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NATO AT 70: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
FOR THE 21st CENTURY

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NATO AT 70: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
FOR THE 21st CENTURY

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James Risch, chair-
man of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen,
Gardner, Romney, Young, Murphy, and Kaine.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES RISCH,
U.S. Senator from Idaho

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Well, thank you all for coming today, and we have an all-star cast of witnesses. Before we do that, both ranking member and I have some remarks regarding NATO. This is an auspicious occasion, on the 70th, or close to the 70th anniversary of NATO, which is the day after to-
morrow.

But in any event, what I would like to do is talk a little bit about NATO, which is, in my judgment, and I think most people’s judg-
ment, the most successful military alliance in the history of the world. And to look ahead at the role of NATO, and how we can play in a quickly evolving threat environment.

NATO was founded by its first 12 members after the shock of the Soviet blockade of Berlin. And the West’s airlift in 1948 and 1949 made us realize the threat that the Soviet Union posed to peace and prosperity. That conflict is far behind us, but NATO has re-
mained an important piece of the framework that supports our col-
lective security.

NATO has come to the aid of the United States in Afghanistan after attacks of September 11th. It has ended genocides, and main-
tained peace in the Balkans. It has trained troops of the new Iraqi government, run air policing missions on Europe’s eastern plank, helped end the genocide in Darfur, provided assistance to the U.S. after Hurricane Katrina, and most importantly, sustained the pe-
riod of unprecedented peace among the major European powers.

NATO has proven not only to be a military success, but a polit-
cal and economic one. For its members, NATO security umbrella has provided the kind of stable environment necessary for economic growth and investment. Former Soviet Bloc countries clamored for NATO membership, not only for protection against Russia, but for
the economic strength the membership could foster. U.S. trade with our fellow NATO members remains key to our economy.

Last week ranking member Menendez and I, along with several of our colleagues, introduced a resolution expressing our strong support for NATO, and in congratulating it on its 70 years of successes. Tomorrow morning, we will have the honor of welcoming NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress. Then later this year this committee will have the opportunity to vote to approve the accession of North Macedonia into the alliance.

Looking back and remembering the accomplishments of NATO is important. NATO remains the preeminent political military alliance in the world. Together, we work to defeat the Soviet Union and usher in decades of peace and prosperity in Europe. I would also argue that the success of institutions like the European Union were only possible because of how NATO reorganized Europe.

NATO is the only international organization where unanimity and thus sovereignty is entirely protected. This means and meant no matter how small a country was in the alliance, they were treated as equals with the largest States, because every nation’s opinion mattered as much as the next in the alliance.

While we should be celebratory of all that NATO has accomplished and the peace it has preserved, I also want this hearing to look forward. How can NATO confront the full set of security challenges that are quickly emerging? Cyber warfare, China, disinformation, and remain relevant in this new environment?

At the same time, Russia has reemerged as a threat to NATO nations. If there is any doubt about that, anyone can spend a short period of time with the governments of Georgia and the Ukraine to convince us how dangerous Russia is today. And in addition to that, spend a few minutes with the victims of the people who have been poisoned recently in London. Russia is a threat, and remains a threat, and is getting worse instead of better.

NATO also faces a number of challenges from within. First is the need to invest more in defense. It is important to note that the number of allies spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on equipment has increased since 2014, adding more than $100 billion to European defense spending. Seven allies currently meet their 2 percent pledge, and 18 in total are on track to do so by 2024.

But we have also seen a couple of countries suggest they will cut their defense budgets in a few years. This is challenging. Congress feels strongly that the financial commitment must be met.

I know of at least one other person in this town who feels even more strongly, and I have had occasion to discuss this with him on a number of occasions. We are all dedicated to the fact that commitments made must be met.

However, the amount of money is not the only issue. We must continue to modernize our defense capability. Spending 20 percent on modernization is a good start. But countries should also see this goal as a floor and not as a ceiling.

Another challenge the alliance faces is that of threat assessments. Our allies along the eastern flank face real security challenges created by Russia, whether through deployments in the
Kaliningrad, or disinformation campaigns targeted at ethnic communities and their countries. Distance from Russia should not diminish the concern over Russian tactics in support for all members of the alliance.

At the same time countries along the southern flank of the alliance have substantial challenges with migrant flows and the ability of extremists to use those flows to move into allied countries. Again, problems of this magnitude do not stop at country borders. They affect all, though differently. Better intelligence sharing and maritime security is needed, and something that NATO can provide.

Mobility in the alliance remains a challenge as road, rail, and seaports create challenges for moving military equipment around the alliance. And the bureaucracy of the EU adds enormous difficulties to establishing requirements for the construction of new transportation networks. Bureaucracy is always a challenge. We Americans know bureaucracy when we see it. We are not immune either.

In an era where speed increases deterrence, the pace of bureaucracy is undermining efforts to improve it. We all need to do better.

Finally, as I said earlier, NATO is the most successful political military alliance in the history of the world, precisely because it defends common values and principles like democracy, human rights, and rule of law. We have seen NATO allies have difficulty adhering to these values as member countries and their institutions mature. But all of us, all of us must remain committed to those core values and upholding them.

In closing, do not let all these critiques make it sound like NATO is weak or imperiled. Thursday will mark 70 years of this alliance and its successes. I said the past 70 years were not always as easy as our memories would have us believe, but those disagreements have taught us how to work through our issues to find solutions. It is that constructive spirit that we should look to as NATO moves forward.

Make no mistake about America’s commitment to NATO. We are committed. We are committed to moving forward through the next 70 years, and make them as successful as the last 70 years.

Senator Menendez.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling a very important hearing as we approach the 70th anniversary of NATO. And I certainly want to associate myself with all of the remarks you made as it relates to the importance of the NATO alliance.

Over the past 2 years we have found ourselves repeatedly having to express support for the alliance in the face of persistent skepticism by President Trump. I am happy to regularly express our commitment to the alliance, one that has done so much to preserve security since World War II. And I applaud you, Mr. Chairman, for leading a resolution on the committee expressing support for the alliance, which I am privileged to co-lead with you.

I would have hoped through our consistent rock-solid bipartisan commitment to NATO through letters, resolutions, and votes on the
floor, our military leaders’ reaffirmation would somehow break through with the President. The American people support this alliance, and it is about time that he unequivocally recognizes that.

These concerns were amplified last month when the White House floated a plan called “Cost, plus 50 Percent,” where any country hosting U.S. troops would pay the full price of American soldiers deployed on their soil, plus 50 percent or more for the privilege of hosting them. Thankfully, this proposal has met with strong bipartisan backlash. There is a reason many times for our own forward promotion of our interests that we site bases in different parts of the world, not just for that country’s interest, but for our own interests in terms of national security.

I would like to quickly address four challenges to the alliance that I hope we can examine today. First, as many of us who were in Munich last February heard directly from our strongest allies, the President’s erratic language on NATO continues to erode confidence in the U.S. commitment to Article V, and the alliance overall.

What was previously unthinkable, that the United States could withdraw from the alliance it was instrumental in shaping, remains a real concern for many of us. That is why Senator Graham and I included within our DASCA legislation provisions that would subject any such move to Senate consent.

Senator Kaine has also led efforts on a similar piece of important legislation. It took Senate consent to get us into NATO, so it should take Senate consent for any effort to remove us from the alliance.

In February I visited NATO headquarters and saw the memorial to those lost on September 11th of 2001. This was a sober reminder of the only time that NATO’s Article V has been invoked. Our allies were there for us in our time of need. There should be no question that we will be there for them.

Second, despite what some say, our allies are largely stepping up to the plate. Starting in 2014, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, countries across the alliance began to significantly increase defense spending. There is bipartisan consensus that spending needs to be maintained, not only for the 2 percent commitment of GDP to defense, but more importantly the 20 percent to new procurement.

Third, I am concerned that the United States is moving increasingly to establish bilateral military ties to avoid coordination at NATO. Many Europeans see this as another divide and rule tactic the Trump Administration is using to weaken European integration and unity. While achieving consensus is hard, our security in the Transatlantic Alliance are best served when NATO acts together.

And fourth, on a positive note, the Senate will deliberate this year on the accession of North Macedonia to the alliance. As we reminded Montenegro during its accession process, NATO is also an alliance of values, and that Article II commitments are just as important as others in the NATO charter. North Macedonia must commit to strengthening their free institutions, the rule of law, and protecting minorities in the country while also bolstering its defense capabilities.
Finally, it is worth highlighting why we need NATO today. The threat the Russian Federation poses to European security has only intensified. The Skripal attack on British soil, continued interference in politics across Europe, intensified military aggression in the European country of Ukraine, as we bolster the defenses of those in the front lines of the enhanced board presence and European deterrence initiative, we must continue to strengthen our defenses against hybrid warfare tactics and work with partners to defend against constantly changing threats from the Kremlin.

On August 24th of 1949, the North Atlantic Charter signing ceremony took place in Washington. At that event President Truman said, “In this pact we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression, a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all of our citizens.”

Nearly 70 years later those words still ring true. NATO has provided for our common defense over the years, and in doing so it has created the environment for our prosperity and that of our allies. That, Mr. Chairman, seems like a pretty good deal to me. And I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez. We will now turn to our witnesses. And as I said earlier, this is an all-star cast, and we certainly want to welcome them. We are going to start with Mr. Ian Brzezinski. He is a resident senior fellow with Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

He also runs the Brzezinski Group, which provides strategic insight. Mr. Brzezinski served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy from 2001 to 2005, where he was responsible for NATO expansion, alliance force planning and transformation, and NATO operations in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Mr. Brzezinski served 7 years on Capitol Hill, first as a legislative assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Bill Roth, and then as a senior professional staff member on this committee. Earlier, Mr. Brzezinski advised the Ukrainian National Security Council, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Parliament, served as a member of the policy planning staff in the Defense Department, and worked for 5 years as principal at Booz, Allen and Hamilton, providing policy and technical support to U.S. combatant commands and to foreign clients.

