens to view
this through.
The second is through the security lens, which I think is
what you are primarily referencing here----
Senator Wicker. Right.
Dr. Ratner.--and the threat it poses to supply chains,
critical infrastructure. That is absolutely real. We know that
the Huawei leadership has members of the Communist Party within
it, and the company has long and deep relationships with both
the PLA [People's Liberation Army] and the Ministry of State
Security in China and, of course, is subject to Chinese law and
their new national intelligence law which gives the government
the right to use the networks and data as they wish.
Third, I would look at the Huawei issue separate from its
functionality but through the lens of China's unfair trade and
investment practices, which our country still is on the wrong
side of to the extent that we do not have access to their
markets and they have access to ours. And we ought to think
about a principle of reciprocity.
And then finally, the overall technology competition.
So these are all coming together within the Huawei issue
and they all merit a response. We need defensive measures, and
we need to invest in our own technologies as well. We need to
be cooperating with allies and partners. So the technology
competition I think stretches across the military and the
economic and requires a comprehensive response.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I agree with Dr.
Ratner on this as so many other points.
I would say I think it absolutely is part of their overall
theory of victory which is to do I think a couple of things.
One is to generate the leverage within various countries that
could be part of this alliance or partnership architecture that
would be designed to check Chinese aspirations to dominate the
region and potentially beyond. Things like Huawei will give
them economic leverage, informational leverage, I mean,
blackmail leverage, bribery we have seen in places like Sri
Lanka. This dissolves or corrodes the resolve in these
countries potentially to stand up to Chinese potential
coercion.
Then there is also the sentiment I think that maybe the
world is going China's way, as they used to say about the
Soviets in the 1970s, that maybe we better just go with the
Chinese. I think that is why these countries, some of them
allies, many of them kind of partners, nontraditional allies,
are really the center of gravity because we need to work with
these countries not in a sort of charity motivated way, but we
need to be able to form a network that together is sufficiently
cohesive to stand up to these Chinese----
Senator Wicker. Is the National Defense Strategy adequate
in discussing this issue?
Mr. Colby. I think absolutely, sir. I think the point can
be made more robustly and more eloquently by people like this
body and political leaders so the American people see that
these alliances are sort of enlightened self-interest, not sort
of charity. I think that is a different way that maybe we can
start talking about these alliances, that it is sort of almost
like a business enterprise that we share these broad interests.
But that involves our allies doing more and contributing more.
But really, we are doing this in our own interest to prevent
the Chinese from dominating East Asia in particular.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here.
Mr. Wilson, I especially appreciated your comments about
NATO and certainly share the views of Senator Wicker and
Senator Reed about the importance.
Are you concerned that there have been mixed messages sent
about our support for NATO to our other NATO partners and the
rest of the world?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, I am. I think that it is important that
there be, as I said, deterrence being part psychology, just
absolute clarity that there is absolute resolve and rock solid
support for the alliance and its commitments, article 5.
I also think the broader tenor of our debate on burden
sharing, which is an important one--it sometimes helps to put
the center of gravity in a different place. I like to see how
we can think about our alliances and our alliance structure as
a force multiplier for our capabilities, our interests, and our
values and how we are leveraging other nations' investments and
their defense to help us achieve our strategic objectives. And
I think that context of while keeping absolute pressure on our
allies to do more, appropriately so, understanding that this is
a force multiplier in effect for our tool and remaining rock
solid in our commitment to what article 5 means in terms of the
defense of all of our allies.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I share that view and have
heard recently from one of our NATO partners who expressed
concern that there was a message being sent by a recent
interview on one of our networks that suggested that we would
support article 5 only if the partner nation was up to date
with their burden sharing responsibilities. Have you heard that
concern from any of our NATO allies, and would you share the
concern that that sends a very bad message about our commitment
to NATO?
Mr. Wilson. As I said prior, I think the calculation, in
this case, of Russia is what can we get away with, and if we
see a pathway to be able to actually divide or shatter this
alliance, that is an invitation for their action. And so I
think the credibility of the alliance depends on that clarity
of our commitment to it and a consistency in that messaging. I
think that is why this body's message on the alliance has been
so important.
Senator Shaheen. Despite whether someone has fulfilled
their commitment to burden sharing or not.
Mr. Wilson. That is correct.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Ratner, a couple of weeks ago, as I am sure you
remember, China landed on the dark side of the moon. At that
time, our NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]
employees were not working. Our researchers were not working
because we were in a government shutdown. How does that address
the credibility and the strength that we need to be positioning
with the rest of the world when that is what is happening in
the United States?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I think that is an excellent question.
Obviously, there were direct economic costs from the shutdown,
and that affects our ability to compete with China. I think as
you referenced, there are two other effects in terms of our
overall competitiveness.
The first relates to our ability to sustain our alliances
and partnerships, and to do that, we need Asia and the world to
have confidence that the United States has the focus and the
resources and, frankly, the competence to enhance American
competitiveness to compete with China. And when our Government
is shut down, that sows doubts and that feeds into the
calculations of countries as to whether they want to stand up
to China and whether they want to partner with us.
Secondly, to the extent that there is--and I agree with Mr.
Wilson--an emergent ideological competition between the free
world and an emergent authoritarianism, we do not like the
juxtaposition, as you described, to be projecting to the world
that our Government is shut down while China is landing on the
dark side of the moon. I think we need to be the shining city
on the hill again.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Colby, I am not sure that I completely understand some
of the arguments that you are making. You talk about on page 5
of your testimony that the new warfighting approach involves
United States forces resisting Chinese or Russian attacks from
the very beginning of hostilities and to blunt Beijing or
Moscow's assault and then defeat it. I certainly agree with
that sentiment, but what I am having trouble reconciling is how
you go from there to a conclusion that therefore we should not
be focused, as I understood you to say, on any action that
China or Russia may be taking in other parts of the world where
we have an interest.
For example, you mentioned the Middle East as a place where
we should not be, as I interpreted your remarks, putting undue
resources. And yet, if we do not blunt Russian and Chinese
actions in those areas, does it not give them an opportunity to
enhance their ability to compete with the United States in
other parts of the world?
Mr. Colby. Ma'am, thank you for the question.
I think from a strategic perspective, East Asia and
Southeast Asia and Europe are the decisive theaters. Things are
ultimately decided there. For the Chinese to project power
without having resolved a favorable situation in the Western
Pacific and East Asia, they would essentially project power
into the Middle East at our sufferance. They would be
essentially using their capital but leaving themselves
vulnerable to our counterattack.
The problem is that Asia is the richest part of the world,
and Europe is the second probably richest part of the world.
And China is the most plausible potential kind of hegemon. The
way they can do that is they can pick off the small states,
starting with Taiwan and then moving to the Philippines and
Vietnam, et cetera. They do not necessarily have to fight a
war. They can use things like Huawei. They can use 5G. They can
use corruption. And then in the back of everybody's mind is if
I fight them, I know I am going to lose.
What I am really getting at is the Chinese or the
Russians--their incentive is not to start a massive World War
III with the Americans. Their incentive is to start a small war
and then say, look, if you are going to fight back, this is
going to get very risky. And by the way, we have ways of
hurting you at home. Sure, nuclear weapons, by the way, are out
there, but so is cyber attack. So is precision conventional
strikes. Are the American people ready for that?
And I think that again gets back to the chairman's point
about really sort of educating I think--educating sounds
patronizing, but illuminating to the American people just how
serious these stakes are because if the Chinese take over Asia
and take over not Genghis Kahn style, but basically they are
the ones who set the rules of the road, to Dr. Ratner's point,
that is ultimately going to have a very, very serious effect on
our lives. I think the election interference that we suffered
in 2016 could very much pale in significance to what we could
see in a world where Asia is dominated by China.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I am out of time. I certainly
appreciate what you are saying. I just think there are some
flaws in your strategy if we think that we should withdraw from
every other part of the world other than Europe and Asia in a
way that gives opportunity to Russia and China for whatever
they might want to do there.
Mr. Colby. Could I just clarify quickly, ma'am? The
strategy does not call for withdrawing. It calls for the more
efficient use. So we have been using B-1's and F-22's in the
air over Afghanistan and places like that. That has a very,
very real opportunity cost for how we are doing. That is why we
could lose. The place we could really lose, that is where we
need to put our resources is the argument and the strategy.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin just
by saying thank you for putting together this particular
hearing. I think it is critical that we be able to share in
open session with the American people just how serious this is.
I would like your comments on this, gentlemen. Number one,
it is not so much that China and Russia today are more than
near-peer to us with regard to our nuclear capabilities or our
space capabilities, but rather their current trajectory is such
that their development is on a faster pace in those strategic
areas. I think this is the part which the American people will
want us to be working on now to make investments so that 3
years, 5 years, and 10 years down the road we do not put the
next generation of leaders in a position where they are
wondering why we did not see this coming.
