[Senate Hearing 116-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 
    ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 2019

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 3:29 p.m. in room SD-138, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Lamar Alexander (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Alexander, Graham, Hoeven, Feinstein, and 
Udall.

                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                National Nuclear Security Administration

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, UNDER 
            SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY 
            ADMINISTRATOR
ACCOMPANIED BY:
        DR. CHARLES P. VERDON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE 
            PROGRAMS
        DR. BRENT K. PARK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR 
            NONPROLIFERATION


              opening statement of senator lamar alexander


    Senator Alexander. At the request of Senator Feinstein, we 
jointly apologize to our distinguished witnesses for keeping 
you waiting. We work for a somewhat inefficient organization. 
And we've been voting. And we will have to go back and vote 
some more, but we think we have a period of time that will 
permit us not only to hear the testimony, but hopefully to make 
our opening statements and then have some questions back and 
forth.
    But with Senator Feinstein's approval, the hearing will 
come to order. And we're going to reverse order a little bit, 
and what we'd like to do, Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, is to 
begin with you, and then go to Admiral Caldwell, I believe the 
two of you are the ones who are going to testify. And we'd like 
to take your testimony first. Then Senator Feinstein and I will 
make our opening statements, and then we'll ask questions. So 
welcome.
    And, Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, on behalf of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, welcome. We look 
forward to your testimony. Please begin.
             Prepared Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander
    The Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development will please come 
to order.
    Today's hearing will review the administration's fiscal year 2020 
budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
    First, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today, 
and also Senator Feinstein, with whom I have the pleasure to work with 
again this year to draft the Energy and Water Appropriations bill.
    Our witnesses today include: Ms. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); 
Dr. Charles Verdon, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs; Dr. 
Brent Park, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
(Dr. Park is a former Associate Laboratory Director from Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory); and Admiral Frank Caldwell, Deputy Administrator 
for Naval Reactors.
    Our subcommittee has a good record of being the first of the 
appropriations bills to be considered by the Committee and by the 
Senate each year. For each of the past 4 years, Senator Feinstein and I 
have been able to have our bill signed into law.
    Last year, we worked together in a bipartisan way on the fiscal 
year 2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill that was 
signed into law before the start of the fiscal year--the first time 
that happened since 2000.
    In last year's appropriations bill we provided $15.2 billion for 
the National Nuclear Security Administration, including $1.9 billion 
for the six life extension programs, which fix or replace components in 
weapons systems to make sure they're safe and reliable.
    We also funded the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National 
Security Complex at $703 million, which will continue to keep this 
project on time and on budget, with a completion year of 2025 at a cost 
no greater than $6.5 billion.
    I look forward to working with Senator Feinstein on another strong 
bill this year.
    We're here today to review the administration's fiscal year 2020 
budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 
the semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy that is 
responsible for a vital mission--maintaining our nuclear weapons 
stockpile, reducing the global dangers posed by weapons of mass 
destruction, and providing the Navy with safe and effective nuclear 
power.
    The president's fiscal year 2020 budget request for the NNSA is 
$16.5 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion (or 8 percent) over last 
year (the fiscal year 2019 enacted level).
    Today, I'd like to focus my remarks and questions on three main 
areas: Effectively maintaining our nuclear weapons stockpile; keeping 
critical projects on time and on budget; and supporting our nuclear 
Navy.
    When the Senate agreed to ratify the New Start Treaty in December 
2010, we also agreed to support funding to modernize and maintain our 
nuclear weapons stockpile, plus the facilities to do the work.
    A vital part of NNSA's mission is completion of the five ongoing 
life extension programs, which fix or replace components in weapons 
systems to make sure they're safe and reliable.
    The budget request includes $2.1 billion to continue the life 
extension programs. I want to make sure we are spending taxpayer 
dollars effectively.
    Completing all of the work that needs to be done for these weapons 
systems will result in a higher workload than the weapons program has 
had in any time since the height of the Cold War, and it will require a 
large number of highly-trained experts at the production sites, like Y-
12 in Oak Ridge Tennessee, the weapons laboratories, and the Federal 
employees that work for NNSA.
    I'd like to hear more today about whether NNSA has enough qualified 
people to do this work.
    I would also like to discuss today whether NNSA will be able to 
keep the life extension programs on time and on budget.
    The NNSA is responsible for some of the largest construction 
projects in the Federal Government.
    Senator Feinstein and I have worked hard to keep costs from 
skyrocketing. We want to make sure hard-earned taxpayer dollars are 
spent wisely and that these projects are on time and on budget.
    First we focused on our oversight on the Uranium Processing 
Facility in Tennessee. We held routine meetings with the Department's 
leadership to discuss the project--particularly how the Department 
implemented the recommendations of a Red Team review, completed in 
2014, to get the project on track.
    After completing more than 90 percent of the design for the nuclear 
facilities, NNSA began construction of the Uranium Processing Facility 
last year.
    I'd like to hear more about the progress on construction from the 
witnesses today.
    Senator Feinstein and I also worked with the Department on ways to 
get excess plutonium out of South Carolina more quickly and for less 
cost. Last year, Secretary Perry canceled the MOX project in favor of 
the Dilute and Disposal alternative, which the Department of Energy 
estimated will save taxpayers more than $20 billion.
    I'd like to hear more today on the progress NNSA is making at 
removing the plutonium from South Carolina.
    Lastly, the NNSA is restarting our ability to make plutonium pits 
for the stockpile. The budget request includes $712 million for 
plutonium sustainment, which is 97 percent more than the current 
funding level. This difficult, but important work, will be done in New 
Mexico and South Carolina.
    The NNSA has decided to use existing facilities and expertise in 
New Mexico to make some pits, and repurpose the MOX facility in South 
Carolina to make the remainder.
    That's a good plan and I support it.
    I want to hear from Administrator Gordon-Hagerty today how NNSA is 
applying the lessons we learned from UPF and MOX to make sure we get 
the pit production restart done on time and on budget.
    Naval Reactors is responsible for all aspects of nuclear power for 
our submarines and aircraft carriers.
    Naval Reactors has a lot on their plate right now--they are 
designing a new reactor core for the next class of submarines, 
refueling a prototype reactor, and building a new spent fuel processing 
facility for nuclear waste from defense activities.
    Admiral Caldwell and I had an opportunity talk about the new spent 
fuel processing facility earlier this week. It is a part of the Navy's 
consolidated interim storage for its used nuclear fuel.
    The Navy's program shows that it can be done safely and 
effectively, but that does not replace the need for a permanent 
repository at Yucca Mountain. That used nuclear fuel will still need to 
go to Yucca Mountain once it is built.
    I look forward to Admiral Caldwell's comments today on the progress 
he's making on his important work, and particularly how Naval Reactors 
stores used nuclear fuel.
    I'd also like to hear what is being done to keep the new Columbia-
Class submarine design on track.
    The NNSA needs to complete a lot of important work, and this work 
is going to require good planning and effective oversight.
    I look forward to working with Administrator Gordon-Hagerty as we 
begin putting together our Energy and Water Appropriations bill for 
fiscal year 2020, and also with Senator Feinstein, who I will now 
recognize for her opening statement.

            SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY

    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member 
Feinstein, thank you for the opportunity to submit--to present 
the President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for the 
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security 
Administration. It's an honor to appear before you today with 
Admiral Caldwell, Dr. Verdon, and Dr. Park.
    We are representing a truly extraordinary team at NNSA 
(National Nuclear Security Administration), a team that is 
indispensable to our Nation's nuclear security. A written 
statement has been provided to the subcommittee, and I 
respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
    Senator Alexander. So ordered.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    Since I last testified before the committee, NNSA has been 
diligently executing our three enduring missions: one, ensuring 
the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile; two, reducing the threat of nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and, 
three, providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet 
of aircraft carriers and submarines.
    The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA is 
an investment in these missions and in our infrastructure and 
our people. My priorities with this crucial funding are to 
revitalize the U.S. defense plutonium capabilities and other 
essential infrastructure to keep our stockpile life extension 
programs on schedule and on budget, and to recruit the 
workforce for the future. My focus is on setting the conditions 
today for a resilient, responsive nuclear security enterprise 
for the next 50 years and beyond.
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review provided a realistic 
assessment of the world. With an evolving and uncertain 
geopolitical landscape, the NPR (Nuclear Posture Review) stated 
that there is no margin for further delay and in recapitalizing 
the nuclear security enterprise, an enterprise that is 
comprised of eight laboratories, plans, and sites, and a 
dedicated workforce of 44,000 employees.
    And NNSA's $16.5 billion budget request is a necessary 
investment when you consider the stakes. Russia and China are 
pursuing completely new nuclear capabilities. North Korea's 
intentions remain unclear. And we face the most complex and 
demanding global security environment since the end of the Cold 
War.
    Accordingly, the fiscal year 2020 budget request represents 
the largest increase for our nuclear nonproliferation, 
counterproliferation, and nuclear counterterrorism program in 
the last 5 years. The 2018 NPR reaffirmed the need for 
effective arms control measures and treaty verification. With 
this funding, NNSA will continue to apply its technical 
expertise to reducing nuclear threats around the world.
    During my nomination hearing last year, I stated that my 
highest priority was plutonium pit manufacturing, and that has 
not changed. For the next several decades, NNSA will rely on a 
combination of newly manufactured pits and a judicious reuse of 
existing pits to modernize our existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile. A modest pit manufacturing capability is necessary 
to ensure the safety and security of refurbished warheads while 
maintaining high confidence in stockpile effectiveness. The 
deliberate, methodical replacement of pits is the most prudent 
way to mitigate the uncertainty of plutonium aging and its 
impact on weapons performance.
    Consistent with the NPR, NNSA is committed to producing no 
fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 to meet military 
requirements. Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed 
NNSA's path forward to recapitalize a production capability 
that was shuttered in the early 1990s. Our two-site approach 
calls for pit production at both Los Alamos National Laboratory 
in New Mexico and Savannah River Site in South Carolina. 
Following this strategy, the fiscal year 2020 budget request 
includes $410 million for conceptual design activities for the 
Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. Our request also 
calls for a nearly $500 million investment in plutonium pit 
production capabilities at Los Alamos.
    NNSA is not only investing in plutonium pit mission thanks 
to the strong support of Congress, we are making significant 
progress in modernization across our enterprise. We started 
construction on the main processing buildings at the Uranium 
Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex. And 
I'm proud to report that this vital undertaking remains on 
budget and on schedule to be delivered by the end of 2025 for 
$6.5 billion.
    And in New Mexico, we've broken ground on a new Albuquerque 
complex which will provide a modern safe workspace for 
approximately 1,200 dedicated personnel. All of NNSA's enduring 
missions are underpinned by the state-of-the-art scientific 
capabilities, and as these capabilities become more important 
during this time of renewed great power competition, NNSA is 
working to stay ahead of the technology curve. A future gap in 
high-performance computing is being addressed through a joint 
effort between the Department of Energy's Science--Office of 
Science and NNSA, and our contribution to that effort will be 
undertaken at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and we 
will deliver an exascale computing platform to the enterprise 
in 2023.
    From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the 
dedicated men and women of the nuclear security enterprise have 
answered our Nation's call. What our team is accomplishing 
today is remarkable. We completed the W76-1 Life Extension 
Program under budget and ahead of schedule. We have five 
warhead modernization programs underway, all of which are on 
schedule and on budget. We've helped 33 countries plus Taiwan 
to become free of highly enriched uranium. We routinely deploy 
nuclear security experts to major events, such as the Super 
Bowl, to keep our public safe from a radiological threat. And 
we are lending unparalleled expertise to the U.S. Navy's new 
Columbia-class program to ensure sea-based deterrence 
capabilities for decades to come.
    Finally, I would like to emphasize that regardless of the 
investments we make to modernize our enterprise, the United 
States must continue our investments in our world-class 
workforce, as requested by the President's fiscal year 2020 
budget. We face stiff competition from the private sector for 
the top talent in highly technical fields. With an aging 
workforce, NNSA has launched an integrated effort to recruit 
the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians 
so that we can continue to answer the Nation's call and meet 
tomorrow's challenges. No other government or civilian agency 
can accomplish these unique missions on behalf of the American 
people, and I couldn't be prouder to represent NNSA.
    Thank you for your strong consistent support and the 
opportunity to testify before you today. And I look forward to 
answering your questions. Thank you.
    [The statement follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
    Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member Feinstein, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's 
fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the 
Committee's strong support for our nuclear security mission and for the 
workforce and organizations that are responsible for executing it every 
day.
    NNSA's enduring missions are to protect our Nation by maintaining a 
safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global 
nuclear threats, and providing the United States (U.S.) Navy's 
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear 
propulsion.
    NNSA has numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, 
and benefit from our efforts, yet no other government or civilian 
organization can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the 
American people.
    The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national 
security and global stability for more than 70 years, and its 
credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy against a nuclear 
attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been 
an aspiration for generations, we must recognize the reality that 
foreign nuclear threats are growing. It is imperative that we modernize 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enterprise; our credibility assures our 
friends and allies and deters those who wish us harm.
