[Senate Hearing 116-117]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-117
EXAMINING STATE AND FEDERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING SCHOOL SAFETY AGAINST TARGETED VIOLENCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2019
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-458 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Staff Director
Courtney Allen Rutland, Deputy Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs
William W. Sacripanti, Research Assistant
David M. Weinberg, Minority Staff Director
Alexa E. Noruk, Minority Director of Homeland Security
Roy S. Awabdeh, Minority Counsel
Jeffrey D. Rothblum, Minority Fellow
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator Peters............................................... 2
Senator Scott................................................ 3
Senator Hassan............................................... 20
Senator Rosen................................................ 22
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 37
Senator Peters............................................... 39
Senator Rubio with attachment................................ 41
WITNESSES
Thursday, July 25, 2019
Max Schachter, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Safe Schools
for Alex....................................................... 7
Tom Hoyer, Treasurer, Stand with Parkland--The National
Association of Families for Safe Schools....................... 9
Hon. Bob Gualtieri, Chair, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
Public Safety Commission, and Sheriff, Pinellas County, Florida 11
Deborah Temkin, Ph.D., Senior Director of Education Research,
Child Trends................................................... 13
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Gualtieri, Hon. Bob:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Hoyer, Tom:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Schachter, Max:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Temkin, Deborah Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 65
APPENDIX
Statements submitted for the Record from:
American Civil Liberties Union............................... 71
Advancement Project.......................................... 77
Alliance for Excellent Education............................. 82
American Federation of Teachers.............................. 84
Association of University Centers on Disabilities............ 86
Autism Society of Florida.................................... 88
Arizona Department of Education.............................. 90
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities.................... 92
Center for American Progress................................. 94
Children's Defense Fund of New York.......................... 96
Communities for Just Schools Fund's.......................... 97
Common Sense................................................. 100
Community Organizing and Family Issues....................... 103
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc............... 106
Disability Independence Group................................ 111
Everytown for Gun Safety..................................... 114
Future of Privacy Forum...................................... 119
Giffords Law Center.......................................... 125
I Vote for Me................................................ 128
Intercultural Development Research Association............... 130
Maricop County Sheriff's Office.............................. 134
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Legal Defense Fund......................................... 140
National Association of Secondary School Principals.......... 146
National Association of School Psychologists................. 149
National Disability Rights Network........................... 173
National Education Association............................... 176
National PTA................................................. 177
Nevada Association of School Psychologists................... 181
Public Advocacy for Kids..................................... 183
Sandy Hook Promise........................................... 187
Tony Sgro.................................................... 189
SPLC Action Fund............................................. 190
School Social Work Association of America.................... 195
Dignity in Schools NY........................................ 198
Dignity in Schools........................................... 200
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Schachter................................................ 204
Mr. Gualtieri................................................ 207
Ms. Temkin................................................... 210
EXAMINING STATE AND FEDERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING
SCHOOL SAFETY AGAINST TARGETED VIOLENCE
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THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Romney, Scott, Hawley, Peters,
Hassan, Sinema, and Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. I would like to call this
hearing to order. The title of this hearing is ``Examining
State and Federal Recommendations for Enhancing School Safety
Against Targeted Violence.''
First of all, I want to welcome everybody to the hearing
room. I certainly want to thank our witnesses for taking the
time for your testimony. In particular, I want to shout out to
Max and Tom and your families and the other families of the
tragedies for attending here and for just your unbelievable
dedication, turning your tragedy into hopefully some positive
action that can prevent tragedies for other families. It is
just remarkable what so many of the families have done in
reaction to so many of these tragedies, which really date back
to about 1998 when we really had sort of the first directed
attack. The number was 56. I know in your testimony, Sheriff,
you are talking about 710 shootings since Columbine in 1999. At
Columbine, 13 people were killed--12 students, 1 teacher.
Twenty-one were injured. At Sandy Hook, in 2012, 26 killed, 2
were injured. And Parkland, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas School,
17 killed and 17 injured.
The death and casualty toll is simply unbelievable, quite
honestly. I grew up in the 1950s and 1960s. We were concerned
about nuclear holocaust. We would hold drills and we would tuck
ourselves under our desks. We never had to worry about somebody
entering our school and opening fire.
So this is a tragedy in terms of the lives lost, people
injured, the families destroyed. But it is a tragedy from the
standpoint of the psychological effect on our Nation, on our
States, on our schools, on our children and our families. And
so what I am hoping this hearing will be about is take a look
at the thoughtful recommendations of so many of these
commissions that have been established afterwards, both State
and the Federal Government one, with the help of parents and
families that have experienced these tragedies.
I want to ask the question: To what extent have these
recommendations, these common-sense, obvious recommendations,
to what extent have they been implemented? And if they are
not--and I know they are not universally implemented--what is
the holdup? And what can we do to make sure that we can take
some of these obvious, relatively simple actions as at least a
first step to, if not completely prevent these things from
happening in the future, at least mitigate the casualties when
one of these attacks occurs?
I think moving forward, what I want the result from this
Committee hearing to be is let us, again, take a look at all
the recommendations, let us find out what is common. What do we
agree on? It is something this Committee does a pretty good job
of. There are plenty of differences. There are all kinds of
things that Gary is wrong about. [Laughter.]
But what this Committee is pretty good at doing is we
identify a problem, we figure out, OK, well, what do we agree
on? What is a common-sense solution that we agree on? Kind of
set the divisions, the differences, aside to maybe be brought
up when it is possible to do so.
I want to really examine: What are the most effective
actions that we can take that we agree on? What are the fastest
and the easiest to implement? Part of that equation will be,
what is the most cost-effective, too? Let us do those things.
I always go back to after September 11, 2001 (9/11). I
really think the most cost-effective and the most effective
action taken after 9/11 was we just hardened the cockpit door.
We have all this other security theater and Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and, we spend billions. But the
most effective thing is we just hardened the cockpit door. So
let us make sure in schools we are at least doing that.
This Committee does not have a whole lot of legislative
jurisdiction, but in this space there may be some that we can
consider. So we certainly want to do everything we can do as
part of this Committee in addition to holding this hearing to
highlight the issue and examine these recommendations.
So, with that, I will turn it over to Senator Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS\1\
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appear in the Appendix
on page 39.
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This is an extremely important and difficult conversation.
There is no question that schools must be safe places for
children to learn and to grow. And every single life lost in a
school shooting is an unspeakable tragedy.
As adults and as policymakers, our number one
responsibility is to protect our children. And we are failing.
I want to recognize the many survivors that we have with us
today, especially Mr. Schachter and Mr. Hoyer for joining us
today as witnesses. And thank you for your courage and your
action.
I cannot even begin to grasp the incomprehensible pain of
losing a child to gun violence. I know that I must--and that we
must--honor the memory of those who are no longer with us by
taking action to stop these preventable tragedies.
I am grateful to you both and to Sheriff Gualtieri and to
Dr. Temkin for helping the Committee better understand how we
can protect children in our schools and work toward ensuring
that no other families have to endure the loss of a loved one
to senseless violence in schools.
Strengthening safety in our schools is not a partisan
issue, and I look forward to a productive discussion on the
actions that we can take to make school campuses more secure,
improve first responders' capabilities in an emergency, and,
most importantly, stop these shootings before they ever happen.
Today's conversation will be about solutions, and we want
to leave here with a clear road map for addressing this
problem. We cannot forget exactly who we are doing this for:
For Alex. For Luke. For the hundreds of children killed or
injured in their schools. For the families, students, teachers,
and staff whose worlds have been irrevocably changed by this
violence. And for the millions of students who will be entering
classrooms this fall.
Thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony
and our discussion. Mr. Chairman, my office has received over
32 letters of support for our discussion today on a wide
variety of topics, and I would like to enter those letters into
our official record.\1\
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\1\ The letters referenced by Senator Peters appear in the Appendix
on page 71.
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Chairman Johnson. Without objection.
I will ask that my written statement be entered into the
record.\2\
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\2\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 37.
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We have a letter from Senator Rubio that will be entered in
the record as well.\3\
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\3\ The letter referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 41.
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I do want to recognize Congressman Ted Deutch, who is the
Congressman in Parkland, Florida. We obviously offer all of you
our condolences and recognize how completely inadequate that
is.
We have the unique situation here where your former
Governor, who established this commission and appointed and
asked many of you to be involved, is here. Senator Scott would
like to say a few words and introduce some of the members of
the audience. I have also asked him to read the list of those
killed in the Parkland shooting, and then we will have a moment
of silence after he does that. Senator Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. First, I want to thank Senator Johnson and
Senator Peters for doing this. What they said is actually
really true in this Committee. People do work together and work
hard to get things done. There are a lot of tough issues to
deal with up here. There is probably not a more important issue
than the safety of our kids and our grandkids. I have six
grandsons, and I think about their safety all the time.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
This is not an easy discussion. It was not easy to deal with
the aftermath, but it is nothing like what these families have
gone through.
This February marked the 1-year anniversary of the Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Parkland that claimed
the lives of 17 innocent victims. I think there is not a day
that goes by that I do not think about that day and the amazing
people that were lost at the hands of a madman. One thing that
has happened since then is many of these families I have spent
a lot of time with, and every day you still feel their pain.
I would like to thank the families, students, and the loved
ones of the victims who are here today: Max and Tom, Gina,
Phil, and Debbie and Tony. Thank you all for being here.
Let us go through a little bit of background. Max's son
Alex--and, by the way, everybody has a copy of this. They just
gave me a copy of this this morning, but you can go and see the
pictures of these kids, and I can just tell you, in the last
year and a half, you get to know them just by all the stories
you hear. But Max's son Alex was 14 years old. He played
trombone in the band at the school. He was very vocal in
seeking changes at schools and served on the High School Public
Safety Commission.
Tom and Gina's son Luke was only 15. He was a sweet young
man who loved playing sports. A lot of these parents, but his
parents have been leading efforts to make change, and Gina,
when we signed the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public
Safety Act into law, was there with me.
Tony, if you will stand up so they recognize you. Tony's
daughter Gina was 14 and a freshman at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas. She was a member of the school's winter guard team.
She was known to be a great dancer with an infectious smile who
made friends everywhere she went. Tony is the president of
Stand with Parkland, an organization founded by the parents of
victims, and I attended some of the funerals, and your heart
goes out to all of them. And, Gina, I should have had you stand
up. Gina, I should recognize you. Gina is Tom's wife, and they
are just a sweet family. So thank you for being here. Gina has
become a good friend of my chief of staff.
Phil, if you will stand up. Phil's daughter Carmen was a
dedicated student who wanted to become a medical researcher and
find a cure for Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). She was
just 16 years old. Both Phil and his wife, April, and their
family have been incredible activists nationwide. Thank you for
being here.