I would like your thoughts. It used to be air, land, and
sea that we talked about as the domains in which we needed to
be dominant. But today there are two more, both space and
cyberspace. It would appear to me that our near-peer
competitors, China and Russia in particular, have taken it upon
themselves to, in a way, shortcut dominance by becoming very,
very good and working in areas of cyber and in space that can
hinder our ability to be dominating on air, land, and sea.
Mr. Colby, would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Colby. Yes. Thank you, Senator. I certainly agree with
your sentiment.
I think one thing is important. The Russians and the
Chinese are quite different. Fundamentally China is an
economy--for the first time in our history, we will be facing a
competitor of comparable size and economic sophistication to
ourselves. It was not true of Nazi Germany. It was not true of
the Kaisers. It was not true of the Soviet Union. It is not
true of contemporary Russia. Contemporary Russia and likely
future Russia poses a very severe but focused threat. I think
it is using primarily asymmetric and time-distance advantages
in Eastern Europe, coupled with its very robust strategic
forces.
The Chinese have started to do that, but they are beginning
to develop actual peer--for instance, for a while they were
doing mostly counter-space. Now they are launching satellites
at a bristling rate. They are developing nuclear submarines to
go far abroad. They are developing aircraft carriers. We are
going to be dealing with a peer competitor.
What I would say about cyber and space, everything is a
contested domain. I would say it is not so much how we do in a
given domain like hypersonics or space. It is really about
these scenarios because that is what we are going to be focused
on. That is what the Chinese are going to be focused on. That
is what if you are in Hanoi or Manila or Tokyo, you are
thinking how does this war end if I stick my neck out with the
Americans. Whatever the force is that we need for that, that is
the standard I think we need to go towards.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Mr. Ratner?
Dr. Ratner. I would agree with Mr. Colby and maybe just
build on it a little bit with some of the fine work that he did
in the National Defense Strategy, which is we need to look at--
and we are doing this at our home institution of the Center for
a New American Security, doing work on what is the future of
American war going to look like. What is going to be the
American way of war? To start with the scenarios embedded in
the strategy and then work toward what is our warfighting
approach, what is our force structure going to look like, our
force employment, our posture, how are we going to integrate
with alliances. All of these things are in need of reform and a
hard new look, but it starts I think with the plausible
scenarios.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I would just add that I think your point on the
trajectory is spot on. I agree with Mr. Colby that if you think
about the challenge that we face from Russia today it is from
an economy less the size than Italy, than the Netherlands. What
is remarkable is the remarkable military modernization that an
authoritarian centrally controlled system has been able to
develop to really enhance the capabilities that do pose, I
think, a severe problem in targeted areas because of the
demonstrated willingness to use them. It is on a different
scale from China, but that trajectory has been very rapid in
the Russian military modernization program.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
If we entered into any sort of a major conflict, can any of
you imagine a scenario in which we would not be at war in
space?
Mr. Colby. No. I think for a long time, Senator, people
thought that space might we a sanctuary, including people who
were responsible for the space command. I think if you got into
that kind of war, there would probably be certain kinds of
limitations. Those would be themselves contested, but space
would certainly be a contested domain. It is so vital for
warfighting in this era.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Ratner?
Dr. Ratner. I agree.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I agree, but again, I do think it is what can
the adversary get away with. And so those efforts for Russia or
even China to be able to essentially have a confrontation with
us that is not a direct confrontation I think is where we are
most vulnerable.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for a very fascinating discussion
about these topics. I appreciate your work on it.
I want to talk specifically about technological advances
and pick up on Senator Rounds' discussion about space and cyber
in particular in an area that I think folks are categorizing as
a major arms race, and that is in artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning which, as you know, will be transformative
for warfare in ways that we probably cannot fully appreciate at
this point. It is moving very, very quickly.
There have been suggestions that the United States is
actually falling behind in AI in terms of our relative position
with China and that we lack really a coherent strategy to deal
with that.
So, gentlemen, certainly Mr. Colby, Mr. Ratner, I would
appreciate your comments as to how do you see the United
States' approach to AI particularly relative to China, but
Russia is working on these projects as well. What are we
getting right? What do we need to improve?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you very much, Senator Peters. I
would really commend the work of our colleague, Paul Scharre,
who I think is a leading scholar on this. I would also commend
Congress' creation of the AI Commission, which is being led by
Eric Schmidt and Bob Work, both of whom were involved in
developing the National Defense Strategy.
So the strategy is really not taking our technological edge
for granted. I think AI may be the crucial piece of the puzzle.
You know, it is hard to say.
I do not have defined views yet on what exactly we need to
do, but I think we need to look at this in a competitive way,
leverage the advantages in our system, the fact that we have
competition, and that there are going to be imperfections that
are arising out of an authoritarian, state-controlled,
mercantilist politicized system, as well as that of our allies.
That is a point I think maybe we can delve into a little bit
later.
But, one of the advantages here is that we have highly
technologically capable allies in places like Japan, Korea,
partners like Taiwan, Europe, et cetera. We should be seeking
to, where possible, work collectively. I think the era of
unipolarity is over. We can still serve the advantages and
goals that we have sought to achieve throughout our history,
but certainly since World War II, but we are going to have to
do it in a different way. Part of that is going to have to be a
more equitable relationship with our allies. That is going to
involve their doing more, and it is also going to involve
potentially our giving up some of our autonomy in decision-
making.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, it is a really important question. I
would also commend the creation of the National Security
Commission for Artificial Intelligence. I think that is a huge,
important first step. My understanding is they will potentially
have their first report out next month. I would hope Congress
would take their recommendations seriously.
There are three areas that we need to focus on as it
relates to artificial intelligence. I think the most important
is the human capital question and ensuring that we have the
talent pipeline and immigration policies to attract and retain
the brightest minds in the world, including at our
universities.
We also need to think hard about data security. The Chinese
data inside their country is not particularly strong, and that
is something they are going to need to advance their artificial
intelligence. That is one of the reasons why they are trying to
appropriate and steal as much data overseas as they can. We
ought to be working inside our own country and with allies and
partners on data privacy and data security.
Then we have to think about how to integrate artificial
intelligence for the purposes of this committee into our
defense and military apparatus. I think the creation of the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to coordinate some of
these activities is important. I think the work that the
Defense Innovation Unit is doing out in California is also
important.
I think we are getting our act together, and this is really
important but we are going to have to maintain focus here.
Senator Peters. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. If I may just add, I think it is important on
the cyber front to recognize that I think we do have peer
competition, particularly with Russia in this case.
On the greater technological challenge, I think for us and
for this body to help frame an understanding that this great
technological evolution that we are going through has profound
implications on whether free democratic societies really get
there first or the authoritarians. That is the same as we think
historically about technological developments, the nuclear
weapons. Who got there first had profound geopolitical
implications.
The strength that we bring to the table will be our private
sector ingenuity, although the Chinese are quickly catching up
to that. The weakness that we bring is a national coherence and
a strategy to help coalesce that into something for national
purposes.
Senator Peters. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses, for finally a public discussion about
it. I think this is long overdue. I mean, there have been some
public discussions but not quite as blunt, maybe even as scary
as we are having right now. I think it is important. It is
important to me as a policymaker because I like to be able to
talk about it in ways that spread the influence a little bit,
and you have been helpful.
What I would like to have you each comment on is what is
our biggest challenge going forward domestically, politically?
Is the biggest issue in front of us financial investment? I
appreciate Mr. Colby's reference to being more efficient in
other places. I think there are efficiencies that can go around
that could get us to do more and do better with what we have.
Or is it attitude? Or is it really a culture institutionally?
And that is what I fear.
In other words, as policymakers and as people of influence,
whether it is in passing a law or encouraging the institutions,
what do you think can be done to speed up this process of
modernization? What has made us so risk averse? I see almost a
paralysis in our entire government. It did not manifest itself
in the worst sense with this issue. But I would just like to
hear from each of you if you have ideas of what we can do to
encourage the bureaucracy a bit.
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Senator.
Maybe I sound a little bit like a broken record. I have
given this a lot of thought. Ultimately it does come down to an
appreciation of threat. I want to be very clear here that I am
not trying to paint some sort of lurid, kind of colorful
picture. But I think it is also the appreciation of the
contingency of the world that we have known for the last
generation or even since the Second World War. I often think it
is a parallel a little bit to the financial crisis of 2008 that
you could--I mean, 75 years since the last great depression.
Right? So people basically wrote it down to effectively zero.
I think there is a natural tendency for people to basically
say a world of great power competition in which somebody really
antithetical to us could actually take over is something I do
not really believe. In the Defense Department, people say we
would have trouble, but we would not actually lose. I think the
reality is we could actually lose, and as Dr. Ratner has
rightly said, if we do not compete effectively and better, we
could lose the grand competition to China in particular. We do
not have to because we have immense reservoirs of national
power, which almost paradoxically make us less anxious. You
know, it is good to be an American.
But I think to me that is why this committee's role, this
hearing, the role of Members of the Senate and the House can be
so important in saying, look, we are not saying the sky is
falling in yet, but if we do not take account of it, we are
basically going to be at the sufferance of the Chinese over
time.
