REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2020 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2019

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson, Gardner, Romney, Isakson, Barrasso, Portman, Paul, Young, Cruz, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Merkley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for being here. We obviously have a distinguished guest here today, who is going to help us through the dialogue. And our topic is the State Department's fiscal year 2020 budget request. And our witness is the right man to answer questions about that request, Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo.

One thing many Americans may not realize is that the State Department is part of the bedrock of our national security. Its diplomats are our eyes and ears on the ground across the globe. These men and women are the tip of the sphere for advancing U.S. interests overseas, our first line of defense against malign influences, and a vital lead in negotiations to make sure that our relations with friends and foes abroad don't go off the rails.

The State Department civil servants work every day to keep the U.S. economy strong, advocating for American exports that translate into jobs back home in states like mine, Idaho, where 24,000 jobs are supported by exporting just agricultural products alone.

The State Department also provides billions of dollars to strategic allies like Israel to protect their security interests and help preserve peace around the world. As the old adage goes, the State Department is so indispensable, if it did not exist, we would have to invent it.

For all of these reasons and many more I believe we need a vibrant State Department that takes care of our national interests and its own people, who do a great job serving the American people. But we need a State Department for today, not for 2001, 1991, or 1975. The world has changed a lot over the past few decades, and we need our diplomacy to reflect that.
For example, we need to make sure that our diplomats are getting the support they need to get outside the walls of our diplomatic posts to do their jobs. We all know that Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats don’t have trouble getting off their embassy compounds.

In 2019, the stakes are too high to hamstring our national security in this way, which limits U.S. engagement in a number of places. We need our people out there working with our security partners, advancing human rights and the rule of law, and pushing our American business.

These are things we simply cannot do well enough by sitting at a desk behind several layers of security in an embassy. On the State Department’s budget, I recognize that like any federal agency there are many areas for improvement, be it reducing redundancies, or increasing efficiencies. I believe the Department should find these efficiencies first, and consider cuts second. I look forward to hearing Secretary Pompeo address these issues.

First and foremost, though, the Department needs to be fully staffed. We are far too into a presidential administration for there to be so many unfilled positions. How can we critique the performance of administration if it is not even allowed to field its own team?

I am optimistic that this week we will see confirmation of General Abizaid to be ambassador to Saudi Arabia, but there is much more work to be done, especially to fill a number of very important senior roles in the State Department here in Washington. And I know that the Secretary shares my view in that regard, as we have had several robust discussions regarding that.

I want to thank Secretary Pompeo for appearing here today, and expect that this will be far from the last time we see him here this Congress. The easiest way to keep relations strong between the State Department and our committee is through open dialog. Just like diplomacy, my hope is that the more we are talking, the less we are disagreeing.

And so on a personal note, let me say, Secretary Pompeo, I have said publicly, and I will say it again, you are the right man for the right job at this time. We sincerely appreciate that. Myself, like most other members of this committee, meet regularly with heads of state from the 200-plus countries, and high-ranking officials there, and uniformly you get high marks from those people, as far as flying the flag and dealing with them. So thank you for what you do. Thank you for appearing here today.

Senator Menendez.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary, back to the committee. We appreciate you being here.

It is something of a cliché to say at hearings like this that we meet at a critical juncture, or a consequential time for America in the world. But never in my nearly three decades of service in Congress have I seen a confluence of complicated challenges. Russia, China, North Korea, Afghanistan, climate changing, rising
authoritarianism, Saudi Arabia, migration crises in Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. None of these are easy, nor are they all of our making.

But with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, thus far, the Trump administration has not demonstrated a deep understanding of or capacity required to meet these challenges. Confronting China is not the same thing as being competitive with China. Squandering alliances and alienating partners while cozying up to dictators is not prudent at precisely the time when we need likeminded democratic freedom-loving friends to confront a rising China, a revisionist Russia, or an emboldened Iran.

Threatening to cut funding that supports the institutional capacity of our partners in Central America to deal with the root causes of migration, including grinding poverty and the violence of MS–13, is not an effective way to manage that challenge.

Undermining unity at the World Trade Organization is a bizarre strategy at a time we should make it clear that China, not the United States, is the outlier in international economic architecture.

Haranguing partners about the dangers of Huawei’s 5G architecture, a concern that I share, is not a successful approach to develop a consortium of likeminded partners to develop a safe and cost-effective alternative.

Failing to develop a diplomatic strategy to support peace in Mali, or the Sahel, more broadly, while Jihadists and ethnic militia attacks have cost more than 2,000 lives in the last 5 months alone, leaves us vulnerable to global terrorism.

And in Saudi Arabia, the administration’s violation of the Global Magnitsky Law, failing to respond to my requests for a determination under the law as to the complicity of the crown prince, sends a global message to authoritarians that you can kill and violate human rights with impunity.

So I am disappointed to be having what I feel like is a recurring bad dream. This administration submits a budget request that demonstrates either no understanding of the value of the U.S. diplomacy and foreign engagement, or has an active desire to see us retreat from the global stage, cede ground to our adversaries.

I am pleased that Congress, in exercising our constitutional prerogative as a separate and co-equal branch of government, has appropriated funds that we need to secure our interests and protect our citizens abroad.

I agree with your national security strategy assessment that Russia poses a threat to democratic partners across Europe. Yet, you propose cutting those funds to support democratic institution building.

I applaud the administration’s continuation of the Obama-era policy ISIS strategy, working with critical partners, that has led to the expulsion of ISIS from physical territory. And I am pleased that at the urging of Congress and of allies, you seem to be willing to keep U.S. troops in place to help secure our interests. But as General Voltei warns, the fight is far from over.

Yet, your budget does not contain the sustained diplomatic and development resources we need to truly combat this evil. The world faces a truly existential crisis with climate change, and our own Defense Department continues to warn about the serious global im-
lications of famine, migration, and conflict it may bear. Yet, your budget seems to pretend that the problem does not even exist.

Again, I agree with this administration's assessment that China presents new and evolving challenges across the Indo-Pacific and the world, challenges we must confront with a robust diplomatic and economic agenda. Your budget proposes a cut of close to 20 percent from the fiscal year 2017 actual budget to meet our commitments in the Indo-Pacific.

At your own department, in Foggy Bottom, this administration’s disdain for civil servants and the value of experienced professionals is weakening the foundational component of U.S. foreign policy, our diplomatic, and development professionals.

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record two columns by Ambassador Stephenson as to the hollowing out of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be entered.

[The information referred to above is located at the end of the hearing.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, on the matter of oversight, I would like to flag for your attention a classified matter that the committee had a briefing on yesterday, the details of which I won’t and can’t discuss here. Where we raised with the Department an important issue that had not previously been shared with us. Would not, in fact, had been shared with us had we not raised it with you. And may have made the difference in how senators voted on a particular matter. As I am sure you appreciate, that is simply unacceptable.

If the committee is to be able to function, if Congress is to play its constitutionally mandated role, the Department needs to do a better job of engaging with us, briefing us, and responding to our requests. Right now, the situation is not acceptable, and I would be happy to discuss this further with you in a classified setting, as I am sure many of my colleagues would.

When you were confirmed as secretary, I had hoped that you would be empowered and committed to promoting core American values and interests on the global stage. But we have seen the administration undermine our values with Saudi Arabia. We have seen maximum pressure on North Korea whittled away one tweet at a time. We have seen the administration pursue illogical misogynistic policies to play domestic reproductive rights politics for political ambitions on the backs of the world’s poorest women.

So as I see it, the challenge for this committee is two-fold. Insurance that Congress serves as a coequal branch on government, and check and power from the White House, and helping to inform the American people why that is important. Restoring the State Department and USAID budgets is a starting point, but we must be more effective in holding the administration accountable for its foreign policy shortcomings as well, and reminding the American people about the importance of core American values, like democracy, governance, and human rights as drivers of our foreign policy.

It is these fundamental values, along with America’s unparalleled strengths on the global stage, a military second to none, a vital economy, driven by innovation and technological ingenuity, a
reservoir of goodwill with our allies and partners that provide us the opportunity to define a new role, and a new grand strategy for the 21st century.

I said earlier that I was skeptical of the administration’s ability to be equal to this moment in world history. But Mr. Secretary, I want you to prove me wrong. An opportunity remains to take hold of the moment before us, to face squarely the new challenges of this more competitive era, and to replenish our vision, reinvigorate our diplomacy, revive our partnerships, and to restore American leadership for a new era. And I look forward to the questions to pursue that for you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.

And with that, we are going to hear from Secretary Pompeo. As a graduate of West Point, and with your Harvard law degree, you are certainly qualified for this job. But more importantly, as the ranking member referred to a classified briefing that we had yesterday, I think that that time you spent as head of the CIA really uniquely qualifies you for this job.

We on this committee—I have the advantage of being on both committees. And there is only two of us, Senator Rubio and I, that have earned that position. And we had a stark reminder yesterday of the tremendous amount of information that is out there in the classified setting that we can’t talk about at hearings like this. But Senator Menendez is correct that there are items that we need a closer bond on.

This isn’t your fault. It is the way that the system works here, where we have a separate foreign relations and intelligence committee, and the volume of what we deal with in Intel, as you know, is just staggering. And it affects what we do here. So anyway, probably as much as we can talk about here.

But with that, Secretary Pompeo, the floor is yours.

Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.

The Chairman. A warm welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary Pompeo. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Senator Menendez, ranking member, thank you, sir.

In my testimony yesterday to the Appropriations Committee I took a few moments to describe the administration’s greatest foreign policy challenges, what we have done to solve them, how we benefited the American people by doing so. And I want to spend a few minutes talking about that same set of issues here with you all this morning.

When we took office, we inherited the most complex set of threats that the United States of America has faced since World War II. We faced a China that was turning towards authoritarianism, turning away from market liberalization, and turning the screws on its minority populations in a truly Orwellian fashion.

We faced an Iranian regime that, flush with cash from the nuclear deal, set about seating terror from Yemen, to Syria, to Lebanon, and beyond. We faced a Russia that felt no compunction
about invading Ukraine, seizing Crimea, meddling in our elections, and breaking arms control treaties.

We faced a North Korea that continued to pursue its nuclear and missile proliferation threats to our nation. And we faced the terror, the threat that was more deadly and stretched across a far wider geography.

What’d we do? First, the Trump administration recognized and faced reality. We know we can’t make sound policy based on wishful thinking. Can’t lead from behind. We leveled with the American people and our friends and partners about the threats that we face individually and collectively.

This honesty produced growing bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill about the need to confront Chinese aggression, and produced unanimous consensus inside of NATO that arms control agreements like the IMF treaty are worthless if only one party adheres to their terms. It produced international support for the brave people of Venezuela, basing policy on reality.

We recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. We recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. It is why the State Department designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terror organization on Monday. It is just a simple recognition of reality.

Second, we just created diplomacy to build coalitions to confront our enemies. We know we can’t nor should we do everything ourselves. We convinced our NATO allies to spend more on their own defense. We rallied the Defeat ISIS Coalition to dismantle the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

We convened over 60 countries in Warsaw to discuss common threats and shared opportunities in the Middle East. And that included both Arab and Israeli leaders talking to each other. We’re getting our Middle East strategic alliance off the ground. And we have built out an Indo-Pacific strategy to do a true pivot to Asia.

We have supported our hemispheric partners in the OAS and the Lima Group as they work to support the Venezuelan people, and we forged the global coalition at the United Nations to impose the toughest ever sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

So what’d we get? Third. What are the outcomes? This administration promised to dismantle the Caliphate, and we have done it. We promised to confront China for its unfair practices, and call them out on human rights violations. We have done that, too.

We promised to exit the Iran Nuclear Deal to exert pressure on Tehran to change its murderous ways. Still more work to do. We are working every day to protect our citizens at home and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support our allies and partners overseas.

Finally, one point. Each of you too in your opening remarks alluded to this. When I became Secretary of State, I promised I would put diplomacy at the forefront of defending U.S. National Security to give State its swagger back. I think we have made a lot of progress.

Here is what we have done. It has been 11 months and a couple weeks now. I lifted the hiring freeze both on our team and em-
ployee family members. This was a no-brainer. Taking 2,000 talented people and putting them back in the workforce.

We reinstituted promotion rates for the Foreign Services. We will have more Foreign Service officers by the end of this calendar year than ever in the history of the United States of America. The notion that we have been hollowed out is simply not factually based.

New Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service specialist classes are being admitted. Fifty-five senior leaders have been confirmed by the Senate. I appreciate that.

I hold small group events, both when I am traveling at embassies. I do it in Washington and other places where State Department has—we call them “Meet with Mike,” where I hear directly from our team. And more importantly, I get to hear the things that we are doing well and the things that they wish we were doing still better. I have learned a great deal from these professionals.

Back in the states, I have traveled a bit. I travel around the country talking about the importance of diplomacy in America, and frankly, doing some recruiting work as well to make sure we have America’s finest joining our team.

At my recommendation President Trump and the Senate recognized four individuals with the rank of career ambassador. David Hale, Phil Goldberg, Michelle Sison, Dan Smith, who leads our Foreign Service Institute. The rest of our team knows that they can look up to these true diplomatic professionals.

I have a lot more to say, but I will end there. I look forward to discussing the administration’s foreign policy, and the $40 billion budget request for the State Department and the USAID for fiscal year 2020.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pompeo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration’s FY 2020 budget request for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

To support our National Security Strategy and achieve our foreign policy goals, the President has submitted an FY 2020 budget request of $40 billion for the State Department and USAID.

The proposed request will allow us to protect our citizens at home and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support our allies and partners overseas.

It will promote partner countries’ economic and security self-reliance as they begin to transition away from U.S. assistance programs, which the American people have generously underwritten for decades.

We make this request mindful of the burden on American taxpayers, and our obligation to deliver exceptional results on their behalf.

In an era of great power competition, the State Department and USAID’s work is key to our security, the protection of our freedoms, and the promotion of American values.

China is proactively applying its power and exerting its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States is responding decisively to China’s aggressive actions. The United States’ future security, prosperity, and leadership depends on maintaining a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific. To advance the Indo-Pacific strategy, the budget request nearly doubles U.S. foreign assistance resources targeting this crucial area compared to the FY 2019 request.

Russia poses threats that have evolved beyond external or military aggression, and now include influence operations targeting America and the Western world. This budget prioritizes countering Russian malign influence in Europe, Eurasia, and
Central Asia, and further strengthens the Department’s own systems against malign actors.

Our diplomatic efforts toward the final, fully-verified denuclearization of North Korea are the most successful that have ever been undertaken. We remain committed to that goal. This budget provides for our diplomatic outreach to continue, and to continue implementation and enforcement of sanctions until we achieve our objective.

We know that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s authoritarian regime will continue to use their nation’s resources to proliferate conflict in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and beyond. It will continue to bankroll terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

The United States will therefore work together with our allies and partners to counter Tehran’s aggressive actions to undermine peace and security in the Middle East and beyond.

As the people of Venezuela continue to fight for their freedom, the budget request includes funding to support democracy and prosperity in Venezuela. The budget also requests new authority to support a democratic transition in Venezuela, including transferring up to $500 million to foreign assistance accounts.

The budget also delivers on the President’s commitment to optimize the effectiveness of our outdated and fragmented overseas humanitarian assistance. It ensures the United States will remain the world’s largest single donor of humanitarian assistance. The proposal maximizes the impact of taxpayer dollars, helps more beneficiaries, and delivers the greatest outcomes by consolidating our humanitarian programming in a new bureau at USAID. This budget request also preserves the State Department’s lead role on protection issues, as well as the U.S. refugee admissions program. Further, through available funding in 2019 and 2020, the United States will have on average approximately $9 billion available per year to support overseas humanitarian programs, maintaining the highest level of U.S. overseas humanitarian funding ever.

President Trump has made the protection of religious freedom a key priority at home and abroad. The Fiscal Year 2020 budget supports our efforts to continue U.S. leadership in the promotion of global religious freedom and the protection of persecuted religious and ethnic minorities all around the world. This July, the State Department will host the second annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.

American assistance is helping to reverse the devastation and suffering caused by ISIS and associated terrorist groups. But much work remains to be done. Working by, with, and through local partners and community leaders, our assistance programs clear explosive remnants of war to help keep families safe, restore access to critical health and education services, improve economic opportunities, and more.

As we work to promote economic growth, the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget includes a request for $100 million for a new Fund at USAID for the White House-led Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative. Through the Fund, we will work to find and scale proposals that advance women’s economic empowerment across the developing world, in support of the Initiative’s goal of reaching 50 million women by 2025.

There are few efforts as important to this administration and to the safety and security of the American people as border security. The State Department and USAID budget request will strengthen visa vetting, and improve our targeting of illicit pathways that transnational criminal organizations use to traffic people, drugs, money, and weapons into our nation.

President Trump has made it clear that U.S. foreign assistance should serve America’s interests, and should support countries that help us to advance our foreign policy goals. This budget therefore maintains critical support for key U.S. allies, including Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Colombia, among others.

The FY 2020 Request also includes $175 million for a Diplomatic Progress Fund. These funds will be used to respond to new opportunities arising from potential progress in diplomatic and peace efforts around the world.

Finally, the diplomatic challenges we face today are compounded by rapid advancements in technology and an ever-changing media environment. We need our colleagues to be safe, prepared, and ready to take on any challenge at a moment’s notice. The FY 2020 budget will fully fund State and USAID’s current workforce levels, enabling us to take on emerging policy challenges. We are also modernizing our human resources, IT infrastructure, and organizational structures to stay on the cutting edge of 21st century innovation.

We must continue to put American interests first and remain a beacon of freedom to the world. With the support of Congress, and through the strategic, efficient use of resources, this budget will do just that.

Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We appreciate that. I am going to reserve questioning as we go down the pike, and so I will first yield to Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the administration’s recent decision to cut all U.S. aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras appears to me to stand out as a self-inflicted wound to our national security and our national interests.

Just 6 months ago Vice President Pence said that the United States, “Has never been more committed to strengthening our partnership with the nations in the Northern Triangle.” And to address the drug trafficking gains and criminal violence, forcing people to flee their countries, he said, “We must confront them at their source within the Northern Triangle.”

So let me ask you a few basic yes or no questions. Do you believe that U.S. foreign assistance advances our national security?

Secretary POMPEO. Are you speaking about in the Northern Triangle countries and its effectiveness, or are you speaking broadly as for——

Senator MENENDEZ. Let us start broadly.

Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir. If done properly, done effectively, it certainly can.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you believe that it is in the U.S. national interest to work with countries around the globe to combat drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations?

Secretary POMPEO. To do this effectively you need partners all around the world. Yes, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you believe that U.S. national security is advanced by terminating funding for law enforcement cooperation with Central American countries?

Secretary POMPEO. If I may explain the decision that we have made, and why the President made that decision. It begins with the fact that there is an enormous crisis at our southern border. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to try and build out solutions—foreign assistance dollars, to try and build out solutions in these three countries, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

You can see it is a fact of this crisis at the southern border that it has not been effective, and so we are endeavoring to change that, right? We deal in reality. It is not enough to take taxpayer money and spend it there. You need to get something for that. And that is what we are engaged in now.

We are having conversations with the leadership in those countries. We want better lives for those people, but most importantly, we want to make sure that every dollar, taxpayer dollar we spend in the Northern Triangle is effectively used.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we certainly want every taxpayer dollar spent anywhere in the world to be effective. But to believe that longstanding challenges—I think the Vice President had it right only 6 months ago when he made the statements that he made. U.S. national security is not advanced by terminating funding for law enforcement cooperation with Central American countries. U.S. national interests are not advanced by terminating funding for programs that strengthen the rule of law.
Why are people fleeing? They are fleeing because of violent crime. Their choice is stay or die, or flee, and have a chance at living, or stay and see my daughter raped, or stay and see my son forcibly put into a gang. We need to fight at the very essence of that. And the very essence of that is not at our border. It is in Central America.

I don’t understand how that, the USAID programs that stabilize Central American countries by promoting economic development, helping people find opportunities in their own countries. I think the administration had it right, and that Congress is urging when you were involved with Central America, and trying to get to the root causes, all this will do is create greater instability in the region, and will drive more people in fear and in hopelessness to the border, and we will exacerbate the situation.

So I really urge you to recalibrate that, because it is just a fundamentally wrong policy.

Let me switch to something we do agree on, Venezuela. And along with Senator Rubio and 10 members of this committee, we have introduced legislation last week reinforcing several elements of the administration’s strategy, and dramatically expanding our humanitarian response with 400 million in new aid.

But I have two questions in this regard. Number one, what is the department doing to internationalize our sanctions, and try to get the European, Canadians, and Latin American partners to join us. And why haven’t we convened an international donor summit? And will you consider doing that?

Secretary Pompeo. The second one, we will absolutely consider it. We will see who the right leader for that should be to actually convene that. It is absolutely a central part of the day that we are successful there in support of the Venezuelan people to achieve democracy in the way they so richly deserve. But there will be resources required, and I am confident we will find partners all around the world that would be part of that. And a donors’ conference will be an element of effectuating that.

Your first question was, we are working with some 50-plus nations now that have recognized the new government, the leadership under Juan Guaido, to sanction in the same way that we have. We are continuing to push. We have demarched countries all across the world. We are trying to bring more to the coalition of 54, and we are trying to get those 54 to impose sanctions that match the ones that the United States has imposed.

Senator Menendez. And that is critical.

Last question. January marked the 1-year anniversary of landmark agreements between the U.S. and Qatar regarding government subsidies to Qatar Airways, the state-owned airline.

In addition to committing to financial transparency, in a side letter to the agreement, the Qatari government indicated that there was no intention to launch additional fifth freedom flights, flights launched from Qatar, but picking up passengers in Europe before flying to U.S. destinations.

Yet, at the same time as the agreement was being negotiated Qatar Airways acquired a 49th percent state in Air Italy, a formerly struggling regional Italian carrier, rebranded it as an inter-
national carrier, with flights to five U.S. destinations from Milan. That runs directly counter to the 1-year agreement.

Are you aware of this, and if so, what efforts are under way to enforce the agreements that are in place?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I am personally aware that I have personally engaged on this issue, and we are working to make sure that every party to those agreements complies with every element of those agreements.

In fact, I will engage again tomorrow with several of the parties that are in this—the United States government sees what is going on, and we are working to put this agreement—we think it was a good agreement. We are trying to just make sure that it is enforced.

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And lest people think that there we are totally divided on things, those last two issues, as you know, were—this committee is, I think, uniformly in favor of the discrimination against our carriers that has taken place by the Middle East carriers.

And secondly, the support of the Juan Guaido administration, the true president of Venezuela, is so important to all of us. And we sincerely appreciate the administration’s efforts in that regard, and we will support it 100 percent.

With that, Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service.

Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Last Monday I met with Brian Bulatao, the nominee for undersecretary of management. Now first of all, that is the second time I have met with him. Normally the way this process works, I meet with the nominee, we go through the confirmation process. The nominee gets confirmed, and we just start talking to those people in hearings like this.

So the fact that such a qualified individual, West Point graduate, somebody's who has served in a lead management role in the private sector, most recently chief operating officer of the CIA, has been languishing as nominee for 9 months, I think is a disgrace, you know, particularly when you have Senator Menendez talking about the hollowing out of the State Department, which you have I think rightly disputed.

Can you just speak to how crucial it is to get Mr. Bulatao confirmed as basically the chief operating officer, the undersecretary of management for the State Department, so you can carry out your vital mission?

Secretary POMPEO. So full disclosure, I have known Brian for 35-plus years. Tells you how old I am. But more importantly, we have not had an undersecretary for management, essentially, the chief operating officer, at the State Department for 2 years now.

The gentleman who is filling that role, Bill Todd, is a great officer, a great civil servant, but we need the confirmed leadership in that position to execute all of the security issues, all of the administrative issues. The enormous bureaucracy of 92,000 people to administer falls under the undersecretary for management. The ab-
sense of having someone confirmed to that position has made each of those tasks more difficult.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you aware of any legitimate reason for holding this nomination up? Are they just pure partisan politics?

Secretary POMPEO. I am not aware of anything that relates directly to Mr. Bulatao’s qualifications.

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Well, again, I urge this committee, I urge the Senate to quickly confirm Mr. Bulatao.

I also want to pick up on the whole situation with the Northern Triangle, our humanitarian crisis at the border. 2014, we had 120,000 unaccompanied children and people’s family units. President Obama correctly called it a humanitarian crisis.

The first 6 months of this year we are already over 240,000, primarily people now coming in as family units. And I will dispute with Senator Menendez that there is no doubt that people are fleeing some violence. But there is also no doubt an awful lot of those individuals are coming here for economic opportunity, family reunification, which I am highly sympathetic with, but it is not a valid asylum claim.

The truth is 85 percent of those asylum claims are denied. As you have pointed out, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars in development down there, but until we crush the drug cartels, I don’t see the development dollars doing a whole lot of good. And it is certainly going to do nothing to solve this problem in the here and now of individuals coming here completely exploiting U.S. laws.

The ball is in Congress’s court. We have to act. We have to change these laws to first and foremost reduce, if not stop, that flow of illegal immigration, the majority of which really is economic migration and family reunification.

In your former capacity, and your current capacity, can you just talk about, I have met with the Mexican ambassador twice, the new administration. I think they are genuinely interested in working with us to solve this problem. But they were talking about development dollars. And I understand that. That is a long-term solution. But we are whistling by the graveyard if we don’t address and talk about an effective strategy for crushing the drug cartels.

Can you just talk about how difficult that is, the challenge that presents to America?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator Johnson, this has been a—it is a long-time challenge. We have had times where we have made more progress, and then it has gotten worse, or regressed. The complexity, the money, these are powerful organizations inside of Mexico, with huge incentives to continue to deliver these drugs, whether that is cocaine or opioids into our country. It is an incredibly lucrative undertaking. So every element of American power needs to be deployed to take them down.

And then we need partners, partners like the Mexican government, partners like the country of Central America. We need China to do what President Xi committed he would do on fentanyl. It is going to take a combined effort, lots of streams, lots of work streams to pull it off. But the risk that it presents to America is enormous. It is an important foreign policy problem often masquerading as a law enforcement problem.
We are deeply engaged. Foreign Minister Ebrard has been a good partner so far in his time in leadership in the Mexican government. I am convinced they want to help us. We need to help them do it.

Senator JOHNSON. This is going to require a multinational effort. One thing we found out in hearing just this week, and last week as well, is the southern border is totally controlled on the southern side of the border by the drug and the human trafficking cartels. Nobody passes virtually without paying the fee.

So this is a highly organized effort, exploiting our laws, and we are going to need through all diplomacy, and I think that is what this administration is trying to do, get the attention of Central American nations and Mexico, we need your help to solve this problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, Senator Johnson. Next, we will have Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your service, and thank you very much for being here.

This is a hearing to review the budget for fiscal year 2020, and budget speaks to priorities. So I want to start to give you a chance to respond to the visual concern that a 30 percent cut in the State Department budget looks like we are cutting back diplomacy as a tool by 30 percent. But I want to get to your statement about promoting American values that you just mentioned.

Democracy programs are reduced by almost 50 percent in this budget. In July, there was a conference in Copenhagen that pointed out that we have seen a decline in democratic states around the world. And we know that we are being attacked on democratic institutions by both Russia, and China, and other actors.

So what are we doing to promote democracy with such a dramatic reduction in the tools that are available in the State Department if the fiscal year 2020 budget became real?

Before you respond, I would also say one of the real opportunities to promote American values of democracy governance, human rights, and anti-corruption are on the bilateral, multi-lateral meetings that we have. And yet, there has been silence in regards to North Korea, Kim Jong-un's treatment of his own people, being the worst human rights record of any country in the world.

And we still have not gotten a response to a full accounting of what happened in Saudi Arabia on the tragic death of Jamal Khashoggi.

So can you just explain to me how you are promoting American values of democracy, good governance, human rights, anti-corruption, in light of the fact that the budget cuts this, and we have not seen the visibility during highly important moments with other countries, these issues being raised?

Secretary POMPEO. Sir, I would just disagree with about everything you opened with in your——

Senator CARDIN. The budget, 30 percent cut?

Secretary POMPEO. This administration has been incredibly active, but more importantly, incredibly effective at promoting democracy around the world. We are engaged. You mentioned a couple particular items. Happy to talk about those in great detail, if you
would like, but our engagement, building up coalitions around the world, part of democracy promotion. You do not think about the work to defeat ISIS as an element of that.

To create the political stability inside of Syria, so that we can get a political resolution there. The work that we are doing in Venezuela. The fact that we are fighting for the people in the Islamic Republic of Iran. And at forums all across the world, my team is in the field working to promote the very values that you just described.

Senator CARDIN. Well, the facts are the facts. The budget submissions are budget submissions.

Let me go to the Northern Triangle for one moment in response to the last questions. Our involvement in the Northern Triangle is critically important for many reasons. These are countries that have significant problems with corruption. And the United States has participated with the international community to try to root out the corruption in the Northern Triangle.

Are you committed to working with this committee? We are looking at additional legislation to give additional tools in regards to identifying corruption issues, so that in our bilateral and regional relationships, the issues of fighting corruption will be front and center in these debates.

Do you agree with that approach?

Secretary POMPEO. I do. Yes, Senator.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. And we will have some legislation, as I talked to you earlier, that we would like to work with you on.

I want to talk a little bit about North Korea, if I might. We have had two summits between the leader of North Korea and the United States. Have we reached an agreement of what the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would look like?

Secretary POMPEO. I can't answer that question yes or no. We have had extensive conversations with the North Koreans about what the full final denuclearization, as verified by the international community, what ultimately would look like. It would look like the fully denuclearized North Korea. That is what it would look like.

Senator CARDIN. Has Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, agreed on that assessment on the—what the denuclearization would be involved?

Secretary POMPEO. Has Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, agreed on that assessment on the—what the denuclearization would be involved?

Secretary POMPEO. Yes. He has made the commitment to me more than half-a-dozen times. He has made the commitment to the President of the United States, and it is in writing.

Senator CARDIN. Has he given you a declaration as to their current nuclear programs, and a way in which they would move from their current nuclear programs to total denuclearization?

Secretary POMPEO. There is still a great deal of work to do to achieve the ultimate goal.

Senator CARDIN. And, of course, we have had hearings before this committee that indicate that that is really the first step on denuclearization, is understanding their program, and having a commitment to end it, and a roadmap that can lead to that commitment. That is usually the preliminaries.

We now have had two summit meetings, and we don't yet have that in place.
Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I wish we had gotten that from the Iranians.

Senator CARDIN. I do believe we have a——

Secretary POMPEO. It was a total fraud, Senator, and everyone knew it. The declaration the Iranians made was completely fraught with errors, both intentional, and otherwise. We understand that you need a baseline to begin to denuclearize North Korea, and we are determined to get there.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate your pivot to my question.

Secretary POMPEO. Well, I answered your question. We have got work to do, Senator.

Senator CARDIN. I understand that. And I am trying to focus on North Korea. In Iran, there are boots on the—we have people, not us, the international community has inspectors that are looking at sites. Do we have international inspectors in North Korea?

Secretary POMPEO. We do not.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to see you.

Secretary POMPEO. Thank you, sir.

Senator ROMNEY. I appreciate your service to our country. You are a man of extraordinary capacity, having worked in the private sector, having served in the CIA, as well as other parts of the public sector. And, of course, having gone to the best law school in the world. So I appreciate your capacity to consider the kind of challenges we have.

It is no surprise to anyone that China has ambition to dominate the world, economically, militarily, geopolitically. And it would be a very, very different world, indeed, if they had the capacity and the ability to do that.

I applaud the fact that the administration is taking action to push back against some of China's plans, specifically the imbalance of trade, the theft of intellectual property, and the forced transfer of technology, as companies are considering moving into the Chinese market.

But I wonder whether we are really addressing and confronting in a holistic strategy the various initiatives that China is undertaking. And there are some that I don't know whether we have plans afoot to deal with them piece by piece, or whether we need something more expansive, but some kind of mind—is, of course, the fact that China has, if you will, an industrial policy, or a form of free enterprise, where they subsidize massively industries of the future, whether that is 5G, or telecommunications systems, or artificial intelligence.

So we welcome them into a world where we say we believe in free markets, and yet, they participate in an unfree way, and that presents a challenge.

They also are reported to buy American and other Western companies, small companies that have good technology, steal that technology, and take it back to their more domestic purposes.

They have a very extensive propaganda program in our country and throughout the West. The Confucius Institutes are clearly a part of that, and yet, we have high schools, elementary schools, and
universities in our country that don’t seem to understand that by accepting the Confucius Institute, that they are participating in Chinese propaganda in our own country. Of course, there is the extraordinary oppression of human beings that we are seeing with the Uyghur in their own country. And then there is their ambition in the South China Sea, which is obviously challenging in its own right.

So my question is, do we have a robust strategy to counter the entire Chinese effort? And particularly on those items that I mentioned, are we considering those, or do we need to take a deeper dive into how to really confront what is, in my view, the great threat of this century, which is an authoritarian regime bent on dominating the world, which would be bad for free enterprise, for freedom, and for the prosperity of America and the world?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, it is an important question, maybe the most important question that I will get asked today. I think the world was slow to recognize the challenge that China has begun to present. I think we are now much further along the way than we were just 2 years ago. The first step is always to recognize the challenge you have in front of you, and then second, how to chart a course to confront each of those various challenges.

You talked about a challenge from the Orwellian nature, of the absence of human rights, inside of China. It is not just Uyghurs. It is Cossacks. It's Christians. It's broader than that.

If you have seen these stories of this app that is being used. It is the Little Red Book, Mao's Little Red Book brought to your iPhone, where they have people put in their phone numbers and their names, and they get points for answering questions about Xi's policies. It is really quite something.

Their military is on the advance. You have seen in the technology space. The State Department has a role in each of those. Obviously, other agencies have a bigger part in some of them. But our effort has been brought, first, to let the world know of these challenges. So our team, across 180-plus embassies, is out talking to our partners, sharing with them the risks, identifying the information we have, so that they will begin to take this challenge seriously.

With respect to predatory lending and forced technology transfer, we are telling these countries about what will happen to them. It may feel good for a year, or 2 years, when you get that new project, but the legacy, the overhang will be enormously bad for the people of your country.

And then there is a significant undertaking, more broad than the State Department inside the United States government, to make sure that these technology challenges, making sure that America remains in the front on AI, in front of the next wireless wave 5G. All the issues that will dominate commerce and the rule of law in the decades ahead, that the United States is positioned properly.

We confronted an enormously difficult challenge. They take their big companies, and make them subservient to their government. We do not roll that way. We should not roll that way. But I believe ultimately we will prevail with rule law transparency as long as we are serious and focused on this set of issues.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Romney. I agree with almost every-thing you said, except I know there are at least three mem-bers who are graduates—or three people in this room who are graduates of the University of Idaho College of Law that would take exception regarding the law school.

Senator ROMNEY. Did not get into Harvard, did they?

[Laughter]

The CHAIRMAN. They did not apply. Thank you so much.

Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator KAINE. Mr. Secretary, we had a hearing in the Armed Services Committee about 10 days ago with Secretary Perry, who is on an annual to talk about the DOE's programs that support the military, primarily nuclear reactors.

And I asked him about news that had broken just within about a day of the hearing, about Part 810 authorizations that I think are in his bailiwick, where he would authorize transfer of nuclear knowhow. Not technology, but nuclear knowhow from American companies to foreign nations. He indicated during the hearing that he had signed seven such approvals, authorizations for transfers of technology to Saudi Arabia.

My understanding is the Part 810 process requires that there be a State Department sign-off on that. Is that correct?

Secretary POMPEO. I believe that is correct. We are aware of these Part 810 issues.

Senator KAINE. He had kept these private in a way that was counter to earlier practice, where the authorizations, at least the fact of the authorizations had been made public. He described it as necessary to protect proprietary information. I asked him, “Well, you could keep the proprietary information private. What about the fact of the authorizations?”

Did the State Department have to sign off on the DOE keeping the fact of these authorizations private?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I do not know the answer to that, but I will get you an answer on whether we signed off on the decision not to release that information, or more broadly, if we were involved in that decision.

Senator KAINE. That would be helpful. I will follow-up with that.

And then finally, I also asked him about the date of the authorizations. The seven occurred from inauguration day 2017, but I asked if he knew anything about the dates. Do you know whether any of the authorizations occurred after October 2, 2018?

Secretary POMPEO. I do not. I do not know. I am sorry, Senator.

Yeah.

Senator KAINE. I will follow-up with that as well.

Another question on Saudi Arabia. I am just referring to an article in the National Interest dated September 22, 2018, which references earlier reporting by Newsweek. The story that I'm looking at and that I would like to introduce for the record, if I might, Mr. Chair, is titled “Saudi Arabia Already Has a Ballistic Missile Arsenal Courtesy of China, with a Little Help From the CIA.” And it is a summary of Saudi purchases of ballistic missiles from China, beginning in the 1980s.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of the hearing.]

There was a set of purchases in the ’80s. And then there is also reporting about purchases that were done, I think, in the 2007, 2008 timeframe that the CIA helped broker. The reporting of it by Newsweek was done in 2014. And then the assessment by the National Interest about the scope of the Saudi ballistic missile program, including purchase of missiles from China, this piece was written in September.

There are a lot of issues with Saudi Arabia right now. We are grappling with Yemen. We are grappling with human rights concerns. We are grappling with these Part 810 authorizations. We are trying to get more information about that.

What should this committee—or what concerns should this committee have about the development of ballistic missile programs in Saudi Arabia? The National Interest article suggests that the missiles are pointed at both Iran and Israel. That is in the National Interest piece that I have introduced.

What concerns should we have about the development of a Saudi ballistic missile program, and particularly the acquiring of missile technology from nations like China?

Secretary Pompeo. So two thoughts. We should absolutely be interested in that. We should know the fact that they are purchasing from China—I think there have been those who have urged the United States to take a different posture with respect to Saudi Arabia, not to sell them technology. I think you see the risks that are created. It would be better if the United States was involved in those transactions than if China was.

I can’t comment. I have seen that reporting publicly as well. I can’t say much about it here. I am confident the intelligence community can give you a full briefing with respect to this. But missiles in the Middle East is an increasing threat.

Frankly, missiles more broadly throughout the world continue to be an increasing risk. The technology has gotten cheaper. The information is now much more widespread, so capabilities are growing in lots of countries, some of which are friendly partner countries today, but may not be 5, 10, 20 years from now. And some of which are adversaries even today.

We think about nuclear proliferation. Threats of missile proliferation are very real as well, and something that this committee should absolutely be looking into.

