[Senate Hearing 116-210]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-210
U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO
REINFORCE AND STRENGTHEN OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-614 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
TED CRUZ, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator From Florida..................... 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland............. 3
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 5
Madison, Hon. Kirsten D., Assistant Secretary, Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Barsa, Hon. John, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and
the Caribbean, United States Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
O'Reilly, Kevin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Balling, Christine, Senior Fellow for Latin American Affairs,
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC................ 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Marczak, Jason, Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center,
Atlantic Council, Washington, DC............................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Jason Marczak for the
Following Questions Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.... 54
(iii)
U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO REINFORCE AND STRENGTHEN
OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational
Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights,
and Global Women's Issues,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio, Risch, Portman, Cardin, Menendez,
Shaheen, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Good afternoon. Thank you all for being
here. I appreciate your indulgence. We just came out of a vote,
so we got a late start here, but I appreciate it.
This subcommittee meeting on the Western Hemisphere will
come to order.
The hearing today is on the U.S.-Colombia relationship, and
it is entitled ``New Opportunities to Reinforce and Strengthen
Our Bilateral Relationship.''
So there are two things I want to achieve with today's
hearing, which we have been trying to get for some time now but
that we really want to do. First, obviously talk about the
U.S.-Colombia relationship--review it, by and large--but second
and most importantly, restate our commitment and what we can do
to be helpful to Colombia and to the Colombian people.
And at the outset, I would say it is impossible to talk
about Colombia today without talking about Venezuela and the
destabilizing impacts that that crisis is having, beginning of
course with over 1.4 million Venezuelan migrants who are now
living in Colombia, reportedly over $1 billion a year that the
Colombian Government is now spending on social services and
health care and the like, and also the threat that is posed,
the direct threat, to the Colombian state, to peace and
security in Colombia by armed narcoterrorist elements operating
with impunity just across the border with the open support and
cooperation of the Maduro regime. And that poses a threat not
just to Colombia but ultimately to our security interests and
to the region at large. Today that safe haven that the regime
has provided is for two organizations that the State Department
has designated as foreign terrorist organizations, the FARC and
its dissident elements that are now there and the ELN.
So this will be an opportunity to hear from our witnesses
who will provide an update on the implementation of the so-
called peace accord on the new government now that has been
there for over close to a year and the political dynamics, the
direct U.S. interests that are threatened and impacted by what
is happening there today, and then some ideas about how to
strengthen our cooperation on all these issues.
Just some key facts that I want to leave here on the
record. It is my view that Colombia is our strongest, most
capable ally in the Western Hemisphere on a series of fronts.
For me personally, obviously there are many Americans of
Colombian descent that reside in the United States, including a
substantial portion of my family since my wife is of Colombian
descent. But that is not why we are doing our hearing, but
nonetheless we are. But it is a very vibrant community, very
engaged and involved.
Colombia--I know this issue from having been around it even
predating my public service--has a very long history, a very
long struggle to restore peace in the country. They have been
plagued for decades first by very powerful and murderous drug
cartels, by these Marxist and narcoterror insurgencies. And
this has been a bipartisan mission under both Republican and
Democrat administrations to support Plan Colombia and
Colombian-led initiatives to ensure stability in the country.
It really began under the leadership of former Colombian
President Uribe.
And the important work continues to this day through the
current administration. The support for the new Duque
administration is paramount for our cooperation on shared
diplomatic security, counternarcotics, rule of law, human
rights, and economic development.
And so with the combination of the generous support of the
American people and the incredible work and sacrifices made by
the Colombian people, Plan Colombia became a model for
effective and targeted foreign assistance. After many years of
negotiations with some of these FARC elements, former Colombian
President Santos, President Duque's predecessor, concluded what
I personally viewed as--but again, it was not for us to make
this decision, but what I viewed as a peace accord with
significant flaws with the largest guerilla organization in
Colombia, the FARC, which is a terrorist organization. It is
well known for plotting against the Colombian Government from
its safe haven in Venezuela, and they are frankly responsible
for the deaths of Colombian police officers and innocent
civilians in just the last year. In just the last year, they
have conducted attacks they have claimed credit for.
There is another narcoterror group, which I mentioned: the
ELN. They have over 1,000 fighters inside of Venezuela. And now
they have been joined by these dissidents of the FARC elements
who are also operating in the same area right there in the
border region.
And so now thousands of ELN and FARC dissident fighters are
newly re-energized by recent defections from some who were
cooperating with the peace accord and then defected and, as I
said earlier, by the open support of the Maduro regime. And
this presents a very serious security challenge to the region,
to Colombia, and ultimately to our nation's interests as well.
Human rights violations against civic leaders are also a
concern. Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of
the OAS and the U.N. Office of High Commissioner have reported
and verified the killings of human rights defenders and social
leaders.
I believe President Duque has taken strong steps to ensure
Colombia remains stable. He has even gone to great lengths to
preserve aspects of the peace agreement, aspects frankly that
were favorable to the FARC. Unfortunately, these efforts were
met with high level defections and a return to narcoterrorism
for many of the FARC's leaders and followers. So I believe we,
indeed, are living a critical moment not just for Colombia but
for the region.
Earlier this year, I wrote an op-ed that recommended some
steps that the United States could take to support Colombia and
the Duque administration specifically that our country should
provide strong support and financial assistance to continue
this fight against the illicit flows of cocaine through our
borders. And this includes things like providing unmanned
aircraft or drones that can spray coca crops, increasing
intelligence support to operations targeting these illegally
armed groups, ensuring additional equipment, funding, and
training for riverine units.
I hope that our witnesses today will explain the critical
nature of these programs and the challenges that they address
and reassure this subcommittee that assisting Colombia remains
a top priority for this administration.
I would like to close by recognizing the significant steps
taken by the Duque administration not only in welcoming, as I
said, over 1.4 million migrants fleeing the manmade catastrophe
created by the Maduro crime family, but also for being a strong
partner to the United States in the fight against external
forces that aim to destabilize our region.
And with that, I now recognize my colleague, the ranking
member, Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank Senator Rubio and his
wife for this hearing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. This is an important relationship, the
United States and Colombia. We have invested about $10 billion
in Plan Colombia. I believe that was a wise investment for U.S.
interests. We are now moving towards the implementation of the
peace that eluded us for five decades. And there are many
reasons why this has been a wise investment to change the
relationship to a very strong relationship between Colombia and
the United States.
First, combating the narcotics traffic. We know that is a
major challenge. It has been a major challenge. We have ended
the civil war and implemented an historic peace accord, and
today Colombia is helping us meet one of the largest migration
crises in our lifetime from Venezuela.
In regards to drug trafficking and the trade, progress has
been made. There is no question about that. But there is still
a major hub for cocaine production and distribution in our
hemisphere. And it is, I think, critically important that we
strengthen the partnership between the United States and
Colombia to deal with the drug trafficking issues.
The coca farmers need the tools and training to develop
alternative sources of income. And when we look at the
geography where most of these farmers are located, they are
concentrated in areas that are most vulnerable to armed groups
responsible for the internal conflict in Colombia. That is
going to require our support to be able to deal effectively
with that challenge.
Implementation of the peace accord, November 2016, five
decades-long civil war with FARC. The Santos Government
negotiated an agreement. The Duque government now is charged
with making sure that it is implemented. Yet, on August 29, a
faction of FARC has indicated that they would be taking up
arms. They have not done that yet, but we know that we have to
be very attentive so we do not go back to the type of violence
that we saw before the peace accord. This is not going to be
easy, and it has been made a lot more difficult because of the
challenges the chairman mentioned in regards to migration from
Venezuela.
We do not know the exact count of how many Venezuelans are
in Colombia. We believe it is around 1.4 million. That is an
incredible burden to any country, but for a country that is
struggling in transition like Colombia, it is an incredible
hurdle to have to overcome. And that number could increase.
There are indications that as many as 600,000 more could be
coming in from Venezuela. Clearly, Colombia cannot deal with
that without a strong partnership from the United States.
In April, Senator Blunt and I introduced a resolution
reinforcing our commitment to working in partnership with
Colombia. This legislation, first and foremost, reaffirms U.S.
Government support for the Colombian people as they work
towards peace and stability in the territories previously in
conflict. It commends the Government of Colombia's progress
thus far and recognizes the United Nations verification mission
for its role in implementing the 2016 peace accords and
disarmament. It asks the Colombian Government to make
protecting community leaders and human rights activists a top
priority. And finally, it urges the United States Secretary of
State to strengthen the U.S.-Colombia partnership by continuing
our security and the anti-narcotics cooperation, supporting the
peace accord and its Special Jurisdiction for Peace, and
contributing to the aid needed to support Venezuelan migrants
in Colombia.
I am proud also to co-chair the Atlantic Council's U.S.-
Colombia Task Force with Senator Blunt. I want to thank our
witness, Jason Marczak, the Director of the Atlantic Council's
Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, for his role in bringing
together this bipartisan, binational, multi-sectoral group to
increase cooperation and improve outcomes for the goals shared
between the United States and Colombia. We look forward to the
release of the U.S.-Colombia Task Force report later this
month.
I remain committed to working with my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to bolster the U.S. partnership with
Colombia, increase U.S. engagement on combating narcotics
production and trafficking, uphold the 2016 peace accords, and
providing both vulnerable Colombians and Venezuelan refugees
the critical help they need in Colombia. But also it is
important for the stability of our own Western Hemisphere.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses as we probe
these issues.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I will recognize the ranking member of the full committee
who I know has a keen interest in these items.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you and Senator Cardin for this incredibly important hearing. I
do not always come to hearings of the subcommittees of the full
committee. But in this particular case, the hearing on Colombia
is of particular importance and interest to me.
Having traveled to Colombia in July for talks with
President Duque, his administration, and civil society leaders,
I remained convinced that Colombia is our single most important
partner in South America. Our strategic partnership stands as a
model in the hemisphere.
So I look forward to hearing from today's panel on our
long-term vision for strengthening this partnership, as well as
how we can best support Colombia in addressing current
challenges, including challenges to its 2016 peace accord,
challenges related to counternarcotics and from the Venezuelan
crisis.
Without a doubt, the recent move by a former FARC commander
to return to arms marks the single greatest setback to
Colombia's young peace accord. Press reports indicating that
this group of FARC dissidents is operating out of Venezuela
underscores the nefarious nature of Maduro's dictatorship.
But this development is not the only challenge to accord
implementation. I am deeply concerned about the violence faced
by civil society across Colombia. As I heard from Colombian
social leaders in July, their heartbreaking stories underscore
the fragility of peace.
I hope to hear from INL and USAID about how we can best
support our Colombian partners as they address this violence,
expand state presence, and implement the accord. And while the
2016 accord is far from perfect, it is the best opportunity
that the Colombian people have to heal the scars of decades of
civil war.
It is also essential that we remain unwavering in our
cooperation to help Colombia combat high levels of coca
cultivation and cocaine production. Historic levels of
cultivation leveled off this year, and I give that credit to
the Duque administration. But we have to expand efforts to help
them drive down these numbers.
Specifically, I look forward to hearing a comprehensive
strategy from INL that attacks every aspect of trafficking
operations, including emphasis on eradication but also
increased initiatives to strengthen the rule of law and address
money laundering.
I also hope to hear how USAID reinforces INL programs and
Colombian initiatives to create programs for transitioning to
the legal economy.
Finally, I am deeply concerned about the destabilizing
nature of Venezuela's refugee crisis. During my travel to
Cucuta in July, I heard directly from individuals fleeing the
humanitarian tragedy in Venezuela and saw its impact on
Colombian communities. 30,000 people crossing every day,
Venezuelans crossing every day, on the bridge to get basic
foodstuffs and essentials that they cannot get in Venezuela.
But 10 percent of those stay in Colombia every day. It is
overwhelming for any nation.
So I commend the administration for dedicating more than
$300 million across the region to address the Venezuelan
exodus, but we need to lead a global response. I have been
advocating a donors' conference that matches the magnitude of
the crisis.
And if we want to have any credibility in this process, we
must provide temporary protected status to Venezuelans in the
United States. You cannot have a travel advisory that says do
not travel to Venezuela and then send back people to Venezuela
who should be here under TPS.
Let me close by saying I caution that comments like
President Trump's claim in March that Colombia, quote, ``has
done nothing for us'' are blatantly false and risk undermining
our strategic partnership. For two decades, there has been
bipartisan consensus on supporting Colombia, and I look forward
to reaffirming that support when I host President Duque in New
Jersey this weekend.
With that, I want to thank our witnesses, the chairman, and
the ranking member. And I appreciate the opportunity.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
We will have two panels. Our first panel is administration
officials: the Honorable Kirsten Madison, who is the Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs; the Honorable John Barsa, Assistant
Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean at USAID; and
Mr. Kevin O'Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the State Department. We will
begin with you, Ms. Madison. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN D. MADISON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Madison. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear before this distinguished subcommittee.
The drug trade in Colombia directly and adversely affects
the safety, security, and health of Americans. Colombian
cocaine contributes to the rising overdose rates in the United
States, particularly when combined with synthetic opioids. In
2017, nearly 14,000 Americans died of cocaine overdose, the
highest on record since 2006, and three-quarters of these cases
also involved opioids. U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia, and
every gain made against the production and trafficking of
cocaine, saves American lives.
In 2018, the United States and Colombia committed to a 5-
year goal to cut coca cultivation and cocaine production levels
in half by 2023. Colombia made very early progress in rolling
back record high coca cultivation and cocaine production levels
with production levels in 2018 decreasing for the first time
since 2012, and that is really due to President Duque's
aggressive counternarcotics policies and courageous work by the
Colombian police, the military, and teams of civilian
eradicators. It is also the direct result of our steadfast
support.
We have a long road ahead, but I am confident that with
robust U.S. assistance, the Colombian Government can succeed.
We have a common goal. We have a plan that is yielding results.
And most importantly, I think there is political will on both
sides to tackle this challenge together.
I was actually on the staff of this committee when Congress
was considering whether or not to invest and invest big in Plan
Colombia. In those days, the conversation was about the
potential for Colombia to become a failed state. How far we
have come. Security gains under Plan Colombia led to the end of
the region's longest conflict. The recent call to arms by FARC
dissidents with strong ties to Venezuela and elsewhere is
intended to undermine the nascent peace and the security won by
Colombia's police and military, but I think this should only
strengthen our resolve to stand by the Colombian people as they
work to secure a just and enduring peace, a peace that they
deserve.
Colombia's narcotics challenge is linked inextricably, I
think, to the Venezuela crisis. The ELN and FARC dissident
groups and other transnational organized criminal groups
operate from within Venezuela. In many cases, these drug
traffickers and armed groups benefit from the enabling
environment created by the illegitimate Maduro regime. And I
think, frankly, that our investments in the strong partnerships
with Colombia, Peru, and our recent restart of the program in
Ecuador are critical to counteracting the sort of poisonous
effect that Venezuela is having on the crime and drug front.
My written testimony details Colombia's counternarcotics
successes and developments through the last year, but let me
highlight a few.
President Duque quadrupled the civilian manual eradication
groups from 23 to more than 100 groups and brought the
cultivation numbers down for the first time since 2012. That is
a big accomplishment. In the first 6 months of 2019, Colombia
destroyed 56 percent more coca, nearly 70 percent more coca
base labs, and 5 percent more cocaine labs than in the same
period in 2018. In 2019, the Colombian army captured nearly
2,200 members from the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and Clan del
Golfo--nearly double the number arrested in 2018.
INL provides significant support for manual eradication,
the backbone of President Duque's eradication program. We
intend to support, if the Colombians decide to proceed, the
start of a safe and effective Colombian-led aerial eradication
program following the Colombian Constitutional Court's
clarification on the issue.
Frankly, eradication is only part of the solution. The key
to our success and sustainability is supporting Colombia's
whole-of-government approach that expands rural governance and
development across the country. Among other steps to promote
rural security and governance, INL is constructing rural police
bases in key narcotics trafficking and historically FARC-
controlled areas and working on professionalization of police
and on getting them more present in rural areas of the country
where they can have an impact on the daily lives of ordinary
Colombians.
USAID efforts, as my colleague can further attest, are also
critical in partnership with this. INL's rule of law and rural
security programs, in tandem with USAID's alternative
development and land titling activities, are fundamental to
supporting Colombia's effort to meet the basic needs of rural
communities and to crowd out criminal actors.
Alongside our eradication, interdiction, and rural security
efforts, INL is helping the Colombians to go after the profits
of criminal groups by working on anti-money laundering training
and support for managing seized assets. Our investments in
judicial training and technical assistance can help to build
Colombia's capacity to prosecute complex crimes, including
financial crimes, illicit gold mining, and crimes against human
rights defenders and social leaders. Our efforts to promote the
rule of law and the protection of human rights in rural areas
are linked directly to our counternarcotics efforts. It is no
accident that the killings of human rights defenders are most
prevalent where you find armed criminal groups and coca growth.
My January visit to Colombia, days after an attack on the
Colombian National Police Academy in Bogota that killed 22 and
left dozens wounded, frankly underscored for me that Colombia's
efforts to fight back against criminal elements and violent
actors really comes at a great cost. It also underscored for me
that our partnership is still very much needed. Reaching our
shared goal requires Colombia to eradicate coca at
unprecedented levels, to work with its neighbors, and to
allocate substantial resources towards counternarcotics, and it
requires the United States and others to remain engaged and to
support the effort. Our interests in the region lie in
Colombia's success, but at its most fundamental level, our
engagement and support is also essential to stemming the deadly
flow of drugs to the United States and saving American lives.
I am going to stop there, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Madison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kirsten D. Madison
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the critical importance of our counternarcotics and security
cooperation with Colombia. Colombia remains one of our closest allies
in the hemisphere. We have worked together for decades to fight
narcotics and transnational organized crime, which negatively affect
both our nations.
