[Senate Hearing 116-207]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-207
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
AFTER THE SECOND SUMMIT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
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______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-599 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,
AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
CORY GARDNER, Colorado, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TOM UDALL, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Gardner, Hon. Cory, U.S. Senator From Colorado................... 1
Markey, Hon. Edward J., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts.......... 2
Cha, Dr. Victor, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Magsamen, Kelly, Vice President, National Security and
International Policy, Center for American Progress, Washington,
DC............................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Secretary Steven T.
Mnuchin
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey.......................... 30
(iii)
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
AFTER THE SECOND SUMMIT
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TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Cory Gardner,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Gardner [presiding], Markey, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. This hearing will come to order.
I'd like to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee on East Asia,
the Pacific, and international cybersecurity policy. Glad to be
participating again in this Congress with my good friend and
ranking member, Senator Markey. During the 115th Congress, our
subcommittee was the most active subcommittee on the Foreign
Relations Committee, holding nearly a dozen hearings and,
really, that guided us into our legislation on the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act, a generational achievement for U.S.
policy in the Indo-Pacific. I sincerely hope that we can keep
this subcommittee bipartisan and productive in this Congress as
well, as it has been.
We're at a real inflection point in our policy toward North
Korea. At the outset, we should commend the Trump
administration for moving beyond press-released diplomacy in a
genuine attempt to resolve a very serious national security
issue that has bedeviled multiple administrations, both
Democrat and Republican alike. But dealing with Kim Jong-un and
the Kim family has been one series of rope-a-dopes. Deception
is certainly a key to the strategy that they have led for
generations.
Our team, led by Secretary Pompeo and special
representative Steve Biegun, deserve major credit for
attempting to move the ball forward. Unfortunately, despite the
pomp and circumstance, commemorative coins, prime-time TV
coverage, the summit in Singapore and most recently in Hanoi
have not moved us any closer to the goal enshrined in U.S. and
international law to complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement/denuclearization of North Korea's illicit
nuclear, missile, chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons programs.
While there has been no missile or nuclear testing for 15
months--that is a very good thing--North Korea still remains a
nuclear threat to the United States and our allies. This
incontrovertible fact was most recently confirmed by the
administration's own 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment released
by the Director of National Intelligence on January 29th. The
summit pageantry has also not resulted in any significant
changes in North Korea's atrocious human rights record. For the
Kim regime, it's a time of choosing: continue the failed game
plan of father and grandfather or open a new chapter of
opportunity. This is where we are unfortunately falling short.
But make no mistake, the blame for the lack of progress lies
squarely with Pyongyang.
So where do we go from here? We must always remember that
the goal of any negotiations with Pyongyang must only be to
bring the regime into compliance with its international
obligations; no more, no less. This is also the United States
law, as enshrined by the North Korea Policy Enhancement Act and
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. Until such time as the
regime chooses to comply, we must pursue the policy of maximum
pressure, including full sanctions enforcement, robust military
posture, and regime isolation and coordination with our allies
and partners around the globe. North Korea's enablers must
recognize the destabilizing effect and proliferation risk of a
nuclear North Korea. Maximum pressure means sanctioning Korea's
enablers. Strategic patience failed. We must not repeat it.
That should be our message both to the administration and
especially to our friends in Seoul, who seem especially eager
to advance the cause of inter-Korean cooperation without a
tangible change in behavior from Pyongyang.
To examine these and other questions, we've assembled an
excellent panel of witnesses today. I look forward to hearing
from you both, but I'll first turn to Senator Markey for his
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and
thank you for convening this hearing and your continued
willingness to focus on the challenges posed by North Korea.
And I want to thank our witnesses, as well, for your
willingness to participate. You both are experts with extensive
governmental experience, and I am glad you are here to help us
shed some light on what American policy towards North Korea
should be, and I look forward to learning from both of you.
At the same time, it must be said, we still need to have an
open hearing with government witnesses to discuss the
administration's strategy for denuclearizing North Korea. I
want to thank the chairman for trying to secure those
witnesses, and I urge the Trump administration to make them
available so that the American people can hear firsthand about
what objectives our negotiators are trying to achieve and how
they are going about achieving them.
After all, a fundamental component of a transparent
American government is public debate. Congress has an
obligation to ask for administration witnesses, and the
executive branch has an obligation to testify. The American
people deserve nothing less. Although President Trump's special
representative for North Korea, Steve Biegun, gave a classified
briefing to members following the Hanoi summit, there has been
very little congressional interaction before or since. History
shows us that diplomacy with North Korea falters without clear
and regular communication between the executive and legislative
branches.
Now, the topic of today's hearing is North Korea's policy
after the Hanoi summit. But determining the future policy
direction requires us to understand how we got here. To be
clear, Kim Jong-un, a third-generation dictator, is to blame
for flouting international condemnation by drastically
expanding his nuclear weapons capabilities, bringing the threat
to America's door. He has abused the North Korean population
almost beyond comprehension and engages in every type of
illegal and destabilizing activity. But U.S. policy matters as
well. Upon taking office, President Trump engaged in a war of
words with Kim Jong-un that unnecessarily risked actual war on
the peninsula. Unsurprisingly, taunts of fire and fury did not
succeed in lowering the nuclear threat from North Korea. The
bluster did not yield results. Kim Jong-un did not capitulate.
Thankfully, the President turned away from the military
threats, perhaps under the mistaken belief that they were
working, and towards engagement. As a proponent of diplomacy
and an observer of the U.S.-North Korean nuclear negotiation
history, I believe his unorthodox approach of leader-level
summits was worth trying. But to have a chance of succeeding,
we, at the very least, needed robust, working-level
negotiations with empowered American diplomats along with
comprehensive and sustained sanctions enforcement.
Unfortunately, we have not had any of these components.
American engagement was too little, too late, and the
President's itchy Twitter finger undermined our diplomats at
every turn. Why is it, for example, that Kim Jong-un appeared
to believe that he could get a better deal from President Trump
than he could through working-level talks? President Trump's
fawning about being in love sent the signal to Kim that the
U.S. President might be willing to give significant concessions
to North Korea without meaningful steps towards
denuclearization.
Although I am relieved that President Trump did not give
away the store in Hanoi, negotiations that are well-planned and
strategic must continue. And while we need to continue to
analyze the summit's outcome, we need to plot the course
forward, and there are many unanswered questions.
Steve Biegun said that ``We are not going to do
denuclearization incrementally.'' So, then, how is the
administration going to achieve North Korean denuclearization
at all, given the unlikelihood of a major deal up front? How is
the administration going to get back to the table? How is the
administration going to ensure that China, Russia, and other
enablers of North Korea's bad behavior will fully enforce
existing sanctions, especially when the President seems intent
on easing pressure? And what message does it send to the rest
of the world if we don't prioritize sanctions enforcement? What
would be the implications on the global nonproliferation
regime? Has the Trump administration sufficiently raised human
rights issues with the North Koreans?
I am eager to hear from our expert witnesses today on these
and other questions because although I am extremely skeptical
that Kim Jong-un is willing to abandon his nuclear weapons
program, we must continue to pursue diplomacy, which is the
only solution to dealing with North Korea. And I very much hope
that the administration, with its ham-handed approach to date,
has not squandered a rare opportunity to make progress.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
exploring all of those issues with our expert panel.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Our first witness is Dr. Victor Cha, who is a Senior
Adviser and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, CSIS. From 2004 to 2007, Dr. Cha served
as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council,
where he was responsible primarily for Japan and Korean
Peninsula, Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island nation
affairs. He was also the Deputy Head of Delegation for the
United States at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing and received
two outstanding service commendations during his tenure at the
National Security Council.
Dr. Cha is no stranger to this committee--whether you like
it or not, the subcommittee--having testified here both in the
115th Congress and in the 114th Congress as well. I welcome
come back Dr. Cha. Thank you very much for your service and
being here today.
Of course, our next witness--I'll introduce you both right
now and then we'll start with Dr. Cha--is Ms. Kelly Magsamen,
who is Vice President for National Security and International
Policy at the Center for American Progress. Previously, she was
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs and also performed the duties of
Assistant Secretary of Defense, where she was responsible for
defense and security policy for all of Asia and served as
principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense. Prior to her
tenure at the Pentagon, she served on the National Security
Council staff for two presidents and four national security
advisers.
I welcome Ms. Magsamen, and thank you very much for your
service, as well.
Dr. Cha, we'll begin with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR CHA, SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA CHAIR,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member
Markey. It's a pleasure to be with you to discuss options for
U.S. policy on North Korea after the second summit.
There were high expectations at the second meeting in
Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on
denuclearization commitments made in Singapore the previous
summer. Not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an
agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, they also
dispensed with the joint statement signing, and in a solo press
statement, the President said that sometimes ``you have to
walk. This was just one of those times.''
Nonetheless, the Hanoi summit has left us with no clear
diplomatic road ahead on this very challenging security
problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia, and a promise of no
more made-for-TV summits, at least for the foreseeable future.
The question is where do we go from here? While I do not think
this will mean a return to the fire and fury days of 2017 when
armed conflict was possible, as you both referred to, we have
learned a number of lessons from Hanoi going forward.