Senator Kaine. So nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, missile proliferation in the Middle East, these are things that this committee and other committees need to take very seriously.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

Senator Kaine. I yield back the rest of my time. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Isakson.

Senator Isakson. I want to commend the chairman and the ranking member on their statements about the Qatar situation with our airlines. And I would like to ask the Secretary, as I understand in the agreement, on Open Skies agreement, there is a provision where one of the parties, including us, would call for what is
known as formal consultations if there are concerns over the good behavior of both parties on that.

Would you get us into a situation where we could call for those consultations? Are we at the point where we need to have consultations with Kunar?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I don't know if we are quite there yet. There are lots of consultations taking place. Not through the mechanism that you are describing. It may be that that is ultimately what will be required.

You know the history of this challenge. We thought we had put together a truly good deal that was good for U.S. domestic businesses that honored the commitments that had been made previously. We thought we were in a very good place. We are looking very closely at this recent decision by Qatar to take on 49 percent of this airline.

We understand the risk of the efforts to circumvent, and we are working to make sure that everyone is complying with the agreement that they entered into.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I appreciate that. It is interesting, because it is very important, and it is important to many, many Georgians. But the entire aviation industry, both manufacturing aviation, as well as providing flights in the United States. And I would appreciate you doing all you can——

Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator ISAKSON. —and what you are doing already.

And I want to say thank you tremendously for meeting with some of the hostages who survived the Iran hostage crisis a number of years ago now. In fact, there are still a number of those people alive; although, some of them have passed, and some of them are in conditions that are not at all conducive to living a normal life, much less a happy life.

As their time runs out, so does the opportunity for them to collect on the rewards that were made to them from the funds that were available. As a matter of fact, the first release they got, they got about 14 percent of what was owed to them in total. The last release that went from 14 percent to 4 percent, not because they reduced the amount of money from the fund that they took out, because 3,000 other people were added to the fund, and the special magistrate's choice to give that money out.

And I am really worried about them ending up not getting what they should have gotten. These people went through probably as bad a torture, as bad a treatment as any American ever did. It was the formation of the Nightline TV show, with 444 nights when all America saw what was happening to them. So I am really concerned about them, and I want to do everything we can to see to it that they get their money and they are spoken for.

Have you talked with Attorney General Barr about their situation?

Secretary POMPEO. I have not had a chance to do that yet. It is an important issue. Fifty-two hostages, 444 days. Frankly, held by some of the same people who are leading the Islamic Republic of Iran today, beaten by those very same human beings. I am aware of the situation with respect to them getting the money that they
deserve, and I will have a conversation with Attorney General Barr. I have not had a chance to do that yet.

Senator Isakson. I would really appreciate it if you would. I think about it every day. Colonel Scott, from Georgia, Stone Mountain, Georgia was one of those victims.

He is a wonderful man. He is aging, as all of us are, and I would love to see the families get the money that was intended to go to them, to go to them.

Lastly, I want to talk about New START for just a second. I supported the START treaty 4 or 5 years ago when we ratified and extended it. And I know it comes up in 2 years, I think, for renegotiation. I think there are preliminary talks going on, am I not correct?

Secretary Pompeo. That is correct. Yes, sir.

Senator Isakson. Some of those nuclear treaties have been canceled in recent years, and there are some people who have misperceptions of different nuclear agreements, like IMF and other things like that. The thing I liked about the START Treaty, and the reason I spoke for it and worked with Secretary Kerry to get the votes to pass it was because it had a unique identifier system which we never had available to us before the Russians, so we could more accurately count their weapons. Not just calling them to be counted. We had a way of counting them.

Second, we had the no-notice inspection provisions where we could have Russians would be in the United States, and would have access to our facilities, and we put Americans in Russia to have access to theirs. So having that kind of elevated accountability was good to me, was something that I thought was good for the country.

What stage are we on New START? Are we going in the right direction, and do you think New START has served us well so far?

Secretary Pompeo. So New START, different than the IMF Treaty, there is large compliance with the New START agreement on both sides. There are some arguments on the edge of each, but largely they have been compliant, both the Russians and the United States have been compliant. We are at the very beginning of conversations about renewing that. If we can get the deal right, if we can make sure that it fits 2021, and beyond, President Trump has made it very clear that if we can get a good solid arms control agreement, we ought to get one. And we are at the start of having those conversations.

Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you for the great work you are doing.

Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you, that New START is going to be very important to us, and we are living in a different world than when the original START Treaty was put together. And there is going to have to be accommodations for that for other powers in the world that are not a member of the treaty. So thank you.

With that, Senator Merkley.

Senator Merkley. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, you said that the renewal depends on fitting 2021 and beyond. What are the two or three key things that you think
need to be addressed to make the New START fit 2021 and beyond?

Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Good question, Senator. So technology has moved. The central idea is a strategic deterrence that underpin the New START deal we will need to make sure still fit. The various technologies that exist today, some may be more important to try it—try and it may be different. We have to make sure it fits, so true deterrence continues to extend.

We have to make sure that the verification regime fits the technology today, the world, as it moved forward. And then finally, we need to make sure that we have got all of the parties that are relevant as a component of this as well.

Those are all tough challenges. They are all difficult.

Senator Merkley. By “all of the parties,” are you referring to other countries—

Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Other countries besides the United States and Russia. And it may be that we cannot get there. It may be that just we end up working with the Russians on this, but if we are talking about a nuclear capacity, nuclear capability that presents risk to the United States, it is very different today in the world than it was when that—

Senator Merkley. It sounds like you are referring to China.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Merkley. Okay. Let me—

Secretary Pompeo. With respect to missiles for other treaties, it is certainly China that has large numbers.

Senator Merkley. Well, let me pivot to China then. The Uyghur Muslims are being enslaved in re-education camps, industrial production, been taken off the streets. Some villages basically have no men left yet.

There is a Uyghur human rights policy act. I believe Marco Rubio is the lead on it, but it is bipartisan. Do you support Congress taking a strong stand, America taking a strong stand in regard to this persecution of the Uyghurs?

Secretary Pompeo. I do.

Senator Merkley. Thank you.

So China has taken the proceeds from the imbalance in trade, and they have brought their infrastructure from bicycles to bullet trains in about 25 years. I was on the first bullet train out of Beijing. They now have 16,000—16,000 miles of levitated magnetic bullet trains running over 200 miles. We have zero miles.

They are buying up foreign minerals around the world. They are doing prestige projects to expand their influence in country after country. They are engaged in debt diplomacy, so those projects can actually lead to huge leverage going forward, like the court they have taken control of in Sri Lanka.

They are doing an inside deal in El Salvador, where they are attempting to buy a huge chunk of the southern coastline in El Salvador to extend their influence in Central America.

They are on the move in a comprehensive belt and roads strategy, while we are sitting here, our infrastructure has been basically the same the last 25 years. I am very concerned that we are slipping behind. What are we going to do about it?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, Senator, with respect to U.S. domestic infrastructure, it is a bit out of my lane as Secretary of State. In terms of pushing back against the Chinese, I laid out, I think it was in response to a question from Senator Romney on the various work streams that we are engaged in.

I am happy to walk through them, whether it is the BUILD Act, the DFC, our diplomatic efforts with Assiyana at the very center of how we build out a coalition. And on the technology side, there is all of United States government effort to make sure that U.S. companies, and frankly, non-U.S. companies, non-Chinese companies have an opportunity to continue to compete on a transparent basis, where we can ensure that we don’t have Chinese values, Chinese systems controlling our information space 10, 15, 20 years from now.

Senator Merkley. I think that a lot of members of the committee bi-partisanly have a lot of concerns that China has a conference whose strategy it is implementing. It is connected to international affairs because the proceeds that drive the Chinese policy come from their trade relationship with the United States.

Let’s turn to North Korea. I think of the challenge with their nuclear program is kind of like a baseball game. And a first base is a freeze on their missile tests and their warhead explosions, which is where we are right now.

Second base is a full inventory of their nuclear assets. Third is an agreement on how to wipe those out, or eliminate them. And fourth is an extensive implemented verification regime.

We are stuck on first base. How are we going to get off first base?

Secretary Pompeo. We have the largest coalition, and the strongest sanctions, and sanctions enforcement in the history of North Korea. It is what has created this opportunity for diplomacy. We have not moved as far, but I think we always knew this would be a long discussion.

We are not stuck on first base. I think that analogy is not accurate. There remains an awful lot of work to do. But we have moved to where you have described. There are not missile tests today. There are not nuclear explosions going on in North Korea today. Our diplomatic team is engaged in painting the picture, trying to convince Kim Jong-un that there is a path forward that will make a brighter future for the North Korean people, and reduce the risk.

We have Japan. We have South Korea. We engage with the Russians and the Chinese. It is a broad effort to lead a diplomatic undertaking to convince Kim Jong-un to deliver on what he promised President Trump he would do in Singapore in June of last year.

Senator Merkley. Thank you. My time is up, but I will just summarize by saying the economic sanctions are weakening. The North Koreans are finding many more ways around them. They have proceeded to develop their missile program even while they have frozen their missile testing and their warheads. So we are not even completely safe on the first page. Thank you.

The Chairman. Secretary Pompeo, did you want to respond to that last comment?

Secretary Pompeo. Only that it is always important to remember initial conditions. When we came in January of 2017, there was
nothing going on. We are in a far better place today than we were 2 years ago, both from a sanctions regime and the diplomatic. That is quite an accomplishment. They sometimes do not go together. Sanctions deter diplomacy. In this case, we have achieved both.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul.

Senator PAUL. Thank you for your testimony, Secretary Pompeo. Do you believe that the 2001 authorization to go to war with those who attacked us on 9/11 applies to Iran or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard?

Secretary POMPEO. I would prefer to just leave that to lawyers, Senator.

Senator PAUL. Well, I would think it would be a pretty important question, that you think you have the right to invade, or declare war, or engage in war with Iran. And it does not sound like something we are going to leave to the Supreme Court. It is going to be a decision by the administration.

Secretary POMPEO. Right.

Senator PAUL. Does the administration believe—you have just recently classified, you know, the Iran—the entire Revolutionary Guard as terrorists. Do you think that that somehow includes them in the 2001, and is that any part of the decision-making process with including this designation?

Secretary POMPEO. I will answer your second question. It was not part of the decision-making process. The designation was a simple recognition of reality. These are terrorists. They killed 600 Americans. Six-hundred Americans, dead. Families today, grieving. We recognize them as terrorists in the same way we do other terrorist groups around the world. When we see them, we try to call them out as best we can and as quickly as we can.

Senator PAUL. But you are unwilling to state unequivocally that the resolution in 2001 to have retribution and stop people who attacked us, that Iran had something to do with the attacks on 9/11? Or that the National Iraqi, you know, Revolutionary Guard had something to do with 9/11?

Secretary POMPEO. You asked a factual question and a legal question there. The legal question I will leave to counsel. The factual question with respect to Iran’s connections to Al Qaeda is very real. They have hosted Al Qaeda. They have permitted Al Qaeda to transit their country. There is no doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al Qaeda, period, full stop.

Senator PAUL. And I think some would argue that the Iranian government is not real happy with Sunni extremists. They have Sunni extremists in their country, but it is not sort of like they are joining forces to fight the West. They actually would just as soon eradicate Sunni extremists, and have actually evicted quite a few, or imprisoned quite a few. So I do not think that that dog hunts very well.

But I am troubled that the administration cannot unequivocally say that you have not been given power. I can tell you explicitly you have not been given power or authority by Congress to have war with Iran. And in any kind of semblance of a sane world you would have to come back and ask us before you go into Iran.

So my hope is, I am not arguing whether Iran’s Revolutionary Guard are terrorists. My argument is that you do not have the per-
mission of Congress to go to war in Iran. If you want a war in Iran, you have to come to us. It is the way the Constitution was written, and it needs to be very clear and begging off, and saying, “Well, the lawyers.” No. No. This is our history. This is a very important question. It is a very explicit question. Only Congress can declare war. You do not have our permission to go to war in Iran. And that should be very explicit.

Part of the reason we are having this debate is we have now been at war for 18 years in Afghanistan. I think even you have admitted there is no military solution to Afghanistan. It is a mess. It is nation building at its worst.

The President, like myself, complains endlessly about the $50 billion we are wasting there every year. I also worry about the lives that we are wasting there. You are sending young men when there is no mission there.

Can you give us any kind of summary, or hope, or update on the negotiations that are currently happening with the Taliban?

Secretary Pompeo. I can give you a brief summary. And your point about the lives, we had three Americans killed just this week in Afghanistan, killed by the Taliban. At least they claimed it.

President Trump has made clear he wants to end what he calls this endless war. And our team is working diligently to create the conditions to do that. Ambassador Khalilzad, I think he is in Doha today, or maybe in Kabul, working with the Afghan government, with other Afghans, non-Taliban, as well as with the Taliban, to create conditions so that we can deliver on what the President has said he wants done there, which is to reduce.

You talked about American outlays, dollars, American taxpayer money. But also to reduce the risk for Americans. He has also told us to do that in a way that continues to reduce risk of an attack from that real estate. And we believe there is a path forward that we can achieve each of those two goals the President has laid out for us.

Senator Paul. Thank you. I think we have the greatest military in the world. Nobody can measure us anywhere. We can do anything. But I will tell you what a Navy SEAL told me, been in 19 years, a couple years ago. He said, “We can go anywhere. We can kill anyone. We can complete any mission you ask us, but the mistake is when you ask us to stay and plant the flag.”

We are not so good at nation building. Our soldiers don’t want to do it. It is a huge expense of money and lives. Let’s learn how to declare victory, and I commend the President for trying to declare victory. And I hope you will support him in that.

Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Murphy.

Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good seeing you again, second day in a row, Secretary Pompeo.

Let me just associate myself quickly with the remarks that ranking member—regarding the importance of information flows between this committee and the State Department. I understand that there is lots of classified data that we will never see. That is what the Intelligence Committee is for. But there is some that rises to such level of importance that it affects decisions that we are making.
ing on this committee and in the Senate. And I just anchor my comments in those made by the——
Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir.
Senator MURPHY. —ranking member.
Second, just a quick pushback on a piece of your opening statement. You did note that we are at record numbers of Foreign Service officers, and that suggests there is no hollowing out of the State Department happening.
I would just remind the committee that has because we have rejected the requests from this administration to dramatically reduce the budget of the State Department. And had we enacted the requests of this administration, you would be on a glide path to record low numbers of personnel.
And, again, I have never been of the mind that this is the budget that you would write, Mr. Secretary, but it is just a reminder that to the extent we still are holding the line, it is because we stayed together on this committee.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to come back to the question of Chinese technology, 5G and Huawei. I was in Dublin a couple months ago, and the embassy there noted that the Chinese Embassy was exploding with personnel. And that was not coincidental to the open tinder of the new high-speed network in Ireland, a country that is, frankly, very important to us, because we have a lot of American data there and a lot of American companies there.
And it struck me that we are just vastly outmanned when it comes to this contest. We have, you know, generally in embassies one State Department officer who is handling technology, energy, and health care. And then we have military attaches, you know, that by and large are not technology experts in these places.
And so you have talked in previous hearings about leveraging access to the U.S. national security apparatus. But what are the other ways in which we can get on the right side of this fight? I mean I worry that we are losing this fight badly to the Chinese right now, in part because they just have staffed up, and we have not.
I also wonder whether there is an opportunity to leverage U.S. companies, particularly in a place like Ireland, who should be sensitive to American data that they hold being at some point maybe way down the line, an object of national security interests from the Chinese.
So what are the additional tools that we could give you to try to contest this fight over the global buildout of 5G?
Secretary POMPEO. Senator, important question. Let me take the second part of it first, or the second idea contained in there. We, the State Department, have to do a better job of making sure that American companies, frankly, non-Chinese companies. We will always fight for ours. But the technology systems being put in place in these countries have American values embedded within them, right? Privacy protections, concepts of property rights, all the central things that we would want from a technology system.
So we have two functions. One is to make sure not only do those governments of countries, like Ireland, or someplace else, as well as the private entities contemplating major technology, understand
the risks associated with the Chinese technology. And we have to help our companies show up to compete.

On 5G today, we are behind. It is difficult to show up with a suite, and we will always have a direct cost disadvantage there. The Chinese will subsidize in ways that we just don’t. So your point about leveraging the private sector I think is very real.

In terms of what other tools do we need, I admit to the case that we have just a handful of officers in most embassies around the world working on economic issues. But we have a big department. Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, I hope we will get him confirmed before too long, so we will do better at this. He comes out of that very space, the nominee does. I think we are close.

We have to show up with our full team. When there is a competition, when there is a tinder, we have to show up there, and make sure that the opportunity for an alternative choice is available.

Senator Murphy. It is the fight of the next 10 to 50 years.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Murphy. And we are fools if we don’t staff up the State Department with a technological expertise that can win this battle.

One final question. I am looking at a Washington Post article from January of this year entitled, “Can Saudi Arabia Produce Ballistic Missiles? Satellite Imagery Raises Suspicions.” Notwithstanding our bipartisan concern about Iran’s ballistic missile program, is it still the policy of the United States to oppose the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the Middle East?

Secretary Pompeo. Yes. We are concerned about ballistic missiles in the Middle East and elsewhere, Senator.

Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Young.

Senator Young. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is good to have you here.

Secretary Pompeo. Hello, sir.

Senator Young. I want you to know that I, along with many other members of this committee, would like to see the Senate confirm more of the President’s nominees to the Department of State as quickly as possible. And I just want to take a moment to flag two particular nominees, happen to be from my home state of Indiana. They are exceptional, and they need to move forward very quickly.

Steven Akard is the nominee to be the director of the Office of Foreign Missions. It has been more than 12 months ago since the President first nominated Steven Akard. That needs to move forward.

Many people don’t fully understand the position he was nominated to serve in, but effectively, he is the top human resources officer for the Foreign Service. So this is a critical member of your team. And I commend you for being able to operate short-staffed.

The second nominee I wanted to mention is Kip Tom. I have known Kip for a number of years. Highly qualified. He knows more about agriculture than I will ever aspire to know. But look, he has been nominated to serve as ambassador and U.S. representative to the U.N. agencies for food and agriculture. It has been over 8 months. And for farmers in Indiana and other states, I know it is
critically important to have a voice at the United Nations speaking on behalf of our farmers and ranchers.

So the good news is that both of these nominees were reported favorably from this committee. It is the full Senate's last week, but both of these nominees remain among more than 60 outstanding nominations referred to this committee that are pending in the Senate. I just urge my colleagues and Senate leadership to confirm both of these highly qualified nominees as soon as possible.

I would like to pivot to Venezuela, Mr. Secretary, and just begin by indicating, I know this crisis is deeply complex, and you are following it incredibly closely. It is growing more challenging by the day, it seems. I describe the situation, from my perspective, in a letter that I sent to you, and the president, and the vice president last week, but I wanted to bring it up to you directly.

There are Americans who we know are suffering at the hands of the Maduro regime today. Todd Leininger, from Indiana, has been in prison since April of 2014, when he was convicted by a Venezuelan court in the midst of anti-government protests. Many questions remain over the due process that was afforded to Todd. But my concern now is that in November of 2018 a San Cristabel court ordered Todd's release; yet, the Venezuelan authorities continue to detain Todd without explanation.

I am in regular contact with Todd's mother. She has concerns for Todd's welfare, not just welfare, but his very life. There are drinking water shortages, severe unsanitary conditions, and other medical concerns that I probably should not air publicly, but let's just say we are concerned about Todd's welfare.

So Mr. Secretary, while the diplomatic process, I know, is being worked on. I want to know what specifically you are doing to bring Americans like Todd home.

And then secondarily, I want to see what members of this committee can do to assist you and Special Envoy Abrahms, moving forward, so that we can help Todd and others be brought home safely and as quickly as possible.

Secretary Pompeo. Thanks for the question. The folks on this committee, we spend a lot of time working to get Americans that are wrongfully detained all around the world. It is a focus, and a big group of them come visit, it would have been a week ago today. It was really remarkable to have these families, to hear from them. Some of them still have folks detained. Some have lost their loved ones.

It re-impressed I think upon me and my whole team how central this is to what we are doing. To the extent that you all talk about this issue, raise this issue, voice the concerns, people around the world hear that. So I think that is important in its own right. And as we think about our policies with respect to, in this case, Venezuela, we should keep in mind that there are many concerns, one of which is the fact that they are wrongfully detaining U.S. persons.

Second, with respect to particular cases, it is more difficult today. We have now withdrawn our diplomatic staff from Curacaos. So our ability to engage in consulate activities of all kinds is absolutely—I regret that we had to make that decision. I think it was the right one. But know that we are still having conversations with
a broad range of Venezuelans, working diligently to try and make the case to get every American returned home.

Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, lastly, do you feel like you have sufficient resources to deal with the crisis in Venezuela? I know the administration has requested $500 million to assist with the democratic transition. Would that also deal with the situation that I just spoke to, Todd's situation and other American detainees? And if not, tell us what else you need, please.

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think we have the resources we need. I don't think we are lacking for either people or resources to execute that mission.

Senator Young. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Markey.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. Secretary, North Korea remains a significant threat.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Markey. And we know that after the two summits there still has been no tangible progress towards denuclearization. We know that Kim Jong-un is expanding his nuclear weapons program, and that he continues to exploit overseas slave labor. He is conducting cyber-heists to enrich himself. And we simply can't get results from Kim Jong-un by relieving pressure upon him and his regime.

You recently said that the Trump administration put more sanctions in place against North Korea than at any time in world's history. However, the U.N. panel on experts warned on March 5th of this year that there are severe deficiencies in the global pressure campaign. It states that there have been quote, "A massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal," and quote, "they render the latest United Nations' sanctions ineffective."

So the experts are saying that the gaps are growing. Yet, the Trump administration has added only 34 names to our sanctions list, down from 207 the year before. That is an 83 percent drop, Mr. Secretary. And we know that U.N. sanctions—resolutions are only as strong as member state enforcement. And the world follows America's lead.

When President Trump, after the Treasury Department sanctioned two China-based companies, asked on Twitter for those listings to be undone, we confused the very allies and partners we need to help solve this problem peacefully, Mr. Secretary.

So, from my perspective, Kim merrily rolls along with his development of his nuclear weapons program. Our sanctions regime is being criticized by the panel of experts, and ultimately, from my perspective, I see Kim Jong-un just trying to play out the string to the end of your administration, with absolutely no results that can be pointed to in reducing the nuclear threat from that country. Please respond.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes. So I agree with some of what you said, but not much.

You describe an 83 percent decrease in our increase in sanctions. And you may think the enforcement regime is ineffective, but you should move to the outskirts of Pyongyang, because those folks think it is very effective. I concede there is more that can be done.
I will concede that China has imperfectly enforced those sanctions. I concede that there are still ship-to-ship transfers taking place. That is absolutely true.

You should know that in every one of those dimensions the things that are happening inside the country——

Senator MARKEY. Do you agree that there has been a massive increase in ship-to-ship illegal——

Secretary POMPEO. I don’t know about massive, but let me assure you there is less coal, less fuel, less resource there today than there was when President Obama was in office.

Senator MARKEY. Well, it is not effective if programs are actually expanding. The ship-to-ship oil transfers are actually increasing. It is not effective.

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, there is an enormous undertaking, not just United States undertaking, to take down the ship-to-ship transfers. You should know the rogue regimes are difficult. They will move. It is a big ocean out there. But you should know that your United States government is working diligently to enforce those sanctions, and working to get our partners in the region, South Koreans, the Japanese, the Australians, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, if I didn’t mention that already, to help us to enforce those sanctions. I concede, we need to continue to keep the pressure on, Senator.

Senator MARKEY. Again, when the expert panel says that it is ineffective, and the President undermines the very effort that we are trying to put in place. To say to the Chinese, say to the Russians you have to get tough. We are going to hold you accountable. And the President is tweeting out that we are not going to have those additional sanctions put in place. It just sends the wrong signal to North Korea, but to China, and to Russia, and to anyone else that we are trying to get to cooperate in a regime to tighten the pressure on Kim Jong-un.

So I just have a big problem with understanding what the strategy is ultimately to get Kim to make the concessions on his nuclear weapons program if, in fact, the sanctions regime is being ultimately relaxed. It is ineffective, and the signal is being sent to the Chinese: we will not sanction you if you violate those sanctions. How can that be effective, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, the North Korean economy will shrink this year.

Senator MARKEY. Well, will it result in actual concessions to be made?

Secretary POMPEO. This is a long process. We took over in a place where there were very limited sanctions. No effort to enforce, no diplomatic engagement to create a global coalition. We weren’t even——

Senator MARKEY. Yeah. That’s two-and-a-half years ago. Two-and-a-half years ago.

Secretary POMPEO. —leading from behind. We refused to engage against this threat, and we have taken this seriously. We are going to continue to take it seriously. We have got him to stop missile testing. We have him to stop nuclear testing. We are going to keep at it.
Senator Markey. Right. Well, look, the economy may be going down in North Korea. It is just not going down enough. The sanctions are not tough enough. We are not pressuring them enough. We are not sending the right signals to China and to Russia to cut it off even further.

So yeah, it might be going down, but it is not going down in a level that is affecting Kim in terms of making concessions to us, or the President, at the summit, that reflects that we, in fact, have been successful.

So the only answer to me is that we have to make it stronger. We just have to be realistic about this, or else in another year-and-a-half, the Trump administration will have been completed, and it will have been no reduction in the nuclear program of North Korea. So that is just my bottom line, looking at it, Mr. Secretary. Make them tougher. The sanctions have to be tougher.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Portman.

Senator Portman. Thank you.

First of all, Secretary Pompeo, thank you for your service, being our diplomat around the world. And you mentioned the returning Americans home efforts that you have made, and meeting with families last week. And one of those families was the parents of Otto Warmbier. And I thank you for staying in touch with them. They appreciated it.

I will be in Korea next week, talking among others to our ambassador, Admiral Harris, and South Korean officials about what is going on in North Korea, and continuing to hold up their human rights abuses, and expose for everyone what happened to Otto, and what is happening to others, including North Koreans. So thank you for staying on top of that issue. And, of course, tighter sanctions are something we should all want as we begin to see some progress as a result of the sanctions we have put in place.

I want to talk about the Global Engagement Center quickly, and about Ukraine. On the Global Engagement Center, you recall Senator Murphy and I a few years ago started working on encouraging State not to just establish the center, but to properly fund it. I want to thank you, because this year you have made a request in your budget of $76.5 million, which is a 38 percent increase from last year’s request.

I know you have a tight budget, and I know you are being asked to find cuts elsewhere. And this is encouraging to me, because I think it is undeniable that the propaganda and disinformation that is going on around the world, from different state actors, and I think we are going to learn a lot more, I think, about Russia even in the next few weeks here, in terms of what they are doing.

In this session we cannot talk about some of the details, but the reality is it is such a huge threat. And I think your former role at the Central Intelligence Agency probably informs you better than other Secretaries of State.

So I assume that having recognized that, this budget increase is reflecting your concern.
Having said that, one thing we have not gotten done yet is this DOD transfer. We have authorized a $60 million transfer from DOD for this fiscal year, fiscal year 2019. It is authorized by law. Can you confirm that you all have requested that full 60 million from DOD?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have requested that.

Senator Portman. Thank you. Do you see this process going a little more smoothly this year? Last fiscal year I recall we got it at the 11th hour, maybe at the 11th-and-a-half hour, if that is possible. Any sense of where we are this year?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are working on it. It did take us a long time last year. I hope that it goes more quickly this year. We have now done it once, so I think there is a mechanism in place. I am hopeful it will move along more quickly.

Interagency cooperation is one reason we put this in place, where you have to go to the Defense Department. They have to work with you. Do you feel as though the interagency process is working well? We want DOD’s help in this effort.

Secretary Pompeo. You mean with respect to the GEC?

Senator Portman. With respect to GEC.

Secretary Pompeo. I felt like we have made strides. Look, it took us a little while. We did not have someone there that we had chosen to lead that organization. We now have that person in place, and I think it has improved dramatically really over what is now the last 2 months.

Senator Portman. With regard to Ukraine quickly, and thank you for the GEC help, we have finally, as you know, provided help to the Ukrainians to be able to defend themselves. And that was the change in this administration. We appreciate that lethal security assistance, so they can defend their own sovereign territory.

In the National Defense Authorization bill 2 years ago, we authorized naval assistance for the first time. And particularly what’s gone on since then on the Kerch Strait means that we need to do all we can to help deal with the naval side of this, that the Russians are being increasingly aggressive.

Do you know what the status is of transferring these two excess island-class cutters to the Ukrainian navy? And are you encouraging of that?

Secretary Pompeo. I am encouraging it. I do not know the status, Senator.

Senator Portman. Okay. I would appreciate you guys getting back to me on that. It seems to me that that is one of our pressing capability gaps we have. Can you speak to other concerns you might have about what is going on in Ukraine vis-a-vis Russia?

Secretary Pompeo. So we are now years into this, and it is frozen, at best. Still challenges. Still fighting along the line of control nearly every day. You know, I think everyone is staring at the Ukrainian election now. A handful more days before the Ukrainians will select their next leader. And we will engage closely with whoever that leader is to ensure that we continue this and provide support for Ukrainian democracy.

Senator Portman. Well, I appreciate that. And I do think we are at a critical time right now. We will see what happens in the election. I plan to go after the election and meet with the new govern-
ment. But it is a frozen—I have been on the contact line. On the other hand, I think we have begun to change the dynamic by the support you have provided. We have to continue to do it.

I have one other question. Maybe you can send something in response as a written response. But it has to do with the sanctions regime. I am hearing from some folks at State that they are having a tough time sanctioning certain Russian individuals because the Treasury Department indicates that our legislation here is too restrictive. In other words, the legislation, as it relates to specific things, like Ukraine, and what happened in Crimea, might not relate exactly to a particular individual who is otherwise involved in malign efforts that affect national security in the United States.

Would it be helpful for you to have a broader sanctions regime that this body could send you in order to ensure that the individuals that you would like to sanction are able to be sanctioned?

Secretary Pompeo. I think it is definitely worth taking a look at. Some of this on the Treasury side, not on—the broader scope would need to be for—the broader scope would need to be for Treasury sanctions. But I would love to see that. And we should evaluate and make sure we do it in a thoughtful way, so that we actually pick up what we are looking for.

Senator Portman. Okay. If you could provide us some current information on that. That would be helpful to——

Secretary Pompeo. Happy to do that. Yes, sir.

Senator Portman. —what you are looking for.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

I have talked to Senator Portman, just for your information—for your information, I have talked with Senator Crapo about this exact issue on the sanctions. He raises some important points, and I think we need to get together to talk about that with the Banking Committee, so it is a joint effort.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary Pompeo for being here, and thank you for your service.

You mentioned in terms of other questions that it was still the policy of the United States to prevent missile proliferation in the Middle East. And I wanted to ask, based on what was said earlier in articles that had been put in the record about the Chinese selling missiles to Saudi Arabia.

Have you spoken up and told Saudi Arabia we don’t appreciate their aggressive acquisition of Chinese missiles?

Secretary Pompeo. There are, I should not say every. There are very few conversations that I have with the leadership in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that I don’t make clear that we prefer they purchase American systems, not Chinese systems across a broader way, whether it is telecommunications, or otherwise.

Senator Udall. Yeah. And are we seeing what many of our foreign policy folks that have been in the region a long time, very worried about an arms race, is this indication of the Chinese penetration into Saudi Arabian missile sales? Is this an indication we are headed down the road to an arms race? And what are we doing about it, if it is our policy to prevent this kind of thing?
Secretary POMPEO. I think it is a little more complicated than that. Look, the Middle East has had arms and arms issues for an awfully long time. This particular set of issues surrounding missiles, you see issues in the region with—we have not talked about Turkey and their S–400 purchase. So missile defense, anti-aircraft systems. This is certainly something that we all need to keep an eye on.

I will tell you that most of the folks who are working to build out missile systems are doing so directly because the Islamic Republic of Iran was permitted to continue with missile program under the JCPOA. It did not slow them down. And so others are doing what they need to do to create a deterrence tool for themselves. It is just a fact.

Senator Udall. Well, I very much hope that the administration will push back in terms of what is happening in missiles across the Middle East.

Secretary Pompeo, our southern border increasingly looks like a war zone, like Germany with the Berlin Wall, or the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula. We have border patrol agents harassing and separating families, and caging children, members of the military supporting a made-up emergency. When the reality is that the U.S. border communities are just as safe and often safer than anywhere else in the United States.

This is reminiscent of how we enemies treat one another. Is Mexico the enemy of the United States?

Secretary Pompeo. There were 20,000 apprehensions last week of illegal entrants into our country. This is a real crisis. These are numbers that I think that when we took office, the numbers were—I will have the numbers wrong, but 20,000 last week. We are working closely with the Mexican government to create the conditions there which will stop this.

I work very closely with Foreign Minister Ebrard. He has been a great partner, but they have not yet effectively been able to stop what is mostly transit through their country, from these folks coming into our country. And President Trump’s determined to create sovereignty and protect our border.

Senator Udall. Do you believe that the U.S. should close the southern border in response to the asylum seekers you just spoke about?

Secretary Pompeo. You know, with the laws as we have them today, I worked on an agreement where we would allow those with proper asylum claims to wait for their asylum here. The numbers are overwhelming to wait in Mexico. We had a court fundamentally misread the law, and deny us the ability to do that. We need your help. We need Congress to change these rules.

We know that some of the folks who come across have legitimate asylum claims, but the system is broken. And we need Congress to change the laws so that we can protect our southern borders. It is not just people who are coming here. It is drugs. It is weapons. I mean the stories, you know them, about human trafficking that is taking place, or what is happening to women as they move across Mexico is truly tragic. If we can secure our southern border, we will improve the lives of those people, I am convinced of it.
Senator Udall. Do you believe our country is “full,” as the President has said, and that we should not accept any more asylum seekers or immigrants to the United States?

Secretary Pompeo. This is the most generous nation in the history of civilization, is the case. As the President said——

Senator Udall. Answer my question.

Secretary Pompeo. The President has said repeatedly, he has talked about lawful immigration. The work that we are doing is along our southern border to prevent people from coming in here unlawfully, illegally. That is the mission set that he has set out. It is what I am working with the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico as a foreign policy matter to take care of.

Senator Udall. Well, the reality is, and I think a lot of policy experts on the Northern Triangle are saying it is a very bad policy to cut off foreign aid to the three countries down there, where these folks are originating from. And that is one of our levers to keep them there, and to keep the countries more stable.

But I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, so——

The Chairman. You are.

Senator Udall. —let me apologize.

[Laughter.]

Senator Udall. And thank you for the courtesies. And I will yield back.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Gardner.

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary for your service to our country, and your leadership. A couple of questions for you, and I will try to do this quickly.

In your testimony you stated the United States’ future security, prosperity, and leadership depends on maintaining a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific. To advance the Indo-Pacific strategy, the budget request nearly doubles U.S. foreign assistance resources targeting this crucial area compared to the fiscal year 2019 request.

Do you commit to fully implement the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, or ARIA, that we have discussed many times?

Secretary Pompeo. We think ARIA makes great sense, and we will do our level best to fully comply, including getting you reports that are late.

Senator Gardner. Thank you. And I was going to talk about the two reports. We have the report on Association of Southeast Asian Nations, human rights strategy, and the report on approach and strategies as it relates to denuclearization of the North Korean governance.

Secretary Pompeo. We are close, Senator.

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that.

Could you quickly identify a few new programs you will build out to prioritize under ARIA, build out or prioritize under ARIA?

Secretary Pompeo. Oh, goodness. May I let our team come brief——

Senator Gardner. Yes.

Secretary Pompeo. We have racked and stacked how we think about this. I would love to have the team come in and get your feedback as well on the way to—if we have the right metrics for our prioritization.
Senator GARDNER. You bet. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.

And today, April 10th, marks the 40th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. Forty years ago, April 10th, the Taiwan Relations Act was signed into law, which together the President—with President Reagan’s 1982 Six Assurances, the Taiwan Travel Act, and ARIA have become the cornerstones of our relationship with Taiwan.

Little over a week ago for the first time in 20 years there appears to have been an intentional crossing of the median line of the Taiwan Straits by Chinese jets. Do you plan to fully implement the TRA, the Taiwan Travel Act, and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act to further strengthen our partnership with Taiwan?

Secretary POMPEO. Yes.

Senator GARDNER. Will you commit to send high-level delegations to Taiwan in the near future to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Taiwan and the Taiwanese people?

Secretary POMPEO. We have a lot of work going on at the AIT, at our center there. Yeah. We’re going to keep at it. We see the increase in China’s activity, both political information warfare. And then as you described, actually on the real estate. We see how China has continued to be more aggressive with Taiwan. We talk with the Chinese. Every conversation I have with the Chinese begins with this discussion. I think they understand America’s policy is constant and enduring.

Senator GARDNER. And I believe both Japan and Taiwan scrambled jets to push back the Chinese incursion.

Secretary POMPEO. I believe that is correct as well.

Senator GARDNER. On China, a quick aside, there is a new extradition agreement that Hong Kong has agreed to with China, or is in discussions with on China. The European Union today has warned journalists of this new extradition that they could face, extradition to China, and perhaps face jail time in China over this new extradition law.

Has the State Department made any decisions or discussions relating to Hong Kong’s new extradition discussions with China?

Secretary POMPEO. I’m aware of this. We are reviewing it. I don’t believe we made any decisions yet.

Senator GARDNER. Would a possible warning to U.S. journalists or civil society activists, would a possible warning come from the State Department as a result of that extradition law?

Secretary POMPEO. I need to look at it. I know the team is reviewing what took place there, and I need to see what impact it has on American citizens traveling in the region, including the occupations you just described.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you.

Your testimony, you stated that our diplomatic efforts towards the final fully verified denuclearization of North Korea are the most successful that have ever been undertaken. We remain committed to that goal. It especially provides for our diplomatic outreach to continue, and continue implementation and enforcement of sanctions until we achieve our objective.

Do you commit to the full enforcement of existing sanctions against the North Korean regime under U.S. law, including all of
those mandated by the North Korea Sanctions Policy Enhancement Act, and ARIA?

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah. Yes, Senator.

Senator GARDNER. Do you agree that no sanctions against North Korea should be lifted until North Korea demonstrates a commitment to complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization?

Secretary POMPEO. I want to leave a little space there. From time to time there are particular provisions that if we were making substantial progress that one might think that was the right thing to do to achieve, sometimes it is visas. So I want to leave a little room.

But yes, your point is well taken. The enforcement regime, the core U.S. Security Council resolutions need to remain in place until the verification of denuclearization has been completed.