In 2018, the United States and Colombia committed to a 5-year goal
to cut coca cultivation and cocaine production levels in half by the
end of 2023. As President Trump recently noted in the Presidential
Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing
Countries for Fiscal Year 2020, Colombia has made early progress in
rolling back the record-high coca cultivation and cocaine production
levels. This is result of President Duque's aggressive counternarcotics
policies and courageous work by the Colombian police and military. It
is also the result of our steadfast support. According to the most
recent U.S. government estimates, Colombian coca cultivation and
cocaine production levels in 2018 decreased for the first time since
2012, following dramatic increases from 2013 to 2017. We still have a
long road ahead to meet our ambitious goal and reduce the amount of
cocaine entering the United States, but I am confident that, with
robust U.S. support, the Colombian government can reverse the troubling
trends of the drug threat President Duque inherited just a year ago. We
have a common goal, we have a plan that is already yielding results,
and, most importantly, under President Duque's leadership, we share the
political will to tackle this challenge together.
I was on the staff of this Committee when Congress was considering
whether or not to invest--and invest big--in Plan Colombia. In those
days, the conversation was about the potential for Colombia to become a
failed state. How far Colombia has come from those days. In the past
two decades, Colombia transformed from a near-failed state to a vibrant
democracy with a stable, market-oriented economy. Joint efforts through
Plan Colombia produced security gains that led to the end of the
longest conflict in the region's history. Colombia's police and
military now have model units for the region that export their security
expertise to other partners, acting as a force multiplier of U.S.
counternarcotics investment. The recent call to arms by former
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish) leaders is
troubling, but these latest actions are intended to undermine the
nascent peace and security that was won by Colombia's police and
military and which the Colombian people want and deserve. We need to
stand by Colombia as they press ahead.
At the same time, the global narcotics threat has changed
significantly. Illicit armed groups have adapted and transformed from
hierarchical, centralized structures to more diffuse, nimble, and
interconnected transnational networks empowered by modern technology.
That evolution has made responding to transnational organized crime
(TOC) harder. Traffickers also exploit encrypted peer-to-peer messaging
applications and other emerging communication technologies to
circumvent law enforcement. To ensure the success of our
counternarcotics investments, we too must adapt. This administration
has committed resources and energy toward building a resilient whole-
of-government approach to fighting the drug epidemic on all fronts, and
my dedicated team, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), is on the frontlines of American diplomacy
in this effort. In short, we must build on the successes of Plan
Colombia to address the threats of today and the future.
The drug trade is not only a threat to Colombia--it directly
affects the safety, security, and health of Americans. Colombia is the
world's largest producer of cocaine and the source of over 90 percent
of the cocaine seized in the United States. Cocaine originating from
Colombia contributes to the rising drug overdose rates in the United
States, particularly when combined with synthetic opioids like
fentanyl. In 2017, nearly 14,000 Americans died of cocaine overdose--
the highest number on record since 2006. Three-quarters of these deaths
involved opioids.
U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia and every single gain made
against the production and trafficking of cocaine saves American lives.
The Colombian counternarcotics challenge is inextricably linked to
and made worse by the Venezuela crisis. The National Liberation Army
(ELN in Spanish) and FARC dissident groups, and other Colombia-based
TOC groups operate from within Venezuela and use it as a safe haven
from Colombian law enforcement. TOC groups bribe corrupt Venezuelan
officials to traffic Colombian drugs through Venezuelan territory, with
no pushback from the illegitimate Maduro regime. In many cases, these
drug traffickers and armed groups, benefit from the covert assistance
of Maduro's corrupt regime. The United States has sanctioned many
senior Maduro officials for their complicit support of the drug trade,
arms trafficking, and systemic corruption. Colombian air force radar
data shows the number of narco-flights originating in Venezuela
increased from 66 in 2015 to 224 in 2018, with each flight moving
hundreds of kilos of Colombian cocaine north. At the same time, more
than 1.4 million Venezuelans who fled the oppressive Maduro regime are
living in Colombia, placing a significant strain on the Colombian
government's resources, including those of the security services. Our
investments in a strong partnership with Colombia, Peru and--most
recently--the relaunch of our programs in Ecuador are critical to
countering the poisonous impact of today's Venezuela.
Colombian drugs fuel the cycle of narcotrafficking violence,
corruption, and insecurity in Central America and Mexico that
contributes to the migration crisis on our border. We know Colombian
drug traffickers forge business relationships with Mexican cartels.
Most of the cocaine trafficked from Colombia transits Central America,
and it is a significant contributor to the corruption, weak rule of
law, and transnational crime plaguing the Northern Triangle, and
driving migration from those countries through Mexico to the U.S.
border. We are working with our Central American counterparts to
address these issues and, importantly, so are the Colombians.
In President Duque we have a partner who has made combating
narcotics a top priority for his government, committing resources and
political capital to achieve our shared goals. To reach the 5-year
goal, the U.S. government is assisting President Duque to implement his
whole-of-government counternarcotics strategy that includes reducing
consumption, decreasing the supply of drugs, dismantling criminal
organizations, disrupting financial flows to criminal organizations,
and increasing state presence and economic opportunity in rural areas.
The Colombian government will focus efforts in five strategic zones:
Catatumbo in Norte de Santander; Tumaco and the Pacific Coast in
Narino; the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia; Arauca department along
Colombia's border with Venezuela; and Caqueta department in southern
Colombia. These priority regions account for 65 percent of the
country's coca cultivation and cocaine production.
With INL assistance, President Duque has significantly increased
Colombia's eradication efforts. Since taking office in August 2018,
President Duque quadrupled the number of highly efficient civilian
manual eradication groups from 23 to 100. Thanks to this surge,
Colombia eradicated more than 86,000 hectares of coca in 2018, the
highest amount of hectares eradicated since 2012. This massive effort,
achieved with INL assistance, stopped the expansion of coca cultivation
for the first time since 2012. Eradication progress continues into
2019. Colombia destroyed 56 percent more coca in the first 6 months of
2019 than during the same period in 2018. In addition to our critical
aviation support, INL provides Colombian eradicators with logistics,
field equipment, supplies, and life-saving counter improvised explosive
device (IED) training and detectors.
On July 18, Colombia's Constitutional Court gave the Colombian
government the authority to restart aerial spray of glyphosate on coca
once it meets certain administrative and oversight conditions. The
unanimous decision assigns responsibility to the government's National
Drug Council (CNE) to weigh any potential risks of glyphosate on health
and the environment against its responsibility to reduce record levels
of coca cultivation. In light of the court's decision and at the
request of the Duque administration, INL will work with the Colombian
government to restart a targeted, Colombian-led aerial eradication
program that meets the administrative and oversight conditions upheld
by the court. Aerial eradication is not a silver bullet, but it is an
effective and safe tool that along with manual eradication, crop
substitution, alternative development, and expanded police presence can
help Colombia sustainably reduce cocaine production. Colombia's earlier
reduction of coca cultivation, between 2007 and 2012, was due in large
part to sustained, high levels of both manual and aerial eradication.
Unlike Plan Colombia, the U.S. government will only play a supporting
role in a potential Colombian-led aerial eradication program, and INL
will continue to support manual eradication as the backbone of
Colombia's integrated eradication strategy.
Under President Duque, Colombian police and military forces
continue to interdict incredible amounts of cocaine and destroy record
number of labs. In 2018, Colombian and third-country security forces
using Colombian intelligence interdicted more than 450 metric tons of
pure cocaine and cocaine base. INL is helping the Colombian Navy build
and operate a chain of radar stations that provide key intelligence to
support interdiction operations along Colombia's Pacific coast, the
departure point for the majority of U.S.-bound cocaine according to the
Drug Enforcement Administration. INL is also supporting the expansion
of interdiction operations along Colombia's rivers, particularly in the
remote and high-coca-growing area of Narino. Over the last 6 months,
with INL support, Colombian National Police (CNP) launched Operations
Resplandor I, II, III, and Osiris, which collectively destroyed more
than 821 base labs, 25 cocaine labs, and six precursor production labs.
According to official Colombian government statistics, through July,
Colombian forces have destroyed 68 percent more base labs and 5 percent
more cocaine labs than during the same period in 2018.
With U.S. assistance, Colombia also leads a powerful regional
approach to maritime interdiction, producing impressive results by
leveraging resources throughout the region. Since April 2018, Colombia
has led three multi-national maritime interdiction operations resulting
in the seizure of nearly 100 metric tons of cocaine. During Orion 3,
the first of these operations planned under President Duque in the
spring of 2019, the Colombian navy led 18 partner navies, and leveraged
U.S. contributions from INL, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Joint
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), that resulted in the
seizure of 48 metric tons of cocaine--a jump of 160 percent from the
previous operation just 4 months prior.
The Colombian government continues its rigorous pace of high-value
target operations against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).
In 2019, the Colombian army alone captured nearly 2,200 members from
the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and Clan del Golfo, nearly double the
number arrested in 2018. In May, the CNP captured Olindo Perlaza, alias
Gafas, for trafficking narcotics from Colombia's Pacific coast through
Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico to the United States. Colombian police
say Perlaza, who is wanted for extradition to the United States, had
the capacity to ship four tons of cocaine a month, in collaboration
with the Sinaloa Cartel.
Beyond counternarcotics and law enforcement operations, INL is
helping the Colombians follow the money. Our assistance helps the
Colombian government go after the profits of criminal groups by
providing anti-money laundering training and support for managing
seized assets. Criminal groups often control areas where illegal gold
mining occurs and use illegal gold to supplement profits from
narcotrafficking and other illicit activities. INL-trained Colombian
investigators built cases against Colombia's two largest gold companies
for laundering a total of $1.4 billion in illicit revenue, according to
the Colombian Attorney General's Office. The Colombian investigators
credited INL training with improving their capacity to trace hidden
sources of illegal money and gold. INL supports the Colombian
government's efforts to liquidate thousands of seized properties
throughout the country, which will generate millions of dollars to
bolster Colombia's counternarcotics resources.
These impressive counternarcotics efforts led to the decrease in
coca cultivation and cocaine production for the first time in 5 years,
but bringing the coca numbers down is just one step. The key to our
long-term success in Colombia will be the implementation of a whole-of-
government approach that helps sustain our near-term operational
counternarcotics results by expanding rural governance and development.
The absence of criminal justice institutions and police in key areas of
the country creates a permissive environment for coca cultivation and
drug trafficking, enabling criminal groups to thrive by generating
insecurity and preventing long-term licit economic development. Without
long-term support for citizen security and licit livelihoods, our
short-term gains on eradication and interdiction will not last.
USAID efforts are critical in this regard, as are Colombian and
other international donor investments. INL's rule of law and rural
security programs, working in tandem with USAID's alternative
development and land titling activities, are fundamental in helping the
Colombian government meet the basic needs of rural communities. Poor
infrastructure in rural areas makes logistics of accessing markets an
enormous obstacle. Willingness alone is not sufficient to overcome
development challenges. Communities need roads, business and vocational
training, and technological advances.
To promote rural security in Colombia and sustain counternarcotics
results, INL is supporting the construction of three rural police bases
in key narcotrafficking and historically FARC-controlled areas in
Antioquia, Caqueta, and Guaviare, with other expansion sites planned
for the coming years. INL supports the CNP stationed in critical rural
narcotrafficking areas with training and other technical assistance to
enable the police and local communities to jointly address the root
causes of criminal activity and resist the influence of criminal
organizations. A component of this effort is the integration of women
into citizen security and development. In June, the United States and
Colombia launched the U.S.-Colombia partnership on women, peace, and
security recognizing the pivotal roles Colombian women have played in
overcoming conflict, building security, and investing in peace and
economic prosperity. The Department will support this initiative
through a range of efforts, including INL assistance focused on helping
the Colombian National Police recruit more women into its ranks from
underserved communities.
To expand access to justice in Colombia and protect human rights,
INL is investing in training and technical assistance across the
justice sector to build Colombia's professional capacity to investigate
and prosecute complex crimes. INL is increasing its support to the
Colombian government to address human rights violations, including
prosecuting those who threaten and commit crimes against human rights
defenders and social leaders. Our efforts to promote rule of law and
the protection of human rights in rural areas are directly linked with
our counternarcotics efforts. The killings of human rights defenders
are most prevalent where you find armed criminal groups and coca
growth.
Finally, through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP) on Regional
Security Cooperation, Colombia exports its hard-won security expertise
to partners in the hemisphere. Each year, INL supports more than 300
USCAP activities implemented by the CNP and the Colombian Navy in 10
partner countries along key narcotrafficking routes for cocaine
destined for the United States. Beyond training, this program is
creating regional law enforcement connections that reinforce our
broader efforts against transnational criminal networks.
Transnational problems need transnational solutions. As our
strongest counternarcotics partner in the region, Colombia has the
capability and political will to lead a new counterdrug network for the
Americas.
My January visit to Colombia days after an attack on a Colombian
National Police Academy in Bogota that killed 22 people and left dozens
wounded reminded me that security and justice do not come cheaply.
Besides Colombia's significant financial investment in
counternarcotics, Colombian soldiers, police, and eradicators continue
to put their lives on the line. In 2019, IEDs have killed nine and
wounded 49 eradicators, the same number of deaths and casualties for
all of 2018. Despite the cost, during my visits to Colombia and
subsequent meetings with senior Colombian officials in Washington, I am
encouraged by the unwavering commitment to achieve our ambitious 5-year
goal from the highest level of the Colombian government to the
campesino manual eradicator risking his life to remove coca from some
of the most dangerous terrain in Colombia.
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, we have not even completed the first full year of our 5-
year goal to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine production by half by
the end of 2023, and Colombia is already demonstrating significant
results. I cannot emphasize enough the enormity of the task. The
Colombian government is facing serious challenges: near record high
coca cultivation and cocaine production levels inherited from the
previous administration, the implementation of a complex 310-page peace
plan that touches every sector of Colombian society, and strained
resources due to the Venezuela crisis. Reaching this goal will require
Colombia to eradicate coca at unprecedented rates, to work with
neighboring countries throughout the region to combat agile and
resourceful criminal networks, and to continue to allocate substantial
resources toward counternarcotics. We will continue to encourage the
Colombian government and other donor countries to do more, but we must
also continue robust U.S. support for our Colombian partners in a joint
effort to prevent deadly drugs from reaching the streets of the United
States.
Senator Rubio. Thank you very much.
Before I turn to you, Mr. Barsa, I wanted to just
acknowledge the chairman of the committee was here for a few
moments, and I want to thank him for coming by as well.
Mr. Barsa, thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARSA, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Barsa. Thank you very much. Chairman Rubio, Ranking
Member Cardin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the invitation to testify today. I appreciate this
subcommittee's support for USAID's work in Colombia and
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID's work in
Colombia advances U.S. national security and prosperity with
programs that further a just and sustainable peace, improve
rural economic development and citizen security, promote the
growth of licit economies, and help the country support the
influx of Venezuelan migrants.
As Administrator Mark Green said during one of his recent
trips to Colombia, ``There is no more important relationship in
this hemisphere.'' I completely agree, which is why last month
I chose to visit Colombia as my first international trip.
On that trip, I was able to witness firsthand USAID's work
with the Government of Colombia, civil society, and the private
sector. I met with key members of President Duque's
administration as well as a number of Colombia's courageous
social leaders, including leaders of ethnic and minority
groups. I also had an opportunity to meet with Venezuelan
migrants and Colombian returnees, many who had just fled the
horror taking place inside Venezuela. Each Colombian official I
met with reiterated the Duque's government commitment to a
strong relationship with the United States, and in each of my
meetings, I underscored USAID's commitment to helping Colombia
advance on the journey to self-reliance and solidify a long-
lasting peace.
USAID is collaborating closely with the Duque
administration to promote licit economies, inclusiveness,
reconciliation, and stability. To foster licit livelihoods,
USAID promotes alternative development, increases financial
inclusion, and addresses land tenure. A few months ago,
Administrator Green and President Duque launched a historic
massive land titling program, and just 2 weeks ago, the program
announced the distribution of 1,000 land titles, a milestone in
peace implementation.
These activities promote stability by giving young people
better opportunities, to discourage them from joining
transnational criminal organizations, providing former
combatants with legal economic opportunities and better
futures.
At USAID, we believe that sustainable development must
include robust participation from the private sector, and we
work to leverage private sector funds to maximize our impact.
We also work to grow the private sector. USAID helps
Colombians in rural areas to find legal economic opportunities,
especially in those regions affected by violence and illegal
activity. For example, USAID helps entrepreneurs and small
producers of products like cacao and coffee improve their
products and connect to local and international markets.
While we work to foster licit economies, we know that no
sustainable development or lasting peace can occur without the
full inclusion of Afro-Colombians, indigenous, and other ethnic
groups. I was pleased to hear directly from President Duque's
High Commissioner for Stabilization Emilio Archila that the
Colombian Government is in agreement with this important point.
I am concerned about reports of human rights defenders
being targeted and can assure you that the protection of human
rights defenders and social leaders is a priority for USAID and
the U.S. embassy in Bogota. To address these human rights
issues, USAID programs promote respect for the rule of law,
support state and civic actors that provide collective and
individual protection, and strengthen the Government of
Colombia's capacity to respond to incidents of violence.
We are also committed to fostering greater social and
economic inclusion of Afro-Colombians and indigenous
communities as a means of advancing peace and reconciliation in
Colombia.
Another critical imperative of Colombia's peace is
reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other
citizens. The Colombian conflict and associated violence
created a tragic legacy of millions of victims. USAID is
collaborating closely with the Duque administration to build
the capacity of key government institutions charged with
delivering services and transitional justice to these victims
as mandated by Colombian law. On my trip, I had the opportunity
to meet with leaders from the USAID-supported Truth Commission
and the Unit to Search for Disappeared Persons to discuss the
strategies, challenges, and impacts that these two main
institutions are making in the reconciliation process. We must
continue to support Colombia's path towards a sustainable and
stable peace.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to discuss
Colombia without discussing the impact of the Venezuelan
migrants. This manmade, regime-driven tragedy has forced more
than 4.3 million to flee Venezuela. More than 1.1 million of
these people are in Colombia right now. When I visited the city
of Cucuta last month on the Colombian-Venezuelan border, I saw
firsthand the dire humanitarian effects this crisis is having
on Colombians and Venezuelans alike.
To help the region cope with this manmade crisis, the
United States has provided nearly $377 million since fiscal
year 2017, $213 million of which is to respond to the crisis in
Colombia.
We salute Colombian President Duque, who has served as a
regional leader in this response, and we thank other countries
in the region for their support for the Venezuelan people and
the legitimate government of Interim President Juan Guaido.
