[Senate Hearing 116-105]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-105
NATO AT 70: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
FOR THE 21st CENTURY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2019
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-966 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
CORY GARDNER, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TIM KAINE, Virginia
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
TODD, YOUNG, Indiana CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Jessica Lewis, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 3
Brzezinski, Ian, Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Donfried, Dr. Karen, President, The German Marshall Fund of the
United States, Washington, DC.................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
(iii)
NATO AT 70: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21st CENTURY
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TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James Risch,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Menendez, Cardin,
Shaheen, Gardner, Romney, Young, Murphy, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Well, thank
you all for coming today, and we have an all-star cast of
witnesses. Before we do that, both ranking member and I have
some remarks regarding NATO. This is an auspicious occasion, on
the 70th, or close to the 70th anniversary of NATO, which is
the day after tomorrow.
But in any event, what I would like to do is talk a little
bit about NATO, which is, in my judgment, and I think most
people's judgment, the most successful military alliance in the
history of the world. And to look ahead at the role of NATO,
and how we can play in a quickly evolving threat environment.
NATO was founded by its first 12 members after the shock of
the Soviet blockade of Berlin. And the West's airlift in 1948
and 1949 made us realize the threat that the Soviet Union posed
to peace and prosperity. That conflict is far behind us, but
NATO has remained an important piece of the framework that
supports our collective security.
NATO has come to the aid of the United States in
Afghanistan after attacks of September 11th. It has ended
genocides, and maintained peace in the Balkans. It has trained
troops of the new Iraqi government, run air policing missions
on Europe's eastern plank, helped end the genocide in Darfur,
provided assistance to the U.S. after Hurricane Katrina, and
most importantly, sustained the period of unprecedented peace
among the major European powers.
NATO has proven not only to be a military success, but a
political and economic one. For its members, NATO security
umbrella has provided the kind of stable environment necessary
for economic growth and investment. Former Soviet Bloc
countries clambered for NATO membership, not only for
protection against Russia, but for the economic strength the
membership could foster. U.S. trade with our fellow NATO
members remains key to our economy.
Last week ranking member Menendez and I, along with several
of our colleagues, introduced a resolution expressing our
strong support for NATO, and in congratulating it on its 70
years of successes. Tomorrow morning, we will have the honor of
welcoming NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to address a
joint session of Congress. Then later this year this committee
will have the opportunity to vote to approve the accession of
North Macedonia into the alliance.
Looking back and remembering the accomplishments of NATO is
important. NATO remains the preeminent political military
alliance in the world. Together, we work to defeat the Soviet
Union and usher in decades of peace and prosperity in Europe. I
would also argue that the success of institutions like the
European Union were only possible because of how NATO
reorganized Europe.
NATO is the only international organization where unanimity
and thus sovereignty is entirely protected. This means and
meant no matter how small a country was in the alliance, they
were treated as equals with the largest States, because every
nation's opinion mattered as much as the next in the alliance.
While we should be celebratory of all that NATO has
accomplished and the peace it has preserved, I also want this
hearing to look forward. How can NATO confront the full set of
security challenges that are quickly emerging? Cyber warfare,
China, disinformation, and remain relevant in this new
environment?
At the same time, Russia has reemerged as a threat to NATO
nations. If there is any doubt about that, anyone can spend a
short period of time with the governments of Georgia and the
Ukraine to convince us how dangerous Russia is today. And in
addition to that, spend a few minutes with the victims of the
people who have been poisoned recently in London. Russia is a
threat, and remains a threat, and is getting worse instead of
better.
NATO also faces a number of challenges from within. First
is the need to invest more in defense. It is important to note
that the number of allies spending 2 percent of their GDP on
defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on equipment
has increased since 2014, adding more than $100 billion to
European defense spending. Seven allies currently meet their 2
percent pledge, and 18 in total are on track to do so by 2024.
But we have also seen a couple of countries suggest they
will cut their defense budgets in a few years. This is
challenging. Congress feels strongly that the financial
commitment must be met.
I know of at least one other person in this town who feels
even more strongly, and I have had occasion to discuss this
with him on a number of occasions. We are all dedicated to the
fact that commitments made must be met.
However, the amount of money is not the only issue. We must
continue to modernize our defense capability. Spending 20
percent on modernization is a good start. But countries should
also see this goal as a floor and not as a ceiling.
Another challenge the alliance faces is that of threat
assessments. Our allies along the eastern flank face real
security challenges created by Russia, whether through
deployments in the Kaliningrad, or disinformation campaigns
targeted at ethnic communities and their countries. Distance
from Russia should not diminish the concern over Russian
tactics in support for all members of the alliance.
At the same time countries along the southern flank of the
alliance has substantial challenges with migrant flows and the
ability of extremists to use those flows to move into allied
countries. Again, problems of this magnitude do not stop at
country borders. They affect all, though differently. Better
intelligence sharing and maritime security is needed, and
something that NATO can provide.
Mobility in the alliance remains a challenge as road, rail,
and seaports create challenges for moving military equipment
around the alliance. And the bureaucracy of the EU adds
enormous difficulties to establishing requirements for the
construction of new transportation networks. Bureaucracy is
always a challenge. We Americans know bureaucracy when we see
it. We are not immune either.
In an era where speed increases deterrence, the pace of
bureaucracy is undermining efforts to improve it. We all need
to do better.
Finally, as I said earlier, NATO is the most successful
political military alliance in the history of the world,
precisely because it defends common values and principles like
democracy, human rights, and rule of law. We have seen NATO
allies have difficulty adhering to these values as member
countries and their institutions mature. But all of us, all of
us must remain committed to those core values and upholding
them.
In closing, do not let all these critiques make it sound
like NATO is weak or imperiled. Thursday will mark 70 years of
this alliance and its successes. I said the past 70 years were
not always as easy as our memories would have us believe, but
those disagreements have taught us how to work through our
issues to find solutions. It is that constructive spirit that
we should look to as NATO moves forward.
Make no mistake about America's commitment to NATO. We are
committed. We are committed to moving forward through the next
70 years, and make them as successful as the last 70 years.
Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling a
very important hearing as we approach the 70th anniversary of
NATO. And I certainly want to associate myself with all of the
remarks you made as it relates to the importance of the NATO
alliance.
Over the past 2 years we have found ourselves repeatedly
having to express support for the alliance in the face of
persistent skepticism by President Trump. I am happy to
regularly express our commitment to the alliance, one that has
done so much to preserve security since World War II. And I
applaud you, Mr. Chairman, for leading a resolution on the
committee expressing support for the alliance, which I am
privileged to co-lead with you.
I would have hoped through our consistent rock-solid
bipartisan commitment to NATO through letters, resolutions, and
votes on the floor, our military leaders' reaffirmation would
somehow break through with the President. The American people
support this alliance, and it is about time that he
unequivocally recognizes that.
These concerns were amplified last month when the White
House floated a plan called ``Cost, plus 50 Percent,'' where
any country hosting U.S. troops would pay the full price of
American soldiers deployed on their soil, plus 50 percent or
more for the privilege of hosting them. Thankfully, this
proposal has met with strong bipartisan backlash. There is a
reason many times for our own forward promotion of our
interests that we site bases in different parts of the world,
not just for that country's interest, but for our own interests
in terms of national security.
I would like to quickly address four challenges to the
alliance that I hope we can examine today. First, as many of us
who were in Munich last February heard directly from our
strongest allies, the President's erratic language on NATO
continues to erode confidence in the U.S. commitment to Article
V, and the alliance overall.
What was previously unthinkable, that the United States
could withdraw from the alliance it was instrumental in
shaping, remains a real concern for many of us. That is why
Senator Graham and I included within our DASCA legislation
provisions that would subject any such move to Senate consent.
Senator Kaine has also led efforts on a similar piece of
important legislation. It took Senate consent to get us into
NATO, so it should take Senate consent for any effort to remove
us from the alliance.
In February I visited NATO headquarters and saw the
memorial to those lost on September 11th of 2001. This was a
sober reminder of the only time that NATO's Article V has been
invoked. Our allies were there for us in our time of need.
There should be no question that we will be there for them.
Second, despite what some say, our allies are largely
stepping up to the plate. Starting in 2014, in response to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, countries across the alliance
began to significantly increase defense spending. There is
bipartisan consensus that spending needs to be maintained, not
only for the 2 percent commitment of GDP to defense, but more
importantly the 20 percent to new procurement.
Third, I am concerned that the United States is moving
increasingly to establish bilateral military ties to avoid
coordination at NATO. Many Europeans see this as another divide
and rule tactic the Trump Administration is using to weaken
European integration and unity. While achieving consensus is
hard, our security in the Transatlantic Alliance are best
served when NATO acts together.
And fourth, on a positive note, the Senate will deliberate
this year on the accession of North Macedonia to the alliance.
As we reminded Montenegro during its accession process, NATO is
also an alliance of values, and that Article II commitments are
just as important as others in the NATO charter. North
Macedonia must commit to strengthening their free institutions,
the rule of law, and protecting minorities in the country while
also bolstering its defense capabilities.
Finally, it is worth highlighting why we need NATO today.
The threat the Russian Federation poses to European security
has only intensified. The Skripal attack on British soil,
continued interference in politics across Europe, intensified
military aggression in the European country of Ukraine, as we
bolster the defenses of those in the front lines of the
enhanced board presence and European deterrence initiative, we
must continue to strengthen our defenses against hybrid warfare
tactics and work with partners to defend against constantly
changing threats from the Kremlin.
On August 24th of 1949, the North Atlantic Charter signing
ceremony took place in Washington. At that event President
Truman said, ``In this pact we hope to create a shield against
aggression and the fear of aggression, a bulwark which will
permit us to get on with the real business of government and
society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life
for all of our citizens.''
Nearly 70 years later those words still ring true. NATO has
provided for our common defense over the years, and in doing so
it has created the environment for our prosperity and that of
our allies. That, Mr. Chairman, seems like a pretty good deal
to me. And I look forward to hearing our witnesses' testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez. We will now turn
to our witnesses. And as I said earlier, this is an all-star
cast, and we certainly want to welcome them. We are going to
start with Mr. Ian Brzezinski. He is a resident senior fellow
with Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic
Council.
He also runs the Brzezinski Group, which provides strategic
insight. Mr. Brzezinski served as deputy assistant secretary of
defense for Europe and NATO Policy from 2001 to 2005, where he
was responsible for NATO expansion, alliance force planning and
transformation, and NATO operations in the Balkans,
Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Mr. Brzezinski served 7 years on Capitol Hill, first as a
legislative assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator
Bill Roth, and then as a senior professional staff member on
this committee.
