[Senate Hearing 116-199]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-199
DEFENSE COOPERATION: USE OF EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES
UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 10, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-504 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Cooper, Hon. R. Clarke, Assistant Secretary, Political-Military
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 34
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 34
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions Submitted by Senator
Todd Young..................................................... 43
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions Submitted by Senator
Edward J. Markey............................................... 45
(iii)
DEFENSE COOPERATION: USE OF EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT
CONTROL ACT
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Gardner, Romney, Cruz,
Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Thank you all for being here today. And today, we are going
to discuss the recent emergency declaration regarding U.S. arms
sales.
To start, we should recognize and acknowledge that the law
contemplates and, indeed, requires a partnership between the
executive branch and the legislative branch regarding arms
sales. This committee plays an important role to conduct
rigorous oversight of the issue. At the same time, the law does
grant the President authority to conduct sales without
congressional approval in times of emergency. We will be
focusing on that issue. This hearing will focus on these rules
and authorities. We must consider the context for this latest
declaration, namely the active threats and attacks from Iran
and its proxies and our partners' capabilities to defend
against those threats.
The Arms Export Control Act grants the President authority
to declare an emergency concerning specific arms sales and
avoid the standard process of congressional notification. Such
presidential authority dates back more than 40 years to lessons
learned from the October 1973 war in the Middle East.
Presidents of both parties have used emergency authorities
five--on five previous occasions. In each case, they address
specific threats to U.S. allies and did not alter the standing
process of congressional review nor have a meaningful impact on
Congress's authority over time. I expect this latest
declaration will continue that pattern and deserves review in
that expectation.
As with one of the previous emergency declarations, this
declaration came in response to threats and attacks from the
Iranian regime. Since mid-May, Iran and its proxies have struck
commercial ships, civilian airports, and desalination plants
critical to the civilian population. Additionally, they shot
down multiple U.S. unmanned aircraft. Over the weekend,
Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen unveiled even newer
models of ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
capable of striking deeper into Saudi Arabia. Iran's threats
and actions toward the U.S. and our allies have been clear: We
must respond to such threats, protect our interests, and
support our allies as they defend themselves. Neither this
President nor Congress nor the American people seek war with
Iran. And I commend the President for his restraint in the face
of numerous provocations.
I was in the room as the President considered the--one of
the most recent provocations, and sought advice regarding that.
Anyone--anyone who interprets the President's reasonable
forbearance is making a grave mistake, that is a--ripe for
miscalculation and it should not be mistaken. Attacking
America, its interests, or our partners will lead to a strong
defensive response. Emergency declarations are useful, not just
for the tangible military capabilities they transfer to allies
and partners, but are equally important for the messages they
convey.
These particular sales come in the context of, and are
colored by, larger challenges with our Saudi and Emirate
partners, including the war in Yemen, the murder of Jamal
Khashoggi, and other human rights issues. To address these
challenges, I introduced the Saudi Arabia Diplomatic Review Act
and sought broad input from all quarters, on a bipartisan
basis, to produce legislation that will move us much more in
the right direction. I want to thank all parties, including my
friends on the other side of the aisle, who have been very
helpful in trying to craft legislation that will get us to
where we want to be. I have been impressed how carefully people
have weighed this issue, and how impressed I have been with the
attempt to reach legislation that balances the various aspects
of this challenge.
This legislation calls for a comprehensive review of United
States-Saudi relations. As we conduct this review, however, we
must not--we must discourage Iran aggression, and must not
leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable. Our partners desperately need
the capabilities in these sales contemplated by other U.S.
training and advising initiatives to improve their ability to
minimize collateral damage and deter aggression. We are here
today because of the continuing threats by Iran. As we move
forward, I urge us all to seek measured solutions to these
difficult challenges and avoid inadvertently strengthening our
adversaries or damaging our partners and allies. I really
believe this committee has done that and, hopefully, we will
continue to do that.
I thank our witnesses for joining us today, and look
forward to hearing their perspectives on these issues.
With that, Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today to examine the appropriate role of congressional
oversight on arms sales.
It is important that any President and any administration,
and this one in particular, respect Congress as a coequal
branch of government and execute our laws in good faith.
Now, despite your pledge during your confirmation hearing
to do just that, Mr. Cooper, and your commitment to be
transparent and forthcoming with this committee, since you
began your tenure, the Department has shown only disdain for
Congress and the laws that govern our arm export programs.
Beyond that, you have balked at the idea that you should be
held accountable for your actions.
On May 24th, the Secretary of State sent this committee 22
notifications for arms sales and transfers to Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates, totaling more than $8 billion. In a
boilerplate memo, the Secretary argued, unconvincingly, that
these sales, some of which the committee had already cleared,
were exempt from the legally required 30 days of congressional
review and action, claiming a sudden, quote, ``emergency threat
from Iran.'' Yet, this administration has been unable to
explain how, precisely, these sales respond to the supposed
emergency. And at no time prior to May 24th did the
administration once raise these sales as necessary to respond
to the threat from Iran.
Let me be clear. Iran has and will continue to pose a
threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. And I have
and will continue to improve--approve arms sales to allies that
are in line with our long- and short-term strategic interests
and basic U.S. principles, such as the basic respect for human
life. But, if you look at these sales, it appears that the
administration had other motives. Indeed, when pressed, rather
than explain exactly how these sales will address a supposedly
imminent threat from Iran, you and other administration
officials demurred and said the sales were for, quote,
``sustaining the global supply chain,'' for preventing, quote,
``loss of sale to peer competitors,'' for maintaining U.S.,
quote, ``credibility as an arms supplier,'' and so on.
So, I look forward to hearing you explain today, How would
taking away American jobs and creating a Saudi jobs program of
manufacturing F-18 panels for export for an aircraft the Saudis
do not own or operate respond to an emergency? How would sales
that would not be delivered for many, many months immediately
respond to an emergency? And, as I have been asking for more
than a year, how does the sale of precision-guided munitions
for use in Yemen, presumably when the same--with the same
atrocious results and human suffering we have seen over the
last 4 years, respond to an emergency?
Mr. Cooper, you testified in a House hearing that the,
quote, ``protracted process of congressional review was
problematic for the commercial sales.'' Indeed, unless I
misunderstood, you implied that I personally, in exercising my
rights as the Ranking Member of this committee, was the reason
you had to push through all 22 sales. As you well know, the
process was protracted because neither the Secretary nor the
Department was willing or able to make a persuasive case that
selling precision-guided bombs to Saudi and the United Arab
Emirates, the particular arms that I was holding, would improve
protection of Yemeni civilians to Saudi airstrikes or end the
UAE's human rights abuses in Yemen. In fact, not only did the
Department not make a persuasive case, you made no case since
last October, after Jamal Khashoggi was literally butchered, on
orders from the highest levels of the Saudi government.
So, Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, the Secretary of State's
message to us is clear, ``Congress can review arms sales. Just
do not take too long or ask tough questions. Otherwise, I will
just ignore the law and cut you out of the process entirely.''
Three weeks ago, in a bipartisan fashion, the Senate made
clear what it thought of the Secretary of State's false
emergency sales by approving an unprecedented 22 separate
resolutions of disapproval of these sales. Two weeks ago, this
committee approved our bipartisan bill, the Saudi Arabia False
Emergencies, or SAFE, Act, to prevent similar abuses of the
emergency authority in the future. I hope the Secretary and the
administration appreciate the gravity of these actions and
those to come.
The informal arms sale review process under the Arms Export
Control Act has operated successfully for decades. It worked
because successive administrations recognized that there is a
value in consulting with the committees about any concerns that
could arise from a sale, and they acted in good faith.
Simply put, Mr. Cooper, you and the Secretary have
undermined this process. I urge you to take another look at the
definition of ``emergency'' and rethink your approach to
engaging Congress and abiding by the congressional oversight
you claimed during your hearing you would respect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Welcome, Secretary Cooper. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. CLARKE COOPER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member, and Senators.
``In recent days, neutral shipping has been attacked. By
providing a deterrent against hostile actions, this transfer
lowers the risk of a broader conflict. The determination
reflects the United States grave concern with the growing
escalation in the Gulf and its implication for the security of
our friends in the region.'' These words could precisely
describe the context of the recent emergency certification this
hearing has been convened to discuss, but they are actually
from a State Department announcement from 1984. Then, as now,
Iran's revolutionary government threatened international
shipping in the Gulf, through its proxies, supported attacks on
American interests in the region, resulting in deaths of 241
American service members in Beirut. Then, as now, our partners
required the reassurance provided by an American demonstration
of resolve. And then, as now, the administration took steps to
deter war, not to bring it closer.
In his May 24th certification, Secretary Pompeo advanced a
set of arms transfers to support our partners in the current
crisis. These capabilities include aircraft support, munitions,
logistics services, unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms, training, and advisory services. None
of these constitute introductions of fundamentally new
capabilities to the region. None alter the military balance of
power. None are of a nature or category that Congress has not
previously reviewed and approved for these particular partners.
The Secretary's decision to exercise his statutory
authorities under the Arms Export Control Act reflects the
current threat from Iran as well as the persistent threat.
Prior to making the certification, the administration saw and
briefed Congress about an increased threat stream from Iran
relating to both U.S. and partner interests throughout the
region. These troubling and escalatory indications and warnings
from the Iranian regime prompted an increased U.S. force
posture in the region.
Events since the Secretary's certification served to
further validate the urgent need for these sales: Iranian
attacks on civilian crude commercial cargo ships and tankers in
the Sea of Oman; continued attacks by the Iranian-backed
Houthis--these are including utilization of one particular case
of a cruise missile against civilian commercial airports; and
the shoot down of a U.S. Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
unmanned aerial system in international airspace.
These provocative actions mark a new evolution in the
threat Iran poses to the region, to our partners, and to our
own national security, including the security of the hundreds
of thousands of Americans who live and work in the Gulf States.
And the current situation in Iran has implications not only in
the Gulf, but in a geostrategic level. In today's world, our
partnerships are vital, and we must ensure our partners have
the capabilities, the systems, the communications, the
intelligence, and the training to play their due role in
maintaining the stability and the security in their regions.
Our adversaries recognize the importance of our
partnerships and have adopted purposeful strategies of trying
to disrupt them at all levels, including in terms of our
security cooperation; for instance, by seeking to replace us as
suppliers of choice. As such, the Secretary's certification
should not be seen not only as a deterrent to Iran and a
reassurance to our partners, but it is also a rebuff to our
competitors.
Before closing, I would like to address some of the
specific concerns that have been raised by this committee. Many
Senators--many Americans--are concerned about the use of arms
we provide overseas, including in the context of the Yemen
civil war. These concerns are appropriate, and we share them.
From the beginning of the conflict, we have maintained a
political solution is urgently needed, and supported the U.N.-
led effort working toward that objective. America stands out
from many foreign suppliers of defense materiel by the premium
we place on ensuring that our capabilities are not contributing
to gross violations of human rights. We have worked with the
Saudi-led coalition, over the course of its operations, to
reduce the occurrence of civilian casualties. Our support in
this regard has ranged from the provision of training on
targeting to mentoring and advising the coalition on best
practices, on lessons learned, and on integrating complex data
into a system that is specifically designed to reduce civilian
casualties. We have also provided higher-end legal training on
the laws of armed conflict, and have directly and regularly
engaged with both military and political leadership on this
topic.
And finally, on the question of process, during both his
confirmation and, as cited here today, my own confirmation, the
Secretary and I did provide you our commitments on the
congressional review process for arms sales. That commitment
stands. I value deeply Congress's role in the review of arms
transfers. I take pride in the depth and the detail of the
working relationships that we have with the committees in the
course of this process. The Secretary's certification is not
setting aside of that process, but it is the utilization of a
longstanding statutory authority to respond to an urgent
contingency. As such, I would like to take this opportunity to
affirm the value we place in our engagement with you on arms
transfers and broader security assistance issues.
Mr. Chairman, in 1984, Ambassador Michael Armacost
explained President Reagan's emergency certification to
Congress in these words, ``Our decisions were a prudent yet
clear response to an escalating emergency which threatens Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf. They satisfied a clear military need. In
addition, we sent a political signal of both reassurance and
deterrence. It was a measured response which promotes regional
stability and security.''
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, committee members, a
political signal of both reassurance and deterrence, a measured
response which promotes regional stability and security, these
are the purposes for which President Reagan certified an
emergency in 1984, and they are the purposes for which Senate--
Secretary Pompeo invoked the same authority in May.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. Clarke Cooper
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Menendez, Senators:
``In recent days, neutral shipping has been attacked . . . By
providing a deterrent against hostile actions, this transfer lowers the
risk of a broader conflict. The . . . determination reflects United
States grave concern with the growing escalation in the Gulf and its
implication for the security of our friends in the region.''