Debbie Hixon. Debbie's husband, Chris, was a loving father
and United States veteran. He served as the athletic director
and a wrestling coach at Marjory Stoneman Douglas and made an
impact on the lives of so many of his students. His legacy
lives on with the Chris Hixon athletic scholarship, which helps
further the education of student athletes. This is a story
about what Chris did to run into danger, without any ability to
do anything, no weapon or anything, to try to save these kids.
It is remarkable. So thanks for being here.
Let me just read off the rest of the names. I have done
this, and it has always been hard. Alyssa Alhadeff, Scott
Beigel, Martin Duque Anguiano, Nicholas Dworet, Aaron Feis,
Jaime Guttenberg, Chris Hixon, Luke Hoyer, Gina Montalto, Alex
Schachter, Meadow Pollack, Helena Ramsay, Carmen Schentrup,
Peter Wang, Cara Loughran, Joaquin Oliver, and Alaina Petty--I
can tell you a story about Alaina. I had actually met her
family because, after we had Hurricane Irma, her brother, who
was just up here the other
day, Patrick, he was going on his 2-year mission--they are
Mormons--and her dad were working out in Everglade City to do
cleanup. I remember meeting them before this ever happened.
Every one of these families, it is just a horrible story of
just wonderful family members that these families lives have
been changed forever.
And so there is no question we have to figure out how to
change this. The remarkable strength and dedication you all
have shown in the aftermath of such an unspeakable tragedy is
inspiring. As we have seen many times, solutions after tragedy
unfortunately get lost in politics. But there are a lot of
reasons why this happened, I think, but we were able to cut
through that in Florida, and I am hopeful that we can continue
to work together to make our schools safer.
Sheriff Gualtieri, we have great law enforcement officers
in our State, and Sheriff Gualtieri is somebody I met right
after I got elected back in 2010. But the sheriff is very
dedicated, is a member of the Statewide Sheriffs Association,
and has been very dedicated in getting good legislation passed.
But what we did was we put together a group right after it
happened on Wednesday. By Friday we had put together a group of
people to work together. One group was educators. One was
mental health. One group was law enforcement. And by Tuesday
night, we came up with what we thought we should do, and by
Friday we made a proposal. And then, fortunately, we were in
session, and so within 3 weeks we got not exactly what we all
would have passed. We would have done some things a little bit
differently. But we got some good legislation passed.
But Sheriff Gualtieri has a great family. He is a great
friend. He is a very dedicated public servant. Max was saying
at breakfast he does not know how he works the hours he does.
But he has shown incredible leadership for our State when we
need it, and it is because of people like Bob that we are at a
48-year low in our crime rate in our State. So I used to brag
as Governor. Of course, you are supposed to brag as a Governor.
We did 1.7 million jobs. We had number one higher education,
and we are at a 48-year low in our crime rate. But we all
worked together to pass the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School Public Safety Act with the goal of preventing this
tragedy again. The goal is that it never, ever happens again.
We also established the commission to work to identify
issues, and they did an incredible job. Sheriff Gualtieri led
it, but we had, I think, 15 people or so on it. But Max and
Ryan Petty, another parent, served on the commission. And this
commission actually did a good job, and they put out good
information, and they are still doing things that are going to
have a positive impact.
So I think what you all are going to hear today, you are
going to hear about people that have really gone above and
beyond to try to change things. Unfortunately, you cannot bring
back these lives, but I think every one of us, especially when
we think about this, we think about our children and our
grandchildren, and we do not want this to ever happen again in
our country. And I think it is very important that all of us
take responsibility to do everything we can to make sure this
does not happen again.
I was disheartened by a recent report from the grand jury
on the progress of implementation of safety measures by certain
Florida schools. It is unbelievably disappointing--I am sure
they will all talk about this--when we have talked about what
we need to do and then you see people that, for whatever
reason, do not take this seriously. I guess they just do not
think it is ever going to happen in their school.
So today I am sending a letter to school superintendents,
board members, and administrators of those schools demanding
action. I am deeply disappointed in the response, but I am
confident
that--and we talked about this a little bit at breakfast. We
are not going to stop fighting, and I think the right things
are going to happen long term. Unfortunately, a lot of us
have--all of us want to be here. It cannot be more important
than what you guys are going to talk about. But others have to
be at committees. After I finish, I am going to have to go to
Armed Services for a mandatory meeting.
So thank you for being here, and thank you for your
testimony. And I think every Senator up here cares deeply that
this does not ever happen again.
Chairman Johnson. Well, thank you, Senator Scott.
I think it would be appropriate if we just have a moment of
silence in memory of and out of respect for those who have lost
their lives and for those lives have been forever altered by
these tragedies.
[Moment of silence.]
Thank you.
It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
witnesses, so if you will all stand and raise your hand. Do you
swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?
Mr. Schachter. I do.
Mr. Hoyer. I do.
Mr. Gualtieri. I do.
Ms. Temkin. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you.
As Senator Scott said, there are a lot of competing
committee meetings. I know Senator Romney and others probably
are going to have to go in and out. Do not take that as a sign
of disrespect. It is just how this place does not work.
But, anyway, our first witness is Max Schachter. Max is the
co-founder and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Safe Schools
for Alex. Max has advocated for improved school safety and
security across the Nation and at the highest levels of the
Federal Government ever since his son Alex was killed at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018.
I was talking to Max before the hearing, and he has--I
called it his ``rap sheet,'' but if you see the list of his
activities since he lost his son, it is just unbelievable how
much time and energy he has devoted to this. So, Max, I look
forward to your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MAX SCHACHTER,\1\ FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, SAFE SCHOOLS FOR ALEX
Mr. Schachter. Thank you, Senator.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Schachter appears in the Appendix
on page 49.
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My name is Max Schachter. My son Alex was one of 17 people
that were brutally murdered at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School last year. After I buried my son, my next priority was
to make sure my other three children were safe in their
schools. I traveled the country and came to realize that in all
of the 139,000 K-12 schools in this country, each principal has
to now become an expert in door locks, access control, cameras,
et cetera. It made no sense to me that each school had to go
and reinvent the wheel.
The idea that crystallized for me was the need to create
National School Safety Best Practices at the Federal level.
Those best practices would be housed on a clearinghouse website
so that all schools had a one-stop shop for all of the most
relevant and important school safety information.
I was pleased to see this idea highlighted in President
Trump's Federal Commission on School Safety report last year. I
am extremely encouraged that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is moving forward to create this clearinghouse.
In fact, they are convening their first meeting July 30, next
week.
We know that we cannot prevent 100 percent of these school
mass murders. But we know that we can absolutely mitigate a lot
of the risk to students, teachers, and staff when they do
happen. Every school can do things today that can improve
school safety. Many of those things are basics that cost little
or no money.
Chairman Johnson, I really want to commend you for your
commitment to focusing on practical solutions that can save
lives right now and for shining a spotlight on that through the
hearing that you are holding today.
In my view, there are two main reasons the national school
security crisis has continued with no end in sight: The first
is we do not implement lessons that we have been painfully
learning for two decades; and, two, we are not being honest to
parents and communities about the real situation with safety in
our schools.
On the first point, we do not implement lessons learned
from dozens of incidents that have taken place. The State of
Virginia is a rare exception. After the Virginia Tech massacre,
Virginia implemented threat assessment teams in all of their
schools. They used the United States Secret Service's National
Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) model, and they have not had a
school shooting since. That is why I support the Eagles Act.
Unfortunately, no other State besides Florida has followed suit
and implemented threat assessment teams in all their schools.
After Columbine, all responding officers were required to
rapidly deploy directly to the threat. Yet in Parkland, eight
deputies waited outside for 11 minutes while children and staff
were being slaughtered in their classrooms. In Parkland, first
responder radios failed and were not interoperable, delaying
help for victims. SWAT teams had to resort to hand signals to
avoid shooting each other because their radios failed. Yet as a
country we have not truly committed to solving the
communications problems. We cannot force all agencies to use a
single radio system, but we can make it possible for them to
communicate no matter which system they are using.
After Sandy Hook, each school should have trained their
students and staff how to respond to active shooters. Sadly,
many did not. During the 2017-18 school year, Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School did not hold a single Code Red drill that
year, so students and staff did not know what to do when the
murderer started firing an AR-15 into classrooms and killing
their classmates. No staff member called a Code Red for 3
minutes after the shooting had already started. And by then all
17 people were dead, including my little boy Alex.
The second sad reality--which most people do not realize--
is that schools are not being truthful about the violence on
their campus. For example, for the years 2014 through 2017,
Marjory Stoneman Douglas reported to the State zero bullying,
zero harassment, zero trespassing incidents, and many other
zeroes. It is not just Broward County that is inaccurately
reporting these incidents. This is pervasive across the entire
country. The result is a false sense of security which leads to
complacency in implementing school safety best practices.
On college campuses, the Federal Cleary Act imposes
financial penalties for inaccurate reporting of campus crime
statistics. But in K-12 there is such no requirement. The
result is that when you go online to look at school ratings,
many of them, including Marjory Stoneman Douglas, have an ``A''
rating. Academics are important, but if the children do not
come home to their families and staff do not come home, nothing
else matters. That ``A'' rating that Marjory Stoneman Douglas
has has nothing to do with safety of that institution. There is
no school safety rating system currently to inform parents and
teachers of whether or not their school has implemented the
best practices to prevent and mitigate the number of casualties
during the next school attack. Schools should not be able to
get an ``A'' rating like Marjory Stoneman Douglas did if they
never held a Code Red drill for the entire school year. They
should not be rewarded if they did not train their teachers and
their staff what to do during an active assailant emergency. If
a school safety rating system existed, it would influence
change nationwide. The car industry's rating system has
improved car safety and reduced fatalities. Before you buy a
car, you review their safety and crash test ratings. For
parents there is nothing. No way to know if your child's school
is safe or not.
It has been 20 years since Columbine, and children continue
to be murdered in their classrooms. We know the next school
mass murderer is already out there. The next gun that he will
use is already out there. It is not a question of if; it is a
question of when. We know what can be done to prevent it, and
we know what must be done to mitigate the risk of more lives
being lost. I hope this Committee will help get us where we
need to be.
I thank you for your commitment, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Peters, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Max.
Our next witness is Tom Hoyer. Tom currently serves as the
treasurer of Stand with Parkland, which advocates for public
safety reforms. Stand with Parkland was formed by the families
of those killed in the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
attack, including Tom, who lost his son Luke. Tom.
TESTIMONY OF TOM HOYER,\1\ TREASURER, STAND WITH PARKLAND--THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FAMILIES FOR SAFE SCHOOLS
Mr. Hoyer. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Peters, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for having me
here today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Hoyer appears in the Appendix on
page 51.
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My name is Tom Hoyer, and I am the treasurer of Stand with
Parkland-The National Association of Families for Safe Schools.
Stand with Parkland was founded by the families of the children
and spouses murdered in the Parkland school massacre, and I
appear today on behalf of our organization.
