[Senate Hearing 116-30]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-30
CHINA'S IMPACT ON THE U.S. EDUCATION SYSTEM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2019
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-158PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Staff Director
David M. Weinberg, Minority Staff Director
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Thomas Spino, Hearing Clerk
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
Andrew Dockham, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
John Kilvington, Minority Staff Director
Kate Kielceski, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Portman.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 4
Senator Peters............................................... 15
Senator Hassan............................................... 17
Senator Romney............................................... 19
Senator Hawley............................................... 28
Prepared statements:
Senator Portman.............................................. 37
Senator Carper............................................... 42
WITNESSES
Thursday, February 28, 2019
Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 8
Walter Douglas, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................. 10
Hon. Jennifer Zimdahl Galt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 12
Hon. Mitchell M. ``Mick'' Zais, Ph.D., Deputy Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education........................................ 14
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Bair, Jason:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Douglas, Walter:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Galt, Hon. Jennifer Zimdahl:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Zais, Hon. Mitchell M. Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 75
APPENDIX
Staff Report..................................................... 80
Letter from Deputy Secretary Zais to Inspector General Sandra
Bruce.......................................................... 176
Exhibit 1........................................................ 178
Exhibit 2........................................................ 187
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Zais..................................................... 190
CHINA'S IMPACT ON THE U.S. EDUCATION SYSTEM
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rob Portman,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Portman, Romney, Hawley, Carper, Hassan,
and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\
Senator Portman. The Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations will come to order. Welcome, Senator Carper.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 37.
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Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi, witnesses.
Welcome.
Senator Portman. Last night, Senator Carper and I issued a
report\2\ detailing concerns about China's impact on the U.S.
education system. The report is the result of an 8-month
investigation that details our concerns focused on the China
Confucius Institutes.
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\2\ The report referenced by Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 80.
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Based on our findings, we are here to focus on a couple of
issues: transparency and reciprocity.
Transparency in how American colleges, universities, and K-
12 institutions manage Confucius Institutes, which are
controlled, funded, and mostly staffed by the Chinese
Government and aim to promote Chinese language, culture, and
interests on U.S. campuses.
Lack of reciprocity in how China does not permit U.S. State
Department programming in China, we will hear more about that
today. Our report details how China--known for its one-sided
dealings in trade sometimes--uses similar tactics in its unfair
treatment of U.S. schools and the State Department and their
efforts in China.
Let me be clear. I support cultural exchange. I support
cultural exchanges with China and other international exchanges
more broadly. I am for engagement, but there must be
reciprocity and there must be appropriate engagement, without
the Chinese Government determining what is said and done on
U.S. campuses. The law must be followed. This is why
transparency is so important.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about China's
influence through its Confucius Institutes. Recently, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Assistant Director for
Counterintelligence testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that Confucius Institutes are, and I quote, ``not
strictly a cultural institute'' and ``that they are ultimately
beholden to the Chinese Government.''
The State Department has labeled Confucius Institutes
``China's most prominent soft power platform.''
Higher education groups have also expressed concern. The
American Council of Education, the National Association of
Scholars, and the American Association of University Professors
have all recommended that U.S. schools fundamentally change how
they manage Confucius Institutes--or consider discontinuing
them altogether.
We know that Confucius Institutes exist as just one part of
China's broader, long-term strategy, but China has invested
significantly in them, giving more than $158 million to U.S.
schools since 2006. That is over 12 years, not 1 year,
incidentally, as I said yesterday.
China has also opened more than 500 Confucius Classrooms at
U.S. K-12 schools. Expanding the Confucius Classroom program is
a priority for them. A document obtained by the Subcommittee
details a plan to expand Confucius Classrooms by seeking, and I
quote, ``top-down policy support from the State government,
legislative and educational institutions, with a particular
emphasis on access to the support from school district
superintendents and principals.''
Over the last 8 months, we interviewed U.S. school
officials, teachers, and Confucius Institute instructors. We
also reviewed tens of thousands of pages of contracts, emails,
financial records, and other internal documents obtained from
more than 100 U.S. schools with either active or closed
Confucius Institutes.
Since our investigation started, more than 10 U.S. schools
announced they would be discontinuing their Confucius
Institutes.
We found that Chinese funding for Confucius Institutes
comes with strings attached--strings that can compromise
academic freedom.
The Chinese Government vets and approves all Chinese
directors and teachers, events, research proposals, and
speakers at U.S. Confucius Institutes.
Chinese teachers at U.S. Confucius Institutes sign
contracts with the Chinese Government pledging that they will
follow Chinese law and ``conscientiously safeguard China's
national interests.''
Some schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S.
laws will apply at the Confucius Institutes on U.S. school
campuses. Think about that for a second. These are American
universities agreeing to comply with Chinese law on their own
campuses.
This application of Chinese law at U.S. schools results in
exporting China's censorship of political debate and prevents
discussion of some politically sensitive topics.
As such, numerous U.S. school officials told the
Subcommittee that Confucius Institutes were not the place to
discuss topics like the independence of Taiwan or the Tiananmen
Square massacre.
Simply put, as one U.S. school administrator told us: ``You
know what you are getting when something is funded by the
Chinese Government.''
Investigators from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) also spoke with U.S. school officials, who acknowledged
that hosting a Confucius Institute could limit events or
activities critical of China, and not just at the Confucius
Institute but also elsewhere on campus. We will hear from Mr.
Bair about that today.
In response to the growing popularity of Confucius
Institutes, the U.S. State Department initiated its own public
diplomacy program in China. The Chinese Government effectively
shut it down.
Since 2010, the State Department has provided $5.1 million
in grant funding for 29 ``American Cultural Centers (ACCs)''--
in China. Through the program, a U.S. school would partner with
a Chinese school to set up a cultural center, which would
enable Chinese students to better understand U.S. culture.
The Chinese Government stifled the program from the start.
Seven of the 29 ACCs never even opened.
The ACCs that did open found they needed permission from
their Chinese partner schools--sometimes including local
Chinese Communist Party officials--to even hold events.
Eventually, the State Department stopped funding the
program altogether. Again, we will hear about that program
today.
While the State Department is mostly known for its overseas
diplomacy efforts, it also has oversight responsibilities right
here in the United States.
The State Department conducts Field Site Reviews to ensure
that foreign nationals who come to the United States on
Exchange Visitor Program visas are here for their stated
reason.
While there are roughly 100 Confucius Institutes, again, at
colleges and universities in the United States, the State
Department has conducted Field Site Reviews at only two. The
State Department found serious problems at both of those
schools.
The State Department revoked more than 30 visas for Chinese
exchange visitors at Confucius Institutes who were only
supposed to be working at the university that sponsored their
visa, but were actually teaching in Confucius Classrooms at
local K-12 schools.
The State Department discovered evidence of ``fraudulent
paperwork and coaching'' that was a ``deliberate attempt to
deceive'' investigators.
Moreover, the State Department told us that it does not
collect visa information specifically related to Confucius
Institutes, so we do not know how many Confucius Institute
teachers there are or where they are.
Our investigation also identified failures at the
Department of Education that have contributed to a lack of
transparency and oversight of schools that take money from
foreign governments.
Under law, if a U.S. school receives more than $250,000
from a single foreign source in 1 year, it is required to
report that data to the Department of Education, which in turn
publishes it.
Our investigation found that nearly 70 percent of the
schools that should have reported receiving funds for a
Confucius Institute from China did not.
When a school fails to report a foreign gift, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) can force a school to comply, but
only at the request of the Secretary of Education. The
Department of Education has never referred these types of cases
to the Department of Justice. Not once.
The Department of Education has not issued any guidance
since October 2004--over 14 years ago--the same year that China
opened its first Confucius Institute. It is time for new
guidance.
Our investigation found that schools in the United States,
from kindergarten to college, have provided a level of access
to the Chinese Government that the Chinese Government refuses
to provide to the United States.
This brings us back to our two key points: transparency and
reciprocity.
Absent full transparency regarding how Confucius Institutes
operate and full reciprocity for U.S. cultural outreach efforts
on Chinese campuses, Confucius Institutes should not continue
in the United States, in my view.
With that, I turn to Senator Carper for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER\1\
Senator Carper. Thanks Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for your attention to this issue. I want to thank our staffs,
both the minority side and the majority side, for the
bipartisan work that went into this hearing.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the
Appendix on page 42.
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I am going to go off script just for a minute, if I could,
and put this hearing into context. Earlier in my life I was a
naval flight officer, served three tours in Southeast Asia.
There are the names of 50,000 men, some women, on a big wall, a
granite wall just near the Lincoln Memorial that I run by every
now and then. When I run by it, I brush my hand, my fingers
across the names of the people I served with.
I had the privilege in 1991 of leading a congressional
delegation to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to find out what
happened to thousands of the missing in action (MIAs) and to
try to see if there might be a way to get onto a road map to
normalized relations between the United States and the
Vietnamese at the behest of President George Herbert Walker
Bush's administration. We had an incredible codel and had a
very emotional meeting with the brand-new leader of Vietnam,
and put us on the road map to normalize relations. Our
colleagues John Kerry and John McCain worked it hard in the
Senate; our delegation worked it hard in the House. One of the
members of my delegation actually became our first U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam, a united Vietnam, in decades.
When it was all over, fast forward, almost 3 years ago this
April, President Obama invited John Kerry, John McCain, and
myself to go back with him to Vietnam to reaffirm our improving
relations, and to expand our trade relations with them,
including our defense and military cooperation with Vietnam,
the country that killed 50,000 of our men and women and as
attested to by this wall I run alongside every now and then.
One of the things we learned from my visit there was that
the U.S. Ambassador, this was 3 years ago. He said, ``I have
two popular opinion polls that were taken of the Vietnamese
people.'' Three years ago. He said, ``One of them, taken by a
group other than the United States, found that 95 percent of
the Vietnamese have a positive opinion toward the United
States.'' Higher than any other nation, 95 percent.
We commissioned our own survey and found that 90 percent of
the Vietnamese people had a positive opinion of us. I describe
it as they like us more than we like us. Think about that.
The reason why I say that, I do not know if my colleagues
went to Munich during our last recess, but about 15 of our
colleagues went to Munich for a big security meeting to kind of
reaffirm our allegiance to our European allies and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An important meeting. But
it was hosted in Munich. In World War II, we lost hundreds of
thousands of troops because of that country and their leaders.