These words could describe the context of the recent Emergency
Certification this hearing has been convened to discuss, but they are
actually from a State Department announcement from 1984. A hearing took
place 35 years ago shortly after that announcement was made, similar to
the one we are participating in today. At that hearing, then Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, Ambassador Michael Armacost, told
Congress of our ``need to respond firmly and decisively to requests
from the Gulf states for appropriate and justifiable security
assistance.'' He added that:
``The states in the area must be confident that our interests in
the Gulf are sufficiently important for us to help in a crisis. The
United States has to be seen as a credible partner in the search for
stability and security.''
Then, as now, Iran's revolutionary government threatened
international shipping in the Gulf. Then, as now, our partners required
the reassurance provided by an American demonstration of resolve. And
then, as now, the administration took steps to deter war, not to bring
it closer.
On May 24th, 2019, the Department of State notified Congress that
the Secretary determined that ``an emergency exists which requires the
immediate sale'' of 22 foreign military and direct commercial sales to
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, in one case, Jordan. These
sales included aircraft support, munitions, logistics services,
unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms,
training, and advisory services.
These sales and the associated emergency certification are intended
to address the military need of our partners in the face of an urgent
regional threat posed by Iran; promote the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners; and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors.
A combination of factors led the Secretary to determine the
situation constituted an emergency and prompted him to make the
Certification, including the significant increase in the intelligence
threat streams related to Iran; the clear, provocative, and damaging
actions taken by Iran's government; and the need to respond to military
capability requests from our partners.
Iran is a malign actor and the leading state sponsor of terrorism.
It poses conventional and asymmetric threats to our partners in the
Gulf, and to U.S. interests in the region and beyond. While these facts
are well-known, we have seen new, troubling and escalatory indications
and warnings from the Iranian regime, which have prompted an increased
U.S. force posture in the region. Indeed, events since the Secretary's
certification further demonstrate the urgent need for these sales :
Iranian attacks on civilian-crewed cargo ships and tankers in the Sea
of Oman; continued attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis, including one
utilizing a cruise missile, against civilian commercial airports; the
shoot-down of a U.S. Broad Area Maritime Surveillance unmanned aerial
system in international airspace.
These latest actions, like those preceding the May 24th
notification, include attacks on commercial shipping off the coast of
the United Arab Emirates, attacks on pumping stations of the Saudi
East-West Pipeline utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles, and a rocket
fired into a park about a kilometer from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on
May 19th. These are provocative actions that mark a new evolution in
the threat Iran poses to the security of the hundreds of thousands of
Americans who live and work in the Gulf States, and to the security of
the region, and our partners.
Our posture regarding Iran remains focused on assuring our partners
of our commitment to enhancing their defense capabilities. This action
is not intended to be an escalatory military step; instead, it is a
loud and clear message to Iran that we stand by our regional partners
at a particularly dangerous time. This set of cases demonstrates the
United States' resolve to stand with our partners and to ensure we
remain their partner of choice.
In the Memorandum to Congress, the Secretary explained ``Iranian
malign activity poses a fundamental threat to the stability of the
Middle East and to American security at home and abroad.'' He noted
``Iran's actions have led directly to the deaths of over 600 U.S.
military personnel in Iraq, untold suffering in Syria, and significant
threats to Israeli security,'' and he observed that ``current threat
reporting indicates Iran engages in preparations for further malign
activities throughout the Middle East region, including potential
targeting of U.S. and allied military forces in the region.'' While the
law requires the Department of State to notify Congress, Members of the
Committee should understand clearly that the intended audience of this
notification extends beyond Congress or even Iran.
As the 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, we are in an
era of global competition against near-peer adversaries, including
Russia and China. That competition includes fostering security and
defense relationships that have political, military, and economic
components. In such an environment it is crucial that the United States
remain the partner of choice and be trusted as a dependable provider of
defense capabilities--including materiel--to our partners.
Our National Security Strategy describes the invaluable advantages
that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver. While
the United States continues to build and offer our partners the most
capable, advanced, defense technologies, we do not have a monopoly on
fostering or maintaining reliable security relationships.
The National Security Strategy is realistic and very clear eyed the
United States must compete for positive relationships around the world
as China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to
expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United
States.
Our adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted
deliberate, long-term strategies of trying to disrupt our partnerships
by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of
choice. We simply cannot allow openings our adversaries will most
certainly exploit to disrupt partnerships, to reduce our regional
influence, to impact our defense industrial base, and to spread chaos.
Remaining a reliable security partner to our allies and friends
around the world is also in the interest and furtherance of our values.
When our adversaries sell weapons of war, they do not place the same,
if any, premium as we do on addressing the risk the capabilities we
provide may contribute to abuses of human rights or violations of
international humanitarian law. China does not work to expand
transparency on the battlefield, and there is no Russian Conventional
Arms Transfer Policy requiring action to facilitate partner efforts to
reduce civilian casualties, which is a policy we have had in place
since 2018.
When President Trump issued the updated Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy in 2018, a centerpiece of the new Policy was its unprecedented
directive that we work with partners to reduce the risk of civilian
harm in their military operations. We are working on the implementation
of that directive to shape future engagements, including with partners
in advance of conflict situations.
Before I close, let me address a few other aspects of these sales
and the emergency certification that may interest to you.
First, the step recently taken by the Secretary to certify an
emergency has ample precedent. The statutory emergency authority in the
Arms Export Control Act was exercised a total of five times since 1979,
across administrations, both Democratic and Republican. In two of those
cases, it was also for sales to Saudi Arabia due to threats posted by
other countries in the region. There is, however, one element of the
most recent emergency notification that is new: unlike in previous
instances this authority has been invoked, Congress was provided with
an unclassified Memorandum of Justification by the Department of State.
Second, we value deeply this Committee's and Congress' role more
broadly in the review of the arms transfer process. I acknowledge the
Committee's concerns regarding the Secretary's certification, evinced
by actions such as your advancement by voice vote of Senator Menendez's
SAFE Act in June. So let me be clear: we take pride in the depth and
detail of the working relationship the Department has with the
Committees in the course of this process. As the Secretary noted, we
intend for this certification to be a one-time event for a discrete set
of cases, utilizing statutory authority provided by Congress. As such,
we view the Secretary's action as an affirmation of the value we
continue to place on our engagement with you on arms transfers and
broader security assistance issues.
The Department will continue to use the Tiered Review process, the
informal review that this Committee, and its House counterpart, conduct
of pending arms transfers, before those transfers are formally
notified. I particularly appreciate the Committee's staff also has
continued to engage in this process since the certification. In fact,
since the emergency notification on May 24, 2019, the Department of
State has already utilized the tiered review process for a new sale of
F-16s to Bulgaria, Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles for Germany, and
sustainment for Morocco's F-16 fleet.
Third, none of these sales constitute introductions of
fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none fundamentally alter
the military balance of power; none are of a nature or category that
Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for these partners.
Finally, many Members--indeed, many Americans--are concerned about
the end use of the arms we provide overseas, including in the context
of the Yemen civil war. These concerns are appropriate and we share
them. From the beginning of this conflict we have maintained a
political solution is urgently needed, and supported the U.N.-led
effort working toward that objective. In addition, we have worked with
the Saudi-led Coalition over the course of its operations to reduce the
occurrence of civilian casualties.
Our support in this regard has ranged from the provision of
training on targeting and the supply of more precise munitions, to
mentoring and advising the Coalition on best practices to reduce
civilian casualties--such as the standing up and operationalization of
the Saudi Joint Incident Assessment Team--to training on international
humanitarian law, and direct engagement with political leadership on
this topic. While more work is undoubtedly needed, our engagement with
the Coalition has improved its ability to avoid civilian casualties in
its operations.
So that is the global, steady-state picture: the need to meet a
present emergency; to remain engaged with partners; to ensure we,
rather than near-peer adversaries, are their primary security partners;
to make clear we support our partners in the defense of their realms
and the security of the regions; and to deter our shared adversaries
from disrupting those objectives. Or, as Ambassador Armacost put it to
Congress all those years ago, ``Our decisions were a prudent yet clear
response to an escalating emergency which threatens Saudi Arabia'' (and
the Gulf). ``They satisfied a clear military need. In addition... we
sent a political signal of both reassurance and deterrence. It was a
measured response which promotes regional stability and security.''
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Committee Members: Those were the
purposes for which President Reagan certified an emergency in 1984:
and, within the context of the imminent threat posed by Iran, they are
the purposes for which Secretary Pompeo invoked the same authority on
May 24.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper.
Do you have any current plans to invoke emergency on any
sales in the immediate or near future?
Mr. Cooper. No, Mr. Chairman. The authority, as you noted,
has been limited, applied very judiciously. This is the fifth
application. The one I cited that was the most historic
relevance was in 1984. The first application was in 1979. It
has been judiciously applied across administrations from
President Carter to President Trump.
The Chairman. You made reference, in your testimony, to the
fact that there was the possibility, always, that someone like
the Saudis, someone with--that has very substantial financial
resources, could turn to one of our two major competitors on
the globe and actually wind up in their orbit. Is that a
substantial threat, do you believe?
Mr. Cooper. In an open fora, I would--it is safe to address
that there is always the risk of near-peer adversaries looking
for opportunities, not only in the Gulf region, but anywhere on
the globe. I would say, when we are talking about the National
Security Strategy and how we meet near-peer adversaries, it is
not limited to where they are geographically set. It is a
global concern. And, back to the calculus on the emergency
certification, it was a message, on several levels. The
immediate one was a deterrence to Iran. There was the
reassurance, as noted here, to these partners. But, it was also
a warning or a rebuff to near-peer adversaries who, maybe, were
looking to augment or seek opportunity.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Cooper, would you agree that an
emergency usually denotes something imminent, something urgent?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. I have--so, it would not refer to
something from years ago. So, I have read this May 24th memo
from the Secretary multiple times, and yet I just cannot seem
to find where it lays out the emergency that these sales
address. I see references to designations dating back to 1984,
events from 2014, and general instability that has been
plaguing the region for years. For years. But, nowhere do I see
where it says what the emergency is.
So, tell me, what is the State Department's operative
definition of an ``emergency'' that you used for these sales?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
So, the statement you are referring to, the actual
declaration, is an unclassified document. And you were correct
to note that there is context in there of this particular
adversary and their persistent threat stream, as well as what
their proxies may or are capable of doing. What actually
equates to an emergency, as it--where we are today--is the
current threat posture of Iran and what was calculated there,
from an interagency aspect. There were multiple tools,
including this----
Senator Menendez. But, just----
Mr. Cooper. --declaration----
Senator Menendez. Let me stop you, because I do not have
unlimited time.
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Senator Menendez. Answer my question. What is the
definition of ``emergency'' that you used for these sales?
Mr. Cooper. A confluence of conditions that were assessed
required several tools by the administration, including an
increase of force posture, this emergency declaration, and
application of sanctions. That did equate an emergency status.
Senator Menendez. None of that--none of that really has
changed, though, from the present to the past. Did the legal
advisor's office opine on what an ``emergency'' is?
Mr. Cooper. The legal advisor's office assured and cleared
on the statutory authority that was made available for the
Secretary to make this decision.
Senator Menendez. Did the legal advisor issue a legal
opinion?
Mr. Cooper. Legal advisor's office was part of the process,
and then----
Senator Menendez. I didn't ask you that.
Mr. Cooper. --the decision----
Senator Menendez. I asked you, Did they issue an opinion?
Mr. Cooper. In this fora, I am not going to talk about the
pre-decisional process on the option----
Senator Menendez. Did they issue----
Mr. Cooper. --that the Secretary had.
Senator Menendez. --an opinion? What is a pre-decisional
process? They either issued an opinion or they did not issue an
opinion. Did they issue an opinion? That is not a question of a
pre-decisional process. Do you have opinion in your possession?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, the legal advisor's office
participated in the application of the certification, as noted
by statute for----
Senator Menendez. Okay.
Mr. Cooper. --the Secretary's----
Senator Menendez. You are not answering my----
Mr. Cooper. --authority.
Senator Menendez. You are not answering my question. And I
am not going to let you get away with what you got away with in
the House. Either you have an opinion, in which case I want to
see it, or, if you do not have an opinion that is written, then
you ultimately invoked an emergency, but without a legally
defined opinion of what that emergency is.
Why did the State Department never utter the word
``emergency'' to me or my staff in relation to any of these
sales, at any point prior to the Secretary's emergency
certification?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, as you noted and others have noted, on
May 21st there was a classified briefing that was provided to
Congress. In that briefing, there was details about the current
threat posture with Iran. This certification was an option as a
tool, including invocation of sanctions or application of
sanctions----
Senator Menendez. The words ``emergency,'' Mr. Cooper, were
never used by anyone, from the Secretary of State all the way
down. Did you discuss declaring an emergency for these sales
with the Secretary before the Secretary briefed the Senate and
the House on May 21st and 22nd?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, all the cases in the emergency,
including cases that were not included in the certification,
were part of our interagency process, not only with the
Department, but the normal review process. We provided options
for the Secretary to make his decision on application of the
certification.