We continue to call upon other donors to make or increase
contributions to help address the crisis in Venezuela, and we
are also particularly grateful to Congress for your bipartisan
support on this issue.
In conclusion, USAID is prepared to continue to help
Colombia address its most pressing challenges and secure
lasting peace.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you again
for your commitment to USAID and to our work in Colombia. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barsa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Barsa
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I
appreciate this Subcommittee's support for USAID's work to advance U.S.
national security and prosperity through programs in the Republic of
Colombia that further a just and sustainable peace, promote rural
economic development, promote the growth of licit economies and help
the country support the influx of Venezuelan migrants.
As Administrator Mark Green said during one of his recent trips to
Colombia, ``There is no more important relationship [for the United
States] in this Hemisphere.'' I completely agree with Administrator
Green, which is why, as USAID's Assistant Administrator for the Latin
America and Caribbean Bureau, I chose to make Colombia the destination
for my first international trip last month.
During my August trip, I witnessed USAID's work with the Government
of Colombia in a number of different sectors. I also met with key
members of President Ivan Duque's administration, including Vice-
President Marta Lucia Ramirez,Vice, Minister of Health Ivan Dario
Gonzalez, Presidential Border Manager Felipe Munoz, High Commissioner
for Security Rafael Guarin, and Presidential Advisor for Stabilization
and Consolidation Emilio Jose Archila. I also met a number of
Colombia's courageous social leaders, including from ethnic and
minority groups.
Each Colombian official reiterated the Duque Government's
commitment to a strong relationship with the United States. In each of
these meetings, I underscored USAID's commitment to helping Colombia
advance on the Journey to Self-Reliance and solidify a long-lasting
peace.
To understand USAID's approach in Colombia, it is essential to
understand the country's over five decades of violent conflict. Despite
this tumultuous history, the country has made significant strides.
USAID is collaborating closely with the Duque administration on a
multi- sectoral approach that promotes licit economies, inclusiveness,
reconciliation, and stability.
For example, USAID takes several approaches to foster licit
livelihoods for Colombians, including promoting alternative
development, increasing financial inclusion and addressing land tenure.
All of these activities aim to promote stability, whether it is giving
young people better opportunities to discourage them from joining
transnational criminal organizations, or providing former combatants
with legal economic opportunities and better futures.
We remain concerned about reports that human-rights defenders are
being targeted. The protection of human rights defenders and social
leaders is a priority for USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. USAID
uses a holistic, cross-sectoral strategy to address the situation that
confronts human-rights defenders by promoting respect for the rule of
law, dignity, and fundamental freedoms; preventing abuses; and
strengthening the Government of Colombia's capacity to respond.
In 2016, we launched our Inclusion for Peace (IPA) activity, with
the aim of fostering greater social and economic inclusion of Afro-
Colombians and indigenous communities as a means of advancing peace and
reconciliation in Colombia. By 2020, we expect that this initiative
will have provided 12,000 individuals from these marginalized
communities access to formal job opportunities. In addition to IPA,
USAID has focused engagement with Afro-Colombian and indigenous
communities through several other activities, including the Fulbright
and Martin Luther King, Jr., fellowships.
We also seek to bring other partners to the equation. At USAID, we
believe that sustainable, economic empowerment--all development--must
include robust participation from the private sector. Private sector
leadership is essential to kick-start economic growth and lower social
and economic inequality. The private sector offers technologies,
innovation, expertise, and networks that can advance our development
goals and those of the Colombian people. The private sector also offers
significant resources. In Colombia, we leveraged nearly $163 million in
private sector funds in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 and the first half of FY
2019.
My first official event in Colombia was in support of USAID's Rural
Financial Alliance, a compelling example of how we want to implement
our Private Sector Engagement Policy. For years, USAID has been helping
people in Colombia's rural areas to find legal economic opportunities,
especially in those regions affected by violence, drug trafficking,
illegal mining and armed groups. We have helped entrepreneurs and small
producers in cacao, coffee, dairy, rubber, and beekeeping to improve
their products, and connected them to local and international markets.
But even as they have found success in these ventures, the people
in these regions have lacked access to the financial services that
would solidify their progress and grow their businesses.
Since 2015, USAID has co-invested with the private sector under the
Rural Financial Alliance to provide these critical services in 197
target municipalities. With support from USAID, financial
intermediaries have channeled $848 million in financial services to
those 197 prioritized municipalities. These financial services are
mainly productive credits, savings accounts, and micro-insurance--
essential tools that are now helping Colombians in rural areas thrive.
It is these types of results that exemplify how critical engagement
with the private sector is to finding, financing, and implementing
lasting solutions.
One crucial program has a particularly relevant role across
multiple sectors: land tenure. USAID and the Duque administration have
worked together on the formalization of land titles, which is central
to addressing inequality in rural areas, promoting socio-economic
development and licit economic growth, and advancing peace-building
efforts. To signify both countries' commitment to this important issue,
in May, President Duque and Administrator Green signed a joint
statement of support to encourage the completion of the Mass Land
Formalization and Cadaster pilot being developed in the municipality of
Ovejas, in Sucre Department. This past August, the program delivered
its first 1,000 land titles to Colombians who participated, a historic
milestone in implementation of the peace accords.
The Ovejas pilot is an unprecedented initiative in Colombia that
seeks to offer viable and proven solutions to the country's land
problems by reducing both the time and costs associated with the
formalization of clear property rights, especially in the most
conflict-affected regions.
Not only does proper land tenure help stabilize communities and
decrease conflict, it also promotes licit livelihoods. We have seen
that without legal land title, more than 75 percent of former coca
growers return to the illicit economy, whereas when they have clear
title, the rate of recidivism drops to less than 25 percent.
Another critical imperative of Colombia's peace process is
reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other citizens. The
Colombian conflict and associated violence created a tragic legacy of
millions of victims, including those forcibly displaced from their
homes, land, and communities. USAID is collaborating closely with the
Duque administration to build the capacity of key institutions in the
Colombian government charged with delivering services, reparations, and
transitional justice to these victims as mandated by Colombian law.
For example, I had the opportunity to meet with the Truth
Commission and the Unit to Search for Disappeared Persons, both of
which have received funding from USAID to support engaging victims,
civil society, and justice officials in the processes and dialogues of
the Truth Commission.
During my meeting with the President of the Truth Commission,
Father Francisco de Roux, and Luz Marina Monzon, Director of the Unit
to Search for Disappeared Persons, we discussed the strategies,
challenges, and impacts that these two main institutions are making in
the reconciliation process. This process is not easy, and there will be
many challenges along the way.
As reported in the press, a former commander of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) recently called on his followers to
take up arms against the Colombian Government.
This is a grim reminder that after decades of armed conflict, it
remains necessary to keep supporting Colombia's path toward a
sustainable and stable peace. The reintegration of former FARC members
into Colombian society is crucial to this reconciliation process as it
breaks the cycle of violence and criminality. USAID will not be
deterred from promoting peace and encouraging a culture of legality.
Colombia is the focus of today's hearing, but I would be remiss not
to mention the Venezuela regional crisis. Venezuela is experiencing a
man-made, regime-driven political and economic crisis that has led to
severe shortages of food and medicine and has driven more than 4.3
million people to flee their once-prosperous country since 2014.
This outflow of vulnerable Venezuelans is straining healthcare,
education, and other social services in neighboring countries,
especially Colombia. When I visited the city of Cucuta on the Colombia-
Venezuela border last month, I saw firsthand the dire humanitarian
effects this crisis is having on Colombians and Venezuelans alike.
It was during this visit that I also fully recognized the
generosity of the Colombian people and the Duque administration for
their continued support for and hospitality toward Venezuelans who have
fled the tyranny and chaos in their country. The stories I heard from
migrants about living conditions inside Venezuela created by the
devastating and corrupt policies of the former Maduro regime were truly
shocking.
To help the region cope with this man-made crisis, the United
States has provided nearly $377 million--including nearly $334 million
in humanitarian aid and $43 million in economic and development
assistance--since FY2017. Of this amount, $213 million has been for
Colombia--$37.1 million in development assistance and $175 million in
humanitarian assistance.
We salute Colombia and President Duque, who has served as a
regional leader on this response, and we thank the other countries in
the region for their support for the Venezuelan people and the
legitimate Government of Interim President Juan Guaido. We continue to
call upon other donors to make or increase contributions to help
address the crisis in Venezuela. We are also particularly grateful to
Congress for your support on this issue.
The partnership between the U.S. and Colombian Governments reaps
dividends on both sides. USAID's projects work best when governments,
civil society, and the private sector in host countries also invest in
our programming. The Duque administration has been an excellent partner
in our joint cooperation. USAID is prepared to continue to help
Colombia address the country's most-pressing challenges, advance
Colombians' progress along the Journey to Self-Reliance and secure a
lasting peace.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you again for your
commitment to USAID and to our work in Colombia. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Finally, Mr. O'Reilly.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN O'REILLY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. O'Reilly. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this
hearing.
Colombia is indeed our highest performing and most
cooperative partner in Latin America, and we built this
partnership on shared values and common and vitally important
shared interests. This is the fruit of decades of U.S.
attention and bipartisan congressional support. Your intense
engagement has been and will remain vital to our success.
Americans and Colombians work together to make both
countries safer and more prosperous. We are working together to
expand cooperation on security and support Colombian efforts to
slash coca cultivation and cocaine production, promote human
rights and democracy, and support Colombia's implementation of
the peace accord, and expand economic opportunity and free,
fair, and reciprocal trade. In short, we face common challenges
together.
That includes helping Venezuelans recover the democratic
rights enshrined in their own constitution, rights honored by
Venezuelan Interim President Juan Guaido and treated with
contempt by Nicolas Maduro.
Colombia is a strong democracy and a vibrant economy. It is
a diplomatic leader in the Americas. It aggressively confronts
terrorists and criminals within its borders, and it helps train
security services across the region. For two decades, Colombian
authorities kept up sustained pressure on FARC criminals and
terrorists. We take pride in having supported those efforts
that brought the FARC to the negotiating table, producing the
peace accord that ended a 52-year insurgency. And Colombia has
made real progress on implementation, disarming nearly 7,000
guerillas.
This complex agreement touches nearly every Colombian
institution. Making it all work represents a huge challenge and
an admirable commitment to peace. Colombia faces its hardest
challenges where government presence remains weak. Killings of
social leaders often in these rural communities most afflicted
by crime concerns us deeply. We need to remain engaged to help
Colombia defeat the illegal armed groups seeking to fill
vacuums left behind by the demobilized FARC. We must ensure
that human rights protections remain foundational in everything
we do in support of Colombia's transformation.
So-called FARC dissidents have scoffed at peace, continuing
to break the law, and traffic drugs. Now a few former FARC
leaders have quit the peace accord, returning to terrorism,
violence, and criminality. The most notable among them all were
and all remain deeply immersed in the coca/cocaine economy. We
are confident that Colombian justice can and will hold to
account those who follow that path, and when they break U.S.
law, we reserve the right to seek their extradition.
Colombian authorities and the FARC political party have
repudiated those who call for a return to violence and crime.
Outlaws such as Ivan Marquez and Jesus Santrich joined the ELN
and other terrorists and criminals on the wrong side of
history, on the wrong side of the law.
Assistant Secretary Madison has spoken about our
counternarcotics cooperation. I can only reiterate that we are
working exceptionally well with the Duque administration and
our Colombian counterparts.
The crisis in Venezuela remains a significant threat to
Colombia and to the region. And Colombia carries the greatest
burden of all. More than 3 percent of the population of
Venezuela, those 1.4 million souls, resides in Colombia, a
statistic that should but will not make even Nicolas Maduro
hang his head in shame.
We have been deeply involved in the efforts to address that
crisis. Since fiscal year 2017, we have provided nearly $214
million to help Colombia respond to the influx, in addition to
support provided elsewhere in the region.
In facing Colombia's challenges, we must never lose sight
of Colombia's progress. Greater security and greater economic
opportunity, an ever more robust democracy, all serve our own
national interests in a secure, prosperous, and reliable
partner.
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the
subcommittee, congressional support has been instrumental in
the success of the past 20 years. It remains the foundation of
our successful partnership with the people and the democratic
institutions of Colombia. Thank you, and I too look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Reilly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin O'Reilly
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for convening this hearing.
Colombia is our highest performing and most willing partner in
Latin America. Together we have built a partnership based on shared
values and shared interests, and our interests there are among the most
important in the entire hemisphere. This administration highly values
the excellent relationship we have with President Ivan Duque and his
government.
Today's robust partnership with Colombia is the fruit of decades of
U.S. attention to this relationship, including the bipartisan support
here in the United States Congress. Your intense engagement with
Colombia has been, and will remain, a critical contributor to our
success.
Americans and Colombians work together to make both the United
States and Colombia safer and more prosperous, while adhering to our
values. We support Colombian efforts to expand cooperation on security
and counternarcotics. This includes helping Colombians implement their
programs to slash coca cultivation and cocaine production, as well as
our robust partnership to dismantle criminal organizations. We work
together to promote human rights and democracy in Colombia and to
implement the 2016 peace accord, despite the recklessness of so-called
FARC dissidents who have abandoned the commitments they made to the
Colombian people and to the international community. We work with
Colombia to expand economic opportunity and free, fair, and reciprocal
trade. In short, we face common challenges together.
Our cooperation extends, and we cannot emphasize this enough, to
our shared efforts to help the people of Venezuela recover and fully
exercise the democratic rights enshrined in their own constitution, a
constitution honored by Venezuelan interim president Juan Guaido and
trampled underfoot by Nicolas Maduro. We continue to support Colombians
as they and their government have received with immense generosity the
many Venezuelans displaced by the corruption, cruelty, and
mismanagement of Maduro and the crisis he has generated in their
homeland.
We remain Colombia's economic partner of choice, and the U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement continues to generate opportunities
for economic growth and employment in both countries. Importantly, we
registered a trade surplus with Colombia in 2018. U.S. companies
increasingly see Colombia as a promising investment destination, and we
are attracting Colombian capital to the United States.
Colombia is, in many ways, a model for the region--a strong
democracy and an economic powerhouse. It aggressively confronts crime
and terrorism within its borders and exports security training.
Colombia is a diplomatic leader in the Americas. We intend to continue
supporting the inclusive democratic institutions so crucial to
advancing peace, security, and prosperity in Colombia and its
neighbors.
For two decades, the Colombian government maintained sustained
pressure on the FARC, a criminal and terrorist organization, and we
take pride in having lent our hand to those efforts. That pressure
helped bring the FARC to the negotiating table, resulting in the 2016
peace accord that ended a 52-year insurgency. The sacrifice and heroism
of many in Colombia's security forces--and prosecutors and judges too--
helped bring this about. Since the signing of the accord, the Colombian
government has made real progress on implementation, and nearly 7,000
guerrillas have disarmed. The Colombian congress passed important
implementing legislation, three transitional justice institutions have
started work to address conflict related crimes and abuses, and two
United Nations political missions have deployed to verify FARC
disarmament, reincorporation, and security guarantees. On September 12,
the United States and other U.N. Security Council members voted to
extend the current U.N. Verification Mission mandate for another year,
as requested by President Duque. The council's unanimous approval
signals the international community's continued strong support for
peace in Colombia.
Violence continues, but nationwide security indices have clearly
improved. The Duque administration has accelerated efforts to approve
individual and collective development projects that support
reincorporation of ex-combatants, implemented land titling and
registration programs, and enrolled approximately 95 percent of ex-
combatants in healthcare.
This vastly complex peace accord--among the most intricate,
multifaceted, and rigorous agreement of its kind--touches nearly every
institution in Colombia, and the country is in just year three of what
the negotiating parties saw as an initial 15-year timeline for
implementation. Making all the pieces fit, making it all work,
represents a huge challenge, and an admirable commitment to peace by
the people of Colombia.
Still, the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies considers implementation now underway for
70 percent of the accord's provisions, a level comparable to other
successful peace processes. The Department of State funds these Kroc
Institute efforts to monitor implementation, resources available to us
because you in Congress have appropriated them. We see this as a
valuable part of our sustained effort to support Colombians as they
work to establish a just and lasting peace for themselves, a way to
help them identify and address implementation challenges.
Implementation does face challenges, particularly where government
presence remains weak. The killing of social leaders, often in the
rural communities most afflicted by crime and narcotrafficking, concern
us deeply. We recognize the importance of continued engagement to help
Colombia defeat the illegal armed groups seeking to fill vacuums left
behind by the demobilized FARC. Helping extend security and state
presence in rural areas can make these regions and those who live in
them more secure and prosperous, and deny these spaces to criminals, to
narcotics traffickers. Of course, this requires a sustained commitment,
and resources.
So-called FARC dissidents--FARC guerrillas who rejected the accord
and retained their control of various illegal economies, notably
drugs--have been a problem since the signing of the accord. More
recently, a few former leaders of the FARC chose to abandon the FARC's
peace accord commitments and return to terrorism, violence, and
criminality.
The most notable among them all were and all remain deeply immersed
in the coca-cocaine economy. We strongly repudiate their actions, and
the peace accord makes clear that those who commit serious crimes after
the signing of the accord can and will be held accountable to the full
extent of the law, including the possibility of extradition as
appropriate. Importantly, both the Colombian government and the FARC
political party have rejected this call by a small group of individuals
to return to violence and crime and have reiterated their commitments
to peace.
Writing in the Washington Post on September 3, President Duque
explained that, ``Colombia stands united in the face of a small number
of criminals who want to sidetrack the historic transformation that is
underway.'' We stand resolutely with Colombia and its efforts to secure
the peace.
Colombians know that to implement the peace accord successfully
they must also confront narcotics production and trafficking and help
Venezuelans resolve the crisis that has cast Venezuela itself into
chaos and threatens to destabilize the region.
You will hear from Assistant Secretary Madison about our efforts to
strengthen counternarcotics cooperation. Our governments are pursuing a
comprehensive approach, including eradication, interdiction, law
enforcement cooperation, extraditions, and integrated rural development
so families immersed in the coca economy can have a legal, decent way
to make a living. In 2018, we agreed with Colombia to work together to
cut coca cultivation and cocaine production by half by the end of 2023,
and we have already seen the Duque administration follow through on
this commitment. We know that they will need unity of effort across
their security and civilian agencies, and our continued cooperation and
support, to drive down cultivation and production, and that doing so
can enhance the health and security of us all.