So, with that, we will start with Mr. Brzezinski. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BRZEZINSKI, Chairman Risch, ranking member Menendez, distinguished members of the committee, as we approach NATO's 70th anniversary, thank you for allowing me to participate in this stocktaking of the alliance. NATO is an invaluable alliance. As said, it is history's most successful alliance.

The transatlantic security architecture NATO provides has transformed former adversaries into allies and deterred outside aggression. European allies that are secure at peace are inherently better
positioned for prosperity. They are better able to work with the United States to address challenges in and beyond Europe. NATO has been a powerful force multiplier for the United States. Time and time again European, Canadian, and U.S. military personnel have served and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder on battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world.

The alliance provides the United States the ability to leverage unmatched political, economic, and military power. NATO’s actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to this community of democracies. NATO’s economic powers and $40 trillion in GDP dwarfs that of any rival. No other military alliance can field the forces capable as NATO.

These assets only become more important in today’s increasingly challenging security environment. That environment features the return of great power competition featuring Russia’s revanchist ambitions and China’s growing assertiveness. Second, we are witnessing a disturbing erosion of rules-based order that has been the foundation of peace, freedom, and prosperity since the end of World War II. Third, we face a growing collision between liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism.

A fourth dynamic is the advent of rapid technological change. The impending introduction of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other technologies to the battlefield portends a radical redefinition of the requirements for stability and security.

If NATO is to be as successful in the future as it has been over the past seven decades, it must adapt to match these challenges. Toward that end its agenda must include the following five priorities.

First, the alliance must accelerate its efforts to increase preparedness for high-intensity conflict. After the cold war, NATO’s force posture shifted toward peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Today, Russia’s military aggressions and sustained military build-up have reanimated the need to prepare for high-intensity warfare, the likes of which we have not had to face since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This is a matter of real concern. It is notable that the commander of United States European Command (EUCOM), testified last month that he is not yet “comfortable with the deterrent posture we have in Europe.” He warned that, “A theater not sufficiently set for full spectrum contingency operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail in conflict, if necessary.”

This reality underscores a second NATO priority. Canada and our European allies must invest more to increase their military capability and readiness. Their investments must address key NATO shortfalls, including air and missile defense, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, long-range fires, among others. Time is long overdue for our allies to carry their share of the security burden.

Third, NATO must further reinforce its flanks in North Central Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Arctic. These are the foci of Russia’s military buildup, provocations, and aggression. In North Central Europe the challenge is acute. The alliance’s four Enhanced Forward Presence battalions stationed in Poland, Lith-
uania, Latvia, and Estonia, they are positioned against divisions of Russia ground forces, backed by sophisticated aircraft, air defense, helicopters, and missiles.

Fourth, NATO must more substantially embrace and support the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement is one of the great success stories of the post-cold war era. It expanded the zone of peace and security in Europe and strengthened the alliance’s military capability. But the alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to membership, recognizing it will take them time to meet the alliance’s political and military requirements.

There is a clear lesson from Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO’s hesitation regarding the membership aspirations of these two democracies only animated Vladimir Putin’s sense of opportunity to reassert control over what has been allowed to become a destabilizing gray zone in Europe’s strategic landscape.

Finally, the alliance needs to actively consider the role it will play in the West’s relationship with China. While China is not an immediate military threat to Europe, its actions against a rule-based international order affects Europe as it does the United States. NATO can play a constructive, if not significant role in the West’s strategy to shaping more cooperative relationship with Beijing.

As the United States confronts the challenges of 21st century, there is no instrument more central, indeed, more indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic power, and military might available through this community of democracies cannot be sustained in the absence of a robust U.S. military commitment to the alliance. That is the price of leadership, and it is one whose returns have been constantly advantageous to the United States.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY IAN J. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for conducting this hearing and sharing the opportunity to highlight the value of the NATO Alliance.

As the Alliance’s completes its 70th year on April 4th, we should also note that this is a year of other significant transatlantic anniversaries. This November will mark thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, an historic NATO victory. Last month brought us the 20th anniversary of the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO and the 15th anniversary of the accession of seven other central European democracies into the Alliance—the “big bang” round of NATO enlargement. This year is also the 10th anniversary of Albania and Croatia joining the Alliance. These are important milestones in the effort to build a transatlantic community featuring a Europe that is “whole, free and at peace”—and they underscore the success of NATO.

For these reasons I applaud the Resolution introduced by the Chairman, Senator Menendez and other members of this Committee to celebrate NATO’s achievements, underscore its value to the United States, and reaffirm US commitment to this Treaty and its cores articles, including, and most importantly, the Article V defense commitment. This resolution is timely, constructive, and needed.

As the resolution infers, now is an appropriate time to take stock of the Alliance and its pivotal role in transatlantic security, the challenges before this unique community of democracies, and what needs to be done to strengthen the Alliance and adapt it to current and anticipated realities.

NATO provides a transatlantic security architecture that has sustained peace among its members on a continent that over the last two centuries was ravaged by some six major wars, including two world wars. Through sustained US leadership,
the Alliance's consensus based decision making process, and its joint commands, exercises and operations, NATO has helped transform former adversaries into partners and deterred outside aggression. European democracies that are secure and at peace are inherently better able become prosperous. They are better able to work with the United States in addressing challenges within and beyond the North Atlantic arena.

The Alliance has been a powerful force multiplier for the United States. It generates among our allies—and a growing number of NATO partners—militaries that are interoperable with the US armed forces and that have earned the confidence of our military commanders. Time and time again European, Canadian and US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have served and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder on battlefields often far from Europe, in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.

Above all, the Alliance provides the United States the ability to leverage unmatched political, economic and military power. NATO’s actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to this transatlantic community of democracies. The economic power of this community—a combined total of over $39 trillion in GDP—dwarfs that of any rival. The Alliance’s military capability remains unsurpassed. No other military alliance can field a force as integrated and as capable as NATO.

NATO’s value to the United States has only increased in today’s increasingly complex and dynamic security environment. This committee has repeatedly documented the return of great power competition driven by Russia’s revanchist ambitions and China’s growing assertiveness. Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, its military provocations, assassinations, interference in foreign elections and abandonment of international arms control treaties are but one set of examples of how the rules based order that has been a driver of peace, freedom and prosperity around the globe is under threat.

The collision between liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism is another disturbing feature of today’s security environment. The latter’s emergence among NATO’s own member states has indigenous causes, but it is also being fueled significantly by both Moscow and Beijing, in large part to weaken and sow division within the West.

And, the world today is on the cusp of dramatic technological change which some refer to the “fourth industrial revolution.” In the realm of defense technology, this features the advent of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other technologies that promise to transform the battlefield and redefine the requirements of military stability and security.

When navigating these challenges to protect and promote US values and interests, NATO’s military capacity as well as the political and economic power offered by this community of democracies only becomes more essential.

Nonetheless, NATO and its member states must continue to adapt to match and surpass the challenges of the new and evolving security environment. Toward this end, NATO should include among its foremost priorities the following:

First, the Alliance must accelerate its efforts to increase preparedness for high intensity conflict. Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s force posture shifted toward the requirements of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency. These were demands generated by operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Today, Russia’s military aggressions and provocations and sustained military build-up, particularly in its Western Military district, underscore the renewed need to prepare for high intensity warfare contingencies, the likes of which we have not had to face since end the Cold War.

The Alliance’s readiness for such contingencies is a matter of real concern. It is notable that General Curtis Scaparrotti, the Commander of United States European Command, testified on March 13th before House Armed Services Committee that he is not yet “comfortable with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe” and warned that “a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary.”

Addressing this challenge is the responsibility of all NATO allies. This is the second challenge before NATO. Our European Allies and Canada must invest more to increase the capability and readiness of their armed forces. Their investments must address key NATO shortfalls, including air and missile defense, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and long-range fires, among others. Europe must build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the rapid movement of heavy forces to NATO’s frontiers in times of crisis and conflict.

1 There are two European infrastructure efforts underway that offer real potential to improve NATO’s ability to move heavy forces rapidly across Alliance territory. The European Commis-
It is true that our Allies are finally making tangible progress toward meeting their longstanding commitment to spend an equivalent of 2% GDP on defense. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently stated that since 2017, our European Allies and Canada have increased their defense spending by $41 billion and that figure is on track to increase to $100 billion by 2020. That is real progress and it must continue.

The 2% benchmark and the concurrent commitment by NATO allies to direct 20% of defense spending into military procurement provides a simple, politically useful metric to prod more equitable burden sharing. However, its effectiveness can and should be reinforced in two ways. NATO should reanimate the inspections it used during the Cold War to assess the readiness, deployability and sustainability of committed Allied military units. Such inspections should be executed by one the Alliance’s two strategic commands, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and Allied Command Transformation. Data from such inspections should be reported to NATO Defense ministers and, where possible, incorporated into the annual public reports the NATO Secretary General publishes on Allied defense spending.

Third, NATO needs to reinforce its increasingly vulnerable flanks in North Central Europe, the Black Sea region and the Arctic where military stability has been undermined by Russia’s military build-up, provocations, and aggression. In North Central Europe, the challenge is acute where the Alliance’s four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battalions stationed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are juxtaposed against divisions of Russian airborne, mechanized infantry, artillery, and tank units and the sophisticated aircraft, air defense, helicopters, ships, and missiles that support them.

If these NATO battalions are to be a truly effective deterrent against an aggressor of this magnitude, they must be able to survive for at least a limited amount of time amidst an aggressive attack. They must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on the adversary, and the Alliance must have a demonstrable capacity to reinforce them in real time. To become truly credible, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence must be a central focus of the Alliance’s readiness initiatives and the investment priorities of NATO member states.

