[Senate Hearing 116-202]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-202
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2020 STATE
DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 10, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-533 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 2
Pompeo, Hon. Mike, Secretary, Department of State, Washington, DC 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 58
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions Submitted by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 99
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions Submitted by Senator
Tim Kaine...................................................... 108
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions Submitted by Senator
Edward J. Markey............................................... 114
The Foreign Service Journal Article Dated April 2019 Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 123
The Foreign Service Journal Article Dated May 2019 Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 124
The National Interest Article Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine..... 126
(iii)
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2020 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson,
Gardner, Romney, Isakson, Barrasso, Portman, Paul, Young, Cruz,
Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and
Merkley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning, everyone. Thank you for being here. We obviously have
a distinguished guest here today, who is going to help us
through the dialogue. And our topic is the State Department's
fiscal year 2020 budget request. And our witness is the right
man to answer questions about that request, Secretary of State,
Mike Pompeo.
One thing many Americans may not realize is that the State
Department is part of the bedrock of our national security. Its
diplomats are our eyes and ears on the ground across the globe.
These men and women are the tip of the sphere for advancing
U.S. interests overseas, our first line of defense against
malign influences, and a vital lead in negotiations to make
sure that our relations with friends and foes abroad don't go
off the rails.
The State Department civil servants work every day to keep
the U.S. economy strong, advocating for American exports that
translate into jobs back home in states like mine, Idaho, where
24,000 jobs are supported by exporting just agricultural
products alone.
The State Department also provides billions of dollars to
strategic allies like Israel to protect their security
interests and help preserve peace around the world. As the old
adage goes, the State Department is so indispensable, if it did
not exist, we would have to invent it.
For all of these reasons and many more I believe we need a
vibrant State Department that takes care of our national
interests and its own people, who do a great job serving the
American people. But we need a State Department for today, not
for 2001, 1991, or 1975. The world has changed a lot over the
past few decades, and we need our diplomacy to reflect that.
For example, we need to make sure that our diplomats are
getting the support they need to get outside the walls of our
diplomatic posts to do their jobs. We all know that Chinese,
Russian, and Iranian diplomats don't have trouble getting off
their embassy compounds.
In 2019, the stakes are too high to hamstring our national
security in this way, which limits U.S. engagement in a number
of places. We need our people out there working with our
security partners, advancing human rights and the rule of law,
and pushing our American business.
These are things we simply cannot do well enough by sitting
at a desk behind several layers of security in an embassy. On
the State Department's budget, I recognize that like any
federal agency there are many areas for improvement, be it
reducing redundancies, or increasing efficiencies. I believe
the Department should find these efficiencies first, and
consider cuts second. I look forward to hearing Secretary
Pompeo address these issues.
First and foremost, though, the Department needs to be
fully staffed. We are far too into a presidential
administration for there to be so many unfilled positions. How
can we critique the performance of administration if it is not
even allowed to field its own team?
I am optimistic that this week we will see confirmation of
General Abizaid to be ambassador to Saudi Arabia, but there is
much more work to be done, especially to fill a number of very
important senior roles in the State Department here in
Washington. And I know that the Secretary shares my view in
that regard, as we have had several robust discussions
regarding that.
I want to thank Secretary Pompeo for appearing here today,
and expect that this will be far from the last time we see him
here this Congress. The easiest way to keep relations strong
between the State Department and our committee is through open
dialog. Just like diplomacy, my hope is that the more we are
talking, the less we are disagreeing.
And so on a personal note, let me say, Secretary Pompeo, I
have said publicly, and I will say it again, you are the right
man for the right job at this time. We sincerely appreciate
that. Myself, like most other members of this committee, meet
regularly with heads of state from the 200-plus countries, and
high-ranking officials there, and uniformly you get high marks
from those people, as far as flying the flag and dealing with
them. So thank you for what you do. Thank you for appearing
here today.
Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary, back to the committee. We
appreciate you being here.
It is something of a cliche to say at hearings like this
that we meet at a critical juncture, or a consequential time
for America in the world. But never in my nearly three decades
of service in Congress have I seen a confluence of complicated
challenges. Russia, China, North Korea, Afghanistan, climate
changing, rising authoritarianism, Saudi Arabia, migration
crises in Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. None of
these are easy, nor are they all of our making.
But with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, thus far, the
Trump administration has not demonstrated a deep understanding
of or capacity required to meet these challenges. Confronting
China is not the same thing as being competitive with China.
Squandering alliances and alienating partners while cozying up
to dictators is not prudent at precisely the time when we need
likeminded democratic freedom-loving friends to confront a
rising China, a revisionist Russia, or an emboldened Iran.
Threatening to cut funding that supports the institutional
capacity of our partners in Central America to deal with the
root causes of migration, including grinding poverty and the
violence of MS-13, is not an effective way to manage that
challenge.
Undermining unity at the World Trade Organization is a
bizarre strategy at a time we should make it clear that China,
not the United States, is the outlier in international economic
architecture.
Haranguing partners about the dangers of Huawei's 5G
architecture, a concern that I share, is not a successful
approach to develop a consortium of likeminded partners to
develop a safe and cost-effective alternative.
Failing to develop a diplomatic strategy to support peace
in Mali, or the Sahel, more broadly, while Jihadists and ethnic
militia attacks have cost more than 2,000 lives in the last 5
months alone, leaves us vulnerable to global terrorism.
And in Saudi Arabia, the administration's violation of the
Global Magnitsky Law, failing to respond to my requests for a
determination under the law as to the complicity of the crown
prince, sends a global message to authoritarians that you can
kill and violate human rights with impunity.
So I am disappointed to be having what I feel like is a
recurring bad dream. This administration submits a budget
request that demonstrates either no understanding of the value
of the U.S. diplomacy and foreign engagement, or has an active
desire to see us retreat from the global stage, cede ground to
our adversaries.
I am pleased that Congress, in exercising our
constitutional prerogative as a separate and co-equal branch of
government, has appropriated funds that we need to secure our
interests and protect our citizens abroad.
I agree with your national security strategy assessment
that Russia poses a threat to democratic partners across
Europe. Yet, you propose cutting those funds to support
democratic institution building.
I applaud the administration's continuation of the Obama-
era policy ISIS strategy, working with critical partners, that
has led to the expulsion of ISIS from physical territory. And I
am pleased that at the urging of Congress and of allies, you
seem to be willing to keep U.S. troops in place to help secure
our interests. But as General Voltel warns, the fight is far
from over.
Yet, your budget does not contain the sustained diplomatic
and development resources we need to truly combat this evil.
The world faces a truly existential crisis with climate change,
and our own Defense Department continues to warn about the
serious global implications of famine, migration, and conflict
it may bear. Yet, your budget seems to pretend that the problem
does not even exist.
Again, I agree with this administration's assessment that
China presents new and evolving challenges across the Indo-
Pacific and the world, challenges we must confront with a
robust diplomatic and economic agenda. Your budget proposes a
cut of close to 20 percent from the fiscal year 2017 actual
budget to meet our commitments in the Indo-Pacific.
At your own department, in Foggy Bottom, this
administration's disdain for civil servants and the value of
experienced professionals is weakening the foundational
component of U.S. foreign policy, our diplomatic, and
development professionals.
I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record two
columns by Ambassador Stephenson as to the hollowing out of the
State Department.
The Chairman. They will be entered.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
the hearing.]
Senator Menendez. Finally, on the matter of oversight, I
would like to flag for your attention a classified matter that
the committee had a briefing on yesterday, the details of which
I won't and can't discuss here. Where we raised with the
Department an important issue that had not previously been
shared with us. Would not, in fact, had been shared with us had
we not raised it with you. And may have made the difference in
how senators voted on a particular matter. As I am sure you
appreciate, that is simply unacceptable.
If the committee is to be able to function, if Congress is
to play its constitutionally mandated role, the Department
needs to do a better job of engaging with us, briefing us, and
responding to our requests. Right now, the situation is not
acceptable, and I would be happy to discuss this further with
you in a classified setting, as I am sure many of my colleagues
would.
When you were confirmed as secretary, I had hoped that you
would be empowered and committed to promoting core American
values and interests on the global stage. But we have seen the
administration undermine our values with Saudi Arabia. We have
seen maximum pressure on North Korea whittled away one tweet at
a time. We have seen the administration pursue illogical
misogynistic policies to play domestic reproductive rights
politics for political ambitions on the backs of the world's
poorest women.
So as I see it, the challenge for this committee is two-
fold. Insurance that Congress serves as a coequal branch on
government, and check and power from the White House, and
helping to inform the American people why that is important.
Restoring the State Department and USAID budgets is a starting
point, but we must be more effective in holding the
administration accountable for its foreign policy shortcomings
as well, and reminding the American people about the importance
of core American values, like democracy, governance, and human
rights as drivers of our foreign policy.
It is these fundamental values, along with America's
unparalleled strengths on the global stage, a military second
to none, a vital economy, driven by innovation and
technological ingenuity, a reservoir of goodwill with our
allies and partners that provide us the opportunity to define a
new role, and a new grand strategy for the 21st century.
I said earlier that I was skeptical of the administration's
ability to be equal to this moment in world history. But Mr.
Secretary, I want you to prove me wrong. An opportunity remains
to take hold of the moment before us, to face squarely the new
challenges of this more competitive era, and to replenish our
vision, reinvigorate our diplomacy, revive our partnerships,
and to restore American leadership for a new era. And I look
forward to the questions to pursue that for you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
And with that, we are going to hear from Secretary Pompeo.
As a graduate of West Point, and with your Harvard law degree,
you are certainly qualified for this job. But more importantly,
as the ranking member referred to a classified briefing that we
had yesterday, I think that that time you spent as head of the
CIA really uniquely qualifies you for this job.
We on this committee--I have the advantage of being on both
committees. And there is only two of us, Senator Rubio and I,
that have earned that position. And we had a stark reminder
yesterday of the tremendous amount of information that is out
there in the classified setting that we can't talk about at
hearings like this. But Senator Menendez is correct that there
are items that we need a closer bond on.
This isn't your fault. It is the way that the system works
here, where we have a separate foreign relations and
intelligence committee, and the volume of what we deal with in
Intel, as you know, is just staggering. And it affects what we
do here. So anyway, probably as much as we can talk about here.
But with that, Secretary Pompeo, the floor is yours.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.
The Chairman. A warm welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Pompeo. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Senator
Menendez, ranking member, thank you, sir.
In my testimony yesterday to the Appropriations Committee I
took a few moments to describe the administration's greatest
foreign policy challenges, what we have done to solve them, how
we benefited the American people by doing so. And I want to
spend a few minutes talking about that same set of issues here
with you all this morning.
When we took office, we inherited the most complex set of
threats that the United States of America has faced since World
War II. We faced a China that was turning towards
authoritarianism, turning away from market liberalization, and
turning the screws on its minority populations in a truly
Orwellian fashion.
We faced an Iranian regime that, flush with cash from the
nuclear deal, set about seating terror from Yemen, to Syria, to
Lebanon, and beyond. We faced a Russia that felt no compunction
about invading Ukraine, seizing Crimea, meddling in our
elections, and breaking arms control treaties.
We faced a North Korea that continued to pursue its nuclear
and missile proliferation threats to our nation. And we faced
the terror, the threat that was more deadly and stretched
across a far wider geography.
What'd we do? First, the Trump administration recognized
and faced reality. We know we can't make sound policy based on
wishful thinking. Can't lead from behind. We leveled with the
American people and our friends and partners about the threats
that we face individually and collectively.
This honesty produced growing bipartisan consensus on
Capitol Hill about the need to confront Chinese aggression, and
produced unanimous consensus inside of NATO that arms control
agreements like the IMF treaty are worthless if only one party
adheres to their terms. It produced international support for
the brave people of Venezuela, basing policy on reality.
We recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital. We recognized
Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. It is why the
State Department designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps as a terror organization on Monday. It is just a simple
recognition of reality.
Second, we just created diplomacy to build coalitions to
confront our enemies. We know we can't nor should we do
everything ourselves. We convinced our NATO allies to spend
more on their own defense. We rallied the Defeat ISIS Coalition
to dismantle the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
We convened over 60 countries in Warsaw to discuss common
threats and shared opportunities in the Middle East. And that
included both Arab and Israeli leaders talking to each other.
We're getting our Middle East strategic alliance off the
ground. And we have built out an Indo-Pacific strategy to do a
true pivot to Asia.
We have supported our hemispheric partners in the OAS and
the Lima Group as they work to support the Venezuelan people,
and we forged the global coalition at the United Nations to
impose the toughest ever sanctions on the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
So what'd we get? Third. What are the outcomes? This
administration promised to dismantle the Caliphate, and we have
done it. We promised to confront China for its unfair
practices, and call them out on human rights violations. We
have done that, too.
We promised to exit the Iran Nuclear Deal to exert pressure
on Tehran to change its murderous ways. Still more work to do.
We are working every day to protect our citizens at home and
abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support our
allies and partners overseas.
Finally, one point. Each of you too in your opening remarks
alluded to this. When I became Secretary of State, I promised I
would put diplomacy at the forefront of defending U.S. National
Security to give State its swagger back. I think we have made a
lot of progress.
Here is what we have done. It has been 11 months and a
couple weeks now. I lifted the hiring freeze both on our team
and employee family members. This was a no-brainer. Taking
2,000 talented people and putting them back in the workforce.
We reinstituted promotion rates for the Foreign Services.
We will have more Foreign Service officers by the end of this
calendar year than ever in the history of the United States of
America. The notion that we have been hollowed out is simply
not factually based.
New Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service specialist
classes are being admitted. Fifty-five senior leaders have been
confirmed by the Senate. I appreciate that.
I hold small group events, both when I am traveling at
embassies. I do it in Washington and other places where State
Department has--we call them ``Meet with Mike,'' where I hear
directly from our team. And more importantly, I get to hear the
things that we are doing well and the things that they wish we
were doing still better. I have learned a great deal from these
professionals.
Back in the states, I have traveled a bit. I travel around
the country talking about the importance of diplomacy in
America, and frankly, doing some recruiting work as well to
make sure we have America's finest joining our team.
At my recommendation President Trump and the Senate
recognized four individuals with the rank of career ambassador.
David Hale, Phil Goldberg, Michelle Sison, Dan Smith, who leads
our Foreign Service Institute. The rest of our team knows that
they can look up to these true diplomatic professionals.
I have a lot more to say, but I will end there. I look
forward to discussing the administration's foreign policy, and
the $40 billion budget request for the State Department and the
USAID for fiscal year 2020.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pompeo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Pompeo
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members
of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
administration's FY 2020 budget request for the State Department and
the U.S. Agency for International Development.
To support our National Security Strategy and achieve our foreign
policy goals, the President has submitted an FY 2020 budget request of
$40 billion for the State Department and USAID.
The proposed request will allow us to protect our citizens at home
and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support our
allies and partners overseas.
It will promote partner countries' economic and security self-
reliance as they begin to transition away from U.S. assistance
programs, which the American people have generously underwritten for
decades.
We make this request mindful of the burden on American taxpayers,
and our obligation to deliver exceptional results on their behalf.
In an era of great power competition, the State Department and
USAID's work is key to our security, the protection of our freedoms,
and the promotion of American values.
China is proactively applying its power and exerting its influence
in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Under President Trump's
leadership, the United States is responding decisively to China's
aggressive actions. The United States' future security, prosperity, and
leadership depends on maintaining a free, open, and secure Indo-
Pacific. To advance the Indo-Pacific strategy, the budget request
nearly doubles U.S. foreign assistance resources targeting this crucial
area compared to the FY 2019 request.
Russia poses threats that have evolved beyond external or military
aggression, and now include influence operations targeting America and
the Western world. This budget prioritizes countering Russian malign
influence in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, and further strengthens
the Department's own systems against malign actors.
Our diplomatic efforts toward the final, fully-verified
denuclearization of North Korea are the most successful that have ever
been undertaken. We remain committed to that goal. This budget provides
for our diplomatic outreach to continue, and to continue implementation
and enforcement of sanctions until we achieve our objective.
We know that the Islamic Republic of Iran's authoritarian regime
will continue to use their nation's resources to proliferate conflict
in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and beyond. It will continue to bankroll
terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
The United States will therefore work together with our allies and
partners to counter Tehran's aggressive actions to undermine peace and
security in the Middle East and beyond.
As the people of Venezuela continue to fight for their freedom, the
budget request includes funding to support democracy and prosperity in
Venezuela. The budget also requests new authority to support a
democratic transition in Venezuela, including transferring up to $500
million to foreign assistance accounts.
The budget also delivers on the President's commitment to optimize
the effectiveness of our outdated and fragmented overseas humanitarian
assistance. It ensures the United States will remain the world's
largest single donor of humanitarian assistance. The proposal maximizes
the impact of taxpayer dollars, helps more beneficiaries, and delivers
the greatest outcomes by consolidating our humanitarian programming in
a new bureau at USAID. This budget request also preserves the State
Department's lead role on protection issues, as well as the U.S.
refugee admissions program. Further, through available funding in 2019
and 2020, the United States will have on average approximately $9
billion available per year to support overseas humanitarian programs,
maintaining the highest level of U.S. overseas humanitarian funding
ever.
President Trump has made the protection of religious freedom a key
priority at home and abroad. The Fiscal Year 2020 budget supports our
efforts to continue U.S. leadership in the promotion of global
religious freedom and the protection of persecuted religious and ethnic
minorities all around the world. This July, the State Department will
host the second annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.
American assistance is helping to reverse the devastation and
suffering caused by ISIS and associated terrorist groups. But much work
remains to be done. Working by, with, and through local partners and
community leaders, our assistance programs clear explosive remnants of
war to help keep families safe, restore access to critical health and
education services, improve economic opportunities, and more.
As we work to promote economic growth, the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget
includes a request for $100 million for a new Fund at USAID for the
White House-led Women's Global Development and Prosperity Initiative.
Through the Fund, we will work to find and scale proposals that advance
women's economic empowerment across the developing world, in support of
the Initiative's goal of reaching 50 million women by 2025.
There are few efforts as important to this administration and to
the safety and security of the American people as border security. The
State Department and USAID budget request will strengthen visa vetting,
and improve our targeting of illicit pathways that transnational
criminal organizations use to traffic people, drugs, money, and weapons
into our nation.
President Trump has made it clear that U.S. foreign assistance
should serve America's interests, and should support countries that
help us to advance our foreign policy goals. This budget therefore
maintains critical support for key U.S. allies, including Israel,
Jordan, Egypt, and Colombia, among others.
The FY 2020 Request also includes $175 million for a Diplomatic
Progress Fund. These funds will be used to respond to new opportunities
arising from potential progress in diplomatic and peace efforts around
the world.
Finally, the diplomatic challenges we face today are compounded by
rapid advancements in technology and an ever-changing media
environment. We need our colleagues to be safe, prepared, and ready to
take on any challenge at a moment's notice. The FY 2020 budget will
fully fund State and USAID's current workforce levels, enabling us to
take on emerging policy challenges. We are also modernizing our human
resources, IT infrastructure, and organizational structures to stay on
the cutting edge of 21st century innovation.
We must continue to put American interests first and remain a
beacon of freedom to the world. With the support of Congress, and
through the strategic, efficient use of resources, this budget will do
just that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. We appreciate that. I am going to
reserve questioning as we go down the pike, and so I will first
yield to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the administration's recent decision to cut
all U.S. aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras appears to
me to stand out as a self-inflicted wound to our national
security and our national interests.
Just 6 months ago Vice President Pence said that the United
States, ``Has never been more committed to strengthening our
partnership with the nations in the Northern Triangle.'' And to
address the drug trafficking gains and criminal violence,
forcing people to flee their countries, he said, ``We must
confront them at their source within the Northern Triangle.''
So let me ask you a few basic yes or no questions. Do you
believe that U.S. foreign assistance advances our national
security?
Secretary Pompeo. Are you speaking about in the Northern
Triangle countries and its effectiveness, or are you speaking
broadly as for----
Senator Menendez. Let us start broadly.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. If done properly, done
effectively, it certainly can.
Senator Menendez. Do you believe that it is in the U.S.
national interest to work with countries around the globe to
combat drug trafficking and transnational criminal
organizations?
Secretary Pompeo. To do this effectively you need partners
all around the world. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Do you believe that U.S. national
security is advanced by terminating funding for law enforcement
cooperation with Central American countries?
Secretary Pompeo. If I may explain the decision that we
have made, and why the President made that decision. It begins
with the fact that there is an enormous crisis at our southern
border. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of
dollars to try and build out solutions--foreign assistance
dollars, to try and build out solutions in these three
countries, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
You can see it is a fact of this crisis at the southern
border that it has not been effective, and so we are
endeavoring to change that, right? We deal in reality. It is
not enough to take taxpayer money and spend it there. You need
to get something for that. And that is what we are engaged in
now.
We are having conversations with the leadership in those
countries. We want better lives for those people, but most
importantly, we want to make sure that every dollar, taxpayer
dollar we spend in the Northern Triangle is effectively used.
Senator Menendez. Well, we certainly want every taxpayer
dollar spent anywhere in the world to be effective. But to
believe that longstanding challenges--I think the Vice
President had it right only 6 months ago when he made the
statements that he made. U.S. national security is not advanced
by terminating funding for law enforcement cooperation with
Central American countries. U.S. national interests are not
advanced by terminating funding for programs that strengthen
the rule of law.
Why are people fleeing? They are fleeing because of violent
crime. Their choice is stay or die, or flee, and have a chance
at living, or stay and see my daughter raped, or stay and see
my son forcibly put into a gang. We need to fight at the very
essence of that. And the very essence of that is not at our
border. It is in Central America.
I don't understand how that, the USAID programs that
stabilize Central American countries by promoting economic
development, helping people find opportunities in their own
countries. I think the administration had it right, and that
Congress is urging when you were involved with Central America,
and trying to get to the root causes, all this will do is
create greater instability in the region, and will drive more
people in fear and in hopelessness to the border, and we will
exacerbate the situation.
So I really urge you to recalibrate that, because it is
just a fundamentally wrong policy.
Let me switch to something we do agree on, Venezuela. And
along with Senator Rubio and 10 members of this committee, we
have introduced legislation last week reinforcing several
elements of the administration's strategy, and dramatically
expanding our humanitarian response with 400 million in new
aid.
But I have two questions in this regard. Number one, what
is the department doing to internationalize our sanctions, and
try to get the European, Canadians, and Latin American partners
to join us. And why haven't we convened an international donor
summit? And will you consider doing that?
Secretary Pompeo. The second one, we will absolutely
consider it. We will see who the right leader for that should
be to actually convene that. It is absolutely a central part of
the day that we are successful there in support of the
Venezuelan people to achieve democracy in the way they so
richly deserve. But there will be resources required, and I am
confident we will find partners all around the world that would
be part of that. And a donors' conference will be an element of
effectuating that.
Your first question was, we are working with some 50-plus
nations now that have recognized the new government, the
leadership under Juan Guaido, to sanction in the same way that
we have. We are continuing to push. We have demarched countries
all across the world. We are trying to bring more to the
coalition of 54, and we are trying to get those 54 to impose
sanctions that match the ones that the United States has
imposed.
Senator Menendez. And that is critical.
Last question. January marked the 1-year anniversary of
landmark agreements between the U.S. and Qatar regarding
government subsidies to Qatar Airways, the state-owned airline.
In addition to committing to financial transparency, in a
side letter to the agreement, the Qatari government indicated
that there was no intention to launch additional fifth freedom
flights, flights launched from Qatar, but picking up passengers
in Europe before flying to U.S. destinations.
Yet, at the same time as the agreement was being negotiated
Qatar Airways acquired a 49th percent state in Air Italy, a
formerly struggling regional Italian carrier, rebranded it as
an international carrier, with flights to five U.S.
destinations from Milan. That runs directly counter to the 1-
year agreement.
Are you aware of this, and if so, what efforts are under
way to enforce the agreements that are in place?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am personally aware that I
have personally engaged on this issue, and we are working to
make sure that every party to those agreements complies with
every element of those agreements.
In fact, I will engage again tomorrow with several of the
parties that are in this--the United States government sees
what is going on, and we are working to put this agreement--we
think it was a good agreement. We are trying to just make sure
that it is enforced.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And lest people think that there we are totally divided on
things, those last two issues, as you know, were--this
committee is, I think, uniformly in favor of the discrimination
against our carriers that has taken place by the Middle East
carriers.
And secondly, the support of the Juan Guaido
administration, the true president of Venezuela, is so
important to all of us. And we sincerely appreciate the
administration's efforts in that regard, and we will support it
100 percent.
With that, Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson. Last Monday I met with Brian Bulatao, the
nominee for undersecretary of management. Now first of all,
that is the second time I have met with him. Normally the way
this process works, I meet with the nominee, we go through the
confirmation process. The nominee gets confirmed, and we just
start talking to those people in hearings like this.
So the fact that such a qualified individual, West Point
graduate, somebody's who has served in a lead management role
in the private sector, most recently chief operating officer of
the CIA, has been languishing as nominee for 9 months, I think
is a disgrace, you know, particularly when you have Senator
Menendez talking about the hollowing out of the State
Department, which you have I think rightly disputed.
Can you just speak to how crucial it is to get Mr. Bulatao
confirmed as basically the chief operating officer, the
undersecretary of management for the State Department, so you
can carry out your vital mission?
Secretary Pompeo. So full disclosure, I have known Brian
for 35-plus years. Tells you how old I am. But more
importantly, we have not had an undersecretary for management,
essentially, the chief operating officer, at the State
Department for 2 years now.
The gentleman who is filling that role, Bill Todd, is a
great officer, a great civil servant, but we need the confirmed
leadership in that position to execute all of the security
issues, all of the administrative issues. The enormous
bureaucracy of 92,000 people to administer falls under the
undersecretary for management. The absence of having someone
confirmed to that position has made each of those tasks more
difficult.
Senator Johnson. Are you aware of any legitimate reason for
holding this nomination up? Are they just pure partisan
politics?
Secretary Pompeo. I am not aware of anything that relates
directly to Mr. Bulatao's qualifications.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Well, again, I urge this committee,
I urge the Senate to quickly confirm Mr. Bulatao.
I also want to pick up on the whole situation with the
Northern Triangle, our humanitarian crisis at the border. 2014,
we had 120,000 unaccompanied children and people's family
units. President Obama correctly called it a humanitarian
crisis.
The first 6 months of this year we are already over
240,000, primarily people now coming in as family units. And I
will dispute with Senator Menendez that there is no doubt that
people are fleeing some violence. But there is also no doubt an
awful lot of those individuals are coming here for economic
opportunity, family reunification, which I am highly
sympathetic with, but it is not a valid asylum claim.
The truth is 85 percent of those asylum claims are denied.
As you have pointed out, we spent hundreds of millions of
dollars in development down there, but until we crush the drug
cartels, I don't see the development dollars doing a whole lot
of good. And it is certainly going to do nothing to solve this
problem in the here and now of individuals coming here
completely exploiting U.S. laws.
The ball is in Congress's court. We have to act. We have to
change these laws to first and foremost reduce, if not stop,
that flow of illegal immigration, the majority of which really
is economic migration and family reunification.
In your former capacity, and your current capacity, can you
just talk about, I have met with the Mexican ambassador twice,
the new administration. I think they are genuinely interested
in working with us to solve this problem. But they were talking
about development dollars. And I understand that. That is a
long-term solution. But we are whistling by the graveyard if we
don't address and talk about an effective strategy for crushing
the drug cartels.
Can you just talk about how difficult that is, the
challenge that presents to America?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator Johnson, this has been a--it is a
long-time challenge. We have had times where we have made more
progress, and then it has gotten worse, or regressed. The
complexity, the money, these are powerful organizations inside
of Mexico, with huge incentives to continue to deliver these
drugs, whether that is cocaine or opioids into our country. It
is an incredibly lucrative undertaking. So every element of
American power needs to be deployed to take them down.
And then we need partners, partners like the Mexican
government, partners like the country of Central America. We
need China to do what President Xi committed he would do on
fentanyl. It is going to take a combined effort, lots of
streams, lots of work streams to pull it off. But the risk that
it presents to America is enormous. It is an important foreign
policy problem often masquerading as a law enforcement problem.
We are deeply engaged. Foreign Minister Ebrard has been a
good partner so far in his time in leadership in the Mexican
government. I am convinced they want to help us. We need to
help them do it.
Senator Johnson. This is going to require a multinational
effort. One thing we found out in hearing just this week, and
last week as well, is the southern border is totally controlled
on the southern side of the border by the drug and the human
trafficking cartels. Nobody passes virtually without paying the
fee.
So this is a highly organized effort, exploiting our laws,
and we are going to need through all diplomacy, and I think
that is what this administration is trying to do, get the
attention of Central American nations and Mexico, we need your
help to solve this problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much, Senator Johnson. Next,
we will have Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your service, and
thank you very much for being here.
This is a hearing to review the budget for fiscal year
2020, and budget speaks to priorities. So I want to start to
give you a chance to respond to the visual concern that a 30
percent cut in the State Department budget looks like we are
cutting back diplomacy as a tool by 30 percent. But I want to
get to your statement about promoting American values that you
just mentioned.
Democracy programs are reduced by almost 50 percent in this
budget. In July, there was a conference in Copenhagen that
pointed out that we have seen a decline in democratic states
around the world. And we know that we are being attacked on
democratic institutions by both Russia, and China, and other
actors.
So what are we doing to promote democracy with such a
dramatic reduction in the tools that are available in the State
Department if the fiscal year 2020 budget became real?
Before you respond, I would also say one of the real
opportunities to promote American values of democracy
governance, human rights, and anti-corruption are on the
bilateral, multi-lateral meetings that we have. And yet, there
has been silence in regards to North Korea, Kim Jong-un's
treatment of his own people, being the worst human rights
record of any country in the world.
And we still have not gotten a response to a full
accounting of what happened in Saudi Arabia on the tragic death
of Jamal Khashoggi.
So can you just explain to me how you are promoting
American values of democracy, good governance, human rights,
anti-corruption, in light of the fact that the budget cuts
this, and we have not seen the visibility during highly
important moments with other countries, these issues being
raised?
Secretary Pompeo. Sir, I would just disagree with about
everything you opened with in your----
Senator Cardin. The budget, 30 percent cut?
Secretary Pompeo. This administration has been incredibly
active, but more importantly, incredibly effective at promoting
democracy around the world. We are engaged. You mentioned a
couple particular items. Happy to talk about those in great
detail, if you would like, but our engagement, building up
coalitions around the world, part of democracy promotion. You
do not think about the work to defeat ISIS as an element of
that.
To create the political stability inside of Syria, so that
we can get a political resolution there. The work that we are
doing in Venezuela. The fact that we are fighting for the
people in the Islamic Republic of Iran. And at forums all
across the world, my team is in the field working to promote
the very values that you just described.
Senator Cardin. Well, the facts are the facts. The budget
submissions are budget submissions.
Let me go to the Northern Triangle for one moment in
response to the last questions. Our involvement in the Northern
Triangle is critically important for many reasons. These are
countries that have significant problems with corruption. And
the United States has participated with the international
community to try to root out the corruption in the Northern
Triangle.
Are you committed to working with this committee? We are
looking at additional legislation to give additional tools in
regards to identifying corruption issues, so that in our
bilateral and regional relationships, the issues of fighting
corruption will be front and center in these debates.
Do you agree with that approach?
Secretary Pompeo. I do. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. And we will have some
legislation, as I talked to you earlier, that we would like to
work with you on.
I want to talk a little bit about North Korea, if I might.
We have had two summits between the leader of North Korea and
the United States. Have we reached an agreement of what the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would look like?
Secretary Pompeo. I can't answer that question yes or no.
We have had extensive conversations with the North Koreans
about what the full final denuclearization, as verified by the
international community, what ultimately would look like. It
would look like the fully denuclearized North Korea. That is
what it would look like.
Senator Cardin. Has Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea,
agreed on that assessment on the--what the denuclearization
would be involved?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. He has made the commitment to me
more than half-a-dozen times. He has made the commitment to the
President of the United States, and it is in writing.
Senator Cardin. Has he given you a declaration as to their
current nuclear programs, and a way in which they would move
from their current nuclear programs to total denuclearization?
Secretary Pompeo. There is still a great deal of work to do
to achieve the ultimate goal.
Senator Cardin. And, of course, we have had hearings before
this committee that indicate that that is really the first step
on denuclearization, is understanding their program, and having
a commitment to end it, and a roadmap that can lead to that
commitment. That is usually the preliminaries.
We now have had two summit meetings, and we don't yet have
that in place.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I wish we had gotten that from
the Iranians.
Senator Cardin. I do believe we have a----
Secretary Pompeo. It was a total fraud, Senator, and
everyone knew it. The declaration the Iranians made was
completely fraught with errors, both intentional, and
otherwise. We understand that you need a baseline to begin to
denuclearize North Korea, and we are determined to get there.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate your pivot to my question.
Secretary Pompeo. Well, I answered your question. We have
got work to do, Senator.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. And I am trying to focus
on North Korea. In Iran, there are boots on the--we have
people, not us, the international community has inspectors that
are looking at sites. Do we have international inspectors in
North Korea?
Secretary Pompeo. We do not.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to see you.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, sir.
Senator Romney. I appreciate your service to our country.
You are a man of extraordinary capacity, having worked in the
private sector, having served in the CIA, as well as other
parts of the public sector. And, of course, having gone to the
best law school in the world. So I appreciate your capacity to
consider the kind of challenges we have.
It is no surprise to anyone that China has ambition to
dominate the world, economically, militarily, geopolitically.
And it would be a very, very different world, indeed, if they
had the capacity and the ability to do that.
I applaud the fact that the administration is taking action
to push back against some of China's plans, specifically the
imbalance of trade, the theft of intellectual property, and the
forced transfer of technology, as companies are considering
moving into the Chinese market.
But I wonder whether we are really addressing and
confronting in a holistic strategy the various initiatives that
China is undertaking. And there are some that I don't know
whether we have plans afoot to deal with them piece by piece,
or whether we need something more expansive, but some kind of
mind--is, of course, the fact that China has, if you will, an
industrial policy, or a form of free enterprise, where they
subsidize massively industries of the future, whether that is
5G, or telecommunications systems, or artificial intelligence.
So we welcome them into a world where we say we believe in
free markets, and yet, they participate in an unfree way, and
that presents a challenge.
They also are reported to buy American and other Western
companies, small companies that have good technology, steal
that technology, and take it back to their more domestic
purposes.
They have a very extensive propaganda program in our
country and throughout the West. The Confucius Institutes are
clearly a part of that, and yet, we have high schools,
elementary schools, and universities in our country that don't
seem to understand that by accepting the Confucius Institute,
that they are participating in Chinese propaganda in our own
country.
Of course, there is the extraordinary oppression of human
beings that we are seeing with the Uyghur in their own country.
And then there is their ambition in the South China Sea, which
is obviously challenging in its own right.
So my question is, do we have a robust strategy to counter
the entire Chinese effort? And particularly on those items that
I mentioned, are we considering those, or do we need to take a
deeper dive into how to really confront what is, in my view,
the great threat of this century, which is an authoritarian
regime bent on dominating the world, which would be bad for
free enterprise, for freedom, and for the prosperity of America
and the world?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it is an important question,
maybe the most important question that I will get asked today.
I think the world was slow to recognize the challenge that
China has begun to present. I think we are now much further
along the way than we were just 2 years ago. The first step is
always to recognize the challenge you have in front of you, and
then second, how to chart a course to confront each of those
various challenges.
You talked about a challenge from the Orwellian nature, of
the absence of human rights, inside of China. It is not just
Uyghurs. It is Cossacks. It's Christians. It's broader than
that.
If you have seen these stories of this app that is being
used. It is the Little Red Book, Mao's Little Red Book brought
to your iPhone, where they have people put in their phone
numbers and their names, and they get points for answering
questions about Xi's policies. It is really quite something.
Their military is on the advance. You have seen in the
technology space. The State Department has a role in each of
those. Obviously, other agencies have a bigger part in some of
them. But our effort has been brought, first, to let the world
know of these challenges. So our team, across 180-plus
embassies, is out talking to our partners, sharing with them
the risks, identifying the information we have, so that they
will begin to take this challenge seriously.
With respect to predatorial lending and forced technology
transfer, we are telling these countries about what will happen
to them. It may feel good for a year, or 2 years, when you get
that new project, but the legacy, the overhang will be
enormously bad for the people of your country.
And then there is a significant undertaking, more broad
than the State Department inside the United States government,
to make sure that these technology challenges, making sure that
America remains in the front on AI, in front of the next
wireless wave 5G. All the issues that will dominate commerce
and the rule of law in the decades ahead, that the United
States is positioned properly.
We confronted an enormously difficult challenge. They take
their big companies, and make them subservient to their
government. We do not roll that way. We should not roll that
way. But I believe ultimately we will prevail with rule law
transparency as long as we are serious and focused on this set
of issues.
Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. I agree with
almost everything you said, except I know there are at least
three members who are graduates--or three people in this room
who are graduates of the University of Idaho College of Law
that would take exception regarding the law school.
Senator Romney. Did not get into Harvard, did they?
[Laughter]
The Chairman. They did not apply. Thank you so much.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, we had a hearing in the Armed
Services Committee about 10 days ago with Secretary Perry, who
is on an annual to talk about the DOE's programs that support
the military, primarily nuclear reactors.
And I asked him about news that had broken just within
about a day of the hearing, about Part 810 authorizations that
I think are in his bailiwick, where he would authorize transfer
of nuclear knowhow. Not technology, but nuclear knowhow from
American companies to foreign nations. He indicated during the
hearing that he had signed seven such approvals, authorizations
for transfers of technology to Saudi Arabia.
My understanding is the Part 810 process requires that
there be a State Department sign-off on that. Is that correct?
Secretary Pompeo. I believe that is correct. We are aware
of these Part 810 issues.
Senator Kaine. He had kept these private in a way that was
counter to earlier practice, where the authorizations, at least
the fact of the authorizations had been made public. He
described it as necessary to protect proprietary information. I
asked him, ``Well, you could keep the proprietary information
private. What about the fact of the authorizations?''
Did the State Department have to sign off on the DOE
keeping the fact of these authorizations private?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I do not know the answer to
that, but I will get you an answer on whether we signed off on
the decision not to release that information, or more broadly,
if were involved in that decision.
Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. I will follow-up with
that.
And then finally, I also asked him about the date of the
authorizations. The seven occurred from inauguration day 2017,
but I asked if he knew anything about the dates. Do you know
whether any of the authorizations occurred after October 2,
2018?
Secretary Pompeo. I do not. I do not know. I am sorry,
Senator. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. I will follow-up with that as well.
Another question on Saudi Arabia. I am just referring to an
article in the National Interest dated September 22, 2018,
which references earlier reporting by Newsweek. The story that
I'm looking at and that I would like to introduce for the
record, if I might, Mr. Chair, is titled ``Saudi Arabia Already
Has a Ballistic Missile Arsenal Courtesy of China, with a
Little Help From the CIA.'' And it is a summary of Saudi
purchases of ballistic missiles from China, beginning in the
1980s.
[The information referred to above is located at the end of
the hearing.]
There was a set of purchases in the '80s. And then there is
also reporting about purchases that were done, I think, in the
2007, 2008 timeframe that the CIA helped broker. The reporting
of it by Newsweek was done in 2014. And then the assessment by
the National Interest about the scope of the Saudi ballistic
missile program, including purchase of missiles from China,
this piece was written in September.
There are a lot of issues with Saudi Arabia right now. We
are grappling with Yemen. We are grappling with human rights
concerns. We are grappling with these Part 810 authorizations.
We are trying to get more information about that.
What should this committee--or what concerns should this
committee have about the development of ballistic missile
programs in Saudi Arabia? The National Interest article
suggests that the missiles are pointed at both Iran and Israel.
That is in the National Interest piece that I have introduced.
What concerns should we have about the development of a
Saudi ballistic missile program, and particularly the acquiring
of missile technology from nations like China?
Secretary Pompeo. So two thoughts. We should absolutely be
interested in that. We should know the fact that they are
purchasing from China--I think there have been those who have
urged the United States to take a different posture with
respect to Saudi Arabia, not to sell them technology. I think
you see the risks that are created. It would be better if the
United States was involved in those transactions than if China
was.
I can't comment. I have seen that reporting publicly as
well. I can't say much about it here. I am confident the
intelligence community can give you a full briefing with
respect to this. But missiles in the Middle East is an
increasing threat.
Frankly, missiles more broadly throughout the world
continue to be an increasing risk. The technology has gotten
cheaper. The information is now much more widespread, so
capabilities are growing in lots of countries, some of which
are friendly partner countries today, but may not be 5, 10, 20
years from now. And some of which are adversaries even today.
We think about nuclear proliferation. Threats of missile
proliferation are very real as well, and something that this
committee should absolutely be looking into.
Senator Kaine. So nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,
missile proliferation in the Middle East, these are things that
this committee and other committees need to take very
seriously.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Senator Kaine. I yield back the rest of my time. Thanks,
Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. I want to commend the chairman and the
ranking member on their statements about the Qatar situation
with our airlines. And I would like to ask the Secretary, as I
understand in the agreement, on Open Skies agreement, there is
a provision where one of the parties, including us, would call
for what is known as formal consultations if there are concerns
over the good behavior of both parties on that.
Would you get us into a situation where we could call for
those consultations? Are we at the point where we need to have
consultations with Kunar?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I don't know if we are quite
there yet. There are lots of consultations taking place. Not
through the mechanism that you are describing. It may be that
that is ultimately what will be required.
You know the history of this challenge. We thought we had
put together a truly good deal that was good for U.S. domestic
businesses that honored the commitments that had been made
previously. We thought we were in a very good place. We are
looking very closely at this recent decision by Qatar to take
on 49 percent of this airline.
We understand the risk of the efforts to circumvent, and we
are working to make sure that everyone is complying with the
agreement that they entered into.
Senator Isakson. Well, I appreciate that. It is
interesting, because it is very important, and it is important
to many, many Georgians. But the entire aviation industry, both
manufacturing aviation, as well as providing flights in the
United States. And I would appreciate you doing all you can----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. --and what you are doing already.
And I want to say thank you tremendously for meeting with
some of the hostages who survived the Iran hostage crisis a
number of years ago now. In fact, there are still a number of
those people alive; although, some of them have passed, and
some of them are in conditions that are not at all conducive to
living a normal life, much less a happy life.
As their time runs out, so does the opportunity for them to
collect on the rewards that were made to them from the funds
that were available. As a matter of fact, the first release
they got, they got about 14 percent of what was owed to them in
total. The last release that went from 14 percent to 4 percent,
not because they reduced the amount of money from the fund that
they took out, because 3,000 other people were added to the
fund, and the special magistrate's choice to give that money
out.
And I am really worried about them ending up not getting
what they should have gotten. These people went through
probably as bad a torture, as bad a treatment as any American
ever did. It was the formation of the Nightline TV show, with
444 nights when all America saw what was happening to them. So
I am really concerned about them, and I want to do everything
we can to see to it that they get their money and they are
spoken for.
