[Senate Hearing 116-115]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 116-115

                    AN EXAMINATION OF U.S.-IRAN POLICY

=======================================================================

                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            OCTOBER 16, 2019             

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                   COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman        
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia              CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana                 CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
              Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director        
            Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        

                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     1

    Prepared Statement...........................................     3

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     5

Hook, Hon. Brian, Special Representative for Iran, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

The Committee Received No Response From Special Representative 
  Brian Hook for the Following Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    51

Responses of Special Representative Brian Hook to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................    54

Responses of Special Representative Brian Hook to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey..........................    59

Fact Sheet--Iranian Regime Malign Activities During Negotiations 
  With Iran and During JCPOA.....................................    60

Document--Cooperation With European Partners and Allies From July 
  28, 2017 Through September 24, 2019 Addressing Range of Threats 
  Posed by Iran..................................................    63

                                 (iii)
                                 

.                   
                  AN EXAMINATION OF U.S.-IRAN POLICY

                              ----------                              


                                          WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2019

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. 
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Rubio, Johnson, 
Gardner, Romney, Graham, Barrasso, Paul, Young, Cruz, Menendez, 
Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Merkley.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee of the United 
States Senate will come to order.
    The chair would note we have a full house today and an 
enthusiastic audience I am sure. We would ask you to be 
respectful. I would remind everyone that holding up signs or 
making verbal outbursts during the proceedings is disruptive 
and appropriate action will be taken. If need be, we will 
suspend briefly while we restore order.
    This morning we have a hearing on a matter that is really 
of pressing national security importance, and that is the 
relationship of the United States and, for that matter, the 
world with Iran.
    This hearing is intended to do three things. Number one, we 
will consider the facts behind the maximum pressure campaign 
against Iran. We will examine the elements of Iran's necessary 
behavioral changes that would satisfy U.S. and the world's 
national security interests and, thirdly, assess Iran's 
willingness to behave as a responsible member of the 
international community.
    Iran's pursuit of regional domination following the 1979 
revolution transformed the fabric of the Middle East. The 
Iranian regime dangerously catalyzed sectarian identities and 
weaponized sect and religion against its neighbors. The regime 
triggered a Sunni-Shia war that threatens to unravel the 
greater Middle East.
    The nuclear issue is but one aspect of the regime's malign 
conduct. Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms I had of the 
JCPOA was that it addressed only the nuclear issue and not the 
many other troubling aspects of Iran's behavior.
    Iran continues to threaten its neighbors with ballistic 
missiles, conducts criminal maritime activity in international 
waters, continues to unlawfully hold American citizens, and 
fuels dangerous proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and 
Lebanon. Iranian-sponsored, precision-guided munitions are a 
threat aimed at the heart of Israel. Iran actively enables 
Assad's continued butchery in Syria. Additionally, the regime 
is working to subvert several other regional governments below 
the level of armed conflict.
    Iran's support of proxies is perhaps the most nefarious. 
Ask any of our men and women in uniform who faced Iranian-
provided roadside bombs in Iraq. Iran already has American 
blood on its hands. The lack of a more firm response by prior 
administrations has only encouraged further Iranian violence.
    Inside of its borders, the regime's abuses against its own 
people continue to be a concern. Iranian citizens live under 
constant threat of arbitrary arrest and torture for expressing 
their most basic human rights, including freedom of expression 
and religion.
    Indeed, despite the regime's claims of religious 
legitimacy, it is morally bankrupt, a kleptocracy that steals 
from its people in order to subvert its neighbors.
    That brings us to a question on the most appropriate 
policies to curb the totality of Iranian behavior.
    It is my assessment that the maximum pressure campaign 
against Iran is working and can serve as the bridge to more 
meaningful negotiations. I note that some of my colleagues have 
argued publicly that the maximum pressure campaign is not 
working. I will be the first to concede that the campaign has 
not achieved its goals, but on the other hand, it is clearly 
working.
    Since May of last year, sanctions have denied the regime 
over $25 billion in oil revenue. The Administration estimates 
it will cost the regime as much as $50 billion annually.
    The Iranian economy faces unprecedented strain. After 
nearly 30 rounds of highly targeted sanctions, the rial has 
plunged. Inflation is at 50 percent in Iran and climbing. 
Iran's economy is shrinking at a rate that should alarm Tehran. 
Nearly a six percent reduction in GDP for 2019 is estimated.
    In my judgment, these are clear indications and clear 
evidence that, indeed, the sanctions are working.
    For the first time, Iran's terror proxies have seen a 
reduction in funding. Hezbollah, once well-funded by Iran, has 
been reduced, as we all know, into panhandling for donations. 
Iran's proxies throughout the region are feeling the pinch. 
They are either going without pay or forced to undergo 
austerity measures to survive.
    Make no mistake. Every dollar, every rial we deny the 
regime is money not spent on terrorism.
    Iran's requests for total sanctions relief in order to come 
to the table should be and is a non-starter. The regime must 
demonstrate it is willing to negotiate in good faith or face 
continued pressure.
    The pressure must have an international face. For too long, 
our European friends have sought to preserve a moribund nuclear 
deal that offered Iran a financial escape hatch to continue 
destabilizing the region. We have had numerous conversations 
with our European friends regarding that.
    I welcomed the joint statement from the U.K., France, and 
Germany following Iran's attacks on Saudi Arabia. Apart from 
rightly identifying Iran as the culprit, our partners stressed 
the importance of addressing regional security issues, as well 
as the nuclear question. This was well received by us.
    They must go further than that. Our European partners must 
follow the United Kingdom's lead and support the pursuit of 
behavioral changes on Iran's part.
    My thoughts on the JCPOA are well known. The deal was a 
poor one, one that only partly addressed the nuclear issue and 
importantly--very importantly--ignored the rest of Iran's 
terrorist conduct and enriched the regime's illicit terrorist 
proxies.
    Any new deal with Iran should address all facets of Iranian 
conduct, curbing the ballistic missile program, ensuring 
freedom of navigation consistent with international law, ending 
Iranian adventurism, and the regime's efforts to undermine 
governments and promote civil war through its proxies in 
addition to the nuclear issue.
    The nuclear solution should not merely delay Iranian 
development of a nuclear weapon or sunset in a manner that 
allows the regime's scientists to sprint to the finish line. It 
is in the U.S.'s vital national security interests and, indeed, 
the interests of the entire world that Iran never possess a 
nuclear weapon.
    Finally, a topic has emerged in public discourse that 
should be addressed. There are many that blame the U.S. 
diplomatic and economic efforts as the root cause of Iran's 
acts of violence. To you, I say you could not be more wrong. 
There is only one party to blame for Iran's acts of violence 
and that is the Iranian regime. There is only one bad actor 
here, and that is the Iranian regime.
    The Iranian regime is feeling the weight of the growing 
community against them. Absent an attack on Americans or 
American assets abroad, we should not be moved by Iranian 
outbursts or attacks on shipping. We should continue to apply 
pressure until the regime capitulates and changes behavior. 
They will.
    The Iranian regime is faced with a sharp choice. It is long 
past time that Iran enter the community of nations as a 
responsible actor and enjoy the many benefits, advantages, and 
cultural progress that all peace-loving nations on the planet 
take delight in. Otherwise, it will remain a pariah state.
    This is an important issue, and I am glad we have the 
attendance we have today to examine this issue.
    With that, I will recognize Senator Menendez.
    [The prepared statement of Senator James E. Risch follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Senator James E. Risch

    This morning we have a hearing on a matter that is really of 
pressing national security importance--the relationship of the United 
States with Iran.
    This hearing is intended to do three things--we will consider the 
facts behind the maximum pressure campaign against Iran, we will 
examine the elements of Iran's necessary behavioral changes that would 
satisfy U.S. national security interests, and we will assess Iran's 
willingness to behave as a responsible member of the international 
community.
    Iran's pursuit of regional domination following the 1979 revolution 
transformed the fabric of the Middle East. The Iranian regime 
dangerously catalyzed sectarian identities and weaponized sect and 
religion against its neighbors. The regime triggered a Sunni-Shia war 
that threatens to unravel the greater Middle East.
    The nuclear issue is but one aspect of the regime's malign conduct. 
Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms I had of the JCPOA was that it 
addressed only the nuclear issue and not the many other troubling 
aspects of Iran's behavior.
    Iran continues to threaten its neighbors with ballistic missiles, 
conducts criminal maritime activity in international waters, continues 
to unlawfully hold American citizens, and fuels dangerous proxy 
conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iranian-sponsored 
precision guided munitions are a threat aimed at the heart of Israel. 
Iran actively enables Assad's continued butchery in Syria. 
Additionally, the regime is working to subvert several other regional 
governments below the level of armed conflict.
    Iran's support to proxies is perhaps the most nefarious--ask any of 
our men and women in uniform who faced Iranian-provided roadside bombs 
in Iraq. Iran already has American blood on its hands. The lack of a 
more firm response by prior administrations has only encouraged further 
Iranian violence.
    Inside of its borders, the regime's abuses against its own people 
continue to be a concern. Iranian citizens live under constant threat 
of arbitrary arrest and torture for expressing their most basic human 
rights including freedom of expression and religion.
    Despite the regime's claims of religious legitimacy, it is morally 
bankrupt--a kleptocracy that steals from its people in order to subvert 
its neighbors.
    That brings us to a question on the most appropriate policies to 
curb the totality of Iranian behavior.
    It is my assessment that the maximum pressure campaign against Iran 
is working and can serve as the bridge to more meaningful negotiations. 
I note that some of my colleagues have argued publicly that the maximum 
pressure campaign is not working. I will be the first to concede that 
the campaign has not yet achieved its goals, but on the other hand it 
is clearly working.
    Since May of last year, sanctions have denied the regime over $25 
billion in oil revenue. The Administration estimates it will cost the 
regime as much as $50 billion annually.
    The Iranian economy faces unprecedented strain. After nearly 30 
rounds of highly targeted sanctions, the rial has plunged, inflation is 
at 50 percent and climbing, and Iran's economy is shrinking at a rate 
that should alarm Tehran--nearly a six percent reduction in GDP for 
2019.
    In my judgment, these are clear indications and clear evidence that 
the sanctions are working.
    For the first time, Iran's terror proxies have seen a reduction in 
funding. Hezbollah, once well-funded by Iran, has been reduced to 
panhandling for donations. Iran's proxies throughout the region are 
feeling the pinch--they're either going without pay or forced to 
undergo austerity measures to survive.
    Make no mistake, every dollar, every rial we deny the regime is 
money not spent on terrorism.
    Iran's requests for total sanctions relief in order to come to the 
table should be a non-starter. The regime must demonstrate it is 
willing to negotiate in good faith or face continued pressure.
    This pressure must have an international face. For too long our 
European friends have sought to preserve a moribund nuclear deal and 
offered Iran a financial escape hatch to continue destabilizing the 
region. We have had numerous conversations with our European friends 
regarding that.
    I welcomed the joint statement from the U.K., France and Germany 
following Iran's attacks on Saudi Arabia. Apart from rightly 
identifying Iran as the culprit, our partners stressed the importance 
of addressing regional security issues as well the nuclear question.
    But, they must go further than that. Our European partners must 
follow the United Kingdom's lead and support the pursuit of behavioral 
changes on Iran's part.
    My thoughts on the JCPOA are well known. The deal was a poor one--
one that only partly addressed the nuclear issue, ignored the rest of 
Iran's terrorist conduct, and enriched the regime's illicit terrorist 
proxies.
    Any new deal with Iran should address all facets of Iranian 
conduct--curbing the ballistic missile program, ensuring freedom of 
navigation consistent with international law, ending Iranian 
adventurism, and the regime's efforts to undermine governments and 
promote civil war through its proxies--in addition to the nuclear 
issue.
    The nuclear solution should not merely delay Iranian development of 
a nuclear weapon or sunset in a manner that allows the regime's 
scientists to sprint to the finish line. It is in the U.S.'s vital 
national security interests that Iran never possess a nuclear weapon.
    And finally, a topic has emerged in public discourse that should be 
addressed. There are many that blame the U.S. diplomatic and economic 
efforts as the root cause for Iran's acts of violence. To you, I say 
you could not be more wrong. There is one party to blame for Iran's 
acts of violence--the Iranian regime.
    The Iranian regime is feeling the weight of the growing community 
against them. Absent an attack on Americans or American assets abroad, 
we should not be deterred by Iranian outbursts or attacks on shipping. 
We should remain steadfast and continue to apply pressure until the 
regime capitulates and changes behavior.
    The Iranian regime is faced with a sharp choice. It is long since 
time that Iran enter the community of nations as a responsible actor 
and enjoy the many benefits, advantages, and cultural progress that all 
peace-loving nations on the planet take delight in--otherwise, it will 
remain a pariah state.
    With that, I recognize Ranking Member Menendez for his opening 
remarks.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding this important hearing.
    Before I get to the hearing, I just want to urge the chair. 
Global events come at us fast and furiously. This committee 
historically has played a role in fashioning U.S. foreign 
policy, and as we face the challenges in Ukraine and Syria, I 
hope that the chairman--I know that committee Democrats have 
written to the chair asking him for a hearing on Ukraine. I 
think that would be echoed on Syria. These are vitally 
important issues in terms of the foreign policy of the United 
States, the role that Russia is playing, and the role that Iran 
is playing. So I certainly hope that the chair will honor those 
requests and hold a hearing on both of those issues as 
expeditiously as possible.
    Now, this committee has not had a hearing on Iran since 
March of 2017, more than 2 and a half years ago, which is 
unfortunate because it has been one of the Administration's 
biggest stated priorities and one in which I believe there is 
at least a basis of bipartisan consensus from which we could 
work.
    There is no doubt that an Iranian-enabled nuclear state 
would pose a serious threat to the United States and its 
allies. There is equal agreement that Iranian malign activity 
throughout the Middle East, including through proxies and 
terrorist organizations, is ongoing, dangerous, and 
destabilizing. There is, I believe, also widespread agreement 
that the United States should utilize strategic diplomacy, 
including sanctions, with our international partners and allies 
to most effectively counter Iran.
    As everyone, I think, on this committee knows, I did not 
support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. When the Trump 
administration withdrew from the deal without a strategy and 
without partners, I worried that this unilateral approach would 
put our nation on a dangerous and lonely path that would 
ultimately leave Iran emboldened.
    Well, Mr. Hook, I am afraid to say I think I was right. 
Yes, the Iranian regime seems starved of some financial 
resources. As far as I can tell, that is all. It would appear 
that beyond sanctions, our maximum pressure campaign only 
extends to sending American troops to protect Saudi Arabia.
    In fact, the rest of the Administration's policies across 
the Middle East seem only to have emboldened Iran, hardened its 
political supporters from Hezbollah to militias in Iraq, and 
most devastatingly and recently, helped entrench itself in 
Bashar al-Assad's Syria.
    On the nuclear front, as it warned it would, Iran is now 
slowly winding back the nuclear restrictions that the JCPOA 
imposed, putting it even closer to weaponization.
    You and your colleagues are quick to point out that Iran 
has pursued this malign activity in the region for more than 40 
years, and frankly, I could not agree more. I do not see your 
policies meaningfully changing that behavior.
    You have said that the two goals of the maximum pressure 
campaign are to deprive the Iranian regime of money to stop its 
malign activity and to bring Iran back to the negotiating 
table. However, application of this policy is confusing. One 
minute the President is willing to make a deal. The next he is 
threatening to wipe out the Iranian economy.
    You have utilized just about every sanctions authority 
available to you, but sanctions are only a viable tool if they 
are consistent.
    For example, Reza Zarrab of Halkbank in Turkey was arrested 
in 2016 in connection with one of the largest Iran sanctions 
evasion schemes in history. However, while his criminal case 
was ongoing, we recently learned that the President and his 
personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, were trying to get him freed 
from prison. I understand you were at least aware of these 
efforts.
    What does that say about the viability of American 
sanctions or this maximum pressure campaign?
    The Iranians are holding out because they believe for now 
they can. They will not come to the table for a Kim Jong-un-
like photo op.
    So my fundamental question for you, Mr. Hook, is where are 
you on the harder diplomatic part of this campaign. How have 
you utilized the pressure to get Iran to a negotiating table?
    I also would like to live in a world where we could 
sanction Iran into stopping its support for terrorism, treating 
its own people with dignity and respect, into releasing all 
unjustly detained Americans, including Princeton University 
student Xiyue Wang.
    I live in the real world where I know that in order to make 
a deal, you have to give something to get something. Now seems 
like the ideal time to harness the pressure you have created. I 
am curious to know if you have laid out the parameters of a 
deal that the Administration would accept, including 
limitations on research and development, limitations on 
enrichment and stockpile amounts, and whether or not you have 
any sense of what the Iranians will seek in relief from the 
United States. I would like to know whether you have directly 
or indirectly or through back channels or other countries 
sought to engage Iran in that regard.
    So, Mr. Hook, let us use our diplomatic tools as leverage 
for what we should be ultimately trying to achieve: a 
negotiated agreement with Iran with buy-in from our 
international partners to meaningfully constrain its nuclear 
program and address other malign activity, a deal that includes 
permanent and long-term restrictions on Iran's nuclear 
capacity, tackles its ballistic missile proliferation, and one 
that addresses its regional support for terrorism, including 
through the transfer of weapons.
    I look forward to hearing about your progress to address 
this ongoing and pressing national security priority.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
    First of all, I want to agree with you 100 percent that 
this hearing on Iran is important and I think probably one of 
the most pressing issues facing the United States because I 
think it is the issue that has the most potential for having 
miscalculation by the other side and winding up with a 
situation that we really do not want to be in. I think that 
potential is there. I think it is there more so with this 
regime than any other regime on the planet.
    Secondly, I agree with you 100 percent that this committee 
has historically played an important role in foreign policy. It 
continues to do so. I note that members of this committee are 
very active in public making statements stating their opinions, 
giving advice to the Administration, both to the State 
Department and the White House. Members of this committee 
regularly I know communicate with the State Department and with 
the White House. We will, of course, continue to do that.
    I want to address briefly--you had mentioned that I had 
received a letter from you and members of the minority on the 
committee wanting certain hearings scheduled. I have taken that 
under advisement. I am in the process of vetting that. I am 
doing some foundational work on that. I have talked with most 
members of the committee, not all, but almost all. I want to 
talk with other interested parties before I respond to that, 
and I will respond to that in writing, just as you did.
    Lastly, I want to correct you respectfully regarding your 
criticism of the Administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA. 
You indicated that you supported the withdrawal. Or I guess you 
did not support the JCPOA. I do not recall whether you said you 
supported the withdrawal. I did. I urged the President to 
withdraw.
    I believe the President withdrew with a very clear 
strategy, and that strategy was to go back to the pressure 
campaign, the maximum pressure campaign, that was in place 
before the JCPOA negotiations started. It was not called the 
maximum pressure campaign, but it was the same thing. I agreed 
with that at that time. What I disagreed with was to stop the 
maximum pressure campaign and sit down and start negotiating 
when they were not at a point where they had to negotiate.
    At the present time, we have a maximum pressure campaign. I 
reiterated the things that I think are pressuring the country. 
I suspect Mr. Hook will talk about that quite a bit more. My 
urging is that we stay with the strategy that we have, the 
clear strategy we have had since we withdrew from the JCPOA. 
That is continue to exert maximum pressure on the regime until 
they capitulate. They will. They will have to.
    So with all that, thank you.
    We have the Honorable Brian Hook, Special Representative 
for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State. 
As Special Representative for Iran, Mr. Hook leads the Iran 
Action Group, which is responsible for directing, reviewing, 
and coordinating all Iran-related activity within the U.S. 
State Department. We could not have a better witness or a more 
informed witness or a more competent witness to address these 
issues before the committee.
    On a personal note, I have had the good fortune to talk to 
Mr. Hook on many, many occasions about these issues and counsel 
with him on these issues. I find him to be receptive. I find 
him to be well informed and acting in the best faith and best 
interest of the United States as we move forward.
    So with that, Mr. Hook, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN HOOK, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR IRAN, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Hook. Thank you, Chairman Risch, and thank you for your 
very kind words.
    I would also like to thank Ranking Member Menendez for his 
opening statement and distinguished members of the committee.
    I have appeared before this committee a number of times, 
but it has mostly been in private. So I am very happy to have 
an opportunity to have a discussion on Iran in a public 
setting. I have a longer prepared statement that I have 
submitted, but why do I not go over some parts of that 
submitted statement.
    We have implemented an unprecedented pressure campaign, and 
it has two objectives. One is to deny the regime the revenue 
that it needs to fund a revolutionary and expansionist foreign 
policy. The other one is to increase the incentives for Iran to 
come to the negotiating table. If you look at the 40-year 
history that the United States has had with this republic and 
other nations have had, you see a consistent pattern that you 
need to have either economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, or 
the threat of military force. It is one or more of these 
factors are what inform Iran's decision-making calculus. We 
have kept our foreign policy squarely within the left-right 
limits of economic pressure and diplomatic isolation.
    The President has also repeatedly expressed the United 
States' willingness to negotiate with Iran, and we are willing 
to meet with the Iranians without preconditions.
    We are seeking a comprehensive deal, and it needs to 
address four areas. It needs to address in a very comprehensive 
way the threats that Iran presents to international peace and 
security, and that is their nuclear program, their missile 
program, its support to terrorist groups and proxies, and its 
40-year history of hostage taking. This includes the arbitrary 
detention of U.S. citizens, including Bob Levinson, Siamak 
Namazi, and Xiyue Wang, and others.
    Before we exited the deal and re-imposed sanctions and 
accelerated our pressure, Iran was increasing the scope of its 
malign activity. We now have newly declassified information 
relating to Iran's missile program that I can share today.
    While the United States was still in the JCPOA, Iran 
expanded its ballistic missile activities to partners across 
the region, including Hezbollah, Palestinian terrorist groups, 
and Shia militias in Iraq.
    Beginning last year, Iran transferred whole missiles to a 
separate designated terrorist group in the region.
    Iran is continuing to develop missile systems and related 
technologies solely for export to regional proxies.
    While we were in the JCPOA, Iran increased its support to 
Hezbollah, helping them produce a greater number of rockets and 
missiles. This arsenal is then used to target our ally, Israel.
    Beyond continuing advancements to its missile program, Iran 
was also deepening its engagement in regional conflicts.
    Also, under the Iran nuclear deal, Iran was given a clear 
pathway to import and export dangerous weapons. Two days from 
now on October 18, we will be exactly 1 year away from the 
expiration of the United Nations arms embargo on Iran. Because 
of the Iran nuclear deal, countries like Russia and China will 
soon be able to sell conventional weapons to Iran.
    The U.N. Security Council needs to renew the arms embargo 
on Iran before it expires. We have made this a priority. The 
Secretary has visited the U.N. Security Council now two or 
three times to highlight the expiration date of the arms 
embargo.
    Today, by nearly every measure, the regime and its proxies 
are weaker than when our pressure began. Shia militant groups 
in Syria have stated to the ``New York Times''--this was in 
March--that Iran no longer has enough money to pay them as much 
as they have in the past. There was one Shia fighter who said 
the golden days are gone and they are never coming back. Iran 
just does not have the money that it used to.
    Hezbollah and Hamas have enacted unprecedented austerity 
plans due to a lack of funding from Iran.
    In March, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, went on TV 
and said Hezbollah needed public support to sustain its 
operations. In various parts of Lebanon, you can see piggybanks 
in grocery stores soliciting spare change from Lebanese 
citizens to support Hezbollah's operation.
    We are also making it harder for Iran to expand its 
military capabilities. Beginning in 2014, Iran's military 
budget increased every year through to 2017 when it hit nearly 
$14 billion. However, from 2017 to 2018, when our pressure went 
into effect, we saw a reduction in military spending of nearly 
10 percent in the first year, and in Iran's 2019 budget, which 
was announced in March, there was a 28 percent cut to their 
defense budget, and this includes a 17 percent cut for IRGC 
funding. Because of our sanctions, Iran will be unable to even 
fully fund this thin budget for 2019.
    The IRGC cyber command is now low on cash, and the IRGC has 
told Iraq Shia militia groups that they should start looking 
for new sources of revenue.
    Today, this morning, the IMF revised its economic outlook 
for Iran and forecasted a GDP contraction of 9.5 percent. We 
anticipate that in this fiscal year, Iran could be in as much 
as a 12 percent negative GDP contraction.
    So the regime does face a choice. It can act like a 
country, or it can act like a cause. Iran must change its 
behavior and start to act like a normal nation or it will watch 
its economy continue to decline.
    Our policy is, at its core, a diplomatic and an economic 
one. This Administration does not seek armed conflict with 
Iran. We are relying on American economic pressure and American 
diplomacy to raise the costs on Iran and force meaningful 
behavior change.
    Unfortunately, Iran has responded to our diplomacy with 
violence and kinetic force. In recent months, Iran has launched 
a series of panicked attacks, what Secretary Pompeo has called 
panicked aggression, to intimidate the world into halting our 
pressure. Iran was responsible for the attacks at the Port of 
Fujairah, the assault on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, 
and the attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq.
    Iran's message to the international community is quite 
clear. This is important that I think people understand the 
regime's paradigm. Iran's message to the world is if you do not 
allow us to conduct our normal level of terror, then we will 
behave even more badly until you do. Iran has long used its 
nuclear program in this way and for this reason. The world 
ought to recognize this extortion when it sees it.
    When the world comes together to push back against Iran--
and we saw this recently in the context of FIFA, which put 
enormous pressure on Iran because it was denying women from 
attending soccer matches. FIFA stood up to the regime, made 
very clear that there needed to be a change, and for the first 
time, Iranian women were admitted recently into a game. They 
were segregated from everybody else, and they were kept in a 
cordoned area. It is an example of imposing, sort of isolating 
Iran, and pressuring Iran can achieve the kind of behavior 
change that we are talking about.
    When the world comes together to push back Iran, we do see 
a change in its behavior. This Administration will do its part, 
and we are succeeding in having others join us. On the Monday 
of the U.N. General Assembly--this is shortly after the attacks 
at Abqaiq--France, Germany, and the United Kingdom called for 
Iran to accept negotiations on its nuclear program, ballistic 
missiles, and regional activity. This has been the position of 
the United States for 2 and a half years, and we were very 
pleased to see the E3 call on new negotiations so that we can 
have a new and comprehensive deal. I think it is very much the 
case that the Iran nuclear deal has come at the expense of 
missile nonproliferation in the Middle East. I think I have 
said to this committee probably a year ago--I know I said it a 
year ago when I was at the United Nations--if we do not restore 
deterrence against Iran's missile proliferation, we are 
accumulating risk of a regional war. We saw this then 1 year 
later in the Iranian attack on Saudi.
    We remember that the longest suffering victims of the 
Iranian regime are the Iranian people. We wish nothing more for 
the Iranian people than a future with a truly representative 
government and a much better future with the American people 
and the Iranian people.
    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other members 
of the committee, I thank you for devoting a hearing on the 
subject of Iran, and I am happy to answer your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hook follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian Hook