Senator Menendez. Did you discuss an emergency as part of
that?
Mr. Cooper. Again, in an open fora, I would say, looking at
intelligence community assessments----
Senator Menendez. I am not asking you----
Mr. Cooper. --at the time----
Senator Menendez. I am not ask--wait a minute.
Mr. Cooper. It is part of the----
Senator Menendez. You want to divert to classified so you
do not have to answer. I did not ask you a classified question.
I simply asked you, did you declare the possibility of an
emergency declaration prior to May 21st and 22nd? That is not
classified.
Mr. Cooper. No, Senator. The calculus is inclusive of that
data, so the data is not absent of intelligence data. So, that
is part of the consideration of----
Senator Menendez. I am not asking you about----
Mr. Cooper. --force posture----
Senator Menendez. --intelligence data. I am not asking you
about how you came to the decision of emergency in this case. I
am simply asking you, Mr. Cooper--this is far from the
transparency that you pledged to when you were before this
committee, far from the transparency that led me to support
your nomination. Simple question. Did you offer up an emergency
as an option prior to May 21st and 22nd?
Mr. Cooper. There were a number of considerations and tools
made available for the interagency, inclusive of sanctions,
this emergency, and force posture. Any of those could have been
applied, or none of those could have been applied.
Senator Menendez. So, you did discuss an emergency prior to
May 21st and 22nd.
Mr. Cooper. Threat posture is continuously assessed. It is
assessed before May 21st, Senator. We do not stop assessing.
Senator Menendez. Iran has been a continuing threat
posture. Let us be honest.
Mr. Cooper. Upticks and changes in posture----
Senator Menendez. Your unwillingness leads to a total lack
of transparency and is insulting to the Senate, when the
Secretary was before us the day before he ultimately made this
decision and never mentioned, in front of 100 United States
Senators, that there was going to be an emergency declaration.
I find that--overwhelmingly amazing to try to believe that all
of a sudden an emergency came up, just right after we were
briefed. Preposterous.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Secretary Cooper.
Secretary Cooper, you started to mention the word
``uptick.'' Was the assessment by yourself, others, the belief
that there was an uptick in hostilities?
Mr. Cooper. In a general sense, in this open fora, there
was a shift in posture that required a number of tools for the
administration, inclusive of this declaration, to be applied.
Senator Gardner. And there was a concern that there was a
strike or activity or hostility of some kind that was imminent?
Mr. Cooper. That is correct, in a very general sense.
Senator Gardner. Would you consider an imminent hostility
or strike an emergency?
Mr. Cooper. Correct.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
I want to change the subject a little bit here. I would
like to switch gears and talk a little about the Indo-Pacific.
On December 31st, 2018, the President signed into law the
Gardner-Markey Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, or ARIA.
Section 209(b) of ARIA states, ``The President should conduct
regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are
tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from
the People's Republic of China, including supporting efforts--
the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric
capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and
cost-effective capabilities into its military forces.''
June 28th, the Senate approved the fiscal year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act, including my amendment
calling for the administration to fully comply with ARIA
provisions. And 2 days ago, on July 8th, the State Department
approved a possible $2.2 billion sale to Taiwan, including 108
Abrams tanks and 250 Stinger missiles. I commend the
administration for making this decision and for implementing
ARIA as Congress intended.
What is your assessments of--assessment of Taiwan's current
defense capabilities and needs?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
I will say, in an open fora, that, in addition to ARIA,
when we were doing the tiered review process, so going back to
the process of lines of communication with Congress, and
particularly Senate Foreign Relations Committee, those cases
that were formally announced on Monday that you referenced went
through the process, as normal. In addition, ARIA also comports
with, aligns with, the Taiwan Relations Act. So, that was--that
factored in and still aligns with our One China policy.
As far as their defense posture, safe to assess, and is
well-known open source, that they certainly have a sovereignty
of--a right to defend their sovereignty, and it is one that we
certainly would not see impeded upon. And that does comport
where we are with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Senator Gardner. What is your assessment of likely and
future threats that Taiwan faces from the People's Republic of
China?
Mr. Cooper. Threats to Taiwan's sovereignty are not abated
or going away, and that are--they are something that we need to
factor with that partner. We are a reliable partner. They also
were a reliable partner when we were looking at making sure
that the Indo-Pacific region is open and free. And they are a
part of that constellation of partners to ensure that we have
an open and free Indo-Pacific.
Senator Gardner. Yeah. And how has the administration
supported the efforts of Taiwan, as I mentioned, to develop and
integrate asymmetric capabilities, the mobile, survivable,
cost-effective capabilities, into its military force?
Mr. Cooper. Again, with this particular partner, with the
parameters that we have to work with them, we seek to make
whatever capabilities robust. Again, it is about making sure
that they are not only able to defend their sovereignty, but
play a regional security role for an open and free Indo-
Pacific.
Senator Gardner. One of the challenges I think that we face
is the pipeline that needs to be filled with continued action
as it relates to fulfill our commitment of the Taiwan Relations
Act and ARIA as it relates to Taiwan. Could you talk a little
bit more about the pipeline, so to speak, of what else we will
be doing to help Taiwan and fulfill our obligations?
Mr. Cooper. Looking forward and a way ahead, there are
additional assets that would be going through the review
process here at the Senate before we go to formal notification.
And that is already happening. To your point about pipeline,
certainly looking forward as to what capabilities may be
required in the future, versus fighting previous, last year's,
or different-generations' wars, looking at--back to the
asymmetric, trans regional aspect of threats that Taiwan may be
needing to address, not just for their own homeland
sovereignty.
Senator Gardner. I think part of the challenge with the
arms sales is allowing too much time between transactions with
Taiwan, allowing China greater opportunity to oppose, to raise
political opposition. And if the pipeline is, indeed, filled
and regularized, so to speak, I think that would present a
better opportunity for the United States to engage with Taiwan
and other allies, and to make sure that we fulfill the Taiwan
Relations Act and ARIA, which calls for routinized or
regularized sales versions.
Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. And, Senator, as you would note, their
legislative body also has their particular processes that
require a pipeline aspect, which is well noted at the
Department and the--throughout the interagency.
Senator Gardner. I commend you for the sale.
Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Yeah.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have sat on this committee with Democrats
in the White House, Republicans in the White House, Democrats
controlling this committee, Republicans controlling this
committee, and the balance in the Arms Export Control Act has
never been breached, except for this declaration. And I think
this is extremely serious. So, I just want to put this on the
record.
We pass the laws. And in the Arms Export Control Act that
we passed, we made it clear about the mandatory nature of
congressional involvement in arms sales. That is our
prerogative, as the Article--first branch of government, on
establishing policy. It is normal for us to give a national
security waiver to a President, to give flexibility for
unforeseen circumstances. We do that routinely in our
legislation. But, the exercise by this administration of that
authority shows a disrespect for Congress and could very well
affect the comity that exists between the two branches of
government on arms sales, which means we are going to have to
be more prescriptive in our laws, taking away discretion from
the executive branch of government, which may not be in our
national security interest, but our responsibility to make sure
our policies are carried out, which were not carried out in
this instance.
Mr. Cooper, you mentioned the 1984 declaration. In 1984, it
was two sales, not 22 sales. In 1984, the arms were delivered
immediately. That is not the case in this. And in 1984, you had
strong support for Congress in what you were doing--what the
President was doing. In this case, you do not. So, there is not
an analogy between the use of the emergency declaration in 1984
and today.
How many of the 22 arms sales have been delivered,
completed?
Mr. Cooper. Of the sales, the direct commercial sales, the
licensing has been completed----
Senator Cardin. How many deliveries have been made of the
22 arms sales? That is a simple question.
Mr. Cooper. As far as specificity on the different licenses
and different deliveries, we can provide that in a record
statement.
Senator Cardin. Is it not safe to say that many of those
arms sales have not been yet delivered?
Mr. Cooper. Licensings have been----
Senator Cardin. Have they been delivered? As I understand
the emergency declarations, they need the military equipment
for our security. How many of those actual arms have been
delivered to date? Not how many licenses have been issued. How
many have been delivered?
Mr. Cooper. Delivery is pending. The issuance in emergency
was providing that reassurance for our partners----
Senator Cardin. And I understand that. So, they have not
been delivered. The declaration was made on May 24th. The Arms
Control Act requires a 15-to-30-day congressional review. It is
a requirement. You could not go through a 15-to-30-day review,
but you have been considering this for a long period of time,
and the arms have not been delivered. Do you understand why we
consider this to be an abuse?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, they had been under review. In many
cases, close to a year. So, the cases that we talk about are
not new. They had been under review. Now, as far as----
Senator Cardin. I understand that, but the----
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Senator Cardin. --law requires the 15-to-30 day, which you
blew through.
Mr. Cooper. We had covered that period, and had gone beyond
that, Senator.
Senator Cardin. I just urge you to recognize the risk
factors that you are leaving for our country. If Congress feels
disrespected by what this President has done--this
administration has done--as to our constitutional role, it
leaves us little choice but to limit the discretion to the
executive branch of government, which we can legally do,
because we are the legislative branch of government. And that
is what is coming down.
I want to talk one other issue, if I might, which deals
with the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, that the U.S.
shall not authorize a transfer when the U.S. has actual
knowledge that transferred weapons will be used to commit
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of Geneva Conventions,
or attacks intentionally directed against civilian objects or
civilians who are legally protected from attack. You have said
that we have been working with the Saudis to reduce the number
of civilian casualties, better targeting, et cetera. Yet, I
think it is undisputed that, after those consultations, there
were still attacks in which the international community said
have violated the international Geneva Convention and civilians
being targeted for death. That is what has been said several
times. I could also go to the Philippines, where we have U.S.
weapons that have been provided, and there has been
extrajudicial killings that we know about that violate
international norms. How are you protecting our policy that our
arms cannot be made available, where we have knowledge that
these governments have participated in actions that have
violated these international norms?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
In addition to statute, the current policy, the CAT policy,
this administration policy, goes above the statute on those
requirements. It does not preclude us from pushing further and
harder. No Department of Defense, no Ministry of Defense, is
ever going to say they have reached a satisfactory point on----
Senator Cardin. I know. But, the law----
Mr. Cooper. --mitigating civilian casualties----
Senator Cardin. --requires that, if you have knowledge that
they have violated, you do not transfer weapons. And you have
transferred weapons after we have acknowledged that there has
been violations.
Mr. Cooper. We do not suspend our security relationship
with a partner that carries so much weight for our interests
and our equities in the region, but we are not precluded from
following up on issues and abuses. We are not precluded from
assuring and providing training and improvements on mitigation
of civilian casualties. There is no abating of that. There is
room for work. And no one has ever denied that----
Senator Cardin. So, just so I understand your answer, you
are saying that the U.S. Convention Arms Transfer Policy can be
sacrificed if we have an important relationship with a country?
Mr. Cooper. No, it should not be sacrificed.
Senator Cardin. That is what you are doing, because you are
transferring weapons after you have knowledge that they have
violated international norms.
Mr. Cooper. It does not preclude us from course correction
or reconciliation, Senator. Our policy is not just limited to
arms transfers. It is a--an expression, a manifestation of what
else we export: open society, human rights. That is a part of
our policy. We do export the best of America with our arms
transfer policy. With that also comes the responsibility of the
application of those weapons. Adversaries do not provide a long
sustainment tail. They also do not provide any tail of any
support when it comes to application and precision of those
services or weapons. It is what is required of us, not only by
statute. It is incumbent upon us, from a policy and moral
aspect.
Senator Cardin. I would just conclude by saying, you have
tried, you have not succeeded, and you are still providing
weapons, and that is against our Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Mr. Cooper, appreciate your being here
today.
We have a policy, as a Nation, to sell weapons to various
nations throughout the world. There are many reasons for doing
that. Surely, one is to support the weapon making industry in
our country, which provides revenue and jobs for people here. I
presume that is a very small part of the decision-making about
whether we are going to sell weapons someplace, and it should
be given very limited weight in our thinking about whether we
are going to sell weapons. Overwhelmingly, I would anticipate
that the decision to sell weapons to other nations should be
related to a strategic purpose that we have as a Nation. And
so, of course, we have a strategic purpose in providing the
most modern weaponry available to our NATO allies and to other
nations that we have very close relationships with.
But, then there are nations that are perhaps outside of
that very close circle, that we also sell weapons to. And I
would like to ask you what the decision rules are that you
follow in thinking about those other nations, and how you
decide what types of weapons to sell to them, and whether or
not to sell weapons to them, and whether they fall into
different categories, whether you have certain groups of
countries that you sell certain types of weapons to, or,
instead, whether you look on a one-off basis, nation by nation,
and say, ``Well, we are going to look here, at Taiwan,
differently than we do Saudi Arabia, than we do another
nation.'' Do they fall into different categories? And what are
the decision rules that you follow in deciding, not just to the
NATO and Israel and these very, very close allies, but to these
other nations? What are the decision rules that you follow?