Earlier, Mr. Brzezinski advised the Ukrainian National
Security Council, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and
Parliament, served as a member of the policy planning staff in
the Defense Department, and worked for 5 years as principal at
Booz, Allen and Hamilton, providing policy and technical
support to U.S. combatant commands and to foreign clients.
So, with that, we will start with Mr. Brzezinski. The floor
is yours.
STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brzezinski. Chairman Risch, ranking member Menendez,
distinguished members of the committee, as we approach NATO's
70th anniversary, thank you for allowing me to participate in
this stocktaking of the alliance. NATO is an invaluable
alliance. As said, it is history's most successful alliance.
The transatlantic security architecture NATO provides has
transformed former adversaries into allies and deterred outside
aggression. European allies that are secure at peace are
inherently better positioned for prosperity. They are better
able to work with the United States to address challenges in
and beyond Europe.
NATO has been a powerful force multiplier for the United
States. Time and time again European, Canadian, and U.S.
military personnel have served and sacrificed shoulder to
shoulder on battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
around the world.
The alliance provides the United States the ability to
leverage unmatched political, economic, and military power.
NATO's actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to
this community of democracies. NATO's economic powers and $40
trillion in GDP dwarfs that of any rival. No other military
alliance can field the forces capable as NATO.
These assets only become more important in today's
increasingly challenging security environment. That environment
features the return of great power competition featuring
Russia's revanchist ambitions and China's growing
assertiveness. Second, we are witnessing a disturbing erosion
of rules-based order that has been the foundation of peace,
freedom, and prosperity since the end of World War II. Third,
we face a growing collision between liberal democracy and
authoritarian nationalism.
A fourth dynamic is the advent of rapid technological
change. The impending introduction of hypersonic weapons,
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other
technologies to the battlefield portends a radical redefinition
of the requirements for stability and security.
If NATO is to be as successful in the future as it has been
over the past seven decades, it must adapt to match these
challenges. Toward that end its agenda must include the
following five priorities.
First, the alliance must accelerate its efforts to increase
preparedness for high-intensity conflict. After the cold war,
NATO's force posture shifted toward peacekeeping and
counterinsurgency. Today, Russia's military aggressions and
sustained military buildup have reanimated the need to prepare
for high-intensity warfare, the likes of which we have not had
to face since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This is a matter of real concern. It is notable that the
commander of United States European Command (EUCOM), testified
last month that he is not yet ``comfortable with the deterrent
posture we have in Europe.'' He warned that, ``A theater not
sufficiently set for full spectrum contingency operations poses
increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and
prevail in conflict, if necessary.''
This reality underscores a second NATO priority. Canada and
our European allies must invest more to increase their military
capability and readiness. Their investments must address key
NATO shortfalls, including air and missile defense,
intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, long-range fires,
among others. Time is long overdue for our allies to carry
their share of the security burden.
Third, NATO must further reinforce its flanks in North
Central Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Arctic. These are
the foci of Russia's military buildup, provocations, and
aggression. In North Central Europe the challenge is acute. The
alliance's four Enhanced Forward Presence battalions stationed
in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, they are positioned
against divisions of Russia ground forces, backed by
sophisticated aircraft, air defense, helicopters, and missiles.
Fourth, NATO must more substantially embrace and support
the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO
enlargement is one of the great success stories of the post-
cold war era. It expanded the zone of peace and security in
Europe and strengthened the alliance's military capability. But
the alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear
path to membership, recognizing it will take them time to meet
the alliance's political and military requirements.
There is a clear lesson from Moscow's invasions of Ukraine
and Georgia. NATO's hesitation regarding the membership
aspirations of these two democracies only animated Vladimir
Putin's sense of opportunity to reassert control over what has
been allowed to become a destabilizing gray zone in Europe's
strategic landscape.
Finally, the alliance needs to actively consider the role
it will play in the West's relationship with China. While China
is not an immediate military threat to Europe, its actions
against a rule-based international order affects Europe as it
does the United States. NATO can play a constructive, if not
significant role in the West's strategy to shaping more
cooperative relationship with Beijing.
As the United States confronts the challenges of 21st
century, there is no instrument more central, indeed, more
indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic
power, and military might available through this community of
democracies cannot be sustained in the absence of a robust U.S.
military commitment to the alliance. That is the price of
leadership, and it is one whose returns have been constantly
advantageous to the United States.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ian J. Brzezinski
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for conducting this hearing and sharing the
opportunity to highlight the value of the NATO Alliance.
As the Alliance's completes its 70th year on April 4th, we should
also note that this is a year of other significant transatlantic
anniversaries. This November will mark thirty years since the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, an historic NATO victory.
Last month brought us the 20th anniversary of the accession of Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO and the 15th anniversary of the
accession of seven other central European democracies into the
Alliance--the ``big bang'' round of NATO enlargement. This year is also
the 10th anniversary of Albania and Croatia joining the Alliance. These
are important milestones in the effort to build a transatlantic
community featuring a Europe that is ``whole, free and at peace''--and
they underscore the success of NATO.
For these reasons I applaud the Resolution introduced by the
Chairman, Senator Menendez and other members of this Committee to
celebrate NATO's achievements, underscore its value to the United
States, and reaffirm US commitment to this Treaty and its cores
articles, including, and most importantly, the Article V defense
commitment. This resolution is timely, constructive, and needed.
As the resolution infers, now is an appropriate time to take stock
of the Alliance and its pivotal role in transatlantic security, the
challenges before this unique community of democracies, and what needs
to be done to strengthen the Alliance and adapt it to current and
anticipated realities.
NATO provides a transatlantic security architecture that has
sustained peace among its members on a continent that over the last two
centuries was ravaged by some six major wars, including two world wars.
Through sustained US leadership, the Alliance's consensus based
decision making process, and its joint commands, exercises and
operations, NATO has helped transform former adversaries into partners
and deterred outside aggression. European democracies that are secure
and at peace are inherently better able become prosperous. They are
better able to work with the United States in addressing challenges
within and beyond the North Atlantic arena.
The Alliance has been a powerful force multiplier for the United
States. It generates among our allies--and a growing number of NATO
partners--militaries that are interoperable with the US armed forces
and that have earned the confidence of our military commanders. Time
and time again European, Canadian and US soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines have served and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder on battlefields
often far from Europe, in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere
around the world.
Above all, the Alliance provides the United States the ability to
leverage unmatched political, economic and military power. NATO's
actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to this
transatlantic community of democracies. The economic power of this
community--a combined total of over $39 trillion in GDP--dwarfs that of
any rival. The Alliance's military capability remains unsurpassed. No
other military alliance can field a force as integrated and as capable
as NATO.
NATO's value to the United States has only increased in today's
increasingly complex and dynamic security environment. This committee
has repeatedly documented the return of great power competition driven
by Russia's revanchist ambitions and China's growing assertiveness.
Moscow's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, its military provocations,
assassinations, interference in foreign elections and abandonment of
international arms control treaties are but one set of examples of how
the rules based order that has been a driver of peace, freedom and
prosperity around the globe is under threat.
The collision between liberal democracy and authoritarian
nationalism is another disturbing feature of today's security
environment. The latter's emergence among NATO's own member states has
indigenous causes, but it is also being fueled significantly by both
Moscow and Beijing, in large part to weaken and sow division within the
West.
And, the world today is on the cusp of dramatic technological
change which some refer to the ``fourth industrial revolution.'' In the
realm of defense technology, this features the advent of hypersonic
weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other
technologies that promise to transform the battlefield and redefine the
requirements of military stability and security.
When navigating these challenges to protect and promote US values
and interests, NATO's military capacity as well as the political and
economic power offered by this community of democracies only becomes
more essential.
Nonetherless, NATO and its member states must continue to adapt to
match and surpass the challenges of the new and evolving security
environment. Toward this end, NATO should include among its foremost
priorities the following:
First, the Alliance must accelerate its efforts to increase
preparedness for highintensity conflict. Following the end of the Cold
War, the Alliance's force posture shifted toward the requirements of
peacekeeping and counter-insurgency. These were demands generated by
operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Today, Russia's
military aggressions and provocations and sustained military build-up,
particularly in its Western Military district, underscore the renewed
need to prepare for high intensity warfare contingencies, the likes of
which we have not had to face since end the Cold War.
The Alliance's readiness for such contingencies is a matter of real
concern. It is notable that General Curtis Scaparrotti, the Commander
of United States European Command, testified on March 13th before House
Armed Services Committee that he is not yet ``comfortable with the
deterrent posture that we have in Europe'' and warned that ``a theater
not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency operations poses
increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail
in conflict if necessary.''
Addressing this challenge is the responsibility of all NATO allies.
This is the second challenge before NATO. Our European Allies and
Canada must invest more to increase the capability and readiness of
their armed forces. Their investments must address key NATO shortfalls,
including air and missile defense, intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), and long-range fires, among others. Europe must
build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the rapid movement of
heavy forces to NATO's frontiers in times of crisis and conflict.\1\
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\1\ There are two European infrastructure efforts underway that
offer real potential to improve NATO's ability to move heavy forces
rapidly across Alliance territory. The European Commission has proposed
that that the European Union Budget for 2021-2027 earmark 6.5 billion
Euros allocated to its Connecting Europe Facility to ensure that
strategic transport routes are fit for heavy military equipment. The
Three Seas Initiative, a Central European effort to accelerate the
development of cross border infrastructure, could also be leveraged to
ensure that the key highways, railroads, and routes it supports will be
able to handle military grade equipment.
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It is true that our Allies are finally making tangible progress
toward meeting their longstanding commitment to spend an equivalent of
2% GDP on defense. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently
stated that since 2017, our European Allies and Canada have increased
their defense spending by $41 billion and that figure is on track to
increase to $100 billion by 2020. That is real progress and it must
continue.
The 2% benchmark and the concurrent commitment by NATO allies to
direct 20% of defense spending into military procurement provides a
simple, politically useful metric to prod more equitable burden
sharing. However, its effectiveness can and should be reinforced in two
ways. NATO should reanimate the inspections it used during the Cold War
to assess the readiness, deployability and sustainability of committed
Allied military units. Such inspections should be executed by one the
Alliance's two strategic commands, NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe and Allied Command Transformation. Data from such
inspections should be reported to NATO Defense ministers and, where
possible, incorporated into the annual public reports the NATO
Secretary General publishes on Allied defense spending.
Third, NATO needs to reinforce its increasingly vulnerable flanks
in North Central Europe, the Black Sea region and the Arctic where
military stability has been undermined by Russia's military build-up,
provocations, and aggression. In North Central Europe, the challenge is
acute where the Alliance's four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)
battalions stationed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are
juxtaposed against divisions of Russian airborne, mechanized infantry,
artillery, and tank units and the sophisticated aircraft, air defense,
helicopters, ships, and missiles that support them.