Today they are one of our best allies. The same situation with
Japan.
I think it is important to remember that the folks who
might be a dreaded enemy at one point in time in our history
can turn around and be our best friends and our best allies. It
is important that we try to make sure that our relationship
with China turns out good for them and good for us. I think the
point that our Chairman makes is reciprocity. For me that is
maybe the most important element to take away from this
hearing. The idea that they are trying to share with us their
culture, their language, I think that is great. It is a huge
country. But with the idea they should be reciprocating and
welcome our opportunities to do the same thing.
Now I am back on script. Ready? This will only take about
an hour--no, it will not.
Anyhow, the words that I know in Mandarin, I know ``ni
hao.'' I know ``xie xie,'' ``thank you.'' I know how to say
``Happy New Year'': ``Xin nian kuai le.'' That is pretty much
it. If I were just speaking in Chinese, it would be a short
statement. Unfortunately for you, it is not that short.
More than 2 years ago now, the Russian Government launched
an unprecedented attack on our country. Using disinformation
and stolen emails, they took advantage of Americans' growing
use of social media in an attempt to stir up conflict and
influence the 2016 election by boosting the campaign of one
candidate while denigrating the campaign and the candidacy of
another.
Today reports are already emerging that disinformation
campaigns, targeting a number of the Democrats seeking to run
against President Trump, have already begun. Given what our
country has been through in recent years and what we are
preparing to grapple with in 2020, it is important that we be
vigilant in combating foreign efforts to influence American
public opinion regardless of where they originate.
Today we will be examining the quiet efforts by the Chinese
Government to improve its image in Americans' minds through its
Confucius Institutes.
China opened its first Confucius Institute outside of Asia
in the United States about 15 years ago, and it did it at the
University of Maryland. The Chinese have this fixation with
Terrapins, so they picked Maryland, I am told, for that reason.
It has since opened roughly 100 of its 500 institutes
throughout the country. In this country there are about 100 of
them.
In addition, half of the 1,000 Confucius Classrooms that it
runs through its Confucius Institutes are in our primary and
our secondary schools.
Activities at the individual Confucius Institutes that our
staffs visited and examined varied quite a bit. At one school,
the Chinese visitors at the Confucius Institute perform
research and work as teaching assistants in for-credit Mandarin
classes, which we could probably all benefit from.
At other schools, the Chinese visitors taught more
informal, non-credit classes to both college students and
members of the community. These classes focused on everything
from Mandarin for business travelers to topics like Chinese
cooking, which we enjoy, and Chinese art, which a lot of us
enjoy.
In a handful of schools, Confucius Institute staff focused
almost exclusively on placing visiting language teachers in K-
12 schools in the area.
At all of the schools, Confucius Institute staff seemed to
focus a significant amount of time on events like Chinese New
Year parties, and I have been to a few of those, and they are
fun.
As best we can determine, these institutes spread around
our country do not appear to be overt efforts by the Chinese
Communist Party to spread pro-China or anti-American
propaganda. There is also no evidence we have uncovered that
suggests that they are a center for some kind of Chinese
espionage efforts or any other illegal activities.
That said, we nonetheless need to be mindful of where the
story told by these Confucius Institutes is coming from.
FBI Director Wray and others have expressed concerns about
the presence of Confucius Institutes in our schools because
they were conceived by and are funded by a Chinese Government
that has a much different world view than ours.
The $158 million that China has spent on Confucius
Institutes in the United States come from a government that
routinely stifles free speech, stifles debate, and stifles
dissent in its own country.
It is a government that monitors and jails religious and
ethnic minorities and has a violent history of oppression.
It is also a government that routinely targets us through
hacking and industrial espionage and threatens Taiwan and our
other close allies in Asia militarily. I would add it is a
country that basically has tried to blockade, keep other ships,
including U.S. naval vessels, out of the South China Sea and
places where I used to operate, flying many missions during the
Vietnam War on surface surveillance of that part of the world.
Participants at Confucius Institute-sponsored activities
will not get the full story on these issues, and that is
because, under the contracts that U.S. schools have signed with
the Chinese Government, Chinese officials can veto programming
they do not like. The staff sent from China to run the
institutes are prohibited under their individual contracts from
doing anything ``detrimental to national interests.''
Despite my concern about the Confucius Institutes and
China's goals for them, I welcome, as I may have implied
earlier, greater opportunities for Americans to learn more
about China, visit the country, and speak Mandarin. I want
Chinese citizens to visit here and learn more about us and our
language and culture as well.
When I was there not long ago--I think it was an Aspen
Institute visit--one of the things I said to a group of Chinese
that we met with, ``There is more that unites us than divides
us, and let us try to figure out how we can focus more on the
former, maybe less on the latter.''
Data reported by the Department of Education indicate that
as many as 400 million people in China are attempting to learn
English. According to a 2018 Pew Research study, more than 90
percent of European primary and secondary school students are
learning a foreign language. At the same time--get this--only
20 percent of American students are working to learn another
language. Not good.
We need to do better than that. At a time when the world is
getting smaller, when our country is growing more diverse, and
when so many American jobs are reliant on global trade, it is
in our Nation's best interest for more Americans to learn
foreign languages, and that includes Mandarin.
To the extent that there is unmet demand in our country for
Chinese language education, we should be filling it rather than
allowing the Chinese Government to fill it.
The report we have released recommends a number of steps
that schools with Confucius Institutes can take to change their
relationship with the Chinese Government and assert the
supremacy of free speech, free debate, and academic freedom on
their campuses.
In closing, we also make recommendations to the U.S.
Departments of Education and State to ensure that Confucius
Institutes are operating within the law. We call on the Chinese
to stop blocking our efforts in cultural outreach in their
country.
As I stated earlier, it is crucial that we continue to be
vigilant in combating foreign efforts to influence public
opinion in our country. But if we take any other lessons away
from today's hearing, I hope it is that, in order to preserve
our economic competitiveness and protect our national security,
we need to make certain that our students are learning about
other cultures and studying Mandarin and other key languages,
too.
With that, I will just say again ``ni hao'' and ``xie
xie.'' Welcome. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I took so long. I
was with Max Baucus. Max Baucus was on an elevator here
yesterday in the Capitol, our immediate past Ambassador, former
colleague here, Senator from Montana. One of the things I
mentioned to him briefly was our hearing today, and he said he
would be interested in following up with us, and he could
probably give us some good insights. We look forward to those.
Thank you so much.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Senator Carper, and thank you,
my friend, for partnering on this report, as always, and to
your staff.
As you probably have noticed, there is not a lot of
bipartisanship here on Capitol Hill. We keep this Committee as
nonpartisan as possible, and as a result, we have done some
pretty good work that has resulted in some important
legislation, as we did today.
I would like to now introduce our panel of witnesses for
the hearing.
Jason Bair is the Acting Director of International Affairs
and Trade at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Walter Douglas is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State
Department.
Jennifer Galt is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs at the State
Department.
And Mick Zais is the Deputy Secretary at the U.S.
Department of Education.
It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in
witnesses, so at this time I would ask you all to please stand
and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you
are about to give before this Subcommittee is the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Bair. I do.
Mr. Douglas. I do.
Ms. Galt. I do.
Mr. Zais. I do.
Senator Portman. Thank you. Please be seated.
Let the record reflect the witnesses all answered in the
affirmative. Your written testimony, ladies and gentlemen, will
all be considered to be part of the record, so you do not need
to give your entire statement. We would ask that you try to
limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes so we will have a chance
for a real dialogue after your oral testimony.
Mr. Bair, why don't we start with you?
TESTIMONY OF JASON BAIR,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Bair. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and
Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss GAO's work on Chinese involvement in U.S. higher
education.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Bair appears in the Appendix on
page 49.
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My testimony summarizes two GAO reports: one issued
yesterday on Confucius Institutes, and one issued in August
2016 on U.S. universities operating in China. I will start by
discussing our observations on the 96 Confucius Institutes
operating on U.S. college campuses.
My overall message is that Confucius Institute agreements
vary in some key areas, and stakeholders have identified
opportunities to improve those agreements.
In examining the agreements between U.S. universities and
Hanban, an affiliate of the Chinese Ministry of Education, we
found that there are a variety of issues that can be addressed.
Regarding the applicability of school policies, we found
that about one-third contained language that applied U.S.
school policies to the operation of the Confucius Institutes.
Regarding the public availability of the agreements, we
found that only approximately half contained language that made
the agreement confidential or limited the ability of either
party to release the agreement.
Regarding funding, we found that Hanban generally provides
startup funds, annual funds, teachers and their salaries, and
teaching materials, while U.S. schools generally provide in-
kind support such as campus space and staff to help manage the
Confucius Institute.
Regarding teachers, we found that Confucius Institute
teachers from China taught a mix of both credit-bearing and
non-credit courses at different schools. However, none of our
10 case study schools used the materials provided by Hanban in
their credit-bearing classes.
We also gathered suggestions for improving the Confucius
Institutes from school officials, researchers, and others. They
suggested improvements in two main areas.
First, they suggested improving the language of the
agreements. Specifically, several people suggested removing the
confidentiality language from the agreements and making them
available online in order to dispel any questions or concerns
about what they contained.
In addition, some school officials, researchers, and others
suggested that agreements should include even stronger
language, making it clearer that the U.S. school has ultimate
decisionmaking authority when it came to operating the
Confucius Institute.
Second, they suggested improvements in the operation of the
institutes. For example, some school officials suggested to us
that Confucius Institute teachers should not teach credit-
bearing course on campuses, even if they were using the
curriculum that had been developed by the U.S. school.
In addition, some officials suggested that Confucius
Institutes should choose to organize events on topics that are
sensitive to China in order to demonstrate that neither the
school nor the institute is subject to undue Chinese influence.
Moving now to our 2016 report on U.S. universities
operating in China, my key message is that U.S. universities do
emphasize academic freedom, but they face a variety of
challenges. At the time of our review, 12 U.S. universities
were operating degree-granting institutions in China. In
reviewing their written agreements and other policies, we found
that they did include a variety of protections for academic
freedom. For example, one university's agreement stated that
everyone at the institution in China will have unlimited
freedoms of expression and inquiry and would not be restricted
in the selection of research or lecture topics.