First, the North Korean position at Hanoi reflects little
change in their negotiating strategy despite holding the
audience of the U.S. President. President Trump essentially
tested the critical thesis that had hung over previous
negotiations for decades; that is, the North Koreans will not
truly show their hand and take big steps unless we talk
directly to the leadership. Yet, what we found in Hanoi was
that North Korea stuck stubbornly to its same negotiating
strategy, which is to negotiate its past when it comes to its
nuclear programs, but not its present nor its future. What this
means is that Pyongyang is only willing to put on the table
elements of its program that it no longer really needs, such as
an old nuclear test site or an old plutonium reactor, while
preserving their present and their future--their nuclear
weapons arsenal, fissile material, missile bases, uranium
program. In exchange, however, they want real concessions from
their negotiating counterpart, like sanctions relief.
Second, I believe that both sides walked away from the
summit with the core belief that pressure works. In the case of
the United States, the fact that the North Korean leader
prioritized sanctions relief above all other concessions taught
us that the sanctions are indeed working. Similarly, the fact
that the North Koreans came to Hanoi with a bad deal in hand
intimates a belief that President Trump was under pressure to
take less than half a loaf. Furthermore, revelations by CSIS
and other think tanks documented North Korean activity at the
Sohae satellite launch facility to return the site to normal
operating status after an initial dismantlement earlier in the
summer of 2018. This again suggests the North believes more
pressure is necessary to soften up the U.S. position. This does
not suggest a rocket launch or nuclear test is imminent, but it
does suggest that the situation could take a downward turn
before a resumption of diplomacy.
Third, the U.S. should be prepared for other regional
partners to start lobbying us to change our position. Whenever
we reach an impasse with North Korea and the diplomacy, third
parties know that it is impossible to move the intransigent
North Koreans. So, invariably, they come to the United States
to find a solution. So as unreasonable as the North is, those
that want to see continued diplomatic progress, like the South
Koreans and the Chinese, will invariably come to us, complain
about the North's behavior, empathize with our frustrations,
and then ask Washington to be more flexible.
Fourth, we should expect North Korea to retrench in the
aftermath of the summit. The outcome constituted a major
embarrassment for the North Korean leader, and it would not
surprise me if there were personnel changes as a result of the
field summit. The question is when they reemerge, whether North
Korea will cycle back to a provocation track or whether they
will look for a diplomatic path forward. Our data research at
CSIS shows that when bilateral negotiations break down with the
United States and North Korea over the past three decades the
likelihood of provocations happening within 5 months of the
breakdown of negotiations is high.
Fifth, human rights continues to be neglected in the
administration's summit diplomacy. It is impossible for U.S.
denuclearization diplomacy to succeed without integration of
the human rights issue. Because of the sanctions levied by this
body, there is no company or international financial
institution that will enter North Korea given human rights
violations in the supply chain. Thus, the President's promises
of casinos and condominiums on the beaches of North Korea in
return for denuclearization ring hollow without beginning a
real dialogue on human rights.
Finally, we are left with the question of who benefits from
a pause in the diplomacy. We believe that time is on our side
because of the continued bite of economic sanctions. But the
North believes their continued production of weapons,
materials, and missile designs puts added pressure on the
United States. In either case, President Trump may be realizing
the limits of his bromance diplomacy with North Korea. If he
loses interest, then we are unlikely to see any progress for
the remainder of his term in office, which will make Americans
less secure, not more secure.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor Cha
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee to discuss options for U.S. diplomacy on North Korea after
the second Trump-Kim summit.
There were high expectations at this second meeting of American and
North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of
progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in
Singapore last summer. Not only were the two leaders unable to deliver
an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, they also
dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial
lunch, and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, the
President said that sometimes you ``have to walk, and this was just one
of those times.'' \1\
The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad
deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the
Yongbyon nuclear complex is a fraction of their growing nuclear program
that does not even break the surface of their underlying arsenal and
stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and
delivery systems. And what they sought in return, in terms of major
sanctions relief on five U.N. Security Council resolutions that target
90 percent of their trade, would have removed one of the primary
sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance,
no deal was better than a bad deal.
Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left us with no clear diplomatic
road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled
allies in Asia, and the promise of no more made-for-television summit
meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains: where do we
go from here?
When leaders' summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by
definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and
Secretary Pompeo put the best face they could on in Hanoi, talking
about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two
sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great
deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek
meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North
Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps.
While I do not think this will mean a return to the ``Fire and
Fury'' days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned a
number of lessons from Hanoi going forward.
First, the North Korean position at Hanoi reflects little change in
their negotiation strategy despite holding the audience of the U.S.
President. This was perhaps the most disappointing outcome of the
summit as a long-timer observer and participant in past nuclear
negotiations. President Trump essentially tested the critical thesis
that had hung over previous negotiations for decades. That is, the
North Koreans will not truly show their hand and take big steps unless
we talk directly to the leadership. Critics of the Six Party talks made
that observation countless times to us when we were negotiating. Yet,
what we found in Hanoi was that North Korea stuck stubbornly to its
same negotiating strategy, which is to negotiate its ``past'' when it
comes to its nuclear weapons programs, but not its ``present'' or its
``future.'' What this means is that Pyongyang is only willing to put on
the table elements of its program that it no longer really needs--such
as an old nuclear test site or the old plutonium reactor at Yongbyon,
while preserving their ``present''--nuclear weapons arsenal, fissile
material, missile bases, and uranium program--and their ``future,''
which are promises on future production bans. In exchange, however,
they want real concessions from their negotiating counterpart like
sanctions relief.
Second, I believe that both sides walked away from the summit with
the core belief that ``pressure works.'' In the case of the United
States, the fact that the North Korean leader prioritized sanctions
relief above all other U.S. concessions taught us that the sanctions
are indeed working. There were many other things that could have been
asked for--including the exchange of liaison offices and even a peace
declaration ending the Korean War--but the North Korean leadership made
clear that only one thing mattered, which just reinforced that the
maximum pressure campaign is having an impact. For some in the
administration like National Security Advisor John Bolton, this means
the pressure should continue and even increase, not abate.
Similarly, the fact that the North Koreans came to Hanoi with a bad
deal in hand intimates a belief that President Trump was under pressure
to take less than half-a-loaf. Apparently in working level talks in the
run-up to the summit, U.S. negotiators made clear that the offer of
Yongbyon for sanctions relief was not nearly workable and yet the North
showed up in Hanoi with the same position (and with no fallback
position). Furthermore, revelations by CSIS and other think tanks
documented North Korean activity at the Sohae satellite launch facility
to return the site to normal operating status after initial
dismantlement earlier in the summer of 2018 again suggests that the
North believes more pressure is necessary to soften up the U.S.
position.\2\ This does not suggest that a rocket launch or nuclear test
is imminent, but it does suggest that the situation could take a turn
downwards before a resumption of diplomacy.
Third, the U.S. should be prepared for other regional parties to
start lobbying us to change our position. This is what I once referred
to as the dilemma of American reasonableness.\3\ Whenever we reach an
impasse with North Korea in the diplomacy, third parties know that it
is impossible to move the intransigent North Koreans; therefore, they
invariably come to the U.S. to find a solution. Coming out of Hanoi,
both the Chinese and South Koreans acknowledge openly that Pyongyang
missed a golden opportunity. After numerous visits to the White House
by Kim's envoys, trips by Pompeo to Pyongyang, and two summit meetings
with the U.S. President (a meeting they have sought for 60 years), the
North was given the chance to make historic progress. Yet, the best
they could manufacture was a minimalist position that one would have
expected to hear as an opening gambit at the working level rather than
in the key negotiation between the two top leaders. Yet as unreasonable
as the North is, those who want to continue to see diplomatic progress,
like the South Koreans and Chinese, will invariably come to the United
States, complain about the North's behavior, empathize with our
frustration, and then ask Washington to be more flexible.
Fourth, we should expect North Korea to retrench in the aftermath
of the Hanoi summit. The outcome constituted a major embarrassment for
the North Korean leader and it would not surprise me if there were some
personnel changes as a result of the failed summit. The question is
when they re-emerge whether Pyongyang will be cycling back to a
provocation track or focused on finding a diplomatic way forward. In a
bizarre Tweet last week, on March 22, President Trump appeared to
unilaterally pull back additional Department of the Treasury sanctions
against the North Korean regime in a bid not to upset the momentum;
however, our data research at CSIS shows that when bilateral
negotiations break down between the U.S. and North Korea over the past
three decades, the likelihood increases of a North Korean provocation
within 5 months.\4\
Fifth, human rights continue to be neglected in the
administration's summit diplomacy with North Korea. The only relevant
statement in this regard was the President's defense of the North
Korean leader's professed ignorance of the murder of American college
student Otto Warmbier. The President had an opportunity to ask for a
full accounting of what happened to Otto as well as a statement of
regret. It is impossible for U.S. denuclearization diplomacy to succeed
without integration of the human rights issue. Because of the sanctions
levied by this body, there is no company or international financial
institution that will enter North Korea given human rights violations
in the supply chain. Thus, the President's promises of casinos and
condos on the beaches of North Korea in return for denuclearization
ring hollow without beginning a real dialogue on human rights.