If these NATO battalions are to be a truly effective deterrent
against an aggressor of this magnitude, they must be able to survive
for at least a limited amount of time amidst an aggressive attack. They
must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on the adversary, and
the Alliance must have a demonstrable capacity to reinforce them in
real time. To become truly credible, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence
must be a central focus of the Alliance's readiness initiatives and the
investment priorities of NATO member states.
Toward this end, Poland has offered to host a permanent US military
presence on its territory, and the two governments are negotiating this
offer. Today, the United States deploys to Poland on a rotational basis
an armored brigade combat team, an armored battalion as part of NATO's
Enhanced Forward Presence, and an Army aviation detachment, among other
military assets. Transitioning that presence so that it would feature a
permanently stationed brigade complemented by a division level
headquarters and key enablers, including air and missile defense,
fires, and engineering equipment would significantly improve the
defense of NATO's eastern frontier, including the Baltics. Such a
permanent US presence in Poland could and should be facilitated by
force contributions from other NATO allies.
Fourth, the Alliance must more substantially embrace and support
the membership aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement has
been one of the great success stories of post-Cold War Europe. The
extension of NATO membership to Central European democracies reinforced
peace and security in Europe and strengthened the Alliance's military
capability. The newest members of the Alliance have been among Europe's
most stalwart transatlanticists and most willing to contribute to US-
led operations, including those beyond Europe.
The recent accession of Montenegro and the impending accession of
Macedonia to NATO are important steps toward completing the vision of
an undivided Europe, but the Alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and
Georgia a clear path to NATO membership, recognizing it will take them
time to meet the political and military requirements.
Toward this end, these two nations should be more deeply
incorporated into the maritime, air, and ground force initiatives the
United States and NATO is developing for the Black Sea region. Their
territories would be useful to anti-submarine, air-defense,
surveillance, and other operations needed to counter Russia's efforts
to leverage its occupation of Crimea into an anti-access/area-denial
bastion spanning that sea. And, NATO Allies should expand the lethal
security assistance provided to Georgia and Ukraine to include anti-
aircraft systems, antiship missiles and other capabilities that would
enhance their capacities for self-defense.
One clear lesson from Moscow's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia is
that the ambiguity of these two countries' relationships with the
Alliance only whetted the appetite of Russia's President, Vladimir
Putin, and animated his sense of opportunity to reassert Moscow's
hegemony over what has been allowed to become a de facto and
destabilizing grey zone in Europe's strategic landscape.
Finally, the Alliance needs to actively consider the role it will
play in the West's relationship with China. While China is not an
immediate military threat to Europe, its actions against the rules
based international order affects Europe as it does America. The
Alliance should expand and deepen its network of partnerships in the
Asia-Pacific region that now include, among others, Japan, Korea, and
Australia. As the transatlantic community's military arm, NATO can play
a constructive, if not significant role, in the West's broader
diplomatic, economic and military strategy to counter China's
provocative actions and to shape a cooperative and mutually beneficial
relationship with Beijing.
As the United States confronts the complex and dynamic challenges
of the 21st century, there is no instrument more essential and
indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic power, and
military might available through this community of democracies cannot
be sustained in the absence of a robust US military commitment to the
Alliance. That is the price of leadership, and it is one whose returns
have been consistently advantageous to the United States.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much. We sincerely
appreciate that, Mr. Brzezinski.
Now we will hear from Dr. Karen Donfried. And she is
president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a
nonprofit organization with whom most of us are familiar,
dedicated to strengthening transatlantic cooperation.
Before joining the German Marshall Fund, Dr. Donfried was
the special assistant to the president and senior director for
European Affairs on the National Security Council. Dr. Donfried
served as a national intelligence officer for Europe on the
National Intelligence Council, a Europe specialist at the
Congressional Research Service. From 2003 to 2005 she was
responsible for the Europe portfolio on the U.S. Department of
State's policy planning staff.
Dr. Donfried is a member of the board of trustees of
Wesleyan University, her undergraduate alma mater. She serves
as a senior fellow at the Center for European Studies at
Harvard University, and is a member of the Council on Foreign
Relations and the American Council on Germany.
Dr. Donfried has a Ph.D. and an MALD from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and a
bachelor's in government and German from Wesleyan University.
Dr. Donfried, welcome. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED, PRESIDENT, THE GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Risch, ranking member Menendez,
other members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity
to address NATO's value to the United States. I just want to
say the views that I will express will be my own, not those of
the German Marshall Fund.
As you noted, in two days, on April 4, NATO turns 70. And
that truly is a remarkable achievement. The secret to NATO's
longevity has been its ability to adapt to and meet the
challenges of a changing strategic landscape. Chairman Risch,
ranking member Menendez, you both did a wonderful job of
reviewing that history, so I will not.
NATO, which as you mentioned, is both a political and a
military alliance, has been a key pillar upholding the rules-
based international order that the United States has long
promoted. I would like to highlight three opportunities that I
see concerning our relationship with and role in NATO: First,
burden sharing; second, NATO's relationship with the European
Union; and third, the challenge posed by China.
First, let me address the debate about burden sharing,
which goes back to the earliest days of the alliance. Defense
spending alone tells us surprisingly little about a country's
actual military capabilities. In 2018, NATO Europe spent $264
billion on defense, which represents the second largest defense
budget in the world, outpaced only by the United States. That
European total represents about 1.5 times China's official
defense budget and roughly 4 times Russia's.
We need to focus not only on the total level of defense
spending by allies, but equally, as you noted, on what that
spending is allocated to. To be sure, allies need to spend 2
percent of their GDP on defense, a goal they recommitted
themselves to in 2014. But it matters just as much that they
spend 20 percent of those outlays on major new equipment,
including the related research and development. That 20 percent
guideline measures the scale and pace of modernization. If
allies' equipment is obsolete or interoperability gaps widen,
NATO will be weakened.
Moreover, some expenditures that count toward the 2 percent
target, such as outlays from military pensions, contribute
little, if at all, to current military readiness. These nuances
are often lost in the current debate over allies' contributions
to NATO.
Second, NATO needs to cooperate in more meaningful ways
with the European Union. The post-war recipe for a stable,
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Europe included two
critical ingredients, U.S. engagement and European integration.
The EU shares 22 members with NATO. And the EU has made
significant strides over the past year on defense cooperation,
making the moment ripe for enhanced NATO engagement with the
EU.
There are many forces pulling Europe apart today. From the
drama of Brexit to the rise of illiberal populism. Those can
often overwhelm unity. Given the direct interest the United
States has in Europe's future, we should strive not to be yet
another force dividing EU members. The European Union is not a
foe. It is a partner, and a very important one at that.
Admittedly, the United States has long been skeptical of
efforts by the EU to enhance defense cooperation. We focused
more on the risks of an enhanced EU defense role, such as
unnecessary duplication of NATO capabilities, than the possible
benefits.
In a variety of areas, enhanced NATO-EU cooperation could
make a real difference. And I would actually highlight military
mobility as one of those. A more integrated transport network
on the European continent is critical for both organizations,
and we also could benefit from a more robust response to hybrid
threats, and enhanced counterterrorism capabilities. NATO will
engage more seriously with the EU only if Washington encourages
such cooperation.
Third, a rising China challenges both sides of the
Atlantic. The primary concern in U.S. national security today
is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition from
China and Russia. NATO has a robust strategy concerning Russia,
but China barely features in alliance discussions. This can and
should change.
Europe and Canada recognize the geopolitical challenge that
China poses. Just last month, for the first time, the EU
identified China as ``an economic competitor in pursuit of
technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting
alternative models of governance.'' If the United States wants
to mount a successful response to China's rise, we will need
close cooperation from all of our democratic allies.
The security implications of China's increasing presence in
Europe are clear. Our European allies worry about how to manage
China's expanding footprint on the European continent, whether
through strategic infrastructure investments, by way of the
Belt and Road Initiative, or through critical digital
infrastructure like Huawei's 5G technology. These issues need
to rise to the top of NATO's agenda.
Let me conclude by underscoring the vital role I see
Congress playing in providing leadership in the alliance. Our
allies have grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals
emanating from the Administration about NATO's value. They had
believed that the alliance was an enduring strategic
commitment, rather than a shifting arrangement based on
transactions.
Whether through your support for increased funding for the
European Deterrence Initiative, the reestablishment of the
Senate NATO Observer Group, the impressive congressional
participation in the Munich Security Conference in February, or
the bipartisan initiative to the NATO Secretary General to
address a Joint Session of Congress tomorrow, your growing
engagement goes a long way to reassuring our allies about U.S.
commitment.
Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering
past achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope
is a policy. NATO members need to unify around a common sense
of purpose, and recommit their countries to investing more
incredible capabilities. The reason to do so is not because the
United States is asking; it is because the current strategic
reality demands it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Karen Donfried
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and other members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee
on Foreign Relations to address NATO's value as we celebrate the 70th
anniversary of the alliance. I would like to make clear that the views
I express are mine alone. I am not speaking for the German Marshall
Fund of the United States, which does not take institutional positions
on policy issues.
In 2 days, on April 4, NATO turns 70. This is truly a remarkable
achievement. Alliances typically disband shortly after the original
threat that gave rise to their creation subsides. One historical study
found that alliances last, on average, for 17 years.\1\
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\1\ Patrick Warren, ``Alliance History and the Future NATO: What
the Last 500 Years of Alliance Behavior Tells Us about NATO's Path
Forward,'' Brookings Policy Paper, June 30, 2010, p. 48.
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Not so with NATO. The secret to NATO's longevity has been its
ability to adapt and remain relevant to a changing strategic landscape
and meet the resulting new challenges. NATO was established to deter
the Soviet threat. But when the cold war ended, NATO played an
important role by stabilizing the new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe. There were also calls for NATO to move ``out of area''
to meet shared security challenges. And NATO responded by expanding its
mission when the alliance fought to restore peace in the Balkans. With
the attacks of 9/11, NATO, for the first and only time, invoked Article
5--and it did so, notably, to come to the defense of the United States.