Senator GARDNER. And would you support further sanctions legislation by this Congress, the LEED Act that Senator Markey and I have introduced, or others?

Secretary POMPEO. Conceptually, yes. I am not familiar with that legislation.

Senator GARDNER. When it comes to China, yesterday we had a hearing, Subcommittee on East Asia, where we heard from witnesses who were discussing the situation that Uyghurs face in Jinjiang, in China. Also discussed China’s approach to Tibet, as well as hearing from a witness testifying about the genocide in Burma.

Could you talk a little bit about how we are approaching these human rights violations, and what we will do specifically to address the Uyghur situation, and what we are further doing in Burma?

Secretary POMPEO. I don’t want to get out in front of decisions where we are working on with respect to other policies we may take, but we have been incredibly candid about what is taking place inside of China, not only to the Uyghurs, but to the Cossacks, and Christians. This is historic. The numbers are staggering. It is certainly into the hundreds of thousands of people.

It began, this information management, this Orwellian state began in Tibet, has now been expanded. The same gentleman who ran the program previously now is running this program in Jinjiang. This is a very serious matter. Very serious human rights violation. The State Department, and, frankly, other elements of the United States government are working diligently to make clear that this is not acceptable behavior.

Senator GARDNER. Yesterday, his holiness, the Dalai Lama, was taken to a hospital for a health concern. I think everything is all right. Would the United States ever consider legitimizing a leader following the Dalai Lama that was anointed by China?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, it doesn’t seem likely.

Senator GARDNER. All right. I hope the answer is no.

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah. It’s a complicated question. I am happy to talk to you about it. We understand the history. We understand what China is trying to do. And you should know there hasn’t been an administration that has taken on China in the way that this one has determined to take on, on every dimension, military, diplo-
matic, the trade agreement, the economics, the intellectual property, theft. It is robust, human rights included.

Senator GARDNER. Thanks.

Secretary POMPEO. We are serious about this, making sure that China behaves in a way that reflects American values.

Senator GARDNER: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you for being here.

The President recently expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of cocaine that is being produced in Columbia. And I thought it was an important to point, I don’t know if he is aware of this, that the migratory situation coming from Venezuela into Columbia is an extraordinary drain on that nation’s resources.

We have ELN and other drug groups operating openly, and with impunity on the Venezuelan side of the border, with the support of all of the Venezuelan government officials. The migrants, by the way, are very vulnerable people, some of whom are now being actively recruited, in efforts to get them to join some of these gangs on the border.

The drug flights that come out of Venezuela, carrying the cocaine, headed north, by the way, many of those planes land right in the Northern Triangle countries, where they are passed on.

The drug trafficking organizations that are fueled by the drug proceeds, and, of course, are a key part of destabilizing Central America, leading to our migratory crisis.

On top of that, in Venezuela, you have an active and growing Russian military presence, as we have seen in Open Source reporting. Yesterday, the Open Source reports about the resumption of direct flights from Iran by the airline that our nation has sanctioned for support to the IRGC.

And adding to all of this fun and games is the fact that we know that they have purchased a series of MANPADS, Russian-made systems, which in a place where you have gangs acting with impunity in the street, links to drug trafficking organizations, linked to guerilla groups on the border. There is always the concern that these MANPADS could be stolen or transferred for profit. They are involved in every sort of illegal traffic imaginable.

So I guess it leads to the question, could not the argument be made, or is it our position that the Maduro Regime, based on all of this that I have just outlined, represents a direct threat to the national interests and the national security of the United States?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I don’t think there is any doubt that that is the case, that the Maduro Regime presents a threat to the United States of America. You mentioned Iran. The Hezbollah has been in South America. This risk is very real.

The drugs are something that has been around for a long time. That is not a new problem. And now the Russian footprint. Couple that with their connection to the Cubans and the Cuban inner circle that is around Maduro, and it is clearly the case that the former leadership of Venezuela, Maduro Regime, is a true threat to the United States of America.

Senator RUBIO. And I guess the broader point is that, of course, we care about human rights and democracy in our region, especially in our hemisphere, and we are going to be supportive of it,
but beyond that there is a national security interest for the United States and what is happening there.

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, we agree.

Senator RUBIO. And one more point on these gangs. They call them the Colectivos. You are aware of them. As we have seen, the normal argument out there is the military is sticking with Maduro. And there is truth to that. But really, what he is using now to control the country and repress our 50,000 members of over 500 gangs, literally street gangs that he has armed, and actually openly calls upon to take to the streets, and repress people.

It would be my view, and I think the White House and State Department would share it, that these military officials, high-ranking military officials, who in the past in Venezuela, have openly discussed how these groups are unconstitutional, and operating outside the law.

It would be incumbent upon them to step forward and confront these groups at a minimum. They may not do a good coup d’etat, they may not take out Maduro, but they must confront these armed groups in Venezuela, who are basically running the streets.

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, we agree. And to the extent we have had the capacity to talk to them directly, we have shared that they need to do that. It is a bit embarrassing to be a Venezuelan senior leader. You have got the Cubans protecting Maduro, and you have the Colectivos keeping down people inside of the country.

We hope they will make decisions that are very, very different from that. We have also spoken about this publicly. It is a real threat. These little roving gangs are doing enormous harm inside of the country. There is not only their water shortages and food shortages, but there are now—the Venezuelan people are being observed by these Colectivos, and their behavior is not consistent with what Maduro would wish. They are under the thumb of these roving gangs.

Senator RUBIO. Yeah. Just one side note on that. These gangs, they will be repressing people in the street, and attacking them, and spot somebody walking down the street, and snatch a purse, and then go back to repressing. They are criminals.

One last question. I support the designation of the IRGC. I think that was the right decision. Has the administration made it clear through every channel that if, in fact, now, as a result of this, U.S. troops in Iraq are targeted, not just designated terrorist groups, but targeted, whether it is by Shia militias, the IRGC, or a combination thereof? No matter who targets us in Iraq from that, the Shia militias or the Iranians that we will hold Iran directly responsible for any harm that comes to our personnel in the region, even if they do it through a third-party surrogate?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, we have made clear that Iran cannot escape responsibility for any harm that comes to United States' interests anywhere in the world by doing it through a proxy force. They understand President Trump's policy.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for your service.

I want to talk a little bit about Iran.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Cruz. And let me start out by thanking you and the administration for designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. As you know, that is a step I have long advocated. I have introduced legislation to move it forward.

And I wanted to ask you to explain to this committee and the American people why designating the IGRC as a terrorist organization is, number one, justified on the merits, and number two, what the consequences of that designation are, specifically for financial institutions, or corporations doing business with IRGC-affiliated entities.

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, that is the very name. People say the IRGC, and sometimes they get the “I” and the “R” wrong. This is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I think that is important. They named themselves appropriately.

This terrorist organization has killed over 600 Americans. The number is probably far higher than that. They continue to engage in terror around the world, include assassination campaigns in Europe and the West. This was kind of an easy decision, reflecting reality. So I am happy that we were able to announce that decision yesterday.

Second, with respect to its impact. The IRGC has another component, which is what I will call the kleptocracy component. It runs a significant piece of the Iranian economy. The numbers vary, but I have seen numbers as high as 20 or 25 percent of the Iranian economy has resources that transfer to the IRGC itself.

If you are the general counsel of an Asian bank or a European bank, your world changed when that designation came out yesterday. If you are thinking about doing business or providing material support in any way to any company that might be connected to the IRGC, this sanction will cause you not to do that. From our goal, what that will do is it will deny them the resources to continue their terror campaign around the world.

Senator Cruz. Thank you for that answer.

You and I worked together, as there was an interagency debate within the administration about whether the President should pull out of the Iranian nuclear deal. I think the President made unquestionably the right decision.

As you know, there were significant voices within the State Department that resisted that step, and that I believe continue to resist that step. And I want to talk to you about two different aspects of implementing that decision to pull out of the Iran deal. Namely, the nuclear waivers and the oil waivers.

On the nuclear waivers, as you know, we have waivers that allow Iran to continue with supposedly non-military nuclear research. If you look to the extraordinary results that the Israeli raids seized from Iran, that debunked what we were told by the Obama administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and made clear that entire parts of Iran’s civilian nuclear program were built in order to create nuclear weapons, and that it was little more than a sham.

I want to ask your view on should we continue to grant nuclear waivers. As I understand, they are up for renewal next month.
Should we continue to grant nuclear waivers, given the rather significant evidence that doing so could further Iran acquiring nuclear weapons?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think this administration, I think it is hard to challenge the fact that we have been tough with respect to sanctions on Iran, with respect to particular waiver decisions, both these and the crude oil ones. I don’t have any announcements to make today. We need to make sure that they wind through the process appropriately.

Your point about different opinions inside the State Department, we have 90,000 employees. We probably have that many opinions. Make no mistake about it, we will stare closely at this.

On the nonproliferation waivers, I would love to talk to you in a classified setting about it. It is complicated. But suffice it to say, President Trump, I can assure the American people, I can assure the world, President Trump will continue to ratchet up the pressure on Islamic Republic of Iran, such that their behavior will change.

Senator Cruz. Well, there will be a critical decision point next month also concerning the oil waivers. And it has been publicly reported that there is currently an interagency dispute between the State Department and the Energy Department about whether to grant those waivers again.

Right now, Iran is producing roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. That is generating billions of dollars that is funding the Ayatollah, and I believe endangering our security.

What are your views on whether allowing Iran to continue to produce 1.2 million barrels of oil a day, and sell it on the world market, is that in our national interest?

Secretary Pompeo. I think the State Department may—I think we have been clear about our objective in getting Iran to zero just as quickly as we possibly can. And we will continue to do that.

Senator Cruz. Well, let me urge you and urge the department unequivocally not to grant the nuclear waivers and not to grant the oil waivers. I think maximum pressure should mean maximum pressure. You have been a strong voice for that, and let me encourage you to continue that strong position defending our national security.

Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.

Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much. And I just wanted to add—thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Barrasso. I just wanted to add my voice to that of Senator Cruz’s. Twenty-one of us sent a letter to President Trump last month on Iran oil sanctions. As you were just saying, 80 percent of Iran’s revenues come from oil exports. The more we can do to shut that down as quickly as possible, I think the more important it is, especially with the new waivers perhaps happening as early as next month. So thank you for that attention to that issue.

I wanted to switch to Turkey and the S-400, and the issues that are going on there. Now you and I had a chance to talk about this a couple of weeks ago. I am very concerned about Turkey’s plan to
obtain the S–400, the surface-to-air missile defense systems from Russia. They want to do that in July.

I would recommend to you an editorial in the New York Times today, “A U.S. Fighter Jet or a Russian Missile System, Not Both.” by Senator Risch, Senator Menendez, the ranking members of this committee, as well as by Senators Inhofe and Reed, who are the ranking member and chair of the Armed Services Committee.

I think Turkey’s purchase of the S–400 reduces the interoperability of that system with our allies. It poses a serious threat to the security of our F–35 fighter jets, and the entire NATO system. A number of us were visiting a number of NATO countries over the last couple of weeks. Great concern over that. I know the Secretary-General, who celebrated the 70th anniversary of NATO with us in the joint session of Congress, has similar concerns.

On April 2nd of this year, the Department of Defense announced it would halt all F–35 equipment transfers to Turkey, unless it abandons plans to acquire the S–400.

So I would just like for you to give us an overview of the risks to the U.S. and NATO security as a result of Turkey trying to integrate the S–400 system and our F–35 fighters in the air defense.

Secretary POMPEO. So I will leave the details to the experts, but as I have been briefed by the Department of Defense team, it is not possible to both fly the F–35 in space where the S–400 is significantly operable. That is not a very technical description, but the two cannot coexist. We have made that clear through foreign ministry channels. We have it clear to General Carr through the Department of Defense channels.

This very challenge, this technical challenge it presents, we now have provided an opportunity for the Turks to buy an American system that will provide them with the air defense capability that they want for their country. That offer is on the table. The details are being worked through, and we have made clear to the Turks as plainly as we can, you know, they built a significant component of the F–35 as well. Not only are they purchasers and customers, but they are——

Senator BARRASSO. Producers.

Secretary POMPEO. —part of the supply chain for the F–35. We have it clear that none of that can exist if the S–400 is purchased by them.

Senator BARRASSO. Are there consequences that you have in mind that Turkey should face if they do go ahead with that purchase?

Secretary POMPEO. Well, I mean I think as a statutory matter, the lawyers will have to sort through the details, but the S–400 is a significant weapons system, and we have shared with them, we have asked them to go take a look at CATSA, what that might well mean for them.

It is just, I think Acting Secretary Shanahan said it best yesterday. We can’t continue to have the F–35 operable in space where the S–400 is also sitting.

Senator BARRASSO. One of the other topics you and I had a chance to discuss was Nord Stream II. I mean it came up when we were at the Munich Defense Conference. It continues to come up
for discussion. To me it is Putin’s pipeline. It is a trap, a Russian
trap that the Germans are seemingly willing to enter into.

And your thoughts on, are there things that Germany has done
over the last year to even—to ensure that Nord Stream II would
even not proceed without guarantees that Russian oil will be able
to continue to be exported through Ukraine. Because questions
were raised earlier about Ukraine and the stability of that country.
And I think Senator Portman is heading there right after the elec-
tion. Some of us were there right before the first round of the elec-
tions.

Secretary Pompeo. So President Trump has made clear, Nord
Stream II underwrites the Russians when we are in the NATO
group. Most of the countries of NATO see that same risk, and so
share America’s concern there.

The Germans appear intent on continuing to build that pipeline.
And we are working with them to see if there is a path forward
that we can, at the very least, ensure that there is energy that
transits through Ukraine.

There may be an outcome there. We have done just about all we
can to discourage the Europeans, primarily the Germans, from
building Nord Stream II, and done that without success today.

Senator Barrasso. And final question in terms of incredible U.S.
military success against ISIS. Are there things that you can share
with us, now that the Caliphate has been defeated, that the admin-
istration is shifting in terms of its strategy to deal with insurgents,
and to rid the region of any kind of additional violent extremism
that could do damage, with the intention of doing damage to the
United States?

Secretary Pompeo. So both in Syria and Iraq we have State De-
partment, often with the military teams, on the ground working to
see if there are ways that we can get the global community to un-
derwrite stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, so that
there is less likelihood that we will get the next variant of Sunni
terror in Anbar and then the west of Iraq.

The Iraqi government is in full support of this. The Iraqi security
forces, our military works closely with the buildout security institu-
tions, so that the next variant of Sunni extremism, Sunni terrorism
in the region doesn’t march on Baghdad or Erbil again.

Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, this administration has still
failed to provide the legally required determination on the role of
the crown prince and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. And despite
superfluous briefings and additional determinations from the
Treasury Department this week, you are still not in compliance
with the law. Nor has the administration provided a justification
for its lack of respect for the law.

So my question is, have you discussed with the President or the
White House whether to make a determination about the crown
prince’s responsibility for Mr. Khashoggi’s death?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to talk about conver-
sations I had with the President. I am confident that we are in
compliance with the law. We simply disagree about the——
Senator MENENDEZ. Let me read the law to you. Let me read the law to you. And the author is sitting next to me.

“Not later than 120 days after receiving a request that meets the requirements of paragraph two,” which is when the chair and the ranking member of the relevant committee, this committee, previous chairman and I made such a request, “the president shall,” shall, shall, not may, not could, he shall, “determine if that person has engaged in such an activity,” which is an activity in violation of the global Magnitsky Human Rights Act, “and submit a classified or unclassified report to the chairperson and ranking member of the committee that submitted the request with respect to that determination, and includes a statement of whether or not the president intends to impose sanctions with respect to the person.”

Shall.

I mean I know you have graduated from a great law school. Shall is shall. I did not graduate from Harvard, but I graduated from Rutgers’ law school. Shall is shall. It means you must. And yet you refuse to get—even if your determination is that he hasn’t, but you refuse to give us a determination.

And the message that that sends globally—for example, we have President el-Sisi here, if he believes that you can do anything with impunity just because you have some strategic interest with the United States, or any other actor in the world, then you have a dangerous precedent.

How is it that the CIA, according to public records, can conclude that the Saudi crown prince ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi, and yet the administration has taken no action regarding a Magnitsky determination? Not sanctions on other people. A Magnitsky determination as required by the law, and requested by the chairman and the ranking member of this committee.

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I would never refer to even a public report of something that the CIA had determined. I just would not do it. I don’t think it’s in America’s best interest for elected officials to be seconding what some reporter thinks they have gotten from classified information.

Second, with respect to the global Magnitsky——

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I think you should tell Senator Graham that, too.

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah. I would tell anyone, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Bottom line is there are public reports that——

Secretary POMPEO. I would tell anyone that.

Senator MENENDEZ. —speak to this, and there are public—there are a whole host of public reports that speak to things that unfortunately the government doesn’t tell us, even as members of the Senate, as we found out yesterday.

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, you know that—I don’t want to get into a debate. There are jurisdictional issues between the Intelligence Committee and this committee that you are deeply aware of.

Senator MENENDEZ. Can you give me the legal—has the office of the legal counsel, legal advisor, provided you with an opinion that says you don’t have to do this?
Secretary POMPEO. I am confident that we are doing everything that we are required to do——

Senator MENENDEZ. That is not what I asked you. Did the office of the legal advisor provide you an opinion that says you don’t have to do this?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, we are compliance with the law.

Senator MENENDEZ. You did not answer my question.

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah. I have given you the answer I am prepared to provide this morning.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me give you an answer to something else that since my colleague, Senator Johnson, invoked my name in disdain. I was not going to talk about this, but since he opened the door, let me speak to it.

Mr. Bulatao and other nominees. I hope that Senator Johnson is concerned about political firings and retribution at the State Department as he is about some of these nominees. After removing the prior undersecretary for management, Pat Kennedy, a career foreign service officer, who knew the department well, the Trump administration failed to nominate a replacement for 142 days.

Then the President nominated a candidate with zero experience managing a larger organization, whose nomination languished for a year, because republicans and democrats in Congress did not believe he was fit to move forward through the process before the administration acknowledged that, and then took him out of the job nomination.

Five-hundred-and-nine days after Pat Kennedy was fired, the White House finally submitted a second nominee to the committee. Now this nominee is ready to go forward if the department gives us the critical information that we have been asking, that has already been provided to an inspector general and a special counsel on information that is critical for this committee’s oversight of the department. But it has failed to do so a year later.

Now I know many of my colleagues, including you, Mr. Secretary, when you were a House member, I could read you the quotes, spoke eloquently of the responsibility of oversight. Yet, you deny you are stonewalling this committee from getting that information.

And finally, talk about characterizing nominees as excellent or outstanding candidates, we have nominees with temporary restraining orders, who failed to disclose lawsuits to this committee, who have Me Too issues, who even lack some basic knowledge about their posts.

Amazingly enough, we have some nominees who have either written or retweeted vile things about current and former senators on this committee, and their families, which speaks to their judgment as someone who is going to represent the United States and the world.

Do you think it is appropriate for our nominee to retweet a post stating George Soros, the leader of their movement, worked for Hitler, helping kill his own people, the Jews? Or do you think it is appropriate for that same nominee to retweet a post alleging that Heidi Cruz, the wife of Senator Cruz, is an architect of the North American Union, whose goal is to destroy the sovereignty of the United States, and to retweet personal attacks accusing Senator Cruz of being a whole host of other things I won’t get into?
Or do you think it is appropriate for that same nominee to retweet a picture of Senator Romney with the words “dumb ass” on it, which goes on to say that, “Senator Romney, Satan has a hold on you. Surely, you’ll go to hell.”

Is this the type of nominee—and I could go through a whole host of others. So we are going to stop talking about nominees. We are working very hard to try to move forward.

I left to speak about General Abizaid on the floor, and I look forward to voting for him. Working with the chairman. We put 24 nominees out before—but some of these nominees are incredible. I think even you recognized it when we had a conversation. Yet, they got re-nominated.

So we have some real vetting issues. So I hope we can get to a better place, because I want you to be staffed. But by the same token, I am just not going to rubberstamp nominees who have some of these problems. And that is why we are having the issue. And if I can get the information that this committee deserves on oversight, Senator Johnson could have Mr. Bulatao.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let’s talk a bit about Russia and Latin America.

Last year, in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I passed bipartisan legislation adopted as part of the NDAA that required the Defense Intelligence Agency to report on Russia security cooperation with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

The report that the administration submitted is extensive and it is worrying. It shows that Russia is building a security infrastructure in our backyard with Cuba, with Venezuela, and with Nicaragua.

Cuba supports Russia naval operations in exchange for credit and military equipment. In 2018 alone Russia and Cuba signed a $50 million loan agreement for the purchase of Russian military hardware and replacement parts.

In Nicaragua, President Ortega is committed to strengthening security and defense agreements with Russia. And over the past years, hundreds of Russian troops participated in training with the Nicaraguan army.

The strongest security partnership, however, that Russia has within Latin America is that of Venezuela. Russia is the regime’s largest arm supplier, with upwards of $11 billion in arms sales over the past two decades. Just last year Russia deployed two 160 Blackjack nuclear-capable bombers to the Venezuelan military, along with 10 attack helicopters the previous year.

Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of Russia’s strategic objective in its major investments in Latin America?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I think that your factual recitations are almost spot-on, correct, in terms of the analysis that I have seen as well. So this threat is real.

Look, they are here in Latin America because they want both proximity. So some of what they do in Cuba, some of what they do in Venezuela gives them access to American Southeast, and allows them to operate their ships, their vessels, the aircraft, and the two bombers that you described. So it gives them logistical hubs.
It also gives them space from which to conduct cyber-operations. That is, they have access to networks that they can't access from other places in the world.

So there is a very real reason for their physical presence in these places. That is why it is so important that the Venezuelan people are successful in overthrowing Maduro, getting their democracy back, and a government that will understand it is in their best interest to have the rule of law, and not operate with Cuban and Russian thugs inside of their country.

Senator Cruz. So Maduro’s regime in Venezuela is being in very significant ways propped up by both Russia and Cuba. And, indeed, Cuban thugs play an integral part of keeping Maduro in power, even though his regime is illegitimate.

In my view, the pivotal piece for whether we have a legitimately elected government in Venezuela, is going to be whether the roughly 3,000 generals in the Venezuelan military choose to remain with an illegitimate dictator that is Maduro, or instead stand with the legitimate and constitutional leader, Juan Guaido.

From the U.S. perspective, I think we should see a combination of sticks and carrots for those military leaders. In other words, each of those generals should know if they stand with Maduro against the Venezuelan people. They face sanctions directly. Their families face sanctions directly. That would be a decision to be on the wrong side of history that will haunt them for decades, for their entire lifetime.

On the other hand, if they make the decision to stand with the people of Venezuela, and with constitutional government, that will be a decision that will benefit them.

What are your views on both the carrots and sticks that we can be using, we should be using, and what more can we do?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I agree with you. And we have done each of those. You should know that Special Representative Abrams and the Charge Jimmy Story both have lots of traffic from the Venezuelan generals looking to see what the bid offer spread is. So there are many conversations taking place.

It is quite interesting from our side to see. We don’t think they are telling their buddies that they are having conversations with Americans about the fact that they are trying to figure out if they can get a passport and a free home somewhere.

So we are confident that this combination of making clear to them—look, it depends on exactly where they are sitting in the command, the actions they are taking. But there is a set of leaders there that have been part of the Maduro regime, but if they come up to the light, if they come to the right side of Venezuelan history, we are happy not to take any action against them. We are happy to support them continuing to exist inside of Venezuela successfully. But those who don’t, those who don’t, we will hold them accountable when the day of reckoning comes, and when Maduro leaves, and the Venezuelans get the democracy they deserve.

Senator Cruz. Good. Final question.

Shifting to the other part of the world, China, if you look at Huawei, and it is troubling to see our allies and partners, including governments within the Five Eyes intelligence community, consider
partnering with Huawei for 5G infrastructure. That raises serious national security concerns for us and our allies.

How are your efforts going to make that case to our allies, and what response are you getting?

Secretary Pompeo. So we are making real progress. I would hope we would get better responses more quickly, but we have continued to make clear the risks, two risks. They have their own risks, risk to their systems, and risk to the privacy of their own people.

But the second risk is, and certainly, if you are a Five Eyes partner, but even if you are outside of Five Eye, inside of Europe, we still share a great deal of intelligence with you, or co-located, or work alongside you. We have made it very clear to them, you jeopardize that.

We may have to not be able to be there with a DOD system. We may have to not be there with a State Department system, because we need to protect our information. So we have it clear moving down that path presents at least two very significant risks, and we have urged them to make a decision that stays away from this technology. There are other alternatives that will deliver them better security and better relationships.

Senator Cruz. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, this morning I had in my office a special immigrant visa recipient from Afghanistan. He had been a translator. He was tortured. He was missing a number of fingers on both hands. Almost killed by the Taliban. And he raised a question with me that I couldn't answer.

He said, “Why do we believe we can negotiate with the Taliban today since we have not been able to do that in past years? And why is the government not at the table for these negotiations?” During the time that the negotiations have been ongoing, seven Americans have been killed by the Taliban.

So can you answer his question for me, and tell me how we are responding to the Taliban’s violence against Americans that has happened during the negotiations? Are they paying any price? Have we asked them for any accountability for what has happened?

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma’am, I think I can answer his question. His statement that we are not talking to the Afghans is not true. We have extensive daily conversation——

Senator Shaheen. I am sorry. I mischaracterized that. I should have said that the Afghans are not at the table for these negotiations.

Secretary Pompeo. To the extent there are negotiations taking place, they are as part of the table as anybody else. We are talking with the government of National Unity, speaking with the Taliban. We are working to get the two of them in the room together. We think we are closer than we have been at any time in the last decade in achieving that.

This will ultimately be a resolution that the Afghan people will have to achieve.

With respect to why we are talking with the Taliban is they control a significant amount of resources. And to get the reconciliation
we need, to take down the violence level, the Taliban is going to have a say in that.

Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt. Again, I did not mean to indicate why are we talking to the Taliban. Why do we believe the Taliban will be honest with us any more today than they have been over the last years?

Secretary Pompeo. Oh, yes, ma'am. That is a fair question. Trust, but verify. It will be about actions on the ground. We understand there is not only a deep level of distrust with the Taliban. There is a deep level of distrust with many of the actors in the Afghan area. It is a nation that has a sad history with respect to truth telling and corruption.

So the Americans, we have our eyes wide open. This will need to be an agreement. If we can receive one that gets reconciliation, that takes down the violence levels, but it will be the actions ultimately. The negotiations, we will get a framework, but it will be the actions we see on the ground that will ultimately come to deliver the confidence that we can begin to do what President Trump has directed us to do, is to take down the enormous resource commitment and risk to American soldiers that we face every day.

Senator Shaheen. And what are we doing to ensure that Afghan women are at the table during these negotiations? As you know, we passed the Women's——

Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.

Senator Shaheen. —Peace and Security Act. The President signed it into law. That says women should be at the table in conflict-ending negotiations.

Secretary Pompeo. I think Ambassador Khalilzad said this pretty well the other day, when he was asked a similar question. We have made some real progress with respect to how women are treated in parts of Afghanistan today.

Senator Shaheen. Without a doubt.

Secretary Pompeo. It has been uneven, to be sure. We want to do everything we can to make sure that as Afghanistan moves forward we don't retrograde, we don't go backwards on that. That is why they should be part of the discussion. I think Ambassador Khalilzad said that pretty clearly.

Senator Shaheen. Well, I had a chance to ask the ambassador that myself several weeks ago. And I was not reassured by his response that we have made a firm commitment to ensure that they are part of any negotiations. So I hope you will commit to today, that that is part of what our effort is in Afghanistan as we are looking at ending this war.

Secretary Pompeo. Well, remember, the Afghans will ultimately decide, right? I mean we——

Senator Shaheen. And no, I appreciate that. But we also have, as we are doing in the negotiations, we are putting pressure on the Afghan government. What I am asking is that we put pressure on the Afghan government and the Taliban to ensure that women are part of the negotiations.

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, there are lots of issues that we are working our way through.

Senator Shaheen. I understand that, but this is half of the population of the country.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma’am. And I hope they will make their voices heard. I hope they will turn to their leadership, that they will demand of the folks in their—if they are in Kandahar, if they are in—

Senator Shaheen. Right. They are trying to do that.

Secretary Pompeo. —Kunduz, I hope the women of Afghanistan will demand that of their leaders. We have always done our part there. America’s can never be criticized for not doing enough for the Afghan people. I take great umbrage to suggest we are doing——

Senator Shaheen. I was not criticizing——

Secretary Pompeo. —anything different.

Senator Shaheen. —based on that.

Secretary Pompeo. So I am urging the Afghan people to take——

Senator Shaheen. And I have done that, too.

Secretary Pompeo. To take a role.

Senator Shaheen. And their response to me has been, “We hope that you will also put that kind of pressure on the government.”

Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma’am.

Senator Shaheen. And that is what I am asking. It doesn’t sound to me like you are willing to commit to that, though.

Secretary Pompeo. Ma’am, we are working on every front to make sure that we continue to move forward on every element. We want every woman’s voice to be heard. I hope they will all do that.

Senator Shaheen. And I hope you will—and our government will put pressure on the Taliban and the Afghan government in the same way. So we can agree to leave it at that.

I would like to just add one more comment that is a separate matter. I have a constituent who was medically evacuated from China. And through him, our office has been engaged in effort to better understand what happened to some of the Chinese officials who have been medically evacuated.

I understand that there is a report about what happened there. Would you be willing to—would you agree to come before this committee to share with us the information that is in that report?

Secretary Pompeo. I am happy to share everything we have done for every State Department official who we believe has been harmed by the kinds of incidents that you are describing, first in Cuba, and then one in China as well, that have been confirmed to date.

Senator Shaheen. And that is in part of the report?

Secretary Pompeo. I am not certain of the exact report. There has been lots of work to do. There have been many reports. I am certainly happy to share with you what all of the United States government, including the State Department, has done for these officers who have been harmed, and some who believe they have been harmed, and are still being medically evaluated.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

The Chairman. Will we have to do that in a classified setting?

Secretary Pompeo. No, sir, not for most of it.

The Chairman. Okay.

Secretary Pompeo. There may be some. There may be some that has to be classified, in terms of the vectors or the methodology of what we are doing to figure out how these health incidents took
place, but the work that the State Department has done to take care of its people we could certainly talk about.

The CHAIRMAN. We have all had a real interest in that for a lot of different reasons. So thank you, Senator Shaheen, for raising that.

Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks Mr. Secretary, for the testimony.

I want to ask you about your testimony yesterday. You were before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee, talking about State Department budget. And you had an exchange with Senator Van Hollen about Israel and the potential annexation of the West Bank.

I think he asked you questions about if Israel annexes all our part of the West Bank, what would the U.S. do? And I am not going to ask you that because that is a little bit of a hypothetical, and it may even be some of that that might be above your pay grade. But I want to ask you the question about what U.S. policy is.

So tell me what U.S. policy is right now. Would we support an annexation of the West Bank? Do we oppose it? Or are we indifferent to whether that happens?

Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I will give you the same answer that I gave yesterday. The United States has had a longstanding policy. We have talked about it. The President has talked about it.

We are now working with many parties to share what our vision for us to how to resolve this problem. Senator, you would concede that for decades now there have been all these wonderful experts that have tried to resolve this crisis in the Middle East, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people, and they have each failed.

So the old set of ideas are not worth retreading. They have simply not succeeded. We are hopeful that our vision, our ideas about what this might look like, how we might proceed to do that will create the conditions where the Israelis and the Palestinians can resolve this. I am not going to get out in front of what is in there.

Senator Kaine. Right.

Secretary Pompeo. And this bears upon the very question you are asking. I don’t want to get out in front of it, but——

Senator Kaine. Do you think two-state solution is an old idea whose time has gone?

Secretary Pompeo. It has certainly been an idea that has been around a long time, Senator.

Senator Kaine. Yeah. But I mean you talked about old ideas that we have to set aside. Is the U.S. policy to set aside the idea of the two-state solution that was at the origin of the United States’ recognition of the State of Israel?

Secretary Pompeo. I would argue that millions of manhours have been spent to try and build out a two-state solution. It hasn’t worked to date. It may work this afternoon, but it hasn’t worked yet.

Senator Kaine. Is that still a goal of the United States, or is that no longer a goal?
Secretary POMPEO. You can probably ask me 15 other different ways, Senator. I am going to allow this process that we have, we are engaged with the parties to work its way through.

Senator KAINE. Well, how about if I state it this way?

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah.

Senator KAINE. It has been a policy of the United States. I agree with that. I think it should be the policy. Do you agree with me or disagree with me?

Secretary POMPEO. I think ultimately the individuals in the region will sort this out. We want good things for the Palestinian people.

Senator KAINE. The President said at the beginning of his term, he actually said kind of candidly, one state, two state, whatever, whatever is agreeable to both Israelis and Palestinians. So let's look at that.

Would a solution, in order for the U.S. to accept it, have to be acceptable to Israelis and Palestinians?

Secretary POMPEO. You imply that somehow the U.S. has veto rights on a solution that the Israelis and the Palestinians achieve.

Senator KAINE. So are we indifferent to the decision that's made?

Secretary POMPEO. We are going to work with—we want a better life for the people of the West Bank——

Senator KAINE. I don't think we have a veto right, but I am just asking you, do we have a policy? Would you suggest, as using the President's formulation that if Israeli—and you even said, Israelis and Palestinians will have to work it out.

Secretary POMPEO. Yeah.

Senator KAINE. For us to find that acceptable, would both Israelis and Palestinians have to find it acceptable?

Secretary POMPEO. I mean yes, I think for there to be a peaceful resolution here, the Palestinian people are—we have seen what happens. We have seen Intifadas. We have seen protests. We have seen what is happening in Gaza. And I think the Israelis accept the fact that what the ultimate resolution of this will be something that the Palestinian people are going to have to acknowledge makes sense.

Senator KAINE. Then I won't follow-up on the hypothetical about whether this administration still accepts the notion of a two-state solution. I am kind of shocked that that cannot be stated clearly. But if your answer is the United States' position is we will accept a resolution, but for that resolution to be acceptable, it has to be accepted by Israelis and Palestinians, I can accept that.

Let me ask you this question. I have got two Virginians, one a Virginia resident, and one a U.S. citizen, Aziz al-Yousef and her son, Sala Arheider, who have been imprisoned. I think Aziz al-Yousef is now out of prison in Saudi Arabia. Largely over their activism around women's rights, women's ability drive, the guardianship issue in Saudi Arabia, and efforts to lift that. Tell me the status of any dialogue that you are in with your Saudi counterparts about either these individuals or others who are imprisoned because of activism for women's rights.

Secretary POMPEO. So I personally, and my team, have spoken with the Saudis about every single American who we know to be wrongfully detailed. And we have urged them to make a better de-
cision, saying that those folks need to be released, they need to come back. There are too many. It's inconsistent with the relationship between our two countries. We do not think it is in the Saudi's best interest to do this either, but we have made clear our expectations.

Senator Kaine. And you think Sala Arheider and Aziz al-Yousef are wrongfully detained?

Secretary Pompeo. If I may not comment on particular cases, I would prefer to do that.

Senator Kaine. I assert that they are wrongfully detained.

Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.

Senator Kaine. But I can understand your point. Thank you, Mr. Chair.


Senator Rubio. Just to follow-up on the Israel point, in Israel, I don't think I can recall a time in recent memory where such a state that nine miles at its narrowest point has faced the array of threats it now faces. It looks north and sees Iranian Hezbollah elements operating openly, just north of its border, in Syria. It looks northwest into Lebanon and sees Hezbollah more capable, with munitions that are now precision guided.

It looks at what is happening in Gaza repeatedly, not just with Hamas, but with other sub-elements, who are the ones behind these recent attacks that we have seen over there. It sees Iran continue to advance in its missile capabilities.

And on top of all that, it is my observation that sure, it would be great if we had this solution to this problem with the Palestinians and the Israelis, but the problem from Israel's point of view, when you take all of that into context, is every time it has ever—any territory on its border throughout its history has been used to target and to attack Israel.

And secondly, who would they negotiate with? It is not even clear who has the authority or the ability to deliver on a deal at this point. And, in fact, some of the deals that are being discussed now are not nearly as generous as deals that have been rejected in the past.

So I guess my first question would be, isn't it fair that anything that we do with regards to talking about Israel and talking about solutions to the Palestinian issue take into its context all of these other threats that are currently weighing on it, recognizing that some argue that by dealing with that these other issues go away.

Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.

Senator Rubio. But it is fair to take that all that into consideration.

Secretary Pompeo. It is not only fair, it is necessary. Israel has a right to defend itself. It has a right to create a situation on its borders that provide security for it and its people. And I am very confident the United States will continue to support that.

Senator Rubio. If tomorrow the issue with the Palestinians were resolved, and it would be great if it were, would it in any way, in your view, lead Iran to be less hostile towards Israel?

Secretary Pompeo. Unimaginable.

Senator Rubio. Would it lead Hezbollah or those elements to be less hostile to Israel?
Secretary Pompeo. No chance.

Senator Rubio. And I believe it is still the case that some of these groups that Israel is being asked to cut a deal with have as their stated objective the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.

Secretary Pompeo. That is true.

Senator Rubio. I would imagine it is, in that vein, that the administration has requested 3.3 billion in security assistance to Israel. And I just want, if I may ask you to further comment, because one of the interesting things about it is, and I say this, and I hope that I’m wrong, but I don’t believe that I am, that a future Israel-Hezbollah war, even though neither side seems to want one, certainly at this point, they may wind up in one anyway. In essence, as Israel is forced to defend itself by targeting certain elements, it could trigger a response from Syria, for example, that Israel would have to respond to, to rapidly escalate.

The situation in Gaza could quickly escalate at any moment, particularly if attacks resume inside, for example, suicide attacks in Jerusalem. They will respond to these things very strongly. Any of these responses could rapidly trigger escalation that could lead to a war.

So the truth of the matter is that there is a hair-trigger threat that at any moment an open and very severe conflict can open up with any of these threats that they now face. I imagine that was the thinking behind the administration’s commitment on this year’s budgeting for security assistance.

Secretary Pompeo. That is absolutely true. We believe that is money well-spent for American security, in addition to Israel’s security. You describe the threats that are very real. Almost every one of them is connected to Iran. The risk that Iran will decide to put missile systems inside of Lebanon, the Israelis will feel compelled, because the threat is so enormous, they will not have the reaction time. The risk of escalation for these kinds of activities that Iran has on occasions is very, very real.

