[Senate Hearing 116-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2020
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TUESDAY, MAY 7, 2019
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran (Chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Moran, Collins, Graham, Boozman, Capito,
Kennedy, Rubio, Shaheen, Leahy, Reed, Coons, Schatz, Manchin,
and Van Hollen.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JERRY MORAN
Senator Moran. Good morning, everyone.
Our subcommittee hearing on Commerce, Justice, Science, and
Related Agencies will come to order.
We welcome the Director of the FBI, Christopher A. Wray.
Thank you for your presence here. Director, Senator Shaheen and
I have decided we will forego our opening statements in order
to enhance the chances that we can get our questions and
questions of all of our Members answered. And we also have a
closed session that follows this public hearing.
Director, you and I just had a conversation with Senator
Shaheen about Blue Mass. It is the reason for your need to
depart. And I would take this moment on behalf of the United
States Senate and my colleagues here today to express our
condolences, our respect, and gratitude for those who serve our
country in all forms of law enforcement. And we appreciate your
service as well.
So unless Senator Shaheen wants to say anything, we will go
directly to your opening statement, and please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Shaheen and Members of the subcommittee.
I am honored to be here today representing the men and
women of the FBI. Our people, nearly 37,000 of them, are the
heart of the Bureau, and every day I see them tackling their
jobs with perseverance, with professionalism, and with
integrity. And I have now visited all 56 of our FBI field
offices over the past year and a half, not just meeting with
our folks but also meeting with State and local law enforcement
partners for every State represented on this subcommittee,
people in your communities, and to hear from them about the
issues that matter most to them. And I am grateful for their
support and their insights as we work together to keep 325
million Americans safe and to help make our communities
stronger.
I want to thank this subcommittee for the funding you have
provided in the past. Without your support, we would not be
able to do all the important work we do. As this subcommittee
knows, we face unprecedented threats from homegrown violent
extremists to domestic terrorists, foreign terrorist
organizations, hostile foreign intelligence services, cyber
criminals, violent gangs, white collar criminals, child
predators, and the list just goes on and on. All of these
threats are ever-changing. We have got to be even more agile
and predictive. We have also got to help our law enforcement
partners in your districts, across the country, and around the
world. And we cannot do any of that without your support.
There are lots areas where we need help, but there are four
areas in particular where I am particularly interested in
working with this subcommittee to ensure that we have
sufficient resources: first, cyber and analytics; second,
transnational organized crime; third, counterintelligence; and
fourth technology investments.
Given the extensive threats we face, the expectations for
the FBI have never been higher. The men and women of the FBI in
my experience continue to meet and exceed those expectations
every day. So thank you for this opportunity to discuss their
work.
I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Wray
Good morning Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members of
the subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. On behalf of
the men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), I
want to thank this Committee for its substantial support in the fiscal
year 2019 Appropriation. The resources provided will allow the FBI to
combat some of the most egregious national security and criminal
threats; continue to partner with State, local, Tribal and other
Federal agencies in a task force environment; and endeavor to keep pace
with technological advancements employed by our adversaries.
The funding provided is also imperative in allowing the FBI to
retain its most precious assets--its personnel. As the Committee is
aware, FBI personnel are the life-force of the organization--they work
tirelessly to combat some of the most complex and serious national
security threats and crime problems challenging the Nation's
intelligence and law enforcement communities.
Today, I appear before you on behalf of the men and women who
tackle these threats and challenges every day. I am extremely proud of
their service and commitment to the FBI's mission and to ensuring the
safety and security of communities throughout our Nation. On their
behalf, I would like to express my appreciation for the support you
have given them in the past, ask for your continued support in the
future, and pledge to be the best possible stewards of the resources
you provide.
I would like to begin by providing a brief overview of the FBI's
fiscal year 2020 budget request, and then follow with a short
discussion of key threats and challenges that we face, both as a nation
and as an organization.
fiscal year 2020 budget request overview
The fiscal year 2020 budget request proposes a total of $9.31
billion in direct budget authority to carry out the FBI's national
security, criminal law enforcement, and criminal justice services
missions. The request includes a total of $9.26 billion for Salaries
and Expenses, which will support 35,558 positions (13,201 Special
Agents, 3,115 Intelligence Analysts, and 19,242 professional staff),
and $51.9 million for Construction.
As a result of this budget being formulated before the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed, it was built utilizing the prior
year enacted level as a starting point. The request does, however,
include six program enhancements totaling $144.9 million. These
enhancements are proposed to meet critical requirements and close gaps
in operational capabilities, including: $70.5 million to enhance cyber
investigative capabilities; $18.3 million to mitigate threats from
foreign intelligence services; $16.6 million to support the National
Vetting Center, $18.2 million to target and disrupt transnational
organized crime financial and Darknet networks; $4.2 million to
increase the capacity to perform National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (``NICS'') services; and $17.2 million to enhance the
FBI's ability to render safe a weapon of mass destruction.
The request also includes two rescissions from funding appropriated
in prior fiscal years--$60 million from the FBI's Salaries and Expenses
account and $159 million from the FBI's Construction account.
When compared against the fiscal year 2019 enacted level, the
fiscal year 2020 request level represents a total decrease of $267.8
million, including an increase of $65.3 million in the Salaries and
Expenses account and a reduction of $333.1 million in the FBI's
Construction account.
key threats and challenges
This Committee has provided critical resources for the FBI to
become what it is today--a threat-focused, intelligence-driven
organization. Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and
evolving threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists to hostile
foreign intelligence services and operatives; from sophisticated cyber-
based attacks to Internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children;
from violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay
current with constantly evolving technologies. Our adversaries--
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--take
advantage of modern technology, including the Internet and social
media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage
terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, and to disperse
information on building improvised explosive devices and other means to
attack the U.S. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as
complex as any time in our history. And the consequences of not
responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been
greater.
The support of this Committee in helping the FBI do its part in
facing and thwarting these threats and challenges is greatly
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong
capabilities and capacities for assessing threats, sharing
intelligence, leveraging key technologies, and--in some respects, most
importantly--hiring some of the best to serve as Special Agents,
Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff. We have built and are
continuously enhancing a workforce that possesses the skills and
knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face
today--and tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views
change and transformation as a positive tool for keeping the FBI
focused on the key threats facing our Nation.
Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and
criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and indeed our
communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and
breadth of the FBI's mission: to protect the American people and uphold
the Constitution of the United States.
national security
Counterterrorism
Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority.
However, the threat posed by terrorism--both international terrorism
(``IT'') and domestic terrorism (``DT'')--has evolved significantly
since 9/11.
The most persistent threats to the Nation and to U.S. interests
abroad are homegrown violent extremists (``HVEs''), domestic
terrorists, and foreign terrorist organizations (``FTOs''). The IT
threat to the U.S. has expanded from sophisticated, externally directed
FTO plots to include individual attacks carried out by HVEs who are
inspired by designated terrorist organizations. We remain concerned
that groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS'')
and al Qaeda have the intent to carry out large-scale attacks in the
U.S.
The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest terrorism threat to the
homeland. These individuals are global jihad-inspired individuals who
are in the U.S., have been radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are
not receiving individualized direction from FTOs. We, along with our
law enforcement partners, face significant challenges in identifying
and disrupting HVEs. This is due, in part, to their lack of a direct
connection with an FTO, an ability to rapidly mobilize, and the use of
encrypted communications.
In recent years, prolific use of social media by FTOs has greatly
enhanced their ability to disseminate messages. We have also been
confronting a surge in terrorist propaganda and training available via
the Internet and social media. Due to online recruitment and
indoctrination, FTOs are no longer dependent on finding ways to get
terrorist operatives into the United States to recruit and carry out
acts of terrorism. Terrorists in ungoverned spaces--both physical and
cyber--readily disseminate propaganda and training materials to attract
easily influenced individuals around the world to their cause. They
motivate these individuals to act at home or encourage them to travel.
This is a significant transformation from the terrorist threat our
Nation faced a decade ago.
Despite significant losses of territory, ISIS remains relentless
and ruthless in its campaign of violence against the West and has
aggressively promoted its hateful message, attracting like-minded
extremists. The message is not tailored solely to those who overtly
express signs of radicalization. It is seen by many who click through
the Internet every day, receive social media notifications, and
participate in social networks. Ultimately, many of the individuals
drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging. Echoing other terrorist
groups, ISIS has advocated for lone offender attacks in Western
countries. Recent ISIS videos and propaganda have specifically
advocated for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement, and
intelligence community personnel.
Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be
susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messages. However, no group
has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse ideology as
ISIS, who has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools.
ISIS uses high-quality, traditional media platforms, as well as
widespread social media campaigns to propagate its extremist ideology.
With the broad distribution of social media, terrorists can spot,
assess, recruit, and radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in the
U.S. either to travel or to conduct an attack on the homeland. Through
the Internet, terrorists overseas now have direct access to our local
communities to target and recruit our citizens and spread the message
of radicalization faster than was imagined just a few years ago.
The threats posed by foreign fighters, including those recruited
from the U.S., are very dynamic. We will continue working to identify
individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters traveling in
support of ISIS, those foreign fighters who may attempt to return to
the United States, and HVEs who may aspire to attack the United States
from within.
ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al Qaeda maintains
its desire for large-scale, spectacular attacks. However, continued
counterterrorism pressure has degraded the group, and in the near term
al Qaeda is more likely to focus on supporting small-scale, readily
achievable attacks against U.S. and allied interests in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Simultaneously, over the last year,
propaganda from al Qaeda leaders seeks to inspire individuals to
conduct their own attacks in the U.S. and the West.
In addition to FTOs, domestic extremist movements collectively pose
a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the United States.
Trends within individual movements may shift, but the underlying
drivers for domestic extremism--such as perceptions of government or
law enforcement overreach, socio-political conditions, and reactions to
legislative actions--remain constant. The FBI is most concerned about
lone offender attacks, primarily shootings, as they have served as the
dominant mode for lethal domestic extremist violence. We anticipate law
enforcement, racial minorities, and the U.S. Government will continue
to be significant targets for many domestic extremist movements.
As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves,
we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the
strength of our Federal, State, local, and international partnerships.
The FBI uses all lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat
these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our domestic
and foreign partners, we are collecting and analyzing intelligence
concerning the ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations
and homegrown violent extremists. We continue to encourage information
sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task
Forces around the country. Be assured, the FBI continues to strive to
work and share information more efficiently, and to pursue a variety of
lawful methods to help stay ahead of these threats. The FBI's fiscal
year 2020 Request includes 48 positions (including two Special Agents)
and $16.6 million to support technical and analytical capabilities
related to Counterterrorism vetting efforts.
Counterintelligence
The Nation faces a continuing threat, both traditional and
asymmetric, from hostile foreign intelligence agencies. Traditional
espionage, often characterized by career foreign intelligence officers
acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and asymmetric espionage,
typically carried out by students, researchers, or businesspeople
operating front companies, is prevalent. Foreign intelligence services
not only seek our Nation's state and military secrets, but they also
target commercial trade secrets, research and development, and
intellectual property, as well as insider information from the Federal
Government, U.S. corporations, and American universities. Foreign
intelligence services continue to employ more creative and more
sophisticated methods to steal innovative technology, critical research
and development data, and intellectual property, in an effort to erode
America's economic leading edge. These illicit activities pose a
significant threat to national security and continue to be a priority
and focus of the FBI.