We also interviewed more than 130 faculty and students who
generally reported that academic freedom had not been
restricted for them and that they could study and discuss any
topic. However, we identified two key challenges to learning at
U.S. universities in China.
First, fewer than half of the universities that we reviewed
had uncensored Internet access. Students and faculty told us
that having restricted access to the Internet limited both
their teaching and their research.
Second, administrators, faculty, and students representing
more than half of the universities gave examples of self-
censorship. For example, an administrator at one university
suggested that it was advisable as a guest of China to refrain
from insulting China. Another administrator noted that the
university advises teachers to avoid discussing sensitive
subject in their classes.
Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the
Subcommittee, that concludes my prepared statement. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Bair. Mr. Douglas.
TESTIMONY OF WALTER DOUGLAS,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Douglas. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to
discuss the State Department's public diplomacy efforts in
China.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Douglas appears in the Appendix
on page 66.
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U.S. diplomats carry out a range of public diplomacy
activities in China. This includes both policy-related
messaging as well as cultural and education exchanges. Our
diplomats do this work despite restrictions by Chinese
authorities, which I will describe in more detail later in this
statement.
Our public diplomacy in China is conducted through our six
diplomatic posts there: the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and five
consulates spread throughout China. We have a total of about
110 staff--including Chinese-speaking American diplomats and
local employees--as well as a budget of $31 million to support
public diplomacy functions.
By and large, Chinese citizens welcome U.S. public
diplomacy, but the Chinese Government impedes access to some
segments of Chinese society, including in academic settings.
To give a recent example, this past November U.S.
Ambassador to China Terry Branstad was scheduled to speak at a
Chinese university campus, but the visit was canceled with just
2 days' notice. This is just one of many cases of unexplained
and sudden cancellations experienced by U.S. diplomats
attempting to visit universities.
We have also seen the obstruction of programs related to
the U.S. Government-funded American Cultural Centers. The
American Cultural Center grant program was started in 2010
specifically for China. Until it was discontinued in 2018, the
program awarded a total of about $5 million in grants ranging
from $10,000 to $100,000. These grants were given to 29
American universities to establish American Cultural Centers on
Chinese university campuses.
Although the program had many successes in the early years,
beginning in 2014 Chinese authorities started unduly
restricting the activities of our centers. In 2015 and 2016,
severe restrictions came into effect, and some of the centers
were forced to close down. Today there are three remaining U.S.
universities that are conducting previously funded American
Cultural Center-related activities, which they will conclude by
the summer of 2019.
These restrictions on American Cultural Centers stand in
stark contrast to the ability of Confucius Institutes to
operate free from government obstruction in the United States.
In 2017, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing decided to discontinue
funding for the American Cultural Center program. This decision
was solidified in a recommendation by the Department's Office
of Inspector General (OIG).
Chinese universities or scholars who would like to engage
with U.S. diplomats are often prevented from doing so, either
by their university's internal foreign affairs officers or by
security authorities. When meetings do take place, Chinese
authorities require participants to submit detailed reports of
their conversations. These intimidation tactics pressure our
interlocutors to be cautious--they refuse or limit interaction
with U.S. diplomats. As a result, the ability of U.S. diplomats
to engage with ordinary Chinese people is stifled. In contrast,
we note that Chinese diplomats here in the United States
regularly address public audiences, free from obstruction by
the U.S. Government, including on university campuses.
U.S. Government-funded exchange programs are another way we
engage the next generation of China's leaders and opinion
makers. For example, the International Visitor Leadership
Program brings between 120 and 150 rising leaders each year
from across China to the United States for 3-week study tours.
However, unlike in other countries, authorities force about 20
percent of the candidates to withdraw their participation at
the last minute. This is yet another avenue through which the
Chinese Government limits who can have access to information
about the United States. The State Department takes notice when
incidents like these take place. In just one 16-month period,
there were more than 150 instances involving denial of
permission to meet an official, cancellation of an event with a
partner organization, withdrawal of a Chinese participant from
a U.S. Government-funded exchange program, or intimidation of a
Chinese citizen who had been in contact with U.S. embassy or
consulate personnel.
We continually convey to the Chinese Government that we
expect reciprocal access for U.S. diplomatic personnel and
programs in China. In spite of these restrictions, we work to
reach the broader Chinese public through traditional media and
social media. In particular, our diplomatic posts in China
maintain a robust social media presence, reaching an average of
more than 3.5 million Chinese citizens each day. Our social
media postings receive thousands of likes, comments, and shares
daily, showing the Chinese public's eagerness to engage in
discussion about U.S.-related topics.
But similar to the restrictions placed on our direct campus
engagement, our social media platforms in China experience
censorship by the Chinese Government several times each week.
This censorship stands in stark contrast to the unhindered use
of social media enjoyed by the Embassy of China in Washington,
D.C., which launched its Facebook page over a year ago.
We continually convey to the Chinese Government that the
United States expects reciprocity in the use of social media.
The Department welcomes the Subcommittee's inquiry into the
questions of reciprocity regarding U.S. and Chinese public
diplomacy efforts. As noted in the report, the Department's
public diplomacy efforts in China have indeed experienced
restrictions. This presents a challenge but not an
insurmountable one. The State Department continues to work
toward reaching ordinary Chinese citizens, in facilitating
dialogue between our peoples, and in promoting American values.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
questions and those of other Members of the Subcommittee.
Senator Portman. Thank you. Ms. Galt.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JENNIFER ZIMDAHL GALT,\1\ PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Galt. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you today. My testimony will focus on the State
Department's responsibility to regulate and monitor the
participation of Chinese nationals in the Exchange Visitor
Program. This program makes it possible each year for over
300,000 exchange visitors from nearly 200 countries and
territories to travel to the United States to participate in
educational and cultural exchanges.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Galt appears in the Appendix on
page 71.
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As mandated by Congress, the State Department's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs works to advance U.S. foreign
policy by building friendly, peaceful relations through
exchange programs that strengthen national security, support
U.S. international leadership, and provide a broad range of
domestic benefits.
The Fulbright Program and the International Visitor
Leadership Program are the U.S. Government's flagship exchange
programs funded through annual congressional appropriations. In
addition to these, the Bureau oversees fee-funded exchange
visitor programs, which are carried out by nearly 1,500 public
and private entities that the State Department designates as
sponsors; no appropriated funds are spent on these programs.
The Office of Private Sector Exchange is sponsored with
promulgating, implementing, and enforcing Federal regulations
that govern all aspects of the Exchange Visitor Program.
Entities seeking designation must apply separately for
authority to conduct programs in one or more of the 13 private
sector categories of exchange.
Exchange visitors from China comprise approximately 11
percent of the more than 300,000 Exchange Visitor Program
participants from around the world.
Chinese exchange visitors associated with U.S. colleges and
universities that host Confucius Institutes are one element of
Chinese participation in the Exchange Visitor Program.
Confucius Institutes are typically set up as collaborations
between a U.S. and a Chinese university. The State Department
does not have a role in the creation or funding of Confucius
Institutes. Our responsibility begins when a U.S. college or
university that is a designated sponsor places an exchange
visitor in a role that is related to a Confucius Institute.
As part of our its routine sponsor monitoring, the Office
of Private Sector Exchange learned in 2012 that a number of
Chinese exchange visitors participating in the Research Scholar
category were inappropriately placed at K-12 schools as Chinese
language teachers. Accordingly, the Department issued a
Guidance Directive to potentially affected sponsors providing
procedures for regularizing the program status of exchange
visitors who were under the incorrect category. The Guidance
Directive clarified that exchange visitors in one of the
university-based academic categories cannot serve as primary
teachers for K-12 students--activities that more appropriately
belong in the Teacher category.
Follow up reviews since 2012 have shown that in some
instances Chinese exchange visitors continued to teach at K-12
schools. As a result, the Office of Private Sector Exchange has
further focused its monitoring efforts and taken steps to
improve compliance.
In November 2017, the office wrote to the nearly 1,000
college and university sponsors reminding them of the 2012
Guidance Directive. We have conducted ``meet and greets'' with
25 academic program sponsors affiliated with Confucius
Institutes and carried out five more targeted field site
reviews and electronic site reviews. We have scheduled four
field site reviews for 2019, and we will conduct additional
electronic reviews. This effort has prioritized institutions
where the potential for category confusion appears to be the
greatest.
Two of the previous field site reviews and two of the
electronic reviews resulted in the issuance of Letters of
Concern to the sponsors, documenting areas of regulatory
vulnerability and encouraging them to modify their programs to
achieve and maintain regulatory compliance. Where K-12 teaching
associated with Confucius Institutes was problematic, these
university sponsors have since ceased those activities based on
our outreach to them. In two cases, the Office of Private
Sector Exchange worked closely with the Bureau of Consular
Affairs which revoked the visas of exchange visitors who had
entered the United States to teach, but not through a sponsor
properly designated in the Teacher category.
The Department of State takes seriously its oversight
responsibility of the Exchange Visitor Program and its
obligation to monitor designated sponsors and exchange visitors
for possible violations of the regulations. We continue to
refine our processes to improve regulatory compliance of all
designated sponsors, including those who work with Confucius
Institutes.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention to the
critical issue of Chinese interference in U.S. education. The
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs stands ready to
cooperate with your ongoing review of this matter. I am happy
to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Ms. Galt. Dr. Zais.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MITCHELL M. ``MICK'' ZAIS, PH.D.,\1\
DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Mr. Zais. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, Senator
Hassan, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. As a retired Army Brigadier General, former college
president, and former Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon, I
understand the importance of ensuring that our colleges and
universities remain free from malign foreign influence. These
concerns surfaced about 30 years ago, and consequently, in 1986
Congress amended the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require
institutions to disclose gifts from and contracts with foreign
sources.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zais appears in the Appendix on
page 75.
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In your letter of instruction and invitation, you noted
your intent to examine the Confucius Institutes and the impact
of the Chinese Government on the U.S. education system. You
asked me to address foreign gift reporting, and I am pleased to
respond on both issues. Before addressing the Confucius
Institutes, I will provide information on the foreign gift and
contract disclosure requirements.
