

FORCED LABOR, MASS INTERNMENT, AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN XINJIANG

HEARING BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 17, 2019

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China



Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56-600 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2024

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts,

Chair

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

THOMAS SUOZZI, New York

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey

BEN McADAMS, Utah

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey

BRIAN MAST, Florida

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri

Senate

MARCO RUBIO, Florida, *Co-chair*

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma

TOM COTTON, Arkansas

STEVE DAINES, Montana

TODD YOUNG, Indiana

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon

GARY PETERS, Michigan

ANGUS KING, Maine

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Not yet appointed

JONATHAN STIVERS, *Staff Director*

PETER MATTIS, *Deputy Staff Director*

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS

	Page
Opening Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from Massachusetts; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China	1
Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from Florida; Co-chair, Con- gressional-Executive Commission on China	3
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey	5
Statement of Hon. Todd Young, a U.S. Senator from Indiana	5
Zenz, Adrian, Non-resident Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, and author of “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang”	7
Turkel, Nury, Washington-based attorney and Chair of the Board and co- founder, Uyghur Human Rights Project	8
Posner, Michael, Jerome Kohlberg Professor of Ethics and Finance and Direc- tor of the Center for Business and Human Rights at NYU’s Stern School	11
Lehr, Amy K., Director of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former legal adviser to the U.N. Special Representative on Business and Human Rights	12

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Turkel, Nury	43
Posner, Michael	48
Lehr, Amy	54
McGovern, Hon. James P.	56
Rubio, Hon. Marco	57

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Zenz, Adrian, “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang”	59
Zenz, Adrian, supplemental material	84
The Citizen Power Institute of Citizens Power Initiatives for China, “Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies” (A Report on Forced and Prison Labor in Xinjiang, China, and the Nexus to Global Supply Chains), submitted by Nury Turkel	87
Lehr, Amy K. and Mariefaye Bechrakis, “Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang— Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains,” a report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative	163
Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Repression Across Borders: The CCP’s Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans,” submitted by Nury Turkel	207
CECC Truth in Testimony form	254
Witness Biographies	255

FORCED LABOR, MASS INTERNMENT, AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN XINJIANG

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2019

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Representative James P. McGovern, Chair, presiding.

Also present: Senators Rubio, Daines, Young, Merkley, and Peters, and Representatives Suozzi, Smith, Kaptur, and Hartzler.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Good morning, and welcome to today's Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing, "Forced Labor, Mass Internment, and Social Control in Xinjiang."

In the last year Chinese authorities have expanded their network of mass internment camps where 1 million or more Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims have been detained and subjected to torture, extended solitary confinement, and political indoctrination, and deprived of food. Children of detainees are reportedly often placed in orphanages, welfare centers, and boarding schools. Some scholars and human rights groups argue that these practices may amount to crimes against humanity.

Outside the camps, the Chinese government has become more efficient in the use of technology to control and suppress. Some observers have described the surveillance system as an open-air prison.

Recent reports indicate that Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are increasingly sentenced to lengthy prison sentences on vague charges. One case is that of Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, who is serving a life sentence in spite of his dedication to nonviolence and reconciliation. He is a "Defending Freedoms Project" prisoner of conscience and his congressional advocate is Representative Jim Langevin of Rhode Island.

Meanwhile, the practice of Islam has also been criminalized. Mosques have been destroyed, Islamic dress has been forbidden, and fasting for Ramadan has been disallowed. It is in this context that new information has come to light detailing the widespread use of a government-subsidized and large-scale system of forced labor in both mass internment camps and in factories throughout Xinjiang. Satellite imagery, personal testimony, and official docu-

ments indicate that detainees in camps, and some who have been released, are forced to work in food, textile, and other manufacturing jobs.

Products reportedly produced with forced labor include textiles, such as yarn, clothing, gloves, bedding, and carpet; electronics, including cell phones and computers; food products; shoes; tea; and handicrafts.

In January 2019, the U.S. company Badger Sportswear stopped importing clothing following reports that it was made with forced labor by internment camp detainees. In May 2019, the Wall Street Journal linked the supply chains of Adidas, Campbell Soup, H&M, Kraft-Heinz, Coca-Cola, and Gap Inc. to forced labor.

On October 1st, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a withhold release order on garments produced with prison or forced labor by Hetian Taida Apparel, which has exported products to Costco. Current U.S. law prohibits the import of any product made with forced labor. Any U.S. or international company that produces or has a supply chain in Xinjiang may be complicit in forced labor and human rights violations.

In 2002 China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The ICESCR affirms the right of all people to self-determination and non-discrimination, to freely choose and accept work, to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, including the right to remuneration, and to take part in cultural life.

All of these policies and practices I have just described violate the ICESCR as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. China is failing to comply with international human rights obligations it freely assumed.

There is no question that the U.S. should be doing more to help the Uyghur people. In April, Senator Rubio and I, and over 40 Members called for Global Magnitsky sanctions against Chen Quanguo, the Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary, as well as Chinese officials and companies complicit in gross violations of human rights. And last week, we expressed support when the Administration added 28 Chinese companies to the Entity List and applied visa restrictions on some Chinese officials.

Right now, there are important bills in Congress that should pass including the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, sponsored by Senator Rubio, Representative Suozzi, and Representative Chris Smith, and the Uighur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act, sponsored by Chairman Brad Sherman.

I look forward to hearing any and all recommendations about what more can and should be done, including whether it is feasible for companies to conduct reliable inspections and audits of supply chains in the region. Congress stands in solidarity with the Uyghur people, and we want to do all we can to support the full exercise of their human rights.