Toward this end, Poland has offered to host a permanent US military presence on its territory, and the two governments are negotiating this offer. Today, the United States deploys to Poland on a rotational basis an armored brigade combat team, an armored battalion as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, and an Army aviation detachment, among other military assets. Transitioning that presence so that it would feature a permanently stationed brigade complemented by division level headquarters and key enablers, including air and missile defense, fires, and engineering equipment would significantly improve the defense of NATO’s eastern frontier, including the Baltics. Such a permanent US presence in Poland could and should be facilitated by force contributions from other NATO allies.

Fourth, the Alliance must more substantially embrace and support the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement has been one of the great success stories of post-Cold War Europe. The extension of NATO membership to Central European democracies reinforced peace and security in Europe and strengthened the Alliance’s military capability. The newest members of the Alliance have been among Europe’s most stalwart transatlanticists and most willing to contribute to US-led operations, including those beyond Europe.

The recent accession of Montenegro and the impending accession of Macedonia to NATO are important steps toward completing the vision of an undivided Europe, but the Alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to NATO membership, recognizing it will take them time to meet the political and military requirements.

Toward this end, these two nations should be more deeply incorporated into the maritime, air, and ground force initiatives the United States and NATO is developing for the Black Sea region. Their territories would be useful to anti-submarine, air-defense, surveillance, and other operations needed to counter Russia’s efforts to leverage its occupation of Crimea into an anti-access/area-denial bastion spanning that sea. And, NATO Allies should expand the lethal security assistance provided to Georgia and Ukraine to include anti-aircraft systems, antiship missiles and other capabilities that would enhance their capacities for self-defense.

sion has proposed that that the European Union Budget for 2021–2027 earmark 6.5 billion Euros allocated to its Connecting Europe Facility to ensure that strategic transport routes are fit for heavy military equipment. The Three Seas Initiative, a Central European effort to accelerate the development of cross border infrastructure, could also be leveraged to ensure that the key highways, railroads, and routes it supports will be able to handle military grade equipment.
One clear lesson from Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine and Georgia is that the ambiguity of these two countries’ relationships with the Alliance only whetted the appetite of Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, and animated his sense of opportunity to reassert Moscow’s hegemony over what has been allowed to become a de facto and destabilizing grey zone in Europe’s strategic landscape.

Finally, the Alliance needs to actively consider the role it will play in the West’s relationship with China. While China is not an immediate military threat to Europe, its actions against the rules based international order affects Europe as it does America. The Alliance should expand and deepen its network of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region that now include, among others, Japan, Korea, and Australia. As the transatlantic community’s military arm, NATO can play a constructive, if not significant role, in the West’s broader diplomatic, economic and military strategy to counter China’s provocative actions and to shape a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Beijing.

As the United States confronts the complex and dynamic challenges of the 21st century, there is no instrument more essential and indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic power, and military might available through this community of democracies cannot be sustained in the absence of a robust US military commitment to the Alliance. That is the price of leadership, and it is one whose returns have been consistently advantageous to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. We sincerely appreciate that, Mr. Brzezinski.

Now we will hear from Dr. Karen Donfried. And she is president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a nonprofit organization with whom most of us are familiar, dedicated to strengthening transatlantic cooperation.

Before joining the German Marshall Fund, Dr. Donfried was the special assistant to the president and senior director for European Affairs on the National Security Council. Dr. Donfried served as a national intelligence officer for Europe on the National Intelligence Council, a Europe specialist at the Congressional Research Service. From 2003 to 2005 she was responsible for the Europe portfolio on the U.S. Department of State’s policy planning staff.

Dr. Donfried is a member of the board of trustees of Wesleyan University, her undergraduate alma mater. She serves as a senior fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Council on Germany.

Dr. Donfried has a Ph.D. and an MALD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and a bachelor’s in government and German from Wesleyan University.

Dr. Donfried, welcome. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED, PRESIDENT, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Risch, ranking member Menendez, other members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address NATO’s value to the United States. I just want to say the views that I will express will be my own, not those of the German Marshall Fund.

As you noted, in two days, on April 4, NATO turns 70. And that truly is a remarkable achievement. The secret to NATO’s longevity has been its ability to adapt to and meet the challenges of a changing strategic landscape. Chairman Risch, ranking member Menendez, you both did a wonderful job of reviewing that history, so I will not.
NATO, which as you mentioned, is both a political and a military alliance, has been a key pillar upholding the rules-based international order that the United States has long promoted. I would like to highlight three opportunities that I see concerning our relationship with and role in NATO: First, burden sharing; second, NATO’s relationship with the European Union; and third, the challenge posed by China.

First, let me address the debate about burden sharing, which goes back to the earliest days of the alliance. Defense spending alone tells us surprisingly little about a country’s actual military capabilities. In 2018, NATO Europe spent $264 billion on defense, which represents the second largest defense budget in the world, outpaced only by the United States. That European total represents about 1.5 times China’s official defense budget and roughly 4 times Russia’s.

We need to focus not only on the total level of defense spending by allies, but equally, as you noted, on what that spending is allocated to. To be sure, allies need to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, a goal they recommitted themselves to in 2014. But it matters just as much that they spend 20 percent of those outlays on major new equipment, including the related research and development. That 20 percent guideline measures the scale and pace of modernization. If allies’ equipment is obsolete or interoperability gaps widen, NATO will be weakened.

Moreover, some expenditures that count toward the 2 percent target, such as outlays from military pensions, contribute little, if at all, to current military readiness. These nuances are often lost in the current debate over allies’ contributions to NATO.

Second, NATO needs to cooperate in more meaningful ways with the European Union. The post-war recipe for a stable, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Europe included two critical ingredients, U.S. engagement and European integration. The EU shares 22 members with NATO. And the EU has made significant strides over the past year on defense cooperation, making the moment ripe for enhanced NATO engagement with the EU.

There are many forces pulling Europe apart today. From the drama of Brexit to the rise of illiberal populism. Those can often overwhelm unity. Given the direct interest the United States has in Europe’s future, we should strive not to be yet another force dividing EU members. The European Union is not a foe. It is a partner, and a very important one at that.

Admittedly, the United States has long been skeptical of efforts by the EU to enhance defense cooperation. We focused more on the risks of an enhanced EU defense role, such as unnecessary duplication of NATO capabilities, than the possible benefits.

In a variety of areas, enhanced NATO-EU cooperation could make a real difference. And I would actually highlight military mobility as one of those. A more integrated transport network on the European continent is critical for both organizations, and we also could benefit from a more robust response to hybrid threats, and enhanced counterterrorism capabilities. NATO will engage more seriously with the EU only if Washington encourages such cooperation.
Third, a rising China challenges both sides of the Atlantic. The primary concern in U.S. national security today is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition from China and Russia. NATO has a robust strategy concerning Russia, but China barely features in alliance discussions. This can and should change.

Europe and Canada recognize the geopolitical challenge that China poses. Just last month, for the first time, the EU identified China as “an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” If the United States wants to mount a successful response to China’s rise, we will need close cooperation from all of our democratic allies.

The security implications of China’s increasing presence in Europe are clear. Our European allies worry about how to manage China’s expanding footprint on the European continent, whether through strategic infrastructure investments, by way of the Belt and Road Initiative, or through critical digital infrastructure like Huawei’s 5G technology. These issues need to rise to the top of NATO’s agenda.

Let me conclude by underscoring the vital role I see Congress playing in providing leadership in the alliance. Our allies have grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals emanating from the Administration about NATO’s value. They had believed that the alliance was an enduring strategic commitment, rather than a shifting arrangement based on transactions.

Whether through your support for increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative, the reestablishment of the Senate NATO Observer Group, the impressive congressional participation in the Munich Security Conference in February, or the bipartisan initiative to the NATO Secretary General to address a Joint Session of Congress tomorrow, your growing engagement goes a long way to reassuring our allies about U.S. commitment.

Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering past achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope is a policy. NATO members need to unify around a common sense of purpose, and recommit their countries to investing more incredible capabilities. The reason to do so is not because the United States is asking; it is because the current strategic reality demands it.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations to address NATO’s value as we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the alliance. I would like to make clear that the views I express are mine alone. I am not speaking for the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which does not take institutional positions on policy issues.

In 2 days, on April 4, NATO turns 70. This is truly a remarkable achievement. Alliances typically disband shortly after the original threat that gave rise to their creation subsides. One historical study found that alliances last, on average, for 17 years.1

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Not so with NATO. The secret to NATO’s longevity has been its ability to adapt and remain relevant to a changing strategic landscape and meet the resulting new challenges. NATO was established to deter the Soviet threat. But when the cold war ended, NATO played an important role by stabilizing the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. There were also calls for NATO to move “out of area” to meet shared security challenges. And NATO responded by expanding its mission when the alliance fought to restore peace in the Balkans. With the attacks of 9/11, NATO, for the first and only time, invoked Article 5—and it did so, notably, to come to the defense of the United States. Ever since, NATO allies have been vitally important partners in the fight against terrorism. NATO’s most significant operational commitment to date is the mission in Afghanistan, starting with the International Security Assistance Force under NATO leadership from 2003 to 2014 and followed by Resolute Support to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. Finally, and most recently, NATO returned to its core business of deterrence and collective defense following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine’s sovereign territory, in 2014, while continuing to pursue crisis management. These are the chapters of NATO’s 70 years of action. Throughout, NATO—both a military and a political alliance—has been a key pillar upholding the rules-based international order that the United States has long promoted.2

As NATO’s mission has expanded, its membership has grown too, from the original 12 countries to 29 today. The next country likely to walk through NATO’s “open door” is the Republic of North Macedonia, with the accession protocol concluded and the protocol now being ratified by existing members.