    Thanks to continued strong support from this Administration and 
Congress, NNSA is transforming the nuclear security enterprise to be 
more responsive and resilient. The following highlights: (1) NNSA's 
accomplishments in calendar year 2018; (2) the budget request for NNSA; 
(3) Weapons Activities Appropriation; (4) Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Appropriation; (5) Naval Reactors Appropriation; and 
(6) NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses Appropriation.
              nnsa's accomplishments in calendar year 2018
    Plutonium Pit Production.--The highest NNSA infrastructure priority 
is re-establishing a plutonium pit production and fabrication 
capability to meet the Department of Defense's (DoD) military 
requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies 
and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 
2030. Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's 
recommended alternative calling for plutonium pit production at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). 
This two-site approach bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's 
responsiveness and resiliency.
    NNSA's Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications, and 
Alteration.--In January 2019, NNSA completed the program of record for 
the W76-1 LEP, extending the warhead's service life from 20 years to 60 
years. The B61-12 LEP, W80-4 LEP, W88 Alteration 370, W87-1 
Modification, and the W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget 
and schedule. These achievements are a testament to NNSA's ability to 
deliver on our commitments we have made to DoD and Congress.
    Infrastructure Investments.--NNSA commenced construction of the 
main buildings of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 
National Security Complex (Y-12). UPF remains on budget and on schedule 
for delivery by the end of 2025 for no more than $6.5 billion. NNSA 
also broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex, which will house 
1,200 employees when complete.
    Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).--Working with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental 
in the conversion of a Nigerian research reactor from HEU to low-
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or 
isotope production facility conversion, which was followed by 
repatriation of the HEU fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country 
plus Taiwan to become HEU free.
    Nuclear Material Removal.--NNSA removed or confirmed disposition of 
more than 280 kilograms of HEU from four countries, enough material for 
more than 11 nuclear weapons.
    Counterterrorism.--NNSA's technical experts were deployed to 
numerous widely attended public events such as the Super Bowl and the 
Boston Marathon to provide radiation detection, identification, and 
technical advice, helping to protect the public from acts of nuclear 
and radiological terrorism. This level of support requires NNSA's 
response assets to maintain full operational readiness at all times.
    Naval Nuclear Propulsion.--NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors 
continued its record of safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and 
nuclear fleet support, while contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's 
new Columbia-Class program. This next generation nuclear-powered 
submarine will ensure required sea-based deterrence capabilities for 
decades to come.
    Supercomputing.--Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
unveiled the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the 
world according to the Top 500 list.
    For more than 70 years, from the early days of the Manhattan 
Project to the height of the Cold War, the dedicated men and women of 
the nuclear security enterprise have overcome every obstacle in their 
way, all while accomplishing a complex and enduring national security 
mission. With Congress' continued support, NNSA will similarly overcome 
the nuclear security threats that face us today and into the future.
                 nnsa's fiscal year 2020 budget request
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (2018 NPR) calls for the United 
States to have modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear capabilities 
that are safe and secure until such a time as nuclear weapons can 
prudently be eliminated from the world. All previous NPRs highlighted 
the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure, yet the 
United States has fallen behind in sustaining a modern infrastructure 
that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to unforeseen 
threats. Additionally, the 2018 NPR reiterates the United States' 
commitment to effective nonproliferation and arms control measures, 
both of which are equally important as having a credible deterrent.
    For the Nation to retain a credible deterrent and prevent, counter, 
and respond to global nuclear security threats, NNSA will require 
significant and sustained investments in its nuclear security mission. 
In pursuit of these goals, the President's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request for NNSA is $16.5 billion. This is an increase of $1.3 billion, 
or 8.3 percent, over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level.\1\
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    \1\ Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds from Naval 
Reactors to the Office of Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation 
of the Advanced Test Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
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                    weapons activities appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Weapons Activities 
account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion, or 12 percent, 
over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this 
account support the Nation's current and future defense posture and the 
associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology, 
engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
    The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their 
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United 
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while 
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons 
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
Maintaining the Stockpile
    In fiscal year 2019, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program supported certifying to the President for the 23rd consecutive 
year that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and 
reliable without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This 
remarkable scientific achievement is made possible through the work 
accomplished by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and 
technicians, and through investments in state-of-the-art diagnostic 
tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern facilities.
    For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2020 budget 
request is $5.4 billion, an increase of $768 million, or 16.5 percent, 
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. Included within this request 
is funding to support the LEPs, modifications, and a major alteration. 
These modernization efforts are aligned with the needs outlined in the 
2018 NPR and approved by the NWC.
    W76-1 LEP.--The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the sea-based 
leg of the nuclear triad, completed its production run in December 
2018. Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include archiving 
production tooling and program records, and completing component 
overbuilds to support hardware provisioning for the life of the warhead 
system.
    W76-2 Modification Program.--The W76-2 is currently on schedule and 
on budget. The First Production Unit (FPU) was completed in February 
2019. By providing the U.S. an assured ability to respond in kind to a 
low-yield nuclear attack, the W76-2 discourages an adversary from 
pursuing such an attack and therefore strengthens deterrence. Having 
credible response options to a nuclear attack of any magnitude ensures 
no adversary mistakenly believes the U.S. would be deterred from 
responding to a low-level nuclear attack for fear of escalation.
    B61-12 LEP.--The B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the 
B61 gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of the weapon. 
Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has 
demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight 
tests, including eight joint flight test drops. The B61-12 LEP will 
enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 
2019, following completion of system qualification and Pantex Plant 
production readiness activities.
    W88 Alteration 370.--The FPU is on track for completion by December 
2019. This program, which also supports the sea-based leg of the 
nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, and 
will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in September 2019.
    W80-4 LEP.--In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4 LEP to 
transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal year 
2020 request for $899 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain on 
track to achieve FPU completion in fiscal year 2025 in support of the 
Air Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
    W87-1 Modification Program.--The W87-1 program will replace the 
aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to support 
fielding on the U.S. Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 
(GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of 
Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement 
warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 Modification Program will 
improve the warhead's safety and security, addressing design, material 
obsolescence, performance, and survivability considerations.
    Within DSW, the fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $636 
million for Stockpile Systems, an increase of $36 million, or 6.1 
percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This program sustains 
the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan by 
producing and replacing limited-life components such as neutron 
generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance, 
surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting 
and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing 
information during the annual assessment process.
    The DSW request also includes $1.1 billion for Stockpile Services, 
an increase of $76 million, or 7.2 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level, to support the modernization of capabilities to improve 
efficiency of manufacturing operations to meet future requirements. 
This request supports all DSW operations by funding programmatic and 
infrastructure management, and maintaining the core competencies and 
technologies essential for reliable and operable stewardship 
capabilities.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget for Strategic Materials is necessary to 
maintain NNSA's ability to produce nuclear and other strategic 
materials associated with its weapons programs, as well as refurbish 
and manufacture components made from these materials. This includes 
uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium.
    Strategic Materials Sustainment.--The request of $257 million, an 
increase of $41 million, or 18.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level, will develop and implement strategies to maintain the 
technical base for strategic materials in support of NNSA's nuclear 
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval nuclear propulsion activities at 
NNSA's eight sites.
    Uranium Program.--The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $909 
million for the Uranium Program is comprised of Uranium Sustainment 
($94 million), Process Technology Development ($70 million), and the 
UPF project ($745 million).\2\ Uranium Sustainment supports the program 
to maintain existing enriched uranium capabilities through enhanced 
equipment maintenance while preparing to phase out mission dependency 
on Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era production facility at Y-12. 
The funding request will enable NNSA to sustain uranium manufacturing 
capabilities while accelerating planning and execution of the Building 
9212 exit strategy to reduce risks associated with transitioning 
enriched uranium capabilities to the UPF. Process Technology 
Development supports key capability transitions out of Building 9212, 
including chip processing, purified metal production, and recovery of 
low equity material, into enduring nuclear facilities. Funding for UPF 
will support peak construction activities in fiscal year 2020 and 
fiscal year 2021. UPF will provide uranium casting, special oxide 
production, and salvage and accountability capabilities for the 
enterprise.
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    \2\ Process Technology Development is funded under the Advanced 
Manufacturing Development program, and the UPF project is funded under 
Infrastructure and Operations.
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    Plutonium Sustainment.--The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $712 
million, an increase of $351 million, or 97.2 percent, above the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted level, supports continued progress to meet pit 
production requirements. The requested funding would support efforts to 
begin the long-term plan to develop a capability to produce no fewer 
than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 2030, as directed in the 2018 NPR.
    The time to move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide (MOX) 
Fuel Fabrication Facility and producing plutonium pits at SRS and LANL 
is the preferred path to achieve the critical DoD requirement of 80 
pits per year by 2030. Even though this approach will require NNSA to 
fund activities at two sites, any interruption or delay to pit 
production in the future due to the lack of resiliency will have huge 
cost increases across the entire nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is 
investing in the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. The 
agency is executing conceptual design activities for the repurposed MOX 
Fuel Fabrication Facility and moving forward with National 
Environmental Policy Act activities.
    NNSA is also investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary 
for the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit 
production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA 
anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next 5 years to enable 
this, and LANL is actively installing pit production equipment and has 
begun hiring to meet future work scope. As the Nation's plutonium 
center of excellence for research and development, LANL plays a 
critical role in early design efforts for pit production.
    In addition, NNSA's budget request includes funding for the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project at LANL, which 
supports our plan to cease operations in buildings dating back to the 
Manhattan Project, in the height of the Cold War, and transition to 
modern facilities.
    Tritium Program.--The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $269 
million, a decrease of $21 million, or 7.3 percent, below the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted level, will provide the tritium necessary for 
national security requirements. Tritium must be replenished regularly 
because it radioactively decays at 5.5 percent per year. Tritium 
availability is dependent on both the production of new tritium and the 
recovery and recycling of tritium from returned warhead components. 
Mission requirements necessitate that tritium production double by the 
mid-2020s. NNSA's tritium strategy focuses on increasing tritium 
production in Tennessee Valley Authority reactors and modernizing 
infrastructure at SRS to support the tritium supply chain.
    Lithium Program.--The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $29 
million, a decrease of $335,000, or 1.1 percent below the fiscal year 
2019 enacted level, supports a lithium bridging strategy to maintain 
the production of lithium. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes 
$32 million for the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF), which will 
replace 1940s infrastructure at Y-12 and house lithium processing 
capabilities by 2030. NNSA completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
for the LPF and is preparing for Critical Decision 1, establishing the 
preferred alternative design and estimated budget.
    Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE).--The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request of $140 million, an increase of $90 million, or 180 percent 
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level, will continue efforts to make 
available, when needed, the necessary supplies of enriched uranium for 
a variety of national security needs. The DUE program schedule is 
driven by the nearest-term defense need--unobligated low enriched 
uranium for tritium production. Other Departmental needs for enriched 
uranium (e.g., research reactors, naval fuel) are supported by this 
effort as well.
    For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal 
year 2020 budget request is $2.3 billion, an increase of $264 million, 
or 13.1 percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted levels.
    Increases to the Science Program ($587 million) provide additional 
funding to support subcritical experiments for pit reuse and advanced 
diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons experiments 
that produce data for stockpile certifications.
    The Engineering Program ($234 million) sustains NNSA's capability 
for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and technologies to improve 
weapon surety and support annual stockpile assessments.
    In fiscal year 2020, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 
High Yield Program ($481 million) will continue to maintain essential 
experimental capabilities and expertise in high energy density 
stockpile science. These efforts continue to provide data to reduce 
uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and improve 
the predictive capability of science and engineering models in high-
pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
    The fiscal year 2020 request includes $840 million for the Advanced 
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, which continues NNSA's close 
collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to implement the Exascale 
Computing Initiative. The ASC Program supports stockpile stewardship by 
developing and delivering predictive simulation capabilities for 
nuclear weapons systems in addition to deploying increasingly more 
powerful supercomputers at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratories.
    The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe, secure 
movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon 
components to meet projected DOE, DoD, and other customer requirements. 
The Office of Secure Transportation has an elite security workforce 
that performs sensitive and demanding work; our agents are among the 
most highly trained and dedicated national security personnel operating 
within the United States. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $317 
million, of which $80 million continues our efforts to modernize and 
replace the existing fleet of transporters with the Mobile Guardian 
Transporter (MGT). The MGT will be used for the containment and 
transport of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and/or special 
nuclear materials.
Improving Safety, Operations, and Infrastructure
    An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons 
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to 
shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence 
to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons 
capabilities and can help to deter, assure, hedge against adverse 
developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.
    More than half of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old, and 
roughly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. It will take 
sustained, significant resources to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons 
infrastructure.
    Thanks to the support of the Administration and Congress, NNSA is 
making progress in repairing, replacing, and modernizing NNSA's 
facilities and stabilizing deferred maintenance; yet much more remains 
to be done. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Infrastructure and 
Operations is $3.2 billion, an increase of $121 million, or 3.9 percent 
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. It includes $1.1 billion for 
line item construction and over $580 million for minor construction and 
equipment recapitalization needs. Delivering these projects on budget 
and schedule is contingent upon stable and predictable funding 
profiles, and support for the President's budget request.
    Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated facilities will 
ultimately be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Management 
(EM) for disposition. For example, EM commenced efforts to remove 
Building 280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. NNSA identified five (including Building 
280) of the top ten highest risk excess facilities at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory.