Finally, we are left with the question of who benefits from a pause
in the diplomacy. We may believe that time is on our side because of
the continued bite of the sanctions, but the North may believe their
continued production of weapons, materials, and missile designs puts
added pressure on the United States. In either case, President Trump
may be realizing the limits of his ``bromance'' diplomacy with North
Korea. If he loses interest, then we are unlikely to see any progress
for the remainder of his term in office, which will make Americans
less, not more secure.
----------------
Notes
\1\ ``Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference Hanoi,
Vietnam,'' The White House, February 28, 2019.
\2\ Joseph Bermudez, ``After Hanoi Summit: Rebuilding of Sohae
Launch Facility,'' CSIS Beyond Parallel, March 5, 2019; ``North Korea's
Tongchang-ri: Rebuilding Commences on Launch Pad and Engine Test
Stand,'' 38 North, March 5, 2019.
\3\ Victor Cha, ``Delisting North Korea,'' The Washington Post,
October 13, 2008.
\4\ Lisa Collins, ``25 Years of Negotiations and Provocations:
North Korea and the United States,'' CSIS Beyond Parallel, October 2,
2017.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Dr. Cha.
And Ms. Magsamen.
STATEMENT OF KELLY MAGSAMEN, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Magsamen. Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Markey, and
members of the committee, it's an honor to be invited today to
give testimony on U.S. policy towards North Korea. It's also a
great honor to be sitting alongside Dr. Cha, whose extensive
experience on this issue is unmatched and whose analysis I seek
to inform my own.
Today, after two U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore and
Hanoi, North Korea still has upwards of 60 nuclear weapons and
is continuing to accumulate fissile material to make more. It
retains the ballistic missile capability to threaten Hawaii,
Guam, Alaska, the West Coast, and good portions of the
continental United States. And North Korea also retains a
conventional capacity to put Seoul and South Korea at
acceptable risk. In sum, the threat has not changed.
I want to be clear at the outset that I am a strong
supporter of diplomacy with North Korea, but I also want to be
clear that I think the administration is doing it wrong. And
while better than the days of fire and fury, this problem is
not going to be solved through reality TV episodes. It's going
to take deliberate, integrated, and coherent interagency effort
in close partnership with the international community.
In the case of the Hanoi summit, many of us were worried
about the possibility of a bad deal. The good news is that
didn't happen. The bad news is that the way forward is now
deeply uncertain and full of risks. We cannot be complacent in
the status quo even if it is better than fire and fury, and we
cannot keep grading the administration on a curve. The reality
is that the Hanoi summit never should have happened. The
President of the United States went into a room with Kim Jong-
un for a second time with no firm commitments and only a rough
outline of possibilities as well as maximalist allusions of a
grand bargain that he alone could make. It turns out this is
not real estate; it's actual rocket science.
Setbacks in diplomacy are to be expected. With proper
preparation, they can be managed and even clarifying for both
sides. This was the case with the Reykjavik summit between
President Reagan and Gorbachev. But it's always better to
under-promise and over-deliver. Unfortunately, the opposite has
been the case since 2017.
In my view, the U.S. team needs to get back to some first
principles: First, reinforce constantly that the United States
remains not just open to, but actually interested, in
negotiating. This will be important for both diplomacy and
international sanctions enforcement. We have no way to control
what North Korea does, but we do control what we say and do.
Second, there should be no more summits without substance.
We have now tested the theory that leader level negotiations
will deliver better results than the hard slog of substantive
diplomacy. The diplomacy leading up to the JCPOA took years of
subcabinet- and cabinet-level effort, and a comprehensive deal
was achieved without summits.
Third, we need a coherent interagency strategy that is
supported by both the President and his national security team.
The North Koreans are exploiting the divisions between the
President and his team. This bifurcation is creating
dysfunction in our diplomacy, dysfunction in our alliance
relationships, and ultimately undermining our strategy.
Fourth, the President needs to stop ingratiating himself to
Kim Jong-un. While developing a practical relationship with an
adversary to advance your interest is often necessary, there
are basic values a U.S. President should not abandon.
Finally, we need to set realistic objectives on realistic
time horizons. While complete denuclearization should always be
our long-term objective, we all know a unilateral surrender by
Kim Jong-un and beach resorts suddenly popping up on the coast
of North Korea are not in the cards anytime soon. This is a
negotiation. The U.S. negotiating team needs to be prepared for
multiple alternatives to its maximalist positions and to look
for pathways to get meaningful concessions at an acceptable
price. And yes, that means reconsidering a step-by-step
approach and doing the hard work on possible interim deals.
We also have a lot of work ahead of us on alliance
management with both Seoul and Tokyo, including the hard but
increasingly necessary work of trilateral cooperation. We need
to double down on sanctions enforcement before we cast our eyes
on new sanctions and develop coherence in sanction diplomacy.
It was clear from Hanoi that sanctions relief is a key
motivator to Kim Jong-un. That is our leverage. And we need to
take steps to strengthen deterrence and defense with an eye
towards a long game, especially in the event that diplomacy
fails and the threat continues.
Finally, I believe Congress has a tremendous role to play
in our North Korea strategy. I commend the members of this
committee for important oversight that you are doing and
especially her close attention to human rights. In my view, the
administration should view Congress as a partner in its
strategy. That's the only way we are going to be successful.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kelly E. Magsamen
Chairman Gardner, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the
Committee: it is an honor to be invited to give testimony today on U.S.
policy towards North Korea after the Hanoi Summit. It is also a great
honor to testify alongside Dr. Cha, whose extensive experience on this
issue is unmatched and whose analysis I seek to inform my own.
Today, after two U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore and Hanoi,
North Korea still has upwards of 60 nuclear weapons and is continuing
to accumulate fissile material to make more. It retains the ballistic
missile capability to threaten Hawaii, Alaska, the West Coast, and of
course, our ally Japan and has proven the capability to range most of
the continental United States. And North Korea retains a conventional
capacity to put South Korea at unacceptable risk. In sum, the threat
has not changed.
I want to be clear at the outset that I am strong supporter of
diplomacy with North Korea, but I want to also be clear that I think
the administration is doing it wrong. And while better than the days of
``fire and fury,'' this problem is not going to be solved through
reality TV episodes. It's going to take deliberate, integrated and
coherent interagency effort in close partnership with the international
community.
analysis of the hanoi summit
In the case of the Hanoi summit, many of us were worried about the
possibility of a bad deal. The good news is that this did not happen.
The bad news is that the way forward is now deeply uncertain and full
of risks. We cannot be complacent in the status quo, even if it is
better than ``fire and fury.'' We cannot keep grading on a curve.
The reality is that the Hanoi summit never should have happened.
The President of the United States went into a room with Kim Jong-un
for a second time with no firm commitments and only a rough outline of
possibilities, as well as maximalist illusions of a grand bargain that
he alone could make. It turns out that this is not a real estate deal--
it's actual rocket science.
It is also not entirely clear what happened in Hanoi--whether the
President or Kim Jong-un attempted any meaningful compromises. There
has been mixed reporting about what may have been offered by the North
Koreans--vague promises of steps on Yongbyon in exchange for some level
of sanctions relief. And reports that President Trump offered to ``go
big'' with a much more expansive deal. Both leaders walked away with
their own version of events, but what it revealed was the continued
disconnect on the scope and definition of denuclearization. The fact
that we do not have a clear understanding of what we are negotiating
towards continues to be the basic rub. So, we are where we are.
What next for diplomacy?
Setbacks in diplomacy are to be expected. With proper preparation,
they can be managed and can even be clarifying for both sides. This was
the case for the Reykjavik Summit between President Reagan and
Gorbachev. But it's always better to under-promise and over-deliver.
Unfortunately, the opposite has been the case since 2017. And it's
putting us on a path to mismatched expectations and possible
miscalculations.
In my view, the U.S. team needs to get back to some first
principles:
First, reinforce that the United States remains not just open to
but actually interested in negotiating. This will be important
for both diplomacy and international sanctions enforcement to
demonstrate our seriousness. We have no way to control whether
North Korea chooses to engage seriously but do control what we
say and do.
Second, there should be no more summits without substance. We have
now tested the theory that leader-level negotiations will
deliver better results than the hard slog of substantive
diplomacy. The diplomacy leading up to the JCPOA took years of
sub-Cabinet and Cabinet level effort and a comprehensive deal
was achieved without summits.
Third, we need a coherent interagency strategy that is supported by
both the President and his national security team. The North
Koreans are exploiting the divisions between the President and
his national security team. This bifurcation is creating
dysfunction in our diplomacy, dysfunction in our alliance
relationships and ultimately undermining our interests.
Fourth, the President needs to stop ingratiating himself to Kim
Jong-un. While developing a practical relationship with an
adversary to advance your interests is often necessary, there
are basic values a U.S. President should not abandon.
Finally, we need to set realistic objectives on realistic time
horizons. While complete denuclearization should be our long-
term goal, we all know a unilateral surrender by Kim Jong-un
and beach resorts suddenly popping up on the coast of North
Korea are not in the cards anytime soon or maybe even ever.