We are fundamentally a nonpartisan group. The safety of our
kids and teachers in schools is not a political issue. We are
willing to work with anyone who shares our goal for safe
schools, and we appreciate your decision to hold this hearing
today.
I am here today because I lost my youngest son, Luke, on
February 14, 2018. He was one of the 17 wonderful souls who was
murdered at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida. My son was one of the first to die. The police tell me
that he felt the impact of the bullets before he heard the
shots. One moment he is standing outside a classroom looking
forward to the end of the school day, carefree. And the next
moment he is on the floor, unable to move and dying. Many times
I have wondered what his last thoughts were. I think about my
wife, Gina, who gave birth to Luke 15 years earlier and who had
to watch the casket close on her youngest son.
This is my story. There are 16 others just like it in
Parkland. The murder of our beloved spouses and children while
at school was devastating. Our families are forever changed.
Our community is forever changed. The trauma of that day haunts
all the survivors--the students, the teachers, and the first
responders.
Our experience in Parkland has led us to conclude that
there is no single solution that can effectively solve this
complex problem. That is why Stand with Parkland advocates for
three key goals: securing the school campus, improving mental
health screening and support programs in the schools, and
responsible firearms ownership.
The first element of our platform is bringing people
together around the idea of securing the school campus. Our
schools need a clearinghouse of best practices that they can
use as a tool, and our country needs Federal minimum school
safety standards such as a single point of entry on a school
campus. We also need to explore Federal funding for school
security enhancements through national infrastructure bills.
The next element of our platform is improvement mental
health screening and support programs. We need funding to
promote suicide intervention programs because more than two-
thirds of mass shooters are suicidal. We also need
congressional action to relax regulations so that schools, law
enforcement, and mental health professionals can share
information.
My son's killer was known to the school. He was known to
the sheriff's office, a local mental health agency, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He was known as an
angry, violent, and potentially dangerous person. My son and 16
other innocent human beings are dead because these agencies
never shared information. They never connected the dots. And in
order to effectively address these potential risks, we have to
fund research into threat assessment tools and practices. The
Eagles Act, which is bipartisan, does exactly that. We urge you
to support and act on that legislation.
The last component of our platform is responsible firearms
ownership. We must find ways to keep firearms out of the hands
of those who should not have them. This starts with enforcement
of existing laws.
Another important step is safe storage of firearms at home
where many school shooters obtain their weapon.
An additional tool is extreme risk protection orders, or
red flag laws, which empower family members or law enforcement
to get a court order and temporarily remove firearms from a
potentially dangerous situation.
Finally, we need comprehensive background checks, including
for sales that occur online.
These three goals--securing the school campus, improving
mental health screening and support programs, and responsible
firearms ownership--can stem the tide on school shootings. Last
year we took important first steps on school safety with the
bipartisan passage of the Stop School Violence Act and Fix
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Act.
Additionally, although we do not agree with all of its
recommendations, the recently issued report of the Federal
Commission on School Safety was one of our Government's most
comprehensive pieces on school safety ever. However, this is
not an academic discussion. Kids and teachers have been dying.
School starts in less than 2 months. Now is the time to build
on the progress that we made last year. Please do not let
another anniversary of my son's death and the death of 16
others pass without concrete steps toward making our kids and
teachers safe in school.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. We
appreciate your decision to hold this hearing to advance the
discussion on school safety.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Tom.
Our next witness is Bob Gualtieri. Sheriff Gualtieri has
served as the sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida, since 2011.
Sheriff Gualtieri also serves as vice president of the Florida
Sheriffs Association and on the Board of Directors of the Major
County Sheriffs of America. In 2018, then-Governor Rick Scott
appointed him to serve as the Chair of the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School Public Safety Commission. Sheriff.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE BOB GUALTIERI,\1\ CHAIR, MARJORY
STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION, AND
SHERIFF, PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
Mr. Gualtieri. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Peters, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and share some thoughts about
school safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gualtieri appears in the Appendix
on page 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the last 16 months, I have chaired the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School Public Safety Commission. We submitted a
500-page report to the Florida Governor and the legislature
regarding what happened at Stoneman Douglas on February 14,
2018, and made recommendations on how to improve school safety.
It is debatable whether the incident at Stoneman Douglas
was entirely avoidable, but what is not debatable, in my view,
based on the evidence, is whether the harm could have been
mitigated. Simply put, the shooting did not have to be as bad
as it was.
Thirty-four people were shot and/or killed in 3 minutes and
51 seconds in Building 12 of the Stoneman Douglas campus, with
24 of those shot and/or killed in 1 minute and 44 seconds on
the first floor alone.
Missed intervention opportunities, ineffective safety on
the part of the school, and an ineffective law enforcement
response contributed to the magnitude of this tragedy. At the
time of the shooting, the Broward County Public Schools did not
have an active shooter response policy. There had been no
active shooter drills on the Stoneman Douglas campus in the
year before the shooting. There had been only one minimal 1
hour of training for school staff, and that occurred just a few
weeks before the shooting. There had been no formal training
for the students. Gates at the Stoneman Douglas campus were
left open and unattended, building and classroom doors
unlocked, and teachers and staff lacked adequate communication
infrastructure. In fact, the shooter shot and/or killed all but
two of his victims before the first staff member on the
Stoneman Douglas campus called a Code Red to alert others of
the active shooting that was occurring that day. People simply
did not know what to do or how to do it because there were no
policies, no drills, and little to no training.
Please keep in mind that this was the state of school
security in Broward County, Florida, the second largest school
district in the third largest State, 19 years after Columbine
and 6 years after Sandy Hook.
As to the law enforcement response, the school resource
officer (SRO) stood by outside, hiding in a place of personal
safety while the shooter shot and/or killed 10 people on the
third floor. The SRO never went in the building that day, and
he hid for 48 minutes before leaving the area. Several other
Broward County sheriff's deputies stood by outside the school
despite hearing gunshots, and they, too, did not enter the
school in an effort to save lives. The SRO and several of the
deputies have been fired, as they should have been, and the SRO
has been criminally charged for his inaction.
We have made improvements in school safety, but we have a
ways to go. As much of the talk of the day is on prevention,
which should be the goal, the immediate emphasis and urgency
must be on harm mitigation, and there is a difference between
the two.
The hard thing to say, but it is the reality, is that it
will happen again, and the question is when and where. But the
most pressing question, the big question, is: What are we doing
differently today to drive a different outcome than what
happened at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February
14, 2018? Because we must have a different outcome. Thirty-four
people shot and/or killed in 3 minutes and 51 seconds is
unacceptable. Today there is not full compliance with the laws
in Florida and the best practices that make our schools safe. I
do not believe that this void is limited only to Florida
schools. I believe the noncompliance is caused in part by
complacency and an attitude that it cannot happen here.
Remember, we are 20 years post-Columbine.
The Broward County School District, ground zero for this
mass killing, just passed its first ever active shooter
response policy in February 2019. It took more than a year
after the Stoneman Douglas shooting for the Broward County
School District to enact that policy, and that is unacceptable.
There has to be a sense of urgency and an immediate focus
on the main tenets of harm mitigation, and those are
identifying the threat, communicating the threat, and reacting
to the threat. All schools must immediately have effective
active shooter response policies. They must train their
personnel to identify threats, empower all personnel to
communicate a threat, have adequate communication
infrastructure so that all students and staff can receive
messages of a threat, and there must be regularly conducted
drills so that students and staff know how best to react to a
threat.
We cannot be here 20 years from now, like we are today, 20
years post-Columbia, talking about the voids and the most basic
concepts of school safety that should have been implemented
years ago. Most, if not all, of these basic school strategies
cost little to nothing to implement. They only require the will
of a decisionmaker to ensure it happens, and, unfortunately,
that has not occurred across the board. There has to be
accountability for those not immediately implementing the basic
school safety necessities.
I encourage you to use your power and require any school
district receiving Federal funding demonstrate compliance with
certain basic and core safety components as a requirement to
receiving Federal money.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to fleshing out how we can do a better job
of making sure what must be a daily priority across this
country, and that is that our kids are as safe as they can be
in our Nation's schools. Parents have a right to expect that
when they send their kids to school in the morning, they come
home alive in the afternoon, and we need to meet that
expectation.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Sheriff.
Our final witness is Dr. Deborah Temkin. Dr. Temkin is the
senior program area director for Child Trends. She also serves
as a senior adviser to Federal Technical Assistance (TA)
Centers that are devoted to student health and school safety.
Prior to her work at Child Trends, Dr. Temkin directed the
Federal initiative on bullying prevention at the U.S.
Department of Education. Dr. Temkin.
TESTIMONY OF DEBORAH TEMKIN, PH.D.,\1\ SENIOR DIRECTOR OF
EDUCATION RESEARCH, CHILD TRENDS
Ms. Temkin. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Peters, and Members of the Committee, thank you for holding
this important hearing to identify effective ways to keep
students safe in school.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Temkin appears in the Appendix on
page 65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I cannot imagine the pain of losing a child or surviving a
school shooting. As a parent, in addition to a researcher, I
share my fellow panelists' commitment to ensuring that our
schools are safe. The tragedies at Parkland and elsewhere
shocked our collective system. We can--and we must--do more.
I have dedicated my career to identifying evidence-based
strategies to improve school health and safety, and through
that work I offer three recommendations:
First, maintain the decades-long trajectory of school
safety initiatives that encourage States and communities to
address the full spectrum of issues that contribute to school
violence. The research is clear. To keep students safe at
school, we must prioritize their overall well-being. Preventing
school violence requires an investment in building a positive
school climate as well as building skills to form healthy
relationships.
Several Federal investments in safe schools were built upon
this research and showed significant improvements in school
safety measures. Beyond competitive grant programs, schools--
and the policies that support them--have fundamentally shifted
toward making student wellness a priority. This includes
expansion under the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) to
include an indicator of school quality and student success and
to fund the Student Success and Academic Enrichment formula
grant program.
School violence has gone down over the past 20 years. The
percentage of 9th to 12th graders who carried a weapon on
school property significantly decreased from about 7 percent in
1999 to just under 4 percent in 2017. For this group, over the
same time period, the percentage of physical fights on school
property also decreased from about 14 percent to 8.5 percent.
It is more difficult to ascertain a trend in school shooting
incidents, in part because, while devastating, they are
statistically rare occurrences.
Although progress has been made, there is clearly much more
we can do. No community should ever have to experience a school
shooting. Three movements are bringing us closer to this goal.
first, increased awareness of the prevalence of adverse
childhood experiences and their potential for resulting trauma;
second, further integration of social, emotional, and academic
learning; and, third, the bridging of school and community
resources through integrated student supports.
My second recommendation is to limit strategies that could
harm students and communities. It may seem logical that adding
security technology or additional law enforcement would prevent
a school shooting, but the research we have is mixed, at best.