What is the U.S. interest that you seek to foster by virtue of
the decisions that you make?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
And you are correct to assess that no partner is
particularly on par with another partner, another ally. And so,
to your point about circles, yes, one can say there is,
essentially, concentric rings of what is available, but it is
also what is capable of that partner. The assessment is not
limited to my part of the State Department. It is a whole-of-
government assessment. This is in--all the way down at the
field level, where we do country-team assessments through our
Defense Cooperation Offices, as well as our political aspects.
It does include a whole host of issues or whether you say
factors of assessment of, where is this country, as far as a
relationship with us, bilaterally? So, country by country. What
particular role do they play in a partnership or in a broader
security alliance, like NATO? Are there interoperability
factors that we need to factor in, like NATO? Are there other
political issues that we need to address? Are there human
rights issues that we need to address? Are there other
negotiations or factors that we are seeking to address or
reconcile at the same time a sale is being considered that also
factors in the timing and sequencing of a sale?
Another big one that I would say is kind of a chapeau
overall sales right now is, what are we looking at from the
National Security Strategy, the chapeau of near-peer
adversaries? Near-peer adversaries are not limited just to
their home geographic regions. They are doing work in
disruption through the globe. So, looking at a partner's
capability to address that on our behalf is certainly a factor.
So, there is a host of interagency whole-of-government
factors that go into--before we even informally notify the
Congress about a potential sell, starting at the country team
level, working with our embassies, and then working here at the
ministerial, interagency, as well. But, it is very much country
by country, case by case, certainly factoring in regional
considerations, certainly factoring in primarily our interests.
Is it--are there U.S. persons, are there U.S. interests that
need to be protected? And there is also an absorption issue.
Can the partner actually take the system or this program or
platform and actually be able to apply it? So, there are some
capacity factors, not just on their ability to defend their
sovereignty and defend our interests. It is, can they do it
with what is being provided?
Safe to say there are partners that we work with that might
have eyes bigger than their capacities, and that is something
that we work to actually frame better and provide them
something--a generation or a capability that is more apropos to
where they may be or where you would like to see them.
But, to your question, it varies on, what is the threat in
the region? What is our bilateral relationship? What is their
capacity to absorb? And also, timing and sequencing of other
strategic interests that we may be addressing in the region.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Cooper, it has been said already, but I
think it is worth repeating, because I share in the
disappointment that has been expressed by members of this
committee over the deliberate decision to ignore the intent of
the Arms Export Control Act. It is very clear that was a
deliberate decision to ignore that Act. Congress and the
executive branch have a protocol on arms sales that works, that
is fully capable of achieving our strategic goals, including
addressing threats from Iran and Saudi Arabia's self-defense.
And when the Secretary disrupts that protocol by declaring an
emergency, he erodes the trust between our branches of
government. And that has consequences. That has consequences
for this administration, and it has consequences for future
administrations. And I hope that you and the Secretary and
other members of the State Department involved in this decision
will think very carefully about what the negative consequences
of those decisions will be.
So, I would like to follow up on questions that have been
asked and ask if you can describe the specific capabilities
that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were lacking that these 22 arms
sales address in a way that could not wait the 15 to 30 days
for congressional approval. I have the list right here. So, I
hope you will go through each one of those 22 arms sales and
tell me which one of these was so immediate that it could not
wait for congressional approval.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
On--and I have the same list--on the overall--to your
question about capabilities and readiness, specific to any
partner's capability or readiness or strengths or gaps, I would
happily address that in a classified setting if we are talking
about that specificity.
To the list, there were a number of cases that were under
consideration or under review already. These were the ones that
were assessed as what would be supportive of defense of
sovereignty in filling particular gaps. One, if you want to ask
about some immediacy, was on some of the training and
sustainment ones, which were reading--reaching some suspense or
timelines that were about to not happen or we would have gaps
there, as far as support on that.
Senator Shaheen. But, as I understand your response to
Senator Cardin, those have not yet been delivered. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cooper. The training and sustainment ones, we were
making sure there was not a break. On licensing for DCS, those
licenses have been completed for--and ready for delivery. On
the FMS, those LOAs are still being completed now that we know
that these are the ones that have been identified for movement.
Senator Shaheen. And can you tell me whether there are any
present or former State Department employees who have ties to
any of the companies that are impacted by these sales, which
may have been involved in any of the discussions to invoke this
emergency provision?
Mr. Cooper. I am not going to talk personnel here, but I
will say that ED--the interagency process applied here was U.S.
Government process only. Nobody from industry was involved in
this process.
Senator Shaheen. No, I did not ask that. I asked if there
were any former State Department employees, present or former
State Department employees with ties to companies affected by
these sales, who were involved in the discussions around the
emergency declaration.
Mr. Cooper. Not that I am aware of, Senator. This was a
government decision, interagency decision. State Department
processes applied here.
Senator Shaheen. And can you tell me the--as has been
suggested, the--we are not supposed to transfer weapons--or the
countries that we provide weapons to are not supposed to
transfer those weapons for use on civilian targets or any
unauthorized transfer. Yet, there have been reports that the
UAE has supplied General Haftar, in Libya, with American-made
missiles. Can you confirm whether that is the case? And is
there an investigation? And how do we expect to sanction the
UAE if the investigation shows that, in fact, they have
supplied those missiles?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, ma'am.
So, Senator, there--the committee staff had a classified
brief this Monday from the State Department specific to the
issue raised about Javelins being present in Libya. What I can
say in an open forum today is that the Javelins in question
that are part of the investigation that we are conducting and
did brief committee staff on actually belong to France, not the
UAE.
Senator Shaheen. And if they had shared those missiles,
what kind of sanction would you expect us to impose on the UAE?
Mr. Cooper. As with any partner, when there is an
investigation of end-use violation, there are consequences that
could be cessation or suspension of particular programs. We
have seen that, and we have applied that with other partners.
Sometimes it is specific to the system, sometimes it is
actually broader. It could actually touch other security
assistance. But, there are consequences where the Department
and Congress have worked concurrently to identify suspense's.
Senator Shaheen. And as I am sure you are aware, today we
are hearing that Turkey, a NATO ally of ours, is expected to
receive delivery of the S-400 system from Russia, NATO's
adversary. How will the administration respond to that? We have
requested briefings from State and Defense on this topic. When
can we expect that kind of a briefing to happen?
Mr. Cooper. Well, Senator Shaheen, I cannot give you a date
certain on briefing, but what I can talk about, and you and I
had a discussion about at my confirmation hearing, is, we--the
administration--actually, I think all parts of government have
been very clear to our Turkish partners, regardless if it has
been at an operational level or up at a senior principal level,
of there being consequences of delivery of the S-400. The
biggest issue that has been raised and amplified and reasserted
with Turkey, with a NATO partner, is that the S-400 is a
challenge to interoperability as a NATO partner and is an
affront. We have made it very clear that there are
consequences, and they are at risk of sanctions.
Speaking of tools provided by Congress, I mean, CATS is one
of those tools that the administration has. I do not think
there has been any lack of clarity to the Turkish government on
our concern about them and their responsibilities as a NATO
partner that they are putting at risk with the receipt of the
S-400.
Senator Romney [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time, but I would
just point out that Congress--the Senate has said that, if they
receive delivery of the S-400, they should not receive the F-
35s or be part of that program. Is that your understanding, as
well?
Mr. Cooper. That--we are on the same page, Senator. That is
very clear. They may not be listening, but we have all said it.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper, thank you for your testimony.
I want to break this issue down into two parts: substance
and process.
On the substance, I agree with the administration that
these arms sales were appropriate, not because the Saudis are
steady and reliable allies. The Saudis are deeply problematic
allies whose conduct often is lacking, and they have
historically shown far too much of a willingness to get in bed
with enemies of America. Even though they are a problematic
ally, the Saudis are also, I believe, a critical counterweight
to Iran. And on any rational and reasonable comparison,
measuring the threat to the United States of America between
the Saudis and Iran, it is not remotely close. Iran is led by
theocratic mullahs and an Ayatollah who chants ``Death to
America'' and is the world's leading state sponsor of
terrorism. That is the reason that I ultimately voted with the
administration in support of these arms sales, is because
helping the Saudis defend themselves against Iran is in the
United States national security interest.
Can you articulate to this committee the threat that Iran
poses, both to the Saudis, but, more fundamentally, to the
United States?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
In an open fora, it has been referenced that the persistent
threat has not gone away. That is fair. What has changed has
been recent upticks in direct threats to U.S. persons and U.S.
interests in the Gulf region. That is what is different.
To our partners, there are direct threats, not only by
Tehran, but emanating through proxies from Tehran. We discussed
a little bit of what has been in open source and open fora
about attacks that have been incurred upon our Saudi partners,
our Emirate partners, on their civilian populace and on their
infrastructure. We have talked about the Houthis and what they
are doing to exacerbate and expand the humanitarian crisis in
Yemen, as well as being supported by Tehran. So, the threat is
not going to go away, but deterrence through these sales,
deterrence through sanctions, deterrence through presence and
posture, is a way to address it. And I would say, in a closed
fora, we could talk articulately about specificity of timing,
very specific threats, specificity----
Senator Cruz. How advanced is Iran's ballistic missile
capability?
Mr. Cooper. In an open fora, Iran has capabilities that go
beyond their localized scope, and are a threat to neighbors,
and are a direct threat to partners other than the ones that we
are talking about here today. They are--they have capabilities
that emanate beyond Tehran to a broader region.
Senator Cruz. Well, that is quite a bit of understatement,
given that they are the leading state sponsor of terrorism in
the world and they are directly responsible for the murders of
over 600 U.S. servicemen and women.
Mr. Cooper. And they also are a facilitator of other forms
of terrorism beyond direct reports or what we would call
command and control of Tehran government. There are elements
that are not under direct C2 or direct command and control from
the Quds Force, as you referenced. But, again, we are in an
open fora at this time.
Senator Cruz. Well, as I said, I agree with the substance.
But, shifting to the process, I have to say I agree with the
concerns that have been expressed in this hearing on both sides
of the aisle. The process that the State Department followed
for these weapon sales, not to put too fine a point on it, was
crap. Under the law, under the Arms Export Control Act, the
administration needs congressional approval and has a 30-day
notification period. And, for whatever reason, the
administration, in what seems to me a not-fully-baked
decisionmaking process, decided to circumvent the law, decided
to circumvent the constitutional responsibility of Congress and
act unilaterally.
Now, if you have an army surging on the border and an
imminent emergency, that is one thing. There is, in fact, an
exception for that. It has now been 47 days since you declared
an emergency. Did I hear you right, in your answer to questions
earlier, that you cannot point to a single one of these 22
sales that have actually been delivered?
Mr. Cooper. Licenses have been completed on the DCS side
for delivery.
Senator Cruz. It is a simple question. Have they been
delivered?
Mr. Cooper. On the servicing-and-training components, yes.
But, if we are talking hardware, they are ready for delivery.
Senator Cruz. So, that was 47 days ago, the emergency
occurred. Did I also hear you right, where you said the review
process on this was close to a year?
Mr. Cooper. This goes back to the cases you are
referencing, the process here. There are--there were cases that
had been before Congress in the tiered review process for close
to a year.
Senator Cruz. Well, if the Department had a year to gaze at
its navel and consider this, the Department had 30 days to take
it to Congress and follow the law. And it was foolishness not
to. And do not make the mistake of thinking that it is simply
Democrats who are concerned about this. I voted with the
administration on the substance, because of the threat of Iran,
but I will tell you, from my end, if the administration does it
again and there is not a live and exigent emergency, you will
not have my vote, and I predict you will not have the vote of a
number of other Republicans, as well. The simpler process is:
Follow the damn law, and respect it.
Thank you.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Romney and Ranking Member
Menendez.
I want to compliment you, Assistant Secretary Cooper, on
managing to achieve a rare moment of bipartisanship on this
committee.
[Laughter.]
Senator Coons. I will tell you, it is not often that my
colleague from Texas and I agree completely on a matter. His
statement that the Saudis are a deeply problematic partner who
have shown, too often, a willingness to embrace enemies of our
country, I agree with. And his condemnation, and that of many
others on both sides of the aisle here, about the timing and
the process, both of the consultation and the ultimate decision
on these recent arms sales, is one of those moments that I will
hope gets the attention of the administration.
I appreciate your service and your testimony here today. It
is important that we continue to have an open and constructive
dialogue between the executive and legislative branches. And,
on something as significant as the Arms Export Control Act and
the complicated consequences of our sales to our security and
military partners and allies around the world, I think it is
essential that we ask questions and get answers.
Most of the concerns I had intended to raise here today
have already been addressed by my colleagues, so let me ask one
or two additional questions.
We have sold billions of dollars in arms to our Gulf
partners and allies over the years. In your view, have these
sales produced capable militaries?