Ever since, NATO allies have been vitally important partners in the
fight against terrorism. NATO's most significant operational commitment
to date is the mission in Afghanistan, starting with the International
Security Assistance Force under NATO leadership from 2003 to 2014 and
followed by Resolute Support to train, advise and assist Afghan
security forces. Finally, and most recently, NATO returned to its core
business of deterrence and collective defense following Russia's
illegal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine's sovereign territory, in 2014,
while continuing to pursue crisis management. These are the chapters of
NATO's 70 years of action. Throughout, NATO--both a military and a
political alliance--has been a key pillar upholding the rules-based
international order that the United States has long promoted.\2\
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\2\ The other pillar is the liberal compact that Bob Kagan
describes eloquently in The Jungle Grows Back (New York, 2018, pp. 135-
6): ``In exchange for nations forgoing traditional geopolitical
ambitions and ceding the United States a near monopoly of military
power, the United States would support an open economic order in which
others would be allowed to compete and succeed; it would not treat
members of the order, and particularly allies, simply as competitors in
a zero-sum game; it would through participation in international
institutions, an active multilateral diplomacy, and the articulation of
shared liberal values support and sustain a sense of community among
those nations that made common cause on behalf of those shared values
and interests.''
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As NATO's mission has expanded, its membership has grown too, from
the original 12 countries to 29 today. The next country likely to walk
through NATO's ``open door'' is the Republic of North Macedonia, with
the accession protocol concluded and that protocol now being ratified
by existing members.
NATO has powerfully served American interests. The political,
economic, and security interests of the United States require a stable
Europe. We learned this lesson through the tragedy of two world wars, a
lesson that must never be forgotten even as those tragic events recede
from us in time. As Winston Churchill famously observed in 1948,
``Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.''
Now, at a time when we are experiencing a global shift of power and
fierce competition for domestic resources, having reliable allies
willing to share the burden of collective defense has become only more
important for U.S. interests. NATO is unique in providing a command
structure, multinational interoperability, and deployable capabilities.
That is why NATO is so often referred to as the partner of first resort
for the United States. The challenge today is how to continue to adapt
and modernize this alliance to meet the challenges of today and
tomorrow.
Much has already been said and written about NATO at 70.\3\ I won't
review those points and provide a comprehensive overview here. Instead,
my focus will be twofold. First, I will highlight opportunities
relating to burden-sharing, NATO's relationship with the European
Union, and the challenge posed by China. Second, I will discuss the
vital role Congress plays in providing U.S. leadership in the alliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, for example, Transcript of ``NATO at 70: An Indispensable
Alliance,'' Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
March 13, 2019; and Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, ``NATO at Seventy:
An Alliance in Crisis,'' Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
nato burden-sharing: shift the focus to european defense capabilities
The debate about burden-sharing among NATO members goes back to the
earliest days of the alliance. More recently, near the end of his
tenure as Secretary of Defense in June 2011, Robert Gates memorably
lamented being ``the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who
have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to
meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.'' He stood in
Brussels and challenged Europe, explaining that ``it will take
leadership from political leaders and policymakers on this continent.
It cannot be coaxed, demanded or imposed from across the Atlantic.''
\4\ Those words remain true today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda,
Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011.
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Defense spending alone--especially viewed in a vacuum without
appropriate context--tells us surprisingly little about a country's
actual military capabilities. In 2018, NATO Europe spent $264 billion
on defense, which represents the second largest defense budget in the
world, outpaced only by the United States. That European total
represents 1.5 times China's official defense budget ($168 billion) and
roughly four times Russia's $63 billion.\5\ Even viewed in this
context, defense spending by allies needs to increase, but other
metrics matter too, namely, what those defense euros are spent on. The
inefficiencies, redundancies, and clash of strategic cultures across
Europe's national militaries are sobering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, ``On the up: Western defence spending in
2018,'' IISS Military Balance Blog, Feb. 15. 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, we need to focus not only on the total level of defense
spending by allies, but equally on what that spending is allocated to.
To be sure, allies should spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, a
target they recommitted themselves to in 2014 following Russia's
annexation of Crimea. But it matters just as much that they spend 20
percent of those outlays ``on major new equipment, including related
Research & Development.'' \6\ That 20 percent guideline measures the
scale and pace of modernization. Allies can spend all the money they
want, but if their equipment is obsolete or interoperability gaps
widen, NATO will be weakened. Moreover, some expenditures that count
toward the 2 percent target--such as outlays for military pensions--
contribute little if at all to current military readiness. These
nuances are often lost in the current debate over the allies'
contributions to NATO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Wales Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Sept. 5, 2014.
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nato's cooperation with the european union: more is needed
One thing we have learned from history and two world wars is that
conflict in Europe inevitably drew the United States in. Thus, the
post-war administration of Harry Truman encouraged European integration
to ensure the countries of Europe would never go to war again. The
Marshall Plan was one of the first steps on this path. Today's European
Union began with a European Coal and Steel Community to
``communitarize'' the key instruments and industries of war and provide
a framework for the peaceful coexistence of France and Germany, in
particular. We often forget that the post-war recipe for a stable,
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Europe included two key
ingredients: U.S. engagement and European integration.
The disdain President Trump directs at the European Union (EU) is
singular and has a negative impact on political cohesion within NATO
given that 22 of NATO's 29 allies are also EU members. The European
Union is not a foe; it is a partner, and a very important one at that.
To cite just one example, the United States and the European Union have
the largest trade and investment relationship in the world.
Today, there are many more factors pulling Europe apart--from the
drama of Brexit to the rise of illiberal populism--than encouraging
unity. These centrifugal forces show no signs of abating. Given the
direct interest the United States has in Europe's future, we should
strive not to be yet another factor dividing EU members.
The United States has long been skeptical of EU efforts to enhance
defense cooperation. Madeleine Albright, during her tenure as Secretary
of State, articulated that European efforts should not duplicate NATO's
efforts or capabilities, discriminate against allies who are not EU
members, or decouple Europe's security from that of other NATO allies.
To date, the American reaction has focused on the risks of an enhanced
EU defense role, rather than on the possible benefits. Within the EU,
Britain, which along with France has the most capable European
military, has been least enthusiastic about EU defense initiatives. The
Brexit process has already resulted in a less engaged Britain, which,
in turn, has translated into greater EU progress in this area.
NATO has long-standing, but under-developed, cooperation with the
EU. The reasons for that are many and include this American and British
skepticism, as well as the EU's propensity to under-deliver on
ambitious initiatives. That said, the EU has made significant strides
over the past year and, in my judgment, the moment for enhanced NATO
engagement with the EU is ripe. As for concerns about EU defense
efforts wasting finite resources on unnecessary duplication like
creating an independent command structure, those concerns are best
addressed by closer cooperation between NATO and the EU precisely to
avoid such duplication.
Today, the European Union may be better poised than NATO to
increase the political will of its members to step up their defense
efforts, especially at a time when an American president, who is deeply
unpopular in many European countries, is perceived as the one making
demands not out of a commitment to a strong alliance, but as a
condition for continued U.S. participation. That stance has fueled
doubts about the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee and sparked
a renewed desire for European strategic autonomy in some quarters,
particularly France.
Where could more serious NATO-EU cooperation make a real
difference? Take military mobility on the European continent, which is
a critical concern for both organizations. At NATO's Brussels Summit in
July of last year, the alliance updated its Command Structure, which
now includes a new Enabling Command based in Germany to improve the
movement of troops and equipment within Europe. The goal is to ensure
NATO has ``the right forces in the right place at the right time.'' \7\
One month earlier, in June 2018, the European Commission announced that
its next long-term EU budget 2021-2017 includes 6.5 billion euros to
adapt Europe's transport network to military requirements and thus
improve military mobility.\8\ This EU investment will be a meaningful
contribution to a stronger NATO as well. Military mobility is just one
example that suggests concrete synergies could result from joint,
rather than simply complementary, efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Brussels Summit Key Decisions 11-12 July 2018, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, Nov. 2018.
\8\ ``EU budget: Stepping up the EU's role as security and defence
provider,'' Press Release, European Commission, June 13, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg champions EU efforts to increase
defense cooperation, arguing that NATO needs those efforts to succeed
because they can contribute to fairer burden-sharing. He has emphasized
that ``after Brexit 80 percent of NATO's defense expenditures will come
from non-EU NATO allies.'' \9\ If the EU can help create the political
will for its members--22 of which, as previously noted, are NATO
allies--to spend more on defense and develop new capabilities that will
be good for both organizations, whether the goal is increased military
mobility, a more robust response to hybrid threats or enhanced counter-
terrorism capabilities. NATO will engage more seriously with the EU,
however, only if Washington encourages such cooperation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
prior to the European Union Foreign Affairs Council meeting, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nov. 20, 2018. See also Ryan Heath, ``8
NATO countries to hit defense spending target,'' Politico, July 5,
2018.
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a rising china: a challenge for both sides of the atlantic
The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies the primary concern
in U.S. national security as the reemergence of long-term strategic
competition from China and Russia, both of which are revisionist,
authoritarian powers. NATO has a robust strategy concerning Russia,
whereas China barely features in Alliance discussions. The lead article
in The Economist's recent special report on NATO at 70 concluded by
asking: ``How can the transatlantic alliance hold together as America
becomes less focused on Europe and more immersed in Asia? That is a
vital question, but so far NATO has barely started tackling it.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Mature reflection,'' Special report NATO at 70, The
Economist, March 16, 2019, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reality is that China can and should be a shared strategic
concern of NATO allies. Europe and Canada also see the geopolitical
challenge China poses. And if the United States wants to mount a
successful democratic response to the rise of an assertive,
authoritarian China, it will need close cooperation with all of its
democratic allies. Allies make the United States stronger. That
statement is no less true in 2019 than it was in 1949.
China's threat to NATO allies is not a military one. But China has
become a serious competitor politically, economically, and
technologically. The United States, Europe and Canada need to align
much more closely in terms of how they approach China. NATO allies
should discuss their efforts to screen foreign direct investment in
strategic infrastructure, as well as in key technology sectors. NATO
should also deepen its military partnerships with allies in the
Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
Our European allies used to look at China's rise and worry about
how the growing competition between the United States and China would
affect them. Now, the Europeans worry themselves about how to manage
China's expanding footprint on the European continent--whether through
strategic infrastructure investments by way of the Belt and Road
Initiative or through critical digital infrastructure like Hauwei's 5G
technology. China's interest in Europe extends from the High North to
Greece in the south. And China's commercial investments are resulting
in political influence. That reality offers an opportunity for
transatlantic coordination and cooperation.
China has proven to be adept at dividing Europe. On March 23, Italy
became the first G7 member to sign a memorandum of understanding with
China's Belt and Road Initiative; 13 smaller EU countries had already
done so.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Lisbeth Kirk, ``Europe shifts gears to balance relations with
China better,'' euobserver, March 13, 2019.
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In the immediate run-up to Chinese President Xi's visit to Rome, on
March 12, the European Commission issued a strategic communication
laying out 10 proposals for dealing with Beijing that EU leaders later
endorsed.\12\ The Financial Times called the document ``a turning point
in EU attitudes toward Beijing.'' \13\ For the first time, the EU
identified China as ``an economic competitor in pursuit of
technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative
models of governance.'' The document stated that ``the EU and its
Member states can achieve their aims concerning China only in full
unity.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Hans von der Burchard, ``EU slams China as `systemic rival' as
trade tension rises,'' Politico, March 12, 2019.