As for restart of aerial eradication, we recognize that Colombia
itself must make that call, but we've seen it work in the past and
we're confident that it could work in the future. At the request of the
Duque administration, we will work with the Colombian government to
restart a targeted, Colombia-led aerial eradication program as part of
a broader comprehensive approach.
The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and
its spillover effects into the region remains a significant threat to
Colombia's economic growth and political stabilization efforts.
Colombia carries the greatest burden of any of Venezuela's neighbors as
this hemisphere deals with the effects of the tyranny, the cruelty, and
the incompetence of Nicolas Maduro.
He and those who support him have provoked a regional stability
crisis As we speak, more than 3 percent of the population of Venezuela
resides in Colombia, a statistic that should--but won't--make even
Nicolas Maduro hang his head in shame. Venezuela's porous border with
Colombia, coupled with Maduro's decision to harbor groups like FARC
dissidents and the ELN in Venezuela, has generated new security
challenges.
At the latest estimate, Colombia hosts over 1.4 million Venezuelan
refugees and displaced Venezuelans, imposing outsized burdens on
Colombian taxpayers and generating outsized demands on Colombian social
services. Lay those costs at the feet of Nicolas Maduro, not at the
feet of those forced to flee his tyrannical rule. Each of those
individuals has a story to tell of oppression, deprivation, and
suffering. Desperate and vulnerable Venezuelans are susceptible both to
exploitation by criminal groups and, in some cases, to recruitment by
illegal actors. We commend Colombia for its humanitarian contributions
and for its generosity.
The United States has been deeply involved in the humanitarian and
diplomatic effort to address the crisis. Since FY 2017, we have
provided nearly $214 million to help Colombia respond to the influx,
including nearly $175 million in humanitarian aid and more than $37
million development and economic assistance. In addition, we have twice
deployed the U.S. Navy Ship COMFORT on medical missions to the region.
During stops in Colombia in November 2018 and in August, COMFORT
personnel treated more than 17,000 patients.
While helping Colombia confront these challenges, we must never
lose sight of the real progress it has made. Through steady economic
stewardship over the past two decades, and with our assistance,
Colombia has doubled the size of its economy and the number of
Colombians in poverty has fallen from 1-in-5 to 1-in-25. Our Trade
Promotion Agreement underpins a strong trading relationship with two-
way goods trade of $29 billion in 2018. The United States supported
Colombia's accession to the OECD, based on its significant efforts over
the past 5 years to meet the OECD's technical standards. We look
forward to formally welcoming Colombia to the OECD once it formalizes
its accession.
We have a fully committed partner in the Duque administration. As
President Duque told President Trump when he visited the White House in
February, he and his administration are supporting efforts to secure a
just and lasting peace by extending stability, legality, and
opportunity in Colombia's conflict-affected regions, aggressively
increasing counternarcotics efforts and confronting the threat of a
destabilized Venezuela.
Our FY 2020 funding request for Colombia reflects the
administration's focus on advancing these priorities. Building on
effective prior-year programs, bilateral U.S. assistance will focus on:
Security, including counternarcotics and reintegration of
ex-combatants;
Expansion of state presence in conflict-affected areas;
and
Justice and support to the Colombian government for
victims.
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss our
relationship with Colombia.
We all know that congressional support has been instrumental in the
successes of the past 20 years, and we know that it remains the
foundation of our successful partnership with the people and the
democratic institutions of Colombia. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I will defer my time. I know members have to be in other
places. So we will start with the ranking member.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank all three of our
witnesses.
Mr. O'Reilly, I want to start with your observations. And
as I said in my opening statement, I strongly support the
progress that we have made on the relationship between the
United States and Colombia. It is in our national security
interests, and I am proud of the progress that we have made. It
is based upon shared values, and you mentioned specifically
promoting human rights.
So how can we explain so many human rights and social
leaders who have been attacked in recent times in Colombia, and
that we see a rise in the safety and protecting human rights in
that country? What are we doing to hold the government
accountable to protect the rights of its citizens?
Mr. O'Reilly. Senator, we all have seen this over the
years. This is a problem of long standing.
Senator Cardin. There seems to have been a spike recently.
Mr. O'Reilly. In Colombia, and indeed, it has been a severe
problem in the short term. Over the longer term, I think the
country has done a substantial job in improving the general
long-term trajectory, but indeed it is incredibly important to
focus on the areas where they have been under the most
pressure. In these rural areas, as Assistant Secretary Madison
was saying, often where the trafficking is most severe, we
have----
Senator Cardin. Are you satisfied that the Duque government
is paying enough attention to this problem?
Mr. O'Reilly. I am, sir. It is an immensely large country.
It is a severe problem.
Senator Cardin. Four hundred seventy-nine human rights
leaders and social leaders have been assassinated since 2016.
You are satisfied they are doing enough?
Mr. O'Reilly. I am satisfied that they are working hard to
confront the problem, sir. If one of these people suffers that
sort of violence meted out against them, if they are murdered,
it is one too many. And it is, in that sense, clearly
unacceptable. The challenge, of course, they face is vast and
complex. We have engaged with them consistently through the
embassy. It has been a regular topic of conversation when we
meet with their senior authorities here in Washington as well.
Senator Cardin. Are we engaging the Colombian military and
police about this issue?
Mr. O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. What type of response are we getting for
their protecting the rights of citizens that are raising
concerns about their own country?
Mr. O'Reilly. We have seen--and I will commit to getting
you the most precise numbers I can. We have seen a relative
increase, as I understand it, in the number of closed cases and
investigations, but that of course is post facto, after the
fact of these attacks. We have seen them move resources into
some of these rural areas even in a period of economic
austerity. The relative focus of their budget across the board
in security and in other social expenditures tends to be
focused more towards rural areas and more towards these areas
identified as being hot areas of conflict. And there is
obviously much more that has to be done.
Senator Cardin. So Mr. Duque was originally not a supporter
of the peace process. He now has the responsibility as the
leader of Colombia. He has been implementing the peace process.
We have seen significant concerns as to the implementation
including, as pointed out, the FARC sources starting to come
back to life.
How do you judge how we can be helpful to make sure the
peace accords are in fact implemented?
Mr. O'Reilly. When President Duque took office, he put
forward about a half dozen different concerns, mostly focused
on procedural issues, with the structure of the peace accord,
and he brought those forward in his political system. When it
finally came to the Constitutional Court and his position did
not prosper within, I believe it was, 3 days, he signed the
implementing legislation.
Senator Cardin. I know that, but we are seeing it getting
off track. What are we doing to work with the Duque government
to get this aggressively implemented?
Mr. O'Reilly. The messages that our former chief of
mission, Ambassador Whitaker, the messages that our current
chief of mission, Phil Goldberg, have brought to the
administration, our engagement with them here all is in support
of helping them bring this agreement forward where they have
made an emphasis--and I think it is a correct emphasis--on a
firm line against those who would stand against peace and
working as aggressively as possible to support those who have
put down their arms and are working towards integration into
the society. They have had significant success, particularly in
those areas where ex-FARC combatants have concentrated their
efforts or concentrated themselves in communities and keeping
those people safe and keeping them engaged in politics as the
FARC party. And I think our fundamental mission is helping them
advance that message of a firm line with those who cross the
line and being as supportive as possible in implementing what
is going to be a long and difficult process of bringing this
peace process to a successful conclusion.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Ranking
Member Cardin, for having the hearing, and I appreciated the
testimony today.
I was involved back in the day with the Free Trade
Agreement with Colombia. I negotiated with President Uribe
directly, who rolled up his sleeves and jumped into it and was
very enthusiastic. I see now that our trade with Colombia,
although significant, is not growing as fast as their trade
relationships with China. In fact, the Chinese investment and
trade with Colombia has grown exponentially, being now their
second largest trading partner and their second largest
exporter.
So I guess one question I would have for you all--and I
know Mr. Marczak is coming up for the Atlantic Council. He
talked about this some in his testimony. But I wonder if you
could talk a little about the trade relationship. I do not
know. Mr. O'Reilly, maybe you are the right one or AID, Mr.
Bursa. But how is it working, one? And are you concerned about
the Chinese influence in Colombia and the stronger economic
relationship there?
Mr. O'Reilly. On the whole, it has been a success--the
process of economic reform over these last 20 years, the
greater stability in the country. We are drawing more Colombian
investment into this country. U.S. firms are making substantial
commitments in foreign direct investment. I was the Colombian
desk officer 15 or 16 years ago. The economy in Colombia now is
more than twice the size of what it was then.
They do trade with China and that trade is growing. We all
trade with China. The question is how fair and how open and
transparent that trade is.
Senator Portman. But also there is more and more Chinese
investment in the country. And I guess my question to you is
are you concerned about that from a national security point of
view, particularly because it seems to be displacing some of
our investment, if you look at the numbers.
Mr. O'Reilly. Thank you, Senator.
We have made it clear with our counterparts in Colombia
that they should look closely. And it is a message that we have
shared with others in the region as well, that they should look
very closely at the character and quality of the relationships
they enter into with Chinese counterparts. Many of them are
state-owned firms. Many of them do not necessarily have the
same commitments to openness and transparency that we would
expect from our firms, that Colombians expect from their own.
So, yes, indeed, we have asked them to take a very close eye at
the quality of those and the nature of the security
implications of any investments that they might consider
accepting from Chinese sources.
Senator Portman. We talked about some of the good news, and
there is a lot of good news on the economy, on the stability in
the country. What President Duque has done is really--you know,
the third of fourth president who has brought that kind of
stability, particularly with regard to the peace agreement.
Things are in better shape.
And yet, I saw just late last month, even a few weeks ago,
one of the splinter groups from FARC called for returning to
arms and armed conflict with the government. I think it was in
relation to the number of people who had been resettled or who
had left FARC who had been assassinated.
Are you concerned about that? And what, if anything, should
we be doing after spending significant amounts of American
taxpayer money, about $10 billion I think over a period of a
couple decades with regard to Plan Colombia? Should we be
concerned that this is starting to unravel, or do you feel as
though it is just a splinter group without much significance?
Mr. O'Reilly. Sir, I am sad to say I am very much
concerned, but I am not surprised. The leading figures who
participated in that announcement on August 29th had been
distancing themselves from the FARC political party and from
the commitments they had made to the international community,
to the Colombian people for some time. Mr. Marquez had stepped
back significantly. Mr. Santrich was under criminal
investigation in his own country and under indictment in our
own. They continued to engage in criminal activity.
Senator Portman. It did not surprise you that those
individuals would have been unhappy with the process of the
peace agreement in effect, but what should we do? And my time
is coming to a close here. But what should we do in relation to
that?
And second, with 1.4 million Venezuelans in Colombia, I
know you are going to talk about this in response to other
questions, but we would love to hear for the subcommittee's
purposes what should we do at this point that we are not
currently doing? So if you could maybe take those questions for
the record, that would be great.
My time has expired, and I appreciate all three of you
being here, to the witnesses on the second panel as well.
Senator Rubio. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses.
You know, people wonder whether the United States' foreign
policy or investments can make a difference. I hold up Colombia
as an example. And the fact that it is still fragile and it
still needs work I think does mean that we need to continue to
be involved. I think we have been persistent. We have been
willing to invest over a long haul. We have been bipartisan. It
began with Presidents Clinton and then Bush and then Obama and
then President Trump. And that has been really important. It
has had great support from bipartisan Members of Congress. And
I do think we have high stakes in maintaining it.
I have heard the names of President Uribe and President
Duque mentioned often. I have not heard anybody mention
President Santos, who won the Nobel Prize for his work, and so
I want to put his name on the record because it has involved
successive leaders who do not see eye to eye on everything, but
it has involved leaders who have been willing to do very hard
work.
I also went to Cucuta and to Bogota in March. And one of
the reasons I went was primarily to follow up on the Venezuelan
issue, but I was worried that I was hearing in this room from
witness tables relatively rosy scenarios about what might
happen and how quickly it might happen. I was hearing that from
others as well. And I was struck, when I went in March, and
visited both with Colombian leaders, governmental leaders and
leaders in the sort of NGO space, and then when I was at the
border in Cucuta, I was not hearing such rosy optimism about
the likely timing of developments in Venezuela.
This is a hearing about Colombia, not Venezuela, but as I
look at the challenges that Colombia has, I share Senator
Rubio's opening statement about the value of Colombia as a
partner in this hemisphere and around the world. I remember
going to the Sinai and looking at Colombian troops who were
there as peacekeepers in the multinational force of observers
protecting the border between Egypt and Israel. To see Colombia
assert itself as a peacekeeping nation around the world, what a
wonderful thing. So we need to do what we can.
But there are significant challenges with the peace
process, with trying to integrate parts of the country that had
not been invested in for decades back into the country. But I
still think the thing that poses the most risk to the peace
process is this massive humanitarian and security crisis in
Venezuela, the refugee effect in Colombia and others.
So I just would sort of like you to give your thoughts to
the committee as of right now, mid-September 2019. To help
Colombia, what should we be doing, this committee and Congress?
What should we be doing more to hasten peace efforts,
negotiation, and other efforts to bring stability to Venezuela?
Should we be doing more bilaterally? Should we be engaged with
the CARICOM process of Caribbean nations? What would your
advice to us be?
Mr. O'Reilly. I too have been frustrated--and my
colleagues--with the difficulty in bringing definitive change
and an improvement of conditions in Venezuela. Mr. Maduro may
not know the time nor the hour, but I think it is clear that
his ability to continue this is not infinite.
I think the best way that we can help Colombia deal with
this is work in concert with Colombia and other likeminded
governments in the region to make it harder and harder for
Nicolas Maduro to evade the inevitable. All it does is drag out
the suffering of the Venezuelan people and those people that
you met in Cucuta and you, Senator Menendez, and others who
have been forced to be expelled effectively from their own
homelands. That includes economic sanctions not on the country,
but on those who are oppressing the country. And it means ever
closer cooperation.
This is one reason that we joined the Guaido administration
recently in calling for a meeting of the Rio Pact not for any
other reason but to more effectively coordinate our
humanitarian and our sanctions regimes and have a practical
discussion with our counterparts in other governments as to how
we can provide relief and how we can do a better job hedging in
Mr. Maduro because, yes, indeed, these externalities are coming
at a stiff cost not just for the Venezuelan people but for the
people of the rest of South America and indeed the Caribbean.
Senator Kaine. My time has expired, but I may submit the
question for the record to try to get witnesses on both panel
one and panel two's responses. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here.
I wanted to talk really about the importance of women in
the peace settlement with the FARC and whether you see that
being important going forward and what we can do to continue to
ensure that women have an important role to play in further
negotiations and in the future of Colombia. And I do not know.
I guess, Mr. O'Reilly, that I would direct that first to you.
Mr. O'Reilly. We absolutely do, ma'am. And it is clear,
although I may defer to Mr. Barsa for more of the programmatic
aspects of this, ma'am, but it is clear to us that where people
successfully protect the role of women in this process in the
communities where that is most effective, the degree of
backsliding or recidivism is less. It knits together families.
It knits together the communities and creates a totally
different kind of a circumstance. These are not just individual
actors. Along with the 7,000 or so demobilized combatants, the
Colombian authorities have recognized a nearly equal number of
people who were supporting, and many of those were women.
Senator Shaheen. You are absolutely right, and I think it
is important to point out that research has shown a direct
correlation between peace and security and a society's
treatment of women. That more than levels of wealth, democracy,
or ethno-religious factors, that the best indicator of a
state's peacefulness and stability is how well it treats its
women. And we have, as I am sure you all are aware, legislation
that passed in 2017, signed by the President, called the Women,
Peace, and Security Act, that encourages us to partner with
other countries to ensure that women continue to be part of the
political process and be part of any conflict negotiations.
So can you talk about how you see that continuing to be
implemented? Maybe you, Mr. Barsa, would be better to address
that from USAID.
Mr. Barsa. Thank you very much, ma'am.
So it was very important to me when I was in Colombia to
meet with human rights leaders, leaders of indigenous groups,
and leaders of women's groups as well because, as you state,
you cannot have any stable peace or development without the
inclusion of all sectors of societies, including women. So when
I was in Bogota, I met with people like Marino Cordoba, the
Director of the National Association of Displaced Afro-
Colombians.
And later on when I was in the field meeting with human
rights leaders, I met with Dora Cortes, who is a coordinator of
a women's roundtable in Tumaco. And we were discussing just how
USAID programs to support human rights inclusiveness have been
helpful for these groups and had a dialogue to see how we could
do better.
Overall, in conversations I had with the members of the
Duque administration, we were in agreement on all these points.
So we have programs in place, and we are constantly looking to
refine them and improve upon them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Ms. Madison, you pointed out the Colombian effort to reduce
cocaine cultivation and production by 50 percent, I think, by
2023. Can you talk about the interconnectedness of the illegal
drug trade from Colombia through Mexico to the U.S., what we
are doing to try and address that and how we are working
cooperatively with those countries in their counter-drug
efforts? As coming from a state where the opioid epidemic has
really taken its toll, the more we can do to keep drugs out of
this country, the better we can help people who are struggling
with substance use disorders.
Ms. Madison. Our program in Colombia is a very longstanding
program. It covers everything really from the coca field and
demand reduction to working with law enforcement on
interdiction, on investigations, targeting the assets and
infrastructure of transnational organized criminals. You know,
you have seen ebbs and flows in the success of eradication.
That has to do, I think, with some shifting realities. I think
in the process of securing the peace accords, there were
certain incentives that were created actually to increase
cultivation. You had the end of aerial eradication. And we saw
the spike begin to rise.
I think what is important now is that the curve is
flattening, which is absolutely critical. It is not enough. And
over the next couple of years, we need to work with the
Colombians directly to continue to drive that down. 90 percent
of the cocaine in the United States comes from Colombia. So
while there is production in Peru and there is production in
Bolivia, Colombia really is the core of the effort.
And just as an aside on the peace agreement, I think the
Colombians have to continue to take this issue on because this
is how they will be able to put deep roots down in the rural
parts of Colombia. The FARC is off the battlefield by and
large, and they are no longer fighting an insurgency while they
try to do this eradication and try and take this on. But now
they actually have to get out into these communities, take it
on, do the eradication, do the kind of things that John and his
team work on, which is alternative development. It is a key
plank of President Duque's game plan, the rural security piece,
and we are supporting it from INL.