    In the interim, NNSA is focusing on reducing risks where possible. 
NNSA has made critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-
contaminated facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's 
Alpha 5 and Beta 4 facilities. In fiscal year 2020, NNSA is using the 
authority Congress provided in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) to pursue disposition of several high-risk 
process-contaminated excess facilities with a project cost of less than 
$50 million. NNSA also remains committed to reducing the risk of non-
process contaminated facilities by dispositioning facilities where 
possible. For example, NNSA completed the Pantex Drummond Office 
Building (formerly known as the Administrative Support Complex) at the 
Pantex Plant outside of Amarillo, Texas in 2018. This building provides 
1,000 employees with modern, energy efficient workspace. As a result, 
NNSA is now disposing of dilapidated, 1950s-era buildings and 
eliminating approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance. In 
fiscal year 2020, NNSA plans to fund the disposition of 24 additional 
facilities totaling 75,000 gross square feet.
    Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2020 budget request is $778 
million, an increase of $88 million, or 12.7 percent, over the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted amount. To execute its enterprise security program, 
DNS provides funding to the sites for: protective forces; physical 
security systems; information security and technical security; 
personnel security; nuclear material control and accountability; and 
security program operations and planning. While NNSA faces challenges 
replacing and refreshing aging physical security infrastructure, we are 
making key investments in recapitalizing this infrastructure through 
the Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP). SIRP 
projects address aging high-priority security systems and related 
security infrastructure and equipment needs at all NNSA sites. NNSA 
will continue to execute ongoing line-item security projects as well, 
including the effort to reduce the Y-12 Protected Area and use security 
resources more efficiently. In addition, NNSA will sustain counter 
unmanned aircraft systems implementation and operation at sites 
possessing Category 0/I quantities of special nuclear material.
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of 
NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $309 million, 
an increase of $88 million, or 40 percent over the fiscal year 2019 
request. This increase will continue cybersecurity enhancements, 
bolster cybersecurity capabilities, and support the continuation of IT 
modernization efforts. NNSA is making steady progress in enhancing and 
upgrading the components of the Enterprise Secure Computing environment 
to ensure that nuclear security enterprise missions can be completed 
without disruption. As NNSA mission requirements expand in scope, the 
IT and cyber programs require modernization, expansion, and innovation 
in a commensurate fashion. Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence 
mechanism and a powerful tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA 
cannot afford to neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as 
frontline assets that protect the information, systems, and networks 
NNSA depends on to execute our mission.
             defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation account is $2 billion, an increase of $63 million, or 
3.3 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 request. Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account activities address the entire nuclear 
threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to 
nuclear and radiological incidents around the world. The fiscal year 
2020 budget request funds two program mission areas under this account: 
the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program and the Nuclear 
Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program.
Nonproliferation Efforts
    The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works to: remove or 
eliminate vulnerable nuclear material; improve global nuclear security 
through multilateral and bilateral technical exchanges and training 
workshops; help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radioactive materials; secure domestic and international civilian 
buildings containing high-priority radioactive material; provide 
technical reviews of U.S. export license applications; conduct export 
control training sessions for U.S. enforcement agencies and 
international partners; strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect and 
deter nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to monitor arms 
control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and maintain 
organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate radiological or 
nuclear incidents worldwide.
    The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an 
integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials. 
The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $334 million, an increase of $40 
million, or 13.5, percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. The 
request supports the conversion or shut-down of research reactors and 
isotope production facilities that use HEU and the acceleration of 
developing new, non HEU-based molybdenum-99 production technologies in 
the United States. Additionally, the request for M3 supports the 
removal and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, with priority 
on expediting the removal of surplus plutonium from the State of South 
Carolina and continuing the transition to the dilute and dispose 
strategy for surplus plutonium disposition.
    The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to 
increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials 
and improve the ability to deter, detect, and investigate illicit 
trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2020 budget request of 
$342 million, a decrease of $65 million, or 15.9 percent, below the 
fiscal year 2019 enacted level and includes efforts to secure the most 
at-risk radioactive material in U.S. high-threat urban areas by the end 
of fiscal year 2020.
    The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and 
implements programs to: strengthen international nuclear safeguards; 
control the proliferation of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment, 
technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with 
nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address 
enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the 
development of innovative policies and approaches. The fiscal year 2020 
budget request for this program is $137 million, an increase of $6 
million, or 5.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This 
increase serves to advance and complete development of the new Export 
Compliance Assistance Program to deploy export control training across 
DOE and NNSA facilities, implement new 10 CFR Part 810 civil penalty 
authority pursuant to the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and establish and 
maintain a nonproliferation enrichment testing and training platform in 
cooperation with the IAEA and select foreign partners.
    The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development 
program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical 
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear 
weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and 
nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for 
this program is $495 million, a decrease of $80 million, or 13.9 
percent, below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This decrease is due 
to shifting the HEU Reactor Conversion program to M3, as it is no 
longer in the research and development phase.
    Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for 
DNN projects. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $299 million, an 
increase of $79 million, or 35.9 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level. Last year, NNSA terminated activities for the MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility project to pursue the dilute and dispose option to 
fulfill the U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium. 
The $220 million for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility will be used to 
continue termination activities. The request also includes $79 million 
for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition project, which supports the 
dilute and dispose strategy.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
    The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) 
provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or 
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the 
unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise. 
Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain 
readiness to support lead Federal agencies to find and render safe 
potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively 
manage the consequences of nuclear or radiological emergencies, and to 
support enhanced security operations for National Security Special 
Events (NSSE).
    NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote 
sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident 
within the continental United States, as well as in support of 
regularly scheduled NSSE. The AMS fleet consists of three Beechcraft 
B200 fixed- wing aircraft with an average age of 33 years and two Bell 
412 helicopters with an average age of 24 years. The age of the current 
aircraft leads to unscheduled downtime resulting in reduced mission 
availability. A 2017 AoA on the AMS aircraft determined that 
recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet is necessary to continue 
to provide Federal, State, and local officials with rapid radiological 
information following an accident or incident. In fiscal year 2019, the 
fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced, and the rotary-wing aircraft will 
be replaced in fiscal year 2020. The fiscal year 2020 budget request 
for AMS recapitalization is $35.5 million.
    NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major 
American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and 
mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device (i.e, 
``stabilization''). CTCP will conduct stabilization training and 
operations and begin transitioning to the Capability Forward 
initiative, under which lifesaving responses to a nuclear threat device 
will be accelerated. Under this initiative, NNSA will provide 
additional training, equipment, and technical support to the current 11 
stabilization cities--eventually growing to 14 U.S. cities by fiscal 
year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations more 
rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training facilities to 
accommodate the increased training requirements associated with 
regional render safe capabilities.
    The Nation's nuclear incident response teams require the ability to 
communicate classified technical assessments in deployed, and often 
austere, environments using highly secure means. Information 
requirements encompass both nuclear device design information and 
intelligence assessments. The equipment used by NNSA's nuclear incident 
response teams is aging, resulting in increasing maintenance costs and 
heightened risks to the emergency response mission. This budget 
includes funding for recapitalization of incident response equipment 
consistent with lifecycle planning to maintain operational readiness. 
The budget also includes funding for state-of-the-art, secure, 
deployable communications systems that are interoperable with FBI and 
DoD mission partners that will help provide decision makers with real-
time technical recommendations to mitigate nuclear terrorist threats.
    CTCP maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability in three 
distinct areas: (1) pre- detonation device disassembly and examination; 
(2) post-detonation assessment; and (3) analysis and characterization 
of nuclear materials. The program maintains readiness to deploy device 
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations 
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject 
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground 
sample collections that support attribution of a nuclear detonation.
    The Emergency Operations program's fiscal year 2020 budget request 
includes $35.5 million under NCTIR to support NNSA's Office of 
Emergency Operations. This funding will support NNSA's all-hazard 
emergency response capabilities that positively impact the Department's 
emergency management continuity and devolution programs, enhance the 
ability of the Department to respond to, and recover from, catastrophic 
emergencies or other man-made hazards or natural disasters.
                      naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines and 
aircraft carriers is critical to the security of the United States and 
its allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Office of 
Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of technological developments 
in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and 
improvements in naval reactor performance.
    This preeminence provides the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in 
naval warfighting capabilities.
    The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2020 budget request is $1.65 
billion, a decrease of $140 million or approximately 8 percent, below 
the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This request reflects reductions to 
planned funding levels following additional funding enacted in fiscal 
year 2018 for the S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul and Spent Fuel 
Handling Recapitalization Project. In addition to supporting today's 
operational fleet, the requested funding is the foundation for Naval 
Reactors to deliver tomorrow's fleet and recruit and retain a highly-
skilled workforce. One of Naval Reactors' three national priority 
projects, continuing design and development of the reactor plant for 
the Columbia-Class submarine, featuring a life-of-ship core and 
electric drive, will replace the current Ohio-Class fleet and provide 
required deterrence capabilities for decades. The project to refuel a 
research and training reactor in New York will enable 20 more years of 
research, development, and training for fleet operators. Funding will 
also be used to support construction of a new spent fuel handling 
facility in Idaho that will facilitate long term, reliable processing 
and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and 
submarines.
    Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2020 to support 
these projects and fund necessary reactor technology development, 
equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical 
infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing 
technical base, the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring 
Site in New York; and the spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho can 
perform the research and development, analysis, engineering, and 
testing needed to support today's fleet at sea and develop future 
nuclear-powered warships. These laboratories also perform the technical 
evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess emergent 
issues and deliver timely responses to provide nuclear safety and 
maximize operational flexibility.
NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses Appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Federal Salaries and 
Expenses is $435 million, an increase of $25 million, or 6.0 percent, 
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. NNSA's workforce is critical 
to the success of the Nation's nuclear security enterprise. NNSA must 
have a sufficient workforce, with the right capabilities, to ensure it 
can modernize the nuclear deterrent, recapitalize an aging 
infrastructure, and continue to meet the requirements of our 
nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs. The 2018 NPR 
highlighted the need to properly support civilian personnel who protect 
the United States against nuclear threats. Effective deterrence would 
be impossible without the vital contributions our personnel make to the 
United States' nuclear capabilities and deterrence.
    If NNSA is to be successful, funding alone will not be enough. NNSA 
will need to have the necessary human resource authorities to attract 
and retain the best and brightest workforce from around the country, 
fostering interest through internships or skilled trade programs, and 
clearing them for classified work as quickly as possible. This includes 
jobs not just in science, technology, and engineering but also 
manufacturing, maintenance, project and program management, and 
construction.
    Meeting NNSA's growing mission requirements, as described in the 
2018 NPR will require an aggressive hiring strategy for the next 2 
years. Since 2010, NNSA's program funding has increased 50 percent, 
while staffing has decreased 10 percent. The fiscal year 2020 request 
increases NNSA staffing to 1,753 full-time equivalents (FTEs), an 
increase of 95 FTEs from the current on-board level of 1,658 Federal 
employees. NNSA would benefit from the elimination of the overall cap 
on FTEs and excepted service personnel.
    Last year, two independent studies identified NNSA's unmet critical 
staffing needs. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and NNSA's 
Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) found that NNSA 
was understaffed across all functions. The number of additional staff 
recommended in both studies would exceed the statutory cap on NNSA's 
full- time equivalent employees. In March 2019, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) endorsed both OPM and CEPE's staffing 
analyses' conclusions of critical staff shortfalls and needs across 
multiple NNSA functions. GAO's endorsement supports NNSA's request for 
additional hiring authorities that would eliminate personnel caps, 
which would allow us to put significant resources behind our mission 
priorities. NNSA is focusing on developing a concrete strategic 
staffing plan based on the information provided by the two independent 
studies and GAO's report.
Management and Performance
    Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2 billion in 
projects, a significant portion of NNSA's total project portfolio, 
under budget. We are committed to encouraging competition and 
increasing the universe of qualified contractors by streamlining major 
acquisition processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering 
timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, 
by using a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that 
are appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site. NNSA's 
Office of Acquisition and Project Management continues to: lead 
improvements in contract and project management practices; provide 
clear lines of authority and accountability for program and project 
managers; improve cost and schedule performance; and ensure that 
Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers possess the 
appropriate skill mix and professional certifications to manage NNSA's 
work.
Conclusion
    NNSA's diverse missions are critical to the national security of 
the United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and 
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of 
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and 
providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft 
carriers and submarines. NNSA is mindful of its obligation to improve 
acquisition, safety, and security practices continually, and to use in 
a responsible manner, the resources entrusted to it by Congress and the 
American people. By investing in our nuclear security enterprise and 
continuing our efforts to modernize our scientific, technical, and 
engineering capabilities and infrastructure, NNSA will continue to 
deliver on its nuclear security mission.

    Senator Alexander. Thank you very much, Madam 
Administrator, and thanks for your service to our country and 
such a vital mission.
    Admiral Caldwell, you're going to provide testimony on 
Naval Reactors, but I mentioned to Senator Feinstein--Senator 
Feinstein and I, but especially Senator Feinstein, are very 
interested in the interim storage of nuclear--of used nuclear 
fuel. And she, with my support, has proposed in our 
appropriations bills that we develop interim storage sites for 
used fuel that is at commercial sites today. Now, of course, 
you have a noncommercial process, but you come as close to 
dealing with--taking used nuclear fuel to an interim site as 
anything that's going on in the country.