\13\ ``EU must show unity in its relations with China,'' Financial
Times, March 29, 2019, p. 10.
\14\ ``Commission reviews relations with China, proposed 10
actions,'' Press Release, European Commission, March 12, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that spirit of unity, French President Macron invited German
Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Juncker to join him
on March 26 in Paris for the final day of the Chinese President's visit
to France. Macron enjoined Xi to ``respect the unity of the European
Union and the values it carries in the world.'' \15\ The next
opportunity for the EU to showcase a united front will be at the EU's
Summit with China on April 9. Overcoming individual national interests
with regard to China will not be easy for European countries. The
United States needs to engage regularly and actively in discussing
China's strategy with its allies, because the American voice carries
significant weight in these intra-European discussions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``Xi, Merkel, Macron and Juncker meet in Paris,'' DW, March
26, 2019.
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The security implications of China's increasing presence in Europe
are clear. Chinese investment in strategic infrastructure--from ports
to tunnels--means that European efforts to screen with greater care
foreign direct investment are urgent. European reliance on Hauwei's 5G
technology could facilitate surveillance by China's security services.
For 70 years, the superior quality of allied military power has rested,
in part, on the technological edge the United States has held globally.
Thus, how NATO allies manage the ongoing technological revolution has
direct implications for NATO's strength. These issues need to rise to
the top of NATO's agenda. NATO-EU consultations on how to engage with
China should follow closely.
congressional leadership on nato: more valuable than ever
Congressional engagement matters, both at home and abroad. Our
allies have grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals emanating
from the Administration about NATO's value. They had believed that the
alliance was an enduring strategic commitment, rather than a shifting
arrangement based on transactions.
Many Members of Congress share these same concerns and have become
increasingly active in voicing their support for NATO. As the lead
nation in the alliance, what the United States says matters immensely
to the other allies. Recently, Congress has stepped forward to
reinforce U.S. leadership in NATO. In February, over 50 Members of
Congress, from Senate Judiciary Chairman Graham to Speaker Pelosi,
attended the Munich Security Conference--the largest congressional
delegation in the over 50-year history of this annual, high-level
gathering. Even more recently, in a valuable expression of
bipartisanship, House Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader
McConnell invited NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to
address a Joint Session of Congress. Stoltenberg will be the first NATO
Secretary General ever to enjoy this privilege tomorrow. This rising
congressional engagement with European counterparts, strengthened by
the reestablishment of the Senate NATO Observer Group last year, goes a
long way to reassuring our allies about U.S. commitment.
Ever since last July's NATO Summit in Brussels, rumors have been
flying that the President wants to pull the United States out of NATO.
Again, Congress has sought to reassure the Allies. In the immediate
run-up to that Summit, the Senate voted 97-2 to reaffirm the U.S.
commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance. This January, the
House of Representatives passed the NATO Support Act by a bipartisan
vote of 357 to 22 , thus ``reject[ing] any efforts to withdraw the
United States from NATO'' and prohibiting any use of Federal funds for
that purpose. Also, in January, a bipartisan group of Senators
reintroduced a joint resolution requiring the President to seek the
advice and consent of the Senate to withdraw the United States from
NATO. The strong show of bipartisan congressional support for NATO at
this time of deep political polarization speaks volumes. Our allies
have noticed.
Congressional leadership on NATO has advanced trust in the U.S.
political and security commitment among U.S. allies. Congress's
oversight role and power of the purse are significant. Congressional
support for increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative
has enhanced our deterrence and defense posture in Europe, making real
that security commitment. The most immediate challenge to NATO
continues to be deterring further Russian aggression in Europe's East.
Alliances depend on shared interests, common values, and trust.
Trust has taken a beating recently. A strong, bipartisan majority in
Congress has been steadfast in emphasizing the enduring commitment of
the United States to its allies. As Ranking Member Menendez said
eloquently in Brussels this February, ``the United States is stronger,
safer, and more prosperous when we work in concert with our allies in
Europe.'' \16\
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\16\ Keynote Speech by Senator Menendez on ``Transatlantic
Relations in a Changing World,'' Feb. 18, 2019, hosted by GMF in
Brussels, Belgium (www.gmfus.org).
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Congress's engagement could prove to be the critical variable for
unifying transatlantic partners around a shared goal of strategic
responsibility. Congress can and should articulate a bipartisan vision
of NATO's future that can serve to strengthen alliance cohesion. Having
European military forces that are more effective, efficient, and
capable is in the interest of every alliance member. It is hard to
imagine future scenarios in which Europeans will not be called on to
take greater responsibility, especially in their neighborhood.
Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering past
achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope is a policy.
NATO members need to unify around a common sense of purpose and
recommit their countries to investing more in credible capabilities.
The reason to do so is not because the United States is asking; it is
because the current strategic reality demands it.
The Chairman. Well, our thanks to both of you. Those
certainly were outstanding remarks. We are going to open it up
to questions now. I will start with one briefly, and then turn
it over to the ranking member.
Last night I gave a similar speech to a group of NATO
policy planners from around the--of our allies. It was a pretty
good-sized group. They were all represented there. And this was
their inaugural meeting. And I told them I thought if I was
planner, I would think that meeting more than once every 70
years might be helpful. They acknowledged as much, and promised
to do better in the future.
But in any event, I took questions, and their questions,
most of them were pretty straightforward, much along the lines
what the ranking member and I have talked about. But I had one
question that, Dr. Donfried, you referred to, and that was, it
was a speech similar to what I gave here at the beginning. And
it was modestly critical of the bureaucracy when it came to
infrastructure. And trying to be self-deprecating I told them
we Americans are familiar with the bureaucracy. We know it when
we see it.
But in any event, one of the--I won't identify the country,
but one of them got up and said, ``Well, we appreciate that. We
agree with you.'' And I am paraphrasing. ``So how much are you
guys going to kick in?'' All right. It wasn't that direct, but
it was a question that actually took me back a little bit. They
obviously are not familiar with politics here, knowing that we
have not been able to pass an infrastructure bill here in the
United States, which we badly need and want. But in addition to
that, of course, we don't have funding for it.
So I explained as delicately as I could the precarious
financial position of the country, and moved on. But I would
like to hear your thoughts on that. I would say that it is my
sense that the rest of the audience knew that the questioner
was tilting at a windmill, but nonetheless, I thought they
might be at least feeling good about the kind of question that
he was asking, and being sympathetic with the position.
So your thoughts, please, both of you, on that issue.
Mr. Brzezinski. On military mobility, the EU is undertaking
an important initiative. As part of its Connecting of Europe
Facility, it is planning to dedicate or earmark 6.5 billion
euros for the budget period which I think is 2021 to 2027. That
money is going to be allocated specifically for upgrading
roads, bridges, rail heads, so that they can handle heavy
military equipment. So that is an important initiative, and the
EU should be complimented for undertaking that.
There is a second initiative worth noting, and that is the
Three Seas Initiative. It is a Central European effort to
accelerate the development of cross-border, transport energy
and telecom infrastructure among the countries between the
Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas. And that, of course, has a
big road and rail component to it, and could be leveraged to
support transport routes that can handle heavy equipment and
move military equipment east and west, and north and south. It
merits a U.S. Government support.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Donfried?
Dr. Donfried. I completely agree with Ian's point about the
fact that the EU is dedicating resources--6.5 billion euros--to
modernizing their infrastructure. This was striking to me,
because we saw last July, at the last NATO summit, that NATO
revamped its command structure. And one of the new commands
that was added was an enabling command based in Ulm, Germany. A
focus of that command is improving the movement of troops and
equipment through Europe.
There was a great quote at the time that the goal of this
new command is to ensure that NATO has the right forces in the
right place at the right time. And I think those two examples
illustrate the extent to which there are synergies between what
NATO is trying to do and what the EU is trying to do, and that
we could benefit from those more.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you. Thank you both for very
insightful testimony. Let me ask you a simple question. Should
the Senate pass legislation which would require a Senate vote
in the event that any administration seeks to withdraw from
NATO.
Dr. Donfried. Yes. Should I say more? I think it is very--
--
Senator Menendez. Yes would do, but I am happy to hear more
if you want to do that. Mr. Brzezinski.
Mr. Brzezinski. I think it is important for Congress, the
Senate, and the House of Representatives to underscore their
commitment to NATO, their determination to support U.S.
Government in the execution of all NATO responsibilities. While
I appreciate greatly the sentiment behind this proposed
legislation, I am a little concerned that it creates an
impression that once passed, it solves the problem. But it
doesn't necessarily so, because as commander-in-chief, as our
chief diplomat, the U.S. president can basically stand down
U.S. military personnel, U.S. diplomatic personnel, and tell
them to do nothing on NATO, and thereby draw NATO to a full
stop.
Senator Menendez. But that would be an--it is very
possible, but that would be an extension to the extent that if
you are, then not committed to Article V either, right? If you
are going to stand down and not respond, then you are also not
committed to Article V. So you have hollowed out the very
existence of your participation in NATO. If anything, you have
violated your agreement to NATO.
So my view simply is, in my visits to both the EU and the
Munich Security Conference, it became very vividly clear to me
that there is a real angst among our allies about this ironclad
commitment that they have always thought existed. And so I
think a reassurance is that, well, before any president, this
or any future one, contemplates that, having the vote of the
Senate will be essential.
And I think that because the allies know largely how the
Senate feels, including the question of 2 percent and the 20
percent, but nonetheless that there is an ironclad reality to
the commitment to NATO, that that would be reassuring. So I
don't think it does any harm, but I appreciate your point.
Let me ask you both, how would you assess the diplomatic
approach taken by the Administration in urging countries to
increase defense spending, which in Germany's case appears to
have slowed somewhat? Are we experiencing a backlash against
the assertive diplomatic approach in Berlin taken by the
Administration?
Dr. Donfried. This in many ways connects to your first
question, Senator Menendez, because alliance fundamentally
rests on shared interests, common values, and alliance
cohesion. That alliance cohesion, part of which is based on
trust, trusting that your allies are there to defend you, and
that they are spending the proper amount on defense, so that
they have capabilities that allow the alliance to perform the
tasks it needs to perform. I think the challenge resulting from
the way we have been discussing the level of defense spending
is that it can erode alliance cohesion.