The law requires that 2-year and 4-year degree-granting
institutions disclose gifts from and contracts with a foreign
source in the amount of a quarter of a million dollars or more
in 1 year. Also, any institutions owned by or controlled by a
foreign source must disclose this information.
Since these requirements have been in place, the Department
has issued two Dear Colleague letters--one in 1995 and one in
2004--to clarify these issues and provide instructions for
submitting reports. These requirements are also included in the
Federal Student Aid Handbook.
There are approximately 3,700 institutions in the United
States that are covered by these requirements. Most recently,
fewer than 3 percent of those institutions reported receiving
foreign gifts in excess of a quarter of a million dollars from
a single source or country.
There are limitations to the reports since the data are
self-reported. Some colleges and universities have independent
but affiliated nonprofit research, endowment, and alumni
foundations which deliver contracts and gifts. It is unclear
which schools report foreign gifts that are channeled through
these foundations since the statute does not reference them.
To collect the required information, the Department uses
the same electronic system that schools use to apply for
Federal student aid. The system reminds and prompts
institutions to provide the required information.
Since 2012, the Department has made these reports available
on the Federal student aid websites in the interest of
transparency. The information is updated twice a year.
During the most recent school year, 91 institutions
reported receiving gifts of over $1.3 billion in gifts and
contracts from sources in 105 countries. China ranked first in
the amount, with about $222 million in gifts and contracts.
This constituted about 17 percent of the total.
Regarding the impact of the Chinese Government and
Confucius Institutes on higher education, we recognize this is
a concern. As you know, Confucius Institutes are partnerships
between the Chinese Government and U.S. colleges and
universities, each of which has their own agreement. Recently,
as you know, a number of these institutions have terminated
their agreements. We fully understand and share your concern
about the need to keep malign foreign interests from
compromising the academic integrity of American colleges and
universities while respecting the importance of institutional
autonomy and academic freedom.
As your Subcommittee reviews the issues presented by the
Confucius Institutes, the Chinese Government, and foreign gifts
and contracts to our colleges and universities, the Department
stands ready to work with you on the way forward. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Dr. Zais, and thanks to all our
witnesses. We look forward to a dialogue. I will be here for
the entire hearing, and I see some of my colleagues have
arrived and have conflicts. I am going to delay my questions
until they have a chance. I will first turn to Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Let me yield to Senator Hassan, if you
would like to go first. I am going to be here for the duration.
Senator Hassan. I think I am yielding to Senator Peters. We
will just play musical chairs here. [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. In that case I am not going to yield to----
[Laughter.]
Because I do not like this guy. I am happy to yield.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, and, Senator Hassan, thank you so much.
Senator Hassan. You are welcome.
Senator Peters. I certainly want to thank the Chairman for
hosting this very important hearing on the impact on our
Nation's education system that the Chinese may be having, and I
thank our witnesses for being here today.
This hearing is certainly consistent with our bipartisan
work in the Committee, and, particularly as the principal
oversight Committee for the U.S. Senate, with how seriously all
of us take the oversight function. In that vein, I actually
have a question outside of the scope of this hearing, but one
that is incredibly important for the oversight of the
Administration, and that is to Deputy Secretary Zais.
Deputy Secretary Zais, on January 3, 2019, the Department
of Education Acting Inspector General (IG) Sandra Bruce
received a letter from you urging her to, and I quote,
``reconsider any plan that her office might have to review'' a
Department of Education decision. I think the letter has just
been handed to you. Is that your signature at the bottom of the
letter?\1\
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\1\ The letter referenced by Senator Peters appears in the Appendix
on page 176.
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Mr. Zais. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Peters. Deputy Secretary, did Secretary DeVos or
her designee or any employee of the White House direct you to
send that letter?
Mr. Zais. No, Senator, they did not.
Senator Peters. You just did that on your own?
Mr. Zais. I worked with the staff and the chief of staff in
composing that letter.
Senator Peters. As you are aware, the subject of the
Education Department decision being reviewed by the Acting
Inspector General was the Accrediting Council for Independent
Colleges and Schools (ACICS). It is a major accreditor for for-
profit colleges. Did you, Secretary DeVos, or her designee
communicate with ACICS or anyone acting on their behalf
regarding the IG investigation?
Mr. Zais. We did not.
Senator Peters. As mentioned, your letter was sent on
January 3. On January 31, Ms. Bruce was notified that she was
being replaced as Acting Inspector General by the Department's
General Counsel (GC), a decision that was later reversed under
pressure. The Department has confirmed that the decision to
replace Ms. Bruce was initially recommended by the Department,
not the White House. Did you participate in conversations with
Secretary DeVos or her designee, or with any White House
employee regarding the designation of a new Acting Inspector
General?
Mr. Zais. I did not.
Senator Peters. Earlier this week, my colleagues on the
Education Committees received a response from the Department to
an oversight letter on this topic. Unfortunately, the
Department's response was wholly inadequate and does not
address the vast majority of our questions, concerns, and
requests for documentation. The Department's response cites,
and I quote, ``Executive Branch confidentiality interests'' as
a reason not to produce the requested documentation.
My question to you: Has the President invoked Executive
privilege?
Mr. Zais. Not to my knowledge, Senator.
Senator Peters. Has the Department performed a document
search of records that would be responsive to the request of my
Education Committee colleagues or the follow-up letter from
February 19th that was sent from the Democratic leadership of
all House and Senate Education and Oversight Committees,
including this full Committee?
Mr. Zais. Senator, I do not know, but I certainly will
investigate.
Senator Peters. Has the Department issued a preservation
order to ensure that documents responsive to our request will
not be destroyed?
Mr. Zais. I can assure you that documents will not be
destroyed that are relevant.
Senator Peters. This is my final point, and thank you
again, Mr. Chairman. Can I have your commitment that my
colleagues and I will receive a full and complete response to
our letters from February 1st and February 19th no later than
March 5th?
Mr. Zais. Senator, we will work to expedite response to
your inquiries.
Senator Peters. I appreciate it. I appreciate your answers.
Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Portman. OK. I plan to reclaim my time unless my
colleagues are going to ask questions about this hearing.
Senator Carper. I am happy not to speak yet, but I just
want to say that was probably the most succinct series of
responses I have heard in 18 years.
Senator Portman. Yes, very succinct, and that was good. But
are we going to talk about the focus of our 18-month
investigation? If not, I will ask some questions about that.
Senator Hassan. I certainly have questions about the
report. I certainly as a member of the Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions (HELP) Committee also have the same concerns that
Senator Peters raised, and so I think, as always, we respect
each other's use of our time.
Senator Portman. Exactly, but I just want to be sure we
have the opportunity to ask some questions about----
Senator Hassan. Of course. I have questions prepared for
that, but I also just want to indicate that I share the
concerns that Senator Peters just raised.
Senator Portman. Senator Hassan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank
you, Senator Portman and Ranking Member Carper, for your
continued attention to the issue of foreign influence in the
United States education system. Thank you to all of the
witnesses for being here today, for your service, for your
appearance, and for your very informative testimony.
I want to start with a question to you, Mr. Zais, and to
Mr. Douglas. It is clear that U.S. schools have challenges with
establishing and maintaining Confucius Institutes. For example,
faculty at some schools have raised concerns that Hanban, the
Office of Chinese Language Council International, is able to
exert influence over the development of curriculum or program
requirements related to Chinese studies at U.S. schools. I
think I speak for all of us in saying that the Chinese
Communist Party cannot have an unchecked voice or promote a
select agenda in the United States as part of a larger
propaganda or government-directed national campaign.
To address some of these concerns, some schools have
developed their own safeguards against influence on academic
affairs through faculty-led initiatives. For example, the
University of New Hampshire has taken steps to ensure that all
curriculum and programs are developed solely by its own
faculty, hired a tenure-track faculty member to direct Chinese
studies programs, and put in place processes for the review and
approval of Confucius Institute's programs and course material
by an academic oversight committee in the College of Liberal
Arts.
Let us start with Mr. Zais. In addition to some of the
recommendations in the Subcommittee report that highlight the
need for additional transparency, is there a role for the
Department of Education to support schools that wish to
continue to implement these kinds of safeguards to help ensure
the integrity of these programs?
Mr. Zais. Senator, we are always concerned with
institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and any threats to
academic freedom. We will work with schools at their request to
help guarantee that, and if they request support in crafting
appropriate agreements, we would be willing to provide that
support.
Senator Hassan. Do you think it is appropriate, though, for
the Department to reach out? Because now that this report has
been issued and there have been some concerns about the
behavior of some of these institutes on some campuses, it may
be incumbent on the Department to do the kind of outreach to
schools that may not be aware of this report or may not be
aware of some of the activities that some of the Confucius
Institutes and their members have engaged in.
Mr. Zais. We are willing to work with the Committee to make
all of our Hanban institution schools and sponsors aware of the
results of these investigations and reports.
Senator Hassan. OK. Let me ask, Mr. Douglas, I would like
to understand how the Department of State can engage Chinese
Government representatives in ensuring that Confucius Institute
contracts are developed in consultation with U.S. entities and
are transparent?
Mr. Douglas. OK. Let me say my responsibilities start at
the water's edge and go out rather than in.
Senator Hassan. OK.
Mr. Douglas. As I mentioned in my remarks, when we are
harassed overseas, we regularly bring this up with the Chinese
authorities and expect reciprocity. But on the agreements that
they have with the universities, we do not interfere with that.
Senator Hassan. Ms. Galt, is that your realm?
Ms. Galt. Senator, I would be happy to answer that. The
State Department, as I mentioned in my testimony, does not have
authority over Confucius Institutes per se because they are not
designated sponsors to host international visitors to the
United States.
Senator Hassan. Between the Department of Education and the
Department of State, how are we going to get to a place where
we are following some of the recommendations of this report?
Because my colleagues have mentioned and you have shared today
recommendations that certain components of the contract should
be eliminated, including the components that make the contracts
confidential. How is--or who among and in the executive branch
is going to say to the Chinese Government keeping these
contracts confidential is not acceptable?
Ms. Galt. I would just say as a Department we are involved
in a larger discussion with U.S. universities about the
importance of transparency and about the importance of
protection of academic freedom. That conversation is ongoing,
and we are involved in that conversation.