Senator Rubio. One last question on the Houthis in Yemen. I have remained concerned that they would acquire from Iran, and I imagine Iran would be the only one that would supply them anti-ship missiles that would allow them to directly threaten not just Saudi shipping, but inadvertently U.S. shipping, or perhaps directly, as a result.

I know there has been a lot of debate here about Yemen, and the U.S.’s role in that. But I think lost in that debate has often been the threat that the Houthis in Yemen pose, particularly as they have increasingly become, it seems, surrogates and agents on behalf of the Iranian regime.

Secretary Pompeo. The risk is not only the ships at sea, but missile systems inside of Yemen that are Iranian missile systems that land in big cities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and if they are extended just a little bit into the Emirates, the Gulf States, Americans transit there all the time.

You all transit there on trips. These risks to U.S. interests are very, very real. They are not just providing the equipment and hardware either. They are providing the training, so that the Houthis can actually use and implement more effectively these weapon systems, UAVs as well. The technology rate that is being
transferred from Iran to the Houthis presents a real risk, certainly to Southeast Saudi Arabia, but to the broader Gulf States and America as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Rubio. For members, a vote was just called. And with that, Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just follow-up quickly in regards to the Israel-Palestinian process. The Israel elections are now over. We know that Hemyat Youfuren—the new government, but the speculation is that will occur rather rapidly. There was also a comment in one of this morning's paper that the United States may be putting forward a peace proposal in regards to the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Can you just, particularly in response to Senator Kaine's point about the United States not having veto right, can we anticipate that the United States will be initiating a peace offer in the near future, or parameter in the near future?

Secretary POMPEO. So we have been working on a set of ideas that we hope to present before too long that will, I hope, have sufficient force of intellect and power that Israelis and Palestinians will see that there is value there. There will be things that neither of them like, but things that the Gulf States make sense. All those who have an interest in resolving this conflict will think make sense.

I am sure there will be critiques of it as well, but we hope that it provides the Intellectual Foundation upon which these discussions can advance in a way that they have not been able to for the past several years.

Senator CARDIN. Well, it seems like over the last umpteen years it has never been the right time to move forward with peace, and peace must forward. So I just would encourage the United States to not give up on peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It is critical, not only for Israel and the Palestinians, but for that region, and for the future of that region.

I want to get back to the human rights agenda. And I really am trying to find ways we work together on advancing the human rights and American values. And the Global Magnitsky is one of those efforts that was strong bipartisan, just about unanimous effort here in United States Congress, to give an additional tool for the U.S. to lead against human rights violators by making it clear we don't want you in our country, and we don't want you to use the banking system.

And we have found many of our allies around the world have patterned laws very similar to Global Magnitsky, and others are considering it. So we already had an exchange that relates to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But the Uygur issue with China is another area that we have triggered interest when using Magnitsky sanctions against the Chinese on a clear violation of international standards.

And I guess my point is this, the Magnitsky law was focused initially on Russia. It is now global. And we want to use it as a global tool to show that America is concerned about human rights globally.

Can you just advise us as to whether this is being actively considered in China in regards to the Uygur issues and other areas?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are considering using this global authority in many places, including Asia, including China.

Senator Cardin. Well, I appreciate that.

Secretary Pompeo. We are trying to find the fact pattern, the right place, and that is what we have done every place in my now almost year as secretary of state, and Treasury as well.

Senator Cardin. And the purpose of Magnitsky Law was to have Congress working with the administration. It is not supposed to be in—and you have used it. The administration has used it in many cases that have been very much in consultation with us. I would just urge us to get a closer relationship in regards to how you implement the Global Magnitsky.

Let me tell you one other area, and I believe Senator Udall may have questioned on this, and that is arms sales. We are not naïve to think we are not going to have arms sales with countries that don't share our total belief in governance. We understand that. But we expect arms sales to advance U.S. values, democratic values.

Can you just assure us that as you look at arms sales that we use that as a way not only for the military issues and defense, but also to advance American values in the country we are doing business with, to let them know it's absolutely essential that these arms be used consistent with American values.

Secretary Pompeo. So we certainly do that, indeed, when recommendations come up, as we discuss arms sales, discuss them with both elements of the United States government as well as the legislative branch. That is always a component of how we think about it.

Indeed, there are arms sales that we have not proposed because we looked at it and said it doesn't make sense, certainly at this time, given what is going on in that country with respect to human rights, or extrajudicial killings. We certainly take a close look at those as a component of whether we think a particular arms transfer makes sense.

Senator Cardin. And I would suggest again, here is an area where Congress, this committee particularly, wants to work with you, to make it clear that it is not how the administration feels, or Congress feels, it is how we feel, advancing U.S. values in our bilateral relations, including arms sales.

Last point, if I am late. In regards to Burma, and I know that question was asked by Senator Gardner, the Holocaust Museum has determined there is compelling evidence that it was ethnic cleansing. I would just ask if you could share with us how we are responding to the genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, issues that have taken place.

We could never let an episode like this go without the United States weighing in very directly and very openly as to how this cannot be tolerated, and that those responsible need to be held accountable.

Secretary Pompeo. So I think this administration has clearly done that in Burma. We are continuing to do it. I had a conversation just yesterday on this very issue. We are looking at are there other sanctions, are there other tools that we have where we can go after other military leaders that engage in inappropriate behavior inside of the country.
I met with the leadership of Bangladesh earlier this week, or end of last week, talking about the difficult conditions that these refugees are in, how we can help as the season for monsoons once again is upon us. It is going to be a long process to get them returned. And so we all have to be mindful of making sure that there is the resources there. We have not forgotten what has taken place in Burma.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Markey.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you made earlier reference to Chen Quanguo, who——

Secretary POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator MARKEY. —who was the oppressor of the Tibetan people. And now he has moved over to a new job, which is oppress the Uygar. And same guy, same attitude towards minorities inside of China.

Your administration has yet to sanction Chen Quanguo. Are you intending on doing that?

Secretary POMPEO. We are constantly evaluating appropriate sanctions. You are right. He got a promotion.

Senator MARKEY. He got a promotion. Yeah. It is a promotion in repression responsibility, however.

Secretary POMPEO. We take this threat incredibly seriously. We have called this out in ways that the previous administration refused to do. I am proud of the work we have done on human rights around the world, and including what we are doing in China.

Senator MARKEY. Yeah. But you have yet to sanction this guy, who is in charge of the repression. So are you going to charge him? Are you going to sanction him particularly so that the whole world knows that we are holding this man responsible for the harm which he is doing to human rights of the Uygar?

Secretary POMPEO. I have made a pretty consistent practice not to announce sanctions in Senate hearings.

Senator MARKEY. All right. Well, let me move over to Burma, where your administration has yet to sanction the commander in chief of the Burmese military, who is also responsible in that country for the repression of the Rohingya, which is an ongoing crime against humanity.

So are you going to sanction the commander in chief of the Burmese military for his activity in harming the Rohingya?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, our diplomatic team is confronted with very complex issues in Burma. We are trying to do our best to figure out which tools to use in which places, how to shape the situation. Our goal, obviously, I think you would agree with me, our goal isn’t to sanction people, but to change behavior, and then to hold those responsible for the acts that took place accountable. And our team, both in theater and here in Washington, that works on these issues is constantly evaluating the right tool mix.

Senator MARKEY. Yeah. I know what you are saying, Mr. Secretary, that it is complicated, but at the same time I think it is very clear, I think it is very clear that there is a genocide, there is a crime against humanity, which is being committed. And the
United States has the responsibility to be the moral leader of the world.

In here, we actually know the military leader, the commander in chief who is responsible for this crime. And we expect you to do something about, Mr. Secretary. We expect you to sanction him in the same way we expect you to sanction the leader in China who has been designated to oppress the Uyghur in their country.

Let me move over, if I could, for a second, following up on Senator Kaine’s questioning. And that is with regard to the Saudi nuclear program, and the recent revelation that it does have a nuclear power plant, but it is not under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which is a lot different than the program inside of Iran.

And what I am concerned about, and Senator Kaine has already made reference to this, is the non-public 810 authorizations for companies to pursue nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia. And I have repeatedly asked whether 810 authorizations have been granted, and to see them. I have received silence—with a dash of obfuscation from your administration.

And I recall that you, yourself, over in the House, you passionately spoke about secret side deals, and how much you were opposed to them when you were a host member. So will you commit to sharing the applications and the authorizations you have granted for companies to pursue nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia?

Secretary POMPEO. Senator, I remain passionate about the important oversight that both the Senate and the House engage in. I think it is incredibly important to keep the Executive Branch acting consistent with the laws that this Congress or previous ones have passed.

Let me take your request under consideration. I can’t make that consideration. There are other agencies that have a voice in this as well. But I am happy to get an answer to you about whether we can provide it, and if so, when.

Senator MARKEY. I think it is important for you to be transparent, and towards that goal, I am going to introduce legislation with Senator Rubio, and Senator Kaine, and Senator Young later on today to mandate those disclosures. There is a bipartisan concern on this committee that we do not have enough information about these potential nuclear deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia, in an already volatile area of the world.

Again, the Sunni-Shia tension is already at a fever pitch. Adding this nuclear dimension to it will only make it worse. So I think it is important for us to be in on the ground floor, or whatever planning you have for the transfer of nuclear material to Saudi Arabia. And transparency is key.

We are the oversight committee, and we have to make sure that we are working to make sure these countries live together and understand each other, and not try to put together programs that will wind up annihilating each other. So I thank you for any information which you can give us, because the Middle East is about to get a lot hotter, and I am not talking about climate change, if Saudi is allowed to continue down the pathway with ballistic missiles, with nuclear materials that will only exacerbate and not reduce the tension in the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, thank you, Secretary Pompeo. We appreciate your patience. And I know you agree with us that these spirited discussions are really important for development——

Secretary POMPEO. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. —and carrying on of diplomacy by the United States. We are all Americans. We all have the same goals. How we get there, sometimes we disagree on, but it is important that we continue these lines of communication, keep them open both in open session and privately. And you have been very kind to me in that regard personally, and I sincerely appreciate that.

In any event, for the information of the members, the record will remain open until close of business on Friday. And we would ask the witness to respond as promptly as possible, and your responses will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to above can be accessed by the following link: http://www.afsa.org/foreign-service-journal]

The CHAIRMAN. With the thanks of the committee, Mr. Secretary, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

**ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

**RESPONSES OF HON. MIKE POMPEO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ**

Question. Mr. Secretary, as far as I can tell we’ve had two presidential-level summits with North Korea, but North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs continue to grow unconstrained and we haven’t seen any of the initial steps, such as a full and complete declaration of its nuclear and missile programs, that you identified a year ago as necessary to begin the denuclearization process. In earlier testimony before this Committee I asked you a series of questions about necessary elements for any deal with North Korea. Given your earlier statements intimating that you’d be able to solve the North Korea denuclearization within a year, your Department’s characterization of the Singapore statement as a “historic” achievement, and your own timeline for denuclearization within a year or by the end of the first term of the Trump administration. I’d like to revisit those questions today and ask you—yes or no—whether you have achieved written agreement with North Korea on any of your own stated goals:

a) Providing a definition for denuclearization, meaning the dismantlement or removal of all nuclear weapons, facilities, technology, and material from North Korea?

b) That North Korea will end the production and enrichment of uranium and plutonium for military programs?

c) That North Korea will permanently dismantle and disable its nuclear weapons infrastructure, including test sites, all nuclear weapons research and development facilities, particularly with respect to advanced centrifuges, and nuclear weapons enrichment and reprocessing facilities?

d) That North Korea will put forward a full, complete and verifiable declaration of all its nuclear activities?

e) That will put in place robust restrictions to assure that nuclear material, technology and expertise are not exported?

f) That North Korea will dismantle all ballistic missiles and agree to a prohibition on all ballistic missile development?

g) That puts in place sufficient safeguards to assure that no ballistic missiles and associated technology are proliferated or exported?

h) That include a commitment by North Korea to robust compliance inspections including a verification regime for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, includ-
ing complete access to all nuclear related sites and facilities with real time verification including “anywhere, anytime” inspections and snap-back sanctions if North Korea is not in full compliance?

i) That there be no sunsets?

j) And that creates a roadmap for progress on sanctions relief dependent on dismantlement and removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs?

Answer. In Singapore, Chairman Kim accepted our goal of achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK. He committed the DPRK to work towards this goal in the Singapore Summit Joint Statement. Chairman Kim has reiterated that promise to the President and to me. We have had extensive conversations with the DPRK about the contours of final, fully verified denuclearization. There is still a great deal of work to do to achieve that ultimate goal. The Department is committed to keeping you and other members of Congress updated on the administration’s efforts.

Question. In response to a question from Senator Markey you stated that compared to 2016 there was less coal, fuel, and “resources” in North Korea as a result of the recent rounds of sanctions. Yet according to the Congressional Research Service fuel prices in North Korea have fallen from 1.71 euros in 2017 to 1.21 euros for gasoline in November 218, and from 1.76 euros in 2017 to 1.6 euros for diesel in November, 2018, indicating either rising supply or at the least no increased shortage. Likewise, CRS reports little to no fluctuation in rice process in 2017 and 2018, and that based on price and other data, there appears to be more coal available in North Korea domestically than previously, which is being used to produce increased electricity generation. Moreover, there are no apparent indicators of macroeconomic stress, despite some fall-off in GDP since Congress, with bipartisan support, initiated a tougher sanctions regime on North Korea under the Obama administration. Can you provide us a factual basis and analysis for your statements regarding coal, fuel and resources in North Korea?

Answer. North Korea’s access to refined petroleum today is more restricted than it was at the beginning of this administration, and its coal exports have decreased. The State Department can provide additional details to the Committee in a classified briefing. The United States, together with our allies and partners, is taking action to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions restricting North Korea’s imports of refined petroleum and exports of coal and combating North Korea’s sanctions-evasion activity. We have deployed aircraft and surface vessels to detect and seek to disrupt these activities. We have increased monitoring and surveillance activities, with a particular focus on detecting and seeking to disrupt ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum to DPRK tankers.

Question. You also stated that you were unsure how to best characterize the massive increase in ship-to-ship transfers over the past several years. Can you provide the Committee with a classified or unclassified estimate of the tonnage of fuel in ship-to-ship transfers in 2016, 2017, 2018, and thus far in 2019?

Answer. As stated in a March 21 North Korea maritime advisory issued by the Departments of State and Treasury and the Coast Guard, we estimate that tankers made at least 263 port calls in the DPRK in 2018, all of which involved deliveries of refined petroleum products, likely procured through illicit, U.N.-prohibited, ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels. If each of these tankers was full when it made its delivery, the DPRK imported 3.78 million barrels of fuel, almost seven and a half times the allowable amount under UNSCR 2397, in 2018. The Department of State can provide additional information to the Committee in a classified briefing.

Question. In your opening statement before the Foreign Relations Committee you commented that as you approach sound foreign policy making, “First, the Trump administration recognized and faced reality. We know we can’t make sound policy based on wishful thinking.” Given the need to recognize and face reality as the basis for sound policy, can you explain why your Department has failed to make a designation regarding crimes against humanity and genocide conducted against the Rohingya during August 2017 military clearance operations in Burma?

Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military’s appalling human rights abuses against Rohingya and the need for justice and accountability. The Department remains focused on accountability for those responsible, seeking justice for victims, and promoting reforms that will prevent the recurrence of atrocities and other human rights violations and abuses. In November 2017, the Department con-
cluded that horrific atrocities in Burma's northern Rakhine State constituted ethnic cleansing against Rohingya.

Question. In your opening statement before the Foreign Relations Committee you commented that as you approach sound foreign policy making, "First, the Trump administration recognized and faced reality. We know we can't make sound policy based on wishful thinking." Would you characterize what transpired as genocide? Will your Department make a designation?

Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military's extensive human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and the need for justice and accountability. In November 2017, the Department concluded that horrific atrocities in Burma's northern Rakhine State constituted ethnic cleansing against Rohingya.

Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be automatic, but will require negotiation. Can you clarify the state of negotiations with Russia specifically on the question of New START extension, and where/when these discussions have occurred? Do you support completing the Export Control Reform Initiative?

Answer. The administration has not started negotiations with Russia on New START extension because the administration is reviewing internally whether to seek an extension of the New START Treaty with Russia.

Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be automatic, but will require negotiation. Is New START extension being examined in the totality of other issues affecting U.S.-Russia strategic stability? What are those other issues?

Answer. The administration's review of whether to seek an extension of New START is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest, and how the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national security in the evolving security environment, including Russia's ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China's continuing nuclear modernization.

Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be automatic, but will require negotiation. Has New START extension and these other issues been discussed in a strategic stability dialogue? Is the State Department going to re-engage Strategic Stability Talks? If not, why not?

Answer. At their 2018 meeting in Helsinki, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. After meeting his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in August, Ambassador Bolton stated the two sides discussed many issues, including some related to strategic stability. They met again last October. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to strategic stability.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that China has "large numbers." I take it to mean you are referring to China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear forces. How would you compare the size of China's strategic nuclear forces vs. those of the United States and Russia?

Answer. China's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and current posture. Today, China invests considerable resources to maintain and modernize a limited, but survivable, nuclear force. Its arsenal consists of approximately 75–100 ICBMs, as well as a large number of theater-range systems to hold regional targets at risk. China is engaged in an ongoing expansion of its nuclear capabilities, presaging a more dangerous future in which it has a considerably larger number of sophisticated delivery systems able to reach the United States, and our allies and partners, than in the past.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that China has "large numbers." I take it to mean you are referring to China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear forces. What is the trajectory of China's strategic nuclear forces? Do you believe the modest increases in the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers (systems accountable under New START) of Chinese forces expected before 2026 will affect the U.S.-Russia strategic balance?
Answer. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and current posture. This modernization is resulting in a diverse nuclear force, with a new generation of delivery systems coming online as China works to establish a nuclear triad. China’s arsenal consists of approximately 75–100 ICBMs, as well as theater-range systems to hold regional targets at risk. The ongoing expansion in China’s nuclear capabilities presages a dangerous future in which it has a considerably larger number of sophisticated delivery systems able to reach the United States, and our allies and partners, than in the past.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that China has “large numbers.” I take it to mean you are referring to China’s nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear forces. What would be the process for adding China as the New START treaty?

Answer. The New START Treaty is a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. The Department has not yet assessed what procedural steps would be required in order to bring China into the Treaty.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that China has “large numbers.” I take it to mean you are referring to China’s nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear forces. How do you envision engaging China on arms control more broadly?

Answer. The United States seeks a meaningful dialogue with China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities. Uncertainty regarding China’s nuclear modernization, its increasingly assertive behavior, and an unwillingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on issues of nuclear weapons policy, strategic capabilities, arms control, and risk reduction raise the risks of misperception and miscalculation. China has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to broach discussions on these issues in our pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New START “fits 2021 and beyond” in the context of the administration thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets future challenges. Can you describe specifically what issues are under consideration?

Answer. The administration’s review of whether to seek an extension of New START is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty’s expiration would impact U.S. national security in the evolving security environment, including Russia’s ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China’s continuing nuclear modernization.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New START “fits 2021 and beyond” in the context of the administration thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets future challenges. Is the administration considering adding additional weapons systems, such as non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), other strategic-range systems such as the one Putin revealed in March 2018, and/or other technologies?

Answer. Russia’s ongoing modernization of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces is part of the evolving security environment that the administration is evaluating as part of its review of whether to seek an extension of New START. We assess that at least two of the new systems described by President Putin in March 2018, Sarmat and Avangard, would be subject to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time in their development. Regarding new kinds of strategic offensive arms, the New START Treaty states in Article V that, “When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.” The United States has engaged Russia on these issues in appropriate channels.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New START “fits 2021 and beyond” in the context of the administration thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets future challenges. Is it possible to modify New START to capture additional weapons without returning the Treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent?
Answer. The Department is continuing its review of the New START Treaty and has not yet assessed how the Treaty would need to be modified in order to constrain additional kinds of weapons that are not currently subject to the Treaty.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New START “fits 2021 and beyond” in the context of the administration thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets future challenges. If the United States seeks to modify New START, what do you foresee Russia asking for in return? Would Russia seek to include limitations on U.S. national missile defense and the European missile defense systems?

Answer. If the United States sought to modify the New START Treaty to constrain additional kinds of weapons that are not currently subject to the Treaty, it is unclear what modifications Russia would ask for in return.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New START “fits 2021 and beyond” in the context of the administration thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets future challenges. Is the Department planning a reorganization or realignment of the Arms Control Bureau? Does the Department plan to move, reorganize, or realign any FTEs within the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau to any other office or Bureau?

Answer. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) has proposed changes to the reporting line structure among the portfolios of its Deputy Assistant Secretaries, which the Department is reviewing. Separately, I am considering the realignment of a small number of positions from the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) as part of creating a Bureau for Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies (CSET). My staff has informally discussed the CSET proposal with some of the Department’s oversight committees, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When I make a final decision about CSET, I will ensure that all necessary consultations and notifications are done prior to its implementation.

Question. Russian violated international law when it used chemical weapons in Salisbury, United Kingdom. However, the State Department has not implemented the second round of sanctions against the Russian Federation which are mandated by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW). These sanctions are now 5 months overdue.

Why has the State Department failed to implemented additional sanctions against Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act of 1991?

Answer. We do not preview sanctions actions. However, we are working diligently with the interagency to prepare for imposing the second round of sanctions.

Question. The State Department has determined that Russian violated international law when it used chemical weapons in Salisbury, United Kingdom. However, the State Department has not implemented the second round of sanctions against the Russian Federation which are mandated by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW). These sanctions are now 5 months overdue. Is the United States coordinating with our allies and partners the imposition of additional sanctions on Russia for its chemical weapons use?

Answer. We do not preview sanctions actions. We regularly work with allies and partners to adopt similar sanctions to broaden the impact of our own sanctions.

Question. Last January, then-Secretary Tillerson convened an independent Accountability Review Board “to review the circumstances surrounding unexplained medical conditions affecting Embassy Havana diplomatic community members.” On June 7, 2018, the Accountability Review Board submitted a report of its findings and recommendations to you. Why hasn’t the Department shared the complete ARB report with affected individuals who have an active security clearance?

Answer. The Department understands the interest of the victims of the attacks in reviewing the summary of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) report. The Department remains committed to responding to their concerns and providing them with updated information. The investigations into sensitive aspects of the issue are ongoing. The summary addresses aspects of the ongoing investigation. The Department cannot provide a classified briefing on the report to the affected individuals while an investigation is ongoing. The Department has communicated this to the affected individuals.
Question. Last January, then-Secretary Tillerson convened an independent Accountability Review Board “to review the circumstances surrounding unexplained medical conditions affecting Embassy Havana diplomatic community members.” On June 7, 2018, the Accountability Review Board submitted a report of its findings and recommendations to you. Will the Department undertake a separate ARB for affected individuals displaying similar symptoms while working at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China?

Answer. The health, safety, and well-being of U.S. government employees and their family members are my greatest concern. The Department responded swiftly to a report of health symptoms by an employee in China that resembled the reported symptoms by our personnel in Havana. The Department continues to conduct medical screenings of any Mission China employees and family members upon request. After thorough consideration, I decided not to convene an independent Accountability Review Board (ARB) to review the incident in China, because it did not meet the statutory criteria for an ARB.

Question. The administration’s lack of leadership in providing stabilization funds will ultimately lead to more instability in Syria, putting our troops there at greater risk and ultimately complicating any chance of bringing them home after securing hard-earned gains. A State Department spokesperson recently said that the U.S. is “committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and al Qaeda, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-led forces in Syria.” How does zeroing out stabilization funding for Syria help to achieve any of these important goals?

Answer. Per ongoing efforts to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS and al-Qaida, we have received donor pledges from members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS totaling $325 million, which will help continue vital stabilization activities in Syria through U.S. stabilization mechanisms.

Question. I understand that some of the projects the United States started through our START teams started by the U.S. in Syria will now be funded by around $180 million in contributions to the U.S. Treasury by partner countries, including Germany, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. If this money was not appropriated by Congress, what are the administration’s obligations to notify Congress on how and when it is spent?

Answer: Our Global Coalition partners are funding the implementation of these programs by the United States under section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act. We will continue to engage with and brief Congress on all of our Syria programming.

Question. The administration’s lack of leadership in providing stabilization funds will ultimately lead to more instability in Syria, putting our troops there at greater risk and ultimately complicating any chance of bringing them home after securing hard-earned gains. A State Department spokesperson recently said that the U.S. is “committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and al Qaeda, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-led forces in Syria.” I have previously expressed concern that we are literally ceding ground to Turkey, Russia, and Iran in Syria. How does being absent advance our interests in the region?

Answer. The United States will keep a residual force in Syria as part of the continued Defeat-ISIS Coalition mission, helping to root out ISIS remnants and preventing the group from regaining momentum. Our policy objectives remain: (1) the enduring defeat of ISIS, (2) a lasting political solution in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, and (3) removing all Iranian-commanded forces from Syria. We will continue to support international efforts to establish local security and governance, a restored economy, and justice and accountability in liberated areas, and to provide humanitarian assistance to people in Syria and throughout the region.

Question. Congress approved funding for bilateral assistance for both renewable energy and adaptation programs in the FY19 omnibus appropriations bill. The first sentence on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement of Division F (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), reads: “The conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled "Funding for Environment and Energy Programs" in the Senate report.” State and USAID have long and well-established channels and programs towards which to obligate these funds. Do you commit to spending these funds in accordance with Congress’s clear intention in this spending legislation, and devoting resources toward renewable energy and adaptation programming?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are in the process of developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations. The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of any deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations Act.

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Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations Act.

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Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations Act.

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Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations Act.

Question. Will the State Department submit an FY19 rescission package to Congress?
Answer. I will ensure that the State Department has every dollar it needs to achieve its mission around the world. The Department remains committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, driving efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American people to advance national security objectives and foreign policy goals. At this time, the Department is unaware of any plans to submit an FY 2019 rescission package to Congress.

Question. Will you commit to this Committee that you will not submit to Congress an FY 19 rescission package?

Answer. I will ensure that the State Department has every dollar it needs to achieve its mission around the world. The Department remains committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, driving efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American people to advance national security objectives and foreign policy goals.

At this time, the Department is unaware of plans to submit an FY 2019 rescission package to Congress. However, should Congress act upon any future rescission proposal submitted by the administration, I will work to ensure that any State and USAID reductions are implemented consistent with applicable law.

Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. How many USAID FY18 Spend Plans and Operations Plans remain unapproved at F Bureau?

Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans and Spend Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are programmed and obligated as quickly as possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.

Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Are any of these delays related to policy or political disagreements to congressionally-mandated programs?

Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans and Spend Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are programmed and obligated as quickly as possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.

Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Has the State Department's Foreign Assistance Bureau delayed the obligation of any FY18 funds at the request of the Office of Management and Budget?

Answer. The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) is working quickly and diligently to ensure that FY 2018 funding appropriated by Congress is notified and obligated for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives consistent with applicable legal and other requirements. The vast majority of FY 2018 funds have been approved by F and are currently in the process of being notified to Congress and obligated. The Department will continue to critically review existing foreign assistance programs to ensure that U.S. efforts are sufficiently focused and effective, and to carry out the President’s direction.

Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Will you provide a timeline outlining the State Department's Foreign Assistance Bureau's steps to apportion and approve operation plans for FY16, FY17, and FY18 funds?

Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are programmed and obligated as quickly as possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.
**Question.** Explain how, based on the various delays in obligating FY17 and FY18 funding, the administration is not violating the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

**Answer.** FY 2018 funding appropriated by Congress is in the process of being obligated consistent with applicable law, including the Impoundment Control Act.

**Question.** In response to questioning before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript of this briefing or the list of participants was consistent with what other Secretaries of State have done in the past. Please provide specific examples of prior off the record press briefings with members of the faith-based media.

**Answer.** The Department remains steadfastly committed to the principles of transparency and press freedom. I have conducted numerous interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters, including those that regularly cover the Department as well as other media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview a Secretary of State.

The March 18 event was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists, not a press briefing. We have not arranged off-the-record press briefings with members of the faith-based media.

**Question.** In response to questioning before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript or the list of participants was consistent with what other Secretaries of State have done in the past. Please provide specific examples of prior off the record press briefings with members of the faith-based media in which Secretaries decided against releasing transcripts or participant lists.

**Answer.** The Department remains steadfastly committed to the principles of transparency and press freedom. Since I became Secretary of State, I have actively engaged with the media and supported ways to increase opportunities for them to engage with me and other senior officials. The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists. Although the Department posts transcripts of press briefings, it does not publish participant lists or transcripts of interviews with print journalists. This facilitates their ability to use material from such interviews at their discretion.

**Question.** In response to questioning before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript or the list of participants was consistent with what other Secretaries of State have done in the past. How do you select which members of the media are granted access to off the record telephone press briefings?

**Answer.** Since I became Secretary of State, I have actively engaged with the media and supported ways to increase opportunities for them to engage with me and other senior officials. I have conducted more than 125 interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters, including those that regularly cover the Department as well as other media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview a Secretary of State. The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists.

**Question.** In response to questioning before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript or the list of participants was consistent with what other Secretaries of State have done in the past. What was the criteria used to select participants for the March 18 briefing?

**Answer.** We do our best to support the work of the journalists who cover the State Department. Since I became Secretary of State, I have actively engaged with the media and supported ways to increase opportunities for them to engage with me and other senior officials. The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists. We grant journalists interviews based on a variety of reasons, including their areas of interests and coverage. I have conducted more than 125 interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters, including those that regularly cover the Department as well as other media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview a Secretary of State.
In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Do you contest the veracity of any of these accounts? If so, how?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh played a coordinating and logistical support role for these visits, as it does for all senior U.S. government visitors on official visits to the Kingdom. The Department has been briefed on these meetings.

In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Was the State Department involved in any way in planning this trip? How?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh played a coordinating and logistical support role for these visits, as it does for all senior U.S. government visitors on official visit to the Kingdom.

In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did anyone from the State Department attend meetings with Mr. Kushner?

Answer. Senior Policy Advisor Brian Hook participated in Mr. Kushner’s meetings during his most recent trip to Riyadh.

In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did Mr. Kushner attend any meetings alone? Did Mr. Kushner attend any meetings with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman? If so, did he attend such meetings alone?

Answer. I respectfully refer you to the White House on additional specifics regarding Mr. Kushner’s engagements.

In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did the State Department receive a readout of Kushner’s meetings with senior Saudi officials, including the Crown Prince?

Answer. Yes.

In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh was not involved in Mr. Kushner’s March trip or read in on the meetings he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Are you personally aware of the topics that Kushner discussed with the Crown Prince?

Answer. Yes, the Department has been briefed on this meeting.

Since Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder last October, you have met with or spoken to senior Saudi officials at least six times. In each of your calls or meetings, did you raise Mr. Khashoggi’s death and specifically call on the Saudi government to cooperate with the Turkish investigation into his death and hold those accountable responsible? Have you raised Khashoggi’s murder with senior Saudi officials in every communication since Oct 2, 2018?

Answer. I share your conviction that those responsible for this horrific act must be held accountable. I consistently raise accountability for Mr. Khashoggi’s killers with all levels of the Saudi Arabian government, as do senior Department officials in Washington and Riyadh. We have routinely highlighted that a transparent and impartial Saudi judicial process is necessary, and have urged Saudi authorities to cooperate with all international inquiries into the killing.

Since Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder last October, you have met with or spoken to senior Saudi officials at least six times. Have you expressed any concerns to Saudi officials about the trials of 11 people charged in the murder of Mr. Khashoggi? Please describe the nature of those concerns and what specifically you have communicated to Saudi officials about these trials.

Answer. Senior Department leadership and I have consistently raised the need for a credible, fair, and transparent judicial process in the horrific murder of Mr. Khashoggi, and we continue to promote accountability for his killers. We also con-
continue to communicate to Saudi leadership that extrajudicial killing by any govern-
ment official is unacceptable. We remain highly concerned about the status of Saud
Al-Qahtani, and the administration has taken several steps in that respect, includ-
ing financial sanctions. We will continue to deploy those tools as necessary. The U.S.
Embassy will continue to monitor the ongoing trials in Riyadh, and we will continue
to raise our concerns at all appropriate levels and opportunities.

**Question.** On February 14, 2019, I sent a letter asking for information regarding
the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and specifically asking for the Department’s
legal determination that it is not required to submit a report to the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to section
1263(d) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. What is the
legal justification for not making the determination required under the Global
Magnitsky Act? When will the Department provide that legal determination?

**Answer.** The administration has used the Global Magnitsky sanctions program to
promote accountability in this case. We imposed financial sanctions under the Glob-
al Magnitsky sanctions program on 17 Saudi government officials. Section 1263(d)
of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act addresses certain Con-
gressional committee requests for determinations and reports by the President on
whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in Section 1263(a)
of the Act. The authorities under Section 1263(d) have not been delegated by the
President to the Secretary of State and thus the Department is not in a position
to make such a determination or report.

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the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and specifically asking for the Department’s
legal determination that it is not required to submit a report to the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to section
1263(d) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Is it your under-
standing that the President is not going to make a determination regarding the
Crown Prince’s responsibility? What is the basis for your understanding?

**Answer.** The Department shares your conviction that those responsible for this
horrific act must be held accountable. The United States was the first country to
take action to promote accountability, when on October 23, 2018, we revoked visas
and entered visa lookouts for those suspected of involvement in the murder. On No-
vember 15, 2018, we imposed financial sanctions on implicated Saudi officials under
the executive order implementing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Account-
ability Act. On April 8, 2019, the Secretary of State further designated Saudi gov-
ernment officials under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-

**Question.** According to a report compiled by my staff, it appears that the Depart-
ment’s public justification for cancelling the Secretary of State’s International
Women of Courage Award to Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro is not true. The De-
partment claims it made a “regrettable error” and that Aro had never been a final-
ist. But State Department documents and communications show that Ms. Aro was
a finalist and the reward was rescinded at the last minute and given to someone
else. According to public reporting, sources within the Department assert the award
was rescinded after the Department discovered social media posts Ms. Aro made
that were critical of President Trump’s attacks on the media and the rule of law.
Were social media postings that Ms. Aro made which were critical of President
Trump’s statements a reason for the Department rescinding her status as a finalist
for the award? If not, for what reason(s) did the Department rescind Ms. Aro’s sta-
tus as a finalist for the award?

**Answer.** A number of errors were made in the nomination and approval process
of Ms. Jessikka Aro. Ms. Aro should not have been notified that she was an awardee
in the absence of a comprehensive review, which is a prerequisite for the nomination
process.

**Question.** According to a report compiled by my staff, it appears that the Depart-
ment’s public justification for cancelling the Secretary of State’s International
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else. According to public reporting, sources within the Department assert the award
was rescinded after the Department discovered social media posts Ms. Aro made
that were critical of President Trump’s attacks on the media and the rule of law.
On February 25th, Embassy Helsinki received a letter from Ms. Aro’s lawyer re-
questing information about who withdrew the award, on what grounds, when the decision was made, and why no official explanation was provided to Ms. Aro. As of today, Ms. Aro and her lawyer have not received a response to the letter. Will the Department be providing a response, and by when?

Answer. We have received the correspondence from Ms. Aro’s lawyer and are working on an appropriate response.

Question. During your testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 9, 2019, you were asked about your role in approval of the Department of Energy’s 810 Authorization used to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. You responded that you signed off on the Department of Energy’s decision. When did you sign off on the 810 Authorizations? What factors went into the decision to sign off on those Authorizations? Did you approve keeping the identity of the companies receiving the authorizations private?

Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) oversaw the State Department’s review of Saudi Arabia-related Part 810 applications from November 2017 to March 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices. The State Department is not involved in determining whether information in the authorizations is protected from public disclosure.

Question. Last year, a former foreign government official was granted a visa by the Department of State, despite reportedly being on a visa ban list for corruption. Please describe how a Presidential Proclamation 7750 Section 2 exception is effectuated for reasons other than an official U.N. visit, and whether the opinions of non-State Department entities, including the National Security Council and Members of Congress, can be considered in the process. Please also explain whether there may be variances in this process for different cases. Since January 20, 2017, how many PP 7750 Section 2 exceptions for reasons other than an official U.N. visit have been granted?

Answer. The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) would lead such a consideration process relating to PP 7750 Section 2. As Secretary, I or my designee would make the final decision with respect to such an exception based on all relevant facts and laws, after considering relevant input from Department and U.S. government sources. As evidence of corruption can involve law enforcement-sensitive information, including information regarding ongoing investigations and other classified information, details of the processes for handling such information may be operationally sensitive. There have been no Section 2 exceptions granted for reasons other than an official U.N. visit since January 20, 2017.

Question. The President’s Budget request for FY20 again cuts funding for the National Endowment for Democracy—a 64 percent cut from NED’s FY19 appropriation of $180 million. The administration proposes the Endowment make these cuts by only funding its small grants program and ceasing funding for its core institutes—The National Democratic and Republican Institute, labor Solidarity Center and business Center for International Private Enterprise. In fact, this budget cut would dramatically cut NED’s small grants program, as well as funding for the core institutes. Dismantling the NED structure would be in contravention with the NED Act (P.L. 98–164), which embeds the work of four core institutes into NED’s mission, as well as undermining the programmatically coordinated efforts of NED and the core institutes that makes it so effective. What message does a reduction in funding for democracy program, whether via NED, State or USAID send to those struggling for human rights and democracy as well as our adversaries, like China and Russia, who are seeking to disrupt the democratic world order and replace it with their authoritarian political, economic and governance model?

Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance, including rule of law, good governance, and anti-corruption programming, is critical for defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY 2020 budget request for DRG assistance reflects the administration’s priorities of advancing peace and security, expanding American influence, and addressing global crises while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget will allow us to advance our core mission and support our most critical foreign policy goals.

Question. How does the President’s Budget Request support expansion of democracy and governance programming to counteract Russian Federation attempts to un-
dermine democratic processes in countries on Russia’s perimeter—countries which the United States has identified as strategically important?

Answer. The Department of State remains committed to working on a whole-of-government basis and with allies and partners to counter Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions and processes in neighboring countries and further afield. The request for regional and bilateral programming prioritizes support to help build resilience in those countries most susceptible to Russian malign influence. These efforts are focused on deterring Russian aggression; building the capacity of civil society and independent media to expose and counter Russian malign influence; recognizing, exposing, and countering Russian disinformation and propaganda; and promoting good governance, strengthening rule of law, and combatting corruption.