Mr. Cooper. As I was sharing earlier about partner-to-
partner capacity assessments, no partner is the same. There is
always an ongoing assessment about their ability to absorb
either a particular platform or system. There is always an
ongoing assessment on their ability to be able to maintain
their own defense of their own sovereignty. And there is always
an ongoing assessment on their capability or ability to be a
regional security partner and carry water for us. There are
always, at varying degrees, sales, and potential sales are
assessed as to how we contribute to actually improve and
augment capabilities. Sometimes the will of a partner does not
always marry up to a capability of a partner. And that is not
unique. But, it does actually amplify the necessity for
constant assessment. When I say ``assessment,'' this is not
limited to the State Department. We share this with our
interagency partners at the Department of Defense. We share
this with the intelligence community. It is an ongoing process.
It also includes, sometimes, making an honest assessment of if
a partner--if we need to adjust what is provided to a partner.
Senator Coons. Well, Assistant Secretary Cooper, it is
exactly that issue, an honest assessment and an adjustment that
lies at the core of this conversation and what I hope will be a
constructive process, led by the Chairman, to reconsider and
reevaluate the U.S.-Saudi partnership, or relationship.
Because, frankly, I have grave concerns over their conduct in
the war in Yemen, over human rights actions within the Saudi
Kingdom and against others in the region and the world. And, in
my view, those of us who have stood with the Saudis over a
number of years because of concerns--legitimate concerns about
the threat that Iran poses to the region, to the world--for
many of us, that patience has run out. We have made persistent,
sustained, engaged efforts to improve their conduct against
civilians in the war in Yemen, only to be shown, over and over
again, that they have come up short. And I think it is long
overdue for us to reconsider, What are the limits? What are the
limits to our relationship with the Saudi Kingdom? Are there
times when we are putting not just our security at risk, but
our values at risk by the ways in which a long and close
partner is conducting themselves?
So, I see my time is almost up. Let me just say this, in
closing. You have heard comments today, forcefully conveyed
from both sides of the aisle by Senators. Both the substance
and the process for these emergency arms sales has gotten us to
a place where the administration must respect the mandate of
the law and the process to be followed in order for the
executive branch to preserve the emergency exemption that
exists in the law. If not, I suspect this body will act and
restrict or remove that ability for future emergency waivers
altogether.
Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Coons.
I think those remarks are well taken. There is a lot of
frustration right now. And we have a confluence of events that
has gotten us to this point, and reevaluation is really, really
important. And I really hope that--this morning I dropped, as
you know, the bill Senator Shaheen and I are cosponsoring that
is a bipartisan bill that strikes at that very issue and calls
for a reevaluation and some very specific steps in that
regard--I am really hoping that all of us can join together to
pass a piece of legislation. Obviously, there is--it does not
go as far as many people would like to go, particularly when it
comes to some of the specifics of recent events. But, again, I
think we should not focus on that as much as actually
developing a bipartisan method for reevaluating the
relationship. Because it has headed south on us since about
2015, and it--unfortunately, it is right at a time when our
challenges from Iran are getting substantially more significant
as we try to respectfully and reasonably impose the sanctions
for what they are doing. And all of this causes a Rubik's Cube
kind of a problem. But, look, we are up to this. We have done
other things that are as difficult. And I hope we will all join
together, in the next couple of weeks, as we try to work on
this piece of legislation.
But, thank you for your remarks. I think your expression of
frustration on parts of virtually everybody up here is well
taken. Thank you, Senator Coons.
With that, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, Assistant Secretary Cooper, thank you for your
testimony.
My colleagues have done a good job of laying out the
concern about compliance with the statute. And I am going to
just go a different direction. And the direction is one word:
Why? Why? Why bypass Congress on arms sales to the Saudi? Why
bypass Congress and not provide Congress the traditional
notification, when part (a)(10) authorizations are entered into
to allow transfers of nuclear know-how to the Saudis? Why veto
the congressional repudiation of the Saudi-led war in Yemen?
Why refuse to comply with the direct congressional request
under the Magnitsky Act to render a determination about whether
the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi was a human rights
violation or not? There are a series of instances, with this
administration, where, in response to congressional action,
and, in some cases, clear congressional mandates, in matters
dealing with Saudi Arabia, that the administration is taking
very unusual action.
Mr. Chair, I would like to introduce for the record a
report from the House Oversight Committee, dated February 2019,
``Whistleblowers Raise Grave Concerns With Trump
administration's Efforts to Transfer Sensitive Nuclear
Technology to Saudi Arabia.''
The Chairman. That will be entered in the record. Thank
you, Senator.
[The information referred to above can be accessed by the
following link: https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.
house.gov/files/Trump%20Saudi%20Nuclear%20Report%20-%202-19-
2019.pdf]
Senator Kaine. Let me just list a series of dates. And,
Assistant Secretary Cooper, this is not really in your
bailiwick, it is a broader set of questions for the
administration that I know I and many other members of the
Senate are concerned about.
As a candidate for President in August of 2015, then-
candidate Donald Trump said, quote, ``Saudi Arabia, I get along
great with all of them. They buy apartments from me. They spend
40-50 million bucks. Am I supposed to dislike them?''
Shortly after he was inaugurated, in May of 2017, President
Trump took his first visit abroad to Saudi Arabia, to Riyadh,
and he announced a $110 billion arms deal.
In December of 2017, the Trump administration approved a
part (a)(10) authorization authorizing transfer of nuclear
know-how to the Saudis. In the past, this information had been
publicly noticed to both Congress, the press, and the public.
This notification--this authorization of transfer to the Saudis
was not notified to Congress in December of 2017.
Within a month after the first transfer of this nuclear
know-how to Saudi Arabia, an investment in real-estate firm
Brookfield Business Partners announced a plan to do an unusual
purchase for them. They bought Westinghouse Electric, one of
the primary nuclear service industries in the United States,
for $4.6 billion.
Shortly after Brookfield bought Westinghouse, Secretary
Perry began testifying on the Hill in public settings, saying
it was our goal as a nation to get the Saudis to use
Westinghouse to construct reactors in Saudi Arabia. Public
testimony about Westinghouse.
In August of 2018, Brookfield, which owns Westinghouse,
made another unusual investment. Jared Kushner had a troubled
real-estate deal on Fifth Avenue, New York, and Brookfield came
in and entered into a 99-year lease worth more than a billion
dollars that was--that has been reported as, essentially,
bailing out a troubled deal. And they paid all of the lease
money for 99 years up front. They paid it up front. After the
administration has been promoting their Westinghouse-now-owned
subsidiary to the Saudis, and transferring nuclear technology
to the Saudis, Brookfield now comes in with a massive
investment in Jared Kushner's personal property.
In October of 2018, Virginia resident and Washington Post
journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by the Saudi regime.
Within just a very few weeks--days after that, the Trump
administration approved another nuclear transfer under part
(a)(10) to the Saudis without informing Congress or the public.
In November of 2018, President Trump said the U.S. stands
with Saudi Arabia after Khashoggi's murder, even though the
U.S. Intel Committee was saying that the royal family, and
possibly MBS, was complicit in that murder.
Congress directed the administration, under the Magnitsky
Act, to determine whether or not there was a human rights
violation in February of 2019. The White House responded and
refused to render a determination.
With days after that, they did another part (a)(10)
transfer to the Saudis that they refused to notify Congress
about.
In April of 2019, President Trump vetoed the bipartisan
resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-backed
war in Yemen.
In May of 2019, the State Department submitted the
emergency notifications we are talking about today, saying that
they did not have time, because of the emergency, to notify
Congress, when, 47 days later, by your own testimony, the
hardware has not actually been delivered.
And just last month, the U.N. published a Special
Rapporteur's Report concerning the state-sponsored murder of
Jamal Khashoggi, encouraging the U.N. and the FBI to continue
to do more criminal investigation, which, as far as we know, is
not being done.
This is the material that the House Oversight Committee is
looking at. This is the material that we are very interested
in. When you look at the financial ties between the President's
own family and companies that stand to benefit, and that are
being publicly promoted by the Secretary of Energy to benefit
from this deal, and you ask the question of, Why is the
administration bypassing Congress, not on matters dealing with
other countries, but, again and again and again, on matters
dealing with Saudi Arabia?--I think the hearing that we are
having today is just the very tip of the iceberg about what
Congress needs to do to exercise oversight about why there is
such a departure from the ordinary course of business on
matters of such national security sensitivity with respect to
Saudi Arabia.
With that, Mr. Chair, I appreciate it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You know, it looks to us, these days, as if the United
States is the junior partner in this relationship. I think of
all of the timeline that Senator Kaine just went through. The
idea that we transferred the Saudis nuclear technology
literally days after the dismemberment of a journalist under
U.S. protection came to light causes us all to wonder whether
this is just one big scam. And I am glad we are doing this
hearing.
I want to drill down on part of your testimony, Mr. Cooper,
with respect to the purpose of our continued coalition with the
Saudis. You say in your testimony that, quote, ``We have worked
with the Saudi-led coalition over the course of its operations
to reduce the occurrence of civilian casualties.'' But, that is
not, in fact, true. In fact, the opposite is true. Civilian
casualties are dramatically increasing. In 2017, airstrikes
killed approximately 2700 civilians inside Yemen. In 2018,
airstrikes killed approximately 4600 civilians inside Yemen.
And reports are consistent that approximately one-third of
coalition airstrikes are hitting civilian targets. That number
has not changed.
So, do you have different numbers, or do you agree with
this broad assessment that civilian casualties are increasing,
not decreasing?
Mr. Cooper. On the tragedy of the civilian casualties,
there is an uptick, what we have seen from the Houthi activity,
on civilians. I would offer, on the----
Senator Murphy. That is not what I asked. I asked about the
airstrikes. The airstrikes--the reports are that almost twice
as many civilians were killed by airstrikes--and the airstrikes
are by the coalition--in 2018 than 2017. Your testimony says
you have worked to reduce civilian----
Mr. Cooper. Correct.
Senator Murphy. --casualties. The data says they doubled.
Mr. Cooper. Correct. There is ongoing work to not only
mitigate, but also refine targeting. So, this is not limited to
where targets are conducted by the coalition. This is how they
actually conduct the work. This is also avoiding areas where
there would be civilian casualties. That work is not abated. It
has actually been increased. We can talk to further detail
about that.
Senator Murphy. So, work has increased. But, just to get
the facts right, I--your wording in the testimony is careful.
You say you have ``worked with them to reduce civilian
casualties.'' But, would you concede that civilian casualties
from airstrikes has increased, not decreased?
Mr. Cooper. I cannot speak to the exact numbers, but I can
tell you that as--what we have done on capabilities to mitigate
has increased on mitigating civilian casualties----
Senator Murphy. Why can you not speak to numbers? I mean,
do you not keep--you--do not--if you are working with them to
decrease civilian casualties, would you not keep the numbers?
Mr. Cooper. On the interagency, we do work with our
partners, with DOD and others, to get them to a capacity where
they are more precise in identifying targets, more precise in
executing their targets, and actually in avoidance of certain
localities----
Senator Murphy. I know that you work to that. I know that
you are trying to work on that. But, you cannot testify before
us today as to what the actual civilian casualties are. You do
not know whether they have increased or decreased.
Mr. Cooper. The numbers associated with civilian casualties
are not limited to what has been attributed to coalition
numbers, Senator.
Senator Murphy. But--okay, so you--do you know, or do you
not know, whether civilian casualties have increased due to
coalition airstrikes?
Mr. Cooper. I would say, in a general sense here, that
there is a delta in information on what is attributed to a
coalition-ascribed casualty and what may be ascribed to either
a Houthi or one of the adversarial----
Senator Murphy. All right. I will be happy to give you some
fairly definitive information that states that they have
doubled over time. And the fact that you are talking around
this is maddening.
You talked earlier about consequences that would run to a
U.S. ally that transfers arms that we have given to them to
third parties not authorized to be the recipient of U.S. arms.
As you know, in February of this year, there was a very
disturbing report that suggested multiple U.S. weapon systems
had been transferred to private militias operating inside
Yemen. Reports are that U.S.-made Oshkosh armored vehicles were
transferred to Abu Abbas, which is a militia linked with al-
Qaeda. And UAE--and UAE's government, in fact, confirmed that
they have transferred MRAP vehicles to the Giants Brigade, a
Salafist militia that is doing work on the UAE's behalf inside
Yemen.
Have you come to the conclusion that these transfers were
made? And, if you have, what have the consequences been, and
how can you justify continuing to sell arms to countries that
are openly advertising that they are taking the weapons we give
them and the vehicles we give them and giving them to others
that are not authorized to be in the possession?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Senator.
The UAE remains a security partner for us in the region,
not just for their sovereignty, but also for our interests and
equities. However, it does not preclude us from an
investigation, it does not preclude us from following up, and
it does not preclude us from any imposition or consequences.