Have you talked with Attorney General Barr about their
situation?
Secretary Pompeo. I have not had a chance to do that yet.
It is an important issue. Fifty-two hostages, 444 days.
Frankly, held by some of the same people who are leading the
Islamic Republic of Iran today, beaten by those very same human
beings. I am aware of the situation with respect to them
getting the money that they deserve, and I will have a
conversation with Attorney General Barr. I have not had a
chance to do that yet.
Senator Isakson. I would really appreciate it if you would.
I think about it every day. Colonel Scott, from Georgia, Stone
Mountain, Georgia was one of those victims.
He is a wonderful man. He is aging, as all of us are, and I
would love to see the families get the money that was intended
to go to them, to go to them.
Lastly, I want to talk about New START for just a second. I
supported the START treaty 4 or 5 years ago when we ratified
and extended it. And I know it comes up in 2 years, I think,
for renegotiation. I think there are preliminary talks are
going on, am I not correct?
Secretary Pompeo. That is correct. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. Some of those nuclear treaties have been
canceled in recent years, and there are some people who have
misperceptions of different nuclear agreements, like IMF and
other things like that. The thing I liked about the START
Treaty, and the reason I spoke for it and worked with Secretary
Kerry to get the votes to pass it was because it had a unique
identifier system which we never had available to us before the
Russians, so we could more accurately count their weapons. Not
just calling them to be counted. We had a way of counting them.
Second, we had the no-notice inspection provisions where we
could have Russians would be in the United States, and would
have access to our facilities, and we put Americans in Russia
to have access to theirs. So having that kind of elevated
accountability was good to me, was something that I thought was
good for the country.
What stage are we on New START? Are we going in the right
direction, and do you think New START has served us well so
far?
Secretary Pompeo. So New START, different than the IMF
Treaty, there is large compliance with the New START agreement
on both sides. There are some arguments on the edge of each,
but largely they have been compliant, both the Russians and the
United States have been compliant. We are at the very beginning
of conversations about renewing that. If we can get the deal
right, if we can make sure that it fits 2021, and beyond,
President Trump has made it very clear that if we can get a
good solid arms control agreement, we ought to get one. And we
are at the start of having those conversations.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you
for the great work you are doing.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you, that
New START is going to be very important to us, and we are
living in a different world than when the original START Treaty
was put together. And there is going to have to be
accommodations for that for other powers in the world that are
not a member of the treaty. So thank you.
With that, Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you said that the renewal depends on fitting
2021 and beyond. What are the two or three key things that you
think need to be addressed to make the New START fit 2021 and
beyond?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Good question, Senator. So
technology has moved. The central idea is a strategic
deterrence that underpin the New START deal we will need to
make sure still fit. The various technologies that exist today,
some may be more important to try it--try and it may be
different. We have to make sure it fits, so true deterrence
continues to extend.
We have to make sure that the verification regime fits the
technology today, the world, as it moved forward. And then
finally, we need to make sure that we have got all of the
parties that are relevant as a component of this as well.
Those are all tough challenges. They are all difficult.
Senator Merkley. By ``all of the parties,'' are you
referring to other countries----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. Other countries besides the United
States and Russia. And it may be that we cannot get there. It
may be that just we end up working with the Russians on this,
but if we are talking about a nuclear capacity, nuclear
capability that presents risk to the United States, it is very
different today in the world than it was when that----
Senator Merkley. It sounds like you are referring to China.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Merkley. Okay. Let me----
Secretary Pompeo. With respect to missiles for other
treaties, it is certainly China that has large numbers.
Senator Merkley. Well, let me pivot to China then. The
Uyghur Muslims are being enslaved in re-education camps,
industrial production, been taken off the streets. Some
villages basically have no men left yet.
There is a Uyghur human rights policy act. I believe Marco
Rubio is the lead on it, but it is bipartisan. Do you support
Congress taking a strong stand, America taking a strong stand
in regard to this persecution of the Uyghurs?
Secretary Pompeo. I do.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
So China has taken the proceeds from the imbalance in
trade, and they have brought their infrastructure from bicycles
to bullet trains in about 25 years. I was on the first bullet
train out of Beijing. They now have 16,000--16,000 miles of
levitated magnetic bullet trains running over 200 miles. We
have zero miles.
They are buying up foreign minerals around the world. They
are doing prestige projects to expand their influence in
country after country. They are engaged in debt diplomacy, so
those projects can actually lead to huge leverage going
forward, like the court they have taken control of in Sri
Lanka.
They are doing an inside deal in El Salvador, where they
are attempting to buy a huge chunk of the southern coastline in
El Salvador to extend their influence in Central America.
They are on the move in a comprehensive belt and roads
strategy, while we are sitting here, our infrastructure has
been basically the same the last 25 years. I am very concerned
that we are slipping behind. What are we going to do about it?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, Senator, with respect to U.S.
domestic infrastructure, it is a bit out of my lane as
Secretary of State. In terms of pushing back against the
Chinese, I laid out, I think it was in response to a question
from Senator Romney on the various work streams that we are
engaged in.
I am happy to walk through them, whether it is the BUILD
Act, the DFC, our diplomatic efforts with Assiyana at the very
center of how we build out a coalition. And on the technology
side, there is all of United States government effort to make
sure that U.S. companies, and frankly, non-U.S. companies, non-
Chinese companies have an opportunity to continue to compete on
a transparent basis, where we can ensure that we don't have
Chinese values, Chinese systems controlling our information
space 10, 15, 20 years from now.
Senator Merkley. I think that a lot of members of the
committee bi-partisanly have a lot of concerns that China has a
conference whose strategy it is implementing. It is connected
to international affairs because the proceeds that drive the
Chinese policy come from their trade relationship with the
United States.
Let's turn to North Korea. I think of the challenge with
their nuclear program is kind of like a baseball game. And a
first base is a freeze on their missile tests and their warhead
explosions, which is where we are right now.
Second base is a full inventory of their nuclear assets.
Third is an agreement on how to wipe those out, or eliminate
them. And fourth is an extensive implemented verification
regime.
We are stuck on first base. How are we going to get off
first base?
Secretary Pompeo. We have the largest coalition, and the
strongest sanctions, and sanctions enforcement in the history
of North Korea. It is what has created this opportunity for
diplomacy. We have not moved as far, but I think we always knew
this would be a long discussion.
We are not stuck on first base. I think that analogy is not
accurate. There remains an awful lot of work to do. But we have
moved to where as you have described. There are not missile
tests today. There are not nuclear explosions going on in North
Korea today. Our diplomatic team is engaged in painting the
picture, trying to convince Kim Jong-un that there is a path
forward that will make a brighter future for the North Korean
people, and reduce the risk.
We have Japan. We have South Korea. We engage with the
Russians and the Chinese. It is a broad effort to lead a
diplomatic undertaking to convince Kim Jong-un to deliver on
what he promised President Trump he would do in Singapore in
June of last year.
Senator Merkley. Thank you. My time is up, but I will just
summarize by saying the economic sanctions are weakening. The
North Koreans are finding many more ways around them. They have
proceeded to develop their missile program even while they have
frozen their missile testing and their warheads. So we are not
even completely safe on the first page. Thank you.
The Chairman. Secretary Pompeo, did you want to respond to
that last comment?
Secretary Pompeo. Only that it is always important to
remember initial conditions. When we came in January of 2017,
there was nothing going on. We are in a far better place today
than we were 2 years ago, both from a sanctions regime and the
diplomatic. That is quite an accomplishment. They sometimes do
not go together. Sanctions deter diplomacy. In this case, we
have achieved both.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you for your testimony, Secretary
Pompeo. Do you believe that the 2001 authorization to go to war
with those who attacked us on 9/11 applies to Iran or Iran's
Revolutionary Guard?
Secretary Pompeo. I would prefer to just leave that to
lawyers, Senator.
Senator Paul. Well, I would think it would be a pretty
important question, that you think you have the right to
invade, or declare war, or engage in war with Iran. And it does
not sound like something we are going to leave to the Supreme
Court. It is going to be a decision by the administration.
Secretary Pompeo. Right.
Senator Paul. Does the administration believe--you have
just recently classified, you know, the Iran--the entire
Revolutionary Guard as terrorists. Do you think that that
somehow includes them in the 2001, and is that any part of the
decision-making process with including this designation?
Secretary Pompeo. I will answer your second question. It
was not part of the decision-making process. The designation
was a simple recognition of reality. These are terrorists. They
killed 600 Americans. Six-hundred Americans, dead. Families
today, grieving. We recognize them as terrorists in the same
way we do other terrorist groups around the world. When we see
them, we try to call them out as best we can and as quickly as
we can.
Senator Paul. But you are unwilling to state unequivocally
that the resolution in 2001 to have retribution and stop people
who attacked us, that Iran had something to do with the attacks
on 9/11? Or that the National Iraqi, you know, Revolutionary
Guard had something to do with 9/11?
Secretary Pompeo. You asked a factual question and a legal
question there. The legal question I will leave to counsel. The
factual question with respect to Iran's connections to Al Qaeda
is very real. They have hosted Al Qaeda. They have permitted Al
Qaeda to transit their country. There is no doubt there is a
connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al Qaeda,
period, full stop.
Senator Paul. And I think some would argue that the Iranian
government is not real happy with Sunni extremists. They have
Sunni extremists in their country, but it is not sort of like
they are joining forces to fight the West. They actually would
just as soon eradicate Sunni extremists, and have actually
evicted quite a few, or imprisoned quite a few. So I do not
think that that dog hunts very well.
But I am troubled that the administration cannot
unequivocally say that you have not been given power. I can
tell you explicitly you have not been given power or authority
by Congress to have war with Iran. And in any kind of semblance
of a sane world you would have to come back and ask us before
you go into Iran.
So my hope is, I am not arguing whether Iran's
Revolutionary Guard are terrorists. My argument is that you do
not have the permission of Congress to go to war in Iran. If
you want a war in Iran, you have to come to us. It is the way
the Constitution was written, and it needs to be very clear and
begging off, and saying, ``Well, the lawyers.'' No. No. This is
our history. This is a very important question. It is a very
explicit question. Only Congress can declare war. You do not
have our permission to go to war in Iran. And that should be
very explicit.
Part of the reason we are having this debate is we have now
been at war for 18 years in Afghanistan. I think even you have
admitted there is no military solution to Afghanistan. It is a
mess. It is nation building at its worst.
The President, like myself, complains endlessly about the
$50 billion we are wasting there every year. I also worry about
the lives that we are wasting there. You are sending young men
when there is no mission there.
Can you give us any kind of summary, or hope, or update on
the negotiations that are currently happening with the Taliban?
Secretary Pompeo. I can give you a brief summary. And your
point about the lives, we had three Americans killed just this
week in Afghanistan, killed by the Taliban. At least they
claimed it.
President Trump has made clear he wants to end what he
calls this endless war. And our team is working diligently to
create the conditions to do that. Ambassador Khalilzad, I think
he is in Doha today, or maybe in Kabul, working with the Afghan
government, with other Afghans, non-Taliban, as well as with
the Taliban, to create conditions so that we can deliver on
what the President has said he wants done there, which is to
reduce.
You talked about American outlays, dollars, American
taxpayer money. But also to reduce the risk for Americans. He
has also told us to do that in a way that continues to reduce
risk of an attack from that real estate. And we believe there
is a path forward that we can achieve each of those two goals
the President has laid out for us.
Senator Paul. Thank you. I think we have the greatest
military in the world. Nobody can measure us anywhere. We can
do anything. But I will tell you what a Navy SEAL told me, been
in 19 years, a couple years ago. He said, ``We can go anywhere.
We can kill anyone. We can complete any mission you ask us, but
the mistake is when you ask us to stay and plant the flag.''
We are not so good at nation building. Our soldiers don't
want to do it. It is a huge expense of money and lives. Let's
learn how to declare victory, and I commend the President for
trying to declare victory. And I hope you will support him in
that.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
seeing you again, second day in a row, Secretary Pompeo.
Let me just associate myself quickly with the remarks that
ranking member--regarding the importance of information flows
between this committee and the State Department. I understand
that there is lots of classified data that we will never see.
That is what the Intelligence Committee is for. But there is
some that rises to such level of importance that it affects
decisions that we are making on this committee and in the
Senate. And I just anchor my comments in those made by the----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Murphy. --ranking member.
Second, just a quick pushback on a piece of your opening
statement. You did note that we are at record numbers of
Foreign Service officers, and that suggests there is no
hollowing out of the State Department happening.
I would just remind the committee that has because we have
rejected the requests from this administration to dramatically
reduce the budget of the State Department. And had we enacted
the requests of this administration, you would be on a glide
path to record low numbers of personnel.
And, again, I have never been of the mind that this is the
budget that you would write, Mr. Secretary, but it is just a
reminder that to the extent we still are holding the line, it
is because we stayed together on this committee.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to come back to the question of
Chinese technology, 5G and Huawei. I was in Dublin a couple
months ago, and the embassy there noted that the Chinese
Embassy was exploding with personnel. And that was not
coincidental to the open tinder of the new high-speed network
in Ireland, a country that is, frankly, very important to us,
because we have a lot of American data there and a lot of
American companies there.
And it struck me that we are just vastly outmanned when it
comes to this contest. We have, you know, generally in
embassies one State Department officer who is handling
technology, energy, and health care. And then we have military
attaches, you know, that by and large are not technology
experts in these places.
And so you have talked in previous hearings about
leveraging access to the U.S. national security apparatus. But
what are the other ways in which we can get on the right side
of this fight? I mean I worry that we are losing this fight
badly to the Chinese right now, in part because they just have
staffed up, and we have not.
I also wonder whether there is an opportunity to leverage
U.S. companies, particularly in a place like Ireland, who
should be sensitive to American data that they hold being at
some point maybe way down the line, an object of national
security interests from the Chinese.
So what are the additional tools that we could give you to
try to contest this fight over the global buildout of 5G?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, important question. Let me take
the second part of it first, or the second idea contained in
there. We, the State Department, have to do a better job of
making sure that American companies, frankly, non-Chinese
companies. We will always fight for ours. But the technology
systems being put in place in these countries have American
values embedded within them, right? Privacy protections,
concepts of property rights, all the central things that we
would want from a technology system.
So we have two functions. One is to make sure not only do
those governments of countries, like Ireland, or someplace
else, as well as the private entities contemplating major
technology, understand the risks associated with the Chinese
technology. And we have to help our companies show up to
compete.
On 5G today, we are behind. It is difficult to show up with
a suite, and we will always have a direct cost disadvantage
there. The Chinese will subsidize in ways that we just don't.
So your point about leveraging the private sector I think is
very real.
In terms of what other tools do we need, I admit to the
case that we have just a handful of officers in most embassies
around the world working on economic issues. But we have a big
department. Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, I hope we will
get him confirmed before too long, so we will do better at
this. He comes out of that very space, the nominee does. I
think we are close.
We have to show up with our full team. When there is a
competition, when there is a tinder, we have to show up there,
and make sure that the opportunity for an alternative choice is
available.
Senator Murphy. It is the fight of the next 10 to 50 years.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Murphy. And we are fools if we don't staff up the
State Department with a technological expertise that can win
this battle.
One final question. I am looking at a Washington Post
article from January of this year entitled, ``Can Saudi Arabia
Produce Ballistic Missiles? Satellite Imagery Raises
Suspicions.'' Notwithstanding our bipartisan concern about
Iran's ballistic missile program, is it still the policy of the
United States to oppose the proliferation of ballistic missile
technology in the Middle East?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. We are concerned about ballistic
missiles in the Middle East and elsewhere, Senator.
Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is good to have
you here.
Secretary Pompeo. Hello, sir.
Senator Young. I want you to know that I, along with many
other members of this committee, would like to see the Senate
confirm more of the President's nominees to the Department of
State as quickly as possible. And I just want to take a moment
to flag two particular nominees, happen to be from my home
state of Indiana. They are exceptional, and they need to move
forward very quickly.
Steven Akard is the nominee to be the director of the
Office of Foreign Missions. It has been more than 12 months ago
since the President first nominated Steven Akard. That needs to
move forward.
Many people don't fully understand the position he was
nominated to serve in, but effectively, he is the top human
resources officer for the Foreign Service. So this is a
critical member of your team. And I commend you for being able
to operate short-staffed.
The second nominee I wanted to mention is Kip Tom. I have
known Kip for a number of years. Highly qualified. He knows
more about agriculture than I will ever aspire to know. But
look, he has been nominated to serve as ambassador and U.S.
representative to the U.N. agencies for food and agriculture.
It has been over 8 months. And for farmers in Indiana and other
states, I know it is critically important to have a voice at
the United Nations speaking on behalf of our farmers and
ranchers.
So the good news is that both of these nominees were
reported favorably from this committee. It is the full Senate's
last week, but both of these nominees remain among more than 60
outstanding nominations referred to this committee that are
pending in the Senate. I just urge my colleagues and Senate
leadership to confirm both of these highly qualified nominees
as soon as possible.
I would like to pivot to Venezuela, Mr. Secretary, and just
begin by indicating, I know this crisis is deeply complex, and
you are following it incredibly closely. It is growing more
challenging by the day, it seems. I describe the situation,
from my perspective, in a letter that I sent to you, and the
president, and the vice president last week, but I wanted to
bring it up to you directly.
There are Americans who we know are suffering at the hands
of the Maduro regime today. Todd Leininger, from Indiana, has
been in prison since April of 2014, when he was convicted by a
Venezuelan court in the midst of anti-government protests. Many
questions remain over the due process that was afforded to
Todd. But my concern now is that in November of 2018 a San
Christabel court ordered Todd's release; yet, the Venezuelan
authorities continue to detain Todd without explanation.
I am in regular contact with Todd's mother. She has
concerns for Todd's, not just welfare, but his very life. There
are drinking water shortages, severe unsanitary conditions, and
other medical concerns that I probably should not air publicly,
but let's just say we are concerned about Todd's welfare.
So Mr. Secretary, while the diplomatic process, I know, is
being worked on. I want to know what specifically you are doing
to bring Americans like Todd home.
And then secondarily, I want to see what members of this
committee can do to assist you and Special Envoy Abrahms,
moving forward, so that we can help Todd and others be brought
home safely and as quickly as possible.
Secretary Pompeo. Thanks for the question. The folks on
this committee, we spend a lot of time working to get Americans
that are wrongfully detained all around the world. It is a
focus, and a big group of them come visit, it would have been a
week ago today. It was really remarkable to have these
families, to hear from them. Some of them still have folks
detained. Some have lost their loved ones.
It re-impressed I think upon me and my whole team how
central this is to what we are doing. To the extent that you
all talk about this issue, raise this issue, voice the
concerns, people around the world hear that. So I think that is
important in its own right. And as we think about our policies
with respect to, in this case, Venezuela, we should keep in
mind that there are many concerns, one of which is the fact
that they are wrongfully detaining U.S. persons.
Second, with respect to particular cases, it is more
difficult today. We have now withdrawn our diplomatic staff
from Curacaos. So our ability to engage in consulate activities
of all kinds is absolutely--I regret that we had to make that
decision. I think it was the right one. But know that we are
still having conversations with a broad range of Venezuelans,
working diligently to try and make the case to get every
American returned home.
Senator Young. Mr. Secretary, lastly, do you feel like you
have sufficient resources to deal with the crisis in Venezuela?
I know the administration has requested $500 million to assist
with the democratic transition. Would that also deal with the
situation that I just spoke to, Todd's situation and other
American detainees? And if not, tell us what else you need,
please.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think we have the resources we
need. I don't think we are lacking for either people or
resources to execute that mission.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Secretary, North Korea remains a significant threat.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. And we know that after the two summits
there still has been no tangible progress towards
denuclearization. We know that Kim Jong-un is expanding his
nuclear weapons program, and that he continues to exploit
overseas slave labor. He is conducting cyber-heists to enrich
himself. And we simply can't get results from Kim Jong-un by
relieving pressure upon him and his regime.
You recently said that the Trump administration put more
sanctions in place against North Korea than at any time in
world's history. However, the U.N. panel on experts warned on
March 5th of this year that there are severe deficiencies in
the global pressure campaign. It states that there have been
quote, ``A massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers
of petroleum products and coal,'' and quote, ``they render the
latest United Nations' sanctions ineffective.''
So the experts are saying that the gaps are growing. Yet,
the Trump administration has added only 34 names to our
sanctions list, down from 207 the year before. That is an 83
percent drop, Mr. Secretary. And we know that U.N. sanctions--
resolutions are only as strong as member state enforcement. And
the world follows America's lead.
When President Trump, after the Treasury Department
sanctioned two China-based companies, asked on Twitter for
those listings to be undone, we confused the very allies and
partners we need to help solve this problem peacefully, Mr.
Secretary.
So, from my perspective, Kim merrily rolls along with his
development of his nuclear weapons program. Our sanctions
regime is being criticized by the panel of experts, and
ultimately, from my perspective, I see Kim Jong-un just trying
to play out the string to the end of your administration, with
absolutely no results that can be pointed to in reducing the
nuclear threat from that country. Please respond.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes. So I agree with some of what you
said, but not much.
You describe an 83 percent decrease in our increase in
sanctions. And you may think the enforcement regime is
ineffective, but you should move to the outskirts of Pyongyang,
because those folks think it is very effective. I concede there
is more that can be done. I will concede that China has
imperfectly enforced those sanctions. I concede that there are
still ship-to-ship transfers taking place. That is absolutely
true.
You should know that in every one of those dimensions the
things that are happening inside the country----
Senator Markey. Do you agree that there has been a massive
increase in ship-to-ship illegal----
Secretary Pompeo. I don't know about massive, but let me
assure you there is less coal, less fuel, less resource there
today than there was when President Obama was in office.
Senator Markey. Well, it is not effective if programs are
actually expanding. The ship-to-ship oil transfers are actually
increasing. It is not effective.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, there is an enormous
undertaking, not just United States undertaking, to take down
the ship-to-ship transfers. You should know the rogue regimes
are difficult. They will move. It is a big ocean out there. But
you should know that your United States government is working
diligently to enforce those sanctions, and working to get our
partners in the region, South Koreans, the Japanese, the
Australians, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, if I didn't mention
that already, to help us to enforce those sanctions. I concede,
we need to continue to keep the pressure on, Senator.
Senator Markey. Again, when the expert panel says that it
is ineffective, and the President undermines the very effort
that we are trying to put in place. To say to the Chinese, say
to the Russians you have to get tough. We are going to hold you
accountable. And the President is tweeting out that we are not
going to have those additional sanctions put in place. It just
sends the wrong signal to North Korea, but to China, and to
Russia, and to anyone else that we are trying to get to
cooperate in a regime to tighten the pressure on Kim Jong-un.
So I just have a big problem with understanding what the
strategy is ultimately to get Kim to make the concessions on
his nuclear weapons program if, in fact, the sanctions regime
is being ultimately relaxed. It is ineffective, and the signal
is being sent to the Chinese: we will not sanction you if you
violate those sanctions. How can that be effective, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, the North Korean economy will
shrink this year.
Senator Markey. Well, will it result in actual concessions
to be made?
Secretary Pompeo. This is a long process. We took over in a
place where there were very limited sanctions. No effort to
enforce, no diplomatic engagement to create a global coalition.
We weren't even----
Senator Markey. Yeah. That's two-and-a-half years ago. Two-
and-a-half years ago.
Secretary Pompeo. --leading from behind. We refused to
engage against this threat, and we have taken this seriously.
We are going to continue to take it seriously. We have got him
to stop missile testing. We have him to stop nuclear testing.
We are going to keep at it.
Senator Markey. Right. Well, look, the economy may be going
down in North Korea. It is just not going down enough. The
sanctions are not tough enough. We are not pressuring them
enough. We are not sending the right signals to China and to
Russia to cut it off even further.
So yeah, it might be going down, but it is not going down
in a level that is affecting Kim in terms of making concessions
to us, or the President, at the summit, that reflects that we,
in fact, have been successful.
So the only answer to me is that we have to make it
stronger. We just have to be realistic about this, or else in
another year-and-a-half, the Trump administration will have
been completed, and it will have been no reduction in the
nuclear program of North Korea. So that is just my bottom line,
looking at it, Mr. Secretary. Make them tougher. The sanctions
have to be tougher.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
First of all, Secretary Pompeo, thank you for your service,
being our diplomat around the world. And you mentioned the
returning Americans home efforts that you have made, and
meeting with families last week. And one of those families was
the parents of Otto Warmbier. And I thank you for staying in
touch with them. They appreciated it.
I will be in Korea next week, talking among others to our
ambassador, Admiral Harris, and South Korean officials about
what is going on in North Korea, and continuing to hold up
their human rights abuses, and expose for everyone what
happened to Otto, and what is happening to others, including
North Koreans. So thank you for staying on top of that issue.
And, of course, tighter sanctions are something we should all
want as we begin to see some progress as a result of the
sanctions we have put in place.
I want to talk about the Global Engagement Center quickly,
and about Ukraine. On the Global Engagement Center, you recall
Senator Murphy and I a few years ago started working on
encouraging State not to just establish the center, but to
properly fund it. I want to thank you, because this year you
have made a request in your budget of $76.5 million, which is a
38 percent increase from last year's request.
I know you have a tight budget, and I know you are being
asked to find cuts elsewhere. And this is encouraging to me,
because I think it is undeniable that the propaganda and
disinformation that is going on around the world, from
different state actors, and I think we are going to learn a lot
more, I think, about Russia even in the next few weeks here, in
terms of what they are doing.
In this session we cannot talk about some of the details,
but the reality is it is such a huge threat. And I think your
former role at the Central Intelligence Agency probably informs
you better than other Secretaries of State.
So I assume that having recognized that, this budget
increase is reflecting your concern.
Having said that, one thing we have not gotten done yet is
this DOD transfer. We have authorized a $60 million transfer
from DOD for this fiscal year, fiscal year 2019. It is
authorized by law.
Can you confirm that you all have requested that full 60
million from DOD?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have requested that.
Senator Portman. Thank you. Do you see this process going a
little more smoothly this year? Last fiscal year I recall we
got it at the 11th hour, maybe at the 11th-and-a-half hour, if
that is possible. Any sense of where we are this year?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are working on it. It did
take us a long time last year. I hope that it goes more quickly
this year. We have now done it once, so I think there is a
mechanism in place. I am hopeful it will move along more
quickly.
Interagency cooperation is one reason we put this in place,
where you have to go to the Defense Department. They have to
work with you. Do you feel as though the interagency process is
working well? We want DOD's help in this effort.
Secretary Pompeo. You mean with respect to the GEC?
Senator Portman. With respect to GEC.
Secretary Pompeo. I felt like we have made strides. Look,
it took us a little while. We did not have someone there that
we had chosen to lead that organization. We now have that
person in place, and I think it has improved dramatically
really over what is now the last 2 months.
Senator Portman. With regard to Ukraine quickly, and thank
you for the GEC help, we have finally, as you know, provided
help to the Ukrainians to be able to defend themselves. And
that was the change in this administration. We appreciate that
lethal security assistance, so they can defend their own
sovereign territory.
In the National Defense Authorization bill 2 years ago, we
authorized naval assistance for the first time. And
particularly what's gone on since then on the Kerch Strait
means that we need to do all we can to help deal with the naval
side of this, that the Russians are being increasingly
aggressive.
Do you know what the status is of transferring these two
excess island-class cutters to the Ukrainian navy? And are you
encouraging of that?
Secretary Pompeo. I am encouraging it. I do not know the
status, Senator.
Senator Portman. Okay. I would appreciate you guys getting
back to me on that. It seems to me that that is one of our
pressing capability gaps we have. Can you speak to other
concerns you might have about what is going on in Ukraine vis-
a-vis Russia?
Secretary Pompeo. So we are now years into this, and it is
frozen, at best. Still challenges. Still fighting along the
line of control nearly every day. You know, I think everyone is
staring at the Ukrainian election now. A handful more days
before the Ukrainians will select their next leader. And we
will engage closely with whoever that leader is to ensure that
we continue this and provide support for Ukrainian democracy.
Senator Portman. Well, I appreciate that. And I do think we
are at a critical time right now. We will see what happens in
the election. I plan to go after the election and meet with the
new government. But it is a frozen--I have been on the contact
line. On the other hand, I think we have begun to change the
dynamic by the support you have provided. We have to continue
to do it.
I have one other question. Maybe you can send something in
response as a written response. But it has to do with the
sanctions regime. I am hearing from some folks at State that
they are having a tough time sanctioning certain Russian
individuals because the Treasury Department indicates that our
legislation here is too restrictive. In other words, the
legislation, as it relates to specific things, like Ukraine,
and what happened in Crimea, might not relate exactly to a
particular individual who is otherwise involved in malign
efforts that affect national security in the United States.
Would it be helpful for you to have a broader sanctions
regime that this body could send you in order to ensure that
the individuals that you would like to sanction are able to be
sanctioned?
Secretary Pompeo. I think it is definitely worth taking a
look at. Some of this on the Treasury side, not on--so the
relief would need to be for--the broader scope would need to be
for Treasury sanctions. But I would love to see that. And we
should evaluate and make sure we do it in a thoughtful way, so
that we actually pick up what we are looking for.
Senator Portman. Okay. If you could provide us some current
information on that. That would be helpful to----
Secretary Pompeo. Happy to do that. Yes, sir.
Senator Portman. --what you are looking for.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have talked to Senator Portman, just for your
information--for your information, I have talked with Senator
Crapo about this exact issue on the sanctions. He raises some
important points, and I think we need to get together to talk
about that with the Banking Committee, so it is a joint effort.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Secretary Pompeo for being here, and thank you for your
service.
You mentioned in terms of other questions that it was still
the policy of the United States to prevent missile
proliferation in the Middle East. And I wanted to ask, based on
what was said earlier in articles that had been put in the
record about the Chinese selling missiles to Saudi Arabia.
Have you spoken up and told Saudi Arabia we don't
appreciate their aggressive acquisition of Chinese missiles?
Secretary Pompeo. There are, I should not say every. There
are very few conversations that I have with the leadership in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that I don't make clear that we
prefer they purchase American systems, not Chinese systems
across a broader way, whether it is telecommunications, or
otherwise.
Senator Udall. Yeah. And are we seeing what many of our
foreign policy folks that have been in the region a long time,
very worried about an arms race, is this indication of the
Chinese penetration into Saudi Arabian missile sales? Is this
an indication we are headed down the road to an arms race? And
what are we doing about it, if it is our policy to prevent this
kind of thing?
Secretary Pompeo. I think it is a little more complicated
than that. Look, the Middle East has had arms and arms issues
for an awfully long time. This particular set of issues
surrounding missiles, you see issues in the region with--we
have not talked about Turkey and their S-400 purchase. So
missile defense, anti-aircraft systems. This is certainly
something that we all need to keep an eye on.
I will tell you that most of the folks who are working to
build out missile systems are doing so directly because the
Islamic Republic of Iran was permitted to continue with missile
program under the JCPOA. It did not slow them down. And so
others are doing what they need to do to create a deterrence
tool for themselves. It is just a fact.
Senator Udall. Well, I very much hope that the
administration will push back in terms of what is happening in
missiles across the Middle East.
Secretary Pompeo, our southern border increasingly looks
like a war zone, like Germany with the Berlin Wall, or the DMZ
on the Korean Peninsula. We have border patrol agents harassing
and separating families, and caging children, members of the
military supporting a made-up emergency. When the reality is
that the U.S. border communities are just as safe and often
safer than anywhere else in the United States.
This is reminiscent of how we enemies treat one another. Is
Mexico the enemy of the United States?
Secretary Pompeo. There were 20,000 apprehensions last week
of illegal entrants into our country. This is a real crisis.
These are numbers that I think that when we took office, the
numbers were--I will have the numbers wrong, but 20,000 last
week. We are working closely with the Mexican government to
create the conditions there which will stop this.
I work very closely with Foreign Minister Ebrard. He has
been a great partner, but they have not yet effectively been
able to stop what is mostly transit through their country, from
these folks coming into our country. And President Trump's
determined to create sovereignty and protect our border.
Senator Udall. Do you believe that the U.S. should close
the southern border in response to the asylum seekers you just
spoke about?
Secretary Pompeo. You know, with the laws as we have them
today, I worked on an agreement where we would allow those with
proper asylum claims to wait for their asylum here. The numbers
are overwhelming to wait in Mexico. We had a court
fundamentally misread the law, and deny us the ability to do
that. We need your help. We need Congress to change these
rules.
We know that some of the folks who come across have
legitimate asylum claims, but the system is broken. And we need
Congress to change the laws so that we can protect our southern
borders. It is not just people who are coming here. It is
drugs. It is weapons. I mean the stories, you know them, about
human trafficking that is taking place, or what is happening to
women as they move across Mexico is truly tragic. If we can
secure our southern border, we will improve the lives of those
people, I am convinced of it.
Senator Udall. Do you believe our country is ``full,'' as
the President has said, and that we should not accept any more
asylum seekers or immigrants to the United States?
Secretary Pompeo. This is the most generous nation in the
history of civilization, is the case. As the President said----
Senator Udall. Answer my question.
Secretary Pompeo. The President has said repeatedly, he has
talked about lawful immigration. The work that we are doing is
along our southern border to prevent people from coming in here
unlawfully, illegally. That is the mission set that he has set
out. It is what I am working with the Northern Triangle
countries and Mexico as a foreign policy matter to take care
of.
Senator Udall. Well, the reality is, and I think a lot of
policy experts on the Northern Triangle are saying it is a very
bad policy to cut off foreign aid to the three countries down
there, where these folks are originating from. And that is one
of our levers to keep them there, and to keep the countries
more stable.
But I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, so----
The Chairman. You are.
Senator Udall. --let me apologize.
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall. And thank you for the courtesies. And I will
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary for your service to our country, and your leadership.
A couple of questions for you, and I will try to do this
quickly.
In your testimony you stated the United States' future
security, prosperity, and leadership depends on maintaining a
free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific. To advance the Indo-
Pacific strategy, the budget request nearly doubles U.S.
foreign assistance resources targeting this crucial area
compared to the fiscal year 2019 request.
Do you commit to fully implement the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act, or ARIA, that we have discussed many times?
Secretary Pompeo. We think ARIA makes great sense, and we
will do our level best to fully comply, including getting you
reports that are late.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And I was going to talk about
the two reports. We have the report on Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, human rights strategy, and the report on
approach and strategies as it relates to denuclearization of
the North Korean governance.
Secretary Pompeo. We are close, Senator.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that.
Could you quickly identify a few new programs you will
build out to prioritize under ARIA, build out or prioritize
under ARIA?
Secretary Pompeo. Oh, goodness. May I let our team come
brief----
Senator Gardner. Yes.
Secretary Pompeo. We have racked and stacked how we think
about this. I would love to have the team come in and get your
feedback as well on the way to--if we have the right metrics
for our prioritization.
Senator Gardner. You bet. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
And today, April 10th, marks the 40th anniversary of the
enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. Forty years ago, April
10th, the Taiwan Relations Act was signed into law, which
together the President--with President Reagan's 1982 Six
Assurances, the Taiwan Travel Act, and ARIA have become the
cornerstones of our relationship with Taiwan.
Little over a week ago for the first time in 20 years there
appears to have been an intentional crossing of the median line
of the Taiwan Straits by Chinese jets. Do you plan to fully
implement the TRA, the Taiwan Travel Act, and the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act to further strengthen our
partnership with Taiwan?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Gardner. Will you commit to send high-level
delegations to Taiwan in the near future to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to Taiwan and the Taiwanese people?
Secretary Pompeo. We have a lot of work going on at the
AIT, at our center there. Yeah. We're going to keep at it. We
see the increase in China's activity, both political
information warfare. And then as you described, actually on the
real estate. We see how China has continued to be more
aggressive with Taiwan. We talk with the Chinese. Every
conversation I have with the Chinese begins with this
discussion. I think they understand America's policy is
constant and enduring.
Senator Gardner. And I believe both Japan and Taiwan
scrambled jets to push back the Chinese incursion.
Secretary Pompeo. I believe that is correct as well.
Senator Gardner. On China, a quick aside, there is a new
extradition agreement that Hong Kong has agreed to with China,
or is in discussions with on China. The European Union today
has warned journalists of this new extradition that they could
face, extradition to China, and perhaps face jail time in China
over this new extradition law.
Has the State Department made any decisions or discussions
relating to Hong Kong's new extradition discussions with China?
Secretary Pompeo. I'm aware of this. We are reviewing it. I
don't believe we made any decisions yet.
Senator Gardner. Would a possible warning to U.S.
journalists or civil society activists, would a possible
warning come from the State Department as a result of that
extradition law?
Secretary Pompeo. I need to look at it. I know the team is
reviewing what took place there, and I need to see what impact
it has on American citizens traveling in the region, including
the occupations you just described.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Your testimony, you stated that our diplomatic efforts
towards the final fully verified denuclearization of North
Korea are the most successful that have ever been undertaken.
We remain committed to that goal. It especially provides for
our diplomatic outreach to continue, and continue
implementation and enforcement of sanctions until we achieve
our objective.
Do you commit to the full enforcement of existing sanctions
against the North Korean regime under U.S. law, including all
of those mandated by the North Korea Sanctions Policy
Enhancement Act, and ARIA?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gardner. Do you agree that no sanctions against
North Korea should be lifted until North Korea demonstrates a
commitment to complete verifiable irreversible
denuclearization?
Secretary Pompeo. I want to leave a little space there.
From time to time there are particular provisions that if we
were making substantial progress that one might think that was
the right thing to do to achieve, sometimes it is visas. So I
want to leave a little room.
But yes, your point is well taken. The enforcement regime,
the core U.S. Security Council resolutions need to remain in
place until the verification of denuclearization has been
completed.
Senator Gardner. And would you support further sanctions
legislation by this Congress, the LEED Act that Senator Markey
and I have introduced, or others?
Secretary Pompeo. Conceptually, yes. I am not familiar with
that legislation.
Senator Gardner. When it comes to China, yesterday we had a
hearing, Subcommittee on East Asia, where we heard from
witnesses who were discussing the situation that Uyghurs face
in Jinjiang, in China. Also discussed China's approach to
Tibet, as well as hearing from a witness testifying about the
genocide in Burma.
Could you talk a little bit about how we are approaching
these human rights violations, and what we will do specifically
to address the Uyghur situation, and what we are further doing
in Burma?
Secretary Pompeo. I don't want to get out in front of
decisions where we are working on with respect to other
policies we may take, but we have been incredibly candid about
what is taking place inside of China, not only to the Uyghurs,
but to the Cossacks, and Christians. This is historic. The
numbers are staggering. It is certainly into the hundreds of
thousands of people.
It began, this information management, this Orwellian state
began in Tibet, has now been expanded. The same gentleman who
ran the program previously now is running this program in
Jinjiang. This is a very serious matter. Very serious human
rights violation. The State Department, and, frankly, other
elements of the United States government are working diligently
to make clear that this is not acceptable behavior.
Senator Gardner. Yesterday, his holiness, the Dalai Lama,
was taken to a hospital for a health concern. I think
everything is all right. Would the United States ever consider
legitimizing a leader following the Dalai Lama that was
anointed by China?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, it doesn't seem likely.
Senator Gardner. All right. I hope the answer is no.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. It's a complicated question. I am
happy to talk to you about it. We understand the history. We
understand what China is trying to do. And you should know
there hasn't been an administration that has taken on China in
the way that this one has determined to take on, on every
dimension, military, diplomatic, the trade agreement, the
economics, the intellectual property, theft. It is robust,
human rights included.
Senator Gardner. Thanks.
Secretary Pompeo. We are serious about this, making sure
that China behaves in a way that reflects American values.
Senator Gardner: Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you for being here.
The President recently expressed dissatisfaction with the
amount of cocaine that is being produced in Columbia. And I
thought it was an important to point, I don't know if he is
aware of this, that the migratory situation coming from
Venezuela into Columbia is an extraordinary drain on that
nation's resources.
We have ELN and other drug groups operating openly, and
with impunity on the Venezuelan side of the border, with the
support of all of the Venezuelan government officials. The
migrants, by the way, are very vulnerable people, some of whom
are now being actively recruited, in efforts to get them to
join some of these gangs on the border.
The drug flights that come out of Venezuela, carrying the
cocaine, headed north, by the way, many of those planes land
right in the Northern Triangle countries, where they are passed
on.
The drug trafficking organizations that are fueled by the
drug proceeds, and, of course, are a key part of destabilizing
Central America, leading to our migratory crisis.
On top of that, in Venezuela, you have an active and
growing Russian military presence, as we have seen in Open
Source reporting. Yesterday, the Open Source reports about the
resumption of direct flights from Iran by the airline that our
nation has sanctioned for support to the IRGC.
And adding to all of this fun and games is the fact that we
know that they have purchased a series of MANPADS, Russian-made
systems, which in a place where you have gangs acting with
impunity in the street, links to drug trafficking
organizations, linked to guerilla groups on the border. There
is always the concern that these MANPADS could be stolen or
transferred for profit. They are involved in every sort of
illegal traffic imaginable.
So I guess it leads to the question, could not the argument
be made, or is it our position that the Maduro Regime, based on
all of this that I have just outlined, represents a direct
threat to the national interests and the national security of
the United States?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I don't think there is any doubt
that that is the case, that the Maduro Regime presents a threat
to the United States of America. You mentioned Iran. The
Hezbollah has been in South America. This risk is very real.
The drugs are something that has been around for a long
time. That is not a new problem. And now the Russian footprint.
Couple that with their connection to the Cubans and the Cuban
inner circle that is around Maduro, and it is clearly the case
that the former leadership of Venezuela, Maduro Regime, is a
true threat to the United States of America.
Senator Rubio. And I guess the broader point is that, of
course, we care about human rights and democracy in our region,
especially in our hemisphere, and we are going to be supportive
of it, but beyond that there is a national security interest
for the United States and what is happening there.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we agree.
Senator Rubio. And one more point on these gangs. They call
them the Colectivos. You are aware of them. As we have seen,
the normal argument out there is the military is sticking with
Maduro. And there is truth to that. But really, what he is
using now to control the country and repress our 50,000 members
of over 500 gangs, literally street gangs that he has armed,
and actually openly calls upon to take to the streets, and
repress people.
It would be my view, and I think the White House and State
Department would share it, that these military officials, high-
ranking military officials, who in the past in Venezuela, have
openly discussed how these groups are unconstitutional, and
operating outside the law.
It would be incumbent upon them to step forward and
confront these groups at a minimum. They may not do a good coup
d'etat, they may not take out Maduro, but they must confront
these armed groups in Venezuela, who are basically running the
streets.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we agree. And to the extent we
have had the capacity to talk to them directly, we have shared
that they need to do that. It is a bit embarrassing to be a
Venezuelan senior leader. You have got the Cubans protecting
Maduro, and you have the Colectivos keeping down people inside
of the country.