Dr. Ratner. I would agree with all that.
I think we are, many, still stuck in an early post-Cold War
ideological paradigm where we believe the world is naturally
and inevitably heading toward greater freedom and democracy and
open markets in the end of history paradigm. Clearly we are
learning today that is not the case. So it is taking a rethink
about sort of our fundamental assumptions about the future of
international politics.
I do think, Senator, as I said earlier, that we need a
clear articulation of what is at stake here. There are a lot of
voices saying a lot of different things, and that is why this
hearing today is so important to say them clearly and paint a
vision of what, in my instance, a Chinese sphere of influence
would actually look like and what it would mean for the
American people, to be clear of that.
Then finally to your question about, yes, we need
institutional reform, but I hope we do not need a crisis. I
think one thing that all the Members here in Congress could do
is to sew together I think the message of American
competitiveness and great power competition with the message of
American renewal and strength, and then if those two come
together, we will do what we need to do to compete effectively.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I would add to this the framework that we are essentially
in a great battle of ideas. We have renewed on a competitive
stage ideologically which we had not been used to. I think part
of what is important here is confidence in our system, self-
correction in our system, and demonstrating that our democratic
institutions, while always messy, are still the best means to
deliver prosperity and security for our citizens and for us to
have confidence in that, for the American people to have
confidence in that, and for our adversaries to actually be
envious of that to show that this system works. At the end of
the day, the best antidote to some of the hybrid strategies we
have faced are the resilience and confidence in our own
democratic processes and institutions and making them work.
Senator Cramer. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Actually, Mr. Chairman, my colleague
from West Virginia is on a time crunch. If it is all right with
you, I would like to let him go first.
Chairman Inhofe. That is fine with me.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. I appreciate
it.
Thank you all for being here.
Just an observation. Basically what we have been told and
what we believe is that the advancements that China has been
able to make on such a rapid scale and also Russia too has been
done because of the cyber, if you will, cyber hacking, the
espionage that goes on for them to elevate themselves so
quickly. If we were better at protecting our cyber and our
intelligence and did a better job--and we have seen this coming
for some time. If we were able to be secured right now, would
that slow them down? Would they be unable to have the rapid
advancements? Because China has openly stated it wants to be a
global front runner in artificial intelligence by 2030. It
stated it wants to make 30 percent of its military equipment
automated by 2025. I would say the dangers are great for that
to happen. What is the best way to slow that down or prevent
that from happening?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I completely agree with you. I
fear the horse may somewhat be out of the barn in the sense
that the Chinese have already stolen a ton and also are
developing their own indigenous capabilities to do things. But
anything helps in a competition like this. Even relatively
modest increments help a lot.
Acting Secretary Shanahan I know is consumed with things
like cyber hygiene, getting our industrial base to take good
care. I think in a sense our whole cyber architecture--and it
is not just cyber, it is also human intelligence. It is also
the sense of the threat, the sense that this is something that
the Chinese are trying to do. But, you know, maybe we built our
cyber architecture in a world characterized by an end-of-
history thinking instead of saying that there are potential
hostile state actors out there that we need to take account of.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would definitely agree with the
point that we do need more defensive measures in the form of
investment reviews and export controls and law enforcement. But
it is also the case that I think the caricature of China only
stealing its way to innovation is an outdated view. I think
that was the case for about a decade. But as Mr. Colby
mentioned, there is more indigenous innovation there. But we do
need the defensive measures. We also need to be cooperating
with our allies and partners on this because if we have
effective defenses ourselves and our other advanced economies
do not, then China can go shopping there quite quickly.
Then finally, of course, the most important thing is
investing in our own competitiveness. So this is not just about
defense.
Mr. Wilson. I would simply add to underscore that point
that as we have become more aware and acted more quickly on
this in the United States, we need to be as cognizant of
working with our allies and partners to advance their efforts
on this front as well. The European Union has been slow, only
more recently beginning to adopt CFIUS [Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States]-like but not quite procedures.
We have seen German technology companies that have been
acquired through Chinese investments. I think this is part of
something that we can lead other societies and our allies and
partners to help them be as cognizant as we are now.
Senator Manchin. It has been reported since 2012 that
Russia has been actively developing military technologies that
may violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
What do you see as the benefit for the United States remaining
in an Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty even as Russia actively
is attempting to circumvent the treaty?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I believe that it makes sense for the
United States at a minimum to renegotiate the treaty and, if
that is not possible, to withdraw. Actually the military
utility is primarily dealing with China where conventional
intermediate-range missiles would help in an increasingly
competitive military balance. I do not think that conventional
range INF systems are actually that necessary. In the European
theater, they're what we primarily need are posture
enhancements and prepositioning and exercising of our forces
and greater exertions by our allies like the Germans. But I
think the administration's bringing this and really forcing the
issue is commendable. I hope there is a way to get to some kind
of new agreement with the Russians if they show themselves
sufficiently reliable.
Senator Manchin. With time running out, I have one
question, and the two that have not answered maybe can.
Which country faces independently the greatest threat to
the United States? China or Russia? We will start at the end.
Mr. Wilson. I think over the long term, the answer is no
doubt China. I believe in the short term, it is Russia because
of the intention and the capability to act, which we have seen
demonstrated.
On the INF issue, even the Russians have been pointing to
the Chinese as a rationale for their concerns about what they
are doing. I think the burden now becomes with the 6-month
clock starting. Can we use this to extract and leverage some
type of agreement, some type of measures at a minimum on
transparency through this process?
Senator Manchin. Dr. Ratner?
Dr. Ratner. I will just say quickly on the INF, I do think
it is worth looking hard at modifying the treaty before
withdrawing. I think it does have potential military utility in
the Pacific for the reasons Mr. Colby mentioned, as well as the
potential to cause a cost imposition on the Chinese and force
them to spend their money on expensive defensive measures
rather than weapons to kill Americans and attack American
bases.
Senator Manchin. Which country?
Dr. Ratner. Which country of the two faces the largest
threat from the United States?
Senator Manchin. Yes.
Dr. Ratner. What I would do here, sir, is I think
differentiate between the Chinese Communist Party and the
country of China. I think the Chinese Communist Party faces a
threat from a United States that is competitive in the 21st
Century.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. Certainly China I think currently and over the
long term. But I agree with Mr. Wilson's point that actually
Russia has not only the capability and potentially the degree
of alienation to do something about it, but since it is
probably in decline, its window may be closing. So we
definitely need to take measures to deter that.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
By the way, that comment is very timely in that I believe
it is Saturday our 60 days are up. And so we better be thinking
about that.
Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Your testimony
has been very informative.
Mr. Colby, can I just start with you? I was struck by a
number of things in your prepared testimony, including your
discussion about the need to reposture our forces in both
Europe and Asia to deal with this new great power competition.
But let me ask you about another type of reposturing. You
say in your prepared testimony at the bottom of page 8 and the
top of page 9--I thought this was very striking--with regard to
our relationships with allies and partners, we simply cannot do
this, meaning everything outlined in the National Defense
Strategy--we simply cannot do this all by ourselves. And then
you go on. We need our allies and our partners to contribute
real military capability to deterring China and Russia.
Now, we have talked a little bit today and other members
have asked you about what I might term our legacy alliance
structures like NATO, legacy because they come to us from a
different era. As we think about the new era of great power
competition, can you just flesh out a little bit what you are
alluding to here about the necessary reposturing in our
alliance structures in order to meet these new challenges?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you, Senator. Actually I have been
looking for an opportunity to talk about this because I think
you hit the nail on the head. I mean, two points.
One is, I think as you said, the era of unipolarity is
over. In the 1990s and the 2000s, the United States was so much
more powerful than any potential adversary that effectively the
United States military could perform any missions essentially
by itself. You can ask them yourselves, but if you would give
Bill Cohen or Don Rumsfeld a truth serum, they would say, well,
allies are nice to have for the flags, but realistically the
American military generally prefers to operate alone. That is
no longer true not only in the most stressing scenarios, say
the Baltics where we really would need, say, Polish and German
assistance, but actually in the totality of circumstances
because I think to Senator Shaheen's point, this is not a
strategy that says, hey, Iran is not a problem, North Korea is
not a problem, terrorists are not a problem. To the contrary.
But the most stressing scenarios, the ones that are most
important for the United States to focus on, are in the central
theater and at the high level of warfare. We need the French to
do things in Mali and so forth. That means giving up a bit of
our decision-making or our influence and having a bit more of
an equitable relationship. It also means more permissive arms
transfer and intelligence sharing provisions.
At the same time, our allies must do more. It is
unacceptable for us to be spending 3 to 4 percent of our
national gross domestic product and a place like Germany or
Japan to be spending 1 percent. We work very closely with the
Germans and the Japanese. They have a very acute strategic
perception of what is going on. They need to match it with an
adequate national commitment that reflects the severity of the
challenge.
I would also say, Senator, that our alliance architecture--
we tend to think about alliance with a capital A, like NATO.