Security measures are often designed to keep the bad guys out.
But history shows us that the vast majority of school shootings
are perpetrated by current students at the school--students who
know the security procedures, as well as the blind spots.
The effectiveness of school-based law enforcement, access
control, metal detectors, and other security measures on
improving school safety has not been well researched. We do
know, however, that many schools that experience active shooter
incidents over the past 20 years had security measures in
place. Certain forms of security may help and pose little risk
to students. These include strategies such as identification
procedures or basic lockdown drills, which are different than
active shooter drills. Emerging evidence, however, suggests
that more intensive security measures in schools may lead to
unintended consequences, including increased levels of fear
among students and staff, decreased perceptions of school
safety, increased student referrals to the criminal justice
system for minor offenses, and, particularly for low-income
students, reduced academic achievement.
Active shooter drills are particularly concerning. These
drills often use actors to portray a school shooter using
realistic guns and plastic bullets. We do not know whether
these drills work. In addition, researchers and educators alike
are raising concerns that such drills may traumatize the school
community or de-sensitize students to the seriousness of an
attack. We need to know much more about these intensive
security measures before risking our children's well-being.
My final recommendation is ensure there are mechanisms to
assess the impact of school safety strategies. There is still
much to learn about keeping schools safe. Research allows us to
understand whether finite resources are being spent effectively
and where improvements could be made.
In Fiscal Year 2018, funds were reallocated away from the
Comprehensive School Safety Initiative out of the National
Institute of Justice, which was the only dedicated funding
stream to support school safety research. Without such research
support, we will continue to debate the issues raised today.
I will close with this: Our children go to school to learn.
When our children are afraid and when we tell them they should
be afraid by installing metal detectors, hiring security
officers, and requiring active shooter drills, it becomes
harder for them to learn. Making school safe is not about
turning schools in fortresses to keep the bad guys out. Our
children's safety is paramount, and that safety must start from
within the school itself. To truly make schools safe, we must
prioritize mutual trust and provide the social, emotional, and
academic supports that prevent violence and help our kids
thrive.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Temkin.
I am going to yield my questioning slot to Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. And
for Tom and Max, it has to be hard to talk about it. Just
listening to it is hard.
One person I want to recognize is Hunter Pollack. Hunter,
if you would stand up. He lost his sister, Meadow, who was 18
at the time, and she died trying to save another student. So
thank you for being here, Hunter.
Sheriff Gualtieri, what do you think is the most important
takeaway from your commission?
Mr. Gualtieri. I think, as in my remarks, it is that it did
not have to be as bad as it was. Harm could have been mitigated
if there was not complacency and people had done what they
should have and learned lessons from what happened 20 years
ago. The law enforcement response was ineffective. When you
have a district that a particular school had done no drills,
had done one minimal training, people did not know what to do
or how to do it. I think that was shocking to us as we
uncovered and looked at the facts and the evidence. And there
is still too much complacency and not enough being done. They
say they take it seriously, but as I say, the proof is in the
pudding and the proof is in the actions, not what you say. And
to this day, there is not enough being done.
As I said, when I appeared before the Broward County School
Board in February of this year, in the last week of February,
it was not until the week before that--it took them a year to
pass an active shooter policy. There are other districts in the
Florida within the last couple of months that still do not have
active shooter response policies. You have districts that are
not compliant with the law to have a safe school officer on
every campus. You have schools that do not have threat
assessment teams.
So the lack of compliance with the basic tenets I think is
the most shocking and I would say appalling to me that we
uncovered.
Senator Scott. So, Sheriff Gualtieri, we have 67 school
districts in Florida. We know the way ours is. And I do not
know if every State is set up this way, but every county has an
elected school board, and they have a lot of autonomy, and then
probably, what, Sheriff, about half of them are elected
superintendents and half are appointed by the school board
probably. So they have a lot of autonomy. So everything that we
all worked hard to get passed, it did not get implemented by
the State. It has to get implemented locally.
So what is your experience so far? Who is the best? Who is
your biggest disappointment in implementing? Just forget what
everybody is trying to do is come up with the right ideas, just
doing the things that we said you had to do.
Mr. Gualtieri. Well, there are some that are doing it well.
I can tell you as an example one that I think is doing it well,
and I just came from there before I came here this week, which
was Pensacola and Escambia County. I think that they have
stepped up, and the superintendent there gets it, and they have
implemented the right policies and procedures. We have other
counties, probably the ones that are most problematic as we sit
here today where we are seeing the most voids as far as
compliance with it would be in South Florida, in Miami-Dade,
Broward, Palm Beach. And there are some others.
Recently, up until a couple of months ago, in Orange County
they were not complying with the requirement that there be a
safe school officer on every campus.
Senator Scott. So the legislation we passed required there
be a public safety officer at every school. And so what were
they doing?
Mr. Gualtieri. So the law----
Senator Scott. It is a requirement of the State law, and we
provided funding for this.
Mr. Gualtieri. Correct, and you provided as the Governor
and the legislature provided $67 million. What the law said was
that there has to be assigned to every charter, elementary,
middle, and high school campus a safe school officer. And they
interpreted the word ``assigned'' to mean assigned on paper and
they do not have to be there. This is the type of manipulation
and disingenuous approach that is maddening and it is
upsetting, because, what a legislative body supposed to do,
this Congress or a State legislature, is you pick words, and
clearly the intent was that there be a good guy with a gun, a
safe school officer on every campus. And so you had lawyers,
who are part of the problem--and I say that as a lawyer because
they are not doing a service to the people that they are
representing. When they interpret words of ``assigned'' and
they go through these machinations and say, well, ``assigned''
can be interpreted to mean you do not have to have somebody
there. Tell that to one of these parents who somebody has to go
knock on the door because they had one deputy for six campuses
because they did not follow the law. It is just not right. And
this is the type of attitude that has to change.
Senator Scott. So, Sheriff, talk about the fact that if
they had done an active shooter drill at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas, where would the students have gone when they know
there was a shooter in the room? And where did the students go?
Mr. Gualtieri. So, unfortunately----
Senator Scott. It is so simple.
Mr. Gualtieri. Right. So they had not identified any of the
safe spaces or what some people call ``hard corners'' in
classrooms. And simply the teachers and the staff did not know
what to do or how to do it. And for those that did try and get
the kids into those safe spaces or the hard corners in the
classrooms is they were full of stuff, meaning bookshelves and
desks and immovable objects. And it is a hard thing to say. It
is a very hard thing to say. But kids died on the line because
they could not get into the hard corners, because they were
being pushed out by others because they were so full.
There were two kids who were unable to get into one of
those safe areas, and they were hiding behind a TV set and a
filing cabinet at the other end of the classroom. TV sets and
filing cabinets do not stop AR-15 rounds. Both of those kids
are deceased. If they had been able to get in those safe areas
or hard corners, this harm would have been mitigated, and it
would not have been as bad, because the shooter that day never
went into any one classroom. He only shot people that he could
see, line of sight, only shot people in hallways. So when he
looked through the doors, the windows in the doors, and he saw
people, he shot them. If they were in the hard corners--because
it worked on the second floor. The shooter was on the second
floor for 41 seconds. He fired rounds. He did not shoot or kill
anybody on the second floor because they had an opportunity to
respond appropriately.
So what we teach works. The first floor, 24 people shot
and/or killed. Third floor, 10 people shot or killed. Second
floor, nobody. So what it is implemented, it works.
Senator Scott. But, Sheriff, go through it. So by the third
floor, did they know that there was a shooter and know what was
going on and how long had he been there?
Mr. Gualtieri. The third floor initially treated it as a
fire drill, and when I met with some of your staff, Chairman
Johnson, I showed them some of the photos. If anybody sees the
photos of the third floor, it was wall to wall, shoulder to
shoulder kids, because nobody communicated anything to them
other than it was a fire drill because the fire suppression
system was activated, and nobody communicated. So the first
floor, they got caught off guard. Second floor, they heard the
gunshots. Third floor, if the shooter arrived on the third
floor at the time he arrived on the second floor, he had over
200 AR-15 rounds left, and it was wall to wall, shoulder to
shoulder, thick, kids, we would be having a much different
discussion, and it would be worse than Vegas.
So because of the lack of communication, because of the
lack of training, because of the lack of policies, because of
the lack of so much, it was as bad as it was. And it could have
been worse.
Senator Scott. So I know my time is up, but what is
frustrating is that there is a lot of--whether it is the FBI--I
do not know. Do you want to talk about--the FBI had two
instances before this happened. I was a Governor for 8 years,
had five mass shootings, and I think in every case the FBI had
prior warning. As far as you know, who has been held
accountable at the FBI for not--was it about 30 days ahead of
time?--not passing on the tip to the FBI, to their hotline, and
not passing it on to the--I guess it would have been the Miami
office. Have you heard of anybody being held accountable?
Mr. Gualtieri. No.
Senator Scott. Nobody. All they had to do was pass it on,
make one phone call, send an email. Nothing happened, is my
understanding, and nobody has been held accountable. This is
just disgusting. And how do we know if anything has changed?
Well, thanks for being here.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you for all of your testimony.
Powerful testimony.
Dr. Temkin, in your testimony you stated that school
shootings are the extreme end of the continuum of violence, and
so I want to talk a little bit about some of the evidence
behind that statement as we try to drill down on evidence-based
solutions here.
What does the data tell us about who the perpetrators of
school shootings are likely to be?
Ms. Temkin. So, unfortunately, there is no one profile of a
school shooter, and this is actually coming directly from the
FBI, having examined several of the previous school shooting
incidents. Previous school shooters have been popular; they
have also been loners. School shooters have been both female
and male. We cannot necessarily say that there is any one
particular profile that is going to lead to someone becoming a
school shooter, but there are certainly warning signs and
risks, and those include both the intra individual as well as
the contextual risks toward school violence.
We know that when communities have increased levels of
trust, students are not likely to bring weapons to school, and
they are much more likely to report to school officials when
they suspect that there is a threat from one of their peers.
This is why it is so important for us to actually focus in on
building a positive school climate as a way for prevention.
Let me be clear. I am not saying we should not invest in
school security measures, but I think that is only one part of
a much broader effort to actually create safe schools, and we
need to make sure that as we are implementing safe school
measures, they are not going to cause harm to our children.
Senator Peters. So are these perpetrators of school
shootings, are they outsiders, or are they folks from within
the school?
Ms. Temkin. The vast majority of school shooters have come
from within the school, either current students or, as in the
case of Parkland, a former student. These are students who
would very likely know exactly what the school is doing for
school security measures, and if they are determined to do
something at that school, probably would find a way around
that. I think that is why it is so important for us to focus
both on prevention as well as securing our schools.
Senator Peters. Well, if they are from the school and they
may know safety measures or they may know drills, I think is
what you are saying, then how do we design systems given that?
What is your recommendation?