We hope they will make decisions that are very, very
different from that. We have also spoken about this publicly.
It is a real threat. These little roving gangs are doing
enormous harm inside of the country. There is not only their
water shortages and food shortages, but there are now--the
Venezuelan people are being observed by these Colectivos, and
their behavior is not consistent with what Maduro would wish.
They are under the thumb of these roving gangs.
Senator Rubio. Yeah. Just one side note on that. These
gangs, they will be repressing people in the street, and
attacking them, and spot somebody walking down the street, and
snatch a purse, and then go back to repressing. They are
criminals.
One last question. I support the designation of the IRGC. I
think that was the right decision. Has the administration made
it clear through every channel that if, in fact, now, as a
result of this, U.S. troops in Iraq are targeted, not just
designated terrorist groups, but targeted, whether it is by
Shia militias, the IRGC, or a combination thereof? No matter
who targets us in Iraq from that, the Shia militias or the
Iranians that we will hold Iran directly responsible for any
harm that comes to our personnel in the region, even if they do
it through a third-party surrogate?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we have made clear that Iran
cannot escape responsibility for any harm that comes to United
States' interests anywhere in the world by doing it through a
proxy force. They understand President Trump's policy.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
welcome. Thank you for your service.
I want to talk a little bit about Iran.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Cruz. And let me start out by thanking you and the
administration for designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. As you know,
that is a step I have long advocated. I have introduced
legislation to move it forward.
And I wanted to ask you to explain to this committee and
the American people why designating the IGRC as a terrorist
organization is, number one, justified on the merits, and
number two, what the consequences of that designation are,
specifically for financial institutions, or corporations doing
business with IRGC-affiliated entities.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, that is the very name. People
say the IRGC, and sometimes they get the ``I'' and the ``R''
wrong. This is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I think
that is important. They named themselves appropriately.
This terrorist organization has killed over 600 Americans.
The number is probably far higher than that. They continue to
engage in terror around the world, include assassination
campaigns in Europe and the West. This was kind of an easy
decision, reflecting reality. So I am happy that we were able
to announce that decision yesterday.
Second, with respect to its impact. The IRGC has another
component, which is what I will call the kleptocracy component.
It runs a significant piece of the Iranian economy. The numbers
vary, but I have seen numbers as high as 20 or 25 percent of
the Iranian economy has resources that transfer to the IRGC
itself.
If you are the general counsel of an Asian bank or a
European bank, your world changed when that designation came
out yesterday. If you are thinking about doing business or
providing material support in any way to any company that might
be connected to the IRGC, this sanction will cause you not to
do that. From our goal, what that will do is it will deny them
the resources to continue their terror campaign around the
world.
Senator Cruz. Thank you for that answer.
You and I worked together, as there was an interagency
debate within the administration about whether the President
should pull out of the Iranian nuclear deal. I think the
President made unquestionably the right decision.
As you know, there were significant voices within the State
Department that resisted that step, and that I believe continue
to resist that step. And I want to talk to you about two
different aspects of implementing that decision to pull out of
the Iran deal. Namely, the nuclear waivers and the oil waivers.
On the nuclear waivers, as you know, we have waivers that
allow Iran to continue with supposedly non-military nuclear
research. If you look to the extraordinary results that the
Israeli raids seized from Iran, that debunked what we were told
by the Obama administration and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and made clear that entire parts of Iran's civilian
nuclear program were built in order to create nuclear weapons,
and that it was little more than a sham.
I want to ask your view on should we continue to grant
nuclear waivers. As I understand, they are up for renewal next
month. Should we continue to grant nuclear waivers, given the
rather significant evidence that doing so could further Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think this administration, I
think it is hard to challenge the fact that we have been tough
with respect to sanctions on Iran, with respect to particular
waiver decisions, both these and the crude oil ones. I don't
have any announcements to make today. We need to make sure that
they wind through the process appropriately.
Your point about different opinions inside the State
Department, we have 90,000 employees. We probably have that
many opinions. Make no mistake about it, we will stare closely
at this.
On the nonproliferation waivers, I would love to talk to
you in a classified setting about it. It is complicated. But
suffice it to say, President Trump, I can assure the American
people, I can assure the world, President Trump will continue
to ratchet up the pressure on Islamic Republic of Iran, such
that their behavior will change.
Senator Cruz. Well, there will be a critical decision point
next month also concerning the oil waivers. And it has been
publicly reported that there is currently an interagency
dispute between the State Department and the Energy Department
about whether to grant those waivers again.
Right now, Iran is producing roughly 1.2 million barrels of
oil a day. That is generating billions of dollars that is
funding the Ayatollah, and I believe endangering our security.
What are your views on whether allowing Iran to continue to
produce 1.2 million barrels of oil a day, and sell it on the
world market, is that in our national interest?
Secretary Pompeo. I think the State Department may--I think
we have been clear about our objective in getting Iran to zero
just as quickly as we possibly can. And we will continue to do
that.
Senator Cruz. Well, let me urge you and urge the department
unequivocally not to grant the nuclear waivers and not to grant
the oil wavers. I think maximum pressure should mean maximum
pressure. You have been a strong voice for that, and let me
encourage you to continue that strong position defending our
national security.
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much. And I just wanted to
add--thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Barrasso. I just wanted to add my voice to that of
Senator Cruz's. Twenty-one of us sent a letter to President
Trump last month on Iran oil sanctions. As you were just
saying, 80 percent of Iran's revenues come from oil exports.
The more we can do to shut that down as quickly as possible, I
think the more important it is, especially with the new waivers
perhaps happening as early as next month. So thank you for that
attention to that issue.
I wanted to switch to Turkey and the S-400, and the issues
that are going on there. Now you and I had a chance to talk
about this a couple of weeks ago. I am very concerned about
Turkey's plan to obtain the S-400, the surface-to-air missile
defense systems from Russia. They want to do that in July.
I would recommend to you an editorial in the New York Times
today, ``A U.S. Fighter Jet or a Russian Missile System, Not
Both,'' by Senator Risch, Senator Menendez, the ranking members
of this committee, as well as by Senators Inhofe and Reed, who
are the ranking member and chair of the Armed Services
Committee.
I think Turkey's purchase of the S-400 reduces the
interoperability of that system with our allies. It poses a
serious threat to the security of our F-35 fighter jets, and
the entire NATO system. A number of us were visiting a number
of NATO countries over the last couple of weeks. Great concern
over that. I know the Secretary-General, who celebrated the
70th anniversary of NATO with us in the joint session of
Congress, has similar concerns.
On April 2nd of this year, the Department of Defense
announced it would halt all F-35 equipment transfers to Turkey,
unless it abandons plans to acquire the S-400.
So I would just like for you to give us an overview of the
risks to the U.S. and NATO security as a result of Turkey
trying to integrate the S-400 system and our F-35 fighters in
the air defense.
Secretary Pompeo. So I will leave the details to the
experts, but as I have been briefed by the Department of
Defense team, it is not possible to both fly the F-35 in space
where the S-400 is significantly operable. That is not a very
technical description, but the two cannot coexist. We have made
that clear through foreign ministry channels. We have it clear
to General Carr through the Department of Defense channels.
This very challenge, this technical challenge it presents,
we now have provided an opportunity for the Turks to buy an
American system that will provide them with the air defense
capability that they want for their country. That offer is on
the table. The details are being worked through, and we have
made clear to the Turks as plainly as we can, you know, they
built a significant component of the F-35 as well. Not only are
they purchasers and customers, but they are----
Senator Barrasso. Producers.
Secretary Pompeo. --part of the supply chain for the F-35.
We have it clear that none of that can exist if the S-400 is
purchased by them.
Senator Barrasso. Are there consequences that you have in
mind that Turkey should face if they do go ahead with that
purchase?
Secretary Pompeo. Well, I mean I think as a statutory
matter, the lawyers will have to sort through the details, but
the S-400 is a significant weapons system, and we have shared
with them, we have asked them to go take a look at CATSA, what
that might well mean for them.
It is just, I think Acting Secretary Shanahan said it best
yesterday. We can't continue to have the F-35 operable in space
where the S-400 is also sitting.
Senator Barrasso. One of the other topics you and I had a
chance to discuss was Nord Stream II. I mean it came up when we
were at the Munich Defense Conference. It continues to come up
for discussion. To me it is Putin's pipeline. It is a trap, a
Russian trap that the Germans are seemingly willing to enter
into.
And your thoughts on, are there things that Germany has
done over the last year to even--to ensure that Nord Stream II
would even not proceed without guarantees that Russian oil will
be able to continue to be exported through Ukraine. Because
questions were raised earlier about Ukraine and the stability
of that country. And I think Senator Portman is heading there
right after the election. Some of us were there right before
the first round of the elections.
Secretary Pompeo. So President Trump has made clear, Nord
Stream II underwrites the Russians when we are in the NATO
group. Most of the countries of NATO see that same risk, and so
share America's concern there.
The Germans appear intent on continuing to build that
pipeline. And we are working with them to see if there is a
path forward that we can, at the very least, ensure that there
is energy that transits through Ukraine.
There may be an outcome there. We have done just about all
we can to discourage the Europeans, primarily the Germans, from
building Nord Stream II, and done that without success today.
Senator Barrasso. And final question in terms of incredible
U.S. military success against ISIS. Are there things that you
can share with us, now that the Caliphate has been defeated,
that the administration is shifting in terms of its strategy to
deal with insurgents, and to rid the region of any kind of
additional violent extremism that could do damage, with the
intention of doing damage to the United States?
Secretary Pompeo. So both in Syria and Iraq we have State
Department, often with the military teams, on the ground
working to see if there are ways that we can get the global
community to underwrite stabilization and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, so that there is less likelihood that we will
get the next variant of Sunni terror in Anbar and then the west
of Iraq.
The Iraqi government is in full support of this. The Iraqi
security forces, our military works closely with the buildout
security institutions, so that the next variant of Sunni
extremism, Sunni terrorism in the region doesn't march on
Baghdad or Erbil again.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Secretary, this administration has
still failed to provide the legally required determination on
the role of the crown prince and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
And despite superfluous briefings and additional determinations
from the Treasury Department this week, you are still not in
compliance with the law. Nor has the administration provided a
justification for its lack of respect for the law.
So my question is, have you discussed with the President or
the White House whether to make a determination about the crown
prince's responsibility for Mr. Khashoggi's death?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to talk about
conversations I had with the President. I am confident that we
are in compliance with the law. We simply disagree about the--
--
Senator Menendez. Let me read the law to you. Let me read
the law to you. And the author is sitting next to me.
``Not later than 120 days after receiving a request that
meets the requirements of paragraph two,'' which is when the
chair and the ranking member of the relevant committee, this
committee, previous chairman and I made such a request, ``the
president shall,'' shall, shall, not may, not could, he shall,
``determine if that person has engaged in such an activity,''
which is an activity in violation of the global Magnitsky Human
Rights Act, ``and submit a classified or unclassified report to
the chairperson and ranking member of the committee that
submitted the request with respect to that determination, and
includes a statement of whether or not the president intends to
impose sanctions with respect to the person.'' Shall.
I mean I know you have graduated from a great law school.
Shall is shall. I did not graduate from Harvard, but I
graduated from Rutgers' law school. Shall is shall. It means
you must. And yet you refuse to get--even if your determination
is that he hasn't, but you refuse to give us a determination.
And the message that that sends globally--for example, we
have President el-Sisi here, if he believes that you can do
anything with impunity just because you have some strategic
interest with the United States, or any other actor in the
world, then you have a dangerous precedent.
How is it that the CIA, according to public records, can
conclude that the Saudi crown prince ordered the killing of Mr.
Khashoggi, and yet the administration has taken no action
regarding a Magnitsky determination? Not sanctions on other
people. A Magnitsky determination as required by the law, and
requested by the chairman and the ranking member of this
committee.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I would never refer to even a
public report of something that the CIA had determined. I just
would not do it. I don't think it's in America's best interest
for elected officials to be seconding what some reporter thinks
they have gotten from classified information.
Second, with respect to the global Magnitsky----
Senator Menendez. Well, I think you should tell Senator
Graham that, too.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. I would tell anyone, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Bottom line is there are public reports
that----
Secretary Pompeo. I would tell anyone that.
Senator Menendez. --speak to this, and there are public--
there are a whole host of public reports that speak to things
that unfortunately the government doesn't tell us, even as
members of the Senate, as we found out yesterday.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, you know the--I don't want to
get into a debate. There are jurisdictional issues between the
Intelligence Committee and this committee that you are deeply
aware of.
Senator Menendez. Can you give me the legal--has the office
of the legal counsel, legal advisor, provided you with an
opinion that says you don't have to do this?
Secretary Pompeo. I am confident that we are doing
everything that we are required to do----
Senator Menendez. That is not what I asked you. Did the
office of the legal advisor provide you an opinion that says
you don't have to do this?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are compliance with the law.
Senator Menendez. You did not answer my question.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah. I have given you the answer I am
prepared to provide this morning.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me give you an answer to
something else that since my colleague, Senator Johnson,
invoked my name in disdain. I was not going to talk about this,
but since he opened the door, let me speak to it.
Mr. Bulatao and other nominees. I hope that Senator Johnson
is concerned about political firings and retribution at the
State Department as he is about some of these nominees. After
removing the prior undersecretary for management, Pat Kennedy,
a career foreign service officer, who knew the department well,
the Trump administration failed to nominate a replacement for
142 days.
Then the President nominated a candidate with zero
experience managing a larger organization, whose nomination
languished for a year, because republicans and democrats in
Congress did not believe he was fit to move forward through the
process before the administration acknowledged that, and then
took him out of the job nomination.
Five-hundred-and-nine days after Pat Kennedy was fired, the
White House finally submitted a second nominee to the
committee. Now this nominee is ready to go forward if the
department gives us the critical information that we have been
asking, that has already been provided to an inspector general
and a special counsel on information that is critical for this
committee's oversight of the department. But it has failed to
do so a year later.
Now I know many of my colleagues, including you, Mr.
Secretary, when you were a House member, I could read you the
quotes, spoke eloquently of the responsibility of oversight.
Yet, you deny you are stonewalling this committee from getting
that information.
And finally, talk about characterizing nominees as
excellent or outstanding candidates, we have nominees with
temporary restraining orders, who failed to disclose lawsuits
to this committee, who have Me Too issues, who even lack some
basic knowledge about their posts.
Amazingly enough, we have some nominees who have either
written or retweeted vile things about current and former
senators on this committee, and their families, which speaks to
their judgment as someone who is going to represent the United
States and the world.
Do you think it is appropriate for our nominee to retweet a
post stating George Soros, the leader of their movement, worked
for Hitler, helping kill his own people, the Jews? Or do you
think it is appropriate for that same nominee to retweet a post
alleging that Heidi Cruz, the wife of Senator Cruz, is an
architect of the North American Union, whose goal is to destroy
the sovereignty of the United States, and to retweet personal
attacks accusing Senator Cruz of being a whole host of other
things I won't get into?
Or do you think it is appropriate for that same nominee to
retweet a picture of Senator Romney with the words ``dumb ass''
on it, which goes on to say that, ``Senator Romney, Satan has a
hold on you. Surely, you'll go to hell.''
Is this the type of nominee--and I could go through a whole
host of others. So we are going to stop talking about nominees.
We are working very hard to try to move forward.
I left to speak about General Abizaid on the floor, and I
look forward to voting for him. Working with the chairman. We
put 24 nominees out before--but some of these nominees are
incredible. I think even you recognized it when we had a
conversation. Yet, they got re-nominated.
So we have some real vetting issues. So I hope we can get
to a better place, because I want you to be staffed. But by the
same token, I am just not going to rubberstamp nominees who
have some of these problems. And that is why we are having the
issue. And if I can get the information that this committee
deserves on oversight, Senator Johnson could have Mr. Bulatao.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let's talk a bit about Russia and Latin
America. Last year, in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
passed bipartisan legislation adopted as part of the NDAA that
required the Defense Intelligence Agency to report on Russia
security cooperation with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
The report that the administration submitted is extensive
and it is worrying. It shows that Russia is building a security
infrastructure in our backyard with Cuba, with Venezuela, and
with Nicaragua.
Cuba supports Russia naval operations in exchange for
credit and military equipment. In 2018 alone Russia and Cuba
signed a $50 million loan agreement for the purchase of Russian
military hardware and replacement parts.
In Nicaragua, President Ortega is committed to
strengthening security and defense agreements with Russia. And
over the past years, hundreds of Russian troops participated in
training with the Nicaraguan army.
The strongest security partnership, however, that Russia
has within Latin America is that of Venezuela. Russia is the
regime's largest arm supplier, with upwards of $11 billion in
arms sales over the past two decades. Just last year Russia
deployed two 160 Blackjack nuclear-capable bombers to the
Venezuelan military, along with 10 attack helicopters the
previous year.
Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of Russia's
strategic objective in its major investments in Latin America?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I think that your factual
recitations are almost spot-on, correct, in terms of the
analysis that I have seen as well. So this threat is real.
Look, they are here in Latin America because they want both
proximity. So some of what they do in Cuba, some of what they
do in Venezuela gives them access to American Southeast, and
allows them to operate their ships, their vessels, the
aircraft, and the two bombers that you described. So it gives
them logistical hubs.
It also gives them space from which to conduct cyber-
operations. That is, they have access to networks that they
can't access from other places in the world.
So there is a very real reason for their physical presence
in these places. That is why it is so important that the
Venezuelan people are successful in overthrowing Maduro,
getting their democracy back, and a government that will
understand it is in their best interest to have the rule of
law, and not operate with Cuban and Russian thugs inside of
their country.
Senator Cruz. So Maduro's regime in Venezuela is being in
very significant ways propped up by both Russia and Cuba. And,
indeed, Cuban thugs play an integral part of keeping Maduro in
power, even though his regime is illegitimate.
In my view, the pivotal piece for whether we have a
legitimately elected government in Venezuela, is going to be
whether the roughly 3,000 generals in the Venezuelan military
choose to remain with an illegitimate dictator that is Maduro,
or instead stand with the legitimate and constitutional leader,
Juan Guaido.
From the U.S. perspective, I think we should see a
combination of sticks and carrots for those military leaders.
In other words, each of those generals should know if they
stand with Maduro against the Venezuelan people. They face
sanctions directly. Their families face sanctions directly.
That would be a decision to be on the wrong side of history
that will haunt them for decades, for their entire lifetime.
On the other hand, if they make the decision to stand with
the people of Venezuela, and with constitutional government,
that will be a decision that will benefit them.
What are your views on both the carrots and sticks that we
can be using, we should be using, and what more can we do?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I agree with you. And we have
done each of those. You should know that Special Representative
Abrams and the Charge Jimmy Story both have lots of traffic
from the Venezuelan generals looking to see what the bid offer
spread is. So there are many conversations taking place.
It is quite interesting from our side to see. We don't
think they are telling their buddies that they are having
conversations with Americans about the fact that they are
trying to figure out if they can get a passport and a free home
someplace.
So we are confident that this combination of making clear
to them--look, it depends on exactly where they are sitting in
the command, the actions they are taking. But there is a set of
leaders there that have been part of the Maduro regime, but if
they come up to the light, if they come to the right side of
Venezuelan history, we are happy not to take any action against
them. We are happy to support them continuing to exist inside
of Venezuela successfully. But those who don't, those who
don't, we will hold them accountable when the day of reckoning
comes, and when Maduro leaves, and the Venezuelans get the
democracy they deserve.
Senator Cruz. Good. Final question.
Shifting to the other part of the world, China, if you look
at Huawei, and it is troubling to see our allies and partners,
including governments within the Five Eyes intelligence
community, consider partnering with Huawei for 5G
infrastructure. That raises serious national security concerns
for us and our allies.
How are your efforts going to make that case to our allies,
and what response are you getting?
Secretary Pompeo. So we are making real progress. I would
hope we would get better responses more quickly, but we have
continued to make clear the risks, two risks. They have their
own risks, risk to their systems, and risk to the privacy of
their own people.
But the second risk is, and certainly, if you are a Five
Eyes partner, but even if you are outside of Five Eye, inside
of Europe, we still share a great deal of intelligence with
you, or co-located, or work alongside you. We have made it very
clear to them, you jeopardize that.
We may have to not be able to be there with a DOD system.
We may have to not be there with a State Department system,
because we need to protect our information. So we have it clear
moving down that path presents at least two very significant
risks, and we have urged them to make a decision that stays
away from this technology. There are other alternatives that
will deliver them better security and better relationships.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, this morning I had in my office a special
immigrant visa recipient from Afghanistan. He had been a
translator. He was tortured. He was missing a number of fingers
on both hands. Almost killed by the Taliban. And he raised a
question with me that I couldn't answer.
He said, ``Why do we believe we can negotiate with the
Taliban today since we have not been able to do that in past
years? And why is the government not at the table for these
negotiations?'' During the time that the negotiations have been
ongoing, seven Americans have been killed by the Taliban.
So can you answer his question for me, and tell me how we
are responding to the Taliban's violence against Americans that
has happened during the negotiations? Are they paying any
price? Have we asked them for any accountability for what has
happened?
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma'am, I think I can answer his
question. His statement that we are not talking to the Afghans
is not true. We have extensive daily conversation----
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry. I mischaracterized that. I
should have said that the Afghans are not at the table for
those negotiations.
Secretary Pompeo. To the extent there are negotiations
taking place, they are as part of the table as anybody else. We
are talking with the government of National Unity, speaking
with the Taliban. We are working to get the two of them in the
room together. We think we are closer than we have been at any
time in the last decade in achieving that.
This will ultimately be a resolution that the Afghan people
will have to achieve.
With respect to why we are talking with the Taliban is they
control a significant amount of resources. And to get the
reconciliation we need, to take down the violence level, the
Taliban is going to have a say in that.
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt. Again, I did not
mean to indicate why are we talking to the Taliban. Why do we
believe the Taliban will be honest with us any more today than
they have been over the last years?
Secretary Pompeo. Oh, yes, ma'am. That is a fair question.
Trust, but verify. It will be about actions on the ground. We
understand there is not only a deep level of distrust with the
Taliban. There is a deep level of distrust with many of the
actors in the Afghan area. It is a nation that has a sad
history with respect to truth telling and corruption.
So the Americans, we have our eyes wide open. This will
need to be an agreement. If we can receive one that gets
reconciliation, that takes down the violence levels, but it
will be the actions ultimately. The negotiations, we will get a
framework, but it will be the actions we see on the ground that
will ultimately come to deliver the confidence that we can
begin to do what President Trump has directed us to do, is to
take down the enormous resource commitment and risk to American
soldiers that we face every day.
Senator Shaheen. And what are we doing to ensure that
Afghan women are at the table during these negotiations? As you
know, we passed the Women's----
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Shaheen. --Peace and Security Act. The President
signed it into law. That says women should be at the table in
conflict-ending negotiations.
Secretary Pompeo. I think Ambassador Khalilzad said this
pretty well the other day, when he was asked a similar
question. We have made some real progress with respect to how
women are treated in parts of Afghanistan today.
Senator Shaheen. Without a doubt.
Secretary Pompeo. It has been uneven, to be sure. We want
to do everything we can to make sure that as Afghanistan moves
forward we don't retrograde, we don't go backwards on that.
That is why they should be part of the discussion. I think
Ambassador Khalilzad said that pretty clearly.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I had a chance to ask the ambassador
that myself several weeks ago. And I was not reassured by his
response that we have made a firm commitment to ensure that
they are part of any negotiations. So I hope you will commit to
today, that that is part of what our effort is in Afghanistan
as we are looking at ending this war.
Secretary Pompeo. Well, remember, the Afghans will
ultimately decide, right? I mean we----
Senator Shaheen. And no, I appreciate that. But we also
have, as we are doing in the negotiations, we are putting
pressure on the Afghan government. What I am asking is that we
put pressure on the Afghan government and the Taliban to ensure
that women are part of the negotiations.
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, there are lots of issues that we
are working our way through.
Senator Shaheen. I understand that, but this is half of the
population of the country.
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma'am. And I hope they will make
their voices heard. I hope they will turn to their leadership,
that they will demand of the folks in their--if they are in
Kandahar, if they are in----
Senator Shaheen. Right. They are trying to do that.
Secretary Pompeo. --Kunduz, I hope the women of Afghanistan
will demand that of their leaders. We have always done our part
there. American's can never be criticized for not doing enough
for the Afghan people. I take great umbrage to suggest we are
doing----
Senator Shaheen. I was not criticizing----
Secretary Pompeo. --anything different.
Senator Shaheen. --based on that.
Secretary Pompeo. So I am urging the Afghan people to
take----
Senator Shaheen. And I have done that, too.
Secretary Pompeo. To take a role.
Senator Shaheen. And their response to me has been, ``We
hope that you will also put that kind of pressure on the
government.''
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. And that is what I am asking. It doesn't
sound to me like you are willing to commit to that, though.
Secretary Pompeo. Ma'am, we are working on every front to
make sure that we continue to move forward on every element. We
want every woman's voice to be heard. I hope they will all do
that.
Senator Shaheen. And I hope you will--and our government
will put pressure on the Taliban and the Afghan government in
the same way. So we can agree to leave it at that.
I would like to just add one more comment that is a
separate matter. I have a constituent who was medically
evacuated from China. And through him, our office has been
engaged in effort to better understand what happened to some of
the Chinese officials who have been medically evacuated.
I understand that there is a report about what happened
there. Would you be willing to--would you agree to come before
this committee to share with us the information that is in that
report?
Secretary Pompeo. I am happy to share everything we have
done for every State Department official who we believe has
been harmed by the kinds of incidents that you are describing,
first in Cuba, and then one in China as well, that have been
confirmed to date.
Senator Shaheen. And that is in part of the report?
Secretary Pompeo. I am not certain of the exact report.
There has been lots of work to do. There have been many
reports. I am certainly happy to share with you what all of the
United States government, including the State Department, has
done for these officers who have been harmed, and some who
believe they have been harmed, and are still being medically
evaluated.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Will we have to do that in a classified
setting?
Secretary Pompeo. No, sir, not for most of it.
The Chairman. Okay.
Secretary Pompeo. There may be some. There may be some that
has to be classified, in terms of the vectors or the
methodology of what we are doing to figure out how these health
incidents took place, but the work that the State Department
has done to take care of its people we could certainly talk
about.
The Chairman. We have all had a real interest in that for a
lot of different reasons. So thank you, Senator Shaheen, for
raising that.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks Mr.
Secretary, for the testimony.
I want to ask you about your testimony yesterday. You were
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee,
talking about State Department budget. And you had an exchange
with Senator Van Hollen about Israel and the potential
annexation of the West Bank.
I think he asked you questions about if Israel annexes all
our part of the West Bank, what would the U.S. do? And I am not
going to ask you that because that is a little bit of a
hypothetical, and it may even be some of that that might be
above your pay grade. But I want to ask you the question about
what U.S. policy is.
So tell me what U.S. policy is right now. Would we support
an annexation of the West Bank? Do we oppose it? Or are we
indifferent to whether that happens?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I will give you the same answer
that I gave yesterday. The United States has had a longstanding
policy. We have talked about it. The President has talked about
it.
We are now working with many parties to share what our
vision for us to how to resolve this problem. Senator, you
would concede that for decades now there have been all these
wonderful experts that have tried to resolve this crisis in the
Middle East, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian
people, and they have each failed.
So the old set of ideas are not worth retreading. They have
simply not succeeded. We are hopeful that our vision, our ideas
about what this might look like, how we might proceed to do
that will create the conditions where the Israelis and the
Palestinians can resolve this. I am not going to get out in
front of what is in there.
Senator Kaine. Right.
Secretary Pompeo. And this bears upon the very question you
are asking. I don't want to get out in front of it, but----
Senator Kaine. Do you think two-state solution is an old
idea whose time has gone?
Secretary Pompeo. It has certainly been an idea that has
been around a long time, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. But I mean you talked about old ideas
that we have to set aside. Is the U.S. policy to set aside the
idea of the two-state solution that was at the origin of the
United States' recognition of the State of Israel?
Secretary Pompeo. I would argue that millions of manhours
have been spent to try and build out a two-state solution. It
hasn't worked to date. It may work this afternoon, but it
hasn't worked yet.
Senator Kaine. Is that still a goal of the United States,
or is that no longer a goal?
Secretary Pompeo. You can probably ask me 15 other
different ways, Senator. I am going to allow this process that
we have, we are engaged with the parties to work its way
through.
Senator Kaine. Well, how about if I state it this way?
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. It has been a policy of the United States. I
agree with that. I think it should be the policy. Do you agree
with me or disagree with me?
Secretary Pompeo. I think ultimately the individuals in the
region will sort this out. We want good things for the
Palestinian people.
Senator Kaine. The President said at the beginning of his
term, he actually said kind of candidly, one state, two state,
whatever, whatever is agreeable to both Israelis and
Palestinians. So let's look at that.
Would a solution, in order for the U.S. to accept it, have
to be acceptable to Israelis and Palestinians?
Secretary Pompeo. You imply that somehow the U.S. has veto
rights on a solution that the Israelis and the Palestinians
achieve.
Senator Kaine. So are we indifferent to the decision that's
made?
Secretary Pompeo. We are going to work with--we want a
better life for the people of the West Bank----
Senator Kaine. I don't think we have a veto right, but I am
just asking you, do we have a policy? Would you suggest, as
using the President's formulation that if Israeli--and you even
said, Israelis and Palestinians will have to work it out.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. For us to find that acceptable, would both
Israelis and Palestinians have to find it acceptable?
Secretary Pompeo. I mean yes, I think for there to be a
peaceful resolution here, the Palestinian people are--we have
seen what happens. We have seen Intifadas. We have seen
protests. We have seen what is happening in Gaza. And I think
the Israelis accept the fact that what the ultimate resolution
of this will be something that the Palestinian people are going
to have to acknowledge makes sense.
Senator Kaine. Then I won't follow-up on the hypothetical
about whether this administration still accepts the notion of a
two-state solution. I am kind of shocked that that cannot be
stated clearly. But if your answer is the United States'
position is we will accept a resolution, but for that
resolution to be acceptable, it has to be accepted by Israelis
and Palestinians, I can accept that.
Let me ask you this question. I have got two Virginians,
one a Virginia resident, and one a U.S. citizen, Aziz al-Yousef
and her son, Sala Arheider, who have been imprisoned. I think
Aziz al-Yousef is now out of prison in Saudi Arabia. Largely
over their activism around women's rights, women's ability
drive, the guardianship issue in Saudi Arabia, and efforts to
lift that. Tell me the status of any dialogue that you are in
with your Saudi counterparts about either these individuals or
others who are imprisoned because of activism for women's
rights.
Secretary Pompeo. So I personally, and my team, have spoken
with the Saudis about every single American who we know to be
wrongfully detailed. And we have urged them to make a better
decision, saying that those folks need to be released, they
need to come back. There are too many. It's inconsistent with
the relationship between our two countries. We do not think it
is in the Saudi's best interest to do this either, but we have
made clear our expectations.
Senator Kaine. And you think Sala Arheider and Aziz al-
Yousef are wrongfully detained?
Secretary Pompeo. If I may not comment on particular cases,
I would prefer to do that.
Senator Kaine. I assert that they are wrongfully detained.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. But I can understand your point. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Just to follow-up on the Israel point, in
Israel, I don't think I can recall a time in recent memory
where such a state that nine miles at its narrowest point has
faced the array of threats it now faces. It looks north and
sees Iranian Hezbollah elements operating openly, just north of
its border, in Syria. It looks northwest into Lebanon and sees
Hezbollah more capable, with munitions that are now precision
guided.
It looks at what is happening in Gaza repeatedly, not just
with Hamas, but with other sub-elements, who are the ones
behind these recent attacks that we have seen over there. It
sees Iran continue to advance in its missile capabilities.
And on top of all that, it is my observation that sure, it
would be great if we had this solution to this problem with the
Palestinians and the Israelis, but the problem from Israel's
point of view, when you take all of that into context, is every
time it has ever--any territory on its border throughout its
history has been used to target and to attack Israel.
And secondly, who would they negotiate with? It is not even
clear who has the authority or the ability to deliver on a deal
at this point. And, in fact, some of the deals that are being
discussed now are not nearly as generous as deals that have
been rejected in the past.
So I guess my first question would be, isn't it fair that
anything that we do with regards to talking about Israel and
talking about solutions to the Palestinian issue take into its
context all of these other threats that are currently weighing
on it, recognizing that some argue that by dealing with that
these other issues go away.
Secretary Pompeo. Yeah.
Senator Rubio. But it is fair to take that all that into
consideration.
Secretary Pompeo. It is not only fair, it is necessary.
Israel has a right to defend itself. It has a right to create a
situation on its borders that provide security for it and its
people. And I am very confident the United States will continue
to support that.
Senator Rubio. If tomorrow the issue with the Palestinians
were resolved, and it would be great if it were, would it in
any way, in your view, lead Iran to be less hostile towards
Israel?
Secretary Pompeo. Unimaginable.
Senator Rubio. Would it lead Hezbollah or those elements to
be less hostile to Israel?
Secretary Pompeo. No chance.
Senator Rubio. And I believe it is still the case that some
of these groups that Israel is being asked to cut a deal with
have as their stated objective the destruction of Israel as a
Jewish state.
Secretary Pompeo. That is true.
Senator Rubio. I would imagine it is, in that vein, that
the administration has requested 3.3 billion in security
assistance to Israel. And I just want, if I may ask you to
further comment, because one of the interesting things about it
is, and I say this, and I hope that I'm wrong, but I don't
believe that I am, that a future Israel-Hezbollah war, even
though neither side seems to want one, certainly at this point,
they may wind up in one anyway. In essence, as Israel is forced
to defend itself by targeting certain elements, it could
trigger a response from Syria, for example, that Israel would
have to respond to, to rapidly escalate.
The situation in Gaza could quickly escalate at any moment,
particularly if attacks resume inside, for example, suicide
attacks in Jerusalem. They will respond to these things very
strongly. Any of these responses could rapidly trigger
escalation that could lead to a war.
So the truth of the matter is that there is a hair-trigger
threat that at any moment an open and very severe conflict can
open up with any of these threats that they now face. I imagine
that was the thinking behind the administration's commitment on
this year's budgeting for security assistance.
Secretary Pompeo. That is absolutely true. We believe that
is money well-spent for American security, in addition to
Israel's security. You describe the threats that are very real.
Almost every one of them is connected to Iran. The risk that
Iran will decide to put missile systems inside of Lebanon, the
Israelis will feel compelled, because the threat is so
enormous, they will not have the reaction time. The risk of
escalation for these kinds of activities that Iran has on
occasions is very, very real.
Senator Rubio. One last question on the Houthis in Yemen. I
have remained concerned that they would acquire from Iran, and
I imagine Iran would be the only one that would supply them
anti-ship missiles that would allow them to directly threaten
not just Saudi shipping, but inadvertently U.S. shipping, or
perhaps directly, as a result.
I know there has been a lot of debate here about Yemen, and
the U.S.'s role in that. But I think lost in that debate has
often been the threat that the Houthis in Yemen pose,
particularly as they have increasingly become, it seems,
surrogates and agents on behalf of the Iranian regime.
Secretary Pompeo. The risk is not only the ships at sea,
but missile systems inside of Yemen that are Iranian missile
systems that land in big cities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
and if they are extended just a little bit into the Emirates,
the Gulf States, Americans transit there all the time.
You all transit there on trips. These risks to U.S.
interests are very, very real. They are not just providing the
equipment and hardware either. They are providing the training,
so that the Houthis can actually use and implement more
effectively these weapon systems, UAVs as well. The technology
rate that is being transferred from Iran to the Houthis
presents a real risk, certainly to Southeast Saudi Arabia, but
to the broader Gulf States and America as well.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rubio. For members, a vote
was just called. And with that, Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just follow-up quickly in regards to the Israel-Palestinian
process. The Israel elections are now over. We know that Hemyat
Youfuren--the new government, but the speculation is that will
occur rather rapidly. There was also a comment in one of this
morning's paper that the United States may be putting forward a
peace proposal in regards to the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Can you just, particularly in response to Senator Kaine's
point about the United States not having veto right, can we
anticipate that the United States will be initiating a peace
offer in the near future, or parameter in the near future?
Secretary Pompeo. So we have been working on a set of ideas
that we hope to present before too long that will, I hope, have
sufficient force of intellect and power that Israelis and
Palestinians will see that there is value there. There will be
things that neither of them like, but things that the Gulf
States make sense. All those who have an interest in resolving
this conflict will think make sense.
I am sure there will be critiques of it as well, but we
hope that it provides the Intellectual Foundation upon which
these discussions can advance in a way that they have not been
able to for the past several years.
Senator Cardin. Well, it seems like over the last umpteen
years it has never been the right time to move forward with
peace, and peace must forward. So I just would encourage the
United States to not give up on peace between the Palestinians
and the Israelis. It is critical, not only for Israel and the
Palestinians, but for that region, and for the future of that
region.
I want to get back to the human rights agenda. And I really
am trying to find ways we work together on advancing the human
rights and American values. And the Global Magnitsky is one of
those efforts that was strong bipartisan, just about unanimous
effort here in United States Congress, to give an additional
tool for the U.S. to lead against human rights violators by
making it clear we don't want you in our country, and we don't
want you to use the banking system.
And we have found many of our allies around the world have
patterned laws very similar to Global Magnitsky, and others are
considering it. So we already had an exchange that relates to
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But the Uygur issue with China is
another area that we have triggered interest when using
Magnitsky sanctions against the Chinese on a clear violation of
international standards.
And I guess my point is this, the Magnitsky law was focused
initially on Russia. It is now global. And we want to use it as
a global tool to show that America is concerned about human
rights globally.
Can you just advise us as to whether this is being actively
considered in China in regards to the Uygur issues and other
areas?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, we are considering using this
global authority in many places, including Asia, including
China.
Senator Cardin. Well, I appreciate that.
Secretary Pompeo. We are trying to find the fact pattern,
the right place, and that is what we have done every place in
my now almost year as secretary of state, and Treasury as well.
Senator Cardin. And the purpose of Magnitsky Law was to
have Congress working with the administration. It is not
supposed to be in--and you have used it. The administration has
used it in many cases that have been very much in consultation
with us. I would just urge us to get a closer relationship in
regards to how you implement the Global Magnitsky.
Let me tell you one other area, and I believe Senator Udall
may have questioned on this, and that is arms sales. We are not
naive to think we are not going to have arms sales with
countries that don't share our total belief in governance. We
understand that. But we expect arms sales to advance U.S.
values, democratic values.
Can you just assure us that as you look at arms sales that
we use that as a way not only for the military issues and
defense, but also to advance American values in the country we
are doing business with, to let them know it's absolutely
essential that these arms be used consistent with American
values.
Secretary Pompeo. So we certainly do that, indeed, when
recommendations come up, as we discuss arms sales, discuss them
with both elements of the United States government as well as
the legislative branch. That is always a component of how we
think about it.
Indeed, there are arms sales that we have not proposed
because we looked at it and said it doesn't make sense,
certainly at this time, given what is going on in that country
with respect to human rights, or extrajudicial killings. We
certainly take a close look at those as a component of whether
we think a particular arms transfer makes sense.
Senator Cardin. And I would suggest again, here is an area
where Congress, this committee particularly, wants to work with
you, to make it clear that it is not how the administration
feels, or Congress feels, it is how we feel, advancing U.S.
values in our bilateral relations, including arms sales.
Last point, if I am late. In regards to Burma, and I know
that question was asked by Senator Gardner, the Holocaust
Museum has determined there is compelling evidence that it was
ethnic cleansing. I would just ask if you could share with us
how we are responding to the genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, issues that have taken place.
We could never let an episode like this go without the
United States weighing in very directly and very openly as to
how this cannot be tolerated, and that those responsible need
to be held accountable.
Secretary Pompeo. So I think this administration has
clearly done that in Burma. We are continuing to do it. I had a
conversation just yesterday on this very issue. We are looking
at are there other sanctions, are there other tools that we
have where we can go after other military leaders that engage
in inappropriate behavior inside of the country.
I met with the leadership of Bangladesh earlier this week,
or end of last week, talking about the difficult conditions
that these refugees are in, how we can help as the season for
monsoons once again is upon us. It is going to be a long
process to get them returned. And so we all have to be mindful
of making sure that there is the resources there. We have not
forgotten what has taken place in Burma.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you made earlier reference to Chen Quanguo,
who----
Secretary Pompeo. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. --who was the oppressor of the Tibetan
people. And now he has moved over to a new job, which is
oppress the Uygur. And same guy, same attitude towards
minorities inside of China.
Your administration has yet to sanction Chen Quanguo. Are
you intending on doing that?
Secretary Pompeo. We are constantly evaluating appropriate
sanctions. You are right. He got a promotion.
Senator Markey. He got a promotion. Yeah. It is a promotion
in repression responsibility, however.
Secretary Pompeo. We take this threat incredibly seriously.
We have called this out in ways that the previous
administration refused to do. I am proud of the work we have
done on human rights around the world, and including what we
are doing in China.
Senator Markey. Yeah. But you have yet to sanction this
guy, who is in charge of the repression. So are you going to
charge him? Are you going to sanction him particularly so that
the whole world knows that we are holding this man responsible
for the harm which he is doing to human rights of the Uygur?
Secretary Pompeo. I have made a pretty consistent practice
not to announce sanctions in Senate hearings.
Senator Markey. All right. Well, let me move over to Burma,
where your administration has yet to sanction the commander in
chief of the Burmese military, who is also responsible in that
country for the repression of the Rohingya, which is an ongoing
crime against humanity.
So are you going to sanction the commander in chief of the
Burmese military for his activity in harming the Rohingya?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, our diplomatic team is
confronted with very complex issues in Burma. We are trying to
do our best to figure out which tools to use in which places,
how to shape the situation. Our goal, obviously, I think you
would agree with me, our goal isn't to sanction people, but to
change behavior, and then to hold those responsible for the
acts that took place accountable. And our team, both in theater
and here in Washington, that works on these issues is
constantly evaluating the right tool mix.
Senator Markey. Yeah. I know what you are saying, Mr.
Secretary, that it is complicated, but at the same time I think
it is very clear, I think it is very clear that there is a
genocide, there is a crime against humanity, which is being
committed. And the United States has the responsibility to be
the moral leader of the world.
In here, we actually know the military leader, the
commander in chief who is responsible for this crime. And we
expect you to do something about, Mr. Secretary. We expect you
to sanction him in the same way we expect you to sanction the
leader in China who has been designated to oppress the Uyghur
in their country.
Let me move over, if I could, for a second, following up on
Senator Kaine's questioning. And that is with regard to the
Saudi nuclear program, and the recent revelation that it does
have a nuclear power plant, but it is not under International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which is a lot different than
the program inside of Iran.
And what I am concerned about, and Senator Kaine has
already made reference to this, is the non-public 810
authorizations for companies to pursue nuclear cooperation with
Saudi Arabia. And I have repeatedly asked whether 810
authorizations have been granted, and to see them. I have
received silence--with a dash of obfuscation from your
administration.