Finally, before I begin, I would like to recognize Nury Teyip, who is here with us today. His brother, Tashpolat Teyip, was the president of Xinjiang University and is a renowned scholar. Tashpolat Teyip was disappeared in March 2017 and was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve.

Last month, we learned from Amnesty International that he may have been executed. I condemn his detention in the strongest possible terms and call on the Chinese government to release him immediately.

Having said that, I'm now happy to yield to the Co-chair of the Commission, Senator Rubio, for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing. Thank you for convening it. It is also timely.

I want to thank all of our witnesses. Your research and your advocacy have done a lot to inform us and the world about what's happening—the atrocities being committed in the Xinjiang region by the Chinese Communist Party.

Through the decades, the crimes of the Chinese Communist Party have been as consistent as they have been egregious. Yet somehow, these tyrants maintain the ability to shock the world even further with their cruelty and their callousness.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the last two years has experienced the classic forms of Communist totalitarianism combined with the application now of new and advanced technologies. The difference between the Chinese Communist Party's crimes of the past and those of the present is the motivation. The past was about power alone. The present is now about power, but also about profit.

Chairman Xi Jinping and his henchman, Chen Quanguo—who, by the way, used to oversee Chinese brutality and repression inside Tibet, so he's a specialist at this—revived collectivization to force Uyghurs into the harness of the Chinese Communist party-state. Just as collectivization created famines that harmed millions in China, this new effort is blazing a trail of human suffering.

The problem goes much deeper than simply one million or more Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities detained and forced to work in what can only be called concentration camps. For those able to escape the camps, they face the full power of the Chinese party-state mobilized against them and their families inside and outside of China. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Uyghur men and women have been forced to go through a regimen of military discipline and political reeducation in preparation to take jobs in satellite factories.

The Chinese Communist government offers incentives for Chinese companies to exploit this labor as the cost of doing business in coastal provinces rises. And what of the families, the children, and the elderly? They're removed from their family's care so the adults can work in the factories. Instead of the warm embrace of their families, the young and the elderly are forced into the stifling custody of the Chinese Communist Party.

For the children, this means the loss of their language, their culture, their faith, their heritage. For the elderly, this means loneliness and isolation in their final years. Their children and grandchildren will never hear the stories of lives well lived, of hardships

conquered, or the importance of faith and values in a brutal communist-governed world.

Today's hearing, however, is not about this alone. It is about understanding how the Party integrates labor and social control, and the national security and moral risks for individuals and companies that deal with China. The network of detention facilities and factories has turned Xinjiang into a forced labor camp roughly the size of the states of California, Montana, Texas, and Florida combined.

Millions of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities labor in textile and light manufacturing and are prohibited from practicing their faith. Simply put, this is slavery—the slavery of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Earlier this month the Trump Administration announced sanctions, as the Chairman said, targeting Chinese officials as well as governmental and commercial entities for these severe human rights abuses, and I believe that these also constitute crimes against humanity. We all welcome these steps. We also believe more can and should be done to resolve one of the world's greatest ongoing tragedies and to hold its perpetrators accountable.

I hope the House will soon pass S. 178, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that the Senate passed last month. The bill would require the Administration to gather information about the situation in Xinjiang and China's efforts to suppress international awareness of it.

China's efforts to silence Uyghurs and turn the world's attention away from the ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang have included the coercion and the intimidation of American citizens and residents here and abroad. This is an outrage that must be addressed.

The U.S. Government needs to do its part to ensure that Americans and the world are aware of what the Chinese government is doing in Xinjiang and have the freedom to express their views. Despite the efforts of our witnesses today, Americans—and American companies in particular—are all too unaware of what is taking place.

For example, the National Basketball Association maintains a residential training camp in Xinjiang, seemingly oblivious to the contradiction between speaking out about societal issues here at home, which they have the full freedom to do, yet staying silent about China's oppression.

Only after the U.S. Commerce Department added the Chinese artificial intelligence company SenseTime to the Entity List last week for its role in facilitating all of these crimes did MIT begin to review its relationship with the firm.

So it's long overdue for Americans and important institutions in academia and the private sector to wake up and fully realize the real risks of doing business with China.

So I thank all of you again for being here today. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the discussion.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

I yield briefly to any of my colleagues who want to make an opening statement. Mr. Smith.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY**

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, for the past two years the Commission has shined a bright light on the massive, outrageous human rights abuses occurring in the Xinjiang region of China. To that end, I, joined by my good friend Tom Suozzi, introduced the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019, H.R. 649, with 110 cosponsors, and the companion bill, as Senator Rubio has pointed out, has already passed the Senate. So I hope we take that up immediately.

We have used our congressional platform to advocate for action on this Commission and to hold Chinese businesses and officials accountable for crimes against humanity. I commend the Administration for speaking out about dire human rights abuses over the past year, particularly Secretary Pompeo and Vice President Pence.

I also applaud the action taken just last week to restrict visas for certain Chinese officials and to place 28 Chinese governmental bodies and businesses on the Commerce Department's Entity List. Of course more needs to be done.

We should also be looking really aggressively at using Magnitsky sanctions against individuals because this is absolutely outrageous. As a matter of fact, we talk about crimes against humanity—this is genocide. They are trying to destroy the Muslim Uyghurs—they being the Chinese dictatorship—and the world needs to do far more than we have done to date. The world cannot remain silent when the Chinese government conducts a high-tech police state whose goal is the destruction of the entire ethnic minority population. And they are using every means at their disposal to do so.