    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today, and thank 
you for devoting a hearing to discuss America's foreign policy to Iran.
    This Administration has implemented an unprecedented pressure 
campaign with two primary objectives: First, to deprive the Iranian 
regime of the money it needs to support its destabilizing activities. 
Second, to bring Iran to the negotiating table to conclude a 
comprehensive deal, as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in May 2018.
    President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have expressed very clearly 
the United States' willingness to negotiate with Iran, and we are 
willing to meet with the Iranians without preconditions. No one should 
be uncertain about our desire for peace or our readiness to normalize 
relations should we reach a comprehensive deal. We have put the 
possibility of a much brighter future on the table for the Iranian 
people, and we mean it.
    The comprehensive deal we seek with the Iranian regime should 
address four key areas: its nuclear program, its ballistic missile 
development and proliferation, its support to terrorist groups and 
proxies, and its arbitrary detention of U.S. citizens including Bob 
Levinson, Siamak Namazi, Xiyue Wang, and others.
    A year and a half ago, Secretary Pompeo laid out 12 points that 
expanded further on the kind of deal we are seeking with Iran. The 
requirements Secretary Pompeo laid out reflect the scope of Iran's 
malign behavior. It also reflects the longstanding global consensus as 
enshrined in multiple Security Council resolutions since Iran's nuclear 
violations were first addressed by the Council in 2006.
    Before we exited the deal, re-imposed sanctions, and accelerated 
our pressure, Iran was increasing the scope of its malign activity. The 
Islamic Republic was strengthened by the resources and legitimacy 
provided by the nuclear deal. Under the deal, Iran was continuing to 
expand its missile testing and proliferation. We now have newly 
declassified information related to Iran's missile program that I can 
share today:

   While the United States was still in the JCPOA, Iran 
        expanded its ballistic missile activities to partners across 
        the region, including Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups, 
        and Shia militias in Iraq.

   Beginning last year, Iran transferred whole missiles to a 
        separate designated terrorist group in the region.

   Iran is continuing to develop missile systems and related 
        technologies solely for export to its regional proxies.

   And while we were in the JCPOA, Iran increased its support 
        to Hizballah, helping them produce a greater number of rockets 
        and missiles. This arsenal is then used to target our ally, 
        Israel.

    Beyond continued advancements to its missile program, Iran was also 
deepening its engagement in regional conflicts.

   In Yemen, Iran helped fuel a humanitarian catastrophe by 
        providing funding, weapons, and training to the Houthis. Its 
        support has only prolonged the suffering of the Yemeni people.

   In Syria, Iran supported Assad's brutal war machine as the 
        Syrian regime killed hundreds of thousands and displaced 
        millions. Under the cover of the Syrian civil war, Iran is now 
        trying to plant deep military roots in Syria and establish a 
        forward operating base to attack Israel.

   In Lebanon, Iran uses Hizballah to provoke conflict with 
        Lebanon's neighbors, threaten the safety of the Lebanese 
        people, and imperil prospects for stability.

    Furthermore, under the deal, Iran was given a clear pathway to 
import and export dangerous arms. Two days from now, on October 18th, 
we will be exactly one year away from the expiration of the U.N. arms 
embargo on Iran. Because of the Iran nuclear deal, countries like 
Russia and China will be able to sell conventional weapons to Iran. The 
Iranian regime will also be free to sell weapons to anyone. This will 
trigger a new arms race in the Middle East.
    The moment Iran is allowed to buy advanced drones, missiles, tanks, 
and jets, it will do so. This will be a win for its proxies across the 
region, who will use such arms to then attack other nations on Iran's 
behalf. The United Nations Security Council needs to renew the arms 
embargo on Iran before it expires. We have made this a priority.
    Under the Iran deal, the travel ban on 23 Iranian terrorists, 
including Qassem Soleimani, expires the same day as the arms embargo.
    Constraints on Iran will continue to unravel under the deal.

   In 4 years, the ban on Iran's missile testing will expire.

   And then, in 6 years, all the provisions of Resolution 2231 
        will end. Restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, enrichment 
        and reprocessing will also expire, positioning Iran with all 
        the weapons it needs to pursue its revolutionary, hegemonic 
        ambitions.

    Our Iran strategy is aimed at reversing these trends. Today, by 
nearly every measure, the regime and its proxies are weaker than when 
our pressure began and we are well on our way to restoring the strong 
international standards that had long guided the world's policy on 
Iran.
    Shia militant groups in Syria have stated to the New York Times 
that Iran no longer has enough money to pay them as much as they have 
in the past. Hizballah and Hamas have enacted unprecedented austerity 
plans due to a lack of funding from Iran. In March, Hizballah's leader 
Hassan Nasrallah went on TV and said Hizballah needed public support to 
sustain its operations.
    We are also making it harder for Iran to expand its own military 
capabilities. Beginning in 2014, Iran's military budget increased every 
year through to 2017, when it hit nearly $14 billion. However, from 
2017 to 2018, when our pressure went into effect, we saw a reduction in 
military spending of nearly 10 percent. Iran's 2019 budget, which was 
released in March, called for even steeper cuts, including a 28 percent 
cut to their defense budget and a 17 percent cut for IRGC funding.
    The IRGC's cyber command is now low on cash, and the IRGC has told 
Iraq's Shia militia groups that they should start looking for new 
sources of revenue. Now, because of our sanctions, Iran will be unable 
to even fully fund this skinny budget for 2019.
    Iran's economy contracted by about 5 percent last year and this 
year will shrink by more than 10 percent. We estimate it could contract 
by as much as 14 percent, sending Iran into a deep depression. Iran is 
now tapping unconventional sources--like privatizing state assets and 
drawing on its sovereign wealth fund--to make up for the shortfall. 
Iran is being forced to choose between printing more money or delaying 
spending on infrastructure development, salaries, and benefits.
    Iran has a choice: it can act like a country, or it can act like a 
cause. Iran must change its behavior and act like a normal nation or it 
will watch its economy crumble.
    Our policy is at its core an economic and diplomatic one. We are 
relying on economic pressure and the might of American diplomacy to 
raise the costs on Iran and force meaningful behavior change.
    Iran, however, has responded to this policy with violence.
    In recent months, Iran has launched a series of attacks in a 
panicked bid to intimidate the world into halting our pressure. Iran 
was responsible for the attacks at the Port of Fujairah, the assault on 
two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, and the attack on Saudi oil 
facilities at Abqaiq.
    Iran should meet diplomacy with diplomacy, not with terror, 
bloodshed, and extortion. Our diplomacy does not entitle Iran to 
undertake violence against any nation or to threaten maritime security.
    This Administration does not seek armed conflict with Iran. We have 
been equally clear to the regime that we will defend our citizens, 
forces, and interests, including against attacks by Iran or its 
proxies.
    We stand with our partners and allies to safeguard global commerce 
and regional stability, and have taken appropriate steps to enhance the 
regional defense architecture. Our aim is to deter conflict and support 
our partners.
    The Islamic Republic is also engaging in its longstanding practice 
of nuclear extortion. Iran's message to the international community is 
clear: if you do not allow us to conduct our normal level of terror, 
then we will behave even more badly until you do. It has long used its 
nuclear program in this way and for this reason. The world ought to 
recognize this extortion when it sees it.
    Iran's recent accelerations of its uranium enrichment reminds us of 
the deficiencies of the Iran nuclear deal. Iran's nuclear threats are 
made possible by a plan that left Iran's nuclear capabilities largely 
intact and that seems to have encouraged Iran to dream of the day when 
key limits on its nuclear program would evaporate, allowing it to 
prepare for rapid breakout.
    I should also emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the problems presented 
by Iran's provocative threats to begin building up its stocks of 
nuclear material--and the actions it is already taking to expand its 
uranium enrichment centrifuge research and development, and to produce 
more heavy water--are problems that the world would have faced anyway, 
in a few years' time, under the terms of the JCPOA itself.
    Had we stuck to the JCPOA until those dangerous Iranian 
provocations were actually permitted by the JCPOA, we would be less 
prepared to meet the threats Iran presents. In that intervening period, 
Iran would have continued on the trajectory it was on until the United 
States' re- imposition of sanctions pressures: amassing revenue from 
abroad because the deal encouraged business with Iran, while funneling 
maximum effort and money into missile development, missile 
proliferation, support for terrorism, and regional destabilization. The 
Iran we would have faced then would be much more formidable than the 
Iran we face today.
    We must learn from past mistakes and demand comprehensive and 
permanent restrictions on Iran's activities in any new deal.
    We can look to a recent tragedy to show nations can pressure Iran 
to change. When Sahar Khodayari, an Iranian woman, died from self- 
immolation after she was sentenced to prison simply for attending a 
soccer match in Tehran. Together with international outrage and 
condemnation, FIFA challenged the regime's policy of prohibiting women 
from attending matches. As a result of international pressure, Iran 
agreed to permit women to a match last week, even though the 
authorities kept the women segregated in a separate section.
    When the world comes together to push back against Iran, we see 
change in its behavior. This Administration will do its part, and we 
are succeeding in having others join us. Late last month, France 
Germany, and the United Kingdom called for Iran to accept negotiations 
on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional activity. The 
E3 now agree with us that a new deal is needed. Secretary Pompeo and I 
have made clear to our allies and partners that we will continue to 
stand with them against Iran's violence.
    Looking forward, our pressure will continue to deny Iran access to 
the revenue streams it needs to destabilize the Middle East. As we 
raise the costs of Iran's expansionism and foreclose the possibility of 
prolonging the status quo, Iran will continue to find its violence will 
only earn it isolation and censure.
    We seek a comprehensive deal that sets our two peoples on a new 
trajectory toward a far more peaceful and stable relationship. We 
remember that the longest suffering victims of the Iranian regime are 
the Iranian people. The last 40 years of Iran's history are a sad tale 
of corruption and the oppression of a once-vibrant people. The United 
States stands with the Iranian people in their deep desire that the 
next 40 years of Iran's history will not be stained by repression and 
fear of the clerics' cruelty. We wish nothing more for the Iranian 
people a future with by a truly representative government and 
friendship with the American people.
    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other Members of the 
Committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you. 
I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.