And I recall that you, yourself, over in the House, you
passionately spoke about secret side deals, and how much you
were opposed to them when you were a host member. So will you
commit to sharing the applications and the authorizations you
have granted for companies to pursue nuclear cooperation with
Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Pompeo. Senator, I remain passionate about the
important oversight that both the Senate and the House engage
in. I think it is incredibly important to keep the Executive
Branch acting consistent with the laws that this Congress or
previous ones have passed.
Let me take your request under consideration. I can't make
that consideration. There are other agencies that have a voice
in this as well. But I am happy to get an answer to you about
whether we can provide it, and if so, when.
Senator Markey. I think it is important for you to be
transparent, and towards that goal, I am going to introduce
legislation with Senator Rubio, and Senator Kaine, and Senator
Young later on today to mandate those disclosures. There is a
bipartisan concern on this committee that we do not have enough
information about these potential nuclear deals between the
United States and Saudi Arabia, in an already volatile area of
the world.
Again, the Sunni-Shia tension is already at a fever pitch.
Adding this nuclear dimension to it will only make it worse. So
I think it is important for us to be in on the ground floor, or
whatever planning you have for the transfer of nuclear material
to Saudi Arabia. And transparency is key.
We are the oversight committee, and we have to make sure
that we are working to make sure these countries live together
and understand each other, and not try to put together programs
that will wind up annihilating each other. So I thank you for
any information which you can give us, because the Middle East
is about to get a lot hotter, and I am not talking about
climate change, if Saudi is allowed to continue down the
pathway with ballistic missiles, with nuclear materials that
will only exacerbate and not reduce the tension in the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. With that, thank you, Secretary Pompeo. We
appreciate your patience. And I know you agree with us that
these spirited discussions are really important for
development----
Secretary Pompeo. Thank you.
The Chairman. --and carrying on of diplomacy by the United
States. We are all Americans. We all have the same goals. How
we get there, sometimes we disagree on, but it is important
that we continue these lines of communication, keep them open
both in open session and privately. And you have been very kind
to me in that regard personally, and I sincerely appreciate
that.
In any event, for the information of the members, the
record will remain open until close of business on Friday. And
we would ask the witness to respond as promptly as possible,
and your responses will be made a part of the record.
[The information referred to above can be accessed by the
following link: http://www.afsa.org/foreign-service-journal]
The Chairman. With the thanks of the committee, Mr.
Secretary, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Mr. Secretary, as far as I can tell we've had two
presidential-level summits with North Korea, but North Korea's nuclear
and missile programs continue to grow unconstrained and we haven't seen
any of the initial steps, such as a full and complete declaration of
its nuclear and missile programs, that you identified a year ago as
necessary to begin the denuclearization process. In earlier testimony
before this Committee I asked you a series of questions about necessary
elements for any deal with North Korea. Given your earlier statements
intimating that you'd be able to solve the North Korea denuclearization
within a year, your Department's characterization of the Singapore
statement as a ``historic'' achievement, and your own timeline for
denuclearization within a year or by the end of the first term of the
Trump administration. I'd like to revisit those questions today and ask
you--yes or no--whether you have achieved written agreement with North
Korea on any of your own stated goals:
a) Providing a definition for denuclearization, meaning the
dismantlement or removal of all nuclear weapons, facilities,
technology, and material from North Korea?
b) That North Korea will end the production and enrichment of
uranium and plutonium for military programs?
c) That North Korea will permanently dismantle and disable its
nuclear weapons infrastructure, including test sites, all nuclear
weapons research and development facilities, particularly with respect
to advanced centrifuges, and nuclear weapons enrichment and
reprocessing facilities?
d) That North Korea will put forward a full, complete and
verifiable declaration of all its nuclear activities?
e) That will put in place robust restrictions to assure that
nuclear material, technology and expertise are not exported?
f) That North Korea will dismantle all ballistic missiles and agree
to a prohibition on all ballistic missile development?
g) That puts in place sufficient safeguards to assure that no
ballistic missiles and associated technology are proliferated or
exported?
h) That include a commitment by North Korea to robust compliance
inspections including a verification regime for its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs, including complete access to all nuclear
related sites and facilities with real time verification including
``anywhere, anytime'' inspections and snap-back sanctions if North
Korea is not in full compliance?
i) That there be no sunsets?
j) And that creates a roadmap for progress on sanctions relief
dependent on dismantlement and removal of North Korea's nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs?
Answer. In Singapore, Chairman Kim accepted our goal of achieving
the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK. He committed
the DPRK to work towards this goal in the Singapore Summit Joint
Statement. Chairman Kim has reiterated that promise to the President
and to me. We have had extensive conversations with the DPRK about the
contours of final, fully verified denuclearization. There is still a
great deal of work to do to achieve that ultimate goal. The Department
is committed to keeping you and other members of Congress updated on
the administration's efforts.
Question. In response to a question from Senator Markey you stated
that compared to 2016 there was less coal, fuel, and ``resources'' in
North Korea as a result of the recent rounds of sanctions. Yet
according to the Congressional Research Service fuel prices in North
Korea have fallen from 1.71 euros in 2017 to 1.21 euros for gasoline in
November 218, and from 1.76 euros in 2017 to 1.6 euros for diesel in
November, 2018, indicating either rising supply or at the least no
increased shortage. Likewise, CRS reports little to no fluctuation in
rice process in 2017 and 2018, and that based on price and other data,
there appears to be more coal available in North Korea domestically
than previously, which is being used to produce increased electricity
generation. Moreover, there are no apparent indicators of macroeconomic
stress, despite some fall-off in GDP since Congress, with bipartisan
support, initiated a tougher sanctions regime on North Korea under the
Obama administration. Can you provide us a factual basis and analysis
for your statements regarding coal, fuel and resources in North Korea?
Answer. North Korea's access to refined petroleum today is more
restricted than it was at the beginning of this administration, and its
coal exports have decreased. The State Department can provide
additional details to the Committee in a classified briefing. The
United States, together with our allies and partners, is taking action
to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions restricting North
Korea's imports of refined petroleum and exports of coal and combatting
North Korea's sanctions-evasion activity. We have deployed aircraft and
surface vessels to detect and seek to disrupt these activities. We have
increased monitoring and surveillance activities, with a particular
focus on detecting and seeking to disrupt ship-to-ship transfers of
refined petroleum to DPRK tankers.
Question. You also stated that you were unsure how to best
characterize the massive increase in ship-to-ship transfers over the
past several years. Can you provide the Committee with a classified or
unclassified estimate of the tonnage of fuel in ship-to-ship transfers
in 2016, 2017, 2018, and thus far in 2019?
Answer. As stated in a March 21 North Korea maritime advisory
issued by the Departments of State and Treasury and the Coast Guard, we
estimate that tankers made at least 263 port calls in the DPRK in 2018,
all of which involved deliveries of refined petroleum products, likely
procured through illicit, U.N.-prohibited, ship-to-ship transfers with
DPRK-flagged vessels. If each of these tankers was full when it made
its delivery, the DPRK imported 3.78 million barrels of fuel, almost
seven and a half times the allowable amount under UNSCR 2397, in 2018.
The Department of State can provide additional information to the
Committee in a classified briefing.
Question. In your opening statement before the Foreign Relations
Committee you commented that as you approach sound foreign policy
making, ``First, the Trump administration recognized and faced reality.
We know we can't make sound policy based on wishful thinking.'' Given
the need to recognize and face reality as the basis for sound policy,
can you explain why your Department has failed to make a designation
regarding crimes against humanity and genocide conducted against the
Rohingya during August 2017 military clearance operations in Burma?
Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military's
appalling human rights abuses against Rohingya and the need for justice
and accountability. The Department remains focused on accountability
for those responsible, seeking justice for victims, and promoting
reforms that will prevent the recurrence of atrocities and other human
rights violations and abuses. In November 2017, the Department
concluded that horrific atrocities in Burma's northern Rakhine State
constituted ethnic cleansing against Rohingya.
Question. In your opening statement before the Foreign Relations
Committee you commented that as you approach sound foreign policy
making, ``First, the Trump administration recognized and faced reality.
We know we can't make sound policy based on wishful thinking.'' Would
you characterize what transpired as genocide? Will your Department make
a designation?
Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military's
extensive human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and the
need for justice and accountability. In November 2017, the Department
concluded that horrific atrocities in Burma's northern Rakhine State
constituted ethnic cleansing against Rohingya.
Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a
long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be
automatic, but will require negotiation. Can you clarify the state of
negotiations with Russia specifically on the question of New START
extension, and where/when these discussions have occurred? Do you
support completing the Export Control Reform Initiative?
Answer. The administration has not started negotiations with Russia
on New START extension because the administration is reviewing
internally whether to seek an extension of the New START Treaty with
Russia.
Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a
long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be
automatic, but will require negotiation. Is New START extension being
examined in the totality of other issues affecting U.S.-Russia
strategic stability? What are those other issues?
Answer. The administration's review of whether to seek an extension
of New START is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national
interest, and how the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national
security in the evolving security environment, including Russia's
ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial
noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China's
continuing nuclear modernization.
Question. A decision on New START extension has been pending for a
long time and Russia has made it clear that extension won't be
automatic, but will require negotiation. Has New START extension and
these other issues been discussed in a strategic stability dialogue? Is
the State Department going to re-engage Strategic Stability Talks? If
not, why not?
Answer. At their 2018 meeting in Helsinki, President Trump and
President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to
continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-
Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual
interest. After meeting his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in
August, Ambassador Bolton stated the two sides discussed many issues,
including some related to strategic stability. They met again last
October. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian
officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to
strategic stability.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in
the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that
China has ``large numbers.'' I take it to mean you are referring to
China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear
forces. How would you compare the size of China's strategic nuclear
forces vs. those of the United States and Russia?
Answer. China's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale
of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its
future intent and current posture. Today, China invests considerable
resources to maintain and modernize a limited, but survivable, nuclear
force. Its arsenal consists of approximately 75-100 ICBMs, as well as a
large number of theater-range systems to hold regional targets at risk.
China is engaged in an ongoing expansion of its nuclear capabilities,
presaging a more dangerous future in which it has a considerably larger
number of sophisticated delivery systems able to reach the United
States, and our allies and partners, than in the past.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in
the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that
China has ``large numbers.'' I take it to mean you are referring to
China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear
forces. What is the trajectory of China's strategic nuclear forces? Do
you believe the modest increases in the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers (systems accountable under New START) of Chinese forces
expected before 2026 will affect the U.S.-Russia strategic balance?
Answer. China's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale
of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its
future intent and current posture. This modernization is resulting in a
diverse nuclear force, with a new generation of delivery systems coming
online as China works to establish a nuclear triad. China's arsenal
consists of approximately 75-100 ICBMs, as well as theater-range
systems to hold regional targets at risk. The ongoing expansion in
China's nuclear capabilities presages a dangerous future in which it
has a considerably larger number of sophisticated delivery systems able
to reach the United States, and our allies and partners, than in the
past.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in
the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that
China has ``large numbers.'' I take it to mean you are referring to
China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear
forces. What would be the process for adding China as the New START
treaty?
Answer. The New START Treaty is a bilateral treaty between the
United States and Russia. The Department has not yet assessed what
procedural steps would be required in order to bring China into the
Treaty.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you raised the possibility of China in
the context of a discussion about New START extension, noting that
China has ``large numbers.'' I take it to mean you are referring to
China's nuclear weapons stockpile and not their strategic nuclear
forces. How do you envision engaging China on arms control more
broadly?
Answer. The United States seeks a meaningful dialogue with China on
our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities.
Uncertainty regarding China's nuclear modernization, its increasingly
assertive behavior, and an unwillingness to engage in meaningful
dialogue on issues of nuclear weapons policy, strategic capabilities,
arms control, and risk reduction raise the risks of misperception and
miscalculation. China has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to broach
discussions on these issues in our pursuit of a peaceful security
environment and stable relations.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New
START ``fits 2021 and beyond'' in the context of the administration
thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether
certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets
future challenges. Can you describe specifically what issues are under
consideration?
Answer. The administration's review of whether to seek an extension
of New START is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national
interest and how the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national
security in the evolving security environment, including Russia's
ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial
noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China's
continuing nuclear modernization.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New
START ``fits 2021 and beyond'' in the context of the administration
thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether
certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets
future challenges. Is the administration considering adding additional
weapons systems, such as non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), other
strategic-range systems such as the one Putin revealed in March 2018,
and/or other technologies?
Answer. Russia's ongoing modernization of its strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear forces is part of the evolving security
environment that the administration is evaluating as part of its review
of whether to seek an extension of New START. We assess that at least
two of the new systems described by President Putin in March 2018,
Sarmat and Avangard, would be subject to the New START Treaty at the
appropriate time in their development. Regarding new kinds of strategic
offensive arms, the New START Treaty states in Article V that, ``When a
Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging,
that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a
strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.'' The United States has engaged Russia on these issues in
appropriate channels.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New
START ``fits 2021 and beyond'' in the context of the administration
thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether
certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets
future challenges. Is it possible to modify New START to capture
additional weapons without returning the Treaty to the U.S. Senate for
advice and consent?
Answer. The Department is continuing its review of the New START
Treaty and has not yet assessed how the Treaty would need to be
modified in order to constrain additional kinds of weapons that are not
currently subject to the Treaty.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New
START ``fits 2021 and beyond'' in the context of the administration
thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether
certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets
future challenges. If the United States seeks to modify New START, what
do you foresee Russia asking for in return? Would Russia seek to
include limitations on U.S. national missile defense and the European
missile defense systems?
Answer. If the United States sought to modify the New START Treaty
to constrain additional kinds of weapons that are not currently subject
to the Treaty, it is unclear what modifications Russia would ask for in
return.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, you described making sure that New
START ``fits 2021 and beyond'' in the context of the administration
thinking about New START extension. This appear to include whether
certain modifications need to be made to New START so that it meets
future challenges. Is the Department planning a reorganization or
realignment of the Arms Control Bureau? Does the Department plan to
move, reorganize, or realign any FTEs within the Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance Bureau to any other office or Bureau?
Answer. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
(AVC) has proposed changes to the reporting line structure among the
portfolios of its Deputy Assistant Secretaries, which the Department is
reviewing. Separately, I am considering the realignment of a small
number of positions from the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance (AVC) as part of creating a Bureau for Cybersecurity and
Emerging Technologies (CSET). My staff has informally discussed the
CSET proposal with some of the Department's oversight committees,
including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When I make a final
decision about CSET, I will ensure that all necessary consultations and
notifications are done prior to its implementation.
Question. Russian violated international law when it used chemical
weapons in Salisbury, United Kingdom. However, the State Department has
not implemented the second round of sanctions against the Russian
Federation which are mandated by the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW). These sanctions are now 5 months
overdue.
Why has the State Department failed to implemented additional
sanctions against Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Warfare Elimination Act of 1991?
Answer. We do not preview sanctions actions. However, we are
working diligently with the interagency to prepare for imposing the
second round of sanctions.
Question. The State Department has determined that Russian violated
international law when it used chemical weapons in Salisbury, United
Kingdom. However, the State Department has not implemented the second
round of sanctions against the Russian Federation which are mandated by
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
(CBW). These sanctions are now 5 months overdue. Is the United States
coordinating with our allies and partners the imposition of additional
sanctions on Russia for its chemical weapons use?
Answer. We do not preview sanctions actions. We regularly work with
allies and partners to adopt similar sanctions to broaden the impact of
our own sanctions.
Question. Last January, then-Secretary Tillerson convened an
independent Accountability Review Board ``to review the circumstances
surrounding unexplained medical conditions affecting Embassy Havana
diplomatic community members.'' On June 7, 2018, the Accountability
Review Board submitted a report of its findings and recommendations to
you. Why hasn't the Department shared the complete ARB report with
affected individuals who have an active security clearance?
Answer. The Department understands the interest of the victims of
the attacks in reviewing the summary of the Accountability Review Board
(ARB) report. The Department remains committed to responding to their
concerns and providing them with updated information. The
investigations into sensitive aspects of the issue are ongoing. The
summary addresses aspects of the ongoing investigation. The Department
cannot provide a classified briefing on the report to the affected
individuals while an investigation is ongoing. The Department has
communicated this to the affected individuals.
Question. Last January, then-Secretary Tillerson convened an
independent Accountability Review Board ``to review the circumstances
surrounding unexplained medical conditions affecting Embassy Havana
diplomatic community members.'' On June 7, 2018, the Accountability
Review Board submitted a report of its findings and recommendations to
you. Will the Department undertake a separate ARB for affected
individuals displaying similar symptoms while working at the U.S.
Consulate General in Guangzhou, China?
Answer. The health, safety, and well-being of U.S. government
employees and their family members are my greatest concern. The
Department responded swiftly to a report of health symptoms by an
employee in China that resembled the reported symptoms by our personnel
in Havana. The Department continues to conduct medical screenings of
any Mission China employees and family members upon request. After
thorough consideration, I decided not to convene an independent
Accountability Review Board (ARB) to review the incident in China,
because it did not meet the statutory criteria for an ARB.
Question. The administration's lack of leadership in providing
stabilization funds will ultimately lead to more instability in Syria,
putting our troops there at greater risk and ultimately complicating
any chance of bringing them home after securing hard-earned gains. A
State Department spokesperson recently said that the U.S. is
``committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and al Qaeda, a political
solution to the Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-led
forces in Syria.'' How does zeroing out stabilization funding for Syria
help to achieve any of these important goals?
Answer. Per ongoing efforts to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS
and al-Qaida, we have received donor pledges from members of the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS totaling $325 million, which will help
continue vital stabilization activities in Syria through U.S.
stabilization mechanisms.
Question. I understand that some of the projects the United States
started through our START teams started by the U.S. in Syria will now
be funded by around $180 million in contributions to the U.S. Treasury
by partner countries, including Germany, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates. If this money was not appropriated by Congress, what are
the administration's obligations to notify Congress on how and when it
is spent?
Answer: Our Global Coalition partners are funding the
implementation of these programs by the United States under section 607
of the Foreign Assistance Act. We will continue to engage with and
brief Congress on all of our Syria programming.
Question. The administration's lack of leadership in providing
stabilization funds will ultimately lead to more instability in Syria,
putting our troops there at greater risk and ultimately complicating
any chance of bringing them home after securing hard-earned gains. A
State Department spokesperson recently said that the U.S. is
``committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and al Qaeda, a political
solution to the Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the removal of all Iranian-led
forces in Syria.'' I have previously expressed concern that we are
literally ceding ground to Turkey, Russia, and Iran in Syria. How does
being absent advance our interests in the region?
Answer. The United States will keep a residual force in Syria as
part of the continued Defeat-ISIS Coalition mission, helping to root
out ISIS remnants and preventing the group from regaining momentum. Our
policy objectives remain: (1) the enduring defeat of ISIS, (2) a
lasting political solution in accordance with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2254, and (3) removing all Iranian-commanded forces from
Syria. We will continue to support international efforts to establish
local security and governance, a restored economy, and justice and
accountability in liberated areas, and to provide humanitarian
assistance to people in Syria and throughout the region.
Question. Congress approved funding for bilateral assistance for
both renewable energy and adaptation programs in the FY19 omnibus
appropriations bill. The first sentence on page 70 of the Joint
Explanatory Statement of Division F (Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), reads: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate report.'' State and
USAID have long and well-established channels and programs towards
which to obligate these funds. Do you commit to spending these funds in
accordance with Congress's clear intention in this spending
legislation, and devoting resources toward renewable energy and
adaptation programming?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are in the process of
developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at
this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations. The Department of
State and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of any deviations
from the allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables
in the Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with
requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations Act.
Question. Congress approved funding for bilateral assistance for
both renewable energy and adaptation programs in the FY19 omnibus
appropriations bill. The first sentence on page 70 of the Joint
Explanatory Statement of Division F (Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), reads: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate report.'' State and
USAID have long and well-established channels and programs towards
which to obligate these funds. Is it your policy to treat joint
explanatory statements and legislative reports associated with enacted
legislation for the purposes of making transparent to the public the
description of legislative intent and offering instruction to the
executive on congressional intent of legislation to be ``applicable
law?''
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and
notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment
Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as
appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations
Act.
Question. Congress approved funding for bilateral assistance for
both renewable energy and adaptation programs in the FY19 omnibus
appropriations bill. The first sentence on page 70 of the Joint
Explanatory Statement of Division F (Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), reads: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate report.'' State and
USAID have long and well-established channels and programs towards
which to obligate these funds. Under what circumstances would you, or
do you, not follow or adhere to the Congress's intent with legislation
as described in legislations' accompanying joint explanatory statements
and committee or conference reports?
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and
notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment
Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as
appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations
Act.
Question. Congress approved funding for bilateral assistance for
both renewable energy and adaptation programs in the FY19 omnibus
appropriations bill. The first sentence on page 70 of the Joint
Explanatory Statement of Division F (Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), reads: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate report.'' State and
USAID have long and well-established channels and programs towards
which to obligate these funds. If you do not consider such reports and
explanatory statements associated with enacted legislation to provide
adequate legal intent or instructions on how to execute laws, do you
feel it is necessary for Congress to be more explicit with instructions
for you in actual legislation to ensure you follow Congress's intent?
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and
notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment
Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as
appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 Appropriations
Act.
Question. Will the State Department submit an FY19 rescission
package to Congress?
Answer. I will ensure that the State Department has every dollar it
needs to achieve its mission around the world. The Department remains
committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, driving
efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American people to advance
national security objectives and foreign policy goals. At this time,
the Department is unaware of any plans to submit an FY 2019 rescission
package to Congress.
Question. Will you commit to this Committee that you will not
submit to Congress an FY19 rescission package?
Answer. I will ensure that the State Department has every dollar it
needs to achieve its mission around the world. The Department remains
committed to ensuring effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, driving
efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American people to advance
national security objectives and foreign policy goals.
At this time, the Department is unaware of plans to submit an FY
2019 rescission package to Congress. However, should Congress act upon
any future rescission proposal submitted by the administration, I will
work to ensure that any State and USAID reductions are implemented
consistent with applicable law.
Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay
approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of
USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific
example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. How many USAID FY18 Spend Plans and
Operations Plans remain unapproved at F Bureau?
Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans and
Spend Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and
USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds
appropriated by Congress are programmed and obligated as quickly as
possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while
assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay
approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of
USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific
example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Are any of these delays related to
policy or political disagreements to congressionally-mandated programs?
Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans and
Spend Plans are completed and approved. The Department of State and
USAID will continue to work diligently to ensure that funds
appropriated by Congress are programmed and obligated as quickly as
possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while
assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay
approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of
USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific
example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Has the State Department's Foreign
Assistance Bureau delayed the obligation of any FY18 funds at the
request of the Office of Management and Budget?
Answer. The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) is
working quickly and diligently to ensure that FY 2018 funding
appropriated by Congress is notified and obligated for programs that
advance U.S. foreign policy objectives consistent with applicable legal
and other requirements. The vast majority of FY 2018 funds have been
approved by F and are currently in the process of being notified to
Congress and obligated. The Department will continue to critically
review existing foreign assistance programs to ensure that U.S. efforts
are sufficiently focused and effective, and to carry out the
President's direction.
Question. It is my understanding that F Bureau continues to delay
approval of FY18 spending and appropriations plans for a variety of
USAID programs, thus delaying obligation of FY18 funds. A specific
example are USAID's Labor Program within the Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. Will you provide a timeline outlining
the State Department's Foreign Assistance Bureau's steps to apportion
and approve operation plans for FY16, FY17, and FY18 funds.
Answer. The vast majority of the FY 2018 Operational Plans are
completed and approved. The Department of State and USAID will continue
to work diligently to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are
programmed and obligated as quickly as possible for programs that
advance U.S. foreign policy objectives while assuring compliance with
applicable legal and other requirements.
Question. Explain how, based on the various delays in obligating
FY17 and FY18 funding, the administration is not violating the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Answer. FY 2018 funding appropriated by Congress is in the process
of being obligated consistent with applicable law, including the
Impoundment Control Act.
Question. In response to questioning before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone
press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith
based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript of this
briefing or the list of participants was consistent with what other
Secretaries of State have done in the past. Please provide specific
examples of prior off the record press briefings with members of the
faith-based media.
Answer. The Department remains steadfastly committed to the
principles of transparency and press freedom. I have conducted numerous
interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters,
including those that regularly cover the Department as well as other
media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview a
Secretary of State.
The March 18 event was an interview with a select group of invited
print journalists, not a press briefing. We have not arranged off-the-
record press briefings with members of the faith-based media.
Question. In response to questioning before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone
press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith
based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript of this
briefing or the list of participants was consistent with what other
Secretaries of State have done in the past. Please provide specific
examples of prior off the record press briefings with members of the
faith-based media in which Secretaries decided against releasing
transcripts or participant lists.
Answer. The Department remains steadfastly committed to the
principles of transparency and press freedom. Since I became Secretary
of State, I have actively engaged with the media and supported ways to
increase opportunities for them to engage with me and other senior
officials. The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It was an
interview with a select group of invited print journalists. Although
the Department posts transcripts of press briefings, it does not
publish participant lists or transcripts of interviews with print
journalists. This facilitates their ability to use material from such
interviews at their discretion.
Question. In response to questioning before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone
press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith
based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript of this
briefing or the list of participants was consistent with what other
Secretaries of State have done in the past. How do you select which
members of the media are granted access to off the record telephone
press briefings?
Answer. Since I became Secretary of State, I have actively engaged
with the media and supported ways to increase opportunities for them to
engage with me and other senior officials. I have conducted more than
125 interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and
reporters, including those that regularly cover the Department as well
as other media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview
a Secretary of State. The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It
was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists.
Question. In response to questioning before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 27 about a March 18 off-the-record telephone
press briefing on international religious freedom with members of faith
based media, you said your decision to not release a transcript of this
briefing or the list of participants was consistent with what other
Secretaries of State have done in the past. What was the criteria used
to select participants for the March 18 briefing?
Answer. We do our best to support the work of the journalists who
cover the State Department. Since I became Secretary of State, I have
actively engaged with the media and supported ways to increase
opportunities for them to engage with me and other senior officials.
The March 18 event was not a press briefing. It was an interview with a
select group of invited print journalists. We grant journalists
interviews based on a variety of reasons, including their areas of
interests and coverage. I have conducted more than 125 interviews in
the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters, including those
that regularly cover the Department as well as other media that
typically do not have the opportunity to interview a Secretary of
State.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Do you contest the
veracity of any of these accounts? If so, how?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh played a coordinating and
logistical support role for these visits, as it does for all senior
U.S. government visitors on official visits to the Kingdom. The
Department has been briefed on these meetings.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Was the State Department
involved in any way in planning this trip? How?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Riyadh played a coordinating and
logistical support role for these visits, as it does for all senior
U.S. government visitors on official visit to the Kingdom.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did anyone from the
State Department attend meetings with Mr. Kushner?
Answer. Senior Policy Advisor Brian Hook participated in Mr.
Kushner's meetings during his most recent trip to Riyadh.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did Mr. Kushner attend
any meetings alone? Did Mr. Kushner attend any meetings with Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman? If so, did he attend such meetings alone?
Answer. I respectfully refer you to the White House on additional
specifics regarding Mr. Kushner's engagements.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Did the State Department
receive a readout of Kushner's meetings with senior Saudi officials,
including the Crown Prince?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In late October 2017 and in March 2019, Jared Kushner
visited Saudi Arabia. The Daily Beast reported that U.S. Embassy Riyadh
was not involved in Mr. Kushner's March trip or read in on the meetings
he held with members of the Saudi royal court. Are you personally aware
of the topics that Kushner discussed with the Crown Prince?
Answer. Yes, the Department has been briefed on this meeting.
Question. Since Jamal Khashoggi's brutal murder last October, you
have met with or spoken to senior Saudi officials at least six times.
In each of your calls or meetings, did you raise Mr. Khashoggi's death
and specifically call on the Saudi government to cooperate with the
Turkish investigation into his death and hold those accountable
responsible? Have you raised Khashoggi's murder with senior Saudi
officials in every communication since Oct 2, 2018?
Answer. I share your conviction that those responsible for this
horrific act must be held accountable. I consistently raise
accountability for Mr. Khashoggi's killers with all levels of the Saudi
Arabian government, as do senior Department officials in Washington and
Riyadh. We have routinely highlighted that a transparent and impartial
Saudi judicial process is necessary, and have urged Saudi authorities
to cooperate with all international inquiries into the killing.
Question. Since Jamal Khashoggi's brutal murder last October, you
have met with or spoken to senior Saudi officials at least six times.
Have you expressed any concerns to Saudi officials about the trials of
11 people charged in the murder of Mr. Khashoggi? Please describe the
nature of those concerns and what specifically you have communicated to
Saudi officials about these trials.
Answer. Senior Department leadership and I have consistently raised
the need for a credible, fair, and transparent judicial process in the
horrific murder of Mr. Khashoggi, and we continue to promote
accountability for his killers. We also continue to communicate to
Saudi leadership that extrajudicial killing by any government official
is unacceptable. We remain highly concerned about the status of Saud
Al-Qahtani, and the administration has taken several steps in that
respect, including financial sanctions. We will continue to deploy
those tools as necessary. The U.S. Embassy will continue to monitor the
ongoing trials in Riyadh, and we will continue to raise our concerns at
all appropriate levels and opportunities.
Question. On February 14, 2019, I sent a letter asking for
information regarding the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and
specifically asking for the Department's legal determination that it is
not required to submit a report to the Chairman and Ranking Member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to section 1263(d) of
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. What is the legal
justification for not making the determination required under the
Global Magnitsky Act? When will the Department provide that legal
determination?
Answer. The administration has used the Global Magnitsky sanctions
program to promote accountability in this case. We imposed financial
sanctions under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program on 17 Saudi
government officials. Section 1263(d) of the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act addresses certain Congressional committee
requests for determinations and reports by the President on whether a
foreign person has engaged in an activity described in Section 1263(a)
of the Act. The authorities under Section 1263(d) have not been
delegated by the President to the Secretary of State and thus the
Department is not in a position to make such a determination or report.
Question. On February 14, 2019, I sent a letter asking for
information regarding the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and
specifically asking for the Department's legal determination that it is
not required to submit a report to the Chairman and Ranking Member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to section 1263(d) of
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Is it your
understanding that the President is not going to make a determination
regarding the Crown Prince's responsibility? What is the basis for your
understanding?
Answer. The Department shares your conviction that those
responsible for this horrific act must be held accountable. The United
States was the first country to take action to promote accountability,
when on October 23, 2018, we revoked visas and entered visa lookouts
for those suspected of involvement in the murder. On November 15, 2018,
we imposed financial sanctions on implicated Saudi officials under the
executive order implementing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act. On April 8, 2019, the Secretary of State further
designated Saudi government officials under Section 7031(c) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2019.
Question. According to a report compiled by my staff, it appears
that the Department's public justification for cancelling the Secretary
of State's International Women of Courage Award to Finnish journalist
Jessikka Aro is not true. The Department claims it made a ``regrettable
error'' and that Aro had never been a finalist. But State Department
documents and communications show that Ms. Aro was a finalist and the
reward was rescinded at the last minute and given to someone else.
According to public reporting, sources within the Department assert the
award was rescinded after the Department discovered social media posts
Ms. Aro made that were critical of President Trump's attacks on the
media and the rule of law. Were social media postings that Ms. Aro made
which were critical of President Trump's statements a reason for the
Department rescinding her status as a finalist for the award? If not,
for what reason(s) did the Department rescind Ms. Aro's status as a
finalist for the award?
Answer. A number of errors were made in the nomination and approval
process of Ms. Jessikka Aro. Ms. Aro should not have been notified that
she was an awardee in the absence of a comprehensive review, which is a
prerequisite for the nomination process.
Question. According to a report compiled by my staff, it appears
that the Department's public justification for cancelling the Secretary
of State's International Women of Courage Award to Finnish journalist
Jessikka Aro is not true. The Department claims it made a ``regrettable
error'' and that Aro had never been a finalist. But State Department
documents and communications show that Ms. Aro was a finalist and the
reward was rescinded at the last minute and given to someone else.
According to public reporting, sources within the Department assert the
award was rescinded after the Department discovered social media posts
Ms. Aro made that were critical of President Trump's attacks on the
media and the rule of law. On February 25th, Embassy Helsinki received
a letter from Ms. Aro's lawyer requesting information about who
withdrew the award, on what grounds, when the decision was made, and
why no official explanation was provided to Ms. Aro. As of today, Ms.
Aro and her lawyer have not received a response to the letter. Will the
Department be providing a response, and by when?
Answer. We have received the correspondence from Ms. Aro's lawyer
and are working on an appropriate response.
Question. During your testimony before the Senate Appropriations
Committee on April 9, 2019, you were asked about your role in approval
of the Department of Energy's 810 Authorization used to transfer
nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. You responded that you signed off
on the Department of Energy's decision. When did you sign off on the
810 Authorizations? What factors went into the decision to sign off on
those Authorizations? Did you approve keeping the identity of the
companies receiving the authorizations private?
Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
(ISN) oversaw the State Department's review of Saudi Arabia-related
Part 810 applications from November 2017 to March 2019. These reviews
were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of
State practices. The State Department is not involved in determining
whether information in the authorizations is protected from public
disclosure.
Question. Last year, a former foreign government official was
granted a visa by the Department of State, despite reportedly being on
a visa ban list for corruption. Please describe how a Presidential
Proclamation 7750 Section 2 exception is effectuated for reasons other
than an official U.N. visit, and whether the opinions of non-State
Department entities, including the National Security Council and
Members of Congress, can be considered in the process. Please also
explain whether there may be variances in this process for different
cases. Since January 20, 2017, how many PP 7750 Section 2 exceptions
for reasons other than an official U.N. visit have been granted?
Answer. The Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) would lead such a consideration process
relating to PP 7750 Section 2. As Secretary, I or my designee would
make the final decision with respect to such an exception based on all
relevant facts and laws, after considering relevant input from
Department and U.S. government sources. As evidence of corruption can
involve law enforcement-sensitive information, including information
regarding ongoing investigations and other classified information,
details of the processes for handling such information may be
operationally sensitive. There have been no Section 2 exceptions
granted for reasons other than an official U.N. visit since January 20,
2017.
Question. The President's Budget request for FY20 again cuts
funding for the National Endowment for Democracy--a 64 percent cut from
NED's FY19 appropriation of $180 million. The administration proposes
the Endowment make these cuts by only funding its small grants program
and ceasing funding for its core institutes--The National Democratic
and Republican Institute, labor Solidarity Center and business Center
for International Private Enterprise. In fact, this budget cut would
dramatically cut NED's small grants program, as well as funding for the
core institutes. Dismantling the NED structure would be in
contravention with the NED Act (P.L. 98-164), which embeds the work of
four core institutes into NED's mission, as well as undermining the
programmatically coordinated efforts of NED and the core institutes
that makes it so effective. What message does a reduction in funding
for democracy program, whether via NED, State or USAID send to those
struggling for human rights and democracy as well as our adversaries,
like China and Russia, who are seeking to disrupt the democratic world
order and replace it with their authoritarian political, economic and
governance model?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance,
including rule of law, good governance, and anti-corruption
programming, is critical for defending national security, fostering
economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S.
leadership and influence. While lower than FY 2019 enacted
appropriations, the FY 2020 budget request for DRG assistance reflects
the administration's priorities of advancing peace and security,
expanding American influence, and addressing global crises while making
efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget will allow us to advance
our core mission and support our most critical foreign policy goals.
Question. How does the President's Budget Request support expansion
of democracy and governance programming to counteract Russian
Federation attempts to undermine democratic processes in countries on
Russia's perimeter--countries which the United States has identified as
strategically important?
Answer. The Department of State remains committed to working on a
whole-of-government basis and with allies and partners to counter
Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions and processes in
neighboring countries and further afield. The request for regional and
bilateral programming prioritizes support to help build resilience in
those countries most susceptible to Russian malign influence. These
efforts are focused on deterring Russian aggression; building the
capacity of civil society and independent media to expose and counter
Russian malign influence; recognizing, exposing, and countering Russian
disinformation and propaganda; and promoting good governance,
strengthening rule of law, and combatting corruption.
Question. The President's FY20 budget request, once again proposes
zeroing out the Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund,
Assistance to Eastern Europe, Central Asia (AEECA), Complex Crises
Fund, and the Democracy Fund into a new Economic Support and
Development Fund (ESDF) account. The President's Budget Request
provided a legislative request that legally consolidates these
accounts, but provides no description for why this consolidation
necessary or beneficial, let alone a description of the policies that
would govern this new program. All we have to go on, is the vague
regurgitated description of the ESDF: ``prioritizes and focuses foreign
assistance in regions and on programs that advance our national
security and protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity and
economic opportunities, and advance American interests and values
around the world.'' It's been 2 years, has the State Department and
USAID developed any policies or guidance that would govern the ESDF,
and if so will you submit the description of this policy, not just
legislative text on how to consolidate accounts, to congress?
Answer. This account consolidation attempts to streamline accounts
to ensure the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars spent on national
security priorities. The traditional distinctions between the
Development Assistance (DA), Democracy Fund (DF), Assistance to Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (AEECA), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
accounts are artificial and reduce programming flexibility
unnecessarily. This streamlining would allow the State Department and
USAID to assess, prioritize, and target development and economic-
related activities in the context of broader U.S. strategic objectives
and partnerships.
Question. The President's FY20 budget request, once again proposes
zeroing out the Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund,
Assistance to Eastern Europe, Central Asia (AEECA), Complex Crises
Fund, and the Democracy Fund into a new Economic Support and
Development Fund (ESDF) account. The President's Budget Request
provided a legislative request that legally consolidates these
accounts, but provides no description for why this consolidation
necessary or beneficial, let alone a description of the policies that
would govern this new program. All we have to go on, is the vague
regurgitated description of the ESDF: ``prioritizes and focuses foreign
assistance in regions and on programs that advance our national
security and protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity and
economic opportunities, and advance American interests and values
around the world.'' Does the State Department and USAID believe it had
the discretion to do the consolidation without expressed authority from
congress? If not, does the State Department and USAID intend to submit
to Congress a legislative proposal to establish the ESDF?
Answer. The FY 2020 request includes a proposal to create the ESDF
account, including proposed legislative text for a new ESDF
appropriation that we ask Congress to include in the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2020.
Question. The President's FY20 budget request, once again proposes
zeroing out the Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund,
Assistance to Eastern Europe, Central Asia (AEECA), Complex Crises
Fund, and the Democracy Fund into a new Economic Support and
Development Fund (ESDF) account. The President's Budget Request
provided a legislative request that legally consolidates these
accounts, but provides no description for why this consolidation
necessary or beneficial, let alone a description of the policies that
would govern this new program. All we have to go on, is the vague
regurgitated description of the ESDF: ``prioritizes and focuses foreign
assistance in regions and on programs that advance our national
security and protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity and
economic opportunities, and advance American interests and values
around the world.'' Since Congress rejected this proposal in both the
FY18 and FY19 omnibus appropriations act, and yet the proposal
continues to be a part of the Budget Request, what efforts do you
intend to make to convince Congress to authorize the Economic Support
and Development Fund?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID continue to request and
urge Congress to include the streamlining of these accounts and the
creation of the ESDF account in the FY 2020 appropriations act. We have
briefed committee staff on the proposal and will continue to answer
questions from Congressional staff on the proposal to address any
concerns.
Question. The President's FY20 budget request, once again proposes
zeroing out the Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund,
Assistance to Eastern Europe, Central Asia (AEECA), Complex Crises
Fund, and the Democracy Fund into a new Economic Support and
Development Fund (ESDF) account. The President's Budget Request
provided a legislative request that legally consolidates these
accounts, but provides no description for why this consolidation
necessary or beneficial, let alone a description of the policies that
would govern this new program. All we have to go on, is the vague
regurgitated description of the ESDF: ``prioritizes and focuses foreign
assistance in regions and on programs that advance our national
security and protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity and
economic opportunities, and advance American interests and values
around the world.'' Is it your intention, that under the ESDF to
apportion and obligate funds so that they ``only go to our friends'' as
the President suggested in his 2018 State of the Union and at the U.N.
General Assembly in 2018?
Answer. I believe Americans benefit from sustained engagement with
the rest of the world that serves both U.S. interests and those of our
allies. The FY 2020 budget request, including funds requested for ESDF,
prioritizes supporting key U.S. partners and allies through strategic,
selective investments that enable the United States to retain its
position as a global leader. At the same time, it relies on other
nations to make greater proportionate contributions toward shared
objectives.
Question. The Washington Post has consistently reported on White
House efforts to undermine the utilization of climate science and
accounting for the effects of climate change in national security
planning and analysis. Do you believe that the effects of climate
change complicate or increase risks to national security?
Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment put together by the
U.S. Intelligence Community identifies impacts that climate change
could have on national security. Specifically, the assessment notes
that climate change is likely to fuel economic and social discontent,
and that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential
for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.
Question. Do you believe that the effects of climate change, which
include sea level rise, extreme draught, and decreased agricultural
production due to growing natural resource scarcity, increase security
risks and contribute to instability and fragility around the world?
Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment put together by the
U.S. Intelligence Community identifies impacts that climate change
could have on national security. Specifically, the assessment notes
that climate change is likely to fuel economic and social discontent,
and that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential
for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.
Question. What reasons are there for our national security agencies
to discount, disregard or question the significance or utilization of
this information, data, and analysis? Should our national security
apparatus?
Answer. National security agencies should analyze and take into
account all information and factors that could affect national
security.
Question. Did you, or a designee from the State Department,
participate in a White House Situation Room meeting on February 22nd?
Will you, or the State Department designee, that participated in the
February 22nd White House situation room meeting on climate change and
national security brief the committee on this meeting?
Answer. I am not in a position to comment on internal policy
deliberations, including participation and topics of discussions at
specific meetings.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Is
supporting the development of renewable energy abroad and helping
countries facing very real safety, security, and stability threats
posed by the effects of climate change ``consistent with administration
policy?''
Answer. The United States remains engaged on the issue of climate
change to advance and protect U.S. interests, including by working with
other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance
resilience in ways that drive innovation and produce market-friendly
solutions. We continue to work with other countries through bilateral
engagement and cooperation to promote access to energy that also
promotes a clean and healthy environment.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' What
``applicable law'' is this response referring to? Are there laws, other
than P.L. 116-6, that the State Department, or USAID, would apply with
respect to obligating and expending funds appropriated in enacted
legislation (in this case H.J. Res. 31, i.e. P.L. 116-6)?