Foreign influence operations--which include covert actions by
foreign governments to influence U.S. political sentiment or public
discourse--are not a new problem. But the interconnectedness of the
modern world, combined with the anonymity of the Internet, have changed
the nature of the threat and how the FBI and its partners must address
it. The goal of these foreign influence operations directed against the
United States is to spread disinformation, sow discord, and,
ultimately, undermine confidence in our democratic institutions and
values. Foreign influence operations have taken many forms and used
many tactics over the years. Most widely reported these days are
attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide swath of Americans
covertly from outside the United States--to use false personas and
fabricated stories on social media platforms to discredit U.S.
individuals and institutions. However, other influence operations
include targeting U.S. officials and other U.S. persons through
traditional intelligence tradecraft; criminal efforts to suppress
voting and provide illegal campaign financing; cyber attacks against
voting infrastructure, along with computer intrusions targeting elected
officials and others; and a whole slew of other kinds of influence,
like both overtly and covertly manipulating news stories, spreading
disinformation, leveraging economic resources, and escalating divisive
issues.
Almost 2 years ago, I established the Foreign Influence Task Force
(``FITF'') to identify and counteract malign foreign influence
operations targeting the United States. The FITF is uniquely positioned
to combat this threat. The task force now brings together the FBI's
expertise across the waterfront--counterintelligence, cyber, criminal,
and even counterterrorism--to root out and respond to foreign influence
operations. Task force personnel work closely with other U.S.
Government agencies and international partners concerned about foreign
influence efforts aimed at their countries, using three key pillars.
Currently there are open investigations with a foreign influence nexus
spanning FBI field offices across the country. Second, we are focused
on information and intelligence-sharing. The FBI is working closely
with partners in the Intelligence Community and in the Federal
Government, as well as with State and local partners, to establish a
common operating picture. The FITF is also working with international
partners to exchange intelligence and strategies for combating what is
a shared threat. The third pillar of our approach is based on strong
relationships with the private sector. Technology companies have a
front-line responsibility to secure their own networks, products, and
platforms. But the FBI is doing its part by providing actionable
intelligence to better enable the private sector to address abuse of
their platforms by foreign actors. Over the last year, the FBI has met
with top social media and technology companies several times, provided
them with classified briefings, and shared specific threat indicators
and account information, so they can better monitor their own
platforms.
But this is not just an election-cycle threat. Our adversaries are
continuously trying to undermine our country, whether it is election
season or not. As a result, the FBI must remain vigilant.
In addition to the threat posed by foreign influence, the FBI is
also concerned about foreign investment by hostile nation states. Over
the course of the last 7 years, foreign investment in the U.S. has more
than doubled. Concurrent with this growth, foreign direct investment
(``FDI'') in the U.S. has increasingly become a national security
concern, as hostile nations leverage FDI to buy U.S. assets that will
advance their intelligence, military, technology, and economic goals at
the expense of U.S. national security. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. (``CFIUS''), an Executive Branch committee
chaired by the Department of Treasury, was statutorily created to
address potential risks to U.S. national security resulting from
foreign acquisitions or mergers with U.S. companies. As part of this
process, the FBI provides input and analysis to the National
Intelligence Council within eight days of a CFIUS filing and a risk
assessment to the Department of Justice within 30 days of a CFIUS
filing. As a result of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act (``FIRRMA''), which was enacted last year, the FBI anticipates its
workload to increase dramatically.
The fiscal year 2020 Request includes six positions (including one
Special Agent) and $18.3 million to address the threats posed by
foreign influence and foreign investment in the United States.
Cyber Threats
Virtually every national security threat and crime problem the FBI
faces is cyber-based or facilitated. We face sophisticated cyber
threats from state-sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized cyber
syndicates, and terrorists. On a daily basis, cyber-based actors seek
our state secrets, our trade secrets, our technology, and our ideas--
things of incredible value to all of us and of great importance to the
conduct of our government business and our national security. They seek
to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy.
As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber-
attacks on our Nation's private sector and government networks have
increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to continue
to grow. We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of
reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the
amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable
information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims.
Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber
activity: high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global
organized crime syndicates, as well as other technically sophisticated
attacks. FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are using
technical capabilities and traditional investigative techniques--such
as sources, court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical
surveillance, and forensics--to fight the full range of cyber threats.
And we continue to actively coordinate with our private and public
partners to pierce the veil of anonymity surrounding cyber based
crimes.
Botnets used by cyber criminals have been responsible for billions
of dollars in damages over the past several years. The widespread
availability of malicious software (malware) that can create botnets
allows individuals to leverage the combined bandwidth of thousands, if
not millions, of compromised computers, servers, or network-ready
devices to conduct attacks. Cyber threat actors have also increasingly
conducted ransomware attacks against U.S. systems, encrypting data and
rendering systems unusable--thereby victimizing individuals,
businesses, and even public health providers.
Cyber threats are not only increasing in size and scope, but are
also becoming increasingly difficult to investigate. Cyber criminals
often operate through online forums, selling illicit goods and
services, including tools that can be used to facilitate cyber attacks.
These criminals have also increased the sophistication of their
schemes, which are more difficult to detect and more resilient than
ever. Cyber threats are also becoming increasingly difficult to
investigate. For instance, many cyber actors are based abroad or
obfuscate their identities by using foreign infrastructure, making
coordination with international law enforcement partners essential.
The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats,
from improving threat identification and information sharing inside and
outside of the government to developing and retaining new talent, to
examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We
take all potential threats to public and private sector systems
seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those
who pose a threat in cyberspace. The fiscal year 2020 Request includes
33 positions (including three Special Agents) and $70.5 million to
enhance cyber information-sharing abilities and increase cyber tools
and capacities.
criminal threats
We face many criminal threats, from complex white-collar fraud in
the financial, healthcare, and housing sectors to transnational and
regional organized criminal enterprises to violent crime and public
corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and international--and
individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to our
security and safety in communities across the Nation. A key tenet of
protecting the Nation from those who wish to do us harm is the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS. The goal of NICS is
to ensure that guns do not fall into the wrong hands, and also to
ensure the timely transfer of firearms to eligible gun buyers. Mandated
by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and launched by
the FBI on November 30, 1998, NICS is used by Federal Firearms
Licensees (``FFLs'') to instantly determine whether a prospective buyer
is eligible to purchase firearms. NICS receives information from tens
of thousands of FFLs and checks to ensure that applicants do not have a
criminal record or are not otherwise prohibited and therefore
ineligible to purchase a firearm. In the first complete month of
operation in 1998, a total of 892,840 firearm background checks were
processed; in 2018, almost 2.2 million checks were processed per month.
While most checks are completed by electronic searches of the NICS
database within minutes, a small number of checks require examiners to
review records and resolve missing or incomplete information before an
application can be approved or rejected. Ensuring the timely processing
of these inquiries is important to ensure law abiding citizens can
exercise their right to purchase a firearm and to protect communities
from prohibited and therefore ineligible individuals attempting to
acquire a firearm. The FBI is currently processing a record number of
checks, over 26 million were processed in 2018--an increase of almost
950,000 checks. The fiscal year 2020 Request includes 40 positions and
$4.2 million to increase the capacity to process NICS checks within the
mandated timeframe and to meet new requirements included in the Fix
NICS Act.
Violent Crime
Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well
organized and use violence to control neighborhoods, and boost their
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with
Federal, State, local, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task
forces and individual investigations.
FBI joint task forces--Violent Crime Safe Streets, Violent Gang
Safe Streets, and Safe Trails--focus on identifying and targeting major
groups operating as criminal enterprises. Much of the FBI criminal
intelligence is derived from our State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement partners, who know their communities inside and out. Joint
task forces benefit from FBI surveillance assets, and our sources track
these gangs to identify emerging trends. Through these multi-subject
and multi-jurisdictional investigations, the FBI concentrates its
efforts on high-level groups engaged in patterns of racketeering. This
investigative model enables us to target senior gang leadership and to
develop enterprise-based prosecutions.
By way of example, the FBI has dedicated tremendous resources to
combat the threat of violence posed by MS-13. The atypical nature of
this gang has required a multi-pronged approach--we work through our
task forces here in the U.S. while simultaneously gathering
intelligence and aiding our international law enforcement partners. We
do this through the FBI's Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces
(``TAGs''). Established in El Salvador in 2007 through the FBI's
National Gang Task Force, Legal Attache (``Legat'') San Salvador, and
the United States Department of State, each TAG is a fully operational
unit responsible for the investigation of MS-13 operating in the
northern triangle of Central America and threatening the United States.
This program combines the expertise, resources, and jurisdiction of
participating agencies involved in investigating and countering
transnational criminal gang activity in the United States and Central
America. There are now TAGs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Through these combined efforts, the FBI has achieved substantial
success in countering the MS-13 threat across the United States and
Central America.
Despite these efforts, we still have work to do. There are still
jurisdictions that are struggling. The latest Uniform Crime Reporting
statistics gathered from the Crime in the United States, 2017 show the
number of violent crimes in the Nation decrease by 0.2 percent compared
with the 2016 estimate. The 2018 Preliminary Uniform Crime Report
indicates a similar trend.
We are committed to working with our Federal, State, local, and
Tribal partners in a coordinated effort to reduce crime in the United
States.
Transnational Organized Crime (``TOC'') and Opioids
More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal
enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional''
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder,
modern criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud and
manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, drug
trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, alien
smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, extortion,
kidnapping, and other illegal activities. TOC networks exploit
legitimate institutions for critical financial and business services
that enable the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and
combating transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort
by the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partners.
While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains
a significant and growing threat to national and international security
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic
institutions and economic stability across the globe. Because of this,
the FBI's fiscal year 2020 request includes $18.2 million to
strategically target TOC networks across the globe and to develop
solutions to effectively disrupt and dismantle Darknet financial
networks and transnational money laundering groups.
Illicit drug trafficking continues to be a growing threat. Large
amounts of high-quality, low cost heroin and illicit fentanyl are
contributing to record numbers of overdose deaths and life-threatening
addictions nationwide. The accessibility and convenience of the drug
trade online contributes to the opioid epidemic in the United States.
Transnational criminal organizations (``TCOs'') are introducing
synthetic opioids to the U.S. market, including fentanyl and fentanyl
analogs. To address this evolving threat, we are taking a multi-faceted
approach and establishing many initiatives and units across our
criminal program.
In January 2018, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General directed
the FBI and other Federal law enforcement partners to develop a
strategic plan to disrupt and dismantle the Darknet illicit
marketplaces facilitating the distribution of fentanyl and other
opioids. As a result, the FBI established the Joint Criminal Opioid
Darknet Enforcement (``J-CODE'') Initiative, which brings together
agents, analysts, and professional staff with expertise in drugs,
gangs, healthcare fraud, and more, with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement partners from across the U.S. Government. The J-CODE team
has developed a comprehensive, multi-pronged criminal enterprise
strategy to target the trafficking of fentanyl and other opioids on the
Darknet and Clearnet. This strategy focuses on identifying and
infiltrating the marketplace administrative team, analyzing financial
information, locating and exploiting marketplace infrastructure,
targeting vendors and buyers, and enabling field office success in the
investigation and prosecution of these marketplaces. As a result,
numerous investigations and operations have been initiated and several
online vendors who are facilitating the trafficking of opioids via the
Internet, to include fentanyl, have been disrupted.
The FBI is also addressing this threat through the Prescription
Drug Initiative (``PDI''). The PDI was established in 2016 in response
to the substantial and increasing threat associated with prescription
drug diversion, and in particular, the staggering national increase in
opioid-related deaths. The objective of the PDI is to identify and
target criminal enterprises and other groups engaged in prescription
drug schemes; identify and prosecute, where appropriate, organizations
with improper corporate policies related to prescription drugs; and
identify and prosecute, where appropriate, organizations with improper
prescribing and dispensing practices. The PDI prioritizes
investigations which target ``gatekeeper'' positions, to include
medical professionals and pharmacies that divert opioids outside the
scope of their medical practice and/or distribute these medications
with no legitimate medical purpose. Since its inception, the PDI has
resulted in the conviction of numerous medical professionals and
secured significant Federal prison sentences, to include life terms for
physicians who cause harm or death to the patients entrusted to their
care.