This is a negotiation. The U.S. negotiating team needs to
prepare multiple alternatives to its maximalist positions and
look for pathways to get meaningful concessions at an
acceptable price. And yes, that means reconsidering a ``step by
step'' approach.
The Hanoi Summit was useful in that it clarified some negotiating
contours: the U.S. will not allow significant sanctions relief for a
meaningless deal and North Korea remains deeply interested in sanctions
relief and willing to take steps but is not interested in grand
bargains.
Within these contours, the administration should also consider what
the outlines of an acceptable interim deal might look like. While
reasonable people can debate the JCPOA, the interim Joint Plan of
Action reached in 2013 demonstrated that you can in fact perform mutual
confidence building measures (sanctions relief and freezing significant
portions of programs) without collapsing international sanctions
pressure and still reaching a final, more comprehensive deal. Elements
of that interim deal could include formalizing the current freeze;
additional freeze on enrichment and reprocessing; limited sanctions
relief; and other confidence-building measures.
Where do we go with alliance management?
As we enter this period of uncertainty, alliance relations between
the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will require a new level of mutual
dexterity. I am concerned that we are not entirely on the same page
with our ally despite all the efforts to portray unity. As North Korea
maintains straining and splitting the U.S.-ROK alliance as one of its
top objectives, active alliance management must be a critical component
of the U.S. strategy as we cannot have an effective North Korea
strategy without Seoul. We need to be sending senior officials to Seoul
often, making good use of our alliance coordination mechanisms, and
most importantly, avoiding own goals like the recent heavy-handed U.S.
approach to the Special Measures Agreement negotiations.
Washington and Seoul will need to come to a mutual understanding of
how to handle the stress tests to the alliance that likely lie in the
months ahead, including a potential return to a provocation cycle by
the North, new sanctions enforcement measures, or setbacks in inter-
Korean diplomacy such as the recent unexpected North Korean withdrawal
of its personnel from the Kaesong liaison office. North Korea will seek
every opportunity put pressure on Seoul, and we should anticipate and
prepare for those moves together.
Meanwhile, Tokyo is undoubtedly relieved that a bad deal was not
reached in Hanoi. But to be clear, the lack of progress towards
denuclearization is also not in Japan's interest even if the current
freeze on nuclear and ballistic missile testing provides some temporary
comfort.
There is no doubt Prime Minister Abe is happy that North Korean
ballistic missiles are not flying over Japan. Despite President Trump's
public promises to Prime Minister Abe that he would raise Japanese
abductees with North Korea during negotiations, his words absolving Kim
Jong-un of any responsibility for the death of Otto Warmbier probably
offer little comfort to Japan of the President's sincerity. Frankly,
the President's words should give us all pause. At the same time, a
little coordination with Tokyo can go a long way: surprises like the
unilateral suspension of military exercises feed Japanese anxiety about
U.S. diplomacy with North Korea.
But the most important alliance management effort that the United
States should be taking right now is working to improve relations
between Seoul and Tokyo, which may be at their lowest point since the
restoration of relations in 1965. This will require consistent high-
level effort by the United States, including at the leader level.
During this period of diplomatic uncertainty, the North Koreans need to
look out and see that lack of diplomatic progress is bringing the U.S.,
Seoul and Tokyo closer together and not farther apart--that delay is
not cost-free with respect to its regional security interests. In this
regard, the recent bicameral Congressional legislation to emphasize the
importance of trilateral cooperation was an extremely important
political signal. The President should also put his political weight
behind these efforts.
What next for the pressure campaign?
It is important to remember that the goal of sanctions is to
support diplomacy--they are not an end in themselves. And while
sanctions will not bring North Korea to its knees, it was clear from
Kim Jong-un's own behavior at the Hanoi Summit that the pressure is
working. North Korea remains focused on meaningful sanctions relief as
its primary objective. It is important to note that the North Korean
economy has had negative growth for 3 years in a row.
In the absence of North Korean provocations, the logical focus now
should be on aggressive sanctions enforcement rather than new
sanctions. Maintaining the current level of pressure on North Korea
will be no easy task and requires full time, high-level attention. The
U.N. Panel on Experts on North Korea outlined several areas where
sanctions enforcement is falling short. In this regards, the
administration's decision this week to designate the two Chinese
shipping companies for sanctions evasion was the right decision. The
confusing presidential tweet afterwards was not. It portrayed stunning
incoherence--an incoherence that North Korea, China and others will
exploit.
And if serious diplomacy restarts, the administration should
explore what limited sanctions relief might support an interim
agreement without necessarily removing leverage. Here, it will be
important to ensure that U.N. sanctions that deal directly with North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic programs remain in place. However, the
administration can look to temporary and proportional sanctions
relief--through waivers and exemptions--with built in snap-back
provisions to incentivize North Korea to not just take but sustain
increasingly meaningful steps.
How do we maintain adequate deterrence?
During this period of diplomatic uncertainty, it will also be
especially important that the United States maintains an adequate
deterrence posture vis-a-vis North Korea. The sustained suspension of
major alliance joint exercises will present some challenges in this
regard. While modifying the exercises and finding creative alternatives
can maintain readiness, it is not a complete substitute for the high-
end exercising. This training and exercising is frankly even more
important for the readiness of South Korean forces than American
forces. That said, I do believe sustained suspension is necessary for
now to ensure that the window for diplomacy is not closed prematurely.
Unfortunately, when the President made the unilateral decision to
suspend the exercises temporarily after Singapore, he all but
guaranteed that any future resurrection would be framed as provocative.
In that regard, again, we are where we are. In the event of serious
North Korean provocations, the administration should clearly revisit
its position.
Regardless of the ups and downs of diplomacy, the U.S. and its
allies should be preparing for the long game on deterrence with respect
to North Korea. If diplomacy ultimately fails, we may find ourselves in
a long-term deterrence and containment scenario. That is going to
require a fresh look at defense and intelligence requirements to ensure
that North Korea cannot proliferate its technology and material, as it
has in the past. It is going to require that the U.S. take steps to
ensure adequate defense of our allies and our homeland.
the role of congress
I want to commend the members of this subcommittee for their active
attention to the North Korea challenge. Active congressional oversight
on this issue is essential and Congress has the right to understand and
help shape U.S. policy. As a former Defense Department official, I can
guarantee you that active congressional oversight is the best way to
ensure that U.S. strategy is grounded in the interests of the American
people.
That said, I would also encourage Congress to also think carefully
about its role in the pressure campaign. While Congress can usefully
play the bad cop to add leverage to negotiations and keep pressure on
the White House, as it did in the case of the Iran, it needs to be
well-coordinated with our diplomatic strategy. This is where the
administration could do a much better job of briefing and coordinating
with Congress and viewing it as an equal partner. What made our Iran
pressure campaign so successful in 2010 in bringing Iran to the table
was that we had a well-sequenced campaign of U.N., European and U.S.
congressional sanctions.
One area where more pressure can and should be applied in the near
term by Congress as well as the international community is on human
rights. However, instead of just purely punitive measures against the
regime, we should explore ways to improve the lives of the North Korean
people. The State Department took some steps in this regard earlier
this year, lifting travel restrictions on aid workers and lifting some
restrictions on humanitarian supplies. But there is far more than can
and should be done. According to the United Nations, humanitarian
funding for North Korea is at a 10-year low. In 2012, it was $117.8
million. In 2018, it was $17.1 million.
Full funding of U.N. and other NGO programs providing critical food
and medical relief to the North Korean people is essential to
demonstrating that the United States remains a compassionate global
leader. Further, the position of Special Envoy for North Korean Human
Rights Issues remains vacant, and this body should demand the
administration quickly fill it.
conclusion
We all want diplomacy to succeed, but the United States must
demonstrate to the world that any failure of diplomacy rests squarely
with Kim Jong-un. We should avoid generating easy opportunities for
North Korea to split us from our allies. We must be steady, deliberate
and coherent in how we execute our strategy instead of looking for big
splashy wins and made for TV moments. Only then can we set the
conditions for real progress.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today before this
committee. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Ms. Magsamen.
I'll begin with questions. I want to start with legislation
that Senator Markey and I have worked together on, the Gardner-
Markey Asia Reassurance Initiative signed into law on New
Year's Eve this past year. Within that legislation, there is a
provision that states that not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment, which will be tomorrow, and every 180
days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of
State or designee shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes actions taken by the
United States to address the threats posed by and the
capabilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Each report will have a summary of ongoing efforts by the
United States, talking about our strategies and policies
including assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of such
strategies and policies; policies to achieve peaceful
denuclearizations, to eliminate the threat posed by ballistic
missiles, a potential roadmap toward peaceful denuclearization,
specific actions that DPRK would need to take for such a
roadmap to become viable, a summary of U.S. strategy to
increase international coordination and cooperation, the
description of actions taken by the United States to fully
implement United Nations Security Council resolutions, other
actions. It goes on and on.
This report is due tomorrow. I've had multiple
conversations with the State Department and Department of
Defense about this report.
Dr. Cha and Ms. Magsamen, are you hearing that this report
is imminent, it's been published, it's just waiting to be filed
tomorrow?