Because some of our allies are feeling that we are using it
almost as a threat, if you do not do this, then we, the U.S.,
will pull out of NATO. And that erodes alliance cohesion. And
that is why in my remarks I was trying to stress that as
important as that 2 percent of GDP spent on defense is, it is
critically important how that money is spent. And I am hopeful
that if we reframe that debate and focus on the capabilities,
on the outputs from that defense spending, it may allow us to
move in a more constructive direction.
Senator Menendez. Mm-hmm.
Dr. Donfried. Now to your specific question about Germany,
I do think every NATO member should feel bound by the
commitments agreed to most recently at the Wales summit in
2014. It was all NATO members that recommitted themselves to
the 2 percent guideline.
Now it is not like a club and dues. It is saying we are
going to move toward spending 2 percent of our GDP on defense
by 2024. And I think all of us who care about the alliance were
disconcerted to see Germany's budget plan suggesting that
German defense spending would actually decline in future years.
So I do think we need to keep pressure on our allies to spend
more, but we also want to engage in that conversation as
constructively as possible.
Senator Menendez. Yes. Having listened to Chancellor Merkel
at the Munich Security Conference I am not sure that our
approach there is the best one to achieve the mutual goal that
we have.
Finally, let me ask you a question, Dr. Donfried. You said
before for President Trump alliances are not something
enduring, they are something transactional. I wonder if you
could expand on that. How is the President's rhetoric affecting
European confidence in the U.S. security guarantees to Europe?
What long-term effects do you anticipate on transatlantic
relations if this is the continuum?
Dr. Donfried. Let me start by underscoring the fact that
the United States is the lead nation in NATO. When you read the
North Atlantic Treaty, if a country wants to withdraw from the
alliance, where do they send that notification? To Washington.
So it is somehow ironic that today we are talking about the
possibility that the U.S. might withdraw from that alliance.
And I do think that the U.S. security guarantee to Europe
has been critical to post-war peace, stability, and prosperity
on the European continent. The reason the U.S. was supportive
of creating the NATO alliance in 1949 was not an act of
benevolence. It had beneficial aspects for others, but it was
very much in our self-interest. We had had the experience of
two world wars, and did not want to return to the European
continent in a future world war. So just to remind why this
alliance was something we felt was in our enlightened self-
interest.
And from that point on, our Canadian and European allies
have felt that that American security guarantee was something
enduring. And yes, there are important differences of opinion
that we have had over the seven decades. You could point to the
disagreement over or the crisis over the Suez Canal in the
1950's; in every decade there have been serious crises. Our
stationing of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, the Iraq
war in 2003. But we have always believed that at the end of the
day we were there for each other, and that Article VI bound all
of us.
What has happened over the past year is in part because of
specific comments the President has made, suggesting that our
commitment to our allies is not enduring, but rather depends on
very explicit deals, particularly on defense spending, that we
might actually not be there in future. And I think that has
been one factor that has been damaging to alliance cohesion.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses. It is great to have you here.
In Senator Risch's opening comments he referred to NATO as
the preeminent military alliance in the world, also used the
word most successful military alliance. Senator Menendez would
have layered superlatives on, too, but he didn't have to,
because the chairman had put the superlatives on the table.
Mr. Brzezinski, you used the words ``essential'' and
``indispensable,'' and then Dr. Donfried, in your written
testimony you say that ``NATO has powerfully served American
interests as well as global interests, interests of our NATO
partners.'' I gave a speech at the French-American Foundation
in Paris two Thursdays ago about the 70th anniversary of NATO,
and I was very interested in the questions that I got.
The issue of mixed signals, Dr. Donfried, that you put on
the table, Congress taking some strong action on funding, the
President sometimes suggesting that we might get out of NATO,
maybe it is to negotiate for more contributions. And you can
understand that negotiating behavior. But I was interested in
this, and it kind of goes to the question that Senator Menendez
asked you, Mr. Brzezinski. The question I was really getting
was less about what the president is saying than this: Are the
President's comments indicative of what the American public
think?
Sylvie Kaufman is the former editor of Le Monde, and she
was my interviewer after my speech. And she was really focusing
on the President's comments as more generally, the way we read
it is that the American public is losing interest in this
alliance.
So I have a bill like Senator Menendez does. It is slightly
different. The bill that I have said that no president can
remove from NATO without doing one of two things, either
getting the Senate to affirm that by two-thirds vote, which we
used to get into the treaty, or by an act of Congress. It would
have to go through both houses with veto and override
possibility. But a president could not unilaterally do it.
And as we talked about the bill there, it was interesting
the perception from Sylvie Kaufman and others that that is less
of a bill about the president as it would be about a bill about
the legislature, which is the American people's elected Article
I branch affirming just how much we believe that this is the
preeminent military alliance in the world, and the most
successful in the world, essential and indispensable.
And so it would be the case, as Mr. Brzezinski said, even
if we passed it, a president could start to stand down. But the
message that we would send if we did pass something like this
is not just what Congress thinks about it, but what Congress
thinks about it, being elected from 435 congressional
districts, being elected from 50 states, that we view this as
so very, very important.
I had hoped the bill that I introduced, which is Senate
Joint Resolution, I say I introduced. Twelve of us introduced
it. Six democrats, six republicans. Very bipartisan. And I know
the same is true of Senator Menendez's bill.
I had hoped that we might be able to deal with that matter
in connection with the NATO 70th. We do not have to deal with
it on the week of the NATO 70th, but I do think anniversaries,
as Dr. Donfried said, are not just times to celebrate, they are
also times to chart a new course, and commit, and recommit.
With proposals on the table that are as bipartisan as
these, I would hope that this committee might take up one of
these and find a path forward where we can clearly state that a
Senate that affirmed NATO at its foundation, and that will vote
soon on a new nation's entrance into NATO, which the Senate
does, is also taking the position that there will be no
unilateral executive withdrawal under this or any other
president from NATO. I think that is so important, and I think
the time is right to do it.
I will admit to a little bias, too. There is a joint forces
command in NATO in Norfolk. This is something that, together
with the presence in Brussels, and some of the other cities
within NATO where there is a little bit of a command presence.
It has been something that has been powerful in connection with
the Atlantic command in the United States Navy.
But I just feel like if it is preeminent, and the best in
the world, then it is. If it is the most successful, if it is
indispensable, if it is essential, if it has protected U.S.
interests, then Congress ought to say it not so much on our
behalf, Congress should say it on behalf of the American
public, and clarify that you can count on us. You can count on
us for the long haul. We will have disputes, and debates, and
things will happen, and there will be disagreements, but that
is what we want to send. That is the Nation we want to be. You
can count on us.
So I appreciate the witnesses being here, and appreciate
the chair for calling this hearing at an important time, and I
am most excited about the opportunity to hear the Secretary-
General tomorrow. With that, Mr. Chair, I will yield back to
you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to
see you both. Thank you very much for being here.
Here is my theory of the case, and I would love to hear
your responses to it. I think that Russia delights in some way,
shape, and form in our obsession over the 2 percent threshold.
Our evaluation of whether countries in NATO are standing up
capabilities necessary to defend themselves is essentially
limited to their investment in military hardware.
And yet, Russia has been wildly successful in weakening
many of our allies, and weakening the alliance without invading
a single NATO country. They have developed over the course of
time all sorts of old-fashioned and newfangled capabilities,
whether it be the spread of Russian-backed propaganda, whether
it be the allure of their natural resources, or just old-
fashioned corruption, craft, and bribery that has done
significant damage to countries in the alliance and on the
periphery of the alliance.
I think we made the right move to put a big annual
commitment into European reassurance initiative. We spent a lot
of money on that on an annual basis for a billion dollars, and
I think it is money well spent, but I also think that Russia
delights in the fact that we spent $4 billion on military
hardware on the border, and zero dollars on actually trying to
get countries in Europe to be energy dependent on Russia.
And so I just want to query you both as to the utility of
this obsession that we have about evaluating your participation
in the alliance based pretty much solely on how much money you
spend on troops, and tanks, and guns. I think that is a really
important conversation to have, but it should not be what has
been, at least for Congress, the beginning and the end of the
conversation.
Is it time (a) to actually update the way in which we
decide whether countries are full partners in the alliance? Is
it time to say that we are going to count something other than
just military hardware into the equation? Or if not that, what
are the other mechanisms by which we can acknowledge the actual
capacities that Russia has, and the lack of those capacities
that exist inside the alliance today, especially given how we
talk about countries' contributions.
That is my question to you, and I would love to hear both
of your thoughts.
Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, on burden sharing, the 2 percent
metric is imperfect. But I like it, because it is simple, and
it is proportional. And when I look at what drives it, what is
driving the 2 percent metric is the need for ready deployable
forces that on day one are ready to go to battle. And NATO has
struggled from day one of its existence in getting all allies
to ensure that they are making a proportionate contribution to
that military readiness.
Senator Murphy. So I can see where you are heading with the
answer. Do you think that NATO should be engaged in those other
questions of security? Or is that something that should happen
in a different forum? If you are talking about energy security
or information security, are those conversations that should
not happen inside of NATO?
Mr. Brzezinski. Because of the nature of conflict and
competition today, the alliance will have to play a role, and
will have to have capacities in the cyber domain, and to a
certain degree in the information domain. It will have to have
its antenna up to watch, observe hybrid operations by our
adversaries.
But if you go back to the cold war, and you look at that
time, and the way we defeated the Soviet Union, the West, lead
by the United States, had a multidimensional strategy. It had
the Alliance, serving as the pointy end of its spear pointed
eastward. It had sophisticated political operations to support
dissident and other political movements in the Soviet Bloc and
the Soviet Union. It had a fairly massive information
infrastructure called United States Information Agency. They
were all coordinated together as part of a national and as part
of an Western response to the challenge posed by the Soviet
Union at that time.
So when I bring those lessons to today, I seen an alliance
that has to improve its military readiness. It has to be aware
of what is going on in the other domains. But I see a real gap
between the amount of resources that a country like Russia, or
a country like China, puts into hybrid operations what what we
do.
I think when the USIA was shut down in 1998 or 1999, it had
roughly a budget of about $3 billion, 20 years ago. I
understand our information operations budget in the United
States Government is about half-a-billion dollars, if that. And
it is of dissipated among different organizations not
centralized in an information agency as it was in the past.
The Chairman. OK.
Dr. Donfried. If I can just jump in with two points. First,
I would completely agree with you that it is important to focus
not only on money and how much money is spent; it matters how
that money is spent. Russia spends much less than NATO Europe
does on defense. Part of the reason that Europeans are getting
less value for their euros is because of the inefficiencies,
redundancies, and clash of culture across Europe's militaries.
So there are many metrics we need to be looking at in terms of
having a more capable alliance. That was my first point.