    And so when you've finish with your comments, if you could 
take three or four extra minutes and just describe for me and 
for Senator Feinstein exactly what you do and how you do it, it 
might be useful to us as we consider our broader 
responsibilities.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. (FRANK) CALDWELL, JR., 
            USN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL 
            REACTORS
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member Feinstein, and 
distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify here today. I also thank the 
subcommittee for consistently supporting Naval Reactors, 
enabling my team to provide the Navy with propulsion plants 
that give our nuclear-powered warships incredible advantages of 
unmatched reliability, speed, and endurance to carry out our 
national security missions throughout the world.
    Our national security strategy, national defense strategy, 
recognize an increasingly complex global security environment 
marked by the reemergence of great power competition and an 
erosion of our military advantage. The Chief of Naval 
Operations has made it clear that our Navy must become more 
agile, must compete in ways that are sustainable, and must be 
prepared to control the high-end maritime conflict. Our nuclear 
Navy is essential to meeting these objectives. Today, nearly 45 
percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear powered, 
including 11 aircraft carriers and 69 submarines.
    In 2018, Naval Reactors supported the operations of the 
nuclear fleet, including 22 submarine fast-attack deployments, 
36 strategic deterrent patrols, and five aircraft carrier 
deployments. At any given time, at least 47 of our submarines 
were either deployed or ready to deploy. The Naval Reactors 
budget request for fiscal year 2020 is a $1.65 billion request 
that represents a reduction of $140 million, or 7.8 percent, 
from our fiscal year 2019 request.
    Our budget fully supports three national priorities. The 
first project supports the Navy's number one acquisition 
priority by developing the propulsion plant for the Columbia-
class ballistic missile submarine. This ship will feature a 
life-of-ship reactor core. That core is made possible by the 
reactor technologies developed over many decades. Because of 
your support, the Navy has begun procuring the long-lead 
propulsion plant equipment for the lead ship this fiscal year. 
And as planned, we will begin manufacturing the Columbia's 
life-of-ship core this year.
    The second project is refueling and overhauling a research 
and training reactor in New York. There is a dual benefit to 
this effort. First, it facilitates reactor development for the 
Columbia-class submarine and it will provide 20 more years of 
training for new fleet operators.
    The third project is constructing the new naval spent fuel 
handling facility in Idaho, which will enable long-term 
reliable processing and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from 
Navy nuclear propulsion plants.
    This year's budget request also invests in three key areas. 
The first is the development of advanced reactor technology for 
future classes of nuclear-powered warships. The second is 
recapitalizing vital laboratory facilities and infrastructure. 
And the third is remediation efforts to reduce environmental 
liabilities of legacy facilities. I want to assure the 
committee that our budget planning efforts are done with great 
rigor. Investments we make today in research and development 
not only advance Navy warfighting capabilities, but also result 
in cost savings and improved capability far into the future.
    I understand the difficult budget environment in which 
Congress must craft legislation, and I respectfully request and 
urge your support of the fiscal year 2020 budget request.
    Thank you for this committee's longstanding support of 
Naval Reactors. And I look forward to answering your questions 
on other topics.
    [The statement follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell
    Chairman Alexander, Ranking Member Feinstein, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today and present the President's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request for Naval Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do 
ensures our nuclear Navy has the power and propulsion to carry out 
missions around the world.
    This past year marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program under the leadership of Admiral Hyman 
Rickover. In 1955, just 7 years after the creation of our program, the 
first nuclear-powered warship, USS Nautilus (SSN 571) reported 
``Underway on nuclear power''. Since Nautilus, follow-on classes of 
ever more capable nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers have 
ensured our warfighting edge over potential adversaries. Reactor core 
lives have increased from just under 2 years to over 40 years. Our 
ballistic missile submarines have provided the most survivable leg of 
our nuclear triad for nearly six decades and are essential to our 
ability to deter major warfare and assure our allies. Our fast attack 
submarines operate virtually undetected, safeguard vital commercial 
sea- lanes, and stand ready to protect American interests. And, our 
aircraft carriers--4.5 acres of sovereign territory--provide our Nation 
unparalleled mobility and the sustained ability to project combat 
power, deter conflict, and protect our interests.
    Today's security environment is dynamic and challenging, best 
characterized as a return to great power competition. In the maritime 
domain, nuclear propulsion enables the Navy to conduct missions vital 
to national security by providing unmatched mobility, flexibility, 
responsiveness, and endurance. These key attributes ensure our nuclear 
fleet can meet the demands of forward presence and crisis response 
world-wide. Today, nearly 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants are 
nuclear-powered (11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 
51 attack submarines, and four guided missile submarines).
    Last year, with Naval Reactors support, the Navy deployed 22 
submarines and conducted 36 strategic deterrent patrols. At any given 
time, there were at least 47 submarines deployed or ready to deploy 
within days. Our carriers, USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Theodore 
Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS John C Stennis (CVN 74), USS Harry S Truman 
(CVN 75), and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) deployed during 2018. This 
past December, USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) successfully concluded a 
historic, two-part deployment as part of the implementation of the 
Dynamic Force Employment plan, demonstrating our Navy's ability to be 
more agile and operationally unpredictable to potential adversaries.
    In submarine shipbuilding, the Navy recently saw the keel laid for 
the attack submarines Pre- Commissioning Units (PCU) Montana (SSN 794) 
and Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795), and the commissioning of USS Colorado 
(SSN 788), USS Indiana (SSN 789), and USS South Dakota (SSN 790). This 
totals 17 Virginia-Class submarines.
    In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, USS Gerald R Ford completed her 
initial at sea operations and began her Post-Shakedown Availability in 
July. Construction of the John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) is nearing 
completion, and she is scheduled to be christened later this year. The 
third carrier of the Ford-Class, Enterprise (CVN 80), began 
construction activities this past year and will proceed as part of a 
two-carrier buy of CVN 80 and CVN 81, which is anticipated to generate 
substantial savings for the Navy. As these aircraft carriers join the 
fleet, they will bring unmatched capabilities to our Navy. The 
propulsion plant for the Ford-Class represents the first newly designed 
aircraft carrier propulsion plant in 40 years. These ships not only 
match the high speed of our Nimitz-Class aircraft carriers but provide 
25 percent more energy and three times the electrical generating 
capacity. Additionally, the propulsion plant design reduces maintenance 
by 30 percent and manpower by 50 percent. These advances in propulsion 
plant design are a direct result of the dedicated and sustained effort 
by Naval Reactors and its field activities, our Department of Energy 
(DOE) laboratories, nuclear industrial base suppliers, the Navy design 
team, and the nuclear shipbuilders.
    This committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the 
nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our 
continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program. Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal 
year 2020 is $1.65 billion, a reduction of $140.2 million, or 7.8 
percent, from our fiscal year 2019 request. The budget request fully 
supports the requirements for our three major projects--Columbia-Class 
propulsion plant development, the refueling overhaul of a research and 
training reactor in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent 
Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho. The budget request also ensures Naval 
Reactors can support the operational nuclear fleet, continue research 
and development efforts for the next generation of nuclear powered 
warships, and make progress on both the recapitalization of our 
laboratory facilities and the environmental remediation of our legacy 
responsibilities.
                             major projects
Columbia-Class Propulsion Plant
    The Columbia-Class ballistic missile submarine is the Navy's number 
one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is on track to support the 
start of ship construction in fiscal year 2021 and is committed to 
delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the electric drive 
propulsion system necessary for the Columbia-Class program. fiscal year 
2020 funding of $75.5 million will continue supporting procurement of 
the lead ship propulsion plant components. The Navy began procuring 
long-lead material for the propulsion plant this year, and also will 
begin manufacturing the life-of-ship reactor core.
S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $155 million to 
support the refueling overhaul of one of the New York land-based 
prototypes, which will enable an additional 20 years of Naval Reactors' 
commitment to research, development, and training. As part of this 
refueling project, we will insert recently manufactured Columbia-Class 
type fuel modules in the prototype reactor as part of testing and 
demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and 
delivery of the Columbia-Class reactor core. The prototype refueling 
overhaul is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2021, with a return to 
training operations shortly thereafter.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $238 million to 
continue construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility, which 
broke ground in 2017. Full support from Congress has enabled us to keep 
this project on track. The cost and schedule baselines were approved in 
September of 2018. Design and site preparation for this facility 
continues, and it is on track to receive spent nuclear fuel from 
aircraft carriers in fiscal year 2024 and be fully operational by 
fiscal year 2025.
                         technical base funding
    In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors 
maintains a high-performing technical base to: (1) execute nuclear 
reactor technology research and development that supports today's fleet 
and ensures our Navy maintains its technological advantage over 
adversaries and, (2) provide the necessary equipment, construction, 
maintenance, and modernization of critical infrastructure and 
facilities. The funding required for this base also supports the lean 
Federal workforce that provides the oversight necessary to carry out 
this important technical work safely and efficiently. These activities 
are vital to our ability to provide 24-7 support to the nuclear- 
powered Navy.
Research and Development
    By employing an effective technical base, the teams of talented and 
dedicated people at Program sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory 
in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site 
in greater Albany, the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho, and our 
Washington, DC headquarters--can perform the research and development, 
analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at 
sea and develop more capable nuclear-powered warships for tomorrow's 
fleet. Advanced nuclear technologies such as those employed in the 
Columbia reactor require extensive development and prototyping, 
spanning a decade or more to mature the technology to a point where it 
is ready to incorporate in a ship design. Technology development will 
receive increased emphasis in the coming years as we complete our major 
projects and increase our focus on the development of tomorrow's fleet.
    Our labs perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval 
Reactors to thoroughly assess approximately 4,000 emergent issues 
annually and deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and 
maximize operational flexibility. Our research and development efforts 
must continue so that we can provide the Navy more capable propulsion 
plants in the future. The performance of our reactors is key to 
maintaining advantages over our potential adversaries. The 
technological advances that go in our propulsion plants today are a 
direct result of research and development investments that began 
decades ago. Continued investment now is vital to the generations of 
scientists and engineers who will design the propulsion plants of the 
future.
Facilities and Infrastructure
    Our laboratory facilities and infrastructure are critical in 
carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. The budget request supports 
recapitalizing our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and 
infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the Program since 
its inception 70 years ago. Without this recapitalization we will be 
unable to effectively support nuclear fleet operations and advanced 
research and development efforts at the level required by this complex 
technology. Our budget request this year also reflects the increase in 
our efforts in decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older 
facilities that have been in existence since the start of the Program 
in the early 1950s. We have approximately $8 billion in environmental 
liabilities requiring D&D efforts--about one-third of these facilities 
are no longer in use. We are increasing our emphasis on retirement of 
theses liabilities in an environmentally responsible and cost-effective 
manner to support best use of our funding.
    I want to assure the committee that the planning efforts we execute 
in budgeting for current and future projects are done with extreme 
rigor. We conduct comprehensive reviews of our budget to ensure we are 
making the right investments and tradeoffs. Our budget profile is 
consistent with projections in earlier Future Years Nuclear Security 
Plan submissions. Investments we make today in research and development 
efforts not only advance capabilities, but will also result in cost 
savings far into the future. We provide unmatched value to our Nation's 
defense and have a history of cost-effectively meeting our obligations. 
I understand the difficult budget environment in which Congress must 
craft legislation, and I respectfully urge your support for aligning 
allocations with the fiscal year 2020 Budget Request.

    Admiral Caldwell. And, sir, with your permission, I'll 
transition to give you a summary of how we handle our nuclear 
spent fuel.
    The naval nuclear spent fuel is loaded into shipping 
containers and is then transported to--from our nuclear-capable 
shipyards via rail to the Naval Reactors Facility that's on the 
Idaho National Lab. Naval Reactors has shipped over 850 
containers of naval spent fuel to Idaho since the 1950s. Now, 
at the Naval Reactors facility, spent fuel is unloaded from the 
shipping containers and is stored in the water pools at our 
expended----
    Senator Alexander. Did you bring your pictures?
    Admiral Caldwell. I did not bring the pictures, sir, but I 
regret--maybe my team did, and if--but I can get those and 
provide those for you.
    Anyway, once the spent fuel containers are-- once the 
containers arrive in Idaho, we unload those containers--oh, 
here we go--and we--we provide--we put the spent fuel in 
canisters.
    I'm going to give you three slides, sir. The first slide is 
sort of a sequence of events that shows the shipping 
containers, the facilities, and then shows some of the pictures 
of the packaging. The second is an artist rendering of the new 
facility that we're building. And then the third picture 
represents what that storage looks like when it's packed and 
ready for this temporary storage that we have.
    So we unload the fuel into the pool at the Expended Core 
Facility. And then once that fuel is there, sir, we do 
examinations of that fuel. That's to validate the performance 
of the fuel. That is vitally important to our mission and has 
allowed us to develop reactor cores with progressively longer 
lives. That's an important part of our mission. In fact, that's 
allowed us to take reactor cores from Nautilus days, where we 
had maybe a core that lasted 18 months to 2 years, to building 
the Columbia core, which will last over 40 years.