Dr. Cha. Chairman Gardner, I have not--unfortunately, I
have not heard that. I think that provision within ARIA is a
very important one because it speaks to exactly the thing that
Ms. Magsamen was saying, which is the absence of any
transparency on the policy. I think this body as well as the
American public have given the administration a lot of rope in
terms of their efforts to try to do this in a very
unconventional way using backdoor diplomacy, not a lot of
transparency--not just for the Congress, but even within the
interagency, there hasn't been a lot of transparency--because
the President wanted to try it his own way. And so he's done
that. He's done that twice. And there couldn't have been a
bigger sign of failure then what happened at Hanoi.
So I think it's high time that there's more transparency,
there's a regularization of the process, again, as Ms. Magsamen
said, and this is not just simply an issue of something passed
by Congress that requires administration action. This is
actually something that can help their diplomacy, because the
North Koreans have had three agreements with the United States
that have come apart because administrations have changed. And
so the most credible sign to the North Koreans that something
we negotiate is going to stand the test of time will be if
there is congressional buy-in.
So I think at this particular point, as there is not a
clear road ahead, I think we really need to reset. And a big
part of that is having the Congress have much more insight and
input into how we are thinking about this policy.
Senator Gardner. Ms. Magsamen, are you hearing the same
thing?
Ms. Magsamen. Well, I agree with--I haven't heard anything
about the report unfortunately, but I do agree with Dr. Cha;
the only way we're going to be successful in the strategy is if
we have a unified front between the President, the executive
branch, within the interagency, and the U.S. Congress.
I think, you know, looking back to my experience on Iran,
one of the things that made us very successful in the pressure
campaign was the fact that we worked closely with the U.S.
Congress on the pressure campaign, the sanction strategy around
2010. And I think that was a hugely important effort. And
that's how the administration should be looking at the
Congress. It should be looking at the Congress as a partner in
its efforts, to what Dr. Cha said.
Senator Gardner. One thing in your statements, both of you
talk about the need for clear diplomatic paths ahead, that that
seems to be something that we're lacking right now. That
provision in the Asia Reassurance Initiative gives a very clear
directive to the administration to let Congress know the buy-in
that you've both talked about I think is absolutely critical,
and it gives our allies in South Korea a roadmap to where we
would like to head, and it certainly lays out to North Korea
how we will expect them to abide by international law and
indeed U.S. law.
Dr. Cha, you mentioned in your opening statement that North
Korea has not changed and--their strategies. But, you know, the
U.S. has. And we've not gotten a single thing in return. Could
you talk a little bit about the ways that you're seeing the
U.S. policy change toward North Korea as we sit here and speak
today? What has changed about U.S. policies? And match that up
against an unchanging North Korea determination to continue its
nuclear policy.
Dr. Cha. Happy to. So there are a few things that have
changed. The first is--well, the first is the summit-level
meeting. This was something that the North Koreans have wanted
for decades. It was something the United States has held back
for a variety of reasons, not just tactically, but on
principle; without real, genuine evidence of North Korea
rejoining the international community of nations, it just did
not make sense to put the President in front of the worst
dictator, the worst human rights abuser in modern history. And
so we've changed that. We have given that up.
The other thing is that we've--when I participated in the
Six-Party Talks, we did talk about a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula as well as liaison offices and possible normalization
of relations with North Korea. But that was always considered
to be something that would become towards the end of a process,
or at least while a denuclearization process was well under
way. And again, these were things that it looked like, at least
prior to Hanoi, were being willfully put on the table by the
United States as the price for entry into the negotiations.
Third is that while I think every administration reserves
the right, because the policy is so difficult, to have a degree
of space when it comes to dealing with negotiating with North
Korea, this administration, again, used very unconventional
means, back channels that had really no advising that was given
either to this body or even to members of their own
administration nor allies. And I think that's something that's
quite different.
And what has remained consistent on the North Korean side
is, and to me, this was the most disappointing part of the
Hanoi summit, was the position that they walked in with was a
position I think that was well-aware to us in advance, to the
U.S. side, and was unreasonable and I think for many was seen
as sort of an opening gambit. But the fact that they came in
with the same position at the leadership level with the U.S.
President, a position that you would expect them to take in a
working-level meeting in the first round was the same position
they held until the meeting with the President was very
disappointing and really showed a lack of flexibility and
unwillingness, really, to negotiate in earnest.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And Dr. Cha, just to summarize,
I mean, you basically have this summit that has now been
offered twice. We have this sort of normalization of relations
with North Korea that may be on the table now. You have
unconventional means with no sort of advising of allies or
administration colleagues. You have this position of Kim Jong-
un that has not changed that we knew going in. And I'll add to
that list we now have sanctions that are being waived by the
President after Treasury, by law, issues them. And it seems
that we have now changed dramatically, and the one consistency
is Kim Jong-un's nuclear program.
I think this body ought to be growing more and more
frustrated with the U.S. continuing to change our policy while
Kim Jong-un sits back and continues to develop fissile
material, nuclear weapons without doing a doggone thing except
watch the United States change its negotiating position.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I agree with
you completely.
Thank you for being here. On Friday, President Trump caused
confusion when he tweeted, ``It was announced today by the U.S.
Treasury that additional large-scale sanctions would be added
to those already-existing sanctions on North Korea. I have
today ordered the withdrawal of those additional sanctions.''
But of course, no new sanctions had been announced. The
Treasury Department announced two additional designations a day
earlier, but those represented regular updates to existing
sanctions.
Both of you are international relations experts. You have
spent your career studying the nuances of how governments
achieve policy goals. How important is signaling in
international relations, especially when we are in
negotiations? What are the implications of sending mixed or
muddled messages? How did President Trump's tweet from Friday
affect U.S. messaging? Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. Thank you, Senator. About a year ago, January
2018, I gave testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee about North Korea, this same topic. And I said the
most important part of our strategy has to be clear and
consistent strategic messaging. And I think Friday's events
over the issuing of sanctions and the sort of alleged waiving
of sanctions, potentially new sanctions, I think creates
confusion, and it demonstrates to the North Koreans that
there's divisions within the administration potentially on
these issues, which, those divisions are the ones they will
exploit.
To Dr. Cha's point, when the President walked into the
Hanoi summit, they had the same position knowing that there was
division within the administration, so they were going to try
to test their position with the President of the United States
directly. So I think it's essential that the President and his
national security team be on the same page on their strategy.
This is something that, for the North Koreans, they will
exploit every possible division. For our allies, it creates
complete confusion over who has the ball, whose view is
prevailing within the administration. And I think that's really
bad for our strategy.
You know, I think with respect to sanctions, I think
Treasury's actions last week were completely appropriate. They
were with respect to sanctions enforcement of existing
sanctions. And so what they were doing I think was really
important. As we look now in this period of uncertainty,
sanctions enforcement is going to be essential going forward.
So I was very confused by what the President did through his
tweet on Friday, and I'm certain that our allies in the
international community--including the financial community, the
business community--they're all very confused about where we're
going.
Senator Markey. Yeah.
So, obviously we're concerned about this, Dr. Cha, and its
potential signaling to Russia and China that we're not really
sincere in implementing the already-existing sanctions,
allowing for additional slippage in terms of the pressure on
North Korea for them to change their behavior. Could you talk
about your response to what happened last week?
Dr. Cha. Yes. So I think, like all of us, everybody was
quite confused by the tweet. I would agree with everything that
Ms. Magsamen said. I think it reinforces the worst tendencies
of--the worst tendencies that have actually led us to where we
are right now, which is two summits and absolutely no progress.
If anything, North Korea has increased its weapons stockpile
since the Singapore summit.
So the problem is that these sanctions--the North Korean
leader made clear what mattered to him at Hanoi. It wasn't a
peace regime. It wasn't liaison offices. He had his time with
the President, and the one thing he focused on was sanctions
relief. So we know that that--as Ms. Magsamen said too--that is
our leverage. That is our point of leverage. That is what they
value. And for us--for the President then to go out and
essentially undercut his own leverage in dealing with this
problem, it doesn't make a great deal of sense and, again,
reinforces this tendency for the North Koreans to believe that
they can abandon the working-level discussions, which tend to
be harder, it's a harder slog, and think they can just go for
the home run or the touchdown, if you will, which is with the
President of the United States.
I would add to what Kelly said in that not only did they
believe coming to Hanoi that they could make a run at the
President and see if they could change his position, they
didn't have a fallback position. They didn't have a plan B,
which meant they really believed that they could bypass the
U.S. national security establishment and try to cut a deal with
the President.
Senator Markey. Okay, great. Thank you.
Now, Ms. Magsamen, let me go to you again. The U.N. Panel
of Experts report raises concerns about a ``massive increase in
illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and
coal,'' but these transfers rely on brokers like the overseas
representatives of the RGB, a North Korean intelligence agency.
The U.N. report states that one known broker for ship-to-ship
transfers is an individual based in Shenyang, China. Elsewhere,
the report implies that China is not closing the bank accounts
of family members of North Koreans' overseas representatives
when those accounts are used to evade sanctions, allowing North
Korea to maintain its access to the global financial system.
And finally, the report notes that the Chinese messaging and
payment platform WeChat is ``the primary means'' of
communication for ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea
and the Yellow Sea.
What should the Trump administration do to tighten China
sanctions enforcement? Is it likely the Chinese government has
conducted appropriate outreach to banks and payment platforms
to encourage proactive compliance with global sanctions?