Beyond these two programs, the FBI has dedicated additional
resources to address this expansive threat. We have more than doubled
the number of Transnational Organized Crime Task Forces, expanded the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (``OCDETF'') Airport
Initiative to focus on insider threats partnering with TCO actors, and
created and led the Fentanyl Safety Working Group at FBI Headquarters,
which has led to a new program to protect field agents and support
employees with personal protective equipment (``PPE'') and opioid
antagonists (i.e. naloxone) from the threat of fentanyl exposure. The
FBI participated, along with other Federal partners, in the creation of
the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan (``HARP''), takes part in
monthly HARP meetings hosted by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (``ONDCP''), and continues to provide training to our
international law enforcement partners on successful identification,
seizure, and neutralization of clandestine heroin/fentanyl
laboratories.
Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking
It is unthinkable, but every year, thousands of children become
victims of crimes--whether it is through kidnappings, violent attacks,
sexual abuse, human trafficking or online predators. The FBI is
uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive
response; identify, locate, and recover child victims; and strengthen
relationships between the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international law enforcement partners to identify, prioritize,
investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from
exploiting children.
The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost
National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation
Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams, Victim Services,
80 Child Exploitation Task Forces, 53 International Violent Crimes
Against Children Task Force Officers, as well as numerous community
outreach programs to educate parents and children about safety measures
they can follow.
Currently, there are at least 30 child pornography sites operating
openly and notoriously on the Dark Net, including the Tor network. Some
of these child pornography sites are exclusively dedicated to the
sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The sites often expand rapidly,
with one site obtaining 150,000 new members within its first seven
weeks of operation. The FBI combats this pernicious crime problem
through investigations such as Operation Pacifier, which targeted the
administrators and users of a highly-sophisticated, Tor-based global
enterprise dedicated to the sexual exploitation of children. This
multi-year operation has led to the arrest of over 348 individuals
based in the United States, the prosecution of 25 American child
pornography producers and 51 American hands-on abusers, the rescue or
identification of 55 American children, the arrest of 548 international
individuals, and the identification or rescue of 296 children abroad.
Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams are ready response teams
stationed across the country to quickly respond to abductions.
Investigators bring to this issue the full array of forensic tools such
as DNA analysis, trace evidence, impression evidence, and digital
forensics. Through improved communications, law enforcement also has
the ability to quickly share information with partners throughout the
world, and these outreach programs play an integral role in prevention.
In addition to programs to combat child exploitation, the FBI also
focuses efforts to stop human trafficking--a modern form of slavery.
The majority of human trafficking victims recovered during FBI
investigations are United States citizens, but traffickers are
opportunists who will exploit any victim with a vulnerability. Victims
of human trafficking are subjected to forced labor or sex trafficking,
and the FBI is working hard with its partners to combat both forms.
The FBI works collaboratively with law enforcement partners to
investigate and arrest human traffickers through Human Trafficking Task
Forces nationwide. We take a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach
to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the needs of victims
are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this, the FBI works in
conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and victim specialists
on the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels, as well as with a
variety of vetted non-governmental organizations. Even after the arrest
and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work
with partner agencies and organizations to assist victims in moving
beyond their exploitation.
Earlier this year, the FBI announced the results of an 11-day
effort by the Violent Crimes Against Children/Human Trafficking Program
and the Metro Atlanta Child Exploitation (``MATCH'') Task Force. The
effort, leading up to Super Bowl LIII, was collaborated with over 25
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and District
Attorney's Offices, along with seven non-government organizations. From
January 23, 2019 to February 2, 2019, the operation's goal was to raise
awareness about sex trafficking by proactively addressing that threat
during the Super Bowl and events leading up to the Super Bowl. This
event led to 169 arrests, including 26 traffickers and 34 individuals
attempting to engage in sex acts with minors; nine juvenile sex
trafficking victims recovered (the youngest was 14 years of age); and
nine adult human trafficking victims identified. Trafficking is not
just a problem during large-scale events--it is a 365 day-a-year
problem in communities all across the country.
The FBI commends the Committee's dedication to these efforts and
appreciates the resources provided to combat these horrific acts.
key cross-cutting capabilities and capacities
I would like to briefly highlight some key cross-cutting
capabilities and capacities that are critical to our efforts in each of
the threat and crime problems described.
Operational and Information Technology
As criminal and terrorist threats become more diverse and
dangerous, the role of technology becomes increasingly important to our
efforts. The FBI is using technology to improve the way we collect,
analyze, and share information. We have seen significant improvement in
capabilities over the past decade; but keeping pace with technology
remains a key concern for the future.
The volume of data collected in the course of investigations
continues to rapidly expand. In the case of the 2017 Las Vegas
shooting, the FBI recovered one petabyte of data. Insufficient network
bandwidth and tools necessitated the need for 260 FBI personnel to work
over 10 days to manually review 21,500 hours of video footage. These
bandwidth and data challenges are not limited to major cases or large
offices. It is not uncommon for FBI investigations to generate more
than one terabyte of data per day, an amount that could normally take 2
days to transit FBI networks at current bandwidth levels. As a result,
the FBI has made dedicated efforts to upgrade and transform its
information technology platforms to meet the demands of current and
future investigations. To keep pace in an era where investigations and
analysis will increasingly be conducted at the petabyte scale, the FBI
needs to build networks that can move bulk data, modernize
investigative data analysis, and reduce reliance on stand-alone, ad-hoc
systems.
A key tenet of this transformation is the integration of Data
Analysts (``DA'') in field offices nationwide. A DA is able to clean,
standardize, enrich, and visualize data using computer programming and
statistical techniques to provide products to the investigative team to
further investigative matters. They are able to create code tailored to
intelligence and investigative requirements to triage and prioritize
vast amounts of data received by investigative teams, enabling
efficient follow-on analysis; convert thousands of location points
contained in cellphone call and data records into a usable format for
follow-on network and geospatial analysis; and combine dozens of
differently formatted files into an easy-to-read, consolidated format,
free of duplicate and inconsistent information. In fiscal year 2018,
the FBI piloted the DA program by sending analysts to several FBI Field
Offices. The DAs helped those offices address several of their most
critical data challenges, and were able to solve volume, velocity, and
geospatial data issues. In one instance, investigators wanted to
determine what businesses a credit card skimming subject visited to
place money orders. The DA converted hundreds of pages of call detail
records to a machine readable format, plotted location points onto a
map to show the subject's location over time, and calculated the
proximity to vendors where fraudulent activity may have occurred. The
DA's mapping product not only provided pattern of life information
(leading to the discovery of new investigative leads), but also saved
investigators days, if not weeks. The fiscal year 2020 Request expands
the 2018 pilot program by requesting an additional 25 Data Analysts to
deploy to the most critical field offices. The FBI will continue to
monitor and measure the success of this program.
The FBI Laboratory is one of the largest and most comprehensive
forensic laboratories in the world. Operating out of a facility in
Quantico, Virginia, laboratory personnel travel the world on
assignment, using science and technology to protect the Nation and
support law enforcement, intelligence, military, and forensic science
partners. The Lab's many services include providing expert testimony,
mapping crime scenes, and conducting forensic exams of physical and
hazardous evidence. Lab personnel possess expertise in many areas of
forensics supporting law enforcement and intelligence purposes,
including explosives, trace evidence, documents, chemistry,
cryptography, DNA, facial reconstruction, fingerprints, firearms, and
counterterrorism and forensic research.
The Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center (``TEDAC'') is a
key example. Formally established in 2004, TEDAC serves as the single
interagency organization that receives, fully analyzes, and exploits
all priority terrorist improvised explosive devices (``IEDs''). TEDAC
coordinates the efforts of the entire government, including law
enforcement, intelligence, and military entities, to gather and share
intelligence about IEDs. These efforts help disarm and disrupt IEDs,
link them to their makers, and prevent future attacks. For example,
Laboratory Division personnel testified in New York in the successful
prosecution of Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh after linking him to a
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device prepared for an attack on a
U.S. military base in Afghanistan. Although originally focused on
devices from Iraq and Afghanistan, TEDAC now receives and analyzes
devices from all over the world.
Additionally, the Laboratory Division maintains a capability to
provide forensic support for significant shooting investigations. The
Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team provides support to FBI field
offices by bringing together expertise from various Laboratory
components to provide enhanced technical support to document complex
shooting crime scenes. Services are scene- and situation-dependent and
may include mapping of the shooting scene in two or three dimensions,
scene documentation through photography, including aerial and oblique
imagery, 360-degree photography and videography, trajectory
reconstruction, and the analysis of gunshot residue and shot patterns.
Significant investigations supported by this team include the shootings
at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California; the Pulse
Night Club in Orlando, Florida; the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival in
Las Vegas, Nevada; and the shooting of 12 police officers during a
protest against police shootings in Dallas, Texas.
FBI Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts need the best
technological tools available to be responsive to the advanced and
evolving threats that face our Nation. Enterprise information
technology must be designed so that it provides information to
operational employees rather than forcing employees to conform to the
tools available. IT equipment must be reliable and accessible, thus
decreasing the time between information collection and dissemination.
conclusion
In closing, the work being done by the FBI is immeasurable;
however, we cannot afford to be complacent. We must seek out new
technologies and solutions for the problems that exist today as well as
those that are on the horizon. We must build toward the future so that
we are prepared to deal with the threats we will face at home and
abroad and understand how those threats may be connected.
Being expected to respond to a wide range of complex and ever-
changing threats and crime problems is not new to the FBI. Our success
in meeting these challenges is, however, directly tied to the resources
provided to the FBI. The resources the Committee provides each year are
critical for the FBI's ability to address existing and emerging
national security and criminal threats.
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members of the
subcommittee, I would like to close by thanking you for this
opportunity to discuss the FBI's fiscal year 2020 budget request and
the key threats and challenges we are facing, both as a nation and as
an organization. We are grateful for the leadership that you and this
subcommittee have provided to the FBI. Your willingness to invest in
and support our workforce and our physical and technical infrastructure
allow the men and women of the FBI to make a difference every day in
communities large and small throughout our Nation and around the world.
We thank you for that support.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
2016 ELECTION
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
Let me begin with a follow-up on the hearing we had last
week with Attorney General Barr. A few weeks ago in that budget
hearing, he indicated that he believed spying on the Trump
campaign did occur in the 2016 election. And the question was
whether that spying was legal. The Attorney General stated he
intended to look into the legality of these actions, and I
believe that is of value.
Have you initiated any internal reviews of the FBI's action
during the 2016 election?
Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are a couple things
going on.
First, there is, of course, the ongoing Inspector General's
investigation that is being conducted by the independent Office
of Inspector General, and our folks are assisting them with
their effort.
And then second, as you alluded to, now that the Special
Counsel investigation is completed and, having only recently
returned to the Department, the Attorney General is seeking to
understand better the circumstances at the Department and the
FBI relating to how this investigation started. And we are
working to help him get that understanding. I think that is
part of his job and part of mine.
Senator Moran. The Mueller report, as you indicated, has
been released, and it did find that the Russians did interfere
with the 2016 election. Could you please elaborate on the FBI's
role in election security and actions taken by the Bureau
during the 2016 election to mitigate foreign interference?
Mr. Wray. Well, as to the 2016 election, I think I will let
the Special Counsel's report speak for itself. You know, it is
450 pages long, represents a lot of hard work by a large team
of professionals over almost 2 years.