I would point out—we talk about how they are using gulags and forced labor—that has been a staple, as we all know, of the Chinese dictatorship's exploitation for decades. I actually, after Tiananmen Square, joined Frank Wolf. We went and visited Beijing Prison No. 1 where the activists—40 of them that were there that we knew of—they were in Tiananmen Square asking for democracy. They were making jelly shoes and socks in Beijing Prison No. 1 for export. So this is just part of their apparatus that has now gone into hyperdrive, extended to the people of Xinjiang.

So we need to speak out. I believe that more countries, especially those with Muslim leaders, need to speak out more aggressively than they have. The OIC has done some, but it needs to do more. And the world and the U.N., all of us need to coalesce around—this has to stop. This is genocide.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much. Senator Young.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Well, I thank you for holding this hearing. It is important to be here today. This strikes me as modern-day slavery consistent with China's disregard for all manner of human rights; the basic dignity and freedom of all these individuals has been undermined and it appears they are being persecuted, in part, for their faith.

It strikes me that the United States is standing up for the Muslim world during this time, which is really important, as we stand

up for the freedom of religion of all people. And I think it's a really important time to hold this hearing.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have some more questions later.

Chair MCGOVERN. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Suozzi.

Representative SUOZZI. I'll wait.

Chair MCGOVERN. All right, well, thank you.

And I am now pleased to introduce our esteemed panel of expert witnesses this morning.

Adrian Zenz is a nonresident senior fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. Dr. Zenz has done pioneering work documenting the scope of mass internment camps by analyzing Chinese government procurement documents, construction bids, and domestic security budgets. He's also helped document the mass institutionalization of children whose parents have been detained in mass internment camps and the incentives offered to Chinese manufacturers to employ forced labor.

Nury Turkel is an attorney and serves as Chair of the Board for the Uyghur Human Rights Project, a research and advocacy organization that he cofounded in 2004. He has published commentaries on policy and legal matters in publications such as the Wall Street Journal and Foreign Policy. Born and raised in Kashgar, Mr. Turkel received his law degree from American University. He is the first U.S.-educated Uyghur lawyer and is a fluent speaker of Uyghur, Chinese, and Turkish.

Michael Posner serves as the Jerome Kohlberg Professor of Ethics and Finance at NYU Stern School of Business. He is the director of the Center for Business and Human Rights at the school, the first-ever human rights center at a business school. Prior to joining NYU Stern, Mr. Posner served in the Obama Administration as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. As a member of the White House Apparel Industry Partnership Taskforce in the mid-90s, he helped found the Fair Labor Association, an organization that brings together corporations, local leaders, universities, and NGOs to promote corporate accountability for working conditions in the apparel industry.

Amy Lehr is the director of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Lehr leads the initiatives work on human rights around the world, with a particular focus on how technology affects human rights and labor rights, and the importance of a values-based foreign policy.

Ms. Lehr's core expertise is in the area of business and human rights. She spent a decade in private practice advising companies and international institutions on how they can respect human rights in their global operations. Previously, she served as legal adviser to John Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, and in that role helped develop the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

Thank you all for being here.

Dr. Zenz, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN ZENZ, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW IN CHINA STUDIES AT THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM MEMORIAL FOUNDATION AND AUTHOR OF “BEYOND THE CAMPS: BEIJING’S GRAND SCHEME OF FORCED LABOR, POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN XINJIANG”

Salaam, and thank you for having me today.

In 2017, China’s Xinjiang region embarked on probably the largest incarceration of an ethno-religious minority since the Holocaust. Despite international criticism, Beijing has persisted in this campaign. The reason for this is now clear. All along there was a long-term strategy behind it.

What I am presenting today is in a number of ways more shocking than the reeducation campaign itself. It is more long-term, more all-encompassing, more intrusive, and more devious. Within this grand scheme, the camps only represent one piece of an entire puzzle.

Beijing’s long-term strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse combination of coercive training and labor, intergenerational separation, and complete control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of poverty alleviation.

In my research I’ve identified three schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of minority adults into different forms of coercive, or at least involuntary, labor. Flow one pertains to persons in vocational training internment camps. Camp detainees can end up in factories on internment camp compounds, in industrial parks, which can be located near camps or the camps in them, or village satellite factories.

The employing companies receive an 1800 Chinese yuan state subsidy for each internment camp laborer they train, 5000 yuan for each they employ, and a shipping cost subsidy of 4 percent of their sales volume. In 2018, Huaifu Corporation, which operates the world’s largest dyed yarn production in Xinjiang, received half a billion Chinese yuan, or US\$71 million in subsidies from the Xinjiang government.

This means that Beijing is now turning its internment campaign into a business of oppression where participating companies benefit not only from huge government subsidies but also from cheap minority labor. As a result, they will be able to undercut global prices and turn Made in Xinjiang into a multi-billion-dollar business model.

In one document, a company was promised the free use of factories. The government paid for two-thirds of the upfront investment cost and provided 500 internment camp laborers with accompanying police guards. The factories came with security equipment pre-installed and are being run in a semi-military style management fashion.

In 2018, several Uyghur counties established large factory compounds explicitly designed to employ internment camp labor. One county alone commissioned a factory park with 335,000 square feet of floor space to be constructed directly on an internment camp compound, providing forced labor for 1,560 camp detainees.

Flow two in this scheme pertains to a vast government scheme that puts hundreds of thousands of so-called rural surplus laborers

into centralized training lasting between one and three months, involving one month of military drill in order to produce standardized behavior, one month of political thought indoctrination, and one month of vocational skills training. Workers are then sent off to their new work destination in large groups and live in factory dormitories, often far from home.

This process might not be as coercive as internment camp labor, but it shares many similar features indicating a high degree of coercion.