    The Chairman. Brian, thank you very much for those 
comments. I really feel like we are in good hands with your 
firm hand on the tiller on this issue. I want to thank you for 
appearing before this committee. As you will recall, Senator 
Menendez indicated we had not had a hearing on Iran since I 
think 2017. On June 19, you appeared in a joint committee 
before us and the Armed Services Committee, along with two 
other informed witnesses, on this important issue. We thank you 
for making yourself available to them.
    It is very troubling the fact that on October 18, the U.N. 
resolution is going to expire on the sale of conventional arms 
to the country. Obviously, we would like to pass another 
resolution, but with the sellers, Russia and China, having veto 
power over that kind of an action by the U.N., realistically 
what do you think can happen there and what is the prognosis on 
this whole thing?
    Mr. Hook. The Secretary and I have had many discussions 
with Russia and China about promoting a more peaceful and 
stable Middle East. I have had separate discussions with China 
and Russia talking about the attack on September 14 and the 
significance of it.
    We have to at least be honest with ourselves that the Iran 
nuclear deal's approach to Iran's missile program facilitated 
its missile testing and it also allowed Iran to, I think, 
proliferate missiles to its proxies without much cost. The 
European Union has not taken one sanction against Iran's 
missile program since adoption of the Iran nuclear deal. Yet, 
during the same period, Iran has increased its ballistic 
missile testing and its provision of weapons to its proxies.
    I have seen some accounts where there was a lot of interest 
in the buyers and the sellers on October 18, a year from now, 
so that Iran can not only buy conventional weapons but also 
sell them.
    So we see a role for the U.N. Security Council after the 
attacks of September 14 on Saudi Arabia by Iran. This is an act 
that was in clear violation of the United Nations Charter. The 
U.N. Security Council is vested with responsibility for 
resolving threats to international peace and security. This 
violation of Saudi sovereignty--and it was an attack really in 
so many ways on the global energy market because Iran is trying 
to create shocks in the global energy markets. They have failed 
at that to date.
    We hope that China and Russia will play a constructive role 
to get serious about Iran's missile proliferation. Russia and 
China voted for the arms embargo on Iran. It was resolution 
1737, 1747, those series of resolutions. So they have supported 
it before. There is no reason they cannot support it again. We 
think that there is a clear case to be made for it in light of 
Iranian aggression not just over since May, but as I said 
earlier during the life of the Iran nuclear deal.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate that view.
    One of the troubling aspects of this for me is that the ask 
here by the world to Iran is an ask that Iran has thumbed its 
nose at in a very haughty manner and just absolutely refuses to 
even agree what is appropriate international accepted conduct. 
I view it very different than the situation with North Korea. 
With North Korea, Kim Jong-un, who actually capitulated and 
said, look, I am willing to talk about what everybody wants, 
and that is a nuclear-free peninsula. The Iranians are not 
anywhere even near that from an attitude standpoint. People 
will argue that North Korea has not gotten where we want it. It 
certainly has not. I will be the first to admit it is a work in 
progress, but at least it is a work in progress.
    To me these things can resolve if you have two things: 
number one, you have two parties that have a common objective, 
and then once the common objective is agreed to, that the two 
parties act in good faith. We have neither of those here with 
Iran and did not when we went into the JCPOA.
    What is your view on that just strictly from an attitude 
standpoint?
    Mr. Hook. We have not seen a change of heart in the Iranian 
regime. They seem to have doubled down on their strategy, which 
is a 40-year strategy of deniable attacks, using proxies in the 
gray zone to conduct attacks against American partners, against 
American interests.
    What I think I would highlight here are the number of 
diplomatic off ramps that this Administration has offered to 
the regime. It is not just the United States. Prime Minister 
Abe was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. He went there. He asked President Trump if he 
thought that would be useful, and the President encouraged him 
to go. He went. The Supreme Leader put out a series of tweets 
rejecting Prime Minister Abe's diplomacy, and while Prime 
Minister Abe was in country, the regime blew up a Japanese oil 
tanker.
    You have President Macron who has repeatedly tried to 
intervene.
    Iran has not met our diplomacy with diplomacy despite being 
offered many opportunities. The President has said many times 
that he would be willing to meet with the regime. So has 
Secretary Pompeo.
    When the United States was in the Iran nuclear deal and I 
attended what turned out to be the last meeting of the joint 
commission where the U.S. was a party to, I requested a meeting 
with Iran's deputy foreign minister so I could talk about the 
hostages. So this is an Administration that is very open to 
resolving our differences with Iran at the negotiating table 
and diplomatically.
    I think now that you have seen the E3 also recognize the 
need for a new deal--and I also would point out at the 
beginning of the U.N. General Assembly--I think it was David 
Sanger who wrote a ``New York Times'' story talking about how 
Rouhani and Zarif are experiencing a very chilly reception at 
the United Nations. What they did, in terms of attacking the 
world's largest oil facility, is indefensible. So I think more 
people are recognizing that and that is a good thing for our 
diplomacy.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I think that your observations 
about their reactions, particularly what they did to the 
Japanese is very troubling. The attitude issue to me is 
something that is troubling. Everybody wants a diplomatic 
result here. Everybody wants diplomatic movement here. They are 
not showing any signs whatsoever of going in that direction.
    Thank you for your thoughts.
    Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just two comments to some of the comments you made. First 
of all, this is the first public hearing in 2 and a half years. 
I believe the public has a right to know about what our Iran 
policy is, and we have not had a public hearing in 2 and a half 
years.
    Secondly, I would just say as someone who was the 
staunchest opponent of the JCPOA that in fact leaving the JCPOA 
without a strategy at the end of the day, without allies at the 
end of the day has not left us in a better position. I do not 
care for the JCPOA, but by the same token, leaving without a 
strategy has not led us to a better position.
    Mr. Hook, is it not true that Iran has hijacked oil 
tankers?
    Mr. Hook. They did take one oil tanker from Iranian waters.
    Senator Menendez. Is it not true that they have struck oil 
tankers?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, they have.
    Senator Menendez. Is it not true that they had a stealth 
attack on Saudi Arabia's oil refineries?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Is it not true that Iran has exceeded the 
limits imposed on its stockpile of uranium?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Is it not true that it has enriched 
uranium to higher levels of concentration than permissible in 
the JCPOA?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. Is it not true that it has begun using 
more advanced centrifuges for enrichment?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. So when I listen to that--and I could go 
down through a list of other things--we are right now in a 
worse position vis-a-vis Iran than we were before.
    Let me ask you something. Withdrawing troops in northern 
Syria and green-lighting Turkey's brutal incursion gives new 
life to ISIS and hands over the keys to our national security 
to Putin, Iran, and Assad, all the sanctions in the world are 
not going to fix that.
    Does the Administration have a plan for countering Iran in 
Syria? If so, can you explain what it is and how it will 
account for recent gains by Iran-backed pro-regime forces that 
are filling the vacuum that we created in northern Syria?
    Mr. Hook. I would like to answer your first question, and I 
will take the next one.
    Senator Menendez. I did not pose a first question. I posed 
a question as it relates to this. So would you answer that one?
    Mr. Hook. Can I comment on your first question?
    Senator Menendez. If I get enough time, but first answer my 
question.
    Mr. Hook. The President's decision with respect to Syria is 
not going to change our Iran strategy or the efficacy of it. So 
we are--Iran has given Assad $4.6 billion in lines of credit 
and billions more. They have sent 2,500 of their own Quds Force 
fighters, and they have helped mobilize 10,000 Shia fighters to 
support Assad.
    Our diplomatic work that Ambassador Jeffrey is heading is 
to ensure, as part of a political solution, that all of the 
forces in Iran under Iranian control have to leave Syria. We 
are withholding our reconstruction assistance for Syria as one 
of the levers that we have.
    Senator Menendez. You really think, after having withdrawn 
and let the Iranians--what we have here is something that we, 
by our presence, helped avoid. We have the possibility of a 
land bridge that Iran has sought over Syria to attack our ally, 
the state of Israel. What commitments do we have from any of 
these parties that in fact they will prevent Iran from moving 
fighters and supplies from Iraq through northern Syria?
    I mean, as far as I am concerned, Iran is not an agent of 
Russia. They have their own interests. They have spent their 
own blood. Russia is not going to tell them, okay, Iran, now 
thank you for your help. It is time to get out. They are going 
to have their own interests. All we have done here is 
perpetuate their interests and created a greater risk for our 
ally, the state of Israel.
    Mr. Hook. Well, I would say this. I think that our pressure 
on Iran threatens Iran's position in Syria in three ways.
    It starves the IRGC and Hezbollah of operational funds.
    It disrupts Iran's financial support to Assad. I talked 
about the billions of dollars that Iran has provided. Our 
pressure is making it harder for Iran to give Assad financial 
support.
    We are also impeding Iran's ability to sell oil to Syria, 
and we have sanctioned one oil shipping operation and we have 
sanctioned Russia and a Syrian. One of the ways that the Quds 
Force has been financing its operations is through illicit oil 
shipments. So we are going to keep after the oil. We are going 
to still keep after that. We are going to continue our pressure 
campaign.
    Senator Menendez. Let me ask again. Do we have any 
commitments from Turkish or Iraqi authorities to prevent Iran 
from moving fighters and supplies from Iraq through northern 
Syria?
    Mr. Hook. That is something--I have been with the Secretary 
to Iraq. We discuss that on a very regular basis to do 
everything we can----
    Senator Menendez. We have no commitments?
    Mr. Hook. The specifics of this--I am happy to follow up 
with you in terms of which minister or leader we spoke with 
about this, but we have raised this issue repeatedly as a 
security concern.
    Senator Menendez. Well, it seems to me that here is a 
perfect example of what maximum pressure without a strategy 
that ultimately brings Iran to the negotiating table leaves us 
in. More attacks, more consequences, greater chance of 
breakout, lowering the breakout time to the possibility of a 
pathway to nuclear weapons, a land bridge, in addition to the 
President's decisions to withdraw precipitously out of Syria, a 
land bridge for Iran to attack our ally, the state of Israel. 
If that is success, if that is your measurement of success, 
then I have a real concern for where we are headed.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook. Just two quick things on that.
    One, when the President got out of the Iran deal, Secretary 
Pompeo released our Iran strategy within a week or two. We did 
exit the deal with a strategy. The Secretary put in place a 
very clear articulation of the 12 areas where we need to see a 
change in Iranian behavior. So that speech that he gave in May 
of 2018 is the same policy that we are pursuing today.
    Senator Menendez. Well, that is a wish list. I agree with 
the wish list.
    Mr. Hook. It is not a wish list.
    Senator Menendez. You think you are going to get everything 
that Pompeo listed, you are going to give virtually no relief 
to Iran, and they are just going to succumb.
    Mr. Hook. No.
    Senator Menendez. Well, I would like to believe that is the 
real world. That is not the real world, Mr. Hook.
    Mr. Hook. Here is the real world. We do not negotiate with 
ourselves. The 12 areas, requirements, are a mirror image of 
Iran's threats to peace and security, and most of those 12 you 
can find in a U.N. Security Council resolution----
    Senator Menendez. Do you believe that the more you ask for, 
the more you have to give?
    The Chairman. Senator, allow him to finish.
    Senator Menendez. Well, he has taken up my time. He has 
gone beyond my time. I saw the chairman went beyond his time as 
well.
    Mr. Hook. I have heard it often said that during the Iran 
nuclear deal, Iran was behaving. Since we got out of the deal, 
things have gotten worse. I would like to, Mr. Chairman, submit 
for the record--this is 71 items of Iran regime malign 
activities during negotiations with Iran and during the JCPOA. 
It is 71 items long.
    I think that we do not do ourselves a great service about 
understanding the historical record if we ignore what Iran did 
during the negotiations and while the JCPOA was being 
implemented. So I would like to submit this for the record so 
that people can review everything Iran was up to while we were 
in the deal.
    The Chairman. Thank you, and that will be submitted for the 
record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Senator Menendez, I will give you the last 
word on this.
    Senator Menendez. Just let me ask you just a simple 
question. Is it not true virtually anywhere in the world, the 
more you want, the more you have to give? Or do you believe you 
can get everything that Secretary Pompeo asked for and just 
return to what was the status quo with the JCPOA in terms of 
Iran's relief?
    Mr. Hook. The United States tried taking a bifurcated 
approach by only focusing on one aspect of Iran's threats to 
peace and security, and it was the Iran nuclear deal. That has 
enabled Iran to expand its missile testing----
    Senator Menendez. That is not responsive to my question.
    Mr. Hook. I am responding to it.
    Senator Menendez. It is a simple proposition. The more you 
ask for, do you not expect the more that you will have to 
give----
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. --and in contemplation of that?
    Mr. Hook. If you look at the strategy that we laid out in 
May, Secretary Pompeo said at the conclusion of an agreement, 
which we will submit to the Senate as a treaty----
    Senator Menendez. Which we applaud.
    Mr. Hook. I have worked very closely with this committee to 
show that I think that we very much need to have full Senate 
support for what we are doing. If we are able to get into talks 
with Iran, you will be fully apprised.
    It is also the case that in that strategy the Secretary 
said if we can get a deal, we are prepared to end all of our 
sanctions and to restore diplomatic ties with Iran and to 
welcome Iran into the international community. That is very 
significant. That has never happened before. Even under the 
Iran nuclear deal, many of our sanctions stayed in place and so 
have some of the U.N. sanctions. They are going to start 
unraveling. We have put out very significant incentives for the 
regime. The decision they face is whether they are going to 
come to the table and recognize that it is deepening isolation, 
come with the United States to the table and other countries to 
negotiate a full and comprehensive deal.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would point out during the JCPOA debate, it was my 
amendment that would have deemed that a treaty. We should have 
voted that 100 to 1. We would be in a far better place today 
had we deemed that a treaty and treated it as such.
    Mr. Hook, first of all, thank you for your service.
    As somebody who has observed Iran for a long period of 
time, you have laid out in your testimony their actions. They 
want to be a nuclear power. They are developing ballistic 
missiles. They continue to support their terrorist proxies 
around the world.
    What is their ultimate goal? Do you have a sense in terms 
of what they are actually trying to achieve?
    Mr. Hook. It is a good question. I gave a speech a couple 
of weeks ago looking at the sort of history of the regime.
    I think in many ways it is the last revolutionary regime on 
earth. If you look at its founding, it talks about exporting 
revolution. It has a clerical model where you have clerical and 
revolutionary oversight over what looks like a sort of fairly 
Westphalian system with a President, with a Foreign Minister, 
with a military, but in fact also has this Revolutionary Guard 
Corps--and I highlight Revolutionary Guard Corps--and a Quds 
Force component. It has an opaque financial system so that it 
can move money around the world for terror finance and money 
laundering. It is all in the service of promoting clerical 
oversight, weaponizing Shia grievances, undermining the 
sovereignty of regimes around the Middle East.
    Senator Johnson. Do they want to topple regimes and put in 
place some kind of Iranian surrogates or total Iranian control 
over areas of the region? Do they want a greater Iran?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, they would like a greater Iran. So when you 
look at their engagement with Iraq, if you look at where they 
engage in Lebanon, where they take a country like Lebanon--and 
that military should have a monopoly on the use of force, but 
then Hezbollah undermines that. They are trying to do the same 
thing in Yemen with the Houthis. They have an ambition there to 
become a power broker in Yemen on Saudi's southern border so 
that it will be in a position to attack UAE, Saudi, Bahrain, 
and also the U.S. Navy through the Bab el-Mandeb.
    Senator Johnson. To eventually install a regime in these 
countries, either favorable or under direct control of Iran. 
That is their ultimate goal.
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Johnson. We need to understand that.
    The situation in Syria is incredibly complex. I would like 
your evaluation. What is the current relationship with Iran and 
Russia as it relates to Syria?
    Mr. Hook. I think Russia has tried to have it both ways, 
both with Syria and with Israel. So I think Russia knows that 
it is going to have a very hard time getting into a post-
conflict stabilization for as long as Iran is using Syria as a 
forward-deployed missile base to attack Israel. So I think 
there are incentives for Russia to direct Iranian forces out. 
At the same time, I think that Russia has also said to the 
Israelis you should do whatever you need to do to defend 
yourself against attacks coming from Iran inside Syria. So they 
have done I think an artful job--President Putin has--of 
playing both sides.
    I think it is going to be very hard for Syria. They are not 
going to see a return to normal until they direct the forces 
under Iranian control to leave. So I think there are incentives 
both for Assad and for Putin to get to a post-conflict 
stabilization, but for as long as they have Iranian forces 
there with another agenda, it is going to be hard to get to 
that.
    Senator Johnson. There is not a cooperative relationship 
between Russia and Iran in Syria. They are both supporting the 
Syrian regime, but they are really not overtly cooperating?
    Mr. Hook. I think in this case they both have a common 
objective of saving Assad.
    Senator Johnson. What is Iran's attitude toward ISIS?
    Mr. Hook. That is something which during the--I would 
probably defer to NEA on this for the more specifics around it 
and the history of that that occurred I think in the last 
Administration. In our mission to defeat ISIS, the President 
made a priority coming into office and working with Secretary 
Mattis to liberate the territorial caliphate from all the lands 
under that control, but I do not have anything to add beyond 
that.
    Senator Johnson. So, I mean, Iran is just kind of agnostic. 
They are happy to have ISIS destabilize the area? There is no 
evidence of support in any way, shape, or form?
    Mr. Hook. This is something which I would probably defer to 
my colleagues at State on this who have been point on the 
counter-ISIS campaign.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook. I am happy to take that as a QFR.
    The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, thank you for your service.
    In your statement, you point out a concern of a 
miscalculation in the region that could spread into a much more 
serious conflict. Clearly the Iranians could make a 
miscalculation. Clearly the Saudis could make a miscalculation. 
Now, Israel might make a miscalculation based upon the 
increased concerns about Iranian strength.
    So I want to just back up one moment to set the history 
here. Along with Senator Menendez, I opposed the JCPOA and I 
strongly disagreed with the Administration's decision to pull 
out of the JCPOA. You pointed out that you wanted to go to a 
maximum pressure campaign against Iran. I support that.
    You also point out that prior to pulling out that Iran was 
violating international standards. We all knew that. It was not 
on the nuclear side. It was on the non-nuclear side. It was not 
covered under the agreement. They were in compliance with the 
agreement.
    As President Trump had indicated his displeasure with the 
JCPOA, you and I had conversations that we now had maximum 
pressure with our European allies to get their support for 
sanctions against Iran on the ballistic missiles and other 
issues in which they were doing activity that was against 
international norms. In fact, we could have had a maximum 
pressure campaign against Iran on the activities that you are 
referring to, but instead the President pulled out of the 
JCPOA.
    That is the facts, and you and I know that even the EU was 
prepared to go along with us on sanctions on non-nuclear 
provided the United States stayed in the JCPOA.
    So I just want to underscore the point of Senator Menendez. 
Since pulling out of the JCPOA, look at the facts of what has 
happened. It has emboldened Iran. Look at their attack against 
the Saudi oilfield and their capacity to do major damage. They 
have partnered and strengthened their position with Russia and 
the Assad regime in Syria giving them additional capacity. They 
are now closer to restarting a nuclear weapons program than 
they were when we were in the JCPOA, and we have no ability to 
challenge that within the JCPOA.
    Now you talk about the U.N. vote on the embargo of 
conventional weapons, and the United States' influence is so 
much weaker today because we have isolated ourselves. We do not 
have the support of China and Russia, and we have lost the 
credible support of our European allies in regards to Iran. So 
when you talk about a maximum pressure campaign, it seems to me 
we gave up that maximum pressure when we pulled out of the 
JCPOA and isolated America.
    Now, I want to get to the most recent decision on President 
Trump pulling out of northern Syria with a conversation with 
President Erdogan and then the Turkish forces going in and our 
Kurdish fighters that were with us in northern Syria now 
engaged in their own military campaign.
    It is clear from the facts on the ground that it has given 
additional influence in Syria by Russia, and there is now 
concern that Iran can be emboldened, including in the bridge to 
Israel's border.
    So I just want to get your view. The fact that we now have 
allowed the Turkish forces unembedded without U.S. presence to 
go in and fight the Kurds--does that help us or hurt us in 
regards to Iran? It is a simple question. I hope we can get an 
answer to that.
    Mr. Hook. We are very comfortable with our Iran strategy in 
Syria.
    Senator Cardin. The specific question I am asking is about 
the current situation with the Kurdish fighters now engaged 
with the Turks. Does that help us or hurt us in regards to the 
Iranian strategy?
    Mr. Hook. It does not hurt our Iran strategy.
    Senator Cardin. So it is helpful to us in regards to Iran 
to have the Kurdish fighters who were our stabilizing force in 
northern Iran keeping Russia and Iran out. That is a positive 
view?
    Mr. Hook. Well, our forces in northeast Syria have never 
had an Iran mission set.
    Senator Cardin. Now that we are not there and we now have 
the ability of Russia to take a greater capacity in Syria, 
allowing Iran then to come into that and to be more emboldened 
in Syria, you are saying that does not affect us?
    Mr. Hook. No, because our strategy from the beginning in 
Syria has always been around using our diplomatic leverage, 
withholding reconstruction assistance so that we can get forces 
under Iranian control out, and then our maximum pressure 
campaign. Remember, while they were in the deal, they were able 
to give Assad many billions of dollars.
    Senator Cardin. I understand the money. So you do not think 
there is now a greater chance of a miscalculation with Israel 
looking at the Iranians having greater access to Syria that 
could use drones in a similar type of an attack that we saw 
against the Saudis? You do not think that is a greater risk 
today because of what is happening in Syria?
    Mr. Hook. We do not see it as a greater risk today. No, 
because Israel will continue to do what it needs to do to 
defend itself.
    Senator Cardin. We know that. But suppose Israel now is on 
higher alert.
    Mr. Hook. I have not seen that. I have not seen that.
    So if you look at our core drivers from the beginning and 
nothing has changed with the President's recent decision on 
withdrawing troops from Syria, our strategy is around denying 
revenue and using diplomatic leverage in Syria to get Iranian 
forces out. It is undeniable that during the Iran nuclear deal, 
Iran was able to use the sanctions relief and give Assad many 
billions of dollars and 12,500 fighters. That was the big 
mistake. Now we are trying to do everything we can to put this 
back in the box. It starts with denying them revenue, and we 
have done that. Iran's military budget is down 28 percent----
    Senator Cardin. I will just state my last point on that. We 
could deny them support from Europe on sanctions, but instead 
we chose to pull out of the JCPOA rather than working with our 
European allies. You know that was on the table before the 
President pulled out of the JCPOA, and we lost that opportunity 
to get European support for stronger sanctions.
    Mr. Hook. So let me make one point on that which I think 
there has been a lot the last couple of years. The President 
directed negotiations with the U.K., France and Germany over 6 
months to see if we could fix the deficiencies of the Iran 
nuclear deal. I led those negotiations, and we met in Paris and 
in London and Berlin and Washington multiple times over 6 
months. We made a great deal of progress around the weak 
inspections regime and the absence of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles from the deal. The biggest priority was 
ending the sunset clauses, and for as much as supporters of the 
deal may like the deal, it expires. It did not permanently 
address Iran's nuclear program.
    So I spent 6 months working with the Europeans, and the 
biggest thing for us that we--I think we achieved largely 
agreement on inspections and on ICBMs. We were not able to get 
agreement on ending the sunsets.
    Senator Cardin. You turned down greater pressure on Iran 
from the financial point of view because of the length of the 
JCPOA.
    Mr. Hook. Say that one more time. I did not understand.
    Senator Cardin. You turned down the opportunity to get 
Europe with us on sanctions against Iran because you wanted a 
longer term on the nuclear provisions. I understand that, but 
you turned down maximum pressure in order to get an extension 
of a nuclear agreement that there was already compliance on. It 
is inconsistent with what you are saying now. You pulled out to 
put additional pressure on Iran. It is inconsistent.
    Mr. Hook. Well, I would say two things. One, we tried to 
remedy the deficiencies of the deal, and I do not know who here 
supports ending the nuclear restrictions on Iran.
    Senator Cardin. I supported your efforts to extend that, 
but the nuclear agreement did not have any limitation on time. 
It was a permanent restriction on Iran.
    Mr. Hook. It is not.
    Senator Cardin. Yes, it was. They were not allowed ever to 
have nuclear weapons.
    Mr. Hook. No. The Iran nuclear deal expires. It is going to 
start expiring a year from now.
    The Chairman. Guys, hold it. You will get your shot at him, 
Senators. I appreciate that. We are well over time. This is a 
good experience to go through to litigate this, but let us try 
to do it as civilly as we can.
    With that, Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, my reading is that Iran's power position has 
changed quite significantly as a result of Turks going into 
Syria wiping out our friends, the Kurds. The Kurds that are 
remaining are rushing to Assad and pledging support to Assad. 
This changes the dynamic for Iran I presume in Iran's view in a 
very positive way. I presume Iran was smiling from ear to ear 
as Turkey rushed into Syria. Am I right that this really 
changes the dynamic for Iran in Syria and perhaps regionally?
    Mr. Hook. We do not believe that it changes the dynamic 
with Iran because in terms of our strategy----
    Senator Romney. Things are not better for Iran in the 
Middle East as we have gone, as Turkey has hit the Kurds and 
the Kurds have now allied with Assad? Surely Assad is stronger. 
This is not good for Iran?
    Mr. Hook. If you take a look at what our U.S. Special 
Representative Jim Jeffrey has said for some time now, our 
military is in Syria for ISIS. Our diplomacy is focused on 
Iran. So that is why Jim Jeffrey and I worked together very 
closely because what I do on the pressure side and what he does 
on withholding reconstruction assistance is mutually 
reinforcing.
    Senator Romney. I hear you. Diplomacy has impact if there 
is a military that is strong and in the region. When our ally 
now aligns with our adversary, Assad, that is in my opinion not 
helpful for diplomacy and not helpful for our interests in the 
region. That is so dramatic a perspective on your part that 
Iran is not celebrating what is happening in Syria is 
extraordinary to me.
    Let me turn to a different area, which is that I do agree 
that there is an enormous benefit in putting pressure on Iran. 
Whether it is maximum pressure or not, I do not know. I believe 