But one of the things that I set in motion almost
immediately after starting in this role was to create a Foreign
Influence Task Force, which is a measure not just of how
seriously I take and we take the foreign malign influence
threat, but also I think a recognition of the need for better
coordination. This is a multi-disciplinary problem requiring a
multi-disciplinary solution.
So the Foreign Influence Task Force brings together our
cyber resources, our counterintelligence resources, our
criminal resources, and even our counterterrorism resources
because there is a little bit of a domestic terrorism wrinkle
to some of this. It is the axis, sort of the hub with the
spokes going out to our field offices and coordinating with the
Department of Homeland Security, ODNI, NSA, and in particular
working much more closely with State and local election
officials, along with the Department of Homeland Security and
the tech sector in Silicon Valley, because on the foreign
influence threat in particular, I think it is very important
for Americans to understand that this is a threat--not just a
government threat. We need to have a partnership with the
social media companies in particular. And we have had really
significant progress in that regard going into the midterms.
There were a lot of successes in the 2018 midterms through that
kind of team effort.
ELECTION INTERFERENCE
Senator Moran. Is the election interference broader than
just--when we talk about foreign interference in our elections,
is it broader than just Russia?
Mr. Wray. Well, there are different kinds of malign foreign
influence. Certainly other countries, other adversaries are
engaged in different kinds of malign foreign influence. The
specific form of sowing divisiveness and discord through the
bullhorn that social media provides, you know, the trolls,
bots, et cetera--that was something that was really fairly
unique to the Russians. But certainly we know that other
countries have been eyeing those efforts and entertaining
whether or not to take a page out of that book.
NASSER INVESTIGATION
Senator Moran. Director, when you appeared before this
subcommittee last year, I asked you about issues related to the
Nasser investigation, Dr. Nasser and the Olympics. You
indicated an answer was difficult to give because of an OIG
investigation.
Since that time, the FBI has conducted an internal
investigation that led to that review by the Inspector General,
and we await that conclusion. I guess at this point, unless you
are willing to share more information than you were a year ago
in this regard, which I would welcome hearing from you, beyond
that, I would ask you to assure me that the FBI will prioritize
and take the OIG's results and recommendations seriously.
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, Mr. Chairman. First, I should
say that our heart breaks and aches for the victims of that
particular matter. As you said, there is an independent
Inspector General investigation going on into the handling of
that matter, and I expect to take very seriously the
recommendations that we get out of the Office of Inspector
General. But that is very much still an ongoing review.
Senator Moran. Thank you, sir.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you very much, Director Wray, for being here this
morning.
I would like to follow up on Senator Moran's question about
the hearing we had with Attorney General Barr because I was
very concerned by his use of the word ``spying,'' which I think
is a very loaded word. It conjures a criminal connotation. And
I want to ask you--and I would appreciate a yes or no answer if
possible--when FBI agents conduct investigations against
alleged mobsters, suspected terrorists, other criminals, do you
believe that they are engaging in spying when they are
following FBI investigative policies and procedures?
Mr. Wray. Well, that is not the term I would use.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. So I would say that is a no to
that question.
Mr. Wray. Well, I mean, look, there are lots of people that
have different colloquial phrases. I believe that the FBI is
engaged in investigative activity, and part of investigative
activity includes surveillance activity of different shapes and
sizes. And to me the key question is making sure that it is
done by the book consistent with our lawful authorities. That
is the key question. Different people use different colloquial
phrases.
SECURING WARRANTS
Senator Shaheen. And as part of the investigative process,
do FBI agents secure warrants for relevant evidence?
Mr. Wray. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question?
Senator Shaheen. Yes. As part of an investigative process,
like the investigative process into the 2016 presidential
campaign, do FBI agents secure warrants for relevant evidence?
Mr. Wray. Certainly, securing warrants is a very important
step that we take every day in the FBI in lots and lots of
investigations.
Senator Shaheen. So I would take that as a yes.
Did FBI agents get warrants for information as part of
their countersurveillance investigation into Russian
interference in the 2016 election?
Mr. Wray. Well, I want to be a little bit careful about
what I can discuss here, but I think it has been publicly
disclosed that there were a number of relevant warrants that
were secured in the course of that investigation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
And do you believe, Director Wray that the FBI and its
agents spied into the 2016 presidential campaign operation?
Mr. Wray. Well, again, I want to be careful about how I
answer that question here because there is an ongoing Inspector
General investigation. I have my own thoughts based on the
limited information I have seen so far, but I do not think it
would be right or appropriate for me to share those at this
stage. I really do think it is important for everybody to
respect the independent Inspector General's investigation,
which I think this line of questioning starts to implicate, and
I think it is very important for everybody to be able to have
full confidence in his review.
Senator Shaheen. And at this time, do you have any evidence
that any illegal surveillance into the campaigns or individuals
associated with the campaigns by the FBI occurred?
Mr. Wray. I do not think I personally have any evidence of
that sort.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Now, again, the Attorney General stated that he was
assembling a team to look into the situation of illegal
surveillance into the Trump presidential campaign and stated
that he expected to work closely with you on this. Has the
Attorney General asked you to look into or review the actions
undertaken by the FBI regarding the counterintelligence
investigation?
Mr. Wray. Well, as I said, he is trying to get a better
understanding of the circumstances at the Department and the
FBI surrounding the initiation of this particular
investigation. He and I have been in fairly close contact about
it, and we are trying to work together to help him get the
understanding that he needs on that subject. I think that is
appropriate.
ELECTION INTERFERENCE
Senator Shaheen. As you pointed out, the evidence in the
Mueller report is very clear that the Russians interfered in
our 2016 election, and there have been a variety of news
reports suggesting that they intend to do that again. We have
had testimony in the Armed Services Committee about their
interest in interfering in the 2020 election.
Can you talk about what the FBI is doing to coordinate with
other branches within government a response to ensure that that
does not happen in the 2020 election?
Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. I agree with you
that this is a particularly important issue. I think one of the
things that people out there would benefit from understanding
is that this is not just an election cycle threat, that the
malign foreign influence threat, which is different from some
effort to interfere with election infrastructure, is something
that continues pretty much 365 days a year. And we have seen it
continue since 2016, and we expect it to continue going into
2020.
The Foreign Influence Task Force that I set up at the FBI
works very closely with a similar kind of vehicle at the
Department of Homeland Security and similar structures at the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and at NSA. So
those four entities in particular are kind of the key ones at
the center of this. But then we work closely with, as I said to
the Chairman, Silicon Valley on the foreign influence side, and
then DHS in particular works with State and local election
officials on some of the election infrastructure piece. So
there is a lot of activity, better coordination in my view than
what I found when I first walked in the door. But make no
mistake, the threat just keeps escalating, and we are going to
have to keep upping our game to stay ahead of it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am out of time. But can you
just tell me who is in charge of that effort? So is there one
person who has been designated to coordinate all of those
efforts?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think each of us has our piece of it. We
coordinate closely together, much as we do on, say,
counterterrorism or any number of other national security
threats.
Senator Shaheen. So does that mean that there is currently
not one person who has been designated as the leader of that
effort?
Mr. Wray. Well, the FBI has lead on foreign influence. The
Department of Homeland Security takes the lead on election
infrastructure hardening and so forth. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence takes the lead in terms of
intelligence analysis. But like I said, in my experience it is
not unlike what we do with any number of other threats facing
this country. We all work together and each of us has our piece
of the pie, which I think is the way it should be.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Wray, I want to follow up on the point that was
just made by my two colleagues. Here are the facts as I see
them.
We know that the Russians were relentless in their efforts
to influence the 2016 campaign and to further divide and
polarize our society.
We know that this effort did not end with the 2016
campaign. It both preceded it and continues to this very day.
Third, we know that it is not just the Russians, that other
foreign states and other malicious actors are targeting our
democratic society.
There are 17 intelligence agencies, and each of them seems
to have a piece of this. You talked about that just now. It
concerns me that there is not one agency that is in charge of
the overall strategy. Should that be the FBI?
Mr. Wray. Well, Senator Collins, first let me say I agree
with your framing of the predicament that we face in terms of
the threat itself.
In terms of coordination, I think the FBI has a lead role
to play in aspects of that. I think the NSC provides a useful
construct for us to coordinate. I have not found a significant
impediment to our coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security, NSA in particular, and ODNI. And I have found that to
be fairly similar to, as I say, the way we deal with
counterterrorism and a number of other national security
threats. So at the moment, that has not struck me as one of the
biggest barriers we face.
I think the bigger issues for us are making sure that we
continue to lean in and are working with Silicon Valley, the
tech sector, on the foreign influence side and with the State
and local election officials who, after all, really control the
election infrastructure side. I think that part of it is where
we need to keep upping our game as we anticipate 2020, the
threat being even more challenging than it has been.
Senator Collins. So let me ask you, what key lessons has
the FBI learned to date that we should be implementing right
now?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly--I will speak to the foreign
influence piece in particular.
I think that there is enormous value to be had in our
cooperation with the tech sector and social media in particular
on the foreign influence threat. The reality is malign foreign
influence, as you I think quite rightly summarized, is not
unique to this particular moment in time nor unique to this
particular foreign adversary. But what is different right now
is the incredible amplification that our adversaries get
through social media. And so one of the things that changed
dramatically from 2016 to 2018 was our coordination with social
media in terms of blunting and mitigating that effect. And what
we saw in 2018 and are going to need to do even more of in
2020, is supply leads and information to the social media
companies, who have all kinds of ways they can leverage their
own tools and kick some of these accounts off of their
platforms very, very quickly in a way that would be hard for
any agency of government to do. And there were a lot of success
stories in that regard in 2018.
In return, one of the things we learned was that they were
then able to provide us lead information about accounts that we
might not have known about, techniques we might not have seen.
And so you start creating this sort of virtuous cycle. And I
think now having figured that out with the midterms, we need to
see even more of that for 2020.
Senator Collins. That cooperation is essential with the
private sector.
Last, let me turn to a different issue very quickly. Last
week in Maine, the FBI and Maine law enforcement charged 25
individuals with drug trafficking crimes. And particularly
alarming to me is the quantity of fentanyl that was discovered.
One man was found to have more than 265 grams of fentanyl. A
fraction of that amount, just 3 milligrams, is sufficient to
kill someone.
OPIOID EPIDEMIC
How is the FBI targeting resources specifically toward
fentanyl crimes?
Mr. Wray. So, Senator, I think you have put your finger on
what I think we would all agree is a deadly epidemic plaguing
communities all over the country. Unfortunately, it has grown
to a point where it is a multi-disciplinary problem requiring a
multi-disciplinary approach. The FBI's role in that is trying
to really focus on where do we uniquely add value. So there are
a number of things we are doing on that.
First, we have a prescription drug initiative that is
geared essentially towards medical providers, medical
professionals, pharmacists, pill mills, doctors, et cetera who
are over-prescribing, which is a big part of the spinning up of
this problem. And we tap into our health care fraud expertise
and resources there.
Second, we have Safe Streets Task Forces all over the
country, which focus on dismantling the gangs that distribute
opioids and fentanyl-related substances all over the country.
Third, we have something called J-CODE, which features
prominently in our budget request that I might mention, focused
on the Darknet because a lot of the opioid trafficking happens
on the Darknet more and more. And we have had a number of
successful operations. We just had a couple in the last few
months that really are aimed at detecting, disrupting, and
dismantling both the enterprises that are dependent on the
Darknet to traffic in opioids and fentanyl, but also to break
down their supply chains.
And then fourth, through our Transnational Organized Crime
program, we focus on the transnational criminal organizations
which are the principal source of the supply coming into the
U.S.
We also have other platforms. We did a documentary with DEA
called ``Chasing the Dragon,'' which we have pushed out to
schools all over the country to try to raise awareness that
way.