Ms. Temkin. I think we absolutely need to continue doing
things to help secure the school. But I think we have to really
invest in actually trying to get to the root causes of the
violence. So we need to help students identify challenges and
provide supports. That is really the theory behind threat
assessment, which says that when there is a viable threat, we
need to identify what those challenges are and find the
supports that are actually going to prevent that student from
carrying out those threats.
Senator Peters. Mr. Schachter, I would like to acknowledge
first your vision and the work in the establishment of a
Federal clearinghouse for best practices that will benefit all
schools, and you talked a great deal about that in your opening
statement, and I appreciate that. And as you know, the
Department of Homeland Security, along with a number of Federal
partners, is going to be releasing this report in the next few
months, hopefully sooner rather than later.
But my question is: What are you specifically watching for
as the DHS implements this clearinghouse and other specific
aspects that you believe are most critical for us to use as a
tool and you are hoping to see in the best practices?
Mr. Schachter. Yes, so on July 30 will be our first
meeting, and we are inviting over three dozen different
stakeholders from all different aspects--mental health, law
enforcement, superintendents, everyone. All the stakeholders
need to be at the table so that we can sit down and come up
with national school safety best practices. There are common-
sense solutions that--lessons learned that came out of
Columbine, Sandy Hook, and now Parkland that need to be
implemented. And so if we have everybody agreeing and have buy-
in, I am hoping that, once we establish these best practices,
it will be put up on a Federal website, and then that will be
implemented through all States and into school districts across
the country.
But that is my main concern, that we need to ensure that
the school districts adopt these best practices as soon as
possible. We cannot let another day go by where lessons learned
that will save and mitigate lives and prevent these school
tragedies do not get implemented. And, hopefully, once we have
these best practices, they are going to be tied to the grant
dollars, because that is a major problem right now.
To give you an example, Broward County got half a million
dollars to implement analytic cameras last year, and they did
not even have a formal active assailant response policy. In the
Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Commission that I am on,
we developed tiers, so Tier 1 would be low-cost/no-cost
measures that every school can implement. No matter if it is a
school in Iowa or a school in Miami, they should implement
those. And then Tiers 2, 3, and 4 would be more expensive and
longer-term implementation. So schools should not be
implementing a Tier 4 strategy--in other words, analytic
cameras--if they have not done the basics, if they have not
installed a formal active assailant response policy. So once we
have those best practices, they need to be tied to the grant
dollars to ensure compliance.
Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you.
Mr. Hoyer, in your testimony you discussed the role that
the U.S. Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center has
played in advancing research used by threat assessment teams.
Mr. Schachter, I think you discussed that as well in your
testimony. So for both you, starting with Mr. Hoyer, but also
Mr. Schachter as well, what role should threat assessment teams
play in the overall safety landscape as you have looked at
this?
Mr. Hoyer. As I look at it, I think it is a pretty central
role. It is one of the prevention measures. In our situation,
the shooter had around 69 interactions, disciplinary
interactions with the school. He had 21 calls from the police,
numerous sessions with a local mental health agency. I cannot
help but think if months or years before somebody had done a
threat assessment on this shooter that my son would still be
here. I think it is critically important to step in and try to
help those individuals, but also, if you cannot, know who they
are and deal with them appropriately.
Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you.
Mr. Schachter, I know you mentioned this as well. Would you
like to add anything to the threat assessment team?
Mr. Schachter. Yes, absolutely. It is critical--we have
identified a major gap, that these information silos, you had
this violent individual from age 3 that had a tremendous amount
of disciplinary actions inside the school, and then you had all
these law enforcement interactions. Well, these were two silos
that were never connected, and so these threat assessment teams
that were instituted after Virginia Tech and now after Florida
are to be to sit down and be proactive, not reactive. And I
would recommend threat assessment teams in every State in every
school. They will save lives. And so that is why I support both
the Eagles Act, which will reauthorize the National Threat
Assessment Center inside Secret Service, and also the Threat
Assessment, Prevention, and Safety (TAPS) Act as well.
Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Hassan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Peters, for your continued attention to the issue of school
safety.
First, I just want to thank all of today's witnesses for
taking the time to speak with us and to help ensure that our
children are protected as we make our schools safer.
A special thank you to Mr. Schachter and Mr. Hoyer for your
tireless efforts to honor your children and to protect and
support all of our children.
And to all of the other family members who are here today
who have lost their loved ones, I thank you as well for being
here and for adding your voices and your presence and your
witness to this issue.
Mr. Schachter, I would like to start with a question for
you. I share your view that we need to acknowledge that school
shootings pose a very real threat that impacts communities
nationwide, and that we need to focus on what we can do to
protect students and prepare them for the unimaginable.
I became Governor of New Hampshire shortly after the horror
of the Sandy Hook shooting, and in New Hampshire, we took
action. The State Department of Safety worked to expand a
number of school safety initiatives, including a statewide
initiative to improve school emergency notification systems, to
improve security assessments for schools, and to improve
information sharing between schools and first responders.
The notification system reduced law enforcement response
times by allowing the school computers to connected directly
with dispatch and notify law enforcement officers closest to
the school during an emergency. The State also worked with
schools to conduct security assessments to identify gaps in
safety that could be addressed.
Mr. Schachter, I know you have talked about some of this
today, but in your work through Safe Schools for Alex, have you
found that these kinds of measures are important in ensuring
that schools and local law enforcement are more prepared in
case of an emergency?
Mr. Schachter. Senator, you are 100 percent correct.
Unfortunately, in our commission we did an analysis of the last
20 years of active shooters, and what we found was that a
majority of these shootings are over in 4 to 5 minutes. As the
sheriff talked about, in 3 minutes and 51 seconds everyone was
dead. And, unfortunately, even though our law enforcement will
do their best to try to get to the scene, they are not going to
get there in time. Even if the SRO on campus was a courageous
individual, which he was not, it still took him a minute and 44
seconds on a golf cart to get to the front of that building. By
the time that happened, 24 children and staff were already shot
and/or killed.
So law enforcement is not going to get there in time. That
is why an immediate notification to law enforcement is
critical, and if we look at the safest school in America, in
Indiana, each teacher wears a key fob on their neck, so in 2
seconds, depressing that key fob tells law enforcement exactly
what is happening, and then law enforcement has access to the
cameras, which Broward County refused to give law enforcement.
They did now, but law enforcement did not have access to the
cameras inside the school prior. And then in Indiana, once they
hit that button and it is depressed, law enforcement can look
inside the school, see exactly where the school shooter is, and
has live, actionable intelligence so it knows exactly where to
go, where to send the officers, and to interdict and stop the
attack as soon as possible.
Senator Hassan. Right. And the other critical piece that we
need to continue to work on is it needs to be the closest
available law enforcement officer. It should not matter whether
it is a county sheriff or a municipal officer or a State
trooper. The fact is whoever is closest needs to be able to get
that information and respond.
Thank you again for your work, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you and all of the witnesses.
Mr. Hoyer, as you have discussed, we need to focus as well
on prevention efforts. Prevention includes increasing school
safety but also recognizing the role of mental health and
making sure that individuals who exhibit behaviors that are a
threat to themselves or others do not have access to firearms
and other deadly weapons. This is one of the reasons that I
have been a strong proponent of expanding the extreme risk
protection orders, also called ``red flag'' laws, which allow
courts to issue time-limited restraining orders to restrict
access to firearms when there is evidence that individuals are
planning to harm themselves or others. To do this effectively,
we also need to make sure that students know where to report
suspicious activity and how to seek help.
Mr. Hoyer, in your experience with the National Association
of Families for Safe Schools, what have you found to be best
practices for building a comprehensive prevention approach that
ensures that students experiencing a mental health crisis
receive the help that they need and are kept as safe as
possible?
Mr. Hoyer. It starts with something pretty simple. One of
the things we are advocating for is suicide prevention or
intervention. So there are proven off-the-shelf programs out
there.
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Hoyer. Columbia Protocol is one. It used to be called
the ``Lighthouse Project.'' Columbia Protocol is a fairly
simple one card, six questions. It tells you the question. It
tells you how to respond to the answer. And it could be
anything from ``I will sit here with you for a little while and
pat you on the back'' to ``I am going to stay here with you
until somebody comes to help.''
Senator Hassan. Right.
Mr. Hoyer. It empowers people, colleagues, family members,
and friends to actually ask the questions and get people to
seek help. We are advocating funding and promotion of those
already proven programs. Our friends at Sandy Hook have a
program, Start with Hello!, and these programs have existed for
a while. The one at Columbia Protocol was implemented in the
Marines. They saw a 22-percent reduction in suicide. I just
think that starting there, starting with something simple,
something easy to implement, would be a first step to
implementing a real comprehensive program, which eventually is
going to have to include mental health, talking with the
school, possibly the police, the whole threat assessment that
we were just talking about.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Dr. Temkin, I wanted to touch on a couple of points that I
know you have made. Your expertise in prevention is critical as
we examine how to balance increasing student safety while
avoiding unintended effects.
I am particularly concerned with trauma experienced by
students and teachers during active shooter trainings and the
potential for disproportionate impacts on students of color and
students who experience disabilities. Can you share concerns
you have with some active shooter drills and how some school
hardening efforts could result in disproportionate impact of
certain students? Obviously, we have to balance all of these
issues, and we all want to make our schools safe. But, again,
if you can help us understand what those best practices might
look like and how we could avoid some traumas to students, that
would be really helpful.
Ms. Temkin. Absolutely. And to be clear, there have not
been rigorous evaluations of many of these active shooter
drills that are what folks call ``multioption'' or may have
been referred to as ``ALICE.'' These drills can often be very
realistic such that teachers have reported in media, which,
without rigorous evaluations, are probably the best that we
have at the moment, that they have been absolutely traumatized
by seeing their colleagues get shot with plastic bullets, by
seeing them trip over each other and saying, this was more
traumatizing than it was training.
In terms of disparities, we have to be very careful in
thinking about both staffing as well as the impact of staffing,
so particularly when it comes to school resource officers, we
know that school resource officers, when they are present and
especially when they are involved in the discipline at school,
will drive up suspension, expulsion, and criminal justice
referrals for minor, nonviolent offenses. And we know that
there is extensive disparities for both students with
disabilities and students of color in receiving such
discipline. So we have to be careful when we are recommending
these that we consider these unintended consequences.
Senator Hassan. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your
testimony.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Peters. I want to thank Senator Scott for his work in
bringing you here today.
As I think about how you must feel as parents, as community
members or students and children and families and
grandchildren, the impact on what you experienced in the
personal level, it has an impact on all of us. And I never want
to imagine what you have gone through. I never want another
family to go through what any of these families are going
through. And I hope sincerely that we can work on honoring the
loss of your most precious loved ones by our action in the
future.