Flow three places rural Uyghur women into village factories equipped with nurseries for infants as young as a few months old. Uyghur women are traditionally resistant to full-time work because they care for the elderly and children. Government village work teams have been working overtime to “convince” these women and their parents of the benefits of full-time factory labor. Government documents note that factory work transforms women away from traditional customs and backward thinking and propels them into modernity.

One propaganda text on Uyghur women in a textile factory states that the process of de-extremification causes minority workers to become “born again.” The Chinese term used here for “born again” is the same as in a Chinese Bible where Jesus says you must be born again. Forced labor is equated with salvation.

A particular concern is that all of these labor flows are mixing beyond recognition. Graduates from internment camps now work alongside workers from flows two and three. Products made by any combination of these workers are then either directly exported or shipped to eastern China, but then may form components of products, or be repackaged, relabeled, and then exported.

As a result, many or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-skilled labor-intensive manufacturing can contain elements of involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang. My findings call for a global investigation of supply chains involving any Chinese products or product components.

The burden of proof should be shifted onto the Chinese companies. By declaring any low-skilled labor-intensive item manufactured in Xinjiang as potentially tainted with some form of coercive minority labor, Chinese companies that seek to export such products to the United States should conclusively prove that these products have no connection to Xinjiang. If they do, then relevant research teams must be permitted to conduct full and randomized authentic due-diligence audits in Xinjiang’s factories, villages, and internment camps.

Thank you.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much. Mr. Turkel.

STATEMENT OF NURY TURKEL, WASHINGTON-BASED ATTORNEY AND CO-FOUNDER AND CHAIR OF THE BOARD, UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT

Thank you, Chairman McGovern. Thank you, Co-chair Rubio, and thanks to the other members of the Commission for directing the attention of Congress to the abominable crimes committed against Uyghur people in East Turkestan that China calls Xinjiang.

Even as we speak, these crimes are tainting American consumer products. I'm here to urge Congress to strong action to end the unwitting complicity of the American public and to create a legislative mandate for a much stronger U.S. Government response to the ongoing Uyghur crisis by passing the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act without further delay.

Forced labor is a deeply embedded tool of repression, punishment, and control in China. Over a decade ago in 2008, the Uyghur Human Rights Project reported on the systematic program of coercive labor transfer that targeted young Uyghur women to be sent to factories in coastal Chinese provinces. The authorities used a combination of deception, pressure, and threats to round up thousands of young Uyghurs against their will. These programs had the dual effect of separating families and placing Uyghurs in involuntary factory settings far from home.

Today we are seeing a convergence of the Strike Hard campaign of mass internment with the pre-existing state plan to relocate the textile industry to the Uyghur region. As documented in the recently published report by Citizen Power for China, new subsidies encourage companies to shift factories to the region. Government documents outline a plan to have at least a million textile industry jobs in the region by 2023.

The manager of a factory known to use detained-labor camps stated in a TV interview: "With the support of the government we have already recruited more than 600 people. We plan to reach 1,000 workers by the end of this year. We plan to provide jobs to 1,500 people by the end of 2019."

One of those workers reported that she got paid less than half of the minimum wage. She was also not allowed to leave and continued to endure forced indoctrination and was threatened with being sent back to the camp if she refused to sign a contract.

We want to thank CBP for its October 7th withhold release order on goods produced by Hetian Taida in a factory in the Hetian Taida vocational education training center. But it's extremely disturbing that U.S. companies were still sourcing from the company until then.

Two weeks ago, baby clothes produced by Hetian Taida were on the shelves at Costco. The company has now pulled these products, but it is hard to understand how the goods got to the store shelves in the first place given how long this information has been public.

But it is not just Hetian Taida. U.S. enforcement must step up the pressure so that all goods sourced from the companies in the Uyghur region receive scrutiny commensurate with the extremely high risk of forced labor in the supply chain.

Asphyxiating social control facilitates forced and involuntary labor. The techno-totalitarian system of surveillance and intimidation put in place by Xinjiang authorities means that any attempt to resist orders puts one and one's family at great risk. As in the case of the 2008 labor transfer program to the eastern factories, many Uyghurs are currently being forced to work in factories under the so-called poverty alleviation program. Uyghurs don't have a choice. Refusing to participate in these programs could result in being sent to the camps.

This is the same dynamic as in the state program encouraging marriage between ethnic Han Chinese men and Uyghur women, which is promoted and celebrated in the state media outlet. Uyghur women consenting to these marriages must be assumed in the vast majority of cases to have consented under extreme duress. If a young Uyghur woman were to decline a marriage proposal from a Han Chinese man, she and her family could be labeled as extremists and sent to the camps. Uyghurs cannot say no.

As a Uyghur individual living overseas recently described to the BBC, there is an atmosphere of horror: "Everyone feels like they are being watched all the time. There is a huge sense of fear. People tell me they sleep in their clothes because no one knows whether at night they might be taken away."

Uyghurs outside of China are also subject to extraterritorial surveillance and coercion. Our latest report on this issue documents these ongoing and flagrant violations of federal law on U.S. soil.

As one Uyghur American said about being contacted by Chinese state secret agents, "They are telling us, 'We are watching you. Wherever you go, you are still Chinese.' Even though you are outside of China, it does not mean that they can't do something to you, because they have your friends, children, parents and relatives."

Agents of foreign powers are surveilling and terrorizing our own fellow American citizens with threats to send their remaining family members to the camps if they speak out about what is happening in their homeland. Given this system of intimidation and terror both inside and outside of China, corporate supply chain due diligence is impossible.

The complete secrecy surrounding the camps and horrific means of total control that is hanging over those who are not in the camps means that the free flow of information has been cut off to an extent rarely seen in modern times. No independent auditor or supply chain certification process can collect reliable information from workers, factory management, and local government. No interviews can be treated as uncoerced.