that a nation that decides to go nuclear should suffer a 
dramatic cost for doing so. Whether they are at their knees or 
not I do not know. It is very hard for us to tell from the 
outside what is actually going on inside Iran, but clearly it 
would have a dramatic effect if other nations were to join us 
in applying maximum pressure.
    What are the prospects for our European friends, for other 
nations around the world joining us either with the snapback 
provisions being applied or not on a snapback basis? What are 
the prospects of us actually seeing truly maximum pressure 
because it is applied not just by us but by our friends as 
well?
    Mr. Hook. There is no precedent in Iran's history for the 
kind of pressure that we have put on them, and the regime has 
said this publicly, that they are experiencing the kind of 
economic contraction that is and will be worse than what 
happened during the Iran-Iraq war in the eighties. We have done 
a very good job of drying up Iran's sources of export revenue, 
but we have also devoted as much energy to enforcing our 
sanctions especially in the case of the oil sanctions. I think 
the fact that the U.K., France, and Germany have now 
acknowledged something that we saw some time ago that the Iran 
deal is insufficient to address Iran's threats to peace and 
security and that when you are inside the deal, you cannot 
touch your energy or your financial sanctions. That was the 
deal. So being out of the deal gives us a great deal more 
leverage to accomplish the objectives of denying Iran a nuclear 
weapon and on missile proliferation which I think other 
countries----
    Senator Romney. Mr. Hook, I am not one of those that thinks 
we should be back in JCPOA, and I do believe that there should 
be an enormous price paid by a country that decides to go 
nuclear. I do not know whether we will actually ever see Iran 
make a different decision.
    My question is, is there some prospect of our being able to 
get other nations to join us in applying maximum pressure on 
Iran, or must we continue to do it alone?
    Mr. Hook. I think it depends on how. So Europe has done a 
lot. They have not re-imposed the financial sanctions that were 
in place, but when you look at what Europe has done since the 
time that we left the Iran deal, it is a fairly extensive list. 
Germany and I believe France and the U.K. have all denied 
landing rights to Mahan Air, which is an Iranian commercial 
airline which is a dual use commercial airline and also ferries 
terrorists and weapons around the Middle East to their proxies.
    The EU did impose sanctions on Iran's ministry of 
intelligence for terrorism in Europe. You have also had the E3 
send a number of letters to the U.N. Security Council 
condemning Iran's space launch vehicle testing, Iran's 
ballistic missile testing. You had Boris Johnson a few weeks 
ago said the Iran deal is a bad deal with many, many defects. 
That has been our position.
    Senator Romney. Mr. Hook, my time is up. I just want to 
point out that letters and speeches are delightful but 
crippling sanctions on the part of our allies would make a real 
difference, I believe, in exacting a very substantial price on 
Iran and hopefully causing dissent within their own country. I 
think it should be a high priority of our country to get other 
nations to join us in those crippling sanctions.
    My time is up, so I am going to pass the time over to the 
chairman.
    The Chairman. I agree with your last point.
    Mr. Hook. Can I say one other thing on that? I am happy to 
submit for the record--this is three pages of European actions 
starting on July 28 going up to September 24, 2019. I talk on a 
weekly basis with my European counterparts, not just the E3, 
but we just had Poland in town. We did a global ministerial on 
the Middle East to promote peace and stability in Warsaw, 
Poland. We had 65 nations from almost every continent attend. 
So we have made working with our partners a priority. That is 
Under Secretary Hale, Secretary Pompeo, Deputy Secretary 
Sullivan. So I am happy to submit for the record three pages of 
everything that Europe has done to counter Iran's threats.
    The Chairman. Those will be included in the record for full 
disclosure to everyone.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. With that, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, without taking the 
Senator's time, can you tell me how we are going to proceed 
since votes have just started? Is the chairman intending to 
keep the hearing going as members come in and out of votes?
    The Chairman. Well, I think this is an important hearing.
    Senator Menendez. I agree.
    The Chairman. I think probably what we ought to do is get 
down to the very end and take a short break, and everybody go 
vote. Then we will come back here.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you.
    The Chairman. I see a lot of anxiousness on my friends' 
parts over here that would like to bite the apple, and I want 
to give you every opportunity to do so.
    So with that, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, I want to follow up on the line of questioning 
that my colleagues have pursued with respect to Syria because 
the shift by Kurdish forces who were our partners in the fight 
against ISIL away from the United States and into alignment 
with Iran and Russia I believe is going to have serious 
implications for Syria and for the region. It is hard for me to 
understand that you think there is no--at least you appear to 
think there is no connection between what is going to happen in 
Syria and our efforts to address what is happening in Iran.
    Now, the President said on Twitter that, ``Anyone who wants 
to assist Syria in protecting the Kurds is good with me, 
whether it is Russia, China, or Napoleon Bonaparte. I hope they 
all do great. We are 7,000 miles away.''
    So does this ``anyone'' who the President is referring to 
also extend to Iran? Are you concerned about a Kurdish-Iranian 
alliance in the Syrian conflict and what its impact on U.S. 
interests in the region will be?
    Mr. Hook. As I said earlier, Syria is not going to see a 
return to normal until they direct forces under Iranian control 
to leave. We do have enormous leverage in that space.
    Senator Shaheen. Can you just further elaborate what our 
leverage is? Because it appears to me, given the pullout of 
troops--and I appreciate what you are saying about 
reconstruction dollars. The fact is they are years away from 
reconstruction at this point. So we had a very small amount of 
troops partnering with Kurdish forces to maintain a significant 
area in northeast Syria that was stable, where the United 
States had influence, where we were wanted. What you are 
telling me now is that we have pulled out those troops and we 
have greater leverage than we had before?
    Mr. Hook. I did not say that. What I am saying is that our 
pressure campaign--because, as I said, Shia fighters do not 
have the money that they used to, Iran does not have the money 
that it used to, to support Assad and to support its proxies. 
So Iran is going to face a dilemma. They can either support 
guns in Syria or prioritize the needs of their own people at 
home. That is the choice that we are trying to force upon the 
regime.
    Senator Shaheen. Have we not just empowered them further by 
pulling out of northeast Syria and giving Iran more influence 
in the region and more ability to negotiate with Russia?
    I heard the Obama administration talk about how we were 
going to starve Syria of the funds they needed to continue to 
engage in a civil war, and that never happened. What our 
experience has been with crippling sanctions--I think they are 
important, but they are not the only way, the only tool in the 
toolbox for us to address these conflicts.
    So I guess I would go on to ask you--in September, you 
noted that it is clear we need to reestablish deterrence. We 
are one missile strike from regional war. I think that is a 
quote.
    Could you speak to how this Administration plans to 
reestablish deterrence against Iran? What specific options, 
other than sanctions, are on the table to penalize Iran for its 
destabilizing behavior?
    Mr. Hook. Well, the first thing you have to do is to stop 
doing what is not working. There is no question that Iran 
increased its missile proliferation and its missile testing. I 
talked about----
    Senator Shaheen. I do not want to talk about JCPOA. What I 
want to talk about is what the Administration has on the table 
now to address Iran's destabilizing behavior.
    Mr. Hook. I am making that, but that is part of it is we 
have to stop doing what we are doing or we are going to get 
more of the same. So we broke the paradigm of not having 
significant leverage and pressure to drive up the costs of 
Iranian aggression. So we are only what? Five or 6 months into 
having all of our sanctions imposed because for the first 6 
months, after getting out of the deal, we granted a few oil 
waivers. Now since May, we are about 5 or 6 months into this, 
and we have achieved record results. We also have to understand 
that we never promised that we would----
    Senator Shaheen. How do you define record results?
    Mr. Hook. Because the regime is materially weaker today 
than when it was when we took office 2 and half years ago.
    Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that on paper that that is 
the case.
    Mr. Hook. It is not just on paper.
    Senator Shaheen. When we look at the behavior that they are 
exhibiting both in the region and in terms of our interests in 
the region, they have increased that destabilizing behavior.
    Mr. Hook. It is not an increase. I mean, I do want you to 
take a look at all 71 instances of this. Iran for 40 years has 
been running a steady state of aggression and using terrorism 
as a tool of statecraft. As I said, they want the world to 
accept a normal level of terrorism, as they defined it, and 
then when the world stands up to them, they increase it to a 
level to put pressure on people so that they will return to 
their normal level. We are breaking the paradigm.
    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Hook, I have heard you make this 
argument this morning, and I appreciate that that is an 
argument that the Administration has. I am just not buying that 
argument at this point. What I am asking is, what are the 
plans, what are the additional plans beyond sanctions that will 
address their behavior? My time is up, so I am not going to ask 
you to respond to that.
    I do have one final question that I would like to ask you, 
and that is, do you believe that ISIS has been defeated in 
Syria?
    Mr. Hook. The territorial----
    Senator Shaheen. That is a yes or no.
    Mr. Hook. The territorial caliphate has been defeated. We 
have liberated all the land that was held by ISIS.
    Now, it is a separate question on the forces of extremism. 
That is a separate question because no one has said----
    Senator Shaheen. Okay. Do you believe that the forces of 
extremism have been defeated in Syria?
    Mr. Hook. There is no one who will claim that the forces of 
extremism have not been defeated in the Middle East in any 
Administration. There is a crisis of Islamist extremism that 
has been going on for many decades, and we have----
    Senator Shaheen. That we just exacerbated by pulling 
American troops out of northeast Syria, and we have given rise 
to the potential for ISIS to come back in Syria, in Iraq, all 
across the region. That empowers Iran.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook. It is clearly the case that Iran, if you talk to 
countries in the region--and here is an area where you are 
going to hear complete agreement from the Israelis and the 
other Arab countries on the front lines of Iranian aggression--
is that Iran expanded its power over the last many years, and 
we came into office with a regime that was enjoying a very 
healthy economy, a healthy military budget, strong proxies. 
There was a deficit of trust that we inherited with our Sunni 
partners and with Israel. I would say that our bilateral 
relations with all of these countries has been markedly 
improved, and we have helped to shrink the Iran tumor.
    We are only at this for the first--this has only been a 
matter of about a year and a half since leaving the deal. I 
mean, you do not have to take my word for it. In March, the 
``New York Times'' ran a front page story documenting that 
Iran's proxies are weaker today. Then the ``Washington Post'' 
ran a follow-on story in June documenting how Iran's proxies 
are weaker because of our sanctions. These are stories that 
were not written about prior to our pressure campaign.
    The Chairman. Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. If we step back and ask the question, do 
sanctions work, I think it is a bigger, broader question. We 
think, oh, it is all we can do is we do sanctions and we do 
more and more. We are doing maximum pressure. I think there has 
been an economic effect. Nobody questions that. Are they 
working to bring Iran to the negotiating table? I would say 
they are not really working.
    So I think it is a fact of a loss of trust. I think that 
Iran feels that we are not trustworthy because of pulling out 
of the agreement that was worked on for so many years. I think 
it is also a matter of having naive expectations that they are 
going to agree to 12 points, most of which they did not agree 
to in the previous agreement. I think it is going to be very 
difficult to get started because of the lack of trust and 
starting with some things that were not agreed to previously 
and were specifically agreed to different limits, like no 
enrichment and no ballistic missile agreement.
    I think Iran sees their ballistic missiles as a deterrent 
as well, and I do not think they are willing to give up a 
deterrent as they see Saudi Arabia spending $83 billion a year. 
We are like, oh, my goodness. Iran spends $14 billion. Well, 
that is one-fiftieth of what we spend, and it is about one-
fourth or even less than one-fourth of Saudi Arabia. If you add 
in Saudi Arabia's allies, you can see why Iran might say, oh, 
please, please--why they might not say please, please take my 
ballistic missiles. They are not jumping up and down to do 
this, and they are really, even against the world's super power 
that can defeat them in a moment, willing to keep pricking and 
prodding because we are unrealistic in what we ask and I think 
by pulling out, showed that we are not to be trusted from their 
perspective. So your problem there is you have an unwilling 
partner.
    In Syria, it is a little bit different. In Syria, we have 
been unwilling to negotiate in the sense that our goal has been 
remove Assad, replace Assad. So no one wants to negotiate with 
Assad.
    I think the one thing that has not been picked up on yet--
and I think it is going to be ironic because everybody seems to 
be concerned about the Kurds--is actually I think the Kurds' 
permanent solution is much more likely to come from Assad. He 
is there. He largely is going to stay barring something 
untoward happening to him from his own people, but the war is 
largely over. Assad stays.
    So really, if we are going to be realistic about this and 
we want to protect the Kurds, maybe the diplomatic arena has 
gotten simplified. Now essentially you have Turkey on one side 
and Syria on the other. So really, I think our goal--everybody 
is going to talk about the sanctions, which I frankly do not 
think will work, but I think really somebody from the State 
Department that is involved with diplomacy ought to be saying 
why do we not try to use our leverage to get Turkey now and 
Assad to talk. We would have to acknowledge that someone is 
going to talk to Assad. I think if we did, the goal would 
actually be to allow the Kurds to live in the northeastern 
quadrant of Syria, similar to the way the Kurds live in Iraq. 
It was not always easy there. It has been very messy, and there 
have been a lot of problems. Currently, the Iraqi Kurds trade 
with the Turks and have a fairly decent and robust trade. Over 
the last 10 years, it has actually increased.
    So I think we should not look at this as all sturm and 
drang and that, oh, my goodness, the Kurds are being wiped out 
and all of this. I think we should look at it as an opportunity 
actually, as a breakthrough diplomatically because we have 
simplified who needs to talk to whom at this point.
    So I would just hope--and I guess my question is, is there 
anybody in the State Department actually looking to take an 
opportunity of the new dynamic in the last 24 hours that if 
Assad could reassure Erdogan that he is going to prevent 
incursions and that he is going to respect the border with 
Turkey and that he is going to use a real government with a 
stability of a real government, is there a possibility Erdogan 
would simply withdraw under that guarantee? That is the kind of 
conversation that we have kind of prevented from happening 
because we would not let the Kurds talk to Assad. So in some 
ways, I think there may be a breakthrough here. Your comments.
    Mr. Hook. Well, my understanding that there is a member 
briefing that is in the works to try to be organized that would 
focus on Syria. So that is probably a question that is best 
left to my colleague, my counterpart, Jim Jeffrey, who is lead 
on Syria.
    Can I answer your question about----
    Senator Paul. Do you see a way the Kurds could permanently 
live in Syria without some kind of an arrangement with the 
Syrian Government?
    Mr. Hook. I am going to stay in my lane and let Jim Jeffrey 
answer that question. I do want to answer your Iran question 
that you asked at the top.
    Iran does have a history of coming to the table in the 
context of sanctions, and we saw that in the run-up to the Iran 
nuclear deal. We have also seen that in various times when the 
United States----
    Senator Paul. I think you have to be willing to offer 
something. Simply saying we are not going to offer any relief--
if you were willing to offer relief of some of the export to 
Asia of their oil so you do not have a complete embargo on 
them, yes, I think they would talk in a heartbeat. That would 
be offering something. It would have been easier before they 
attacked Saudi Arabia. I agree. It is easier to offer them 
something now. But 6 months ago, had you offered them relief of 
some of the sanctions in order to get the talks started, I 
think you might have had a chance. Now nobody wants to offer 
any relief because of the heightened tensions between the 
countries. I think it is more difficult now to get started.
    Mr. Hook. Sanctions relief was not granted in the run-up to 
what became the Iran nuclear deal. I think once you establish 
that precedent----
    Senator Paul. You had a unified Europe at that time too. 
You had a little bit more pressure. You also had the engagement 
of the Obama administration actually talking to them, and there 
was more a trust then. There is less trust now because we 
basically pulled out of something that they were adhering to.
    Mr. Hook. Well, on that, we have made it clear that we are 
open to meeting. Iran has rejected the offer. By the way, they 
rejected the offer while we were in the deal. Iran rejected our 
offers of meeting while we were in the Iran nuclear deal. It 
did not happen after we left the deal. So they have 
consistently rejected diplomacy. I think they have a theory of 
the case that their resistance is greater than our pressure. We 
are very comfortable with the foreign policy that we have in 
place because we know that the regime has less revenue to spend 
on its military budget. We are forcing them to make very hard 
choices.
    As I said earlier, I have looked at the 40-year history of 
it. If talking nicely with the Iranians worked, we would have 
solved this a long time ago, but it does not. This is a regime 
that only respects and understands strength.
    Senator Paul. They do not consider an embargo of their main 
export talking nicely to them. I am not saying it is justified, 
but you have to understand their perspective. They do not 
understand this to be nice talk when we have an embargo on 
their main export.
    Mr. Hook. That oil goes to fund terrorism. So if you let 
Iran sell oil, they use it for terrorist operations. So we do 
not want Iran to sell its oil. That is why we put in place the 
sanctions that we have on Iran's oil exports, and that is tens 
of billions of dollars in revenue that they would otherwise 
spend on Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, Palestine 
Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. That is a good 
thing.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Hook. We are going to have to 
take a break at this point. We have got some votes going on. We 
are going to go vote on number one, number two, and then we 
will be back in session. I appreciate your patience. Thank you. 
You are welcome to use our anteroom.
    Mr. Hook. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 
be in recess.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, thank you for your service.
    The President has deployed a growing number of additional 
U.S. armed forces to Saudi Arabia in recent weeks as part of a 
potential conflict with Iran. Do you believe that the Congress 
is required by the Constitution to authorize U.S. participation 
in any war with Iran?
    Mr. Hook. I know that my colleague, Marik String, who is 
the Department's Acting Legal Adviser, testified before this 
committee on July 24 to answer questions related to legal 
authorities surrounding Iran. I have nothing new to add beyond 
what he said, and so I would defer to his answers.
    As I said earlier in my statement, we are not looking for 
conflict with Iran, and we have said repeatedly that we will 
not exercise military force unless we are attacked.
    The troop-enhanced posture with Saudi is purely defensive, 
and it is to help Saudi do a better job of defending itself. 
Obviously, when----
    Senator Udall. I am not so sure that Iran sees it that way 
when we are taking sides like we have.
    How many times have you met with President Trump's personal 
attorney, Rudy Giuliani, about any subject involving foreign 
policy? What topics did you discuss?
    Mr. Hook. Back when I was the Director of the Office of 
Legal Policy--I am friends with--I know Judge Michael Mukasey. 
He asked for a meeting when I was in Legal Policy. He brought 
Rudy Giuliani to the meeting with him. The meetings were 
regarding a consular issue. There was no action taken regarding 
the meeting topic.
    Senator Udall. That is the only meeting you had with him?
    Mr. Hook. General Mukasey came and met with me twice, and 
Mr. Giuliani was there at both meetings.
    Senator Udall. What was the second meeting about?
    Mr. Hook. The same one.
    Senator Udall. So are you confirming the meeting about the 
Zarrab case?
    Mr. Hook. It is a consular issue, and we do not discuss 
consular issues. What I can say----
    Senator Udall. Let me ask it this way then. So you were 
confirming the ``Washington Post'' reporting that you met with 
Mr. Giuliani in 2017 when he was representing Reza Zarrab, a 
Turkish national who has been convicted of helping powerful 
Turkish figures make huge amounts of money evading Iranian 
sanctions.
    Did you believe that it was appropriate for Mr. Giuliani to 
press for presidential intervention in an ongoing criminal 
trial to free an Iranian sanction evader to avoid testimony 
that would implicate powerful figures in Turkey? What actions 
did you take after that meeting in response?
    Mr. Hook. So it was a meeting at the request of Judge 
Mukasey, and there was no action taken after either meeting.
    Senator Udall. So can you confirm that you only met with 
Mr. Giuliani twice?
    Mr. Hook. Correct. Again, it was a meeting at the request 
of Judge Mukasey, and I know Judge Mukasey. He was Attorney 
General of DOJ in the Bush administration. I served at the 
Justice Department. I have known him for a number of years. He 
requested the meeting. So that is the nature of the meeting. I 
want to make that clear.
    Senator Udall. Well, you said two meetings.
    Mr. Hook. Yes. I am saying Judge Mukasey came by twice.
    Senator Udall. With Giuliani about the same subject as 
reported by the Washington Post.
    Mr. Hook. Well, I do not have the Post article. I do not 
know what the Post is reporting.
    Senator Udall. Well, I have stated the basis of it, and you 
confirmed it.
    Mr. Hook. Well, no. What I said was it was involving a 
consular issue. We do not discuss consular issues.
    Senator Udall. You confirmed the meeting.
    Mr. Hook. I have confirmed that I met at the request of 
Judge Mukasey twice to discuss--he requested the meeting to 
discuss a consular issue.
    Senator Udall. The consular issue concerned Reza Zarrab, a 
Turkish national.
    Mr. Hook. I do not have any comment beyond what I said 
about the nature of the meeting that Judge Mukasey requested.
    Senator Udall. So do you not confirm at all what the 
Washington Post reported about your meeting with this 
gentleman?
    Mr. Hook. I have not read the Post article, so I cannot 
confirm something that I have not read.
    Senator Udall. The Inspector General and internal State 
Department emails show that you have been working to retaliate 
against State Department employees whom you do not believe are 
sufficiently loyal to President Trump. There are reports that 
you wrote yourself an email with a list of individuals whom you 
consider insufficiently loyal or whom you listed as 
troublemakers or turncoats. Furthermore, you have reportedly 
received communications from private citizens such as Newt 
Gingrich and others in the Republican Party to justify firing 
or reassigning career officials.
    We have a civil service system to protect this sort of 
politicization of our government, especially our diplomats.
    Who was urging you to take action against career State 
Department officials, and what actions did you take in 
response?
    Mr. Hook. So first of all, I cannot comment on an IG 
investigation. I look forward to that report coming out.
    I think what you are quoting from is from something that 
was leaked. So I do not have any comment on something that was 
leaked. So we will wait for the report to come out. It is not 
proper for me to comment on it.
    I will say that as Director of Policy Planning and in my 
current role as Director of the Iran Action Group, I have 
worked very closely and very well with all members of the 
career Civil Service, the Foreign Service, political 
appointees, all manner of schedule appointments in the Federal 
Government, and I am very proud of the work that we have done 
together.
    The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you.
    Thank you for being here, Mr. Hook.
    Let me start out by saying I am a supporter of the 
Administration's policy towards Iran. I also believe you are 
very knowledgeable about the topic, and I think you are doing a 
very good job. I think you have a very tough job. So obviously, 
I am not expecting you to be able to do that job and opine on 
everything I am about to say. I do need to challenge the notion 
that our decision that led to the Turkish incursion and attack 
on northern Syria do not hurt our Iranian strategy.
    I want to start by saying that clearly Iran is carrying out 
a counter-pressure campaign that allows them to directly or 
under cover of surrogates conduct attacks in the region with 
enough deniability to avoid international condemnation. It is a 
capacity, by the way, that they have built partially with the 
funds generated by the disastrous Iran deal. I believe--and I 
think the evidence is clear--that the threshold they think they 
can get away with on some of these attacks is greatly 
influenced by their perception that the Administration is 
looking to get out of the Middle East, not reengage in some 
conflict.
    So I do not believe, although I understand the difficulty 
of the job you have, it is credible to argue that the decision 
with regard to Turkey does not fortify that Iranian perception.
    I also think it is difficult to ignore the implications 
that that decision has on our partners in the region and their 
views on our security assurances, whether it is Israel or 
Jordan or the UAE or Saudi Arabia. Frankly even beyond the 
Middle East, it is not credible to argue that other countries 
do not view that decision and see themselves there one day 
potentially in a moment of conflict and crisis.
    So I do not expect you can opine on it. Those are my views. 
I feel strongly about it, and I suspect many others do as well. 
If anything I said that you disagree with, I welcome a comment. 
If not, I do have a question.
    Mr. Hook. I am happy to take your question.
    Senator Rubio. The Security Council resolution that 
implemented the nuclear deal and revised the embargo on sales 
of conventional weapons to Iran is set to expire no later than 
October 2020 on things like large caliber artillery systems and 
combat aircraft and the like. It banned foreign assistance to 
Iran's ballistic missile program and manufacturing that sunset 
in 2023.
    In September of 2019, an opinion piece in the Wall Street 
Journal by Steve Rademaker, a lawyer who served as President 
Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for International Security 
and Nonproliferation--and he made the argument that the U.S. 
should trigger the 2231 and the mechanisms there for snapping 
back U.N. sanctions against Iran and preserving the arms 
embargo and the missile ban. Under those provisions, by the 
way, the snapback would then go into effect unless the U.N. 
Security Council adopts a resolution to the contrary, which 
would be, of course, subject to a U.S. veto.
    One thing that is important to note in his op-ed is he 
wrote, ``some might argue that because the U.S. withdrew from 
the JCPOA, it is no longer a participant and therefore cannot 
trigger this procedure. In fact, resolution 2231 defines a 
JCPOA participant to include the U.S. without any 
qualifications.''
    My question is, do you agree with his assessment that the 
U.S. could trigger the snapback mechanism regardless of whether 
or not the U.S. is observing the non-legally binding deal?
    Mr. Hook. It is ultimately a question for L. I think we 
need to have the lawyers from the NSC and the State legal 
department and other agencies with equities take a look at this 
question.
    The broad procedure for a snapback is a member of the deal 
would go to the U.N. Security Council. The president of the 
council would table a resolution that was introduced by the 
member. Then the member that introduced it would then veto his 
own resolution, and then that would then end the Iran nuclear 
deal.
    I think the question you raised is who has standing to 
initiate that sequence of events that leads to the end of the 
Iran nuclear deal and the full snapback of all the U.N. 
sanctions. That is--since you have asked--and I have talked to 
other staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I know 
this is a live question that you would like to have answered. I 
will take it back and work with the interagency to come up with 
an answer.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Question. Do you agree with his assessment that the U.S. could 
trigger the snapback mechanism regardless of whether or not the U.S. is 
observing the non-legally binding deal?