The challenge that we have, of course, is that the cocaine
moves, it sweeps up the isthmus, it goes through Mexico. The
paths cross sometimes with opioids, which dramatically
increases the lethality. I would say Mexico and Colombia are
really the two poles of our efforts in the Western Hemisphere.
Again, in Mexico, it is a different relationship and a
different program, but we are also working with the Mexican
Government to start in the field, target ports, help on
interdiction. And I think it is a constant effort because these
groups continue to evolve their tactics and their skills. But
these two countries working together is an absolutely essential
piece of it.
I am quite worried actually about what is going on with the
synthetic opioids in Mexico. It is a very specific issue that
we need to take on with them and figure out a game plan on.
But I think these two countries' very expansive programs,
much more expansive in Colombia, are the key.
The other thing I would say which has fundamentally changed
from even a decade ago is the fact that we now have Colombia
leading in the hemisphere. They are leading complex, 18-nation
missions to do interdiction. They are out working. They are
working with Ecuador, which was not happening even just few
years ago. So we have the Colombians actually helping us fill
the space and helping us build the capabilities of other
partners. So I think we are trying to connect the dots up the
isthmus from Colombia to Mexico.
There is a lot there and there is a lot of complexity to
it, and I think the key is that we just cannot let up. And when
I say the Colombians have done spectacular things with
eradication in this first year, I mean it. It is amazing. But
it is not enough. It has to continue. It has to expand. We are
right there with them. And I think if we get it right in
Colombia, we begin to really change the calculus all the way up
the isthmus with the exception of synthetic opioids in Mexico,
which I think is a separate issue and a really critical one.
Senator Shaheen. And at this point is what is really
killing people--the synthetics.
Ms. Madison. I think that is right. As I said, the
statistics show that of the 14,000 cocaine deaths in 2017,
three-quarters of them involved opioids. And it is because
opioids are cheap. They are easier to produce. You do not have
to worry about somebody eradicating your fields. And the
agility of the synthetic opioids business model is actually
really dangerous. I am not surprised we are seeing
proliferation. What is most concerning, of course, is that it
is proliferation right on our border. And so this requires time
and attention. I am actually headed to Mexico in October really
to talk about this.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses.
Mr. O'Reilly, you know, a dissident faction of the FARC
announced that it will rearm and it is believed their
operations are supported by the Maduro regime and conducted on
Venezuelan territory. President Duque has backed this claim
about the location of the FARC dissidents.
What do we know about the location of the FARC dissidents,
and can you confirm President Duque's claims?
Mr. O'Reilly. Senator, we know that people have moved in
and out across that border. In fact, indeed, the Colombian
authorities have stated that some of these people are now
lodging themselves there. To the extent that this continues, it
creates a circumstance which is quite a challenge for the
Colombians.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate what you are saying, but
that is not my question. My question is, what do we
independently know about FARC dissidents and those who have
called back to arms being in Venezuela, and does that coincide
with the Colombian assertions that the FARC dissidents are now
inside of Venezuela?
Mr. O'Reilly. I can say that I know that they have moved
back and forth and that on occasion they have settled in there.
For the rest of it, if it is okay with you, sir, I will take
the question and we can discuss it offline.
Senator Menendez. Are you telling me it is a classified
answer that you need to give?
Mr. O'Reilly. I will tell you I have to investigate that,
sir, before I can give you a definitive answer.
Senator Menendez. Okay. But you come to a hearing on
Colombia where we know we are going to talk about Venezuela,
and it seems to me a simple enough question to have been
prepared for. Anyhow, I want to know what the answer is to
that.
Mr. O'Reilly. Absolutely understood.
Senator Menendez. What steps is the administration
contemplating to hold the Maduro regime accountable for its
willingness to allow foreign terrorist organizations like the
ELN and now this dissident group of the FARC to operate out of
Venezuelan territory if our assertion is, along with the
Colombians, that they are in Venezuelan territory?
Mr. O'Reilly. Sir, we are constantly assessing the
activities or their support for these sorts of activities of
any foreign terrorist organization and any international acts
of terrorism linked to that. And we, in terms of dealing with
the Colombian authorities, are regularly sharing whatever
information we have and as much as we possibly can in
coordinating with them so that when they are operating inside
Colombian territory, the Colombian authorities can respond
effectively to that. It is unacceptable that Nicolas Maduro and
those who support him would offer any top cover for these
people or any safe haven to them at any time.
Senator Menendez. Well, excuse my impatience, but I have
limited time.
So the question is, are we considering particular sanctions
beyond what we have done in Venezuela because of what Maduro
has done? Are we looking at designations here of terrorist
organizations? Are we looking at others that have given refuge
and are part of facilitating these terrorist organizations
operating out of Venezuela? Some suggest the Cubans have
something to do with that. Are we considering any of those
things?
Mr. O'Reilly. We are constantly assessing the question of
designations.
Senator Menendez. All right. But you cannot give me any
designations that you are contemplating right now. No. Okay.
Now, let me ask you. Maybe this one will be simpler. I
appreciate what the administration did. As a matter of fact,
legislation that several of us on this committee have promoted
is to actually advance a more robust amount of money because of
the realities that Colombia is facing every day with over 1.4
million Venezuelans that have now stayed in Colombia, not just
transited through but stayed in Colombia, and growing. So while
$350 million is a good thing, it is nowhere near the magnitude
of the crisis.
Why has the administration not engaged in creating a
donors' conference to have others--this is going to rival Syria
at the rate that it is going in terms of the displacement of
people. So I am not suggesting we should bear it all, though I
am suggesting we should do more. But why is there not a donors'
conference that has been pursued. Either you or Mr. Barsa maybe
can help me with this.
Mr. Barsa. Senator, it was heartening for me to learn how
other countries have assisted with humanitarian assistance, as
well as some of the aid that was trying to get through Cucuta
when you were there. But certainly we called for other
countries to increase their assistance in this area. Regarding
the specifics of planning for a donors' conference, I have no
information I could share.
Senator Menendez. Mr. O'Reilly, any plans for a donors'
conference?
Mr. O'Reilly. The question, apart from the conference, sir,
is that we are constantly arm-twisting our other colleagues
from other governments to step up and do more.
Senator Menendez. Well, it seems that if we convene a
donors' conference, number one is we are going to invite
countries to join. They are going to have to say what they are
willing to do or not do. And it would be far more significant
in resources than what we have given and what is needed. And
so, you know, we talk about the Colombians being responsible to
do a series of things, which I agree with, but we need to help
them. They are in our own hemisphere. This is one of the
largest refugee crises that we have had in our hemisphere in
quite some time. We need to help the Colombians be able to
achieve this goal. They have been incredibly good neighbors.
You know, they have not done what some other countries have
done of closing the border. So we need to help them. I do not
understand why there is a reticence on creating a donors'
conference.
If I may, just one last question to Secretary Madison. You
know, during my recent meetings with President Duque in the
U.S. embassy in Bogota, I stressed the need for a truly
comprehensive approach to counter narcotics. And while I
understand the administration's priority on eradication, given
the alarming levels of coca cultivation, we certainly cannot
expect to achieve long-term success without a balanced
approach. And I heard you refer to a balanced approach.
As an example, I would like to see INL place greater
emphasis on money laundering and financial crimes. While the
Department submitted congressional notifications for $250
million in fiscal year 2018, only $4 million, or 1.5 percent,
of the funding will address money laundering. What steps are
you taking to ensure a comprehensive approach and ensure that
adequate funding for issues, including money laundering and the
rule of law, are part of it?
Ms. Madison. Senator, I do believe that we take a
comprehensive approach to the reality of the drug issue in
Colombia. We are working really on all fronts in supporting the
efforts of the Government of Colombia to reduce demand, to
reduce supply, to disrupt TCOs, to push out on rural security
and improving rural security and all the sort of elements of
that. And the rule of law and anti-money laundering efforts and
asset forfeiture efforts are an important piece of it.
I will say I arrived at INL last year thinking that
actually we needed to modernize and think more creatively about
our anti-money laundering programs in general because I think
money laundering has continued to evolve and our training and
other things had not evolved in the same way that the money
laundering tactics of the criminals have.
In Colombia specifically, we have had training with IRS and
UNODC to build investigative skills. We have had ongoing
efforts to build the capabilities of judges who actually look
at asset forfeiture in these financial cases. And looking
forward, we formed an actual technical working group with the
Attorney General's Office, which owns a financial investigative
arm. It owns an anti-money laundering unit. It owns an asset
forfeiture unit. And we think that that will continue to
generate ideas on what else we can do.
We have also brought in the FBI to do an assessment to look
at other things that we could put on the table to be helpful to
the Colombians. And more recently I took my team over to sit
down with FINCEN and talk a little bit more about what else we
can do.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate it, but if 1.5 percent of
your total monies for Colombia are going to money laundering,
it seems to me that if I get your money and I squeeze you, it
is one of the ways in which I harm you the greatest. And so I
would just urge you to be looking at a more robust engagement
in this regard so that we can actually get to the traffickers'
monies at the end of the day, which I think can be enormously
debilitating and help fuel some of the things we need.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
And I will take my time now here at the end unless there
are any more questions.
I want to narrow in, Secretary Madison, on the drug trade
that we keep focusing on. There is no doubt that coca is grown,
maybe even being processed in these labs out there. But then it
has to be moved, and some of that is maritime movement. Is that
correct? Some of it is put on these boats.
Ms. Madison. I think they move it any way that they can,
but a big part is maritime.
Senator Rubio. Right.
So let us talk about the flights because there are
airplanes that land in these fields in Central America and then
are trafficked up across the border. There are others that go
into the Caribbean, and some of it leapfrogs from the Caribbean
into the U.S., but some of it leapfrogs from the Caribbean to
Europe. There is a growth in the cocaine that is being shipped
to Europe. Correct?
Ms. Madison. In fact, there is growth in the cocaine market
around the world. I was recently in London, and I was recently
in Australia. And in both places cocaine is actually an
enormous issue, and it is coming from this hemisphere.
Senator Rubio. Right. And those would have to be aerial
routes. I imagine they are not taking these little fake
submersibles all the way over there. Right?
Ms. Madison. Actually they do get boats that cross the
southern ocean and go to Australia.
Senator Rubio. Fast boats.
Ms. Madison. But I am assuming that that is not the
preponderance of it.
Senator Rubio. The point I am trying to raise is when those
flights happen, where are those flight originating? What is the
path those flights are taking?
Ms. Madison. There are a number of pathways, but we have
noted, which I imagine is an issue of concern to you in
particular, a pattern of flights leaving Venezuela. There is
also a maritime vector through Ecuador up the East Pac, which
is actually pretty significant. A lot of them are Venezuelan.
Senator Rubio. And the flights to Venezuela--how many of
those that we know of have the Maduro regime interdicted and
stopped and called up and said we have these drug traffickers
here that we caught?
Ms. Madison. Because I am not on the operational side, I
cannot answer you with absolute certainty. I am not aware that
we are getting substantial cooperation out of Venezuela on the
issue of narcotics. In fact, I think it is quite the opposite.
Senator Rubio. Is it fair to say that these people who are
flying these drugs are deliberately flying through Venezuelan
airspace to avoid radar detection by either the Colombians or
otherwise and certainly taking off from airfields in Venezuela?
That is fair to say.
Ms. Madison. What I think is always fair to say is that
narcotraffickers will take the path of least resistance, and if
there is a place where enforcement is not done, where there is
not sort of a denial of use of airspace and where there is no
official effort to block them, they will take it. The other
instance where they can take it is when there is not capacity,
which is also the case in some places.
Senator Rubio. Well, Venezuela has the capacity to control
its airspace. We have seen them do it when they have to.
The point being is one of the paths of least resistance--
there are air flights leaving Venezuela with Colombian cocaine,
a significant portion.
Ms. Madison. As I said in my testimony--let me just
reiterate--I think Venezuela is an enormous problem on the
counter-drug issue. I think the fact that Venezuela does not
work with us or its neighbors in the way that it once did is
very damaging to the larger effort to take these issues on in
South America. It is why it is so important that we are working
with the Colombians, working with the Peruvians. We brought
Ecuador back online. In some respect, it is about the objective
realities of a place like Colombia, but it is also about the
failures in Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. Well, I know there was a question asked
earlier by Senator Menendez. The Deputy Secretary of State, Mr.
Sullivan, has said on the record that Venezuela acts as a safe
haven for criminal organizations, and he was referring to the
ELN and these dissident FARCs. They are criminal organizations
because what criminal enterprise were they involved in beyond
murder and kidnapping and things of this nature?
Ms. Madison. I mean, obviously, there is a narcotrafficking
nexus into Venezuela.
Senator Rubio. And if the Deputy Secretary of State is
saying they have safe haven and the Colombians are saying the
same also, we have these narcotrafficking organizations
operating in Venezuela.
Ms. Madison. I believe that is correct.
Senator Rubio. I will tell you where I am getting at that
point. So all this eradication stuff is important. And by the
way, there was a direct correlation between the ending of the
aerial eradication under a court order and the spike in
production. And that was under a court order, and now I know
they have worked through it.
The point I am trying to get at is all these things we are
doing with the Colombians are important. What they are trying
to do is important as well. But as long as you have two major
drug trafficking organizations, if not more, operating openly
with little to no formal resistance and often I believe--I
think the evidence is clear--cooperation of a neighboring
regime in a neighboring country, there is no way to deal with
this. As long as there are these criminal elements operating
with impunity across their border, trafficking these drugs,
operating in this way, I do not know how we wrap the bow and
really deal with this problem.
Ms. Madison. I certainly think it makes it much harder, as
I have said. I will say even at a time when we had more
cooperation out of Venezuela, it was still absolutely critical
that we were present and working with the Colombians and with
others.
Senator Rubio. Of course.
Ms. Madison. But this is, most assuredly, not making it
easier, and in fact, it is really undermining a lot of the good
work that is going on.
Senator Rubio. Well, not only do you have these
narcotrafficking organizations operating out of Venezuelan
territory, they also have as a side intent to overthrow the
government of Colombia. And so you have these two things--I
guess the point I am trying to raise is I personally do not
believe--and I believe the evidence supports this--that we
could ever truly address the production and sale and
trafficking of cocaine out of Colombia without addressing the
fact that these groups are operating with impunity from a
neighboring territory, and the Colombians, right now anyway,
cannot do anything about it because of what the implications of
that would be.
I want to talk about the peace deal because I think it is
important to bring some clarity into that.
One of the guys that showed up in the video the other day,
by all accounts, certainly was not in Bogota. So he was
probably in Venezuela when he put out that video about how he
is going to take up arms again. This is an individual who after
the peace deal had been signed, after he had been handed a seat
in congress, was caught, along with his nephew shipping 10 tons
of cocaine. And he was indicted and the DEA went after him. His
nephew is now a cooperating witness, so we are going to learn a
lot more about all this. The guy, Santrich, was able to fight
extradition, and then winds up on a video a few weeks later
saying, ``I am out of the peace deal because they are not being
nice to me.'' He was a drug dealer, and he is a drug dealer
after the peace deal was in place. And all of a sudden, the
peace deal does not make sense.
Look, I guess we should have expected it because I imagine
he took a major pay cut going from drug dealer to congressman.
It was a huge pay cut I imagine. It was very lucrative to be in
this business.
But I think it is important to point out that this peace
deal that people now say is falling apart is not taking up arms
because people are being mean, not that there are not problems
in implementation--that is always the case. But many of these
elements broke away initially because they do not want to give
up the money that it produces. And this guy, after the deal was
signed and he was supposedly a congressman, tried to ship 10
tons of cocaine, and the DEA went after him. So I think that is
really important.
On the violence issue, you know, we have had seven
candidates for local and municipal elections assassinated, and
they were from different parties across the board. And there is
all kinds of causation.
In fairness, President Duque announced, I believe yesterday
or the day before, that he is providing security to some of
these candidates. Some of it appears to be regional in nature,
a regional dispute of some kind. Some may be related to these
groups and so forth. You have a candidate that says they are
for aerial eradication. All of a sudden, people are taking
shots at you.
But what I want make clear is we are talking about violence
against--certainly at least in this administration and the
previous, we are not talking about the state. We are not
talking about the army or the police assassinating these
people. We are talking about political candidates and human
rights activists being assassinated by paramilitary groups from
the left, the right, gangs, the criminal gangs and the like.
But just to be clear on the record, we are not talking about
Colombian authorities murdering people. And I think the
question is whether enough is being done to provide them
protection.
I will wrap this all up in a second.
On the diplomacy front--I know that has been mentioned--
last week, Mr. O'Reilly, is it not the case that the United
States and Colombia, along with 10 other countries, invoked at
the OAS the beginning process of raising what is commonly known
as the Rio Treaty, which took a significant amount of
diplomatic work. I know it was under-reported, but that took a
lot of diplomatic work. And I think one of the things that has
been lost in a lot of the discussion about the region, because
the focus is on U.S. policy, is I think a pretty unprecedented,
certainly in the last decade, regional diplomatic commitment on
this issue of Venezuela. Obviously, that impacts Colombia. Am I
correct? There were 12 countries that helped bring that to the
forefront.
Mr. O'Reilly. Yes, Senator, absolutely. And it took an
immense amount of work, and most of that work was done by South
Americans. We, of course, follow this closely. We are members
of the Rio Pact. We are signatories to the Rio Treaty, and we
are deeply engaged in this. But it was Colombian diplomacy. It
was Chilean diplomacy. It was Brazilian diplomacy and many
other governments besides, all working together to try to
figure out how they can protect their interests. They are the
ones who are receiving millions of people expelled by Nicolas
Maduro into their territory. They are the ones who are having
the health risks imposed on them by this migration and the
security risks and the whole gamut of challenges.
Senator Rubio. And I guess just to be fair, you can talk
about other parts of the world and what role diplomacy has
played in other parts of the world and other policy challenges.