The second point is NATO should have a holistic view of
security. And issues like energy dependence matter, information
warfare matters, and those are areas that I think buttress the
point I was making earlier that greater cooperation between
NATO and the European Union is important, because many of those
issues are places where the EU also has capacities.
So I do think we in the transatlantic space need to have
holistic view of security and need to be looking at this set of
metrics.
Thank you.
Senator Murphy. I appreciate the responses. I just think we
get awful boxed in by this conversation around 2 percent, first
because it tends to exclude capacities that are just as
important as the military capacities, and second, to your
point, Ms. Donfried, it has nothing to do with integration. So
you can be spending that 2 percent in a way that does not
integrate into the rest of your partners, and be meeting the
metric that the President says is the end-all and be-all of
sufficient participation.
Coordination, the quality of your spending, is important as
well. I do not deny the utility of having a number, but we
should also have a means of being able to evaluate how you
spend it, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Menendez, anything else
for the good of the--whoops. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Are we out of time, I am----
Senator Cardin. We have a unique friendship going between
the chairman and myself.
Let me first acknowledge my strong support for NATO. I have
listened to the chairman, and ranking member, and my colleagues
all talk about this importance of NATO to our national
security, the transatlantic partnership. And I strongly endorse
that. So I want to do that as a preface to my question. I think
it has been an extremely important alliance, one that I
strongly support.
I am also going to start with a quote from our former late
Senator John McCain when he said, ``For the last seven decades
the United States and our NATO allies have served together,
fought together, and sacrificed together for a vision of the
world based on freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of
law. Put simply, the transatlantic alliance has made the United
States safer, more prosperous, and remains critical to our
national security interests.'' I endorse Senator McCain's
comments there.
So when we look at NATO expansion, we vet for all those
purposes. How strong the country is in its institutions, its
commitment to democracy, its commitments to human rights, its
ability to control its military, et cetera, et cetera.
Once they become a partner in NATO, we do not have much
formal way of dealing with their commitment to these values.
And I would say that there have been several NATO partners that
have gone in the wrong direction on their commitments of good
governance, human rights, rule of law, and democratic
institutions.
So my question to you: How do we use our NATO alliance to
reinforce its principle value, and that is, to protect
democracy and democratic institutions, when some of our NATO
partners are moving in a wrong direction on this?
Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, the first point I would make is
that what was the purpose for NATO? It was to send lead down
range. It was to provide for military defense against our
adversaries. It was not established primarily as a democracy-
building institution.
Senator Cardin. I am going to disagree with that, because
when I look at every partner we had in NATO, when they came
into NATO they were committed to democratic institutions. And I
could tell you as we vet whether we will vote for approval, I
won't support the accession of a country into the NATO alliance
that does not show those values.
Mr. Brzezinski. No. I would support your decision on that.
Commitment to democratic value should be one of the criteria
for membership.
Senator Cardin. I am going to let you answer, and I would
suggest to you perhaps--we talked about the threat from China.
We talked about the threat from Russia. There is a direct
threat against democratic institutions today. We have seen an
erosion of democratic countries around the world for the 13th
consecutive year. NATO stands for protection of democratic
countries.
Mr. Brzezinski. True. The problem is, is that NATO, as a
consensus-based organization, may not be the most effective
means to stop a reversal in a commitment to democratic
principles by one of its members. It can put pressure on a
member state informally. Member states can be more effective in
putting pressure on that country through other means, through
their bilateral relationship, through institutions like the EU,
and such. But NATO is not going to be the driver of democratic
reform.
NATO's experience in that realm is really limited to
civilian control over the military. It is not an institution
that has been configured to monitor elections, to measure
adherence to core values. It is an institution that is designed
to help allies fight together.
Senator Cardin. I do not disagree with you. It is a
military alliance. I recognize that. But its strength is in
what it stands for. Otherwise, we invite Russia to join us.
They have a pretty strong military. But we do not want a
strategic--we do not want a military alliance with Russia. Why?
Because they don't share our values.
Mr. Brzezinski. NATO is a reflection of its member states'
commitment to values. And member states should pressure
countries, as we did in the case of Portugal, to reform in the
direction toward democracy. We did not do that directly through
NATO's institutions or NATO's decisionmaking, we did that
through external pressure, pressure from outside NATO, through
our bilateral relationships, European Union.
Senator Cardin. I would hope for a more--I do not disagree
with what NATO's mission is. I understand that. But it seems to
me there has to be the ability within the alliance to recognize
the importance of its values, because if we are just countries
of convenience that have joined together for mutual defense, I
would have picked a different group of countries, quite
frankly.
I do not think a lot of our alliances are really going to
help us militarily. We are actually defending them in a sea
that is trying to turn them away from democracy. And that is--
great. I am for that. But if we are--if we just look at this
from a tunnel vision on military security, and we do not look
at the values we are trying to protect in Europe and the United
States, we lose. And we have to use every institution we can,
because there are efforts being made to compromise the
democratic institutions. That is Russia's principle objective.
China's principle objective.
Mr. Brzezinski. When you introduce these sorts--when you
try and address these sorts of issues on the alliance, you bill
bump up against the consensus principle. And the only way you
can really leverage NATO's institutional capacity against a
particular member state is through the consensus principle. And
you will never get that as a result.
Senator Cardin. OSCE is a consensus organization. They have
principles, and they fight for those principles. And it has
been pretty successful every year as a consensus institution.
And that includes countries that we are not terribly in line
with on values. Seems to me, NATO, we should not have that
problem.
Mr. Brzezinski. If one breaks a consensus principle in
NATO----
Senator Cardin. They do not break it. You should be able to
get consensus through our commitments to values to get change,
or to let it be known that it is not acceptable for a NATO
partner to infringe upon the basic human rights of its
citizens.
Mr. Brzezinski. And NATO provides a mechanism by which
members can express that. But to translate that expression into
action can be extremely difficult in a consensus-based
organization.
If you challenge the consensus principle, if you want to
get into a position to be extreme, or you want to be able to
kick a member state our, I think you would bring into the
Alliance a really divisive dynamic.
Senator Cardin. I am not saying that. Maybe we got off to
the wrong discussion here. I want to know how we use NATO and
our associations within NATO to advance the values in countries
that are moving in the wrong direction. I did not suggest that
we kick them out of NATO. I did not suggest that we penalize
them and tell them they cannot go to the next NATO summit. I
did not suggest any of that. What I am suggesting is that there
should be a focus for NATO membership of a commitment to
democratic values.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
commitment to our alliance.
Clearly, Russia represents a proximate threat and
geopolitical adversary of sorts. But increasingly long-term, I
think there is a perspective that China represents a greater
long-term threat to freedom, to free enterprise, to human
rights. We hope they will not go down that path, but they have
taken some frightening turns.
I would like to ask each of you, to what extent do you
believe NATO members that have been focused primarily on
Europe, of course, given its history, and its charter, but to
what extent do NATO members recognize and seize the importance
of the potential threat of China, a rising China. That will be
question one.
And question two, I will get them both out. And then
question two is, what would you do--if you had the potential to
do so, what would you do to strengthen NATO? What is the key to
making NATO a more powerful alliance? And I say that in part
because China will have a population many times our size down
the road. They will have an economy much larger than ours, just
given the fact that they will have a much--or will have a much
larger population.
And for us to have the same economic might, the same
capacity to build an impregnable military will depend not just
on us standing alone, but us standing with others whose
population and economies we can share. So, again, do our NATO
allies recognize the significance of China as a threat? Are
they taking action consistent with that? And then No. 2, what
do we do to strengthen NATO as it faces these challenges?
Dr. Donfried and then Mr. Brzezinski.
Dr. Donfried. Thanks so much, Senator Romney.
In many ways, this connects to the question Senator Cardin
raised. I am not sure we would have democracy in Europe to the
extent that we do were it not for NATO, were it not for U.S.
engagement on the European continent. And the U.S. was very
clearly trying to expand a liberal, small L, international
order at the end of World War II that was based on principles
of liberal democracy, free market economy, rule of law, rights
of the individual. And those values are essential to what NATO
stands for.
And we expect not only aspirants, the Georgias, Ukraines,
Bosnias of the world, but also existing members to live up to
those values. And this is why I would argue all NATO allies
agree with the U.S. that China poses a real challenge to the
order that we constructed together at the end of World War II.
The fact of the matter is that China barely registers on
NATO's agenda today. I would agree with you that NATO needs to
grapple much more directly with what that rise of China means.
We see it in terms of China going west with its Belt and Road
Initiative, making strategic investments in European ports, in
European tunnels that clearly have affected political stances
of particular European countries.
I do think there is increasingly a recognition in Europe
about the challenge China poses. And we have seen that in
recent European Union writings as well, and also in the fact
that many European member states, along with the EU, have
tightened up their review of Chinese strategic investment.
So that is to your first question.
To your second question about how can NATO become more
powerful, I think for the U.S. it is about doubling down on
this alliance. We, the U.S., are facing this challenge from a
rising China, and I believe firmly that we are stronger for
having democratic allies who are meeting this challenge with
us.
What is it that sets us apart from China and from Russia?
It is precisely that we have allies. And so we should celebrate
that and treasure it, and work to enhance alliance cohesion.
Thank you.
Mr. Brzezinski. I agree with Karen that the European Union,
our European allies, are becoming more aware of the threat
posed by China. You see the discussion over Huawei, you see the
recent strategy document, where they defined China as a
competitor--pretty daring language for the European Union. And
so Europe really is ready for a serious discussion with the
United States on how we can collaborate to help shape the
relationship the West has with a rise in China.
How to strengthen NATO? I agree that NATO is going to have
to put China on its agenda. We are beginning to see the first
signs of that in the internal discussions going on within the
alliance.
As I mentioned in my testimony, what China is doing to the
international rules-based order affects Europe just as much as
it affects the United States. The good news is that some of our
allies actually are already very active. They have a history in
Asia. The British just had a naval exercise with the Japanese.
The Norwegians regularly send some ships to RIMPAC exercises.
That kind of activity is going to have to increase in the
future, as the two continents deal with an increasingly
assertive China.
NATO also has a network of partnership agreements with
countries in Asia-Pacific. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand,
Australia. Those can serve as a foundation block, so to speak,
for a more active NATO engagement in the region, which can be
then, you know, a building block to a more coordinated
political military and economic response by the West to China's
rise.
Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
you and Senator Menendez for holding this hearing this week of
celebration of the 70th anniversary or NATO.
I want to begin, actually, by pointing out that on Sunday
that the Presidential elections in Ukraine, their first round
was completed. They were determined to be free, and fair, and
competitive by the international observers who were there, one
of whom was a staff member of mine. And I think it is important
to recognize that especially at a time when free and fair
elections are not something that we are seeing certainly in
Russia and a number of other countries that are aggressors.