So, specific to the MRAP question, that--I have been in
long enough to be able to directly address that issue with
Emirati government. We are working with our embassy to get more
detail and finality on that issue. It is an ongoing
investigation. It has not been completely resolved. But, we
have directly approached the Emirati government, at a
ministerial level and at a working level, specific to the
reported MRAP transfer.
Senator Murphy. My time is up. But, they have publicly
confirmed that they transferred the MRAPs. There is no
investigation needed. They told a CNN reporter that they gave
the MRAPs to the Giants Brigade. And so, that report, coming in
February, does not need a 5-month-long investigation. And part
of our frustration about this new transfer of weapons to the
Emiratis is, it signals that there are no consequences. And so,
I would hope that this committee would make some further
inquiry as to why an investigation is still ongoing, when, in
February, the UAE government confirmed that they had taken
these MRAPs and given them to a Salafist militia inside the
UAE.
Sorry I went over my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. During the June 12th House hearing on the
so-called emergency, you said, quote, ``Holding a partner
accountable does not preclude us from working with a partner.
If anything, detaching ourselves from a partner, removing
ourselves from our partner, puts at risk ensuring that
accountability.'' So, anyone remotely familiar with this
subject sees the Trump administration has not held Saudi Arabia
and the UAE to account for their unacceptable actions. In fact,
it has rewarded them. And that fits a pattern of the Trump
administration appeasement of the Saudis, including by, one,
providing access to nuclear know-how; two, supporting an
immoral war in Yemen; three, breaking our word on the Iran
nuclear deal; and, four, helping Riyadh escape accountability
for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and for the use of child
soldiers. So, this accountability you speak of is purely
theoretical accountability.
So, Mr. Cooper, would China keep selling arms to countries
that are committing human rights violations?
Mr. Cooper. I am sure China has, I would say, not any
parameters or any bar that would preclude them from selling to
any customer that was willing to receive their equipment or
sub-par services.
Senator Markey. So, would Russia keep selling arms in such
a case to countries that are committing human rights
violations?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, I would say that any of those
adversaries probably do not have the limits, the parameters,
the requirements that we, the United States Government, expect
from any of our security partners, regardless of what region
they are in.
Senator Markey. So, in practice, other countries require no
accountability for the sales of deadly weapons. So, why is the
United States doing what China or Russia would do in this
situation? We are not extracting any accountability from the
Saudis any more than the Chinese or the Russians would, so why
should we continue?
Mr. Cooper. Well, blessedly, we are not operating on the
same limited parameters or lack of parameters that those
adversaries would be operating under. If anything, we have very
tight parameters. We are also transparent. Those two
adversaries you referenced do not operate in a transparent
fashion either with their legislative branch or with their
partner that they are doing dealings with. The recipient
country probably does not--their populace is not, probably,
aware of what system or sale that they have been signed up for,
their government has committed it into.
Senator Markey. All right. But, the----
Mr. Cooper. And we also provide----
Senator Markey. --point----
Mr. Cooper. --we also provide sustainment in a way that an
adversary does not. We make sure that our partners, if they
receive or purchase a platform or system, know how to operate
it, that it is operable, that we make sure that they can be
capable and ready for----
Senator Markey. But, what you are----
Mr. Cooper. --our security interests.
Senator Markey. But, what you are saying is that we have
transparency, so everyone knows that we are selling the
equipment. We actually give them good training so they can
operate the equipment. So, that is great. But, we do not
actually, then, hold them accountable for their human rights
violations. And so, I--we are transparent about that, as well.
And so, yeah, maybe the Chinese or the Russians are not as
transparent, but they also do not require any human rights
compliance.
So, your argument that we should be a reliable security
partner, and that will further our values, that just,
unfortunately, demonstrates that the Trump administration's
standards are no higher than those of China or of Russia, and
we are in a race to the bottom, in terms of what our standards
will be on human rights. And, thanks to the Trump
administration, our ability to push our security partners for
accountability and moral leadership is theoretical platitudes
rather than a practical reality.
It is critical that the United States be the moral leader,
the country that upholds the rules-based international order,
the country that advances fundamental rights, freedoms, and
accountability. But, the Trump administration intentionally is
overlooking human rights considerations in our arms exports and
using the guise of a, quote, ``emergency'' to do so.
So, Mr. Cooper, there is a wide bipartisan agreement that
your efforts have been insufficient. And I have yet to see any
evidence that the administration has any standard for how many
bombed hospitals or how many targeted activists it would take
to have the Trump administration change its course.
The problem is that the Trump administration refuses to
actually use the very influence that you say that the arms
sales provide. We have a dearth of leadership on the global
stage, and anytime leaders around the world hear this
administration refer to its morality, it rings increasingly
hollow, Mr. Cooper. We need some evidence to convict this
administration of actually having stood up for human rights in
Saudi Arabia. Some evidence that that has happened. Thus far,
it is still not evident to the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator----
Mr. Cooper. If I may, there is an--and, Senator, you are
right to point out the necessity for us to not only export our
know-how and our technology, but also to export what is what
makes America unique. And that is export our values, export our
open society, our free society. And we do do that. That is part
of the process.
Specific to Saudi Arabia and UAE, there are dissident
voices that are being supported by the administration, by the
Secretary. There are cases that the Secretary is pressing
specifically, as well as Ambassador Abizaid. There are also
other human rights concerns that are not always enumerated in
the open report. There is the annual report that our Department
produces. But, those factors are not precluded at all. We can
work with partners, but it--and we can also continue to address
issues of concern that are about open society, free society,
dissident voices, and human rights. We can do both. We have
done both as a country. And we continue--can do so.
Senator Markey. Again, I--I thank you, but, again, Yemen,
Khashoggi, nuclear know-how, pulling out of the Iran nuclear
deal--I just think it is a one-way street, here. And there may
be some small exceptions. But, on the larger picture, the
United States is not standing up for the human rights values
that we profess to be the world leader on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper, as the Assistant Secretary for Political-
Military Affairs, I assume you understand the difference
between the informal review process on arms sales with this
committee and the Senate-wide 30-day formal statutory review
and resolution of disapproval. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Senator, and including how that is defined
by if someone is a NATO ally or a different partner status.
Senator Menendez. Well, I do not know about NATO allies. I
simply care about what we do here.
So, in that regard, when you answered Senator Cardin and
said some of these had been pending a year, the reality is, is
that at--as it relates to the statutory 30-day Senate-wide
review, you blew through that. So, that is not a completely
accurate answer.
Let me ask you this. Forty-seven days after the Secretary
claimed that there was an emergency, is it not true that State
has not even given the government-to-government draft contracts
to the Saudis and Emirates for all eight of the foreign
military sales?
Mr. Cooper. There is ongoing on the LOAs for FMS, there is
the working with the government-to-governments on if they have
to be adjusted because some of them were dated during the--as
you noted, the informal review process. So, it is getting some
of those to date.
What is complete are the licenses on the DCS side, sir.
Senator Menendez. I did not ask you that. I mean, I
appreciate you answering questions that I did not ask.
Let me reiterate. Is it not true that State has not given
the government-to-government draft contracts to the Saudis and
Emirates for all eight of the foreign military sales? Yes or
no?
Mr. Cooper. I cannot attest to the exact status of that
here right now, Senator.
Senator Menendez. You are the Assistant Secretary of State
in charge of arms sales in this matter. There is an emergency.
You know what this hearing is all about. And you cannot tell me
that?
Well, let me help you out. As of July 1st, there have been
three letters of offer and acceptance for the eight military
sales. You cannot wait 30 days for the statutory Senate-wide
congressional review of these sales, and yet, 47 days after the
Secretary's declaration of an emergency, the administration
still has not offered the government-to-government contract on
a whole host of these. So, what is the sense of the emergency?
What is the sense of the emergency?
Let me turn to something else. Has anyone at the State
Department or the White House told, directed, or advised you
not to answer specific questions during this hearing?
Mr. Cooper. No, I have not received any of that guidance.
Senator Menendez. Okay. Then I expect a full and complete
answer from you.
To your knowledge, did anyone in the White House advocate,
direct that the State Department find a way to move these sales
to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or both, despite both my and Chairman
Engel's holds?
Mr. Cooper. I am not aware of that, Senator. What I am
aware of is, this was the Secretary's decision to make. It was
an option for the Secretary. It was a tool for the--a tool of
deterrence for the Secretary.
Senator Menendez. So, the State Department made this
decision fully independent of the White House, is what you are
telling me.
Mr. Cooper. I can tell you, from where I sit, that
Secretary Pompeo had several tools to look at, including
imposition or application of sanctions. This was another set of
tools in his toolkit to deter Iran. It was his decision to
make, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Let me reiterate my question. Did the
State Department make this decision fully independent of the
White House, yes or no? I do not want to hear about the toolkit
and----
Mr. Cooper. No, no.
Senator Menendez. --the tools, you know----
Mr. Cooper. But--so, there is an interagency process that
is required. All these cases went through that. That is
including NSC knowledge of these cases. So, the cases----
Senator Menendez. So----
Mr. Cooper. --went through an interagency process,
including----
Senator Menendez. So, through the interagency process, the
White House was involved.
Mr. Cooper. They would have to be, like on all cases. We
just talked about Taiwan today. They would be in part of that
process of the review of any case----
Senator Menendez. You----
Mr. Cooper. --any arms case.
Senator Menendez. You were confirmed on April 30th of this
year. Is it not true that, upon your confirmation, there were
already discussions taking place at the State Department about
evoking an emergency declaration on some or all of the 22 arms
sales?
Mr. Cooper. What I can attest and affirm is that there is
always an ongoing assessment on any of the cases that we have,
not just the Gulf ones that we are talking about today. Those
would certainly----
Senator Menendez. I am only----
Mr. Cooper. --have precluded----
Senator Menendez. I am only interested in the ones we are
talking about today----
Mr. Cooper. There would have been ongoing----
Senator Menendez. --conversations, at the time that you
took office, that there were already discussions at the State
Department, in terms of invoking an emergency declaration on
these sales.
Mr. Cooper. I cannot speak to an emergency declaration, but
I would say it is safe to assess that these cases in the
emergency declaration certainly would have been under----
Senator Menendez. What----
Mr. Cooper. --consideration and of interest----
Senator Menendez. What----
Mr. Cooper. --as one is looking at the posture of their
defense, their sovereignty, their----
Senator Menendez. What they----
Mr. Cooper. --ability to be a security----
Senator Menendez. What day----
Mr. Cooper. --partner----
Senator Menendez. What day did you first discuss, with
anyone in the Department, invoking an emergency declaration for
these sales?
Mr. Cooper. In an open fora, I am not going to talk to that
or the pre-decisional----
Senator Menendez. Well, what--``pre-decisional''? Wait a
minute.
Mr. Cooper. This is the Secretary's decision, Senator.
Senator Menendez. It is not a question of--I am not asking
about the Secretary's decision. You know--what privilege are
you asserting? You keep talking about ``pre-decisional.'' What
privilege are you asserting?
Mr. Cooper. The interagency review of what was taking place
before we do information notification on any case, also the
review of the intelligence----
Senator Menendez. That is not----
Mr. Cooper. --assessments.
Senator Menendez. That is not a privilege. You are
testifying before the Senate's oversight committee of this
particular Department, and there is no legal basis to refuse to
respond, regardless of whether it is pre-decisional or not.
So, I am simply asking you for a date. When did you first
discuss, with anyone in the Department, invoking an emergency
declaration?
Mr. Cooper. As to a specific date, I cannot tell you, but I
can tell you that being read into the Department, the Iran
threat was certainly of interest. It is--would be for anybody
who would be coming into the Department at that time. And any--
--
Senator Menendez. But, the Iran threat----
Mr. Cooper. --any----
Senator Menendez. The Iran threat that you now justify is
not the same threat, back in April of this year.
Mr. Cooper. There is a posture shift. There is a posture
shift. But, I would say that anybody arriving in the national
security framework in a different capacity----
Senator Menendez. Well, I would ask----
Mr. Cooper. --would be getting----
Senator Menendez. --I would ask----
Mr. Cooper. --read onto a number of----
Senator Menendez. --I would ask you----
Mr. Cooper. --statuses.
Senator Menendez. --to look at your calendar and respond to
me in writing. When was the first date that you began to
discuss an emergency declaration on these 22 arms sales? Will
you do that for the record?
Mr. Cooper. Will look for the QFR, Senator.
Mr. Cooper. I do want to reemphasize that review of any
particular threat posture would have been part of my read-on.
Fortunately, I was already in the national security framework,
so much of that was not----
Senator Menendez. My----
Mr. Cooper. --news to me.
Senator Menendez. My point is that the threat posture in
April is not the threat posture that now justifies----
Mr. Cooper. No, it is an adjusted posture, but it was one
that was----
Senator Menendez. Let me----
Mr. Cooper. --relevant to the time and----
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you, today, one final
question. I will have a whole bunch for the record, but not to
delay the hearing anymore, and there is another vote on the
floor.
Give me a simple yes or no. Did you or the Department
receive a legal written opinion on this declaration?