    Now, today our fuel spends less than 6 years in the water 
pool prior to being placed in dry storage. And what we do in 
the dry storage process is to load that fuel in specialized--
I'll describe that in a minute, ma'am--we load that spent fuel 
into stainless steel baskets. Then those stainless steel 
baskets are loaded into stainless steel canisters, we call 
those spent fuel canisters--and then the entire thing is loaded 
into a concrete overpack.
    So that picture that you held up, Senator Feinstein, that's 
the concrete overpack, and so that's what--there's a stainless 
steel cylinder that's designed to go into our shipping 
container and designed to go into a long-term repository, and 
that goes inside a concrete cylinder.
    Yes, sir.
    Senator Alexander. And the cylinder goes on a railcar.
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes. The spent fuel canister can fit into 
that shipping container that's shown on the upper left in those 
slides.
    Senator Alexander. And then the cylinder goes into the 
cement?
    Admiral Caldwell. The cylinder goes into that cement 
overpack.
    Senator Alexander. In this?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir, just like that.
    Senator Alexander. I'm coming along.
    Admiral Caldwell. And it's designed to be like that to 
provide the right level of shielding. And it's in an 
environmentally protected, safe, and secure condition. And then 
it's there until we're ready to move it to a permanent storage 
facility. And, again, those spent fuel canisters are designed 
to go right into the shipping container, and then it's designed 
to be able to go and take that spent fuel canister and put it 
in a long-term repository.
    Senator Alexander. So just so we take a minute on this----
    Admiral Caldwell. Sure.
    Senator Alexander [continuing]. So the canisters are these 
things, right?
    Admiral Caldwell. The stainless steel spent fuel canisters.
    Senator Alexander. Stainless steel. And they go into the 
thing in the upper left-hand corner.
    Admiral Caldwell. They can fit inside there for shipment.
    Senator Alexander. And then it goes into this.
    Admiral Caldwell. No, sir. Before you ship it, we're going 
to store it in those concrete overpacks until we're ready to 
ship it to a long-term repository.
    Senator Alexander. Oh. Oh, well, these are in Idaho.
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir; that's right.
    Senator Alexander. So this is--so you take it out of the 
submarine, you put it in these, then you put it--then you put 
this in the--what do you call that? The cylinder?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Can I walk up there and point 
out what you can see?
    Senator Alexander. Yes, why don't you do that.
    Admiral Caldwell. It may be unorthodox, but maybe it's----
    Senator Alexander. It's all right. We're not orthodox.
    Admiral Caldwell. So the fuel then is loaded when it leaves 
the shipyard into one of these containers. That's for aircraft 
carrier fuel, and that's for submarine type fuel. That's 
shipped out here to Idaho. And this is where the railhead is. 
And this is our old facility; it's called the Expended Core 
Facility. And we are building a new facility over here because 
this facility is aged and it doesn't handle the full length 
aircraft carrier fuel.
    Now, we put the fuel into the pool. That's an example of 
the pool. And it will stay there for up to 6 years.
    Senator Feinstein. And so water in this----
    Admiral Caldwell. There is no water in this. It is shipped 
dry.
    Senator Feinstein. Oh. So how long is it in dry status?
    Admiral Caldwell. Well, it's in dry status only as long as 
it takes to package it and then ship it when--and we ship them 
when we're ready and ship it across country via rail to get to 
the pool.
    Senator Feinstein. And there's no danger?
    Admiral Caldwell. No, sir--no, ma'am. It's packaged with 
safety in mind and strict rules to make sure that we are doing 
business the correct way. And then once it comes out to Idaho, 
we load it into the pool. And then it will stay in there for up 
to 6 years. The average is about 3 years.
    Senator Feinstein. And these are plutonium rods.
    Admiral Caldwell. No, ma'am. These are spent Navy nuclear 
fuel. So uranium that's been used in a fission process----
    Senator Alexander. Similar to the commercial reactors.
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. There are fission products in 
there of all different types that occur from fission----
    Senator Alexander. The same kind of stuff you've got in 
California in your plants that are closed down.
    Admiral Caldwell. And we do examinations of this----
    Senator Feinstein. We've got rods in the plants. We have 
plutonium rods in California, in PG&E (Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company) and in Southern California Edison.
    Senator Alexander. Are they plutonium? They wouldn't be 
plutonium.
    Admiral Caldwell. Well, no. There are many kinds of 
products of fission that are inside these--this fuel. Our fuel 
contains all the fission products.
    Senator Feinstein. Maybe we can talk about this more later 
because the big spent fuel pools that I've seen, like the one 
at Fukushima that cracked, they go into water, the rods, for a 
period of time, and then--I don't know what they call them.
    Admiral Caldwell. Well, we put them in this pool, and then 
when we're ready to package them, we put them in these baskets. 
Those baskets, in turn, fit into these stainless steel 
containers. These stainless steel containers were designed to 
be able to fit in the shipping container. And they're also 
designed to go with the requirements of a long-term repository. 
These are designed to last for up to 10,000 years.
    Senator Feinstein. Can I ask a quick question?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. Is there a difference between handling 
of uranium and plutonium?
    Admiral Caldwell. I don't handle, as a matter of general 
practice, plutonium, although I have to handle items with 
fission products periodically, and it does take special 
precautions.
    Senator Feinstein. So that must be different.
    Senator Alexander. Well, but your----
    Admiral Caldwell. [Audio malfunction] that are the product 
of that. Any of those fission products that we produce are 
contained within the fuel system.
    Senator Alexander. But you're able to take--you take rods--
--
    Admiral Caldwell. Fuel cells.
    Senator Alexander. Fuel cells. You put them in a----
    Admiral Caldwell. Container.
    Senator Alexander [continuing]. Container.
    Admiral Caldwell. And then we put them in a concrete 
overpack.
    Senator Alexander. And then----
    Admiral Caldwell. And we store it this way. And then if we 
get ready to move it to a long-term repository, we take that 
stainless steel container out of the concrete overpack and we 
put it into this----
    Senator Feinstein. Let me ask you, Can we do that 200 years 
after we put it in? Can we take it out?
    Admiral Caldwell. I believe so. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. Really?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Alexander. Well, by long term, you mean Yucca. So 
you put it in----
    Senator Feinstein. Well, it's forever.
    Senator Alexander. But when you take it out of the cell and 
ship it to Idaho, where's the first place you put it? Here?
    Admiral Caldwell. We put it in the pool first.
    Senator Alexander. You put it in the pool. And then where 
does it go?
    Admiral Caldwell. Then it will stay--then it goes into 
these baskets.
    Senator Alexander. Right. And then where does it go?
    Admiral Caldwell. And then it will go into this.
    Senator Alexander. And that goes on the railcar?
    Admiral Caldwell. When we're ready to ship it again, it 
would go into the railcar.
    Senator Alexander. Well, how about the first time? I mean, 
Idaho is way out here and your sub is way over here. How do 
you--where do you----
    Admiral Caldwell. We have a process that's to the left of 
this that prepares the fuel for going into the shipping 
containers before it goes, and it's not too dissimilar. We have 
inside of this container there's another basket arrangement 
that allows us to load fuel cells in here and then ship it out 
to Idaho.
    Senator Feinstein. One quick--is there a difference between 
handling uranium and plutonium?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. So that's good. I'm familiar with what 
they do in California, which is plutonium.
    Senator Alexander. But you mainly handle uranium, right?
    Senator Feinstein. He--yes.
    Admiral Caldwell. Well, I handle the uranium, which 
includes all kinds of spent fuel, which contains all kinds of 
additional fission products. If I can make a suggestion, can we 
come back maybe and provide the next level of detail for you on 
that?
    Senator Alexander. Yes, but I thought it's interesting, 
though, because we--you know, our goal in the commercial side 
is to get a place to put the used fuel at the reactors like the 
ones in California. And I guess the example here is you are 
taking used fuel, you are putting it in an interim site in 
Idaho, and once the Yucca Mountain is built or some other long-
term repository, you put it right back in the same container 
and send it there.
    Admiral Caldwell. And then we would send it to----
    Senator Alexander. Yes. So it's----
    Senator Feinstein. Would it be in the cement----
    Admiral Caldwell. [Audio malfunction] and once that is--
once we would be ready to ship it to a long-term repository, we 
take it out of the cement [off microphone].
    Senator Alexander. Okay.
    Admiral Caldwell. So if I could--I volunteer to come back 
and give more detail.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. We appreciate it.
    Admiral Caldwell. Thank you for the time.
    Senator Alexander. No, no, that's very helpful. And I think 
the main relevance of it is it shows that the interim storage 
site, which we've included in our appropriations bill for the 
last few years that Senator Feinstein has suggested is that 
people know how to do that because you're already doing it, 
you're already taking spent fuel, safely handling it, putting 
it on a railcar, sending it to an interim site in Idaho, 
holding it there until it's ready to go to Yucca Mountain if 
and when Yucca Mountain is open.
    So, now, why don't we go ahead with our opening statements 
if I can get my correct glasses on here. We'll--we--this is the 
second of our four budget hearings in the committee. We thank 
you for coming and for allowing us to take a little diversion 
there.
    We heard from Secretary Perry last week. We'll have two 
more hearings in the coming week to review the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau 
of Reclamation budget requests.
    First, I want to welcome not only Ms. Gordon-Hagerty and 
Admiral Caldwell, but, Dr. Verdon, thank you for being here, 
and, Dr. Park, thank you for being here as well.
    Are you here now or are you still at Oak Ridge or--you 
used----
    Dr. Park. I celebrate 1 year in my position. I was sworn in 
exactly a year ago today.
    Senator Alexander. Yes, okay.
    Senator Feinstein. Congratulations.
    Senator Alexander. Congratulations.
    So our subcommittee has produced a good record of being the 
first of the appropriations bills to be considered by the 
committee and by the Senate each year, and that's due to the 
excellent working relationship that Senator Feinstein and I 
have, and with the cooperation of both the Democratic and 
Republican members of this subcommittee. We've been able to 
work together and get the Senate leaders our bill early, and, 
as a result, during this last year, you had the advantage of 
having your appropriations bill signed into law before the year 
began, which I'm sure saved the taxpayers money and made it 
possible for you to do your job better. That was the first time 
that happened since 2000.
    Last year's appropriations bill we provided $15.2 billion 
for the NNSA, including $1.9 billion for the six life extension 
programs, which fix or replace components and weapons systems 
to make sure they're safe and reliable.
    We also funded the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 
National Security Complex, $703 million, which will continue to 
keep this project on time and on budget with a completion year 
of 2025 at a cost no greater than $6.5 billion. The 
Administrator mentioned that in her testimony. In addition to 
finding a way to get rid of used nuclear fuel, I suppose 
Senator Feinstein and I have spent more time on trying to work 
with the Department to get large projects under cost control 
than any other subject. And we're glad to see the uranium 
facility on time and on budget, and we are glad to see the 
progress that's been made in South Carolina with the MOX (Mixed 
Oxide) facility.
    We're here today to review your request, and the budget 
request for NNSA is $16.5 billion, an increase of 8 percent, 
$1.3 billion, over the last year enacted level. I'd like to 
focus my remarks on three main areas: maintaining our weapons 
stockpile; keeping critical projects on time and on budget, 
which I just mentioned; and supporting our nuclear Navy.
    When the Senate agreed to ratify the New START Treaty in 
December 2010, which both of us voted for, we also agreed to 
support funding to modernize and maintain our nuclear weapons 
stockpile, plus the facilities to do the work. A vital part of 
NNSA's mission is completion of the five ongoing life extension 
programs, which fix or replace components and weapons systems 
to make sure they're safe and reliable. The budget request 
includes $2.1 billion to continue the life extension programs. 
I want to make sure we're spending those dollars effectively. 
Completing all of the work that needs to be done for these 
weapons systems will result in a higher workload than the 
weapons program has had at any time since the height of the 
Cold War. It will require a large number of highly trained 
experts at the production sites, like at Oak Ridge and Y-12, 
the weapons laboratories, and the Federal employees that work 
for NNSA. I'd like to hear more today about whether you have 
enough qualified people to do that work.
    I would also like to discuss whether NNSA will be able to 
keep the Life Extension Programs on time and on budget.
    You are responsible for some of the largest construction 
projects. We've mentioned how hard we have worked over the last 
several years to help you keep those on time and on budget. We 
focused on the uranium facility. We held routine meetings with 
the leadership until that was done. We insisted that 
construction not begin until design was 90 percent completed. 
That was done. I'd like to hear more about that progress in my 
questions.
    We also worked with the Department on ways to get excess 
plutonium out of South Carolina more quickly and for less cost. 
Last year, Secretary Perry canceled the MOX project in favor of 
the dilute and dispose alternative, which the Department 
estimates will save taxpayers more than $20 billion. And I 
would congratulate Secretary Perry and the Department for 
taking on a difficult issue and bringing it to--toward, let's 
say, a conclusion. I'd like to hear more about the progress 
there.
    The NNSA is restarting our ability to make plutonium pits. 
You mentioned that, Madam Administrator. The budget request 
includes $712 million for plutonium sustainment, 97 percent 
more than the current funding level. This difficult important 
work is, as you said, in New Mexico and South Carolina. You 
have decided to use existing facilities and expertise in New 
Mexico to make some pits and repurpose MOX facility in South 
Carolina to make the remainder. I support that plan. I want to 
hear how lessons learned from UPF (Uranium Processing Facility) 
and MOX can make sure we get the pit production restart done on 
time and on budget.