Senator Hassan. I think what I would like to suggest is
that we be more involved. I think there has to be a way to let
the Chinese Government know that if they have an interest in
having these institutes on our college campuses, their
contracts have to be transparent, that they cannot keep the
terms of those contracts confidential. I would look forward to
working with all of you to figure out how we can make that
happen.
Ms. Galt. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss that
further.
Senator Hassan. OK. I thank you for that. I do want to get
back--and I respect the Chair's interest in making sure we
focus on the report, which is a very important report and
something that, again, I think we all need to continue to work
to implement the recommendations of. But I did just want to go
back, Mr. Zais, to follow up on what I think I heard was a
commitment from you and the Department to Senator Peters. I am
on the HELP Committee. I have been on letters to the Department
to try to understand why the ACICS entity was recredentialed. I
have expressed concerns about the Department's citations, about
recommendations for this entity that were not true. I want to
make sure that we do, in fact, get a response, a much more
adequate response than the letter we got from Mr. Oppenheim on
February 25th to our letters about this.
Can I have your commitment that the Department will provide
a full and complete response to the letters sent on February
1st and 19th? Can you do it no later than March 5th?
Mr. Zais. Senator, we will work to expedite a response.
Senator Hassan. OK. Please just note also for the record
that this letter cites something called the ``Executive Branch
Confidentiality Interest,'' and I am unaware of such an
interest that would allow the Department to fail to respond to
a congressional inquiry.
Thank you.
Senator Portman. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. I would say to our fairly new member of our
Subcommittee, sometimes the Chairman and I will yield to other
folks on our Committee before we ask questions if they have
other things they need to be doing, and I would be happy to
yield to you, if you would like.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY
Senator Romney. I thank the Ranking Member for yielding and
also the Chairman, the two of you, for bringing together this
group and opening a discussion on something that I think is
quite important. I appreciate the various witnesses coming
today and testifying and providing information and perspective.
I think it is pretty clear that we and China have very
different views on a whole host of very important topics, and I
was just writing out a list here, but everything from how we
deal with and welcome minorities in our civilization, what we
believe about diversity, what we think about single-party rule,
or how we would deal with Taiwan, for instance. Our perspective
on censorship is very different. Our perspective on human
rights is very different. The rule of law in our Nation and in
their nation is very different. The South China Sea is an area
of great conflict. The list goes on and on. We have a number of
things that are very different between the perspectives of a
free people in the United States of America and the leadership
of China.
I wonder whether these Confucius Institutes are part of an
influence campaign by the Chinese Government to shape attitudes
and the minds of the American children, the coming generations,
as to those kinds of differences. Is this really a propaganda
effort, a mind-shaping effort of our young people being carried
out through the auspices of these Confucius Institutes? I would
ask for your perspective and whether you believe that is the
case.
Ms. Galt. Senator--first of all, thank you for the
question. I would say generally the State Department supports
international educational exchange. We support Americans
learning critical languages. As you may know, the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs, thanks to congressional
support, conducts a number of programs to teach Americans.
Language is critical to our national security, including
Mandarin Chinese. We have the Gilman Fellowship for Young
Americans, and we also have the National Security Language
Initiative, which supports both high school and college
students to go overseas and study languages critical to the
United States' national security.
Senator Romney. That makes all the sense in the world, to
study other languages and to learn about other cultures. But
the question I have is whether the Chinese Government is
selecting individuals, funding individuals into our educational
institutions with the intent not just of letting us learn an
important global language and a different culture, but also to
gain a perspective on a host of issues where they and we have
differing points of view, whether this is, in effect, an
influence campaign, whether it is being financed as an
influence campaign to shape public opinions of our young
people.
Mr. Bair. Thank you for the question. I would say that in
the course of the work that we did looking at Confucius
Institutes, the one thing that really popped out for us was the
variety of activities that they do. You certainly heard about
the language training, and I think as Ranking Member Carper
talked about in his statement, there are a variety of other
cultural events that they focus on, holiday celebrations,
cooking events or things like that. We did not really focus on
questions you were focused on there, but I think that it is
notable, the variety of activities that they perform.
Senator Romney. I am not sensing anyone jumping to the bait
on that, and perhaps we do not have information about that. I
guess that is the question in my mind, which is, I would
welcome the chance to learn about a foreign language, the
culture of another people, but it would be a very different
matter to have people coming in from another nation that has
such dramatically different perspectives than we do in our
country if their intent in coming to our country is to
inculcate those attitudes and views among our young people. I
would hope that there is a way for us to be able to determine
whether that is occurring and the extent to which it is
occurring, and if it is occurring, to provide a warning to
educational institutions about the potential concern that would
obviously be attached to something of that nature.
You have also spoken about reciprocity and the opportunity
for us to be able to share our culture and language in their
nation. That has apparently been very difficult to obtain, the
kind of reciprocity that we had hoped, and I would anticipate
that the degree to which we are able to welcome and provide
visas and so forth to those that want to become part of
Confucius Institutes here would be gauged to a certain degree
to the kind of welcome we receive there and wonder whether we
are taking action to make sure that there is, if you will, a
reciprocity here with the degree of welcome that we have there.
Is that the case or is there more to be done there?
Mr. Douglas. Yes, and because I am here to speak about what
we do in China, when we are harassed or when things are blocked
or upset, we regularly protest to the Chinese Government that
we expect the same treatment here that we give to your embassy
in the United States. We regularly make those protests. How
successful they are, that is another matter, but we do
regularly approach them. I have done it myself actually when I
have been visiting China and make it very clear that we expect
that.
Senator Romney. Yes, that is, I think, wise and effective.
I would also suggest that in some respects we might respond in
the same way with their requests that they respond to ours. It
is one thing to protest when they do things that we do not
approve of. It is another thing to say, well, if you are going
to do that to people that we are trying to encourage to be part
of your system, why, then, we are going to do the same to
yours. That seems to concentrate the mind more than protest.
I am happy to return the time back to the Ranking Member or
the Chairman. I think my time is up.
Senator Portman. Thank you. I really appreciate your
comments, Senator Romney, and I think you are hitting the nail
on the head. I think the question is whether this Confucius
Institute funding and the activities that they engage in is
something that is consistent with our traditions here. What we
found in our report, of course, is that it is not. The GAO
found the same thing in their reporting, and I think Mr.
Douglas might be a little more forthcoming in a moment when he
talks about how we are treated over there, because you are
absolutely right, we do not have reciprocity there. This is why
the State Department has to actually shut down our program
there because they cannot operate and so there is no
reciprocity. Mr. Douglas has been good about that in his
opening statement, and we are going to ask him some more
questions about it. I appreciate your questions, but also your
insights, and I think they are accurate.
Mr. Bair, thank you for working with us, and, in fact,
issuing your report last night in conjunction with ours. You
did a separate investigation. Yours had a slightly different
focus, as you indicated, but I think we both showed that there
is a lack of transparency at these U.S.-based Confucius
Institutes that does implicate academic freedom, among other
things.
You have talked about the level of control and the lack of
transparency. For example, officials told the Subcommittee that
the Confucius Institutes were not the place to discuss topics
like the independence of Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square
massacre.
Your report said, for example, that researchers told you
that a Confucius Institute ``could choose to avoid hosting
events on certain topics elsewhere on campus, such as Taiwan,
Government of Tibet, or the Tiananmen Square massacre so as not
to offend its Chinese partners.'' Can you elaborate on that
self-censorship?
Mr. Bair. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. I think
that is an important topic, and it is one of the central issues
that we dealt with in our report.
Let me start with the issue of transparency. I think as I
talked about in my opening statement, one of the notable things
about the agreements that we got copies of between the U.S.
university and their Chinese partner was whether those
agreements were going to be able to be publicly available. What
we found was that 42 of the 90 contain specific clauses making
them confidential or in some way limiting the public release of
those documents. When we talked to a variety of stakeholders
and faculty and administrators, a number of them raised that
issue. Whether it was real or apparent, it creates at a minimum
concern about what is in those agreements. A number of
universities that we spoke to were willing to share those
agreements with us, and I think a number of the stakeholders
think that that is a really important first step.
Senator Portman. Mr. Bair, let me take you to Exhibit 1
just because you made the point about these contracts. If you
look in your binder, it is in front of you, and I will, without
objection, enter Exhibit 1\1\ into the record today.
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\1\ Exhibit 1 referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
on page 178.
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There are some concerning provisions. For instance, the
contract States, as you will see there, that the Chinese
instructor should ``conscientiously safeguard national
interests.'' Again, these are Chinese instructors who are here
on a visa in the United States. The contract terminates if the
Chinese instructors ``violate Chinese laws''--so they are
subject to Chinese laws here in America--or ``engage in
activities detrimental to national interests.''
This is on a college campus where we pride academic
freedom, and these are the restrictions placed on that
Confucius Institute instructor. We were not able to find many
contracts because, as you say, they are hard to find and some
are confidential. This one might have been, but we were able to
obtain it.
Your report also found that some school officials expressed
concerns that the Confucius Institute hiring process did not
follow their own hiring processes for teachers at the
university. In fact, your report found that some schools did
not have, as I quote from your report, ``full control over
selecting its teachers.''
Why is it concerning that U.S. schools have foreign
teachers, one, signing these contracts with contract law to be
enforced by Chinese law; and that, second, conscientiously
safeguarding the national interests is one of the requirements
and they can be terminated if they engage in activities
detrimental to national interests, in addition to the fact that
these schools are not following their normal hiring procedures
in order to hire these individuals, some of whom do teach
credit courses? Can you respond to that?
Mr. Bair. Let me try to the best of my ability to talk
about what we heard during the course of our review, and you
very appropriately point out some of the concerns that,
frankly, were expressed to us as well about the hiring process
for these teachers.
I will say we heard a mix of views. We certainly talked to
a number of universities that either had chosen to close their
Confucius Institute or had considered opening a Confucius
Institute but had made a decision not to. One of the reasons
was that they did not feel like they had full control over the
hiring process, and that was a deal breaker for them. They made
a decision that they thought was in the best interest of their
university.
Some of the Confucius Institutes that we visited that were
open during the course of our review, though they may have had
some concerns, felt that they had the final decisionmaking
authority over who they would hire, and they were choosing from
a set of applicants. They were comfortable with that decision.
The opinions really differed on that issue.