NATO has powerfully served American interests. The political, economic, and security interests of the United States require a stable Europe. We learned this lesson through the tragedy of two world wars, a lesson that must never be forgotten even as those tragic events recede from us in time. As Winston Churchill famously observed in 1948, “Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.”

Now, at a time when we are experiencing a global shift of power and fierce competition for domestic resources, having reliable allies willing to share the burden of collective defense has become only more important for U.S. interests. NATO is unique in providing a command structure, multinational interoperability, and deployable capabilities. That is why NATO is so often referred to as the partner of first resort for the United States. The challenge today is how to continue to adapt and modernize this alliance to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Much has already been said and written about NATO at 70.3 I won’t review those points and provide a comprehensive overview here. Instead, my focus will be twofold. First, I will highlight opportunities relating to burden-sharing, NATO’s relationship with the European Union, and the challenge posed by China. Second, I will discuss the vital role Congress plays in providing U.S. leadership in the alliance.

NATO BURDEN-SHARING: SHIFT THE FOCUS TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

The debate about burden-sharing among NATO members goes back to the earliest days of the alliance. More recently, near the end of his tenure as Secretary of Defense in June 2011, Robert Gates memorably lamented being “the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.” He stood in Brussels and challenged Europe, explaining that “it will take leadership from political leaders and policymakers on this continent. It cannot be coaxed, demanded or imposed from across the Atlantic.”4 Those words remain true today.

Defense spending alone—especially viewed in a vacuum without appropriate context—tells us surprisingly little about a country’s actual military capabilities. In 2018, NATO Europe spent $264 billion on defense, which represents the second largest defense budget in the world, outpaced only by the United States. That Euro-

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2 The other pillar is the liberal compact that Bob Kagan describes eloquently in The Jungle Grows Back (New York, 2018, pp. 135–6): “In exchange for nations forgoing traditional geopolitical ambitions and ceding the United States a near monopoly of military power, the United States would support an open economic order in which others would be allowed to compete and succeed; it would not treat members of the order, and particularly allies, simply as competitors in a zero-sum game; it would through participation in international institutions, an active multilateral diplomacy, and the articulation of shared liberal values support and sustain a sense of community among those nations that made common cause on behalf of those shared values and interests.”

3 See, for example, Transcript of “NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 13, 2019; and Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,” Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019.

4 Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011.
pean total represents 1.5 times China’s official defense budget ($168 billion) and roughly four times Russia’s $63 billion.5 Even viewed in this context, defense spending by allies needs to increase, but other metrics matter too, namely, what those defense euros are spent on. The inefficiencies, redundancies, and clash of strategic cultures across Europe’s national militaries are sobering.

Thus, we need to focus not only on the total level of defense spending by allies, but equally on what that spending is allocated to. To be sure, allies should spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, a target they recommitted themselves to in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But it matters just as much that they spend 20 percent of those outlays “on major new equipment, including related Research & Development.”6 That 20 percent guideline measures the scale and pace of modernization. Allies can spend all the money they want, but if their equipment is obsolete or interoperability gaps widen, NATO will be weakened. Moreover, some expenditures that count toward the 2 percent target—such as outlays for military pensions—contribute little if at all to current military readiness. These nuances are often lost in the current debate over the allies’ contributions to NATO.

NATO’S COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION: MORE IS NEEDED

One thing we have learned from history and two world wars is that conflict in Europe inevitably drew the United States in. Thus, the post-war administration of Harry Truman encouraged European integration to ensure the countries of Europe would never go to war again. The Marshall Plan was one of the first steps on this path. Today’s European Union began with a European Coal and Steel Community to “communitarize” the key instruments and industries of war and provide a framework for the peaceful coexistence of France and Germany, in particular. We often forget that the post-war recipe for a stable, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Europe included two key ingredients: U.S. engagement and European integration.

The disdain President Trump directs at the European Union (EU) is singular and has a negative impact on political cohesion within NATO given that 22 of NATO’s 29 allies are also EU members. The European Union is not a foe; it is a partner, and a very important one at that. To cite just one example, the United States and the European Union have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world.

Today, there are many more factors pulling Europe apart—from the drama of Brexit to the rise of illiberal populism—than encouraging unity. These centrifugal forces show no signs of abating. Given the direct interest the United States has in Europe’s future, we should strive not to be yet another factor dividing EU members.

The United States has long been skeptical of EU efforts to enhance defense cooperation. Madeleine Albright, during her tenure as Secretary of State, articulated that European efforts should not duplicate NATO’s efforts or capabilities, discriminate against allies who are not EU members, or decouple Europe’s security from that of other NATO allies. To date, the American reaction has focused on the risks of an enhanced EU defense role, rather than on the possible benefits. Within the EU, Britain, which along with France has the most capable European military, has been least enthusiastic about EU defense initiatives. The Brexit process has already resulted in a less engaged Britain, which, in turn, has translated into greater EU progress in this area.

NATO has long-standing, but under-developed, cooperation with the EU. The reasons for that are many and include this American and British skepticism, as well as the EU’s propensity to under-deliver on ambitious initiatives. That said, the EU has made significant strides over the past year and, in my judgment, the moment for enhanced NATO engagement with the EU is ripe. As for concerns about EU defense efforts wasting finite resources on unnecessary duplication like creating an independent command structure, those concerns are best addressed by closer cooperation between NATO and the EU precisely to avoid such duplication.

Today, the European Union may be better poised than NATO to increase the political will of its members to step up their defense efforts, especially at a time when an American president, who is deeply unpopular in many European countries, is perceived as the one making demands not out of a commitment to a strong alliance, but as a condition for continued U.S. participation. That stance has fueled doubts about the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee and sparked a renewed desire for European strategic autonomy in some quarters, particularly France.

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Where could more serious NATO-EU cooperation make a real difference? Take military mobility on the European continent, which is a critical concern for both organizations. At NATO’s Brussels Summit in July of last year, the alliance updated its Command Structure, which now includes a new Enabling Command based in Germany to improve the movement of troops and equipment within Europe. The goal is to ensure NATO has “the right forces in the right place at the right time.”

One month earlier, in June 2018, the European Commission announced that its next long-term EU budget 2021–2017 includes 6.5 billion euros to adapt Europe’s transport network to military requirements and thus improve military mobility. This EU investment will be a meaningful contribution to a stronger NATO as well. Military mobility is just one example that suggests concrete synergies could result from joint, rather than simply complementary, efforts.

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg champions EU efforts to increase defense cooperation, arguing that NATO needs those efforts to succeed because they can contribute to fairer burden-sharing. He has emphasized that “after Brexit 80 percent of NATO’s defense expenditures will come from non-EU NATO allies.” If the EU can help create the political will for its members—22 of which, as previously noted, are NATO allies—to spend more on defense and develop new capabilities that will be good for both organizations, whether the goal is increased military mobility, a more robust response to hybrid threats or enhanced counter-terrorism capabilities, NATO will engage more seriously with the EU, however, only if Washington encourages such cooperation.

A RISING CHINA: A CHALLENGE FOR BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC

The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies the primary concern in U.S. national security as the reemergence of long-term strategic competition from China and Russia, both of which are revisionist, authoritarian powers. NATO has a robust strategy concerning Russia, whereas China barely features in Alliance discussions. The lead article in The Economist’s recent special report on NATO at 70, published in March, concluded by asking: “How can the transatlantic alliance hold together as America becomes less focused on Europe and more immersed in Asia? That is a vital question, but so far NATO has barely started tackling it.”

The reality is that China can and should be a shared strategic concern of NATO allies. Europe and Canada also see the geopolitical challenge China poses. And if the United States wants to mount a successful democratic response to the rise of an assertive, authoritarian China, it will need close cooperation with all of its democratic allies. Allies make the United States stronger. That statement is no less true in 2019 than it was in 1949.

China’s threat to NATO allies is not a military one. But China has become a serious competitor politically, economically, and technologically. The United States, Europe and Canada need to align much more closely in terms of how they approach China. NATO allies should discuss their efforts to screen foreign direct investment in strategic infrastructure, as well as in key technology sectors. NATO should also deepen its military partnerships with allies in the Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Our European allies used to look at China’s rise and worry about how the growing competition between the United States and China would affect them. Now, the Europeans worry themselves about how to manage China’s expanding footprint on the European continent—whether through strategic infrastructure investments by way of the Belt and Road Initiative or through critical digital infrastructure like Huawei’s 5G technology. China’s interest in Europe extends from the High North to Greece in the south. And China’s commercial investments are resulting in political influence. That reality offers an opportunity for transatlantic coordination and cooperation.

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China has proven to be adept at dividing Europe. On March 23, Italy became the first G7 member to sign a memorandum of understanding with China's Belt and Road Initiative; 13 smaller EU countries had already done so. In the immediate run-up to Chinese President Xi’s visit to Rome, on March 12, the European Commission issued a strategic communication laying out 10 proposals for dealing with Beijing that EU leaders later endorsed.12 The Financial Times called the document “a turning point in EU attitudes toward Beijing.” For the first time, the EU identified China as “an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” The document stated that “the EU and its Member states can achieve their aims concerning China only in full unity.”14

In that spirit of unity, French President Macron invited German Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Juncker to join him on March 26 in Paris for the final day of the Chinese President’s visit to France. Macron enjoined Xi to “respect the unity of the European Union and the values it carries in the world.” The next opportunity for the EU to showcase a united front will be at the EU’s Summit with China on April 9. Overcoming individual national interests with regard to China will not be easy for European countries. The United States needs to engage regularly and actively in discussing China’s strategy with its allies, because the American voice carries significant weight in these intra-European discussions.