But when it comes to the issue of Venezuela and Latin America,
I think it is truly under-reported and largely unknown that
there has been significant diplomatic work done, honestly, with
no modern precedent. If you look at the Lima Group that we are
not even members of--we accompany them, we attend meetings, but
that is a Latin American initiative that we have been fully
supportive of, and of course, the work at the OAS, which has
taken 2 years of consistent diplomacy by the United States, by
others to get to that point. And that is an important thing to
point out.
And I think the point that I am trying to make here is the
following. One of the problems I have with U.S. foreign policy
under administrations of either party is sometimes I worry that
we are not good to our friends. We are sometimes nicer to
adversaries than we are to friends. And that is troubling to
me. You know, you are North Korea. You put people in camps. You
do all these sort of atrocious things, and you get meetings.
And you can fill in the blank and mention other places.
I do not know of any nation that has been more cooperative
in this hemisphere on virtually anything we have ever asked
them to do with us than Colombia. And if you look at what they
are facing, it is pretty daunting. They have not one but two
well-funded criminal organizations operating with impunity out
of a neighboring territory without the cooperation of the
regime that controls that territory. These drug trafficking
organizations that want to overthrow the government have an
ideological bent, but largely, even though they are Marxist,
they apparently like money because they like selling drugs. And
then you have your neighboring regime mobilizing troops. He
says 150,000. That is maybe a bunch of people holding
broomsticks, but he has got people and he is moving stuff and
assets in the region and mobilizing it. You are facing 1.4
million migrants in the country, spending over $1 billion a
year on social services and on education and the like, on top
of all the other challenges you have trying to develop your
economy.
And by the way, all the donor stuff is important. Mr.
Barsa, I do not know how much money the international community
has given to this. But I also know that, for example, some
neighboring countries, good friends at the OAS, are now
requiring visas for the entry of Venezuelans, which only pushes
even more Venezuelan migration towards Colombia.
This is an untenable situation that they are facing. They
have got this pressure on eradication, pressure to deal with
political violence, and on top of that, have to deal with the
costs, $1 billion or more a year, of dealing in a humane way
with these neighbors that have come over, a hostile regime next
door with equipment provided by Russian arms dealers and
others, drug trafficking organizations not one but two that
actually control territory and operate with impunity. This is a
lot of pressure on one country.
And I know we have been very helpful, but I also think we
need to recognize the sheer volume of challenges that face
Colombia. And that does not mean that we cannot be critical and
that does not mean we cannot point to things that they can be
doing better. But I also think we have to be fair in
acknowledging that they are facing an extraordinary array of
challenges.
And I will end with this. It is very simple for these
countries to go around and criticize Colombia on this, that, or
the other. I do not know of any nation certainly in the world
and even in this hemisphere that would tolerate or could
tolerate for an extensive period of time armed elements
operating with impunity from a neighboring territory without
the cooperation of a regime that controls theoretically that
territory and sit there with their arms crossed and do nothing
about it. We would not tolerate it. We would not tolerate it.
We would not ask anyone else in the world to tolerate it.
So I think it is really important for us--I am not saying
any of you have not done this--but for everyone to recognize
that the sheer volume of challenges facing Colombia knows no
precedent in this hemisphere. None. And it is amazing in my
view that they have been able to do what they have done up to
this point given all these challenges hitting them all at once.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, if I might. I certainly share
your frustration.
The Venezuelan issue is not going to be resolved in the
next couple weeks or next couple months. I think all of us had
hoped that we would see a transition to a democratic, elected
government by now. The circumstances in Venezuela have become
more complicated because of the criminal elements and the
outside support that the Maduro government has received. So it
is a reality that we have to deal with. Today's hearing is on
Colombia.
I could not agree with you more. The leadership of Colombia
is dedicated to the principles that we have set out in Plan
Colombia, and that is democracy, protection of human rights,
peace, economic progress, et cetera. The capacity to deal with
these issues is challenged because it has transitioned from a
near-failed state to a state that is making great economic
progress. But now you put into it the challenges presented by
Venezuela that you have already mentioned, and then the burden
of 1.4 million migrants, that is why I questioned earlier as to
what we are doing and--Senator Menendez--what the international
community is doing in order to support the leadership in
Colombia, to support the democratic process, the implementation
of the peace process, the challenges related to the drug
trafficking, and the circumstances of the border with Venezuela
and the migrants. And as pointed out by our witnesses, they are
moving in both directions and using Venezuela as a headquarters
potentially for the resurgence of FARC elements to try to
disrupt the peace process.
So I appreciate our governmental panel. This is sort of a
transition to the next panel. I hope that the private panel
will have some concrete suggestions for us as to how we can
increase the capacity of Colombia to deal with these challenges
and where the United States can play a critical part in making
that a reality.
But I just really wanted to share your frustration as to
the external factors that have made it much more difficult for
Colombia that was on a path with obstacles now becoming even
more challenging.
Senator Rubio. And my last point on this is I would
encourage, as I have privately and publicly, the administration
to view our relationship with Colombia no longer simply in the
vacuum of its own territory but all of those external factors
that are facing it. It is in my view impossible to address the
fundamental challenges we are talking about here today and not
address the complexity created by the fact that some of the
prominent groups behind many of the groups operate with
impunity from a neighboring territory and a mafia acting as a
government-under-arms controls that territory. So that is going
to have to be addressed as part of this. There is no way to do
one without the other.
So I appreciate all of you and the time you have given us
here today. Thank you very much.
And we are going to call up our next panel. When we make
that transition, I will introduce them.
And I appreciate again the time all of you have given us.
Our second panel: Christine Balling, Senior Fellow for
Latin American Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council;
and Mr. Jason Marczak, the Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin
America Center, Atlantic Council.
Probably a shameless plug here while we make this
transition. Ms. Arsht--I do not know if she is still a resident
of Florida. She was a longtime resident of Miami, Florida, and
a big benefactor. I know she spends a lot of time here in
Washington and has invested in the Atlantic Council's work as
well.
So I want to welcome both of you here. Usually we have like
four people on the second panel, and by the time I am done
introducing everybody, it is all set up. But today we had to
move much quicker.
Ms. Balling, we will begin with you. Thank you for being
here.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE BALLING, SENIOR FELLOW FOR LATIN
AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ms. Balling. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, members
of the committee, thank you very much.
First, I would like to make a brief mention of my
background as it relates to U.S.-Colombian relations.
For 6 years, I operated a nonprofit organization that
promoted democracy and youth leadership in areas where the FARC
and the ELN were recruiting young people. I worked closely with
the Colombian armed forces and U.S. Army civil affairs teams
downrange.
Additionally, in 2013, I was hired to serve as a subject-
matter expert to the Special Operations Command South commander
on demobilization and counter-recruitment issues. My work
included interviewing newly demobilized FARC and ELN fighters
and creating the Colombian army's first tactical guide for
individual demobilization.
I have two specific recommendations as to how the U.S. can
better help Colombia.
With regard to the Venezuelan refugee crisis, to date the
Colombian people have been incredibly welcoming of the
Venezuelan refugees. It is relatively easy for Venezuelans to
obtain a temporary border card to enter Colombia and have
access to emergency health services as long as they enter at an
official border checkpoint and remain in the four of the
departments bordering Venezuela.
However, as hundreds of Venezuelans seek refuge in Colombia
every day, the Colombian authorities will need more assistance
in order to maintain security and good relations with the
civilian population.
To this end, the United States should increase funding for
U.S. Army civil affairs efforts that support the Colombian
army's accion integral teams in the border region. Accion
integral teams work for and with the local communities. Their
initiatives include relatively low cost community engagement
and infrastructure projects. In addition to fostering a
trusting relationship between soldiers and the people they
protect, successfully executed accion integral projects lessen
the influence of bad actors who rely heavily on civilian
cooperation in their day-to-day operations. The more unstable a
given area is, the easier it is for bad actors to wield
influence and recruit from the local population.
For example, given their dire economic circumstances,
Venezuelan refugees are particularly vulnerable to recruitment
by bad actors, especially if they feel government presence is
lacking. In some border areas, the Colombian army is all there
is in terms of state presence. Therefore, it is crucial for a
soldier to win the trust of the community by working alongside
civilians to improve it. Additionally, unchecked xenophobia can
destabilize a community to the point where it becomes a
security issue. Executing accion integral projects that engage
Colombians and their new Venezuelan neighbors could lessen
tensions between them.
A note about improving Colombian army intelligence
networks. No doubt members of our intelligence community have
been working this issue, but it warrants a mention in this
forum.
The United States should support the modernization of
Colombian intelligence networks. Each Colombian army division
has its own regional intelligence team known as a RIME. The
RIME teams are highly effective in gathering human intelligence
within their respective areas of operation. However,
intelligence sharing mechanisms between army divisions and
across other branches of the armed forces are lacking. If
Colombian military intelligence is to be prepared for an
increasingly complex security situation, continued investment
in overhauling existing databases and intelligence sharing
networks is warranted.
I mentioned about the peace accord implementation. In 2016,
when the Santos administration and the FARC representatives
signed the peace accord, they did so knowing that implementing
it as written would be very difficult to do. As an example, it
was known that the Colombian Government could not fully finance
it, as estimated costs over a decade are in the billions. It
was also known that certain FARC fronts would never demobilize
and that the highest ranking commanders might not be fully
committed to abandoning their old ways.
As it happens, Ivan Marquez and three other FARC commanders
recently announced a renewed call to arms. Not surprisingly,
these former peace negotiators blamed the Duque administration
for failing to meet its accord-related commitments. Ivan
Marquez's call to rearm, based on deep-seated grievances, is a
disingenuous and a mere excuse to return to narcotrafficking
and other illicit activities. It is therefore crucial that a,
quote, ``FARC 2.0'' be stripped of political legitimacy if
indeed it turns to violence.
A note on the political situation. Unfortunately, the Duque
administration's political rivals are also critical of its
accord implementation efforts, going so far as to say that it
is intentionally sabotaging the peace accord. The Duque
administration must more effectively counter this narrative and
publicize its successes while explaining how it is addressing
the challenges.
In sum, Colombia continues to be one of the United States'
strongest allies in the western hemisphere. While most
Americans are not aware of what the United States and Colombia
have accomplished together for the betterment of both our
nations, I thank Chairman Rubio and the members of the
subcommittee for dedicating a hearing to this important
bilateral relationship.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Balling follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Balling
peace accord implementation
In 2016, when the Santos administration and the FARC
representatives signed the peace accord, they did so knowing that
implementing it as written would be difficult to do. As an example, it
was known that Colombian government cannot fully finance it, as
estimated costs over a decade are in the billions.\1\ It was also known
that certain FARC fronts would never demobilize and that the highest
ranking commanders might not be fully committed to abandoning their old
ways.
As it happens, Ivan Marquez and three other FARC commanders
recently announced a renewed call to arms. Not surprisingly, the former
peace negotiators blamed the Duque administration for failing to meet
its accord-related commitments. Ivan Marquez's call to re-arm based on
legitimate grievances is disingenuous and a mere excuse to return to
narco-trafficking and other illicit activities. It is therefore crucial
that a FARC 2.0 be stripped of political legitimacy if it indeed turns
to violence.
Unfortunately, the Duque administration's political rivals are also
critical of its accord implementation efforts, going so far as to say
it is intentionally sabotaging the peace accord. The Duque
administration must more effectively counter this narrative and
publicize its successes while explaining how it is addressing the
challenges.
----------------
Notes
\1\ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rebels/peace-will-
cost-colombia-44-billion-over-10-years-senator-says-
idUSKCN0HX1KC20141008.
venezuealan refugee crisis--supporting colombian army efforts
To date, the Colombian people have been incredibly welcoming of the
Venezuelan refugees. It is relatively easy for Venezuelans to obtain a
temporary ``border card'' to enter Colombia and have access to
emergency health services as long as they enter at an official border
check point and remain in four of the departments bordering Venezuela.
However, as hundreds of Venezuelans seek refuge in Colombia every day,
the Colombian authorities will need more assistance in order to
maintain security and good relations with the civilian population. To
this end, the U.S. should increase funding for U.S. Army Civil Affairs
efforts that support the Colombian Army's accion integral teams in the
border regions. Accion integral teams work for and with local
communities. Their initiatives include relatively low cost community
engagement and infrastructure projects. In addition to fostering a
trusting relationship between soldiers and the people they protect,
successfully executed accion integral projects lessen the influence of
bad actors who rely heavily on civilian cooperation in their day-to-day
operations. The more unstable a given area is, the easier it is for bad
actors to wield influence over and recruit from the local population.
For example, given their dire economic circumstances, Venezuelan
refugees are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by bad actors--
especially if they feel government presence is lacking. In some border
areas, the Colombian army is all there is in terms of state presence.
Therefore, it is crucial for a soldier to win the trust of the
community by working alongside civilians to improve it. Additionally,
unchecked xenophobia can destabilize a community to the point where is
becomes a security issue. Executing accion integral projects that
engage Colombian and their new Venezuelan neighbors could lessen
tensions between them.
improving colombian army intelligence networks
No doubt members of our intelligence community have been working
this issue, but it warrants a mention in this forum.
The United States should support the modernization of Colombian
Army intelligence networks. Each Colombian army division has its own
regional intelligence team--known as Regionales de Inteligencia Militar
(RIME). The RIME teams are highly effective in gathering human
intelligence within their respective areas of operation. However,
intelligence sharing mechanisms between army divisions and across other
branches of the armed forces are lacking. If Colombian military
intelligence is to be prepared for an increasingly complex security
situation, continued investment in overhauling existing databases and
intelligence sharing networks is warranted.
In sum, Colombia continues to be one of the United States'
strongest allies in the Western Hemisphere. While most Americans are
not aware of what the United States and Colombia have accomplished
together for the betterment of both our nations, I thank Senator Rubio
and the members of this subcommittee for dedicating a hearing to this
important bilateral relationship.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JASON MARCZAK, DIRECTOR, ADRIENNE ARSHT LATIN
AMERICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Marczak. Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is my privilege
to address you on the critical importance of the U.S.
partnership with Colombia.
First, I would like to thank you for your longstanding
continued bipartisan support of Colombia, one of the United
States' strongest, most reliable partners in the entire world.
I will be summarizing my written testimony.
Colombia today shows how long-term U.S. commitment can pay
incredible dividends, but as discussed today, it is facing
major headwinds. Partnership with the United States at this
moment is pivotal. We must double down to support our ally and
capitalize on the broader potential of deepened U.S.-Colombia
ties. The issues of historical focus must continue to be
addressed: security, counternarcotics, human rights, among
them. But Colombia is and can increasingly be a partner for the
United States on issues ranging from trade and investment to
partnering in solving other regional challenges.
It is for this reason the Atlantic Council's Adrienne Arsht
Latin America Center convened our U.S.-Colombia task force, and
I thank Senator Cardin and Senator Blunt for co-chairing this
effort.
Today given rapid changes in the Western Hemisphere, U.S.-
Colombia security, economic, and geopolitical interests are
more intertwined than ever before. We work together to fight
international drug trafficking and transnational organized
crime while promoting democracy, rule of law, and economic
prosperity in the region. Through its leadership in the Lima
Group, Colombia is spearheading efforts to address the crisis
in Venezuela.
While the ratification of the peace deal in 2016
represented the opening of a new chapter for Colombia, it has
also led to new challenges, among them securing and directing
the necessary financial resources to implement the accords,
expected to easily surpass $30 billion. The recent call to arms
by Jesus Santrich and Ivan Marquez, both former FARC
commanders, marks a worrying new development in the accord's
implementation.
As this subcommittee knows well, the regime of Nicolas
Maduro is a direct threat to Colombia's peace and prosperity
and that of the hemisphere and frankly the world. Maduro
welcomes Colombian criminal groups with open arms and shelters
FARC dissidents and the National Liberation Army, who engage in
illegal gold mining and increasingly run their drug trafficking
out of Venezuela. According to estimates from the Colombian
Government, over 1,000 members of the ELN are currently in
Venezuela. Colombian criminal groups have used the safe haven
granted by the Maduro regime to regroup and rearm.
At the same time, Colombia is a primary recipient of the
largest mass migration in Latin America's recent history, which
I have seen in my numerous visits to Colombia. 1.4 million
Venezuelan migrants and refugees had arrived as of June, with
Colombian migration authorities now projecting that number
could even reach 2.5 million by year end in a moderate
scenario.
President Ivan Duque has adopted a policy of complete
solidarity toward Venezuelans, providing medical care, housing,
and public education, among other services.
Still, more attention is needed to prevent a regional
public health emergency that could eventually reach the United
States.
These factors make it critical to develop a regional
consensus on how to absorb the influx of Venezuelans. Recently
Ecuador joined Peru and Chile in tightening entry requirements,
thereby increasing the burden further on Colombia.
Additional international support, as previously discussed,
is urgently needed. Colombia has received international funds
that equate to about $68 per migrant, a fraction of the $500 to
$900 donated per migrant or refugee from Syria, South Sudan, or
Myanmar.
Beyond the strains of Venezuela, the partnership will be
further solidified as the United States supports Colombia's
efforts to stabilize territories, foster rural development, and
advance its economic prosperity.
With the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, the
opportunities for mutually beneficial trade with our third
largest export market in Latin America are enormous. Still,
both countries must implement pending aspects of the TPA to
expand market access and investment protections. These advances
will also help to provide a counterweight to China's growing
influence in Latin America.
The future Colombian economy can be unleashed through
innovation and technology, as well as linking human capital to
rural development. One area of opportunity is for Colombia and
the United States to expand educational exchange programs.
A more modern agenda should also find new ways to promote
rural development, build stronger institutions, and tackle the
longstanding bilateral stress point, namely coca cultivation.
Weak institutions and lack of economic opportunities in
rural areas serve as the breeding ground for coca cultivation
and cocaine production, illegal mining, and environmental
degradation, as well as the strengthening of criminal
organizations.
To fully implement the peace agreement, Colombia will need
the continued support of the United States and the
international community.
At the same time, although overall levels of violence have
decreased, a new wave of violence has been unleashed against
human rights defenders, community leaders, and social
activists. Working with the Colombian Government to stop such
killings should continue to be a priority for the United
States.
In conclusion, this is a critical moment to stand by
Colombia. A strengthened and modernized partnership will
provide the United States with an even stronger partner in the
western hemisphere at a moment of great concern.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before
the subcommittee today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marczak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jason Marczak
Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, it is my privilege to address you this afternoon on
the critical importance of the U.S. partnership with Colombia. My
testimony will focus on opportunities for deepened collaboration with
Colombia at this critical moment for the country and the hemisphere.