Question. The President’s FY20 budget request, once again proposes zeroing out the Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund, Assistance to Eastern Europe, Central Asia (AEECA), Complex Crises Fund, and the Democracy Fund into a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. The President's Budget Request provided a legislative request that legally consolidates these accounts, but provides no description for why this consolidation necessary or beneficial, let alone a description of the policies that would govern this new program. All we have to go on, is the vague regurgitated description of the ESDF: “prioritizes and focuses foreign assistance in regions and on programs that advance our national security and protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity and economic opportunities, and advance American interests and values around the world.” It’s been 2 years, has the State Department and USAID developed any policies or guidance that would govern the ESDF, and if so will you submit the description of this policy, not just legislative text on how to consolidate accounts, to congress?

Answer. This account consolidation attempts to streamline accounts to ensure the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars spent on national security priorities. The traditional distinctions between the Development Assistance (DA), Democracy Fund (DF), Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (AEECA), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts are artificial and reduce programming flexibility unnecessarily. This streamlining would allow the State Department and USAID to assess, prioritize, and target development and economic-related activities in the context of broader U.S. strategic objectives and partnerships.

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Answer. The FY 2020 request includes a proposal to create the ESDF account, including proposed legislative text for a new ESDF appropriation that we ask Congress to include in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020.

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do you intend to make to convince Congress to authorize the Economic Support and Development Fund?

Answer. The Department of State and USAID continue to request and urge Congress to include the streamlining of these accounts and the creation of the ESDF account in the FY 2020 appropriations act. We have briefed committee staff on the proposal and will continue to answer questions from Congressional staff on the proposal to address any concerns.

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Answer. I believe Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest of the world that serves both U.S. interests and those of our allies. The FY 2020 budget request, including funds requested for ESDF, prioritizes supporting key U.S. partners and allies through strategic, selective investments that enable the United States to retain its position as a global leader. At the same time, it relies on other nations to make greater proportionate contributions toward shared objectives.

Question. The Washington Post has consistently reported on White House efforts to undermine the utilization of climate science and accounting for the effects of climate change in national security planning and analysis. Do you believe that the effects of climate change complicate or increase risks to national security?

Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment put together by the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies impacts that climate change could have on national security. Specifically, the assessment notes that climate change is likely to fuel economic and social discontent, and that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.

Question. Do you believe that the effects of climate change, which include sea level rise, extreme drought, and decreased agricultural production due to growing natural resource scarcity, increase security risks and contribute to instability and fragility around the world?

Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment put together by the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies impacts that climate change could have on national security. Specifically, the assessment notes that climate change is likely to fuel economic and social discontent, and that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.

Question. What reasons are there for our national security agencies to discount, disregard or question the significance or utilization of this information, data, and analysis? Should our national security apparatus?

Answer. National security agencies should analyze and take into account all information and factors that could affect national security.

Question. Did you, or a designee from the State Department, participate in a White House Situation Room meeting on February 22nd? Will you, or the State Department designee, that participated in the February 22nd White House situation room meeting on climate change and national security brief the committee on this meeting?

Answer. I am not in a position to comment on internal policy deliberations, including participation and topics of discussions at specific meetings.

Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L. 116–6); the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: “The conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled
“Funding for Environment and Energy Programs” in the Senate Report.” I asked Keith Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement Congress’s clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: “If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is consistent with administration policy and applicable law.” Is supporting the development of renewable energy abroad and helping countries facing very real safety, security, and stability threats posed by the effects of climate change “consistent with administration policy?”

Answer. The United States remains engaged on the issue of climate change to advance and protect U.S. interests, including by working with other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance resilience in ways that drive innovation and produce market-friendly solutions. We continue to work with other countries through bilateral engagement and cooperation to promote access to energy that also promotes a clean and healthy environment.

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Answer. The State Department and USAID review all planned assistance to ensure it is provided in accordance with applicable laws related to the obligation and expenditure of funds. For FY 2019 foreign assistance funding, this would include, for example, relevant provisions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116–6), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and other foreign assistance authorities, and other provisions of law relevant to the planned assistance.

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intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: “If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is consistent with administration policy and applicable law.” Do you believe that the reference in Sec. 7019(a) of H.J. Res. 31 that reads “Subject to subsection (b), funds appropriated by this Act under titles III through V shall be made available in the amounts specifically designated in the respective tables included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying this Act.”

Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations act including section 7019.

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Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional intent when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID are in the process of developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations, including funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs. The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate,
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Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account Congressional intent when developing funding allocations, including information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID are in the process of developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations, including funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs. The Department of State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations act including section 7019.

Question. As the relationship with Turkey continues to deteriorate, how would you characterize the strategic importance of Greece and Cyprus to U.S. interests in the region?

Answer. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are democracies, EU member states, and key partners in a strategically important region. Greece is a long-standing NATO Ally. Both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have important roles in enhancing peace, stability, and prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is a need for us to do more with these two countries, especially as external actors like Russia, Iran, and China pose challenges to the norms and institutions that undergird security and prosperity in the region. The administration is actively working to strengthen our relations with these two countries across a wide spectrum of issues, including security and defense, business and trade, and energy diversification.

Question. What can the U.S. specifically do to leverage our relations with those countries to hedge against a deteriorating Turkey relationship as well as increased Russian and Chinese influence in the region?
Answer. I attended the March 20 Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral summit in Jerusalem, where we affirmed our shared vision for a peaceful and prosperous region. The United States is elevating our relationship with Greece under the framework of the U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue and reasserting our presence in northern Greece, building off the U.S.’s role as the honored country at the 2018 Thessaloniki International Fair. We are working to strengthen security and energy cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. These efforts will focus on combating terrorism, money laundering, and illicit finance and improving maritime security, while supporting Cypriot-led, U.N.-facilitated negotiations to reunite the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

**Question.** In his hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Pompeo stated that the Northern Triangle governments will need to take specific steps before the U.S. reinstates its assistance programs. Can you please identify exactly what steps the Secretary wants the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to take?

Answer. Illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle to the United States continues to increase, contributing to the humanitarian and security crisis at our southern border. We need to see these countries make greater efforts to stem illegal immigration. The Department urges the Northern Triangle governments to do more to increase border security; combat migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, especially related to children; receive returned citizens; and dissuade illegal immigration. We also urge these governments to improve citizen security and economic growth, attract foreign investment to create jobs, and address corruption and impunity by strengthening governance and judicial capacity to increase accountability and deter crime.

**Question.** In a phone call on April 9, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff asked for the unobligated balances report for FY 2018 and FY 2017 for funding destined for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The State Department agreed to provide this information. Can you please provide this information? Please break this funding down by account (i.e. ESF, DA, INCLE, etc).

Answer. All FY 2017 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have been obligated. Approximately $440.7 million in bilateral and regional FY 2018 funds for these countries has not been obligated, including $126.7 million in INCLE, $78 million in ESF, $223 million in DA, and $13 million in GHP. These levels exclude funding for global programs implemented by functional and pillar bureaus.

**Question.** Can the State Department please provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the unobligated balances report for FY 2016 and FY 2015 funding destined for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? Please break this funding down by account (i.e. ESF, DA, INCLE, etc).

Answer. All FY 2015 and FY 2016 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have been obligated.

**Question.** In a phone call on April 9, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff asked for a description of the parameters being used for the State Department’s ongoing review of FY 2017 funding for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The State Department agree to provide this information. Can you please provide this information?

Answer. FY 2017 foreign assistance-funded activities that were already planned or paid for under existing awards continue during the review period, but no new activities are to be initiated. Last year, the Department and USAID obligated $505 million in bilateral and regional FY 2017 foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle. The review includes about $225 million on existing foreign assistance funded grants, contracts, and other agreements. This level does not include centrally managed resources implemented by State and USAID functional/pillar bureaus, which are part of the review. I may redirect up to $290 million of the remaining bilateral and regional FY 2017 funds to other foreign policy priorities.

**Question.** In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned that there are approximately $450 million in unobligated FY 2018 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras that State intends to reprogram. Is this correct?

Answer. Yes. I am planning to redirect more than $400 million in FY 2018 funds allocated for bilateral and regional programs in the Northern Triangle to other foreign policy priorities. This total excludes centrally managed resources implemented by State and USAID functional/pillar bureaus, but which we are also redirecting away from the Northern Triangle.
In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned that there are approximately $12 million in obligated FY 2018 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Is this correct? Can you provide clarity on what that $12 million was obligated for and what State intends to do with those funds?

Answer. Yes. Approximately $12 million in FY 2018 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds were obligated prior to the President’s decision.

In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned that it will continue to assign FY 2019 funding for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras during the ongoing 653(a) process. Is this correct?

Answer. I expect the Northern Triangle governments to keep their commitments to stem illegal immigration to the United States. I hope these actions take place in time for them to be factored into FY 2019 programming decisions. Absent sufficient actions, I will consider reallocating the FY 2019 funding to other foreign policy priorities, consistent with applicable requirements.

In an April 9 phone call, the State Department informed Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that it will continue to advocate for its FY 2020 budget for Central America, including funding for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Is this correct?

Answer. I expect the Northern Triangle governments to keep their commitments to stem illegal immigration to the United States. I hope these actions take place in time for them to be factored into FY 2019 programming decisions. Absent sufficient actions, I will consider reallocating the FY 2019 funding to other foreign policy priorities, consistent with applicable requirements.

As part of its review of FY 2017 funding for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, can the State Department please provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a list of all pending subobligations, obligated subobligations, and a description of the Department’s intent regarding obligated and unobligated subobligations?

Answer. A review of all Department of State and USAID FY 2017 foreign assistance funding on current agreements and awards began April 3. This review is intended to provide detailed data that will be used to determine the best way forward pursuant to the President’s direction. Last year, the Department and USAID obligated $505 million in bilateral and regional FY 2017 foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle. The review encompasses $225 million on existing grants and contracts. I may redirect up to $280 million of the remaining FY 2017 funds to other foreign policy priorities. I plan to redirect more than $400 million in FY 2018 bilateral and regional funds allocated for programs in the Northern Triangle to other priorities.

Does the Department of State view corruption as a problem in Central America, and does it acknowledge that corruption and impunity are driving migration to the United States? If so, how does the Department of State plan to mitigate it? Does the Department plan on taking a stronger stand against corruption in Guatemala and Honduras as those countries’ government seek to undermine efforts by the international community to combat malfeasance?

Answer. Systemic corruption and impunity in the Northern Triangle are among the foremost challenges these countries face. Corruption and impunity contribute to illegal immigration to the United States by undermining economic growth and development, weakening rule of law, and facilitating transnational crime. The Department supports the fight against corruption in the Northern Triangle by helping to
strengthen government institutions by mentoring prosecutors, training law enforce-
ment, and providing other technical assistance. I will continue to press these gov-
ernments to take concrete actions to combat corruption and impunity and improve
democratic governance.

Question. Section 2 of P.L. 115–335 established the sense of Congress regarding
a negotiated solution to the current crisis in Nicaragua. What specific steps has the
State Department taken to advance to these aims since the legislation was signed
into law.

Answer. Credible negotiations that include Nicaragua’s civil society, student
movement, private sector, political opposition, and the Catholic Church represent
the best opportunity for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Nicaragua. The Ortega
regime’s failure to negotiate in good faith is the primary obstacle to progress. The
Department has consistently condemned the regime’s repression and called for ac-
countability for human rights abuses and violations. We are working with inter-
national partners and leveraging economic and diplomatic tools to support the Nica-araguans’s people’s pressure on the Ortega regime to reach a solution that includes
early, free, and fair elections, the cessation of violence, and investigations into the
killings of protestors.

Question. Section 3 of P.L. 115–335 codified U.S. policy towards Nicaragua. What
specific steps has the State Department take to advance these policies since the leg-
islation was signed into law.

Answer. Core components of the Department’s Nicaragua policy include helping
Nicaraguans restore democratic rule through transparent elections with credible ob-
servation, reestablish the rule of law, and bolster anti-corruption and transparency
efforts. Our Embassy in Managua has supported the democratic, transparent de-
mands of the Civic Alliance in its negotiations with the Ortega regime. We reiterate
our support for the Civic Alliance and the Nicaraguan people in their quest to re-
store democracy through peaceful means, and believe that Nicaraguans deserve to
have a government that respects their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Question. Section 4 of P.S. 115–335 codified targeted sanctions on individuals in-
volved in undermining democratic institutions, corruption and human rights. Since
the legislation was signed into law, what steps has the State Department taken to support implementation of these pro-
visions?

Answer. The Department has continued its efforts to review on a case-by-case
basis international financial institutions’ proposed loans to Nicaragua. In conjunc-
tion with international partners in these institutions, the Department has worked
to scrutinize and limit international financial support to Nicaragua as long as the
Ortega regime continues to repress its citizens. We will continue to work with the
Department of the Treasury to ensure international financial institutions are enforc-
ing program safeguards in Nicaragua. Since April 2018, international financial insti-
tutions including the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Inter-
national Monetary Fund have not approved any new loans to the central govern-
ment of Nicaragua.

Question. Section 5 of P.S. 115–335 codified targeted sanctions on individuals in-
volved in undermining democratic institutions, corruption and human rights. Since
the legislation was signed into law, what steps has the State Department taken to support implementation of these pro-
visions?

Answer. The State Department continues to expose and promote accountability for
those responsible for corruption and human rights abuses associated with the vio-
lence and intimidation campaign in Nicaragua, including through financial sanc-
tions. We work closely with our international and regional partners to monitor the
situation and promote democratic solutions. The State Department also continues
to impose visa restrictions against officials responsible for or complicit in under-
mining democracy in Nicaragua.

Question. How does the Department plan to respond to attacks on human rights
and free speech in Nicaragua?

Answer. Through public statements and coordination with international partners,
the Department will continue condemning the violence perpetrated by the Nica-araguans government and its proxies. We will also continue to support and utilize tar-
ged visa restrictions and other tools, including economic sanctions, against those
persons responsible for human rights abuses and undermining democracy, and en-
courage the regime’s supporters to break with Ortega. We continue to engage with
and support activists, including independent investigative journalists and human
rights defenders, to increase their capacity to document human rights violations and advocate in regional and international fora.

Question. How is the State Department working to combat illicit gold mining in countries like Peru and Colombia?

Answer. The Department has been working with governments in Latin America to combat illicit gold mining, including completing MOUs with Peru in 2017 and with Colombia in 2018. Embassy Lima’s Illegal Mining Working Group coordinates technical assistance activities in collaboration with Peruvian agencies to help legal miners meet Peru’s environmental and labor laws, while also helping enforcement efforts against illegal mining including through training of police, prosecutors, and judges. Similarly, Embassy Bogota provides training and equipment and builds institutional capabilities in the police, armed forces, office of the attorney general, and judicial institutions to detect, investigate, and prosecute environmental crimes.

Question. Congress appropriated $15 million in ESF for Venezuela for FY 2018 and $17.5 million in ESF for FY 2019. These programs provide essential funding to support democratic actors inside Venezuela at a time of grave political, economic and humanitarian crisis inside the country. Alarmingly, however, the administration’s budget for FY 2020 only requests $9 million for these programs. Why is the administration cutting support from the levels previously provided by Congress? Does the administration believe that democratic actors in Venezuela do not need more support at this critical moment of crisis?

Answer. Foreign assistance was reduced globally in the administration’s FY 2020 budget request, and Venezuela was not singled out. The administration requests authority in the budget to transfer up to $500 million to support a democratic transition in Venezuela, and the FY 2020 request for assistance to Venezuela reflects the need for flexibility and agility given the rapidly changing situation in the country. The Department is working to ensure we will have an effective response in a post-Maduro time, as the road to rebuilding Venezuela will be long and difficult.

Question. As was affirmed in the briefing provided by the State Department for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Administration’s FY 2020 budget, the $500 million budget transfer limit for Venezuela does not constitute an actual request for funding by the administration. Please explain why the administration did not request actual humanitarian, economic, and development funding to address the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and its impact on surrounding countries.

Answer. The FY 2020 budget request provides flexibility to make additional funds available to support a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela and respond to related needs in the region. This includes authority to transfer up to $500 million between foreign assistance accounts to support a whole of government response. The United States continues to monitor the situation closely. Since FY 2017, the United States has dedicated over $256 million in humanitarian and development assistance, of which over $213 million is humanitarian assistance, to complement the efforts of countries in the region and to mitigate the effects of hosting Venezuelans with food, health, and other emergency assistance.

Question. Venezuela’s widespread humanitarian crisis has prompted more than 3 million Venezuelan migrants to flee their country and, in turn, has placed significant strain on neighboring countries. What is your assessment of the ability of countries in the region to manage massive influx of Venezuelan refugees?

Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the impact of the current situation in Venezuela, as more than 3.7 million Venezuelan refugees strain the resources and health and education systems in host countries throughout our hemisphere. These governments have taken important steps to coordinate a regional response to this crisis and ensure a coherent response, but many governments are becoming increasingly overwhelmed. Since FY 2017, the United States has dedicated over $256 million in humanitarian and development assistance, of which over $213 million is humanitarian assistance, to complement the efforts of countries in the region and to mitigate the effects of hosting Venezuelans with food, health, and other emergency assistance.

Question. Venezuela’s widespread humanitarian crisis has prompted more than 3 million Venezuelan migrants to flee their country and, in turn, has placed significant strain on neighboring countries. What is your assessment of the ability of countries in the region to manage massive influx of Venezuelan refugees?

Answer. The United States remains concerned about the regional impact of the current situation in Venezuela. Countries in the region have been extraordinarily generous hosts for millions of Venezuelans, but the burden has become increasingly
Overwhelming. Since FY 2017, the United States has provided more than $256 million in life-saving humanitarian and development assistance, of which over $213 million is humanitarian assistance, for Venezuelans to complement the efforts of host countries. We are continually assessing the needs of Venezuelans, and we are scaling up humanitarian assistance to meet those needs and reduce the impact of the crisis on both Venezuelans and the countries that generously host them.

Question. During his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary stated that the State Department had demarched numerous countries with the request to impose some form of sanctions on the Government of Venezuela. Please provide a list of all of the countries that the administration has demarched with this request.

Answer. The Department of State has demarched more than 60 countries to request the imposition of some form of sanctions (e.g. travel restrictions, freezing assets, blocking property) on the former Maduro regime. Due to the constantly evolving nature of demarches coming from many different places, the list is fluid. We continue to reach out to a dynamic list of partners across the globe to jointly address the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.

Question. During his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary stated that the State Department was considering planning a donors’ summit to raise funding to address the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and its impact on the surrounding countries. When does the State Department intend to help convene such a meeting? Is the State Department planning to coordinate with a multilateral institution to convene such a meeting? If so, which one(s)?

Answer. The Department of State supported the Global Conference on the Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela, which was convened at the Organization of American States by interim President Juan Guaido on February 14, 2019. Approximately 270 participants attended, and the Guaido government welcomed humanitarian pledges for Venezuela and its people in presentations made by representatives from Germany ($28 million), the Netherlands (USD $10.6 million), Canada (USD $39.6 million), the United Kingdom ($8.4 million), Taiwan ($500,000), and the United States ($160 million), emphasizing funding previously announced publicly by these governments.

We are assisting the Guaido government on implementation of these pledges; so far, U.S. partners are routing their donations through existing international and non-governmental organizations active in Venezuela’s crisis response. We will consider additional development conferences as appropriate.

Question. In February, the Organization of American States held a pledge conference to raise support to address the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Please provide a list of the pledges made, itemized by country and the respective amount.

Answer. Approximately 270 participants attended, and the Guaido government welcomed humanitarian pledges for Venezuela and its people in presentations made by representatives from Germany ($28 million), the Netherlands (USD $10.6 million), Canada (USD $39.6 million), the United Kingdom ($8.4 million), Taiwan ($500,000), and the United States ($160 million), emphasizing funding previously announced publicly by these governments.

Question. For nearly a decade, Congress has annually appropriated $20 million to support democratic actors and independent civil society in Cuba. However, in FY 2019, the administration only requested $10 million for these programs. And, in FY 2020, the administration only requested $6 million for these programs. Why is the administration cutting funding support from the levels previously appropriated by Congress? Does the administration believe that democratic actors in Cuba do not need more support?

Answer. The administration’s FY 2020 budget request would reduce foreign assistance globally and did not single out specific countries such as Cuba. The FY 2020 request provides a sustainable level of funding for democracy support. Advancing democracy and human rights in Cuba remains the administration’s priority through U.S. foreign assistance to Cuba, and we are committed to ensuring U.S. democracy assistance in Cuba achieves results.

Question. What exactly is the Department doing to determine the source of the injuries against U.S. personnel attacked in Havana? What additional resources does the Department need to adequately determine this?

Answer. Through the Department-led Health Incidents Response Task Force, we are coordinating with the interagency to investigate the cause and source of the injuries. We requested the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conduct an epi-
demiological investigation of the events in Havana. The National Institutes of Health is conducting a clinical study of individuals who were in Havana to better understand the clinical issues surrounding the events. The Department has also requested the National Academy of Sciences arrange meetings and that committees be formed of experts who can review the information available and provide guidance to better understand and determine what may have caused the health effects we have observed in the patients from Cuba.

**Question.** What steps is the Department taking to determine the appropriate ongoing care for those affected by Havana Syndrome? How does the Department plan to care for those injured in Havana if they suffer long-term disabilities? Does the State Department have sufficient authorities to provide ongoing and long-term care to personnel affected?

**Answer.** We have encouraged all those who were injured in Havana to apply for workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). FECA is the exclusive remedy for Federal employees injured in the performance of duty and is administered by the Department of Labor. While their cases are being evaluated by Labor, we have continued to provide secondary payer benefits for up to 1 year starting from the date of their initial medical evaluation. The Department continues to review its current authorities to ensure affected personnel are covered in the long-term.

**Question.** How is the Department ensuring that personnel are regularly updated on progress regarding ongoing investigations about the cause of these injuries, and what the risks are to those posted overseas?

**Answer.** The Department of State has shared information and policy guidance to all U.S. diplomatic posts abroad and made similar information available to U.S. citizens regarding the unidentified health incidents. All medical providers who serve our overseas population have been trained in performing the appropriate care and screening and receive updated information on this priority issue. We have developed screening protocols for individuals that report similar symptoms and have in place baseline screening for those going to Havana in the future. A MED Health Alert Response Team has been set up within the Department and is available for consultation if any events are reported overseas.

**Question.** Why has the State Department not permitted the victims of the attacks against U.S. personnel in Havana to see the summary of the Accountability Review Board report?

**Answer.** The Department understands the interest of the victims of the attacks in reviewing the summary of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) report. The Department remains committed to responding to their concerns and providing them with updated information. The investigations into sensitive aspects of the issue are ongoing. The summary addresses aspects of the ongoing investigation. The Department cannot provide a classified briefing on the report to the affected individuals while an investigation is ongoing. The Department has communicated this to the affected individuals.

**Question.** What is the Department of State doing to protect U.S. personnel from similar attacks in the future?

**Answer.** The Department-led Health Incidents Response Task Force (HIRTF), led by the Deputy Secretary, continues to work closely with interagency partners on the criminal and technical investigations to determine the cause and source of the attacks. Specific to Embassy Havana, the Department has consolidated housing to provide additional setback and deployed sensors to detect possible causes and environmental factors. Through the HIRTF, the Department is working with the interagency to explore additional protective countermeasures as the investigation into the cause of these attacks continues.

**Question.** While the current Government of Brazil is playing an important role in international efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela, what concerns does the Department of State have regarding the state of human rights, civil society, and the environment in Brazil at this point in time?

**Answer.** Brazil has been cooperative on policies that are in the interest of the United States, including by joining the United States in recognizing interim President Guaidó in Venezuela. Nevertheless, as noted in the 2018 Human Rights Reports and the 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report, issues of concern in Brazil include reports of unlawful or arbitrary killings by state police; harsh and sometimes life-threatening prison conditions; violence against journalists; corruption by officials;
killings of human rights defenders; and human trafficking. The Department routinely encourages Brazil to protect and promote the human rights of its citizens.

Question. Does the State Department believe that President Bolsonaro is taking steps to improve protections for human rights, civil society organizations, and the environment?

Answer. I am aware of troubling comments that President Bolsonaro has made in the past; however, I note President Bolsonaro’s stated commitment to uphold Brazil’s strong democratic institutions and to serve all Brazilians, no matter their background. Brazil engages actively with the Department in bilateral discussions on issues of equality in venues such as the annual human rights working group discussions with Brazil’s Department of Human Rights. Should we find that the Brazilian government falls short in the area of human rights or the environment, we will certainly raise our concerns with them.

Question. What is the State Department’s assessment of President Bolsonaro’s draft legislative decree to monitor the work of civil society organizations?

Answer. The Department is currently reviewing the draft legislation to assess its implications.

Question. Since January 2019, the Trump administration has been sending asylum seekers from San Diego back into Tijuana, Mexico to wait for the duration of their court proceedings. In March, the administration announced that it would expand the “Remain in Mexico” plan to asylum seekers in El Paso, Texas. However, details on the Remain in Mexico plan, known officially as the Migration Protection Protocols, remain murky. For instance, while the Mexican government has said this is a “unilateral policy” the plan was rolled out in Tijuana and it appeared that Mexican authorities were cooperating with their U.S. counterparts. What role does the Mexican government play in this policy? Was there an agreement signed prior to the roll out of this policy in Tijuana? If so, who were the specific U.S. and Mexican officials that signed this agreement?

Answer. The decision to apply the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) was a unilateral decision by the U.S. government announced on December 20, 2018. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead agency implementing this policy. There is no formal or signed agreement with Mexico. The Department of State engages in ongoing discussions with the Government of Mexico to ensure the MPP are implemented smoothly on our shared border, but we refer you to DHS for more specific details on MPP implementation.

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Answer. Then-Secretary of Homeland Security Nielsen announced the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) on December 20, 2018. This was a unilateral decision by the U.S. government. There is no formal or signed agreement with Mexico.

Question. When will Ambassador Khalilzad brief this committee?

Answer. Since Ambassador Khalilzad is engaged in complex negotiations involving multiple countries, I asked his deputy, Ambassador Molly Phee, to brief staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 5. My understanding is that 17 staff attended her comprehensive briefing and were very appreciative of the update on reconciliation negotiations they received.

Question. If not, can you tell us that the administration has conveyed to the Taliban in the current negotiations that a rollback in the rights of women and minorities is not acceptable?

Answer. In his discussions with the Taliban, Ambassador Khalilzad has vigorously pressed the Taliban to respect the rights of Afghan women and minority groups. Consistent with the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017, the United States has also taken the position that it is important for Afghan women to join all parties engaged in discussions about the country’s future—including the Afghan
government, opposition political figures, civil society leaders and the Taliban—so that they can directly convey their priorities and concerns. Toward this end, the U.S. government has encouraged the launch of intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations so that Afghan women and men can work together to determine the future of their country.

**Question.** The Pentagon’s decision to halt delivery of equipment related to F–35 fighter aircraft to Turkey given Ankara’s planned purchase of a Russian S–400s is the right approach. The Kremlin is moving aggressively to make arms deals with our partners and allies. Another example of this is India’s $3 billion submarine lease from Russia for 10 years—this comes after reports that India plans on purchasing Russia’s S–400 system. Are you concerned about these transactions?

**Answer.** These transactions are very concerning. I have repeatedly discussed CAATSA in my interactions with Indian officials. We will continue to work with India to identify potentially sanctionable activity so that they can avoid it and encourage them to reduce military purchases from Russia. The U.S.–India defense relationship has undergone rapid growth in recent years based on converging security and strategic interests between our two nations. The administration is working to make sure that India understands the potential sanctions consequences of these transactions and takes the steps necessary to avoid derailing this growth.

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**Answer.** Throughout my interactions with Indian officials, I continue to highlight the advantages of defense trade between our two nations. This trade benefits the security of both countries. Strengthening this relationship, while highlighting Russian shortfalls, will encourage India to diminish its defense ties with the Kremlin.

**Question.** The December elections were widely reported, included in the Department’s latest human rights report, as not free, fair or credible. The government violently attacked political opponents and their supporters in the electoral process, including in the gang rape of a woman in which a local Awami League leader was implicated. Last summer, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly committed 200 extrajudicial killings during an “anti-narcotics” campaign. Also, last year, the government arbitrarily arrested student protestors, journalists, and civil society activists during student-led protests seeking civil service quota reform and better road safety conditions. On April 8, you met with the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. Did you state concern for the rapid decline of human rights and democracy in Bangladesh, particularly over the last year?

**Answer.** Following Bangladesh’s December 30, 2018, election, the Department expressed concern in a January 1, 2019, statement that “credible reports of harassment, intimidation, and violence in the pre-election period” and “election-day irregularities prevented some people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process.” President Trump sent a letter to Prime Minister Hasina further raising these concerns, and the Department continues to raise them with Bangladesh senior officials. The Department supports calls for an independent investigation into the suppression of political opposition, their supporters, and journalists as well as other electoral-related complaints.

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**Question.** President Sirisena’s government has made some progress on human rights, but not where it ultimately counts—including accountability for war crimes. Instead, the president appointed in January 2019 war criminal Major General Shavendra Silva to the post of Army Chief of Staff. This does not demonstrate genuine commitment to the Human Rights Council Resolution commitments. In light of this, what is the U.S. policy on bilateral security cooperation with Sri Lanka?

**Answer.** The Department takes all allegations of human rights violations or abuses seriously and raises these concerns with the Government of Sri Lanka, including when high-level appointments appear to conflict with Sri Lanka’s commitments. As we have told President Sirisena, the appointment of Major General Silva was not in line with Sri Lanka’s commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation. The Department’s security cooperation policy seeks to promote respect for human rights, democratic processes, and the rule of law with Sri Lanka’s security forces.

**Question.** Last week Senator Rubio and I sent a letter to the administration urging consideration of the use of Magnitsky to address China’s repression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. My understanding is that the administration has prepared a package of sanctions ... it has failed for many months to make designations. Given the clear and compelling evidence of Chinese repression—a million people in "reeducation camps ... despread use of high-tech surveillance ..." Can you tell us why the administration has not implemented Magnitsky sanctions on appropriate Chinese officials for the gross violations of human rights in Xinjiang?

**Answer.** I share your concerns about China’s highly repressive campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups. China is in a league of its own when it comes to human rights violations and abuses. As I recently said in conjunction with the roll-out of the Department’s annual Human Rights Reports, the Department is leading the international charge to shine a spotlight on the scope and scale of this issue, as well as to galvanize pressure on China in order to limit or halt its repression. We are working hard to promote accountability for those responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including by widely publicizing what is happening there and through potential economic measures.

**Question.** Tunisia has upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in October and November 2019, and the stability of Tunisia’s democracy hinges on the proper execution of these elections. Tunisia his historically welcomed not just U.S. dollars, but our unique technical assistance in helping develop democratic governing institutions. It is critical that we continue to support Tunisia’s efforts to build democratic institutions and execute free and fair elections. Additionally, supporting Tunisia’s democracy also merits engagement and assistance, including economic development programs. Tunisia’s economic and political stability is not guaranteed; approximately one third of Tunisia’s young adults are currently unemployed. Additionally, the administration has begun to back away from counterterrorism engagement in Africa, which puts at risk the hard-fought gains the U.S. has helped drive against ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. With rising instability and limited internal capacity to deal with militants in both Algeria and Libya, Tunisia will likely be in need of more security assistance. Economic and political stability will play an important role in upcoming elections. We have an important, capable, and willing partner in Tunisia. How does it advance our interests or Tunisia’s to cut ESF by 25 percent in FY 2020?

**Answer.** Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest of the world that serves both our interests and those of our allies. The FY 2020 budget request prioritizes supporting key U.S. partners, including Tunisia, through strategic and targeted investments that enable the United States to retain its position as a global leader. The United States has provided Tunisia with nearly $775 million from the Economic Support Fund since 2011, as well as other assistance in areas such as rule of law and security. This budget request recognizes the importance of other nations contributing toward our shared objectives.

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Answer. Tunisia continues to face threats from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the ISIS-affiliated Jund al-Khilafah Tunisia (JAK-T), and the potential return of Tunisian foreign terrorist fighters from battlefields in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. U.S. and international assistance is helping the Tunisian security forces improve their capacity and ability to conduct internal and border security operations. The FY 2020 NADR and FMF request for Tunisia is designed to build on these successes and further develop Tunisia’s security forces in the areas of air-to-ground joint operations, counterterrorism and border security operations, intelligence capacity, and defense institution building.

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Answer. In FY 2020, the Department requested $2 million for the TSCTP program funding through the new Near East Regional operating unit for counterterrorism programming, and requested funding for law enforcement and corrections in TSCTP member countries’ bilateral allocations. The Department remains committed to Tunisia’s security and will continue to coordinate with the Department of Defense to ensure resources are aligned to support Tunisia and stability in North Africa.

Question. Do you agree that there is a risk for mass atrocities in Mali? Does the March attack in Mopti bear the hallmarks of a mass atrocity?

Answer. We are deeply saddened by the reported loss of over 170 innocent Malians, including women and children, killed on March 23 in the central Malian village of Ogossagou. The Department of State has called on the Government of Mali to conduct a full investigation and to hold those responsible accountable. We have also urged Malian stakeholders to make every effort to stop the cycle of violence and to restore peace and security in central Mali. U.S. diplomatic and programmatic engagement in Mali will continue to focus attention on mitigating risks of mass atrocities.

Question. What actions and activities can the U.S. support to lessen intercommunal tension, and how are such actions funded through this budget?

Answer. We assist Mali in the development of its justice systems, countering violent extremism, protecting human rights, and advancing agricultural practices, livelihoods, and other development activities. We support stability in Mali, particularly through contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping mission, and through our efforts to build stronger institutions and capabilities within Malian defense and security forces. We call on the government to cut all ties with armed militias and hold perpetrators accountable.

Question. What specific diplomatic actions have you taken as Secretary in the year since your confirmation to foster implementation of the agreement? What additional actions do you plan to take? What is the resource request in the President's
Fiscal Year 2020 budget to support actions and activities for this peace agreement implementation?

Answer. On March 26, I joined Deputy Secretary John J. Sullivan’s meeting with Malian Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga to urge full and rapid implementation of the Algiers Accord. On March 29, Under Secretary David Hale spoke at the U.N. Security Council, calling for the signatory parties to make compromises for peace. He then echoed this message with foreign ministers from Mali and neighboring states. We continue to engage regional partners on the peace process. We will also advocate for changes to the U.N. peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, which we support with assessed contributions, to facilitate more rapid and effective accord implementation.

Question. In October 2018, police opened fire at Shi’ite protestors in Abuja killing at least one person. In response to a question for the record submitted in the wake of last year’s budget hearing about human rights abuses by security forces in Nigeria, you indicated that you “take all reports of human rights violations and abuses seriously,” and committed to press the Nigerian government to live up to commitments that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari made in his remarks in the Rose Garden in April 2018, ensuring accountability for human rights violations. What specific actions did you take in the wake of the incident in keeping with your commitment to press the Nigerian government to ensure accountability for human rights violations? Has the Nigerian government launched a credible investigation into the October violence?

Answer. After the October killings, our Ambassador immediately raised U.S. concerns with senior Government of Nigeria officials. Both privately and in the Embassy’s November 1, 2018, public statement, the United States called for a thorough and transparent investigation and accountability for those responsible for these killings. We do not have any information on whether an investigation was launched. We will continue to prioritize in our engagements with the Nigerian government respect for human rights and accountability for those found responsible for human rights violations and abuses.

Question. In October 2018, police opened fire at Shi’ite protestors in Abuja killing at least one person. In response to a question for the record submitted in the wake of last year’s budget hearing about human rights abuses by security forces in Nigeria, you indicated that you “take all reports of human rights violations and abuses seriously,” and committed to press the Nigerian government to live up to commitments that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari made in his remarks in the Rose Garden in April 2018, ensuring accountability for human rights violations. We understand that units and individuals are vetted in accordance with Leahy laws. In addition to that, what safeguards if any, has the administration put in place to ensure U.S. equipment is not being used to commit human rights abuses? Has the administration undertaken a review of the security assistance portfolio for Nigeria in the wake of the incident to ensure we are providing appropriate assistance given human rights concerns?

Answer. The administration continually presses Nigeria for progress and accountability on human rights. Human rights are an important factor in the President’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (National Security Presidential Memorandum 10, issued April 19, 2018). As part of every arms transfer assessment, the Department considers “the risk that the transfer may be used to undermine international peace and security or contribute to abuses of human rights.” We continually review our limited security assistance to Nigeria to ensure it contributes to building more capable, professional, and accountable security forces that respect human rights and protect civilians, and that U.S. equipment will only be used for legitimate security purposes.

Question. What specific programmatic activities has the U.S. undertaken to support the transition in Ethiopia?

Answer. The Department supports the important reforms underway in Ethiopia and continues its broad spectrum of programs investing in the Ethiopian people, in health, education, and food security, as well as expanding activity in direct support of Prime Minister Abiy’s reform agenda. An interagency group convened by the National Security Council and led by the Department’s Africa Bureau has met with its Ethiopian partners and created a number of cross-cutting new initiatives, including expert economic, legal, and security specialists to work directly with key Ethiopian ministries. The Africa Bureau is also coordinating interagency efforts to facilitate U.S. private sector investments in Ethiopia.
Question. What specific programs is the U.S. undertaking for targeting youth in marginalized communities? What specific geographic areas are we reaching through such programs?

Answer. The Department is focused on providing opportunities for Ethiopian youth. Expanding employment and hope for this demographic is the critical element to Ethiopia’s political and economic success, as is true across Africa. All existing Department programs reflect this priority. The political geography of Ethiopia is especially complex, and the Department works in close cooperation with Ethiopian leaders to make U.S. investment in the Ethiopian people strategically effective.

Question. The New York Times reported on March 10th, that a “surge in American airstrikes over the last four months of 2018 pushed the annual death toll of suspected Shabab fighters in Somalia to the third record high in three years.” The article and other media reports suggest that the increased attacks have increased displacements as Somalis flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. How specifically does the increase in the number of airstrikes support the administration’s strategy for Somalia?

Answer. U.S. military efforts in Somalia are one part of a whole-of-government approach that includes diplomacy and development to advance peace and stability, combat terrorism, promote political and economic reform, and provide life-saving humanitarian and development assistance. The Department continues to support Somali-led efforts to advance political reconciliation and conflict mitigation, which are necessary to address the root causes of instability that provide al-Shabab freedom to operate. Operations against al-Shabaab keep pressure on the organization and help to counteract its efforts to disrupt these processes, while providing space and time for the Federal Government of Somalia to enact political and security sector reforms.

