[Senate Hearing 116-200]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-200
IRAQ: A CROSSROADS OF U.S. POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-519 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
MITT ROMNEY, Utah, Chairman
TED CRUZ, Texas CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RAND PAUL, Kentucky TIM KAINE, Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Romney, Hon. Mitt, U.S. Senator from Utah........................ 1
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut.......... 2
Polaschik, Hon. Joan, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Mulroy, Michael P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
Middle East, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC........ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Joan Polaschik to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 24
Responses of Michael P. Mulroy to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 30
Responses of Hon. Joan Polaschik to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..................................... 31
(iii)
IRAQ: A CROSSROADS OF U.S. POLICY
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TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2019
U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mitt Romney,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Romney, Gardner, Murphy, Shaheen, and
Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Romney. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism will come to order.
Today we are holding the first hearing in this Congress of
the Near East Subcommittee. It is significant that the topic we
are considering is Iraq. Not only is Iraq a place of enormous
strategic interest for the U.S., it is a country where 4,565
United States service members have given their lives. We
remember and honor these individuals and the families who
survive them. Iraqi Freedom came at a great cost.
Several months ago, Ranking Member Murphy and I traveled to
Iraq to meet with U.S. officials there and with Iraqi
Government leaders. Iraq has proven for nearly two decades to
be the place where vital U.S. interests and the Middle East
intersect. This is the focus of our hearing today.
In 2014, ISIS seized control of roughly a third of Iraqi
territory, terrorized the Iraqi people with a level of
brutality unexpected even in a country that had lived under the
regime of Saddam Hussein. While ISIS is no longer a territorial
caliphate, Iraq still faces major security and economic
challenges. Among those challenges are how to build an
independent Iraq, how to sustain a vibrant economy, whether and
how to assimilate returning ISIS fighters, and how to counter
excessive Iranian influence.
The question for us is how can the U.S. best support Iraq's
efforts to achieve a secure and prosperous future and become a
stabilizing force in the region. We note that Iraq has
significant natural resources, but it is failing to exploit
them. It flares its natural gas because of insufficient
infrastructure. The annual value of flared gas is in the tens
of billions of dollars. Even so, infrastructure investments
have been negotiated for years but never executed. Just last
month, a 30-year $53 billion project with Exxon Mobil was
placed on hold.
Recently the Iraqi Government lifted travel restrictions in
Baghdad's Green Zone, but the security situation is not
resolved. ISIS may no longer have territorial control but is
reorganizing in underground cells. The Iraqi Government faces
enormous challenges to prevent these extremists from
terrorizing and radicalizing the people.
Of course, the ISIS challenge is not just from terrorist
cells. There are currently tens of thousands of former ISIS
fighters and their families in camps in Iraq and Syria. The
government is committed to bringing home as many as 30,000
Iraqis who went to Syria as part of the Islamic State.
Determining how to handle such a staggering number of
radicalized men, women, and even children is a daunting
challenge.
Another concern is the ongoing presence of militias that
were formed to counter ISIS. These militias have not been
easily assimilated into Iraqi security apparatus. Some of them
remain under Iranian direction.
And finally and perhaps most significantly, Iraq needs a
strategy to address its relationship with Iran. The Iraqi
leaders we met with underscored that they do not want their
nation to become a vassal state of anyone. I note that recent
Iranian attacks on ships and a U.S. drone have elevated our
concern for the safety of American troops there, as well as our
diplomatic personnel. The question then becomes how can we help
Iraq foster closer ties with other countries in the region to
balance Iranian influence.
I am grateful to have two expert witnesses from the
administration with us to discuss these issues. I hope today
that you will be able to provide an overview not only of the
current situation on the ground in the context of these
challenges, but also to provide your insights and
recommendations about how the U.S. can support Iraq in its
journey to become a secure, economically successful, and
independent state.
And with that, I will turn things over to Senator Murphy
for his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was grateful to join you in visiting the region, grateful
for our hearing today.
As you have noted, more than a year and a half since the
Iraqi Government declared victory over ISIS, a number of
challenges still remain. The first is obvious. ISIS is not
fully defeated. It has lost control over territory. That is a
very important step, but the group has gone underground to
regroup. And they still periodically mount insurgency-style
attacks in the country. The threat they pose in Iraq remains.
Of course, there cannot be any enduring victory over ISIS
in Iraq without political stability. The Iraqi Government will
need to rebuild decimated cities and help millions of civilians
that are displaced. The Iraqi Government will need to resolve
territorial and resource disputes with the Kurdistan regional
government. They need to tackle corruption, improve service
delivery, diversify the economy, and integrate militia groups.
If this sounds like a familiar prescription for success, it
is because it is. The political mission inside Iraq is the one
that America has, unfortunately, failed at over and over. The
military successes--they come a little bit easier.
We spent a lot of money in Iraq, averaging about $1.2
billion annually in recent years to train and equip Iraqi
Security Forces and billions more in economic assistance,
humanitarian aid, and lines of credit.
But looking back on the trends of U.S. assistance to Iraq,
there is a pattern: huge spikes in military and non-military
assistance levels in response to outbreaks of violence in the
country, and then dramatic drop-offs once victory is declared,
only to see this cycle repeat. There has to be a better way to
play the long game here, to signal a longer-term, multiyear
level of commitment in ways that do not require us to
dramatically ramp up and ramp down funding in response to
crises.
When we were in Iraq in April, I heard from many Iraqis who
told me that they worry that the United States is just going to
move on and forget about them. Listen, I opposed the Iraq war,
but I also understand that we have a moral obligation as a
country to help fix a nation that we played a leading role in
breaking. So we need to reassure the Iraqis that we are
invested in their long-term stability and success.
Unfortunately, it seems some of the moves by this
administration are signaling the opposite. Today the bulk of
our assistance to Iraq is military assistance, and because it
is parceled out on a year-to-year basis, it seems that many of
our representatives in Baghdad are spending their time just
trying to buy as much stuff as quickly as possible for the
Iraqis. One of the folks we talked to there said that they
would rather have $100 million over 10 years than have to spend
$100 million in 1 year. The balance of our assistance, military
to civilian, seems badly askew.
Last September, we also closed our consulate in Basra and
withdrew our diplomats. Over the weekend, new reports emerged
that the diplomatic drawdown from our embassy in Baghdad has
left less then 15 State Department officials working directly
on our core diplomatic functions. From an outside perspective,
it is hard to reconcile the withdrawal of our diplomats now
when we were able to maintain a diplomatic presence in Baghdad
and Basra through even the most dangerous years in Iraq in the
mid-2000s. How can we hope to have any influence in Iraq
without sufficient diplomatic personnel in place? How can we
accomplish our goals if we have no one in the field?
And lastly, the administration's backward policy towards
Iran is making our job much, much harder. I hope to ask you
some questions about the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist
organization. We have put our troops at risk of attack, and we
have cut off much of our ability to talk to any of the Iraqi
militia groups that have relationships with Tehran. The cost of
this new, hastily-planned hard line with Iran is going to make
our job of political reconciliation a lot harder in Iraq.
I am grateful for the hearing. There is a lot to discuss,
and I look forward to hearing from both of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
Let me note that I made an error in my comments. I said the
annual value of flared gas is in the tens of billions of
dollars. That is not accurate. It is in the single billions of
dollars.
We have one panel here today with two witnesses.
Ambassador Joan Polaschik is here. She is the Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, is a
career Foreign Service officer, and has focused her career on
the Middle East and North Africa. Most recently she served as
the U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Algeria. Her
previous positions included serving as the Director of the
State Department's Office of Egypt and Levant Affairs and
Director of the Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs,
Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya,
and Regional Refugee Coordinator based at the U.S. embassy in
Amman, Jordan.
We also have Michael or Mick P. Mulroy, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. Mr. Mulroy is a
retired paramilitary operations officer from the Central
Intelligence Agency. His previous assignments include Chief of
Department in the Special Activities Center, Chief of Station
of an overseas country, Chief of Expeditionary Team in a war
zone country, Chief of Base in a war zone country, and Deputy
Chief of Branch in the Special Activities Division. He served
as a U.S. Marine reservist who served in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
We will now turn to our first witness, Ambassador
Polaschik. Thank you for your service and your willingness to
testify here today. Your full statement will be included in the
record, without objection. So if you could please keep your
remarks to no more than 5 minutes or so, we would appreciate
that so that we can engage with some questions. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN POLASCHIK, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Polaschik. Chairman Romney, Ranking Member
Murphy, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before
you today and agree that my full testimony should be submitted
for the record. Thank you for that.
I look forward to discussing the challenges Iraq continues
to face and the many ways the United States can help Iraq as it
seeks stability and reintegrates into the region.
Our relationship with Iraq remains vital for U.S. national
security interests. Bolstering Iraq as a sovereign, stable,
united, and democratic partner continues to be our principal
objective. We must remain engaged to ensure that Iraq can fend
off internal and external threats, including from Iran, to its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
U.S. security assistance remains integral to Iraq's
stability. Iraq relies on our assistance to reinforce the
primacy of the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Kurdish
Peshmerga.
The United States remains committed to the enduring defeat
of ISIS and eliminating the conditions that would allow for its
resurgence. We operate in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
Government, and together with two dozen other countries, we
help Iraq ensure that our gains against ISIS endure. Iraq's
growing ability to act in partnership with the coalition to
defeat our shared national security threats is one of the truly
remarkable developments since 2014.
Despite the gains they have made, Iraq's armed forces are
stretched by competing demands and need continued assistance to
eradicate ISIS remnants, secure Iraq's borders, and become a
source of regional stability. The U.S.-led coalition must
continue to build the capacity of Iraq's legitimate and
professional security forces.
Iraq's stability will hinge upon its government's ability
to assert control over militia groups. We support the
Government of Iraq's efforts to bring all armed groups fully
under state control. On July 1, Prime Minister Abd al-Mahdi
issued a decree to institutionalize the Popular Mobilization
Forces, or PMF. Disciplined elements of the PMF were
instrumental in the territorial defeat of ISIS. Some rogue PMF
elements, however, take instructions from Iran. Their
activities are particularly destabilizing in the liberated
areas where they prioritize smuggling and extortion over
fighting ISIS. These same groups surveil our diplomatic
facilities and Iraqi military bases where the coalition is
training Iraqi Security Forces. Some militia leaders plot
against U.S. interests and plan operations that could kill
Americans, coalition partners, and Iraqis. Undisciplined PMF
groups also continue to conduct indirect fire attacks as they
did against our consulate in Basra last year. The prime
minister's decree, therefore, is an important step for shoring
up Iraq's sovereignty and security. Implementation of the
decree will be key, and we will engage with the Government of
Iraq on its plans for enforcement.
Eliminating Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy imports will
strengthen the Iraqi economy and deprive Iran of resources to
exert its malign influence. Iraq should remain focused on
advancing projects to install new power generation facilities,
develop electricity delivery infrastructure, and promote
domestic production of natural gas. These projects make
economic sense, contribute to Iraq's full autonomy from Iran,
and support our policy of denying the Iranian regime revenue.
In order for Iraq to reach its economic potential, the
Government of Iraq must also tackle corruption and excessive
red tape. The United States continues to support an initiative
from the U.N.'s Conference on Trade and Development which will
increase transparency for the Iraqi public and U.S. investors.
It is in our interest to support Iraq's democratic
development, but significant challenges remain to the building
of durable institutions that protect the rule of law, secure
human rights, and promote free and fair elections. Supporting
pluralism and protecting the rights of minorities is integral
to the administration's effort to defeat ISIS, counter violent
extremism, and promote religious freedom. In the 5 years since
ISIS launched its campaign of genocide against Yazidis,
Christians, and other religious minorities, we have programmed
over $340 million to help the recovery of Iraq's persecuted
religious communities.
Finally, a strong Kurdistan regional government within a
unified and federal Iraq is essential to Iraq's long-term
stability. We are proud of our longstanding partnership with
Iraq's Kurdish people. Following the Kurds' 2017 independence
referendum, the administration has focused on helping Baghdad
and the Iraqi Kurdistan region mend relations. The Government
of Iraq and the KRG have made progress and we will continue to
work with both sides to resolve outstanding tensions.
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Polaschik follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joan Polaschik
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, Members of the Committee: I
am honored to appear before you today to discuss the challenges Iraq
continues to face from Iran, ISIS, and armed groups not under the
control of the Iraqi government, including some that are backed by
Iran. These actors pose a threat to the stability of Iraq and to Iraq's
future and I look forward to discussing the many ways the United States
and the U.S.-led Coalition can help Iraq as they continue to seek
stability and re-integrate into the region.