So there are a lot of different things we are trying to do,
but make no mistake. This is a problem that has mushroomed to a
degree where it is going to really require all hands on deck.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Senator Moran. I recognize the Vice Chairman of the full
committee, Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director Wray, good to see you again.
It was interesting listening to the evolution of the FBI. I
remember as a young prosecutor--I was on the executive board of
the National DA's Association--having a meeting with J. Edgar
Hoover. He told us there was no such thing as organized crime.
Our biggest problems were our hippies and communists, and the
``New York Times'' was close to being a communist paper and he
was preparing to investigate it as such. It was an interesting
conversation for many reasons. He passed away shortly
thereafter.
Now, one of my concerns on last week's hearing with the
Attorney General is a reluctance on the part of the
administration, starting at the top, to acknowledge what Russia
did was wrong and an American campaign knowingly benefiting
from or encouraging a foreign adversary's attack on our
elections is also wrong. In fact, quite wrong I think we would
all agree.
Two thousand twenty is around the corner. Friday, the
President had a long conversation with Russian President Putin.
He did not even bring up future election interference. He
refers to the last investigation as treasonous, claims the FBI
was leading a coup. I suspect that you probably have a
different view of this. I think those who are going to enforce
our laws have to be crystal clear about the ongoing threat.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO CAMPAIGNS
So I am going to ask you this. If a foreign government
offers assistance to a political campaign, opposition research,
stolen information, social media campaign, or otherwise, what
would you as Director of the FBI, if you discovered it, ask
that campaign to do?
Mr. Wray. Well, Senator, as I think I have said even back
to my confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee----
Senator Leahy. That is why I asked the question.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. When Senator Graham asked me a
similar question then, I think my view is that if any public
official or member of any campaign is contacted by any nation
state or anybody acting on behalf of a nation state about
influencing or interfering with our election, then that is
something that the FBI would want to know about.
Senator Leahy. And if they did not make such things
available to the FBI and you found out about it later, would
that trouble you?
Mr. Wray. Well, as I said, we would like to make sure
people tell us information promptly so that we can take
appropriate steps to protect the American people.
Senator Leahy. The President said he would like to use the
Justice Department as a political weapon targeting his
opponent. I know the Attorney General has been asked about
this.
Has the White House ever communicated to you directly or
indirectly any desire of interest in having the FBI initiate an
investigation of anyone?
Mr. Wray. Not that I can think of. Certainly, there are all
kinds of public commentary, but my view is we base our
investigations on the facts, the evidence, and proper
predication, and that has been my practice since the day I
walked in the door.
Senator Leahy. I ask the question only because I would like
to think there is a different FBI than the first time I sat
down an FBI Director with J. Edgar Hoover and heard his
discussions of, obviously, being interested in political
investigations.
Is it your position you would not be willing to have the
FBI initiate an investigation that was done for a political
purpose not for a criminal purpose?
Mr. Wray. My strong view and my commitment is to making
sure that the FBI under my leadership does things by the book,
and that includes making sure that we base our investigations
on proper predication, the facts, the evidence, and adherence
to the rule of law and nothing else.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
The Hate Crimes Statistics Act requires hate crimes to be
reported to the FBI. But we find that in 2017, of 16,000 law
enforcement agencies in the country, 14,000 of them did not
report hate crimes to you. The Crime Victimization Survey
estimates more than a quarter of a million hate crimes, and you
were able to only report 7,175 based on what was reported to
you.
Are you concerned that these hate crimes are not being
reported to you? And if you are concerned about it, how do we
improve them?
Mr. Wray. So it is a good question. I do think that
historically hate crimes have gone underreported. I think that
is probably still true to a certain extent. I do think it is
getting better. So some of the uptick in numbers reported may
reflect closing the gap between what is happening and what is
being reported.
To the second part of your question, we have tried to do a
number of things to try to raise awareness with State and local
law enforcement, with community groups, and so forth to try to
increase the likelihood that hate crimes will be reported. I am
a big believer in the idea that everybody benefits--law
enforcement, the community, et cetera, when discussions about
these things are based on the facts and the real data as
opposed to relying instead on what would fill the gap
otherwise--media commentary, which I have found to be much less
reliable.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
And on a personal matter, Mr. Chairman, I have to applaud
the video you put out talking about the shutdown. You have
talked to the men and women of the FBI who said the shutdown
was mind-boggling, short-sighted, unfair. When Senator Shelby
and I, with our two counterparts from the House, met in my
office to broker a deal to stop the shutdown, you had both
Republicans and Democrats applauding what you said to the FBI.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
In order for us to have plenty of time for the executive
session, now that Senator Leahy and Senator Shaheen have
completed their questioning, I am going to try to hold
everybody to their 5 minutes better than I have so far to date.
Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director, for being here very, very much.
VIOLENT CRIME
As you know, we in Arkansas, as well as every other State
in the Union, is struggling with--violent crime and the
substance abuse epidemic that we have going on.
In your testimony, you mentioned State, local, Tribal law
enforcement partnerships are crucial to the FBI to better
understand a community and their needs. Can you elaborate on
the partnerships and task forces that are created within these
communities? How does the Bureau work across jurisdictions and
communities do that this very, very important work in fighting
against these things?
Mr. Wray. Well, Senator, I think you have rightly
identified a really significant problem facing this country. I
have had the opportunity to visit the Little Rock field office
and meet with State and local law enforcement there to talk
about this very issue. And there is some very good work, even
within the whole FBI, some particularly good work being done on
the violent crime problem in the Little Rock area.
I think the keys to the violent crime problem from my
perspective are, number one, partnership and, number two,
intelligence--meaning intelligence driving prioritization. So
one of the things we have found is that in almost every
community around the country--and it is true in Little Rock,
but it is true in every community in this Nation--is that there
is almost always some tail or tails that are wagging the dog,
meaning some particular gang that is disproportionately
accounting for the homicide rate or violence in some particular
neighborhood or corridor on a highway. I mean, it varies from
community to community. But what does not vary is that there is
always that disproportionate effect.
And so using good intelligence to prioritize and be
disciplined about where we are going to maximize our impact and
then taking the partnership with State and local law
enforcement to, as I like to say, not just put two plus two to
get four, but get two plus two to make five or six or seven by
finding synergies. And that is what is happening in the Little
Rock area and that is what is happening in a number of the
other communities represented up here on this subcommittee. And
that is where you start to see very promising reductions in the
violent crime rate, the assault rate, the homicide rate
sometimes in a very short period of time. And that translates
to kids who can go out in the front yard and play after dark
and people who can walk home and who do not have to be afraid
in their own neighborhoods. And that is the impact we are
after.
COORDINATION WITH POSTAL INSPECTORS
Senator Boozman. One of the things that seems to be at play
right now in a very, very significant way is the mail, and our
postal authorities, postal inspectors do a great job. They do
not have a lot of resources. Is that something that we do have
coordination with people like you and the rest of the agencies?
Mr. Wray. I am sorry coordination between us and?
Senator Boozman. And the postal inspectors. So much of this
is mail-oriented now.
Mr. Wray. Oh, I see.
Senator Boozman. Yes. As I visit with my county sheriffs
and others, it seems like that is an area that perhaps we have
not--again, not because our postal inspectors are not doing a
good job. They have not had a lot of resources. Are we
coordinating to somehow try and bring that under control?
Mr. Wray. We are. And I go back to my earliest days as a
baby prosecutor working with Postal Inspection Agents. So they
are an incredibly great partner.
I will just give one good example, the Cesar Sayoc
investigation from back in the fall, the sort of package IED
cases that got so much attention around the country. We worked
incredibly closely with postal there to help each other to,
again, get that two plus two to get five or six effect. And
there was a lot of great work there done not just by the FBI's
folks but by postal.
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS
Senator Boozman. Your budget is fairly modest. How can we
help you?
Mr. Wray. Well, there are a number of places where we
really need significant help. I mentioned a few in my opening
statement.
On the cyber side, I would say that the threat has grown
exponentially in terms of actors, methods, targets, so we need
personnel and tools there in a big, big way. Just to give you
some frame of reference in terms of the data context, you know,
the entire Library of Congress digital library has about 7
petabytes of data. The Las Vegas shooting, which everybody on
this subcommittee is familiar with--just that one investigation
generated 1 petabyte of data. That is one investigation out of
the thousands we do. So we are in serious need of both cyber
tools and data analytic tools.
On the counterintelligence side, we are facing a uniquely
challenging time in terms of foreign investment and foreign
influence from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran--I could go on
and on there. We have resources that we are asking for there.
We really need help.
Transnational Organized Crime is something that is
diversifying every time we turn around and affects Americans
every day.
I mentioned the J-CODE initiative in response to Senator
Collins' question about the Darknet. So we need help there.
And then again, modernizing our IT. It is not glamorous,
but in today's world, technology is at the heart of every
threat we are all concerned about, and we need to be able to
stay ahead of it because if we start falling behind, people are
less safe.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Director.
SPECIAL COUNSEL INVESTIGATION
The Special Counsel report on the investigation into
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election
concluded--and I quote--the Russian Government perceived it
would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that
outcome.
The report detailed two primary information warfare
operations, one of which was, in their words, a Russian entity
that carried out a social media campaign that favored
presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.
Director Wray, based on your intelligence at the moment, do
you conclude that the Russians still have the same goal and
intention to support President Trump in next year's election as
the Special Counsel's report indicated? And I think that
requires a yes or no.
Mr. Wray. I do not know that I think we have the answer to
that at the moment. I think what I would say is the Special
Counsel's report speaks for itself in terms of what it found.
And we continue to assess that the Russians are focused on
sowing divisiveness and discord in this country and pitting us
against each other, and that part I think we see alive and
well.
Senator Reed. But you have no further indication of a
preference for a candidate at this point.
Mr. Wray. I do not think there is anything that I could
share at this particular point in time.
Senator Reed. Would you commit to making public at a point
that you have sufficient information and intelligence that
there is a preference by the Russians that is guiding their
information operations? I think that would be critical to the
American public.
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we want to make sure that both
the Congress and the American public get the information they
need to have. Anytime you start raising hypotheticals involving
counterintelligence efforts, I want to be really careful about
what I commit to given my commitment to protecting sources and
methods in ongoing investigations and to protecting our
relationships with foreign liaison partners.
Senator Reed. It is not about sources and methods. I think
there has been a lot of criticism previously--and many from our
Republican colleagues--that President Obama did not do enough
to alert the American public that there was a concerted effort
directed at supporting President Trump, as was established very
clearly in the Mueller report.
Also, again the intelligence communities--their report in
2017--of January 2017, quote, when it appeared to Moscow that
Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency, the Russian
influence campaign focused more in undercutting Secretary
Clinton's legitimacy, including by impugning the fairness of
the election. In fact, there was an indictment last year, last
October, in the Eastern District of Virginia of a criminal-
linked troll group, the Internet Research Agency, posing as
Americans, deployed messages about voter fraud through social
media throughout the United States.
Are you looking at the 2020 election anticipating another
attempt to discredit the credibility and the legitimacy of the
election?
ELECTION INTERFERENCE
Mr. Wray. We are keenly focused on preparing for the 2020
election in terms of the malign foreign influence threat. We
expect to see efforts to, as I said, sow divisiveness and
discord and likely efforts to use fake news, propaganda, fake
personas, et cetera, which might be done in a way that would be
geared towards affecting particular races, but might also be
done just to generate chaos. Either way, we are also keenly
attuned to it and focused on that.
Senator Reed. To undermine the legitimacy of the election,
which is interesting because President Trump on the campaign
trail in 2016 talked about the only way we can lose is if
cheating goes on. It is a conscious parallelism perhaps or
unconscious parallelism. I do not know which.