Our alliance architecture--we should preserve things like our
United States-Japan alliance, of course, United States-
Philippines, NATO, et cetera. But I think we are increasingly
going to be need to be thinking small A, which sometimes people
tend to refer to as partners. But our relationship with India
to many people would already be an alliance. We are not going
to pledge to defend India in the way that we did Japan or
Germany. Well, actually Germany was very involved in defending
itself. But Japan, for instance, after World War II. They are
going to defend themselves, but we share interests in blocking
a Chinese aspiration for hegemony. So we are going to need to
be more plastic and strategic in how we go about considering
these new partnerships.
What I would just say on that is we need to prioritize the
strategic dimension. We need to agglomerate enough geopolitical
and military power to check the Chinese. That means sometimes
not getting everything we want out of the relationship, whether
that be ideological or economic or what have you. That might
stick in our craw sometimes, but if we do not get the power
relationship right, we will not have the free and open order.
Senator Hawley. Can you just say briefly just a bit more
when it comes to the Asian theater? In the European theater, we
have NATO. But talk about these new partnerships and the sort
of plasticity that might be required particularly in Asia.
Mr. Colby. Sure. Well, I think it is no accident that if
you looked at Secretary Mattis' travel schedule, he was in
Southeast Asia and South Asia all the time. He was in Vietnam,
which we fought a war with that did not go so well for us. He
was in Malaysia, and the current defense leadership is there. I
think that is exactly right. You know, we are not John Foster
Dulles going around trying to sign everybody up for an Asian
NATO. That is not going to work for a variety of reasons.
But I think we need to really deepen our relationships in a
way that is politically sensitive over time because that is
essentially the soft theater for the Chinese to assert their
power. They know the Japanese are a hard target. They are going
to put pressure. To some extent South Asia. These are the
places where they can make a lot of hay and make a lot of
movement. If they can basically convince Manila, for instance,
where there is concern not just with Duterte but with others in
the Philippine defense establishment about American
reliability, then they can say, look, you have got to come with
us because even if you prefer the Americans, the world is going
our way and you do not want to be left exposed before us when
we have the chance to penalize you.
Senator Hawley. Thank you.
Mr. Ratner, can I just quickly ask you, switching to China
and some of your prepared remarks and remarks today? You talk
about the need to embrace not just confrontation but also
competitiveness with China. You also point out that China has
embraced a model of high tech authoritarianism, which seems
exactly right to me.
We are all familiar or hopefully familiar with the fact
that China is requiring these technology transfer agreements
for companies, United States companies, doing business there.
You know, just looking at some headlines from this past year,
Apple has now signed onto these technology transfer agreements,
putting sensitive encryption keys in China; Facebook giving
data access to Chinese firms that have been flagged by United
States intelligence; Google patent agreements with Chinese
firms.
Should we be concerned about these technology transfer
requirements on the Chinese side and should we perhaps consider
preventing these in the law?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, it is an important question. I think
the answer is on a case-by-case basis. But I do think that the
way forward here is not to wag our finger and ask these
companies to act in the national interest, but to set
boundaries on their behavior. If there are instances where
these companies are transferring technology that have important
security or future technological implications for American
competitiveness, then certainly the U.S. Government should
consider new export controls.
Senator Hawley. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Now Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, I cannot help but notice that much of the
discussion surrounding the National Defense Strategy and great
power competition discusses increased investments in tactical
aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, other large weapons
platforms. What I have not heard much about are investments in
transportation and logistics systems that can operate in a
contested environment to support these weapons platforms. For
example, the number of U.S.-flagged ships has gone down
significantly.
What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.
military transportation and logistics systems to support great
power competition? Do we have what it takes to be able to, as
you mentioned, agilely move our forces to where we need to go
and sustain them in order to react more quickly?
Mr. Colby. Ma'am, that is a great question. I would say it
is very problematic. Actually in the defense strategy,
logistics is highlighted, as is information as an independent
warfighting domain. In a sense, the strategy is trying to take
the focus away from how many BCTs do you have, how many capital
ships, et cetera and saying what are the forces that you need
all through the chain from A to Z that will allow you to
complete the mission. So I think logistics is crucial,
including civilian logistics.
I think the basic logic there should be that we need our
forces and our logistics chain to be able to operate under a
plausible Chinese or Russian sustained attack, that you are
never going to have the total sanctuary that we enjoyed in the
unipolar era. Now, that does not mean that everything has to be
perfectly secure. Every satellite we put into space does not
have to survive, but as an architecture it needs to operate.
The other key thing and I think a really core piece of the
logic here is we want our architecture to be able to work in a
way that for the Chinese or the Russians to attack it, they
will have to escalate and expand the war in ways that are bad
for them.
Senator Duckworth. So, in your opinion what are some of the
investments that the Department can make to ensure this
logistical readiness so that our military will be able to
provide the warfighters in the field with the appropriate
resources to execute the National Defense Strategy? You talk
about this logistical architecture. What do we need to do to
build this logistical architecture to where we need it to be?
Mr. Colby. Well, I am not sure what exactly it will entail
in terms of investments. I would imagine it is going to be kind
of a soup to nuts thing. A couple of points that I would say
are we would want realistic exercising, in a sense something
like the Operation Reforger model of the 1980s, which is
basically how are you getting from the United States to the
conflict zone abroad while under attack. That will tell us a
lot about what we need and where our vulnerabilities are. I
would also say selective investments in things like cruise and
ballistic missile defense specifically designed, imparts
crucial nodes in our logistics architecture both in the United
States and abroad that, again, are not going to be able to give
us perfect security. But if the Russians have to launch 100
missiles to take out Ramstein rather than two, that is going to
be very important for Germany's political decision-making.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
This is both for you and also for Dr. Ratner. Should we be
doing something about the Chinese's low-end capabilities such
as their coast guard vessels, their fishing fleets that have
been known to interfere with maritime-enabled traffic? It is
not all just their military, but they have all of these other
low-end network things that are out there.
Dr. Ratner. That is exactly right, and in fact, they have a
maritime militia that has knitted together fisheries and coast
guard with the PLA. I do think we should approach these vessels
and forces based upon their behavior and not the color of their
hull. So if there are coast guard ships engaging in coercive
military activity, particularly if the PLA is parked over the
horizon, I do not think we should treat them like law
enforcement vessels. We should treat them like military
vessels.
The other thing that we can do in this space that we have
not done nearly enough of is information warfare and strategic
messaging where we have an immense amount of intelligence that
is not particularly sensitive, that does not require unknown
sources and methods about the Chinese coast guard and other
forms of illegal and coercive activity in the South China Sea
and elsewhere, and we ought to be splashing that across
newspapers all across the region every day of the week. From my
experience in government, it was incredibly hard to unlock this
intelligence to even share it with close partners, and we ought
to have much faster and more widespread declassification
authority on this information.
Mr. Wilson. Senator, if I just might pick up your first
question, if I might.
Senator Duckworth. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. Our strategy so often depends on reinforcement,
particularly in Europe. We have seen demonstrated through many
exercises through the alliance some of the unanticipated
difficulties we have had in moving forces across borders in the
European domain to prepare for the Russian challenge. It is
partly why we saw the NATO summit establish a new logistics
command to be based in Germany, why we have underway a military
mobility initiative that really requires working with the
European Union on how to facilitate movement of our Armed
Forces across territories, and why what we are doing with this
Three Seas Initiative in Central Europe is so important because
we lack in many places the cross-border infrastructure required
for this type of mobility. I would factor that into the
strategy.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator McSally?
Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. It has been
a good discussion.
I want to pick up on the--Russia generally we see--I think
you all agree--is on the decline where China is on the rise.
Yet, Russia poses threats in their decline in how they are
acting and their adventurism militaristically and just trying
to impact our influence around the world.
What other things--you have mentioned many so far. What
other things can we do with all elements of our national power
to mitigate the threat as Russia is in the decline or
accelerate it, to accelerate the decline in a way, whether that
is energy policy or other things that we could do on top of
what you have already talked about? If we can manage this as
best as we can maybe over the next decade or so, perhaps that
threat is further diminished than it is now, and we look at
China as the longer-term challenge. So what other ideas do you
have related to that, if that is even an accurate way to be
thinking about it?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator. I think that is a very
important question, a very important way to think about it.
Russia's strategy is out to blunt United States strength
but to do so in a way where China risks displacing us, the
Russians are looking to disrupt us. It is actually a much lower
bar. It is easier to accomplish. It is the games they play in
the Balkans and other areas. They are not building. They are
disrupting. And so they need cheap wins essentially to trip us
up.
They cannot compete economically with us. This is part of
the loss during the Cold War. How do they keep up on the
military modernization? I think that is why the sanctions
regimes that we have in place because of their behavior are so
important. Putin's conclusion after the Georgian invasion that
he could get away with it without consequence is part of what
we have been dealing with. I think this multilateral sanctions
regime with our European allies and Asian allies actually is
quite important to help ensure that they do not have the
ability to compete with us as long as this is the type of their
behavior.