And so I agree with the panel that we have to emphasize
multimodal approaches to address this issue. It is not just one
thing. It is many things, because each incident is going to be
different. Schools have to foster safe and supportive learning
environments for all students. We have to have an adequate
number of school-based mental health professionals to reach
students in crisis, suicidal, angry, whatever that is. You
cannot learn if you do not feel safe for the other students who
may be scared of someone who they see that has issues.
In Nevada, the Nevada Association of School Psychologists,
they recommend a ratio of one psychologist for every 500 to 700
students. In Nevada, we have 1 for every 3,000 students. It is
just a ticking time bomb. And the Nevada Association, they
really worked with--the school psychologists have worked
closely with our State legislators. We actually just passed
recently S. 89 that requires our State Board of Education to
develop recommendations for ratios of pupils to specialized
support personnel--counselors, psychologists, social workers,
nurses--and to develop a strategic plan to achieve those
ratios. I am going to ask that a letter from the Nevada
Association of School Psychologists be entered into the
record.\1\
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\1\ The letter referenced by Senator Rosen appears in the Appendix
on page 181.
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Chairman Johnson. Without objection.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
And so, Dr. Temkin, thinking about this multimodal
approach, I have a two-part question. How do you think schools
can work to identify and support students needing more
intensive interventions to assure they receive the appropriate
attention before, God forbid, a tragedy could happen? And can
you speak a little bit to the necessity of Federal support both
through guidance and funding to support these efforts? Because
that is what we can do.
Ms. Temkin. Absolutely. In terms of identifying students, I
subscribe to a public health model, meaning that universal
approaches, things like bringing in prevention programs, can
reach about 80 percent of our students, but about 15 percent
probably need a little bit more intensive support and about 5
percent really need targeted interventions.
When we institute these multitiered systems of support, we
can actually help identify those students through data
collection bringing in teams that are not just law enforcement
but mental health providers to really understand a student and
identify their challenges.
One thing I want to flag about threat assessment is that it
is not just about identifying and eliminating a threat. It is
really grounded in supports. It is grounded in let us find a
way to help the students so they can succeed, not just to
prevent a tragedy.
In terms of Federal support, we have seen over the course
of the last 20 years, starting with response to Columbine, a
series of investments that the Federal Government has made in
school safety that have really focused on prevention: the Safe
Schools Healthy Students Initiative, the Safe and Supportive
Schools grant program in 2010. These really helped schools, and
we saw significant reductions in school safety indicators, so
school violence indicators, as a result. But they are very
limited. We are hopeful to see the results of what is going to
come from the Every Student Succeeds Act that we have invested
in Title IV funding. But I should note that the Student Success
and Academic Enrichment grant program covers a whole host of
things, not just school violence prevention. So when schools
are deciding what to use those funds for, they may not be
investing there either.
So Federal support and Federal guidance toward where those
funds would best be prioritized is very important.
Senator Rosen. And can you speak a little bit more about
national guidelines and standards for school staffing and the
evidence behind needing these specialized staff?
Ms. Temkin. Absolutely. One thing I would flag is that we
know that it is not just an underrepresentation of school
psychologists and other support personnel. It is a disparate
representation. So we know that majority black schools are much
more likely to have a school resource officer than they are to
have a mental health professional compared to majority white
schools.
Now, this is problematic. Again, as I mentioned, school
resource officers can perpetuate disparities in school
discipline. So when your only resource is a school resource
officer and not a mental health professional, that is going to
be where your default lies. So we have to balance our
investments in school resource officers with school mental
health professionals.
Senator Rosen. We need to increase our number of mental
health professionals across the board, I suppose.
I want to talk about what Senator Hassan talked about, the
impact--she talked about the trauma on students just going
through these drills, because it is frightening to come home,
especially if you have an elementary school. Preschoolers are
having drills. And so the impact of that is great. But God
forbid there is a tragedy.
What is the impact of this trauma going forward on the
students, the teachers, people who remain who have to continue
to maybe not go back to that school but have to go back to some
school, go back to their profession? How do we support people
who have been through a horrific event like this?
Ms. Temkin. We need to invest in trauma-informed
approaches, and that means really acknowledging trauma and
finding individualized ways to actually help support that
person to feel comfortable in their environment.
Now, I will stress there is no one-size-fits-all model for
any of this. It is going to depend on the particular community
as well as the particular individual.
I should say that not everyone responds to traumatic events
the same way. We talk a lot about adverse childhood
experiences, for instance, as a driver of trauma, but not every
child who experiences an adverse childhood experience is
actually going to experience trauma. And we have to be careful,
for instance, when we are doing screenings that we are not just
labeling a child who has experienced something hard in their
life as someone who is damaged. We have to really tailor this
to each individual situation.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony, and
I think an approach with mental health and school safety in
hard and soft ways is the way we move forward.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
I want to start with something that I think really
surprised me to hear, that in the school in Parkland there was
not controlled access. I visit schools all the time, and there
is only one point of entry. It is hard for me to get into a
school. It is also true of most businesses. So is that pretty
common in Florida? Was that not implemented? I would kind of
ask my colleagues, do you find the same thing? Do you have
pretty much one point of entry in your schools? Sheriff, can
you comment on that?
Mr. Gualtieri. Yes, it is very inconsistent, and single
points of entry, fenced campuses are not across the board. It
is inconsistent. I will give you an idea, and it is also how it
is implemented.
At the Stoneman Douglas campus, the campus was fenced, but
here is the practice: They open the gates for arrival time at
5:30 in the morning for a 7:40 school start time. They open the
gates in the afternoon at 2:15 for a 2:40 dismissal, and when
the gates were opened, they were unstaffed. And we asked the
question during the investigation: Why? It is just the way we
have always done it. So why even bother having closed and lock
gates? Because, as Dr. Temkin said--and she is absolutely
right--the majority of these--in fact, in the last 20 years,
there have been 46 targeted attacks on K-12 schools; 43 of them
were done by insiders, so 94 percent.
In the case of this situation, the shooter exploited it. He
knew that that gate was going to be open. He arrived at 2:19
p.m. The gate was opened at 2:15. So it is inconsistent. And
when there are gates, if they are not staffed, if they do not
have somebody standing there that has the adequate
communication device to alert others, it is all useless.
So I would say it is very inconsistent. We are making
progress. It is getting better in some places, but there is
still a lot of voids.
Chairman Johnson. So controlled entry would be a Tier 1
action, correct?
Mr. Schachter. It depends. In Florida, Marjory Stoneman
Douglas is a very large campus. There are 13 buildings. And a
lot of the schools around the country, one building, it is much
easier to have a single point of entry, to have a visitor
vestibule or a mantrap, and so it is easier that way.
Chairman Johnson. You brought up a point I was going to
bring up with Dr. Temkin. Just basic school size, we have these
massive schools nowadays versus go back 100 years, single-
room--I am not suggesting we go back to single-room
schoolhouses, although, things like Acton Academies, I mean,
there is somewhat of a movement toward that way. I think these
massive schools are dehumanizing in many respects, and so it is
pretty easy to understand how kids get lost in this and the
bullying and that type of thing. Can you just comment on the
large school sizes? And is that part of the solution, to start
going toward smaller schools again?
Ms. Temkin. It certainly could be. I think we should
definitely do more research into that. The data that I have
seen is that there is not necessarily a significant difference
in the rates of violence, I think in part because it depends on
the investments each particular school is making into both
school safety and school climate. At least when it comes to
bullying, as you mentioned, we know that there is really not a
correlation between school size and rates of bullying.
Chairman Johnson. I want to kind of go back to Parkland.
What was notable about that perpetrator is how well known his
problems were, and it just was not communicated. I know, Tom,
in your testimony you talked about modifications to,
relaxation, clarification for the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) and Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). Sheriff, was that part of the
problem here? Did those Federal laws prevent that sharing of
information? Was it also just negligence? Or to what extent was
it both?
Mr. Gualtieri. All of the above, a combination. FERPA has
been around for 40 years. It has not been updated. I think
there is a lot of room and a lot of opportunity to update some
of that so there can be better information sharing. HIPAA is,
of course, more recently enacted, but I will say this: As far
as both of those laws are concerned, they are overly applied by
the people who are charged with interpreting them and applying
them, and the exceptions are not as understood as they need to
be. So there is a lot of room to do more training and to have
more effective communication so that those dots can be
connected.
There are some questions and discussion about behavioral
threat assessment teams. Behavioral threat assessment teams are
only as good as the information they receive. If they are not
receiving comprehensive information that is going to tell the
whole story, then they are not going to make a good decision.
So that information sharing and having the laws that allow that
are vitally important.
Chairman Johnson. In our system of justice, innocent until
proven guilty is a bedrock principle. So it is an issue. Just
what do you do if they are not guilty yet?
Mr. Gualtieri. Well, and it is not so much--it is true, and
they are not guilty, but there are things that can be done. I
think the behavioral threat assessment teams, I would take it a
step further or maybe a step differently in the behavioral
threat assessment process. I think if we wait until we have
threats, we are waiting too long. We really need to get it back
here where there are behavioral indicators of concern, and we
need to catch it before it manifests as a threat so that
something can be done and there can be intervention.
One of the places that is really lacking is in care
coordination. You have community-based mental health providers.
You have school-based providers. You have private providers.
Many of these kids, we see that they are under multiple
treatment plans. There needs to be more case management, more
coordinated care to catch it earlier.
Also, again, it comes back to identifying the threat and
doing something about it. There was a campus monitor that saw
the shooter, and the campus monitor is a security person at the
school. He saw the shooter walk through that gate unfettered,
and it took the shooter a minute and 30 seconds to walk through
the gate to the east door of the building where he walked in
because it is unlocked. He identified him, eyes to the shooter,
and said to himself, ``That is crazy boy and he is carrying a
rifle bag.'' He did nothing about it.
So this is where the importance of harm mitigation is and
being able to identify a threat, communicate the threat so
others can react to it. If they do not know how to identify it,
then there is nothing to communicate. In this case it was
identified. He saw him and we have him on tape saying that he
saw ``crazy boy carrying a rifle bag.'' He knew it was a rifle
bag. He did nothing about it, so it was not communicated and
people could not react to it. So it really is a combination of
things that have to be done.
Chairman Johnson. I want to follow up on what Senator Scott
was talking about in terms of the--is it school safety
officers?
Mr. Gualtieri. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. I want to know a little bit more about
that. So, first of all, what is the profile of a school safety
officer? Are they supposed to be armed? Are they supposed to be
former law enforcement, former military?
Mr. Gualtieri. So the requirement of Florida is that on
every charter, elementary, middle, and high school campus there
be what is called a ``safe school officer.'' A safe school
officer can be a police officer, a deputy sheriff, or a
guardian. A guardian is not a law enforcement officer, but it
is somebody that goes through a rigorous background and
screening process and rigorous training and is that person on
campus who is authorized under law to thwart that active
assailant event.