Ms. Magsamen. Thank you, Senator. It's a very important
question. I think, you know, sanctions enforcement has to be at
the top of the priority list right now in this period of time.
And I think the administration has done a pretty good job of
putting in place very important sanctions since 2016.
I do think that it's time for the administration to
potentially dedicate some high-level, senior, almost cabinet-
level or subcabinet-level effort to this. In the case of Iran
strategy, we had Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey
at the time going around the world working on sanctions
enforcement around the world. I think a similar effort needs to
be taken now. Somebody at the Treasury Department or the State
Department needs to be appointed full-time in charge of
sanctions enforcement on North Korea. I think that'd be hugely
valuable. It's not clear to me that Steve Biegun or others have
that kind of time, given all the other challenges they've got
to face. So, and part of that has to be China. Part of that has
to be sitting on China all the time, every day, ensuring that
the Chinese are taking action.
Now, whether or not the trade dispute currently between the
President and Beijing is interacting or affecting any of this
is not clear to me. I think the President needs to make clear
to President Xi Jinping that this is an essential priority for
the United States that sanctions enforcement for North Korea is
going to be the top of the list regardless of whatever
negotiations are going on, on the bilateral trade issues. I
think it's important that the President reinforce that directly
with Beijing.
Senator Markey. Beautiful.
Dr. Cha.
Dr. Cha. I think this point about reinforcing this message
to China is very important at the highest levels. I mean, not
just--but consistently across all levels of the U.S.
government. So even as members of U.S. Congress travel, it's an
important message to send because, you know, the Chinese used
to make the argument when we called for them to put more
sanctions on things as remote as this--ship-to-ship transfers,
payments through WeChat--the argument they used to make is
that, you know, we're a big country, it's very decentralized,
we can't do all this stuff. But the reality is when they want
to, they can. And they did, in the last quarter of 2017, put
very serious sanctions on North Korea. So they have the
capacity to do this if the will is there, and the will, will
not be there if the United States is not on all channels
sending this very important message.
The other thing I'd like to add is that when we talk about
increasing sanctioning on North Korea, this is not increasing
sanctioning because the Hanoi summit failed; it's increasing
sanctioning because they are violating current sanctions so
that there's a question of enforcement of existing sanctions,
existing law, and also because they continue to proliferate,
they continue to develop weapons and fissile material, and they
continue to violate human rights. That's why the sanctions are
there.
Senator Markey. So what do you make of the fact that the
administration has only designated 34 individuals, entities,
and vessels in connection to North Korea even as the latest
U.N. Panel of Experts report details serious shortcomings in
sanctions enforcement, and through this lack of action, the
Trump administration has boxed itself in. The world has the
impression that simply adding entities to our North Korea
sanctions list is a serious escalation instead of just routine
maintenance, which is really what it is. What message is that
sending?
Ms. Magsamen. Well, I think it sends a message that the
administration needs to update its messaging at the highest
levels about what we're actually trying to do. I think it's
very important that we be clear and consistent with the
international community about sanctions enforcement so it
doesn't become an escalatory situation, as you point out,
Senator.
Senator Markey. Beautiful.
Dr. Cha. The thing I would add is that, I mean, what the
Panel of Experts did highlight is that North Korean efforts to
circumvent sanctions are robust, and they're effective. They're
effective at doing this. So part of this is not the
administration's fault, in the sense that North Korea is
finding workarounds. But once we identify what those
workarounds are, we have to go after them right away.
And so the statement that you described, Senator that the
President made on--was it Friday? I mean, that just completely
undercuts the whole philosophy behind why we pursue sanctions.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Markey. And I want to
correct one of my comments earlier--it's good news for the
State Department--they actually have a few more days.
Tomorrow's not March 31st. So they have a few more days to get
this report done.
In a letter that Senator Markey and I sent to Secretary
Pompeo and Secretary Mnuchin March 14th, and I'm going to
submit this for the record if there's no objection, but in this
letter, we reminded the administration about the March 31st
report that would lay out the roadmap, diplomatic security
strategic roadmap as it relates to North Korea. We reminded
them of this deadline, in law that the President signed on the
31st of December and we also talked about this pace of
sanctions. And here's what we said:
``Unfortunately, it appears that the pace of U.S. sanctions
designations with regard to North Korea has slowed
considerably. According to research conducted by the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, since March 31, 2017, the Trump
administration sanctioned 182 persons and entities for North
Korea sanctions violations; however, after February 23, 2018,
the Treasury Department has issued only 26 new designations
despite ample evidence of illicit behavior from Pyongyang and
its enablers.''
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
the hearing.]
Senator Gardner. So you have this slowing of pace. The law
requires--the North Korea Sanctions Enhancement Act requires
that the U.S. investigate and designate those who violate our
sanctions. If they don't, then it requires a waiver from the
administration.
So I think we've only received one or two waivers, perhaps
a few more, but, clearly, Treasury knows of more violators. So
are they going to move forward with this or not? Is the
administration going to continue to offer waivers? And I assume
that we should be expecting waivers, then, for the sanctions
that apparently the President waived on Friday. I assume that
has to follow the law, because the law says that they should be
sanctioned, and that's what Treasury was doing. So I guess we
anticipate those waivers.
There seems to be this willingness to give up sanctions,
but yet, going back to the question I asked before, nothing in
return. So on Friday, the sanctions were lifted or waived, or
waived off, and there was nothing that we got in return.
I mean, Ms. Magsamen, are you aware of anything the United
States got in return or for the waivers of those sanctions?
Ms. Magsamen. Certainly not.
Senator Gardner. And Dr. Cha.
Dr. Cha. No. I mean, the one thing that was reported in the
press was that the North Koreans had left the inter-Korean
liaison office and then they came back, but there's no way that
one could say one caused the other.
Senator Gardner. Well, and even if it did, Dr. Cha, I think
that the concern is that their bad behavior gets rewarded.
Dr. Cha. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Gardner. So they walk away of their own volition,
we give them something in return, and they come back to
something they walked away from.
Dr. Cha. Right, which they would consider a major success.
Senator Gardner. My growing concern is that we had this
successful maximum-pressure doctrine that was put in place and
that it was beginning to work. My concern is that we are slow-
walking back into strategic patience. And I hope we can get
clarity with this report that's due on March 31st. We'll have
an opportunity to hear from General Stilwell tomorrow at a
confirmation hearing. We're going to talk about this. But my
concern is that the administration is slow-walking back into a
strategic patience.
Now, strategic patience led to the continued production. I
guess it's the status quo. I guess maybe it's no different than
we are in today, right now. If the United States simply gives
up on this progress or just decides to live with a nuclearized
North Korea, the risk of that is unacceptable. And the
proliferation risk--could you explain the proliferation risk if
we don't change course right now with North Korea?
Dr. Cha. Sure. I mean, it's multidimensional. As you know
well, Chairman, that the one most concerning thing, of course,
is the growth of the homeland security threat as North Korea
perfects long-range delivery systems to mate with their nuclear
warheads. The other is the concern about sale. North Korea
unfortunately has sold every weapons system it has ever
developed, from small arms to ballistic missiles. The Ghauri
missile, the Shahab missile are all first-generation North
Korean ballistic missiles.
As some of our research has shown, North Korea has at least
20 undeclared missile bases that are part of the mainstay of
their short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missile
program, none of which appear to be part of any sort of ongoing
negotiation.
So you're absolutely right. There is--if we fall back into
a sort of patience, strategic patience, if you will, policy,
this will do nothing to stem the collaboration threat.
Senator Gardner. In September--and Ms. Magsamen, I don't
know if you wanted to comment on that or not.
Ms. Magsamen. I will say I do think that we have to keep
the door open to diplomacy. I think that's the only way this
threat is ever going to be addressed in the end game. I do not
think that sanctions alone are going to produce the result that
we want, so I do think it's important that the administration
continue to try to pursue diplomacy with Korea.
I think the most important thing that we could be doing
right now is alliance management. I think we are entering a
period that's going to be a little bit topsy-turvy in this
regard with respect to the strategic comparatives that Seoul
has, where Tokyo is and their concerns, the fact that
trilateral cooperation has pretty much collapsed and the
relationship between South Korea and Japan is falling apart.
I think there's got to be a sort of maintenance level of
diplomacy among our allies right now to ensure that we are all
working on the same sheet of music, that we all anticipate what
the North Koreans are going to throw our way, what the Chinese
are going to throw our way and the Russians are going to throw
our way, and that we work collectively to address it in this
period of time.
Senator Gardner. And something like the report that's
required by law due March 31st would help us meet those sort of
concerns you have, correct?
Ms. Magsamen. Absolutely. I think it's really important
that the administration lay out its strategy and work in
partnership with Congress to effectuate it.
Senator Gardner. In September of last year, Secretary
Pompeo made the following statement, talking about some of the
conversations they've had with Steve Biegun and the invitation
of various Korean officials to the negotiations: This will mark
the beginning of negotiations to transform U.S.-DPRK relations
through the process of rapid denuclearization of North Korea to
be completed by January 2021 as committed by Chairman Kim and
to construct a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula, Secretary Pompeo said.