The energy security issue is fundamental. Russia wields
energy as a way to influence, coerce decisions from its
neighbors. There has been significant progress, but
unfortunately, it has not been rapid enough. But we are seeing
progress through many of Central Europe, still much more of a
problem along Russia's periphery and its neighbors. I think our
pressure and working with the European Union and others as a
first order priority is important. Efforts like Nord Stream
today actually undermine what should be a coherent Western
strategy on diversifying our European energy supplies.
Finally, I think a coherent effort where we are thinking
about our defense strategy and engaging with allies and
partners where we are bolstering their capabilities. I think we
do need a permanent, continuous modest presence in the Baltic
States for deterrent purposes. But it is about an
intentionality of whether it is Sweden, Finland, the Baltic
States, Georgia, Ukraine building a strong set of capabilities
that those countries have on Russia's perimeter.
Senator McSally. As a deterrent. Great. Thanks.
Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
One thing I would really say is that we really do not want
to increase the incentives for the Russians and Chinese to come
together. Recent reports indicate that they are coming more
together. The Russians are actually moving. The conventional
wisdom which said, oh, they are actually relatively distant is
starting to fall apart. This is a very grave situation. We have
very, very serious differences with the Russians, obviously.
My sense is from a geopolitical perspective we have
specific deterrent requirements vis-a-vis the Russians which
relate in particular to our eastern NATO allies. We should
focus most of our effort, at least in the military sphere and
the kind of security sphere, on defending those allies and a
credible method to do so. I lay out a lot of this in detail.
One thing that I would raise for the committee's attention
is the CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act] provisions. I am not familiar with the entire
bill, but the provisions that penalize places like India,
Vietnam, Indonesia are really, really, really harmful and
counterproductive for us. I totally support deterring and
penalizing, as appropriate, Russia, but we need to do it in a
way that is consistent with our strategy vis-a-vis China and
that is counterproductive.
Senator McSally. Great. Thanks. I am running out of time.
I do have a follow-up question unrelated on Venezuela. So
the influence of both China and Russia is apparent in helping
to destabilize the situation there, and it is unfolding every
single day. Do any of you have any comments on their influence
there and how we prevent that in the future and help manage the
situation right now?
Dr. Ratner. Well, only that I think it is a harbinger of
what China-led order would look like if they had a much broader
sphere of influence in terms of protecting and defending non-
democratic regimes and also impeding the ability of the
international community to galvanize to be able to respond. If
we do not get our act together in Asia, we are going to see
this movie over and over and over again throughout the
developing world.
Senator McSally. Thanks. I am out of time. I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator McSally.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our witnesses for being here.
We are here today to talk about the strategic challenges
presented by Russia and China, and that is important. But we
just concluded the longest government shutdown in American
history because President Trump wants to build a monument to
division on our southern border.
Now, this shutdown had terrible consequences not just for
families but for our economy as a whole. The White House's own
internal models reportedly showed that the shutdown reduced our
economic growth. The President's own chief economist warned
last week that if the shutdown continued, our economic growth
in the first quarter of this year could be very close to zero.
We cannot afford to shoot ourselves in the foot with dumb
political stunts like government shutdowns if we want to remain
competitive.
Let me start by asking Dr. Ratner. Do you think the
government shutdown that risks grinding our economic growth to
a halt makes us more competitive with China or less competitive
with China?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, earlier Senator Shaheen asked the same
question. I think my answer was clearly there are direct
economic costs which hurt our competitiveness with China, and
this also has negative effects on our alliances and
partnerships, given perceptions of dysfunction of American
democracy, and it hurts us in the ideological battle against an
emergent form of authoritarianism.
Senator Warren. So let me just go a little bit more on
this. I serve on the Banking Committee, and in 2017, we heard
testimony from James Lewis, a former senior Commerce Department
official responsible for national security and China. He told
us that our underinvestment--and here I want to focus on
scientific research. He said underinvestment in scientific
research, quote, creates a self-imposed disadvantage in
military and economic competition with China. He also said that
maintaining our competitiveness requires, quote, investment
both by encouraging private sector investment and by government
spending in those areas like basic research where private
sector spending is likely to be insufficient.
Dr. Ratner, do you agree?
Dr. Ratner. I do agree, Senator. I would add to that that I
think not only do we need to invest more in research, but we
need to invest more in STEM education and have strategic visa
and immigration policies that attract and retain the best
talent from around the world.
Senator Warren. And can I ask you? I know that Senator Reed
mentioned this, but I just want to emphasize and ask you to
maybe put a little more meat on the bones on this. What do we
need to be doing domestically to enhance our competitiveness in
this area with China?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I said in my opening statement that
ultimately how America fares in the strategic competition with
China is going to be about us, not about them. It is going to
be about American competitiveness. It is, of course, going to
have a foreign policy component, but it is going to have a
domestic policy component as well that includes the type of
research and education and immigration and visa initiatives
that I just spoke to, as well as enhancing American
infrastructure, having a robust health care system, fixing our
fiscal policy, and making a whole set of bureaucratic reforms
that get us ready for this competition. Clearly, getting our
own house in order but being our strongest selves is task
number one.
Senator Warren. Thank you. I agree. I worry that we view
competition with China too often just through a military lens.
In order to project our power abroad, we must be strong here at
home. Strong, sustained investments in education, in scientific
research are not only related to our strength abroad. They are
truly the foundation of it.
Thank you very much, Mr. Ratner, and thank you all for
being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all so much for your time and your testimony and
talking with us about this today.
When I was in the House, I spent a good bit of my time
working on issues that pertain to the virtual space. I think we
all appreciate and recognize that with China American
displacement is indeed one of their goals. They are approaching
what they do as not only through their traditional military
lens but also technology and fighting a virtual war or a war in
the virtual space that we are being hit with every single day.
One of the things we have really not touched on today that,
Mr. Ratner, I want to come to you and have you talk a little
bit about it because I think it is so instructive as we look at
how China and Russia are organized, authoritarian states,
different ideology, integration, we silo private sector,
government sector. There it is all one platform.
I want you to talk about scale because as we look at
fighting 21st Century warfare, fighting in the virtual space, I
think scale is going to be important for us as we adapt, as we
move forward. I will come to you, and then, Mr. Wilson, if you
add to that. Mr. Colby, too.
Dr. Ratner. Well, Senator, I have a couple reactions.
First, I do think the authoritarian, state-led model is at
the core of this competition, and many of the contradictions
between the Chinese Government and the United States stem
precisely from that and from the interests of the Chinese
Communist Party. I do think that is an important factor.
In terms of scale, I think we ought not overestimate the
success of that model, and our own success is not going to be
in replicating it. In fact, we ought to not violate our own
tenets about what we believe in terms of market mechanisms and
democracy so as to chase after a China model because they have
enormous resources, but they have enormous inefficiencies, some
of which are coming home to roost now and many of which we are
going to see over the next decade or so.
I think my response to the question of how do we look at
their model against ours is certainly we need to make some of
the investments, and there is a role for government here in
terms of investing in science and technology, some of the
issues we talked about earlier. There are opportunities for the
private sector and the government to integrate better, and
there is a lot of work to do on that front. But I do not think
the answer is--and I do not think this is what you are
suggesting--to adopt China's model. I do not think that is how
we achieve scale. I think we need better integration.
Senator Blackburn. No. I am not suggesting that at all.
Quite the contrary. But I think as you look at artificial
intelligence, as you look at the expansion of 5G and the
commercialization of 5G, and look at how China is developing
this partnership with Russia, and scalability is important to
them because they want to set the standards and displace us in
that realm. It is an awareness that we should have as to what
they are seeking to do.
I agree and have supported the premise for years that we
should not use technology from Huawei or ZTE because of the
embedding of spyware and malware.
Dr. Ratner. And, Senator, I would just say I think to the
extent that the Belt and Road Initiative is part of China's
strategy to gain that kind of scale, what has gotten most of
the attention to date are the bridges and the ports. But it is
the digital Silk Road that we ought to be really worried about
and focused on, and we ought to be competing in the developing
world to ensure that China does not control the communications
and data throughout the world.
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Colby to answer.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
I think your point on scale is very appropriate because it
is a sense of scale in which the trajectory is intimidating
where China could go on scale. That is why we are concerned
about how they can use big data AI or how they can become peer
competitors, how, as Mr. Colby said, you can imagine a scenario
where we actually potentially could lose, and as you I think
just rightly very importantly pointed out, scale providing a
potential power to set global standards whether on trade
practices or other norms or even ultimately military
interoperability.
I think that is why it comes back to us having confidence
in our model and understanding that we win through the power of
our ideas, that we are competing for influence, that we are in
a very competitive space around ideas and ideology, and to
demonstrate the vibrancy of a free market, democratic system as
the best delivery vehicle for our citizens I think ultimately
is part of the key success story of how we mitigate and
neutralize the sense of scale that China can leverage over
time.
Senator Blackburn. Nothing to add, Mr. Colby?
I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the
witnesses.