The security implications of China’s increasing presence in Europe are clear. Chinese investment in strategic infrastructure—from ports to tunnels—means that European efforts to screen with greater care foreign direct investment are urgent. European reliance on Huawei’s 5G technology could facilitate surveillance by China’s security services. For 70 years, the superior quality of allied military power has rested, in part, on the technological edge the United States has held globally. Thus, how NATO allies manage the ongoing technological revolution has direct implications for NATO’s strength. These issues need to rise to the top of NATO’s agenda. NATO-EU consultations on how to engage with China should follow closely.

CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ON NATO: MORE VALUABLE THAN EVER

Congressional engagement matters, both at home and abroad. Our allies have grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals emanating from the Administration about NATO’s value. They had believed that the alliance was an enduring strategic commitment, rather than a shifting arrangement based on transactions. Many Members of Congress share these same concerns and have become increasingly active in voicing their support for NATO. As the lead nation in the alliance, what the United States says matters immensely to the other allies. Recently, Congress has stepped forward to reinforce U.S. leadership in NATO. In February, over 50 Members of Congress, from Senate Judiciary Chairman Graham to Speaker Pelosi, attended the Munich Security Conference—the largest congressional delegation in the over 50-year history of this annual, high-level gathering. Even more recently, in a valuable expression of bipartisanship, House Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader McConnell invited NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to address a Joint Session of Congress. Stoltenberg will be the first NATO Secretary General ever to enjoy this privilege tomorrow. This rising congressional engagement with European counterparts, strengthened by the reestablishment of the Senate NATO Observer Group last year, goes a long way to reassuring our allies about U.S. commitment.

Ever since last July’s NATO Summit in Brussels, rumors have been flying that the President wants to pull the United States out of NATO. Again, Congress has sought to reassure the Allies. In the immediate run-up to that Summit, the Senate voted 97–2 to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance. This January, the House of Representatives passed the NATO Support Act by a bipartisan vote of 357 to 22, thus “reject[ing] any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO” and prohibiting any use of Federal funds for that purpose. Also, in January, a bipartisan group of Senators reintroduced a joint resolution requiring the President to seek the advice and consent of the Senate to withdraw the United States from NATO.
States from NATO. The strong show of bipartisan congressional support for NATO at this time of deep political polarization speaks volumes. Our allies have noticed. Congressional leadership on NATO has advanced trust in the U.S. political and security commitment among U.S. allies. Congress's oversight role and power of the purse are significant. Congressional support for increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative has enhanced our deterrence and defense posture in Europe, making real that security commitment. The most immediate challenge to NATO continues to be deterring further Russian aggression in Europe's East.

Alliances depend on shared interests, common values, and trust. Trust has taken a beating recently. A strong, bipartisan majority in Congress has been steadfast in emphasizing the enduring commitment of the United States to its allies. As Ranking Member Menendez said eloquently in Brussels this February, “the United States is stronger, safer, and more prosperous when we work in concert with our allies in Europe.”

Congress’s engagement could prove to be the critical variable for unifying transatlantic partners around a shared goal of strategic responsibility. Congress can and should articulate a bipartisan vision of NATO’s future that can serve to strengthen alliance cohesion. Having European military forces that are more effective, efficient, and capable is in the interest of every alliance member. It is hard to imagine future scenarios in which Europeans will not be called on to take greater responsibility, especially in their neighborhood. Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering past achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope is a policy. NATO members need to unify around a common sense of purpose and recommit their countries to investing more in credible capabilities. The reason to do so is not because the United States is asking; it is because the current strategic reality demands it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, our thanks to both of you. Those certainly were outstanding remarks. We are going to open it up to questions now. I will start with one briefly, and then turn it over to the ranking member.

Last night I gave a similar speech to a group of NATO policy planners from around the—allies. It was a pretty good-sized group. They were all represented there. And this was their inaugural meeting. And I told them I thought if I was planner, I would think that meeting more than once every 70 years might be helpful. They acknowledged as much, and promised to do better in the future. But in any event, I took questions, and their questions, most of them were pretty straightforward, much along the lines what the ranking member and I have talked about. But I had one question that, Dr. Donfried, you referred to, and that was, it was a speech similar to what I gave here at the beginning. And it was modestly critical of the bureaucracy when it came to infrastructure. And trying to be self-deprecating I told them we Americans are familiar with the bureaucracy. We know it when we see it.

But in any event, one of the—I won’t identify the country, but one of them got up and said, “Well, we appreciate that. We agree with you.” And I am paraphrasing. “So how much are you guys going to kick in?” All right. It wasn’t that direct, but it was a question that actually took me back a little bit. They obviously are not familiar with politics here, knowing that we have not been able to pass an infrastructure bill here in the United States, which we badly need and want. But in addition to that, of course, we don’t have funding for it.

So I explained as delicately as I could the precarious financial position of the country, and moved on. But I would like to hear your

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thoughts on that. I would say that it is my sense that the rest of
the audience knew that the questioner was tilting at a windmill,
but nonetheless, I thought they might be at least feeling good
about the kind of question that he was asking, and being sympa-
thetic with the position.

So your thoughts, please, both of you, on that issue.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. On military mobility, the EU is undertaking an
important initiative. As part of its Connecting of Europe Facility,
it is planning to dedicate or earmark 6.5 billion euros for the budg-
et period which I think is 2021 to 2027. That money is going to be
allocated specifically for upgrading roads, bridges, rail heads, so
that they can handle heavy military equipment. So that is an im-
portant initiative, and the EU should be complimented for under-
taking that.

There is a second initiative worth noting, and that is the Three
Seas Initiative. It is a Central European effort to accelerate the de-
velopment of cross-border, transport energy and telecom infrastruc-
ture among the countries between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic
Seas. And that, of course, has a big road and rail component to it,
and could be leveraged to support transport routes that can handle
heavy equipment and move military equipment east and west, and
north and south. It merits a U.S. Government support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you. Dr. Donfried?

Dr. DONFRIED. I completely agree with Ian’s point about the fact
that the EU is dedicating resources—6.5 billion euros—to modern-
izing their infrastructure. This was striking to me, because we saw
last July, at the last NATO summit, that NATO revamped its com-
mand structure. And one of the new commands that was added
was an enabling command based in Ulm, Germany. A focus of that
command is improving the movement of troops and equipment
through Europe.

There was a great quote at the time that the goal of this new
command is to ensure that NATO has the right forces in the right
place at the right time. And I think those two examples illustrate
the extent to which there are synergies between what NATO is try-
ing to do and what the EU is trying to do, and that we could ben-
cfit from those more.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. Thank you both for very insight-
ful testimony. Let me ask you a simple question. Should the Senate
pass legislation which would require a Senate vote in the event
that any administration seeks to withdraw from NATO.

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes. Should I say more? I think it is very——

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes would do, but I am happy to hear more
if you want to do that. Mr. Brzezinski.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is important for Congress, the Senate,
and the House of Representatives to underscore their commitment
to NATO, their determination to support U.S. Government in the
execution of all NATO responsibilities. While I appreciate greatly
the sentiment behind this proposed legislation, I am a little con-
cerned that it creates an impression that once passed, it solves the
problem. But it doesn’t necessarily so, because as commander-in-
chief, as our chief diplomat, the U.S. president can basically stand
down U.S. military personnel, U.S. diplomatic personnel, and tell them to do nothing on NATO, and thereby draw NATO to a full stop.

Senator MENENDEZ. But that would be an—it is very possible, but that would be an extension to the extent that if you are, then not committed to Article V either, right? If you are going to stand down and not respond, then you are also not committed to Article V. So you have hollowed out the very existence of your participation in NATO. If anything, you have violated your agreement to NATO.

So my view simply is, in my visits to both the EU and the Munich Security Conference, it became very vividly clear to me that there is a real angst among our allies about this ironclad commitment that they have always thought existed. And so I think a reassurance is that, well, before any president, this or any future one, contemplates that, having the vote of the Senate will be essential. And I think that because the allies know largely how the Senate feels, including the question of 2 percent and the 20 percent, but nonetheless that there is an ironclad reality to the commitment to NATO, that that would be reassuring. So I don’t think it does any harm, but I appreciate your point.

Let me ask you both, how would you assess the diplomatic approach taken by the Administration in urging countries to increase defense spending, which in Germany’s case appears to have slowed somewhat? Are we experiencing a backlash against the assertive diplomatic approach in Berlin taken by the Administration?

Dr. DONFRIED. This in many ways connects to your first question, Senator Menendez, because alliance fundamentally rests on shared interests, common values, and alliance cohesion. That alliance cohesion, part of which is based on trust, trusting that your allies are there to defend you, and that they are spending the proper amount on defense, so that they have capabilities that allow the alliance to perform the tasks it needs to perform. I think the challenge resulting from the way we have been discussing the level of defense spending is that it can erode alliance cohesion.

Because some of our allies are feeling that we are using it almost as a threat, if you do not do this, then we, the U.S., will pull out of NATO. And that erodes alliance cohesion. And that is why in my remarks I was trying to stress that as important as that 2 percent of GDP spent on defense is, it is critically important how that money is spent. And I am hopeful that if we reframe that debate and focus on the capabilities, on the outputs from that defense spending, it may allow us to move in a more constructive direction.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mm-hmm.

Dr. DONFRIED. Now to your specific question about Germany, I do think every NATO member should feel bound by the commitments agreed to most recently at the Wales summit in 2014. It was all NATO members that recommitted themselves to the 2 percent guideline.

Now it is not like a club and dues. It is saying we are going to move toward spending 2 percent of our GDP on defense by 2024. And I think all of us who care about the alliance were disconcerted to see Germany’s budget plan suggesting that German defense spending would actually decline in future years. So I do think we
need to keep pressure on our allies to spend more, but we also want to engage in that conversation as constructively as possible.

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. Having listened to Chancellor Merkel at the Munich Security Conference I am not sure that our approach there is the best one to achieve the mutual goal that we have.