    Answer. Whether there is a legal basis for the initiation of 
snapback in a given case would have to be evaluated against the 
requirements in U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 in light 
of the particular facts and circumstances. The requirements for 
initiating snapback under UNSCR 2231 are that (i) a ``JCPOA participant 
State'' (ii) notify the U.N. Security Council (iii) of an issue it 
believes constitutes ``significant non-performance'' of commitments 
under the JCPOA.

    Senator Rubio. One last point is in July of this year, I 
raised the problem of Chinese individuals and entities that 
were helping the Iranian regime export oil in violation of the 
secondary sanctions. I was very pleased to see later that month 
that the Secretary of State announced the imposition of 
sanctions against the Chinese firm and its CEO for knowingly 
purchasing or acquiring oil from Iran contrary to U.S. 
sanctions.
    Without getting ahead of ourselves and alerting people to 
the fact they are in the crosshairs, are there other such 
actors still out there that are available for us to go after? 
Is there more to do in this space in regards to entities, 
whether it is Chinese or otherwise?
    Mr. Hook. Well, thank you for raising what we have done to 
enforce our sanctions, especially our oil sanctions because 
that is the chief source of Iran's export revenue.
    We have sanctioned Chinese companies, Zhuhai Zhenrong back 
in July, and then in mid-September we sanctioned six Chinese 
entities that were importing Iranian crude oil. All the oil 
waivers--there are none. Those ended after the 6-month period 
after we left the deal.
    So we have said that we will sanction any sanctionable 
activity. We also sanctioned five executives, Chinese 
executives, in these firms. We have demarched China a number of 
times on this subject. I have met with the Chinese to talk 
about this.
    China is Iran's--historically its largest importer, and so 
it is important that its largest importer not import crude oil. 
The argument that I have made to the Chinese is that you, like 
many nations, would like to see greater peace and stability in 
the Middle East, and for as long as Iran is able to sell its 
oil, they are going to use that oil to fund their proxy 
operations around the Middle East. That undermines security and 
it undermines sovereignty and stability. So that is the message 
that we have been taking to them.
    We hope that China decides that it will no longer import. 
Iranian crude oil is not an exotic grade. We have a well-
supplied oil market. There has been no interruption of China's 
energy needs during this period, and so there is no need for 
them to be importing Iranian crude oil.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hook, the reason that Senator Udall is asking you 
questions about Rudy Giuliani's requests on behalf of Reza 
Zarrab I think is twofold. One, we are very concerned that 
there is a shadow foreign policy operation that exists being 
conducted by the President's personal lawyer, a representative 
of his political interests. We know that because we have 
transcripts of phone calls in which the President tells foreign 
leaders not to call your boss, Secretary Pompeo, if they want 
to deal with the United States, but to call Rudy Giuliani.
    We are also concerned about this particular case because it 
seems as if it is evidence that the President's personal 
lawyer, his shadow Secretary of State, is working to undermine 
American sanctions against Iran, the very sanctions that you 
testified to us that are crippling their economy.
    So let me ask Senator Udall's question a different way. 
Have you spoken to Rudy Giuliani about U.S. sanctions policy 
towards his client, Reza Zarrab?
    Mr. Hook. This meeting was a couple of years ago. I was in 
listening mode. As I said, Judge Mukasey asked for the meeting, 
and I listened to what they had to say and there was no action 
taken.
    Senator Murphy. You did have a meeting with Rudy Giuliani 
specific to his representation of a client who was seeking to 
get out of U.S. sanctions.
    Mr. Hook. I had a meeting with Judge Mukasey, who was the 
lead, and Judge Mukasey raised a consular issue with me, and 
there was no action taken.
    Senator Murphy. There is a report from three people 
familiar with the meeting between President Trump and Secretary 
Tillerson, who you were working for at the time as perhaps his 
closest advisor, in which President Trump asked for Secretary 
Tillerson's help to work to drop the case against Zarrab. Are 
you familiar with this meeting or the request that was made?
    Mr. Hook. I was not familiar with the meeting.
    Senator Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to 
set the broader record straight here with respect to some of 
the things that Mr. Hook has said about our policy vis-a-vis 
Iran and its connection to the recent developments in Syria.
    I appreciate that you do have a tough job to do, and I do 
not imagine that you would have given counsel to the President 
to abandon our Kurdish partners in Syria. It is simply not 
credible to say that we did not have a counter-Iran element to 
our Syria strategy. In fact, multiple individuals testified to 
that before this committee and would still testify to that 
before the committee.
    It is not credible to say that abandoning the Kurds does 
not change the efficacy of our Iran strategy. Iran absolutely 
benefits unequivocally from a new alignment inside Syria in 
which the Kurds are forced to align themselves with Bashar al-
Assad.
    It is also not credible--it just does not pass the straight 
face test--to try to convince us that Europe is helping us with 
a maximum pressure campaign on Iran.
    To the extent that I have a question on these topics, I 
will give you one to try to clarify the record. I know you have 
this list of actions that Europe has taken. Let us be honest. 
Europe is attempting to work around our sanctions. Europe is 
trying to create financial vehicles so that their businesses 
can continue to trade with Iran. They are talking about a new 
line of credit to prop up the Iranian economy. They still have 
diplomatic relations. It just does not pass the laugh test to 
suggest that the Europeans are working with us.
    So I just want to put this question back to you again. I 
mean, are you really trying to convince us that the Europeans 
are assisting in our maximum pressure campaign when we know 
that they are actively engaged in trying to help their 
businesses work around U.S. sanctions?
    Mr. Hook. So you said that Europe is working around our 
sanctions, and I think maybe just to be a little more precise 
European companies is what we are talking about. European 
companies have made a clear choice to choose the United States 
market over the Iranian market. The EU does more trade with 
Kazakhstan than it does with Iran. It is not even in the top 30 
of trading partners. So we have seen nothing but full 
compliance by European companies on our sanctions regime.
    European governments are frustrated that Iran has lost some 
of the benefits under the Iran nuclear deal with our departure, 
but that is a secondary consequence.
    As it pertains to European companies, there is no daylight. 
There is more daylight between European companies and European 
governments than there is between the U.S.----
    Senator Murphy. I think you were sending us a list of 
actions that European countries had taken. I think it just 
strains credibility to suggest that you have had success in 
convincing other nations, especially those in Europe, to rejoin 
the pressure campaign. The pressure campaign is unilateral. It 
is not as effective as it could be if you were successful.
    Mr. Hook. So our unilateral sanctions have been much more 
effective than the multilateral sanctions that were in place 
prior to the deal. Indisputable on that.
    The second thing. It is true--and maybe this is just a 
matter of sort of making distinctions. There is our pressure 
campaign, and then there is Europe working to confront and 
address Iranian threats to peace and security. Sometimes those 
overlap, and sometimes they separate. When I look at this list 
of European actions, it is dozens of actions, I mean, 
everything from, as I said, the statements. Austria, Belgium, 
France, and Germany exposed an Iranian plot to bomb an 
oppositionist rally in Paris and they arrested several Iranian 
operatives. The Netherlands expelled two Iranian diplomats in 
connection with an assassination. The French Foreign Minister 
condemned Iran's attack on U.S. diplomatic missions in Iraq. 
Serbia revoked visa-free travel for Iranian citizens. Belgium 
extradited--I would welcome you reading this.
    Europe has done a lot in the time that we have left the 
deal to try to raise the cost of Iranian aggression. They have 
not joined our maximum pressure campaign, but they have adopted 
our position that we need a new deal. Boris Johnson said that 
the Iran nuclear deal was a bad deal with many, many----
    Senator Murphy. I would just say, listen, the proof is in 
the pudding. Iran is not at the negotiating table. You have a 
year left on your term. Their malevolent activity in the region 
is worse than ever before. If you had evidence that all of 
these actions were bringing them to the table, we might be in a 
different conversation, but there is absolutely no evidence 
that this has actually gotten us to a point where you can 
effectuate a negotiated settlement. You only have 12 months 
left on the term. We are just not going to get the agreement 
that you have sought with the time that you have left and 
without European partners.
    I know I am way over my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Murphy, I am not complaining about 
the time because I think this is an important discussion to 
have. I am sitting here listening, and I am hoping we are not 
talking past each other. I mean, as far as starting with the 
Europeans, we all meet with the Europeans. We know what their 
view is on this.
    Senator Murphy. Of course.
    The Chairman. They are despondent over the fact that we 
walked away from the JCPOA.
    On a transactional basis, I think as Mr. Hook has pointed 
out, they have certainly done some things to help us move the 
ball forward. They have also done some things to try to get 
around us by establishing other credit and what have you.
    Again, I think the debate should be--and apparently we have 
at least some disagreement on that--that the sanctions that 
have been put in place indeed are causing great difficulty 
within Iran. Has that gotten them to the table yet? No. Have 
they given any indications they are coming to the table? No. So 
where do you suggest we go to? We then just say, oh, okay, we 
will go back to the JCPOA or we beg them to come to the table. 
I do not understand that.
    Believe me, I am not trying to rankle anybody here. I think 
we all need to pull the wagon together as far as Iran is 
concerned. So I hope we are not talking past each other on 
this.
    Senator Murphy. Again, my point is that to the extent there 
is evidence you are crippling the economy, that is supposed to 
be leverage in order to get them to the table to negotiate a 
deal that was better than the JCPOA. I think many of us would 
argue that you are never going to get them to agree to 
something that was better than the JCPOA. You cannot even get 
them to the table in part because they see Europe as a 
lifeline. They see their ability to work around our sanctions 
through lines of credit and innovative financial vehicles from 
Europe. I just do not think we should let the Administration 
get away with telling us that Europe is our partner in trying 
to get Iran to the negotiating table. They are not. They are 
trying to work around the sanctions that the Trump 
administration has enacted. That is one of the primary reasons 
why this strategy has not worked for 3 years and is not going 
to work as a vehicle to try to get the Iranians back to the 
table before the end of Trump's term.
    The Chairman. I think that is a fair opinion of yours. I 
would disagree with it. The point about sitting it out until 
Trump's terms is over may be good, but boy, they got a tough 
year ahead of them. They have got 14 months ahead of them of 
some pretty dark times if you accept what is happening 
internally within Iran, particularly with the depreciation of 
their currency and that sort of thing. Look, that is a fair 
opinion that you have. I think we just have a fair disagreement 
on that opinion.
    With that, unfortunately, we have got to go vote a couple 
of times. So we will do that and we will come back as we are 
anxious to hear from Senator Markey and Senator Cruz who are 
our last questioners. So if we can have a short break while we 
go vote, we will all come back. Fair enough? The committee will 
be at ease subject to the call of the chair.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Chair, thank 
you for interrupting me as I was interrupting the witness 
earlier. I should not have interrupted, and I appreciated you 
making me wait my turn.
    Mr. Hook, the reason I interrupted is I do not like being 
lied to. You said something that you repeated twice that has 
been said to this committee before that I just think is 
completely wrong, and that is that the JCPOA, the Iran deal--
one of the reasons it was bad is because it expires. I think 
you know that is false. There are provisions in the agreement 
that expire. That is correct. So the agreement has a set of 
provisions dealing with centrifuges and inspections, and some 
of the provisions, you are correct, expire at year 8 or year 15 
or year 20 or year 25 or year 30. To say to me, to our 
committee, to the American public that the deal is bad because 
it expires is just wrong.
    The first paragraph of the deal, preface--I said first 
sentence, first paragraph. I was wrong. It is not the first 
sentence. The first paragraph of the deal: Iran reaffirms that 
under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire 
any nuclear weapons. That is permanent. Ever, under no 
circumstances, any. That is a permanent provision that they 
have signed to that never expires unless somebody like the 
United States decides to blow up the deal.
    The second page of the deal, preamble and general 
provisions. I guess they felt that was important enough that 
they wanted to repeat it twice. Iran reaffirms that under no 
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any 
nuclear weapons.
    That is not the only permanent part of the deal. While 
there are some provisions that expire--and anybody can feel 
free to like or not like the sunset on those provisions--there 
is also a provision that I believe at year 30 extra 
investigation, examination of their nuclear arsenal provisions 
expire, but at year 30 Iran agrees to permanently abide by the 
additional protocol set up by the IAEA for inspections in the 
aftermath of North Korea being caught cheating.
    I would not dwell on it except other Administration 
witnesses have come here and looked us in the eye and said the 
same thing. I get it that you guys want to say the deal was 
bad. By lying about it and suggesting that the deal was bad 
because it expires, you tremendously weaken your credibility.
    I believe that the Administration backing out of the JCPOA 
was incredibly foolish. Who cares what I think? I am a 
Democrat. I do not think the Administration cares one whit what 
I think.
    How about Secretary Mattis? How about Secretary Tillerson? 
How about head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joe Dunford? I am 
on the Armed Services Committee. They appeared when the 
President was trying to decide what to do about the deal and 
said staying in the deal was in the United States' interests. 
All right. Well, forget about them. Maybe they do not know 
anything.
    Our European allies begged us to stay in the deal. Okay. 
Who cares about allies? Maybe we do not. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency said Iran was complying with the deal. 
President Trump felt otherwise, just like President Bush 
trashed the IAEA when it said Iraq had a program of weapons of 
mass destruction.
    So this is a deal that had some provisions that did, in 
fact, expire, provisions that expired, but it was a permanent 
deal where Iran suggested they would never seek, purchase, 
acquire, develop nuclear weapons. That promise was enforceable 
by sanctions. That promise could potentially have given legal 
justification for military action against Iran if they had 
violated the provision. The additional protocol that was 
permanent gives the United States not only intel, but intel 
plus inspection data that if we ever needed to take military 
action, we could target it in a more sophisticated way.
    When I see the Administration coming and telling the 
American public we do not like the deal because it expires, it 
just infuriates me.
    We should have done what Senator Cardin said. The 
Administration should have stayed in the JCPOA and then done 
exactly what you are trying to do, sanction Iran for all the 
other bad activities that you have testified to here today. 
Many of us on both sides of the aisle had supported sanctions 
against Iran for missiles, human rights violations, their 
aggression in the region. We should have kept the permanent 
promise and the additional protocol being permanent in our 
pocket and worked with our European allies to get sanctions 
against Iran for those activities, which you could have done by 
your own testimony today except you were asking for additional 
negotiations of the JCPOA itself.
    The withdrawal has made the region less safe, and the 
withdrawal has made it much more difficult for you to do what 
you want to do, which is to get another deal, because if the 
deal is being complied with and we backed out of it, why would 
a country do another deal with us? They would think we would 
back out of it.
    Backing out of the deal has made it much harder to get a 
deal with North Korea. I applaud the President's efforts in 
trying. When North Korea sees the U.S. backing out of a deal 
that the IAEA said Iran was complying with, it makes it much 
more difficult. Much more difficult for them to get on board.
    So I just wanted to put on the record that is why I was 
agitated. You can be against the deal. You can be against the 
expiration of provisions of the deal. To tell the American 
public the deal was bad because it expires is just a lie.
    Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Would you like to respond, please?
    Mr. Hook. I would like to respond to that.
    The Chairman. I am sure that Senator Kaine will give you 
the rest of his time, such as it is.
    Mr. Hook. It is the case that the deal will expire. I do 
not think it is a material distinction to say that after all of 
the substance of the deal expires, that the deal does not 
expire because Iran makes a commitment to never get a nuclear 
weapon. I think that is a misreading, and it is a misleading 
account of the Iran nuclear deal.
    In 2031----
    Senator Kaine. Do you think I misquoted what I just read? 
Are you accusing me of misquoting it?
    Mr. Hook. I am happy to go through everything that you 
raised.
    Senator Kaine. No, but are you saying that I--you think it 
is a misreading. Did I incorrectly state those provisions in 
the preface and preamble to the deal?
    Mr. Hook. As I understood what you said, it was that 
because Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran 
ever develop or acquire any nuclear weapons that that means 
that this deal never expires. The provisions of the deal 
expire.
    Senator Kaine. That is a provision of the deal.
    Mr. Hook. It is not a provision.
    Senator Kaine. It is in the preamble. It is in the preface.
    Mr. Hook. It is preambular. It is a preambular. It is not 
an operative paragraph. It is preambular paragraph. It is 
hortatory.
    So in 2031, all restrictions lift on the Iran nuclear deal.
    Senator Kaine. Except that provision and the agreement to 
follow the additional protocol in perpetuity.
    Mr. Hook. If Iran has no intent to acquire a nuclear 
weapon, what were they doing with that atomic archive in the 
heart of Tehran that Israel had to liberate?
    Senator Kaine. Look, if you want to talk about what Iran is 
doing wrong, that is fine. I am just saying----
    Mr. Hook. I did not misrepresent it. I stated very clearly 
that the Iran deal will expire.
    Senator Kaine. The wording stands as it is, and I am 
perfectly comfortable to let the people look at the first 
paragraph of the deal and the preamble and compare it against 
this witness' statement.
    The Chairman. That is fair, Senator Kaine. The language of 
the agreement cannot be argued with. It is black and white. The 
opinion as to whether or not that is an expiring provision I 
think is subject to debate. Some of us feel one way. Some of us 
feel another. That is a fair statement.
    I understand how it agitates anybody if you come in and try 
to tell somebody the facts are different than what they are. I 
think there are a lot more important issues here over whether 
or not that provision was expiring. I think we can go forward 
with what we have to do about the situation that we have in 
front of us without agreeing on whether an agreement that is no 
longer in effect had a provision that said this or that. Again, 
I get the same frustration you do when people try to tell me 
something that I believe differently. In any event, it would be 
productive if we did go forward with other parts. There is 
nobody going to argue with you that the language of the 
agreement is not exactly what it is.
    So thank you, Mr. Hook.
    Let us go to--I had it mixed up--Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me start by saying that I know my friend from Virginia 
is speaking in good faith when he expresses his support for 
this deal, but I think the Obama Iran nuclear deal was flawed 
in virtually every respect. In my judgment, the threat of a 
nuclear Iran is the single greatest national security threat 
facing the United States. The Obama Iran nuclear deal was the 
most catastrophic international agreement since Neville 
Chamberlain led the United Kingdom. It was flawed on multiple 
fronts.
    On one front, it gave $150 billion to the Ayatollah 
Khamenei, to the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. It 
did so while the Ayatollah was chanting ``death to America'' 
and ``death to Israel.'' Literally as we negotiated the deal, 
the Ayatollah would lead mobs in chanting ``death to America.'' 
History teaches us when someone tells you they want to kill 
you, we should believe them.
    The deal on its face would have led inexorably to a nuclear 
Iran. It was designed to be utterly unenforceable. On the face 
of the deal, numerous sites were deemed exempt from 
inspections. Military sites were deemed exempt from inspections 
which, of course, means that is naturally where the Iranian 
regime would engage in additional nuclear research.
    It also required 21 days advance notice to the regime 
before any inspection, a provision certain to encourage 
cheating.
    Indeed, in some circumstances, the agreement provided that 
Iran would inspect itself, a provision so laughably weak the 
only consequence of the Iran deal that would have occurred is 
that Iran would acquire nuclear weapons.
    We now know thanks to Israel's heroic work seizing Iranian 
records that Iran has cheated from day one and continues to 
cheat, and the only question is is Iran better off with $150 
billion or without $150 billion. I believe pulling out of the 
disastrous Obama Iran nuclear deal is the single most important 
national security decision the Trump administration has made.
    The maximum pressure campaign is exactly the right 
approach. Now, listen, Iran remains profoundly dangerous, but I 
would much rather a weakened Iran with billions of dollars less 
resources to use to pay terrorists to kill Americans and to 
fund nuclear research than an Iran flush with cash racing to 
catch up with North Korea and use nuclear weapons and ICBMs to 
threaten the lives of millions of Americans.
    Now, Mr. Hook, you talked about major provisions of the 
Iran deal expiring, major provisions such as the arms embargo 
and the ballistic missile test ban expiring. I agree that that 
is highly troubling. There is an obvious remedy to that, which 
is under the terms of resolution 2231, you have the snapback 
sanctions. We now have a situation where Iran's conduct has 
gotten even worse. Even our European allies acknowledge that 
Iran committed a serious act of war in bombing Saudi Arabia and 
taking out about half of their oil production capability. That 
act of war merits a real response.
    Two questions. Does State believe the United States is able 
to trigger the snapback mechanism? Number two, should we 
trigger the snapback mechanism?
    Mr. Hook. Senator, thank you for your question. I read your 
letter from July 2 I believe to Secretary Pompeo that raises 
this question, and it is something which Senator Rubio and I 
discussed earlier about whether we can and whether we should 
use the 2231 to trigger the snapback of the sanctions.
    I have raised this with our legal advisor's office. I know 
it has been in discussion with the NSC legal advisor. It is a 
procedural question and interpretation of 2231 that turns 
around what the definition of some of the various terms are, 
like ``participant'' and other things. I think yours is a very 
plausible reading.
    What we have done since leaving the deal is allow other 
countries to decide whether to stay in the deal. Obviously, I 
think even as the French Foreign Minister said recently after 
the attacks on Abqaiq on September 14, it is a seminal event. 
It is a game changer. I cannot remember exactly how he 
described it. It is something we should take another look at 
and I appreciate you raising it to our attention.
    Senator Cruz. Well, I would certainly encourage you. On my 
reading, I believe we have full authority to invoke the 
snapback sanctions, and particularly given this recent attack 
against Saudi Arabia, I think we should invoke the snapback 
sanctions. I think that is a natural response.
    Second question. You and I have had multiple conversations 
about the civilian nuclear waivers. As you know, another round 
of waivers is coming up in the next couple of weeks. We have 
waivers right now allowing them to continue construction at the 
underground Fordow nuclear bunker, a bunker built into the side 
of a mountain to build nuclear weapons. We also have a waiver 
allowing Iran to continue working on the Iraq plutonium-
producing reactor, which Secretary Pompeo has rightly said 
needs to be shut down anyway.
    Is it not time to end these waivers and shut down the 
Fordow nuclear bunker and the Iraq plutonium-producing 
facility?
    Mr. Hook. You are correct that the current--there are five 
restrictions that are currently in place. Secretary Pompeo 
extended those restrictions on June 30. You are correct. Those 
are going to expire very soon on October 29.
    What we have done is we have, over the course of a couple 
of years now, tightened the restrictions on Iran's nuclear 
program. We did sanction the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
in November of 2018. In March of this year, we imposed new 
sanctions on nuclear scientists who were linked to Iran's WMD 
proliferation-sensitive activities. Secretary Pompeo on July 30 