Senator Portman. On research, quickly, your report found
that Confucius Institutes also sponsored Chinese-related
research projects for U.S. students and U.S. professors, and
those proposals had to be approved by the Chinese Government
first. You said that several school officials expressed concern
or uncertainty about whether a Confucius Institute would
sponsor a research project on a ``topic that could include
criticism of China.''
Going to academic freedom and research, that certainly is
not consistent, as Senator Romney was talking about, with our
traditions here.
Mr. Douglas, so much to talk about in terms of the Chinese
part of this. Let me just ask you something sort of
straightforward here. Can you describe to us what reciprocity
means in international relations? Quickly.
Mr. Douglas. I am not a lawyer, and I do not know what the
legal term is, but I assume----
Senator Portman. But you are a diplomat.
Mr. Douglas. Right. If one side does something, the other
side could do it, too.
Senator Portman. Yes. The State Department has found that
the Chinese Government essentially shut down one State program
known as the ``American Cultural Centers.'' We talked about
this earlier. Let me ask you a couple questions about the State
Department and your relationship with ACC programs as compared
to what we talked about in terms of the Chinese relationship
with the Confucius Institutes.
Do State Department contracts with the ACC programs have a
clause that says that the schools must conscientiously
safeguard U.S. interests?
Mr. Douglas. No.
Senator Portman. Do you vet or screen U.S. professors for
the ACC program?
Mr. Douglas. No.
Senator Portman. Does the State Department require that
they approve every ACC event?
Mr. Douglas. No.
Senator Portman. Does the State Department maintain veto
power over proposed speakers or lecture topics at ACCs?
Mr. Douglas. No.
Senator Portman. Does the State Department always provide
U.S. schools with preapproved textbooks or materials for an
ACC?
Mr. Douglas. No.
Senator Portman. Does the State Department grant agreements
with U.S. schools that have confidentiality or nondisclosure
provisions as we talked about?
Mr. Douglas. Not that I know of, no.
Senator Portman. To summarize, the State Department does
not maintain control over teachers, topics, or speakers at an
ACC in China?
Mr. Douglas. That is exactly right.
Senator Portman. OK. That does not sound like reciprocity
the way you have described it.
Mr. Douglas. Yes. This is how we deal with it in the
American system with American values when we go overseas, and
that is really where in public diplomacy what we focus on, is
what we do overseas. That is how we operate worldwide.
Senator Portman. Yes. Let me ask you this: We talked about
the 100 Confucius Institutes at college campuses and about 500
in
K-12. How many American Cultural Centers is the State
Department funding in China today?
Mr. Douglas. Three, and they are holdovers. Their funding
will run out. It is just the remains of what funds they have,
but the others have been closed down. We stopped the funding.
Senator Portman. After the summer, how many will there be
in China?
Mr. Douglas. They go down to zero.
Senator Portman. Zero. OK. Thank you. I have exceeded my
time, but I am going to come back later with more questions.
Mr. Douglas. Sure.
Senator Portman. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. I am sitting here thinking about a couple
of our former colleagues. One is a guy named Biden who served
here for, part of seven terms, and he was the senior Democrat
on the Foreign Relations Committee for many of those years,
Chairman for many years. He has a lot of sayings. He and I
served together in a lot of capacities, and I have heard them
all. One of my favorite Joe Bidens is, ``All diplomacy is
personal.'' He also said that about all politics is personal,
and I think there is a lot of truth to that.
I was mentioning to our Chairman as an aside earlier in the
hearing that there was once a rising Chinese official who came
to the United States and he was interested in learning more
about agriculture. He wanted to go to our breadbasket, our
heartland, and he ended up in a couple of States. One of them I
think was Iowa, and he was hosted by the Governor there. They
kind of hit it off, had a good visit; the guy learned a lot.
Later on, the Governor was on a trade mission to China, and
they would cross paths again. The Chinese official is a guy
whose last name is Xi, and the American Governor is a guy whose
last name is Branstad, now our Chinese Ambassador. I think
about them and their friendship over all these years, and I
think about what Joe said about diplomacy being personal.
We had our caucus retreats last month. Democrats had their
caucus retreats, and Republicans had theirs. We never do them
together. We almost never eat together either. We focus in our
retreats on things that divide us. I have talked to some of my
Republican colleagues about their retreat, my moles, and they
said they spend a fair amount of time focusing on what divides
us as well. I think one of the things that is important in our
relationship with China--it is a huge country, huge trading
partner, and they are going to be around for a long time,
hopefully we will, too, and we have to figure out how to get
along with them.
Having said that, I do not like being taken advantage of,
and I should ask the audience: Anybody out there like being
taken advantage of? None of us do. So, the challenge is how do
we make sure we are not going to be taken advantage of as a
Nation, have our stature diminished, our strength diminished by
these guys and gals, and at the same time do what we can to
find areas of agreement.
One of our colleagues is a guy named Enzi here from
Gillette, Wyoming, a wonderful guy, a Republican conservative.
He and Ted Kennedy used to have a great relationship when they
were the senior Senators on a lot of committees that Senator
Romney is on. The HELP Committee got a huge amount done. I once
asked Senator Enzi, I said, ``How do you guys work so well
together?'' He said, ``We focus on the 80-20 rule.'' I said,
``What is that?'' He said, ``We focus on 80 percent of what we
agree on. We set aside the 20 percent where we do not agree,
and we get a lot done as a result.''
I think it is important for us to use a similar kind of
rule with the Chinese--focus on the areas where we agree, set
aside some areas we do not agree--and that is probably not a
bad recipe. That does not mean we always agree when they try to
use cybersecurity to steal our trade secrets, or to steal our
military secrets. That does not mean we should agree with them
when they do unfair things on the trade side. But having said
that, it is important that we do find ways to agree.
Let me ask you a question. I think Senator Romney asked a
couple of really insightful questions. On the one hand, we want
to be able to work with these folks where we can. On the other
hand, we want to make sure we are not taken advantage of. I am
going to ask each of you: What should we do in response to the
kind of behavior that we see demonstrated by them and their
reluctance or refusal to allow us to have reciprocity in their
countries? What should we do? I think I will start with--a
fellow whom my staff said, General, your name rhymes with
``nice,'' and I found it does not. It rhymes with ``mace.''
There you go--``face.'' It rhymes with ``face.'' Take a shot at
that question. Not a real long answer, but you had a great
series of answers earlier.
Mr. Zais. Senator, if you know how to get reciprocity while
still maintaining the lines of communication between our two
societies, I do not know how to do that. I think we understand
that everything in Communist China is run by the government.
All their education system and everything. I do not know how
you take politics out of interaction with that regime, that
government.
Senator Carper. Before I turn to Ambassador Galt, I
mentioned to our Chairman and to you as well--I will just
mention to our colleagues--I ran into Max Baucus yesterday, our
former colleague, former Ambassador to China, and I am very
much interested in asking him--I just wish we had brought him
here, pull him out of the audience, pull him up to the table,
and say, ``Well, what do you think, Max?'' But I would like to
pick his brain, and I would actually like to pick the brain of
our current Ambassador there, Terry Branstad, with whom we
served. Did you serve with him as Governor? He was Governor for
Life and became Ambassador, maybe for life. We will see. But
same question. We know we need to figure out how to get along
with the Chinese. We do not want to be taken advantage of. We
realize that cultural exchanges can actually be very helpful.
They have worked in a lot of other places. I guess I am looking
for the balance, the right balance here. How do we do this? You
speak how many different languages? Six? Seven? Just use
English for me.
Ms. Galt. Thank you, Senator. I am going to go a little bit
off script here to answer your question.
Senator Carper. I have gone off script, so you should be
able to.
Ms. Galt. I am going to follow your lead. I think this is
an essential question. I think it is a tough one to achieve
that balance, so I would like to speak from my professional
experience as a career diplomat.
Senator Carper. You can even speak from your heart.
Ms. Galt. I spent 15 years of my career in China engaged in
public diplomacy work, engaged in trying to explain the United
States to the Chinese, and I have found that I think two
elements of the solution are essential, and we need to just
keep at them.
The first element is we need to call the Chinese out when
they behave badly. Whether it is demarching on a canceled
speech or an edited set of remarks or not allowing us to go to
university campuses, I think we need to keep calling them out.
We cannot do that enough, in my view.
The second thing I think we need to do----
Senator Carper. Who is the ``we''? I think you are right,
but who is the ``we'' in ``we should be calling them out''?
Ms. Galt. We, the State Department. That is what we do as
diplomats stationed in mission China, and here in Washington we
can amplify that message with Chinese diplomats posted here in
the United States.
Senator Carper. Occasionally, our President talks to their
leader as well.
Ms. Galt. Absolutely. Absolutely, we can do this at all
levels of our government.
Senator Carper. And we have congressional delegations that
go over there from time to time.
Ms. Galt. Yes. We have U.S. universities who engage, and
they can share those messages from their own perspective.
Senator Carper. So maybe the idea of a consistent message
from ``we''--us.
Ms. Galt. Yes.
Senator Carper. Yes.
Ms. Galt. The second thing I think we need to do is
continue to share American values and American best practices
with young Chinese, with the next generation of Chinese. The
Chinese students represent the largest number of international
students in the United States, so we know there is continued
interest in the high-quality American education and the
innovation and entrepreneurial spirit that we have in the
United States.
There is value in the academic freedom and the world-class
research that American universities offer, and I have to
believe that that Chinese leader who visited Muscatine, Iowa,
and the other Chinese who visit the United States learned
something about our system and that that will make a difference
in the long run. That is my public diplomacy heart speaking,
and I think those are two elements of a possible solution, and
I thank you again for the question.
Senator Carper. You bet. I said earlier, Mr. Chairman--I
know my time has expired. Can I have just 2 more minutes for a
response, please, if you do not mind? I said earlier before
other colleagues arrived that General Zais had a great series
of responses of short answers, and I would say your response,
you just hit a home run, with maybe a couple runners on base,
so thank you for that.
Mr. Douglas, I am sorry you have to follow that, but go
ahead.
Mr. Douglas. First of all, let me say everything Ambassador
Galt said I was going to say in various ways the same thing.
Senator Carper. You would say, ``I am Walter Douglas, and I
approve this message.''