We are in a position right now where, particularly if their
favored candidate does not prevail, the Russians will do what
they were going to do deliberately in 2016 and suggest that
machines have been tampered with, that immigrants have voted
illegally.
So in what respect in a legitimate office of the United
States today has been charged with the task, collaborating with
the States because they run these elections, to immediately
communicate with the American public on the facts--i.e., there
was no machine tampering, there were no illegal immigrants--or
if there are, the specifics of those facts? Without that, we
could face a crisis and a constitutional crisis of immense
dimensions. Who is going to do that?
Mr. Wray. Well, the principal interface between the Federal
Government and State and local election officials is the
Department of Homeland Security.
Senator Reed. But we do not have a director.
Mr. Wray. I am sorry?
Senator Reed. We do not have a director.
Mr. Wray. Well, we have an acting Secretary.
And I think in terms of putting out information, what I
have experienced during my 20 months on the job, when it comes
to putting out information about election influence or election
interference is that we, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security all work
together----
Senator Reed. My time has expired. But has the President
directed you or anyone else to be prepared to do this? Because
given what we have observed already, it is highly unlikely that
he would be in a position, particularly if he was on the other
end of the election, the wrong end, to be objective and factual
and trying to calm the American public rather than to aggravate
the situation. Has he directed you to do that?
Mr. Wray. We, the group that I have described a minute ago,
meaning the FBI, ODNI, NSA, DHS, and others, have had a number
of meetings, some of which included the President himself
chairing them, that have been focused on our efforts on how we
can up our game to protect our elections and our democracy.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Director. I want to thank you personally and
your entire team for your help in catching the punk that burned
three of our churches in Louisiana. The perpetrator was caught
quickly, and I do not think we could have done that without the
assistance of the FBI. And we in Louisiana are very grateful
for that.
I want to talk to you for a second about 2016. I think we
can agree that--at least this is my opinion--the FBI is the
premier law enforcement agency in all of human history. And I
think most Americans and most of our friends across the world
believe that as well.
Unfortunately, there has been created a perception that
given the two investigations of presidential candidates in
2016, that some members of the FBI allegedly acted on their
political beliefs. And I think it is important that we get rid
of that perception.
We have forgotten also that there were two investigations.
There was an investigation of President Trump but also an
investigation of Secretary Clinton.
I know the Inspector General has weighed in on the Clinton
investigation, and he is weighing in on the Trump
investigation. But aside from that, can you tell me what the
factual predicate was for the investigation of Secretary
Clinton and her alleged email scandal?
PREDICATE FOR INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wray. I do not know that I can say sitting here what
the predicate is.
As you mentioned, the independent Inspector General did a
fairly intense, rigorous and thorough investigation of that
case, provided a pretty long report, and testified in front of
multiple committees of Congress about it. There were a lot of
important lessons learned from that, and I think we, the FBI
and I at the helm, took those lessons very much to heart
immediately. Some of them we already had in place.
Senator Kennedy. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Director,
but I am going to run out of time and I do not want to do that.
Can you tell me what the factual predicate was for the
investigation of President Trump?
Mr. Wray. Well, the Special Counsel's report goes through a
fair amount of detail about the predication for its
investigation. I think beyond that, as I mentioned to the
Chairman, I have had a number of conversations working to help
the Attorney General get a better understanding of what the
circumstances surrounding the initiation of that investigation
were at the Department and the FBI back in 2016.
Senator Kennedy. Why do you not just--I know you cannot do
this on your own, but the President can. The President could
declassify, with proper redaction, all of the documents at the
FBI pertaining to the 2016 investigation of Secretary Clinton
and President Trump and then let the American people see them
and draw their own conclusions. Why do we not do that?
Mr. Wray. Well, without weighing in on the legal question
of authority certainly, I would tell you that when we redact
information or when we classify information, there are a number
of very, very important principles that are at stake there:
protection of sources and methods without which Americans are
less safe, and the protection of ongoing criminal
investigations or other investigations without which the
American people are less safe. And there are various other
legal issues implicated that go beyond just the power to
declassify. And so while I think it is important that we be as
transparent as we can be with the American people and certainly
with the Congress, I also think it is very important to protect
those kinds of information that are the lifeblood of our
ability to fulfill our mission.
Senator Kennedy. What are we going to do then, Mr.
Director? How do we remove this perception that there were a
handful of people at the FBI and at the Justice Department in
2016 that acted on their political beliefs and tried to
influence the election? How are we going to lance that boil?
And I am talking about both with respect to the investigations
of Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Trump.
Mr. Wray. So as to both matters--one case already
completed, the other case still underway--there have been
independent--so outside the FBI--Inspector General
investigations that are professional and apolitical, that are
rigorous, and that are sometimes quite painful for the agency
in question. And we have taken a number of steps to learn those
lessons from the Clinton email investigation. There have been
personnel moves, training improvements, policy improvements,
all sorts of things that I laid out in great depth last summer
in response to that investigation. And I would expect that we
will take to heart in a very similar way whatever lessons are
conveyed through the other Inspector General investigation,
which is pending.
But as to the perception, I think it is important for the
American people to understand--and you alluded to it in your
very helpful comments at the beginning--that we are talking
about two investigations over about a 15-month period as
opposed to the thousands and thousands of investigations that
the FBI does to keep Americans safe each day. These
investigations are conducted by 37,000 men and women that in my
experience are brave, professional, rigorous, and thoughtful
and I think deserve better than some of the commentary that has
been out there.
And so I appreciate your comments about the efforts in New
Orleans where there have been some really remarkable efforts
made, and I think it would be helpful for everyone to take a
deep breath and remember that we have had more than two
investigations over the last 2 years.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member
Shaheen.
Thank you, Director Wray. It is great to have you before us
today.
And I want to start by thanking you and the 37,000 men and
women of the FBI for their service and devotion to our country
and Constitution and the way that they work every day to keep
Americans safe regardless of race, creed, or political
leanings. This work, as we both know, is often dangerous and
difficult and under-appreciated and it saves lives. And I think
we need to do a better job here of recognizing the
professionalism and dedication of the men and women of the FBI.
They have recently made a real difference in my home
community of Wilmington, Delaware, and in just the last 2
months, the FBI in Delaware has worked with prosecutors and law
enforcement to bring criminal convictions on fraud, bribery,
cyber stalking, and narcotics cases. I am from one of those
small towns like Little Rock where violence was spiraling out
of control, and real and effective engagement by our FBI office
has made a difference in combating that. I look forward to
talking more about that.
ELECTION INTERFERENCE
But let me first just--on election interference. I have
been encouraged by the clarity with which you have said that
foreign interference efforts continue, that you have no doubt
that Russia will attempt to interfere again in our next
election, that a campaign should immediately contact the FBI if
offered dirt on an opponent by a foreign power, and that you
have been in meetings with the DNI and with DHS about how to
protect our next election.
In your remarks, both written and spoken, for today's
hearing, you highlighted the foreign influence task force you
have created. What more resources do you need to bolster
efforts like that task force to better protect our society from
foreign interference and specifically our upcoming elections
from foreign interference?
Mr. Wray. Well, Senator, I appreciate the question and
would be happy to talk about violent crime in Wilmington in
particular also.
On the foreign influence side, the Foreign Influence Task
Force that I described--we basically put that together through
existing resources with no additional help from Congress at
that point. I think it was a significant success, but we view
our adversary, in particular Russia in this context, as upping
its game, and we are also expanding our efforts to look at
other nation states as well.
And the budget request that we have submitted asks for
additional personnel and additional tools to help us get
through the volumes and volumes of data. In that sense, this
threat is not unlike a lot of the other threats that I have
been describing through my testimony of the mountains of
information that comes in. I cannot underscore this issue--you
always hear about sort of the big data problem. We all hear
about that phrase. Well, we have got the big data problem just
like everybody else. And the need for speed, as matched up
against the volume of data, is a real concern that I have. And
so I think over the next few years and certainly with this
budget, the more that this subcommittee can do to help us get
the personnel and the tools and data analytics that we need,
and the cyber tools that we need, that is the best way we are
going to get ahead of this threat.
Senator Coons. I look forward to supporting that request
because I think you are hearing widespread concern that we do
everything we can to ensure the integrity of our election
system so that we do not face widespread doubts about that.
Let me move to the State and local law enforcement
partnership. I like your two plus two equals five, six, or
seven synergy view.
NICS
NICS, the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System, is a central tenet in protecting our country from those
who would do us harm. You have said that in your written
remarks, and I agree.
Senator Toomey and I have introduced a bipartisan bill, the
NICS Denial Notification Act that would require the Federal
Government to notify State and local enforcement when someone
lies and tries, when a person prohibited by law from purchasing
a gun--a convicted felon, for example--goes into a gun store,
tries to buy and is denied. There were about, I think, 103,000
NICS denials last year that prevented people from buying guns
who should not have to buy them.
Could you do that without legislation? Could you just as a
simple matter of a decision about partnership decide to notify
State law enforcement every time someone tries to buy a gun who
is a person prohibited? And if not, could I have your support
for this legislation that I think is exactly the sort of better
enforcement of laws on the books that help State enforcement
that we ought to be able to do on a bipartisan basis?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly I share your concern about trying
to make sure that we keep guns out of the hands of people who
are legally prohibited from having them.
I do know as to the legal question of whether we would need
legislation to share information, I am enjoying the role of not
being a lawyer right now for the first time in my career. So I
will defer to the lawyers on the legal question.
But I will say that I do know that anecdotally, because I
see it come up in the context of investigations we have, that
there are plenty of times where we do share denial information
with partners--Federal, State, and local--on the ground in the
context of existing investigations. And sometimes it is very
useful information.
As you say, I would be a little bit concerned about
thinking through the resource burden. And this would, of
course, resonate I would think in particular for you given the
challenges in Delaware, of what that would mean for State and
local law enforcement if they were suddenly bombarded with all
that information, whether they would have the resources
necessary to handle that flow.
Senator Coons. I will just say in meetings with the police
chiefs of my smaller cities and towns, they would welcome
knowing when a resident of their community, who is prohibited
from buying a weapon, has gone in to try and buy a weapon
because that is an excellent predictor that they are then going
to try and acquire a weapon some other way, probably for malign
purposes.
There are other States where it is State police who conduct
the NICS background check, initial contact. So they are
immediately notified of the denial. Then there are States like
my own where that it is not the case, where it goes directly
from the federally licensed firearm dealer back and forth to
the NICS system. I am just trying to fix a small communication
piece that I think really could help keep people safer.
I know I am over my time.
I would welcome hearing more from you, Director, about the
partnership program, the PSP, that you reference and how we
could strengthen resources for State and local law enforcement
to benefit from the FBI.
Thank you for your service.
Senator Moran. Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director, for your service.
DOMESTIC TERRORISM
I want to talk to you about domestic terrorism. I would
like for us to get a better understanding of how the statistics
are evolving. It seems to me we are getting better at reporting
sort of white nationalist, white extremist both hate crimes and
also terrorist events. And I am wondering whether you think, A,
do we have an increasing domestic terrorism problem related to
white extremism or whatever word you would choose to use.
Mr. Wray. I think we assess that domestic terrorism--well,
let me put the hate crime category to the side for a second,
although you are exactly right, that there is a lot of blurring
between them, sometimes for good reason.
But on the domestic terrorism side, what I would say is
that we assess that domestic terrorism, including domestic
terrorism conducted by people subscribing to some sort of white
supremacist ideology, is a serious, persistent threat. I do not
know that we have seen a noted increase in the threat, but make
no mistake, it is a real serious threat and it is persistent.