Our relationship with Iraq remains vital for U.S. national security
interests and regional security. Bolstering Iraq as a sovereign,
stable, united, and democratic partner of the United States continues
to be our principal objective. We must remain engaged to ensure that
Iraq can fend off the internal and external threats, including threats
from Iran, to its sovereignty and its territorial integrity.
To help offset the impact of Iran's harmful meddling in Iraq, we
must continue to build on our successful diplomatic efforts to
reintegrate Iraq into the region, particularly among Arab states.
Constructive relations between Iraq and its neighbors are a powerful
counterweight to Iran's malign influence. Under the leadership of Prime
Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, President Barham Salih, and Foreign
Minister Mohammed Ali al-Hakim, Iraq has strengthened ties across the
region. Since taking office, they have welcomed King Abdullah II of
Jordan and with him inaugurated a joint industrial zone along the
Jordan-Iraq border; they have received an unprecedented visit from the
Emir of Kuwait; and they have conducted significant state visits to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, among other key milestones.
U.S. security assistance remains integral to Iraq's security and
stability. Iraq relies on our assistance to reinforce the primacy of
the Iraqi Security Forces, strengthen their capabilities, and deepen
their professionalism. In support of our partners in the Iraqi Security
Forces, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to defeat ISIS helped Iraq regain
control over all its territory and train-and-equip more than 212,000
members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Kurdish Peshmerga.
The Government of Iraq's December 2018 announcement of the liberation
of all Iraqi territory from ISIS control was a great moment for Iraq
and all Iraqis. Together with the U.S.-led Coalition and our Iraqi
partners, we must remain vigilant to prevent the return of ISIS or the
emergence of other terrorist groups.
The United States remains committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS
and eliminating the conditions that would allow for its resurgence. The
work of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is not over yet.
The United States and our partners continue to operate in Iraq at the
invitation of the Iraqi government, with two dozen other countries
helping Iraq ensure that our gains against ISIS endure. The Iraqi
Security Forces realize that they still need the Coalition's assistance
in conducting targeted counter-terrorism operations and combatting a
reemerging ISIS insurgency. Iraq's growing ability to act in
partnership with the Coalition to defeat our shared national security
threats is one of the truly remarkable developments since 2014. For
example, Iraq was instrumental in advancing the Coalition's military
campaign in Syria, providing valuable artillery support and airstrikes
for the Syrian Democratic Forces' offensive just over the border.
Despite the gains they have made with our support, Iraq's armed
forces are stretched by competing demands and need continued assistance
and training to eradicate ISIS remnants, secure Iraq's borders, and
become a source of regional stability. Consequently, the U.S.-led
Coalition must continue to build the capacity of Iraq's legitimate and
professional security forces.
Iraq's stability will hinge upon its government's ability to assert
control over increasingly powerful militia groups. We support the
Government of Iraq's efforts to bring all armed groups fully under
state control. On July 1, Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi issued a
decree to institutionalize the Popular Mobilization Forces. Disciplined
elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces were instrumental in the
territorial defeat of ISIS and we recognize the critical role they
played in that campaign. Some rogue elements, however, take
instructions from Iran rather than the Iraqi central government. Their
activities are particularly destabilizing in the liberated areas, where
they appear to prioritize smuggling and extortion for personal gain
over fighting ISIS. These same groups surveil our diplomatic facilities
as well as Iraqi military bases where the Coalition is training the
Iraqi Security Forces. We know that militia leaders continue to plot
against U.S. interests and plan operations that could be used to kill
Americans, other Coalition partners, and even Iraqis that work closely
with us. Undisciplined Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) groups also
continue to conduct nuisance indirect fire attacks, as they did against
our Consulate in Basrah last year. The Prime Minister's decree is an
important step towards shoring up Iraq's sovereignty and security.
Implementation of the decree will be key, and we will engage with the
Government of Iraq on its plans for enforcement.
Eliminating Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy imports will
strengthen the Iraqi economy and deprive Iran of resources to exert its
malign influence. A country as wealthy in natural resources as Iraq
should be able to produce all of its own electricity. Iraq, however,
imports a significant amount of electricity and natural gas from Iran.
While we recognize there is no quick fix to eliminate Iraq's energy
imports from Iran, we support Iraq's efforts to expand its own energy
independence over time. These efforts include increasing domestic gas
capture and electricity generation capacity as well as enhancing energy
cooperation with Iraq's Gulf neighbors and Jordan. Of course, it will
take years for Iraq to realize full energy independence. Iraq, should
remain focused on advancing projects to install new power generation
facilities, develop electricity delivery infrastructure, and promote
domestic production of natural gas.
These projects not only make economic sense, they contribute to
Iraq's national interest of full autonomy from Iran, and simultaneously
support our policy of denying the Iranian regime revenue.
In order for Iraq to reach its economic potential, the Government
of Iraq must tackle corruption and the problem of excessive red tape.
To that end, the United States continues to support an initiative from
the U.N.'s Conference on Trade and Development, which is streamlining
some of Iraq's bureaucratic processes, thereby increasing transparency
both for the Iraqi public and for U.S. investors.
Lack of essential services and high unemployment, especially among
youth, are major drivers of Iraq's instability. The best solution is to
foster a sustainable Iraqi private sector as an outlet for the 800,000
Iraqis who reach working age every year. The government cannot be the
sole source of employment for a country where 60 percent of Iraq's
population is under the age of 25. Iraq's current and future stability
depends on finding work for this disproportionately large youth
segment.
It is in our interest to support Iraq's democratic development, but
significant challenges remain to the building of durable institutions
that will protect the rule of law, secure human rights for all its
citizens, and promote free and fair elections. Iraqis are demanding
better governance and ultimately their voices must be heard.
Unfortunately, last year's electoral turnout was the lowest since 2005.
In spite of all of the turmoil of the past 15 years, however, Iraq's
core democratic institutions have survived. The administration will
continue to support free and fair elections while encouraging all
Iraqis to vote.
In particular, supporting pluralism and protecting the rights of
minorities is integral to the administration's effort to defeat ISIS,
counter violent extremism, and promote religious freedom around the
world. In a little more than 2 weeks, it will be 5 years since ISIS
launched its campaign of genocide against Yezidis, Christians, and
other religious minorities. In response, we have programmed over $340
million since fiscal year 2017 to help the recovery of Iraq's
persecuted religious communities. Our support includes life-saving
humanitarian assistance, rehabilitating critical infrastructure,
clearing explosive remnants of war, psychosocial and legal services,
funding justice and accountability efforts, and help for local
businesses. Yet, hundreds of thousands of Yezidi, Christian and other
religious minorities, remain blocked from returning home by these
noncompliant militias, representing an existential threat to Iraq's
religious mosaic. We continue to press the Government of Iraq to take
immediate steps to transition security in Sinjar and Nineveh Plain away
from these militias to formal state bodies and help these traumatized
communities return home and restore their lives within Iraq.
The administration believes that a strong Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) within a unified and federal Iraq is essential to
Iraq's long-term stability and to the enduring defeat of ISIS. We are
proud of our longstanding and historic partnership with Iraq's Kurdish
people.
Following the Kurds' 2017 independence referendum, the
administration has focused on helping leaders in Baghdad and in the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) mend relations, and since the appointment
of Prime Minister Abd al-Mahdi, the Government of Iraq and the KRG have
made strides toward this. We will continue to work with Baghdad and
Erbil to encourage their efforts to resolve outstanding sources of
tension. We will also continue to press the KRG to implement badly-
needed reforms. For example, the KRG must put Peshmerga security forces
under the direct control of the KRG rather than political parties. In
addition, we encourage the KRG and the Government of Iraq to restore
joint security mechanisms which will increase security and
counterterrorism cooperation and eliminate security gaps in seams
between KRG and Government of Iraq-controlled areas.
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, as you know, Mission Iraq
operates in a critical threat environment. On May 14, the Department
approved Embassy Baghdad's request to go on Ordered Departure. The
decision was based on the current threat situation against U.S.
personnel and facilities. We recognize the critical importance of
advancing U.S. interests in Iraq through our diplomatic presence;
however the President and Secretary have been clear that the safety and
security of our all Americans is the administration's top priority.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Mulroy.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. MULROY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Mulroy. Thank you, sir. Chairman Romney, Ranking Member
Murphy, members of the committee, it is my pleasure and
privilege to speak to you today.
The U.S.-Iraq security partnership is of vital importance.
Any disengaging from Iraq would risk an ISIS resurgence. It
would cede the field to Iran and destabilize the region. U.S.
and coalition forces are operating at the invitation of the
Iraqi Government, anchored in the Strategic Framework Agreement
signed by our countries more than 10 years ago.
The best way to honor U.S., coalition, and Iraqi sacrifices
is to bolster Iraqi Security Forces to defend their sovereignty
against internal and external threats.
The fight against ISIS is not over, and the road to
recovery will be long. 5 years ago, ISIS controlled a territory
the size of West Virginia. The group seized major cities,
attracted terrorist fighters from across the globe, and
generated over $1 million in income every day. It also claimed
responsibility for numerous global attacks and its violent
propaganda casts a shadow across the world.
When the Government of Iraq requested support to defeat
ISIS, the United States answered the call. We mobilized a
global coalition which now stands at 80 members. The combined
joint task force Operation Inherent Resolve includes the United
States and 15 other nations. It brought immense fire power
through thousands of airstrikes and combat-experienced side-by-
side advisors. I have been one of those advisors in the past,
and I can tell you that nothing gives you more confidence than
having the United States Air Force above you and a tactical air
controller beside you.
I would also like to highlight Iraq's Counter Terrorism
Service. They rank among the region's most capable, and they
serve as a testament to our capacity-building efforts.
Our priority now is to ensure that the investments of blood
and sweat in the D-ISIS fight outlive the warfighting of the
last 5 years. Our by, with, and through approach continues to
benefit both countries with a relatively limited U.S.
footprint, down from 150,000 in 2008 to just over 5,000 today.
The defeat of ISIS, however, is not a foregone conclusion.
We see ISIS building clandestine networks across Iraq and
Syria, working to undermine the Iraqi Security Forces and the
Syrian Democratic Forces and to create conditions they need to
seize territory in the future.
At the Department of Defense, we also recognize that good
governance and economic opportunity are needed to translate
battlefield gains into a lasting peace. U.S. diplomats are the
main effort in this endeavor, and at the Department of Defense,
we proudly support them.
Critics of our military presence often claim we have
ulterior motives. We do not. We are in Iraq to defeat ISIS and
build Iraq's capacity. The more capable their security
institutions are, the more resilient they will be in the face
of terrorists and malign activities bent on exploitation.
Iran is the foremost of these malign actors. Iran-backed
militias have consistently flouted Baghdad and turned to crime
for self-enrichment. We see Iran using this playbook throughout
the region. They hide behind their proxies and use them to
fight only for Iranian interests. Our primary concern is the
extent to which these noncompliant militias, more loyal to
Tehran than Baghdad, undermine the prime minister's authority,
prey on ordinary Iraqis, and destabilize the fragile
communities recently liberated by ISIS.
It is in Iraq's national security interest to unburden
itself from Iran's exploitation. We are encouraged by the prime
minister's July 1st decree to bring all militias under formal
Iraqi control.
Another high priority concern is Baghdad-Erbil relations.
We are encouraging the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan
Regional Government to work through their political
differences, coordinate security in northern Iraq, and prevent
an ISIS resurgence.
There is also growing risk that ISIS will exploit their
captured fighters in prisons in Iraq and their family members
residing in IDP camps. This situation amounts to a ticking time
bomb, given the risk of producing a new generation of
extremists. It is ISIS 2.0 if the international community does
not address it.
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, only with a long-
term security partnership can Iraq prevent the territorial
resurgence of ISIS that would threaten the United States, Iraq,
and the world. If sufficiently resourced for the long game, the
Department of Defense's efforts will afford diplomats the space
to help Iraq overcome its challenges. Over time, we will
further economize our footprint, normalize our security
cooperation, and sustain an increasingly mature partnership
with Iraq.
I look forward to discussing how we best advance our
interests with you. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulroy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael P. Mulroy
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, Members of the Committee:
It is my pleasure to speak to you today as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. I look forward to discussing
how we can best advance U.S. interests in Iraq.