Answer. The State Department and USAID review all planned
assistance to ensure it is provided in accordance with applicable laws
related to the obligation and expenditure of funds. For FY 2019 foreign
assistance funding, this would include, for example, relevant
provisions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and other foreign assistance authorities, and
other provisions of law relevant to the planned assistance.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: "The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled "Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs" in the Senate Report." I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: "If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law." Are there
laws, other than P.L. 116-6, that the State Department, or USAID, would
apply with respect to obligating and expending funds appropriated in
enacted legislation (in this case H.J. Res. 31, i.e. P.L. 116-6)?
Answer. The State Department and USAID review all planned
assistance to ensure it is provided in accordance with applicable laws
related to the obligation and expenditure of funds. For FY 2019 foreign
assistance funding, this would include, for example, relevant
provisions of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and other foreign assistance authorities, and
other provisions of law relevant to the planned assistance.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Do you
believe that the reference in Sec. 7019(a) of H.J. Res 31 that reads
``Subject to subsection (b), funds appropriated by this Act under
titles III through V shall be made available in the amounts
specifically designated in the respective tables included in the joint
explanatory statement accompanying this Act.''
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and
notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment
Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as
appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations
act including section 7019.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Does the
State Department consider the reference in Sec 1079(a) of H.J. Res. 31
(P.L. 116-6) to the joint explanatory statement, which does not include
an explicit reference in its tables to renewable energy programs and
adaptation, but does explicitly state that the ``conference agreement
supports funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs as
specified in the table entitled `Funding for Environment and Energy
Programs' in the Senate Report'' sufficient to meet the Department's
definition of ``applicable law?''
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional directives when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID will consult with and
notify Congress of deviations from the allocations in the Environment
Programs table and other tables in the Joint Explanatory Statement as
appropriate, consistent with requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations
act including section 7019.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Will you
support implementing Congress's clear intention in H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6) spending legislation, particularly with respect to supporting
funding for renewable energy and adaptation programs specified in the
Joint Explanatory Statement?
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional intent when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID are in the process of
developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at
this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations, including funding
for renewable energy and adaptation programs. The Department of State
and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the
allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the
Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with
requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations act including section 7019.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Will you
instruct the F bureau, to ensure the State Department obligates and
expends the funds related to renewable energy and adaptation programs
in accordance with H.J. Res 31 which includes legal references to
expend in accordance with the Joint Explanatory Statement?
Answer. The State Department and USAID take into account
Congressional intent when developing funding allocations, including
information included in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanies the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Appropriations
Act (SFOAA). The Department of State and USAID are in the process of
developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at
this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations, including funding
for renewable energy and adaptation programs. The Department of State
and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the
allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the
Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with
requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations act including section 7019.
Question. The first sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 of
the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J. Res. 31 (P.L.
116-6), the FY19 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, says the following: ``The
conference agreement supports funding for renewable energy and
adaptation programs as specified in the table entitled ``Funding for
Environment and Energy Programs'' in the Senate Report.'' I asked Keith
Krach, the nominee to be the Under Secretary for the Bureau of Economic
Growth, Energy, and Environment for a commitment to implement
Congress's clear intent, with respect to the aforementioned paragraph
on page 70 of the Joint Explanatory Statement for Division F of H.J.
Res. 31. I received the following cryptic response: ``If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that all funds are implemented in a manner that is
consistent with administration policy and applicable law.'' Will you
ensure that these sums are obligated as intended, and not applied to
existing spending or otherwise double-counted?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are in the process of
developing FY 2019 funding allocations. No decision has been made at
this time on specific FY 2019 funding allocations, including funding
for renewable energy and adaptation programs. The Department of State
and USAID will consult with and notify Congress of deviations from the
allocations in the Environment Programs table and other tables in the
Joint Explanatory Statement as appropriate, consistent with
requirements in the FY 2019 appropriations act.
Question. As the relationship with Turkey continues to deteriorate,
how would you characterize the strategic importance of Greece and
Cyprus to U.S. interests in the region?
Answer. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are democracies, EU
member states, and key partners in a strategically important region.
Greece is a long-standing NATO Ally. Both Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus have important roles in enhancing peace, stability, and
prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is a need for us to do
more with these two countries, especially as external actors like
Russia, Iran, and China pose challenges to the norms and institutions
that undergird security and prosperity in the region. The
administration is actively working to strengthen our relations with
these two countries across a wide spectrum of issues, including
security and defense, business and trade, and energy diversification.
Question. What can the U.S. specifically do to leverage our
relations with those countries to hedge against a deteriorating Turkey
relationship as well as increased Russian and Chinese influence in the
region?
Answer. I attended the March 20 Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral
summit in Jerusalem, where we affirmed our shared vision for a peaceful
and prosperous region. The United States is elevating our relationship
with Greece under the framework of the U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue
and reasserting our presence in northern Greece, building off the
U.S.'s role as the honored country at the 2018 Thessaloniki
International Fair. We are working to strengthen security and energy
cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. These efforts will focus on
combatting terrorism, money laundering, and illicit finance and
improving maritime security, while supporting Cypriot-led, U.N.-
facilitated negotiations to reunite the island as a bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation.
Question. In his hearing before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Secretary Pompeo stated that the Northern Triangle
governments will need to take specific steps before the U.S. reinstates
its assistance programs. Can you please identify exactly what steps the
Secretary wants the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
to take?
Answer. Illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle to the
United States continues to increase, contributing to the humanitarian
and security crisis at our southern border. We need to see these
countries make greater efforts to stem illegal immigration. The
Department urges the Northern Triangle governments to do more to
increase border security; combat migrant smuggling and trafficking in
persons, especially related to children; receive returned citizens; and
dissuade illegal immigration. We also urge these governments to improve
citizen security and economic growth, attract foreign investment to
create jobs, and address corruption and impunity by strengthening
governance and judicial capacity to increase accountability and deter
crime.
Question. In a phone call on April 9, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff asked for the unobligated balances report for FY 2018
and FY 2017 for funding destined for El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras. The State Department agreed to provide this information. Can
you please provide this information? Please break this funding down by
account (i.e. ESF, DA, INCLE, etc).
Answer. All FY 2017 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
have been obligated. Approximately $440.7 million in bilateral and
regional FY 2018 funds for these countries has not been obligated,
including $126.7 million in INCLE, $78 million in ESF, $223 million in
DA, and $13 million in GHP. These levels exclude funding for global
programs implemented by functional and pillar bureaus.
Question. Can the State Department please provide the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee with the unobligated balances report for FY
2016 and FY 2015 funding destined for El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras? Please break this funding down by account (i.e. ESF, DA,
INCLE, etc).
Answer. All FY 2015 and FY 2016 funds for El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras have been obligated.
Question. In a phone call on April 9, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff asked for a description of the parameters being used
for the State Department's ongoing review of FY 2017 funding for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The State Department agree to
provide this information. Can you please provide this information?
Answer. FY 2017 foreign assistance-funded activities that were
already planned or paid for under existing awards continue during the
review period, but no new activities are to be initiated. Last year,
the Department and USAID obligated $505 million in bilateral and
regional FY 2017 foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle. The
review includes about $225 million on existing foreign assistance
funded grants, contracts, and other agreements. This level does not
include centrally managed resources implemented by State and USAID
functional/pillar bureaus, which are part of the review. I may redirect
up to $280 million of the remaining bilateral and regional FY 2017
funds to other foreign policy priorities.
Question. In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned
that there are approximately $450 million in unobligated FY 2018 funds
for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras that State intends to
reprogram. Is this correct?
Answer. Yes. I am planning to redirect more than $400 million in FY
2018 funds allocated for bilateral and regional programs in the
Northern Triangle to other foreign policy priorities. This total
excludes centrally managed resources implemented by State and USAID
functional/pillar bureaus, but which we are also redirecting away from
the Northern Triangle.
Question. In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned
that there are approximately $12 million in obligated FY 2018 funds for
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Is this correct? Can you provide
clarity on what that $12 million was obligated for and what State
intends to do with those funds?
Answer. Yes. Approximately $12 million in FY 2018 Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funds were obligated prior to the President's decision.
Question. In an April 9 phone call, the State Department mentioned
that that it will continue to assign FY 2019 funding for El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras during the ongoing 653(a) process. Is this
correct?
Answer. I expect the Northern Triangle governments to keep their
commitments to stem illegal immigration to the United States. I hope
these actions take place in time for them to be factored into FY 2019
programming decisions. Absent sufficient actions, I will consider
reallocating the FY 2019 funding to other foreign policy priorities,
consistent with applicable requirements.
Question. In an April 9 phone call, the State Department informed
Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that it will continue to
advocate for its FY 2020 budget for Central America, including funding
for El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Is this correct?
Answer. I expect the Northern Triangle governments to keep their
commitments to stem illegal immigration to the United States. I hope
these actions take place in time for them to be factored into FY 2019
programming decisions. Absent sufficient actions, I will consider
reallocating the FY 2019 funding to other foreign policy priorities,
consistent with applicable requirements.
Question. Will the State Department seek to reprogram FY 2018, FY
2017, FY 2016 and/or FY 2015 regional funds for Central America,
including but not limited to regional funds such as the Central America
Region Security Initiative (CARSI), so that none of these regional
funds are used in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras?
Answer. The foreign assistance review for the Northern Triangle
includes bilateral and regional (CARSI and CAMRI--Central America
Maritime Regional Initiative) assistance as well as resources
implemented by State and USAID functional/pillar bureaus. Last year,
the State Department and USAID obligated $505 million in bilateral and
regional FY 2017 foreign assistance for the Northern Triangle. The
review encompasses $225 million on existing grants and contracts. I may
redirect up to $280 million of the remaining FY 2017 funds to other
foreign policy priorities. I plan to redirect more than $400 million in
FY 2018 bilateral and regional funds allocated for programs in the
Northern Triangle to other priorities.
Question. As part of its review of FY 2017 funding for El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras, can the State Department please provide the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a list of all pending
subobligations, obligated subobligations, and a description of the
Department's intent regarding obligated and unobligated subobligations?
Answer. A review of all Department of State and USAID FY 2017
foreign assistance funding on current agreements and awards began April
3. This review is intended to provide detailed data that will be used
to determine the best way forward pursuant to the President's
direction. Last year, the Department and USAID obligated $505 million
in bilateral and regional (CARSI and CAMRI) FY 2017 assistance for the
Northern Triangle. The review encompasses $225 million in FY 2017
bilateral and regional funding on existing grants and contracts. This
total excludes resources implemented by State and USAID functional/
pillar bureaus, also subject to the review. I may redirect up to $280
million of the remaining FY 2017 funds to other priorities.
Question. Does the Department of State view corruption as a problem
in Central America, and does it acknowledge that corruption and
impunity are driving migration to the United States? If so, how does
the Department of State plan to mitigate it? Does the Department plan
on taking a stronger stand against corruption in Guatemala and Honduras
as those countries' government seek to undermine efforts by the
international community to combat malfeasance?
Answer. Systemic corruption and impunity in the Northern Triangle
are among the foremost challenges these countries face. Corruption and
impunity contribute to illegal immigration to the United States by
undermining economic growth and development, weakening rule of law, and
facilitating transnational crime. The Department supports the fight
against corruption in the Northern Triangle by helping to strengthen
government institutions by mentoring prosecutors, training law
enforcement, and providing other technical assistance. I will continue
to press these governments to take concrete actions to combat
corruption and impunity and improve democratic governance.
Question. Section 2 of P.L. 115-335 established the sense of
Congress regarding a negotiated solution to the current crisis in
Nicaragua. What specific steps has the State Department taken to
advance to these aims since the legislation was signed into law.
Answer. Credible negotiations that include Nicaragua's civil
society, student movement, private sector, political opposition, and
the Catholic Church represent the best opportunity for a peaceful
solution to the crisis in Nicaragua. The Ortega regime's failure to
negotiate in good faith is the primary obstacle to progress. The
Department has consistently condemned the regime's repression and
called for accountability for human rights abuses and violations. We
are working with international partners and leveraging economic and
diplomatic tools to support the Nicaraguan people's pressure on the
Ortega regime to reach a solution that includes early, free, and fair
elections, the cessation of violence, and investigations into the
killings of protestors.
Question. Section 3 of P.L. 115-335 codified U.S. policy towards
Nicaragua. What specific steps has the State Department take to advance
these policies since the legislation was signed into law.
Answer. Core components of the Department's Nicaragua policy
include helping Nicaraguans restore democratic rule through transparent
elections with credible observation, reestablish the rule of law, and
bolster anti-corruption and transparency efforts. Our Embassy in
Managua has supported the democratic, transparent demands of the Civic
Alliance in its negotiations with the Ortega regime. We reiterate our
support for the Civic Alliance and the Nicaraguan people in their quest
to restore democracy through peaceful means, and believe that
Nicaraguans deserve to have a government that respects their human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
Question. Section 4 of P.S. 115-335 codified U.S. actions with
regard to lending at multilateral institutions for Nicaragua. Since the
legislation was signed into law, what steps has the State Department
taken to support implementation of these provisions?
Answer. The Department has continued its efforts to review on a
case-by-case basis international financial institutions' proposed loans
to Nicaragua. In conjunction with international partners in these
institutions, the Department has worked to scrutinize and limit
international financial support to Nicaragua as long as the Ortega
regime continues to repress its citizens. We will continue to work with
the Department of the Treasury to ensure international financial
institutions are enforcing program safeguards in Nicaragua. Since April
2018, international financial institutions including the World Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund have
not approved any new loans to the central government of Nicaragua.
Question. Section 5 of P.S. 115-335 codified targeted sanctions on
individuals involved in undermining democratic institutions, corruption
and human rights. Since the legislation was signed into law, what steps
has the State Department taken to support implementation of these
provisions?
Answer. The State Department continues to expose and promote
accountability for those responsible for corruption and human rights
abuses associated with the violence and intimidation campaign in
Nicaragua, including through financial sanctions. We work closely with
our international and regional partners to monitor the situation and
promote democratic solutions. The State Department also continues to
impose visa restrictions against officials responsible for or complicit
in undermining democracy in Nicaragua.
Question. How does the Department plan to respond to attacks on
human rights and free speech in Nicaragua?
Answer. Through public statements and coordination with
international partners, the Department will continue condemning the
violence perpetrated by the Nicaraguan government and its proxies. We
will also continue to support and utilize targeted visa restrictions
and other tools, including economic sanctions, against those persons
responsible for human rights abuses and undermining democracy, and
encourage the regime's supporters to break with Ortega. We continue to
engage with and support activists, including independent investigative
journalists and human rights defenders, to increase their capacity to
document human rights violations and advocate in regional and
international fora.
Question. How is the State Department working to combat illicit
gold mining in countries like Peru and Colombia?
Answer. The Department has been working with governments in Latin
America to combat illicit gold mining, including completing MOUs with
Peru in 2017 and with Colombia in 2018. Embassy Lima's Illegal Mining
Working Group coordinates technical assistance activities in
collaboration with Peruvian agencies to help legal miners meet Peru's
environmental and labor laws, while also helping enforcement efforts
against illegal mining including through training of police,
prosecutors, and judges. Similarly, Embassy Bogota provides training
and equipment and builds institutional capabilities in the police,
armed forces, office of the attorney general, and judicial institutions
to detect, investigate, and prosecute environmental crimes.
Question. Congress appropriated $15 million in ESF for Venezuela
for FY 2018 and $17.5 million in ESF for FY 2019. These programs
provide essential funding to support democratic actors inside Venezuela
at a time of grave political, economic and humanitarian crisis inside
the country. Alarmingly, however, the administration's budget for FY
2020 only requests $9 million for these programs. Why is the
administration cutting support from the levels previously provided by
Congress? Does the administration believe that democratic actors in
Venezuela do not need more support at this critical moment of crisis?
Answer. Foreign assistance was reduced globally in the
administration's FY 2020 budget request, and Venezuela was not singled
out. The administration requests authority in the budget to transfer up
to $500 million to support a democratic transition in Venezuela, and
the FY 2020 request for assistance to Venezuela reflects the need for
flexibility and agility given the rapidly changing situation in the
country. The Department is working to ensure we will have an effective
response in a post-Maduro time, as the road to rebuilding Venezuela
will be long and difficult.
Question. As was affirmed in the briefing provided by the State
Department for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
Administration's FY 2020 budget, the $500 million budget transfer limit
for Venezuela does not constitute an actual request for funding by the
administration. Please explain why the administration did not request
actual humanitarian, economic, and development funding to address the
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and its impact on surrounding
countries.
Answer. The FY 2020 budget request provides flexibility to make
additional funds available to support a peaceful democratic transition
in Venezuela and respond to related needs in the region. This includes
authority to transfer up to $500 million between foreign assistance
accounts to support a whole of government response. The United States
continues to monitor the situation closely. Since FY 2017, the United
States has provided more than $256 million for the regional response to
the crisis in Venezuela, including more than $213 million in
humanitarian assistance and approximately $43 million in development
and economic assistance.
Question. Venezuela's widespread humanitarian crisis has prompted
more than 3 million Venezuelan migrants to flee their country and, in
turn, has placed significant strain on neighboring countries. What is
your assessment of the ability of countries in the region to manage
massive influx of Venezuelan refugees?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the impact
of the current situation in Venezuela, as more than 3.7 million
Venezuelan refugees strain the resources and health and education
systems in host countries throughout our hemisphere. These governments
have taken important steps to coordinate a regional response to this
crisis and ensure a coherent response, but many governments are
becoming increasingly overwhelmed. Since FY 2017, the United States has
dedicated over $256 million in humanitarian and development assistance,
of which over $213 million is humanitarian assistance, to complement
the efforts of countries in the region and to mitigate the effects of
hosting Venezuelans with food, health, and other emergency assistance.
Question. Venezuela's widespread humanitarian crisis has prompted
more than 3 million Venezuelan migrants to flee their country and, in
turn, has placed significant strain on neighboring countries. What is
your assessment of the financial needs to appropriately address the
impact of the Venezuelan migration and refugee crisis on the
surrounding countries?
Answer. The United States remains concerned about the regional
impact of the current situation in Venezuela. Countries in the region
have been extraordinarily generous hosts for millions of Venezuelans,
but the burden has become increasingly overwhelming. Since FY 2017, the
United States has provided more than $256 million in life-saving
humanitarian and development assistance, of which over $213 million is
humanitarian assistance, for Venezuelans to complement the efforts of
host countries. We are continually assessing the needs of Venezuelans,
and we are scaling up humanitarian assistance to meet those needs and
reduce the impact of the crisis on both Venezuelans and the countries
that generously host them.
Question. During his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the Secretary stated that the State Department had demarched
numerous countries with the request to impose some form of sanctions on
the Government of Venezuela. Please provide a list of all of the
countries that the administration has demarched with this request.
Answer. The Department of State has demarched more than 60
countries to request the imposition of some form of sanctions (e.g.
travel restrictions, freezing assets, blocking property) on the former
Maduro regime. Due to the constantly evolving nature of demarches
coming from many different places, the list is fluid. We continue to
reach out to a dynamic list of partners across the globe to jointly
address the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.
Question. During his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the Secretary stated that the State Department was
considering planning a donors' summit to raise funding to address the
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and its impact on the surrounding
countries. When does the State Department intend to help convene such a
meeting? Is the State Department planning to coordinate with a
multilateral institution to convene such a meeting? If so, which
one(s)?
Answer. The Department of State supported the Global Conference on
the Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela, which was convened at the
Organization of American States by interim President Juan Guaido on
February 14, 2019. Approximately 270 participants attended, and the
Guaido government welcomed humanitarian pledges for Venezuela and its
people in presentations made by representatives from Germany ($28
million), the Netherlands (USD $10.6 million), Canada (USD $39.6
million), the United Kingdom ($8.4 million), Taiwan ($500,000), and the
United States ($160 million), emphasizing funding previously announced
publicly by these governments.
We are assisting the Guaido government on implementation of these
pledges; so far, U.S. partners are routing their donations through
existing international and non-governmental organizations active in
Venezuela's crisis response. We will consider additional development
conferences as appropriate.
Question. In February, the Organization of American States held a
pledge conference to raise support to address the humanitarian crisis
in Venezuela. Please provide a list of the pledges made, itemized by
country and the respective amount.
Answer. Approximately 270 participants attended, and the Guaido
government welcomed humanitarian pledges for Venezuela and its people
in presentations made by representatives from Germany ($28 million),
the Netherlands (USD $10.6 million), Canada (USD $39.6 million), the
United Kingdom ($8.4 million), Taiwan ($500,000), and the United States
($160 million), emphasizing funding previously announced publicly by
these governments.
Question. For nearly a decade, Congress has annually appropriated
$20 million to support democratic actors and independent civil society
in Cuba. However, in FY 2019, the administration only requested $10
million for these programs. And, in FY 2020, the administration only
requested $6 million for these programs. Why is the administration
cutting funding support from the levels previously appropriated by
Congress? Does the administration believe that democratic actors in
Cuba do not need more support?
Answer. The administration's FY 2020 budget request would reduce
foreign assistance globally and did not single out specific countries
such as Cuba. The FY 2020 request provides a sustainable level of
funding for democracy support. Advancing democracy and human rights in
Cuba remains the administration's priority through U.S foreign
assistance to Cuba, and we are committed to ensuring U.S. democracy
assistance in Cuba achieves results.
Question. What exactly is the Department doing to determine the
source of the injuries against U.S. personnel attacked in Havana? What
additional resources does the Department need to adequately determine
this?
Answer. Through the Department-led Health Incidents Response Task
Force, we are coordinating with the interagency to investigate the
cause and source of the injuries. We requested the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention conduct an epidemiological investigation of the
events in Havana. The National Institutes of Health is conducting a
clinical study of individuals who were in Havana to better understand
the clinical issues surrounding the events. The Department has also
requested the National Academy of Sciences arrange meetings and that
committees be formed of experts who can review the information
available and provide guidance to better understand and determine what
may have caused the health effects we have observed in the patients
from Cuba.
Question. What steps is the Department taking to determine the
appropriate ongoing care for those affected by Havana Syndrome? How
does the Department plan to care for those injured in Havana if they
suffer long-term disabilities? Does the State Department have
sufficient authorities to provide ongoing and long-term care to
personnel affected?
Answer. We have encouraged all those who were injured in Havana to
apply for workers' compensation under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA). FECA is the exclusive remedy for Federal
employees injured in the performance of duty and is administered by the
Department of Labor. While their cases are being evaluated by Labor, we
have continued to provide secondary payer benefits for up to 1 year
starting from the date of their initial medical evaluation. The
Department continues to review its current authorities to ensure
affected personnel are covered in the long-term.
Question. How is the Department ensuring that personnel are
regularly updated on progress regarding ongoing investigations about
the cause of these injuries, and what the risks are to those posted
overseas?
Answer. The Department of State has shared information and policy
guidance to all U.S. diplomatic posts abroad and made similar
information available to U.S. citizens regarding the unidentified
health incidents. All medical providers who serve our overseas
population have been trained in performing the appropriate care and
screening and receive updated information on this priority issue. We
have developed screening protocols for individuals that report similar
symptoms and have in place baseline screening for those going to Havana
in the future. A MED Health Alert Response Team has been set up within
the Department and is available for consultation if any events are
reported overseas.
Question. Why has the State Department not permitted the victims of
the attacks against U.S. personnel in Havana to see the summary of the
Accountability Review Board report?
Answer. The Department understands the interest of the victims of
the attacks in reviewing the summary of the Accountability Review Board
(ARB) report. The Department remains committed to responding to their
concerns and providing them with updated information. The
investigations into sensitive aspects of the issue are ongoing. The
summary addresses aspects of the ongoing investigation. The Department
cannot provide a classified briefing on the report to the affected
individuals while an investigation is ongoing. The Department has
communicated this to the affected individuals.
Question. What is the Department of State doing to protect U.S.
personnel from similar attacks in the future?
Answer. The Department-led Health Incidents Response Task Force
(HIRTF), led by the Deputy Secretary, continues to work closely with
interagency partners on the criminal and technical investigations to
determine the cause and source of the attacks. Specific to Embassy
Havana, the Department has consolidated housing to provide additional
setback and deployed sensors to detect possible causes and
environmental factors. Through the HIRTF, the Department is working
with the interagency to explore additional protective countermeasures
as the investigation into the cause of these attacks continues.
Question. While the current Government of Brazil is playing an
important role in international efforts to restore democracy in
Venezuela, what concerns does the Department of State have regarding
the state of human rights, civil society, and the environment in Brazil
at this point in time?
Answer. Brazil has been cooperative on policies that are in the
interest of the United States, including by joining the United States
in recognizing interim President Guaido in Venezuela. Nevertheless, as
noted in the 2018 Human Rights Reports and the 2018 Trafficking in
Persons Report, issues of concern in Brazil include reports of unlawful
or arbitrary killings by state police; harsh and sometimes life-
threatening prison conditions; violence against journalists; corruption
by officials; killings of human rights defenders; and human
trafficking. The Department routinely encourages Brazil to protect and
promote the human rights of its citizens.
Question. Does the State Department believe that President
Bolsonaro is taking steps to improve protections for human rights,
civil society organizations, and the environment?
Answer. I am aware of troubling comments that President Bolsonaro
has made in the past; however, I note President Bolsonaro's stated
commitment to uphold Brazil's strong democratic institutions and to
serve all Brazilians, no matter their background. Brazil engages
actively with the Department in bilateral discussions on issues of
equality in venues such as the annual human rights working group
discussions with Brazil's Department of Human Rights. Should we find
that the Brazilian government falls short in the area of human rights
or the environment, we will certainly raise our concerns with them.
Question. What is the State Department's assessment of President
Bolsonaro's draft legislative decree to monitor the work of civil
society organizations?
Answer. The Department is currently reviewing the draft legislation
to assess its implications.
Question. Since January 2019, the Trump administration has been
sending asylum seekers from San Diego back into Tijuana, Mexico to wait
for the duration of their court proceedings. In March, the
administration announced that it would expand the ``Remain in Mexico''
plan to asylum seekers in El Paso, Texas. However, details on the
Remain in Mexico plan, known officially as the Migration Protection
Protocols, remain murky. For instance, while the Mexican government has
said this is a ``unilateral policy'' the plan was rolled out in Tijuana
and it appeared that Mexican authorities were cooperating with their
U.S. counterparts. What role does the Mexican government play in this
policy? Was there an agreement signed prior to the roll out of this
policy in Tijuana? If so, who were the specific U.S. and Mexican
officials that signed this agreement?
Answer. The decision to apply the Migrant Protection Protocols
(MPP) was a unilateral decision by the U.S. government announced on
December 20, 2018. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead
agency implementing this policy. There is no formal or signed agreement
with Mexico. The Department of State engages in ongoing discussions
with the Government of Mexico to ensure the MPP are implemented
smoothly on our shared border, but we refer you to DHS for more
specific details on MPP implementation.
Question. Since January 2019, the Trump administration has been
sending asylum seekers from San Diego back into Tijuana, Mexico to wait
for the duration of their court proceedings. In March, the
administration announced that it would expand the ``Remain in Mexico''
plan to asylum seekers in El Paso, Texas. However, details on the
Remain in Mexico plan, known officially as the Migration Protection
Protocols, remain murky. For instance, while the Mexican government has
said this is a ``unilateral policy'' the plan was rolled out in Tijuana
and it appeared that Mexican authorities were cooperating with their
U.S. counterparts. In the absence of a signed agreement, was there a
verbal agreement reached between the U.S. and Mexico? If so, who were
the specific U.S. and Mexican officials involved in this agreement?
Answer. Then-Secretary of Homeland Security Nielsen announced the
Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) on December 20, 2018. This was a
unilateral decision by the U.S. government. There is no formal or
signed agreement with Mexico.
Question. When will Ambassador Khalilzad brief this committee?
Answer. Since Ambassador Khalilzad is engaged in complex
negotiations involving multiple countries, I asked his deputy,
Ambassador Molly Phee, to brief staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on April 5. My understanding is that 17 staff attended her
comprehensive briefing and were very appreciative of the update on
reconciliation negotiations they received.
Question. If not, can you tell us that the administration has
conveyed to the Taliban in the current negotiations that a rollback in
the rights of women and minorities is not acceptable?
Answer. In his discussions with the Taliban, Ambassador Khalilzad
has vigorously pressed the Taliban to respect the rights of Afghan
women and minority groups. Consistent with the Women, Peace and
Security Act of 2017, the United States has also taken the position
that it is important for Afghan women to join all parties engaged in
discussions about the country's future--including the Afghan
government, opposition political figures, civil society leaders and the
Taliban--so that they can directly convey their priorities and
concerns. Toward this end, the U.S. government has encouraged the
launch of intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations so that Afghan women
and men can work together to determine the future of their country.
Question. The Pentagon's decision to halt delivery of equipment
related to F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey given Ankara's planned
purchase of a Russian S-400s is the right approach. The Kremlin is
moving aggressively to make arms deals with our partners and allies.
Another example of this is India's $3 billion submarine lease from
Russia for 10 years--this comes after reports that India plans on
purchasing Russia's S-400 system. Are you concerned about these
transactions?
Answer. These transactions are very concerning. I have repeatedly
discussed CAATSA in my interactions with Indian officials. We will
continue to work with India to identify potentially sanctionable
activity so that they can avoid it and encourage them to reduce
military purchases from Russia. The U.S.-India defense relationship has
undergone rapid growth in recent years based on converging security and
strategic interests between our two nations. The administration is
working to make sure that India understands the potential sanctions
consequences of these transactions and takes the steps necessary to
avoid derailing this growth.
Question. The Pentagon's decision to halt delivery of equipment
related to F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey given Ankara's planned
purchase of a Russian S-400s is the right approach. The Kremlin is
moving aggressively to make arms deals with our partners and allies.
Another example of this is India's $3 billion submarine lease from
Russia for 10 years--this comes after reports that India plans on
purchasing Russia's S-400 system. What can the U.S. do to encourage
India to diminish its security cooperation with the Kremlin?
Answer. Throughout my interactions with Indian officials, I
continue to highlight the advantages of defense trade between our two
nations. This trade benefits the security of both countries.
Strengthening this relationship, while highlighting Russian shortfalls,
will encourage India to diminish its defense ties with the Kremlin.
Question. The December elections were widely reported, included in
the Department's latest human rights report, as not free, fair or
credible. The government violently attacked political opponents and
their supporters in the electoral process, including in the gang rape
of a woman in which a local Awami League leader was implicated. Last
summer, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly committed 200
extrajudicial killings during an ``anti-narcotics'' campaign. Also,
last year, the government arbitrarily arrested student protestors,
journalists, and civil society activists during student-led protests
seeking civil service quota reform and better road safety conditions.
On April 8, you met with the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. Did you
state concern for the rapid decline of human rights and democracy in
Bangladesh, particularly over the last year?
Answer. Following Bangladesh's December 30, 2018, election, the
Department expressed concern in a January 1, 2019, statement that
``credible reports of harassment, intimidation, and violence in the
pre-election period'' and ``election-day irregularities prevented some
people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process.''
President Trump sent a letter to Prime Minister Hasina further raising
these concerns, and the Department continues to raise them with
Bangladesh senior officials. The Department supports calls for an
independent investigation into the suppression of political opposition,
their supporters, and journalists as well as other electoral-related
complaints.
Question. The December election were widely reported, included in
the Department's latest human rights report, as not free, fair or
credible. The government violently attacked political opponents, and
their supporters in the electoral process, including in the gang rape
of a woman in which a local Awami League leader was implicated. Last
summer, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly committed 200
extrajudicial killings during an ``anti-narcotics'' campaign. Also,
last year, the government arbitrarily arrested student protestors,
journalists, and civil society activists during student-led protests
seeking civil service quota reform and better road safety conditions.
On April 8, you met with the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. What
leverage will you deploy to demonstrate to the government of Bangladesh
that the negative trajectory has implications for the bilateral
relationship?
Answer. Following Bangladesh's December 30, 2018, election, the
Department expressed concern in a January 1, 2019, statement that
``credible reports of harassment, intimidation, and violence in the
pre-election period'' and ``election-day irregularities prevented some
people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process.''
President Trump sent a letter to Prime Minister Hasina further raising
these concerns, and the Department continues to raise them with
Bangladesh senior officials. The Department supports calls for an
independent investigation into the suppression of political opposition,
their supporters, and journalists as well as other electoral-related
complaints.
Question. President Sirisena's government has made some progress on
human rights, but not where it ultimately counts--including
accountability for war crimes. Instead, the president appointed in
January 2019 war criminal Major General Shavendra Silva to the post of
Army Chief of Staff. This does not demonstrate genuine commitment to
the Human Rights Council Resolution commitments. In light of this, what
is the U.S. policy on bilateral security cooperation with Sri Lanka?
Answer. The Department takes all allegations of human rights
violations or abuses seriously and raises these concerns with the
Government of Sri Lanka, including when high-level appointments appear
to conflict with Sri Lanka's commitments. As we have told President
Sirisena, the appointment of Major General Silva was not in line with
Sri Lanka's commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation.
The Department's security cooperation policy seeks to promote respect
for human rights, democratic processes, and the rule of law with Sri
Lanka's security forces.
Question. Last week Senator Rubio and I sent a letter to the
administration urging consideration of the use of Magnitsky to address
China's repression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. My understanding is that
the administration has prepared a package of sanctions . . . centst has
failed for many months to make designations. Given the clear and
compelling evidence of Chinese repression--a million people in
``reeducation camps . . .despread use of high-tech surveillance . .
..'' Can you tell us why the administration has not implemented
Magnitsky sanctions on appropriate Chinese officials for the gross
violations of human rights in Xinjiang?
Answer. I share your concerns about China's highly repressive
campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of
Muslim minority groups. China is in a league of its own when it comes
to human rights violations and abuses. As I recently said in
conjunction with the roll-out of the Department's annual Human Rights
Reports, the Department is leading the international charge to shine a
spotlight on the scope and scale of this issue, as well as to galvanize
pressure on China in order to limit or halt its repression. We are
working hard to promote accountability for those responsible for or
complicit in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including by widely
publicizing what is happening there and through potential economic
measures.
Question. Tunisia has upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections in October and November 2019, and the stability of Tunisia's
democracy hinges on the proper execution of these elections. Tunisia
his historically welcomed not just U.S. dollars, but our unique
technical assistance in helping develop democratic governing
institutions. It is critical that we continue to support Tunisia's
efforts to build democratic institutions and execute free and fair
elections. Additionally, supporting Tunisia's democracy also merits
engagement and assistance, including economic development programs.
Tunisia's economic and political stability is not guaranteed;
approximately one third of Tunisia's young adults are currently
unemployed. Additionally, the administration has begun to back away
from counterterrorism engagement in Africa, which puts at risk the
hard-fought gains the U.S. has helped drive against ISIS and Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb. With rising instability and limited internal
capacity to deal with militants in both Algeria and Libya, Tunisia will
likely be in need of more security assistance. Economic and political
stability will play an important role in upcoming elections. We have an
important, capable, and willing partner in Tunisia. How does it advance
our interests or Tunisia's to cut ESF by 25 percent in FY 2020?
Answer. Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest
of the world that serves both our interests and those of our allies.
The FY 2020 budget request prioritizes supporting key U.S. partners,
including Tunisia, through strategic and targeted investments that
enable the United States to retain its position as a global leader. The
United States has provided Tunisia with nearly $775 million from the
Economic Support Fund since 2011, as well as other assistance in areas
such as rule of law and security. This budget request recognizes the
importance of other nations contributing toward our shared objectives.
Question. Tunisia has upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections in October and November 2019, and the stability of Tunisia's
democracy hinges on the proper execution of these elections. Tunisia
his historically welcomed not just U.S. dollars, but our unique
technical assistance in helping develop democratic governing
institutions. It is critical that we continue to support Tunisia's
efforts to build democratic institutions and execute free and fair
elections. Additionally, supporting Tunisia's democracy also merits
engagement and assistance, including economic development programs.
Tunisia's economic and political stability is not guaranteed;
approximately one third of Tunisia's young adults are currently
unemployed. Additionally, the administration has begun to back away
from counterterrorism engagement in Africa, which puts at risk the
hard-fought gains the U.S. has helped drive against ISIS and Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb. With rising instability and limited internal
capacity to deal with militants in both Algeria and Libya, Tunisia will
likely be in need of more security assistance. Conditions on the ground
in the region are changing for the worse. What is driving the flat
request for FMF and NADR to Tunisia for FY 2020?
Answer. Tunisia continues to face threats from al-Qa'ida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the ISIS-affiliated Jund al-Khilafah Tunisia
(JAK-T), and the potential return of Tunisian foreign terrorist
fighters from battlefields in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. U.S. and
international assistance is helping the Tunisian security forces
improve their capacity and ability to conduct internal and border
security operations. The FY 2020 NADR and FMF request for Tunisia is
designed to build on these successes and further develop Tunisia's
security forces in the areas of air-to-ground joint operations,
counterterrorism and border security operations, intelligence capacity,
and defense institution building.
Question. Tunisia has upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections in October and November 2019, and the stability of Tunisia's
democracy hinges on the proper execution of these elections. Tunisia
his historically welcomed not just U.S. dollars, but our unique
technical assistance in helping develop democratic governing
institutions. It is critical that we continue to support Tunisia's
efforts to build democratic institutions and execute free and fair
elections. Additionally, supporting Tunisia's democracy also merits
engagement and assistance, including economic development programs.
Tunisia's economic and political stability is not guaranteed;
approximately one third of Tunisia's young adults are currently
unemployed. Additionally, the administration has begun to back away
from counterterrorism engagement in Africa, which puts at risk the
hard-fought gains the U.S. has helped drive against ISIS and Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb. With rising instability and limited internal
capacity to deal with militants in both Algeria and Libya, Tunisia will
likely be in need of more security assistance. Why are we zeroing out
the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) funds?
Answer. In FY 2020, the Department requested $2 million for the
TSCTP program funding through the new Near East Regional operating unit
for counterterrorism programming, and requested funding for law
enforcement and corrections in TSCTP member countries' bilateral
allocations. The Department remains committed to Tunisia's security and
will continue to coordinate with the Department of Defense to ensure
resources are aligned to support Tunisia and stability in North Africa.
Question. Do you agree that there is a risk for mass atrocities in
Mali? Does the March attack in Mopti bear the hallmarks of a mass
atrocity?
Answer. We are deeply saddened by the reported loss of over 170
innocent Malians, including women and children, killed on March 23 in
the central Malian village of Ogoussagou. The Department of State has
called on the Government of Mali to conduct a full investigation and to
hold those responsible accountable. We have also urged Malian
stakeholders to make every effort to stop the cycle of violence and to
restore peace and security in central Mali. U.S. diplomatic and
programmatic engagement in Mali will continue to focus attention on
mitigating risks of mass atrocities.
Question. What actions and activities can the U.S. support to
lessen intercommunal tension, and how are such actions funded through
this budget?
Answer. We assist Mali in the development of its justice systems,
countering violent extremism, protecting human rights, and advancing
agricultural practices, livelihoods, and other development activities.
We support stability in Mali, particularly through contributions to the
U.N. peacekeeping mission, and through our efforts to build stronger
institutions and capabilities within Malian defense and security
forces. We call on the government to cut all ties with armed militias
and hold perpetrators accountable.
Question. What specific diplomatic actions have you taken as
Secretary in the year since your confirmation to foster implementation
of the agreement? What additional actions do you plan to take? What is
the resource request in the President's Fiscal Year 2020 budget to
support actions and activities for this peace agreement implementation?
Answer. On March 26, I joined Deputy Secretary John J. Sullivan's
meeting with Malian Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga to urge full
and rapid implementation of the Algiers Accord. On March 29, Under
Secretary David Hale spoke at the U.N. Security Council, calling for
the signatory parties to make compromises for peace. He then echoed
this message with foreign ministers from Mali and neighboring states.
We continue to engage regional partners on the peace process. We will
also advocate for changes to the U.N. peacekeeping mission MINUSMA,
which we support with assessed contributions, to facilitate more rapid
and effective accord implementation.
Question. In October 2018, police opened fire at Shi'ite protestors
in Abuja killing at least one person. In response to a question for the
record submitted in the wake of last year's budget hearing about human
rights abuses by security forces in Nigeria, you indicated that you
``take all reports of human rights violations and abuses seriously,''
and committed to press the Nigerian government to live up to
commitments that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari made in his
remarks in the Rose Garden in April 2018, ensuring accountability for
human rights violations. What specific actions did you take in the wake
of the incident in keeping with your commitment to press the Nigerian
government to ensure accountability for human rights violations? Has
the Nigerian government launched a credible investigation into the
October violence?
Answer. After the October killings, our Ambassador immediately
raised U.S. concerns with senior Government of Nigeria officials. Both
privately and in the Embassy's November 1, 2018, public statement, the
United States called for a thorough and transparent investigation and
accountability for those responsible for these killings. We do not have
any information on whether an investigation was launched. We will
continue to prioritize in our engagements with the Nigerian government
respect for human rights and accountability for those found responsible
for human rights violations and abuses.
Question. In October 2018, police opened fire at Shi'ite protestors
in Abuja killing at least one person. In response to a question for the
record submitted in the wake of last year's budget hearing about human
rights abuses by security forces in Nigeria, you indicated that you
``take all reports of human rights violations and abuses seriously,''
and committed to press the Nigerian government to live up to
commitments that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari made in his
remarks in the Rose Garden in April 2018, ensuring accountability for
human rights violations. We understand that units and individuals are
vetted in accordance with Leahy laws. In addition to that, what
safeguards if any, has the administration put in place to ensure U.S.
equipment is not being used to commit human rights abuses? Has the
administration undertaken a review of the security assistance portfolio
for Nigeria in the wake of the incident to ensure we are providing
appropriate assistance given human rights concerns?
Answer. The administration continually presses Nigeria for progress
and accountability on human rights. Human rights are an important
factor in the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (National
Security Presidential Memorandum 10, issued April 19, 2018). As part of
every arms transfer assessment, the Department considers ``the risk
that the transfer may be used to undermine international peace and
security or contribute to abuses of human rights.'' We continually
review our limited security assistance to Nigeria to ensure it
contributes to building more capable, professional, and accountable
security forces that respect human rights and protect civilians, and
that U.S. equipment will only be used for legitimate security purposes.
Question. What specific programmatic activities has the U.S.
undertaken to support the transition in Ethiopia?
Answer. The Department supports the important reforms underway in
Ethiopia and continues its broad spectrum of programs investing in the
Ethiopian people, in health, education, and food security, as well as
expanding activity in direct support of Prime Minister Abiy's reform
agenda. An interagency group convened by the National Security Council
and led by the Department's Africa Bureau has met with its Ethiopian
partners and created a number of cross-cutting new initiatives,
including expert economic, legal, and security specialists to work
directly with key Ethiopian ministries. The Africa Bureau is also
coordinating interagency efforts to facilitate U.S. private sector
investments in Ethiopia.
Question. What specific programs is the U.S. undertaking for
targeting youth in marginalized communities? What specific geographic
areas are we reaching through such programs?