Finally, let me ask you a question, Dr. Donfried. You said before for President Trump alliances are not something enduring, they are something transactional. I wonder if you could expand on that. How is the President's rhetoric affecting European confidence in the U.S. security guarantees to Europe? What long-term effects do you anticipate on transatlantic relations if this is the continuum?

Dr. DONFRIED. Let me start by underscoring the fact that the United States is the lead nation in NATO. When you read the North Atlantic Treaty, if a country wants to withdraw from the alliance, where do they send that notification? To Washington. So it is somehow ironic that today we are talking about the possibility that the U.S. might withdraw from that alliance.

And I do think that the U.S. security guarantee to Europe has been critical to post-war peace, stability, and prosperity on the European continent. The reason the U.S. was supportive of creating the NATO alliance in 1949 was not an act of benevolence. It had beneficial aspects for others, but it was very much in our self-interest. We had had the experience of two world wars, and did not want to return to the European continent in a future world war. So just to remind why this alliance was something we felt was in our enlightened self-interest.

And from that point on, our Canadian and European allies have felt that that American security guarantee was something enduring. And yes, there are important differences of opinion that we have had over the seven decades. You could point to the disagreement over or the crisis over the Suez Canal in the 1950’s; in every decade there have been serious crises. Our stationing of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, the Iraq war in 2003. But we have always believed that at the end of the day we were there for each other, and that Article VI bound all of us.

What has happened over the past year is in part because of specific comments the President has made, suggesting that our commitment to our allies is not enduring, but rather depends on very explicit deals, particularly on defense spending, that we might actually not be there in the future. And I think that has been one factor that has been damaging to alliance cohesion.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine.

Senator K AINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses. It is great to have you here.

In Senator Risch’s opening comments he referred to NATO as the preeminent military alliance in the world, also used the word most successful military alliance. Senator Menendez would have layered superlatives on, too, but he didn’t have to, because the chairman had put the superlatives on the table.

Mr. Brzezinski, you used the words “essential” and “indispensable,” and then Dr. Donfried, in your written testimony you say that “NATO has powerfully served American interests as well as global interests, interests of our NATO partners.” I gave a speech
at the French-American Foundation in Paris two Thursdays ago about the 70th anniversary of NATO, and I was very interested in the questions that I got.

The issue of mixed signals, Dr. Donfried, that you put on the table, Congress taking some strong action on funding, the President sometimes suggesting that we might get out of NATO, maybe it is to negotiate for more contributions. And you can understand that negotiating behavior. But I was interested in this, and it kind of goes to the question that Senator Menendez asked you, Mr. Brzezinski. The question I was really getting was less about what the president is saying than this: Are the President's comments indicative of what the American public think?

Sylvie Kaufman is the former editor of Le Monde, and she was my interviewer after my speech. And she was really focusing on the President's comments as more generally, the way we read it is that the American public is losing interest in this alliance.

So I have a bill like Senator Menendez does. It is slightly different. The bill that I have said that no president can remove from NATO without doing one of two things, either getting the Senate to affirm that by two-thirds vote, which we used to get into the treaty, or by an act of Congress. It would have to go through both houses with veto and override possibility. But a president could not unilaterally do it.

And as we talked about the bill there, it was interesting the perception from Sylvie Kaufman and others that that is less of a bill about the president as it would be about a bill about the legislature, which is the American people's elected Article I branch affirming just how much we believe that this is the preeminent military alliance in the world, and the most successful in the world, essential and indispensable.

And so it would be the case, as Mr. Brzezinski said, even if we passed it, a president could start to stand down. But the message that we would send if we did pass something like this is not just what Congress thinks about it, but what Congress thinks about it, being elected from 435 congressional districts, being elected from 50 states, that we view this as so very, very important.

I had hoped the bill that I introduced, which is Senate Joint Resolution, I say I introduced. Twelve of us introduced it. Six democrats, six republicans. Very bipartisan. And I know the same is true of Senator Menendez's bill.

I had hoped that we might be able to deal with that matter in connection with the NATO 70th. We do not have to deal with it on the week of the NATO 70th, but I do think anniversaries, as Dr. Donfried said, are not just times to celebrate, they are also times to chart a new course, and commit, and recommit.

With proposals on the table that are as bipartisan as these, I would hope that this committee might take up one of these and find a path forward where we can clearly state that a Senate that affirmed NATO at its foundation, and that will vote soon on a new nation's entrance into NATO, which the Senate does, is also taking the position that there will be no unilateral executive withdrawal under this or any other president from NATO. I think that is so important, and I think the time is right to do it.
I will admit to a little bias, too. There is a joint forces command in NATO in Norfolk. This is something that, together with the presence in Brussels, and some of the other cities within NATO where there is a little bit of a command presence. It has been something that has been powerful in connection with the Atlantic command in the United States Navy.

But I just feel like if it is preeminent, and the best in the world, then it is. If it is the most successful, if it is indispensable, if it is essential, if it has protected U.S. interests, then Congress ought to say it not so much on our behalf, Congress should say it on behalf of the American public, and clarify that you can count on us. You can count on us for the long haul. We will have disputes, and debates, and things will happen, and there will be disagreements, but that is what we want to send. That is the Nation we want to be. You can count on us.

So I appreciate the witnesses being here, and appreciate the chair for calling this hearing at an important time, and I am most excited about the opportunity to hear the Secretary-General tomorrow. With that, Mr. Chair, I will yield back to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you both. Thank you very much for being here.

Here is my theory of the case, and I would love to hear your responses to it. I think that Russia delights in some way, shape, and form in our obsession over the 2 percent threshold. Our evaluation of whether countries in NATO are standing up capabilities necessary to defend themselves is essentially limited to their investment in military hardware.

And yet, Russia has been wildly successful in weakening many of our allies, and weakening the alliance without invading a single NATO country. They have developed over the course of time all sorts of old-fashioned and newfangled capabilities, whether it be the spread of Russian-backed propaganda, whether it be the allure of their natural resources, or just old-fashioned corruption, craft, and bribery that has done significant damage to countries in the alliance and on the periphery of the alliance.

I think we made the right move to put a big annual commitment into European reassurance initiative. We spent a lot of money on that on an annual basis for a billion dollars, and I think it is money well spent, but I also think that Russia delights in the fact that we spent $4 billion on military hardware on the border, and zero dollars on actually trying to get countries in Europe to be energy dependent on Russia.

And so I just want to query you both as to the utility of this obsession that we have about evaluating your participation in the alliance based pretty much solely on how much money you spend on troops, and tanks, and guns. I think that is a really important conversation to have, but it should not be what has been, at least for Congress, the beginning and the end of the conversation.

Is it time (a) to actually update the way in which we decide whether countries are full partners in the alliance? Is it time to say that we are going to count something other than just military hardware into the equation? Or if not that, what are the other mechanisms by which we can acknowledge the actual capacities that Rus-
sia has, and the lack of those capacities that exist inside the alliance today, especially given how we talk about countries’ contributions.

That is my question to you, and I would love to hear both of your thoughts.

Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, on burden sharing, the 2 percent metric is imperfect. But I like it, because it is simple, and it is proportional. And when I look at what drives it, what is driving the 2 percent metric is the need for ready deployable forces that on day one are ready to go to battle. And NATO has struggled from day one of its existence in getting all allies to ensure that they are making a proportionate contribution to that military readiness.

Senator Murphy. So I can see where you are heading with the answer. Do you think that NATO should be engaged in those other questions of security? Or is that something that should happen in a different forum? If you are talking about energy security or information security, are those conversations that should not happen inside of NATO?

Mr. Brzezinski. Because of the nature of conflict and competition today, the alliance will have to play a role, and will have to have capacities in the cyber domain, and to a certain degree in the information domain. It will have to have its antenna up to watch, observe hybrid operations by our adversaries.

But if you go back to the cold war, and you look at that time, and the way we defeated the Soviet Union, the West, lead by the United States, had a multidimensional strategy. It had the Alliance, serving as the pointy end of its spear pointed eastward. It had sophisticated political operations to support dissident and other political movements in the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union. It had a fairly massive information infrastructure called United States Information Agency. They were all coordinated together as part of a national and as part of an Western response to the challenge posed by the Soviet Union at that time.

So when I bring those lessons to today, I seen an alliance that has to improve its military readiness. It has to be aware of what is going on in the other domains. But I see a real gap between the amount of resources that a country like Russia, or a country like China, puts into hybrid operations what what we do.

I think when the USIA was shut down in 1998 or 1999, it had roughly a budget of about $3 billion, 20 years ago. I understand our information operations budget in the United States Government is about half-a-billion dollars, if that. And it is of dissipated among different organizations not centralized in an information agency as it was in the past.

The Chairman. OK.

Dr. Donfried. If I can just jump in with two points. First, I would completely agree with you that it is important to focus not only on money and how much money is spent; it matters how that money is spent. Russia spends much less than NATO Europe does on defense. Part of the reason that Europeans are getting less value for their euros is because of the inefficiencies, redundancies, and clash of culture across Europe’s militaries. So there are many metrics we need to be looking at in terms of having a more capable alliance. That was my first point.
The second point is NATO should have a holistic view of security. And issues like energy dependence matter, information warfare matters, and those are areas that I think buttress the point I was making earlier that greater cooperation between NATO and the European Union is important, because many of those issues are places where the EU also has capacities.

So I do think we in the transatlantic space need to have holistic view of security and need to be looking at this set of metrics.

Thank you.

Senator MURPHY. I appreciate the responses. I just think we get awful boxed in by this conversation around 2 percent, first because it tends to exclude capacities that are just as important as the military capacities, and second, to your point, Ms. Donfried, it has nothing to do with integration. So you can be spending that 2 percent in a way that does not integrate into the rest of your partners, and be meeting the metric that the President says is the end-all and be-all of sufficient participation.