I want to ask you about NATO and about Space Force. So let
me begin with NATO.
The 70th anniversary is April. The President's comments or
reports about thinking about withdrawing from NATO have raised
great concerns. Those have been addressed.
But they have also raised an interesting question which is
the Constitution says that the Senate must ratify treaties, but
the Constitution is silent about the U.S. withdrawing from
treaties. On a matter like this, if the Constitution is silent,
it creates an ambiguity, but an ambiguity can be resolved by
statutory action.
I have introduced a bill, together with eight colleagues,
four Democrats, four Republicans, largely members of this
committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, to do two
things: one, to say that a President cannot withdraw from NATO
without either a two-thirds vote in the Senate or an act of
Congress--that would be both houses subject to veto and
override--to try to clarify that a treaty entered into with
this treaty ratification could not be unilaterally abandoned by
the President.
The second piece would be if a President decided to do that
unilaterally, there would be no funds available to be spent for
the withdrawal of U.S. troops who are deployed with NATO, et
cetera.
Do you think a provision like that, if passed in a
bipartisan way, would send a positive message to both allies
and adversaries?
Mr. Wilson. Senator Kaine, thank you for that question.
Thank you for your leadership on the alliance as well.
I do. I think the clear signal coming from Congress of rock
solid support--we have seen votes in the House and the Senate
on various issues related to the alliance over the past 2 years
with astounding majorities. It has sent a very important signal
I think to all of our allies and to the world.
The premise of this is that NATO is for our interests,
remembering that the first time article 5 was invoked was for
allies to come to our defense.
Senator Kaine. After 9/11.
Mr. Wilson. In every operation we have been in since, we
have had allies by our side.
It was at the acrimonious Brussels summit where the
presence of Senator Tillis and Senator Shaheen sent a very
clear message to our allies about the strong support.
So I support these discussions. I support this measure.
I think it is important that we manage the debate in our
country responsibly, however, so that we do not give a sense of
the credibility of the proposition that this is a serious issue
of American withdrawal from the Alliance.
Senator Kaine. Could I just quickly ask, Mr. Colby and Mr.
Ratner? Would you also agree that it would be a positive
message to allies and adversaries to pass this NATO provision?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I do not know enough. I do not
have enough to say about the constitutional aspects. But I
certainly think withdrawing from NATO would be a grave mistake
of historic proportions, and anything of that gravity should
only be done, I would think as a matter of prudence and good
judgment, in consultation with the other parts of the body.
Senator Kaine. In fact, just because you said it that well,
let me ask is there any treaty that the U.S. now part of that
you think is as monumental or consequential as NATO?
Mr. Colby. Probably not, not even the UN maybe. I do not
know.
Senator Kaine. Right. There are all kinds of treaties, but
if this is the most momentous and consequential treaty that the
U.S. is in and it was ratified by a two-thirds vote of the
Senate, to have sort of an ambiguity and have a possibility
that a President may withdraw when a Congress wants to stay in,
that would be pretty destabilizing. The idea on something of
that magnitude, whether we are in or whether we are out, it
would be a good thing if there were political consensus between
the Article I and II branches about that. Would you not agree?
Mr. Colby. I would just say, Senator, that I think I would
agree that having a consensus is good. I also think it is
crucial to have, as I was trying to have with Senator Hawley, a
new discussion about burden sharing that actually harkens back
to some of the roles--I guess it was the Foreign Relations
Committee with the Mansfield Amendment. There needs to be a
serious conversation with the NATO allies about this, but we
should be committed to NATO.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Ratner, quickly before I get to Space
Force.
Dr. Ratner. I would support that effort from Congress, sir.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I hope we might take this up as part of the NDAA
discussion because I think especially in this 70th anniversary
year of NATO, it would be really good to make sure that what we
do moving forward, moving backward, getting out, is done as a
consensus between the Article I and II branches and that
unilateral action I think could be very dangerous.
Space Force. We have not had a presentation in this
committee by the Pentagon and making their pitch about the
Space Force idea. I am an agnostic. I am very open to it. We
see the Chinese landing on the dark side of the moon. Maybe we
need to do something different.
Based on what you know right now, do you think the
administration's Space Force idea is a good one or a bad one,
or is it kind of too early to say?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I am kind of with you. I am agnostic on
it on principle, but I would say it is too early to say. I
mean, part of me says, oh, God, another bureaucracy. Just what
we need. But then very serious people on space have
consistently said that space is being neglected. And to Senator
Duckworth's point, it is one of those areas that is a little
bit more back-officey that is actually vital for the
warfighting effort. I think I would really look forward to the
Department's presentation saying this is not just going to be
another bureaucracy, but it is actually going to increase focus
in an intelligent, cohesive way that is consistent with the
National Defense Strategy.
Senator Kaine. I am over time. But good, bad, or too early
to say? Can you just quickly?
Dr. Ratner. I would agree exactly with what Mr. Colby said.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thanks.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Actually I thought Senator Kaine's questions were very good
and very important.
I happen to be, Mr. Wilson, in Brussels while the NATO
summit was going just about to get in front of a group of
people to talk about the importance of the Alliance when the
President I think expressed frustration that some people
logically assume that we are only 1 day away or 24 hours away
from withdrawing from the Alliance. Look, General Mattis
famously said the only thing worse than going to war with
allies is going to war without allies. I think that there is a
person with stars on their shoulders in any line of service
that thinks that withdrawing from the NATO Alliance is a good
idea, and I believe that the President would heed their advice.
My concern is mainly making sure that the NATO partners,
the NATO allies recognize we understand the importance of it. I
think, Mr. Colby, you said it would be a grave mistake of
historical proportions. I believe that that is true. And what
we want to do in the work that I have done with Senator Shaheen
is continue to reinforce the message.
By the same token, if you are particularly facing down the
threat of Russia, in addition to, Mr. Colby, everything you put
in your written testimony and in your opening statement, the
thing that really matches up to make that an unlikely conflict
is a very strong NATO alliance where the NATO allies and
partners are investing their fair share, making sure they are
ready, they are capable and interoperable while we are working
on all the other things that we need to do.
But, Mr. Wilson, I do appreciate your comment about the
allies, and I think that we just have to continue to reinforce
that message. I think anybody here on the panel would all share
Mr. Colby's view of the dire consequences not only in Europe,
but really around the world. You all agree with that. Right?
Yes.
Now, Mr. Colby, you said something in your opening
statement and your written testimony that I am trying to figure
out. On the one hand, you say we have got to muster more
resources. We have to match the challenge. We are capable of
doing it, but we are either losing right now or losing ground
at least.
You also alluded to the concept of--I think you called
them--elective activities in the Middle East. We also know that
in the Middle East, in Africa, South America, that both Russia
and China are playing there.
What does a cessation of activities in the Middle East look
like? Is it a withdrawal or just a different kind of
engagement? Because if we create a vacuum there, the two
adversaries that we are focused on today will absolutely take
advantage of it in my view.
Mr. Colby. Thanks for the opportunity, Senator.
I think the main point here is what do we want our military
to focus on. The point is that in the most strategically
significant, plausible scenarios in the central theaters, we
are in a position where we increasingly could lose a war. What
the Chinese and the Russians are up to, what certainly al Qaeda
is up to, and others are up to in the Middle East, in Africa,
et cetera are important. What the strategy is saying is the
military should focus on making sure that it is prepared to
fight and win the nation's war along with our allies and
partners.
It is not a withdrawal strategy. It is saying we are going
to be in the Middle East over the long haul in fact, but we
need to do it more efficiently. Things like light attack
aircraft instead of
B-1, things SFAB [Security Force Assistance Brigade], Army
advise and assist units. These are ways of allowing essentially
a high-low mix of the force, most of the force focused on the
high end, going to Top Gun, going to Red Flag, going to NTC
[National Training Center], but then portions of the force,
including unmanned and working with allies and partners to help
out and keep stability in those areas.
I think the main point, though, is that we should not get
distracted by what the Russians or the Chinese are doing in
these secondary theaters because, as I said to Senator Shaheen
earlier, that is secondary. I mean, secondary is still
important. But if the Chinese can basically suborn Taiwan,
which I think is a possibility--I really want to try to ring
the alarm bell on Taiwan because I think something could happen
in the near future if we are not careful about it. Everybody in
Asia is going to look at that. Nothing that serious is going to
happen from what the Chinese are doing, say, in Latin America.
So I think that is where our focus needs to be.
Senator Tillis. Got you.
Mr. Ratner, I think in your opening comments and your
written testimony, you talked about the concept of competing
with versus challenging China. I agree with that to a certain
extent. I have worked in the high tech sector most of my career
and am very familiar. I have actually got a company down in
North Carolina that has a facility now that the Chinese have
stood up in China that are Carolina Pipe and Foundry. It
literally looks like you transported yourself to Charlotte, but
it is in China.
I think, on the one hand, we want to compete, but in order
to compete and compete on a level playing field, we have to
challenge. I think it is working that balance, particularly
with intellectual property, particularly with competition in
the global space. We will go back to your testimony but would
like some more thoughts on how you really flesh that out.