Answer. The Department is focused on providing opportunities for
Ethiopian youth. Expanding employment and hope for this demographic is
the critical element to Ethiopia's political and economic success, as
is true across Africa. All existing Department programs reflect this
priority. The political geography of Ethiopia is especially complex,
and the Department works in close cooperation with Ethiopian leaders to
make U.S. investment in the Ethiopian people strategically effective.
Question. The New York Times reported on March 10th, that a ``surge
in American airstrikes over the last four months of 2018 pushed the
annual death toll of suspected Shabab fighters in Somalia to the third
record high in three years.'' The article and other media reports
suggest that the increased attacks have increased displacements as
Somalis flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. How
specifically does the increase in the number of airstrikes support the
administration's strategy for Somalia?
Answer. U.S. military efforts in Somalia are one part of a whole-
of-government approach that includes diplomacy and development to
advance peace and stability, combat terrorism, promote political and
economic reform, and provide life-saving humanitarian and development
assistance. The Department continues to support Somali-led efforts to
advance political reconciliation and conflict mitigation, which are
necessary to address the root causes of instability that provide al-
Shabaab freedom to operate. Operations against al-Shabaab keep pressure
on the organization and help to counteract its efforts to disrupt these
processes, while providing space and time for the Federal Government of
Somalia to enact political and security sector reforms.
Question. The New York Times reported on March 10th, that a ``surge
in American airstrikes over the last four months of 2018 pushed the
annual death toll of suspected Shabab fighters in Somalia to the third
record high in three years.'' The article and other media reports
suggest that the increased attacks have increased displacements as
Somalis flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. Have the
airstrikes resulted in civilian displacement? If so, what assistance
are we providing to those displaced due to U.S. airstrikes, and where
is this reflected in the FY20 budget request?
Answer. U.S. military efforts in Somalia are one part of a whole-
of-government approach that includes diplomacy and development to
advance peace and stability, combat terrorism, promote political and
economic reform, and provide life-saving humanitarian and development
assistance. At present, the U.S. government continues to provide life-
saving humanitarian assistance to approximately 1.5 million people
within Somalia, as well as more than 800,000 Somali refugees in East
Africa who previously fled insecurity and past years of drought.
Question. The New York Times reported on March 10th, that a ``surge
in American airstrikes over the last four months of 2018 pushed the
annual death toll of suspected Shabab fighters in Somalia to the third
record high in three years.'' The article and other media reports
suggest that the increased attacks have increased displacements as
Somalis flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. Have the
increased airstrikes significantly diminished the capacity of Al
Shabaab to plan and execute attacks in Somalia? Please provide the
answer in classified form if necessary.
Answer. Airstrikes are one part of the U.S. strategy to support the
Somali people and government by disrupting the activities of al-Shabaab
and providing space for Somali forces to secure the country. These
precision airstrikes enable larger Somalia security force activities to
build enhanced security conditions that then allow time and space for
government and economic development to occur. They directly impact al-
Shabaab's ability to carry out activities and recruitment. Strikes
targeted at various levels of al-Shabaab leadership diminish their
capability to conduct catastrophic attacks against civilians, such as
the October 2017 truck bombing which killed more than 600 Somalis.
Question. Last May, the White House announced the United States is
undertaking a comprehensive review of its assistance programs to South
Sudan to ensure our assistance does not contribute to, or prolong the
conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior. What was the
result of that review? What impact has it had on the FY20 budget
request?
Answer. On May 8, 2018, the White House announced a comprehensive
review of U.S. assistance programs in South Sudan. This review is still
ongoing. U.S. foreign assistance to South Sudan in the FY 2020 budget
request reflects our humanitarian, political, and economic priorities,
including to support a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This
approach has been informed by our ongoing South Sudan assistance
review.
Question. Last year you committed to ``analyze the value and impact
of a Special Envoy'' for Sudan and South Sudan. What was the result of
your analysis? What are the factors that led to the conclusion that a
Special Envoy for the Great Lakes was necessary, which may inform the
need for a Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan?
Answer. Three considerations factored heavily into my decision to
appoint a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. First,
many of the political, security, economic, and social issues arising in
the region are cross-border concerns. Secondly, the then-imminent
prospect of elections and the possibility of either a historic transfer
of power or renewed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
was a concern for the United States as well as the neighboring
countries. Thirdly, the U.N., EU, and roughly half a dozen countries
have Special Envoys who meet regularly; a U.S. Special Envoy enables
the Department to maintain our diplomatic engagement through those
channels.
Question. Does the administration plan to assign a senior,
experienced diplomat who has previously been confirmed by the Senate as
an Ambassador to lead U.S. government diplomatic efforts--especially
during this critical time in Sudan?
Answer. Resolving the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and the
civil conflicts in both Sudan and South Sudan remain top policy
priorities for the administration. At this time I do not anticipate
naming a special envoy, although I am reviewing options for an
additional senior-level position that could include a focus on Sudan
and South Sudan issues. I do not have a timeline for such a decision
and anticipate any additional senior-level position would be covered by
existing resources in FY19.
Question. The President released a policy memorandum on November
26th tightening enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
and restricting assistance to Tier Three countries. It is my
understanding that the new policy took NSC, DOS, and USAID by surprise
and there remains little or no direction to Washington DC or mission-
based staff and even less guidance provided to USAID implementing
partners on how to implement the new policy. While no one wants to
encourage Human Trafficking, needed programming is being impacted. In
the DRC, over 1 million children will lose access to schools. Also, in
the DRC Nobel Peace prize winner Denis Mukwege is losing U.S. funding
support via an implementing partner. His work focuses on women and
their treatment in face of sexual violence in war and armed conflict. I
can't see how disrupting NGO operations in these or other scenarios
helps end human trafficking. What steps are being taken to exempt NGOs
from adverse impacts of this policy?
Answer. The restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA) applies to assistance for the benefit of the government,
regardless of the type of entity implementing the assistance. The State
Department and USAID assess whether the restriction applies with
respect to a particular program on a case-by-case basis. Where an
activity will not receive additional funding as a result of the
restrictions under the TVPA, implementing partners are generally
permitted to incur closeout costs to allow for the responsible winding
down of the activity.
Question. As the Secretary of State, you are the head of the new
United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC),
which will subsume the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
and the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID)
Development Credit Authority. How will you ensure that State has the
tools and resources necessary to fulfill its important role in the
USDFC's due diligence processes, particularly given the increased
mandate and capacity of the new institution?
Answer. The USDFC's success will require strong linkages to U.S.
policymakers at the Department and USAID in order for the USDFC to both
complement and be guided by U.S. foreign policy, development, and
national security objectives. Under a new governance structure, as
Secretary of State, I will serve as Chair of the USDFC, and the
Administrator of USAID will serve as Vice-Chair. The State Department's
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) and the USDFC's Chief
Development Officer (a position jointly appointed by the USAID
Administrator and the CEO of the USDFC, who reports directly to the
USDFC's Board) will work closely with the USDFC's management to ensure
it is fulfilling its mission, while coordinating programming and
resources with the Department of State and USAID. The global reach of
the State Department and USAID will be key to assisting the USDFC in
due diligence.
Question. Can you answer where it will go?
Answer. The process to determine which agency will adopt the legal
rights and responsibilities of the Sovereign Loan Guarantee (SLG)
portfolio is ongoing. The agencies under consideration include USAID,
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the U.S.
Development Finance Corporation (USDFC). Under the BUILD Act, the
current SLG exposure is expected to count against the USDFC maximum
contingent liability, if responsibility for SLGs is assigned to the
USDFC. This is an outcome the administration would like to avoid.
Question. If it goes to the USDFC and the $21 billion in exposure
from existing guarantees (Israel, Jordan, and Ukraine) are shifted onto
the USDFC's books, would you count them against the agency's liability
cap?
Answer. The process to determine which agency will administer the
Sovereign Loan Guarantee (SLG) portfolio is ongoing. Under the BUILD
Act, the current SLG exposure is expected to count against the USDFC
maximum contingent liability, if responsibility for SLGs is assigned to
the USDFC. This is an outcome the administration would like to avoid.
Question. Another meaningful upgrade for the USDFC is the inclusion
of equity authority. OPIC was frequently hamstrung because of a
restriction to only using debt finance. Under BUILD, the USDFC now has
limited equity authority, up to 30 percent (of the aggregate equity
investment) in any project and up to 35 percent of the total portfolio.
Yet, the FY20 budget request includes just $150 million for equity
investments, or equivalent to about 4 percent of OPIC's overall
commitments last year. What was the justification for crippling the
equity authority?
Answer. Equity can be particularly appropriate when investing in
frontier markets where more support than lending and insurance may be
required. The budget requests $150 million for a new program for the
USDFC to support projects as a minority investor acquiring equity,
including as a limited partner in investment funds. This will allow for
cooperation with allies and for investments to reach smaller companies
for the greatest developmental impact. The request supports a
diversified portfolio of 5 to 10 investment funds with an average
equity investment between $5 million to $20 million. Adding $150
million for equity funds in 2020 would represent a 36 percent expansion
on OPIC's average (debt) funds program business over the past 6 years,
a significant and impactful, but manageable expansion. The USDFC will
also maintain the ability to lend to investment funds--a strong
complement to the USDFC's equity program.
Question. The FY20 budget request includes $98 million to cover
administrative expenses. At first glance, this looks like a roughly 10
percent increase over the $79 million in OPIC expenses plus $10 million
from USAID's DCA in FY19. However, these top line numbers don't include
an estimated $26 million in revenue from fees and other services which
OPIC uses to cover project costs separate from direct administrative
expenses. So the appropriate baseline is $115 million. This suggests
that the new USDFC is facing, not a 10 percent increase in expenses but
a 15 percent cut. What is the justification for this budget cut?
Answer. The total $300 million budget for the new USDFC is more
than double that of OPIC plus USAID's Development Credit Authority
(DCA) funding today. This increase in funding reflects the priority the
administration places on the new USDFC. Per the BUILD Act, fees may be
charged and collected to support project-specific transaction costs.
This includes costs for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect
costs incurred in claims settlements. The FY 2020 budget request covers
these costs along with other administrative expenses. The
administration also expects efficiencies from the consolidation of OPIC
and DCA, and anticipates that the USDFC, through stronger linkages with
the State Department and USAID, will be able to leverage their
expertise and footprint overseas.
Question. The FY20 budget request includes $98 million to cover
administrative expenses. At first glance, this looks like a roughly 10
percent increase over the $79 million in OPIC expenses plus $10 million
from USAID's DCA in FY19. However, these top line numbers don't include
an estimated $26 million in revenue from fees and other services which
OPIC uses to cover project costs separate from direct administrative
expenses. So the appropriate baseline is $115 million. This suggests
that the new USDFC is facing, not a 10 percent increase in expenses but
a 15 percent cut. Did you take into account the $26 million for project
costs when crafting the budget?
Answer. Pursuant to the BUILD Act, fees may be charged and
collected to support project-specific transaction costs. This includes
costs for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect costs
incurred in claims settlements associated with support provided under
the BUILD Act.
Question. The amount of money handled under each portfolio per OPIC
employee is estimated to be around $86 million, which is a much higher
size than other countries' development agencies. Yet, the FY20 budget
for the USDFC doesn't take into account the hiring of more employees.
What is the justification for this?
Answer. The FY 2020 request is expected to fund existing OPIC and
DCA programs, other operational expenses, and new responsibilities to
implement the DFC's new equity, grant, and technical assistance
programs. This assumes a level of 305 FTEs, higher than current levels
for OPIC and DCA combined today, and takes into consideration the
addition of FTE positions such as the Chief Development Officer and
Chief Risk Officer, increased evaluation and monitoring activity, and
new reporting requirements mandated by the BUILD Act. Through stronger
linkages to State and USAID, the DFC will leverage the overseas
platforms that Posts and Missions provide, allowing additional U.S.
government personnel to support development finance efforts.
Question. The State Department recognizes that discrimination
against people with disabilities is not simply unjust and immoral, but
hinders economic development, limits democracy, and erodes societies.
Unfortunately, State does not require all development programs to be
inclusive of people with disabilities. Please explain in detail how
State and USAID programs give a voice to people with disabilities,
particularly through global democracy and governance programs, in
absence of a specific requirement.
Answer. USAID is continuously striving to ensure programming for
persons with disabilities is included not only in democracy, human
rights, and governance programs, but across all sectors. Approaches to
achieve this include disability-related provisions that are required
for contracts and grants, disability-inclusive sector strategies and
programming, the development of training materials, and designated
expert staff who serve as a resource to all employees. USAID is
currently onboarding a disability rights advisor who will have a
responsibility to manage the disability program.
Question. We continue to hear from NGO implementing partners of
delays in receiving FY 2018 funding including new programming as well
as incremental funding of already existing programs. This was also a
problem with FY 2017 funds. These delays and disruptions adversely
impact the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. supported programming.
Implementing partners are often forced to bridge the funding gap with
their own funds and, in a few cases, the programs had to scale down and
NGOs feared that they needed to shut down operations. For some
partners, they've been told by the administration that the delay is due
to a congressional notification that we often have not yet seen. What
steps are State and USAID taking identify and remove barriers to speed
resources to the field as well as easing the burden on implementing
partners?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID work diligently to ensure
that funds appropriated by Congress are obligated as quickly as
possible for programs that advance foreign policy objectives while
assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements. It is
a complex process to allocate over $30 billion in foreign assistance
funds and ensure it meets hundreds of Congressional funding directives.
Once the funding allocations are complete, numerous pre-obligation
requirements must be met before funds can be obligated to partners. It
is a multi-step process, but one that we are working to ensure is
executed as quickly and effectively as possible.
Question. We continue to hear from NGO implementing partners of
delays in receiving FY 2018 funding including new programming as well
as incremental funding of already existing programs. This was also a
problem with FY 2017 funds. These delays and disruptions adversely
impact the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. supported programming.
Implementing partners are often forced to bridge the funding gap with
their own funds and, in a few cases, the programs had to scale down and
NGOs feared that they needed to shut down operations. For some
partners, they've been told by the administration that the delay is due
to a congressional notification that we often have not yet seen. Can
you commit to me that you and Administrator Green will disburse funds
more quickly this year than in the 2 prior years and that if there are
problems, you will inform this committee?
Answer. Administrator Green and I are committed to working to
ensure that the Department of State and USAID provide funds to partners
as quickly as possible for programs that advance U.S. foreign policy
objectives while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other
requirements. We will continue to keep your staff apprised as we work
through this process.
Question. Two years ago, data from the Charity & Security Network
showed that two-thirds of all U.S.-based nonprofit organizations
working abroad face financial access difficulties. Since then,
nonprofits say the problem is getting worse, negatively impacting their
ability to fund vital humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and development
programs overseas in line with the U.S.'s national security objectives.
In many cases, time-sensitive programs have had to be delayed or even
canceled. How can terrorist financing be prevented while preserving
nonprofits' ability to get money to these lifesaving programs?
Answer. Malign actors use front companies in the humanitarian
sector to mask nefarious activity. I support robust anti-money
laundering and counter-terror financing standards as promulgated by the
Financial Action Task Force and domestic regulatory agencies. Such
standards require financial institutions use a risk-based approach when
dealing with clients, including nonprofits, but support financial
inclusion without compromising measures that exist to combat crime. We
can achieve a safe system and access for all clients through this
approach and communication between institutions and clients about the
nature and purpose of transactions.
Question. There are more than 68 million people displaced from
their homes, the highest number since the end of World War II and
nearly 132 million people will require humanitarian assistance. In the
United Nations' 2019 Global Humanitarian Overview, the U.N. reported
that it was only able to meet 56 percent of global humanitarian needs
in 2018. Yet, while humanitarian need shows no signs of abating, the
administration has proposed cutting the humanitarian assistance budget
by 24 percent. Does the President's Budget Request provide sufficient
funds to respond to existing crises, including the growing number of
refugees fleeing Venezuela and the worsening Ebola outbreak in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as new crises that may emerge?
Answer. Yes. The FY 2020 request of $6.3 billion for humanitarian
assistance (including resettlement)--essentially a funding straight-
line of the FY 2019 request level--will allow the United States to
remain the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance in the
world, for these crises and new ones that may emerge. Combined with
carryover resources, the average program levels for 2019 and 2020 will
allow the U.S. to remain the world's largest single donor of
humanitarian assistance and to robustly address needs for Syria, Yemen,
and other major crises around the world. When combined with all
available resources, average annual funding available for FY 2019 and
FY 2020 of around $9 billion roughly matches the highest-ever annual
level of U.S. overseas humanitarian programming. I am also working on
implementing a strategy intended to get other donors to step up and
increase their share of global humanitarian funding and reduce the
burden on American taxpayers.
Question. There are more than 68 million people displaced from
their homes, the highest number since the end of World War II and
nearly 132 million people will require humanitarian assistance. In the
United Nations' 2019 Global Humanitarian Overview, the U.N. reported
that it was only able to meet 56 percent of global humanitarian needs
in 2018. Yet, while humanitarian need shows no signs of abating, the
administration has proposed cutting the humanitarian assistance budget
by 24 percent. The administration has repeatedly called for increased
burden-sharing amongst donors. Can you outline the administration's
strategy to encourage other donors to give more in humanitarian
settings?
Answer. In 2017, the three largest donors--including the United
States--provided nearly three-fifths of all government contributions in
response to humanitarian needs. Burden-sharing amongst a wider set of
donors is critical for closing the humanitarian funding gap. The
administration is pursuing a burden-sharing strategy that draws on all
levels of government and specific diplomatic missions overseas. For
example, the multi-year strategy will strengthen the coordination of
messaging across the U.S. government through common talking points
aimed at key donors; capitalize on engagement through multilateral and
regional fora; and support active outreach and enlisting of donors in
funding critical humanitarian emergencies.
Question. In this year's budget request, the administration
proposes merging all humanitarian assistance accounts--Migration and
Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Food for
Peace Title II--and moving all assistance functions from PRM to USAID.
I am concerned that this proposal goes beyond the ongoing USAID
Transformation efforts and may disrupt current efforts to merge Food
for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I
am concerned that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises
that involve refugee populations. How does this proposal connect with
other ongoing lines of work related to reform, including the
establishment of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Committee?
Answer. The humanitarian policy priorities for the U.S. government
have not changed and will continue through FY 2020, including through
the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council (HASC). These include
ensuring there is a unified voice and single message in public
engagement, increased burden-sharing from other donor governments, and
reforming the humanitarian system. Additionally, the role of the HASC
is intended to coordinate humanitarian assistance in line with the
administration's policy priorities as well as to ensure the necessary
diplomatic engagement needed to address and end the numerous man-made
crises around the world. However, the creation of the HASC cannot
optimize humanitarian assistance, and that is why the FY 2020
President's Budget proposal addresses the necessary changes.
Question. In this year's budget request, the administration
proposes merging all humanitarian assistance accounts--Migration and
Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Food for
Peace Title II--and moving all assistance functions from PRM to USAID.
I am concerned that this proposal goes beyond the ongoing USAID
Transformation efforts and may disrupt current efforts to merge Food
for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I
am concerned that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises
that involve refugee populations. If this proposal moves forward, can
you outline what impact you expect it would have on U.S. diplomacy
abroad?
Answer. The administration proposes to merge overseas humanitarian
assistance into one account by leveraging expertise of USAID in
administering and implementing programs and oversight of partners with
the State Department's expertise on refugee and protection policy,
diplomacy, and other refugee issues. This proposal delivers on the
President's commitment to achieve a unified voice and single message on
humanitarian issues focused on advancing optimal reforms at the United
Nations and optimizing outcomes for beneficiaries and for American
taxpayers. It will improve current diplomatic actions by having one
clear channel between diplomats and a unified voice and single message
on issues that focused on optimizing the outcomes of humanitarian
assistance across the agencies, as well as improving the coordination
of efforts to resolve conflicts that drive many of the current
humanitarian crises.
Question. In this year's budget request, the administration
proposes merging all humanitarian assistance accounts--Migration and
Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Food for
Peace Title II--and moving all assistance functions from PRM to USAID.
I am concerned that this proposal goes beyond the ongoing USAID
Transformation efforts and may disrupt current efforts to merge Food
for Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In addition, I
am concerned that this proposal may hamstring U.S. diplomacy in crises
that involve refugee populations. How do you plan to ensure that U.S.
refugee policy is closely tied to U.S. programming in crisis settings
if these functions are divided between USAID and the State Department?
Answer. The FY 2020 request supports the effort to merge Food for
Peace and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance into USAID's new
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance. The FY 2020 request preserves the
State Department's lead role on refugee and protection policy and
refugee resettlement, and on advocating for states to comply with their
international refugee law obligations and to protect refugees and
conflict-affected people. The proposed high-level, dual-hatted State
and USAID leadership structure, under my direction, will also elevate
humanitarian assistance within the U.S. government to ensure a unified
voice and message in international organizations and with other
implementers and donors that is focused on optimizing humanitarian
responses and making them more effective, seamless, and coherent. The
new structure will facilitate more effective coordination and
engagement, not just across our current humanitarian offices but across
State and USAID, to achieve our humanitarian objectives. The proposal
keeps funding for PRM's administrative expenses for overseas staff,
policy, legal work, and refugee resettlement in MRA.
Question. Your budget proposes to consolidate humanitarian programs
and funding into a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA)
account. You argue that this will ``optimize humanitarian assistance''
and ``leverage the comparative strengths of the Department of State and
USAID.'' The request also proposes to create a new structure. Can you
please specifically explain the problems with the current structure and
how the proposal will specifically address those problems?
Answer. The ``Delivering Government Solutions in the 21st Century:
Reform Plan and Reorganization Recommendations'' report released by the
Office of Management and Budget in June 2018 details challenges facing
the current overseas humanitarian assistance structure conducted by one
bureau at the Department of State and two offices at USAID. The
proposal outlined in the FY 2020 request consolidates overseas
humanitarian assistance with funding in a new, flexible International
Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account. IHA and having a single agency
administering programs will allow funds to adjust readily to optimize
responses as needs evolve, particularly in conflict-based crises where,
for example, populations are shifting more often from being internally
displaced to being refugees and back. The proposal creates a high-level
dual-hat leadership structure elevating humanitarian assistance to
better achieve foreign-policy priorities and establishes a seamless,
coherent response to optimize live-saving assistance to populations in
need and to better address the continuum of response, including
diplomacy, execution of strategies to permanently resolve humanitarian
crises and protracted displacements, and the transition to development.
Question. Your budget proposes to consolidate humanitarian programs
and funding into a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA)
account. You argue that this will ``optimize humanitarian assistance''
and ``leverage the comparative strengths of the Department of State and
USAID.'' The request also proposes to create a new structure. You argue
that the new structure will ``enable the U.S. government to respond
seamlessly'' can you please explain how this will happen when you
propose a new structure that appears to add additional layers to a
process that needs to be as quick and nimble as possible?
Answer. The administration's FY 2020 request consolidates overseas
humanitarian assistance with funding in a new International
Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account, which USAID's new Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) would administer under the authority of
the Secretary of State. This proposal builds on the work to combine
USAID's Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace,
and would ensure that all U.S. government overseas humanitarian-
assistance programming--whether responding to displacement, natural
disaster, or other shock--is efficient and effective.
In practice, we are already seeing the benefits of consolidating
the administration of humanitarian assistance at USAID, where the joint
use of International Disaster Assistance has significantly strengthened
USAID's ability to address funding gaps and overlaps. Having one
management structure and one set of policies, procedures, and systems
will streamline, not complicate, the provision of assistance.
Implementers will no longer need to request and manage awards from
three different offices, each with separate reporting and oversight
requirements.
Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling
reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the
death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual
same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating
flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In
addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the
globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and
even killed, just for being who they are. We've seen it in Chechnya,
Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was
pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. ``opposes
criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination'' against
LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to
the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of
violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly
surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing
the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level
spokespersons to do so. What are you and the State Department doing to
address this new set of laws in Brunei and to ensure that the human
rights and dignity of all people there are protected and respected?
Answer. All governments have an obligation to ensure that their
people can freely enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms to
which they are entitled. The Department has raised its concerns about
these laws with Brunei on numerous occasions since the enactment of
Phase One in 2014, and we will continue to do so, including as part of
our bilateral Senior Officials Dialogue.
Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling
reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the
death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual
same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating
flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In
addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the
globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and
even killed, just for being who they are. We've seen it in Chechnya,
Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was
pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. ``opposes
criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination'' against
LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to
the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of
violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly
surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing
the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level
spokespersons to do so. What in specific will you commit to do to help
LGBTQ people in Brunei, Chechnya, Egypt and other places to ensure they
are not targeted for abuse?
Answer. The Department continues to work to protect and defend
human rights for all--including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and intersex persons--across the world, including in Brunei, Chechnya,
and Egypt. No one should face violence, criminalization, or serious
forms of discrimination because of their sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, or sex characteristics.
Question. In the last several weeks we have seen very troubling
reports that Brunei has enacted a new set of laws that mandates the
death penalty for numerous offenses, among them adultery, consensual
same-sex relations, blasphemy, and robbery, as well as mandating
flogging for women who have abortions, and amputation for theft. In
addition to Brunei, there have been a number of other places around the
globe where LGBTQ people have been targeted, rounded up, tortured and
even killed, just for being who they are. We've seen it in Chechnya,
Egypt, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, among others. While I was
pleased to see your statement last year that the U.S. ``opposes
criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination'' against
LGBTI persons, the U.S. refused to join a recent statement delivered to
the United Nations Human Rights Council calling for the perpetrators of
violence in Chechnya to be held accountable. And I was frankly
surprised that you have not personally issued a statement addressing
the new laws in Brunei and instead have left it to lower level
spokespersons to do so. What in specific do you commit to doing to make
your commitments a reality on a day-to-day basis?
Answer. Under my leadership, the Department has been clear and
consistent in affirming that human rights are universal, and that no
one should face violence, criminalization, or serious forms of
discrimination because of their sexual orientation. We have and will
continue to stand up and speak out in support of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of persons in all corners of the globe, and will
continue to press to hold perpetrators of human rights violations and
abuses to account.
Question. What is U.S. policy in regards to children who are U.S.
citizens and alleged to be affiliated with ISIS families? Will the
United States repatriate these children, as we are obligated to do
under international law? What is the plan for giving these children the
support they need to reintegrate into society?
Answer. U.S. citizen children affiliated with ISIS members had no
choice in traveling to or being born in ISIS-held territory. Most are
victims of their parents' decisions, with some living in destitute and
harsh conditions in internally displaced persons camps in northeast
Syria. The U.S. government is working to repatriate these U.S. citizens
in accordance with strict travel guidelines in place to safeguard the
American people. We work to locate American citizen relatives of these
minor children who are already living in the United States who are
willing to support the children's integration or reintegration into
American society. We also coordinate with law enforcement and child
protective services to ensure each child returns to a suitable and safe
home environment.
Question. 2019 is a significant year for U.S. participation in the
Paris Agreement because November 4th is the day when President Trump
can officially initiate the formal withdrawal process. November 4th
happens to be 7 days before the start of COP25 in Santiago, Chile. How
is it in the best strategic and economic interests for the U.S. to
remove itself from the international Agreement every other nation of
the world is using to shape the future of the global economy?
Answer. When the President announced his intention to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement absent the identification of better terms for the
American people, he emphasized concerns that the United States had
pledged to do much more to reduce emissions under the Agreement than
major U.S. economic competitors, and that the United States would not
put itself at an economic disadvantage. The United States remains
active in international discussions, including those related to the
Paris Agreement, in order to protect U.S. interests.
Question. When President Trump announced he would withdraw the U.S.
from the Paris Agreement he did so with the caveat that he would work
to seek a ``better deal'' wherein the U.S. would remain party to the
Paris Agreement. Is this effort to achieve a better deal underway?
Answer. The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the
agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as
soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the agreement, absent
the identification of better terms for the American people. The United
States remains active in international negotiations, including those
related to the Paris Agreement, in order to protect U.S. interests.
Question. Will you provide the committee an update on the progress
and strategy for achieving the new deal the President mentioned in his
June 1, 2017 rose garden speech?
Answer. The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the
agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as
soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the agreement, absent
the identification of better terms for the American people. The United
States will maintain its leadership and influence through our
diplomatic and development activities with other countries as well as
multilateral policy forums regardless of our position on the Paris
Agreement.
Question. Will you commit to the committee that you will work
towards achieving a ``better deal?''
Answer. The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the
agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as
soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the agreement absent the
identification of better terms for the American people. The United
States will maintain its leadership and influence through our
diplomatic and development activities with other countries as well as
multilateral policy forums regardless of our position on the Paris
Agreement.
Question. Will you provide the committee details on what a ``better
deal'' would be as well as the strategy for achieving a new or better
deal?
Answer. The administration policy regarding withdrawal from the
Agreement remains unchanged. The United States intends to withdraw as
soon as possible, consistent with the terms of the Agreement, absent
the identification of better terms for the American people. I would be
happy to provide updates to the committee when and if the
administration's policy changes.
Question. Senator Collins and I wrote you on February 28th about
the positive outcomes from COP24 and requested an explanation how you
intend to maintain U.S. power and influence in a process that we seem
likely to be leaving. How are U.S. interests better served when we
excuse ourselves from processes and policy decisions that the rest of
the entire world is actively engaging in?
Answer. The United States continues to participate in ongoing
international climate change discussions to protect U.S. economic and
environmental interests. Regardless of our position on the Paris
Agreement, the United States' approach to environmental protection
serves U.S. interests and has unburdened communities, individuals, and
industries to develop and implement policies that fit their needs. This
approach leverages the ingenuity of our citizens and businesses to
protect our environment, ensure our energy security, and grow our
economy.
Question. Will the U.S. still have a voice in Paris Agreement
implementation policies and negotiations when, or if, the U.S. leaves
the Paris Agreement?
Answer. The United States has remained active in international
discussions related to the Paris Agreement in order to protect U.S.
interests. If a country is not a Party to the Paris Agreement, it can
participate in negotiations as an observer.
Question. The outcomes from COP24 are widely regarded as successful
and favorable towards the U.S.'s interests. Do you agree with this
assessment? How much credence do you put on the achievement of these
positive outcomes resulted from the U.S.'s full participation in the
negotiations as a party to the Paris Agreement?
Answer. I appreciate the hard work of our negotiators, whose active
and constructive engagement made it possible for the United States to
achieve success. The outcome took a significant step toward holding our
economic competitors accountable for reporting their emissions in a
manner consistent with standards the United States has met since the
early 1990s.
Question. What is your strategy for maintaining and growing U.S.
influence, cooperation, and power on climate diplomacy at COP25?
(taking into consideration that in the coming months leading up to
November 4, 2019, which is the earliest date the President can
officially begin the U.S.'s withdrawal process).
Answer. With COP25 months away, it is too early to say anything
specific. That said, the United States was actively engaged at COP24,
and we plan to remain actively engaged at COP25 and beyond to advance
and protect U.S. interests.
Question. How do you think our partner and ally, as well as rival,
parties to the Paris Agreement posture and willingness to deal with the
U.S. may change, knowing that on November 4, 2019 the U.S. may very
likely initiate the withdrawal process?
Answer. With COP25 months away, it is too early to say anything
specific. That said, the United States was actively engaged at COP24,
and we plan to remain actively engaged at COP25 and beyond to advance
and protect U.S. interests.
Question. The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on
foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to
comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to
discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this
administration intends to realize the President's ``I am asking the
Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance
dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends''
comments. What guidance has the Statement Department received from the
White House on how to implement any directive associated with this
statement?
Answer. The President is committed to ensuring that American
foreign assistance serves American interests. The FY 2020 budget
request reflects this commitment and prioritizes assistance that
protects the American people, promotes U.S. prosperity, and advances
American interests and values.
Question. The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on
foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to
comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to
discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this
administration intends to realize the President's ``I am asking the
Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance
dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends''
comments. When can we expect USUN, the State Department or the White
House to submit to Congress the legislative proposal the President
requested in the State of the Union?
Answer. The President is committed to ensuring that American
foreign assistance serves American interests. The FY 2020 budget
request reflects this commitment, and prioritizes assistance that
protects the American people, promotes U.S. prosperity, and advances
American interests and values.
Question. The President Trump's 2018 State of the Union comments on
foreign assistance were a gross demonstration of his failure to
comprehend what defines American leadership and power. I want to
discuss and gain your understanding of what policies this
administration intends to realize the President's ``I am asking the
Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign Assistance
dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends''
comments. Do you believe the U.S. should limit diplomatic and
development engagements to our ``friends?''
Answer. I believe Americans benefit from sustained engagement with
the rest of the world that serves both U.S. interests and those of our
allies. The FY 2020 budget request prioritizes supporting key U.S.
partners and allies through strategic, selective investments that
enable the United States to retain its position as a global leader. At
the same time, it relies on other nations to make greater proportionate
contributions toward shared objectives.
Question. In your first remarks to State Department personnel back
in May 2018, ``The United States diplomatic corps needs to be in every
corner; every stretch of the world, executing missions on behalf of
this country; and it is my humble, noble undertaking to help you
achieve that.'' I applaud your vision. Yet the Department's most recent
Five-Year Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan acknowledges that
the Department has ``abolished a large number of positions in
warzones.'' While I understand that you do not want to have ``forever
wars''--and reducing the size of warzone embassies is part of that--
where did these positions go?
Answer. War-zone position levels were established through a
combination of new positions and positions drawn from other Department
domestic and overseas bureaus. As such, staffing levels in war zones
have fluctuated throughout the years. This resulted in vacancies in
many areas because many Foreign Service personnel were assigned to war
zones and war zone support operations. As war zone positions have been
gradually reduced over time, personnel were available for reassignment
to bolster staff levels at other posts or domestic organizations where
needs were greatest.
Question. In your first remarks to State Department personnel back
in May 2018, ``The United States diplomatic corps needs to be in every
corner; every stretch of the world, executing missions on behalf of
this country; and it is my humble, noble undertaking to help you
achieve that.'' I applaud your vision. Yet the Department's most recent
Five-Year Workforce and Leadership Succession Plan acknowledges that
the Department has ``abolished a large number of positions in
warzones.'' Were these positions redistributed to the field, and if
not, why not?
Answer. Staffing levels in war zones have fluctuated throughout the
years. During surges in war zones, staff shortages/vacancies in other
posts have occurred. During drawdowns, personnel are available for
reassignment to other critical areas where vacancies exist. The
Department is committed to closely monitoring essential programs and
ensuring the staffing needed to implement them. As the Department
reassesses employment within war zones, we aim to establish accurate
staffing levels with appropriate skill sets at embassies worldwide.
Question. How do you expect the diplomatic corps to be in every
corner of the world without addressing the need for positions abroad
directly in the FY20 Budget Request?
Answer. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly
24,700 full-time personnel. This level of staffing is needed to carry
out the Department's foreign policy mission and meet the goals and
objectives of the National Security Strategy and Joint Strategic Plan.
This staffing level is consistent with the Department's current hiring
plan and Congressional guidance of maintaining onboard levels as of
December 31, 2017.
Question. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy
states that the United States must ``upgrade its diplomatic
capabilities'' to compete in today's international environment. How
does abolishing positions at certain posts without distributing them
back to the field--in effect, shrinking the footprint of the Foreign
Service--achieve your goals?
Answer. In many cases, positions that are considered for
abolishment are redistributed to other posts requiring additional
staffing needs. For example, the Bureau of Consular Affairs conducts an
annual review of worldwide visa workload to determine workforce levels
required at overseas posts. Positions for posts that are experiencing a
decrease in workload are redistributed to posts that are facing an
increase in visa demand. Similarly, regional bureaus may abolish
positions at certain posts for redistribution elsewhere to address new
initiatives or align staffing with regional strategic priorities.
Question. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy
states that the United States must ``upgrade its diplomatic
capabilities'' to compete in today's international environment. What is
your end-strength vision for the Foreign Service and in what ways is it
outlined in this FY20 Budget Request?
Answer. Our current hiring plans are geared to increase Foreign
Service and Civil Service employment to target levels coinciding with
the Department's FY 2018 appropriation Explanatory Statement. The
Department has gone beyond those levels for Foreign Service staffing,
enabling us to reverse the effects of last year's hiring freeze. The
hiring classes planned for the remainder of FY 2019 will bring us to
levels that are at or above previous highs. The President's FY 2020
budget submission requests funding to continue Foreign Service staffing
levels to replace anticipated attrition and add some moderate increases
in critical areas. This will provide the diplomatic capacity to support
our current global engagement strategies.
Question. As you know, many of us have benefitted greatly from the
Pearson Fellows program, where State Department personnel spend a year
or two in Congressional offices. We have noticed that in the last
couple of years, there are many fewer of these positions available to
interested candidates. Would you explain to us what happened to the
Pearson Fellows? Why did it shrink? Where did the positions go?
Answer. There will be 16 new Pearson Fellows joining the Hill this
summer, up from 10 last year. The Department will soon be recruiting
and selecting Foreign Service Officers to fill the Summer 2020
assignments and return to our traditional number of 20 Pearson Fellows.
It is my understanding that in 2017, the Department conducted a
strategic review of all external assignments to include Pearson
Fellowships. While the review took place, external assignments were
either temporarily held or reduced. In addition to the Foreign Service
Pearson Fellows, there are Civil Service Brookings and Georgetown
Fellows who also serve in Congressional offices, and I have returned
these programs to traditional levels as well.
Question. You have stated that there are 1,500 state economic
officers working overseas to promote U.S. business. In fact, data from
your own Human Resources bureau shows that there are only 369 FSOs in
the field in straight economic positions. Is that sufficient, given the
global economic competition we are facing? Do you believe adequate
funding is provided in the FY20 Budget Request to get us to 1,500
economic officers?
Answer. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly
24,700 personnel. This staffing level is sufficient to carry out the
Department's foreign policy mission and meet the goals of the National
Security Strategy and Joint Strategic Plan, and is consistent with the
Department's current hiring plan and Congressional guidance of
maintaining onboard levels as of December 31, 2017. The Department has
more than 1,500 economic officers. Roughly 63 percent are deployed
overseas in either purely economic or other Foreign Service positions.
The Department is continually assessing its economic skills capacity to
ensure that staffing is aligned with economic interests.
Question. In October of 2018, 96 business associations, ranging
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers to the Kansas Trucking Association, hailed the work of
FSOs as instrumental in advancing the interests of American companies
around the world. ``We urge you to send more diplomats overseas.
Foreign competitors are continually extending their economic reach into
markets where America's diplomatic presence is limited.'' You have
stated that there are 1,500 state economic officers working overseas to
promote U.S. business. In fact, data from your own Human Resources
bureau shows that there are only 369 FSOs in the field in straight
economic positions. Since January 21, 2017, how many career diplomats
has the Trump administration nominated for ambassadorial posts in the
Western Hemisphere? During the same timeframe, how many non-career
nominees have there been for ambassadorial posts in the Western
Hemisphere? Please provide a list of countries for both questions.
Answer. As of March 31, 2019, we have more than 1,500 full-time,
permanent economic officers, nearly 63 percent of whom are serving
overseas. As of April 17, 2019, 13 Ambassadors nominated by this
administration are in place in the Western Hemisphere. These include
seven career individuals (Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname) and six non-career individuals (Dominican
Republic, Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the
U.S. Mission to the OAS). Seven nominees are currently pending in the
Senate: one career individual (Ecuador), and six non-career individuals
(Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Uruguay). I look
to Congress to help us confirm these nominees so they can get to work
serving our nation.
Question. The U.S. is currently about $750 million in arrears to
U.N. peacekeeping. As a result, the U.N. is now facing a significant
and growing cash crunch, and countries who provide troops to
peacekeeping missions are not being fully reimbursed for their
contributions, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. If these
arrears are allowed to continue building, it is also likely that they
will affect the operational effectiveness of the missions themselves,
curtailing the ability of peacekeepers to deploy into the field and
conduct patrols. Given that the U.S. does not contribute significant
numbers of its own military personnel to U.N. missions, what kind of
message does it send when we shortchange countries that do?
Answer. The administration has delivered a very clear message on
U.S. financial contributions for U.N. peacekeeping: no single country
should contribute more than 25 percent of total U.S. peacekeeping
assessments. At that level, the United States is by far the largest
contributor. Our contributions this financial year have been nearly $2
billion, which is nearly twice the amount paid by the next largest
contributor and more than the total amount contributed by 185 countries
combined. We continue to support peacekeeping through both our
financial contributions and our bilateral assistance to troop- and
police-contributing countries. At nearly $1.5 billion, we are the
largest peacekeeping training and capacity-building partner in the
world.
Question. The U.S. is currently about $750 million in arrears to
U.N. peacekeeping. As a result, the U.N. is now facing a significant
and growing cash crunch, and countries who provide troops to
peacekeeping missions are not being fully reimbursed for their
contributions, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. If these
arrears are allowed to continue building, it is also likely that they
will affect the operational effectiveness of the missions themselves,
curtailing the ability of peacekeepers to deploy into the field and
conduct patrols. Since none of these missions would be deployed without
our support in the first place, don't you think that we have a
particularly strong responsibility to pay our peacekeeping assessments
in-full?
Answer. The administration has delivered a very clear message on
U.S. financial contributions for U.N. peacekeeping: no single country
should contribute more than 25 percent of total U.N. peacekeeping
assessments. At that level, the United States is by far the largest
contributor. Our contributions this financial year have been nearly $2
billion, which is nearly twice the amount paid by the next largest
contributor and more than the total amount contributed by 185 countries
combined. We continue to support peacekeeping through both our
financial contributions and our bilateral assistance to troop- and
police-contributing countries. At nearly $1.5 billion, we are the
largest peacekeeping training and capacity-building partner in the
world.
Question. In FY 2018, the State Department withheld $18.9 million
from its U.N. regular budget payments to express disapproval of the
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). OHCHR
plays a critical role in advancing U.S. human rights priorities, which
help raise international awareness of human rights violations, magnify
the voices of human rights defenders and civil society organizations
working on the ground, and serve as a useful tool for applying pressure
to repressive governments. Your policy of withholding funding is
especially confounding given that the State Department itself has
publicly expressed support for the work of OHCHR. Recently one of your
spokespersons noted, ``The United States remains engaged in the work of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . and strongly supports
those special procedures and mandates that have proven effective in
illuminating the most grave human rights environments, including in
Iran and DPRK.'' How do you account for the gap between your
Department's financial decisions on the one hand and statements of
support for OHCHR on the other?
Answer. Following withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council in
FY 2018, there was a decision to withhold assessed funding that was, in
part, going to support human rights mandates and activities that do not
advance U.S. national interests. At the same time, Department voluntary
contributions have continued for those mandates and activities that do
advance U.S. national interests. This approach ensures that Department
funding aligns with national priorities.