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Answer. Airstrikes are one part of the U.S. strategy to support the Somali people and government by disrupting the activities of al-Shabaab and providing space for Somali forces to secure the country. These precision airstrikes enable larger Somalia security force activities to build enhanced security conditions that then allow time and space for government and economic development to occur. They directly impact al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out activities and recruitment. Strikes targeted at various levels of al-Shabaab leadership diminish their capability to conduct catastrophic attacks against civilians, such as the October 2017 truck bombing which killed more than 600 Somalis.

Question. Last May, the White House announced the United States is undertaking a comprehensive review of its assistance programs to South Sudan to ensure our assistance does not contribute to, or prolong the conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior. What was the result of that review? What impact has it had on the FY20 budget request?

Answer. On May 8, 2018, the White House announced a comprehensive review of U.S. assistance programs in South Sudan. This review is still ongoing. U.S. foreign
assistance to South Sudan in the FY 2020 budget request reflects our humanitarian, political, and economic priorities, including to support a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This approach has been informed by our ongoing South Sudan assistance review.

Question. Last year you committed to “analyze the value and impact of a Special Envoy” for Sudan and South Sudan. What was the result of your analysis? What are the factors that led to the conclusion that a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes was necessary, which may inform the need for a Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan?

Answer. Three considerations factored heavily into my decision to appoint a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. First, many of the political, security, economic, and social issues arising in the region are cross-border concerns. Secondly, the then-imminent prospect of elections and the possibility of either a historic transfer of power or renewed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a concern for the United States as well as the neighboring countries. Thirdly, the U.N., EU, and roughly half a dozen countries have Special Envoys who meet regularly; a U.S. Special Envoy enables the Department to maintain our diplomatic engagement through those channels.

Question. Does the administration plan to assign a senior, experienced diplomat who has previously been confirmed by the Senate as an Ambassador to lead U.S. government diplomatic efforts—especially during this critical time in Sudan?

Answer. Resolving the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and the civil conflicts in both Sudan and South Sudan remain top policy priorities for the administration. At this time I do not anticipate naming a special envoy, although I am reviewing options for an additional senior-level position that could include a focus on Sudan and South Sudan issues. I do not have a timeline for such a decision and anticipate any additional senior-level position would be covered by existing resources in FY19.

Question. The President released a policy memorandum on November 26th tightening enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and restricting assistance to Tier Three countries. It is my understanding that the new policy took NSC, DOS, and USAID by surprise and there remains little or no direction to Washington DC or mission-based staff and even less guidance provided to USAID implementing partners on how to implement the new policy. While no one wants to encourage Human Trafficking, needed programming is being impacted. In the DRC, over 1 million children will lose access to schools. Also, in the DRC Nobel Peace prize winner Denis Mukwege is losing U.S. funding support via an implementing partner. His work focuses on women and their treatment in face of sexual violence in war and armed conflict. I can’t see how disrupting NGO operations in these or other scenarios helps end human trafficking. What steps are being taken to exempt NGOs from adverse impacts of this policy?

Answer. The restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) applies to assistance for the benefit of the government, regardless of the type of entity implementing the assistance. The State Department and USAID assess whether the restriction applies with respect to a particular program on a case-by-case basis. Where an activity will not receive additional funding as a result of the restrictions under the TVPA, implementing partners are generally permitted to incur closeout costs to allow for the responsible winding down of the activity.

Question. As the Secretary of State, you are the head of the new United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC), which will subsume the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Development Credit Authority. How will you ensure that State has the tools and resources necessary to fulfill its important role in the USDFC’s due diligence processes, particularly given the increased mandate and capacity of the new institution?

Answer. The USDFC’s success will require strong linkages to U.S. policymakers at the Department and USAID in order for the USDFC to both complement and be guided by U.S. foreign policy, development, and national security objectives. Under a new governance structure, as Secretary of State, I will serve as Chair of the USDFC, and the Administrator of USAID will serve as Vice-Chair. The State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) and the USDFC’s Chief Development Officer (a position jointly appointed by the USAID Administrator and the CEO of the USDFC, who reports directly to the USDFC’s Board) will work closely with the USDFC’s management to ensure it is fulfilling its mission, while coordinating programming and resources with the Department of State and USAID. The
global reach of the State Department and USAID will be key to assisting the USDFC in due diligence.

Question. Can you answer where it will go?

Answer. The process to determine which agency will adopt the legal rights and responsibilities of the Sovereign Loan Guarantee (SLG) portfolio is ongoing. The agencies under consideration include USAID, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (USDFC). Under the BUILD Act, the current SLG exposure is expected to count against the USDFC maximum contingent liability, if responsibility for SLGs is assigned to the USDFC. This is an outcome the administration would like to avoid.

Question. If it goes to the USDFC and the $21 billion in exposure from existing guarantees (Israel, Jordan, and Ukraine) are shifted onto the USDFC's books, would you count them against the agency's liability cap?

Answer. The process to determine which agency will administer the Sovereign Loan Guarantee (SLG) portfolio is ongoing. Under the BUILD Act, the current SLG exposure is expected to count against the USDFC maximum contingent liability, if responsibility for SLGs is assigned to the USDFC. This is an outcome the administration would like to avoid.

Question. Another meaningful upgrade for the USDFC is the inclusion of equity authority. OPIC was frequently hamstrung because of a restriction to only using debt finance. Under BUILD, the USDFC now has limited equity authority, up to 30 percent (of the aggregate equity investment) in any project and up to 35 percent of the total portfolio. Yet, the FY20 budget request includes just $150 million for equity investments, or equivalent to about 4 percent of OPIC's overall commitments last year. What was the justification for crippling the equity authority?

Answer. Equity can be particularly appropriate when investing in frontier markets where more support than lending and insurance may be required. The budget requests $150 million for a new program for the USDFC to support projects as a minority investor acquiring equity, including as a limited partner in investment funds. This will allow for cooperation with allies and for investments to reach smaller and more developmental impact. The request supports a diversified portfolio of 5 to 10 investment funds with an average equity investment between $5 million to $20 million. Adding $150 million for equity funds in 2020 would represent a 36 percent expansion on OPIC's average (debt) funds program business over the past 6 years, a significant and impactful, but manageable expansion. The USDFC will also maintain the ability to lend to investment funds—a strong complement to the USDFC's equity program.

Question. The FY20 budget request includes $98 million to cover administrative expenses. At first glance, this looks like a roughly 10 percent increase over the $79 million in OPIC expenses plus $10 million from USAID's DCA in FY19. However, these top line numbers don't include an estimated $26 million in revenue from fees and other services which OPIC uses to cover project costs separate from direct administrative expenses. So the appropriate baseline is $115 million. This suggests that the new USDFC is facing, not a 10 percent increase in expenses but a 15 percent cut. What is the justification for this budget cut?

Answer. The total $300 million budget for the new USDFC is more than double that of OPIC plus USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) funding today. This increase in funding reflects the priority the administration places on the new USDFC. Per the BUILD Act, fees may be charged and collected to support project-specific transaction costs. This includes costs for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect costs incurred in claims settlements. The FY 2020 budget request covers these costs along with other administrative expenses. The administration also expects efficiencies from the consolidation of OPIC and DCA, and anticipates that the USDFC, through stronger linkages with the State Department and USAID, will be able to leverage their expertise and footprint overseas.

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Answer. Pursuant to the BUILD Act, fees may be charged and collected to support project-specific transaction costs. This includes costs for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect costs incurred in claims settlements associated with support provided under the BUILD Act.

Question. The amount of money handled under each portfolio per OPIC employee is estimated to be around $86 million, which is a much higher size than other countries’ development agencies. Yet, the FY20 budget for the USDFC doesn’t take into account the hiring of more employees. What is the justification for this?

Answer. The FY 2020 request is expected to fund existing OPIC and DCA programs, other operational expenses, and new responsibilities to implement the DFC’s new equity, grant, and technical assistance programs. This assures a level of 305 FTEs, higher than current levels for OPIC and DCA combined today, and takes into consideration the addition of FTE positions such as the Chief Development Officer and Chief Risk Officer, increased evaluation and monitoring activity, and new reporting requirements mandated by the BUILD Act. Through stronger linkages to State and USAID, the DFC will leverage the overseas platforms that Posts and Missions provide, allowing additional U.S. government personnel to support development finance efforts.

Question. The State Department recognizes that discrimination against people with disabilities is not simply unjust and immoral, but hinders economic development, limits democracy, and erodes societies. Unfortunately, State does not require all development programs to be inclusive of people with disabilities. Please explain in detail how State and USAID programs give a voice to people with disabilities, particularly through global democracy and governance programs, in absence of a specific requirement.

Answer. USAID is continuously striving to ensure programming for persons with disabilities is included not only in democracy, human rights, and governance programs, but across all sectors. Approaches to achieve this include disability-related provisions that are required for contracts and grants, disability-inclusive sector strategies and programming, the development of training materials, and designated expert staff who serve as a resource to all employees. USAID is currently onboarding a disability rights advisor who will have a responsibility to manage the disability program.

Question. We continue to hear from NGO implementing partners of delays in receiving FY2018 funding including new programming as well as incremental funding of already existing programs. This was also a problem with FY 2017 funds. These delays and disruptions adversely impact the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. supported programming. Implementing partners are often forced to bridge the funding gap with their own funds and, in a few cases, the programs had to scale down and NGOs feared that they needed to shut down operations. For some partners, they've been told by the administration that the delay is due to a congressional notification that we often have not yet seen. What steps are State and USAID taking identify and remove barriers to speed resources to the field as well as easing the burden on implementing partners?

Answer. The Department of State and USAID work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are obligated as quickly as possible for programs that advance foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements. It is a complex process to allocate over $30 billion in foreign assistance funds and ensure it meets hundreds of Congressional funding directives. Once the funding allocations are complete, numerous pre-obligation requirements must be met before funds can be obligated to partners. It is a multi-step process, but one that we are working to ensure is executed as quickly and effectively as possible.

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Answer. Administrator Green and I are committed to working to ensure that the Department of State and USAID provide funds to partners as quickly as possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements. We will continue to keep your staff apprised as we work through this process.

Question. Two years ago, data from the Charity & Security Network showed that two-thirds of all U.S.-based nonprofit organizations working abroad face financial access difficulties. Since then, nonprofits say the problem is getting worse, negatively impacting their ability to fund vital humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and development programs overseas in line with the U.S.’s national security objectives. In many cases, time-sensitive programs have had to be delayed or even canceled. How can terrorist financing be prevented while preserving nonprofits’ ability to get money to these lifesaving programs?

Answer. Malign actors use front companies in the humanitarian sector to mask nefarious activity. I support robust anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing standards as promulgated by the Financial Action Task Force and domestic regulatory agencies. Such standards require financial institutions use a risk-based approach when dealing with clients, including nonprofits, but support financial inclusion without compromising measures that exist to combat crime. We can achieve a safe system and access for all clients through this approach and communication between institutions and clients about the nature and purpose of transactions.

Question. There are more than 68 million people displaced from their homes, the highest number since the end of World War II and nearly 132 million people will require humanitarian assistance. In the United Nations’ 2019 Global Humanitarian Overview, the U.N. reported that it was only able to meet 56 percent of global humanitarian needs in 2018. Yet, while humanitarian need shows no signs of abating, the administration has proposed cutting the humanitarian assistance budget by 24 percent. Does the President’s Budget Request provide sufficient funds to respond to existing crises, including the growing number of refugees fleeing Venezuela and the worsening Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as new crises that may emerge?

Answer. Yes. The FY 2020 request of $6.3 billion for humanitarian assistance (including resettlement)—essentially a funding straight-line of the FY 2019 request level—will allow the United States to remain the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance in the world, for these crises and new ones that may emerge. Combined with carryover resources, the average program levels for 2019 and 2020 will allow the U.S. to remain the world’s largest single donor of humanitarian assistance and to robustly address needs for Syria, Yemen, and other major crises around the world. When combined with all available resources, average annual funding available for FY 2019 and FY 2020 of around $9 billion roughly matches the highest-ever annual level of U.S. overseas humanitarian programming. I am also working on implementing a strategy intended to get other donors to step up and increase their share of global humanitarian funding and reduce the burden on American taxpayers.

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Answer. In 2017, the three largest donors—including the United States—provided nearly three-fifths of all government contributions in response to humanitarian needs. Burden-sharing amongst a wider set of donors is critical for closing the humanitarian funding gap. The administration is pursuing a burden-sharing strategy that draws on all levels of government and specific diplomatic missions overseas. For example, the multi-year strategy will strengthen the coordination of messaging across the U.S. government through common talking points aimed at key donors; capitalize on engagement through multilateral and regional fora; and support active outreach and enlisting of donors in funding critical humanitarian emergencies.

Question. In this year’s budget request, the administration proposes merging all humanitarian assistance accounts—Migration and Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Food for Peace Title II—and moving all assistance func-
tions from PRM to USAID. I am concerned that this proposal goes beyond the ongo-
ing USAID Transformation efforts and may disrupt current efforts to merge Food
for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I am concerned
that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises that involve refugee pop-
ulations. How does this proposal connect with other ongoing lines of work related
to reform, including the establishment of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering
Committee?

Answer. The humanitarian policy priorities for the U.S. government have not
changed and will continue through FY 2020, including through the Humanitarian
Assistance Steering Council (HASC). These include ensuring there is a unified voice
and single message in public engagement, increased burden-sharing from other
donor governments, and reforming the humanitarian system. Additionally, the role
of the HASC is intended to coordinate humanitarian assistance in line with the ad-
ministration’s policy priorities as well as to ensure the necessary diplomatic engage-
ment needed to address and end the numerous man-made crises around the world.
However, the creation of the HASC cannot optimize humanitarian assistance, and
that is why the FY 2020 President’s Budget proposal addresses the necessary
changes.

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humanitarian assistance accounts—Migration and Refugee Assistance, International
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for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I am concerned
that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises that involve refugee pop-
ulations. If this proposal moves forward, can you outline what impact you expect
it would have on U.S. diplomacy abroad?

Answer. The administration proposes to merge overseas humanitarian assistance
into one account by leveraging expertise of USAID in administering and imple-
menting programs and oversight of partners with the State Department’s expertise
on refugee and protection policy, diplomacy, and other refugee issues. This proposal
delivers on the President’s commitment to achieve a unified voice and single mes-
sage on humanitarian issues focused on advancing optimal reforms at the United
Nations and optimizing outcomes for beneficiaries and for American taxpayers. It
will improve current diplomatic actions by having one clear channel between dip-
ломats and a unified voice and single message on issues that focused on optimizing
the outcomes of humanitarian assistance across the agencies, as well as improving
the coordination of efforts to resolve conflicts that drive many of the current human-
itarian crises.

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ing USAID Transformation efforts and may disrupt current efforts to merge Food
for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I am concerned
that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises that involve refugee pop-
ulations. How do you plan to ensure that U.S. refugee policy is closely tied to U.S.
programming in crisis settings if these functions are divided between USAID and
the State Department?

Answer. The FY 2020 request supports the effort to merge Food for Peace and
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance into USAID’s new Bureau for Humani-
tarian Assistance. The FY 2020 request preserves the State Department’s lead role
on refugee and protection policy and refugee resettlement, and on advocating for
states to comply with their international refugee law obligations and to protect refu-
gees and conflict-affected people. The proposed high-level, dual-hatted State and
USAID leadership structure, under my direction, will also elevate humanitarian as-
sistance within the U.S. government to ensure a unified voice and message in inter-
national organizations and with other implementers and donors that is focused on
optimizing humanitarian responses and making them more effective, seamless, and
coherent. The new structure will facilitate more effective coordination and engage-
ment, not just across our current humanitarian offices but across State and USAID,
to achieve our humanitarian objectives. The proposal keeps funding for PRM’s ad-
ministrative expenses for overseas staff, policy, legal work, and refugee resettlement
in MRA.

Question. Your budget proposes to consolidate humanitarian programs and fund-
ing into a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. You argue
that this will “optimize humanitarian assistance” and “leverage the comparative strengths of the Department of State and USAID.” The request also proposes to create a new structure. Can you please specifically explain the problems with the current structure and how the proposal will specifically address those problems?

Answer. The “Delivering Government Solutions in the 21st Century: Reform Plan and Reorganization Recommendations” report released by the Office of Management and Budget in June 2018 details challenges facing the current overseas humanitarian assistance structure conducted by one bureau at the Department of State and two offices at USAID. The proposal outlined in the FY 2020 request consolidates overseas humanitarian assistance with funding in a new, flexible International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. IHA and having a single agency administering programs will allow funds to adjust readily to optimize responses as needs evolve, particularly in conflict-based crises where, for example, populations are shifting more often from being internally displaced to being refugees and back. The proposal creates a high-level dual-hat leadership structure elevating humanitarian assistance to better achieve foreign-policy priorities and establishes a seamless, coherent response to optimize live-saving assistance to populations in need and to better address the continuum of response, including diplomacy, execution of strategies to permanently resolve humanitarian crises and protracted displacements, and the transition to development.

Question. Your budget proposes to consolidate humanitarian programs and funding into a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. You argue that this will “optimize humanitarian assistance” and “leverage the comparative strengths of the Department of State and USAID.” The request also proposes to create a new structure. You argue that the new structure will “enable the U.S. government to respond seamlessly” can you please explain how this will happen when you propose a new structure that appears to add additional layers to a process that needs to be as quick and nimble as possible?

Answer. The administration’s FY 2020 request consolidates overseas humanitarian assistance with funding in a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account, which USAID’s new Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) would administer under the authority of the Secretary of State. This proposal builds on the work to combine USAID’s Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace, and would ensure that all U.S. government overseas humanitarian-assistance programming—whether responding to displacement, natural disaster, or other shock—is efficient and effective.

In practice, we are already seeing the benefits of consolidating the administration of humanitarian assistance at USAID, where the joint use of International Disaster Assistance has significantly strengthened USAID’s ability to address funding gaps and overlaps. Having one management structure and one set of policies, procedures, and systems will streamline, not complicate, the provision of assistance. Implementers will no longer need to request and manage awards from three different offices, each with separate reporting and oversight requirements.

Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. We’ve seen it in Chechnya, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. “opposes criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination” against LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level spokespersons to do so. What are you and the State Department doing to address this new set of laws in Brunei and to ensure that the human rights and dignity of all people there are protected and respected?

Answer. All governments have an obligation to ensure that their people can freely enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which they are entitled. The Department raised its concerns about these laws with Brunei on numerous occasions since the enactment of Phase One in 2014, and we will continue to do so, including as part of our bilateral Senior Officials Dialogue.
Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. We've seen it in Chechnya, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. "opposes criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination" against LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level spokespersons to do so. What in specific will you commit to do to help LGBTQ people in Brunei, Chechnya, Egypt and other places to ensure they are not targeted for abuse?

Answer. The Department continues to work to protect and defend human rights for all—including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons—across the world, including in Brunei, Chechnya, and Egypt. No one should face violence, criminalization, or serious forms of discrimination because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.

Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. We've seen it in Chechnya, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. "opposes criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination" against LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level spokespersons to do so. What in specific do you commit to doing to make your commitments a reality on a day-to-day basis?

Answer. Under my leadership, the Department has been clear and consistent in affirming that human rights are universal, and that no one should face violence, criminalization, or serious forms of discrimination because of their sexual orientation. We have and will continue to stand up and speak out in support of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons in all corners of the globe, and will continue to press to hold perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to account.

Question. What is U.S. policy in regards to children who are U.S. citizens and alleged to be affiliated with ISIS families? Will the United States repatriate these children, as we are obligated to do under international law? What is the plan for giving these children the support they need to reintegrate into society?

Answer. U.S. citizen children affiliated with ISIS members had no choice in traveling to or being born in ISIS-held territory. Most are victims of their parents’ decisions, with some living in destitute and harsh conditions in internally displaced persons camps in northeast Syria. The U.S. government is working to repatriate these U.S. citizens in accordance with strict travel guidelines in place to safeguard the American people. We work to locate American citizen relatives of these minor children who are already living in the United States who are willing to support the children’s integration or reintegration into American society. We also coordinate with law enforcement and child protective services to ensure each child returns to a suitable and safe home environment.

Question. 2019 is a significant year for U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement because November 4th is the day when President Trump can officially initiate the formal withdrawal process. November 4th happens to be 7 days before the start of COP25 in Santiago, Chile. How is it in the best strategic and economic interests for the U.S. to remove itself from the international Agreement every other nation of the world is using to shape the future of the global economy?

Answer. When the President announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement absent the identification of better terms for the American people, he em-
phasized concerns that the United States had pledged to do much more to reduce emissions under the Agreement than major U.S. economic competitors, and that the United States would not put itself at an economic disadvantage. The United States remains active in international discussions, including those related to the Paris Agreement, in order to protect U.S. interests.

**Question.** When President Trump announced he would withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement he did so with the caveat that he would work to seek a “better deal” wherein the U.S. would remain party to the Paris Agreement. Is this effort to achieve a better deal underway?

**Answer.** The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the agreement, absent the identification of better terms for the American people. The United States will maintain its leadership and influence through our diplomatic and development activities with other countries as well as multilateral policy forums regardless of our position on the Paris Agreement.

**Question.** Will you provide the committee an update on the progress and strategy for achieving the new deal the President mentioned in his June 1, 2017 rose garden speech?

**Answer.** The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the agreement, absent the identification of better terms for the American people. The United States will maintain its leadership and influence through our diplomatic and development activities with other countries as well as multilateral policy forums regardless of our position on the Paris Agreement.

**Question.** Will you commit to the committee that you will work towards achieving a “better deal?”

**Answer.** The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the Agreement, absent the identification of better terms for the American people. I would be happy to provide updates to the committee when and if the administration’s policy changes.

**Question.** Senator Collins and I wrote you on February 28th about the positive outcomes from COP24 and requested an explanation how you intend to maintain U.S. power and influence in a process that we seem likely to be leaving. How are U.S. interests better served when we excuse ourselves from processes and policy decisions that the rest of the entire world is actively engaging in?

**Answer.** The United States continues to participate in ongoing international climate change discussions to protect U.S. economic and environmental interests. Regardless of our position on the Paris Agreement, the United States’ approach to environmental protection serves U.S. interests and has unburdened communities, individuals, and industries to develop and implement policies that fit their needs. This approach leverages the ingenuity of our citizens and businesses to protect our environment, ensure our energy security, and grow our economy.

**Question.** Will the U.S. still have a voice in Paris Agreement implementation policies and negotiations when, or if, the U.S. leaves the Paris Agreement?

**Answer.** The United States has remained active in international discussions related to the Paris Agreement in order to protect U.S. interests. If a country is not a Party to the Paris Agreement, it can participate in negotiations as an observer.

**Question.** The outcomes from COP24 are widely regarded as successful and favorable towards the U.S.’s interests. Do you agree with this assessment? How much credence do you put on the achievement of these positive outcomes resulted from the U.S.’s full participation in the negotiations as a party to the Paris Agreement?

**Answer.** I appreciate the hard work of our negotiators, whose active and constructive engagement made it possible for the United States to achieve success. The outcome took a significant step toward holding our economic competitors accountable
for reporting their emissions in a manner consistent with standards the United States has met since the early 1990s.

**Question.** What is your strategy for maintaining and growing U.S. influence, cooperation, and power on climate diplomacy at COP25? (taking into consideration that in the coming months leading up to November 4, 2019, which is the earliest date the President can officially begin the U.S.'s withdrawal process).

**Answer.** With COP25 months away, it is too early to say anything specific. That said, the United States was actively engaged at COP24, and we plan to remain actively engaged at COP25 and beyond to advance and protect U.S. interests.

**Question.** How do you think our partner and ally, as well as rival, parties to the Paris Agreement posture and willingness to deal with the U.S. may change, knowing that on November 4, 2019 the U.S. may very likely initiate the withdrawal process?

**Answer.** With COP25 months away, it is too early to say anything specific. That said, the United States was actively engaged at COP24, and we plan to remain actively engaged at COP25 and beyond to advance and protect U.S. interests.

**Question.** The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this administration intends to realize the President's "I am asking the Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends" comments. What guidance has the State Department received from the White House on how to implement any directive associated with this statement?

**Answer.** The President is committed to ensuring that American foreign assistance serves American interests. The FY 2020 budget request reflects this commitment and prioritizes assistance that protects the American people, promotes U.S. prosperity, and advances American interests and values.

**Question.** The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this administration intends to realize the President's "I am asking the Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends" comments. When can we expect USUN, the State Department or the White House to submit to Congress the legislative proposal the President requested in the State of the Union?

**Answer.** The President is committed to ensuring that American foreign assistance serves American interests. The FY 2020 budget request reflects this commitment, and prioritizes assistance that protects the American people, promotes U.S. prosperity, and advances American interests and values.

**Question.** The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this administration intends to realize the President's "I am asking the Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends" comments. Do you believe the U.S. should limit diplomatic and development engagements to our "friends)?

**Answer.** I believe Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest of the world that serves both U.S. interests and those of our allies. The FY 2020 budget request prioritizes supporting key U.S. partners and allies through strategic, selective investments that enable the United States to retain its position as a global leader. At the same time, it relies on other nations to make greater proportionate contributions toward shared objectives.

**Question.** In your first remarks to State Department personnel back in May 2018, "The United States diplomatic corps needs to be in every corner; every stretch of the world, executing missions on behalf of this country; and it is my humble, noble undertaking to help you achieve that." I applaud your vision. Yet the Department's most recent Five-Year Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan acknowledges that the Department has "abolished a large number of positions in warzones." While I understand that you do not want to have "forever wars"—and reducing the size of warzone embassies is part of that—where did these positions go?
Answer. War-zone position levels were established through a combination of new positions and positions drawn from other Department domestic and overseas bureaus. As such, staffing levels in war zones have fluctuated throughout the years. This resulted in vacancies in many areas because many Foreign Service personnel were assigned to war zones and war zone support operations. As war zone positions have been gradually reduced over time, personnel were available for reassignment to bolster staff levels at other posts or domestic organizations where needs were greatest.

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Answer. Staffing levels in war zones have fluctuated throughout the years. During surges in war zones, staff shortages/vacancies in other posts have occurred. During drawdowns, personnel are available for reassignment to other critical areas where vacancies exist. The Department is committed to closely monitoring essential programs and ensuring the staffing needed to implement them. As the Department reassesses employment within war zones, we aim to establish accurate staffing levels with appropriate skill sets at embassies worldwide.

Question. How do you expect the diplomatic corps to be in every corner of the world without addressing the need for positions abroad directly in the FY20 Budget Request?

Answer. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly 24,700 full-time personnel. This level of staffing is needed to carry out the Department’s foreign policy mission and meet the goals and objectives of the National Security Strategy and Joint Strategic Plan. This staffing level is consistent with the Department’s current hiring plan and Congressional guidance of maintaining onboard levels as of December 31, 2017.

Question. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy states that the United States must “upgrade its diplomatic capabilities” to compete in today’s international environment. How does abolishing positions at certain posts without distributing them back to the field—in effect, shrinking the footprint of the Foreign Service—achieve your goals?

Answer. In many cases, positions that are considered for abolishment are redistributed to other posts requiring additional staffing needs. For example, the Bureau of Consular Affairs conducts an annual review of worldwide visa workload to determine workforce levels required at overseas posts. Positions for posts that are experiencing a decrease in workload are redistributed to posts that are facing an increase in visa demand. Similarly, regional bureaus may abolish positions at certain posts for redistribution elsewhere to address new initiatives or align staffing with regional strategic priorities.

Question. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy states that the United States must “upgrade its diplomatic capabilities” to compete in today’s international environment. What is your end-strength vision for the Foreign Service and in what ways is it outlined in this FY20 Budget Request?

Answer. Our current hiring plans are geared to increase Foreign Service and Civil Service employment to target levels coinciding with the Department’s FY 2018 appropriation Explanatory Statement. The Department has gone beyond those levels for Foreign Service staffing, enabling us to reverse the effects of last year’s hiring freeze. The hiring classes planned for the remainder of FY 2019 will bring us to levels that are at or above previous highs. The President’s FY 2020 budget submission requests funding to continue Foreign Service staffing levels to replace anticipated attrition and add some moderate increases in critical areas. This will provide the diplomatic capacity to support our current global engagement strategies.

Question. As you know, many of us have benefitted greatly from the Pearson Fellows program, where State Department personnel spend a year or two in Congressional offices. We have noticed that in the last couple of years, there are many fewer of these positions available to interested candidates. Would you explain to us what happened to the Pearson Fellows? Why did it shrink? Where did the positions go?

Answer. There will be 16 new Pearson Fellows joining the Hill this summer, up from 10 last year. The Department will soon be recruiting and selecting Foreign
Service Officers to fill the Summer 2020 assignments and return to our traditional number of 20 Pearson Fellows. It is my understanding that in 2017, the Department conducted a strategic review of all external assignments to include Pearson Fellowships. While the review took place, external assignments were either temporarily held or reduced. In addition to the Foreign Service Pearson Fellows, there are Civil Service Brookings and Georgetown Fellows who also serve in Congressional offices, and I have returned these programs to traditional levels as well.

Question. You have stated that there are 1,500 state economic officers working overseas to promote U.S. business. In fact, data from your own Human Resources bureau shows that there are only 369 FSOs in the field in straight economic positions. Is that sufficient, given the global economic competition we are facing? Do you believe adequate funding is provided in the FY20 Budget Request to get us to 1,500 economic officers?

Answer. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly 24,700 personnel. This staffing level is sufficient to carry out the Department’s foreign policy mission and meet the goals of the National Security Strategy and Joint Strategic Plan, and is consistent with the Department’s current hiring plan and Congressional guidance of maintaining onboard levels as of December 31, 2017. The Department has more than 1,500 economic officers. Roughly 63 percent are deployed overseas in either purely economic or other Foreign Service positions. The Department is continually assessing its economic skills capacity to ensure that staffing is aligned with economic interests.

Question. In October of 2018, 96 business associations, ranging from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to the Kansas Trucking Association, hailed the work of FSOs as instrumental in advancing the interests of American companies around the world. “We urge you to send more diplomats overseas. Foreign competitors are continually extending their economic reach into markets where America’s diplomatic presence is limited.” You have stated that there are 1,500 state economic officers working overseas to promote U.S. business. In fact, data from your own Human Resources bureau shows that there are only 369 FSOs in the field in straight economic positions. Since January 21, 2017, how many career diplomats has the Trump administration nominated for ambassadorial posts in the Western Hemisphere? During the same timeframe, how many non-career nominees have there been for ambassadorial posts in the Western Hemisphere? Please provide a list of countries for both questions.

Answer. As of March 31, 2019, we have more than 1,500 full-time, permanent economic officers, nearly 63 percent of whom are serving overseas. As of April 17, 2019, 13 Ambassadors nominated by this administration are in place in the Western Hemisphere. These include seven career individuals (Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname) and six non-career individuals (Dominican Republic, Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the U.S. Mission to the OAS). Seven nominees are currently pending in the Senate: one career individual (Ecuador), and six non-career individuals (Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Uruguay). I look to Congress to help us confirm these nominees so they can get to work serving our nation.

Question. The U.S. is currently about $750 million in arrears to U.N. peacekeeping. As a result, the U.N. is now facing a significant and growing cash crunch, and countries who provide troops to peacekeeping missions are not being fully reimbursed for their contributions, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. If these arrears are allowed to continue building, it is also likely that they will affect the operational effectiveness of the missions themselves, curtailing the ability of peacekeepers to deploy into the field and conduct patrols. Given that the U.S. does not contribute significant numbers of its own military personnel to U.N. missions, what kind of message does it send when we shortchange countries that do?

Answer. The administration has delivered a very clear message on U.S. financial contributions for U.N. peacekeeping: no single country should contribute more than 25 percent of total U.S. peacekeeping assessments. At that level, the United States is by far the largest contributor. Our contributions this financial year have been nearly $2 billion, which is nearly twice the amount paid by the next largest contributor and more than the total amount contributed by 185 countries combined. We continue to support peacekeeping through both our financial contributions and our bilateral assistance to troop- and police-contributing countries. At nearly $1.5 billion, we are the largest peacekeeping training and capacity-building partner in the world.
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Answer. The administration has delivered a very clear message on U.S. financial contributions for U.N. peacekeeping: no single country should contribute more than 25 percent of total U.N. peacekeeping assessments. At that level, the United States is by far the largest contributor. Our contributions this financial year have been nearly $2 billion, which is nearly twice the amount paid by the next largest contributor and more than the total amount contributed by 185 countries combined. We continue to support peacekeeping through both our financial contributions and our bilateral assistance to troop- and police-contributing countries. At nearly $1.5 billion, we are the largest peacekeeping training and capacity-building partner in the world.

Question. In FY 2018, the State Department withheld $18.9 million from its U.N. regular budget payments to express disapproval of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). OHCHR plays a critical role in advancing U.S. human rights priorities, which help raise international awareness of human rights violations, magnify the voices of human rights defenders and civil society organizations working on the ground, and serve as a useful tool for applying pressure to repressive governments. Your policy of withholding funding is especially confounding given that the State Department itself has publicly expressed support for the work of OHCHR. Recently one of your spokespersons noted, “The United States remains engaged in the work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . and strongly supports those special procedures and mandates that have proven effective in illuminating the most grave human rights environments, including in Iran and DPRK.” How do you account for the gap between your Department’s financial decisions on the one hand and statements of support for OHCHR on the other?

Answer. Following withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council in FY 2018, there was a decision to withhold assessed funding that was, in part, going to support human rights mandates and activities that do not advance U.S. national interests. At the same time, Department voluntary contributions have continued for those mandates and activities that do advance U.S. national interests. This approach ensures that Department funding aligns with national priorities.

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Answer. Following withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council in FY 2018, there was a decision to withhold assessed funding that was, in part, going to support human rights mandates and activities that do not advance U.S. national interests. At the same time, Department voluntary contributions have continued for those mandates and activities that do advance U.S. national interests. This approach ensures that Department funding aligns with national priorities.
RESPONSES OF HON. MIKE POMPEO TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN CARDIN

Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary consideration. I applaud the administration’s willingness to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the National Endowment for Democracy. How does this proposed budget reflect American values?

Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance, including rule of law, good governance, and anti-corruption programming are critical for defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. These programs help bring U.S. values to the forefront of the world stage. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY 2020 budget request reflects the administration’s priorities to advance these efforts while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. With the support of Congress, this budget will bring America’s international role into a new era and ensure we succeed in putting America first.

Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary consideration. I applaud the administration’s willingness to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the National Endowment for Democracy. How central do you view these issues as being to our foreign and national security policy and how is anticorruption factored into the State Department budget?

Answer. The President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) makes clear that respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is more likely to produce peace, stability, and prosperity at home and abroad, and is therefore integral to our foreign and national security policy. As a key part of these efforts, anti-corruption is prioritized in the President’s FY 2020 budget request for DRG assistance, which totals approximately $1.4 billion.

Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary consideration. I applaud the administration’s willingness to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the National Endowment for Democracy. My Combating Global Corruption Act, which I hope to reintroduce soon, would allow the U.S. to take stock of where our anti-corruption programming and could me most beneficial. Given how critical these issues are to the long-term success and sustainability of our global engagements, what and where are the trade-offs between being able to pursue good governance and other diplomatic or security considerations?

Answer. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY 2020 budget request reflects the administration’s priorities to advance peace and security, expand American influence, and address global crises while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget will allow us to advance our core mission and support our most critical foreign policy goals.

Question. Do DRL, INL, and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) have the staff resources they need to expeditiously research, vet, and apply sanctions?

Answer. Economic sanctions are a fundamental tool of diplomacy, and their use has increased exponentially with successive administrations. The Department works
hard to keep pace with the significant demand related to sanctions implementation.
I would welcome Congressional support for the resources for sanctions implementation
requested in the FY 2020 budget. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly 24,700 personnel, including staffing for DRL, INL and EB.

**Question.** I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary consideration. I applaud the administration’s willingness to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the National Endowment for Democracy. Given the violence and instability we see caused by autocratic regimes like Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Iran, what is the rationale for cutting these valuable programs?

**Answer.** While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY 2020 budget request reflects the administration’s priorities while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget will allow us to advance our core mission and support our most critical foreign policy goals.

**Question.** The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is an important human rights defending body within the Organization of American States (OAS). They enforce women and girls’ human rights to dignity, life, and freedom from violence. The IACHR has been instrumental in advancing the rights of survivors of domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual assault, and slavery. They give people a place they can turn to when their own justice systems have failed them. How will the administration’s proposed budget cuts to the OAS (15 percent below FY19 funding levels) affect IACHR’s ability to protect all Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere against human rights violations, particularly given concerning trends in Venezuela and Nicaragua?

**Answer.** The Department remains committed to supporting the efforts of IACHR in the promotion and defense of human rights throughout the Western Hemisphere. The potential practical impact on IACHR of the proposed reduction in the budget request for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS regular budget will depend in part on: (a) the amount of funds ultimately appropriated for that purpose; and (b) the amount of funds contained in the OAS budget for IACHR, as approved by the OAS General Assembly.

**Question.** How does your budget improve sanctions implementing offices at the State Department?

**Answer.** Diplomatic Programs resources support sanctions implementation efforts as follows: the Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation’s work on weapons of mass destruction; the Bureau of Counterterrorism’s work on counterterrorism; the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s work on narcotics and corruption; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s work on human rights; and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs’ administration of the majority (25 out of 30) of Department economic sanctions programs. I welcome Congressional support for the resources for staffing and sanctions implementation activities requested in the FY 2020 budget.

**Question.** The United States has been a leader for decades in promoting human rights and ensuring the protection of human rights defenders across the world. In accordance with this leadership, we’ve been gratified to see the Department’s use of Global Magnitsky designations to hold individuals and entities who commit serious human rights violations or who engage in acts of corruption accountable by freezing their assets and denying their visa requests to the United States. As a result, the government has named over 80 individuals and entities including Maung Maung Soe, the former Chief of Burma’s Western Army Command who has carried out genocidal attacks upon the Rohingya, and Jose Francisco (Lopez) Centeno, the President of Petronic, Nicaragua’s state-owned oil company, which has ties to the Venezuelan government and has supported Ortega’s corrupt regime. Do you support the use of Global Magnitsky designations as a tool of foreign policy in order to hold individuals and entities to account?

**Answer.** Yes. Global Magnitsky is a critical tool of foreign policy that has allowed this administration to promote accountability on a global scale in ways previously not possible. Since December 2017, the United States has taken action against 101 individuals and entities around the world under this designation. Global Magnitsky
is central to our effort to disrupt and deter serious human rights abuse and corruption on a global scale through the imposition of tangible and significant consequences on those who would engage in such behavior. You have my commitment to continue to support the active use of this tool.