Thank you for your longstanding, continued bipartisan support of
the Colombian people and of Colombia--one of the United States'
strongest, most reliable partners in the Western Hemisphere and the
world.
Colombia today is a success story of how long-term U.S. commitment
can pay incredible dividends. Twenty years ago, many feared that
Colombia, then-embroiled in violence, was on the path to becoming a
failed state.
Fast forward and Colombia is now one of the greatest success
stories, but one that is facing major headwinds. A peace accord with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016 is in the
midst of implementation, but today faces new threats including those
emanating from the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. Colombia faces
two additional challenges: the flow of millions of Venezuelan migrants
and refugees across its border and Venezuela increasingly being used as
a safe haven for criminal organizations that threaten Colombia and the
hemisphere. The support of the United States at this moment is pivotal:
we must double-down to support our ally and capitalize on the broader
potential of deepened U.S.-Colombia ties.
The new challenges--and opportunities--faced by Colombia makes it
imperative that we advance a new, modernized blueprint for the U.S.-
Colombia partnership. The issues of historical focus must continue to
be addressed: security, counter-narcotics, human rights, among them.
But Colombia is and can increasingly be a partner for the United States
on issues ranging from trade and investment, to partnering in solving
other regional challenges. Still, Colombia is at a crossroads.
The leadership of this subcommittee and the U.S. Senate will thus
be imperative. It is for this reason that the Atlantic Council's
Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center convened the second phase of our
U.S.-Colombia Task Force, with the findings to be released next week. I
thank Senator Cardin and Senator Blunt for co-chairing this important
effort. I will thus focus the rest of my testimony on three items that
draw from our findings: Colombia's role as a strategic U.S. partner;
Venezuela's multi-pronged impact; and opportunities to deepen and
modernize the relationship.
colombia as a strategic u.s. partner
The U.S.-Colombia relationship is one of the greatest U.S. foreign
policy successes over the last two decades. The two nations have
jointly worked together to create a mutually beneficial partnership
that has successfully safeguarded U.S. and Colombian national security
interests. Today, given rapid changes in the Western Hemisphere, our
security, economic, and geopolitical interests are more intertwined
than ever before.
The partnership is far-reaching. We work together to fight
international drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, while
promoting democracy, the rule of law, and economic prosperity in the
region. Colombia also contributes security expertise in Central
America, Afghanistan, and a number of countries in Africa and is NATO's
only global partner in Latin America. Through its leadership in the
Lima Group, Colombia is spearheading regional efforts to address the
crisis in Venezuela, and will certainly play a pivotal role in eventual
post-transition efforts.
Although the relationship is longstanding, the announcement of Plan
Colombia in 1999 marked a sea change in the bilateral ties. Over the
next two decades, the United States provided more than $11 billion to
aid the Colombian government to strengthen state capacity and
institutions, decrease coca crops, and fight the FARC and other illegal
groups that profited from drug trafficking. This model is one that
should be looked at for replication in other hotspots. U.S. financial
support and technical assistance were fundamental, but, in the end,
Colombia contributed more than 95 percent of the total investment in
Plan Colombia.
While the ratification of the peace deal in 2016 represented the
opening of a new chapter for Colombia, it has also led to new
challenges. Among them, securing and directing the necessary financial
resources to implement the accords, expected to easily surpass $30
billion. As well, although the University of Notre Dame's Kroc
Institute for International Peace Studies notes that implementation is
underway in 70 percent of the accords' commitments, uneven
implementation is widely seen among the six pillars of the accord. An
issue of great concern is the almost 300 percent increase in 2018 in
victims of antipersonnel mines and explosive devices over the previous
year. Also, the recent call to arms by Jesus Santrich and Ivan Marquez,
both former FARC commanders, marks a worrying new development in the
accords' implementation.
The Colombia of 2019 is far removed from that of two decades
earlier, making Plan Colombia one of the United States' most successful
foreign policy initiatives in recent memory. We must protect this
investment to ensure that Colombia has the needed support as it faces
new challenges. Colombia's pivotal role as a regional leader in
advancing security and prosperity means that Colombia's success is
directly tied to U.S. success.
venezuela's multi-pronged impact
The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is an
external threat to Colombia--and to the Western Hemisphere--of the size
and scope not previously seen. The regime of Nicolas Maduro is a direct
threat to Colombia's peace and prosperity and that of the hemisphere.
Maduro welcomes Colombian criminal groups with open arms and shelters
FARC dissidents and the National Liberation Army (ELN) who engage in
illegal gold mining and increasingly run their drug trafficking out of
Venezuela. According to estimates from the Colombian government, over
1,000 members of the ELN are currently in Venezuela. Colombian criminal
groups have used the safe haven granted by the Maduro regime to regroup
and re-arm.
The freedom to operate in Venezuela has provided Colombian criminal
groups with new opportunities to launch attacks into Colombia. In
February 2019, 22 young cadets were killed by a car bomb at the
Colombian Police Academy, an attack ordered by ELN commanders from
Venezuelan territory. Last month Ivan Marquez announced a ``new phase
of the armed struggle'' in a video that Colombian authorities believe
was filmed in Venezuela.
The cooperation between the Venezuelan regime and Colombian illegal
groups seems to have increased recently. According to leaked Venezuelan
intelligence documents, Colombia's rebels are actively trained and
armed in Venezuela, including in the use of weapons such as high-tech
Russian shoulder-mounted antiaircraft missiles. Further, according to
the Colombian newsweekly Semana, ELN and FARC dissidents are helping
Venezuela to identify high-value military targets inside Colombia.
At the same time, Colombia is the primary recipient of the largest
mass migration in Latin America's recent history. With 1.4 million
Venezuelan migrants in its territory as of June 2019, Colombia is the
primary destination for Venezuelans. Estimates from Colombian migration
authorities project that in a moderate scenario, up to 2.5 million
Venezuelans could be living in Colombia by year end. That number could
reach as high as 3.5 million Venezuelans--an unprecedented wave of
migrants and refugees by global standards.
President Ivan Duque has adopted a policy of complete solidarity
toward Venezuelan migrants, providing medical care, housing and public
education, among other services.
In the last 2 years, more than 340,000 Venezuelans were treated in
the Colombian health system, over 29,000 pregnant women gave birth at
no cost, 156,000 Venezuelan children and youth were enrolled in
publicly funded schools, and 62,000 Venezuelans had access to public
protection programs and child and family welfare services. Recently,
the government granted nationality to 24,000 children born to
Venezuelan parents in Colombian territory.
Still, more attention is needed to prevent a regional public health
emergency that could eventually reach the United States. Malaria,
chagas disease, dengue, zika and other dangerous infectious diseases
are prevalent in Venezuela and could rapidly spread throughout the
hemisphere.
The Colombian response has not only been humanitarian. A long-term
solution to the current migration crisis includes giving legal status
to Venezuelans and integrating them into the labor force. Almost
700,000 migrants have received temporary protected status, which
provides them with legal status and facilitates their access to legal
employment opportunities, healthcare, and education. These measures are
critical so that migrants can achieve economic self-reliance and
contribute to the Colombian economy.
However, a regional consensus on how to absorb the Venezuelan
influx is necessary and urgent. Recently, Ecuador joined Peru and Chile
in tightening entry requirements, therefore increasing the burden on
Colombia. This crisis is a regional problem and cannot be borne by
Colombia alone. Colombia's generous response to the massive influx of
Venezuelan migrants and refugees should be viewed as a model for
countries around the world.
Naturally, the Venezuelan migration crisis is placing significant
strains on Colombia's economy. According to the World Bank, the
estimated economic cost for Colombia in 2018, not including
infrastructure and facilities, reached 0.4 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP), or the equivalent of $1.5 billion. But the number of
refugees has increased since then, and today the Colombian government
estimates that the cost of providing health care, schooling and other
services to Venezuelans will be 0.5 percent of GDP.
Additional international support is urgently needed. In the last 2
years, Colombia has received approximately $150 million per year in
assistance from the global community--10 percent of what is needed.
Colombia has received international funds that equate to approximately
$68 per migrant--a drop in the bucket compared to the $500 to $900
donated per migrant or refugee from Syria, South Sudan, and Myanmar. A
U.N. call for $738 million from the international community has turned
up less than a third of the money sought, with the United States
contributing the lion's share.
The continued flow of Venezuelans to other countries in Latin
America, and precisely to Colombia, is not sustainable. Fiscal costs
will peak in 2020 as a result of Colombia's efforts to provide migrants
and refugees with access to quality healthcare, education, housing, and
other basic needs. These costs represent a major economic strain for a
country working to implement a peace agreement and seeking to secure
institutional control over all its territory.
a deepened and modernized u.s.-colombia partnership
The interests of Colombia and the United States are closely linked.
The new U.S.-Colombia partnership should recognize this reality, and
capitalize on the opportunities that this represents. The partnership
will be further solidified as the United States supports Colombia's
efforts to stabilize territories, foster rural development, and bring
about a sustainable democratic transition in Venezuela. Economic and
diplomatic ties will also be strengthened as both countries work
together to support the eventual reconstruction of Venezuela and to
advance stability in other parts of the region, particularly in Central
America.
With the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), the
opportunities for mutually beneficial trade are enormous. The United
States is Colombia's largest trading partner and Colombia is the United
States' third-largest export market in Latin America behind Mexico and
Brazil. Still, both countries must implement pending aspects of the TPA
to expand market access and investment protections.
Additionally, strengthened trade and investment between Colombia
and the United States will help to provide some counterweight to
China's growing influence in Latin America. Over the last 20 years,
trade between China and Latin America has multiplied 18 times, from $12
billion in 2000 to $224 billion in 2016. Today, China is the largest
trading partner for Chile, Peru, and Brazil, and, in the case of
Colombia, China has become its second-largest export partner.
The future Colombian economy should also prioritize innovation and
technology as well as linking human capital to rural development. One
area of opportunity is for Colombia and the United States to expand
educational exchange programs via scholarships, grants, exchange
programs, and joint research. About 8,000 Colombians study in the
United States every year--with an economic impact of $302 million--and
approximately 236 of them receive full scholarships through the
Fulbright Program. Expanding opportunities for postgraduate training of
Colombian students in the United States would make a direct
contribution to the development of human capital and economic
development in Colombia, which would benefit shared U.S.-Colombia
interests.
A more modern agenda should also find new ways to promote rural
development, build stronger institutions, and tackle the longstanding
bilateral stress point, namely coca cultivation. Office of National
Drug Control Policy figures released in June 2019 show a slight drop in
coca production from 209,000 hectares in 2017 to 208,000 in 2018. Those
numbers must continue to drop. President Duque has prioritized coca
eradication and counter-narcotics efforts overall, with the expectation
of a continued downward trend in coca cultivation.
Weak institutions and lack of economic opportunities in rural areas
affect both Colombia and the United States. These conditions serve as
the breeding ground for coca cultivation and cocaine production,
illegal mining, and environmental degradation, as well as the
strengthening of criminal organizations, all of which affect the well-
being of Colombian citizens as well as U.S. national security
interests.
Devoting the necessary effort and resources to implement the peace
agreement is critical as is bringing to justice those who are in stated
violation of the agreement and intend to return to conflict. To fully
implement the agreement and devote the necessary resources to capacity
building, local governance, and alternative economic development in
rural areas, Colombia will need the continued support of the United
States and international community. This is especially true in the
midst of ever-growing fiscal strains resulting from Colombia's
commitment to continue to support the growing Venezuelan migrant and
refugee population. The U.S. Senate has historically risen to the
occasion to provide resources at critical moments for Colombia.
The need to double-down on rural development is exemplified by the
fact that many of the communities that believed the end of the FARC
meant the arrival of the state are experiencing fierce battles between
different criminal groups competing over illicit rents. More than 25
illegal armed groups, with a total of about 7,000 members, operate in
the country today. The August 2019 call to arms by Ivan Marquez
reinforces the critical importance of meaningful reintegration of ex-
combatants and attention to unmet needs in rural areas, which are the
parts of the accord most behind in terms of implementation.
At the same time, although overall levels of violence have
decreased in Colombia, a new wave of violence has been unleashed
against human rights defenders, community leaders, and social
activists. Estimates of the total number of murders vary across
sources, but Colombia's Ombudsman's Office reports 317 victims from
January 2016 to April 2019, most of whom were peasants, Afro-
Colombians, or indigenous persons. Working with the Colombian
government to stop such killings should continue to be a priority for
the United States.
In sum, this is a critical moment to stand by Colombia. It is vital
for the long-term interests of Colombia, the United States and the
whole region. A strengthened and modernized U.S.-Colombia partnership
involves deepening bilateral trade and investment, promoting rural
development in Colombia, cooperating to find a solution to the world
drug problem, and finding a peaceful solution to the Venezuela regional
crisis. This multi-pillar focus will help catapult Colombia to the next
stage of prosperity and provide the United States with an even stronger
partner in the Western Hemisphere at a moment of great concern.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The ranking member.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank both of you.
You heard our discussion during the first panel. Mr.
Marczak, your point about the international community's support
for the migrants from Venezuela in Colombia is eye-opening. It
is shocking. $68 per migrant versus $500 to $900 for the Syrian
crisis.
We cannot do this by government alone. We are going to have
to have help from the private sector. That has been
underscored. In the Council's work, that has been one of our
key points.
What should we be mobilizing to help Colombia on the
migrant issue so that they can make the progress they need to
in regards to their economy, in regards to dealing with drug
issues, in regards to dealing with implementing the peace
process?
Mr. Marczak. Well, thank you, Senator Cardin, for that
question.
As mentioned in the earlier panel, the question of an
international donor conference for Colombia is fundamental.
This is one of the recommendations in our report is that more
analysis is needed on specifically----
Senator Cardin. We have got to get countries to attend.
Mr. Marczak. You got to get the countries to attend. And
the numbers that are out there right now--the World Bank
estimate of how much it costs Colombia, .4 percent of their
GDP--that only takes into account the short-term needs that
Colombia is doing, the short-term housing, the education. It is
not the long-term needs that Colombia will have to bear to
absorb the millions more that could potentially be coming from
Venezuela. It is pivotal that the United States and the
international community work with member countries to provide
that support and convene donors to really focus on the
importance of this crisis in Colombia.
At the same time, what is critical is to help Colombia in a
number of other areas. One of those is data gathering and
collection and of other collection techniques. The Colombians
are trying to find for two different types of data collection
efforts: one on data gathering to facilitate integration;
another data gathering for security, knowing who is crossing
the border, getting sensors, getting drones at the border.
On the first point----
Senator Cardin. Well, on that point, I invite both of you
to respond. The Chairman raises a very valid point. How do you
maintain a stable government when you have a border country
that is harboring your terrorists, the FARC rebuilding? You
said monitor the border. I wanted to stop you on that because
maybe that is part of the answer to deal with the FARC presence
in Venezuela coming back into Colombia. Is that viable?
Mr. Marczak. Thank you, sir. Yes. The Colombians can
tremendously benefit from increased U.S. support through
technology to strengthen its border, drones, sensors. The FARC,
the ELN in particular, are frequently crossing back and forth
across the Colombian-Venezuelan border. They have impunity.
Dictator Nicolas Maduro and Venezuela grants them that
impunity, and they use that impunity to target Colombian
sources, to launch attacks in Colombia, and then go back across
that border. So the more that the United States can do to
facilitate strengthening that border--we are not going to be
able to put soldiers across that entire border, but we have the
technology to be able to help the Colombians.
Senator Cardin. Let me ask both of you. We applaud Colombia
having an open border so Venezuelans can escape the horrific
humanitarian crisis and find safe haven in Colombia. We noticed
more countries in the region are requiring visas. They are
starting to close their border. Is Colombia right to keep the
open borders? We wanted them to, but from an internal security
point of view, are they right to do that?
Ms. Balling. Well, first I would say one of the wonderful
things about the Colombian people is that they are actually
quite grateful to the Venezuelan people for when, during the
time of, for example, Pablo Escobar, there were thousands of
Colombians that had to resettle in Venezuela. So there is an
unusual amount of good will between the two peoples.
As Mr. Marczak said, unfortunately, the Colombian military
is not capable of shoring up the border, in part because the
topography makes it impossible. Drones are certainly a good
suggestion.
I think until the Colombian people no longer have the will
to welcome their Venezuelan neighbors, the Colombians are doing
the right thing. And as both Senators have suggested earlier,
it is quite remarkable because they are essentially standing
alone because, as you say, the other neighboring countries are
requiring visas.
So as I mentioned in my testimony, at least for a short-
term solution, I think helping the Colombians manage the
security situation in those specific four departments that
border Venezuela could definitely make an impact.
Mr. Marczak. Can I just emphatically say that the Colombian
model is a model to the rest of the world. The way that the
Colombians are treating migrants and refugees should be
broadcast around the world as an example of what you do in a
situation like this, the welcoming of millions, and not just
welcoming them, not just providing health care and housing and
education services, but actually giving them the status so that
they could actually formally work inside Colombia, the recent
granting of Colombian nationality to children of Venezuelan
parents born inside Colombia, and looking at the Venezuelan
migrant/refugee situation as not about people who are going to
go back the next day, but looking at how do they incorporate
these people into their society.
Senator Cardin. I agree completely with you. They should
not be penalized. They should be rewarded, and that is why we
are all frustrated there has not been more international
support for the burden that they are bearing with open borders.
But I agree with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rubio. So a couple points here to tie this up.
It is a complex situation with the migration, number one.
There is actually a substantial number of Venezuelans that also
hold Colombian citizenship, predating the migration. So that is
a factor.
The other is clearly--you know, it is interesting. If you
went back 25 years, it was the reverse. It was the Colombians
going into Venezuela. And so I think that gratitude has played
a role in this reception.
But there are indications--and I am not being critical. It
is a natural reaction of any country that--we saw it very
quickly happen in Peru. We saw it very quickly happen in
Ecuador. There is a natural tendency at some point in time for
it to begin to create fractures and pressures inside of a
society. So I am not prepared to say that there is an emerging
xenophobia, but there are the beginning signs that the support
for this migration has begun to sort of flag a little bit among
the general population in Colombia as more and more of this
burden is being fully felt. And that is something to be
concerned about. Is that your assessment as well?