Question. In FY 2018, the State Department withheld $18.9 million
from its U.N. regular budget payments to express disapproval of the
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). OHCHR
plays a critical role in advancing U.S. human rights priorities, which
help raise international awareness of human rights violations, magnify
the voices of human rights defenders and civil society organizations
working on the ground, and serve as a useful tool for applying pressure
to repressive governments. Your policy of withholding funding is
especially confounding given that the State Department itself has
publicly expressed support for the work of OHCHR. Recently one of your
spokespersons noted, ``The United States remains engaged in the work of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights . . . and strongly supports
those special procedures and mandates that have proven effective in
illuminating the most grave human rights environments, including in
Iran and DPRK.'' If the Office is engaging in activities that this
administration supports and has deemed important to U.S. interests,
what sense does it make to withhold funding?
Answer. Following withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council in
FY 2018, there was a decision to withhold assessed funding that was, in
part, going to support human rights mandates and activities that do not
advance U.S. national interests. At the same time, Department voluntary
contributions have continued for those mandates and activities that do
advance U.S. national interests. This approach ensures that Department
funding aligns with national priorities.
__________
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ben Cardin
Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of
U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights
around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and
rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance
helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses
to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long
U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary
consideration. I applaud the administration's willingness to apply
Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights
abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy
programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the
National Endowment for Democracy. How does this proposed budget reflect
American values?
Answer. Democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance,
including rule of law, good governance, and anti-corruption programming
are critical for defending national security, fostering economic
opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership
and influence. These programs help bring U.S. values to the forefront
of the world stage. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations,
the FY 2020 budget request reflects the administration's priorities to
advance these efforts while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
With the support of Congress, this budget will bring America's
international role into a new era and ensure we succeed in putting
America first.
Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of
U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights
around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and
rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance
helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses
to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long
U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary
consideration. I applaud the administration's willingness to apply
Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights
abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy
programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the
National Endowment for Democracy. How central do you view these issues
as being to our foreign and national security policy and how is
anticorruption factored into the State Department budget?
Answer. The President's National Security Strategy (NSS) makes
clear that respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is
more likely to produce peace, stability, and prosperity at home and
abroad, and is therefore integral to our foreign and national security
policy. As a key part of these efforts, anti-corruption is prioritized
in the President's FY 2020 budget request for DRG assistance, which
totals approximately $1.4 billion.
Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of
U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights
around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and
rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance
helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses
to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long
U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary
consideration. I applaud the administration's willingness to apply
Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights
abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy
programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the
National Endowment for Democracy. My Combatting Global Corruption Act,
which I hope to reintroduce soon, would allow the U.S. to take stock of
where our anti-corruption programming and could me most beneficial.
Given how critical these issues are to the long-term success and
sustainability of our global engagements, what and where are the trade-
offs between being able to pursue good governance and other diplomatic
or security considerations?
Answer. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY
2020 budget request reflects the administration's priorities to advance
peace and security, expand American influence, and address global
crises while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget will
allow us to advance our core mission and support our most critical
foreign policy goals.
Question. Do DRL, INL, and the Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs (EB) have the staff resources they need to expeditiously
research, vet, and apply sanctions?
Answer. Economic sanctions are a fundamental tool of diplomacy, and
their use has increased exponentially with successive administrations.
The Department works hard to keep pace with the significant demand
related to sanctions implementation. I would welcome Congressional
support for the resources for sanctions implementation requested in the
FY 2020 budget. The FY 2020 request supports an onboard level of nearly
24,700 personnel, including staffing for DRL, INL and EB.
Question. I believe it is absolutely critical to the success of
U.S. national security strategy to advance democracy and human rights
around the globe, combat corruption, and strengthen good governance and
rule of law. Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance
helps keep America safe, minimizes migration, and allows our businesses
to more effectively compete in global markets. Yet, for far too long
U.S. foreign policy has treated governance issues as a secondary
consideration. I applaud the administration's willingness to apply
Global Magnitsky sanctions against corrupt officials and human rights
abusers, but am alarmed by the proposed 50 percent cut to democracy
programs, the 40 percent cut to DRL programs, and 60 percent cut to the
National Endowment for Democracy. Given the violence and instability we
see caused by autocratic regimes like Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and
Iran, what is the rationale for cutting these valuable programs?
Answer. While lower than FY 2019 enacted appropriations, the FY
2020 budget request for DRG assistance reflects the administration's
priorities while making efficient use of taxpayer dollars. This budget
will allow us to advance our core mission and support our most critical
foreign policy goals.
Question. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is
an important human rights defending body within the Organization of
American States (OAS). They enforce women and girls' human rights to
dignity, life, and freedom from violence. The IACHR has been
instrumental in advancing the rights of survivors of domestic and
intimate partner violence, sexual assault, and slavery. They give
people a place they can turn to when their own justice systems have
failed them. How will the administration's proposed budget cuts to the
OAS (15 percent below FY19 funding levels) affect IACHR's ability to
protect all Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere against human
rights violations, particularly given concerning trends in Venezuela
and Nicaragua?
Answer. The Department remains committed to supporting the efforts
of IACHR in the promotion and defense of human rights throughout the
Western Hemisphere. The potential practical impact on IACHR of the
proposed reduction in the budget request for the U.S. assessed
contribution to the OAS regular budget will depend in part on: (a) the
amount of funds ultimately appropriated for that purpose; and (b) the
amount of funds contained in the OAS budget for IACHR, as approved by
the OAS General Assembly.
Question. How does your budget improve sanctions implementing
offices at the State Department?
Answer. Diplomatic Programs resources support sanctions
implementation efforts as follows: the Bureau of International Security
and Non-Proliferation's work on weapons of mass destruction; the Bureau
of Counterterrorism's work on counter terrorism; the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's work on narcotics and
corruption; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's work on
human rights; and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs'
administration of the majority (25 out of 30) of Department economic
sanctions programs. I welcome Congressional support for the resources
for staffing and sanctions implementation activities requested in the
FY 2020 budget.
Question. The United States has been a leader for decades in
promoting human rights and ensuring the protection of human rights
defenders across the world. In accordance with this leadership, we've
been gratified to see the Department's use of Global Magnitsky
designations to hold individuals and entities who commit serious human
rights violations or who engage in acts of corruption accountable by
freezing their assets and denying their visa requests to the United
States. As a result, the government has named over 80 individuals and
entities including Maung Maung Soe, the former Chief of Burma's Western
Army Command who has carried out genocidal attacks upon the Rohingya,
and Jose Francisco (Lopez) Centeno, the President of Petronic,
Nicaragua's state-owned oil company, which has ties to the Venezuelan
government and has supported Ortega's corrupt regime. Do you support
the use of Global Magnitsky designations as a tool of foreign policy in
order to hold individuals and entities to account?
Answer. Yes. Global Magnitsky is a critical tool of foreign policy
that has allowed this administration to promote accountability on a
global scale in a way previously not possible. Since December 2017, the
United States has taken action against 101 individuals and entities
around the world under this designation. Global Magnitsky is central to
our effort to disrupt and deter serious human rights abuse and
corruption on a global scale through the imposition of tangible and
significant consequences on those who would engage in such behavior.
You have my commitment to continue to support the active use of this
tool.
Question. The United States has been a leader for decades in
promoting human rights and ensuring the protection of human rights
defenders across the world. In accordance with this leadership, we've
been gratified to see the Department's use of Global Magnitsky
designations to hold individuals and entities who commit serious human
rights violations or who engage in acts of corruption accountable by
freezing their assets and denying their visa requests to the United
States. As a result, the government has named over 80 individuals and
entities including Maung Maung Soe, the former Chief of Burma's Western
Army Command who has carried out genocidal attacks upon the Rohingya,
and Jose Francisco (Lopez) Centeno, the President of Petronic,
Nicaragua's state-owned oil company, which has ties to the Venezuelan
government and has supported Ortega's corrupt regime. Do you agree that
there should be additional resources provided to those who review
Global Magnitsky designations in order to ensure a more robust
sanctions regime that targets the worst human rights abusers?
Answer. The close collaboration between Congress and the Department
of State has been critical to the success of Global Magnitsky and I
welcome continued Congressional support for this program, including
additional resources.
Question. Last year the administration announced two $100 million
funds to support faith-based organizations abroad--one focused on
religious freedom, and the other focused on HIV prevention. This money
should be bound by the Siljander amendment, which stipulates that all
recipients of U.S. foreign assistance dollars neither lobby to restrict
nor expand abortion access. Last week, you employed the Siljander
amendment to cuts funds to the Inter American Human Rights Commission
under the (nebulous) pretense of their work to expand reproductive
rights. Similarly, do you plan on ensuring that faith based (groups)
abroad do not use their U.S. dollars to lobby to restrict abortion
access?
Answer. The Department takes very seriously its obligation to
ensure our activities are consistent with U.S. law, including the
Siljander Amendment.
Question. This past May, you stated that the U.S. ``firmly opposes
criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination such as
housing, employment and government services directed against LGBTI
persons.'' You went on to say that the U.S. uses ``public and private
diplomacy to raise human rights concerns, provide emergency assistance
to people at risk, and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions
against those who persecute them.'' Do you stand by these remarks?
Answer. Yes.
Question. This past May, you stated that the U.S. ``firmly opposes
criminalization, violence and serious acts of discrimination such as
housing, employment and government services directed against LGBTI
persons.'' You went on to say that the U.S. uses ``public and private
diplomacy to raise human rights concerns, provide emergency assistance
to people at risk, and impose visa restrictions and economic sanctions
against those who persecute them.'' Furthermore, this past year at the
Commission of the Status of Women, the U.S. has continuously pushed a
binary definition of gender that is tantamount to erasing the rights of
trans people. How do you reconcile this with your prior statements on
LGBTI rights?
Answer. Under my leadership, the Department continues to work to
protect and defend human rights for all--including lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons. No one should face
violence, criminalization, or serious forms of discrimination because
of their sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex
characteristics.
Question. In countries around the world, there are criminal
penalties associated with exercising sexual and reproductive health and
rights. LGBTQ people are criminalized for who they love and are
regularly prosecuted or incarcerated for consensual same sex sexual
conduct in places like Indonesia, Chechnya, and Egypt. There are also
women who are in jail in places like El Salvador and Senegal for having
miscarriages or abortions. Do you plan on instructing DRL to report on
LGBTI rights and access to sexual and reproductive health services in
the Human Rights Report?
Answer. The State Department reports on the violence,
criminalization, and severe discrimination that LGBTI persons face in
many parts of the world. The Reproductive Rights subsection of the
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices was renamed Coercion in
Population Control in accordance with the requirement of U.S. law that
we report on ``wherever applicable, practices regarding coercion in
population control, including coerced abortion and involuntary
sterilization.'' Additional material on maternal mortality,
contraception, and similar issues is available via hyperlink in the
text of each country chapter and in an appendix to the Reports.
Question. Implicit in the right to reproductive health is the right
of men, women, and LGBTI people to be informed and to have access to
safe, effective, affordable, and acceptable methods of family planning
of their choice. Nevertheless, this administration has undermined
women, girls, and LGBTI peoples' rights to sexual and reproductive
health services through the imposition, and the recent expansion, of
the global gag rule. This has had the effect of shutting down health
care clinics globally, which has particularly acute affects in the
aftermath of humanitarian disasters and in places where rape is being
used as a tool of war. How do you plan on meeting our global
commitments given the ways the administration has worked to repeatedly
restrict women and girls' rights to access care?
Answer. This administration will do all it can to protect and
respect the sanctity of life all across the globe. As the world's
largest bilateral donor to global health programs, the United States
remains committed to helping women and their children thrive. In the 6-
month review of the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA)
policy, we found that less than one percent of prime partners had
declined to agree to the PLGHA term in their awards. In those
instances, State and USAID have worked to minimize any potential
changes in services. The Mexico City Policy does not change overall
funding levels, nor does the Secretary's recent announcement.
Question. Implicit in the right to reproductive health is the right
of men, women, and LGBTI people to be informed and to have access to
safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning
of their choice. Nevertheless, this administration has undermined
women, girls, and LGBTI peoples' rights to sexual and reproductive
health services through the imposition, and the recent expansion, of
the global gag rule. This has had the effect of shutting down health
care clinics globally, which has particularly acute affects in the
aftermath of humanitarian disasters and in places where rape is being
used as a tool of war. In addition, the recent announcement that
dollars from the international community--including U.S. foundations--
will now be prohibited from moving through gagged organizations to non-
gagged organization presents a serious speech restriction on U.S.
organizations, who now find their independent money bound by a
regressive restriction on their spending. How to you reconcile these
gags on speech with the responsibility of the Secretary to promote free
expression and assembly through its work, and the constitutional rights
of American foundations?
Answer. The policy's restrictions only apply to foreign NGOs that
receive U.S. funding for global health assistance. I am confident we
can continue to work with NGO partners to meet our critical global
health goals while preventing U.S. taxpayer dollars from subsidizing
abortion. We will continue to work closely with our partners to ensure
they understand how to comply with the policy.
Question. You have personally questioned the scientific consensus
that human activity is changing the climate and strongly opposed the
Paris Agreement. During your Senate confirmation hearing for CIA
Director, you stated that the notion of climate change as a top
national security threat was ``ignorant, dangerous, and absolutely
unbelievable.'' Yet scientists believe that there are just 12 years to
take bold action on climate change before its most catastrophic effects
are irreversible. Do you still believe that climate change is not a top
national security threat?
Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community identifies the impacts of climate change, among
other factors, as likely to fuel economic and social discontent and
notes that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential
for greater impacts. In accordance with this assessment, we continue to
work to engage foreign governments and the private sector to address
these challenges.
Question. The conflicts in both Syria and Yemen are just two recent
examples where climate change that has driven desertification and
resource competition has led to conflict or made it worse. Do you
disagree that it is in the United States interests to address the
underlying causes of conflict, including climate change, through
nonmilitary means?
Answer. Addressing the underlying causes of conflict through
nonmilitary means remains a priority. The United States does this in
many ways, including through continued support to enhance resilience
and reduce disaster risk in partner countries around the world.
Question. Do you disagree with the Department of Defense that
climate change is ``a threat multiplier'' and thus a key national
security challenge?
Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community identifies the impacts of climate change, among
other factors, as likely to fuel economic and social discontent and
notes that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential
for greater impacts. We continue to work to engage foreign governments
and the private sector to address these challenges.
Question. Do you disagree with me that bold, multilateral action,
such as the Paris Climate Accord and beyond, is required to prevent the
worst effects of climate change from harming our planet and the United
States should be leading the charge both abroad and here at home?
Answer. The United States will maintain its leadership and
influence through our diplomatic and development activities regardless
of our position on the Paris Agreement. We also will continue to
advance and protect U.S. interests, working with other countries to
help drive innovation and market-friendly solutions, so that our
efforts to protect the environment and grow our economy are mutually
supportive.
Question. Please provide additional details on the administration's
proposed ``Diplomatic Progress Fund.'' How, under current law, would
entities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip be eligible to receive U.S.
assistance?
Answer. The Diplomatic Progress Fund will enable the U.S. to
provide assistance where diplomatic breakthroughs present an
opportunity to advance U.S. interests, including in support of
diplomatic efforts such as the administration's plan for a lasting and
comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The
administration continues to support existing restrictions on U.S.
assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA) that seek to end the
abhorrent practice of PA payments to imprisoned terrorists and the
families of terrorists, including through the Taylor Force Act and the
prisoner payments' reductions included in the annual appropriations
acts.
Question. On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for
the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the
Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator
Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom
Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among
other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against
humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the
Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. Do you believe that the
gross human rights violations that took place in 2017--in which over
700,000 fled persecution, when the Rohingya were raped, tortured,
burned and killed for who they were--constitute genocide and crimes
against humanity?
Answer. I remain deeply concerned about the Burmese military's
extensive, horrific human rights violations and abuses against the
Rohingya and the need for accountability. Determinations that certain
acts may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic
cleansing are not made in all cases in which such acts may have been
committed; they depend on our assessment of the facts and consequences
of such determinations in each context. To establish a comprehensive
understanding of the human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State,
the Department supported a large-scale documentation project in Cox's
Bazar, Bangladesh. The report clarified the extent and severity of the
abuses, and the underlying information and findings will help inform
our decisions as we seek accountability in Burma.
Question. On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for
the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the
Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator
Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom
Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among
other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against
humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the
Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. What additional measures
would you recommend the U.S. take to address allegations of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes?
Answer. Since August 2017, the United States has sanctioned five
Burmese generals and two Burmese military units for committing gross
violations of human rights. I will continue to consider the utility of
all bilateral and multilateral policy tools at our disposal, including
sanctions, for further accountability. I will also continue U.S.
support for Burma's transition to a civilian-led democracy. Further, we
will continue to work closely with the U.N. and regional partners to
support U.N. mechanisms, including the International Investigative
Mechanism for Myanmar, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, and the U.N.
Special Envoy and press the Government of Burma to grant such
mechanisms unhindered access.
Question. On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for
the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the
Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator
Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom
Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among
other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against
humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the
Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. What additional measures
would you recommend the international community take? Would you
recommend, for example, collaboration to establish a multilateral
sanctions regime against Burmese military officials who aided,
participated in, or were otherwise implicated in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights in Burma?
Answer. The United States was the first country to sanction a
Burmese military officer after the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in
2017. We supported the U.N. fact-finding mission and continue to
support its successor, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for
Myanmar (IIMM). We also continue to support the mandates of the U.N.
Special Envoy to Myanmar and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights Situation in Myanmar and co-sponsored the U.N. General Assembly
resolution on human rights in Burma in 2018. We will continue to
consider additional multilateral actions as appropriate and will
continue to call for accountability for Burmese security forces and for
the establishment of civilian control of the military.
Question. On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for
the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the
Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator
Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom
Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among
other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against
humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the
Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. How does your proposed
budget adequately address the humanitarian crisis facing Rohingya and
other minority groups who are internally displaced or have fled to
Bangladesh, Thailand, and elsewhere in the region?
Answer. The United States has led the donor response since the
current Rakhine State crisis began in August 2017. We have provided
more than $494 million in humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh and
Burma in response to the crisis. The President's FY 2020 budget request
includes plans for continued U.S. leadership in the humanitarian
response, as well as to support the humanitarian needs of long-standing
displaced Burmese elsewhere in the region.
Question. On December 3, 2018, the Holocaust Museum announced for
the first time that it believes there is compelling evidence that the
Burmese military committed ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,
and genocide against the Rohingya, Muslim minority population. Senator
Young and I plan to re-introduce our Burma Human Rights and Freedom
Act, which promotes democracy and human rights in Burma, and among
other actions, requires a State Department report on crimes against
humanity and other serious human rights abuses committed against the
Rohingya and other ethnic groups in Burma. Additionally, given that the
most effective way to permanently resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis
is by restoring their citizenship in Burma and ensuring safe, dignified
and voluntary repatriation process, how do you propose employing the
Department's resources to resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis in a
more permanent manner?
Answer. Supporting the Burmese government's stated commitment to
facilitate the return of Rohingya is currently the best avenue to
ensure that the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from northern Rakhine
State does not become permanent. The United States has consistently
urged Bangladesh and Burma to involve the United Nations in the
repatriation process while emphasizing that any returns of refugees
must be fully voluntary, safe, and dignified. And we continue to press
Burma to implement the recommendations of the Annan Commission to
address root causes and uphold the human rights of Rohingya.
Question. How can the U.S. better communicate with our allies in
the future, particularly on decisions including whether to reduce or
withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan?
Answer. We have an ongoing dialogue with NATO regarding the future
of our shared mission in Afghanistan and our ongoing efforts to achieve
a comprehensive peace agreement that will ensure Afghanistan is never
again a platform for international terrorism. At the April 3-4 NATO
foreign ministerial, I personally updated our NATO Allies and partners
on the work of Ambassador Khalilzad. Since December 2018, Ambassador
Khalilzad has visited NATO headquarters for three rounds of
consultations and briefed the North Atlantic Council on another
occasion via video teleconference.
Question. How can the U.S. play a role in facilitating post-
conflict peacebuilding, including encouraging investigations into and
accountability for allegations of war crimes?
Answer. The United States supports accountability for the
deliberate killing of civilians and other serious crimes in
Afghanistan. We will continue to encourage the Afghan government to
further reform the justice sector, promote the rule of law, and hold
accountable those responsible for serious crimes in the country.
Question. In December 2018, President Trump announced that U.S.
troops would withdraw from Syria; however, U.S. officials state that
troops will redeploy by summer 2019. Recent testimony from U.S. Central
Command Commander Gen. Joseph Votel states that approximately 1,500 IS
fighters have been confined to a 20 square mile area of the Euphrates
River valley in Syria near the border with Iraq. Meanwhile, the
administration has not requested any bilateral foreign assistance for
programs in Syria for FY 2020. What is your assessment of the December
decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and what impact does this
decision have on the broader perception of U.S. interest and engagement
in the Middle East?
Answer. While we have completed the territorial defeat of ISIS, the
group remains a determined enemy. We are therefore keeping a residual
force in Syria as part of the continued Defeat-ISIS Coalition mission,
helping to root out ISIS remnants and prevent the group from regaining
momentum. Our policy objectives remain: (1) the enduring defeat of
ISIS; (2) a lasting political solution in accordance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2254; and (3) removing all Iranian-commanded forces
from Syria. We are also continuing to counter destabilizing activities
by Russia, including efforts to press countries to normalize ties with
the Assad regime and force refugees and internally displaced persons to
return home before it is safe to do so.
Question. In December 2018, President Trump announced that U.S.
troops would withdraw from Syria; however, U.S. officials state that
troops will redeploy by summer 2019. Recent testimony from U.S. Central
Command Commander Gen. Joseph Votel states that approximately 1,500 IS
fighters have been confined to a 20 square mile area of the Euphrates
River valley in Syria near the border with Iraq. Meanwhile, the
administration has not requested any bilateral foreign assistance for
programs in Syria for FY 2020. How does the budget request reflect the
administration's stance on bilateral foreign assistance? Can you
comment on the decision to allocate 91 percent of total bilateral aid
requested for the MENA region to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan over
countries like Syria?
Answer. The FY 2020 request prioritizes funding for Israel and
Jordan at the levels set by our respective MOUs with these two key
regional allies. We also remain deeply committed to our relationship
with Egypt and Egypt's security and stability. Foreign assistance is
important to the bilateral relationship and to helping Egypt address
threats to its national security. U.S. policy priorities in Syria
remain unchanged. We are committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS and
al-Qa'ida, a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line with
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, and the
removal of all Iranian-led forces in Syria.
Question. The State Department's FY 2020 budget justification
states that, ``The role and size of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) will likely increase somewhat, in order to appropriately
respond to the severe security and humanitarian situation and to
support the fledgling commitment from South Sudanese parties to engage
in peace processes.'' Nevertheless, that same document requests a
nearly one-third cut in U.S. funding for the mission. If the
administration does, as your own department suggests, plan to vote for
an expansion of UNMISS on the Security Council, what rational basis is
there for underfunding it?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS), are effective mechanisms to address global
challenges to international peace and security. However, the U.N. needs
to complete reforms to achieve more efficient operations, and other
U.N. member countries must assume more of the financial burden. The
United States is focused on supporting Secretary-General Guterres'
peacekeeping reform efforts and is working with U.N. member states to
create a ``culture of performance'' in U.N. peacekeeping. Doing so will
improve U.N. operations and ensure U.S. taxpayer resources are used in
the most cost-effective manner.
Question. What are the specific actions that the Department will
take to support a vibrant and active civil society in Guatemala,
particularly because this is so tied to regional stability and
migration?
Answer. The Department of State, under my leadership, is committed
to supporting a vibrant and active civil society in Guatemala. We will
encourage increased protections for civil society organizations and
promote their vital role in a healthy democracy. We will engage
Guatemalan officials and use the Department's media platforms in an
effort to limit restrictions on civil society and promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law.
Question. Particularly given your recent unvetted and ill-advised
decision to cut funding from Guatemala and other Northern Triangle
countries, how do you intend to ensure regional stability without this
funding?
Answer. The Department wants to see a safe and prosperous Northern
Triangle where citizens do not flee their countries but instead choose
to stay and contribute to their communities' growth. We are actively
engaging the Northern Triangle governments on additional steps they can
take to improve border security; combat migrant smuggling and
trafficking in persons, especially related to children; receive
returned citizens; and dissuade illegal immigration. Likewise, we
continue urging these governments to make needed reforms to improve
citizen security and economic growth, attract foreign investment to
create jobs, and address corruption and impunity by strengthening
governance and judicial capacity to increase accountability and deter
crime.
Question. Do you agree that CICIG has contributed significantly to
combating the culture of impunity and corruption in Guatemala in the
last 12 years?
Answer. We have focused our efforts in Guatemala on developing
Guatemala's ability to combat corruption and impunity and exercise the
rule of law. The Department has sought a reformed CICIG with greater
transparency and accountability in order to ensure the investigative
and prosecutorial capacity can be effectively transferred from CICIG to
Guatemalan institutions. We continue to support efforts that will build
the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight corruption and
impunity.
Question. Do you pledge to support the continued work of CICIG, or
other justice and anti-corruption mechanisms, in Guatemala through
designated U.S. funding?
Answer. CICIG's presence depended on the consent of the Guatemalan
government and in September 2019, CICIG's current mandate is set to
expire. We will however, continue to support efforts that will build
the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight corruption and
impunity.
Question. Will you raise concerns about Morales's attacks on CICIG
or other mechanisms and support foreign policy measures to defend these
bodies?
Answer. I believe firmly that the rule of law, reducing corruption,
and ending impunity are essential to ensuring security, governance, and
prosperity, not only in Guatemala but throughout the region and the
world. The Department, under my leadership, continues to publicly
support the rule of law, strong democratic institutions, and efforts to
address endemic corruption and impunity, which threaten Guatemala's
future economic security and stability. We continue to support efforts
that will build the capacity of Guatemalan institutions to fight
corruption and impunity.
Question. The State Department's 2018 Human Rights Report says that
the ``judicial system [in Guatemala] generally failed to provide fair
or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation of
judges, prosecutors, and witnesses.'' Additionally, Guatemala's
Congress is attempting to pass an amnesty legislation that will
terminate all ongoing justice proceedings, free all military officials
and guerrilla leaders already convicted, and bar all future
investigations into international crimes including genocide, torture,
and crimes against humanity during the country's 36-year civil war. How
do you propose DRL should support the thousands of victims who still
have pending legal cases against army generals, security forces and
former presidents for disappearances, torture, and extermination of
whole villages?
Answer. I am deeply concerned about the proposed amendments to the
national reconciliation law and criminal code in Guatemala. The trials
held in Guatemala to date for crimes related to human rights violations
and abuses have restored dignity to the victims' surviving families and
fostered increased trust in state institutions. I remain committed to
supporting Guatemalan institutions and the Guatemalan people in their
ongoing fight against corruption and impunity. My staff, including DRL,
will continue to monitor closely and engage with stakeholders in
judicial processes and ensure we continue to promote the rule of law
and truth and accountability for human rights violations.
Question. The State Department's 2018 Human Rights Report says that
the ``judicial system [in Guatemala] generally failed to provide fair
or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, and intimidation of
judges, prosecutors, and witnesses.'' Additionally, Guatemala's
Congress is attempting to pass an amnesty legislation that will
terminate all ongoing justice proceedings, free all military officials
and guerrilla leaders already convicted, and bar all future
investigations into international crimes including genocide, torture,
and crimes against humanity during the country's 36-year civil war.
What role do you believe DRL can play in strengthening the rule of law
in Guatemala?
Answer. I am deeply concerned about the challenges facing the
Guatemalan judicial system and the proposed amendments to the national
reconciliation law and criminal code in Guatemala. I remain committed
to supporting Guatemalan rule of law institutions and the Guatemalan
people in their ongoing fight against crime, corruption, and impunity.
DRL's role, in coordination with other bureaus, is to engage with civil
society stakeholders, closely monitor judicial processes, implement
visa restrictions and sanctions on individuals who violate human
rights, and ensure we continue to call out corruption or abuse that
undermines the rule of law.
Question. The State Department's 2018 Human Rights Report states
that 158 cases of criminalization were filed against human rights
defenders through August, over 300 attacks against human rights
defenders occurred through September, and 24 human rights defenders
were killed through October of last year. What concrete measures will
you take to protect those individuals who are on the frontlines of
defending human rights in Guatemala?
Answer. Under my leadership, the Department of State is committed
to promoting and protecting civil society in Guatemala. We will
encourage increased protections for human rights defenders and promote
their vital role in a healthy democracy. We will engage Guatemalan
officials to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law and
use the Department's media platforms in an effort to end impunity for
threats and violence against human rights defenders.
Question. On April 9, Senator Blunt and I introduced a resolution
commemorating the U.S.-Colombia strategic partnership and relaunched
the Atlantic Council's Colombia Task Force. At great cost and
sacrifice, Colombians have worked to partner with the U.S. in Colombia
and elsewhere to fight armed groups, halt narcotics trafficking, and
help stabilize the region. They now face the added challenge of a
crisis next door in Venezuela and more than a million Venezuelans who
are now in Colombia. How does the administration plan to help Colombia
address the Venezuela crisis without detracting from Colombia's own
efforts to consolidate peace and security?
Answer. The USG has committed nearly $130 million in aid to respond
to the influx of Venezuelans in Colombia since FY 2017, including $37.1
million in development assistance and $91 million in humanitarian
assistance. This funding supports Colombia's efforts to assist
Venezuelan migrants and refugees and the communities that accept them.
In addition to this support, the FY 2019 appropriation includes $418.3
million in bilateral assistance for Colombia. This includes robust
support for priorities such as our joint goal to reduce coca
cultivation and cocaine production by 50 percent by the end of 2023, as
well as peace implementation.
Question. Part of the success of Plan Colombia was that it balanced
counter-narcotics and security assistance with support for development,
governance, and human rights to address the root causes of conflict and
crime in the country. Why does the administration plan to cut more than
$80 million dollars in economic support and development funding to
Colombia at this critical moment?
Answer. We strongly support Colombia's efforts to secure a lasting
peace and address root causes of conflict and appreciate Congressional
support for this critical bilateral relationship. U.S. foreign
assistance advances shared goals on security, rural economic
development, good governance, and human rights. The FY 2020 request for
Colombia reflects the administration's focus on advancing bilateral
priorities, including on counternarcotics and peace implementation.
Building on effective prior-year programs, U.S. assistance will focus
on: (1) security, including counternarcotics and reintegration of ex-
combatants; (2) expansion of state presence in conflict-affected areas;
and (3) justice and other support to the Colombian government for
victims.
Question. We have seen the importance of engaging the Caribbean as
related to the Venezuela crisis, narcotics trafficking and migration,
and votes in the U.N. and OAS. Does the administration have a strategy
to more effectively engage with Caribbean nations?
Answer. The Trump administration has made the strengthening of
relations with the Caribbean a priority for the reasons you outline. On
April 12, Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan plans to hold a
ministerial with 18 Caribbean countries to launch a new ``U.S.-
Caribbean Resilience Partnership'' to build upon our Caribbean 2020
strategy and increase our engagement with this important region. This
ministerial follows President Trump's March 22 engagement at Mar-a-Lago
with the leaders of the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Jamaica, and Saint Lucia. We continue to implement Congressional
directives and build stronger disaster resilience, energy, and security
ties through the American Crece Initiative and the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative.
Question. We have seen the importance of engaging the Caribbean as
related to the Venezuela crisis, narcotics trafficking and migration,
and votes in the U.N. and OAS. The President's budget proposes zeroing
out assistance to the Eastern Caribbean, the Dominican Republic, and
the USAID Caribbean development program. What effects will that have on
Caribbean countries' ability to respond to these challenges or support
U.S. positions in the U.N. or OAS?
Answer. The Trump administration has made stronger relations with
the Caribbean a priority for the reasons you outline. The FY 2020
request for the Caribbean prioritizes U.S. foreign assistance that
supports key counternarcotics, anti-trafficking, crime and violence
prevention, and other security cooperation programs. The request
includes $4.4 million in bilateral assistance for the Caribbean,
including $600,000 for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean and $500,000
for the Dominican Republic. It also includes $40.2 million for the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which supports critical efforts to
develop the region's judicial and police capacity. This assistance
directly responds to key needs identified by Caribbean nations.
__________
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. On March 28, 2019 you met with Prince Khalid bin Salman,
now Saudi Arabia's deputy defense minister, at the State Department.
During the time of Jamal Khashoggi's murder, he was Saudi Arabia's
Ambassador to the United States. According to the CIA's assessment,
Prince Khalid helped persuade Khashoggi to visit the Saudi consulate in
Istanbul where he was killed and dismembered. He also lied to Members
of this body about Khashoggi's murder and then left the country. Do you
believe the CIA's assessment that Prince Khalid bin Salman had a role
in in the murder? Do you think it is appropriate to meet individuals
involved in Khashoggi's murder at State Department headquarters? What
message does this send about the administration's intent to hold those
responsible accountable?
Answer. I have been clear that Saudi Arabia must hold accountable
every individual implicated in the horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi,
including high-ranking members of the Saudi government. I have pressed
senior Saudi leadership, including the King, Crown Prince, and Khalid
bin Salman, on this point. I cannot characterize or discuss
intelligence matters in this forum.
Question. IAEA Director Amano has said that Saudi Arabia has not
given the IAEA a clear answer on its nuclear intentions. Amano recently
told reporters that, ``They didn't say no. They didn't say yes, and
they are now giving it thought. This is where we stand now.'' You have
been categorical that you will not permit Saudi Arabia to become a
nuclear power. Has Saudi Arabia given you a clear answer on its nuclear
intentions and what was your response?
Answer. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force with the
IAEA. It has committed to an obligation never to acquire nuclear
weapons and to apply IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear
activities. We have been clear that we attach great importance to Saudi
Arabia's continued implementation of these obligations.
Question. During the hearing, you committed to telling me when the
Department of State concurred in a decision to grant a Part 810
authorization for a U.S. company to conduct work in Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, you committed to telling me the dates of when the State
Department concurred in a decision to allow a Part 810 authorization
for Saudi Arabia to be kept secret. Who in the Department provided this
concurrence? Were any of these concurrences after October 2, 2018?
Answer. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
oversaw the State Department's review of Saudi Arabia-related Part 810
applications from November 2017 to March 2019. These reviews were
conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State
practices. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that
they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or
reactors, as a 123 agreement does, but rather merely authorize the
transfer of nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter
expertise, and data. The State Department is not involved in
determining whether information in the authorization is protected from
public disclosure; I refer you to the Department of Energy for such
issues.
Question. Is it an administration priority for Saudi Arabia to
repeal the guardianship rules that prevent women from owning property,
opening a business, or traveling out of the country without explicit
permission from a male family member? Please detail your efforts and
engagements to date on this front with Saudi officials. What, if any,
progress have you made because of these efforts and engagements?
Answer. The State Department's most recent Human Rights Report on
Saudi Arabia documents significant restrictions on freedom of
expression and civil society, as well as ongoing discrimination through
mechanisms such as guardianship rules. While the administration
welcomes many of the positive reforms underway in the Kingdom to expand
opportunities for women, we have consistently told Saudi leadership
that repressive policies threaten to undermine the very progress it
seeks to achieve.
Question. President Trump has repeatedly touted his early
opposition to the Iraq War. In 2016, he said, ``I was totally against
the war in Iraq.'' During his recent State of the Union address, he
also said, ``Great nations do not fight endless wars.'' In Cairo in
January of this year, you said that ``[t]oday in Iraq, at the
government's invitation, we have approximately 5,000 troops where there
were once 166,000,'' and further that ``when we do set up major bases .
. . it's at the invitation of the host country.'' Also in January,
CENTCOM Commander General Votel gave testimony before SASC noting that
U.S. forces are in Iraq ``at the invitation of the Government of
Iraq.'' Do you agree that the Government of Iraq--a democratically
elected, sovereign Government--is now a partner and that U.S. forces
are there at their invitation to combat ISIS?
Answer. Yes, the United States and Iraq are partners, and U.S.
forces are in Iraq at the Government of Iraq's invitation. President
Barham Saleh, PM Adel Abd al-Mahdi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-
Halbusi publicly support the U.S. and Coalition troop presence in Iraq.
They have affirmed in their statements that U.S. forces are in Iraq at
the Government of Iraq's invitation to advise and assist Iraq with
counter-terrorism and the fight against ISIS. We look forward to
continuing to partner with the Government of Iraq to ensure the lasting
defeat of ISIS.
Question. President Trump has repeatedly touted his early
opposition to the Iraq War. In 2016, he said, ``I was totally against
the war in Iraq.'' During his recent State of the Union address, he
also said, ``Great nations do not fight endless wars.'' In Cairo in
January of this year, you said that ``[t]oday in Iraq, at the
government's invitation, we have approximately 5,000 troops where there
were once 166,000.'' and further that ``when we do set up major bases .
. . it's at the invitation of the host country.'' Also in January,
CENTCOM Commander General Votel gave testimony before SASC noting that
U.S. forces are in Iraq ``at the invitation of the Government of
Iraq.'' Do you think it reflects the current state of our bilateral
relationship to have not one, but two, open war authorizations against
Iraq?
Answer. The United States and Iraq are partners and have a
relationship characterized by friendship and cooperation, as reflected
in the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of
Friendship and Cooperation signed between the United States and the
Republic of Iraq. The authorizations for use of military force do not
determine the character of our relationship with the Government of
Iraq.
Question. Do you support repeal of the 1991 AUMF for the Gulf War?
Answer. The administration is not seeking any changes to existing
authorizations for the use of military force.
Question. Is the administration relying upon the 2002 AUMF--which
was a war declaration against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein--as
the sole legal authority for any U.S. military operations in Iraq or
elsewhere (not just as reinforcing actions taken under the 2001 AUMF)?
Answer. The administration relies upon the 2002 AUMF for certain
operations against ISIS but relies in those cases upon the 2001 AUMF as
well. We do not believe it would be prudent to terminate the 2002 AUMF
without making it clear that counter-ISIS operations continue.
Question. Do you agree that the administration should only support
a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the
Palestinians have full and equal rights to those of the Israelis?
Answer. This administration continues to work toward a
comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians
that offers a brighter future for all. We have made it clear that,
ultimately, it will be up to the parties to decide if and how to move
forward. As the President has said, he is open to any solution the two
parties find acceptable.
Question. Do you commit that any change in the status of
sovereignty over any piece of Palestinian territory will take place in
the framework of a final resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
agreed upon by both sides?
Answer. As the President has said, he is open to any solution the
two parties find acceptable. This administration intends to release its
own vision for peace between Israel and the Palestinians that offers a
brighter future for all. Ultimately, it will be up to the parties to
decide if and how to move forward.
Question. What is the administration's position on Israeli
settlements, including new settlements, outposts and the expansion of
the land covered by existing settlements? Does the administration
believe that continued settlement activity is illegal under
international law?
Answer. The administration has stated that while the existence of
settlements is not in itself an impediment to peace, further
unrestrained settlement activity does not help advance peace. The
Israeli government has made clear that going forward, its intent is to
adopt a policy regarding settlement activity that takes the President's
concerns into consideration. We welcome this.
Question. Does the administration view its recognition of Israeli
claims of sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with U.S.
treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter? Specifically, does the
administration view Israel's claim of sovereignty over the Golan
Heights as consistent with its treaty obligation to ``refrain in [its]
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state'' under
Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter? If so, how so?
Answer. The administration has made clear it, like all
administrations before it, supports negotiations towards a
comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. This
administration is willing to acknowledge the reality that there can be
no comprehensive peace agreement that does not satisfactorily address
Israel's security needs in the Golan Heights. The President's statement
on the Golan reflects his understanding of the unique circumstances
that makes it appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty at this
time. The Golan is an area vital to Israel's national security. Our
policy continues to be that no country can change the borders of
another by force.
Question. Does the administration view Israel's claim of
sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 497 and Israel's related treaty obligations
under the U.N. Charter? If so, how so?
Answer. The administration has made clear it, like all
administrations before it, supports negotiations towards a
comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. This
administration is willing to acknowledge the reality that there can be
no comprehensive peace agreement that does not satisfactorily address
Israel's security needs in the Golan Heights. The President's statement
on the Golan reflects his understanding of the unique circumstances
that makes it appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty at this
time. The Golan is an area vital to Israel's national security.
Question. Does the administration view Israel's claim of
sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with its treaty
obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention, most specifically Art.
47? If so, how so?
Answer: We expect all states, including our partners and allies, to
comply with their international legal obligations. I would refer you to
the Government of Israel for questions regarding Israel's treaty
obligations.
Question. Does the administration view its recognition of Israeli
sovereignty over the Golan Heights as consistent with its obligation
under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to ``ensure respect
for the [Geneva Conventions] in all circumstances?'' If so, how so?
Answer. The United States does not interpret Common Article 1 of
the Geneva Conventions to require Parties to police the conduct of
other states.
Question. Does the United States continue to view the prohibition
on ``the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state'' articled in Art. 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter as a binding obligation on U.N. member states under
international law? Does the United States view its recognition of
Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights as fitting within a legal
exception to this obligation? If so, what is the legal basis and scope
of this exception?
Answer. There has been no change in U.S. policy in this regard. Our
policy continues to be that no country can change the borders of
another by force.
Question. There has been strong condemnation from you, Ambassador
Brownback, and Vice President Pence regarding China's crackdown on the
civil and religious liberties of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region of
China. However, Congress has received little information as to what has
been discussed--if at all--in diplomatic conversations with the Chinese
about Americans with relatives missing, including family members of six
journalists (all Virginia residents) working for taxpayer-funded Radio
Free Asia. These individuals were specifically targeted for their work
in exposing abuses by the Chinese government. Could you describe in
detail the inquiries and efforts regarding these individuals--beyond
public statements--and whether the administration is raising these
cases with Chinese officials at every opportunity, such as in recent
trade talks?
Answer. I share your concerns about China's highly repressive
campaign in Xinjiang. The Department has regularly raised the case of
the Radio Free Asia (RFA) journalists with Chinese counterparts. In
2018, then-Spokesperson Heather Nauert met with the RFA reporters to
hear about their families. Department officials, including myself, have
met with Uighur residents in the United States to gather information
about conditions in Xinjiang. We continue to raise these cases with
Beijing and insist China provide information about the locations and
medical conditions of those detained and immediately release them and
all those arbitrarily detained.
Question. Are you concerned that Vietnam's overall trajectory on
human rights is moving in the wrong direction?
Answer. Yes. While we have seen some positive steps on human rights
in Vietnam over the past few years--including increased recognition of
religious organizations and limited legal reforms--we are deeply
concerned by the growing trend of arrests, convictions, and harsh
sentences of peaceful activists and members of religious communities,
as well as increased restrictions on free expression, peaceful
assembly, and association. We regularly raise our human rights concerns
with Vietnam and will continue to urge that they reverse the current
trend.
Question. What steps has the administration taken to hold Vietnam
accountable for its failure to meet international norms for human
rights?