Are we on the same time frame, rapid denuclearization by
2021, Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. It certainly doesn't appear to be the case,
Chairman. The one thing if I could add to the point about
sanctions, the North Korea Sanctions Policy Enforcement Act,
the provision ARIA, is that this also has international
support. I mean, if the EU3, other countries, with the
exception of China, maybe, and Russia, this sanctions policy
has had universal support among all U.N. member states, backed
by 11 U.N. Security Council resolutions, in addition to
existing congressional legislation.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
The U.N. Panel of Experts report on North Korea tells the
story of one U.S. effort to stop North Korea from importing
refined petroleum products above the U.N.'s cap of 500,000
barrels. In July of 2018, the United States notified the U.N.'s
North Korea Sanctions Committee that the Kim regime had hit its
import limit back in May of that year in part by relying on
illicit ship-to-ship transfers, yet Russia repeatedly objected
to the numbers and evidence collected by the United States.
In September, despite U.S. documentation of 148 deliveries
of refined petroleum products to North Korea along with images
and explanations of the process by which transfers occurred,
Russia asked to put the U.S. request ``on hold.''
Question: In Russia, they seem to be in denial. And so, is
Russia protecting the Kim regime because Russia profits from
continued sales of refined petroleum products, because Russia
has an interest in undermining the effectiveness of U.S.
sanctions on North Korea, or because Russia has a broader
interest in undermining all U.S. sanctions? Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. Yes, I saw that data as well, and it was very
concerning. I think the issue with Russia is, I do agree that
they see interest in and of itself in undermining broader U.S.
policy efforts on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia. When it
comes to North Korea in particular, I have found over the past
decades that Russian policy is very self-serving. So it could
simply be for the fact that they are making money off these
ship-to-ship transfers, that they would do it that way. It was
the same reason that they were willing to offer North Korea
civilian nuclear reactors and technology when the international
community was against providing those things to them and was
trying to convince them of alternative energy sources if they
were to give up their plutonium reactors.
So there's a very self-serving nature to their policy on
the Korean Peninsula, and this piece of data appears to fit
with that longer-term behavioral trend.
Ms. Magsamen. I agree with Dr. Cha, and I'm very glad you
raised it, Senator, because I do think there's a lot of
American focus on Chinese enforcement of sanctions, but we have
a similar problem on the Russia front, so I'm glad you raised
it. More attention needs to be put on the Russia sanctions
enforcement issue, and I agree with Dr. Cha that they generally
want to make money, they want to play spoiler. And so really
watching the Russia flank on sanctions enforcement is going to
be very important going forward.
Senator Markey. Okay, great.
Now, let me follow up with the next question. The State
Department recently estimated that in 2018 there were--this is
an unbelievable number--100,000 North Korean citizens working
as overseas laborers primarily in Russia and China. And in
addition, the State Department explicitly named 35 other
countries in which these workers were present. Another report
from the firm C4ADS noted that despite mandatory sanctions
authority targeting employers of Korean workers, relatively few
employers have faced any action at all.
Question One: North Korean overseas laborers work under
oppressive conditions, and the Kim regime uses them to generate
hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue every year. Why do
you think we haven't taken more action in the Trump
administration against companies that continue to employ North
Korean workers, and what should the administration be doing
instead? Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. I don't know why the administration hasn't
taken more action. I do think this goes back to an earlier
point I made. I think there has to be somebody in charge of
sanctions enforcement across the interagency. And that person
needs to be high-level, they need to be going out doing the
capital-to-capital engagement on sanctions enforcement that we
did during the previous administration and also in the Bush
administration on Iran. I think there needs to be someone who's
given this ball to run with, whether it's on Russia, shipping,
or coal or, you know, overseas workers. Somebody needs to be
put in charge of this full-time.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Cha, according to press reports this morning, Russia
and China recently told the U.N. that they sent home more than
half of the workers in their countries during 2018. How
credible do you think that self-reporting is, and do you expect
China and Russia and the other countries to meet the U.N.
deadline of December 22nd of this year to repatriate to North
Korea all North Koreans earning income in their countries?
Dr. Cha. As you said, Senator, they are obligated by the
U.N. to do this. Self-reporting--well, I would believe the
self-reporting like I believe China's self-reporting on their
economic trade with North Korea, which is I don't believe it
very much.
Yes, the solution here, at least from a U.S. policy
perspective, is secondary sanctioning of the companies that we
know are doing this, regardless of what country they're in. The
other is if governments claim ignorance, then we should be
providing them information on the companies that are
undertaking this activity so that they could then be stopped.
And if they're not stopped, then we sanction them.
Senator Markey. Okay. Beautiful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gardner. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank you, Dr. Cha and Ms. Magsamen, for
being here today offering your thoughtful testimony.
This is really for both of you. South Korean President Moon
has said that Seoul will work to get nuclear negotiations back
on track in the wake of the Hanoi summit. Moon has been a
critical player in the relationship between South Korea and
North Korea and the United States. Do you both believe that
President Moon desires to see a unified Korean Peninsula, and
if so, how should the idea of a unified Korean Peninsula inform
next steps in the wake of the summit? Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. So I think the South Korean President is committed
to an engagement strategy with North Korea. The tip of the
sword of that is really economic engagement using economic
incentives to bring North Korea to the table. I think the
ultimate goal of that is not necessarily unification, but it is
to try to create at least a one country, two systems approach
for the time being.
The current South Korean President hails from the
progressive end of the political spectrum. And there's a long
line of thinking in the progressive end of Korean politics that
the goal is not unification, but it is to try to create this
one country, two systems, where there is an economic marriage
between the two sides, but they would allow the North Koreans
to maintain sort of a separate political entity, at least for
the foreseeable future. And the reason----
Senator Young. Sort of a confederacy?
Dr. Cha. Yeah, a confederacy of sorts, that it's sort of a
non-conflictual political solution. There's lots of human
rights issues that come up with something like that. But I
think that's what they're aiming towards.
And then, to your question of incentives, I don't think now
is the right time for the South Korean government to be
providing incentives to North Korea. It would again undercut
the overall strategy that is being--that we are trying to
prosecute along with our allies.
Senator Young. Ms. Magsamen.
Ms. Magsamen. I agree with Dr. Cha. I do think that we
can't have a North Korea strategy without Seoul, however. So I
think right now it's----
Senator Young. Gotta have soul.
Ms. Magsamen. Huh?
Senator Young. It's gotta have soul.
Ms. Magsamen. It's gotta have soul, of all sorts.
So I do think it's really important for the United States,
the administration to sit down with South Korea right now and
anticipate some of the ways that North Korea is going to seek
to divide the United States from South Korea. And there are
going to be stress tests along the way. I think we saw it over
the weekend with the North Koreans pulling their folks out of
the Kaesong complex and sending them back in. I think these are
the kinds of maneuvers that the North Koreans are going to
pursue. And while reunification may not be Seoul's objective,
we have to remember that Kim Jong-un does have that objective
of a reunified Korea. And so I think we need to be vigilant
with respect to defense of South Korea as well, in terms of
deterrence.
Senator Young. So can you speak to China's fears,
apprehension, or anxiety related to a unified democratic South
Korea that is friendly to the United States? Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. So I think it's exactly for that reason that China
opposes a unification of the Korean Peninsula, if there were
ever unification. The only foreseeable way in which that could
happen would be as you described, Senator, a democratic free
ally of the United States that would then be directly be on
China's border.
Senator Young. And do they fear that more than a nuclear-
armed North Korea?
Dr. Cha. Oh, I think so. I think they do, yes.
Senator Young. Okay.
Ms. Magsamen. Yeah, I actually, I agree, and I also think
that Beijing breathed a sigh of relief after Hanoi. I think one
of their nightmares was potential actual progress in the
relationship. And so I think they are currently very pleased
with the status quo.
Senator Young. Dr. Cha, in your testimony, you state that
human rights continue to be neglected in the administration's
summit policy with North Korea. You continued by stating that
it is impossible for U.S. denuclearization diplomacy to succeed
without integration of the human rights issue.
I am deeply concerned about the horrific human rights
abuses that are ongoing in North Korea and that it seemed to be
left out of any conversation at the summit. What actions do you
propose that this body, or more broadly, the international
community take to confront this issue?
Dr. Cha. I mean, there are a number of things. One of the
most important things is to call on the administration to
appoint a senior envoy for North Korean human rights abuses as
mandated by this body. I think their current thinking is they
have folded this position into an assistant secretary-level or
acting assistant secretary-level position. But the reality is
that you need a senior envoy out there who will be a voice for
this issue because there's no one else in the world who will be
a voice for Korean human rights aside from this senior envoy.
And this senior envoy, in conjunction with our ambassador to
the U.N., which is also a vacant position, is critical to
moving the Security Council in their vote on discussing the
North Korean human rights issue on the agenda.