But I do think that some of the President's pressure on
China to challenge them, to make it very clear that we
understand the financial underpinnings of their economy and
that without a good relationship with the United States, then
their 50-year plan probably is not going to work out. We have
got to strike a balance there. I look forward to continued
discussion beyond the limits of the time we have here.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I will just say briefly I do not
disagree with you. I would be happy to clarify my remarks. The
statement I made was about being confrontational without being
competitive, not challenging China.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Mr. Chairman, if it please, with your
permission, I would like to defer to Senator King. He has got
an important presidential nominee coming in.
Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To follow up on the question--and I do not think this is
something we are going to do in 5 minutes. You all may not be
aware, but we have these little digital clocks up here.
But there is a fundamental question that I have asked
several times at this committee, once of Henry Kissinger, as a
matter of fact. What does China want? In other words, we are
building up our military. They are building up their military
on the assumption that we are both defending against the other.
My question is, are they looking for economic hegemony in the
world, in the region? Are they looking for territorial
conquest?
I mean, I think of China as differently motivated than
Russia, for example. Can one of you give me a minute or so on
what China wants and then perhaps follow up? I would love to
see some scholarly work on this because I think we need to
understand our potential adversary's motivations in order to
formulate a strategy. If it is simply economic competition, let
us talk about intellectual property and all those things. Mr.
Ratner, do you want to tackle that?
Dr. Ratner. Sure. In short, I think what China wants is to
make the world safe for authoritarianism and to ensure the
stability of the Chinese Communist Party. Because they view the
U.S.-led order as antithetical to their interests, their
economic interests and their security interests and their
political interests, they are looking to back the U.S. military
out of the region. They are looking to undermine the ability
of----
Senator King. Are they looking to invade Hawaii or
California? I mean, do they have territorial ambitions, or do
they just want us to tend to our region and they tend to their
region?
Dr. Ratner. They certainly have territorial ambitions in
the South and East China Sea.
I think I would say, Senator, they do not have a strategy
in a vault like we do in terms of these very detailed, forward-
looking grand strategies, but where we ought to look is what
the interests of the leadership are, but also what the
interests of the Communist Party are. And the interests of the
Communist Party are to have a region of Asia and beyond that is
not free, in which the United States is excluded from the
economics and trade of the region and technology standards, in
which institutions are inert, in which democracy and freedom is
not advancing, in which the U.S. military is not able to
operate, and in which U.S. alliances and partnerships erode
over time. It is an illiberal sphere of influence that will
expand and, if left unfettered, will undermine severely U.S.
interests and peace and prosperity.
Senator King. Well, I think the other piece is they
currently have not the will but the will can always be a change
of regime 5 minutes away.
I want to move on. I realize this is a provocative
question, and I hope you all will think about some writing on
this. You know, that is the title of the article, ``What Does
China Want''?
You talked about NATO, and I think you covered that very
thoroughly in the answers to Senator Kaine's questions. Is
there anything that Vladimir Putin would like better than the
U.S. withdrawing from NATO? Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I think his goal of restoring the prestige of
the former Soviet Union comes hand in glove with seeing the
destruction of the alliance.
Senator King. The two are related. Somebody said you cannot
understand Putin unless you understand Frederick the Great.
There is Russian history involved here.
Mr. Colby, do you want to comment on that question?
Mr. Colby. Yes. I think the Russians seem to want to divide
and ultimately probably get rid of NATO.
I would just say, Senator, I think on the earlier question
on China, very briefly.
Senator King. I could tell you were aching.
Mr. Colby. I know. I know. Actually I am working on a book
on this.
But I think fundamentally you do not have to have that
aggressive a conception of the Chinese leadership to be very
worried because it is totally in their interest to secure
hegemony, not territorial control but basically sway, the
internal policies of the regional countries. That is the
largest economic bloc in the world. Do the American people
think they are going to be immune from that kind of influence?
Senator King. Did we make a mistake by withdrawing from the
TPP?
Mr. Colby. Well, I supported the TPP at the time.
Senator King. Because we have ceded that regional----
Mr. Colby. I think we absolutely need to have an economic
strategy, as Dr. Ratner has eloquently put it, that is
integrated. What the right trade agreement looks like I do not
know, but we definitely need something.
Senator King. Final point, and this is not Russia or China,
but it is so topical I have to ask. Venezuela. This morning in
an Intelligence Committee hearing, where I was before I came
here, Senator Rubio listed refugee flow, human rights
violations, corruption, alliance with adversaries. My problem
is you could read that list along a lot of countries in the
world. How do we define our vital interests in terms of
intervening in another country no matter how bad the leader is?
We have not had good luck with that.
Mr. Colby. I think you are absolutely right, Senator. I
think the main thing is maintaining favorable regional balances
of power in the key regions of the world, which are Asia and
Europe. Venezuela is a human tragedy and it is important for
our interests, but it should not, as Senator Rubio I think
said, be something of primary focus for our military forces, at
least at this stage.
Senator King. Mr. Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. I agree that the focus is not military, but I
do think the scale of the crisis unfolding in Venezuela is
often underestimated. This is, I think, a first tier
international crisis, and a strategy that is focused on how do
you bolster the strong regional alliances and a lot of the
democratic states willing to stand and help support the
Venezuelan people, democratic forces in Venezuela, and for us
to have a very keen sense that China, Russia, Cuba have been
looking at how to use Venezuela as a base for their operations
in this hemisphere. That is something I think we have to stay
on top of.
Senator King. Of course, ironically one of the results of
our obviously and openly coming out against Maduro would be to
strengthen Maduro. He could say this is 100 years of American
imperialism. It is a very difficult situation. I appreciate
your thoughts and thanks for joining us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for--this has turned into a really
good hearing--all of your public service to our country. I know
all of you have served in different capacities, and I
appreciate that as well.
I want to continue this discussion on allies. Would you not
all agree that probably our most important strategic advantage
is that we are an ally rich Nation and our adversaries and
potential adversaries are ally poor? Not a lot of countries
looking to join the Iran team or the North Korea team or the
Russia team or, for that matter, even the China team unless
their arms are twisted. Is that not correct?
I think Senator Kaine's line of questioning was really
important. But in my discussions with the President--I do not
see him--you know, the ``New York Times'' like to breathlessly
report unnamed sources on the impending pullout of NATO. I do
not believe that is happening. It is a problem, though, when
you have countries like Germany that consistently spend about 1
percent of their GDP. I do not even know if they are hitting 1
percent now. Is that not a problem, Ambassador Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. It is a problem.
Senator Sullivan. What do we do about this? The President
is trying to press them. I do not think he--or certainly there
is not going to be support on pulling out of NATO. But at the
same time, they are a very powerful country economically. They
compete really hard against us, and they do not pull their
weight. Is that not part of the problem?
Mr. Wilson. Senator Sullivan, a couple points in response
to that. Thank you.
First, you are right. This is an alliance that, as the
National Defense Strategy puts, is built on free will and
shared responsibility, a fundamental difference. It is an
incredible alliance structure not based on coercion and
intimidation, but essentially inspiration. I think that is an
important strategic asset.
Second, the point of our clarity of resolve behind the
alliance is so that we do not have our allies involved in
hedging. Right now, there is an unhealthy debate, frankly, in
Europe of whether we can count on the United States. I think it
is a waste of time. The discussions in Europe about strategic
autonomy are completely misplaced because it applies autonomy
from the United States.
Senator Sullivan. I am going to let you finish. But there
is this notion that again comes up in the papers. But in terms
of actions that we, this Congress and this administration, have
taken with regard to Putin--let me just--Javelin missile system
to Ukraine. Pretty important. Right?
Mr. Wilson. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. The previous administration would not do
that. The previous President was essentially afraid to do that.
We did that.
A lot more troops in the Baltics and Poland. Correct?
Mr. Wilson. That is correct.
Senator Sullivan. Does Putin not understand, you know,
101st Airborne on the ground and armor on the ground more than
rhetoric?
Mr. Wilson. I think there is no doubt that we have done
more to bolster the alliance in recent years.
Senator Sullivan. With actions.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, with actions, with actions.
Deterrence is credibility and capability, and we are moving
on that capability side. We have to keep that credibility piece
connected.
Senator Sullivan. Are our European allies recognizing that?
They recognize that the Ukrainians can now take out T-72 tanks
in eastern Ukraine when a couple years ago they did not have
that capacity. Or that we have troops in Poland or that we have
troops in the Baltics? Is that recognized?
Mr. Wilson. It is. Yes, it is.
Senator Sullivan. What more do we need to do? This is just
for all of the panelists because is there not a strategic
competition for allies right now, and would Russia not love to
splinter our NATO alliances? And would China not love to
splinter our Japan, Australia, Korean alliances and troop
deployments there? What should we be thinking, and what should
this administration be doing more with regard to making sure
that we double down on this strategic advantage, deepening
current alliances and broadening alliances to other countries
for both our competition with Russia and China?