then extended those five restrictions around Iraq, Fordow, 
Bushehr, the Tehran research reactor. So he will have a 
decision to make coming up.
    You have been a thought leader on this subject, and we will 
make sure that that is all before the Secretary before he makes 
this decision.
    Senator Cruz. Well, I would strongly urge that you not 
extend the waivers, particularly given Iran's spectacularly bad 
conduct.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Mr. Hook, in a July 23 interview, Secretary Pompeo said 
that Iran before the Trump administration came into office 
violated the nuclear deal, ``and continued to work on their 
nuclear program.''
    Mr. Hook, in your opinion, was Iran working on its nuclear 
weapons program during our period of compliance with the JCPOA?
    Mr. Hook. It is the case that Iran was hiding under armed 
guard in a warehouse in the heart of Tehran half a ton of 
materials----
    Senator Markey. Were they out of compliance with the JCPOA 
in your opinion?
    Mr. Hook. I think if Iran is housing an atomic archive and 
keeping it from the International Atomic Energy Association 
that they are not in compliance.
    Senator Markey. So you disagree with Secretary Mattis, 
Secretary Tillerson, and the generals in the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff that they were not out of compliance with the JCPOA?
    Mr. Hook. Well, it depends on, in this case--under I think 
a statute passed by Congress, the President had to certify on a 
fairly regular basis whether Iran was or was not in compliance 
with the deal.
    The discovery of the atomic archive happened just a couple 
of months before the President left the deal, and I think that 
that was a factor.
    Senator Markey. So--you disagree with Secretary Tillerson 
and Secretary Mattis that they were--you believe they were out 
of compliance. Is that what you are saying?
    Mr. Hook. No. What I am saying--I would have to look at the 
dates that both Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis said 
that, and so that is relevant to this because the atomic 
archive was discovered only a month or two before----
    Senator Markey. I appreciate that. Do you agree that the 
IAEA inspectors have not found that Iran is out of compliance 
and definitely was not out of compliance before Donald Trump 
took office?
    Mr. Hook. I think in the reports that the IAEA--the IAEA 
does not certify that Iran is in compliance. That is something 
which the member states do. I think that the Iran nuclear deal 
set such a low bar for compliance----
    Senator Markey. Well, that is separate from whether or not 
they are in compliance.
    Is Secretary Pompeo correct that they were not in 
compliance?
    Mr. Hook. I would have to see exactly what he said and when 
he said it.
    Senator Markey. Well, let me just say this. Secretary 
Pompeo's suggestions have consequences because the Crown Prince 
of Saudi Arabia stated in March of 2018 that without a doubt if 
Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit. Again, that 
gets into the question of the 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia 
in terms of the United States agreeing that Saudi Arabia would 
not have to, in fact, comply with the gold standard for 
securing uranium and plutonium on Saudi territory. So that just 
would then call into question whether or not they--that is, the 
Saudis--would, in fact, act in a way that would be reacting to 
an Iranian active nuclear weapons program.
    Mr. Hook. Could I speak to that, Senator?
    Senator Markey. So, from my perspective, the goal has to be 
that the Trump administration is not saying that there is an 
active program that has been certified by the IAEA if that is 
not the case because it triggers a reaction in Saudi Arabia 
that is very, very dangerous.
    I want to reach one other question and that is the issue of 
not whether or not we might differ on the Iranian nuclear deal, 
but we know that Turkey has undermined Iran sanctions across 
administrations. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Hook. I can only speak to the Iran file. Turkey has 
been in compliance with Iran sanctions.
    Senator Markey. You think they are in compliance--Turkey.
    Mr. Hook. In terms of the key factor on oil, Turkey is not 
importing Iranian crude oil.
    Senator Markey. So you do not think Turkey has been out of 
compliance, which is important for me to understand.
    What the problem is right now is that Turkey is endangering 
U.S. troops after another rash decision by President Trump, but 
that is happening near the Syrian border where we reportedly 
store 50 U.S. nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Base inside 
of Turkey. So the question then is, will we, as a country 
remove those nuclear weapons from Turkey? They are right now 
endangering U.S. assets inside of Syria. They are at the 
border. We have nuclear weapons, reportedly 50 nuclear weapons, 
on the Incirlik Air Base, and Erdogan has become a less and 
less reliable partner.
    So the President just moments ago said he is confident that 
the weapons are secure because they are at a, ``large, powerful 
airbase.'' Well, that large, powerful airbase is inside of 
Turkey with Erdogan, right now, undermining American security 
in a way that is almost impossible to fully understand the 
magnitude, right now, the ripple effect. The law of unintended 
consequences is just happening and happening and happening. 
Turkey has actually previously restricted our access to that 
base during a crisis.
    So from my perspective, instead of irresponsibly pulling 
our troops back from the Turkish border, President Trump should 
be pulling our nuclear weapons out of Turkey instead. That is 
the right kind of signal to send. That is an accurate 
reflection of the reliability of the Erdogan administration in 
terms of American security.
    So this whole dynamic in the Trump administration has 
tremendous ripple effects--pulling out of the Iranian deal; 
playing footsy with the Saudis in terms of a 123 agreement that 
is less than the gold standard with uranium and plutonium; 
having the Saudi prince say they are going to pursue nuclear 
weapons if they believe the Iranians are; and having our 
Administration saying they are. So that creates a ripple 
effect. Then turning a blind eye to the Turkish aggressive 
military action along our border that endangers our interest 
and if things really go awry, could potentially endanger the 
security of the nuclear weapons inside of Turkey that are made 
in the U.S.A.
    So all of this is basically something that basically points 
to the result from my perspective is that the nuclear weapons 
of the United States in Turkey is a relic of the Cold War. They 
are not necessary. They should not be there. It is highly 
unclear that the Turks would ever allow us to be using those 
weapons in a retaliatory strike against Russia with whom at 
least ostensibly right now they are partnering in this effort 
in Syria. It is absolutely a crazy policy. We got to get those 
nukes out of Turkey and do so immediately.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Did you want to comment?
    Mr. Hook. Yes. Could I just say on the first part of the 
question about Saudi, prior to the Iran nuclear deal--and 
Senator Markey and I have had many conversations about 
nonproliferation, advocate for nonproliferation. Prior to the 
Iran nuclear deal, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 
1737, and under chapter 7, article 39, it prohibited Iran from 
enriching. By the way, that is the right standard. There should 
be no enrichment for the world's leading state sponsor of 
terrorism.
    I know that you like the 123 agreement that was negotiated 
in the Bush administration with the UAE. That agreement allows 
UAE to have a peaceful nuclear program, but they cannot enrich.
    Unfortunately, the Iran nuclear deal lifted the prohibition 
in 1737 and then conceded the point that Iran can enrich. Once 
you do that, you are not going to be able to sign up anybody 
for a 123 agreement because you have already breached that 
standard of no enrichment. We were able to get a 123 agreement 
because we had a standard of no enrichment.
    So I think the Iran nuclear deal has caused all of these 
countries around the Middle East to look at Iran enriching and 
ask themselves why can I not enrich. It is much better to 
restore. So if you look at Secretary Pompeo's list of 12, at 
the very top is to restore the standard of no enrichment, and 
that is the best thing that we can be doing. That standard was 
voted unanimously by China, Russia, the P3, all 10 elected 
members of the council repeatedly. It was the----
    Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I have been patiently 
waiting. Could you please put this in writing?
    Senator Markey. I will just say, Mr. Chairman, a bad deal 
with Iran should not be the justification for a bad deal with 
the Saudi Arabians. We are trying to walk back a bad deal 
historically. We should not create that as a precedent that 
allows for a bad deal with----
    The Chairman. Let us turn to Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. All right. Mr. Hook, is Assad a friend of 
the United States?
    Mr. Hook. No.
    Senator Graham. Do you consider him a war criminal?
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Graham. Is he aligned with Iran?
    Mr. Hook. Iran has been supporting Assad----
    Senator Graham. Without Iran helping Assad, he would not be 
around because Hezbollah came to his aid when nobody else 
would. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Hook. Yes. Iran was an early supporter of Assad.
    Senator Graham. Well, Russia and Iran keep Assad 
functioning.
    You are a good man. You are a good choice for this. So my 
questions are really not about you and your policies. It is 
about this President's policies. I could not agree more with 
Senator Markey. This is the most screwed up decision I have 
seen since I have been in Congress.
    When the President said today Syria--Turkey's invasion of 
Syria is really of no consequence to us, do you know why we 
sanctioned Turkey if that is true, Mr. Hook?
    Mr. Hook. The President did threaten sanctions on Friday 
and it has imposed some of them on Monday.
    Senator Graham. I cheered them on.
    I do not know how in the world Pompeo and Pence bring it 
into the bloodshed before they leave the present Syria. If 
Syria wants to fight for their land, that is up to Turkey and 
Syria. So I view the situation on the Turkish border with Syria 
to be, for the United States, strategically brilliant. I do not 
see anything brilliant about this.
    Do you believe the Kurds are safer today than they were 
before Turkey's invasion?
    Mr. Hook. That is a question for Ambassador Jeffrey. I 
understand there is a member briefing happening. I am the 
Special Representative for Iran.
    Senator Graham. Fair enough.
    Mr. Hook. I can answer the Iran questions on Syria, but----
    Senator Graham. Fair enough. Okay.
    Do you see Iran moving in to take the oilfields from Syria 
if we withdraw all of our forces?
    Mr. Hook. I have not seen any intelligence on that yet, but 
that does not----
    Senator Graham. Do you think that would be a logical move 
for Iran if America abandoned Syria?
    Mr. Hook. Iran's interests in Syria are mostly around 
supporting Assad and creating a----
    Senator Graham. Well, if the oilfields are there for the 
taking and we leave, what is the likelihood that Iran would go 
in, and would it matter?
    Mr. Hook. That is not something which I am at liberty to 
speculate on.
    Senator Graham. Well, I will speculate. Iran is amassing at 
the border as I speak. If we withdraw all of our forces and 
abandon the oilfields, Iran would surely go in and seize the 
oilfields. It will undercut the maximum pressure campaign, and 
our friends in Israel would be in a world of hurt.
    Do you agree with this? If Iran gets stronger in Syria, it 
is to the detriment of Israel.
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Graham. Do you agree that it is in our national 
security interests to make sure that we have a partnership in 
Syria that will contain Iran's ambitions?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, that is our strategy, to reverse Iran's 
power projection and to deny them the revenues----
    Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that if ISIS comes 
roaring back, it will be very difficult to contain. The Kurds 
will have a hard time fighting Turkey and taking care of the 
ISIS prisoners. That is a bad spot for the Kurds to be in. Do 
you agree?
    Mr. Hook. In terms of the position the Kurds are in, it is 
a question for Jim Jeffrey.
    Senator Graham. Well, who would be the biggest winner of a 
breakdown in Syria? Would it be the Iranians? If there is a 
vacuum created by an American withdrawal, do you see Iran as a 
potential big winner?
    Mr. Hook. So I think we need to--this is obviously a very 
fluid situation. We do not want anything done in Syria to be to 
the detriment of our Iran policy.
    Senator Graham. Okay. Now, Iran policy is to contain Iran, 
reduce their ability to project power and create upheaval. Do 
you agree with that?
    Mr. Hook. I did not hear the last part. To do what?
    Senator Graham. To create upheaval.
    Mr. Hook. Yes. We are trying to minimize Iran's ability to 
do that.
    Senator Graham. Do you agree that if they seize the 
oilfields in Syria, they will be stronger and have more 
resources, not less?
    Mr. Hook. I do not know the odds of Iran taking the 
oilfields in Syria.
    Senator Graham. If they did.
    Mr. Hook. I can say that so what we have tried to do is 
that Iran----
    Senator Graham. It is a simple question. If they did seize 
the oilfields in Syria, would it help their regime in terms of 
their capability?
    Mr. Hook. If they are able to get more revenue, then that 
is always a bad thing.
    Senator Graham. All I can say--that is not a hard question. 
The answer is yes.
    So my view is that the biggest winner of this decision by 
the President, if he follows through with it, to abandon Syria 
will be Iran, ISIS, and the biggest loser is going to be our 
Kurdish allies who fought bravely with us, our friends in 
Israel.
    Do you see Turkey's action going into Syria as undercutting 
our policies toward Iran?
    Mr. Hook. Our diplomacy--so I would say our troops in the 
northeast are there to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. Our 
diplomats working on Syria are there to----
    Senator Graham. Let us just talk about the troops are there 
to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS by partnering with the 
Kurds. Is that not correct? The Syrian Democratic Forces.
    Mr. Hook. Beyond the ISIS mission and how it is 
accomplished----
    Senator Graham. We are not there in large enough numbers. 
We are there in hundreds. It is the thousands of Kurdish 
fighters and Arab fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces 
that we rely upon. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Hook. That is a question I think for the person--I am 
the U.S. Special Representative for Iran. I can speak to the 
Iran----
    Senator Graham. I will end this. I ask you a very simple 
question. Does Erdogan's invasion of Syria putting our Kurdish 
allies at risk, driving President Trump out of Syria in terms 
of our military presence--do you think over time that will 
inure to the benefit of Iran?
    Mr. Hook. I believe that the strategy that we have put in 
place will accomplish our objectives to deny Iran the revenue 
it needs.
    Senator Graham. Does your strategy include allowing Erdogan 
to slaughter the Kurds?
    Mr. Hook. That is not part of our strategy.
    Senator Graham. Does your strategy include leaving the 
oilfields in Syria for the taking by Iran?
    Mr. Hook. I have not heard any proposal to enable Iran to 
take oilfields in Syria.
    Senator Graham. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. I will just associate myself with Senator 
Graham's line of questioning, and it is a very legitimate line 
of questioning and it is a very serious one.
    Mr. Hook, you referenced EU actions, but the EU actions, 
some of which you read, are nowhere in line with the sanctions 
that we have levied against Iran. That is a fair statement. 
Right?
    Mr. Hook. No, it is not true because----
    Senator Menendez. The EU has the same set of sanctions as 
we have against Iran?
    Mr. Hook. Yes, I am sorry. The EU, unfortunately--and this 
is one of the weaknesses of the deal--is that the European 
Union I think----
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Hook, I am sorry. You are an 
excellent lawyer and you have developed the expertise of the 
State Department to go on and on without being specific to an 
answer to a question.
    I have a very simple question. Do the EU sanctions line up 
with our sanctions against Iran? Yes or no.
    Mr. Hook. Yes.
    Senator Menendez. So they have all the sanctions we have.
    Mr. Hook. I did not--no.
    Senator Menendez. They are not as strong as the United 
States' sanctions. You before heralded that our sanctions were 
more powerful and more consequential than when we had the EU 
with us.
    Mr. Hook. Well, that is true.
    Senator Menendez. The EU sanctions are not the same as 
ours.
    Mr. Hook. They are, I think, complementary because----
    Senator Menendez. I did not ask you if they are 
complementary. I asked you are they the same as ours. What is 
so difficult about that answer?
    Mr. Hook. I never said they are the same. I am happy to 
review the transcript. I never said that.
    Senator Menendez. You suggested that there are a series of 
EU sanctions that were EU sanctions and actions that have----
    Mr. Hook. No. I said European. I said European.
    Senator Menendez. Let me finish.
    Mr. Hook. I did not say EU----
    Senator Menendez. I get to ask the questions. You get to 
answer them.
    Mr. Hook. I am happy to.
    Senator Menendez. The EU's actions do not equate to the 
sanctions that the United States has levied against Iran. That 
is a fair statement. Is it not?
    Mr. Hook. Can you repeat it so that I understand it 
precisely?
    Senator Menendez. The EU actions do not equate to the 
sanctions the United States has levied against Iran. Is that 
fair?
    Mr. Hook. They do not equate and I never said they equate.
    Senator Menendez. Fine.
    Now, you also said that Iran has a history of coming to the 
table because of sanctions. I was the author of most of those 
sanctions. The reality is, however, those sanctions were 
multilateralized by the European Union and others and therefore 
the magnitude of the consequence was greater. That brought them 
to the table. Your sanctions unilaterally have not brought them 
to the table.
    You talked about having diplomatic leverage in Syria to 
deal and thwart Iran from where we want them. Well, the 
President just made a statement that Russia's expansion after 
the U.S. departs is fine, and all they are fighting over there 
is a lot of sand.
    Well, when you have 14,000 to 18,000 ISIS fighters, when 
you have another 10,000 that were imprisoned by the Kurds that 
may be released--several hundred have already been released--
and regroups with them, that is about more than a lot of sand. 
When you create a land bridge for Iran to come into Syria and 
attack our ally, the state of Israel, that is about a lot more 
than sand.
    So I do not know what leverage you are referring to that we 
have in Syria because we have outsourced Syria to Russia. 
Talking about reconstruction funds as our leverage, not only is 
it years away, but I am sure others will fill the void 
economically with Syria when and if that time ever comes 
because they already have a big stake in it, i.e., Russia just 
to mention a few. So we do not really have any leverage in 
Syria. Except that which we have we just expended.
    So my question is, at what point, if Iran continues to 
enrich and do all the things that you admitted they were doing 
as a result of them feeling that we walked away and they have 
no obligation anymore--if they continue to do that, at what 
point will the size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear 
program force the Administration to consider whether military 
action is necessary to restrain Iran's nuclear program?
    Mr. Hook. I think that question is probably best left to a 
classified briefing.
    Senator Menendez. Well, without getting into the specifics, 
have you come to such a determination?
    Mr. Hook. A determination of what?
    Senator Menendez. As to what is the size and sophistication 
of Iran's nuclear program that would force the Administration 
to consider military action? Without getting into what it is, 
have you come to a conclusion of----
    Mr. Hook. In an unclassified setting, I cannot have that 
discussion. I am happy to----
    Senator Menendez. This is a simple answer that has nothing 
to do with classification.
    Mr. Hook. Oh, it does because you have asked how close is 
Iran to a nuclear weapon, and you have also asked----
    Senator Menendez. That is all a matter of public 
information. I do not need you to testify to that or to speak 
to it. I am not asking you about that.
    I am asking you have you come to a conclusion that if Iran 
reaches X dimension and X sophistication, that will cause a 
necessity for military action because the sanctions have not 
worked.
    Mr. Hook. Our military is always prepared for any 
contingency.
    Senator Menendez. That is not an answer.
    Finally, you agree that the full enforcement of sanctions 
on Iran is incredibly important. Right?
    Mr. Hook. Correct, yes.
    Senator Menendez. In our sanctions regime, it is weaker 
when people figure out how to evade them to the benefit of 
Iran. Is that not a fair statement?
    Mr. Hook. Correct.
    Senator Menendez. Do you believe that those who seek to 
evade U.S. sanctions on Iran should be prosecuted or fined to 
the fullest extent of the law?
    Mr. Hook. That is our policy, yes. We will sanction any 
sanctionable behavior.
    Senator Menendez. So in the case of Reza Zarrab, who ran 
the biggest sanctions evasion scheme in recent history in which 
Turkish gold was traded for Iranian oil, he paid off Turkish 
Government officials, as well as officials at the Turkish 
HalkBank to facilitate the transactions. Erdogan, who was the 
Prime Minister at the time, reportedly knew about the scheme. 
Zarrab was arrested in March of 2016 by U.S. authorities and 
then hired Rudy Giuliani and former Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey to represent him. You have testified here that General 
Mukasey asked to come see you.
    When he asked to come see you, did you know that Rudy 
Giuliani was going to accompany him?
    Mr. Hook. I do not recall if that was mentioned. I just 
know that he was there.
    Senator Menendez. He was there. He just showed up.
    When he came the second time, did you know that he was 
going to accompany Mr. Mukasey?
    Mr. Hook. I may or may not have. I am not sure how it is 
material. I just honored the request of General Mukasey to do a 
meeting, and I did the meeting. Then no action was taken.
    Senator Menendez. Well, the price must have been right 
because both were willing to put their reputations on the line 
to represent someone who worked so hard to undermine U.S. 
national security interests.
    Are you familiar with the report that the Washington Post 
had that both Mr. Giuliani and Mukasey directly appealed to the 
President to exchange Zarrab for an imprisoned American in the 
fall of 2017 in an Oval Office meeting that included then 
Secretary Tillerson?
    Mr. Hook. I have not read the Post story, and I am not 
aware of the meeting.
    Senator Menendez. You are not aware of the meeting. Mr. 
Tillerson never spoke to you about such an effort.
    Mr. Hook. No.
    Senator Menendez. The October 10 report also says, as you 
have stated before, that Mr. Giuliani, in addition to Mr. 
Mukasey, met with you to discuss the case at the State 
Department. Is that true?
    Mr. Hook. There were two meetings early in the 
Administration.
    Senator Menendez. It was about Mr. Zarrab. Right?
    Mr. Hook. I have not said that. I just said it was on a 
consular issue.
    Senator Menendez. Well, first of all, a consular issue is 
about visas. It is about whether or not a visa has been given 
for a visitor's visa, for a work permit, for investor permits. 
That is a consular issue. You are trying to hide behind the 
term ``consular issue'' when this was a meeting about someone 
who was in prison seeking to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran 
through Turkey. That is not a consular issue.
    Mr. Hook. It was presented as a consular issue.
    Senator Menendez. That is not a consular issue.
    Mr. Hook. But it was presented as a consular issue.
    Senator Menendez. I could call a dog a cat. That does not 
mean that ultimately it is a cat. Right? I could call it 
anything to try to avoid it, but that does not mean that is 
what it is.
    Mr. Hook. The meeting did concern a consular proposal, and 
it was not acted upon. I think anybody who knows me knows that 
I vigorously enforce all sanctions against Iran.
    Senator Menendez. When we have the highest office in the 
land empowering people to seek to make a deal, when you have 
the biggest violator of U.S. sanctions on Iran, it is hard to 
believe that we have a universal message on Iran that our 
sanctions will be vigorously enforced and preserved. It breaks 
credibility at the end of the day.
    Mr. Hook. I do not see how it does. There is no 
Administration in history that has imposed more sanctions on 
Iran than this Administration. There is no historic precedent 
for greater enforcement of our sanctions, and there was nothing 
that impacted our sanctions at all as a consequence of those 
two meetings. Nothing.
    Senator Menendez. Mr. Zarrab was the biggest violator of 
U.S. Iran sanctions of any single individual. Is that not true?
    Mr. Hook. In the prior Administration, yes, and he is in 
jail.
    Senator Menendez. It was not the prior Administration who 
was letting free agents go to make a deal to let him loose. 
Come on. Come on. Stop with that prior Administration stuff.
    Mr. Hook. No. But this is a question for----
    Senator Menendez. This is a question that you met with 
them, not the prior Administration. You met with them.
    Mr. Hook. Then took no action. So we are in full agreement 
on this that we need to vigorously enforce our sanctions, and 
we have.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, gentlemen. That will 
conclude the hearing.
    A sincere thank you to you, Mr. Hook. I said at the 
beginning of the hearing that you were the right man for the 
job, and certainly you have proven that to be the case. I thank 
you for your service to the country. I think you have been an 
excellent witness as far as describing how we are attempting to 
handle a very difficult situation, and I want you to know the 
appreciation of the American people is there for you.
    So thank you so much. For the information of the members, 
the record will remain open until the close of business on 
Friday. We would ask, Mr. Hook, if you get questions, to 
respond as promptly as possible, and those responses will be 
included in the record.
    The committee is hereby adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