    Now as to our Navy, Reactors are responsible for all 
aspects of nuclear power for our submarines and aircraft 
carriers. I mean Naval Reactors when I say ``Reactors.'' Naval 
Reactors has a lot on your plate right now designing a new 
reactor core for the next class of submarines, refueling a 
prototype reactor, and building a new spent fuel processing 
facility for nuclear waste from defense activities, which you 
just showed us on your--on your chart.
    We had an opportunity to talk earlier this week, Admiral 
Caldwell, which I appreciate, about the new spent processing 
facility, part of your consolidated interim storage for your 
fuel. That shows it can be done safely and effectively, and we 
welcome your advice as we move ahead with consideration of 
Yucca Mountain. But as you said to me, your interim site in 
Idaho does not replace the need for a permanent repository at 
Yucca Mountain. That used nuclear fuel will still need to go to 
Yucca Mountain once it's built, and I think your contract with 
the State of Idaho says that by 2035 you're supposed to have it 
out of there and into somewhere else. I look forward to your 
comments on that today. I'd like to hear what's being done to 
keep the new Columbia-class submarine design on track.
    NNSA needs to complete a lot of important work, and this 
work is going to require good planning and effective oversight. 
I look forward to working with the Administrator and her team 
for the fiscal year 2020, and with Senator Feinstein, who I now 
recognize for an opening statement.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

    Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you for your leadership, thank you for your chairmanship, and 
thank you for your concern, and thank you for holding this 
hearing.
    As I understand it, the budget request for NNSA totals 
$16.5 billion. That's a $1.3 billion increase over fiscal year 
2019. It's an all-time high. The vast majority of this increase 
is in the weapons account, which sees a 12-percent increase. 
Meanwhile, the rest of DOE (Department of Energy) sees a $3.9 
billion, or 11-percent, cut to scientific and energy research 
programs as well as environmental cleanup. Within NNSA, the 
nonpro program, which has been so successful in reducing 
nuclear dangers, is basically flat. This is part, as I see it, 
of a long and troubling trend.
    Since 2011, when the Senate approved the New START, the 
weapons program budget has increased a staggering $5.5 billion. 
In that same time, the nonproliferation program has seen a 
roughly $300 million decrease. That's very hard for me to 
accept.
    The CBO estimates it will cost $494 billion over the next 
decade to modernize our nuclear arsenal. The $162 billion would 
need to be appropriated by our subcommittee for the NNSA. In 
addition, CBO (Congressional Budget Office) estimates that we 
will spend $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years updating our 
nuclear submarines, missiles, and bombers. Gentlemen in 
uniform, that's an eye-popping number.
    I'm not seeing a lot of tough choices being made with this 
budget request candidly. All I see is more money for weapons 
and less money for everything else.
    Madam Administrator, the NNSA's track record with warheads 
and new facilities to some extent doesn't really inspire 
confidence. Rather, their history of rising costs and missed 
schedules suggests that even more money will be required than 
currently projected. I was just delighted to meet with you 
yesterday, at least have a chance to get to know you, and I 
very much hope that we can work together and talk about this 
because I've got to ask the question, Where does it end and how 
much is enough?
    Troublemaking by Russia and nuclear provocations by North 
Korea say to me now is not the time to let down our guard on 
nonproliferation nuclear security. The nonpro program has been 
wildly successful in reducing the dangers of nuclear terrorism.
    So you've got--I come from California, where people say 
there's an earthquake fault within 5 miles no matter where you 
are, and where I grew up, watching troops ship out under the 
Golden Gate Bridge, saw the submarine nets going down, saw the 
Nike gun emplacements going up, and really saw from a 
nonmilitary person who, as a small child, what war meant.
    The nonpro program has been successful because it's 
removed, as I understand it, more than 7,100 kilograms of 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium from 47 countries and 
Taiwan. It has secured 2,200 buildings containing high-priority 
radioactive sources, such as cesium and cobalt that can be used 
in a dirty bomb. It has removed and secured more than 80,000 
disused or unwanted radioactive sources, and converting or 
shutting down--well, it has converted or shut down 103 reactors 
that use highly enriched uranium. And it has deployed more than 
600 fixed and mobile radiation detectors at border crossings 
and ports in 59 countries. And still there's more to do.
    NNSA is implementing a cost-sharing program to spur the 
replacement of medical devices that use radioactive sources and 
those that do not. There are more than 700 blood irradiation 
devices that use highly radioactive cesium-137 around the 
country. The University of California system, with which I am 
familiar, has 44 of these devices. They've already replaced 
eight and are poised to replace 12 more. And NNSA has replaced 
almost half of the 32 devices in New York City, where there is 
high interest in this program. I see the program as a good 
example of a small increase of funding having a major impact on 
nuclear risk.
    So I look at this hearing, that we have a great opportunity 
to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism right here at home. 
And how we do this, by maintaining our nuclear prowess, 
particularly for the Navy--I'm a big Navy person, and going way 
back, and so it's sort of interesting because you kind of get a 
beachhead in a specific service. And for me, it's been the Navy 
in San Francisco.
    So, yes, I am very cautious when I say about nuclear 
warheads, and the pros and cons of them are often brought home 
to me. So I look forward, Admiral, to your comments in that 
regard.
    And, Madam Administrator, I welcome your testimony, and I 
very much appreciate your visit yesterday.
    Thank you so much.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
    We are delighted to have with us the distinguished Senator 
from North Dakota.
    Would you like to make an opening comment, Senator Hoeven?
    Senator Hoeven. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll wait for 
questions. Thank you.
    Senator Alexander. We'll begin questions. Let me start with 
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Let's talk about the uranium 
facility. I'll just ask you two questions here at once and let 
you talk about them. One is, as you know, we worked for several 
years to get a rapidly escalating project on time and on 
budget, and I just want--this would be a good day for you to 
reassure us once again that it is, or if it's not, we need to 
know that, too.
    Second, some of the same things we learned in dealing with 
uranium we applied--for example, we had a red team for both in 
the Department for the uranium facility and the MOX project, 
and we applied some of those lessons to the MOX project, and 
now I believe the Department has that one under--has a plan, 
that you're moving forward with a plan. We'd like to know how 
you're doing on that.
    And then the third thing is, What have you learned from 
those two experiences about big construction projects at NNSA? 
You the red team recommended that you basically set up an 
office to manage these special projects. I think you did that. 
What's your experience been?
    So those are my questions.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Alexander. And as I 
mentioned in my opening statement, I am proud to say that the 
Uranium Processing Facility is under construction today, and we 
are 6 years--6--we have seen 6 consecutive years of being on 
budget and on schedule. So that's a wonderful testament to our 
acquisition and project management personnel, that we have kept 
our finger and used rigor, with which we are--in which we are 
operating. And so we're very pleased with that. We will, 
complete project with the sustained funding and the adequate 
funding necessary to complete that project by the end of 2025 
for a cost not more than $6.5 billion.
    We also have over 1,000 craftspeople onsite right now. And 
as you know, it's been a challenge to be able to get qualified 
staff and workforce, craft workforce in particular, to stay on 
the job because there are so many other opportunities for them. 
But we've got a dedicated workforce there. And we are on budget 
and on schedule this year.
    So with regard to that, let me talk for a moment about 
lessons learned. As Senator Feinstein has correctly pointed 
out, the history of the Department of Energy has been with such 
large acquisition projects in the past, we haven't necessarily 
been successful in all those programs, but as a result of UPF, 
we have three other major projects under--ongoing right now. We 
have got the CMRR (Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement) and the RLUOB (Radiological Laboratory Utility 
Office Building) at Los Alamos, and those are also on schedule 
and on budget, and we can say that confidently because of the 
level of rigor with which we are operating.
    And because of the red teams and because of the acquisition 
and project management team person, the leadership reports 
directly to me. We follow the projects and the lessons learned 
from UPF and from other major acquisition projects. And we're 
applying those same lessons learned to what we're doing in 
terms of repurposing the MOX facility at Savannah River Site 
into our plutonium processing facility.
    So we are absolutely taking stock of all of the lessons 
learned out of UPF. We've got massive--major project management 
and processes in place and controls in place. And, in fact, we 
are undertaking right now, we're looking for the Federal 
project manager to assign to that project because we are in 
conceptual design right now. And as you rightly pointed out, we 
will not baseline the program until conceptual design is 90-
percent complete rather than just starting to dig and then hope 
for the best. We will have 90-percent complete conceptual 
design before we undertake baselining.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you.
    Admiral Caldwell, are you on schedule to meet the Navy's 
submarine construction needs?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir; I am. Thanks to the support of 
this subcommittee in previous years, we are on track to procure 
the reactor plant heavy components this year. That was as 
planned. That's because the maturity of our design work is to 
the point where we can do that. And this year we will place the 
contract for the reactor core, and I will start construction of 
that reactor core later on this year. The start of construction 
for that submarine is next October, fiscal year 2021. And we 
are on track to support requirements to support that 
construction timeline that delivers the submarine in 2028 and 
gets it on its first patrol in 2031.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, what difference did it make 
in your ability to manage your agency to have a budget-approved 
in law before the fiscal year started? I think that would help 
Senator Feinstein, me, and Senator Hoeven as we talk among 
other Senators to try to give them specific reasons why we 
don't want to delay. What difference did it make?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. It made a tremendous outcome because we 
were able to continue to recapitalize and to ensure that we 
were undertaking the necessary infrastructure improvements that 
have been long since passed that should have been taking place. 
For example, in our major construction projects, more than 30 
percent of our facilities in the Department of Energy and NNSA 
are more than 60 years old. We have a massive infrastructure 
program ahead of us to modernize and recapitalize our 
infrastructure and to know that we would have the funding to be 
able to support that. And also with regard to that, the actual 
programs and the five modernization programs, we know we can 
undertake that work and they will remain on schedule and on 
budget.
    So, absolutely, that was an incredibly important move, and 
we thank the Appropriations Committee for that.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to go and ask something that's a little different. I 
have become very concerned about talks between Saudi Arabia and 
the United States for our companies to sell nuclear reactors 
there. The killing of Jamal Khashoggi has confirmed some of my 
very deepest of concerns. I supported a resolution last year 
that called for any agreement with Saudi to adhere to the 
strongest possible nonproliferation gold standard. What has 
been your involvement in negotiating a 123 agreement with Saudi 
Arabia?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Feinstein, the 123 agreement is 
led by--the interagency process to get to a 123 agreement with 
any nation or any entity is undertaken by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. They lead that process. It's been a very 
rigorous and ongoing process. Currently, there are 23, 123 
agreements with 48 entities or countries around the world. The 
United States Government has engaged with the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia since 2012. And so we continue to interact with them 
about a 123 agreement, but no decisions have been made. And, 
again, the 123 agreement also has rigorous oversight by the 
Senate and the House Foreign Relations Committees before a 123 
agreement can be put in place.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. You're welcome.
    Senator Feinstein. Has the United States' withdrawal from 
the Iranian nuclear deal affected NNSA's nonproliferation 
programs?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Our participation in the JCPOA (Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action), or the previous JCPOA, has been 
to provide rigorous training efforts to the IAEA inspectors and 
to provide the technical expertise that's resident in our--in 
the NNSA. We continue to do so. We provide support to the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) and continue to administer 
that technical training and provide equipment as necessary for 
the IAEA. So, no, it hasn't changed.
    Senator Feinstein. Last year, I wrote to Secretary Mattis 
and Perry about my concerns of the Trump administration's plan 
to retain the, and we talked a little bit about this yesterday, 
B83 megaton nuclear bomber. It's my view that it's dangerous 
and unnecessary. I'd like to know, what is the current plan for 
the B83?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The NPR stated and the Nuclear Weapons 
Council has made a decision, or the STRATCOM commander has made 
a decision, that the B83 will remain in the active nuclear 
weapons stockpile until a replacement unit has been identified. 
We continue to maintain it and have found cost effective 
measures to maintain surveillance and keep it in the active 
stockpile.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, I notice there's a $13 million 
increase for the B83 in the budget request. What is that for?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Okay. May I turn to Dr. Verdon and have 
him answer the specifics on that?
    Senator Feinstein. Yes, of course.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    Dr. Verdon. Since it's being retained a little bit longer, 
we have upped the surveillance on it again in order to meet the 
annual assessment requirements associated with the warhead, 
keeping it in the stockpile longer. So that's to bring back up 
to a certain level the surveillance that we do on the unit to 
ensure its safety and reliability.
    Senator Feinstein. I was very much a supporter of the plan 
to use the B61 and retire the B83. I guess there are no plans 
in this administration for retirement of the B83. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Verdon. As the Administrator said, it's--until we--
until the DoD is satisfied that they found a replacement, they 
want to keep it in--you know, a comparable replacement, they 
want to keep it in the active stockpile. They're pursuing, you 
know, looking at replacements, but right now it will stay in.
    Senator Feinstein. Is that based on the size of the B83, or 
is it based on other considerations?
    Dr. Verdon. It's based on their need for targeting what 
they need for targets that they are provided that they have to 
hold at risk.
    Senator Feinstein. How long can NNSA extend the life of 
B83-1 without a multibillion-dollar life extension program?