Mr. Douglas. That is good enough for me. I have been
involved with public diplomacy since 1986. I joined the United
States Information Agency (USIA), and then that has moved on. I
have served in a number of various places. What you do see is
that the engagement we have with public diplomacy does tend to
have a long-term impact, and we see leaders all over the world
who run our programs. Thirty years later, maybe 20 years later,
you get the impact from that. We try to track how many of our
world's leaders and world's cabinet members and those types
have been on our programs, and we usually come up with a 20 or
25 percent number.
The Ambassador recently told me that a recent change of
government in her country, in the new cabinet that came in, 14
of the cabinet members had been in one of our programs
somewhere.
Senator Carper. OK.
Mr. Douglas. It gave us an automatic dialogue with those
people, and friendliness. We see that in China. Ambassador Galt
mentioned the tremendous number of students who come here. One
of our programs that is very successful there is EducationUSA.
We prepare them, give student advising, talk about preparing
for coming to the United States. They have an impact when they
come back with a much broader view of the United States.
Senator Carper. Good.
Mr. Douglas. I would say that across the board with all of
our exchange programs. These do have an impact in the long
term, and they do change attitudes. We have such an attractive
society, people want to come here, that is a great and
strategic advantage we have. Our soft power is awesome
throughout the world, and as a public diplomacy officer, I
really have seen the impact over time. The more we can expose
people to the United States, the better off the long-term
result is.
Senator Carper. That is great. I am way over my time, Mr.
Bair. I am not going to ask you--GAO does great work. We love
what you are doing and value it very much. Thank you all. That
was terrific. Thank you. ``Xie xie.''
``Gong xi fa cai.'' That means, ``Have a prosperous New
Year,'' in this year of the boar, which just began recently.
All the best.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
I would like to ask Senator Hawley if he has some questions
and to welcome you to the Subcommittee, as well as Senator
Romney.
Senator Hawley. Thank you.
Senator Portman. As you can see, we are kind of free-
wheeling here. But we also do good nonpartisan work here which
has ended up with some significant legislation in addition to
our oversight responsibilities, and we are pleased to have both
of you on the Subcommittee. Senator Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
It is a privilege to be here and to be part of the
Subcommittee.
Let me come back to the public diplomacy angle, and, Mr.
Douglas, I want to start with you. In your prepared testimony,
you shared a lot of information, good information about the
extent of Chinese Government interference and disruption with
our public diplomacy efforts beyond even the experience of the
American Cultural Center programs. You noted, for example, the
Chinese Government efforts to disrupt some of our outreach from
our embassy in Beijing, social media, etc.
I want to ask you about Chinese Government disruptions of
our public diplomacy efforts outside of China and, in
particular, perhaps the 68 countries that China considers part
of the Belt and Road Initiative. I am just wondering,
recognizing, of course, that China's footprint differs across
those countries, have you noticed explicit cases or are you
aware of explicit cases of Chinese Government interference,
interruptions of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in those places?
If so, what does that look like?
Mr. Douglas. I would not say it is like that. It is
generally more there is a competitive space out there that we
both go and fill. We have our public diplomacy efforts; they
have theirs. I think because our product is better to sell, and
that is, in a sense, we have America, the United States and all
its values, our programs tend to be more popular. We get large
attendance. We do not have to force anyone to do anything about
it. While we see they have some public diplomacy programs, I
would not say they are as effective.
I would also note that we launched our first ever report of
Chinese public diplomacy. It was presented in Singapore in June
2018 in which it underscored what their efforts are, how much
they tie them into their economic policies. We also found that
we needed to know more, so we have actually come with round two
of that, and we have our second report that will be coming out
in a few months which looks into more aspects of what Chinese
public diplomacy is in the East Asia and Pacific Region.
For us, it is really helpful to have a better understanding
of what they do. Yes, they are out there, but I do not think
that--because of what they ultimately have to share with other
countries, I do not think it has nearly the impact that we
have.
Senator Hawley. Tell us a little bit about some of the ways
that the Chinese Government attempts to interfere with our
public diplomacy efforts apart from and in addition to our
American Cultural Center programs.
Mr. Douglas. Yes. We mentioned, for example, they are
harassing some of our visitors for our International Visitors
Program, 20 percent. I remember at one point there was even--
one of the participants was at the airport and was pulled back.
It can go to this very haphazard application.
I think in the absence of a rule of law it is unclear when
and how they will do that, and it is something we live with. We
still think that for the other percents that get through which
are greater, these programs are very worth it.
We see the censorship on our social media platforms. We see
censorship in general of everything we do. They might take an
op-ed and hack it to pieces, keep some of it, let others be
printed, other parts of it be printed. All along the line, you
do not really know what is going to happen. There is a very
haphazard, unpredictable application of whatever rules and
regulations they have. We still just have to work with it. It
is one of the difficulties of working in that country. But our
officers are still dedicated to doing it.
I should note that there are--I mentioned Chinese speaking,
as my colleague over here, and that is a very effective tool
for us, that we have our officers who can be out there
interacting not just with, say, Chinese Government officials.
In public diplomacy, we tend not to do that. But we can cover a
much broader range of opinion leaders, rising leaders, and
those types because of our officers.
Senator Hawley. Tell us a little bit about some of the
measures that we have taken. You talk about their efforts at
disruption, some of which you say we just have to live with, we
press on. But are there measures that we are taking to adapt,
to respond, to curtail their interference, or just to try and
get around their interference with our public diplomacy
efforts?
Mr. Douglas. I think what we look at--and I could say this
is true everywhere we go, and I have served in, I do not know,
nine or ten countries now. We have this toolkit of public
diplomacy tools, and different ones are appropriate for
different countries. My last overseas posting was India, an
open, democratic country. You can pretty much do anything you
want there. We never got ``no.'' We never had any office say
you could not do this. We never had anybody censored for what
they have done.
But when you go to other countries, you have to look at
what part of that toolkit is most appropriate. Where can you
get the biggest bang for the buck? Our public affairs officers
then choose from that what works and then actually see what
works.
I mentioned EducationUSA because we know that the Chinese
are very interested in studying the United States. It is
something that they very much welcome, as any college advising
they have, education advising even below college. What we try
to do is promote those things where we know we can have a lot
more success.
Senator Hawley. Thank you. In my time remaining, I just
want to come back to the broad topic of these Confucius
Institutes, which I understand we have been discussing quite a
lot. I have to say that reading the report, looking at the
spread of these institutes, the degree of government control is
really shocking, I think, and I think that the American public
would be shocked and will be shocked to learn about exactly
what is going on on these college campuses.
I am not sure to whom to direct this question, so let me
just throw it out there for whomever. Can you just talk about
broadly--I think one question that people will have when they
hear about this is, well, why would an American college campus
ever allow something like this to be on there? Why would they
ever think this is a good idea? Why is that? Do any of you want
to address that? How does it happen that we find ourselves in
this circumstance to begin with? Mr. Bair?
Mr. Bair. I would be happy to start with that. We visited a
number of colleges and university campuses that host Confucius
Institutes, and they had a variety of reasons. Some of them
were interested in attracting more Chinese students, and so
they thought that having a Confucius Institute might provide
them some entree to get a greater number of Chinese students.
As you have heard from others, about a third of the foreign
students studying in the United States are from China, and so
they viewed that as very attractive.
It also was an opportunity for them perhaps to have
programs that they would not otherwise be able to fund related
to, let us say, Chinese language. I think those were a couple
of the key things that they mentioned for us.
Senator Hawley. How big of a component is funding, do you
think, the availability of funds for programs the university
might itself otherwise have to spend its own budget on?
Mr. Bair. I would say the answer varies significantly by
university. There are some very large universities which have a
significant amount of funding available, and for them it is
going to be less important. But for some of the smaller
universities that might not otherwise be able to have access to
those, it could be a more significant pull for them.
Senator Hawley. I would just note that the Chinese funds,
the Chinese Government has invested over $158 million in funds
over just this past decade, which is really staggering, I
think, and quite significant.
Thank you all for being here. I see that my time has
expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Romney, follow up questions?
Senator Romney. I would just add one additional thought,
which is it is stunning to me that they have effectively closed
down our cultural centers in China. We are going to be at zero
by the end of the year. Yet they have 100 here, and we say,
gosh, we are going to protest, and we are going to express how
unhappy we are with them doing this. This is not so much a
question as a comment, which is why are we not saying it is
going to be harder for you to get visas for people to come here
to become part of your Confucius centers? Because I think the
Chinese, like other people, like myself, respond to action, and
when they are able to keep adding more and more Confucius
centers and bringing in people and in many cases inculcating
people with values that we would find foreign and
inappropriate, that we continue to allow that without taking
reciprocal action and saying, ``You do not have our centers, we
are not going to have your centers.'' That would be part one.
Then part two, I would think it would be simply
unacceptable in our country to have a faculty member on a
university campus or at a K-12 institution that is subject to a
contract with a foreign government as opposed to being subject
only to the contract, the principles, and procedures of the
American educational institution. I think in both those things
we can take action. It is not necessary to have legislation to
pursue that action, but I think in both cases we need to take
action to assure that these institutions are, one, not part of
an influence effort that we would find inappropriate; and, two,
that the faculty members that are teaching at our institutions
are abiding by American principles and the contracts of
American institutions as opposed to the contract of a Communist
Chinese Government. If you have any comment or thought, I am
happy to have you have that opportunity.
[No response.]
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this----
Senator Portman. I would like to comment on that.
Senator Romney. Please.
Senator Portman. I think, again, you are insightful and
making good points. I would say two things.
One, threatening to discontinue the programs here might be
very effective to open up what you have experienced in China,
as Mr. Douglas has talked about. What we are talking about
today, though, in our report is simply having the transparency
that is required under law. With all due respect, the State
Department has visited--how many? Two. Two out of the 110,
until we started our investigation, now 100 colleges and
universities, and you found violations at both, significant
violations at both, yet there have not been any other site
visits.
Dr. Zais, we know that 33 of the 48, 70 percent, of the
U.S. schools that should have reported a contribution from a
foreign government of over $250,000 have not done so. So, 70
percent of the schools are in violation. Yet you have not
referred a single one to the Department of Justice, which is
under law what has to happen. Justice cannot prosecute unless
you refer.