The U.S.-Iraq security partnership is of vital importance. Our
principal objective is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. U.S. and
Coalition forces are operating in Iraq at the express invitation of the
Iraqi government to help Iraqis secure Iraq. When I was last in Baghdad
in March, every Iraqi I met with underscored the indispensability of
our security partnership. U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi forces fought
shoulder to shoulder to defeat ISIS's so-called ``caliphate.'' The best
way to honor those shared sacrifices is to bolster Iraq's security
forces to prevent an ISIS resurgence and defend its sovereignty against
internal and external threats. U.S. national security interests and
regional stability hinge on a secure, sovereign Iraq.
At the Department of Defense (DoD), we recognize that the U.S.
military effort cannot alone deliver the desired results in Iraq. We
see our toolkit as nested within a whole-of-government approach. U.S.
commitment to diplomatic and economic action is required to ensure
Iraq's long-term stability and security.
Supporting Iraq in providing good governance and economic
opportunity can translate battlefield gains into lasting peace. U.S.
diplomats represent the vanguard in this endeavor, and we proudly
support them.
There is a fundamental premise that shapes much of our thinking on
Iraq: Prematurely disengaging would compromise U.S. national security,
leave Iraq exposed to other foreign influence, and destabilize the
region.
The fight against ISIS is not over, and the road to recovery will
be long.
Five years ago, ISIS controlled approximately 21,000 square miles
of Iraqi territory. That is nearly the size of West Virginia. More than
4 million people in Iraq lived under ISIS's oppressive rule. The group
fielded a battlefield force capable of seizing major cities, attracted
foreign terrorist fighters from more than 100 countries to Iraq and
Syria, and generated at least $1 million a day in income. It claimed
responsibility for a steady drumbeat of terrorist attacks outside of
Iraq and Syria, from coordinated mass-casualty attacks, such as in
Paris in November 2015, to those conducted by lone actors claiming
inspiration from the group.
Despite the liberation of ISIS-held territory in Iraq and Syria,
ISIS-linked attacks continue abroad, including in Sri Lanka in April
2019.
Ruthless and cruel, ISIS's attempts to establish a caliphate in
Iraq and Syria were marked by mass executions and public beheadings. On
Iraqi soil, ISIS committed acts of genocide, desecrated holy sites, and
nearly destroyed the Iraqi economy. The resulting refugee crisis from
Iraq and neighboring Syria rippled across Europe. The group's
weaponization of violent propaganda cast a shadow across the world.
When the Government of Iraq requested U.S. support to defeat ISIS
in 2014, the United States readily answered. We mobilized a Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which now stands at 80 members, including
many with which we work side by side in Iraq. Our State Department
colleagues have seen success in fundraising from the Global Coalition,
particularly to support humanitarian and stabilization activities, and
DoD has received contributions from partners to support counter-ISIS
efforts directly. DoD also continues to work with these allies and
partners to clear areas liberated from ISIS, train partner forces and
provide technical assistance, conduct targeted CT operations to address
continuing threats, and support stabilization efforts. Moreover, the
United Nations Assistance Mission, U.N. Investigative Team for
Accountability of Da'esh, NATO Mission Iraq, and EU Advisory Mission
also represent crucial political and political-military efforts.
The Combined Joint Task Force--Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-
OIR), which includes the United States and 15 other nations, brought to
bear immense firepower against ISIS through thousands of airstrikes and
the expertise of thousands of experienced U.S. and Coalition advisors
building the capacity of Iraq's soldiers. CJTF-OIR currently helps
train and equip 28 Iraqi brigades composed of thousands of soldiers.
U.S. and Coalition forces have trained and equipped more than 212,000
members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including our stalwart
Kurdish Peshmerga partners in the north. Iraq's Counter Terrorism
Service (CTS) ranks among the region's most capable and serves as a
testament to the capacity-building enterprise and the importance of
sustaining our support.
The CTS, of course, cannot accomplish this mission alone. The Iraqi
government has to coordinate the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and
Justice, as well as its intelligence services, to disrupt ISIS networks
effectively and deny them sanctuary. This requires the capability to
detect terrorist activity, analyze facilitation and support networks,
and disrupt activity before ISIS can carry out attacks.
In December 2017, the Iraqi government declared all its territory
liberated from ISIS control. It was a proud moment not just for Iraqis
but for everyone around the world reeling from the group's terror.
Our priority now is to ensure that U.S. and Coalition investments
in the D--ISIS fight outlive the warfighting of the last 5 years. With
a relatively light U.S. footprint, efforts to train and equip Iraq's
security forces continue to reap dividends and prove the effectiveness
of our ``by, with, and through'' approach. In 2008, the United States
had more than 150,000 U.S. military forces in Iraq at an expense of
nearly $150 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds;
today, there are approximately 5,200 U.S. military forces stationed in
Iraq, funded with less than $15 billion in OCO funding.
The ISIS threat in Iraq persists, and the group's enduring defeat
in Iraq and Syria is not a foregone conclusion. We see ISIS building
clandestine networks across Iraq and Syria, working to undermine the
ISF and Syrian Democratic Forces and to create the conditions they need
to seize territory in the future. Despite Iraq's growing capability,
the Iraqis require additional U.S. and Coalition support to conduct
effective counterterrorism and wide-area security operations necessary
to keep ISIS at bay. We will continue to empower Iraq's legitimate and
professional security forces to protect its sovereignty and prevent an
ISIS resurgence.
We are resolute in our commitment to Iraq's security and
prosperity, but critics of our military presence often insinuate vague
ulterior motives. The premise of our capacity-building initiative is to
help Iraqis secure Iraq. The more capable Iraq's security institutions
are, the more resilient Iraq will be in the face of terrorists and
malign regional actors bent on coercion and exploitation.
Iran is foremost among those malign actors. Iran's cynical
interference undermines Iraqi interests and jeopardizes Iraqi
stability. Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have come to embody
this challenge, although the problem set is far from black and white.
Disciplined PMF elements, we recognize, fought bravely against ISIS and
earned public respect. But in recent years, Iran-backed, semi-
autonomous militias have consistently flouted the Government of Iraq
and turned to local criminality for self-enrichment. We see Iran using
this playbook throughout the region; they hide behind proxies and use
them to fight Tehran's fight. Our primary concern is the extent to
which noncompliant militias, more loyal to Tehran than Baghdad,
undermine the Iraqi Prime Minister's legitimate authority, prey on
ordinary Iraqis, and destabilize the fragile communities recently
liberated from ISIS control.
It is in Iraq's own interest to unburden itself from Iranian
exploitation. Iraqi sovereignty depends on it, and no one craves that
independence more than Iraqis. The prospect of coercive militias
preventing local communities from recovering from the trauma of ISIS
risks sparking further violent extremism and insurgency. DoD is
committed to supporting State Department-led engagements with the Iraqi
government on this issue. We are encouraged by the Prime Minister's
July 1 decree bringing all militias under formal government control.
At the end of the day, the best way to counter Iran's malign
influence in Iraq is to continue supporting the Iraqis and delivering
visible good for the Iraqi people. No other country can match the
world-class security assistance we provide, let alone our ability to
mobilize international diplomatic and financial resources to support
Iraq's long-term prosperity.
Another high priority for DoD concerns Baghdad-Erbil relations. The
seams separating Kurdish and federal Iraqi security forces in northern
Iraq's so-called disputed territories are susceptible to ISIS
resurgence. As is the case with the CTS and the Iraqi Army, the
Peshmerga are trusted U.S. partners in the fight against terrorism. It
is crucial that the Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional
Government work through their political differences and coordinate
security for those areas. Otherwise, ISIS will surely exploit security
vacuums and gather steam.
There is also the growing risk that ISIS--notoriously adept at
building clandestine networks--will exploit not only the populations of
captured ISIS fighters now in prison in Iraq but also their family
members, who may reside in local communities or in internally displaced
person camps. At present, it has been reported that tens of thousands
of Iraqis could soon return from Syria, the vast majority of them women
and children, many possibly linked to ISIS fighters and who likely
still subscribe to the terrorist ideology that helped give rise to
ISIS. It has also been reported that some 45,000 children born in ISIS-
controlled territory in Iraq remain in limbo because of their lack of
recognized birth records.. The exploitation of Iraqis by ISIS, and the
marginalization of ISIS victims leads many observers to deem the
problem a ``ticking time bomb,'' given the risk of producing a new
generation of violent extremists if there is not a reintegration
process and if they are not treated humanely.
Chairman Romney, Ranking Member Murphy, only with a long-term
security partnership can Iraq prevent ISIS' from territorial resurgence
that would threaten the U.S. homeland, Iraq, the region, and the world.
The Defense Department's continued work in the security sector will
afford diplomats the political space to help Iraq resolve its systemic
challenges. Over time we will incrementally economize our footprint,
normalize our security cooperation, and sustain an increasingly mature
partnership with Iraqi security institutions.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Mulroy.
Let me begin by offering several questions, and hopefully I
can hear from both of you on these.
First of all, one of the things that we heard in our travel
was from the leadership of the country which, as you know,
represents leaders from Kurdistan, as well as Sunni and Shia
leaders, with the president, the prime minister, and the
speaker of the house. And they made it a very high priority in
their communication with us to communicate that they have no
interest in becoming a puppet state of Iran and that they
believe that at least in the public press--and perhaps I am
projecting on them my own reading of the public press--a sense
that Iraq has fallen under the sway of Iran and will
increasingly do their bidding. They, instead, said no, our
interest is not becoming the puppet of any nation, but is
instead to become an independent and strong, stable entity.
Is that an accurate assessment of what you believe is
really the intent of the leadership in Iraq, or is that just
what they hope to be able to sell to traveling Americans?
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, thank you very much for that
question.
I concur. I mean, I believe that that is an accurate
portrayal of the genuine Iraqi leadership view on this issue.
Iraq's goal is to become a sovereign, independent, unified,
democratic state, and that is certainly the goal of the United
States' policy as well. When you look at the horrors of what
has happened in the last few years in Iraq, the ravages of the
institutions both from the era of Saddam Hussein and then in
the difficult fight against ISIS, the Iraqi authorities have a
real desire to rebuild institutions and ensure that they have
the capacity to withstand any threats, any hostile actions from
any of their neighbors.
Senator Romney. Mr. Mulroy.
Mr. Mulroy. Yes, sir. So they said essentially the exact
same thing to me in my trip in March. And I would point out
that all three of those leaders you mentioned have longstanding
relationships with U.S. senior leaders for decades, and they do
talk very bluntly.
I would say that the July 1st proclamation by the prime
minister is a very good step to bring them under the control of
the Iraqi Security Forces and away from political affiliations.
It is important to note that all PMF fought against ISIS. Some
of them are very well thought of by the Iraqi people. Others
are almost wholly controlled by the Iranians and not only do
not work for the best interests of the Iraqi people, but they
have essentially turned to criminality to fund themselves even
further. And they have become less and less favored by the
Iraqi people. It is important, I think, that we do everything
we can to help facilitate the Government of Iraq bringing in
the good and the disciplined PMF under the authority of the
Iraqi military and disband the remainder.
Senator Romney. One of the things we heard from the leaders
there was a recognition that they share a very large border
with Iran, that Iran has substantial interests in extending
their influences throughout Iraq, that Iran is investing
substantially in enterprises of various kinds to strengthen
those ties, and they wonder why are other nations not doing the
same.
Given the obvious conflict geopolitically between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, I would have anticipated that Saudi Arabia would
have been a very active participant in Iraq as well, that it
would have been countering Iran's influence there by its own
investments, by its own personnel, cultural exchanges, and so
forth. But that was not what was recounted by Iraq's leaders.
Is there a reason that Saudi Arabia is not more involved
and other Arab nations are not more involved with Iraq? And are
there ways to encourage their greater participation there, as
well as more U.S. participation? Clearly, the Exxon Mobil
investment would have been a major connection between our
nations. But are there ways we have of encouraging Saudi Arabia
and others to become more involved with the Iraqi economy?
Ambassador Polaschik. Those are all great questions, Mr.
Chairman.
I would note that the prime minister's first trip outside
of Iraq was to Cairo, not to Tehran. And this was a really
important step because he went there to meet with heads of
state from Egypt and Jordan to further the Iraqi Government's
goal of further reintegration with their Arab neighbors. Iran
and Iraq have a shared border, a shared history, a shared
culture. A lot of infrastructure is connected. So those are
tough things to undo. But I think the fact that the prime
minister's very first trip was to the Arab world rather than to
Tehran shows that he is very committed to strengthening those
ties.