Mr. Marczak. I agree with that assessment, Chairman. I
think that this is a phenomenon, as you correctly state,
throughout the world, just recently on a trip to Colombia,
seeing a news broadcast and seeing the people being labeled as
Venezuelans when a particular crime was committed. And I think
that that further reinforces the need, as talked about in
today's subcommittee hearing, for additional international and
U.S. support for Colombia at this critical moment. Colombia
just does not have the fiscal resources to be able to implement
the peace accord, deal with FARC and ELN attacks coming from
Venezuela, and at the same time provide services and
integration for millions of Venezuelans that are crossing its
border.
Senator Rubio. Is that your assessment as well?
Ms. Balling. Yes, that is my assessment absolutely. As I
said, I think that these types of specific civil affairs
efforts that U.S. SOUTHCOM and U.S. SOC SOUTH could execute
could really help with that because, yes, I have heard that the
tensions are beginning to worsen and unfortunately, of course,
among the poorest of Colombia's citizens.
Senator Rubio. And I do not raise to be critical----
Ms. Balling. No, no. It is just natural.
Senator Rubio. And to add to it though, I also do not want
people to take for granted that what we have now is forever,
that this is some sort of a permanent thing that we can accept.
I do think that there is the potential at some point for this
situation to take a different direction if it continues for
much longer.
I do want to say, because it has been mentioned a couple
times--and I do not know if this has been noted by others and I
failed to do so. But there was a donor conference convened I
believe by our mission at the OAS with Ambassador Trujillo and
others a few months ago. And I think there was $100 million
pledged, which is 10 percent or less of what the annual cost
is. I am not sure how much of that $100 million ultimately came
in, but the lion's share--and I think it was noted in your
testimony, Mr. Marczak. The lion's share of the international
contribution has been U.S. dollars. I forgot the number. It is
about $300 some odd million at this point, about $375 million
or so--U.S. assistance.
Mr. Marczak. That is correct, Chairman. And of that $100
million pledged at the OAS conference, only a fraction of that
money has actually come to fruition.
Senator Rubio. And then the U.N. put out a call as well,
and I think a very small reaction to that as well. So there
have been efforts. It is not fair to say there have not been
efforts. There have been efforts to step up. But frankly, we as
policymakers do not like it. We complain about it, but we are
going to have to do a lot of this ourselves if we want it done.
And that is why this hearing is so important. We can sit here
and hope that others will step up, but ultimately we have to
make a decision about whether it is in our national interest to
do so or not. And I hope after this hearing today that we can
convince more of our colleagues of that.
A side note because I do not want to forget to ask. You
mentioned, Mr. Marczak, the Free Trade Agreement. I do not know
what the numbers have been the last couple years, but for some
substantial period of time, there was actually a trade deal we
ran a surplus on of trade. I do not know if those numbers
remain that way, but it is a pretty good deal for the U.S., in
essence. It is certainly very good for Miami where I live and
in south Florida and in Florida at large. But it is actually a
real success. We talk a lot about Plan Colombia, but one of the
real successes of our relationship has been the trade
opportunities that it has created. So I do not know what the
numbers are. Maybe one of you do, but I know for a while it was
a surplus. It may still be the case.
On the military and the border, one of the interesting
things is for all of their reputation of being militant and I
see descriptions of Duque as more with a firmer, harder hand
than Santos. And I think the people who say that often use it
to criticize him. They have actually deliberately avoided
sending military units to the border. For example, when the
effort was made to bring in humanitarian assistance across the
border into Venezuela, it was police units that they deployed.
And one of the reasons why is the fear that if they deployed
military units to the border, it could inflame tensions and
lead to a military escalation. And they have also shown
tremendous restraint. I think there is clear evidence that not
only was tear gas and other things fired into Colombian
territory, but there were even intrusions by some of the
national guard elements. So I think they have shown tremendous
restraint.
And I say that only because there is a challenge there
between--and it is something that may need to happen, but if
you stand up and bulk up a military presence on the border,
there are some that will accuse that of being militarization,
in essence, a provocative act in response. And I do not know if
any of you have sort of thought through that or what the
international reaction to that would be. Colombians are
sensitive to it.
Ms. Balling. Yes, absolutely, Chairman. And forgive me for
repeating myself. That is why these very specific forms of,
quote/unquote, ``military presence'' are crucial. So that is
one of the functions civil affairs teams serve. And that is one
of the missions of accion integral is to essentially actually
present the military as an extension of the state as a
protector of democracy, but not in an offensive, aggressive
way. And these specific programs actually are the programs
designed to show the citizens that they do not look at the
national police and the army as aggressive invaders and so
forth. It is nuanced. But that is why I feel very strongly
about backing these specific programs.
Senator Rubio. And I do not disagree. I think one of the
challenges people are unaware of is when the peace deal came
into being and FARC elements would pull out, immediately other
criminal elements would step in and now begin to fight. And
some of the violence that we keep hearing about are these
different criminal elements saying, hey, there is a vacuum
there now. It is like if a gang abandons a neighborhood. So
these four other gangs start fighting over who now inherits
that territory. And that has also been a challenge to the state
in dealing with that reality as well.
And then clearly in many of these areas that have not had a
government presence for a significant period of time, people
grew up in a culture and society where government forces coming
in were viewed as hostile. And so changing that perception is
important.
I think one of the things I had hoped would come from this
hearing is one of the things that you talked about--I think
both of you really have alluded to--and that is we really do
need to upgrade and update. You know when you get that alert
that your app has a new update? We really do need to update
this relationship because it now faces a set of challenges that
extend beyond Colombia's border. And frankly, I am not sure
that our current programs, as they are currently constructed,
fully address the full spectrum of those challenges.
Obviously, we will await the work that you have done along
with Senator Cardin and Blunt, which I guess you will announce
a review on next week?
Mr. Marczak. Next Thursday.
Senator Rubio. And is that one of the things you have
looked at, what that update to the app looks like?
Mr. Marczak. Yes. This is a refresher. This is the app 2.0.
And it is how to provide for a modern blueprint for a U.S.-
Colombian partnership.
Senator Rubio. Because one of the things that I have spoken
to the National Security Council about, I have spoken to the
Department of State about to some extent about is we really do
need a more holistic approach to this that involves the use,
for example, of the OAS, which I think has been reinvigorated
in a role that it reinvigorated. And that has been positive. It
looked at how our existing programs coincide.
But at the core of it is the argument I consistently make,
and that is it is impossible to simply focus on Colombia as a
challenge that exists within the confines of their own border.
It is impossible to deal with these issues that we are
discussing as long as there is a mafia acting as a government
in a neighboring country cooperating and, in some cases,
potentially training and harboring criminal elements who have
among their stated intent the overthrow of your government. And
I think about what nation on earth could sit there and
permanently tolerate that groups hostile to the government and
prepared to carry out armed attacks and killings is operating
with impunity and you are basically sitting there unable to do
anything about it. I think that is an intolerable situation
that eventually has to come to a head one way or the other.
And so ideally it would be a regional response to it.
Perhaps the beginning of the Rio discussion will convince more
countries in the region that this is a regional response that
needs to happen to this.
But I just do not know ultimately how we solve any of these
challenges that we are discussing as long as--no matter how
much they eradicate coca, no matter how much we fund the
migrant situation, all these things will help. But as long as
there are these armed criminal groups operating with impunity,
I do not know this gets substantially improved. I do not know
how you solve this problem without dealing with that specific
part of the problem.
Mr. Marczak. Chairman, if I may. I fully agree.
First, the task force report, which I look forward to
sharing with you that will be coming out next week, looks at
not only the challenges of Colombia being beyond Colombia's
borders, but also frankly the opportunities that Colombia
brings. Colombia is a regional and a global leader on security
assistance. Colombia is a regional leader on economic
prosperity, on democracy promotion. And Colombia frankly is the
regional leader through the Lima Group and working to solve the
Venezuela crisis.
I think as you pointed out beforehand with regard to the
influx of Venezuelans to Colombia, the illegality of what is
occurring in Venezuela will only continue to grow the longer
that Nicolas Maduro stays in power. The more that he is
squeezed, the more he is going to continue to resort to illegal
groups and illegal sources of funding. And that illegal source
of funding, arms trafficking, illegal gold trafficking, arms
smuggling, money laundering--this is what is helping to keep
the regime afloat, among other issues. And that needs to be
curtailed or else he will continue to resort to illegality and
to the FARC and ELN and other groups as his supporters.
Ms. Balling. Yes. I would say one good thing is now that
the peace accord has been signed, there is no longer what was,
I think, an incredibly high level of political pressure to have
that deal signed at whatever cost. Now, as a result in my
opinion, there were certain things that perhaps were somewhat
more permissive than they could have been with the FARC. Be
that as it may, it has been signed. I think it is crucial for
the U.S. and Colombia now to be very pragmatic without the
burden of the political pressure of signing a deal with a
terrorist organization with regards to the security situation.
So I actually look at this as a positive.
Senator Rubio. Look, I know there is a lot of talk about--
people love to talk about the deal because I think, for
whatever reason in our culture, we view deals as the answer to
every problem. The problem is deals are only as good as
compliance. And in a deal with a criminal organization, even if
80 percent of them comply, that is still a lot of armed people.
You had FARC dissidents almost from the beginning. And then you
had these other criminal groups that stepped into the vacuum.
You still had to deal with the ELN, which was not part of the
deal. And then you saw what happened when one of them decided
we want to sell drugs again, and you went after them. They
claimed you are violating the deal as if somehow it gave them
impunity to act.
So I think it is important to understand that--and by the
way, we also need to point out that that deal failed in a
national referendum in Colombia. It never had the buy-in of the
population. It required Santos to go through the legislative
process and twist arms to get the votes for it.
But, look, that is a sovereign issue for them to determine.
We are here to help them either way.
I do want to say this one more point, and that is, you talk
about the economic opportunities. But when someone says to you
we are going to harm the state, we are now at war with the
state and they are going to try to harm you, that is not just
about shooting at them. It is about going after their economy.
And these criminal elements know that one of the best ways to
go after the Colombian economy and harm them as an attractive
place for investment is to carry out attacks in urban centers,
which we have not seen in quite a while where they used to be
commonplace back in the day. It is what the cartels did. When
Escobar wanted to pressure the government to provide him
whatever it is he wanted at that point, which I think was just
impunity and amnesty, he blew up airplanes. He blew up
newspapers. He attacked in the urban centers.
And so I do not think it is far-fetched that at some point
in the near future, Colombian authorities are going to be aware
of efforts to carry out attacks in urban centers being
organized, orchestrated, and perhaps financed from the
territory of Venezuela.
And I want people to put yourselves in their shoes for a
moment. Imagine the United States was aware that there was a
terrorist organization somewhere in the world plotting to
attack and carry out attacks in our cities. We would go after
them in that territory, and no one could say anything to us
about it. We have a right to defend ourselves.
And I do not know if policymakers and those who cover this
have been sufficiently socialized the fact that no matter what
we are talking about here today, that is something that I think
is going to happen at some point here. There will come a point
where if these people are serious about waging war against the
state, they will try to conduct and may even carry out
successful attacks similar to what we saw in the police academy
but at a much higher rate. And I do not know what people are
prepared to say or do about when Colombia turns to the world
and says this is unsustainable for us. We have to do something
to stop this. And we have a regime next door that is unwilling
to do anything about it. We are going to have to take it upon
ourselves, and what response that would elicit and what that
could mean and what would unfold.
I do not know if either of you have given thought to that
contingency, which I think is not a far-fetched one. In fact, I
think it is a likely one.
Mr. Marczak. Chairman, I think a couple of things.
One is I think it highlights as well the importance of
implementing the peace accords in Colombia, the attention to
rural development in Colombia, because as you state, the FARC
and the ELN are using Venezuelan territory as an opportunity to
regroup, rearm, identify targets within Colombia.
But at the same time, there are vast swaths of Colombian
territory, as part of the peace accords, that need to be
developed. And that goes from creating alternative economic
models, not just crop substitution, but actually creating new
economic models in rural territories. It involves state
capacity in rural territories. It involves interconnectivity.
It involves building secondary, tertiary roads. It involves
bring electricity: all of these different factors that can
convert rural territories from being areas where illegal groups
or criminal organizations thrive to ones where there is
actually a state presence and a thriving economy. So I would
like to add that into part of the equation here: the need for a
multidimensional strategy and the need for U.S. support for
Colombia in implementing that.
Senator Rubio. And I agree 100 percent. There is nothing
bad, and a lot of good comes from winning the hearts and minds
of people who have not had interaction with the government in
many cases their whole lives.
But that does not stop a criminal organization who is
plotting to detonate bombs in Bogota operating from Venezuela
and then using a porous border to insert those terrorists into
the country to carry out these attacks. And you are the
Colombian authority sitting there. You see this is about to
happen, and you want to stop it before it does. And maybe you
can intercept them at the border. Maybe your informants on the
ground will tell you these guys are coming over because you
have a better relationship with them. But maybe you have to go
after them.
And I am not saying that is going to happen tomorrow
morning. I am just that is where I think this leads, knowing
how these things work and knowing how these particular groups
work. Is that something you have looked at or talked about?
Ms. Balling. Yes. So again, actually roads are a huge
issue. I mean, that is definitely something that keeps the poor
rural Colombians isolated. And by the way, when it comes to
building the roads, it is their army corps of engineers. And
unfortunately, they have in the past had problems because the
perception of them by the population is that they are
aggressive and so on. So that is again an example of when,
unfortunately, sometimes it is the army that is really the only
representative of the state.
Whether the FARC is operating geographically beyond its
border or in, unfortunately, any of the myriad areas of
Colombia where it is very difficult to access them, it
underscores the importance again of intelligence. As you might
remember when the DAS imploded, that was a significant blow to
the Colombian intelligence system in general. So I think that,
again, if we could take a close look at how to improve that
because from what I experienced, having interviewed scores of
FARC, some commanders and some civilians--they were not, since
the 1990s, motivated by ideology. It was whether they were
forcibly recruited or--well, it is really the fact that they
can make more money, as you pointed out, trafficking drugs, et
cetera.
So in terms of intelligence effectiveness of weakening a
given group, that is the good news. In other words, I think
actually the ELN, despite their smaller numbers, is far more
ideologically motivated and therefore perhaps a little bit more
difficult to penetrate when it comes to HUMINT. But I do think
that with a renewed focus on intelligence gathering, that this
is a way that we could help the Colombians combat what could be
advantage now if Maduro is in fact letting these commanders sit
in his back yard.
Senator Rubio. And I just have two wrap-up comments, not
even questions, although if you have a comment, I would welcome
it.
The first is we talked about the border. You look at a map,
and there is a line, but that is not really how this works. It
is largely an ungoverned swath of people coming across all the
time in areas. And part of it is the topography makes it
difficult. Part of it is the lack of a state presence in some
of those places because the cost of maintaining a human
presence there is quite high. You have people shooting back at
you. So I think that is important. A lot of people do not
realize it. It is a border, but it is a geographic border with
coordinates and the like. But it does not function in that way.
It really is more of an ungoverned corridor space and parts of
it because it is really difficult both because of the
topography and also because of the violence and other things
and even resources.
And the last point I would make is--I do not want to
misstate this either--that if tomorrow morning Maduro gets on
an airplane and flies to Havana and retires, that this all goes
away. The transition in Venezuela is not going to be this
linear, one-day-to-the-next issue even in the best case
scenario. Even if tomorrow morning, Juan Guaido was able to
rightfully assume control of the apparatus of the state, there
is reason to believe that for a substantial period of time, the
Venezuelan state under new leadership would not have the
capacity to deal with some of these matters. In fact, one of
the biggest concerns I would have in the short term is the
sheer volume of people currently wearing police and army
uniforms that would quickly abandon their posts because of the
fact that they are only there now either because they receive
some small benefit that the general population does not or
because of what happens to defectors and their families when
they do leave.
So my point is that this Venezuela problem, even if
tomorrow there was a political transition that began and it was
ideal, you still have a host of other capacity and societal
challenges. You have armed elements, the colectivo groups in
Venezuela that certainly work for the state and operate at the
direction of the regime, but who are criminals that are not
just going to all of a sudden decide to go in to open a chain
of car washes or laundromats.
So this is really complicated. I do not want to simplify
the long-term challenges that Venezuela poses when you have
upwards of 4.5 million to 5 million people in your population,
when your entire infrastructure is destroyed. This is a long-
term commitment we have on our hands here even beyond what we
are facing here today.
Well, thank you both for being a part of it. We look
forward to seeing that report. I know Senator Cardin is going
to get all the credit for it, so that is good.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. Blunt too.
Senator Cardin. Let me read it first. Then I will see.
Senator Rubio. Yes.
Do you have anything else?
Senator Cardin. No. Again, I thank the witnesses, and I
really do thank the Task Force that has been set up. I do look
forward to their report. I think it can be very helpful to us.
Senator Rubio. And unfortunately, we are talking more about
the hemisphere because of these challenges. But I think we have
talked more about the hemisphere in the last couple years than
we ever have. So even today with the attendance of the chairman
and you saw the ranking member, who has had a long commitment,
stay, you saw the attendance on the minority side, so I think
it is good that there is more conversation happening about the
region. And unfortunately, it is because of these challenges.
But I do hope we can build some real momentum and that your
report and other products that are put out could serve as sort
of a blueprint that policymakers could take and begin to
implement.
All right. Well, I want to thank you both for your patience
and time. It has been a longer hearing than we anticipated but
I am glad it has been because it is an important topic and one
I care a lot about. Just as a side note, we have tried to have
this hearing now for a few months. We struggled to get people
to sit there on the first panel for a while, but it all worked
out. The second panel was ready to go for a long time. But we
got there and we are happy about that. Again, we thank you for
being here.
The record will remain open for 48 hours after the close of
this hearing.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Jason Marczak for the
Following Questions Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. How can we further deepen the U.S.-Colombia trade and
investment relationship?
[No Response Received]
Question. Coca crops are cultivated in areas with vastly different
topographies. What would a more differentiated approach look like for
U.S. assistance that takes into account this reality?
[No Response Received]