Mr. Cooper. Our legal office, our legal advisory, was that
it was within the statute that Congress had passed and was
within the realm of the Secretary's authorities----
Senator Menendez. I asked----
Mr. Cooper. --to apply.
Senator Menendez. I did not ask you that. Thank you for
answering a question I did not ask you. You have become very
good at that. I asked you a very specific question. Did you
receive a written--underlined, underscored--written legal
opinion?
Mr. Cooper. There was legal opinion provided for the
process, Senator----
Senator Menendez. A written legal opinion? Not legal
opinion. A written legal opinion.
Mr. Cooper. There was a number of reviews that took place
in the interagency, including legal, on what was in the
statute, what was applicable, and what was available for the
Secretary----
Senator Menendez. Mr. Cooper, you are an incredibly bright
man. You have served the country well in so many different
ways. It pains me to have to go through this with you, but I
will try a third time.
Written. Was there a written legal opinion? Yes or no?
Mr. Cooper. Senator, there were multiple reviews and
multiple writings, not just from legal, but the interagency, on
this. So, this was not a--this was not a--this was a very
prudent process, so it is--we are talking a detailed review
that took place for the Secretary to have that option to make a
decision.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, this is why we have
challenges here. This is why--I try to work together to achieve
certain goals. But, when a simple answer, ``Yes, there was a
written opinion,'' ``No, there was not a written opinion,''
``There was a verbal opinion,'' ``There was an oral opinion,''
it--I mean, when there is not responsiveness like this, then I
have limited resources of what I can do to try to get a
response. And that--and then creates the need to pursue those
limited resources. And if I could only get, you know, honest,
transparent answers to my questions, not to every gobbledygook
that has nothing to do with my question, then we could all move
along a lot further, we could all achieve a lot more, and we
could all find more comity. But, for so long as this is the
type of answer I am going to get, then I am going to use all
the tools at my disposal to get the right answers, to get the
honest answers, to get the transparent answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez.
My experience in court is that all you can do is ask
questions, but you cannot make them answer the questions the
way you want them answered. So, that is just the way it is.
And, with that----
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, it is not ``the way I want
them answered.'' I would just like to get an honest answer.
The Chairman. Got that. But, the--again, you can only craft
the questions, you cannot craft the answers.
In any event, that will conclude our hearing today.
Mr. Cooper, thank you very much for being with us today.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday. And we would ask that--the witness to respond as
promptly as possible. Your responses will be made a part of the
record.
With that, again, thanks from the committee. And the
committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Will you commit to consulting with Committee leadership
in advance of any future potential emergency declarations?
Answer. I am committed to the Congressional review process for arms
sales. I value deeply Congress' role in the review of the arms transfer
process; I take pride in the depth and detail of the working
relationship we have with the Committees in the course of this process.
The Secretary's certification is not a setting aside of that process,
but the utilization of a longstanding statutory authority to respond to
an urgent contingency. As such, I take this opportunity to affirm the
value we place on our engagement with you on arms transfers and broader
security assistance issues.
Question. Do you foresee needing to use the emergency authority to
address any other current or likely scenario in the near term?
Answer. It is our hope and intent that this use of the emergency
authorities under the Arms Export Control Act will not need to be
repeated.
__________
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What is the State Department's operative definition of an
``emergency''?
Did the Legal Adviser's office opine on what an ``emergency'' is?
If so, was that opinion in writing?
If so, will you provide a copy of that written opinion to the
Committee?
If not, what legal privilege is State claiming to exercise that
prevents it, or enables it, from providing that written opinion
to the Committee?
Answer. While the Office of the Legal Adviser (L) did not provide a
``written opinion'' on the definition of ``emergency'' under section 36
of the Arms Export Control Act, L reviewed and cleared the action
memorandum to the Secretary to approve the emergency determination and
related memorandum of justification, consistent with regular practice.
To support the Department's response to specific questions raised by
the committee, L also provided legal advice on other issues, including
through written analysis.
Question. Why did the State Department not inform Senator Menendez
or his staff that an emergency declaration for these arms sales was
being contemplated, or was going to be invoked, prior to May 24, 2019?
Answer. The Secretary met with members of Congress on May 21, 2019.
This briefing was intended to provide Congress with classified
information regarding the developing Iran threat posture. The Secretary
made the emergency determination based on a number of factors,
including the significant increase in the intelligence threat streams
related to Iran; the clear, provocative, and damaging actions taken by
Iran's government; and the need to respond to military capability
requests from our partners in the Gulf region. This situation made it
urgent to move forward with these cases for which the Department had
repeatedly sought Congressional support.
Question. Did anyone from State Department inform any Member or
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to May 24, 2019,
about consideration of, or a decision made, to make the emergency
declaration issued by the Secretary of State on May 24, 2019?
Answer. The Secretary met with members of Congress on May 21, 2019
to provide classified information regarding the developing Iran threat
posture, which included consideration of long-held risks associated
with Iran's malign behavior in the past, as well as more recent
escalations.
Question. How many FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance have been
concluded, and how many have been transmitted for consideration, to the
governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?
Answer. All initial licenses or approvals have been issued for the
14 Direct Commercial Sales cases. Of the eight Foreign Military Sales
cases, two have been offered to Saudi Arabia, one has been offered to
the UAE, and we anticipate offering the remaining five in the coming
months.
Question. How many of the 13 commercial sales have begun delivery?
Which ones? What percentage of deliveries have been made so far of the
total authorized in each sale?
Answer. This information is sensitive and/or proprietary to the
U.S. companies involved; the Department would be happy to brief you on
this information in an appropriate setting.
Question. Many of these sales could take months or years to be
delivered, isn't that right?
If so, and these sales are important to build Saudi and UAE
capacity to defend against a threat from Iran, does the expediting of
these sales via an emergency declaration also give Iran an incentive to
attack sooner, before the months and years pass for these weapons to be
brought to bear against them?
Answer. Our posture regarding Iran remains focused on assuring our
partners of our commitment to enhancing their defense capabilities.
This action is not intended to be an escalatory military step; instead,
it is a loud and clear message to Iran that we stand by our regional
partners at a particularly dangerous time. This set of cases
demonstrates the United States' resolve to stand with our partners and
to ensure we remain their partner of choice.
Question. What date was the first discussion in the State
Department regarding invoking an emergency determination for these
sales?
Answer. I cannot speak to deliberative, pre-decisional
communications that may be subject to Executive Branch confidentiality
interests.
Question. When, specifically, did the Secretary decide to use an
emergency declaration for these sales?
Answer. Secretary Pompeo made the determination on May 24, 2019.
Question. Did State Department personnel discuss declaring an
emergency for these sales with the Secretary before the Secretary
briefed the Senate and the House on May 21 and 22?
Answer. I cannot speak to deliberative, pre-decisional
communications that may be subject to Executive Branch confidentiality
interests.
Question. You testified at the House hearing that the decision memo
to the Secretary was prepared, quote, ``right before we issued the
declaration.'' On what date, specifically, was that memo prepared?
What does ``right before'' mean? An hour? 8 hours? 24 hours?
Is that why the Secretary didn't follow the law and make individual
justifications for each of the 22 sales, as required by law? He
just didn't have the time to find out what the law was and
whether he was complying with it?
Answer. I cannot speak to deliberative, pre-decisional
communications that may be subject to Executive Branch confidentiality
interests. The Secretary utilized an authority provided by the Arms
Export Control Act, complying with all of its requirements.
Question. Did the office of the Legal Advisor produce a written
legal analysis, determination, and/or recommendation that the Secretary
actually had the authority to invoke an emergency for these sales?
Answer. The Office of the Legal Adviser (L) provided legal advice
at various stages regarding the proposed exercise of the emergency
authority under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, including
reviewing and clearing the action memorandum to the Secretary to
approve the emergency determination and related memorandum of
justification. L reviews and clears all action memoranda to approve
determinations under section 36 regarding arms sales in order to ensure
the Department is acting within its legal authorities with respect to
such determinations.
Question. If so, what was the date of that legal analysis,
determination and/or recommendation?
Answer. The Office of the Legal Adviser provided advice at various
stages throughout the clearance process. The decision package on the
emergency determination was finalized and submitted to the Office of
the Secretary on May 22 or 23, 2019. On May 23rd the Secretary approved
the determination and the memorandum of justification.
Question. Will State Department provide a copy of that written or
any related legal analysis, determination and/or recommendation to the
Committee?
If not, what legal privilege is State claiming to exercise that
prevents it, or enables it, from providing such written legal analysis,
determination and/or recommendation to the Committee?
Answer. The Department is not in a position to provide a copy of
any such advice related to the preparation of a report to Congress
given the significant executive branch interests implicated in such a
request, including interests related to the protection of internal
Executive Branch deliberations and/or attorney-client communications.
Question. Mr. Cooper, can you explain why the Secretary invoked an
emergency on Friday, May 24--the Friday before a weeklong Memorial Day
recess? Why not 1 day prior? Why not 3 days prior, when the Secretary
had briefed the Senate on the Iran threat?
Answer. The Secretary of State utilized an emergency authority in
the Arms Export Control Act specifically to respond to the urgent
threat posed by Iran; the timing of his decision reflected, among many
factors, the escalation of those threats.
Question. Your written testimony also claims that the emergency
certification was also intended to preserve, quote, ``strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors:''
Is this the new standard for the State Department for congressional
oversight, that it cannot be tolerated if it in any way
undermines this ``strategic advantage''?
Does the Secretary now want to sell anything to any dictator for a
strategic business advantage?
Answer. The Secretary of State utilized an emergency authority in
the Arms Export Control Act specifically to respond to the urgent
threat posed by Iran. This action is intended to support our partners'
ability to contribute to deterring and--if necessary--defeating that
threat. Our partners need to retain a high degree of readiness and know
that the United States stands with them to ensure that have what they
need for their own security in the region.
While this emergency certification was in response to the increased
threat from Iran, it is also relevant that our adversaries, including
Russia and China, have adopted deliberate long-term strategies of
trying to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United
States as the credible partner of choice.
Question. Mr. Cooper, in pushing through these sales and
circumventing Congress, doesn't it send a dangerous message to
authoritarian regimes and autocrats everywhere: that legislative
oversight doesn't matter to Secretary Pompeo, the State Department, and
the Trump administration, as when it is inconvenient, he'll just ignore
it and declare an ``emergency''?
Answer. These emergency certifications were made pursuant to and
consistent with the longstanding statutory authority, which has been
used by past administrations, both Republican and Democrat.
Question. Section 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (arguably
does not give the President or the Secretary the authority to declare
an emergency for commercial sales for countries that are not members of
NATO and are not Israel, Australia, South Korea, Japan or New Zealand.
What is State's legal basis for why the Secretary can use authority not
explicitly present in the statute?
Answer. The Secretary's certification met the requirements under
section 36(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act for the sales at issue
here. The opening clause of section 36(c)(2) makes clear that the
regular notification procedures apply to licenses under any of the
ensuing subparagraphs only if there is not an emergency certification.
Question. Would U.S. companies issued export licenses that are not
legal under U.S. law be legally liable for violating U.S. export laws?
Answer. U.S. companies are entitled to rely on the terms of export
licenses issued to them.
Question. Secretary Cooper, the law is very clear that the
President has to provide individual justifications for each arms sale
that is the subject of an invocation of an emergency determination.
Yet, the Secretary only provided one, overarching boilerplate
justification of the history of Iran's malign activities, for all 22
separate sales, as disparate as they are:
Does this in State's opinion comply with the AECA requirement to
submit individual justifications for each sale? Why?
Answer. The Secretary's emergency certification was consistent with
the relevant provisions of the AECA. The justification transmitted to
Congress as part of the certification applied to each of the 22 cases.
Question. Mr. Cooper, is the Department investigating allegations
that the UAE transferred MRAP vehicles to others in Yemen without U.S.
permission?
Approximately when did this investigation begin? Before the
Secretary's May 24th declaration of an emergency?
Why did the Secretary think it was a good idea to bypass the 30-day
Congressional review period and expedite the process of getting
these arms to UAE, some of which they could also retransfer
without permission? Does he not care if U.S. arms are illicitly
transferred or misused? Or he cares, just not enough to slow
down the process as required by statute for Congressional
review?
Answer. We are working with our partners to address these
allegations, and we will continue to do so until we are confident all
steps necessary are taken to safeguard U.S.-origin equipment. We intend
to provide a full accounting of our review to your committee once our
investigation is complete.