We are working very hard to support the Iraqi Government's
goal of becoming more sovereign, more independent. Energy
independence, as you highlighted in your remarks, is a very key
part of that. In addition to the various U.S. projects that we
are promoting, we are also looking at ways that Iraq could hook
its infrastructure further into the GCC countries or even into
Jordan. So these are very interesting ideas for Iraq to pivot
west rather than east.
The business climate in Iraq is challenging, and I think it
is a lot easier for countries with less high standards than the
United States, countries that do not have strong anti-
corruption laws to do business. But that said, we are working
very closely with the Iraqi Government to try to improve the
business climate there. As I mentioned in my opening remarks,
UNCTAD has an important project that works to improve the
business environment. We have been very supportive in working
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business
delegations, other business groups to bring American businesses
to Iraq to establish the relationships, to get to know the
environment there. Deputy Secretary Sullivan, for example, led
our largest-ever trade delegation to Iraq, and we continue to
do that.
So it is a work in progress of supporting Iraq's goal to
reorient itself away from dependence on Iran in an economic
sense to opening to the rest of the region.
Senator Romney. Thank you. I will let Mr. Mulroy respond
briefly, if you will, but in particular, why is Saudi Arabia
not more involved there, and can we encourage that?
Mr. Mulroy. Sir, to the point of your question, you know,
with the tyranny of geography when it comes to Iran, they do
share a 900-mile border with Iraq, and they have $12 billion in
trade. And they have extensive, permanent family ties back and
forth.
For the U.S., we provide a lot of things that they do not.
We have provided the top-notch security assistance that
actually is to the benefit of the government of Iraq. We also,
of course, have international leadership when it comes to
stabilization and economic development.
Specifically to Saudi Arabia, we under defense diplomacy,
so to speak, support the State Department in its efforts to get
Saudi Arabia more involved, and I think they are getting more
involved. I also think they are getting more involved in some
of the key components of that, which includes bringing some of
the disenfranchised parts of Iraq like the Sunni Arab tribes
into the future of Iraq. They have a unique perspective on that
and capability to do that, and they have been involved with us
in developing that tribal engagement program that we think is
so important so we do not do perhaps the same mistakes of the
past where we have just excluded the Sunnis.
I would also point out the fact that Jordan is becoming
more involved economically with our encouragement with Iraq,
and I think that is very important because at the end of the
day, the key component of stabilization is economic development
that lasts. And I think coming from the Department of Defense
person, that is the key to further normalizing our relationship
and getting to a place where we are not so dependent on U.S.
military support.
Senator Romney. Thank you for your responses to my
questions.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you both for your service and for being here
today.
Mr. Mulroy, first I wanted to talk to you a little bit
about the efficacy of our security assistance. The United
States spent about $20 billion on the Iraqi military between
2003 and 2011. Of course, then faced with a marching ISIS in
2014, an army of a quarter million just seemed to melt away.
Since 2014, we have spent another $5 billion. And so the
logical question is what are we doing differently this time
around to ensure that the same outcome does not repeat itself.
But I mentioned in my opening statement another concern,
which is that when we were there, one of our top commanders
talked to us about the difficulty of getting large amounts of
short-term money out the door. We appropriate on an annual
basis. We have given significant amounts of security
assistance, and it worries me that it seems that many of our
top military people there are spending lots of time spinning
their wheels just trying get as much money out the door as
quickly as possible because they do not know whether it will be
there the next year, leading one of these individuals to say to
us we would rather have $100 million over 10 years than $100
million in 1 year so that we could engage in long-term
projects.
So my question is, what are we doing differently this time?
What are the top line things we are doing differently? And is
there a danger about not having a longer-term commitment here
so that we can do longer-term military and security investments
rather than just speeding money out the door?
Mr. Mulroy. Yes, sir. So I would point out that in 2008,
when we had 120,000 troops there, we were spending $150 billion
a year. Now in 2019, we are spending $15 billion. For me, it
still sounds like a lot of money because it is. But it is
important to see that we have a trend in the right direction
when it comes to expenditures of taxpayer money.
I would say one other difference, when we saw the collapse
of the Iraqi military in 2014 to when we saw how they performed
more recently 2017, 2018, 2019. One of the things they had--and
that is why I highlighted it in my opening--is the enabling
component of the U.S. military. It is a game changer when you
have air support conducted by the most effective air force in
the world. And we have advisors that can actually assist them
on the ground and give them the confidence that they will be
there in the height of the battle. I really do think that, in
my estimation, is the game changer.
When it comes to the specifics of the spending, as you
requested, I think I have heard that a lot when it comes to
government spending everywhere, that there is a requirement to
spend everything at the end of a particular fiscal year and
that oftentimes people spend--and I think that is a legitimate
issue that you raise, which also includes in a place like Iraq.
From my perspective, everything we are trying to do now is move
more to the economy of forces, which I have already highlighted
we are, but also to a normalization.
So we have established an SDO/DATT, and we are moving
toward a traditional country team model with the SDO/DATT
answering to the ambassador, now Ambassador Tueller, and we
will start standardizing and modernizing and normalizing our
spending as we do that. We are doing that with the Kurdish
Peshmerga right now, and we obviously are going to be doing
that when it comes to the rest of the Iraqi Government.
Senator Murphy. We can solve that problem partially.
Congress can do a multiyear authorization. It is still an
authorization subject to appropriation, but we can at least
provide some of that certainty. And I would encourage our
committee to look into that.
Ambassador Polaschik, I wanted you to address something
else I brought up in my opening statement, which is a report
over the weekend, a really concerning report, suggesting that
the embassy in Baghdad is down to 15 functional political
staffers. Help me understand the conundrum I laid out in my
opening remarks, which is how do we maintain our political
mission inside Baghdad if we have pulled so many of our
personnel out? Can you confirm that we are down to 15
functional political staffers in Baghdad? And if we were able
to maintain a full diplomatic corps there during the height of
the Iraq war in the 2000s, why can we not do the same today?
The report from this weekend suggests that this is a permanent
decision, that State has made a decision that they are going to
keep these low levels of staff for a time uncertain. And so
given that report, I wondered if you could clarify some of that
for the committee today.
Ambassador Polaschik. Of course. First, I would like to
maybe go back just a couple of months to early May where we
faced a very serious, specific, credible threat stream against
U.S. personnel in Iraq. And that threat stream has not
diminished. It is still there. So that was the reason that
Embassy Baghdad requested authorization to go to ordered
departure status, and the Secretary of State approved that on
May 14th.
This is a temporary situation. Ordered departure is
something that is done in 30-day increments. We constantly
evaluate the situation, looking carefully at the threat
information that we have and the personnel on the ground and to
make sure that we have got the right fit. And the Secretary
just renewed the ordered departure status on July 12 for
another 30 days.
I would prefer not to go into specific numbers of personnel
that we have on the ground in this open setting, but I would be
very, very happy to brief you later.
I would note again, though, that this is just a temporary
decision. We have not made any decisions to permanently
withdraw staff. We are constantly evaluating the situation, and
it is certainly our hope that we are able to have a maximum
presence on the ground in order to achieve all of the important
objectives that we have.
Senator Murphy. Certainly without getting into a classified
threat assessment, I think it is hard to suggest that the
threat is higher today than it was during the height of the
insurgency and the fighting in and around Baghdad. And so while
I would never second guess the security decisions, I would hope
that if there is a long-term decision made to have lower levels
of staffing there, that we start to think about how to increase
security so that we can return to some level of political
functionality because if we do not, if we maintain a dozen or
two dozen political staffers there, it is an invitation for
ISIS to reemerge because we are not there helping the Iraqis do
the hard lift of political reconciliation that ultimately
protects our interests against the future rise of ISIS or a
follow-on organization. And so I understand how sensitive this
is because you are talking about the lives of American
personnel there. But the risk of a long-term political
withdrawal from Baghdad could, in the end, cost as many
American lives as we are saving in the short run, and it is
just something I hope the State Department is contemplating.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I may have a few if we have a
second round as well.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you to the witnesses. Good to be with you again.
How would you describe the relationship between the United
States and Iraq? Are we partners? Are we allies? Are we
competitors? Are we adversaries? You do not have to pick from
my labels, but how would you describe the relationship?
Ambassador Polaschik. I would say that we are partners. And
this Iraqi Government in particular has made it very clear that
it is intent upon ensuring Iraq's sovereignty, its
independence, its unified democratic status. So we are a
partner and working with them.
Senator Kaine. And the current government continues to want
U.S. engagement as they pursue that strategy. Correct?
Ambassador Polaschik. Absolutely. We are there at the
invitation of the Iraqi Government.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Mulroy, how would you describe the
relationship?
Mr. Mulroy. I completely agree, sir. It is a partnership,
and I think they would actually say the same thing. Specific to
the Government of Iraq, if you look at the president, Bahram
Salih, he used to be the chairman of the American University in
Saladin. And I think most of my colleagues have known him for
10 to 15 years in the Department of Defense. The prime
minister--very similar relationships. The speaker of the house,
Halbusi--he worked very closely with us when he was a governor
in Anbar, and many of us know him.
So I think they talk to us pretty bluntly, and I think we
know what they are saying when they are saying it. And I think
that we both view this as a long-term partnership because we
have been together so long. So it is more than just a label. It
is actually real relationships that have proven effective in
the fight against ISIS, for example, and hopefully will prove
effective going forward as they become more and more sovereign
and have the ability to push back.
Senator Kaine. And there is no doubt, is there, as we sit
in the room today that we would not consider Iraq an adversary
or an enemy. Correct?
Mr. Mulroy. Iran, sir?
Senator Kaine. We would not consider Iraq an adversary of
an enemy. Would we?
Mr. Mulroy. No, sir.
Senator Kaine. The reason I asked that is there are
currently pending two authorizations for military force against
Iraq. The 1991 authorization for use of military force by the
United States against Iraq had no termination date, and so that
is still a pending war authorization against the sovereign
Government of Iraq. That was the first Gulf War. That was never
repealed.
There was a 2002 authorization for war against the
sovereign nation of Iraq that was passed in October of 2002. It
had no termination date. That is still pending.
It strikes me as highly bizarre that we are sitting here at
a hearing talking about our partner, the long-term partnership,
going through the president and the prime minister and the
speaker and their connections to the United States. And you are
stating facts that I believe from my visits there as well as in
my conversations with Iraqi officials. And yet we still have
two unexpired war authorizations against Iraq.
Senator Young and I have introduced a bill that would
repeal the 1991 and the 2002 war authorizations to simply
recognize that we are not enemies anymore. We are not
adversaries. We are not seeking to, through military force,
topple the Government of Iraq anymore. We are actually using
our military assets to support the Government of Iraq.
I hope my colleagues would agree that if we cannot agree on
a lot of complicated things, when we have got the Trump
administration witnesses sitting here looking us in the face
and telling us we are partners with Iraq, why do we need two
war authorizations with Iraq? I have been trying to get the
administration to--their official position is we do not seek a
change of any war authorization at this time. But they have
given me no reason to suggest why we should continue to have
war authorizations against Iraq.
And I am deeply worried that if we pass war authorizations
with no termination date and we leave them sort of floating out
in space, these zombie war authorizations that can be used by
any administration at any time to cook up a bootstrapped
argument for some military misadventure, then we really are not
doing the job that we should do.
The legislation that I filed with Senator Young and others
has been pending before this committee now for a number of
months. I would hope that my colleagues would support the idea
of bringing it up and repealing the war authorizations and
sending the very clear message that we do not consider Iraq an
enemy. We do not consider Iraq an adversary. We do not think
they are going to turn into one tomorrow. If they did, we could
pass a new authorization. But why would we leave war
authorizations out there against them?
On the Kurds, I want to talk to you about this. In my
visits to Iraq, the situation, the relationship between Baghdad
and Erbil is a complicated one and there is much history there.
And I know it is the U.S.'s preference that Iraq be democratic
and stable and united. There are Kurdish aspirations. This is
not necessarily that every Kurd believes this. It is not a
monolith, but there are Kurdish aspirations for independence.
There are longstanding disagreements over allocation of oil
revenues and payment for governmental services, et cetera.
I am curious. Tell us a little bit about what you think is
the kind of current state of play between the relatively new
government in Baghdad and also a new governmental arrangement--
the last names are not different, but some of the individuals
are different--in Kurdistan.