Mr. Wilson. I think that is exactly right. That premise is
exactly right, Senator.
As I see it, we need an intentional strategy on how--we are
not just thinking about U.S. presence, which matters, but a
U.S. strategy to bolster the capability and defenses of our
allies, particularly those that are most capable and those that
are closest to Russia.
This is where I think our pressure has had some effect. We
see $40 million more on the table this year. Germany is one of
the key challenges. It now has set a pathway to achieve 1.5
percent, not the 2 percent threshold.
Senator Sullivan. By when?
Mr. Wilson. By 2020--by 2024.
Senator Sullivan. Is that not a problem?
Mr. Colby. I think it is 2021 actually.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, 2021.
Mr. Colby. Can I just jump in?
I think we need to be very clear that our burden sharing
strategy has failed over the last generation, and it is
absolutely unacceptable for our allies not to be carrying their
weight. The Trump administration has, as you said, done more
for European defense than anybody in a long time and has made
more progress on burden sharing. There is a lot more to go.
Things can be done better.
I think, Senator, to your point, the National Defense
Strategy was actually very consciously sketched out with this
in mind, which is we got to get somewhere between, obviously,
abandonment and basically giving the Europeans and the Asians
the impression that we are going to be able to do everything.
What it is saying is we are committed, but we cannot do
everything. It is a credible signal of our limited ability to
do everything. They need to step up.
If they really want to be independent, if you are Japan,
for instance, and you have had 1 percent--look, we have been
trying to get the Japanese to do more on defense spending since
the 1950s. In Germany, we had huge debates. The balance of
payments crisis, and the Congress was very involved in that. We
are going to need to be tough on them. The Germans cannot go to
places like Davos and the Munich security conference and say we
are the moral leaders of Europe without spending what is
required of them. Now, they are making progress. But I think
this body and others do need to maintain pressure even as we
maintain the fundamental commitment. That is going just have to
be a balancing act that policymakers are going to have to deal
with.
Senator Sullivan. I am finished unless Mr. Ratner wants to
mention China.
Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to respond if I had another 60
seconds, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, I know you would.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal? Oh, I am sorry. Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank each of you for your service and also for being
here today.
Mr. Ratner, I would like to follow up on an area that has
not really been touched on, but you touched on it primarily in
your written statement. That is the idea about tariffs and how
that is affecting our standing, particularly where we are with
China. You talked about the harms caused by the
administration's section 301 tariffs and section 232 tariffs,
and I could not agree with you more on that.
I have, last Congress, introduced a bill with Senator
Alexander and others. I think Senator Blackburn is joining us
on that, the Automotive Jobs Act, which really focuses on the
automobile industry, but also a bill, the Trade Security Act,
with Senator Portman and Senator Ernst that would really take
the national security designation away from Commerce and put it
with people who really know what they are talking about over at
the Department of Defense.
I was struck with Senator Sullivan's comments about we are
an ally rich Nation and we are competing for allies. I think
you alluded to this. We are kind of kicking our allies in the
shins a little bit as we are focused on our trade and our
tariffs with China.
I would like for you, if you would, just elaborate a little
bit on the negative consequences that you are seeing from the
trade war, the trade strategy, for lack of a better term, that
we see coming with the administration right now.
Dr. Ratner. Sure, Senator. Thank you.
As I said in my written testimony, I do think the way in
which the Trump administration has applied tariffs against our
allies and partners has been extremely harmful for a couple
reasons. One, it has limited their political space to cooperate
with us on other aspects of the China challenge and, in
addition, has created an international narrative around
American protectionism that is not differentiated between the
illegal and unfair trade practices of the Chinese which should
be our focus and around which we should be mobilizing our
partners in the international community, differentiated from
some of the lower level disagreements we have with allies and
partners. So the fact that the administration led with the 232
tariffs I think was unwise compared to a strategy that was very
focused on China specifically.
Senator Jones. Do you think we should try to move that
designation of national security out of Commerce and over to
Defense, or have you even had a chance to look at the bill that
we introduced?
Dr. Ratner. I have, Senator. In fact, in my
recommendations, I would encourage Congress to constrain the
ability of the administration in a variety of ways from having
this authority on--particularly against U.S. security partners
to use the national security authority for tariffs.
Senator Jones. You mentioned targeted tariffs and other
tools for curbing China's illegal behavior. Can you give me
some specifics about what that might look like?
Dr. Ratner. Sure. I think the Trump administration says
they have done their best to target the tariffs at issues
associated with some of their subsidies and Made in China 2025
Plan. I think the reality is they are much more indiscriminate
than that. I would certainly support tariffs against Chinese
companies that are particularly benefiting from their unfair
practices and some of their subsidies in a way that harm
American interests.
I think there is a space for tariffs particularly against
the state-owned enterprises but indiscriminately I think is a
less effective tool than targeted tariffs, as well as law
enforcement measures and export controls and investment
restrictions and the full suite of other defensive measures we
have to deal with China's behavior.
Senator Jones. Thank you.
Mr. Colby, along the same lines, is Russia looking at this?
Are they exploiting these divisions particularly by acting more
aggressively abroad such as in the Baltic States?
Mr. Colby. Well, I defer to Mr. Wilson. I think he knows a
lot about that.
I would say that the Russians are looking to exploit
divisions within the alliance and the potential for them to use
coercive measures, including military measures, that would play
upon a lack of resolve and cohesion among the allies.
Senator Jones. Mr. Wilson, do you want to respond?
Mr. Wilson. I would just add that very much a Russian
strategy is divide and conquer, where can they coerce decisions
favorable to them through intimidation and coercion.
The Baltic States actually have quite strong resolve across
all of their political parties to manage this challenge. Where
they see them being more effective is where they can peel off
parties, peel off forces, influence the debate within
countries, and we see that playing out very actively in a place
like Ukraine today.
Senator Jones. Well, thank you all for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
I want to ask a kind of bigger picture question. I am
struck being on this committee by how new forms of technology,
whether it is hypersonic missiles or cyber, seem to be making
some of our conventional weapons platforms more vulnerable, for
example, aircraft carriers. They cost $12 billion, $13 billion
or more. That is what the latest one costs. But I think there
is growing evidence that they may be more susceptible to attack
in various ways or disruption as contrasted with submarines
that are still strong, stealthy, reliable not only as a means
of nuclear deterrence but also the Virginia class fast attack
is a very versatile and important force.
I wonder if you could--and I am struck by your mention, Mr.
Colby, about theories of victory that our adversaries may have.
To what extent are our weapons platforms becoming more
vulnerable? I am not going to say obsolete, but more vulnerable
as a result of those new technologies.
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you, Senator. I think the Chinese
and the Russians have both spent the last 10 to 20 years
specifically trying to do that.
Essentially much of the force we have today is what you
could think of as a middle weight force. It was designed to
fight two simultaneous wars against a Middle East state and
basically North Korea. And that assumed that something like an
aircraft carrier could get close and pound the enemy or that we
could operate from very concentrated nodal bases in the
Pacific.
We now have to go back to a situation, as we did during the
Cold War, when we would expect our forces to be under attack.
The fact that our forces are becoming more vulnerable is
inevitable. Space satellites are going to be vulnerable. The
carrier is going to be more vulnerable to things like anti-ship
ballistic missiles.
So the key question is, what do you do with it and how do
you balance it against buys with things like submarines?
As you know, the industrial base on our submarines is
constrained. Unfortunately, it is decisions dating back to the
early 1990s, which we now rue. I think a lot of what we need to
be doing is certainly trying to keep as many submarines as
possible in the fleet, maximizing magazine capability,
including through, say, prepositioning, as well as developing
things like unmanned underwater systems and the like and
bringing our allies. The Japanese national defense planning
guidelines that they just released are very commendable,
focused on blocking potential adversary attacks on their
islands and so forth. That is a lot of the things we can do.
Senator Blumenthal. Any of you have thoughts about that
topic?
Dr. Ratner. No. Just that I agree. There are, of course,
powerful bureaucratic and political interests in maintaining
our existing force, and the effort to see the kind of
substantial reform that is called for in the National Defense
Strategy is going to require real leadership. I think
intellectually people agree with this argument, but getting
from here to there is the challenge before us.
Mr. Colby. Senator, if I could just say--I am not sure you
were here, but I think this, once more, gets back to the point
of the threat, to Dr. Ratner's point about bureaucratic and
organizational and political interests. These are life in the
big city.
But I think the point is if people truly understand and
appreciate the degree and severity of the threat, it will be
harder to make the sort of legacy-style arguments. You know,
the carrier has a bright future if you look at things like
longer-range unmanned aviation and these kinds of things. But
that itself is a hard slog.
Senator Blumenthal. You are ditto.
Mr. Wilson. I defer to my colleagues on this.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
First of all, we appreciate very much--this has been a real
education I know for me and some of the others here. I
appreciate it very much. It was not intended to go this long,
but that was the level of interest in hearing from you folks
and we appreciate it very much.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX A
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