And we have a lot of investigations, somewhere a little short
of 1,000 that are domestic terrorism, not just that particular
type of domestic terrorism but all domestic terrorism.
Senator Schatz. The question I have has to do with the
allocation of resources, the way you organize your desks, the
way agents are assigned. And I just want to be reassured that
the resources are allocated according to the risk. And it seems
to me that the way the Congress has appropriated money, the way
the political ecosystem has evolved since 9/11 and for lots of
very good reasons and sound reasons that the focus has been on
external threats, jihad-inspired terrorism. But to the extent
that the data demonstrate that white nationalism is something
approaching about half of the terrorist events, depending on
whether you count individual instances or total number of
deaths, can I be confident that the way you organize your desks
and the way you allocate resources are proportional to the data
as it comes in and if the data shows something new, that you
can reallocate the resources?
Mr. Wray. Certainly we have a whole Threat Review and
Prioritization process that is designed to help us do the kind
of calibration you are talking about. I would say that we very
aggressively treat domestic terrorism as a priority through our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces. And in fact, I think last year,
just as one imperfect measure of it, I think we had more
domestic terrorism arrests than we did international terrorism
arrests.
Now, in addition to what we do for the terrorism side, as
you mentioned, there is the hate crime side which we do through
our criminal programs. And so there is a lot of times where
some of the same kinds of activity can be tackled through the
resources we use on that side too.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
FACIAL RECOGNITION
Let me get to facial recognition. I think it has got lots
of potential. But the GAO had a study that recommends that the
Director conduct tests and to take steps to determine whether
systems used by external partners are valid. There was a recent
study cited by the ``New York Times'' that says that women of
color have an error rate--a 35 percent increase in the error
rate in terms of these facial recognition databases and
softwares. And I am sort of a mixed mind here. I think this
provides great potential for you to catch bad guys, but only if
the software works.
And I have two worries. First, if the software is not
ready, that is one thing. Second, if you use third party
contractors and the algorithm is proprietary and you do not
know how they are determining who is a risk and who is not,
then I think the FBI has an obligation to take a breath and try
to figure out how reliable this facial recognition software is.
Can you speak to facial recognition generally and the worry
that sort of garbage in/garbage out that these approaches can
enhance existing uneven enforcement of the law?
Mr. Wray. Well, with the caveat up front that I have not
had the chance to review the newspaper article that you
described or the GAO report that summarizes, I would say that
facial recognition--kind of like you, I view it as a very
exciting technology with a lot of promise. I also view it as
something that we have to approach thoughtfully to make sure
that it is just like any exciting technology, it is not
misused.
I sometimes say that with all the technology that is out
there right now that is changing so fast, I usually have two
reactions. Every time there is a new technology, I think, wow,
we can do that. And then my second reaction is, oh, no,
somebody else can do that. And you know, this is one of those
tools that is in that regard.
But I think there is a lot of promise to the technology in
terms of what it can do to help solve crimes and keep people
safe, and we would be happy to arrange a briefing for you in a
little more detail.
Senator Schatz. I will do that.
In the interest of time, I will reduce the follow-up to the
record. But I do want to understand your response to both the
``New York Times'' article and the GAO report. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Schatz, thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you, Director, for being here.
NOTIFICATION OF CYBER INTRUSION
And I am not going to ask you to comment about any specific
cases, especially in this setting, matters that are highly
compartmented. But I do want to point to things that are in the
public record.
The first is May of last year, the Senate Intelligence
Committee, as part of our review of the 2016 election, in an
interim reported stated that there had been a number of
counties across the country in which foreign actors had been in
a position, had they wanted to, to change and influence voter
databases. They did not do so, but they were in a position to
do so. That was disclosed.
As you can imagine, a few weeks ago when the Mueller report
came out, it had a brief, but obviously significant mention
that at least one Florida county had been impacted by an
intrusion, and it has elicited, as you can imagine, across our
67 counties a tremendous amount of attention, to say the least.
And I know that you have heard from both my colleague, Senator
Scott, and from our new Governor, Governor DeSantis.
So on the one hand, I explain to people we are always
trying to protect our methods and sources. And so sometimes by
revealing information, you have revealed how you learned about
it and thereby compromise the ability to learn about it in the
future.
On the other hand, you can imagine if you are a county
election official anywhere in America--I am not talking
specifically about Florida--and you hear that you may have been
potentially one of those impacted and no one has told you that
directly, it puts them in a very difficult position.
So just thinking through how can we handle a matter--and
these are just hard things. I know sometimes it is not entirely
the FBI's decision to make or any other agency, for that
matter. But I think I have described sort of, just writ large--
let us just back up from Florida and just say writ large. That
is a tough spot to be in other than to tell people if you do
these things, you should be fine, but we cannot tell you who it
is that has been impacted because we will lose the ability to
learn about it in the future.
Is there any thought being given to how to confront this in
the future, the balance between notifying a county or a victim
of this sort of intrusion and the ability to protect our
methods and sources?
Mr. Wray. So I think you have identified a particularly
vexing problem. As you have, I think, correctly framed, it is
something that we in the intelligence community struggle with
quite a bit. We have tried to put in place a fairly specific
protocol that is intended to guide a thoughtful and disciplined
decisionmaking process for when we notify victims of a cyber
attack, whether it is in the election context or anything else.
And it goes through a lot of the considerations that would
apply. And you anticipated some of them in your question.
Sometimes the information is a particularly sensitive source or
method, and if we lose or jeopardize that source or method,
then we lose the ability to even better protect, sometimes,
even the same victim. Sometimes the information comes from a
trusted foreign liaison partner, and it is not our decision to
make about whether to share the information. Sometimes it
affects an ongoing criminal investigation and might jeopardize
that. So there is a whole host of things.
We also look at things like how actionable is the
information. Is the information we have in a form where
somebody could even do something with it? And so sometimes
those factors come to our attention and we try to wrestle
through them as best we can.
I will say that sometimes we also strike a middle ground.
We may try to provide more general information to help people
take appropriate cyber hygiene steps. It is not a perfect
solution, but it is a solution that intends to kind of have it
a little bit both ways, where we are sharing information that
allows people to take some steps while still protecting some of
those sensitive sources of information.
But this is an issue that we all in the intelligence
community struggle with not just in an election context but in
a lot of other settings as well.
PARKLAND REVIEW
Senator Rubio. One final question on a different topic.
Fifteen months ago, as you know, the tragedy took place in
Parkland. And as you have acknowledged and others, the FBI made
some mistakes. There were clear tips that were disregarded
about how the shooter was a threat to the lives of others.
There was a commitment to a review of the policies and
procedures, but so far, there has not been anything public in
terms of accountability aside from acknowledging the mistakes.
So what is the status of that review?
Mr. Wray. So we have done not one, but two fairly in-depth
reviews out at our call center, which is where the key activity
occurred. We have changed training. We have also changed
policies out there. We have increased significantly the amount
of resources that are out there. We have increased the amount
of oversight. We have built certain technology tools to
improve--sort of put redundancies in the process to ensure that
the right kinds of things are caught. There is a whole host of
things we have done.
In addition, I have met with families of some of the
victims, as has the Deputy Director. And we are committed to
trying to get this right.
We have now recently--and this is very recent information,
but I have now put in charge of that whole division out there
in West Virginia one of our senior most executives to run that
division. He is somebody that we personally enlisted to really
bring the right level of maturity and sophistication to running
that whole division. I think that is a measure of how important
this is to us.
Senator Moran. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, thank you very much for attending and your
service.
SPECIAL COUNSEL
Sir, you know, as I look and see a troubled world and a
divided country, the only thing that separates us from other
countries in the world is the rule of law. People must believe
they are going to be treated fair no matter who you are, what
rung of life you might be on.
After Mr. Barr's appearance last week, there were still
some unanswered questions, but the one thing that was asked of
him, would he have a problem with Mr. Mueller appearing, and he
says, no, he did not have a problem with that at all.
Do you think that would be helpful to have Mr. Mueller to
appear before Congress, or would you have a problem with that?
Mr. Wray. Well, I will not purport to speak for Special
Counsel Mueller. I have had nothing but good experiences
working with him over the years and nothing but good
experiences working with the current Attorney General.
Senator Manchin. Do you think it would be helpful if he did
appear before us so we could clear up--it would be helpful to
me as someone who voted for Mr. Barr and leaving a lot of
questions unanswered just to hear Mr. Mueller's report and
basically from himself.
Mr. Wray. You know, that is really a decision between the
Special Counsel, the Department, and the Congress.
Senator Manchin. Also on redaction, the report was 448
pages. When these reports come out, what would you consider an
average percentage of that being redacted usually because of
ongoing investigations, things that might still be pending?
Mr. Wray. I am not sure that I have ever heard of a sort of
average percentage of redaction.
Senator Manchin. This was about 10 percent. This was one
was 44 pages. So I am saying does that seem high or there is an
awful lot going on still yet we do not know about?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think the Special Counsel report does
identify that there have been a number of referrals, and there
are a number of ongoing investigations that grew out of that.
The figure, 10 percent--I do not know if that is the right
figure, but I will take your word for it. Certainly I have seen
lots of documents submitted to Congress--and you probably have
too with your time on the Senate Intelligence Committee--that
have been much more heavily redacted than that.
Senator Manchin. Right.
OPIOIDS
Sir, I am going to switch to opioids right now. The State
of West Virginia has been extremely hard hit, as you know. We
lead the Nation as far as the deaths per 1,000. It is just a
horrendous situation, and the millions and millions and
millions of pills that the companies basically from the
manufacturers to the distributors have poured into my State is
unbelievable.
We have one little town, Kermit, West Virginia, where over
9 million pills were shipped in. There are 392 people who live
in that town. You can do the math. It is thousands and
thousands per person. It makes no sense at all.
But when there was a deal made basically and they have an
agreed upon amount that they are going to pay restitution, we
are not able to get--and especially if they do not admit to
guilt towards the wrongdoing, we cannot get the information.
Basically at that time, the courts say, well, that belongs back
to the company or we will destroy them. We have no public
records. And we know the intent cannot be for a health outcome
when you are sending 9 million pills to a town of 392 people.
Is there any way that that can be stopped or we can reverse
that so we can get some information on the intent of what they
are doing and how to stop that?
Mr. Wray. So I am not familiar with the specific impediment
that you are describing. I would be happy for my staff to take
a closer look at that.
Senator Manchin. If you could look at it. We have one right
now with McKesson. McKesson basically settled with the State of
West Virginia for $37 million. And basically they sent 5
million pills to this little town, as they were one of the
biggest distributor of pills all over my State. And to let them
off is just absolutely criminal as far as in my mind from what
they did to our State.
So I am trying to get the information. I cannot get it
since they did not have to prove any wrongdoing when the
settlement was made, and it put us in a really onerous position
to ever stop them from doing it, to continue to do it. If you
could help me with that, I would be most appreciative.
Mr. Wray. Well, I would be happy to take a look at it. Like
I said, I am not familiar with the specific issue. I do know
that we have done a big surge on the opioid issue and
specifically on the provider part of it in your region. We just
had a huge takedown.
Senator Manchin. I know you all have been there and I
appreciate it.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
My last question is going to be on CFIUS, sir. From CFIUS,
what we have--and maybe from your perspective, we have an awful
lot of assets that are not required to go through CFIUS for the
United States. So I will give you an example, propane, ethane,
butane, all the different building blocks to manufacturing.
Foreign investments can buy them up and gobble them all up, and
we have no recourse whatsoever.
So should most Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States filings remain a voluntary process, or can we
change that to make it mandatory? Reciprocating is what I am
looking for. Basically we cannot go to China and own the assets
that they own in America.