Ambassador Polaschik. First, Senator, I would stress that a
strong Kurdistan Regional Government within a unified and
federal Iraq is essential to Iraq's long-term stability and the
enduring defeat of ISIS. This is a top priority for us.
So in the wake of the 2017 referendum for independence, we
have been working very hard to try to promote reconciliation
between the Kurds and the central authorities in Baghdad. And
we have had some successes. Oil is now flowing through the
Kirkuk pipeline. That is important. The central authorities are
now paying the salaries of civil servants in the KRG. And we
are working very effectively to promote greater security
cooperation particularly in the seam line areas between the
Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi central authorities. So we
still have a ways to go, but we feel that there is positive
progress. And I would note, in fact, that the new KRG prime
minister was just in Baghdad I believe either yesterday or
today. So that is a very positive sign.
Senator Kaine. Excellent.
Mr. Mulroy, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Mulroy. Yes, sir. So I would agree with everything that
the Ambassador said. A one-Iraq policy I think is the best
policy not just for the United States' interests but for Iraq
and for the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
I would say, albeit anecdotally, I have talked and I know
several of the new generation of Iraqi Kurds, and they would
highlight that during their struggles against Saddam Hussein,
that that generation often relied on external forces. Sometimes
it was Iran. The current generation's struggle against Saddam
Hussein and after that against ISIS--they relied almost
exclusively on the United States. So their affinity with the
United States is very strong, and I think that we can talk to
them more openly that way and explain, at least from our
perspective, why we think a one-Iraq policy is the most
effective for them, not just for the overall mission. And I
think that many of them understand that.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here. I am sorry that I missed
your testimony, but I was in Iraq in April, and certainly what
I have heard you say in terms of the new government, I would
agree with. They were very supportive of the United States'
partnership there and of the joint command that is operating
there.
One of the concerns that we heard when we were there is
about the ISIS detainees that are still in Syria and the
potential for that to become a growing problem for Iraq. Now,
as we know, many of those detainees are Iraqis, but we have a
number of foreign fighters who are being detained in Syria, and
most of them are in the custody of the Syrian Democratic
Forces.
So I wonder, Ms. Polaschik, how many ISIS detainees do we
know are currently in the custody of the central Government of
Iraq or of the Kurdish Regional Government?
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, thank you for raising this
issue. It is a serious problem that we spend a lot of time
thinking about at the State Department.
In terms of the exact numbers, I would have to take that
question back and get back to you.
[The information requested above was not available at time
of print]
But this is a global effort. We are engaging with all of
our partners throughout the world to ask them to take home
their foreign nationals.
With respect to the situation in Iraq, we also recognize
that there are capacity issues. There are rule of law issues.
There are human rights issues. So we have an intense and
ongoing dialogue with the Iraqi authorities to make sure that
those Iraqi citizens who are returned to Iraq face a fair,
transparent judicial process and that also the family members
who are there, because we have large numbers of children, for
example, who are in some of these detention facilities, that
they have the psychosocial support that they need to ensure
that they are reintegrated into society and do not turn to
radicalization.
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. It was a very big concern.
There was a camp at that time of, I think, about 70,000
families and detainees that was very close to the Iraqi border,
and they were quite concerned about what was going to happen to
those folks.
I saw that Italy recently repatriated the foreign fighter
who was in Syria. Can you talk about what efforts we have
underway with some of our Western allies to repatriate the
foreign fighters who are from their countries?
Ambassador Polaschik. The Counterterrorism Bureau in the
State Department has the lead on that. So I think, with your
permission, I would like to take that question back to make
sure that we get you the most accurate information.
Senator Shaheen. That would be very helpful. I am sure you
are aware there is also language in the defense authorization
bill that would create a coordinator to help work on the
detainee issue because we have made very little progress.
And I know that we have some folks who would like to see
some of those terrorists brought back. James Foley was a
constituent. His family was a constituent of mine. The family
who was murdered by ISIS--there was a question about whether
his murderers are in custody in Syria. And his family and the
family of other Americans murdered are very interested in
seeing them brought back to justice and tried in our civilian
courts. So I hope that that will be a focus of the efforts with
detainees.
Let me go to another question because the other issue that
was raised on our trip was the importance of the continued U.S.
troop presence in northern Syria and the support for U.S.
stabilization efforts in areas that are controlled by the
Syrian Democratic Forces. I am concerned, as we have heard the
administration talk about the need to draw down those forces,
that we do not have any backup there. Can you talk about what
the position is of the State Department and the Department of
Defense in terms of trying to encourage and ensure that we have
stabilization efforts in that northeastern region of Syria? I
will ask you both that question.
Ambassador Polaschik. Senator, perhaps I could address the
stabilization issue and then ask Mr. Mulroy to discuss the
troop issues.
It is very clear that stabilization efforts need to
continue. I think that is the painful lesson that we have all
learned over these many years now of strife in the Middle East,
that if those core issues are left unaddressed, there will
still be problems.
So the United States is still engaged. The administration
has made a priority to have burden sharing so that it is not
the United States alone which is funding all of these efforts.
We have been very successful in securing funds from our Gulf
partners, in particular Saudi Arab and the United Arab
Emirates. Of course, our European partners are there as well.
So the United States has residual funding from previous years
that we are still using. But our partners are relying on U.S.
experts then to make sure that the assistance is being
channeled and useful in effective ways. We still have our START
mission that is based in Turkey, and we also have our START
forward team as well. So we are there. We are in the game, and
the State Department feels very strongly that we need to
continue these stabilization efforts in order to ensure that
ISIS truly is defeated.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Mulroy.
Mr. Mulroy. If I could start with the issue brought up in
the first question, the SDF currently has over 2,000 foreign
terrorist fighters in their custody from over 50 countries. And
this is obviously a group with very limited resources who
expends quite a bit of time, effort, and resources taking care
of everybody else's problems. So from our perspective at the
DOD, we are pushing all the time for our partners to take back
their citizens. It is their responsibility.
Specific to stabilization, the Strategic Assessment Review
2018 puts State Department in the lead, USAID as the
implementer, and the DOD provides support, security and
logistics. And we do so in everything the Ambassador just
referenced, and that includes in northern Iraq to the efforts
that go on there by USAID.
From our perspective, the long-term plan for protecting the
religious minorities in these areas is to train local security
forces as police to be there for the long term. The point being
is locals need jobs. These jobs are obviously helpful to
stabilize the situation. They will stay there in the long term,
and we are going to train them more as police, less as
soldiers, as that, for obvious reasons, is what provides long-
term security in the area. So as a concept, that is the effort
we intend to pursue.
Senator Shaheen. But you are talking about Iraq when you
are saying that----
Mr. Mulroy. I am talking about Iraq.
Senator Shaheen. --not Syria.
Mr. Mulroy. Iraq, yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Can I ask another question, Mr. Chairman?
Because that raises another issue that we heard when we were
there and that is about the influence of the Iranian-backed
militias and the effort to integrate the militias into the
structure of the Iraqi Security Forces. I noticed that Prime
Minister Mahdi announced on July 1st that all of Iraq's
Iranian-backed militias would be more closely integrated.
Can you talk about some of the challenges that exist there
and what we are doing to support the Iraqis as they try and
address those Iranian-backed militias because they have the
potential to create a lot of mischief in Iraq?
Ambassador Polaschik. From the political, diplomatic
perspective, it is a huge step that the prime minister has
taken by issuing this decree on July 1. And we are committed to
working with Prime Minister al-Mahdi and his cabinet to make
sure that they implement this quickly.
As Mr. Mulroy had said in his earlier remarks, the PMF
played a very important role in the defeat of ISIS, and there
are good groups among them so it will be very important to
integrate the good PMF elements fully into the Iraqi Security
Forces.
There are also undisciplined actors out there who continue
to extort local populations, who are plotting very nefarious
activities. The United States has been quite clear in its
opposition to these groups. I would note that just in March of
this year we designated Harakat al-Nujaba, one of the primary
Iran-backed PMF groups that is engaged in all sorts of
deplorable activities. So we will continue to exercise pressure
on these groups to ensure that they are no longer able to pose
a threat to Iraq or to U.S. interests in Iraq.
Mr. Mulroy. Yes. I completely agree that the PMF is not a
homogenous group. Many of them did play a really substantial
role in the defeat of ISIS. So there is a popularity amongst
the Iraqi people. Now many of them have turned to criminality
and are essentially a scourge on the population. Others have
been completely controlled by Iran. KH has already been
designated and HAN is now designated. So what we need to do is
be sophisticated in our approach to the PMF, assess them, find
out which ones could be integrated into the Iraqi Security
Forces and which ones could never be, and then isolate the
latter and obviously embrace the former.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
The ranking member has an additional question we are going
to let him ask.
I would just underscore, before he asks that question, the
concern that I share with him that we need as many diplomatic
personnel as possible in Iraq to encourage that government and
to support that government in the enormous challenges that they
have. I did hear from another source in the administration the
belief that Iran has pulled back from their level of threat on
our interests or our resources in the region. I would just
encourage the administration to be as up to date as possible
with all of its intelligence resources to make that assessment
and to restore a full diplomatic presence as soon as possible.
With that, let me turn to Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
going to try to sneak two quick ones in here.
Mr. Mulroy, you described the militias as sort of belonging
to two categories, and Ambassador Polaschik referenced the
same. There is the group that enjoys popular support in Iraq in
part because of the good work they did against ISIS, and then
there is the group that is directly aligned with Iran. And that
is not how I understand it.
I understand there to be a Venn diagram in which there are
groups that have broad popular support and there are groups
that have very close relationships with Iran, and those two
circles overlap in big parts. And one of the concerns that I
heard when we were there is that by forcing this choice with
the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, we are
in fact pushing some groups that exist inside the overlap to
Iran because those groups perceive the United States, again, to
be a relatively short-term player and partner. Iran is going to
be around forever. And so by sort of pushing this question in
front of many of these militias that are popularly supported
and have relationships with Iran, we are actually working
against our interests by pushing more of these groups towards
Iran. They are not making the choice to align with us.
Would you disagree with that assessment?
Ambassador Polaschik. I fully agree with your assessment
that it is a little squishier, that there are overlapping
circles. And it is an important question that the Iraqi
Government is grappling with and that we are grappling with as
well. What is the best way to encourage good behavior from
groups that fall into that middle area? There are several PMF
groups which now have political parties and they have members
elected to the Council of Representatives. And so how could we
encourage those groups to become good actors instead of bad
actors?
So this is an ongoing policy debate within the
administration. It is something that we are grappling with, but
the intent is to do everything possible that we can to
strengthen Iraq's sovereignty and its capacity to withstand
threats to its sovereignty both internal and external. So you
have hit, I think, one of the hot button issues that we
continue to deliberate and is very much on our minds.
Senator Murphy. I am not speaking to either of you here. I
think the administration has essentially already deliberated on
this question and has made a decision with respect to the
designation of the IRGC that makes all of your jobs much more
difficult.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask one question on
stabilization, to build on Senator Shaheen's question. I just
have a hard time figuring out the math here. Again, this is a
question of finite resources. But the estimate is that the
rebuilding of places like west Mosul are in the $80 billion
range when you look at all of the work that needs to be done
inside that country. And yet, we are appropriating about $250
million a year, and we have got commitments from other partners
that get that number up to maybe about a billion dollars a
year. I just do not know how that math works.
If we are putting together a billion dollars, a quarter of
that is our money which, by the way, represents about one-
quarter of 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget, how does Iraq
put together the dollars to rebuild parts of that country which
are literally rubble today? Because, again, if they do not
rebuild, then it is part of the political impetus for ISIS to
emerge. Is the rest of it all on them or is there hope that
bigger numbers ride to the rescue from outside of the country?
Ambassador Polaschik. There was the Iraq reconstruction
pledging conference. Perhaps that name is not accurate, but it
was early in 2018 where there were significant pledges from key
Arab countries. From the United States' perspective, we have
been very focused on immediate stabilization needs, getting the
essential services back on, providing humanitarian assistance,
working on justice and accountability, all of the measures that
are required to allow people to come home.
And yes, there are huge infrastructure needs that exist,
but I think one way to address that would be to also push
forward on the economic reform agenda because a lot of
construction, writ large development can be done by the private
sector if there is a better business environment. I mean, there
is serious money that could be made in Iraq. It is a wealthy
country in terms of its resources, in terms of its human
capacity. So that is why we are also putting the emphasis on
the regulatory reforms that will be required to create a more
open, inviting business environment because Iraq is still a
statist economy. This is a very heavy legacy from the Saddam
Hussein era. So whatever we can do to transition the Iraqi
economy away from that heavy statist focus to more a more open
market approach I think will be better.