The guardians could be school employees who perform it as a
collateral responsibility, so they could be the athletic
director, they could be the counselor, or they could be the
principal. Or they could be somebody that is hired dedicated
just for that role.
Chairman Johnson. OK. So the State actually allocated
money. What happened to the money? What was it used for if it
was not used for a safe school officer?
Mr. Gualtieri. It is still sitting there because it was--in
last year's budget, the State allocated $67 million in
nonrecurring funds, and this year the legislature rolled it
over again. So of the $67 million that was allocated
originally, there is probably at least $50 million of it,
probably more, still sitting there that is available to
implement the guardian program.
Chairman Johnson. So schools did not take the money and
reallocate it to something else?
Mr. Gualtieri. No.
Chairman Johnson. They just did not take the money. Was
there resistance to having an armed individual on--I mean, was
there that political argument there?
Mr. Gualtieri. Yes, and the resistance was to the
guardians. What too many of the school boards, the school
superintendents, and the district wanted is what they cannot
have. They wanted only cops. And the reality of it is that that
cannot happen. First and foremost, in law enforcement today
probably one of the most pressing challenges we have is
recruitment and retention. In the State of Florida alone, today
there are 1,500 openings for police officers. There are 4,000
schools in the State of Florida, and only about half of them
have cops. So where are we going to get 3,500 cops? So it does
not work. You have to use alternatives, and it comes down to
what can you live with. And the guardians provide a good
alternative.
The problem was they did not like it, and so if they did
not like it, they did not want it, so they threw the ``this is
an unfunded mandate'' flag--which it was not--and said, ``We
are just not going to do it.'' And so that has resulted in
where we are.
Chairman Johnson. By the way, I think we have a real
shortage of mental health professionals as well.
Senator Peters, I have a ton more questions, but I will
turn it over to you if you have some.
Senator Peters. I have a couple, and then we can go back.
Sheriff Gualtieri, the other thing that has been
highlighted in the after-action report was the problems with
the communications systems and the interoperability of them.
Now, these are not new. We hear about that across all sorts of
law enforcement agencies now, but, obviously, this is
absolutely critical because speed is a matter of life and
death, the quicker you get folks and you can communicate and be
able to find out where that shooter is and coordinate your
activity.
So my question to you is: What is your recommendation, what
can we be doing today to help the communications systems or
invest in communications systems and coordinate? What sort of
action should we be thinking about doing in this Committee to
deal with that problem across agencies, across the country?
Mr. Gualtieri. So two issues. One would be ensuring that
there is radio interoperability, which means that all police
officers and deputy sheriffs and all law enforcement entities
can speak to each other. That was not the case in Parkland. The
Coral Springs police officers--Coral Springs and Parkland abut,
and the south end of the Stoneman Douglas campus is the city
line between Parkland and Coral Springs. The Coral Springs
police officers and the Broward County sheriff's deputies who
provide police services in Parkland could not communicate
because they did not have radio interoperability. They did not
have each other's radio channels installed in the radios, and
they were relying on a system of patching the two channels. But
you cannot patch that which you do not have. Nobody installed
the Coral Springs channels in the Broward County console, so
they could not patch it. So you had two totally separate
operations. That is unacceptable, obviously, and those types of
things can be fixed, and they need to be fixed. But there needs
to be complete interoperability.
Second is in the 911 centers. Way too many counties in
Florida and across the country have multiple 911 centers in
their counties. Most people think--and they are wrong--that
when you pick up the phone and you call 911, the person who is
answering your call is going to be able to dispatch help for
you. That is not true. That was not the case in this situation.
The first girl who called 911 from the first floor at Building
12, her 911 call was answered by the Coral Springs Police
Department because they set it up that 911 calls in Parkland
went to the Coral Springs 911 center, not the Broward sheriff's
office 911 center. So that first call that came in was answered
in Coral Springs. That call taker waited 28 seconds before he
then transferred it over to the Broward County sheriff's
office. It took 57 seconds to process the call at the Broward
County sheriff's office where the story had to be told again.
And then it was a minute and 24 seconds before the first
dispatcher put voice to radio to dispatch the first law
enforcement officer. A minute and 24 seconds. On the first
floor, 24 people were shot or killed in a minute and 44
seconds.
Those are the things that need to change. And as soon as
somebody calls 911, that call needs to go out immediately.
Seconds matter. And an irony is that when finally they did
dispatch a Coral Springs police officer, the first officer, he
arrived in 19 seconds. So if it had been done properly and the
work flow had been set up differently, maybe somebody would
have been there a little earlier that could have helped.
Senator Peters. Yes. Dr. Temkin, my State of Michigan is a
State rich in diversity, including folks in rural areas, urban
areas, also students of various racial and ethnic backgrounds.
And I know there is no one-size-fits-all approach to school
safety, and we need to be thinking about that as we are looking
at putting together national policies.
My question to you is: What are some of the unintended
consequences we should be aware of when discussing school
safety measures that may not look the same across very diverse
communities?
Ms. Temkin. Well, I think it is important that we recognize
that it cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution. I can say that
the high school that I attended in Arizona was not laid out as
a traditional high school. We had multiple buildings, something
similar to Marjory Stoneman. The security measures that it
would take to secure that school would have been very different
than the schools here in D.C., which are largely held in a
single building.
We have to not restrict the solutions that we can give
schools, and we also need to recognize that every context is
going to be different. In a rural area, it may take even longer
than the sheriff has mentioned for a police officer to reach a
campus, and we have to recognize that in developing whatever
recommendations we give to schools.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. I do not know to what extent there is
still a sense of urgency in Colorado. I know the sense of
urgency there is in Florida. I have a sense there is still a
pretty high level of urgency in Connecticut.
The question I have is: How do we create the sense of
urgency that exists right now in Florida after these tragedies?
How do we find champions in States where the tragedies have not
already occurred, people like Tom and Max and all the other
families that are involved here? How do we do that? I am
completely supportive of the clearinghouse. That will have the
information. But we will still need within the States those
champions.
I will certainly try and be that champion in Wisconsin. I
think it should be incumbent on every Senator to do that. But
you still need people that are there pretty much full-time
driving this process. Are there any suggestions?
Mr. Schachter. Absolutely, and it is that mindset that
needs to change, that we had in Parkland, that they had in
Sandy Hook. That is not going to happen here, and my schools
are safe. And, if you have that mindset, it prevents you from
having a security mindset.
The principal at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, when he was
interviewed and asked, ``If there was a threat to shoot up your
school, do you expect to know about it?'' His answer was no. He
was completely disinterested and uninvolved in the threat
assessment process and the security of his campus.
So that needs to change, and it is not an easy answer, but
I think part of the way we do that is by, number one, having
that school safety rating system to show the public whether or
not your school is safe. Right now there is no way for a parent
to go online to see if their school is safe, and if we can take
that information and push it out to the public, I think that it
will put nationwide pressure on school districts to implement
the best practices that are going to be developed in the
clearinghouse, and I think that is one of the major ways.
Then, also, it is the best practices because, as we travel
around to schools, they ask us, ``What can I do? Show me where
to go.'' Well, the clearinghouse is going to develop those best
practices, and they are going to be up on schoolsafety.gov very
shortly, hopefully.
Chairman Johnson. So I want to talk about your best
practices and your tier system here. I think Senator Scott used
the words ``things we just had to do.'' I am assuming Tier 1 is
things we just had to do, it is so obvious. What is the
criteria you are setting as you are setting those tier levels?
Do you have multiple criteria, no-cost, low-cost, people agree
on it, most effective? What do you use as your criteria?
Mr. Schachter. Yes, so, Tier 1 would be low-cost/no-cost
where, for instance, in an active assailant response policy, we
are not talking about implementing massive amounts of
technology that would cost a lot of money and would be a very
short time to implement.
Also, another example is locking doors. You lock your door
when you leave your house. Every teacher should be teaching
with a locked door.
And then you go to Tier 2, 3, and 4. Tier 4 would be, a
long time to implement and very costly. So, implementing those,
the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Commission laid that out, Tier 1,
2, 3, and 4. And, I think that the clearinghouse is going to be
hopefully doing that as well.
Chairman Johnson. In my briefing--this is a relatively
thick briefing packet I got--I saw the summary recommendations
from your commission, from Sandy Hook, from Columbine, from the
Federal commission. And then they set up a matrix for me in
terms of here are the four columns. Here are all the
recommendations, which commission was recommending which. There
are a fair amount of differences. A lot of commonality but a
fair amount of differences. But there were a lot of
recommendations.
Mr. Schachter. But there are things that every school can
do. No matter if you are in Indiana, in rural Indiana, or in
Miami, every school should be doing these no-cost/low-cost
things.
Chairman Johnson. Again, that is what I appreciate about
the structure you have brought to this, the tiers, the priority
in terms of what we need to be doing in this, and then, again,
a national clearinghouse. It does not require a big old
government program, but it just requires the National
Government to be that clearinghouse and do it thoughtfully and
highlight it. From my standpoint, the legislation ought to be
action-inducing to create that pressure, to find those
champions in the States so this is a driven at a State and,
even more important, at the local level because schools are a
local issue. It just really is.
You mentioned Indiana. I have met with so many people on
this issue. I think I met with the folks that have really
hardened--kind of an Exhibit 1 of a hardened school. It cost
$300,000. Can you tell me a little bit more about that and talk
about all the things they have done?
Mr. Schachter. Yes, and the reason there was such a high
cost is because they have bulletproof glass in that school.
Obviously that is not, scalable, but the things that that
school does do, number one, you would never know that it has
the best security. It does not look like a prison at all. You
would not even notice that. It does not even have metal
detectors. But what it does have is it has that immediate
notification to law enforcement, and it has--they drill, they
practice, because if you do not train your teachers and your
staff, you see what happens, like my son was murdered. That is
what happens if you do not drill and you do not train. And when
I went to that school, I arranged a private tour right after
the tragedy in Parkland, and one thing that I thought was very
illuminating was we talked to teachers, we talked to children
in that school, and they felt safer knowing that they knew what
to do in an emergency. They know that if there is an active
shooter, they know exactly where to go in that classroom.
Another Tier 1 measure would be, they have a red line in
that classroom, in the corner of that classroom, so that every
child knows where to go. He is out of the sight line of that
window. Alex was murdered because the murderer targeted him
through that window, and the kids on the second floor, like the
sheriff talked about, a lot of them were in those corners. So
that is another thing. It is low-cost/no-cost, and the training
is very important, training for law enforcement officers. In
the Marjory Stoneman Douglas shooting, the active shooter
training that law enforcement had, they only trained active
shooter every 3 years. So active shooter training, whether it
is law enforcement or staff and children, it is muscle memory.
You need to know what to do. And these are life skills. We do
not live in Kansas anymore. This is happening around our
country. Children and staff need to be trained no matter if
they are in a movie theater or they are in a school. They need
to be equipped with these life lessons to be able to protect
themselves in case of an emergency.