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Answer. The close collaboration between Congress and the Department of State has been critical to the success of Global Magnitsky and I welcome continued Congressional support for this program, including additional resources.

Question. Last year the administration announced two $100 million funds to support faith-based organizations abroad—one focused on religious freedom, and the other focused on HIV prevention. This money should be bound by the Siljander amendment, which stipulates that all recipients of U.S. foreign assistance dollars neither lobby to restrict nor expand abortion access. Last week, you employed the Siljander amendment to cut funds to the Inter American Human Rights Commission under the (nebulous) pretense of their work to expand reproductive rights. Similarly, do you plan on ensuring that faith based (groups) abroad do not use their U.S. dollars to lobby to restrict abortion access?

Answer. The Department takes very seriously its obligation to ensure our activities are consistent with U.S. law, including the Siljander Amendment.

Question. This past May, you stated that the U.S. “firmly opposes criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination such as housing, employment and government services directed against LGBTI persons.” You went on to say that the U.S. uses “public and private diplomacy to raise human rights concerns, provide emergency assistance to people at risk, and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions against those who persecute them.” Do you stand by these remarks?

Answer. Yes.

Question. This past May, you stated that the U.S. “firmly opposes criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination such as housing, employment and government services directed against LGBTI persons.” You went on to say that the U.S. uses “public and private diplomacy to raise human rights concerns, provide emergency assistance to people at risk, and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions against those who persecute them.” Furthermore, this past year at the Commission of the Status of Women, the U.S. has continuously pushed a binary definition of gender that is tantamount to erasing the rights of trans people. How do you reconcile this with your prior statements on LGBTI rights?

Answer. Under my leadership, the Department continues to work to protect and defend human rights for all—including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons. No one should face violence, criminalization, or serious forms of discrimination because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.

Question. In countries around the world, there are criminal penalties associated with exercising sexual and reproductive health and rights. LGBTQ people are criminalized for who they love and are regularly prosecuted or incarcerated for consensual same sex sexual conduct in places like Indonesia, Chechnya, and Egypt. There are also women who are in jail in places like El Salvador and Senegal for having miscarriages or abortions. Do you plan on instructing DRL to report on LGBTI rights and access to sexual and reproductive health services in the Human Rights Report?

Answer. The State Department reports on the violence, criminalization, and severe discrimination that LGBTI persons face in many parts of the world. The Reproductive Rights subsection of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices was
renamed Coercion in Population Control in accordance with the requirement of U.S.

law that we report on “wherever applicable, practices regarding coercion in popu-

lation control, including coerced abortion and involuntary sterilization.” Additional

material on maternal mortality, contraception, and similar issues is available via

hyperlink in the text of each country chapter and in an appendix to the Reports.

**Question.** Implicit in the right to reproductive health is the right of men, women,

and LGBTI people to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable,

and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice. Nevertheless, this admin-

istration has undermined women, girls, and LGBTI peoples’ rights to sexual and re-

productive health services through the imposition, and the recent expansion, of the

global gag rule. This has had the effect of shutting down health care clinics globally,

which has particularly acute affects in the aftermath of humanitarian disasters and

in places where rape is being used as a tool of war. How do you plan on meeting

our global commitments given the ways the administration has worked to repeat-

edly restrict women and girls’ rights to access care?

**Answer.** This administration will do all it can to protect and respect the sanctity

of life all across the globe. As the world’s largest bilateral donor to global health

programs, the United States remains committed to helping women and their chil-

dren thrive. In the 6-month review of the Protecting Life in Global Health Assist-

ance (PLGHA) policy, we found that less than one percent of prime partners had

declined to agree to the PLGHA term in their awards. In those instances, State and

USAID have worked to minimize any potential changes in services. The Mexico City

Policy does not change overall funding levels, nor does the Secretary’s recent an-

nouncement.

**Question.** Implicit in the right to reproductive health is the right of men, women,

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productive health services through the imposition, and the recent expansion, of the

global gag rule. This has had the effect of shutting down health care clinics globally,

which has particularly acute affects in the aftermath of humanitarian disasters and

in places where rape is being used as a tool of war. In addition, the recent an-

nouncement that dollars from the international community—including U.S. founda-

tions—will now be prohibited from moving through gagged organizations to non-

gagged organization presents a serious speech restriction on U.S. organizations, who

now find their independent money bound by a regressive restriction on their spend-

ing. How to you reconcile these gags on speech with the responsibility of the Sec-

retary to promote free expression and assembly through its work, and the constitu-

tional rights of American foundations?

**Answer.** The policy’s restrictions only apply to foreign NGOs that receive U.S.

funding for global health assistance. I am confident we can continue to work with

NGO partners to meet our critical global health goals while preventing U.S. tax-
payer dollars from subsidizing abortion. We will continue to work closely with our

partners to ensure they understand how to comply with the policy.

**Question.** You have personally questioned the scientific consensus that human ac-
tivity is changing the climate and strongly opposed the Paris Agreement. During

your Senate confirmation hearing for CIA Director, you stated that the notion of cli-

mate change as a top national security threat was “ignorant, dangerous, and abso-
lutely unbelievable.” Yet scientists believe that there are just 12 years to take bold

action on climate change before its most catastrophic effects are irreversible. Do you

still believe that climate change is not a top national security threat?

**Answer.** The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Commu-
nity identifies the impacts of climate change, among other factors, as likely to fuel

economic and social discontent and notes that extreme weather events in a warmer

world have the potential for greater impacts. In accordance with this assessment,

we continue to work to engage foreign governments and the private sector to ad-

dress these challenges.

**Question.** The conflicts in both Syria and Yemen are just two recent examples

where climate change that has driven desertification and resource competition has

led to conflict or made it worse. Do you disagree that it is in the United States inter-
est to address the underlying causes of conflict, including climate change, through

nonmilitary means?

**Answer.** Addressing the underlying causes of conflict through nonmilitary means

remains a priority. The United States does this in many ways, including through
continued support to enhance resilience and reduce disaster risk in partner countries around the world.

**Question.** Do you disagree with the Department of Defense that climate change is “a threat multiplier” and thus a key national security challenge?

**Answer.** The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies the impacts of climate change, among other factors, as likely to fuel economic and social discontent and notes that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts. We continue to work to engage foreign governments and the private sector to address these challenges.

**Question.** Do you disagree with me that bold, multilateral action, such as the Paris Climate Accord and beyond, is required to prevent the worst effects of climate change from harming our planet and the United States should be leading the charge both abroad and here at home?

**Answer.** The United States will maintain its leadership and influence through our diplomatic and development activities regardless of our position on the Paris Agreement. We also will continue to advance and protect U.S. interests, working with other countries to help drive innovation and market-friendly solutions, so that our efforts to protect the environment and grow our economy are mutually supportive.

**Question.** Please provide additional details on the administration’s proposed “Diplomatic Progress Fund.” How, under current law, would entities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip be eligible to receive U.S. assistance?

**Answer.** The Diplomatic Progress Fund will enable the U.S. to provide assistance where diplomatic breakthroughs present an opportunity to advance U.S. interests, including in support of diplomatic efforts such as the administration’s plan for a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The administration continues to support existing restrictions on U.S. assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA) that seek to end the abhorrent practice of PA payments to imprisoned terrorists and the families of terrorists, including through the Taylor Force Act and the prisoner payments’ reductions included in the annual appropriations acts.

**Question.** On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. Do you believe that the gross human rights violations that took place in 2017—in which over 700,000 fled persecution, when the Rohingya were raped, tortured, burned and killed for who they were—constitute genocide and crimes against humanity?

**Answer.** I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military’s extensive, horrific human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya and the need for accountability. Determinations that certain acts may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing are not made in all cases in which such acts may have been committed; they depend on our assessment of the facts and consequences of such determinations in each context. To establish a comprehensive understanding of the human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State, the Department supported a large-scale documentation project in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The report clarified the extent and severity of the abuses, and the underlying information and findings will help inform our decisions as we seek accountability in Burma.

**Question.** On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. What additional measures would you recommend the U.S. take to address allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes?

**Answer.** Since August 2017, the United States has sanctioned five Burmese generals and two Burmese military units for committing gross violations of human rights. I will continue to consider the utility of all bilateral and multilateral policy
tools at our disposal, including sanctions, for further accountability. I will also continue U.S. support for Burma’s transition to a civilian-led democracy. Further, we will continue to work closely with the U.N. and regional partners to support U.N. mechanisms, including the International Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, and the U.N. Special Envoy and press the Government of Burma to grant such mechanisms unhindered access.

**Question.** On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. What additional measures would you recommend the international community take? Would you recommend, for example, collaboration to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Burmese military officials who aided, participated in, or were otherwise implicated in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Burma?

**Answer.** The United States was the first country to sanction a Burmese military officer after the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in 2017. We supported the U.N. fact-finding mission and continue to support its successor, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). We also continue to support the mandates of the U.N. Special Envoy to Myanmar and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Myanmar and co-sponsored the U.N. General Assembly resolution on human rights in Burma in 2018. We will continue to consider additional multilateral actions as appropriate and will continue to call for accountability for Burmese security forces and for the establishment of civilian control of the military.

**Question.** On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. How does your proposed budget adequately address the humanitarian crisis facing Rohingya and other minority groups who are internally displaced or have fled to Bangladesh, Thailand, and elsewhere in the region?

**Answer.** The United States has led the donor response since the current Rakhine State crisis began in August 2017. We have provided more than $494 million in humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh and Burma in response to the crisis. The President’s FY 2020 budget request includes plans for continued U.S. leadership in the humanitarian response, as well as to support the humanitarian needs of long-standing displaced Burmese elsewhere in the region.

**Question.** On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. Additionally, given that the most effective way to permanently resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis is by restoring their citizenship in Burma and ensuring safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation process, how do you propose employing the Department’s resources to resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis in a more permanent manner?

**Answer.** Supporting the Burmese government’s stated commitment to facilitate the return of Rohingya is currently the best avenue to ensure that the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from northern Rakhine State does not become permanent. The United States has consistently urged Bangladesh and Burma to involve the United Nations in the repatriation process while emphasizing that any returns of refugees must be fully voluntary, safe, and dignified. And we continue to press Burma to implement the recommendations of the Annan Commission to address root causes and uphold the human rights of Rohingya.
**Question.** How can the U.S. better communicate with our allies in the future, particularly on decisions including whether to reduce or withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan?

**Answer.** We have an ongoing dialogue with NATO regarding the future of our shared mission in Afghanistan and our ongoing efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement that will ensure Afghanistan is never again a platform for international terrorism. At the April 3–4 NATO foreign ministerial, I personally updated our NATO Allies and partners on the work of Ambassador Khalilzad. Since December 2018, Ambassador Khalilzad has visited NATO headquarters for three rounds of consultations and briefed the North Atlantic Council on another occasion via video teleconference.

**Question.** How can the U.S. play a role in facilitating post-conflict peacebuilding, including encouraging investigations into and accountability for allegations of war crimes?

**Answer.** The United States supports accountability for the deliberate killing of civilians and other serious crimes in Afghanistan. We will continue to encourage the Afghan government to further reform the justice sector, promote the rule of law, and hold accountable those responsible for serious crimes in the country.

**Question.** In December 2018, President Trump announced that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria; however, U.S. officials state that troops will redeploy by summer 2019. Recent testimony from U.S. Central Command Commander Gen. Joseph Votel states that approximately 1,500 IS fighters have been confined to a 20 square mile area of the Euphrates River valley in Syria near the border with Iraq. Meanwhile, the administration has not requested any bilateral foreign assistance for programs in Syria for FY 2020. What is your assessment of the December decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and what impact does this decision have on the broader perception of U.S. interest and engagement in the Middle East?

**Answer.** While we have completed the territorial defeat of ISIS, the group remains a determined enemy. We are therefore keeping a residual force in Syria as part of the continued Defeat-ISIS Coalition mission, helping to root out ISIS remnants and prevent the group from regaining momentum. Our policy objectives remain: (1) the enduring defeat of ISIS; (2) a lasting political solution in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254; and (3) removing all Iranian-commanded forces from Syria. We are also continuing to counter destabilizing activities by Russia, including efforts to press countries to normalize ties with the Assad regime and force refugees and internally displaced persons to return home before it is safe to do so.

**Question.** In December 2018, President Trump announced that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria; however, U.S. officials state that troops will redeploy by summer 2019. Recent testimony from U.S. Central Command Commander Gen. Joseph Votel states that approximately 1,500 IS fighters have been confined to a 20 square mile area of the Euphrates River valley in Syria near the border with Iraq. Meanwhile, the administration has not requested any bilateral foreign assistance for programs in Syria for FY 2020. How does the budget request reflect the administration’s stance on bilateral foreign assistance? Can you comment on the decision to allocate 91 percent of total bilateral aid requested for the MENA region to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan over countries like Syria?

**Answer.** The FY 2020 request prioritizes funding for Israel and Jordan at the levels set by our respective MOUs with these two key regional allies. We also remain deeply committed to our relationship with Egypt and Egypt’s security and stability. Foreign assistance is important to the bilateral relationship and to helping Egypt address threats to its national security. U.S. policy priorities in Syria remain unchanged. We are committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and al-Qa’ida, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-led forces in Syria.

**Question.** The State Department’s FY 2020 budget justification states that, “The role and size of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will likely increase somewhat, in order to appropriately respond to the severe security and humanitarian situation and to support the fledgling commitment from South Sudanese parties to engage in peace processes.” Nevertheless, that same document requests a nearly one-third cut in U.S. funding for the mission. If the administration does, as your own department suggests, plan to vote for an expansion of UNMISS on the Security Council, what rational basis is there for underfunding it?

**Answer.** U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), are effective mechanisms to address global challenges to international peace and security. However, the U.N. needs to complete reforms to achieve
more efficient operations, and other U.N. member countries must assume more of the financial burden. The United States is focused on supporting Secretary-General Guterres’ peacekeeping reform efforts and is working with U.N. member states to create a “culture of performance” in U.N. peacekeeping. Doing so will improve U.N. operations and ensure U.S. taxpayer resources are used in the most cost-effective manner.

**Question.** What are the specific actions that the Department will take to support a vibrant and active civil society in Guatemala, particularly because this is so tied to regional stability and migration?

**Answer.** The Department of State, under my leadership, is committed to supporting a vibrant and active civil society in Guatemala. We will encourage increased protections for civil society organizations and promote their vital role in a healthy democracy. We will engage Guatemalan officials and use the Department’s media platforms in an effort to limit restrictions on civil society and promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.

**Question.** Particularly given your recent unvetted and ill-advised decision to cut funding from Guatemala and other Northern Triangle countries, how do you intend to ensure regional stability without this funding?

**Answer.** The Department wants to see a safe and prosperous Northern Triangle where citizens do not flee their countries but instead choose to stay and contribute to their counties’ growth. We are actively engaging the Northern Triangle governments on additional steps they can take to improve border security; combat migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, especially related to children; receive returned citizens; and dissuade illegal immigration. Likewise, we continue urging these governments to make needed reforms to improve citizen security and economic growth, attract foreign investment to create jobs, and address corruption and impunity by strengthening governance and judicial capacity to increase accountability and deter crime.

**Question.** Do you agree that CICIG has contributed significantly to combating the culture of impunity and corruption in Guatemala in the last 12 years?

**Answer.** We have focused our efforts in Guatemala on developing Guatemala’s ability to combat corruption and impunity and exercise the rule of law. The Department has sought a reformed CICIG with greater transparency and accountability in order to ensure the investigative and prosecutorial capacity can be effectively transferred from CICIG to Guatemalan institutions. We continue to support efforts that will build the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight corruption and impunity.

**Question.** Do you pledge to support the continued work of CICIG, or other justice and anti-corruption mechanisms, in Guatemala through designated U.S. funding?

**Answer.** CICIG’s presence depended on the consent of the Guatemalan government and in September 2019, CICIG’s current mandate is set to expire. We will however, continue to support efforts that will build the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight corruption and impunity.

**Question.** Will you raise concerns about Morales’s attacks on CICIG or other mechanisms and support foreign policy measures to defend these bodies?

**Answer.** I believe firmly that the rule of law, reducing corruption, and ending impunity are essential to ensuring security, governance, and prosperity, not only in Guatemala but throughout the region and the world. The Department, under my leadership, continues to publicly support the rule of law, strong democratic institutions, and efforts to address endemic corruption and impunity, which threaten Guatemala’s future economic security and stability. We continue to support efforts that will build the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight corruption and impunity.

**Question.** The State Department’s 2018 Human Rights Report says that the “judicial system [in Guatemala] generally failed to provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses.” Additionally, Guatemala’s Congress is attempting to pass an amnesty legislation that will terminate all ongoing justice proceedings, free all military officials and guerrilla leaders already convicted, and bar all future investigations into international crimes including genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity during the country’s 36-year civil war. How do you propose DRL should support the thousands of victims who still have pending legal cases against army generals, security forces and former presidents for disappearances, torture, and extermination of whole villages?

**Answer.** I am deeply concerned about the proposed amendments to the national reconciliation law and criminal code in Guatemala. The trials held in Guatemala to
date for crimes related to human rights violations and abuses have restored dignity to the victims’ surviving families and fostered increased trust in state institutions. I remain committed to supporting Guatemalan institutions and the Guatemalan people in their ongoing fight against corruption and impunity. My staff, including DRL, will continue to monitor closely and engage with stakeholders in judicial processes and ensure we continue to promote the rule of law and truth and accountability for human rights violations.

Question. The State Department’s 2018 Human Rights Report says that the “judicial system [in Guatemala] generally failed to provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses.” Additionally, Guatemala’s Congress is attempting to pass an amnesty legislation that will terminate all ongoing justice proceedings, free all military officials and guerrilla leaders already convicted, and bar all future investigations into international crimes including genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity during the country’s 36-year civil war. What role do you believe DRL can play in strengthening the rule of law in Guatemala?

Answer. I am deeply concerned about the challenges facing the Guatemalan judicial system and the proposed amendments to the national reconciliation law and criminal code in Guatemala. I remain committed to supporting Guatemalan rule of law institutions and the Guatemalan people in their ongoing fight against crime, corruption, and impunity. DRL’s role, in coordination with other bureaus, is to engage with civil society stakeholders, closely monitor judicial processes, implement visa restrictions and sanctions on individuals who violate human rights, and ensure we continue to call out corruption or abuse that undermines the rule of law.

Question. The State Department’s 2018 Human Rights Report states that 158 cases of criminalization were filed against human rights defenders through August, over 300 attacks against human rights defenders occurred through September, and 24 human rights defenders were killed through October of last year. What concrete measures will you take to protect those individuals who are on the frontlines of defending human rights in Guatemala?

Answer. Under my leadership, the Department of State is committed to promoting and protecting civil society in Guatemala. We will encourage increased protections for human rights defenders and promote their vital role in a healthy democracy. We will engage Guatemalan officials to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law and use the Department’s media platforms in an effort to end impunity for threats and violence against human rights defenders.

Question. On April 9, Senator Blunt and I introduced a resolution commemorating the U.S.-Colombia strategic partnership and relaunched the Atlantic Council’s Colombia Task Force. At great cost and sacrifice, Colombians have worked to partner with the U.S. in Colombia and elsewhere to fight armed groups, halt narcotics trafficking, and help stabilize the region. They now face the added challenge of a crisis next door in Venezuela and more than a million Venezuelans who are now in Colombia. How does the administration plan to help Colombia address the Venezuela crisis without detracting from Colombia’s own efforts to consolidate peace and security?

Answer. The USG has committed nearly $130 million in aid to respond to the influx of Venezuelans in Colombia since FY 2017, including $37.1 million in development assistance and $91 million in humanitarian assistance. This funding supports Colombia’s efforts to assist Venezuelan migrants and refugees and the communities that accept them. In addition to this support, the FY 2019 appropriation includes $418.3 million in bilateral assistance for Colombia. This includes robust support for priorities such as our joint goal to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine production by 50 percent by the end of 2023, as well as peace implementation.

Question. Part of the success of Plan Colombia was that it balanced counter-narcotics and security assistance with support for development, governance, and human rights to address the root causes of conflict and crime in the country. Why does the administration plan to cut more than $80 million dollars in economic support and development funding to Colombia at this critical moment?

Answer. We strongly support Colombia’s efforts to secure a lasting peace and address root causes of conflict and appreciate Congressional support for this critical bilateral relationship. U.S. foreign assistance advances shared goals on security, rural economic development, good governance, and human rights. The FY 2020 request for Colombia reflects the administration’s focus on advancing bilateral priorities, including on counternarcotics and peace implementation. Building on effective prior-year programs, U.S. assistance will focus on: (1) security, including counter-
narcotics and reintegration of ex-combatants; (2) expansion of state presence in conflict-affected areas; and (3) justice and other support to the Colombian government for victims.

Question. We have seen the importance of engaging the Caribbean as related to the Venezuela crisis, narcotics trafficking and migration, and votes in the U.N. and OAS. Does the administration have a strategy to more effectively engage with Caribbean nations?

Answer. The Trump administration has made the strengthening of relations with the Caribbean a priority for the reasons you outline. On April 12, Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan plans to hold a ministerial with 18 Caribbean countries to launch a new “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership” to build upon our Caribbean 2020 strategy and increase our engagement with this important region. This ministerial follows President Trump’s March 22 engagement at Mar-a-Lago with the leaders of the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia. We continue to implement Congressional directives and build stronger disaster resilience, energy, and security ties through the American Crece Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

Question. We have seen the importance of engaging the Caribbean as related to the Venezuela crisis, narcotics trafficking and migration, and votes in the U.N. and OAS. The President’s budget proposes zeroing out assistance to the Eastern Caribbean, the Dominican Republic, and the USAID Caribbean development program. What effects will that have on Caribbean countries’ ability to respond to these challenges or support U.S. positions in the U.N. or OAS?

Answer. The Trump administration has made stronger relations with the Caribbean a priority for the reasons you outline. The FY 2020 request for the Caribbean prioritizes U.S. foreign assistance that supports key counternarcotics, anti-trafficking, crime and violence prevention, and other security cooperation programs. The request includes $4.4 million in bilateral assistance for the Caribbean, including $600,000 for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean and $500,000 for the Dominican Republic. It also includes $40.2 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which supports critical efforts to develop the region’s judicial and police capacity. This assistance directly responds to key needs identified by Caribbean nations.

RESPONSES OF HON. MIKE POMPEO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Question. On March 28, 2019 you met with Prince Khalid bin Salman, now Saudi Arabia’s deputy defense minister, at the State Department. During the time of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, he was Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the United States. According to the CIA’s assessment, Prince Khalid helped persuade Khashoggi to visit the Saudi consulate in Istanbul where he was killed and dismembered. He also lied to Members of this body about Khashoggi’s murder and then left the country. Do you believe the CIA’s assessment that Prince Khalid bin Salman had a role in the murder? Do you think it is appropriate to meet individuals involved in Khashoggi’s murder at State Department headquarters? What message does this send about the administration’s intent to hold those responsible accountable?

Answer. I have been clear that Saudi Arabia must hold accountable every individual implicated in the horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi, including high-ranking members of the Saudi government. I have pressed senior Saudi leadership, including the King, Crown Prince, and Khalid bin Salman, on this point. I cannot characterize or discuss intelligence matters in this forum.

Question. IAEA Director Amano has said that Saudi Arabia has not given the IAEA a clear answer on its nuclear intentions. Amano recently told reporters that, “They didn’t say no. They didn’t say yes, and they are now giving it thought. This is where we stand now.” You have been categorical that you will not permit Saudi Arabia to become a nuclear power. Has Saudi Arabia given you a clear answer on its nuclear intentions and what was your response?

Answer. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA. It has committed to an obligation never to acquire nuclear weapons and to apply IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. We have been clear that we attach great importance to Saudi Arabia’s continued implementation of these obligations.

Question. During the hearing, you committed to telling me when the Department of State concurred in a decision to grant a Part 810 authorization for a U.S. com-
pany to conduct work in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, you committed to telling me the dates of when the State Department concurred in a decision to allow a Part 810 authorization for Saudi Arabia to be kept secret. Who in the Department provided this concurrence? Were any of these concurrences after October 2, 2018?

Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation oversaw the State Department’s review of Saudi Arabia-related Part 810 applications from November 2017 to March 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or reactors, as a 123 agreement does, but rather merely authorize the transfer of nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and data. The State Department is not involved in determining whether information in the authorization is protected from public disclosure; I refer you to the Department of Energy for such issues.

Question. Is it an administration priority for Saudi Arabia to repeal the guardianship rules that prevent women from owning property, opening a business, or traveling out of the country without explicit permission from a male family member? Please detail your efforts and engagements to date on this front with Saudi officials. What, if any, progress have you made because of these efforts and engagements?

Answer. The State Department’s most recent Human Rights Report on Saudi Arabia documents significant restrictions on freedom of expression and civil society, as well as ongoing discrimination through mechanisms such as guardianship rules. While the administration welcomes many of the positive reforms underway in the Kingdom to expand opportunities for women, we have consistently told Saudi leadership that repressive policies threaten to undermine the very progress it seeks to achieve.

Question. President Trump has repeatedly touted his early opposition to the Iraq War. In 2016, he said, “I was totally against the war in Iraq.” During his recent State of the Union address, he also said, “Great nations do not fight endless wars.” In Cairo in January of this year, you said that “[t]oday in Iraq, at the government’s invitation, we have approximately 5,000 troops where there were once 166,000,” and further that “when we do set up major bases . . . it’s at the invitation of the host country.” Also in January, CENTCOM Commander General Votel gave testimony before SASC noting that U.S. forces are in Iraq “at the invitation of the Government of Iraq.” Do you agree that the Government of Iraq—a democratically elected, sovereign Government—is now a partner and that U.S. forces are there at their invitation to combat ISIS?

Answer. Yes, the United States and Iraq are partners, and U.S. forces are in Iraq at the Government of Iraq’s invitation. President Barham Saleh, PM Adel Abd al-Mahdi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbusi publicly support the U.S. and Coalition troop presence in Iraq. They have affirmed in their statements that U.S. forces are in Iraq at the Government of Iraq’s invitation to advise and assist Iraq with counter-terrorism and the fight against ISIS. We look forward to continuing to partner with the Government of Iraq to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS.

Question. President Trump has repeatedly touted his early opposition to the Iraq War. In 2016, he said, “I was totally against the war in Iraq.” During his recent State of the Union address, he also said, “Great nations do not fight endless wars.” In Cairo in January of this year, you said that “[t]oday in Iraq, at the government’s invitation, we have approximately 5,000 troops where there were once 166,000,” and further that “when we do set up major bases . . . it’s at the invitation of the host country.” Also in January, CENTCOM Commander General Votel gave testimony before SASC noting that U.S. forces are in Iraq “at the invitation of the Government of Iraq.” Do you think it reflects the current state of our bilateral relationship to have not one, but two, open war authorizations against Iraq?

Answer. The United States and Iraq are partners and have a relationship characterized by friendship and cooperation, as reflected in the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the United States and the Republic of Iraq. The authorizations for use of military force do not determine the character of our relationship with the Government of Iraq.

Question. Do you support repeal of the 1991 AUMF for the Gulf War?

Answer. The administration is not seeking any changes to existing authorizations for the use of military force.
Question. Is the administration relying upon the 2002 AUMF—which was a war declaration against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein—as the sole legal authority for any U.S. military operations in Iraq or elsewhere (not just as reinforcing actions taken under the 2001 AUMF)?

Answer. The administration relies upon the 2002 AUMF for certain operations against ISIS but relies in those cases upon the 2001 AUMF as well. We do not believe it would be prudent to terminate the 2002 AUMF without making it clear that counter-ISIS operations continue.

Question. Do you agree that the administration should only support a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the Palestinians have full and equal rights to those of the Israelis?

Answer. This administration continues to work toward a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians that offers a brighter future for all. We have made it clear that, ultimately, it will be up to the parties to decide if and how to move forward. As the President has said, he is open to any solution the two parties find acceptable.

Question. Do you commit that any change in the status of sovereignty over any piece of Palestinian territory will take place in the framework of a final resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict agreed upon by both sides?

Answer. As the President has said, he is open to any solution the two parties find acceptable. This administration intends to release its own vision for peace between Israel and the Palestinians that offers a brighter future for all. Ultimately, it will be up to the parties to decide if and how to move forward.

Question. What is the administration’s position on Israeli settlements, including new settlements, outposts and the expansion of the land covered by existing settlements? Does the administration believe that continued settlement activity is illegal under international law?

Answer. The administration has stated that while the existence of settlements is not in itself an impediment to peace, further unrestrained settlement activity does not help advance peace. The Israeli government has made clear that going forward, its intent is to adopt a policy regarding settlement activity that takes the President’s concerns into consideration. We welcome this.

Question. Does the administration view its recognition of Israeli claims of sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with U.S. treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter? Specifically, does the administration view Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with its treaty obligation to “refrain in [its] international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” under Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter? If so, how so?

Answer. The administration has made clear it, like all administrations before it, supports negotiations towards a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. This administration is willing to acknowledge the reality that there can be no comprehensive peace agreement that does not satisfactorily address Israel’s security needs in the Golan Heights. The President’s statement on the Golan reflects his understanding of the unique circumstances that makes it appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty at this time. The Golan is an area vital to Israel’s national security. Our policy continues to be that no country can change the borders of another by force.

Question. Does the administration view Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 497 and Israel’s related treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter? If so, how so?

Answer. The administration has made clear it, like all administrations before it, supports negotiations towards a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. This administration is willing to acknowledge the reality that there can be no comprehensive peace agreement that does not satisfactorily address Israel’s security needs in the Golan Heights. The President’s statement on the Golan reflects his understanding of the unique circumstances that makes it appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty at this time. The Golan is an area vital to Israel’s national security.

Question. Does the administration view Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with its treaty obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention, most specifically Art. 47? If so, how so?
Answer: We expect all states, including our partners and allies, to comply with their international legal obligations. I would refer you to the Government of Israel for questions regarding Israel's treaty obligations.

Question. Does the administration view its recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with its obligation under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to "ensure respect for the [Geneva Conventions] in all circumstances?" If so, how so?

Answer. The United States does not interpret Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to require Parties to police the conduct of other states.

Question. Does the United States continue to view the prohibition on "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" articulated in Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a binding obligation on U.N. member states under international law? Does the United States view its recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights as fitting within a legal exception to this obligation? If so, what is the legal basis and scope of this exception?

Answer. There has been no change in U.S. policy in this regard. Our policy continues to be that no country can change the borders of another by force.

Question. There has been strong condemnation from you, Ambassador Brownback, and Vice President Pence regarding China's crackdown on the civil and religious liberties of Uighurs in the Xinjiang region of China. However, Congress has received little information as to what has been discussed—if at all—in diplomatic conversations with the Chinese about Americans with relatives missing, including family members of six journalists (all Virginia residents) working for taxpayer-funded Radio Free Asia. These individuals were specifically targeted for their work in exposing abuses by the Chinese government. Could you describe in detail the inquiries and efforts regarding these individuals—beyond public statements—and whether the administration is raising these cases with Chinese officials at every opportunity, such as in recent trade talks?

Answer. I share your concerns about China's highly repressive campaign in Xinjiang. The Department has regularly raised the case of the Radio Free Asia (RFA) journalists with Chinese counterparts. In 2018, then-Spokesperson Heather Nauert met with the RFA reporters to hear about their families. Department officials, including myself, have met with Uighur residents in the United States to gather information about conditions in Xinjiang. We continue to raise these cases with Beijing and insist China provide information about the locations and medical conditions of those detained and immediately release them and all those arbitrarily detained.

Question. Are you concerned that Vietnam's overall trajectory on human rights is moving in the wrong direction?

Answer. Yes. While we have seen some positive steps on human rights in Vietnam over the past few years—including increased recognition of religious organizations and limited legal reforms—we are deeply concerned by the growing trend of arrests, convictions, and harsh sentences of peaceful activists and members of religious communities, as well as increased restrictions on free expression, peaceful assembly, and association. We regularly raise our human rights concerns with Vietnam and will continue to urge that they reverse the current trend.

Question. What steps has the administration taken to hold Vietnam accountable for its failure to meet international norms for human rights?

Answer. We have repeatedly called on Vietnam to release all prisoners of conscience immediately, and to allow all individuals in Vietnam to peacefully express their political views and exercise their freedom of religion without fear of government retribution. We have also urged the Vietnamese government to bring its actions and laws, including the Penal Code and new Law on Cybersecurity, into compliance with the human rights provisions of Vietnam's Constitution and Vietnam's international obligations and commitments. We continue to raise human rights issues with Vietnam at all levels and will do so at our upcoming annual human rights dialogue, which will be held in Hanoi, in May.

Question. President Trump has met with Vietnamese leaders several times since 2017—has he discussed human rights issues with senior members of the Vietnamese Community Party?

Answer. During his most recent visit, President Trump recognized the importance of protecting and promoting human rights in Vietnam, as affirmed in U.S.-Vietnam joint statements. President Trump and Vietnamese leaders have supported the
frank discussion of human rights, including during the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue. The administration continues to make clear to Vietnam that the bilateral relationship cannot reach its fullest potential absent progress on human rights.

**Question.** Will the U.S. continue to deepen its military ties with Vietnam if the human rights situation in the country continues to deteriorate?

**Answer.** Our goal is to support the development of a strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam that contributes to international security; engages in free, fair, and reciprocal trade; and respects human rights and the rule of law. We have made it clear to Vietnam that only through sustained progress on human rights can the U.S.-Vietnam partnership reach its fullest potential.

**Question.** In FY 2018, we provided $9 million in ESF funding to the Organization for American States. OAS funding was zeroed out in the administration's FY 2019 and FY 2020 budget requests. On March 26, you announced the U.S. would cut $210,000 in funding to the OAS. You had recently received a letter from nine Republican Senators calling attention to statements and actions of OAS organs including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Women. The Senators expressed concern that the Siljander Amendment, which bars the use of federal funds appropriated under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act from being used to lobby for or against abortion, is not being properly enforced by the State Department. The Senators asked you to stop funding OAS organs that they believe are lobbying in support of abortion until they are in compliance with the Siljander Amendment. Describe in detail the Department’s process for evaluating compliance with the Siljander Amendment.

**Answer.** Due to concerns regarding certain Inter-American Commission on Human Rights activities related to abortion, the Department undertook a review of foreign assistance funding provided to OAS. Because of concerns regarding these activities, the Department is withholding part of the FY 2019 U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS regular budget in an amount equivalent to the U.S. proportional share of possible OAS costs of the activities.

**Question.** In FY 2018, we provided $9 million in ESF funding to the Organization for American States. OAS funding was zeroed out in the administration's FY 2019 and FY 2020 budget requests. On March 26, you announced the U.S. would cut $210,000 in funding to the OAS. You had recently received a letter from nine Republican Senators calling attention to statements and actions of OAS organs including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Women. The Senators expressed concern that the Siljander Amendment, which bars the use of federal funds appropriated under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act from being used to lobby for or against abortion, is not being properly enforced by the State Department. The Senators asked you to stop funding OAS organs that they believe are lobbying in support of abortion until they are in compliance with the Siljander Amendment. Provide all evidence used to justify immediate funding reductions for these entities. Describe efforts undertaken to ensure that organs actively lobbying against abortion are in compliance with the Siljander Amendment.

**Answer.** Due to concerns regarding certain Inter-American Commission on Human Rights activities related to abortion, the Department is withholding part of the FY 2019 U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS regular budget in an amount equivalent to the U.S. proportional share of possible OAS costs of the activities.

**Question.** In your comments on the reduction of funding, you suggested that the OAS “should be focused on addressing crises in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, not advancing the pro-abortion cause.” The OAS has been a critical partner for the bi-partisan U.S. support of political transition in Venezuela. Our partnership with the OAS and the Lima Group gives regional legitimacy and credibility to support for Interim President Guaido and to sanctions on Maduro and his inner circle. Please provide examples of ways in which the OAS has not been focused on addressing the crisis in Venezuela.

**Answer.** We are greatly satisfied with the OAS response in addressing the crisis in Venezuela. The OAS remains fully focused on this issue and continues to demonstrate strong and determined leadership in advancing our joint regional efforts in support of the legitimate government of interim President Juan Guaido and the restoration of Venezuelan democracy, including recognizing Gustavo Tarre as the new Venezuelan government’s representative. The United States remains committed to...
supporting the vital work of the OAS as the premier political multilateral institution committed to the promotion and defense of democracy in the region consistent with the principles and values articulated in the OAS Charter and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

**Question.** In your comments on the reduction of funding, you suggested that the OAS “should be focused on addressing crises in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, not advancing the pro-abortion cause.” The OAS has been a critical partner for the bipartisan U.S. support of political transition in Venezuela. Our partnership with the OAS and the Lima Group gives regional legitimacy and credibility to support for Interim President Guaido and to sanctions on Maduro and his inner circle. Please explain the why ESF was zeroed out for the OAS in the administration’s FY20 budget request. Please detail (fiscal year and account) where the $210,000 cuts will come from and any plans to redirect that funding.

**Answer.** The Department did not request ESF funding for OAS in the FY 2020 request consistent with prior-year budget requests, including by previous administrations, which did not specify ESF funding for OAS. The $210,000 withholding is from FY 2019 funds in the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account that are available for the assessed contribution to the OAS regular budget. No decision has been made at this time on allocation of the CIO funds withheld from OAS.

**Question.** What is the status of “Phase II” discussions between the U.S. and Sudan in light of the ongoing political transition? Will the U.S. attempt to revive these discussions under a transitional or future government?

**Answer.** We are assessing the best way forward on Phase II engagement. We will continue to calibrate our Sudan policy based on our assessment of events on the ground.

**Question.** How will the departure of President Bashir affect discussions over Sudan’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terror?

**Answer.** Sudan remains designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), and a number of foreign assistance and other restrictions remain in place. Before rescission of Sudan’s designation as an SST will be considered, the United States must determine Sudan has made sufficient progress on areas of mutual concern and meets all relevant statutory criteria for SST rescission. We will continue to calibrate our policies based on our assessment of events on the ground.

**Question.** The government of Kenya recently announced plans to close Dadaab refugee camp, which houses over 230,000 refugees, most Somali, despite the Kenyan High Court standing ruling prohibiting this action. I am concerned that the administration’s drastic reduction in the refugee cap, coupled with “extreme vetting” procedures, have prevented us from being a steadfast partner to Kenya and other African nations who host large refugee populations, and have contributed to harder-line policies towards refugees in these countries. Please detail how the U.S. is engaging with Kenya, either bilaterally or multilaterally with other nations and/or international organizations, on the specific issue of Dadaab and on the issue of refugees more broadly.