Senator Murphy. Senator Romney noted they do not help
themselves when they continue to reject offers from Western
companies, Western energy companies to help them get a better
return on their rate of investment in fossil fuels. So I
appreciate that answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Romney. Thank you so much to the individuals who
have been witnesses today for providing your testimony, as well
as your response to our questions. Thank you also for your
service to our great country.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business on Thursday, including for members
to submit questions for the record.
And so with thanks to the committee members, this hearing
is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Joan Polaschik to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
russia in iraq
Russia continues to make significant investments into Iraq's energy
sector, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan. I am particularly concerned by
press reports that Rosneft has purchased 60 percent of the Kurdistan
Regional Government's (KRG) oil export pipeline while also committing
to build a gas export pipeline from Erbil to Turkey, in addition to
exploration blocks and advance crude purchases.
Question. What has motivated the KRG, a reliable U.S. partner in
the counter-ISIS fight, to pursue these deals with Russia?
Answer. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) saw Russia and
state-controlled Rosneft as a potential ally in its bid for
independence due to historic ties between Iraqi Kurds and the former
Soviet Union. The agreement was negotiated before the independence
referendum, but was signed after it in October 2017.
Question. What steps has the U.S. taken to discourage these deals
and provide the KRG and the Iraqi government with alternatives to
Russian energy deals? What has been the response from the KRG or Iraqi
Government? What steps is the U.S. taking going forward?
Answer. Because the Government of Iraq (GOI) views oil and gas
deals negotiated outside its purview as illegal, the GOI has taken the
KRG to court over the deal. While Iraqi courts hear legal arguments and
Iraqi politicians continue negotiations, the United States has promoted
U.S. energy companies in all of Iraq. The GOI is in negotiations with
several U.S. companies to capture gas and improve oil and gas
infrastructure.
Question. What message have U.S. officials delivered to KRG or
Iraqi Government officials regarding these deals? At what level have
those messages been delivered?
Answer. U.S. officials including our Ambassador to Iraq and the
Secretary of Energy have raised the issue of Russian involvement in the
KRG's energy sector with both GOI and KRG officials. The message has
been consistent that Western companies can provide better services and
that Russia does not have an interest in seeing Iraqi gas compete with
Russian gas for European markets. Moreover, Russia's ownership of the
oil pipeline creates dependence that does not benefit the KRG nor Iraq.
popular mobilization forces
Question. On July 1st, Iraq's Prime Minister issued a decree
attempting to more closely integrate the Popular Mobilizations Forces
(PMFs) into the Iraqi Armed Forces. As you know, these militias, some
of which are backed by Iran, contribute to Iraq's instability,
especially in the northern regions: What continuing support, if any,
does Iran provide to PMF units? What is your assessment of the PMF
threat to Iraq's security?
Answer. Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
continue to provide support to some, but not all, PMF units. This
includes logistical, advisory, and material support as well as
training. The actions of some PMF units such as Kata'ib Hizballah,
Harakat al-Nujaba, and other Iran-backed groups are destabilizing and
threaten Iraq's internal security. In contrast to Iran's efforts to
undermine Iraq's stability, we remain committed to supporting Iraqi
sovereignty.
Question. What are the State Department and Department of Defense
doing to help the Government of Iraq integrate these groups into the
Ministry of Defense chain of command?
Answer. One of the Government of Iraq's (GOI) primary challenges is
reining in undisciplined Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) elements that
operate outside of state control. The Prime Minister's recent decree
ordering PMF units to de-politicize, remove checkpoints, and forego
economic activities is a positive first step toward reform. The
timeline by which PMF units are formally and fully integrated into the
broader Iraqi security force architecture, as called for by the Prime
Minister's decree, is for the GOI to decide. Prime Minister Adel Abd
al-Mahdi continues to be steadfast in his public statements that the
PMF must reform into a professional, disciplined, and apolitical
security service, and the U.S. Government supports the GOI's efforts to
achieve this goal.
Question. How is this decree and its implementation different from
a similar decree by former Prime Minister Haider Abadi that was meant
to integrate the PMF into the Ministry of Defense but was not fully
implemented?
Answer. Former Prime Minister Haider Abadi's decree proclaimed that
the PMF would have the same pay and benefits as their counterparts in
the Ministry of Defense, and additionally subjected them to Iraq's
military service laws and regulations. The decree did not address the
future of the PMF's roles and responsibilities, and did little to
reform undisciplined and Iranian-backed PMF units significantly. The
decree issued July 1st by Prime Minister Adel Abd al-Mahdi is a more
significant effort to bring all armed groups under the effective
command and control of the Government of Iraq (GOI). This decree orders
PMF offices closed, units be stripped of sectarian nomenclature, and
that economic and political endeavors discontinue. While implementing
PMF reform would be a challenge for any Iraqi Prime Minster, Prime
Minister Abd al-Mahdi has demonstrated serious intent and we fully
support his efforts to ensure effective GOI control of all armed groups
in Iraq.
captured isis fighters
According to the United Nations, some 55,000 suspected ISIS
fighters and their families remain in detention in Iraq and Syria.
Additionally, there are numerous reports coming out about overcrowding
and horrific conditions in these detentions centers, specifically in
the Ninewa region of Iraq, an area which is a key focus of this
administration's religious minority work. Yet, neither the Government
of Iraq, nor the United States seems to have a plan for this
population.
Question. What is the administration's long-term plan for
addressing this population?
Answer. The United States encourages the repatriation of suspected
ISIS foreign terrorist fighters held in Syria so that they face justice
at home, in accordance with domestic and international law. The
Government of Iraq (GOI) is working to bring back its citizens from
Syria, and has reached an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) to repatriate Iraqi ISIS fighters detained in Syria and to
facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced Iraqis currently
in Syria. The repatriation of Iraqi ISIS fighters has already begun.
The GOI has been insistent that all those who fought for ISIS and
brought damage and harm to the Iraqi people need to be held responsible
for their crimes. We fully support Iraq's efforts to repatriate its
citizens and to hold ISIS fighters accountable for their crimes.
Question. How is the United States engaging in judicial process and
reform at the national and local levels in Iraq?
Answer. The United States is supporting UNITAD's efforts to
collect, preserve, and store evidence of ISIS atrocities that may
amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide for use in
prosecutions. The United States has made it clear that the Government
of Iraq's prosecution of ISIS suspects should be fair and subscribe to
due process norms, so as not to engender feelings of arbitrary
persecution that can drive cycles of radicalization. The Department has
provided support to Iraq's justice system through the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), among
others, which works with foreign governments to develop professional
and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights,
combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and
terrorism.
Question. How is the United States working with other countries on
accepting returned ISIS fighters?
Answer. The State Department is engaging countries to urge that
they take responsibility for their foreign terrorist fighter (FTF)
citizens in Syria by repatriating and prosecuting them for their
crimes. This remains an urgent undertaking as our partner, the Syrian
Democratic Forces, has custody of more than 2000 FTFs. This engagement
is done both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. Repatriation has
been a major theme in all Global Coalition meetings as well as the FTF
Working Group, made up of almost half of the Global Coalition's 80
members as well as observer states. The Secretary called for action at
the Global Coalition Ministerial in February.
The State Department's Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau seeks to
enhance the capacity of our partners to manage threats posed by FTFs
through technical assistance to law enforcement, corrections, and
justice sector agencies and, by doing so, to enable those partners to
repatriate and, where possible and appropriate, prosecute their FTF
citizens. The CT Bureau also works to build partner nation capacity
through initiatives to enhance rehabilitation and reintegration of
repatriated FTFs and their families. Working through multilateral
organizations such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
International Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), the
Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), Hedayah, and
the aforementioned Coalition FTF working group, we helped develop and
are now contributing to programs that help countries implement good
practices for addressing the challenges posed by returning families of
FTFs.
Question. How is the United States engaging in judicial process and
reform at the national and local levels in Iraq?
Answer. The United States is supporting UNITAD's efforts to
collect, preserve, and store evidence of ISIS atrocities that may
amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide for use in
prosecutions. The United States has made it clear that the Government
of Iraq's prosecution of ISIS suspects should be fair and subscribe to
due process norms, so as not to engender feelings of arbitrary
persecution that can drive cycles of radicalization. The Department has
provided support to Iraq's justice system through the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), among
others, which works with foreign governments to develop professional
and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights,
combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and
terrorism.
Question. What programs does the United States have in place,
including those working with Iraq and other countries, to counter
violent extremism?
Answer. The Department has provided support to Iraq's justice
system through the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP), among others, which works with foreign
governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement
institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce
the threat of transitional crime and terrorism. We support the
implementation of effective psychosocial efforts, especially for
children of ISIS foreign terrorist fighters who endured trauma from the
violence they witnessed and suffered. We also support the reintegration
of non-combatants into their communities, through which Iraqis can
remove some of the radicalizing influences and make room in detention
facilities for those convicted of serious offenses related to violent
extremism. We also support inclusive governmental practices, which
counter violent extremism by diminishing exclusion of various
communities from engagement in political and economic life in Iraq.
government of iraq-krg relations
Question. What are the issues that have improved?
Answer. The KRG and Government of Iraq have made significant
progress to improve relations since the appointment of Prime Minister
Abd al-Mahdi. We have seen early indications that the new KRG
government led by PM Masrour Barzani intends to build on that. Progress
since last fall includes an agreement to resume the transportation and
export of Kirkuk oil through a KRG-administered pipeline in the north.
Another agreement harmonizes customs duties, facilitating the removal
of internal GOI customs checkpoints along the internal boundary with
the IKR.
Question. What are the key outstanding issues that remain
unresolved?
Answer.Unresolved issues include disputed areas, oil shipments to
the central government, and security coordination to prevent ISIS from
exploiting weaknesses in national and regional security units.
Question. How is the U.S. engaging to help resolve those
differences?
Answer. A strong KRG within a unified and federal Iraq is essential
to Iraq's long-term stability and to the enduring defeat of ISIS. Thus,
it remains in our interest to help Baghdad and Erbil resolve these
outstanding differences. We will continue to encourage KRG and
Government of Iraq officials, with whom we have strong relationships,
to resolve their differences by identifying and accepting reasonable
compromises.
post-isis reconstruction and stabilization
Question. What are the prospects for stabilization and
reconstruction in areas of northern and western Iraq most damaged by
the battle with the Islamic State [specifically]: How long will it take
these areas to recover?
Answer. Iraq's recovery from the devastation wrought by ISIS
depends on many factors, including the support of its allies. The next
several years will be critical as Iraq continues to implement security,
economic, and governance reforms necessary to achieve long-term
stability. The Department of State is working to shift from the
provision of humanitarian and stabilization assistance, that helps
restore services in areas liberated from ISIS and encourage internally
displaced persons to return home, to a longer-term partnership on
security, trade, and investment. Assistance to Iraq will remain
essential in promoting U.S. goals for America's security and
prosperity. Not only will security, economic, and governance assistance
stabilize Iraq, it will also enable Iraq to be a stabilizing influence
in the region.
Question. How much money has the USG invested in Iraq's religious
and ethnic minorities since the Vice President's announcement in
October 2017?
Answer. Since the Vice President's announcement in October 2017,
the U.S. government has provided $340 million in funding to support
religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq.
Question. How much has the United States invested in minority
populated areas relative to Mosul and Ramadi?
Answer. Much of the $340 million in funding provided in support for
religious and ethnic minorities focuses on the Ninewa Plain, Sinjar,
and areas in northern Iraq to which Iraqis from those areas have been
displaced. Programs in these provinces address critical needs,
including: the provision of shelter, water, sanitation, hygiene,
protection and psychosocial services; the restoration of core essential
services by rehabilitating damaged infrastructure such as schools,
clinics, hospitals, electric and water systems; support to local and
faith-based civil society organizations with intimate knowledge of the
communities affected by ISIS; legal assistance to Iraqis who suffered
human rights abuses at the hands of ISIS; and enabling investment in
the private sector to rehabilitate the economy in these areas. Many
country-wide USG-supported programs also include activity in Anbar and
Ninewa, including programs to clear explosive remnants of war, provide
support to victims of violence and conflict, support the return of
displaced populations, and promote economic recovery. USAID has
committed $69 million specifically to support the revival of Mosul, the
economic and education center of northern Iraq, through electricity,
water, education, and business development projects. The Department of
State and USAID have also committed to providing $100 million in
additional funds to support the stabilization of Anbar province.