Because due diligence is impossible, no company can provide assurance that products sourced in the Uyghur region qualify for legal import into the United States or any country that bans the import of forced labor products. If existing legal authorities are insufficient for Customs and Border Protection to issue withhold release orders commensurate with the risk of allowing illegal goods into the United States, Congress must act to shift the burden of proof to the companies that wish to import products sourced in Xinjiang or that were produced with Xinjiang-sourced cotton.

I have some additional recommendations that I would like to share with you when time permits. Thank you very much.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turkel appears in the Appendix.]

Chair MCGOVERN. Mr. Posner.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL POSNER, JEROME KOHLBERG PROFESSOR OF ETHICS AND FINANCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT NYU'S STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Thank you, Chairman McGovern, Chairman Rubio. I want to first thank you, especially, and Congressman Smith, for the leadership you've displayed on human rights over the years.

When I was in the government, I was called quite frequently to come to various places in Congress to defend things that we were doing. We needed prodding then and it was really, to me, a welcome opportunity to come up here, but not everybody in the State Department or the Government views congressional appearances as their favorite pastime.

This is a particularly important moment for you to be continuing to lead, and especially on this issue. All of you in your opening statements laid out the various things that you have done—you, Senator Rubio, and the Senate passing the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, and Congressman McGovern and Smith, what you've done, what you are doing now in getting the House to pass a comparable or different bill that deals with some restrictions, especially on technology.

It's really important that you keep doing that. And I think the recent actions by the Administration, adding the 28 organizations to the Entity List, the October Customs and Border withhold release orders, and the identification—although without names—of individuals for visa restrictions. None of that would have happened if Congress hadn't been on the ball.

And there's more that the Administration can do. You have mentioned the Magnitsky Act as one example. We need to name names. We need to not only pass laws, but we need to implement them and implement those regulations so that companies that are doing business, and entities, leaders in that area really feel the bite. So I just urge you to continue what you are doing.

I want to say just a couple of words about what the Administration's done. I am often critical of the Administration, and this is an area where I think Secretary Pompeo and Deputy Sullivan have spoken out forcefully and said the right things consistently, including at the U.N. General Assembly last month. Their words are clear. They are clearly concerned about what's happening in Xinjiang.

But their words are undermined by the ambivalence of the Administration, and frankly, it starts at the top. The President himself has been unable or unwilling to speak out forcefully about human rights in China. And it's part of a broader pattern.

At the Group of Seven meeting last month, Trump referred to Egyptian President el-Sisi as "my favorite dictator." In a bilateral meeting, he called him a real leader who's done some things that are absolutely amazing. He called the Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman a friend, saying he's done a spectacular job. He has pledged complete support for Brazilian President Bolsonaro, saying he's done a great job for the people of Brazil in all respects. He has praised Vladimir Putin as a terrific person. The list goes on and on.

And it's not surprising then, that in August, when he was asked about what was happening in Hong Kong, he said the people of Hong Kong and China are going to have to deal with that themselves; they don't need any advice.

With due respect, they do need advice. They need support. They need help. People who are suffering human rights violations in China need our leadership and that leadership has not been forthcoming.

I will give you one quick example. At the UN Human Rights Council, which we withdrew from, 22 mostly Western European governments together called on the Council to condemn what's happening with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. We weren't there. We did not participate. U.S. leadership is lacking in the world now on these issues at a time when it's more needed than ever.

I want to just take my last minute to say a couple of things about the business community. I'm at a business school. Senator Rubio talked briefly about the NBA. What was striking to me last week as the NBA caught itself up in an unnecessary set of confused statements—they were debating whether or not a general manager of a team even had the right to tweet something. They didn't talk about the underlying issue—are human rights and democracy being respected in Hong Kong? We all need—whether on the commercial side, in government, or the private sector or private individuals, we need to recognize that what's happening in Hong Kong, what's happening with the Uyghurs, is of interest and concern to all of us. We need to be straightforward and we need to be stronger.

In my written testimony, I talk a lot about surveillance technology, the so-called integrated joint operations platform in Xinjiang, which is probably the most pervasive surveillance program anywhere in the world. A number of American companies have been involved in that as investors—there are some examples in my testimony.

I think it is critical now—and this goes back to something Senator Rubio said—it's critical now for the investment community, for the technology community, for universities, to double their efforts to think about what due diligence really means and not involve themselves at all in supporting this Chinese program of surveillance technology that's being misused against this population.

Thank you very much.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Posner appears in the Appendix.]

Chair MCGOVERN. Ms. Lehr.

STATEMENT OF AMY LEHR, DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND FORMER LEGAL ADVISER TO THE U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Chairman McGovern, Chairman Rubio, and distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this important topic and for the opportunity to speak.

I've worked in the field of business and human rights for over a decade, which will inform what I say. My program has been focus-

ing on both technology and forced labor in Xinjiang and we issued a report today on forced labor in that region. Can I submit this report for the hearing record?

Chair MCGOVERN. Without objection.

[The report appears in the Appendix.]

Ms. LEHR. Thank you.

Forced labor in Xinjiang is unique and it requires novel responses. Normal forced labor involves migrant workers who end up indebted to recruiters and have their passports confiscated, leaving them trapped in a foreign country. In contrast, in Xinjiang, the Chinese state itself is organizing the forced labor.

Moreover, it is part of a broader effort to cut minorities off from their culture and religion and increase loyalty to the CCP through detention, reeducation, and work. Forced labor in Xinjiang may indeed rise to the level of a crime against humanity, which I'm happy to expand upon later.