Coordination, the quality of your spending, is important as well. I do not deny the utility of having a number, but we should also have a means of being able to evaluate how you spend it, too.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Menendez, anything else for the good of the—whoops. Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we out of time, I am——

Senator CARDIN. We have a unique friendship going between the chairman and myself.

Let me first acknowledge my strong support for NATO. I have listened to the chairman, and ranking member, and my colleagues all talk about this importance of NATO to our national security, the transatlantic partnership. And I strongly endorse that. So I want to do that as a preface to my question. I think it has been an extremely important alliance, one that I strongly support.

I am also going to start with a quote from our former late Senator John McCain when he said, “For the last seven decades the United States and our NATO allies have served together, fought together, and sacrificed together for a vision of the world based on freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Put simply, the transatlantic alliance has made the United States safer, more prosperous, and remains critical to our national security interests.” I endorse Senator McCain’s comments there.

So when we look at NATO expansion, we vet for all those purposes. How strong the country is in its institutions, its commitment to democracy, its commitments to human rights, its ability to control its military, et cetera, et cetera.

Once they become a partner in NATO, we do not have much formal way of dealing with their commitment to these values. And I would say that there have been several NATO partners that have gone in the wrong direction on their commitments of good governance, human rights, rule of law, and democratic institutions.

So my question to you: How do we use our NATO alliance to reinforce its principle value, and that is, to protect democracy and democratic institutions, when some of our NATO partners are moving in a wrong direction on this?
Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Senator, the first point I would make is that what was the purpose for NATO? It was to send lead down range. It was to provide for military defense against our adversaries. It was not established primarily as a democracy-building institution.

Senator CARDIN. I am going to disagree with that, because when I look at every partner we had in NATO, when they came into NATO they were committed to democratic institutions. And I could tell you as we vet whether we will vote for approval, I won't support the accession of a country into the NATO alliance that does not show those values.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No. I would support your decision on that. Commitment to democratic value should be one of the criteria for membership.

Senator CARDIN. I am going to let you answer, and I would suggest to you perhaps—we talked about the threat from China. We talked about the threat from Russia. There is a direct threat against democratic institutions today. We have seen an erosion of democratic countries around the world for the 13th consecutive year. NATO stands for protection of democratic countries.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. True. The problem is, is that NATO, as a consensus-based organization, may not be the most effective means to stop a reversal in a commitment to democratic principles by one of its members. It can put pressure on a member state informally. Member states can be more effective in putting pressure on that country through other means, through their bilateral relationship, through institutions like the EU, and such. But NATO is not going to be the driver of democratic reform.

NATO's experience in that realm is really limited to civilian control over the military. It is not an institution that has been configured to monitor elections, to measure adherence to core values. It is an institution that is designed to help allies fight together.

Senator CARDIN. I do not disagree with you. It is a military alliance. I recognize that. But its strength is in what it stands for. Otherwise, we invite Russia to join us. They have a pretty strong military. But we do not want a strategic—we do not want a military alliance with Russia. Why? Because they don't share our values.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. NATO is a reflection of its member states' commitment to values. And member states should pressure counties, as we did in the case of Portugal, to reform in the direction toward democracy. We did not do that directly through NATO's institutions or NATO's decisionmaking, we did that through external pressure, pressure from outside NATO, through our bilateral relationships, European Union.

Senator CARDIN. I would hope for a more—I do not disagree with what NATO's mission is. I understand that. But it seems to me there has to be the ability within the alliance to recognize the importance of its values, because if we are just countries of convenience that have joined together for mutual defense, I would have picked a different group of countries, quite frankly.

I do not think a lot of our alliances are really going to help us militarily. We are actually defending them in a sea that is trying to turn them away from democracy. And that is—great. I am for that. But if we are—if we just look at this from a tunnel vision on
military security, and we do not look at the values we are trying to protect in Europe and the United States, we lose. And we have to use every institution we can, because there are efforts being made to compromise the democratic institutions. That is Russia's principle objective. China's principle objective.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. When you introduce these sorts—when you try and address these sorts of issues on the alliance, you will bump up against the consensus principle. And the only way you can really leverage NATO's institutional capacity against a particular member state is through the consensus principle. And you will never get that as a result.

Senator CARDIN. OSCE is a consensus organization. They have principles, and they fight for those principles. And it has been pretty successful every year as a consensus institution. And that includes countries that we are not terribly in line with on values. Seems to me, NATO, we should not have that problem.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. If one breaks a consensus principle in NATO——

Senator CARDIN. They do not break it. You should be able to get consensus through our commitments to values to get change, or to let it be known that it is not acceptable for a NATO partner to infringe upon the basic human rights of its citizens.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. And NATO provides a mechanism by which members can express that. But to translate that expression into action can be extremely difficult in a consensus-based organization.

If you challenge the consensus principle, if you want to get into a position to be extreme, or you want to be able to kick a member state out, I think you would bring into the Alliance a really divisive dynamic.

Senator CARDIN. I am not saying that. Maybe we got off to the wrong discussion here. I want to know how we use NATO and our associations within NATO to advance the values in countries that are moving in the wrong direction. I did not suggest that we kick them out of NATO. I did not suggest that we penalize them and tell them they cannot go to the next NATO summit. I did not suggest any of that. What I am suggesting is that there should be a focus for NATO membership of a commitment to democratic values.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your commitment to our alliance.

Clearly, Russia represents a proximate threat and geopolitical adversary of sorts. But increasingly long-term, I think there is a perspective that China represents a greater long-term threat to freedom, to free enterprise, to human rights. We hope they will not go down that path, but they have taken some frightening turns.

I would like to ask each of you, to what extent do you believe NATO members that have been focused primarily on Europe, of course, given its history, and its charter, but to what extent do NATO members recognize and seize the importance of the potential threat of China, a rising China. That will be question one.

And question two, I will get them both out. And then question two is, what would you do—if you had the potential to do so, what would you do to strengthen NATO? What is the key to making
NATO a more powerful alliance? And I say that in part because China will have a population many times our size down the road. They will have an economy much larger than ours, just given the fact that they will have a much—or will have a much larger population.

And for us to have the same economic might, the same capacity to build an impregnable military will depend not just on us standing alone, but us standing with others whose population and economies we can share. So, again, do our NATO allies recognize the significance of China as a threat? Are they taking action consistent with that? And then No. 2, what do we do to strengthen NATO as it faces these challenges?

Dr. Donfried and then Mr. Brzezinski.

Dr. DONFRIED. Thanks so much, Senator Romney.

In many ways, this connects to the question Senator Cardin raised. I am not sure we would have democracy in Europe to the extent that we do were it not for NATO, were it not for U.S. engagement on the European continent. And the U.S. was very clearly trying to expand a liberal, small L, international order at the end of World War II that was based on principles of liberal democracy, free market economy, rule of law, rights of the individual. And those values are essential to what NATO stands for.

And we expect not only aspirants, the Georgias, Ukraines, Bosnias of the world, but also existing members to live up to those values. And this is why I would argue all NATO allies agree with the U.S. that China poses a real challenge to the order that we constructed together at the end of World War II.

The fact of the matter is that China barely registers on NATO’s agenda today. I would agree with you that NATO needs to grapple much more directly with what that rise of China means. We see it in terms of China going west with its Belt and Road Initiative, making strategic investments in European ports, in European tunnels that clearly have affected political stances of particular European countries.

I do think there is increasingly a recognition in Europe about the challenge China poses. And we have seen that in recent European Union writings as well, and also in the fact that many European member states, along with the EU, have tightened up their review of Chinese strategic investment.

So that is to your first question.

To your second question about how can NATO become more powerful, I think for the U.S. it is about doubling down on this alliance. We, the U.S., are facing this challenge from a rising China, and I believe firmly that we are stronger for having democratic allies who are meeting this challenge with us.

What is it that sets us apart from China and from Russia? It is precisely that we have allies. And so we should celebrate that and treasure it, and work to enhance alliance cohesion.

Thank you.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with Karen that the European Union, our European allies, are becoming more aware of the threat posed by China. You see the discussion over Huawei, you see the recent strategy document, where they defined China as a competitor—pretty daring language for the European Union. And so Europe
really is ready for a serious discussion with the United States on how we can collaborate to help shape the relationship the West has with a rise in China.

How to strengthen NATO? I agree that NATO is going to have to put China on its agenda. We are beginning to see the first signs of that in the internal discussions going on within the alliance.

As I mentioned in my testimony, what China is doing to the international rules-based order affects Europe just as much as it affects the United States. The good news is that some of our allies actually are already very active. They have a history in Asia. The British just had a naval exercise with the Japanese. The Norwegians regularly send some ships to RIMPAC exercises. That kind of activity is going to have to increase in the future, as the two continents deal with an increasingly assertive China.

NATO also has a network of partnership agreements with countries in Asia-Pacific. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia. Those can serve as a foundation block, so to speak, for a more active NATO engagement in the region, which can be then, you know, a building block to a more coordinated political military and economic response by the West to China’s rise.

Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Romney. Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to you and Senator Menendez for holding this hearing this week of celebration of the 70th anniversary or NATO.

I want to begin, actually, by pointing out that on Sunday that the Presidential elections in Ukraine, their first round was completed. They were determined to be free, and fair, and competitive by the international observers who were there, one of whom was a staff member of mine. And I think it is important to recognize that especially at a time when free and fair elections are not something that we are seeing certainly in Russia and a number of other countries that are aggressors.

I want to go back to what I think was Senator Cardin’s question about backsliding on the part of some of our NATO allies. Certainly, I think that is true of Turkey. We are seeing that with Hungary and with Poland.

And as you pointed Dr. Donfried, NATO is not just a military alliance. It is an alliance of shared values. And when the countries who are participating in NATO no longer share those democratic values, what kind of action can NATO take to address that? And how should we view the backsliding that is going on in those countries?