    Dr. Verdon. That's--so that's probably--it's going to be, 
depending on the numbers, it will probably be another--let's 
see, to be careful, I would say probably about another 5 to 7 
years before we have to do anything major to it.
    Senator Feinstein. And then what is the estimated cost?
    Dr. Verdon. We haven't looked at it in terms of the total 
number. We would have to come up with what the total number is, 
so I wouldn't have an estimate of the cost right now, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you very much.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Hoeven.
    Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being 
here.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, we're now several years into the W80-4 
program, which will extend the life of the warhead that goes on 
our current air-launched cruise missile. The Air Force is 
developing the LRSO (Long Range Stand-Off), so obviously you 
have to coordinate with their timelines.
    So your testimony indicates the first refurbished warhead 
will be completed in fiscal 2025. I think that's consistent 
with the schedule you have provided for the past few years. My 
question is, What would be the impact on the W80-4 schedule if 
it does not receive full funding this year?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We are currently on schedule and on 
budget, and we are aligned fully with the Air Force. However, 
if we don't receive the funding that is necessary to complete 
the 80-4 LEP, which will align with the LRSO, with the Long-
Range Stand-Off missile of the Air Force, we will not--or the 
platform--we will not be able to continue being aligned with 
them. So we do need consistent and reliable funding, and we've 
laid out a strategy for that, and as has the Air Force.
    Senator Hoeven. All right. So you need to--in order to stay 
on schedule, you need to receive the funding request.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Hoeven. Shifting to the W87 modification program, 
which will provide the refurbished warhead on the ICBM 
(intercontinental ballistic missile), are you confident that 
you can stay on schedule with the funding that you have 
requested? And based on the expertise NNSA has developed with 
previous warhead life extension programs, are there any 
opportunities to accelerate the schedule?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Well, first of all, I'd like to say all 
five modernization programs are on schedule and on budget, 
and--but with the magnitude and complexity of all of those 
programs, obviously, any slippage in funding or any slippage in 
any programs could affect the others.
    I'd like to ask Dr. Verdon, he can tell you about the plans 
for the 87-1 replacement.
    Senator Hoeven. Okay.
    Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. Similar to your comments on the LRSO, 
that warhead is being developed in close coordination with the 
United States Air Force in terms of their Ground-Based 
Strategic Deterrent development. So those are again--those two 
activities are very carefully orchestrated to where we're 
supporting each other to be able to deliver what they need on 
time and vice versa. So it's really a very coordinated activity 
between the two that has to take place.
    Senator Hoeven. Absolutely. Thank you to you both.
    Admiral Caldwell, I was up at Annapolis earlier this week. 
There was a phenomenal Virginia-class submarine in the harbor; 
it was the USS North Dakota. Amazing crew. Captain Robinson and 
the entire crew, I mean, I just wish every single person in our 
State could meet them. So impressive. These guys are doing an 
incredible job, which is why the Navy had the submarine at 
Annapolis, so that the cadets could, you know, get a look at 
it. And obviously you bring your top performer up for a look, 
not your average performer. So we were very pleased. And 
obviously I'm bragging on them, but they absolutely deserve it.
    Talk to me about the Naval Reactors program. You know, your 
submarine fleet is just beyond belief, the capability, just 
untouchable. A great example of where we truly are ahead of 
everybody else with the technology, which is where we need to 
be with all of our weapons systems. But talk about the 
resources, the capacity, and whether you have what you need to 
continue that incredibly important technological advantage.
    Admiral Caldwell. Well, sir, thank you first off for the 
compliments about the North Dakota crew. I agree with you, a 
fine crew. I got to attend the submarine birthday ball with the 
commanding officer and the team with the Naval Academy 
midshipmen last weekend, and it was a tremendous event, and 
we're glad to have the chance to get out there.
    Our submarine force is an excellent force. We have the--
over many decades have created these phenomenal submarines, and 
they're manned by just tremendous people. My role in that is to 
provide the safe, reliable, effective nuclear propulsion that 
enables everything that our nuclear submarines do. To do that, 
I have a budget request before-- that's submitted through DOE 
every year that supports my four Navy nuclear labs, DOE 
facilities, that are really the technical backbone to 
everything that we do. And my budget request this year supports 
three major projects that allow us to continue supporting the 
submarine force; that is, the development of the Columbia-class 
propulsion plant, the refueling of a reactor up in New York, as 
well as the--the recapitalization of a spent fuel handling 
facility in Idaho.
    The budget also supports recapitalization of very important 
laboratory facilities that allows me to have the scientists, 
the technologists, and the engineers that are the engine that 
drives all of our technical excellence, that solves current 
problems today, and builds the fleet for the future. And so 
what--the enabler there is the support of this subcommittee 
that allows me to deliver what I need to for the nuclear Navy.
    Senator Hoeven. They're absolutely modern marvels, just 
amazing. And so again thanks to all of you for being here and 
for your important work.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator. Were all the 
crewmembers from North Dakota, too?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Hoeven. Some of the really outstanding crewmembers. 
But I tell you, regardless of where they're from, they are 
just--they are great Americans.
    Senator Alexander. Good.
    Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all the witnesses for being here today 
with us.
    Infrastructure investment is incredibly important for 
continuing the nuclear security work at our labs. Sandia 
National Laboratory, in the long term, is in need of 
investments for new spaces to accommodate new hires and to meet 
the requirements for microelectronics and pulsed power, 
especially if we hope to keep up with the Chinese investments 
and avoid a technological surprise. Is NNSA planning to 
increase its investments at Sandia, particularly with regard to 
pulsed power? And how can my office help with these efforts?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Udall, so first, as we've 
spoken about before, the SiFab facility in Mesa are an integral 
component to producing trusted microsystems for our nuclear 
weapons stockpile. And with regard to that, we think that the 
life of that program, as we make--continue to make investments 
in that to modernize that is through about 2040. However, 
that's yet another example of our infrastructure requirements. 
We are now taking stock of that facility and what we will do to 
modernize it even in the future. We are working with our 
colleagues in DoD and IC (Intelligence Community) to see what 
investments they need, too. So we are sharing ideas with them 
because they also need future trusted microelectronics.
    With regard to pulsed power and some other programs, we are 
working closing with the Sandia National Laboratory leadership 
to talk about what investments we need in the future for our 
science-based stockpile programs, and that is a critical 
component to that.
    I'd like to ask Dr. Verdon, if possible, to--if he has any 
other insights into pulsed power and other specific issues at 
Sandia.
    Senator Udall. Sure.
    Dr. Verdon. So yes. The existing Z platform is an extremely 
important experimental platform. The platform and the program 
are actually increasing funding, proposing to increase funding, 
to that this year to support some important experiments that 
we'd like to conduct. And with regards to the future, as was 
mentioned, we are working closely with Sandia, but also the 
intelligence community to do a broader assessment of where the 
entire world is going with pulsed power and what our response 
should be to that.
    Senator Udall. Great. Thank you. Artificial intelligence 
and machine learning capabilities are growing at an increasing 
rate in both the public sector and the private sector. To my 
knowledge, both Sandia and Los Alamos are adopting uses for 
this new technology, as are Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore, and 
others. For NNSA applying machine learning to the immense 
amount of data acquired for the Stockpile Stewardship Program 
could greatly improve the efficiency and accuracy of work done 
at the labs and could result in private sector spinoffs as 
well. Would NNSA benefit from a long-term plan outlining its 
efforts and budget for implementing and developing AI 
(Artificial Intelligence) and machine learning?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Udall, Secretary Perry has 
undertaken this--this specific issue with great gusto, and so 
he is looking across the entire DOE focused with leadership in 
the Office of Science in AI and machine learning. And, yes, we 
are absolutely part and parcel of that discussion and actually 
are providing some resources to the larger endeavors to 
basically make use of being more efficient. And, yes, we could 
absolutely support and be--and machine learning and artificial 
intelligence could help us inform our stockpile.
    Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer.
    The New Mexico congressional delegation is still waiting 
for a report on the plutonium mission mandated by law last 
year.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Senator Udall. Can we expect this report to be finished 
soon?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Senator Udall. Yes. And as I mentioned to Secretary Perry, 
you've offered a strong budget for the National Nuclear 
Security Administration and the labs, and New Mexico very much 
appreciates that. However, I continue to be concerned with 
NNSA's insistence that it move forward with a plan to send more 
nuclear waste to WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) than the 
State had originally agreed to accept and split the plutonium 
missions between Los Alamos and South Carolina.
    More waste, higher costs, and fewer jobs does not sound 
like a good deal. The NNSA proposal to split the plutonium 
missions would close to double the life-cycle costs. NNSA's own 
engineering report confirms this. The State of New Mexico and 
our new Governor, who I believe you've talked with, Madam 
Secretary, will have to review DOE's permit to operate WIPP, 
which is up in 2020.
    If DOE expects New Mexico to cooperate about WIPP when no 
other State in this country is doing its part on nuclear waste, 
then DOE must treat New Mexico fairly. We need strong cleanup 
funding to finish the job at Los Alamos; we need improved 
support for technology, commercialization to diversify our 
economy; and we need to keep the labs' missions stable and 
strong and not subject to political moves. I hope DOE and NNSA 
will rethink their plan.
    And I'm out of time here, but I had just one more question 
if that's all right. I know Lindsey is waiting here, so I'll 
keep it to be a short one here.
    Last week Secretary Perry committed--it's related to just 
what I said--last week Secretary Perry committed to ensuring 
that Los Alamos remain the plutonium center of excellence right 
sitting in the chair where you are, and that future budgets 
support the labs' efforts to meet the first requirement of 30 
pits per year. Do you also support this commitment?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Udall. Yes. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Senator Udall.
    Senator Graham, welcome.
    Senator Graham. Thank you. So what about the next 50? Where 
are they going to be built?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The next 50, under our plan, will be 
built at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility.
    Senator Graham. Are you okay with that, Senator Udall?
    Senator Udall. Well, I just put it out there. Senator 
Graham, I put in a very specific statement that I thought----
    Senator Graham. Yes. I mean, you say it doubles the cost.
    Senator Udall. We have two things going on here.
    Senator Graham. Yes. I think we've got a bunch of things 
going on.
    Senator Udall. And the cost issue is one that you and I 
agree on very much----
    Senator Graham. Yes, I know. I know exactly where you're 
coming from.
    Senator Udall [continuing]. Of doubling close to the cost.
    Senator Graham. Let's get back to MOX. In 2002, we passed a 
law that says if you don't have--if MOX production has not been 
achieved as of January 2016, it owes South Carolina $1 million 
a day, up to $100 million a year. We really don't want the 
money, but this thing has been going a long--a long time. Now 
you've got till 2020 to get 1 ton out. Do you think you'll get 
it out by 2020?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I'm confident that we are, and we 
are undertaking that. And has been noted in the paper----
    Senator Graham. How much of that--of that 1 ton, how much 
is dilute and dispose?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Of that? None. This is not defense 
waste, defense----
    Senator Graham. Okay. So the rest of it, where is it going 
to go?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. For the--we are going--we're 
undertaking the surplus plutonium project, the dilute and 
dispose strategy that is known and proven technology, which 
we've already----
    Senator Graham. So where is it going to go?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. It's going to go to WIPP.
    Senator Graham. Are you okay with that?
    Senator Udall. I--in my statement, I----
    Senator Graham. Well, I missed that statement, but----
    Senator Udall. No, no, no, no, but--well, if you want me to 
answer your question, I don't know if----
    Senator Graham [continuing]. I don't mean to get you 
involved with this --
    Senator Udall. Chairman, if it's all right, but--but, 
Senator Graham, the point on WIPP is we accepted this where no 
other State----
    Senator Graham. I'm with you, pal. I'm not----
    Senator Udall [continuing]. In terms of nuclear waste--no 
other State is doing anything. And we said for the mission--
this is a whole new mission--that she's describing and that 
Secretary Perry has described and we just want----
    Senator Graham. Is your Governor on board, or do you know?
    Senator Udall. Well, I've just said the Governor is 
reviewing this. It has to be reviewed in 2020. And as far as I 
know the--now, she's spoken with the Governor, too. The 
Governor is very skeptical at this point from my sense of 
talking to her.
    Senator Graham. So let me----
    Senator Udall. Now, she doesn't----
    Senator Graham. Let me put myself in your shoes. We were 
willing to do something nobody else wanted to do called the MOX 
program. They were looking around, ``Who will take all this 
weapons-grade plutonium?'' Not a lot of people raised their 
hand, but we did, thought it was, you know, turning a sword 
into a plowshare, and about 15 or 20 years later, the thing is 
like 70-percent built, and now we're going to shut it down and 
come up with a new idea that has not been well thought through.
    So to my good friend from New Mexico, I'm sorry you're 
leaving.
    Senator Udall. Well----
    Senator Graham. You're a great Senator, and I need to talk 
to the people in Mexico because I want to tell the people--New 
Mexico--the people of South Carolina, you've promised to get 
this stuff out, and I'm going to hold you to it. I have no 
confidence you've got a plan. I think you're making this up as 
you go. I have no confidence we're going to have two pit 
production facilities unless somebody can figure this out 
better than we have today. So the one thing I am focused on is 
to make sure that now that the MOX program has been canceled, 
this stuff leaves my State.