At CSIS our research confirmed and expanded on the work of others who have spoken today. Our interviews with ex-detainees confirmed, for example, that in some cases both ex-detainees and the rural poor are being threatened with more detention if they don't accept work assignments. Both groups are also being paid far below the minimum wage in some instances, and the populations of the rural poor and ex-detainees are being mixed in factories.

We don't know the exact scale of forced labor in Xinjiang, but there are some indicators. So for example, the government of Kashgar, a region in Xinjiang, stated that it would send 100,000 reeducated individuals to work in factories. That is 20 percent of the entire Uyghur population of Kashgar. Even if the Chinese government does not hit all of its targets, the numbers are likely to be very significant.

Because some of the companies potentially involved in forced labor in Xinjiang are linked to global supply chains, action in this area can be part of the solution, although it certainly won't be sufficient.

So what are these links? Xinjiang produces 84 percent of China's cotton. A number of large Chinese yarn, textile, and apparel companies operate in Xinjiang, along with many smaller ones. This sector is on the rise because, as others have mentioned, it is being subsidized heavily, including for taking in reeducated workers.

In many instances, the companies operating in Xinjiang sell to other enterprises in China that further process textiles or other goods. The U.S. imports over 30 percent of its apparel from China. So it's quite clear that some of Xinjiang's tainted goods are indeed entering our stream of commerce. But when we reviewed import records, less than 1 percent of Chinese shipments arrive directly from Xinjiang to the U.S. So it's a bit complex, the supply chains are.

Identifying Chinese suppliers using forced labor in Xinjiang will require new approaches. For example, companies cannot conduct their normal human rights due diligence such as labor audits because it's such a suppressed place. And our labor auditors actually don't have access to the region in many cases now. Very few ex-detainees are willing to speak about their experience because they're being terrorized, even abroad.

There are some red flags or indicators of forced labor that can be identified through online research. These include—I'll just give a few examples—hiring through government recruiters, language that mentions employing ethnic minority graduates, or companies that are getting certain kinds of subsidies, for example, for training supplements for factories in Xinjiang, aid to Xinjiang, and so forth.

So where does that take us in terms of recommendations? As a starting place, U.S. foreign policy really should embody our values, and we need to respond with an urgency that matches the severity of these abuses. As others have mentioned, the Administration should apply the Magnitsky sanctions and that could be to individuals that are hiding some of these companies, for example.

We do know that some of the companies involved in forced labor in Xinjiang have a U.S. presence. And generally, I think the more we can pursue companies directly involved in abuses in Xinjiang, the better. And that wouldn't just be forced labor, but also related to technology and even companies that are building these factories and detention facilities.

A federal agency, perhaps the Department of Labor or Department of State, should actually be funded to create a public watchlist of companies in Xinjiang that trigger the red flags we identified that indicate a risk of forced labor. That would help CBP do its job, it would assist with Global Magnitsky designations, and it would also put U.S. companies on formal notice of the risks in their supply chain.

CBP's approach will need to reflect—in terms of using the Tariff Act to seize goods that are produced with forced labor abroad—their approach needs to reflect the fact that Xinjiang is a police state. And so they probably are going to need to make some assumptions based on certain of the red flags we identified to enable seizures.

Companies have a stand-alone responsibility to respect human rights. So they should be carrying out human rights due diligence on their extended supply chains that come from China. And again, that means not business as usual, but actually much enhanced due diligence that will require new efforts and learning on their part.

They could consider a ban on knowingly sourcing Xinjiang cotton as well. That's obviously challenging given the relationship between our economy and the Chinese economy and certain sectors, but it is an option.

The U.S. Government itself should adopt our report's recommendations on using red flags and due diligence in their own procurement practices. Our procurement as a government is enormous.

And last, I do think it's going to be really critical to work with allies so they adopt similar measures on global supply chains because there's a risk that what we shut out here will simply go, let's say, into Europe.

Thank you very much for your time. I welcome your questions.
Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lehr appears in the Appendix.]

Chair MCGOVERN. I'm going to yield to Mr. Suozzi first. He is chairing another hearing at the same time as this. So we'll go to him first for any questions.

Representative SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership. Thank you, Senator Rubio, for holding this hearing as well. I want to thank my colleague Chris Smith for his longstanding work on human rights issues, and especially for working together with me on the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. You see the President on television with the leader of China and it looks kind of like it's just another normal relationship, but there is really something extreme going on that you're educating the public about. And the American people do not realize—despite the reports in major periodicals and reports that you've done and people that pay attention like the people on this Committee—most Americans do not realize what's happening.

I sound like a broken record, but most Americans have believed ever since Nixon went to China that the more that China was exposed to the United States of America and the West, that they'd become more like us, that they would adopt our way of life as far as capitalism. They would adopt our way of life as far as democracy and human rights.

And obviously that just hasn't happened. And this is one of the most blatant examples of the way that the Chinese Communist Party and government treat the people. It started with the Tibetans, and we see it unfolding in the newspapers and on television in Hong Kong. But this is really one of the grossest examples of human repression that's taking place in the world today.

China, as it makes its efforts to become more and more of a global power economically, technologically, militarily, wants to export its way of life to other people. And this is their way of life. This is the way they want to treat their own people.

So I want to go to you, Mr. Zenz, where you talked about this as being an economic model. When most of us have looked at this, certainly when I've looked at this, we've thought about it as being a way to promote conformity, to repress people, religious persecution, but you're saying that this is also an economic model. And if you look at the industries that this forced labor is being used for, it's usually low-skilled, standardized mass production. It's not the future of high technology and things like that. This is a way to get cheap labor for standardized mass production.