Question. How is the United States prioritizing development and
reconstruction funds for certain populations?
Answer. The Department of State has prioritized support that
addresses critical needs for health care, shelter, water, sanitation,
hygiene, and protection services. These funds also support the
restoration of core services in the three provinces most affected by
ISIS--Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al Din. Further programs will foster
stability and reconciliation by strengthening citizen-responsive
governance, security, democracy, and the rule of law. The Department
will support efforts to provide assistance and political support to at-
risk minority communities, and to encourage governmental and civil
society efforts to mediate disputes among Iraq's diverse ethnic and
religious minority populations, particularly in areas liberated from
ISIS in recent years.
Question. What further investments [in stabilization and
reconstruction] does the administration plan to make?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID have committed to
providing $100 million in additional FY 2018 funds to support the
stabilization of Anbar province, one of the regions most affected by
ISIS. These funds will support the provision of essential services in
Anbar province and the return of internally displaced persons, and also
will help reduce Anbar's vulnerability to another insurgency.
The Department will continue to announce additional contributions
as funds become available for obligation through the foreign assistance
process.
diplomatic drawdown
Question. What exactly is the plan for U.S. presence in Iraq?
Answer. With Mission Iraq under ordered departure for the third
month, we are assessing how best to staff the post in the long-term,
amid continued heightened regional tensions. Our goal is to ensure that
we have the resources to meet the President's objectives while at the
same time protecting our people. We are currently in the midst of
internal discussions on this issue and look forward to working with
Congress once we have additional information.
Question. How many personnel are currently in-country and where?
Answer. Today there are a total 328 personnel under Chief of
Mission security responsibility (excluding Locally Employed Staff) at
the Baghdad Embassy Compound, the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center,
and Consulate General Erbil. There are another 3,169 USG contractors,
located at the three sites above plus Union III, the headquarters for
the Coalition Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).
These numbers fluctuate daily as personnel depart on R&R and permanent
change of station, and others enter Iraq to assume those emergency
duties.
Question. What are the impacts of reducing diplomatic presence in
our diplomatic facilities?
Answer. Despite reductions, the United States remains committed to
our important bilateral relationship with Iraq and continues daily
diplomatic engagement to counter external malign influence and to
advance our many other interests in Iraq and the region. Ambassador
Tueller leads a strong team of some our best and most effective
diplomatic professionals at our Embassy in Baghdad.
Question. What do you assess to be primary threats to U.S.
personnel and facilities in Iraq?
Answer. The undisciplined Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF) and ISIS are the principle threats to U.S. interests in Iraq. The
threat of undisciplined PMF units has grown in recent months in
response to the United States increasing its maximum pressure campaign
against Iran.
Despite ISIS's loss of territory, it has transitioned into using
traditional terrorist tactics in Iraq. ISIS's targets are primarily
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the PMF, and Sunni tribal
groups. ISIS continues to conduct attacks against these entities in an
effort to create a more permissive operating environment for itself in
Iraq.
u.s. presence in southern iraq
Question. Along with many of my colleagues, I continue to be
concerned about the closure of our consulate in Basra. Additionally,
the administration has just notified $10 million in assistance for a
Basra water project: Please describe the administration's plans for
engagement with the southern governorates of Iraq and how you plan to
monitor the $10 million, in the wake of the temporary closure of the
U.S. Consulate in Basra.
What effects has the U.S. withdrawal had on U.S. interlocutors
among the local Iraqi populations in the south?
Answer. The United States remains deeply engaged in Basrah and the
southern provinces. The Embassy has established a Southern Iraq Affairs
Unit that maintains frequent contact with a wide range of government
and private sector contacts in southern Iraq. U.S. outreach and
programming focused on southern Iraq continues to be implemented with
the approval of national and local government officials and is being
administered effectively by Baghdad-based personnel. The Department's
efforts are aimed at helping the Government of Iraq to improve its
delivery of essential basic services, build professional security
forces loyal to the Iraqi state, develop durable democratic
institutions, and promote adherence to the rule of law. These efforts
are a stark contrast to Iran's destructive agenda to undermine the
Iraqi government and propagate sectarianism.
designation of the irgc as a foreign terrorist organization
Question. How has the designation of the IRGC as an FTO impacted
U.S. engagement with Iraqi interlocutors in Iraq, both diplomats and
military?
Answer. The IRGC designation has not hindered the USG's ability to
interact with its Iraqi partners. The United States continues to
monitor the situation closely, warning Iraqis of the consequences of
providing support to designated terrorist groups like the IRGC.
Question. Please describe diplomatic outreach to Iraqi officials to
describe the designation.
Answer. Secretary Pompeo designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Embassy Baghdad and Department
officials in the United States briefed and continue to engage a wide
range of Iraqi officials on the designations and their implications for
Iraq. Although Iraqis may be concerned that the escalating tensions
between the United States and Iran will affect Iraq, we continue to
assure them that the United States is not seeking conflict with Iran
and we do not view Iraq as an arena for escalation.
Question. Please describe how this determination was made, and what
considerations were made regarding U.S. presence and operations in
Iraq.
Answer. On April 15, 2019, the State Department designated the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Secretary of State made this decision after consulting with the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury, as required by statute, and
considering input from other relevant agencies.
This designation demonstrates the United States' unwavering
commitment to a sovereign, independent Iraq free from malign external
influence. An important part of that effort is isolating the actors
that conduct the Iranian regime's malign behavior and deterring others
from supporting them.
northern iraq
Question. What is your assessment of security in Erbil?
Answer. U.S. interests throughout Iraq are at high risk for
violence, crime, kidnapping, and terrorism. Kurdish security forces are
highly responsive to these threats, including that of ISIS, which
remains a significant threat in northern Iraq. The United States has
adequate resources to conduct its core diplomatic tasks despite these
challenges, and we continue to work with both our Government of Iraq
and Kurdistan Regional Government partners to advance U.S. interests
and promote the security of American citizens.
Question. Please describe any discussions with the government of
Turkey regarding security in and around Erbil and Northern Iraq.
Answer. Whether through Embassy Ankara's engagements with Turkish
interlocutors or as part of high-level U.S.-Turkey meetings in
Washington and Ankara, the United States regularly engages with the
Government of Turkey regarding security in and around Erbil and
Northern Iraq, particularly as it relates to the presence of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S. designated foreign terrorist
organization.
When engaging regarding security in Northern Iraq, the United
States consistently urges the Government of Turkey to coordinate with
the Government of Iraq and to act consistent with Iraqi sovereignty.
Question. Please describe your assessment of the PKK's operational
capacity in Iraq.
Answer. The United States takes the threat of the PKK seriously and
works closely with the governments of Iraq and Turkey to bolster the
security of our partners. The group maintains the ability to plan and
conduct terrorist attacks both in Iraq and elsewhere from their bases
in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.
__________
Responses of Michael P. Mulroy to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. On July 1st, Iraq's Prime Minister issued a decree
attempting to more closely integrate the Popular Mobilizations Forces
(PMFs) into the Iraqi Armed Forces. As you know, these militias, some
of which are backed by Iran, contribute to Iraq's instability,
especially in the northern regions. a) What continuing support, if any,
does Iran provide to PMF units? What is your assessment of the PMF
threat to Iraq's security? b) What are the State Department and
Department of Defense doing to help the Government of Iraq integrate
these groups into the Ministry of Defense chain of command? c) How is
this decree and its implementation different from a similar decree by
former Prime Minister Haider Abadi that was meant to integrate the PMF
into the Ministry of Defense but was not fully implemented?
Answer. Iran has historically provided arms, training, and advising
to its preferred elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and
Iran maintains continuing relationships with those groups. Although
many PMF units made great sacrifices to liberate Iraqi territories from
ISIS, undisciplined elements of the PMF now exploit liberated
populations and contribute to instability that could aid ISIS in its
attempts to resurge. Changing the structure of the PMF or integrating
PMF units into the Ministry of Defense chain of command is an Iraqi
decision. The Department of Defense is prepared to assist and encourage
our Iraqi partners in reforming their security institutions. The recent
decree on the PMF from Prime Minister Abd-al-Mahdi reiterates and
reinforces many of the same themes from former Prime Minister Abadi's
PMF decree. The effectiveness of this decree will ultimately depend on
implementation. We have seen some promising signs in recent weeks with
some significant PMF units agreeing to comply, but much work remains to
be done in fully implementing the decree.
Question. According to the United Nations, some 55,000 suspected
ISIS fighters and their families remain in detention in Iraq and Syria.
Additionally, there are numerous reports coming out about overcrowding
and horrific conditions in these detentions centers, specifically in
the Ninewa region of Iraq, an area which is a key focus of this
administration's religious minority work. Yet, neither the Government
of Iraq, nor the United States seems to have a plan for this
population. a) What is the administration's long-term plan for
addressing this population? b) How is the United States engaging with
Iraq on suspected ISIS fighters, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi? c) How is
the United States working with other countries on accepting returned
ISIS fighters? d) How is the United States engaging in judicial process
and reform at the national and local levels in Iraq? e) What programs
does the United States have in place, including those working with Iraq
and other countries, to counter violent extremism?
Answer. Returning captured ISIS fighters currently held by the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria, including foreign terrorist
fighters, to their countries of origin is the best way to keep them
from returning to the battlefield, re-engaging in terrorism, or further
radicalization. In this way, repatriation and prosecution of ISIS
fighters by countries of origin are in the best interest of regional
and international security. The Department of Defense supports the
Department of State's efforts to encourage countries to take back their
foreign terrorist fighters and their families, to address the
challenges posed by these populations, and to counter violent extremism
more broadly. Iraqi citizens make up a significant portion of the ISIS
fighters currently detained by the SDF in Syria. The Government of Iraq
(GoI) has announced that it plans to repatriate Iraqi citizens from
Syria, and we understand the GoI and SDF are working together to start
that process. The United States is not involved in this arrangement. We
commend the GoI for taking this step to return suspected Iraqi ISIS
fighters and their families from Syria and for holding members of ISIS
accountable. The GoI has been consistent that all those who fought for
ISIS, including foreign terrorist fighters, and brought damage and harm
to the Iraqi people, need to be held responsible for their crimes. We
encourage the SDF, the GoI, and all countries of origin to detain these
individuals humanely and prosecute them fairly, in accordance with
their domestic and international obligations.
Question. How has the designation of the IRGC as an FTO impacted
U.S. engagement with Iraqi interlocutors in Iraq, both diplomats and
military?
Answer. The Department of Defense maintains a close partnership and
robust engagement with the Iraqi Security Forces. That partnership has
not changed since the designation of the IRGC as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO). We would defer to the Department of State on
broader diplomatic engagements with the GoI.
Question. Please describe diplomatic outreach to Iraqi officials to
describe the designation.
Answer. We would defer to the Department of State on diplomatic
outreach to Iraqi officials with respect to the IRGC FTO designation.
Question. Please describe how this determination was made, and what
considerations were made regarding U.S. presence and operations in
Iraq.
Answer. The Secretary of State made this decision after consulting
with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, as required by
statute, and considering input from other relevant agencies, including
from the Department of Defense.
Question. What is your assessment of security in Erbil?
Answer. Thanks to close collaboration between Coalition and Iraqi
Kurdish security forces, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) has enjoyed
relative security since the fall of ISIS's physical caliphate. The
recent Erbil restaurant shooting, which resulted in the tragic death of
a Turkish diplomat, was a rare example of political violence in the
IKR's capital city. We defer to the State Department for more details.
Question. Please describe any discussions with the government of
Turkey regarding security in and around Erbil and Northern Iraq.
Answer. We defer to the Department of State on any such
negotiations.
Question. Please describe your assessment of the PKK's operational
capacity in Iraq.
Answer. The PKK is based out of the Qandil Mountains in northern
Iraq, from where it mounts smallscale attacks in Northern Iraq and
Turkey. The PKK's operational capacity remains a threat to our NATO
Ally Turkey and our partner Iraq. We defer to the intelligence
community for a specific and current assessment of the PKK's
operational capacity.
__________
Responses of Hon. Joan Polaschik to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Why didn't the Department request Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) assistance for Iraq for FY2020? Do you expect that the
Department will obligate FY 2019 FMF funds for Iraq?