It is even worse than you are saying in a sense. We are not
nearer to the point of suggesting that we discontinue, but what
we are saying is, unless there is transparency in at least
following U.S. law, we ought to discontinue the existing
practice because it is not consistent with traditions and
practices, as we have talked about here in terms of the
contracts with these teachers and the lack of academic freedom.
But, second, it is not even following our own laws, and we are
not enforcing our own laws.
Finally, I will say, the second point is that the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee just a few days ago published
a document saying that Confucius Institutes remain a key
government policy and said that China now plans to optimize the
spread of Confucius Institutes. I do not blame them. It seems
like it is working pretty well for them if you are the
Communist Party in China. We are not sure what ``optimize''
means. It might mean a rebranding effort in ways that would
intend to seek even more of their interests, national
interests, as we talked about in these contracts, and less
transparency and less disclosure. I think this is a serious
concern, and I think both of you outlined that well. We want
more exchange, of course. We want more engagement. We believe
that China ought to be a strategic partner in addition to being
a strategic competitor. Yet it has to be on some basis of a
level playing field.
I made the analogy earlier to our trade policy. It is not a
bad analogy here, where I think Senator Romney is absolutely
right. I think the way to get the attention of the Chinese
Government on the trade issue has been to say, if you are not
going to let our products in and are not going to treat our
companies fairly, then we are going to have to reciprocate.
What you find is suddenly they come to the table, which is what
is happening right now, and our hope is that in the next short
period of time, maybe the next few weeks, we will have some
resolution of that. But here we have not even enforced our own
laws, and so I think we have been able through our
investigation over the last 8 months and through a lot of
interviews to be able to obtain enough information to at least
be sure that the State Department, which does have a
responsibility here in this country--Ambassador Galt, you are
not just focused on overseas--and the Department of Education,
which does have a responsibility here, ought to at a minimum
follow the U.S. law that is in place, and I think put out new
guidance. The guidance is 14 years old and was put in place
when there was one Confucius Institute, as I understand. As it
grows, we ought to be sure that these universities, colleges,
high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools know what
the guidance is.
Mr. Zais. We agree with you, Senator. This is a concern,
and we are grateful to you and your Committee for shining a
light on this issue and bringing it to public attention, and we
will look forward to working with you to rectify some of these
issues.
Senator Portman. Thank you. Let me ask you a couple of
questions, if I could, with regard to the schools that have not
reported. What is your intention with regard to acting on that
and specifically including the Department of Justice by giving
them the information?
Mr. Zais. In the past every institution that we have called
and reminded them of the requirement to report--normally this
comes to our attention because they reported significant gifts
in the past and then they have failed to report a gift--they
have responded appropriately and provided the requested
information. We have never had an institution that has just
refused to report, which is why we have never referred a case
to the Justice Department.
But I think what the Department needs to do is figure out
how to be a little more proactive in getting complete reports
from all of the institutions.
Senator Portman. With all due respect, when 70 percent of
the schools, based on our investigation--maybe we are wrong,
but based on our investigation, 70 percent of the schools are
not complying. I guess you have to make more phone calls if you
are saying that is the way to do it, to be sure that they
understand it. Otherwise, a civil action may be brought by the
Attorney General (AG) at the request of the Secretary of
Education. If you are finding that people are not complying
even though you are providing guidance, maybe that would--as
was indicated earlier with regard to the Chinese Government on
reciprocity, maybe that would get people's attention.
Mr. Zais. Yes, Senator.
Senator Portman. If you look briefly at Exhibit 2\1\ on the
table in front of you, it is a Dear Colleague letter dated
October 4th from the Department of Education to U.S. schools.
It provides detail on reporting of gifts, contracts, and
relationships. Without objection, I would like to enter Exhibit
2 into the record. This is about 15 years old. Do you have a
plan to issue this updated guidance to U.S. schools regarding
the reporting of foreign gifts?
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\1\ Exhibit 2 referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
on page 187.
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Mr. Zais. Senator, at the present time we do not have a
plan, but we certainly look forward to exploring how to clarify
this guidance document and working with the Committee to
clarify portions of the statute that are not clear. As I
mentioned in my testimony, the issue of affiliated independent
foundations through which gifts and contract dollars are routed
is not addressed in the statute. We want to clarify that as
well.
Senator Portman. We would be delighted to work with you on
any clarifications on the statute, but the statute is clear
enough to know that you have to report, and so you were pretty
forward-leaning earlier in response to some questions on some
much more difficult issues. I would think on this one you can
give us a yes, which is that you will issue new guidance. The
question is when, but you will issue this guidance so we do not
have these schools continue to be uncertain about what their
responsibilities are.
Mr. Zais. Absolutely.
Senator Portman. That is a yes?
Mr. Zais. Yes, sir.
Senator Portman. Great. Thank you, Dr. Zais.
Ambassador Galt, the same question to you, a yes-or-no
question. You found problems with visa use at all of your site
visits, huge problems, relative to, I assume, what you
expected. You have gone to 2 percent of the Confucius
Institutes. You found 30 visas had to be revoked at just two
institutions, 30 visas. Do you have a plan to ensure proper
visa use at the roughly 98 percent of Confucius Institutes that
you have not visited?
Ms. Galt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. We
take our monitoring role seriously, as I said in my statement,
and let me just describe we have a layered approach to
monitoring. While we have only done two site visits to date of
university sponsors that host Confucius Institutes, we have
four more planned this year, and we also regularly engage in
what we call ``meet and greets,'' which are meetings with
sponsors to share information on regulations, to inquire and to
explore. Out of those we would then conduct electronic reviews
of the various databases, the Student Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS) database operated by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), and other databases to explore
further.
We have a layered approach. Site visits are only the most
intensive of our reviews. We have ongoing engagement with our
sponsors across the full range----
Senator Portman. Does that ongoing engagement enable you to
find out whether they are being properly operated, including
the use of visas?
Ms. Galt. Yes. It allows us to uncover that, and we would
then engage in a site visit, as we plan to with four more
university sponsors that host Confucius Institutes this year.
Senator Portman. I would suggest that taking it from 2
percent to 6 percent may be a substantial increase, but not
nearly adequate if it is the site visit that really is going to
enable you to determine whether they are properly operating. I
would hope that today you would tell us that you are going step
up those efforts.
Ms. Galt. We will certainly look at that. Our
investigations to date, we have encouraged--in the two site
visits, both sponsors have rectified their program
administration and are now in full compliance. We think that
our methodology makes sense and our record is good, and we will
explore further investigations.
Senator Portman. Dr. Zais, one thing that I think could be
done is just make schools aware of what is going on. I said in
the time period of the last 8 months while we conducted this
investigation, ten programs have been terminated. I cannot say
that it is strictly because of the questions that we asked all
110 schools, now 100 schools, but I think it probably had an
influence on them, because they, frankly, were not aware at the
higher levels of university leadership what was going on and
what some of the concerns are that we have raised today.
I think I heard you say earlier that you intend to provide
this report to the colleges and universities that are engaged
in Confucius Institutes. Is that accurate?
Mr. Zais. Certainly to the 96 institutions that currently
house Confucius Institutes, but we will send clarifying
guidance to all of the 3,700 eligible institutions of higher
education.
Senator Portman. OK. With regard to the K-12 schools, what
is your recommendation there? Do you have the ability to also
send them guidance and summaries of this report?
Mr. Zais. I do not know what our role in the monitoring of
K-12 is for Chinese teachers. As State superintendent of
education in South Carolina, we had Chinese language native
speakers in some of our language immersion schools. They were
exchanged. We sent teachers to China to teach English----
Senator Portman. I am talking about the Confucius
Institutes. Would you look into that?
Mr. Zais. We will check into it and see what we can do. I
am not sure what we can do, Senator.
Senator Portman. Yes, I am not sure either, but the proper
communication I think is to provide information----
Mr. Zais. Yes.
Senator Portman [continuing]. At this point to those
institutions as well.
Mr. Douglas, you said earlier that Chinese diplomats here
in the United States can speak to whoever they want, and it is
true.
Mr. Douglas. Right. Yes.
Senator Portman. At our rotaries in Ohio, we welcome them.
We welcome them at our colleges and universities. What is the
situation in China with regard to U.S. diplomats and their
ability to speak with whatever group they might choose?
Mr. Douglas. It sometimes can work and sometimes cannot.
You cannot guarantee that you will have access to anybody, and
meetings can get canceled at the very last minute, as happened
with Ambassador Branstad in November. It is unpredictable.
Senator Portman. Let me tell you one story we heard during
our investigation. It was from a U.S. school official--a dean,
actually--and this dean told us that she was interviewed for
several hours by Chinese police regarding her school's
involvement with your ACC program. It was a harrowing
experience for her. It was a difficult, emotional, tough
experience.
Is this something that you believe happens often? Are you
concerned about U.S. universities essentially self-censoring in
China because of this kind of harassment?
Mr. Douglas. That is a very good question. It is something
we talk about a lot. I cannot give you an answer because I do
not know that we have data that would sort of prove one way or
the other. We hear anecdotally things like what you say. I
cannot say
that--I do not know how widespread it is. I think maybe people
are not telling us. We are just a handful of us with a lot more
American educators over there. But it is a very good question.
I just do not think I could answer it, definitely.
Senator Portman. One U.S. school told us they would never
discuss the topic of Tibet or the topic of Taiwan. That is part
of our investigation. This was someone who is telling us how
they are experiencing the ACC program. That sounds like self-
censorship, doesn't it?
Mr. Douglas. Yes, it sure does.
Senator Portman. Do you think that is typical?
Mr. Douglas. I have heard that anecdotally, so I assume it
is more than just one person who said that. A number have.
Senator Portman. I appreciate all of you coming today and
your testimony and work on this. I appreciate the commitments
that have been made by the Department of Education and the
Department of State to step up what is the first step in this,
which is to provide that transparency and information that is
required by law. I appreciate GAO's continued oversight of the
Confucius Institutes. I know your report is not the end of you
work on this, and we look forward to continuing to work with
you.
We will now conclude the hearing, and I will tell you that
we are always open to more information. In particular, this
record will stay open for 15 days for any additional comments
or questions you might have, any follow-up that you all feel is
appropriate. We look forward to continuing to focus on this
issue to ensure we can at a minimum have the transparency and
the reciprocity that we think is required.
Thank you all. The hearing is adjourned.
[The Committee Report follows:]
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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