    And this little exchange we had proves to me beyond a 
shadow of a doubt you're making this up as you go. And we shut 
down one project to start a new one, and apparently we've 
learned nothing. We're starting a whole new idea without the 
real stakeholders being bought in. We're putting a bunch of 
money out for dilute and dispose, not so sure where we're going 
to dispose it. You might dilute it, but you've got to dispose 
it, and it's not going to be in South Carolina.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with New Mexico 
and this committee to give certainty to the people of South 
Carolina and New Mexico and the country as a whole that we know 
what the hell we're doing because I don't think we do.
    Senator Udall. Senator Graham, if I could just have one 
more exchange with you. The last time we accepted the mission, 
we had a group of 13 scientists that were working in New Mexico 
on the project specifically. We don't have that capability now. 
And if they want us to take a whole new mission like that, we 
need to have that kind of capability to review what this whole 
dilute and dispose means and what it means for the 
characterization and what's happening----
    Senator Graham. Just reclaiming my time, we should think 
about all this stuff before we stop one program.
    Senator Udall. I agree.
    Senator Alexander. Right.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Senator Graham's question is, 
Can you get the stuff--do you want to answer the question? Can 
you get it out of South Carolina? And how are you going to do 
it? That's what he's asking.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Our plan is to get the material out of 
South Carolina, Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Yes. And I'm just telling you, it ain't 
well thought out because nobody in New Mexico seems to be 
signing up, and that's where it's headed, and I don't blame 
them for being skeptical. You've got a lot of talking to do 
with New Mexico. We want to help you if we can. But this is not 
much of a plan so far. I hope it works out.
    Senator Alexander. Do you have any more specific 
information about how and when the material from South Carolina 
will be taken wherever it's going?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. It's----
    Senator Alexander. Well, why don't you say what that is.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. We're using the surplus--surplus 
Plutonium Disposition Plan, it's called Dilute and Dispose, 
it's a known technology. We've already diluted and disposed 
more than 5 metric tons of material, the same defense waste. It 
will eventually go to WIPP. And, regardless, that's--that's the 
planned path forward.
    I caution everyone, though, that, as we've discussed, WIPP 
is important because it's where we put defense nuclear waste, 
transuranic waste, and we generate transuranic waste at Los 
Alamos. In fact, it's the largest generator in the NNSA 
complex. So even setting aside the Dilute and Dispose program, 
we need to make sure that we've got the adequate capacity at 
WIPP so that we can continue our 30 pits per year and our 
plutonium center of excellence at Los Alamos because we've got 
waste being generated there as well as Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory and the waste that we have currently at 
Idaho----
    Senator Alexander. So you're saying you don't have room for 
South Carolina's waste?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We absolutely have room for South 
Carolina's waste at WIPP.
    Senator Alexander. Well, how soon can you start taking it 
out?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We're undertaking the plans right now. 
We're in conceptual design for the additional glove boxes to--
to conduct this, and we'll start in--in the 2020s.
    Senator Alexander. Well, the argument that was made to us 
last year was that if we adopted Dilute and Dispose, which I 
supported, that it would get the material out of South Carolina 
faster than if we didn't.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Alexander. Is that true?
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That is true. And the mixed oxide fuel 
fabrication process was that that facility was not going to be 
completed by--until 2048. This program will be less than 50 
percent of the cost, and it will do it in a far faster and 
quicker and more safe way.
    Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'm sorry.
    Senator Alexander. Sure.
    Senator Graham. Go ahead. So here's the deal. We've been 
studying this thing since the late '90s. We picked MOX over 
everything else, including dilute and dispose and shooting it 
in space and putting it in the bottom of the ocean and every 
idea you could think of, of how to get 34 metric tons of 
weapons-grade plutonium out of the inventory so it could never 
be used again. Three administrations looked at it and picked 
MOX. We're about 70 percent through. Now they say it takes--
I've never bought into all the analysis, but we are where we 
are. The program has been basically terminated, and now we're 
going to come up with a new alternative that has been poorly 
thought through, if at all.
    It seems to me that you wouldn't stop one program until you 
knew you had a pathway forward. If I've learned nothing from 
this hearing, it's you've got a new Governor in New Mexico, 
you've got a Senator who says we're not so sure about this, and 
you're talking about two pit facilities, and I'll believe that 
when I see it. We've been talking about building a pit facility 
since 2004, and now all of a sudden we're going to build two.
    So the bottom line is this is problematic and it's not a 
way to run a railroad, and I'm going to be all over this. I'm 
going to make sure it gets out of my State. I hope the people 
in New Mexico will take it. That will be up to you all. But if 
you don't take it, I don't know what we're going to do with it.
    Senator Alexander. Madam Administrator, several years ago 
when Senator Feinstein and I were working on projects that were 
not on time and on budget, we found it useful to meet on a 
regular basis with the administrators and see if they were on 
time and on budget. I think it is clear that I think a good 
idea would be for you, if you're not doing it, to meet with 
Senator Graham and this subcommittee on a regular basis and 
give us a report on, your plan for getting the material out of 
South Carolina, when you plan to do it, how much it's going to 
cost, and are you on time and on budget and pursuing it? And 
from Senator----
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Will do.
    Senator Alexander [continuing]. Udall's point of view, I 
think he wants to make sure, as Senator Graham does, that the 
two-location plutonium program is on time and on budget. And I 
think it's a part of our responsibility to make sure that both 
are on time and on budget. If they're not, we need to know why.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I welcome that opportunity. Thank you.
    Senator Alexander. Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Chairman----
    Senator Alexander. Senator Graham, did you have----
    Senator Graham. No, I just think that's a great idea. I 
would just ask that we include Senator Udall in the 
conversation about dilute and dispose.
    Senator Udall. I'm happy to be in the conversation.
    Senator Graham. Because if you're going to be the dispose 
part, you need to be in the conversation.
    Senator Udall. I will be glad.
    Senator Alexander. Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Are you saying you don't want the pit 
plan that's there in your State?
    Senator Graham. Ma'am, I'm saying that we've been talking 
about building pit facilities for a long time. Now the plan is 
to build 30 in New Mexico and 50 in South Carolina. It's not 
that I'm against, I'm a pretty hawkish guy, I just am very 
skeptical of what's going on because Senator Udall claims that 
to do it this way is twice what it would cost if you did it in 
one place. People who are experts say you need redundancy. That 
makes some sense. I don't know who is going to be President in 
2020, but they are likely to revisit this. If it's not 
President Trump, I know they will. If it is, I don't know what 
he'll do.
    I'm just saying about before I get into the pit deal, I 
want to know what happens to this waste. Before you tell me 
you're going to do something with the MOX facility that's 70 
percent complete, convert it into something new, tell me what 
you're going to do with the material I've got. And I am more 
skeptical today than I was before I came here that there's a 
pathway out. With MOX, there was pathway out. Now I don't know 
if there is. If New Mexico doesn't come along and agree to 
this, I don't know what happens.
    Senator Alexander. I think what we've concluded, if Senator 
Graham and Senator Udall would like, is within--within, say, 
the next few months, a plan on how to get the material out of 
South Carolina, when it's going to go, where it's going to go, 
how much it's going to cost, and then come to us with a 
proposal----
    Senator Feinstein. That would be helpful.
    Senator Alexander. And then we'll review it every 6 months 
or so and see if it's on time and on budget.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Well----
    Senator Graham. It sounds like a plan.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. This, for me, is a big 
surprise because my understanding is that you were for the 
facility.
    Senator Graham. Here's--yes, ma'am.
    Senator Alexander. He's just skeptical.
    Senator Graham. I am----
    Senator Alexander. He's not going to believe anything----
    Senator Graham [continuing]. Okay with pit production being 
done at AE. I'm okay with South Carolina being in the mix. What 
I'm not okay with is bypassing the issue that I've been talking 
about, the weapons-grade plutonium in my State. I want it out. 
I don't want to buy another pig in the poke, and I want to make 
sure that we're making a good decision about two pit production 
facilities. I'd love to have the business.
    But, Senator Udall, I'd like to talk to you about, how does 
this make sense? I mean, two facilities? I think it makes 
sense. Maybe it doesn't. I don't know. I just want to know, can 
you take this material?
    If our friends in New Mexico do not--does not take-- if 
they do not take the material, Senator Feinstein, there's no 
path out. That's what I'm worried about. I don't want to mix 
the two conversations.
    Senator Udall. Senator Feinstein, the issue for the WIPP 
facility, the way--the way I see it, is the WIPP facility was 
designed for transuranic waste, and much of that waste is 
intermediate and lower. Okay? And it's things like gloves and 
production of being around plutonium and all of that. That's 
what it was designed for. And there was a certain cubic feet 
level, and this is where that's what it was for.
    Now, as Senator Graham is saying very accurately, we're 
talking about weapons-grade plutonium, which has come in--a lot 
of it from Russia is my understanding. We don't have the 
capability now to evaluate like we did at the early part of the 
WIPP process as to what is this waste, what is dilute and 
dispose----
    Senator Feinstein. Right.
    Senator Udall [continuing]. How it's going to work. And the 
Governor for the State of New Mexico has a say in terms of 
accepting this under the Environment Department in New Mexico.
    So all of the issues and skepticisms Senator Graham has 
raised I have the same skepticism here at this point.
    Senator Graham. So I would say, in fairness, the dilute 
part of it's going to make it at a level that's not weapons-
grade plutonium. I get that. But you--they say that the space 
is--the other Governor said, ``We'll make room for it,'' but 
you've got a new Governor, and if she wants to reconfigure the 
regulation, then we're stymied.
    All I'm saying is that we stop one program, and we really 
haven't thought through, Does the other program work? It only 
is half the cost if it works. If it doesn't work, then I'm 
stuck with the stuff. I don't mind doing pits, love to do pits, 
but I don't want to talk about pits until we can figure out, do 
we have a viable plan to get it out of South Carolina?
    Senator Feinstein. Could I ask a question?
    Senator Alexander. Well, yes, but before I say, one, 
they've called two roll call votes.
    Senator Graham. Oh, okay.
    Senator Alexander. So we'll have those in a moment. And, 
second, the subcommittee would like to help make sure that the 
material comes out of South Carolina on schedule and that the 
plutonium production moves ahead as planned. So we look forward 
to a discussion with you, an update, of which both Senator 
Graham and Senator Udall are perfectly welcome to come, and 
Senator Feinstein will be interested as well.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. I remember when we had those meetings in 
Senator Alexander's office on the studies that have been done 
on that facility. My understanding was that you were for them 
and now--it was always going to be weapons-grade. I never 
thought it was anything below that.
    Senator Graham. Senator Feinstein, what I was advocating 
for was making the MOX program more cost efficient, keeping the 
program in place, not withdrawing from the treaty with Russia, 
which we have. It's the biggest nonproliferation agreement in 
the history of mankind that's just been completely voided. Now 
we don't have a certain pathway out of South Carolina. Our 
friends in New Mexico have questions that are legitimate that 
need to be answered.
    But I think Senator Alexander has proposed a great 
solution, which is for us to continue to talk, make sure that 
we do have a viable plan to get it out of South Carolina and 
take it off the market if possible, and then we'll, you know, 
see if the pit thing makes sense and is working.
    I can't ask anything more than that, Senator Alexander, 
just to stay on top of it.
    Senator Alexander. Well, we'll do that if Senator Feinstein 
will join me in staying on top of both these projects.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, I may fall off, but I'll try to 
stay on top of it.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Alexander. Now, do you have other questions, 
Senator Feinstein? We've interrupted you.
    Thank you, Senator Graham and Senator Udall. And we commit 
to pay attention to both projects.
    Senator Feinstein, we'll let you wrap the hearing up so we 
can go vote.
    Senator Feinstein. I don't--the MOX facility has been so 
difficult. And sometimes I listen to people, and I think I know 
what they're saying, and then I find out I don't. But let me 
just thank everybody for being here. It's clear that we need to 
all be clear that we're on the same page, Madam Administrator--
--
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. With respect to MOX, and 
that it doesn't change every 6 or 8 months because we have to 
make a commitment one way or another. I mean, as I understand 
it, the construction is underway and moving along.
    Senator Alexander. On dilute and dispose.
    Senator Feinstein. On dilute and dispose.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. So I look forward to that and I look 
forward to your offer, and I welcome that opportunity. Thank 
you.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Senator Alexander. We would appreciate it. Will you signal 
to us when you're ready----
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Senator Alexander [continuing]. Within the next few 
months----
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Alexander [continuing]. To meet with Senator 
Feinstein and me and the two Senators who are here to discuss 
each of those. What's the plan for getting the material out of 
South Carolina? And what's the plan, in specifics, for the 
plutonium? You did address some of that earlier, but I think to 
be as specific as possible will be interesting to them and to 
us.
    Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely. Thank you for that 
opportunity.
    Senator Alexander. I don't have any other questions unless 
you do, Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. I do not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, everybody.
    Senator Alexander. This has been a very useful, free-
wheeling discussion here for the hearing. The record will 
remain open for 10 days. Senators may submit additional 
information or questions for the record within that time if 
they would like. The subcommittee requests all responses to 
questions be provided within 30 days of receipt.

                          SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

    Thank you for being here. The committee will stand 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., Wednesday, April 3, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of 
the Chair.]