I want to go back to what I think was Senator Cardin's
question about backsliding on the part of some of our NATO
allies. Certainly, I think that is true of Turkey. We are
seeing that with Hungary and with Poland.
And as you pointed Dr. Donfried, NATO is not just a
military alliance. It is an alliance of shared values. And when
the countries who are participating in NATO no longer share
those democratic values, what kind of action can NATO take to
address that? And how should we view the backsliding that is
going on in those countries?
Dr. Donfried. I think that it is critically important that
we talk about these issues, because what NATO has in its
backpack to deal with this really is declaratory policy. It is
not like the European Union, which actually does have
provisions to try to work against democratic backsliding within
its member states.
So I do think that declaratory policy is the public stance
that we can take. And I think it is very important that in
private you, as members of the Senate, together with
administration officials, also have those conversations with
the countries where we have concerns, and make it clear that
this is something we value. Because, again, we are the lead
nation. Our opinion of what is happening inside these countries
does matter and does carry weight. And we should not
underestimate the influence that we have.
Let me just add here that I think on this issue, as really
on every issue we have discussed today, the fact that there has
been a bipartisan stance in the Senate, in the House of
Representatives, also is critically important. I do think NATO
would be seriously undermined were NATO itself to become a
partisan issue. I just want to commend the committee on its
bipartisan approach to this set of issues.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Brzezinski, do you have anything to
add to what NATO ought to do to address backsliding?
Mr. Brzezinski. I think Karen put it very well. You know,
the alliance is based on a shared commitment to Allies, shared
values. But we always have to remember, it is primarily created
to serve as a warfighting instrument. And the ability for that
warfighting instrument to be effective lies on unity. And if we
see our fundamental values dissipating, that alliance is
weaker.
How do you address these challenges I believe is really not
through NATO as much as it is through our bilateral
relationships, or our other multilateral relationships and
institutions where we can speak directly and clearly to our
allies and say, ``You have got to change course here, or you
need to address this in this way.''
We have done that in the past, and it has been effective.
And right now, this is a very challenging time for the
alliance. We have a democratic sag in the West. We see it in
Central Europe. We see it in Turkey. We see it in Western
Europe. And to a certain degree we even see it here in North
America.
The way we address that is going to be through strong U.S.
leadership, and as Karen pointed out, Congress has a very
important role to play in that, particularly when it brings a
bipartisan consensus to the table in support of these values.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both. NATO is setting up a new
cyber center of excellence. And I know that that is supposed to
be fully staffed by 2023. But do we know to what extent it is
also going to address questions around what cyber intrusions--
how cyber intrusions should be addressed with respect to a
response?
So, for example, I remember we had a hearing in the Armed
Services Committee several years ago where we talked about the
fact that--or we raised the question if someone attacks our
networks in the United States, and shuts down all of the
utilities, for example, in the United States, is that
considered an act of war?
How is NATO's cyber center going to deal with those kinds
of questions? Do we know the answer to that?
Mr. Brzezinski. I am not an expert on the cyber domain, but
I will share the following thoughts. First, the fact that NATO
set up such a cyber center is important. It reflects a
commitment to integrate cyber operations into the full spectrum
of NATO operations.
Senator Shaheen. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Brzezinski. Second, it is interesting that NATO has
agreed that there can be an offensive dimension to its cyber
operations. So that reflects a level of commitment to this. So
it is not just going to be defending, but if someone messes
with NATO, so to speak, and there is consensus within the
alliance that this deserves a cyber response, it will be
prepared to do that. It will take time for the alliance to get
there.
And then third, NATO has agreed that a cyber contingency
could ``lead to an invocation of Article V.'' Could of course
does not necessarily mean it will.
Senator Shaheen: Sure.
Mr. Brzezinski. But that has always been the case for every
type of military contingency that the alliance could face.
There is not a guarantee that Article V kicks in. It only kicks
in when there is a consensus decision by the alliance.
Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
have one brief followup.
I do want to remark on Senator Cardin's observations and
questions, because the Russians cannot outspend us and NATO in
terms of military spending, but they would be far better off in
terms of leveraging, creating disunity. You know, when they
engage in the EU, and try to pick certain countries apart with
their influences, both in terms of cyber influence, in terms of
money to certain parties and entities, and can pick a country
off, then you undermine unity.
The same is true at NATO. And I think that there has to be
serious thought if, Mr. Brzezinski, and I do believe in robust
diplomacy, if the way in which we are going to deal with this
question is robust diplomacy, then we have to have some robust
diplomacy with Turkey, because they want to go by, you know,
the S-400, and they are on a path that is totally antithetical
to both NATO and our relationship with them.
We have to tell our friends in Hungary that they are on the
wrong path. We cannot coddle them or to ultimately embrace
authoritarianism. We have to challenge it. Because if I was
Russia, I would be spending far more money in trying to
undermine some of these countries both to undermine NATO
cohesion, undermine EU cohesion as it relates, for example, to
sanctions, and I have achieved my goal without any military
engagement, at a fraction of the cost. So how we do this, I
think, there is a lot of food for thought here that I think is
appropriate.
My question goes to the following. I have been pressing the
Administration to work with our European partners to reenergize
our common front against Kremlin aggression. Russia's attack in
the Kerch Strait was over 3 months ago, and I think the
response from the West was weak, to say the least.
They continue their aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Their
work to destabilize Ukrainian politics has not stopped. Their
malign efforts in the upcoming European Parliament elections
are pretty vivid. These actions are unacceptable. And I am
wondering how you would assess NATO's efforts to counter
Russian government aggression in Europe? What is necessary to
bolster these efforts from both the U.S. and from NATO? Because
from my perspective, Putin is on a march. He annexed Crimea.
Yes, condemnation, but nothing more. He has got a destabilizing
reality in Eastern Ukraine, condemnation, but well, we had some
sanctions, some of which I helped author.
You have the Kerch Strait. You have the Skripal attack. We
have not had any sanctions, responses related to that. So you
see it involved in action, and, you know, the challenge for us
that we only have a handful of peaceful diplomacy tools. Russia
is willing to use militarism to advance its goals. We use
peaceful diplomacy tools, which are largely sanctions to fight
back.
So what should we be doing. What should we be doing? What
should we be seeing NATO do to posture, at least, to send a
very clear deterrent message to Russia?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, there has been a fundamental flaw in
the West's response to Russian revanchism, Russian aggression,
that has been ongoing for almost 15 years even before the
invasion of Georgia in 2008.
Our strategy has been a strategy of incrementalism. The
Russians go in, they violate the sovereignty of an independent
nation, seize territory, and our response is piecemeal. It is
hesitant.
Look in the case of the invasion of Ukraine. It had 10
percent of its territory seized, Crimea taken away, and our
response, the West's response is to move into Central Europe a
mere handful of U.S. aircraft in the days after that attack.
And weeks later we move a U.S. company or two into the Baltics,
and into Poland. And our Western European allies do nothing.
We impose sanctions on Russia that limited to targeted
sanctions, largely against individuals. Individuals who
probably walk around Moscow wearing them as a red badge of
courage, a demonstration of fealty to Putin. And yes, we
increase them over time, but they are targeted incremental
sanctions.
Senator Menendez. So what should we do?
Mr. Brzezinski. Well, I would do three things. One, I would
have more robust military deployments in North Central Europe.
I don't think we are properly postured in that region. I would
increase NATO's military presence in the Baltic Sea. So more
robust military response.
I would escalate to sectorial economic sanctions. I would
really hit hard the Russian banking sector. Maybe you could
incrementally pick off different banks, and just increase the
number of banks you hit over a period of time to put steadily
increasing pressure on the Russian economy.
The Russian economy is still growing in 1 percent, 1.5
percent. That is not hurting. LUKOIL oil has got record sales
today. So we are not hitting them as hard as we can.
And then I would initiate a strategy of disruption. If
Putin's going to play a game against the West where he is
funding rightest parties in Europe, meddling around in our
elections through social media and such, why don't we do the
same against him? We did that during the cold war, and we
prevailed.
I think Putin has a very fragile regime. He is also a very
pragmatic character. And if we really ratcheted up the pressure
through a more robust military posture, through stronger
economic sanctions, with real bite, and a strategy of
disruption, he is more likely to back off.
Senator Menendez. Some of those items are in our desk of
legislation. Yes.
Do you have any suggestions, Dr. Donfried?
Dr. Donfried. I would just say in addition to what you have
in the desk of legislation, it is critical that we be thinking
about how we build resilience in the face of Russian
interference. As you noted, the cyber tool is very inexpensive
for Russia to deploy. And I think part of this is a NATO
response, but also I think the U.S. rightly is working very
closely with the European Union on this, because our European
allies are equally concerned about Russian interference in
their elections. I also think there are bilateral roles here to
play for U.S. intelligence that can be helpful to our allies in
highlighting some of the things that Russia, and it is not only
Russia, that Russia, China, Iran are doing in terms of meddling
and trying to undermine our democracies.
So I think we need to work on all of those fronts. I will
just pick up on the fact that Senator Shaheen mentioned
Ukraine. It really was encouraging to see this expression of
vibrant democracy in Ukraine over the weekend. I think the fact
that we have been very open in public about our concern with
Russian interference in elections, that that in and of itself
has provided a deterrent effect as well. But I think we need to
move out on all of those arenas to build resilience to Russian
interference.
Senator Menendez. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. Thank you to both of you for
testifying here today. It has been enjoyable going back down
memory lane about the successes that NATO has had. We have
touched on a number of the challenges that are right here in
front of us now, and we only scratched the surface on some of
them, and not the least of which is a NATO ally, Turkey, that
reference has been made to the fact that they are going to be
purchasing military equipment from the Russians. I mean this is
totally against everything that NATO stands for. Certainly,
those can't be interoperable with NATO materials.
Some of us has had some very robust discussions with our
Turkish friends. I am not satisfied with where we are. I don't
think they have a full understanding of the consequences that
are going to come. I agree with you Mr. Brzezinski. We can't
sit on our hands, particularly on this new challenge that we
are getting. I think we are going to have to act quickly. We
are going to have to act severely, and we have mandatory
sanctions that will take place if, indeed, that sale goes
through. And they claim the sale has gone through, but they
haven't deployed yet, and won't deploy until August or
September, but this is a really serious challenge. And I
suspect we are going to be speaking about it more here on the
committee.
So thank you both for coming here today and visiting with
us. And it has been, I think, an eye-opening discussion in many
regards.
For information from the members, the record will remain
open until the close of business Friday. We ask the witnesses
to respond promptly to any of those questions, and those
answers will be made part of the record.
With the sincere thanks of the committee, the committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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