So there are a number of things that can be done that are
very important to bring this back to the level--to the
visibility that this issue had only a couple of years ago in
the aftermath of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
and the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Can I make an observation? Both you and Ms. Magsamen are in
agreement that a senior envoy, a special envoy should be
appointed for various purposes to be a focal point and provide
leadership through the interagency on some of these different
issues. We've done this in so many different areas over the
years. There are dozens of special envoys. This is something we
addressed over the last couple of years. And it seems to
suggest that the State Department's structure is flawed. This
is a whole other hearing and so forth, but just an observation,
and it was something former Chairman Corker and I would discuss
quite a bit. If you have the functional personnel and the
geographic personnel not accomplishing these jobs optimally,
and the workaround, administration after administration,
Republican and Democrat alike, is to always appoint special
envoys that seems to me incongruous. You don't have private
entities frequently creating these czars internally. The
organizations work.
And so, just for anybody, you know, for the 43 individuals
who might be watching this subcommittee hearing right now----
[Laughter.]
Senator Young. And just, I think as an issue of sort of,
like, organizational management, it's interesting. I don't
doubt or acknowledge that in some cases, special envoys--maybe
this case--it's entirely appropriate because of the gravity of
the situation. But it does seem to be like a very consistent
fallback for the State Department in particular, and it seems
to suggest some organizational failings.
So if you have any, kind of, general thoughts, great, but
we don't have to spend a long time on it here.
Ms. Magsamen. Well, I think it's a very good question. I
mean, I do think that there are some challenges that require
just kind of a high-level amount of attention and focus that an
assistant secretary who has a broad scope--trust me, I have
seen this from experience--has such a broad scope of
responsibilities, it's very hard for them to get on the road
and go to Beijing and Moscow and Tokyo and Seoul and just spend
their entire time on North Korea.
So I do think there's some aspect to that. But also, I
think the other option is empowering, appointing, nominating,
you know, getting confirmed and empowering assistant
secretaries to do that work. And in that case, we've had some
failings in the last couple of years.
Senator Young. We completely have. We've had failings to
nominate, and then we've had extended delays in confirmation
and--so that's kind of like a bipartisan affliction, and we
need to solve it ASAP.
So thank you so much for being here.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Senator Young.
And just kind of going over a couple of the questions and
comments you have made, in light of leverage that the U.S. has
on sanctions, in light of continued diplomacy, in light of the
offer that Kim Jong-un made at the Hanoi summit, in light of
the President's decision to waive off the sanctions the
Treasury called for last week, if you're Kim Jong-un today, do
you have a new offer that you're willing to make to the United
States, or are you just going to stick with what you're
offering because the U.S. position continues to change?
Dr. Cha. Well, if we continue to do what we did on Friday
and I'm Kim Jong-un, I'm just going to sit tight and have a
beer and wait.
Senator Gardner. Yeah.
Dr. Cha. Wait to see what we're going to do. You know, we
end up negotiating with ourselves in the sorts of down periods
of the diplomacy, and you know, the President took a very big
step in that direction on Friday.
Senator Gardner. Yeah. And again, that's my concern. I
mean, we've given nothing to Kim Jong-un to have him change his
mind, to change his offer, to change his position. We
consistently have been, at least now, consistently changing our
position and not sticking with maximum pressure, which is
something that I think was effective and helped bring people to
the table in negotiations.
That being said, do we need new sanctions authority to
cover what Senator Markey was talking about on the petroleum
side of things, things like the LEED Act, Senator Markey and I
have the LEED Act, do you think the passage of something like a
LEED Act-type initiative for the sanctions, creating more of an
economic embargo on North Korea, would put us back into a
position where it could change the negotiating posture of Kim
Jong-un?
Dr. Cha. Well, I think it was made very clear at the summit
by the leader himself what he values the most in our strategy,
and that has been the economic pressure. Because we have to
remember that the North Korean leader is not term limited. And
he's planning on ruling not for 5 years, but for 50 years. And
it's very clear that the pressure that has been brought to bear
thus far, in no small part because of this body, albeit
imperfect, has really made an impact. And that is why that is
the one--he didn't ask for peace on the Korean Peninsula. He
did not ask for normal political relations with the United
States. He asked for one thing, and that was sanctions relief
because he can't rule like this for 50 years.
So this is the leverage point, as Ms. Magsamen said, and
things like the LEED Act are a very important step forward.
Senator Gardner. Ms. Magsamen, on the bilateral
management--alliance management, excuse me, in the bilateral
and trilateral relationships at stake here, what more should we
be doing in that bilateral management and also to make it even
more clear about the importance of Japan, South Korea, and the
United States being a part of the solution?
Ms. Magsamen. I think it's hugely important right now. I
actually think at the trilateral level, we need to see some
leadership from the President of the United States on this
issue. I think he needs to make clear to both Seoul and Tokyo
this is a priority for him. I think in this period of whatever
lull we're calling this in diplomacy, I think the most
important thing we can demonstrate to the North Koreans is more
unity among the three capitals. And I think some sort of show
of political unity is going to be essential in this period of
time, but that's going to require the leadership of the
President of the United States. It's not going to come from the
Minister level or the Secretary of State level. This has to be
pushed at the highest levels. We experienced that during the
Obama administration when President Obama really had to push at
his level on trilateral cooperation. So I think that's really
the way to go at this stage.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And Congress, of course, has
introduced language that would further bolster the trilateral
relationship and cooperation and the importance of Japan, the
United States, and South Korea coming together on this.
A question I wanted to ask as you talked about the
dismantlement of the satellite facility, Dr. Cha, North Korea
has willingly volunteered that they would dismantle various
components of from time to time, but then they always seem to
be able to put them back together, so a complete dismantlement
doesn't ever seem to actually be achieved, because if you can
put it back together, you must not have taken it apart in a way
that it couldn't be put back together.
So as we look at sort of the concrete actions that we need
for complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization, what
are some outcomes that we could get from North Korea that would
represent those concrete actions that might actually justify
further opportunities for negotiations and diplomacy?
Dr. Cha. It's a great question, Chairman. I think the
dismantlement and then reassembly of the Sohae satellite launch
facility demonstrated clearly how North Korea can reverse
whatever actions that it's taken. I think that was an important
lesson for us to learn. And one of the things that we have to
focus on is not just focusing on token dismantlement, but--not
to get too technical on language, but we have to focus on
disablement, actual activity----
Senator Gardner. Salting the fields.
Dr. Cha. Salting the fields, putting sand in the gears,
things that actually create a disablement platform from which
you can then dismantle.
What North Korea has become an expert in doing is doing
exactly what they did at Sohae, which is to take some token
steps, but then easily ones that they can reverse to send a
political signal in full view of commercial satellites so that
they can signal to us that they are taking a step backwards
again. So, going forward, if we ever get back into a
negotiation with them, it is very important for our
administration to understand that steps like that aren't really
credible dismantlement steps.
Senator Gardner. So actual disablement would be a concrete
step of the important facilities.
Dr. Cha. Yes.
Senator Gardner. Ms. Magsamen.
Ms. Magsamen. Yeah, I do think that--while I wouldn't put
new deals on the table right now, I do think that the
administration does need to do some internal planning work
around what interim deals could be acceptable to them. And I
think part of that is what Dr. Cha addressed in terms of that
kind of steps, but also, you know, even freezing of enrichment
and reprocessing at various facilities. These can be things
that we look for in an interim deal in exchange for very
limited and reversible sanctions relief with potential
snapback, for example.
I think, you know, I looked back at--you know, there's a
lot of debate about the Iran nuclear deal, but in 2013, the
joint plan of action was successful and did show that you could
pursue an interim deal and still maintain sanctions leverage to
get a final deal. So I do think that the administration does
need to do some internal planning about what would be
acceptable to them, where our redlines are, what we think would
be a meaningful step, and have that prepared in the event that
diplomacy reemerges.
Senator Gardner. And that kind of a roadmap or plan was
something that you could cover in a March 31st report that is
due by law; is that correct?
Ms. Magsamen. Potentially, although I'm not sure I would
publicize everything in my plan, but----
Senator Gardner. But there is an option for a classified
annex if they would like to do that.
Ms. Magsamen. But certainly, they could certainly brief the
Congress about what their plans are.
Senator Gardner. Well, thank you for that.
Dr. Cha, Ms. Magsamen, is there any further comment, final
comments you'd like to make?
Dr. Cha. I just want to add to what Kelly said about why
this sort of report that you are acquiring on March 31st
becomes important, because in order--and you all know this
well--in order to write a report like that, you have to have an
interagency process where they agree on choices that they're
going to make. So are we going to, if we get disablement, then
talk about temporary suspension of sanctions that can be snap-
backed, or are we going to instead coordinate with the South
Koreans to say, ``And then you can provide some assistance.'' I
mean, these are choices and policy that have to be made far in
advance of a negotiation, and, you know, a document like this
forces the administration to sit down and work through what are
the choices that they want to make in terms of a strategy going
forward.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Ms. Magsamen, final comments?
Ms. Magsamen. I completely agree. It is a forcing function.
And then the final comment is thank you again, Chairman,
for this committee's leadership on this issue and the oversight
of the North Korea challenge. It's hugely important. Thank you.
Senator Gardner. Well, thank you very much for your time
and testimony. Thank you both for this great opportunity and
for your responses.
For the information of all the members who are here, the
record will remain open until the close of business Thursday,
including for members to submit questions for the record. We
just ask that you provide a timely response to those questions.
They will be made part of the record.
Senator Gardner. And so, with the thanks of this committee,
thank you very much. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]