Chairman Johnson. I should know this. Did you all see each
other's testimony before today?
Mr. Schachter. Negative.
Chairman Johnson. So you have not seen Dr. Temkin' written
testimony.
Mr. Schachter. Negative.
Chairman Johnson. I think it is interesting. Dr. Temkin,
you mentioned about, live fire drills, basically, using plastic
bullets. I kind of have to scratch my head, but the type of
drill and the type of--do you have any problems with what Max
is talking about in terms of, like we used to do, we would
crawl under our desk--I did not really feel particularly
traumatized by that. I realize it was pretty stupid. But, we do
need to prepare, just like you have to do fire drills, that
type of thing. Do you see any problem with that?
Ms. Temkin. I absolutely agree that we need to prepare, but
I think it is the way we frame how we are doing the training as
well as the types of training we are doing. I think we have to
be careful that these do not become so routine that when an
incident unfortunately happens, students do not feel
complacent, ``Oh, this is just another drill.'' That is a risk
of overdoing some of these things.
I also think that we have to make it clear that we are not
doing this because there is an imminent threat. I think that is
where kids get scared, when they think that the community they
are in and the community their peers, the teachers that are
around are going to in some way harm them, they become scared
to come to school. And so we need to prevent that option as
well. I think there has to be that balance.
Chairman Johnson. So in preparing and in listening to the
testimony and that type of thing, I am thinking about an issue
we are dealing with all the time, and that is the problem on
our border. And before Senator Peters starts rolling his eyes
on this one, I see a similarity in terms of what we are dealing
with here, because right now we have a crisis at the border,
there is a specific problem in here now. And oftentimes the
solution--which, by the way, it is a solution. If we could
develop those countries, if we could get rid of the drug
cartels, if we could end the extortion rackets and provide
opportunity, you would not have a migrant flow out of Central
America. But that is a very long term solution.
With all respect, Dr. Temkin, an awful lot of things you
are talking about, better mental health treatment, again, we do
not have enough mental health practitioners now. So how do we
separate out and how we do make sure that the kind of longer-
term solutions, which are completely valid and we would all
love to do them, do not get in the way of the Tier 1, the
things we must do right now? Really take that long-term
viewpoint, because the next thing I am going to ask is some of
the controversial proposals as well, that those do not get
locked up or get included in these things and prevent action.
Ms. Temkin. So I think the main issue is that there is a
limited amount of resources to go to this, so we have to
balance our investments in what we do to defend our schools
with what we are doing to actually prevent school violence and
build our students up. When we are given such a limited amount
of resources, our schools are incentivized to do the visible,
easy security systems and less incentivized to really engage in
the systematic prevention efforts that are really necessary to
create safe schools. So we have to incentivize both.
Chairman Johnson. OK. I am a big proponent of the
principle: ``Keep it simple, stupid (KISS).'' OK? So what I am
asking--I hate to give folks like you a homework assignment,
but, again, I have seen the recommendations. And I know you
have done the tiering. But work with this Committee to design
the most simple but most effective piece of legislation under
our jurisdiction that can grab people's attention, that can
create that sense of urgency, that can have the Federal
Government do what it can do so that we are actually taking
action as opposed to what often happens around here, oh, well,
we just need more funding for X, Y, and Z. OK? I think the most
important things we need to do here do not require a whole lot
of funding. So let us concentrate first on that because to me
the number one thing we have to do is create that sense of
urgency so that every community, every school, and every State
is implementing at least those Tier 1. And if we can get their
attention on that, if we get them active, you take that first
step--I come from a manufacturing background, continuous
improvement. If we can make that incremental improvement, take
that first step, you are going to get people's attention, and
they will be looking at Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4 without
arguing over the more controversial things. OK?
One final question that I have is I do want to address the
controversial issues. We talked about red flag laws. What did
you say, 15 States have enacted those? What has always
frustrated me about the whole gun control debate is I really do
think there is common ground, but what ends up happening is,
well, you have to take all of mine or all of mine, and just
people do not--OK, what do we agree on? I mean, let us at least
enact what we agree on. It seems to make an awful lot of sense
to me that you want to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous
people or people that have serious mental health problems. But
at the same time, I fully respect due process. There is a real
serious concern about what do you do if they are not guilty
yet. So how do you come together--that is just one of--I would
say that is probably one of the more controversial aspects of
this whole thing, the gun control debate. How do we get by
that? Any suggestions? Does anybody want to comment on that at
all? I probably should not have even brought it up, but I was
advised not to have this hearing, too.
Mr. Gualtieri. We have in Florida, as a result of the
legislation last year, passed a red flag law, a risk protection
order law, and it is extremely effective, and it has a lot of
due process built into it, where law enforcement has the
ability to seek an order immediately from a judge, and then a
final hearing has to be held within 14 days. Then they are good
for a year, and they can be renewed, and it is a full
adversarial hearing.
Finally, we also have now authority when we do take
somebody into custody under what we call the ``State's Baker
Act law''--every State has a version, which is an involuntary
commitment for mental health evaluation. Up until last year, we
did not even have the authority when we take somebody into
custody because they threaten somebody, let us say, with a
firearm, we could not even seize the firearm. We can do that
now.
So those are very important and effective, but they also
have a lot of process built into it so that it is being done
with the right people, and it is not just blanket and sweeping
across the board.
Chairman Johnson. Obviously, because of Parkland, that was
something--it is easier to pass that. Was it designed pretty
well so it was also noncontroversial? Had you been a State
where you did not have Parkland----
Mr. Gualtieri. Oh, no. Of course, it was controversial.
Chairman Johnson. But how controversial?
Mr. Gualtieri. I think it was, I would say moderate to very
controversial. There had to be a lot of discussions and
negotiations. As we all know, and you would know better than I
in the legislation process, it is all about compromise and
getting it to a place where we could get something through. It
is not perfect, but it is better than where we were.
Senator, I just want to add this. I think that there are a
number of things that can be done across the board that are
low-cost/no-cost, and probably the best thing is to set
minimums on what should be done, but recognizing that we are a
very diverse country and there has to be local control in local
communities, and that we tell and you tell and others who are
in a position to tell people, tell them what to do but not
necessarily how to do it, to allow for that local control, like
with drills as an example. You have to have drills, but do not
get into telling them the specifics of it, because they need to
be age appropriate, and they are going to be different in
different places. You have to have an active shooter response
policy. Let them craft it. If we can just get to a place where
every school district in this country had five, six, seven
basic core security competencies in place, we would be much
further ahead than where we are. So we need to make it so that
it is palatable, so that it is the noncontroversial things that
they will actually take and do.
So I am a big advocate of telling them here are the 5, 6,
or maybe even 10 things you have to do. Let them figure out how
to do it, and if we could get there, we would move the needle.
Chairman Johnson. I am not a real fan of the Federal
Government here. I am all about local and State control,
government close to the governed. I really do not want to
create mandates, but I do realize the Federal Government can
play a role, but I want it to be a constructive, facilitating
role.
Do you have anything further you want to add?
Senator Peters. No.
Chairman Johnson. I will give you one last chance. I will
start with you, Dr. Temkin, if there is something you want to
add to this--not necessarily what we just talked about but just
to kind of close out the hearing.
Ms. Temkin. Sure. So there are a few points that I think
are really important to consider here. One is: What is our
definition of safety? So if our definition of safety is only
about preventing school shootings, I think that security is
clearly the way we want to go. But if we want our kids to
actually feel safe in schools, if we want them to be protected
against all forms of school violence ranging from bullying on
up, we have to do more than just security. We have to make sure
that we are thinking more broadly. We have to be thinking about
school climate.
To Mr. Schachter's point about school safety scores, we
know that several States are moving towards, within their ESSA
plans, incorporating school climate surveys as part of their
fifth indicator for Title I. These are movements that I think
could be helpful, but it will take a much broader view of what
school safety means.
I think the other thing is we also need to build upon
things that are already happening. One piece I want to make
sure is known to the Committee is that there are several
clearinghouses already in existence around school safety that
are from the Federal Government and are available, as well as
technical assistance centers. So I would encourage you to look
at them and see what might be improved upon them. So
crimesolutions.gov is a Federal website maintained by National
Institute of Justice. That has many of the practices and
programs available around school safety and the evaluations
thereto, including those that have shown to both not work and
had potential unintended consequences. So we have to consider
that as we are thinking through these.
There are also several technical assistance centers from
the Department of Education, including the readiness and
emergency management TA center, which does a lot of this work
as well. So I really encourage you, as you are thinking about
the national clearinghouse, to look at what has already been
funded and what is already in existence.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Temkin. By the way, I will
start with the safe schools, one that kids do not get shot at,
and then we will proceed from there. Sheriff.
Mr. Gualtieri. I think we have covered it. I appreciate the
opportunity, and thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member Peters,
for shining a light on this problem and letting people know
that we still have a lot of work to do. The needle does need to
move further, and in some cases it needs to move to begin with.
And what people need to know is that it is going to happen
again and that we have to do things differently. So I
appreciate the opportunity.
Chairman Johnson. Tom?
Mr. Hoyer. Yes, I would just like to restate how much we
believe this is such a complex problem, there is no single
answer to this. A lot of school safety lies outside of the
school way before a shooting ever happens. We think about these
in like layers of protection, right? So mental health is the
first layer where you try to detect and help kids who need the
help. If they fall through the cracks there, we have to keep
the firearm out of their hands. And if they fall through the
cracks there, we have to have schools that are safe.
So you have to think about it that way. It is a much
broader problem than just one thing.
Chairman Johnson. Max.
Mr. Schachter. I want to address the mindset for the last
20 years that school safety is a local issue and the Federal
Government really should not have a lot to do with that. In my
opinion, schools have failed to protect their children since
Columbine, and when those national crises happen, I think the
Federal Government has a larger role to take and I think should
take a larger role in protecting its schools and its children.
And as far as the Federal Government's role, they have the
power of the purse, and most schools receive money in some form
or fashion from the Federal Government. There are many grant
programs in the Department of Justice (DOJ) that give out money
to schools, and once we develop these best practices and, for
instance, these Tier 1 levels, I would certainly advocate that
no school gets money unless they have implemented these Tier 1
low-cost/no-cost measures. I think that that would move the
needle.
Just to give you an example, Colorado just signed its law
20 year post-Columbine to lock all their doors when they teach.
It has taken 20 years for that to happen. Florida, has that as
well, is recommending that, but that needs to be nationwide.
And as the sheriff talked about, we are just talking about
trying to move the needle here to protect our children.
Chairman Johnson. Max, I have always been impressed with
just your basic common sense and the way you have taken your
tragedy and just turned it into a practical approach.
Mr. Schachter. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Johnson. Again, I truly appreciate that. Again,
our sincere condolences. Thank you all for participating in
this.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until
August 9 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
questions for the record.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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