 The Committee Received No Response From Special Representative Brian 
 Hook for the Following Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

                             iran strategy
    This Administration has pursued its maximum pressure campaign to 
constrain Iran's ability to destabilize the region and threaten U.S. 
interests and our allies but does not seem to have a strategy for 
taking advantage of that pressure. In fact, it seems that we have 
reached an impasse with the maximum pressure campaign and lost any 
ability to deter Iranian behavior.

    Question. Do you believe you have successfully countered Iranian 
aggression in the short term and long term?

    [No Response Received]
                              negotiations
    You've said that the purpose of the maximum pressure campaign was 
to get Iran to and return to the negotiating table, where a new, more 
restrictive agreement would be crafted that eliminated its nuclear 
enrichment program, curtailed its ballistic missile program and reduced 
its influence in the Gulf. Secretary Pompeo has also said, ``Iran knows 
what it needs to do.''

    Question. What steps does Iran need to take to get back to the 
negotiating table?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Iran has repeatedly said it will not come back to the 
negotiating table without preconditions. To date, it has not. Do you 
believe under any circumstances Iran will start negotiations without 
some kind of guarantees of relief from the United States or the 
international community?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Has this been communicated to the Iranians? How?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What does a new, more restrictive agreement look like?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Have you developed specific parameters that have been 
communicated to the Iranians? On inspections? On heavy water 
reprocessing or shipment of spent fuel? On ballistic missiles?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. How have you engaged with our international partners 
regarding a new agreement with Iran?

    [No Response Received]
                              saudi attack
    Following the Aramco attacks, the Administration announced it would 
send additional troops and enhanced air and missile defense systems to 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE in response to the attacks. Secretary Pompeo 
referred to the attack as an ``act of war.''

    Question. Under what authorities did the President deploy troops to 
Saudi Arabia? What direct threat to the United States are they 
protecting? Is the Administration planning to come to Congress for an 
appropriate authorization?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What assistance has the Saudi Government requested? This 
President seems focused on burden-sharing; how are the Saudis sharing 
the burden of our protecting their oil facilities and territories?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. How can the President tell the American people he is 
withdrawing troops from forever wars across the Middle East when in 
fact he's deploying thousands?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What message do you think it sends to our allies around 
the world that the President has withdrawn troops who were supporting 
our partners in the fight against ISIS as they are actively being 
slaughtered--and Russian forces are now running around U.S. military 
bases--but that we will send our men and women to protect Saudi Arabia?

    [No Response Received]
                                  aumf
    Question. Will the Administration come to Congress for an 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force?

    [No Response Received]
                                 jcpoa
    The Administration's maximum pressure campaign has prompted Iran to 
renounce many of the nuclear commitments it made in the JCPOA. Since 
July, Iran has exceeded the limits imposed on its stockpile of uranium, 
it has enriched uranium to higher levels of concentration than 
permissible in the JCPOA, and it has begun using more advanced 
centrifuges for enrichment. The Institute for Science and International 
Studies warned in early September that over time these steps could 
``shrink precipitously'' the amount of time Iran needs to produce the 
material for one nuclear weapon, known as breakout time.

    Question. Would you agree that the nuclear steps Iran has taken 
since July have shrunk their break-out time below 1 year? In other 
words that Iran is now closer to achieving its goal of building a 
nuclear weapon than it was before the maximum pressure campaign was 
initiated?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Do you have a current estimate for Iran's breakout time?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What is the Administration's strategy for reining in 
Iran's nuclear program now that Iran has said it is no longer bound by 
the commitments it made in the JCPOA?

    [No Response Received]
                                  iraq
    Iraq now finds itself wedged perilously between the 
Administration's maximum pressure campaign and its reckless decision to 
abandon the counter-ISIS fight in Syria. Both are creating spillover 
effects in Iraq that threaten that country's stability. Yet the 
Administration continues to drawdown staff at Embassy Baghdad and 
Consulate Erbil, to say nothing of its earlier closure of our Basra 
consulate.

    Question. How can the U.S. Government effectively work with the 
Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence given our significantly 
reduced diplomatic footprint in the country?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. What is the Administration's plan to maintain a high-
level of diplomatic outreach in this regard in spite of the drawdown?

    [No Response Received]
                                 troops
    I was under the impression that this President, this 
Administration, wanted to remove or reduce U.S. troop presence in the 
Middle East. Yet, at the same time the President is withdrawing 1,000 
troops from Syria and creating havoc across the region, he is adding 
3,000 troops to Saudi Arabia to ``enhance defensive assets.'' There are 
conflicting messages here. On the one hand, he wants troops of the 
Middle East. He has said that sending troops was one of the biggest 
mistakes in the history of America. Yet, on the other he is sending 
3,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, with a promise of 14,000 more. There is a 
fundamental contradiction here.

    Question. How does this make sense? Do you see the threat from Iran 
to be such that this is absolutely necessary to regain the deterrent 
factor?

    [No Response Received]
                                treaties
    At the Hudson Institute last year you argued the JCPOA, which was 
agreed to by the United National Security Council was ``insufficient in 
our system of government if you want to have something enduring and 
sustainable.'' You went on to say the Trump administration would 
improve upon the Obama administration efforts by negotiating a treaty 
with Iran, requiring the advise and consent of the Senate. While I 
applaud your desire to work with the Senate I must say your views on 
this issue are at odds with every other action the Trump administration 
has taken. The Trump administration policy again and again has been to 
cavalierly abandon U.S. legally binding international commitments 
including those contained in long-standing treaties.

    Question. Why should Iran or any other international actor believe 
the Trump administration is less willing walk away from treaties that 
other types of international agreements?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. In your opinion are the criteria for withdrawing from a 
treaty, for example the Open Skies Treaty which the Administration is 
threatening to pull out of, different than pulling out of the JCPOA?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Do you believe the Trump administration's policy of 
withdrawing the United States from legal binding international 
instruments are undermining attempts to reach a future agreement with 
Iran?

    [No Response Received]
                         political retaliation
    For more than 2 years now, there have been disturbing reports about 
politically-motivated retaliation against career State Department 
career employees.

    Question. Do you agree that retaliation of any kind has no place in 
Federal Government? And that anyone found to have engaged in it should 
be held fully accountable, up to and including losing their job?

    [No Response Received]

    Question. I'm sure you won't be surprised when I raise that you 
have allegedly engaged in retaliation against at least one career 
employee--and, at a minimum, appear to have done nothing to stand up 
when that employee was subject to unfounded attacks about her 
``loyalty.'' Do you believe that public servants must be ``loyal'' to a 
President?
    Background: A career State employee who was detailed to the Policy 
Planning shop, headed by Hook, was the subject of conservative media 
attacks for being ``Iranian'' and having worked on JCPOA under Obama. 
After they surfaced, her detail to Hook's shop was cut short.

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Have you used the perceived loyalties of federal 
employees as a factor in whether or not they should work on certain 
policy portfolios? What about their ethnic heritage?
    Background: Well, I certainly hope not. But I have seen some 
troubling evidence that indicates otherwise. As you know, we are 
awaiting an IG report that is expected to cover the conduct of 
officials in your former shop, the policy planning office. I look 
forward to reviewing that report and expect that the Department will 
act swiftly to address any misconduct.

    [No Response Received]

    Question. Can you explain why an email you reportedly sent yourself 
included a list of names including notes next to them that included 
things like ``leaker and troublemaker'' and ``turncoat''? Is that 
conduct that we should expect from senior officials at the State 
Department?
    Background: An email that has been publicly reported that Hook sent 
to himself included a list of names with questions about their 
loyalties, including the charges that one was a ``leaker and 
troublemaker'' and another a ``turncoat.''
    Note: If he refuses to answer because the Inspector General 
investigation is ``ongoing'': First, that is not a legal basis for not 
answer the question. Second, that review has actually concluded and 
already gone to the Department for comment. We are just awaiting its 
final release. So there is no basis for not answering because of an 
ongoing investigation.

    [No Response Received]
                     u.s. citizens detained in iran
    Question. What steps have you specifically taken in the past 12 
months to secure the release of Princeton University student Xiyue 
Wang, Robert Levinson, and Siamak Namazi?

    [No Response Received]
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Special Representative Brian Hook to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. In light of the continuation of Iran-sponsored attacks on 
Gulf shipping and its neighbors, what is the basis for arguing that the 
maximum pressure campaign has been effective in countering the threat 
posed by Iran?

    Answer. The maximum pressure campaign is working. We have taken 2 
million barrels per day of Iranian crude off the market, and purchases 
of Iranian crude now are subject to U.S. sanctions. More than 30 
countries that once purchased Iranian oil have zeroed out their 
imports. With the drastic reduction in export revenue, Iran has had to 
make tough choices between meeting the needs of its own people and 
financing proxy militant groups abroad. As a result of our pressure 
campaign, Iranian-backed militias have had to institute austerity plans 
due to reductions in Iran's financial support--directly countering the 
threat posed by Iran to us and our allies and partners in the region.

    Question. To what extent does President Trump's willingness to meet 
with President Rouhani support or conflict with the maximum pressure 
campaign?

    Answer. The maximum pressure campaign is designed to bring Iran to 
the negotiating table, where we can broker a deal that comprehensively 
addresses the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior--not just their 
nuclear program but also their missile program, support for terrorism, 
and malign regional behavior. The President's repeated statements that 
he is willing to meet with Iran underscores our commitment to seeking a 
deal through negotiations and is an intrinsic part of the maximum 
pressure campaign.

    Question. Rather than continue to fuel Saudi Arabia's proxy war 
with Iran, shouldn't the U.S. be pursuing diplomacy with Iran to dial 
down tensions?

    Answer. President Trump has made clear that he is willing to talk 
with the Iranian regime without preconditions when the time is right. 
He wants to solve problems and is seeking a deal with Iran that 
comprehensively addresses Iran's destabilizing behavior.

    Question. To what extent does the Administration take cues from the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia when it comes to regional security?

    Answer. The Administration's actions in the Middle East are 
strictly based on U.S. national security priorities and not dictated by 
other actors. In line with U.S. priorities, our longstanding 
partnership with Saudi Arabia allows us to advance long-term stability 
and development of the region. Supporting a key Gulf partner like Saudi 
Arabia--particularly after major attacks on its territory from forces 
hostile to both our nations--advances U.S. national security, protects 
the lives of over 100,000 Americans in the country, and supports our 
long-term economic and energy security.

    Question. A letter from the State Department in June to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee stated that no determination as to whether 
the 2001 AUMF authorizes military force against Iran.
    Has the State Department since made any such determination?

    Answer. The June letter stated that the Administration had not, to 
date, interpreted either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF as authorizing military 
force against Iran, except as may be necessary to defend U.S. or 
partner forces engaged in counterterrorism operations or operations to 
establish a stable, democratic Iraq. That statement remains true today.

    Question. Does the President require prior authorization from 
Congress before initiating hostilities with Iran? If so, what actions 
under what circumstances, ought to be covered by such an authorization?

    Answer. As Secretary Pompeo has noted, the Administration's goal is 
to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's activities, not to engage in 
conflict with Iran. The Department of State has great respect for 
Congress's role in authorizing the use of military force. And the 
Administration has not, to date, interpreted either the 2001 or 2002 
AUMF as authorizing military force against Iran, except as may be 
necessary to defend U.S. or partner forces engaged in counterterrorism 
operations or operations to establish a stable, democratic Iraq.
    Acting Legal Adviser Marik String appeared before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in July and elaborated on when the 
President can authorize a use of force without prior congressional 
approval. He explained that Article II of the Constitution empowers the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to order certain military action to 
protect the Nation from an attack or threat of imminent attack and to 
protect important national interests. The Office of Legal Counsel at 
the U.S. Department of Justice (OLC) has issued a series of opinions 
about the President's Article II authority over the years under both 
Democratic and Republican Presidents. I would refer you to those 
opinions, and Mr. String's testimony, for greater detail, and reiterate 
that the Administration is committed to keeping Congress informed about 
these very important matters.

    Question. Should U.S. armed forces be operating in a region of 
great uncertainty and danger without the certainty of the proper 
authority to carry out their mission?

    Answer. As Secretary Pompeo has noted, the Administration's goal is 
to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's activities, not to engage in 
conflict with Iran. But, we will retain a robust military capability in 
the region that is ready to respond to any crisis and will defend U.S. 
forces and interests in the region, consistent with our legal 
authorities.
    The Administration has sufficient legal authority to prosecute the 
campaign against al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, 
including against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 
President does not need a new or revised AUMF.

    Question. Is it important to determine what constitutional and 
legislative authorities permit the President to introduce U.S. armed 
forces into hostilities before such hostilities commence?
    At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on April 10, 2019, 
Secretary Pompeo suggested that the 2001 authorization for force 
against those responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks could 
potentially apply to Iran, asserting that ``[Iran has] hosted Al Qaida. 
They have permitted Al Qaida to transit their country. There-there's no 
doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al 
Qaida. Period.''

    Answer. The Administration has not, to date, interpreted either the 
2001 or 2002 AUMF as authorizing military force against Iran, except as 
may be necessary to defend U.S. or partner forces engaged in 
counterterrorism operations or operations to establish a stable, 
democratic Iraq.
    The Secretary made a factual assertion and was careful not to make 
a legal assessment. A determination that a group is covered by the 2001 
AUMF is made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government only 
after a careful evaluation of the intelligence, including concerning 
each group's organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and its 
participation in al-Qa'ida or the Taliban's ongoing hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. To date, such a 
determination has not been made with respect to Iran.

    Question. Short of a formal determination, is it your opinion that 
Iran is targetable under the 2001 AUMF?

    Answer. A determination that a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is 
made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government only after a 
careful evaluation of the intelligence, including concerning each 
group's organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and its 
participation in al-Qa'ida or the Taliban's ongoing hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. To date, such a 
determination has not been made with respect to Iran.

    Question. What further considerations must be made to determine 
whether 2001 AUMF authority applies to Iran?

    Answer. A determination that a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is 
made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government only after a 
careful evaluation of the intelligence, including concerning each 
group's organization, links with al-Qa'ida or the Taliban, and its 
participation in al-Qa'ida or the Taliban's ongoing hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. To date, such a 
determination has not been made with respect to Iran.

    Question. In May 2018, Secretary Pompeo outlined 12 demands that 
the United States would insist be included in a revised JCPOA. From 
what I can tell, absolutely none of the Administration's 12 goals for 
negotiations have been accomplished. To what extend do these conditions 
still apply? If not, what revised demands are there, if any?

    Answer. The 12 points are largely derived from talks with allies 
and partners around the world and there is a great deal of consensus 
around these points. These requirements are not difficult for any 
normal country to meet. The maximum pressure campaign has successfully 
imposed historic strain on the Iranian economy, and preventing Iran 
from sending financial support to its proxies and exporting weapons to 
them. We will continue to apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime 
until it returns to the negotiating table. That's Iran's only option 
for alleviating pressure.

    Question. What is the Administration's position on whether EU 
parties to the JCPOA should invoke ``snap back'' provisions if Iran 
continues to violate the terms of the agreement (e.g. by stockpiling 
enriched uranium?)

    Answer. Cooperation with our European partners and allies to 
address the range of threats posed by Iran remains robust. We made the 
choice that departing the JCPOA is in the best security interest of our 
nation. It is up to each country to make their own choices about their 
participation in the JCPOA.

    Question. How might Iran react to re-imposition of pre-JCPOA 
sanctions?

    Answer. Iran is now subject to the majority of U.S. sanctions that 
were lifted during the JCPOA. The Iranian regime has a long history of 
engaging in malign behavior. The Iranian regime uses its nuclear 
program to extort the international community and threaten regional 
security. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terror. It has 
made it a policy of state to actively direct, facilitate, and engage in 
terrorist activity globally.
                  attacks on saudi oil infrastructure
    The attacks on Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure and the 
resulting bellicose rhetoric from Iran and President Trump's twitter 
feed were the latest example of the ease with which a military conflict 
with Iran could break out.

    Question. INR clear with NEA. To what extent did the attacks 
suggest that Iran's military technology capabilities might have 
advanced further than U.S. officials and the U.S. intelligence 
community have estimated?

    Answer. This response contains classified information and will be 
sent via secure correspondence.

    Question. Why did U.S.-provided defenses fail to intercept the 
September 14 strike? What additional missile defense equipment, beyond 
that announced on September 26, might be deployed in the Gulf states to 
prevent or deter a similar attack in the future?

    Answer. I cannot provide information on partner nation capabilities 
or capability gaps in an unclassified forum. Further information may be 
provided in a classified briefing.

    Question. Why have the additional U.S. military deployments to the 
region since May not deterred Iran from continuing its attacks on 
shipping and infrastructure? What additional U.S. steps might be 
required to deter Iran from future Iranian or Iran-backed attacks?

    Answer. In response to Iran's attacks, we have increased economic 
pressure, increased the presence of defensive forces in the region, and 
spearheaded an international maritime initiative to promote maritime 
awareness and the freedom of navigation. All these efforts increase 
deterrence and provide our partners with reassurance.
    We have also held Iran publicly accountable and clearly identified 
Iran as responsible for attacks, which has had a deterrent effect. Iran 
often seeks to maintain deniability for its actions. We noted that 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom came to this same conclusion 
recently and identified Iran as responsible for the September 14 
attacks in Saudi Arabia. When we prevent Iran from hiding in the 
shadows or behind its proxies, we raise the costs of its malign 
activity.

    Question. To what extent are there U.S. security guarantees to the 
Gulf states?

    Answer. The United States has strong partnerships in the Gulf and a 
significant military presence in the region, which can quickly respond 
to crises, deter aggression, and assure our partners and allies. A 
recent example of such partnership is the International Maritime 
Security Construct (IMSC). The IMSC is a multinational maritime 
security coalition established in the wake of attacks in the Arabian 
Gulf since May, including mine attacks on six commercial vessels, to 
safeguard commercial shipping routes and freedom of navigation in and 
around the Strait of Hormuz. The IMSC is based in Bahrain and 
participants include Australia, Albania, Bahrain, the United Kingdom, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    As noted in the 2016 Report to Congress on Security Guarantees to 
Countries in the Middle East, there are no international agreements 
that provide security commitments by the United States to any of the 
Gulf States.

    Question. What might be the international legal ramifications if 
the United States were to undertake retaliatory, preventive, or 
preemptive strikes against Iran without a U.N. Security Council 
mandate?

    Answer. I am not going to address a hypothetical question like this 
one. As Secretary Pompeo has noted, the Administration's goal is to 
find a diplomatic solution to Iran's activities, not to engage in 
conflict with Iran.

    Question. What steps would the Department of State take to protect 
U.S. citizens overseas in the event of a military confrontation with 
Iran?

    Answer. The welfare and safety of U.S. citizens abroad is the 
highest priority of the Department of State and consequently the reason 
we recommend against U.S. citizen travel to Iran. U.S. citizens present 
in the region should exercise extra caution by monitoring the news, 
following instructions from local authorities, consulting the Travel 
Advisory for Iran, enrolling in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program 
to receive important emergency information, and following the 
Department of State, along with relevant Embassies and Consulates, on 
Twitter (@travelgov/Mission account) and Facebook http://
www.facebook.com/travelgov for additional updates.

    Question. How do you respond to assessments by some experts that 
these sanctions will slow the importation of humanitarian items into 
Iran--items that normally are immune from sanctions? Following the 
snapback of nuclear-related sanctions, reports indicate that the 
Iranian people have experienced a shortage of cancer medication, the 
blockage of pharmaceutical supply chains, and skyrocketing healthcare 
costs.

    Answer. Our sanctions target the regime and those that support its 
malign activities. It is the Iranian regime that deprives its people of 
investment, resources, and dignity. Our sanctions contain broad 
authorizations and exceptions for the export to Iran of food, medicine, 
medical devices, and agricultural products. It has never been, nor is 
it now, our policy to target humanitarian trade with Iran. Many of 
these shortages are due to regime corruption and mismanagement. For 
example, in July 2019, President Rouhani's Chief of Staff sent a letter 
to ministers because over 1 billion Euros intended for medical supplies 
has ``disappeared.'' Iran's deputy health minister admitted in July 
2019 that over $170 million dollars intended for medical supplies were 
then instead spent on tobacco and cigarette paper.

    Question. How do we ensure that Syria is not lost to Russia and 
Iran--or is it too late?

    Answer. We have in no way ceded our influence in Syria or in the 
region. We remain committed to pushing back on malign Iranian influence 
in the region, the withdrawal of all Iranian-commanded forces from 
Syria, full support of Israel's right to self-defense against Iran, the 
enduring defeat of ISIS, and a political resolution to the Syria 
conflict consistent with U.N. Resolution 2254.
    The United States is conducting an ongoing campaign of economic 
pressure to deny the Iranian regime funds that it uses in furtherance 
of its malign regional activities. We are achieving a tremendous amount 
of economic pushback on Iran in response to its destabilizing regional 
activities, including denying the Iranian regime as much as $10 billion 
in oil revenue since May 2018. We are exercising a tremendous whole-of-
government approach that is putting effective pressure on Iran for the 
first time in a long time.
    We have used and will continue to use our diplomatic and economic 
leverage to ensure that Russia cannot single-handedly dictate Syria's 
future. We actively support the U.N.-led Geneva political process, 
ensuring that Russia cannot use its own separate formats to seize the 
initiative from the U.N. We have imposed a series of sanctions on 
Russian companies for their material support to the Assad regime.
    At the same time that we are finding space where we can work with 
Russia--areas where Russian and American interests overlap, allowing us 
to tackle difficult problems together. De-confliction mechanisms have 
enabled both U.S. and Russian forces to conduct D-ISIS operations 
without creating unnecessary risk of unintended incidents in an 
increasingly complex battlespace. U.S.-Russian discussions on long-term 
stability in Syria under UNSCR 2254 continue at various levels.

    Question. Is it your expectation that Iran and Russia will ``win'' 
northern Syria, or at the least, change the course of history for 
Syria?