Answer. We have repeatedly called on Vietnam to release all
prisoners of conscience immediately, and to allow all individuals in
Vietnam to peacefully express their political views and exercise their
freedom of religion without fear of government retribution. We have
also urged the Vietnamese government to bring its actions and laws,
including the Penal Code and new Law on Cybersecurity, into compliance
with the human rights provisions of Vietnam's Constitution and
Vietnam's international obligations and commitments. We continue to
raise human rights issues with Vietnam at all levels and will do so at
our upcoming annual human rights dialogue, which will be held in Hanoi,
in May.
Question. President Trump has met with Vietnamese leaders several
times since 2017--has he discussed human rights issues with senior
members of the Vietnamese Community Party?
Answer. During his most recent visit, President Trump recognized
the importance of protecting and promoting human rights in Vietnam, as
affirmed in U.S.-Vietnam joint statements. President Trump and
Vietnamese leaders have supported the frank discussion of human rights,
including during the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue. The
administration continues to make clear to Vietnam that the bilateral
relationship cannot reach its fullest potential absent progress on
human rights.
Question. Will the U.S. continue to deepen its military ties with
Vietnam if the human rights situation in the country continues to
deteriorate?
Answer. Our goal is to support the development of a strong,
prosperous, and independent Vietnam that contributes to international
security; engages in free, fair, and reciprocal trade; and respects
human rights and the rule of law. We have made it clear to Vietnam that
only through sustained progress on human rights can the U.S.-Vietnam
partnership reach its fullest potential.
Question. In FY 2018, we provided $9 million in ESF funding to the
Organization for American States. OAS funding was zeroed out in the
administration's FY 2019 and FY 2020 budget requests. On March 26, you
announced the U.S. would cut $210,000 in funding to the OAS. You had
recently received a letter from nine Republican Senators calling
attention to statements and actions of OAS organs including the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission
on Women. The Senators expressed concern that the Siljander Amendment,
which bars the use of federal funds appropriated under the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act from being used to lobby for or against
abortion, is not being properly enforced by the State Department. The
Senators asked you to stop funding OAS organs that they believe are
lobbying in support of abortion until they are in compliance with the
Siljander Amendment. Describe in detail the Department's process for
evaluating compliance with the Siljander Amendment.
Answer. Due to concerns regarding certain Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights activities related to abortion, the Department
undertook a review of foreign assistance funding provided to OAS.
Because of concerns regarding these activities, the Department is
withholding part of the FY 2019 U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS
regular budget in an amount equivalent to the U.S. proportional share
of possible OAS costs of the activities.
Question. In FY 2018, we provided $9 million in ESF funding to the
Organization for American States. OAS funding was zeroed out in the
administration's FY 2019 and FY 2020 budget requests. On March 26, you
announced the U.S. would cut $210,000 in funding to the OAS. You had
recently received a letter from nine Republican Senators calling
attention to statements and actions of OAS organs including the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission
on Women. The Senators expressed concern that the Siljander Amendment,
which bars the use of federal funds appropriated under the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act from being used to lobby for or against
abortion, is not being properly enforced by the State Department. The
Senators asked you to stop funding OAS organs that they believe are
lobbying in support of abortion until they are in compliance with the
Siljander Amendment. Provide all evidence used to justify immediate
funding reductions for these entities. Describe efforts undertaken to
ensure that organs actively lobbying against abortion are in compliance
with the Siljander Amendment.
Answer. Due to concerns regarding certain Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights activities related to abortion, the Department is
withholding part of the FY 2019 U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS
regular budget in an amount equivalent to the U.S. proportional share
of possible OAS costs of the activities. The Department is also
including a standard provision in grants and other foreign assistance
agreements with OAS, which specifies that none of the funding provided
by the United States to OAS may be used to lobby for or against
abortion.
Question. In your comments on the reduction of funding, you
suggested that the OAS ``should be focused on addressing crises in
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, not advancing the pro-abortion cause.''
The OAS has been a critical partner for the bipartisan U.S. support of
political transition in Venezuela. Our partnership with the OAS and the
Lima Group gives regional legitimacy and credibility to support for
Interim President Guaido and to sanctions on Maduro and his inner
circle. Please provide examples of ways in which the OAS has not been
focused on addressing the crisis in Venezuela.
Answer. We are greatly satisfied with the OAS response in
addressing the crisis in Venezuela. The OAS remains fully focused on
this issue and continues to demonstrate strong and determined
leadership in advancing our joint regional efforts in support of the
legitimate government of interim President Juan Guaido and the
restoration of Venezuelan democracy, including recognizing Gustavo
Tarre as the new Venezuelan government's representative. The United
States remains committed to supporting the vital work of the OAS as the
premier political multilateral institution committed to the promotion
and defense of democracy in the region consistent with the principles
and values articulated in the OAS Charter and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
Question. In your comments on the reduction of funding, you
suggested that the OAS ``should be focused on addressing crises in
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, not advancing the pro-abortion cause.''
The OAS has been a critical partner for the bipartisan U.S. support of
political transition in Venezuela. Our partnership with the OAS and the
Lima Group gives regional legitimacy and credibility to support for
Interim President Guaido and to sanctions on Maduro and his inner
circle. Please explain the why ESF was zeroed out for the OAS in the
administration's FY20 budget request. Please detail (fiscal year and
account) where the $210,000 cuts will come from and any plans to
redirect that funding.
Answer. The Department did not request ESF funding for OAS in the
FY 2020 request consistent with prior-year budget requests, including
by previous administrations, which did not specify ESF funding for OAS.
The $210,000 withholding is from FY 2019 funds in the Contributions to
International Organizations (CIO) account that are available for the
assessed contribution to the OAS regular budget. No decision has been
made at this time on allocation of the CIO funds withheld from OAS.
Question. What is the status of ``Phase II'' discussions between
the U.S. and Sudan in light of the ongoing political transition? Will
the U.S. attempt to revive these discussions under a transitional or
future government?
Answer. We are assessing the best way forward on Phase II
engagement. We will continue to calibrate our Sudan policy based on our
assessment of events on the ground.
Question. How will the departure of President Bashir affect
discussions over Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terror?
Answer. Sudan remains designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
(SST), and a number of foreign assistance and other restrictions remain
in place. Before rescission of Sudan's designation as an SST will be
considered, the United States must determine Sudan has made sufficient
progress on areas of mutual concern and meets all relevant statutory
criteria for SST rescission. We will continue to calibrate our policies
based on our assessment of events on the ground.
Question. The government of Kenya recently announced plans to close
Dadaab refugee camp, which houses over 230,000 refugees, most Somali,
despite the Kenyan High Court standing ruling prohibiting this action.
I am concerned that the administration's drastic reduction in the
refugee camp, coupled with ``extreme vetting'' procedures, have
prevented us from being a steadfast partner to Kenya and other African
nations who host large refugee populations, and have contributed to
harder-line policies towards refugees in these countries. Please detail
how the U.S. is engaging with Kenya, either bilaterally or
multilaterally with other nations and/or international organizations,
on the specific issue of Dadaab and on the issue of refugees more
broadly.
Answer. The United States continues to engage the U.N. Refugee
Agency (UNHCR) and the Government of Kenya (GOK) on the closure
directive. UNHCR is leading the discussion and has assured the United
States that Kenya remains committed to its obligations and seeks to
transition Dadaab into a sustainable space for refugees. The GOK has
publicly stated returns to Somalia must be done in safety and dignity,
and the environment must be conducive for returns. The United States
leads a core donor group in Nairobi that focuses on solutions for
refugees in Kenya and supports the GOK's efforts to pass a draft
refugee bill. If enacted, the bill would facilitate refugee access to
employment opportunities and national education and health services.
Question. The government of Kenya recently announced plans to close
Dadaab refugee camp, which houses over 230,000 refugees, most Somali,
despite the Kenyan High Court standing ruling prohibiting this action.
I am concerned that the administration's drastic reduction in the
refugee cap, coupled with ``extreme vetting'' procedures, have
prevented us from being a steadfast partner to Kenya and other African
nations who host large refugee populations, and have contributed to
harder-line policies towards refugees in these countries. How many
Somali refugees were resettled in the U.S. in 2018, as compared to 2017
and 2016?
Answer. The United States admitted 257 Somali refugees via the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) in FY 2018. In FY 2017, the USRAP
resettled 6,130 Somali refugees to the United States, and in FY 2016,
the USRAP admitted 9,020 Somali refugees.
Question. What steps is the State Department taking to emphasize
the critical importance of a political solution to the crisis in the
Anglophone regions, support civil society groups to ensure that
elections are free, credible, and transparent, and offer our assistance
as mediators?
Answer. We have urged both sides to forswear further acts of
violence and to enter into a broad-based dialogue without
preconditions. The Department is working closely with our diplomatic
partners including the EU, the U.K., and France to encourage dialogue
between both sides. The Department continues to urge the Government of
Cameroon to address citizens' grievances, strengthen its electoral and
legal frameworks, and increase political plurality and respect for
fundamental freedoms, particularly the rights to freedom of expression
and assembly. We continue to support civil society actors in Cameroon
who reinforce their fellow citizens' constitutional rights and
encourage non-violent means to prevent further violence.
Question. What is the current extent of U.S. military cooperation
with Cameroonian security forces? Is the State Department considering
whether to impose additional conditions on U.S. security assistance to
Cameroon?
Answer. The U.S. government has made it clear to the Government of
Cameroon (GRC) that U.S. security assistance is contingent upon respect
for human rights and increased accountability. The Department
reprogrammed $17.5 million in security assistance due to concerns that
it could either be diverted to or inadvertently free up other assets
that could be used in Cameroonian operations in the Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We anticipate obligating approximately $7 million in
FY 2019 in military counterterrorism assistance, peacekeeping capacity
building, and IMET. However, we will consider more reductions if the
GRC continues pursuing a military-only strategy and continues to reject
calls for open-ended dialogue without pre-conditions.
Question. (Diplomatic Security contractor payment disputes) Can you
please explain why there seem to be so many contractors encountering
these payments challenges?
Answer. Several factors have affected the processing of payments,
including lingering impacts of the ``hiring freeze'' and the recent
lapse in appropriations. In FY 2018, The Bureau of Diplomatic Security
processed 10,103 invoices totaling $932 million within Prompt Payment
Act (PPA) designated timelines, and the Department paid $26,616 in
interest for late payments on 1,550 invoices (13.3 percent). Thus far
in FY 2019, DS has processed 5,974 payments totaling $616 million
within PPA designated timelines, and the Department paid $57,364 in
interest for late payments on 820 invoices (12 percent).
Question. How many Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REAs) or
Contract Disputes Act Claims with a value of more than $10 million is
State DS currently involved in? What is the status and what is State DS
doing to resolve these disputes in a timely and equitable manner? How
long does it take State DS to resolve REAs and contract disputes?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security currently has six formal
claims for REAs exceeding $10 million, which are under litigation.
These claims are with the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) or
the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) for decision. Contract disputes
require time to adjudicate to ensure the Department pays for costs that
are fair, reasonable, allowable, and allocable to the contract terms
and conditions. Contracting Officers adjudicate contract disputes and
follow the procedures set under the Contract Disputes Act, Federal
Acquisition Regulation, and Department of State Acquisition Regulation.
Question. How many security providers did State DS use 10 years ago
versus in 2019?
Answer. Currently Diplomatic Security (DS) has approximately 575
vendors that provide security products and services in support of DS's
mission, versus 478 from 10 years ago.
__________
Responses of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. During the FY 2020 budget hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, you remarked that the Obama administration
had made ``no diplomatic effort to create the global coalition'' to
apply pressure on North Korea. Elsewhere, you have claimed that your
administration ``forged'' the coalition. On what factual basis did you
make these statements given that two of five recent United Nations
Security Council Resolutions enacting global sanctions against North
Korea date back to 2016?
Answer. International solidarity and increased pressure on the DPRK
led by this administration opened the door for U.S. engagement with
North Korea on denuclearization. The militaries of the North and South,
together with the U.N. Command and U.S. Forces Korea, have embarked
upon a number of measures that have lowered the threat level and
tensions at the Demilitarized Zone.
Question. During the hearing, you remarked that the previous
administration made ``no effort to enforce'' North Korea sanctions. Can
you explain the factual basis for your statement given the 97 North
Korea-related individuals, entities, and vessels added to the U.S.
sanctions list in 2016? Can you explain why the Trump administration
has added only 34 names in the year preceding this hearing?
Answer. The administration is pressing countries around the world
for action to pressure the DPRK and fully implement U.N. Security
Council resolutions. International solidarity and increased pressure on
the DPRK opened the door for U.S. engagement with North Korea on
denuclearization. The administration has rolled out 11 tranches of
North Korea-related sanctions actions, targeting 29 individuals, 50
entities, and 42 vessels in response to North Korea's ongoing
development of weapons of mass destruction, continued violation of
United Nations Security Council resolutions, and serious human rights
violations abuses, including the continued use of forced labor.
Question. You told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that you
needed more time to make a determination on whether atrocities
committed against the Rohingya people in August 2017 constitute
genocide and crimes against humanity so as to be ``thoughtful'' in
making this determination. This decision has been on your desk for many
months. What additional information is required to make a
determination?
Answer. I am concerned about the Burmese military's extensive,
horrific human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya. To
establish a comprehensive understanding of the human rights abuses
committed in Rakhine State, the Department supported a large-scale
documentation project in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. The report clarified
the extent and severity of the abuses, and the underlying information
and findings will help inform our decisions as we seek accountability
in Burma.
Question. How is the State Department investing in conflict
prevention programming in preparation for next year's elections in
Burma? And how does short-term crisis response and election support fit
within the broader diplomatic strategy to support Burma in its journey
to democracy, peace, and prosperity?
Answer. The State Department is investing in programs and localized
conflict analysis for appropriate prevention efforts in the lead up to
Burma's national elections in November 2020. Our programs engage with a
variety of stakeholders, including political parties, members of
parliament, government officials, civil society, and community
religious leaders to foster inclusive campaign processes and a tolerant
and inclusive political environment. Department and USAID programs also
work with local partners to improve digital media literacy to combat
disinformation and historically have worked to strengthen the
capacities of the Union Election Commission.
Question. U.N. officials said recently that Facebook's efforts to
address dangerous speech in Burma were still insufficient, and
``denigration'' of the Rohingya and other minority groups continued.
What is the State Department doing to counter the spread of dangerous
speech online? Please outline specific programs, and any contact that
you have had with Facebook on this issue.
Answer. Through a range of programs and working in conjunction with
media and civil society, the United States continues to support values
of peace, tolerance, and diversity in Burma. The Department also
supports programs working with local partners to improve digital media
literacy to combat disinformation. We have met with Facebook both in
Burma and in Washington, DC, to share these concerns.
Question. How does the FY 2020 foreign operations budget for the
Indo-Pacific reflect funding authorized by the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act (ARIA) which includes $1.5 billion each year for fiscal
years 2019 through 2023, as well as support for cybersecurity, trade,
and democracy initiatives?
Answer. ARIA advances a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled
U.S. policy that aligns with President Trump's vision for a free and
open Indo-Pacific. The FY 2020 request includes more than $1.2 billion
in foreign assistance and $566 million in funding for diplomatic
engagement. This will support the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy to
strengthen the international rules-based system; promote market-based
economics; open investment environments; support good governance and
respect for individual rights; improve digital connectivity and
cybersecurity; help protect the political and economic sovereignty of
all Indo-Pacific nations; support embassy operations abroad; and engage
foreign audiences to strengthen alliances.
Question. Does the FY 2020 budget reflect the $113 million for
Southeast Asia announced by Secretary Pompeo in April 2018 for
``foundational areas of the future, including the digital economy,
energy, and infrastructure?''
Answer. The administration launched the economic pillar of the
Indo-Pacific Strategy on July 30, 2018, at the Indo-Pacific Business
Forum where I announced $113 million in FY 2018 and prior year funding
for initiatives foundational to the Indo-Pacific's economic future
including on high standard infrastructure development, digital
connectivity and cybersecurity, and energy market development. The $113
million announcement represented a down payment on the United States'
commitment to free and open economies in the Indo-Pacific. The FY 2020
request aims to continue and expand these important initiatives.
Question. Does the FY 2020 budget include $300 million in security
assistance for Asia that the State Department announced in August 2018?
Answer. On August 4, 2018, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in
Singapore, I outlined the security pillar of the administration's Indo-
Pacific Strategy and announced $300 million focused on areas of
cooperation critical to ensuring a free, open, and rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific: maritime security, humanitarian assistance and
disaster response, peacekeeping capabilities, and countering
transnational crime. The FY 2020 request continues to expand security
sector engagement with Indo-Pacific partners in various areas of
cooperation to push back on China's encroachment in the South China
Sea, combat terrorism and violent extremism, support South Asia's
maritime security and domain awareness, and bolster regional security
organizations.
Question. The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for
U.S. interests and for the continued relevance of the rules-based
international order. Although the U.S. government has made progress in
recent years in highlighting the challenges and opportunities in the
region, government investment in American security interests, economic
interests, and values has been insufficient. Given the importance of
the [Indo-Pacific] region for U.S. interests, why did the FY 2020
budget request include reductions in requests (over the FY 2018
actuals) in areas including the following?
Diplomatic Programs
Educational and Cultural Exchanges
The East-West Center
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan
The Asia Foundation
Answer. I am confident we have asked for sufficient diplomatic
engagement resources to support our Indo-Pacific Strategy. The FY 2020
request includes $565 million in program operations and public
diplomacy funding, an increase of $39 million above the FY 2019
request. The FY 2020 request does not include a dedicated appropriation
for East-West Center or The Asia Foundation. These organizations will
continue to seek alternative funding sources, to include continuing to
compete for federal funding and fundraising from non-federal sources,
as they have done in the past.
Question. According to the Financial Times, China's government has
doubled the amount it spends on diplomacy during the 5 years of
President Xi Jinping's rule. On March 5, 2019, Beijing announced that
it would spend 62.71 billion RMB (U.S. $9.35 billion) on foreign
affairs in 2019, a 7.4 percent increase from 2018. How is the State
Department investing in its own ability to compete with China's
expanding diplomatic and strategic outreach?
Answer. Through strategic funding and programming, this FY 2020
budget request positions the Department of State to advance U.S.
interests. This means ensuring our nation is fully engaged in regions
of the world upon which our national security and future prosperity
depend. In recent years, we have seen China proactively applying its
power to exert its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
Under President Trump's leadership, the United States has taken
decisive steps to respond to China's aggressive actions. I am confident
we have asked for sufficient diplomatic engagement resources to support
our Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes competing with China's
expanding diplomatic and strategic outreach.
Question. To fulfill its statutory mandate of countering foreign
state and non-state propaganda efforts aimed at undermining U.S.
national security interests, how does the Global Engagement Center
(GEC) identify and prioritize specific issue areas regarding Chinese
influence on which to allocate its resources?
Answer. The Global Engagement Center (GEC) is taking a deliberate
approach to countering Chinese propaganda and disinformation. The GEC's
China-related priorities are informed by National Security Council
(NSC) regional strategies, various NSC-led processes on China, and
through coordination with the State Department's Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, other State Department bureaus, and U.S.
interagency counterparts. The GEC coordinates with interagency partners
and overseas missions to identify and execute programs that illuminate
and forcefully counter the influence of Chinese propaganda and
disinformation.
Question. What are the metrics by which the GEC is evaluating its
effectiveness in countering foreign state and non-state propaganda by
the Chinese government?
Answer. The GEC funds programs, in close coordination with the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that illuminate and counter
the influence of Chinese propaganda and disinformation by identifying
key narratives, information sources, and target audiences of Chinese
influence activities. Our dedicated monitoring and evaluation team
works with program partners to develop metrics that are valid and
useful. Metrics include opinion polling data, news consumption habits,
media trends, and counter-disinformation training effectiveness. With
program implementers, we design and execute dissemination plans to
generate maximum media impact and then monitor audience engagement via
traditional and social media to evaluate program effectiveness.
Question. Please explain whether the State Department and the
Department of Defense intend to utilize the authority provided in the
FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act to transfer up to $60
million in additional funds from DoD to the GEC.
Answer. Yes. The Department intends to utilize this authority. On
March 4, the Department took the initial step of requesting up to $60
million in FY 2019 funds from the Department of Defense (DoD) to
support new joint initiatives to counter foreign propaganda and
disinformation by submitting an Executive Secretary Memorandum to DoD.
The amount of funding that is ultimately transferred to the GEC this
fiscal year will only be decided once the GEC and DoD agree on which
specific threats merit focus, to likely include Chinese disinformation
and propaganda from international terrorist organizations. Those
agreements will be made by a joint GEC-DoD Senior Coordination Group.
Question. During your Senate confirmation hearing for CIA Director,
you stated that the notion of climate change as a top national security
threat was ``ignorant, dangerous and absolutely unbelievable.'' Do you
still believe that climate change is not a top national security
threat? Do you disagree with the Department of Defense that climate
change is ``a threat multiplier'' and thus a key national security
challenge?
Answer. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community identifies the impacts of climate change, among
other factors, as likely to fuel economic and social discontent and
notes that extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential
for greater impacts and compound with other drivers to raise risks.
Question. In Brunei, the government recently enacted brutal new
criminal laws that include death by stoning for sex between men or for
adultery, and amputation of limbs for theft. What are you and the State
Department doing to address this new set of laws in Brunei and to
ensure that the human rights and dignity of all people there are
protected and respected?
Answer. I share your concerns about new punishments under Phases
Two and Three of Brunei's Sharia Penal Code, which are inconsistent
with international human rights commitments and obligations. The
Department has raised concerns about these laws with Brunei on numerous
occasions since the enactment of Phase One in 2014, and we will
continue to do so, including as part of our bilateral Senior Officials
Dialogue.
Question. Given continued threats to LGBTI rights around the world,
observers and LGBTI rights groups have noted that an LGBTI special
envoy would demonstrate U.S. leadership and ensure more effective
intra-department policy coordination in the promotion of LGBTI rights.
When will you fill the vacancy of special envoy for LGBTI issues?
Answer. I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the
Human Rights of LGBTI Persons and am working to fill the position with
a qualified individual as soon as possible.
Question. The state of LGBTI rights in Egypt and Brazil remain
particularly concerning, and both heads of state have made troubling
remarks against the LGBTI community. During President Bolsanaro's and
President Sisi's visits to Washington, did LGBTI rights come up in your
or the President's conversations with those heads of state?
Answer. We regularly raise a wide range of human rights issues and
concerns with foreign counterparts at all levels. We continue to convey
privately and publicly the importance of democratic processes, rule of
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to ensuring
the stability and prosperity we all want to see for Egypt. With respect
to Brazil, President Bolsonaro has stated his commitment to serve as
president for all Brazilians and reiterated his allegiance to Brazil's
constitution and democracy. We take him at his word. The United States
will continue to stand up and speak out against human rights violations
and abuses wherever and against whomever they occur.
Question. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the President, in
consultation with Congress, sets an annual ceiling for refugee
admissions into the United States. Last year, President Trump slashed
that ceiling to a record-low 30,000 admissions. Given the importance of
refugee resettlement in our efforts to recruit intelligence assets
abroad, increase U.S. global influence, counter anti-Western
propaganda, and promote regional stability in foreign countries hosting
large numbers of refugees, why is the administration limiting refugee
admissions?
Answer. We anticipate resettling up to 30,000 refugees in FY 2019
under the refugee ceiling, and we also anticipate processing more than
280,000 asylum-seekers, most of whom have arrived at our southern
border. They will join hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who are
already inside the United States awaiting adjudication of their claims.
Our refugee admissions program must take into account this operational
reality.
Question. On March 12, United States Citizenship & Immigration
Services (USCIS) announced it was considering closing 23 different
field offices in over 20 countries around the globe, effectively
eliminating its entire International Operations Division (IO). Is there
a plan for how the DOS will manage expanded workloads with the transfer
of possibly thousands of cases from USCIS to the State Department? Do
you anticipate this will impact the Department's ability to have fair
caseloads and provide timely services to Americans and immigrants
abroad? Do you anticipate that you will need to hire additional staff?
Answer. The Department, through the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
provides services on USCIS' behalf at more than 200 posts worldwide. If
USCIS phases out its overseas offices, we anticipate a smooth
transition and continued efficient processing of USCIS-related work at
all of our missions overseas. We will determine our resource needs
through our on-going discussions with USCIS. Under the provisions of
the Economy Act, USCIS will continue to reimburse the Department for
any services it performs on behalf of USCIS.
Question. Were you consulted by USCIS prior to the announcement
that USCIS' international operations would close? If so, did you raise
any concerns about the potential impact to the State Department or its
staff abroad?
Answer. Earlier this year, USCIS informed the Department of its
interest in eliminating international operations. Thereafter, we
established a working group to discuss and coordinate a smooth
transition of operations. The Department, through the Bureau of
Consular Affairs, currently provides services on USCIS' behalf at more
than 200 posts worldwide. If USCIS phases out its overseas presence we
anticipate a smooth transition and continued efficient processing of
USCIS-related work at all of our missions overseas. We will determine
our resource needs through our on-going discussions with USCIS.
Question. How is State Department addressing the crackdown in
Southeast Asia on pro-democracy/free speech advocates? Specifically,
please update us on the Department's efforts concerning: 1) Truong Duy
Nhat, a well-known blogger who was reportedly abducted by Vietnamese
police in Bangkok where he was applying for refugee status before being
forcibly expatriated back to Vietnam; 2) Maria Ressa, the founder of
the investigative journalist platform Rappler who has investigated
President Duterte's drug war; and 3) Leila de Lima, a prominent
opposition legislator in the Philippines currently being detained by
the government?
Answer. We share your concerns about the crackdown on free speech
advocates in Southeast Asia. We have raised Truong Duy Nhat's case with
the Government of Vietnam and have repeatedly called on Vietnam to
release all prisoners of conscience immediately and to allow all
individuals to express their views freely. In the Philippines, we have
expressed our concern about the series of apparently politically
motivated charges against Maria Ressa and Rappler and hope that both
can continue to operate freely. We are aware of the allegations against
Senator de Lima, and U.S. Embassy Manila officials are in regular
contact with her staff. We will continue to raise our human rights
concerns with Philippine officials both in Washington and Manila.
Question. What has happened to positions that were taken from
warzone embassies like Iraq and Afghanistan? What are your plans to
increase our diplomatic presence with a focus on enhancing our
leadership, both in the Indo-Pacific itself, and addressing negative
elements of the Chinese government's influence in other regions?
Answer. The Department regularly assesses its global staffing needs
to align with strategic priorities and risks, including the safety and
security of our personnel. We have empowered bureaus to configure their
staffing to support our strategic goals. The Department's Foreign
Service assignment process annually assigns personnel based upon these
priorities and individuals' career progression needs. As current
resources support increased Foreign Service staffing levels, the
Department can fill vacant positions at a variety of locations such as
in the Indo-Pacific region, including with personnel who previously
filled positions in Iraq.
Question. In your written response to a question during your
confirmation hearing in April 2018, you said you ``will express
publicly, and at the highest levels of government, that Chinese
authorities need to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the
Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to lower
tensions and resolve differences.'' Have you raised the issue of
dialogue on Tibet with Chinese officials? Would you recommend that
President Trump publicly urge the Chinese President to address the
grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?
Answer. This administration is committed to raising Tibetan issues
with Chinese government counterparts at multiple levels. U.S.
government officials including myself, the Vice President, the
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, and officials
from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate General in
Chengdu continue to work to establish conditions favorable to the
facilitation of a direct and meaningful dialogue between Chinese
authorities and the Dalai Lama or his representatives. This dialogue
needs to occur without preconditions and is intended to lead to a
sustainable resolution of longstanding differences.
Question. As outlined in the State Department's report to Congress
of March 25, 2019 (mandated by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act),
China has been attempting to isolate Tibet from the rest of the world
by denying or restricting access to diplomats, journalists and ordinary
citizens. One concrete way to challenge this Chinese effort is by
implementing the Tibetan Policy Act's requirement of establishing a
U.S. consulate in the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Will you take this up with
the Chinese Foreign Ministry?
Answer. I will press the Chinese government to allow the opening of
a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa, consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act. I
will also implement the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act. I am committed
to working closely with Congress in pursuit of our shared goal of
seeing Americans have full access to China, including the Tibetan
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas.
Question. On April 7, the head of the Anti-Defamation League
criticized President Trump for invoking anti-Semitic tropes about the
loyalty of American Jews in a recent speech. The President also
suggested that Jewish people are especially influential in trade policy
during the same speech. You had recently stated, ``This administration
speaks the truth, and anti-Semitism is unacceptable in any form from
anyone, but to see it come from one of America's leaders is just
abhorrent.'' Do you stand by this statement?
Answer. President Trump has made the fight against anti-Semitism a
top priority. As I said earlier this year, the United States stands
with the Jewish people and with Israel in the fight against the world's
oldest bigotry. Promoting human rights and religious freedom, including
by combating anti-Semitism everywhere it exists, is a U.S. foreign
policy priority. We will continue to work to stamp out prejudice in all
of its forms. As of February 5, 2019, Elan S. Carr is the United States
Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. I have full confidence he
will act as a sentinel against bigotry and prejudice around the world
and help us continue to lead on this issue.
Question. Your hearing marked a year to the day that the Anti-
Defamation League released a statement about your ``long, documented
record of anti-Muslim prejudice.'' The statement said it was
``essential'' for you to repudiate your past anti-Muslim (and anti-
LGBT) views and to ``renounce any associations with anti-Muslim
conspiracy-haunted organizations.'' Have you since renounced any such
views or repudiated your associations with ACT for America and the
Center for Security Policy?
Answer. I have spoken clearly and directly that I will treat
persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that
they deserve. I believe in the fundamental freedom to practice religion
as ones sees fit, whoever one is, whatever one's belief. I have worked
closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim-majority
countries. I also believe that religious leaders, institutions, and
communities--including Muslim communities--can be critical
interlocutors on many issues central to U.S. foreign policy. Promoting
human rights and religious freedom, including by combating religious
bigotry everywhere it exists, is a U.S. foreign policy priority.
Question. Approximately how many meetings--at the PCC level or
above--have State Department officials attended as part of the
``reviewing'' New START's status and prospects for renewal?
Answer. The interagency is conducting a thorough review of the New
START Treaty, including whether extending the Treaty beyond its current
expiration date of February 5, 2021, is in the national security
interests of the United States. Department of State officials have been
present at these meetings.
Question. Have key experts, from all bureaus with arms control
equities, such as EUR or L, been allowed to attend all interagency
discussions on arms control issues? At the PCC level or above? Please
list the specific bureaus that have participated in meetings at the PCC
level or above to discuss New START and its potential extension.
Answer. The Department is properly represented at interagency
meetings, and relevant bureaus have input into the policy process.
Question. Your lead arms control official, Assistant Secretary
Yleem Poblete, has not had any publicly reported bilateral meetings on
arms control with Russia. Why?
Answer. Department officials regularly engage with their Russian
counterparts to discuss arms control matters. I have discussed arms
control issues directly with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Under Secretary
of State Andrea Thompson has conducted multiple meetings with Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, and Ambassador Huntsman regularly
raises arms control issues in interactions with counterparts in Moscow.
More importantly, working level officials are in regular contact on
arms control implementation matters. There is no lack of communication
with Russia on arms control.
Question. Given the litany of violations and concerns your
administration has noted vis-a-vis Russia and arms control treaties and
agreements, why is the compliance report not yet delivered to the
Congress? When do you plan to make this report available to the
Congress?
Answer. The compliance report will be delivered to Congress
shortly.
Question. What efforts has the Congress made to address new Russian
nuclear systems through the New START Treaty?
Answer. The administration has regularly briefed Congress on the
status of its implementation of the New START Treaty and will continue
to do so.
Question. Given your past experience as CIA Director, if New START
expires in February 2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no
constraints on Russia's nuclear forces, in your view would that
increase or decrease the threat Russia poses to the United States?
Answer. The administration is currently reviewing whether to seek
an extension of the Treaty with Russia. Central to that review is
evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest and how
the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national security in the
evolving security environment. This includes considerations related to
Russia's ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial
noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China's
continuing nuclear modernization.
Question. Given your past experience as CIA Director, if we lose
the New START data exchanges and onsite inspection rights, do you
believe the Pentagon and the Intelligence Community would have to spend
more on national technical means of verification to make up for this
loss? If so, by roughly how much would you estimate?
Answer. Through its verification regime, the New START Treaty
mandates that the United States and Russia exchange data detailing the
numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of all weapons
systems and facilities subject to the Treaty. The 18 on-site
inspections that are conducted by the United States each year under the
terms of the Treaty allow confirmation of Russia's declared data. We
are continuing to review how the Treaty's extension or expiration would
impact U.S. national security in the evolving security environment,
including by evaluating the impact of data exchanges and access through
on-site inspections to Russian facilities subject to the Treaty.
Question. Given your past experience as CIA Director, is there any
way to replace the ``boots on the ground'' inspections provided by New
START if the treaty did not exist?
Answer. We are continuing to review how the Treaty's extension or
expiration would impact U.S. national security in the evolving security
environment, including by evaluating the impact of access through on-
site inspections to Russian facilities subject to the Treaty.
Question. Administration officials have raised concerns about new
strategic-range weapons that Russia is developing, which Russian
President Vladimir Putin claims would not be subject to any arms
control treaty. These include nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles;
globe-circling, nuclear-powered cruise missiles; and very long-range
nuclear torpedoes for use against U.S. coastal cities. My understanding
is that New START envisioned the possible development of new kinds of
strategic offensive arms during the period of implementation of the
treaty. Article II of the treaty states: ``When a Party believes that a
new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have
the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for
consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' Has the State
Department formally raised Russia's development of these new weapons
for discussion in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty's
implementing body? Yes or no?
Answer. The United States has engaged Russia on these issues in
appropriate channels. While the Treaty's confidentiality provisions
prohibit public discussion of the details of conversations held within
the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the Department regularly briefs
the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the status and
content of such discussions.
Question. Wouldn't extending New START for another 5 years buy us
additional time to discuss and address our concerns about the new
weapons with Russia?
Answer. The Bilateral Consultative Commission, the New START
Treaty's implementation body, is not the only appropriate forum for
discussing these systems with Russia. Any decision regarding a
potential extension of the Treaty will include considerations related
to Russia's ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms.
Question. If New START goes away, through what mechanism would the
United States try to raise its concerns about new Russian nuclear
weapons?
Answer. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian
officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to
arms control. The United States government has many channels through
which it can address concerns related to potential Russian weapon
systems. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the
interest of U.S. national security.
Question. Secretary Pompeo, during the hearing you suggested that
we need to take China's nuclear forces into account when weighing the
future of New START. You stated that ``certainly China . . . has large
numbers'' of nuclear weapons. Has the administration begun discussions
with China on including it in New START or otherwise limiting China's
nuclear forces? Please describe specifically any engagements State
Department officials have had with China related to nuclear arms
control.
Answer. The United States has sought a meaningful dialogue with
China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities in
pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations.
Following the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United
States proposed establishing a Strategic Capabilities Working Group
with China, focused on risk reduction and transparency in the nuclear
and strategic capabilities arena. China has rebuffed multiple U.S.
attempts to broach meaningful discussions on these topics.
Question. How would China be included in New START? Could China be
included without amending the treaty?
Answer. The New START Treaty is a bilateral treaty between the
United States and Russia. The Department has not yet assessed what
procedural steps would be required in order to bring China into the
Treaty.
Question. Which Chinese weapons would be limited if it were a party
to New START? Would China be allowed to build up to the New START
limits, which according to open source estimates, are much larger than
China's current nuclear stockpile?
Answer. Any discussion about modifying the New START Treaty to
include China is hypothetical at this time.
Question. In 2012, then commander of U.S. Strategic Command Gen.
Kehler stated: ``I do not believe that China has hundreds or thousands
more nuclear weapons than what the intelligence community has been
saying, [ . . . ] that the Chinese arsenal is in the range of several
hundred'' nuclear warheads. Do you agree with this assessment? If not,
why not?
Answer. I do not make public comments on U.S. intelligence
assessments. I would say China invests considerable resources to
maintain and modernize a survivable nuclear force. China's lack of
transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization
program, however, raises questions regarding its future intent and
current posture as it expands and diversifies its nuclear arsenal.
Question. How do you assess China would react to the New START
Treaty's expiration? Do you believe new Start's expiration would make
it easier or harder to engage in arms control with China?
Answer. It is unknown how China would react to a hypothetical
expiration of the New START Treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has
referred to the New START Treaty as ``an important bilateral nuclear
disarmament arrangement'' and expressed ``hope that the treaty can be
extended.'' The United States has sought a meaningful dialogue with
China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities in
pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations. China
has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to broach meaningful discussions on
these topics.
__________
the foreign service journal article dated april 2019
submitted by senator robert menendez
__________
the foreign service journal article dated may 2019
submitted by senator robert menendez
__________
[From The National Interest, September 22, 2018]
Saudi Arabia Already Has a Ballistic Missile Arsenal Courtesy of
China--With a Little Help From the CIA
(By Sebastien Roblin)
You would be hard pressed to find two more determined foes of Iran
other than Saudi Arabia and Israel. The latter country has long been
perturbed by bellicose anti-Israeli rhetoric from Tehran, and has
unleashed hundreds of air strikes and artillery bombardments targeting
Iran's efforts to arm Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria.
Meanwhile, Riyadh appear to see itself as engaged in nothing short
of an epic struggle for dominance of the Middle East, and has oriented
its foreign policy around combating the perceived Iranian menace, even
in places its influence is moderate at best.
Iran hawks are preoccupied by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear
weapon--a weapon which, given the limitations of Tehran's air and sea
forces, would need to be delivered by a ballistic missile. Iran's
continuing development of such missiles has been proposed as a casus
belli, and was cited to justify the U.S. withdrawal from a nuclear deal
struck in 2014 (the deal constrained Iran from developing nuclear
warheads, but not ballistic missiles to carry them in). It's often
ignored that Israel and Saudi Arabia themselves maintain some of the
largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region--the latter of which
is the subject of this article.
Iran's ballistic missile program began during the `War of the
Cities' phase of the devastating Iran-Iraq war, when Baghdad rained
hundreds of Scud missiles on Iranian metropolises. Though Iran managed
to acquire a few Scuds from Libya with which to retaliate against Iraqi
cities, it mostly could only strike back with air attacks--which placed
its steadily diminishing fleet of U.S.-built warplanes at risk.
Saudi Arabia was also growing nervous of Iraq's evidently huge
missile arsenal. Denied access to U.S. ballistic missiles, Riyadh
instead went knocking at the door of Beijing--which had previously
proven willing to export arms to Iran when Moscow and Washington
refused to do so.
In 1987, China transferred between thirty and 120 Dongfeng (`East
Wind') DF-3A intermediate range ballistic missiles measuring 24 meters
long and a dozen Transport-Erector-Launcher trucks. Once gassed full of
liquid fuel, the missiles could strike targets as far as 2,700 miles
away--though they required special launch pads. Saudi Arabia formed a
Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force to operate the weapons, much to
Washington's annoyance.
Just 4 years later, Riyadh did end up in a war with Baghdad, and 46
Iraqi missiles did fall upon Saudi territory. Yet Riyadh never bothered
flinging missiles back at Baghdad. Why?
The problem with the DF-3 is that it has a Circular Error Probable
of at best 300 meters. This means that if you fired a half-dozen at a
given target, you could expect on average only three to land within the
length of three football fields of the aim point; with the other three
most likely falling further afield. Other sources claim the CEP may
even be as large as one or two miles.
A weapon that inaccurate is pretty much useless for striking a
military target--unless equipped with a nuclear warhead, which is what
the DF-3 was designed to do.
But China wasn't going to sell nukes to the Saudis. The DF-3s were
instead modified to carry 3,000 pounds of high explosives. This meant
the Saudi DF-3s were only `useful' for dropping high explosives on a
target as large as a city and randomly killing whatever unlucky
civilians happened to be nearby the point of impact. However, the
abundant firepower of U.S. war planes during the Gulf War meant the
Saudis felt little need for such tactics.
Over a decade later, Riyadh grew interested in acquiring a more
effective strategic missile deterrence, and again turned to China--this
time seeking its much more accurate DF-21 IRBM, which has a CEP of only
30-meters. (China even developed a guided DF-21D model designed to hit
large ships at sea.) Furthermore, the DF-21's use of solid-fuel rockets
means it can be launched on very short notice.
Though possessing a shorter range of 1,100 miles, the 30-ton
missile is perfectly adequate to hit targets throughout the Middle East
and would be difficult to intercept as it plunges towards its target at
10 times the speed of sound. Reportedly Saudi launch sites were
photographed oriented for firing at Iran and Israel, though given the
increasingly less discrete alliance between Riyadh and Tel Aviv in
recent years, that latter part may be more for show.
In 2014, Newsweek exposed that the CIA had actually helped broker
the sale of Chinese missile to Riyadh--as long as it was established
that the DF-21s did not have nuclear warheads. Thus, after a series of
covert meetings in Washington DC-area diners between spooks and Saudi
officials, in 2007 two CIA agents were dispatched to inspect the
missiles in their shipping crates before they were transferred into
Saudi possession.
Saudi Arabia has reportedly never test-fired its missile arsenal,
however, leaving the operational readiness of the RSSMF open to
question.
Nonetheless, it has maintained four or five underground facilities
to house the weapons. Finally, in April 2014, as Riyadh grew fearful of
U.S. rapprochement with Iran due to the nuclear deal, it paraded the
gigantic missiles publicly.
The thing with a `deterrent' weapon system is that, though they
need to appear to be a credible threat, they only serve their primary
purpose if they scare a foe into avoiding hostilities. However, that
deterrence can't happen if the adversary isn't well aware of the extent
of that threat due to secrecy, which may explain the Saudi decision to
begin prominently trotting the rockets out in full view.
There are also persistent rumors that Riyadh has acquired a small
quantity of nuclear weapons from Pakistan, or has arranged to have some
transferred in the event of a conflict. Again, the mere existence of
the rumors is useful for Saudi deterrence, regardless of the truth of
the matter.
That Tehran takes the Saudi threat seriously is supported by a
statement by an Iranian general claiming in September 2018 that Iran
had earlier tested its Bavar-373 surface-to-air missile system to
intercept a ballistic missile. As the primary threat to Iran from the
United States comes from air strikes and cruise missiles, the test is
likely aimed at Saudi or Israeli missile capabilities. The Bavar-373
appears to be an attempted domestic copy of the Russian S-300PMU-2
long-range SAM.
Ultimately, Washington clearly has fewer objections to the
possession of ballistic missiles and possible nuclear capabilities in
its nominal allies. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia, past victims of
ballistic missile attack, appear to believe that bulking up on such
weapons will deter each other from overt hostilities--perhaps even if
they only have conventional warheads. However, the tens of thousands of
civilians killed during the War of the Cities in the 1980s doesn't
really support that assumption.
[all]