**Answer.** The United States continues to engage the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Government of Kenya (GOK) on the closure directive. UNHCR is leading the discussion and has assured the United States that Kenya remains committed to its obligations and seeks to transition Dadaab into a sustainable space for refugees. The GOK has publicly stated returns to Somalia must be done in safety and dignity, and the environment must be conducive for returns. The United States leads a core donor group in Nairobi that focuses on solutions for refugees in Kenya and supports the GOK’s efforts to pass a draft refugee bill. If enacted, the bill would facilitate refugee access to employment opportunities and national education and health services.

**Question.** The government of Kenya recently announced plans to close Dadaab refugee camp, which houses over 230,000 refugees, most Somali, despite the Kenyan High Court standing ruling prohibiting this action. I am concerned that the administration’s drastic reduction in the refugee cap, coupled with “extreme vetting” procedures, have prevented us from being a steadfast partner to Kenya and other African nations who host large refugee populations, and have contributed to harder-line policies towards refugees in these countries. How many Somali refugees were resettled in the U.S. in 2018, as compared to 2017 and 2016?

**Answer.** The United States admitted 257 Somali refugees via the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) in FY 2018. In FY 2017, the USRAP resettled 6,130
Somali refugees to the United States, and in FY 2016, the USRAP admitted 9,020 Somali refugees.

**Question.** What steps is the State Department taking to emphasize the critical importance of a political solution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions, support civil society groups to ensure that elections are free, credible, and transparent, and offer our assistance as mediators?

**Answer.** We have urged both sides to forswear further acts of violence and to enter into a broad-based dialogue without preconditions. The Department is working closely with our diplomatic partners including the EU, the U.K., and France to encourage dialogue between both sides. The Department continues to urge the Government of Cameroon to address citizens’ grievances, strengthen its electoral and legal frameworks, and increase political plurality and respect for fundamental freedoms, particularly the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. We continue to support civil society actors in Cameroon who reinforce their fellow citizens’ constitutional rights and encourage non-violent means to prevent further violence.

**Question.** What is the current extent of U.S. military cooperation with Cameroonian security forces? Is the State Department considering whether to impose additional conditions on U.S. security assistance to Cameroon?

**Answer.** The U.S. government has made it clear to the Government of Cameroon (GRC) that U.S. security assistance is contingent upon respect for human rights and increased accountability. The Department reprogrammed $17.5 million in security assistance due to concerns that it could either be diverted to or inadvertently free up other assets that could be used in Cameroonian operations in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. We anticipate obligating approximately $7 million in FY 2019 in military counterterrorism assistance, peacekeeping capacity building, and IMET. However, we will consider more reductions if the GRC continues pursuing a military-only strategy and continues to reject calls for open-ended dialogue without preconditions.

**Question.** (Diplomatic Security contractor payment disputes) Can you please explain why there seem to be so many contractors encountering these payments challenges?

**Answer.** Several factors have affected the processing of payments, including lingering impacts of the “hiring freeze” and the recent lapse in appropriations. In FY 2018, The Bureau of Diplomatic Security processed 10,103 invoices totaling $932 million within Prompt Payment Act (PPA) designated timelines, and the Department paid $26,616 in interest for late payments on 1,550 invoices (13.3 percent). Thus far in FY 2019, DS has processed 5,974 payments totaling $616 million within PPA designated timelines, and the Department paid $57,364 in interest for late payments on 820 invoices (12 percent).

**Question.** How many Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REAs) or Contract Disputes Act Claims with a value of more than $10 million is State DS currently involved in? What is the status and what is State DS doing to resolve these disputes in a timely and equitable manner? How long does it take State DS to resolve REAs and contract disputes?

**Answer.** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security currently has six formal claims for REAs exceeding $10 million, which are under litigation. These claims are with the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) or the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) for decision. Contract disputes require time to adjudicate to ensure the Department pays for costs that are fair, reasonable, allowable, and allocable to the contract terms and conditions. Contracting Officers adjudicate contract disputes and follow the procedures set under theContract Disputes Act, Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Department of State Acquisition Regulation.

**Question.** How many security providers did State DS use 10 years ago versus in 2019?

**Answer.** Currently Diplomatic Security (DS) has approximately 575 vendors that provide security products and services in support of DS’s mission, versus 478 from 10 years ago.

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RESPONSES OF HON. MIKE POMPEO TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

**Question.** During the FY 2020 budget hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you remarked that the Obama administration had made “no diplomatic
effort to create the global coalition” to apply pressure on North Korea. Elsewhere, you have claimed that your administration “forged” the coalition. On what factual basis did you make these statements given that two of five recent United Nations Security Council Resolutions enacting global sanctions against North Korea date back to 2016?

Answer. International solidarity and increased pressure on the DPRK led by this administration opened the door for U.S. engagement with North Korea on denuclearization. The militaries of the North and South, together with the U.N. Command and U.S. Forces Korea, have embarked upon a number of measures that have lowered the threat level and tensions at the Demilitarized Zone.

Question. During the hearing, you remarked that the previous administration made “no effort to enforce” North Korea sanctions. Can you explain the factual basis for your statement given the 97 North Korea-related individuals, entities, and vessels added to the U.S. sanctions list in 2016? Can you explain why the Trump administration has added only 34 names in the year preceding this hearing?

Answer. The administration is pressing countries around the world for action to pressure the DPRK and fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions. International solidarity and increased pressure on the DPRK opened the door for U.S. engagement with North Korea on denuclearization. The administration has rolled out 11 tranches of North Korea-related sanctions actions, targeting 29 individuals, 50 entities, and 42 vessels in response to North Korea’s ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction, continued violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and serious human rights violations abuses, including the continued use of forced labor.

Question. You told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that you needed more time to make a determination on whether atrocities committed against the Rohingya people in August 2017 constitute genocide and crimes against humanity so as to be “thoughtful” in making this determination. This decision has been on your desk for many months. What additional information is required to make a determination?

Answer. I am concerned about the Burmese military’s extensive, horrific human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya. To establish a comprehensive understanding of the human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State, the Department supported a large-scale documentation project in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The report clarified the extent and severity of the abuses, and the underlying information and findings will help inform our decisions as we seek accountability in Burma.

Question. How is the State Department investing in conflict prevention programming in preparation for next year’s elections in Burma? And how does short-term crisis response and election support fit within the broader diplomatic strategy to support Burma in its journey to democracy, peace, and prosperity?

Answer. The State Department is investing in programs and localized conflict analysis for appropriate prevention efforts in the lead up to Burma’s national elections in November 2020. Our programs engage with a variety of stakeholders, including political parties, members of parliament, government officials, civil society, and community religious leaders to foster inclusive campaign processes and a tolerant and inclusive political environment. Department and USAID programs also work with local partners to improve digital media literacy to combat disinformation and historically have worked to strengthen the capacities of the Union Election Commission.

Question. U.N. officials said recently that Facebook’s efforts to address dangerous speech in Burma were still insufficient, and “denigration” of the Rohingya and other minority groups continued. What is the State Department doing to counter the spread of dangerous speech online? Please outline specific programs, and any contact that you have had with Facebook on this issue.

Answer. Through a range of programs and working in conjunction with media and civil society, the United States continues to support values of peace, tolerance, and diversity in Burma. The Department also supports programs working with local partners to improve digital media literacy to combat disinformation. We have met with Facebook both in Burma and in Washington, DC, to share these concerns.

Question. How does the FY 2020 foreign operations budget for the Indo-Pacific reflect funding authorized by the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) which includes $1.5 billion each year for fiscal years 2019 through 2023, as well as support for cybersecurity, trade, and democracy initiatives?
Answer. ARIA advances a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled U.S. policy that aligns with President Trump’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The FY 2020 request includes more than $1.2 billion in foreign assistance and $566 million in funding for diplomatic engagement. This will support the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy to strengthen the international rules-based system; promote market-based economics; open investment environments; support good governance and respect for individual rights; improve digital connectivity and cybersecurity; help protect the political and economic sovereignty of all Indo-Pacific nations; support embassy operations abroad; and engage foreign audiences to strengthen alliances.

Question. Does the FY 2020 budget reflect the $113 million for Southeast Asia announced by Secretary Pompeo in April 2018 for “foundational areas of the future, including the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure?”

Answer. The administration launched the economic pillar of the Indo-Pacific Strategy on July 30, 2018, at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum where I announced $113 million in FY 2018 and prior year funding for initiatives foundational to the Indo-Pacific’s economic future including on high standard infrastructure development, digital connectivity and cybersecurity, and energy market development. The $113 million announcement represented a down payment on the United States’ commitment to free and open economies in the Indo-Pacific. The FY 2020 request aims to continue and expand these important initiatives.

Question. Does the FY 2020 budget include $300 million in security assistance for Asia that the State Department announced in August 2018?

Answer. On August 4, 2018, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore, I outlined the security pillar of the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and announced $300 million focused on areas of cooperation critical to ensuring a free, open, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific: maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, peacekeeping capabilities, and countering transnational crime. The FY 2020 request continues to expand security sector engagement with Indo-Pacific partners in various areas of cooperation to push back on China’s encroachment in the South China Sea, combat terrorism and violent extremism, support South Asia’s maritime security and domain awareness, and bolster regional security organizations.

Question. The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for U.S. interests and for the continued relevance of the rules-based international order. Although the U.S. government has made progress in recent years in highlighting the challenges and opportunities in the region, government investment in American security interests, economic interests, and values has been insufficient. Given the importance of the [Indo-Pacific] region for U.S. interests, why did the FY 2020 budget request include reductions in requests (over the FY 2018 actuals) in areas including the following?

- Diplomatic Programs
- Educational and Cultural Exchanges
- The East-West Center
- Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
- The Asia Foundation

Answer. I am confident we have asked for sufficient diplomatic engagement resources to support our Indo-Pacific Strategy. The FY 2020 request includes $566 million in program operations and public diplomacy funding, an increase of $39 million above the FY 2019 request. The FY 2020 request does not include a dedicated appropriation for East-West Center or The Asia Foundation. These organizations will continue to seek alternative funding sources, to include continuing to compete for federal funding and fundraising from non-federal sources, as they have done in the past.

Question. According to the Financial Times, China’s government has doubled the amount it spends on diplomacy during the 5 years of President Xi Jinping’s rule. On March 5, 2019, Beijing announced that it would spend 62.71 billion RMB (U.S. $9.35 billion) on foreign affairs in 2019, a 7.4 percent increase from 2018. How is the State Department investing in its own ability to compete with China’s expanding diplomatic and strategic outreach?

Answer. Through strategic funding and programming, this FY 2020 budget request positions the Department of State to advance U.S. interests. This means ensuring our nation is fully engaged in regions of the world upon which our national security and future prosperity depend. In recent years, we have seen China proactively applying its power to exert its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and
beyond. Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States has taken decisive steps to respond to China’s aggressive actions. I am confident we have asked for sufficient diplomatic engagement resources to support our Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes competing with China’s expanding diplomatic and strategic outreach.

**Question.** To fulfill its statutory mandate of countering foreign state and non-state propaganda efforts aimed at undermining U.S. national security interests, how does the Global Engagement Center (GEC) identify and prioritize specific issue areas regarding Chinese influence on which to allocate its resources?

**Answer.** The Global Engagement Center (GEC) is taking a deliberate approach to countering Chinese propaganda and disinformation. The GEC’s China-related priorities are informed by National Security Council (NSC) regional strategies, various NSC-led processes on China, and through coordination with the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, other State Department bureaus, and U.S. interagency counterparts. The GEC coordinates with interagency partners and overseas missions to identify and execute programs that illuminate and forcefully counter the influence of Chinese propaganda and disinformation.

**Question.** What are the metrics by which the GEC is evaluating its effectiveness in countering foreign state and non-state propaganda by the Chinese government?

**Answer.** The GEC funds programs, in close coordination with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that illuminate and counter the influence of Chinese propaganda and disinformation by identifying key narratives, information sources, and target audiences of Chinese influence activities. Our dedicated monitoring and evaluation team works with program partners to develop metrics that are valid and useful. Metrics include opinion polling data, news consumption habits, media trends, and counter-disinformation training effectiveness. With program implementers, we design and execute dissemination plans to generate maximum media impact and then monitor audience engagement via traditional and social media to evaluate program effectiveness.

**Question.** Please explain whether the State Department and the Department of Defense intend to utilize the authority provided in the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act to transfer up to $60 million in additional funds from DoD to the GEC.

**Answer.** Yes. The Department intends to utilize this authority. On March 4, the Department took the initial step of requesting up to $60 million in FY 2019 funds from the Department of Defense (DoD) to support new joint initiatives to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation by submitting an Executive Secretary Memorandum to DoD. The amount of funding that is ultimately transferred to the GEC this fiscal year will only be decided once the GEC and DoD agree on which specific threats merit focus, to likely include Chinese disinformation and propaganda from international terrorist organizations. Those agreements will be made by a joint GEC–DoD Senior Coordination Group.

**Question.** During your Senate confirmation hearing for CIA Director, you stated that the notion of climate change as a top national security threat was “ignorant, dangerous and absolutely unbelievable.” Do you still believe that climate change is not a top national security threat? Do you disagree with the Department of Defense that climate change is “a threat multiplier” and thus a key national security challenge?

**Answer.** The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies the impacts of climate change, among other factors, as likely to fuel economic and social discontent and notes that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.

**Question.** In Brunei, the government recently enacted brutal new criminal laws that include death by stoning for sex between men or for adultery, and amputation of limbs for theft. What are you and the State Department doing to address this new set of laws in Brunei and to ensure that the human rights and dignity of all people there are protected and respected?

**Answer.** I share your concerns about new punishments under Phases Two and Three of Brunei’s Sharia Penal Code, which are inconsistent with international human rights commitments and obligations. The Department has raised concerns about these laws with Brunei on numerous occasions since the enactment of Phase One in 2014, and we will continue to do so, including as part of our bilateral Senior Officials Dialogue.
Question. Given continued threats to LGBTI rights around the world, observers and LGBTI rights groups have noted that an LGBTI special envoy would demonstrate U.S. leadership and ensure more effective intra-department policy coordination in the promotion of LGBTI rights. When will you fill the vacancy of special envoy for LGBTI issues?

Answer. I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons and am working to fill the position with a qualified individual as soon as possible.

Question. The state of LGBTI rights in Egypt and Brazil remain particularly concerning, and both heads of state have made troubling remarks against the LGBTI community. During President Bolsanaro's and President Sisi's visits to Washington, did LGBTI rights come up in your or the President's conversations with those heads of state?

Answer. We regularly raise a wide range of human rights issues and concerns with foreign counterparts at all levels. We continue to convey privately and publicly the importance of democratic processes, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to ensuring the stability and prosperity we all want to see for Egypt. With respect to Brazil, President Bolsonaro has stated his commitment to serve as president for all Brazilians and reiterated his allegiance to Brazil's constitution and democracy. We take him at his word. The United States will continue to stand up and speak out against human rights violations and abuses wherever and against whomever they occur.

Question. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the President, in consultation with Congress, sets an annual ceiling for refugee admissions into the United States. Last year, President Trump slashed that ceiling to a record-low 30,000 admissions. Given the importance of refugee resettlement in our efforts to recruit intelligence assets abroad, increase U.S. global influence, counter anti-Western propaganda, and promote regional stability in foreign countries hosting large numbers of refugees, why is the administration limiting refugee admissions?

Answer. We anticipate resettling up to 30,000 refugees in FY 2019 under the refugee ceiling, and we also anticipate processing more than 280,000 asylum-seekers, most of whom have arrived at our southern border. They will join hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who are already inside the United States awaiting adjudication of their claims. Our refugee admissions program must take into account this operational reality.

Question. On March 12, United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) announced it was considering closing 23 different field offices in over 20 countries around the globe, effectively eliminating its entire International Operations Division (IO). Is there a plan for how the DOS will manage expanded workloads with the transfer of possibly thousands of cases from USCIS to the State Department? Do you anticipate this will impact the Department's ability to have fair caseloads and provide timely services to Americans and immigrants abroad? Do you anticipate that you will need to hire additional staff?

Answer. The Department, through the Bureau of Consular Affairs, provides services on USCIS' behalf at more than 200 posts worldwide. If USCIS phases out its overseas offices, we anticipate a smooth transition and continued efficient processing of USCIS-related work at all of our missions overseas. We will determine our resource needs through our on-going discussions with USCIS. Under the provisions of the Economy Act, USCIS will continue to reimburse the Department for any services it performs on behalf of USCIS.

Question. Were you consulted by USCIS prior to the announcement that USCIS' international operations would close? If so, did you raise any concerns about the potential impact to the State Department or its staff abroad?

Answer. Earlier this year, USCIS informed the Department of its interest in eliminating international operations. Thereafter, we established a working group to discuss and coordinate a smooth transition of operations. The Department, through the Bureau of Consular Affairs, currently provides services on USCIS' behalf at more than 200 posts worldwide. If USCIS phases out its overseas presence we anticipate a smooth transition and continued efficient processing of USCIS-related work at all of our missions overseas. We will determine our resource needs through our on-going discussions with USCIS.

Question. How is State Department addressing the crackdown in Southeast Asia on pro-democracy/free speech advocates? Specifically, please update us on the Department's efforts concerning: 1) Truong Duy Nhat, a well-known blogger who was
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reportedly abducted by Vietnamese police in Bangkok where he was applying for refugee status before being forcibly expatriated back to Vietnam; 2) Maria Ressa, the founder of the investigative journalist platform Rappler who has investigated President Duterte’s drug war; and 3) Leila de Lima, a prominent opposition legislator in the Philippines currently being detained by the government?

Answer. We share your concerns about the crackdown on free speech advocates in Southeast Asia. We have raised Truong Duy Nhat’s case with the Government of Vietnam and have repeatedly called on Vietnam to release all prisoners of conscience immediately and to allow all individuals to express their views freely. In the Philippines, we have expressed our concern about the series of apparently politically motivated charges against Maria Ressa and Rappler and hope that both can continue to operate freely. We are aware of the allegations against Senator de Lima, and U.S. Embassy Manila officials are in regular contact with her staff. We will continue to raise our human rights concerns with Philippine officials both in Washington and Manila.

Question. What has happened to positions that were taken from warzone embassies like Iraq and Afghanistan? What are your plans to increase our diplomatic presence with a focus on enhancing our leadership, both in the Indo-Pacific itself and addressing negative elements of the Chinese government’s influence in other regions?

Answer. The Department regularly assesses its global staffing needs to align with strategic priorities and risks, including the safety and security of our personnel. We have empowered bureaus to configure their staffing to support our strategic goals. The Department’s Foreign Service assignment process annually assigns personnel based upon these priorities and individuals’ career progression needs. As current resources support increased Foreign Service staffing levels, the Department can fill vacant positions at a variety of locations such as in the Indo-Pacific region, including with personnel who previously filled positions in Iraq.

Question. In your written response to a question during your confirmation hearing in April 2018, you said you “will express publicly, and at the highest levels of government, that Chinese authorities need to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to lower tensions and resolve differences.” Have you raised the issue of dialogue on Tibet with Chinese officials? Would you recommend that President Trump publicly urge the Chinese President to address the grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?

Answer. This administration is committed to raising Tibetan issues with Chinese government counterparts at multiple levels. U.S. government officials including myself, the Vice President, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu continue to work to establish conditions favorable to the facilitation of a direct and meaningful dialogue between Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama or his representatives. This dialogue needs to occur without preconditions and is intended to lead to a sustainable resolution of longstanding differences.

Question. As outlined in the State Department’s report to Congress of March 25, 2019 (mandated by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act), China has been attempting to isolate Tibet from the rest of the world by denying or restricting access to diplomats, journalists and ordinary citizens. One concrete way to challenge this Chinese effort is by implementing the Tibetan Policy Act’s requirement of establishing a U.S. consulate in the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Will you take this up with the Chinese Foreign Ministry?

Answer. I will press the Chinese government to allow the opening of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa, consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act. I will also implement the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act. I am committed to working closely with Congress in pursuit of our shared goal of seeing Americans have full access to China, including the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas.

Question. On April 7, the head of the Anti-Defamation League criticized President Trump for invoking anti-Semitic tropes about the loyalty of American Jews in a recent speech. The President also suggested that Jewish people are especially influential in trade policy during the same speech. You had recently stated, “This administration speaks the truth, and anti-Semitism is unacceptable in any form from anyone, but to see it come from one of America’s leaders is just abhorrent.” Do you stand by this statement?

Answer. President Trump has made the fight against anti-Semitism a top priority. As I said earlier this year, the United States stands with the Jewish people and
with Israel in the fight against the world's oldest bigotry. Promoting human rights and religious freedom, including by combating anti-Semitism everywhere it exists, is a U.S. foreign policy priority. We will continue to work to stamp out prejudice in all of its forms. As of February 5, 2019, Elan S. Carr is the United States Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. I have full confidence he will act as a sentinel against bigotry and prejudice around the world and help us continue to lead on this issue.

**Question.** Your hearing marked a year to the day that the Anti-Defamation League released a statement about your “long, documented record of anti-Muslim prejudice.” The statement said it was “essential” for you to repudiate your past anti-Muslim (and anti-LGBT) views and to “renounce any associations with anti-Muslim conspiracy-haunted organizations.” Have you since renounced any such views or repudiated your associations with ACT for America and the Center for Security Policy?

**Answer.** I have spoken clearly and directly that I will treat persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that they deserve. I believe in the fundamental freedom to practice religion as one sees fit, whoever one is, whatever one’s belief. I have worked closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim-majority countries. I also believe that religious leaders, institutions, and communities—including Muslim communities—can be critical interlocutors on many issues central to U.S. foreign policy. Promoting human rights and religious freedom, including by combating religious bigotry everywhere it exists, is a U.S. foreign policy priority.

**Question.** Approximately how many meetings—at the PCC level or above—have State Department officials attended as part of the “reviewing” New START’s status and prospects for renewal?

**Answer.** The interagency is conducting a thorough review of the New START Treaty, including whether extending the Treaty beyond its current expiration date of February 5, 2021, is in the national security interests of the United States. Department of State officials have been present at these meetings.

**Question.** Have key experts, from all bureaus with arms control equities, such as EUR or L, been allowed to attend all interagency discussions on arms control issues? At the PCC level or above? Please list the specific bureaus that have participated in meetings at the PCC level or above to discuss New START and its potential extension.

**Answer.** The Department is properly represented at interagency meetings, and relevant bureaus have input into the policy process.

**Question.** Your lead arms control official, Assistant Secretary Yleem Poblete, has not had any publicly reported bilateral meetings on arms control with Russia. Why?

**Answer.** Department officials regularly engage with their Russian counterparts to discuss arms control matters. I have discussed arms control issues directly with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson has conducted multiple meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, and Ambassador Huntsman regularly raises arms control issues in interactions with counterparts in Moscow. More importantly, working level officials are in regular contact on arms control implementation matters. There is no lack of communication with Russia on arms control.

**Question.** Given the litany of violations and concerns your administration has noted vis-a-vis Russia and arms control treaties and agreements, why is the compliance report not yet delivered to the Congress? When do you plan to make this report available to the Congress?

**Answer.** The compliance report will be delivered to Congress shortly.

**Question.** What efforts has the Congress made to address new Russian nuclear systems through the New START Treaty?

**Answer.** The administration has regularly briefed Congress on the status of its implementation of the New START Treaty and will continue to do so.

**Question.** Given your past experience as CIA Director, if New START expires in February 2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no constraints on Russia’s nuclear forces, in your view would that increase or decrease the threat Russia poses to the United States?

**Answer.** The administration is currently reviewing whether to seek an extension of the Treaty with Russia. Central to that review is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty’s expiration would impact U.S.
national security in the evolving security environment. This includes considerations
related to Russia’s ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China’s continuing nu-
clear modernization.

Question. Given your past experience as CIA Director, if we lose the New START
data exchanges and onsite inspection rights, do you believe the Pentagon and the
Intelligence Community would have to spend more on national technical means of
verification to make up for this loss? If so, by roughly how much would you esti-
mate?

Answer. Through its verification regime, the New START Treaty mandates that
the United States and Russia exchange data detailing the numbers, locations, and
technical characteristics of all weapons systems and facilities subject to the Treaty.
The 18 on-site inspections that are conducted by the United States each year under
the terms of the Treaty allow confirmation of Russia’s declared data. We are con-
tinuing to review how the Treaty’s extension or expiration would impact U.S. na-
tional security in the evolving security environment, including by evaluating the im-
 pact of data exchanges and access through on-site inspections to Russian facilities
subject to the Treaty.

Question. Given your past experience as CIA Director, is there any way to replace
the “boots on the ground” inspections provided by New START if the treaty did not
exist?

Answer. We are continuing to review how the Treaty’s extension or expiration
would impact U.S. national security in the evolving security environment, including
by evaluating the impact of access through on-site inspections to Russian facilities
subject to the Treaty.

Question. Administration officials have raised concerns about new strategic-range
weapons that Russia is developing, which Russian President Vladimir Putin claims
would not be subject to any arms control treaty. These include nuclear-armed
hypersonic glide vehicles; globe-circling, nuclear-powered cruise missiles; and very
long-range nuclear torpedoes for use against U.S. coastal cities. My understand-
ing is that New START envisioned the possible development of new kinds of strategic
offensive arms during the period of implementation of the treaty. Article II of the
treaty states: “When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is
emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic
offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.” Has the
State Department formally raised Russia’s development of these new weapons for
discussion in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty’s implementing
body? Yes or no?

Answer. The United States has engaged Russia on these issues in appropriate
channels. While the Treaty’s confidentiality provisions prohibit public discussion of
the details of conversations held within the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the
Department regularly briefs the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
the status and content of such discussions.

Question. Wouldn’t extending New START for another 5 years buy us additional
time to discuss and address our concerns about the new weapons with Russia?

Answer. The Bilateral Consultative Commission, the New START Treaty’s imple-
mentation body, is not the only appropriate forum for discussing these systems with
Russia. Any decision regarding a potential extension of the Treaty will include con-
siderations related to Russia’s ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms.

Question. If New START goes away, through what mechanism would the United
States try to raise its concerns about new Russian nuclear weapons?

Answer. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian officials bilat-
 erally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to arms control. The United
States government has many channels through which it can address concerns re-
lated to potential Russian weapon systems. We will continue these discussions as
appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. Secretary Pompeo, during the hearing you suggested that we need to
take China’s nuclear forces into account when weighing the future of New START.
You stated that “certainly China ... has large numbers” of nuclear weapons. Has
the administration begun discussions with China on including it in New START or
otherwise limiting China’s nuclear forces? Please describe specifically any engage-
ments State Department officials have had with China related to nuclear arms con-
 trol.
Answer. The United States has sought a meaningful dialogue with China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities in pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations. Following the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States proposed establishing a Strategic Capabilities Working Group with China, focused on risk reduction and transparency in the nuclear and strategic capabilities arena. China has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to broach meaningful discussions on these topics.

Question. How would China be included in New START? Could China be included without amending the treaty?

Answer. The New START Treaty is a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. The Department has not yet assessed what procedural steps would be required in order to bring China into the Treaty.

Question. Which Chinese weapons would be limited if it were a party to New START? Would China be allowed to build up to the New START limits, which according to open source estimates, are much larger than China's current nuclear stockpile?

Answer. Any discussion about modifying the New START Treaty to include China is hypothetical at this time.

Question. In 2012, then commander of U.S. Strategic Command Gen. Kehler stated: “I do not believe that China has hundreds or thousands more nuclear weapons than what the intelligence community has been saying, [. . . ] that the Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred” nuclear warheads. Do you agree with this assessment? If not, why not?

Answer. I do not make public comments on U.S. intelligence assessments. I would say China invests considerable resources to maintain and modernize a survivable nuclear force. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program, however, raises questions regarding its future intent and current posture as it expands and diversifies its nuclear arsenal.

Question. How do you assess China would react to the New START Treaty’s expiration? Do you believe New Start’s expiration would make it easier or harder to engage in arms control with China?

Answer. It is unknown how China would react to a hypothetical expiration of the New START Treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has referred to the New START Treaty as “an important bilateral nuclear disarmament arrangement” and expressed “hope that the treaty can be extended.” The United States has sought a meaningful dialogue with China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities in pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations. China has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to broach meaningful discussions on these topics.
Time to Refund the Iraq Tax
BY BARBARA STEPHENSON

The evidence is clear: we have too few Foreign Service positions in the field.

This is no small power competition that is lacking. This is why nearly 100 American businesses are in the foreign policy and diplomatic community. "We urge you to send more diplomats overseas," they wrote. "Foreign exchanges are continually expanding their economic outreach programs, where American diplomats are in high demand." Congress also takes seriously the threat of losing comparators. That is at least part of the reason why Congress has voted by such wide margins to support and upgrade the diplomatic infrastructure. The appropriation bill passed on Feb. 14 increases funding for "Diplomatic Programs," including $30 million for the "overseas programs" line item, which covers overseas support costs for deploying PSCs in the field. Congressional language finally prohibits reducing staffing.

How do we resolve that situation in diplomatic and economic priorities? The answer, it seems, is to provide adequate staffing. The U.S. is not alone in facing this challenge. Across the globe, countries are investing more in their diplomatic efforts to compete in the global arena and protect their interests. It is time to invest in positions overseas in advance of the next budget season—-and give embassies the tools and authority they need to promote and defend American interests.

Ambassador Barbara Stephenson is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.
The State of State: Putting the Back Channel Up Front

BY BARBARA STEPHENSON

I am so pleased that this edition of the FSI contains an interview with Bill Burns. For those of you who have missed the reviews of Ambassadors Rums—known here as a name for celebration. His book is now finished—and at the top of the Foreign Service Journal is listed as one of the best reviewed books of the year. —and a book to the public eye marking the case for American diplomacy. Burns was praised in his book

The Middle East: A New American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Moment.

The Back Channel is getting excellent reviews, and the Washington Post review by David Ignatius, when it was just released, with a quote regarding a nation’s security issue, is no exception. He finds much to admire in this "astonishing accomplishment," the book in the review that has most stuck with me, been hardest to shake, is a diligent reminder that every Department of State worker and that, as a matter of fact, Burns was still involved in government, one member even if he could make a difference.

That is a sobering, even jarring assessment of a situation in which I have proudly and gladly devoted myself for more than three decades. So, what is the state of the State Department?

That is a topic

The department has been addressing all over the country as part of the Foreign Policy Association’s Great Decisions series, many of them drawing on background material and taking pains to provide AEPA. We have given much thought to "The State of the State," and I will be in a position to discuss the issue in the fall.

First, the good news. The back channel despite the term is an important issue in the minds of American diplomats and those who work with them, especially in the Middle East, which is the focus of this article.

Strong bipartisan majorities in Congress have long been clear that the President and the Department of State have been long-staking missions and a strong presence in the region. The FY 2019 appropriations bill, which is now in the House, includes funds to continue the current level of support for American diplomatic missions. The Appropriations Committee has recommended a budget of $5.7 billion for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which supports the work of American diplomats around the world.

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to December 2016, the number of Career Ministers (three-star equivalents) fell from 33 to 19; Senior Counsellors (two-star equivalents) fell from 49 to 37; and the number of Counsellors (one-star equivalent) fell from 639 to 561.

In his interview, Bill Burns notes that the lack of senior vacancies and decreased morale is impediment to career professionals, as a result of Congress, the media, and the public when it comes to the State Department, who are making senior vacancies and diplomat senior ranks—otherwise known as career professionals who are serving in positions that are increasingly less senior and less respected within the foreign office hierarchy. The best way to retain top talent, especially in a mission driven organization like the US Foreign Service, is to give them opportunities in senior positions, at least in the form of career diplomats, but also talented officials in the senior foreign service ranks. And they also need the problem of declining senior Foreign Service ranks at State, encouraging still more highly qualified and experienced officials to take up and depart further weakening the corps.

Opportunities for career professionals are further limited by the number of political appointees filling senior positions. Only one assistant secretary position is currently filled by an exile FSO, and the rest of the current ambassadors are drawn from the career Foreign Service, when the historical norm was a commission to 18 percent. The United States has the largest number of career diplomats in the world, but their numbers have decreased in recent years.

BY THE NUMBERS

- Two out of six under secretary positions are filled (P and T).
- Nine out of 24 assistant secretary positions are not filled, including four of the six geographic bureaus (A, FA, AFR, CA, SCA, EUR).
- 33 ambassador positions are vacant and have no nominees, including Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Lebanon, Georgia, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand and the United Nations.
- At least 20 additional ambassador positions are vacant, but the list is not comprehensive.
- Only one career FSO is serving at the under secretary level (State/SA) and one at the assistant secretary level (P/J).

(November 2016)
SAUDI ARABIA ALREADY HAS A BALLISTIC MISSILE ARSENAL COURTESY OF CHINA—
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THE CIA

(BY SEBASTIEN ROBLIN)

You would be hard pressed to find two more determined foes of Iran other than Saudi Arabia and Israel. The latter country has long been perturbed by bellicose anti-Israeli rhetoric from Tehran, and has unleashed hundreds of air strikes and artillery bombardments targeting Iran’s efforts to arm Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, Riyadh appear to see itself as engaged in nothing short of an epic struggle for dominance of the Middle East, and has oriented its foreign policy around combating the perceived Iranian menace, even in places its influence is moderate at best.

Iran hawks are preoccupied by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon—a weapon which, given the limitations of Tehran’s air and sea forces, would need to be delivered by a ballistic missile. Iran’s continuing development of such missiles has been portrayed as a casus belli, and was cited to justify the U.S. withdrawal from a nuclear deal struck in 2014 (the deal constrained Iran from developing nuclear warheads, but not ballistic missiles to carry them in). It’s often ignored that Israel and Saudi Arabia themselves maintain some of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region—the latter of which is the subject of this article.

Iran’s ballistic missile program began during the ‘War of the Cities’ phase of the devastating Iran-Iraq war, when Baghdad rained hundreds of Scud missiles on Iranian metropolises. Though Iran managed to acquire a few Scuds from Libya with which to retaliate against Iraqi cities, it mostly could only strike back with air attacks—which placed its steadily diminishing fleet of U.S.-built warplanes at risk.

Saudi Arabia was also growing nervous of Iraq’s evidently huge missile arsenal. Denied access to U.S. ballistic missiles, Riyadh instead went knocking at the door of Beijing—which had previously proven willing to export arms to Iran when Moscow and Washington refused to do so.

In 1987, China transferred between thirty and 120 Dongfeng (‘East Wind’) DF–3A intermediate range ballistic missiles measuring 24 meters long and a dozen Transport–Erector–Launcher trucks. Once gassed full of liquid fuel, the missiles could strike targets as far as 2,700 miles away—though they required special launch pads. Saudi Arabia formed a Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force to operate the weapons, much to Washington’s annoyance.

Just 4 years later, Riyadh did end up in a war with Baghdad, and 46 Iraqi missiles did fall upon Saudi territory. Yet Riyadh never bothered flinging missiles back at Baghdad. Why?

The problem with the DF–3 is that it has a Circular Error Probable of at best 300 meters. This means that if you fired a half-dozen at a given target, you could expect on average only three to land within the length of three football fields of the aim point; with the other three most likely falling further afield. Other sources claim the CEP may even be as large as one or two miles.

A weapon that inaccurate is pretty much useless for striking a military target—unless equipped with a nuclear warhead, which is what the DF–3 was designed to do.

But China wasn’t going to sell nukes to the Saudis. The DF–3s were instead modified to carry 3,000 pounds of high explosives. This meant the Saudi DF–3s were only useful for dropping high explosives on a target as large as a city and randomly killing whatever unlucky civilians happened to be nearby the point of impact. However, the abundant firepower of U.S. war planes during the Gulf War meant the Saudis felt little need for such tactics.

Over a decade later, Riyadh grew interested in acquiring a more effective strategic missile deterrence, and again turned to China—this time seeking its much more accurate DF–21 IRBM, which has a CEP of only 30-meters. (China even developed a guided DF–21D model designed to hit large ships at sea.) Furthermore, the DF–21’s use of solid-fuel rockets means it can be launched on very short notice.

Though possessing a shorter range of 1,100 miles, the 30-ton missile is perfectly adequate to hit targets throughout the Middle East and would be difficult to intercept as it plunges towards its target at 10 times the speed of sound. Reportedly Saudi launch sites were photographed oriented for firing at Iran and Israel, though given the increasingly less discrete alliance between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in recent years, that latter part may be more for show.
In 2014, Newsweek exposed that the CIA had actually helped broker the sale of Chinese missile to Riyadh—as long as it was established that the DF–21s did not have nuclear warheads. Thus, after a series of covert meetings in Washington DC-area diners between spooks and Saudi officials, in 2007 two CIA agents were dispatched to inspect the missiles in their shipping crates before they were transferred into Saudi possession.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly never test-fired its missile arsenal, however, leaving the operational readiness of the RSSMF open to question. Nonetheless, it has maintained four or five underground facilities to house the weapons. Finally, in April 2014, as Riyadh grew fearful of U.S. rapprochement with Iran due to the nuclear deal, it paraded the gigantic missiles publicly.

The thing with a ‘deterrent’ weapon system is that, though they need to appear to be a credible threat, they only serve their primary purpose if they scare a foe into avoiding hostilities. However, that deterrence can’t happen if the adversary isn’t well aware of the extent of that threat due to secrecy, which may explain the Saudi decision to begin prominently trotting the rockets out in full view.

There are also persistent rumors that Riyadh has acquired a small quantity of nuclear weapons from Pakistan, or has arranged to have some transferred in the event of a conflict. Again, the mere existence of the rumors is useful for Saudi deterrence, regardless of the truth of the matter.

That Tehran takes the Saudi threat seriously is supported by a statement by an Iranian general claiming in September 2018 that Iran had earlier tested its Bavar-373 surface-to-air missile system to intercept a ballistic missile. As the primary threat to Iran from the United States comes from air strikes and cruise missiles, the test is likely aimed at Saudi or Israeli missile capabilities. The Bavar-373 appears to be an attempted domestic copy of the Russian S-300PMU–2 long-range SAM.

Ultimately, Washington clearly has fewer objections to the possession of ballistic missiles and possible nuclear capabilities in its nominal allies. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia, past victims of ballistic missile attack, appear to believe that bulking up on such weapons will deter each other from overt hostilities—perhaps even if they only have conventional warheads. However, the tens of thousands of civilians killed during the War of the Cities in the 1980s doesn’t really support that assumption.