    Answer. No, that is not our expectation. We have in no way ceded 
our influence in Syria or in the region. We remain committed to pushing 
back on malign Iranian influence in the region, the withdrawal of all 
Iranian-commanded forces from Syria, full support of Israel's right to 
self-defense against Iran, and the enduring defeat of ISIS and 
resolution in Syria consistent with U.N. Resolution 2254.
    The United States is conducting an ongoing campaign of economic 
pressure to deny the Iranian regime funds that it uses in furtherance 
of its malign regional activities. We are achieving a tremendous amount 
of economic pushback on Iran in response to its destabilizing regional 
activities, including denying the Iranian regime as much as $10 billion 
in oil revenue since May 2018. We are exercising a tremendous whole-of-
government approach that is putting effective pressure on Iran for the 
first time in a long time.
    We have used and will continue to use our diplomatic and economic 
leverage to ensure that Russia cannot single-handedly dictate Syria's 
future. We actively support the U.N.-led Geneva political process, 
ensuring that Russia cannot use its own separate formats to seize the 
initiative from the U.N. We have imposed a series of sanctions on 
Russian companies for their material support to the Assad regime.
    At the same time that we are finding space where we can work with 
Russia--areas where Russian and American interests overlap, allowing us 
to tackle difficult problems together. De-confliction mechanisms have 
enabled both U.S. and Russian forces to conduct D-ISIS operations 
without creating unnecessary risk of unintended incidents in an 
increasingly complex battlespace. U.S.-Russian discussions on long-term 
stability in Syria under UNSCR 2254 continue at various levels.
                                 ______
                                 

      Responses of Special Representative Brian Hook to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. How, specifically, does this action go beyond existing 
authorities in stopping the flow of funds to the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps or to Hizballah?

    Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy of supporting 
the Iranian people in the face of continued corruption and oppression 
by the Iranian regime. Unfortunately, the Iranian regime, including the 
Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has directed billions of dollars to 
entities like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizballah 
instead of providing public services to the Iranian people. Designating 
the CBI under counterterrorism authorities sends an important message 
about the CBI's involvement in these activities and will further 
restrict its access to the funds it uses to support the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hizballah, and other terrorist groups.
    The Department of the Treasury can provide additional information 
on the designation of the CBI pursuant to its authorities under 
Executive Order 13224.

    Question. Given that this action raises barriers to humanitarian 
transactions that were already high, what does the action say about the 
Trump administration's concern for the Iranian people?

    Answer. Secretary Pompeo has made it clear that we continue to 
stand in solidarity with the Iranian people, the longest suffering 
victims of the Iranian regime. We are committed to promoting 
accountability for the regime's human rights violations and abuses, 
whether through public statements raising awareness about individual 
cases, imposing sanctions against Iranian officials who commit human 
rights violations and abuses, or cooperation in U.N. forums to 
strengthen the international community's resolve to insist on better 
treatment for the Iranian people.
    The Department of State must refer all questions pertaining to the 
recent designation of the Central Bank of Iran under Executive Order 
13224 to the Department of the Treasury.

    Question. You reportedly authored a May 2017 memo to then-Secretary 
of State Rex Tillerson arguing that human rights concerns should be 
used to pressure U.S. adversaries and not to ``badger'' U.S. partners 
and allies, including Saudi Arabia and the Philippines.
    What, in your view, are some of the risks of not raising human 
rights concerns in discussions with partners and allies?

    Answer. The State Department consistently raises human rights 
concerns in discussions with partners and allies, in addition to 
spotlighting human rights concerns in countries where we have a more 
adversarial relationship or where we do not have diplomatic relations 
at all. Part of our relationship with partners and allies involves 
having frank discussions in areas where we disagree, whether that be 
human rights or other issues. As Secretary Pompeo said upon the release 
of the Department's Human Rights Reports in March 2019, ``even some of 
our friends, allies, and partners around the world have human rights 
violations. We document those reports with equal force. Our aim is 
always to identify human rights challenges and use American influence 
and power to move every nation towards better, more consistent human 
rights practices.''

    Question. Your testimony noted Iran's involvement in the 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Do you believe that necessary and 
appropriate criticisms of Iran on human rights grounds would be more 
effective if the United States appeared credibly to voice concerns 
about human rights violations regardless of who perpetrates them?

    Answer. The United States voices concerns about human rights 
violations regardless of who perpetrates them. The Department's most 
recent Human Rights Report on Yemen, for example, documents at length 
allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Houthi forces, the 
Saudi-led Coalition, and other state and non-state actors. Department 
officials have also spoken out consistently about allegations of human 
rights violations and abuses by all of these actors, and, as 
appropriate, have called for investigations and accountability.

    Question. Is it possible that partners and allies may backslide on 
human rights when they expect the United States to de-emphasize human 
rights issues?

    Answer. It is a government's responsibility to protect the human 
rights of all persons in their country, regardless of any perception 
they have of United States policy. The United States continues to take 
a leadership role on global human rights issues, as exemplified in the 
President's National Security Strategy, and we have frank discussions 
with partners and allies all over the world in cases where we believe 
they can take steps to improve their human rights record.
                                 ______
                                 

 Fact Sheet--Iranian Regime Malign Activities During Negotiations With 
                         Iran and During JCPOA

   During the period of JCPOA negotiations, Iran continued to 
        provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of Shia 
        fighters to the Assad regime.

   Between late 2011 and mid-2013, IRGC-linked entities 
        conducted a coordinated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
        campaign against the U.S. financial sector, threatening the 
        international global financial system. The DDoS campaign 
        disabled bank websites, prevented customers from accessing 
        their accounts online, and collectively cost the victims tens 
        of millions of dollars in remediation costs as the banks worked 
        to neutralize and mitigate the attacks.

   In 2013, one of the Iranian hackers involved in the DDoS 
        campaign also conducted an intrusion into the industrial 
        control system of a U.S. dam just north of New York City.

   In 2013, Iran further integrated the IRGC-QF into forces 
        loyal to Assad.

   On January 23, 2013, Yemeni authorities seized an Iranian 
        dhow, the Jihan, off the coast of Yemen. The dhow was carrying 
        sophisticated Chinese antiaircraft missiles, C-4 explosives, 
        rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and a number of other weapons 
        and explosives. The shipment of lethal aid was likely headed to 
        Houthi separatists in Northern Yemen.

   On February 20, 2013, the Nigerian State Security Service 
        (SSS) announced the December 2012 arrest of three Nigerian 
        members of an Iranian terrorist cell. Two of the men, Abdullahi 
        Mustapha Berende and Saheed Oluremi Adewumi, were officially 
        charged on August 28, 2013. Nigerian authorities claim the cell 
        was conducting surveillance on American and Israeli targets in 
        Nigeria for a possible terrorist attack.

   In April 2013, an Iranian traveling on a fake Israeli 
        passport was arrested for conducting surveillance of the 
        Israeli Embassy.

   In late April 2013, the Government of Bosnia declared two 
        Iranian diplomats, Jadidi Sohrab and Hamzeh Dolab Ahmad, 
        persona non grata after Israeli intelligence reported they 
        were, in fact, members of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and 
        Security (MOIS). One of the two men had been spotted in India, 
        Georgia and Thailand, all of which were sites of a simultaneous 
        bombing campaign in February of 2012, according to Israeli 
        intelligence. Both diplomats were subsequently expelled from 
        Bosnia.

   On September 1, 2013, an attack by Iranian proxies Kata'ib 
        Hezballah (KH) and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) on Camp Ashraf in 
        Iraq, led to the deaths of 50 members of the Mujahedeen-e 
        Khalq, or MeK. Press reports claim members of the QF not only 
        planned the attack, but also played a direct combat role in it. 
        The QF, along with KH and AAH members, also abducted seven MeK 
        members and smuggled them back to Iran, according to the press. 
        The missing seven members haven't been seen or heard from since 
        the attack.

   On December 29, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard interdicted a 
        speedboat filled with weapons and explosives that was likely 
        bound for Shia oppositionists in Bahrain, specifically the 14 
        February Youth Coalition (14 FYC). Bahraini authorities accused 
        the QF of providing opposition militants with explosives 
        training in order to carry out attacks in Bahrain. The 
        interdiction led to the discovery of a two weapons and 
        explosives cache sites in Bahrain, the dismantling of a car 
        bomb, and the arrest of 15 Bahraini nationals.

   Iran continued its terrorist-related activity during the 
        period of JCPOA negotiations, including support for Lebanese 
        Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and various 
        groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.

   In 2014, Iran dramatically increased the arming and funding 
        of Shia militant groups in Iraq, including the terrorist group 
        Kata'ib Hezballah, and incorporated these groups into the 
        Popular Mobilization Force, a militant organization separate 
        from the Iraqi Government that today wields enormous influence 
        and power outside the democratically elected government.

   In 2015, the U.S. Navy recorded 22 incidents of IRGC Navy 
        fast-attack small crafts engaging in ``unsafe and 
        unprofessional'' harassment of U.S. naval vessels in 
        international waters.

   In January 2015, a senior Iranian diplomat was expelled for 
        planning an attack near the Israeli Embassy in Montevideo, 
        Uruguay.

   In March 2015, Iran began mass production of its Qadir 
        cruise missile.

   In April 2015, Iran dramatically increased its support to 
        the Houthis in Yemen and attempted to send a large naval supply 
        convoy to Yemen to support the Houthis.

   In April 2015, IRGC Navy vessels fired shots across the bow 
        of the Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship Maersk Tigris near 
        the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy then forced the vessel to 
        dock at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. Iranian officials 
        held the vessel for a week.

   In August 2015, the Iranian military unveiled the Fateh-313, 
        a solid-fuel missile with a reported range of up to 500 km.

   In October 2015, Iran's Defense Ministry announced the 
        successful test of the Emad, a ballistic missile with a range 
        of 1,700 km. A later report of a U.N. Panel of Experts 
        determined that the Emad launch was a violation of U.N. 
        resolution 1929.

   In November 2015, Iran tested Ghadr-110, an improved version 
        of the Shahab-3, with a range of about 1,900 km.

   In 2015 in Syria, Iran more openly acknowledged the deaths 
        of Iranian personnel, including several senior commanders, and 
        increased Iranian troop levels, while continuing to claim 
        publicly that Iranian forces had only deployed in an advisory 
        role.

   In 2015, the Government of Bahrain raided, interdicted, and 
        rounded up numerous Iran-sponsored weapons caches, arms 
        transfers, and militants. This included the Bahraini 
        Government's September 2015 discovery of a bomb-making facility 
        with 1.5 tons of high-grade explosives.

   Iran continued to declare its vocal support for Palestinian 
        terrorist groups and its hostility to Israel in 2015.

   On January 6, 2016, Bahraini security officials dismantled a 
        terrorist cell, linked to IRGC-QF, planning to carry out a 
        series of bombings throughout the country.

   On January 12, 2016, the IRGC Navy seized two U.S. Navy 
        riverine command boats near Iran's Farsi Island in the Persian 
        Gulf and held the U.S. sailors for 15 hours, in contravention 
        of their rights under the Geneva Convention.

   In February 2016, Philippine authorities thwarted an Iranian 
        plot to hijack a Saudi Arabian civilian aircraft.

   In August 2016, Kuwaiti authorities intercepted and arrested 
        10 Iranian nationals attempting to enter Kuwaiti waters 
        illegally.

   The Assad regime's relationship with Hizballah and Iran grew 
        stronger in 2016 as the regime became more reliant on external 
        actors to militarily fight the Syrian opposition.

   In 2016, German authorities convicted an IRGC-QF operative 
        for spying on the ex-head of a German-Israeli group and people 
        close to him.

   In November 2016, two Iranian operatives and their Kenyan 
        driver, a local embassy employee, were arrested and charged 
        with information collection in connection with a terrorist act 
        after surveilling the Israeli embassy.

   In 2016, the U.S. Navy recorded 36 incidents of IRGC Navy 
        fast-attack small crafts engaging in ``unsafe and 
        unprofessional'' harassment of U.S. naval vessels in 
        international waters.

   In October 2016, the Iranian-supported Houthi militants 
        fired anti-ship cruise missiles at U.S. warships in 
        international waters just north of the Bab-al-Mandeb. The 
        attacks came just one week after militants struck the Emirati 
        vessel Swift, disabling the transport ship.

   In 2016, the U.N. Secretary General expressed concern over 
        Iran's illicit arms shipments following the seizure of an arms 
        shipment by the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Oman. The U.S. 
        concluded that the shipment originated from Iran and was bound 
        for Yemen, in clear violation of a U.N. Security Council arms 
        embargo on Houthi militants.

   In 2016, an Iranian cyber attack resulted in the destruction 
        of databases affecting the Saudi Government and elements of its 
        private sector, including the General Authority for Civil 
        Aviation and the Central Bank.

   In January 2017, a recruiter for the IRGC claimed that 
        thousands Afghans were currently fighting in Syria to defend 
        the regime of Iran's ally Bashar al-Assad.

   On January 29, 2017, Iran tested a Khorramshahr medium range 
        ballistic missile.

   On January 30, 2017, Houthis attacked a Saudi frigate in the 
        Red Sea with three unmanned explosive boats, killing two 
        sailors.

   In February 2017, Conflict Armament Research documented 
        Iranian designed UAVs provided to Houthis to use as `Kamikaze' 
        drones.

   On March 30, 2017, Iran test-fired a ballistic missile.

   On June 8, 2017, DOJ announced the arrest of two members of 
        Hizballah for allegedly conducting attack preparations in the 
        U.S. and abroad.

   On June 14, 2017, Houthis fired missile at Emirati ship in 
        the Red Sea.

   On June 20, 2017, armed pro-regime Shaheed-129 UAV was shot 
        down by the U.S. after it displayed hostile intent and advanced 
        on Coalition forces in Syria.

   On July 27, 2017, Iran test-fired its Simorgh satellite 
        launch vehicle, which Iranian officials claim is capable of 
        carrying a satellite/payload of up to 250 kg.

   On July 25, 2017, FBI Cyber Division indicates a group of 
        Iranian based malicious cyber actors use U.S. infrastructure to 
        compromise government, corporate and academic computer networks 
        in the Middle East, Europe and the United States.

   On July 27, 2017, Houthis launch a Burkhan missile toward 
        King Fahd airbase near Mecca.

   In August 2017, Iranian appeals court upheld 10-year prison 
        sentences against three U.S. citizens unjustly imprisoned on 
        fabricated national security-related charges.

   On August 28, 2017, Israeli PM reported the Iranian regime 
        is helping Hizbollah produce precision guided missiles in 
        Lebanon and Syria threatening Israel.

   On September 14, 2017, Iranian Regime-backed Houthi leader 
        announced that his forces had the capability to strike targets 
        anywhere in the UAE.

   On September 23, 2017, Iran test-fired a ballistic missile.

   A German intelligence report released in October 2017 
        revealed that Iran made 32 attempts in 2016 to procure 
        technology for the its ballistic missile program from North-
        Rhine-Westphalia.

   On November 4, 2017, Houthis launched a Burkhan missile 
        toward Riyadh's Kind Khalid International Airport. The debris 
        indicated that at least components of the missile were produced 
        by two Iranian entities.

   On November 12, 2017, Houthis threatened to target coalition 
        warships and oil tankers in response to Saudi Arabia's closure 
        of Yemeni ports.

   On December 19, 2017, Houthis launched a ballistic missile 
        targeting the royal Yamama Palace in southern Riyadh.

   On January 4, 2018, Ukrainian authorities arrested two 
        Iranian nationals accused of procuring missile parts.

   The U.N. Panel of Experts on Yemen concluded in January 2018 
        that the debris recovered from the July and November 2017 
        Houthi ballistic missiles were ``almost certainly'' Iran-
        origin.

   On January 9, 2018, Houthis threatened to block 
        international navigation through the Red Sea if the Saudi-led 
        Coalition continued its advance toward al-Hudeidah.

   On January 10, 2018, the Saudi-led Coalition announced it 
        had foiled a Houthi attack on a Saudi oil tanker near al-
        Hudeidah port, destroying a boat carrying explosives it 
        attributed to the Houthis.

   On January 16, 2018, Houthis launched a ballistic missile 
        toward a regional airport in Jizan province.

   On January 30, 2018, Houthis launched a ballistic missile 
        toward Riyadh's King Khaled International Airport.

   On February 10, 2018, Israel shot down an armed Iranian 
        drone that crossed into Israeli airspace. The IDF later 
        concluded in April 2018 that the drone was ``tasked to attack'' 
        in Israeli territory.

   Israeli satellite photos published by Fox News on February 
        27, 2018, showed an IRGC-QF military base northeast of 
        Damascus, Syria.

   On March 7, 2018, IRGC Aerospace Commander Amir Ali 
        Hajizadeh, overseeing Iran's ballistic missile program, stated 
        that Iran had tripled its defense-related production.

   On March 25, 2018, Houthis launched seven ballistic missiles 
        toward four different Saudi cities, including three missiles 
        directed at the capital Riyadh. The missile debris resulted in 
        one civilian fatality.

   On March 31, 2018, Houthis fired a ballistic missile 
        targeting a Saudi National Guard base in Saudi border city of 
        Najran.

   On April 3, 2018, Houthis fired a missile at a Saudi oil 
        tanker near the port city of al-Hudeidah, prompting a Saudi-led 
        Coalition warship to intervene to escort the tanker.

   On April 20, 2018, then-deputy commander of IRGC Hossein 
        Salami threatened that Iran's ``hands are on the trigger and 
        missiles are ready'' to strike Israeli air bases.

   In a speech on April 21, 2018, commander of Iran's 
        conventional Army Abdolrahim Mousavi said that the Army would 
        work together with the IRGC to annihilate Israel within 25 
        years.

   On April 11, 2018, Houthis fired a Burkhan ballistic missile 
        at Riyadh and targeted southern areas of Saudi Arabia using 
        Qasif-1 drones, both probably provided by Iran.

   On May 9, 2018, Houthis fired several ballistic missiles at 
        ``economic'' targets in Riyadh.

   On May 10, 2018, IRGC-QF fired 32 rockets toward Israeli 
        military positions in the Golan.

   On May 14, 2018, Houthis launched ballistic missiles 
        targeting a Saudi Aramco facility in the Saudi port city of 
        Jizan.
                                 ______
                                 

 Document--Cooperation With European Partners and Allies From July 28, 
 2017 Through September 24, 2019 Addressing Range of Threats Posed by 
                                  Iran

    Cooperation with our European partners and allies to address the 
range of threats posed by Iran remains robust:

   July 28, 2017: Joint U.S.-E3 statement on Iran's Space 
        Launch Vehicle: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/
        272934.htm.

   June 2018: The Austrian, Belgian, French, and German 
        governments exposed an Iranian plot to bomb an oppositionist 
        rally in Paris and arrest several Iranian operatives.

   June 2018: The Netherlands expelled two Iranian diplomats in 
        connection with the November 2017 Nissi assassination.

   July 1, 2018: Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi was 
        arrested in Bavaria in connection to a plot to bomb a Paris 
        rally.

   September 17, 2018: French FM Le Drian condemned Iran's 
        attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions in Iraq.

   September 20, 2018: France announced it had frozen the 
        nomination of its new ambassador to Tehran in relation to the 
        terror plot on a Paris rally.

   October 2, 2018: France froze assets of an MOIS unit and two 
        agents in connection with the Paris bomb plot.

   October 9, 2018: Belgium announced the extradition of 
        Asadollah Assadi from Germany for his role in the Paris 
        terrorist plot.

   October 17, 2018: Serbia revoked visa-free travel for 
        Iranian citizens.

   October 30, 2018: Denmark recalled its Ambassador to Tehran 
        and condemned an Iranian plot to assassinate members of a 
        dissident group on its soil.

   November 20, 2018: E3 sent letter to U.N. Security Council 
        raising concerns about Iran's launching of short range 
        ballistic missiles on targets in Syria.

   December 3, 2018: France condemned medium range ballistic 
        missile launch: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
        files/iran/events/article/iran-ballistic-missile-test-01-12-
        18#.

   December 12, 2018: E3, Poland, Netherlands and the European 
        Union raised concerns regarding Iran's ballistic missile 
        program at a U.N. Security Council meeting.

   December 17, 2018: Albania expelled Iran's Ambassador to 
        Tirana and another Iranian diplomat for involvement in thwarted 
        terrorist plots.

   December 18, 2018: E3 sent letter to U.N. Security Council 
        raising concerns about Iran's testing of medium range ballistic 
        missile.

   December 21, 2018: German media reported (unconfirmed) that 
        the German Government will ban Mahan flights into Germany 
        beginning January 2019.

   January 8, 2019: The EU sanctioned an MOIS Unit and two 
        agents in response to the terrorist and assassination plots 
        uncovered in Paris and Denmark in 2018.

        The Danish Prime Minister issued a statement saying, the 
            ``EU stands united--such actions are unacceptable and must 
            have consequences,'' in response to announcement of new EU 
            sanctions on Iran.

        The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored its 
            condemnation of Iran's planned covert actions in Europe and 
            called Iranian intelligence activities in Europe 
            ``unacceptable.''

   January 8, 2019: Netherlands, U.K., France, Germany, 
        Denmark, and Belgium provide Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
        in Tehran with a demarche laying out new sanctions.

   January 8, 2019: Netherlands for the first time announced 
        that Iran was likely behind the murders of two Dutch citizens 
        who were Iranian dissidents.

   January 15, 2019: German authorities announced that a German 
        civilian working as a translator for the Bundeswehr was 
        arrested for allegedly passing sensitive information to the 
        Iranian intelligence service.

   January 16, 2019: France strongly condemned Iran's launch of 
        a space launch vehicle, which it said was not in conformity 
        with UNSCR 2231.

   January 21, 2019: Germany announced it was banning all Mahan 
        Air flights from landing in the country, citing security 
        concerns and the airline's involvement in Syria.

   February 4, 2019: The EU Foreign Affairs Council issued 
        conclusions regarding Iran. While reaffirming support for the 
        JCPOA, the conclusions raise very explicit concerns with Iran's 
        missile program, support of terrorism, and role in regional 
        conflicts.

   February 13-14, 2019: All EU 28 member states attended the 
        Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the 
        Middle East in Warsaw.

   February 25, 2019: The U.K. announced it was listing 
        Hizballah as a terrorist group, noting that there is no longer 
        a distinction between its political and military wings.

   March 25, 2019: France banned flights in and out of the 
        country by Mahan Air, accusing it of transporting military 
        equipment and personnel to Syria and other war zones.

   June 18, 2019: German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany 
        had seen ``strong evidence'' of Iran's responsibility in the 
        attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman.

   September 24, 2019: The E3 condemned (https://www.gov.uk/
        government/news/joint-statement-by-the-heads-of-state-and-
        government-of-france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom) the attack 
        on the Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and attributed the attack 
        to Saudi Arabia. They urged Iran to accept negotiations on its 
        nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional activity.

                                 [all]