How much of what's going on with the Uyghurs, especially, and the forced labor that's taking place, do you see as being a way to get conformity and repression of a religious minority, and how much of it do you see as being an economic model? I know this is not a precise thing, but is it a 50/50 thing, or is it 80 percent repression and conformity and 20 percent economic model? How do you view that?

Mr. ZENZ. The primary goal of Beijing in Xinjiang is to secure the long-term power and survival and rule of the Communist Party. For a communist regime, securing power and ideological supremacy through labor is ideologically consistent. It goes hand in hand.

I argue that the ideological goals are primary, and the economic goals are secondary. But even so, the economic goals are very important because, as we have seen, economic success is now the main driver of the CCP's power in the world, the reason why China

is powerful. And I believe they are extending their business model in Xinjiang; they're killing a whole bunch of birds with one single stone.

Representative SUOZZI. So when they are using this economic model, I think it's important for us to publicize the fact that—and I was not even aware of the extent of this until I prepared for this hearing—how many American companies are using the products that are being produced from this forced labor in Xinjiang.

So we see that there was a Wall Street Journal report back in May of 2019, that supply chains of Adidas, Campbell Soup, Kraft-Heinz company, Coca-Cola, and The Gap, and I see also—and I don't know where this came from, but it is in some of my materials that I prepared for this—that yarn reportedly entered the supply chain for H&M and Esprit, that there's also supplied clothing for Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, Nike, Patagonia.

Is it even more extensive than the companies that I have mentioned that are using these products that are being produced with forced labor in these internment camps—reeducation camps? Is it even more extensive than the companies that I have mentioned here?

Mr. ZENZ. Three points on this. The first point is that this is subject to further research because it likely is much more expansive than we all realize. Secondly, Xinjiang produces 84 percent of China's cotton. And China produces more than a quarter of the world's cotton, supplying cotton to Bangladesh, almost half of Bangladesh cotton, etc.

Now, we need to establish the exact dynamics of what all is made with forced labor, what is made with involuntary labor. I will give you one example. Hetian Taida—who was just subject to a Customs and Border Protection detention order—days before this detention order came into effect, Hetian Taida shipped 1.2 million items of baby pajamas and baby sleeper blankets with the destination Costco. Costco was going to sell them and put them up on a website until they decided to pull it.

I personally went to a Costco in Minnesota and asked about these baby clothes. And they said, yeah, we had them; for some reason we just got an order from management to pull them off the shelves for now.

Representative SUOZZI. So it's important that we remind people that this is internment. People are being imprisoned. People are being tortured. People are being forced to do things against their religion, and they're trying to benefit from it economically as well.

And the work that we are doing is to try and highlight this and have them pay for this economically. Part of their goal is economic. We want to really hurt them in their wallets. There are other things we need to do as well, but the sanctions efforts that we are trying to do to stop these products from coming to the United States of America are also essential.

I just want to point out also that China is exporting these practices to other parts of the world, including U.S. soil. And there was a report in March of this year that a jury in Brooklyn convicted the head of a Chinese construction firm for engaging in a conspiracy to provide forced labor of Chinese workers working here in the United States of America where people were working 14-hour days,

7 days a week for several years without receiving any pay, in the United States of America, in Brooklyn.

We also have—the U.S. Department of Labor announced that a Chinese construction company owed over \$13.9 million to 2,400 workers on the island of Saipan, part of the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The Chinese construction firms hired to build the Imperial Pacific Casino Resort project engaged in reprehensible labor practices. They employed workers who entered Saipan on tourist visas and forced workers to labor for over 12 hours a day with no days off, ignoring federal minimum wage and overtime rules. And there is further ongoing litigation regarding worker safety and forced labor.

China's goal is to become the dominant world power. They have a plan to do it. We need to look at what it is they are trying to accomplish. We know how they treat their people already. We know how they treat the Uyghurs. We know how they treated the Tibetans and are treating the Tibetans. We know what's going on in Hong Kong. And they want to export this throughout the world.

So I want to thank all of our witnesses today for their excellent work that they've done leading up to this point, the research they've done in helping to highlight this to the American people. And I ask my colleagues here to work with us to try and get our Foreign Affairs Committee to finally put our bill forward on the Uyghurs to get this moving so we can join with the Senate to try and get something passed to help make this happen.

Thank you very much to everyone, and Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for allowing me to go.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

Senator Rubio.

Co-chair RUBIO. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

Mr. Turkel, let me ask you this. It's clear from your testimony that the horrific situation that Uyghurs are facing, they're facing it no matter where they live, as their relatives at home in the Uyghur region are either swept into the camps or live in an atmosphere of constant and pervasive fear. As a Uyghur American yourself, if you feel comfortable speaking about this, can you tell us a little bit about how all of this has affected your family personally?

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you. Before I answer your question, I would like to ask the Chairman for permission to enter these two reports into the record. One is by my organization profiling China's harassment activities, coercive activities. And the second one is about labor, issued by a Chinese sister organization.

Chair MCGOVERN. Without objection.

[The reports appear in the Appendix.]

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you very much.

First of all, Senator Rubio, I would like to thank you for writing a letter early on to our ambassador, Ambassador Max Baucus, to ask for his help to help assist my parents.

Two things that I thought I was over with—especially after I arrived in the United States and became a U.S. citizen. One, I would never talk about my past history being born in a reeducation camp. Forty-odd years later, we're talking about similar circumstances. And then, two, I thought after becoming a U.S. citizen and licensed

to practice in the United States, I should be able to speak my mind. That is not happening to the full extent.