The bilateral relationship, including the provision of security
assistance, with the UAE has existed for many decades. Based upon our
decades of robust interaction with them, and our continued engagement
regarding the MRAPs, the Department is confident that they remain a
reliable partner and there is not a significant risk of diversion or
misuses of these defense articles.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
marketing, sale, and on-going support of ScanEagle and Integrator
Unmanned Aerial Systems and support for future Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements for the UAE Armed
Forces will enable the UAE to counter a specific physical military
threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a description
of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. The sales also promote the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
the introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of RQ-21A Blackjack UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance to the UAE will enable the UAE to counter a specific
physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and
include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of Aircraft Follow On Logistics and Support Services for the Saudi
Air Force, including repair and spare parts, will enable Saudi Arabia
to counter a specific physical military threat or actual military
attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific physical
military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of USMC Training for UAE Presidential Guard in unit operations
such as operating the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System; plan, conduct
and supervise individuals in Rappelling and Fast Roping from a static
structure; Special Operations Basic Course and in operation of Special
Forces Weapon Systems used within the Presidential Guard, will enable
the UAE to counter a specific physical military threat or actual
military attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific
physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
continuance of spare and repair parts and contractor support for the
Tactical Air Surveillance Support System in Saudi Arabia will enable
Saudi Arabia to counter a specific physical military threat or actual
military attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific
physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of Aircraft Follow Logistics On and Support Services for the Saudi
Air Force, including repair and spare parts, will enable Saudi Arabia
to counter a specific physical military threat or actual military
attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific physical
military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System rockets to the UAE will
enable the UAE to counter a specific physical military threat or actual
military attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific
physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of Javelin anti-armor Guided Missiles to the UAE will enable the
UAE to counter a specific physical military threat or actual military
attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific physical
military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale Additional equipment for AH-64E Apaches, including one new
helicopter, to the UAE will enable the UAE to counter a specific
physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and
include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how:
(A) The authorization of coproduction and manufacture in Saudi
Arabia of Paveway Pre-Amp Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA), Guidance
Electronics Assembly (GEA) CCAs, and Control Actuator System (CAS) CCAs
for all Paveway variants;
(B) The authorization of coproduction and manufacture in Saudi
Arabia of Paveway II Guidance Electronics Detector Assemblies (GEDA)
and Computer Control Groups (CCG).
(C) The transfer of up to 64,603 additional kits, partial kits, and
full-up-rounds will enable Saudi Arabia to counter a specific physical
military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a
description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of Integration, installation, operation, training, testing,
maintenance, and repair of the Maverick AGM-65 Weapons System and the
Paveway II, Paveway III, Enhanced Paveway II, and Enhanced Paveway III
Weapons Systems to the UAE will enable the UAE to counter a specific
physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and
include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of installation, integration, modification, maintenance, and
repair services for F110-GE-132 gas turbine engines for use in F-16
Aircraft for use by the UAE in the amount of $50,000,000 or more will
enable the UAE to counter a specific physical military threat or actual
military attack from Iran, and include a description of the specific
physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of Manufacture, production, test, inspection, modification,
enhancement, rework, and repair of F/A-18E/F and derivative series
aircraft panels to Saudi Arabia will enable Saudi Arabia to counter a
specific physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran,
and include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
sale of assistance to Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Defense Transformation
Project will enable Saudi Arabia to counter a specific physical
military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a
description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
authorization for a technical assistance agreement with the UAE to
support the preparation, shipment, delivery, and acceptance of the
Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) (Patriot) will enable the UAE to
counter a specific physical military threat or actual military attack
from Iran, and include a description of the specific physical military
threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
transfer of technical data and defense services in order to provide
technically qualified personnel to advise and assist the Royal Saudi
Air Force (RSAF) in maintenance and training for the RSAF F-15 fleet of
aircraft will enable Saudi Arabia to counter a specific physical
military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a
description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
authorization to retransfer of 500 Paveway II laser guided bombs to
Jordan will enable Jordan to counter a specific physical military
threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a description
of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
export of 15,000 120mm M933Al 120mm mortar bombs to the Saudi Arabian
Royal Land Forces will enable Saudi Arabia to counter a specific
physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and
include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
export of 100 M107Al, .50 caliber semi-automatic rifles and 100 sound
suppressors to the UAE for end use by the General Headquarters, UAE
Armed forces will enable the UAE to counter a specific physical
military threat or actual military attack from Iran, and include a
description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
export of defense articles, including data and defense services, to
support the performance of maintenance and repair services of F-110
engines for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense will enable
the Saudi Arabia to counter a specific physical military threat or
actual military attack from Iran, and include a description of the
specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
Question. Provide a detailed individual justification as to how the
transfer of defense articles, defense services, and technical data to
support the integration of the FMU-152A/B Joint Programmable Bomb Fuze
system into the UAE Armed Forces General Headquarters' fleet of
aircraft and associated weapons will enable the UAE to counter a
specific physical military threat or actual military attack from Iran,
and include a description of the specific physical military threat.
Answer. The justification transmitted to Congress as part of the
certification applied to each of the 22 cases. These sales and the
associated emergency certification are intended to address the military
need of our partners in the face of an urgent regional threat posed by
Iran. This sale also promotes the vitality of our bilateral
relationships by reassuring our partners and preserving strategic
advantage against near-peer competitors. None of these sales involves
introduction of fundamentally new capabilities to the region; none
fundamentally alters the military balance of power; none is of a nature
or category that Congress has not previously reviewed and supported for
these partners.
Each of these cases furthers our interests in addressing a present
emergency; remaining engaged with partners; ensuring the United States,
rather than near-peer adversaries, is their primary security partner;
supporting our partners in the defense of their homelands and the
security of the region; and deterring our shared adversaries from
disrupting those objectives.
__________
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Can you describe what threat was present against which
the U.S. forces deployed to region would have been incapable of
defending or deterring and thus require this sale?
Answer. The Secretary made the Emergency Certification based on a
number of factors, including the significant increase in the
intelligence threat streams related to Iran and the clear, provocative,
and damaging actions taken by Iran's government; and the rapidly
evolving security situation in the region that required accelerated and
overt delivery of certain military capabilities to our partners.
Question. Do you believe the administration currently possesses the
authority to engage in military action against Iran or is a new
authorization for the use of military force required in order to act?
Answer. As Secretary Pompeo has noted, the administration's goal is
to find a diplomatic solution to deter Iran's activities, not to engage
in a conflict with Iran. I do not wish to comment on hypotheticals, but
the administration is not currently seeking a new authorization for use
of military force. Moreover, the administration has not, to date,
interpreted either the 2001 or the 2002 AUMF as authorizing military
force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or
partner forces engaged in counterterrorism operations or operations to
establish a stable, democratic Iraq.
Question. What legitimate military capability would these sales
have filled that would have increased the effectiveness of the Saudi
and Emirati military forces?
Answer. Our partners have requirements for continuing supply and
support for their defense programs to counter current and potential
threats, including from Iran. Specifics on partner readiness and
capabilities is sensitive and often classified information; we welcome
the opportunity to brief the committee, you and/or your staff on these
issues.
Question. If this truly was an emergency, the facts and information
that necessitated that emergency are of great interest and concern to
this committee. Are you able to describe those to us?
Answer. Iran is a malign actor and the leading state sponsor of
terrorism. Iran continues to pose conventional and asymmetric threats
to our partners in the Gulf, and to U.S. interests in the region and
beyond. While these facts are well-known, we have seen new, troubling
and escalatory indications and warnings from the Iranian regime
prompting an increased U.S. force posture in the region. Indeed, events
since the Secretary's certification further demonstrate the urgent need
for these sales: Iranian attacks on civilian-crewed cargo ships and
tankers in the Sea of Oman; continued Houthi attacks, including one
utilizing a cruise missile, against civilian airports; the shoot-down
of a U.S. Broad Area Maritime Surveillance unmanned aerial system in
international airspace.
These latest actions, like those that preceded the May 24
notification, including attacks on commercial shipping off the coast of
the United Arab Emirates, attacks on pumping stations of the Saudi
East-West Pipeline utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles, and a rocket
fired into a park about a kilometer from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on
May 19 are provocative actions that mark a new evolution in the threat
Iran poses to the security of the hundreds of thousands of Americans
who live and work in the Gulf States, and to the security of the
region, and our partners.
My testimony July 10 described these events. I would be happy to go
into further detail in a classified setting for the committee, you,
and/or your staff.
Question. Did the administration feel the need to use these
emergency powers because of a clear threat, or was it more out of
frustration with the politics and bureaucracy that was slowing these
sales?
Answer.The Secretary of State utilized an emergency authority in
the Arms Export Control Act specifically to respond to the urgent
threat posed by Iran. This action is intended to support our partners'
ability to contribute to deterring and--if necessary--defeating that
threat. To do so our partners need to retain a high degree of readiness
and know that the United States stands with them to ensure that have
what they need to ensure their own security and security in the region.
Question. Do you believe the politics of the Senate have created a
situation in which the State Department's fulfillment of its
responsibilities are being hampered?
Answer. In regards to arms transfers, I can affirm the Department
has the necessary authorities to fulfill its responsibilities. In the
case of this Emergency Certification, the law provided an appropriate
tool for the Secretary to apply against the increase in Iran-related
threat streams. Congress plays an important role in the review of
pending arms transfers, and the Department returned immediately to the
regular Tiered Review process for further sales to these and other
security partners.
Question. Mr. Secretary, what review occurred to ensure that these
military sales would not be used in operations that result in
humanitarian violations, especially in Yemen, home of perhaps the most
intense humanitarian rights crisis in the world?
Answer. These cases received a full policy review, as would any
other sales, including with regard to human rights and civilian
casualties. Saudi Arabia and the UAE face legitimate security threats
emanating from Yemen, and the Executive interagency continues to assist
those partners in defending themselves. At the same time, the Executive
interagency is also continuing to work with the Saudi-led Coalition to
mitigate the risk of civilian casualties. The Coalition continues to
implement organizational and process changes to mitigate the risk of
civilian harm, and to enhance respect for rules of engagement and the
law of armed conflict. We will continue to work closely with our
partners in enhancing these efforts. The Department also continues to
press partners to conduct transparent and credible investigations of
civilian casualty incidents, hold accountable those responsible, and
take steps to mitigate the risk of such incidents occurring again.
Question. Are you able to provide me an assurance that the State
Department took humanitarian concerns into account when evaluating
these sales?
Answer. The President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, issued
in 2018, mandates consideration of ``the risk that the transfer may be
used to undermine international peace and security or contribute to
abuses of human rights, including acts of gender-based violence and
acts of violence against children, violations of international
humanitarian law, terrorism, mass atrocities, or transnational
organized crime.'' The Department requires consideration of
humanitarian factors in its assessment of all arms transfers, including
those submitted under the emergency certifications, which each received
a full policy review.
__________
Responses of R. Clarke Cooper to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
civilian casualties in yemen
Question. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project, the total number of reported fatalities in the Yemen conflict
from the beginning of 2015 to present is 91,600. Around 12,000 have
been reported so far in 2019.
The Saudi-led coalition and its allies remain responsible for the
highest number of reported civilian fatalities from direct targeting.
About two thirds of reported civilian fatalities in Yemen over the last
four and a half years have been caused by Saudi-led coalition
airstrikes.
In your written testimony, you stated, quote, ``Remaining a
reliable security partner to our allies and friends around the world is
also in the interest and furtherance of our values:''
Do you believe the number of reported casualties reflects well on
American values?
Answer. We share your concerns about the end use of the arms we
provide overseas, including in the context of the Yemeni civil war.
From the beginning of this conflict we have maintained that a political
solution is urgently needed, and have supported the U.N.-led effort
working toward that objective. In addition, we have engaged with the
Saudi-led Coalition over the course of its operations to help it reduce
the occurrence of civilian casualties. Every civilian casualty is a
tragedy, and we have both a moral and strategic imperative to do as
much as possible to prevent them and to help our partners and allies
prevent them.
Question. Are you satisfied with the administration's efforts to
minimize civilian casualties, which you said was a cornerstone of the
Trump administration's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in 2018?
Answer. I hope that no military is ever complacent that it has done
enough to minimize civilian casualties, nor am I complacent that we
have done enough to help our partners do so. That is why we continue to
look for opportunities to help our partners do better. When President
Trump issued the updated Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in 2018, a
centerpiece of the new Policy was its unprecedented directive that we
work with partners to reduce the risk of civilian harm in their
military operations. We are working on the implementation of that
directive to shape future engagements, including with partners in
advance of conflict situations.
Question. Given that the 2018 U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy requires the executive branch to account for human rights and
international humanitarian law, which attacks reported in an open forum
have concerned you the most with respect to the ability of the Saudi-
led coalition to avoid civilian harm?
Answer. All incidents that incur civilian casualties are
concerning. In particular, the August 9, 2018 strike in Saada
governorate that hit a school bus was deeply concerning and drew
significant attention. We regularly engage the Coalition [at the
highest levels?] to encourage appropriate procedures to assess and
minimize the risk of civilian harm, as well as accountability and
transparency in investigations of strikes that lead to civilian
casualties. The Coalition has indicated to us that it wants to improve
further and remains open to our input on best practices. I remain
committed to policies that reduce civilian harm wherever possible.