Dr. Donfried. I think that it is critically important that we talk about these issues, because what NATO has in its backpack to deal with this really is declaratory policy. It is not like the European Union, which actually does have provisions to try to work against democratic backsliding within its member states.

So I do think that declaratory policy is the public stance that we can take. And I think it is very important that in private you, as members of the Senate, together with administration officials, also have those conversations with the countries where we have concerns, and make it clear that this is something we value. Because, again, we are the lead nation. Our opinion of what is happening...
inside these countries does matter and does carry weight. And we should not underestimate the influence that we have.

Let me just add here that I think on this issue, as really on every issue we have discussed today, the fact that there has been a bipartisan stance in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, also is critically important. I do think NATO would be seriously undermined were NATO itself to become a partisan issue. I just want to commend the committee on its bipartisan approach to this set of issues.

Thank you.

Senator Shaheen. Mr. Brzezinski, do you have anything to add to what NATO ought to do to address backsliding?

Mr. Brzezinski. I think Karen put it very well. You know, the alliance is based on a shared commitment to Allies, shared values. But we always have to remember, it is primarily created to serve as a warfighting instrument. And the ability for that warfighting instrument to be effective lies on unity. And if we see our fundamental values dissipating, that alliance is weaker.

How do you address these challenges I believe is really not through NATO as much as it is through our bilateral relationships, or our other multilateral relationships and institutions where we can speak directly and clearly to our allies and say, “You have got to change course here, or you need to address this in this way.”

We have done that in the past, and it has been effective. And right now, this is a very challenging time for the alliance. We have a democratic sag in the West. We see it in Central Europe. We see it in Turkey. We see it in Western Europe. And to a certain degree we even see it here in North America.

The way we address that is going to be through strong U.S. leadership, and as Karen pointed out, Congress has a very important role to play in that, particularly when it brings a bipartisan consensus to the table in support of these values.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you both. NATO is setting up a new cyber center of excellence. And I know that that is supposed to be fully staffed by 2023. But do we know to what extent it is also going to address questions around what cyber intrusions—how cyber intrusions should be addressed with respect to a response?

So, for example, I remember we had a hearing in the Armed Services Committee several years ago where we talked about the fact that—or we raised the question if someone attacks our networks in the United States, and shuts down all of the utilities, for example, in the United States, is that considered an act of war?

How is NATO’s cyber center going to deal with those kinds of questions? Do we know the answer to that?

Mr. Brzezinski. I am not an expert on the cyber domain, but I will share the following thoughts. First, the fact that NATO set up such a cyber center is important. It reflects a commitment to integrate cyber operations into the full spectrum of NATO operations.

Senator Shaheen. Mm-hmm.

Mr. Brzezinski. Second, it is interesting that NATO has agreed that there can be an offensive dimension to its cyber operations. So that reflects a level of commitment to this. So it is not just going to be defending, but if someone messes with NATO, so to speak, and there is consensus within the alliance that this deserves a
cyber response, it will be prepared to do that. It will take time for the alliance to get there.

And then third, NATO has agreed that a cyber contingency could “lead to an invocation of Article V.” Could of course does not necessarily mean it will.

Senator SHAHEEN: Sure.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. But that has always been the case for every type of military contingency that the alliance could face. There is not a guarantee that Article V kicks in. It only kicks in when there is a consensus decision by the alliance.

Senator SHAHEEN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one brief followup.

I do want to remark on Senator Cardin’s observations and questions, because the Russians cannot outspend us and NATO in terms of military spending, but they would be far better off in terms of leveraging, creating disunity. You know, when they engage in the EU, and try to pick certain countries apart with their influences, both in terms of cyber influence, in terms of money to certain parties and entities, and can pick a country off, then you undermine unity.

The same is true at NATO. And I think that there has to be serious thought if, Mr. Brzezinski, and I do believe in robust diplomacy, if the way in which we are going to deal with this question is robust diplomacy, then we have to have some robust diplomacy with Turkey, because they want to go by, you know, the S-400, and they are on a path that is totally antithetical to both NATO and our relationship with them.

We have to tell our friends in Hungary that they are on the wrong path. We cannot coddle them or to ultimately embrace authoritarianism. We have to challenge it. Because if I was Russia, I would be spending far more money in trying to undermine some of these countries both to undermine NATO cohesion, undermine EU cohesion as it relates, for example, to sanctions, and I have achieved my goal without any military engagement, at a fraction of the cost. So how do we do this, I think, there is a lot of food for thought here that I think is appropriate.

My question goes to the following. I have been pressing the Administration to work with our European partners to reenergize our common front against Kremlin aggression. Russia’s attack in the Kerch Strait was over 3 months ago, and I think the response from the West was weak, to say the least.

They continue their aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Their work to destabilize Ukrainian politics has not stopped. Their malign efforts in the upcoming European Parliament elections are pretty vivid. These actions are unacceptable. And I am wondering how you would assess NATO’s efforts to counter Russian government aggression in Europe? What is necessary to bolster these efforts from both the U.S. and from NATO? Because from my perspective, Putin is on a march. He annexed Crimea. Yes, condemnation, but nothing more. He has got a destabilizing reality in Eastern Ukraine, condemnation, but well, we had some sanctions, some of which I helped author.
You have the Kerch Strait. You have the Skripal attack. We have not had any sanctions, responses related to that. So you see it involved in action, and, you know, the challenge for us that we only have a handful of peaceful diplomacy tools. Russia is willing to use militarism to advance its goals. We use peaceful diplomacy tools, which are largely sanctions to fight back.

So what should we be doing? What should we be doing? What should we be seeing NATO do to posture, at least, to send a very clear deterrent message to Russia?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, there has been a fundamental flaw in the West's response to Russian revanchism, Russian aggression, that has been ongoing for almost 15 years even before the invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Our strategy has been a strategy of incrementalism. The Russians go in, they violate the sovereignty of an independent nation, seize territory, and our response is piecemeal. It is hesitant.

Look in the case of the invasion of Ukraine. It had 10 percent of its territory seized, Crimea taken away, and our response, the West's response is to move into Central Europe a mere handful of U.S. aircraft in the days after that attack. And weeks later we move a U.S. company or two into the Baltics, and into Poland. And our Western European allies do nothing.

We impose sanctions on Russia that limited to targeted sanctions, largely against individuals. Individuals who probably walk around Moscow wearing them as a red badge of courage, a demonstration of fealty to Putin. And yes, we increase them over time, but they are targeted incremental sanctions.

Senator MENENDEZ. So what should we do?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would do three things. One, I would have more robust military deployments in North Central Europe. I don't think we are properly postured in that region. I would increase NATO's military presence in the Baltic Sea. So more robust military response.

I would escalate to sectorial economic sanctions. I would really hit hard the Russian banking sector. Maybe you could incrementally pick off different banks, and just increase the number of banks you hit over a period of time to put steadily increasing pressure on the Russian economy.

The Russian economy is still growing in 1 percent, 1.5 percent. That is not hurting. LUKOIL oil has got record sales today. So we are not hitting them as hard as we can.

And then I would initiate a strategy of disruption. If Putin's going to play a game against the West where he is funding rightest parties in Europe, meddling around in our elections through social media and such, why don't we do the same against him? We did that during the cold war, and we prevailed.

I think Putin has a very fragile regime. He is also a very pragmatic character. And if we really ratcheted up the pressure through a more robust military posture, through stronger economic sanctions, with real bite, and a strategy of disruption, he is more likely to back off.
Senator MENENDEZ. Some of those items are in our desk of legislation. Yes.

Do you have any suggestions, Dr. Donfried?

Dr. DONFRIED. I would just say in addition to what you have in the desk of legislation, it is critical that we be thinking about how we build resilience in the face of Russian interference. As you noted, the cyber tool is very inexpensive for Russia to deploy. And I think part of this is a NATO response, but also I think the U.S. rightly is working very closely with the European Union on this, because our European allies are equally concerned about Russian interference in their elections. I also think there are bilateral roles here to play for U.S. intelligence that can be helpful to our allies in highlighting some of the things that Russia, and it is not only Russia, that Russia, China, Iran are doing in terms of meddling and trying to undermine our democracies.

So I think we need to work on all of those fronts. I will just pick up on the fact that Senator Shaheen mentioned Ukraine. It really was encouraging to see this expression of vibrant democracy in Ukraine over the weekend. I think the fact that we have been very open in public about our concern with Russian interference in elections, that that in and of itself has provided a deterrent effect as well. But I think we need to move out on all of those arenas to build resilience to Russian interference.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you both.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. Thank you to both of you for testifying here today. It has been enjoyable going back down memory lane about the successes that NATO has had. We have touched on a number of the challenges that are right here in front of us now, and we only scratched the surface on some of them, and not the least of which is a NATO ally, Turkey, that reference has been made to the fact that they are going to be purchasing military equipment from the Russians. I mean this is totally against everything that NATO stands for. Certainly, those can't be interoperable with NATO materials.

Some of us has had some very robust discussions with our Turkish friends. I am not satisfied with where we are. I don't think they have a full understanding of the consequences that are going to come. I agree with you Mr. Brzezinski. We can't sit on our hands, particularly on this new challenge that we are getting. I think we are going to have to act quickly. We are going to have to act severely, and we have mandatory sanctions that will take place if, indeed, that sale goes through. And they claim the sale has gone through, but they haven't deployed yet, and won't deploy until August or September, but this is a really serious challenge. And I suspect we are going to be speaking about it more here on the committee.

So thank you both for coming here today and visiting with us. And it has been, I think, an eye-opening discussion in many regards.
For information from the members, the record will remain open until the close of business Friday. We ask the witnesses to respond promptly to any of those questions, and those answers will be made part of the record.

With the sincere thanks of the committee, the committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]