Answer. We remain committed to helping the Iraqi government defend
itself against terrorist threats, counter malign Iranian influence, and
promote internal stability. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will
receive robust support from the U.S. government and other coalition
partners in FY 2020, and are increasingly able to sustain the costs FMF
has covered in the past.
FY 2019 FMF funding will continue to support the procurement of
defense articles, technical support, and training to build the long-
term capacity of Iraq's defense institutions, interoperability within
the ISF, and increase professionalization. Funds may also be used to
meet critically needed counterterrorism needs and support Kurdish
forces organized under the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Question. What are the State Department's views on the future of
the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad? How
does the State Department envision the security assistance mission in
Iraq evolving and what resources and personnel will the State
Department contribute to the mission of security partnership with Iraq?
Answer. The State Department views the Office of Security
Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) as an essential part of our security
relationship in Iraq. During the peak of the military campaign against
ISIS, OSC-I ensured materials and resources were provided to the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). As the campaign wore on and the Department of
Defense was able to fulfill the immediate needs of the ISF, OSC-I
focused on long term institution building and other tasks essential to
the enduring defeat of ISIS. We anticipate OSCI-I continuing to be of
broad benefit to Iraqi security over the long term.
Question. What is the status of U.S. outreach and programming in
southern Iraq in light of the 2018 decision to withdraw U.S. personnel
from the U.S. Consulate facility in Basra? What are the implications of
reduced U.S. presence and activity for U.S. interests and the security
of international businesses?
Answer. The United States remains deeply engaged in Basrah. The
Embassy has established a Southern Iraq Affairs Unit that maintains
frequent contact with a wide range of government and private sector
contacts in southern Iraq. U.S. outreach and programming focused on
southern Iraq continues to be implemented with the approval of national
and local government officials and are being administered effectively
by Baghdad-based personnel. The Department's efforts are aimed at
helping the Government of Iraq to improve its delivery of essential
basic services, build professional security forces loyal to the Iraqi
state, develop durable democratic institutions, and promote adherence
to the rule of law. These efforts are a stark contrast to Iran's
destructive agenda to undermine the Iraqi government and propagate
sectarianism.
Question. What support is the United States providing to help the
Iraqi government improve electricity and water service reliability and
quality in south-central and southern Iraq?
Answer. The United States has been clear with Iraq's national and
local government officials that they must take responsibility for
service delivery to Iraqi citizens. That said, U.S. efforts to assist
Iraq continue. On electricity, the United States is urging Iraq to
attract foreign investment that would expand its domestic electricity
production while supporting Iraqi-led efforts to enhance regional
energy cooperation. On water, the State Department is providing
training for Ministry of Water Resources personnel on water use
optimization and, through USAID, improved prioritization of
infrastructure repairs.
Question. Do you expect Iran-linked elements of the Popular
Mobilization Forces to comply with the various de-politicization,
demobilization, and disarmament demands of Prime Minister Abd al
Mahdi's recent decree? What are the implications for his government if
these groups refuse to comply?
Answer. The Prime Minister's decree seeks to bring all Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) units under firm state control. We view the
decree as a positive step toward a secure and sovereign Iraq.
Enforcement will be a significant challenge, but we continue to support
the Government of Iraq's efforts to bring all armed groups under
effective command and control.
We believe the Iraqi people are tired of the criminal and
destabilizing actions of some Iran-backed PMF and are broadly
supportive of the Government of Iraq's efforts to address destabilizing
PMF behavior. This political reality will incentivize PMF compliance
with the decree and isolate groups that fail to adhere to the Prime
Minister's orders.
Question. To what extent have those elements of the Popular
Mobilization Forces that have integrated with the Iraqi Security Forces
to date maintained their individual unit structures versus their
personnel being absorbed and distributed into other units?
Answer. The Government of Iraq is working to establish control over
all armed groups in the country. Reining in undisciplined Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) operating outside of state control is a
particularly daunting challenge that Iraq is now addressing. We believe
the Prime Minister's recent decree ordering PMF units to de-politicize,
remove checkpoints, and refrain from money-generating activity is a
positive first step. The timeline by which PMF units are formally
integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces as called for by the Prime
Minister's decree is for the Government of Iraq to decide. Prime
Minister Adel Abd al-Mahdi continues to be steadfast in his public
statements that the Popular Mobilization Forces must reform into a
professional, disciplined, and apolitical security service, and we
support the Government of Iraq's efforts to achieve this goal.
Question. What are the administration's plans for providing
additional support for stabilization and reconstruction in areas of
northern and western Iraq most damaged by the battle with the Islamic
State? When will the administration announce additional contributions
from funds already appropriated by Congress for this purpose in FY 2018
and FY 2019?
Answer. To date, the Department of State and USAID have provided
$365 million in funds to the UNDP's Funding Facility for Stabilization
for stabilization assistance and $340 million for the recovery of
religious and ethnic minority populations in areas most damaged by the
Islamic State in northern and western Iraq. The Department of State and
USAID have committed to providing $100 million in additional FY 2018
funds to support the stabilization of Anbar province, one of the
regions most affected by ISIS. These funds will support the provision
of essential services in Anbar province, the return of internally
displaced persons, and will help reduce Anbar's vulnerability to
another insurgency.
USAID will also program at least an additional $30 million into
programs supporting the recovery of communities in the Ninewa Plain and
western Ninewa, as well as supporting communities displaced from those
areas to other parts of northern Iraq, whose populations are
predominantly religious and ethnic minorities targeted for genocide by
ISIS.
The Department will continue to announce additional contributions
as funds become available for obligation through the foreign assistance
process.
Question. Now that the KRG has resolved its leadership selection
process, what are the prospects for the relationship between the
Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq? What are the key outstanding
issues of difference between the national government and the KRG?
Answer. The KRG and Government of Iraq have made important progress
to improve relations since the appointment of Prime Minister Abd al-
Mahdi, and we have seen early indications that the new KRG government
led by PM Masrour Barzani intends to build on that. Progress since last
fall includes an agreement to resume the transportation and export of
Kirkuk oil through a KRG-administered pipeline in the north, and
another agreement to harmonize customs duties, facilitating the removal
of internal GOI customs checkpoints along the internal boundary with
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Unresolved issues include disputed areas,
oil shipments to the central government, and security coordination to
prevent ISIS from exploiting the seams between national and regional
security units.
Question. What, if anything, can and should the United States do to
help resolve these differences?
Answer. A strong KRG within a unified and federal Iraq is essential
to Iraq's long-term stability and to the enduring defeat of ISIS. Thus,
it remains in our interest to help Baghdad and Erbil resolve these
outstanding differences. We will continue to encourage KRG and
Government of Iraq officials, with whom we have strong relationships,
to resolve their differences by identifying and accepting reasonable
compromises.
Question. In late 2017, Vice President Pence announced that the
Trump administration would hold up funding pledged to U.N.
reconstruction activities in Iraq, instead channeling funds directly to
Christian communities in the north of the country. A recent article in
The Washington Post noted that: `` . . . for Iraq's Sunni Muslims, who
bore the brunt of the Islamic State occupation but have received little
reconstruction help from the United States, the miserable conditions
could seed a new round of militancy.'' One of the major advantages of
working with the U.N. in these types of situations is that it delivers
humanitarian and development assistance in an impartial and non-
discriminatory manner on the basis of greatest need: Can you address
these concerns?
Answer. Since FY 2014, the U.S. government has provided more than
$2.3 billion in humanitarian assistance for the Iraq response in the
region, including for IDPs in Iraq. U.S. government humanitarian aid is
provided through the U.N. and other international and non-governmental
humanitarian organizations. The U.N., in coordination with the
Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government, is leading the
humanitarian response in Iraq. We provide humanitarian assistance
strictly on the basis of need, without consideration of religion or
ethnicity.
Since FY 2014, we have also committed $358 million in stabilization
assistance that is being implemented through UNDP's Funding Facility
for Stabilization to help stabilize areas of Iraq liberated from ISIS.
On April 14, 2019, we announced a $100 million contribution to UNDP in
support of stabilization work in Anbar Province, which has a majority-
Sunni population.
Question. Will the administration commit to working with the U.N.
to address the humanitarian and development needs of all of Iraq's
citizens, including religious minorities?
Answer. Yes. Our support for minority communities is not at the
exclusion of support for other Iraqi communities who are also
recovering from the destruction of ISIS. For example, on April 14,
2019, we announced a $100 million contribution to UNDP in support of
stabilization work in Anbar Province, which has a majority-Sunni
population.
Question. Since 2003, a U.N. political mission (the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Iraq, or UNAMI) has been on the ground supporting
international efforts to stabilize Iraq. The U.S. has long been a key
supporter of UNAMI, repeatedly supporting the reauthorization of its
mandate by the U.N. Security Council over the years, including most
recently this May. Moving forward, will the administration continue to
coordinate its efforts in Iraq with UNAMI?
Answer. Yes. UNAMI significantly contributes to U.S. policy goals
of a sovereign, stable, and prosperous Iraq that is free from foreign
interference and capable of disrupting ISIS and other terrorist
networks. Following the territorial defeat of ISIS, UNAMI is
coordinating with the Iraqi government on reconstruction, recovery, and
stabilization efforts. The Mission enjoys strong support among Iraqi
political and religious elites, who view UNAMI as a neutral broker and
often consult with UNAMI leadership in efforts to break political
impasses. UNAMI's recent mandate renewal in May 2019 focuses on
progress related to corruption, stabilization, regional integration
with neighboring countries, reining in undisciplined armed groups, and
internally displaced persons.
Question. The U.S. strongly supported adoption of the Security
Council resolution authorizing UNITAD at the time; does it still find
value in these types of activities?
Answer. Yes. The United States strongly supports UNITAD's work to
collect, preserve, and store evidence of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide committed by ISIS in Iraq. Iraqis, including
religious and ethnic minorities, suffered unspeakable atrocities under
the genocidal rule of ISIS; these crimes cannot go unpunished or
undocumented. To this end, the United States has contributed $2 million
to UNITAD to begin exhumations of mass graves in the Sinjar region of
Northern Iraq, historic home to the Yezidi people.
Question. How is the U.S. working with UNITAD to support the
collection and preservation of evidence, while at the same time
impressing on Iraqi authorities the need to ensure that trials of
terrorism suspects meet international human rights standards?
Answer. The United States has contributed $2 million to UNITAD for
the exhumation of mass graves in the Sinjar region of Northern Iraq,
historic home to the Yezidi people, in order to collect, preserve, and
store evidence of ISIS atrocities that may amount to war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide for use in prosecutions. This support
builds on years of funding and support provided to the International
Commission on Missing Persons in Iraq to lay the foundation for
processing mass graves from decades of conflict in Iraq. The United
States is urging other countries to repatriate suspected foreign
terrorist fighters for prosecution in their countries of origin and
supports the Government of Iraq's prosecution of ISIS suspects pursuant
to its domestic laws. The United States has made it clear that this
process should be fair and subscribe to due process norms, so as not to
engender feelings of arbitrary persecution that can drive cycles of
radicalization. The Department has provided support to Iraq through the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP), among others, to develop and support institutions to
investigate, prosecute, and defend against human rights abuses,
criminal behavior, and other abuses of power within Iraq's security
services.
Question. The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) is playing a critical
role in efforts to address the ongoing acute needs of children in Iraq.
For example, the agency is currently working to reopen nearly 2,000
schools in arrears formerly controlled by ISIS, including in conflict
affected arrears of Mosul. Nevertheless, the needs remain immense:
according to UNICEF's team in Iraq, 2.6 million children are still
either out of school or ``at risk of missing out on their education''
due to the disruptions caused by the conflict: What is the U.S. doing
to support efforts by UNICEF and other organizations to restore
educational opportunities for children in Iraq?
Answer. We share your concerns about the disruption in education
caused by the conflict against ISIS in Iraq and are working to ensure
children have access to education. The U.S. government, through the
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, has
provided more than $16 million in humanitarian assistance in Fiscal
Years (FY) 2018 and 2019 to UNICEF's education, protection, and
assistance activities for displaced and conflict-affected children in
Iraq. In addition, in FY 2018, the State Department supported non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) working to rehabilitate schools,
provide teacher training and learning materials, and assist students to
re-enroll in formal education, among other activities. U.S. government
assistance also focuses on meeting the needs of out-of-school children
and of adolescent girls and boys who face heightened protection risks,
as well as the needs of gender-based violence survivors.
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