Mr. Wray. So I do think that the CFIUS process is not only
indispensable where it applies, but the Congress--and I am
grateful to the Congress for this--recently expanded and
improved the effectiveness of CFIUS.
But I think you are also exactly right that the ability to
channel foreign investment into this country with an improper
motive is something that is a real challenge. And so while a
number of loopholes were closed with the recent reform that
occurred to CFIUS, I think we are going to have to keep looking
for more ways to close more loopholes because I think this is
going to be a bigger and bigger problem for us as a nation.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Director thank you very much.
Senator Capito. We need to be done here by 11:00 in order
to have time for a classified briefing. So, again, if we can
shorten our questions and answers.
Senator Capito. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Wray, for being here.
BUDGET INCREASE
I wanted to begin by thanking you for something that is not
in the budget. In the past, the budget has called for
rescissions that would impact the work at CJIS and the men and
women in our Clarksburg facility in Clarksburg, West Virginia.
So thank you for not calling for that.
But shifting focus to something that is in the budget,
there is a $4 million increase for additional positions in
Clarksburg. Can you describe what kinds of works they are going
to be doing?
IMPACT OF CJIS OPERATIONS
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we feel both excited about the
growth that we are trying to have out at CJIS and concerned
about the need to address all the different functions that
occur out there. In some ways, I think CJIS is one of those
divisions, that probably has the most impact on the American
people and that people know the least about. You know, between
the 10 million times a day that we are providing criminal
justice information to State and local law enforcement, between
the 26 million gun checks that NICS did last year, between the
190,000-something fingerprints that they processed through NGI
every day, through the call center, NTOC, which I think had
over a million tips between calls and emails last year--we need
to kind of keep pace. The volume just keeps growing. And so the
positions and the other allocations in the budget I think will
be important to helping us do that.
Senator Capito. Let me ask a follow-up on that. I know that
I went to a ribbon cutting out there, which was an agreement
between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense
to sort of merge some of their--well, not merge but to use
resources together out there. How has that been progressing? I
do not know. From your standpoint, how has that been working,
that partnership?
Mr. Wray. I think it has been working pretty well, but I
will confess I have not gotten an update recently on that.
Senator Capito. All right.
You know, we did pass the Fix NICS Act, and I am wondering
how the implementation of that has gone in terms of being more
precise with the data and closing some of those loopholes that
we did in Fix NICS.
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly I think we get better all the
time in terms of our ability to keep pace with the volume of
gun checks that we have to do. I do think it is the reality. I
think we had almost the highest number of checks we had to run
in history last year, maybe second highest in history.
So I have actually gone out and visited the folks there. I
have sat down and put the headset on so I could listen to
experience what it is like to be doing those gun checks as a
NICS operator. So it is incredibly important work that they are
doing.
Senator Capito. Thank you.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
I would like to follow up again on Senator Manchin's
question, both of us being from West Virginia. On the fentanyl
and heroin, I know that you have put a lot of resources into
this. I know that you have worked on closing up the
prescription loopholes and going after providers.
The situation at the southern border is such that, I mean,
I feel there is still a proliferation of illegal drugs coming
through our ports of entry. Do you work with the Border Patrol
to try to--I know you get into transcontinental or trans-
country cartels and all of that. How do you information share
so that we can prevent this? Because this is killing people.
Mr. Wray. Well, we have a number of task forces where we
work closely with Border Patrol agents. Certainly this is a
problem that requires both skill sets and both agencies'
expertise. I come back to my two plus two to get five or six
paradigm. We focus kind of on dismantling the enterprises, but
they have enormous eyes and ears on the ground. And I think we
have a great relationship with the Border Patrol, and we are
incredibly grateful for the very hard job they do.
Senator Capito. Are you able to stay ahead of them, though?
I mean, it seems like they are, obviously, very creative, very
wealthy on the other side. I am talking about the cartels. What
kinds of resources are you lacking that you think you can break
these up so that we can stop this illegal trafficking?
Mr. Wray. Well, we always need more bodies and more tools.
The Transnational Organized Criminal activity that we see now
is not just the drug trafficking. It has diversified into all
kinds of other activity. There, like in the other threat areas
I have described, there is a data analytics piece of it. In
order for us to be more agile, we need to work in closer
partnership with the countries that are south of us in order to
try to make sure that they take their share of the
responsibility. We have had some great successes in that regard
in Central America in particular, you know, in El Salvador and
Guatemala and Honduras.
Senator Capito. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Moran. Senator Van Hollen, the most patient of our
Members.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Director Wray. And thank you and the men and
women of the FBI for all you do for our country.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
We have had a lot of talk this morning about Russian
interference in our elections. You and the Intelligence
Committee have been very clear the Mueller report emphatically
puts the exclamation point on it that Russians interfered in
2016.
You have also said recently that Russian interference in
the previous elections was, quote, just a kind of dress
rehearsal for the big show in 2020. And it seems to me if we
know that, we should be doing everything in our power to both
prepare for it but also try to deter it. And we should try to
harden our systems. We should deal with malign influence. We
should try to prevent the cyber hacking.
But would you agree that the best defense would be an
ability to deter that kind of interference in the first place?
In other words, if Putin understood that the costs of
interfering in our election outweigh the relatively low costs
he is facing right now, should we explore that option?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly I think the best part of a
defense against a foreign intelligence threat like malign
foreign influence includes an offensive capability. Sometimes
people say the best defense is a good offense. There is a
degree to which that applies in this setting. A lot of what
would be appropriate there is not the kind of thing that we
would be discussing in an open hearing. But certainly we work
jointly with others. And I will say that I appreciate your
reminding me of my recent comments on this topic. We have
significantly increased, again just based on resources we
already have, not new resources, our own footprint on foreign
influence. So far from sort of stepping back after the midterms
and saying, thank goodness that is over, we have actually
stepped it up a notch and tried to figure out, okay, how do we
learn the things that worked well in 2018 and kind of get ready
for 2020.
DETER ACT
Senator Van Hollen. I got it. So I think--and you hinted at
it. Look, my personal view is we should be very proactive when
it comes to cyber offense. But I am also talking about a piece
of legislation Senator Rubio and I have introduced called the
DETER Act, which lays out out front very big penalties, sticks
that the Russian economy would face if we catch them
interfering in our elections going forward. So you know up
front, if you are Putin, if you interfere, if we catch you, you
are going to see these penalties.
Secretary Pompeo was in front of one of the appropriations
subcommittees recently. I asked him if he would support
something like that going forward. His answer, quote, I would.
I know the outlines of the DETER Act and conceptually I think
it makes sense.
Do you agree and can you work with us on refining that
legislation?
Mr. Wray. We would be happy to work with you on the
legislation and see if there is operational impact information
we can share that would be useful to you as you tweak or move
forward. Certainly sanctions are a very important tool in the
toolbox that can, should be, and has been in some instances
applied in this particular space that we are talking about
right now. So happy to work with you.
Senator Van Hollen. The idea here is instead of acting
after the fact, instead of trying to apply sanctions after the
fact, you make it clear up front what sanctions will
automatically come down to try to influence behavior.
You know, the FBI was helpful in Maryland last year on a
number of fronts, but specifically identified that one of the
vendors that oversaw some of our elections infrastructure was
actually controlled by a company where a Putin oligarch had a
controlling interest. The good news is because we monitored
that, with your help, there was no interference in Maryland's
specific election.
But Senator Collins and I and others have introduced
legislation making it clear that no part of U.S. elections
infrastructure, including at the State level, should be
controlled in whole or in part by a foreign adversary. Does
that sound like common sense to you?
Mr. Wray. I think you have put your finger on a permutation
of what we sometimes call the supply chain threat, which
applies not just to Russians but other foreign adversaries. And
it is a real concern for this country.
I appreciate your comments about the good work in
Baltimore. I have actually been out to visit that office twice
just in my short time on the job, met with all the employees,
and met with our community partners there as well. And there is
really, really exciting, great work being done by that office
that I am very proud of.
Senator Van Hollen. Just in conclusion, do you agree that
we should prohibit foreign adversaries from owning or
controlling any part of our elections infrastructure?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly as framed, it makes pretty good
sense to me. I would have to look at the particulars of any
legislation certainly.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. Look forward to working with
you.
Senator Moran. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Wray, I think you are doing a great job. Tell
everybody in your organization we appreciate what they do for
the country.
IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION
Sequestration. If it kicks back in, what kind of effect
would it have on the FBI?
Mr. Wray. Senator, if sequestration were to kick back in, I
think in short it would be devastating.
Senator Graham. We would be less safe as a nation.
Mr. Wray. I think it would have a negative impact on the
safety of the American people.
Senator Graham. All the things that we have been talking
about here would be undermined in terms of the role you play.
Mr. Wray. Virtually all of them, yes.
Senator Graham. When it comes to deterring Russian
interference in the American election, is it working, or should
we do more?
Mr. Wray. Well, I tend to be dissatisfied by nature. So I
always think we can do more and should do more on pretty much
every threat we have described here.
Senator Graham. Do you think the Russians have gotten the
message or are there still more messages to be sent?
Mr. Wray. I think there are still more messages to be sent.
Senator Graham. Other than Russia, what nation state should
we be worried about in 2020?
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
Mr. Wray. Well, I think there are a number of our
adversaries--China, Iran, North Korea--who all have different
ideas about foreign influence. They will pursue different tools
in their toolbox. But I think all of those adversaries, just as
you and I have discussed in the past, are things that we need
to be worried about across the foreign influence front.
Senator Graham. Okay. So sequestration would be
devastating. We need to send more messages to Russia about what
they have done and will do, not less. You gave us a list of
other countries to worry about.
Are you familiar with the two terrorists called the Beatles
that are in custody in Syria by the Syrian Democratic Forces?
Mr. Wray. I am. I mean, not every detail about it but
certainly familiar.
Senator Graham. These are two of the four terrorists
described as the Beatles because they were British and they
were working with ISIS. Two of them have been captured. They
are accused of being involved in the beheading of Mr. Foley, an
American citizen, and some others.
Could you give this subcommittee a status on those cases,
what the plan is in terms of bringing them to justice? You do
not have to do it here in an open hearing, but let us know. I
think all of us want to make sure these people do not break out
and they are brought to justice.
Mr. Wray. Well, I think, as you anticipated, there is
probably not a whole lot I can say in this setting on that. I
will say that this is a very important case to us, to me
personally. I have actually met with a number of the family
members of some of the victims. I think this part is public. We
certainly are in appropriate coordination with our British
counterparts about whether or not there is a way to ensure that
these folks can be brought to justice. But if there is one
thing the FBI is known for it is not giving up.
Senator Graham. Well, I appreciate that. And please, I know
you will not give up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Graham, thank you for joining us.
Director Wray, anything you would like to add in this open
setting to any of the questions, expand any of your answers, or
anything we have missed that you would like to highlight for
us?
Mr. Wray. Not that I can think of. We covered a lot of
ground.
Senator Moran. Director, thank you.
NEW LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
On Friday of this week, I will give a graduation address at
the Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center. Would you care to
share any thoughts you have about what should be said to 60 new
men and women who are becoming members of the law enforcement
community?
Mr. Wray. I think I would tell them that they are
undertaking not an ordinary job but a calling, that it takes a
very, very, very special kind of person who is willing to put
his or her life on the line to protect complete strangers, and
that the whole country is grateful for their service.
Senator Moran. I will try to deliver that message with
those kind words.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
If there are no further questions in this morning's
hearing, the open portion of our hearing, Senators may submit
additional questions for the subcommittee's record. We request
the FBI respond within 30 days.
The subcommittee now stands in recess and we will reconvene
momentarily in a closed and classified session to hear from
Director Wray in Senate Visitors Center 217. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 7, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]