The last time I saw my mother was when she was here in 2004 for my law school graduation. With all the efforts, including Mr. Posner here, we have not made any progress. My father is 80 years old. Mom is 68. I do not think that I will ever see them again unless the Chinese government allows them to spend the rest of their lives here with their three American grandchildren.

It's been difficult. It would be disingenuous for me to say that I have a normal life. I don't. I would love to go back to my life two years ago, even though it was sort of a weird, strange, difficult life, but at least I was able to check up with my family members, to say hello, you know, congratulate them on significant dates.

Because of this software that the Chinese government forced Uyghurs to install on their phones, the Uyghurs have been disconnected. Even testifying at this hearing may cost the lives of my parents. But, you know, it's the right thing to do. I have to speak out. This helps me to overcome the sense of anxiety, sense of guilt, sense of desperation and despair, because speaking as the voice of the people is very empowering.

Co-chair RUBIO. And I think anyone who hears your testimony should be troubled. You're a United States citizen. Your children are United States citizens and your family is being directly impacted by the policy decisions, the coercion, the repression of a foreign entity, and it's being applied even here in the United States.

When people ask about this issue—first, this is not just about something that's happening in China. It is terrible what has happened over there. It is impacting people that live here, on a regular and daily basis. And it's not just limited, by the way, to people with your background from that region who have a family there or were born there.

As we saw last week, the NBA has learned that you really cannot ignore politics in China if you are doing business with or in China because your business partner is the Chinese Communist Party. In the case of the NBA, their partner is the Ministry of Education. And in the case of these corporations—and I think this is for the whole panel—the entity in China in charge of joint ventures and foreign companies doing business is the exact same entity that's in charge of standing up these factories in these different operations in this region.

If all of you could elaborate, if somebody is listening now, the corporate CEO, members of the board, even prominent shareholders who think that they could somehow make money in China, do business with China, but somehow avoid the political implications and/or witting or unwitting complicity in what's happening—I want to give the panel the opportunity to explain to them why that cannot be the case and why that will get harder and harder both from a realistic perspective—I think, Mr. Turkel, in your testimony you talked about how due diligence is impossible in this region—but even broader that there is no way to escape this. If you're sourcing from there, if you're doing business from there, particularly in the Xinjiang region, you are engaged in not just witting or unwitting complicity in these crimes, but you're engaged in politics whether

you like it or not and you're now forced to make this decision between billions of dollars in revenue or speaking out and losing it.

Mr. ZENZ. I would say something right away. I would like to support your point, Mr. Rubio, with one further important aspect that you will find in my written testimony.

The links between Xinjiang and eastern China are growing stronger by the day. So even if a company is doing business with an eastern Chinese corporation in China or outside of China, because of the mutual pairing assistance scheme by which 19 cities and provinces including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and others, the biggest ones, the biggest business players, are mutually linked with mostly Uyghur minority regions in Xinjiang, especially southern Xinjiang.

And by design and default, they're investing billions in the development of Xinjiang's minority regions. Now, this development, especially in the past years, has been predominantly to support the very business models that I've testified about, the three flows of labor.

I have hard evidence that mutual pairing assistance monies have directly funded internment camp labor by constructing factories on the grounds of internment camps or right next to them, expressly designated by government documents to employ internment camp workers. And these links mean that China's entire domestic supply chain is becoming tainted. The implications of that heavily underscore the very point that you have made, that doing business with China is not only a problem because the CCP and Beijing dictate what you can say publicly or not say about anything that they care about, but also because doing business even in eastern China is now increasingly impossible without in some way participating or supporting the repression in Xinjiang.

Co-chair RUBIO. If I can paraphrase, what you're basically saying is there is not a single American today that has not either worn clothes or used a tech device that is either funded or has been directly created by forced labor in China.

Mr. ZENZ. This is the trend because as we speak, it's Beijing's policy to turn Xinjiang into the cheap manufacturing hub of the Belt and Road. Xinjiang is already the center of the Belt and Road. And this pertains to textiles, also to electronics assembly. It pertains to food products, all kinds of products.

This is a long-term strategy, and this is increasing Xinjiang's share in the manufacturing of cheap goods, as we have heard, because of rising labor costs in the east. It is only going to increase its long-term government policy.

Mr. POSNER. Senator Rubio, just to add one other dimension which I mentioned briefly in my testimony, there are a number of companies now that have been put on this Entity List—28 companies and government institutions. A number of them are private companies that have gotten U.S. investment dollars. And it seems to me one place to start would be to look at—there is a company called Megvii, another called SenseTime. We know that not only are private investment firms, let's say in California, venture firms, investing, but also our public pension funds. In fact, the majority of dollars are coming from public pension, from state university funds.

I think one of the ways we can start to look at this is to ask not only who's doing business, who's manufacturing, but who's investing. Here we are talking about firms that are involved in surveillance technology, facial recognition in Xinjiang. They are being supported financially by U.S.-based investors who say, I am not focused on that. We need to focus—every American business that is connected to that needs to be put on notice that this is now their responsibility as well.

CO-CHAIR RUBIO. I just have one final question in regard to all this, and I am not claiming this is what is going to happen. I think I know the answer you're going to give me, but I think it's important to have it on the record.

How disastrous would it be if we wake up one day six months from now to news that there's some sort of trade deal and as part of this broader economic arrangement we have agreed, in exchange for them buying more stuff from us, to stop doing anything about this, to stop talking about this, to remove companies from the Entity List—in essence, I get asked this all the time—should this be related to the trade talks?

My answer has always been you don't want it related to the trade talks because you don't want this to be something that can be bargained away in exchange for more agricultural product purchases or what have you. But how disastrous, how demoralizing would it be on the global stage, not to mention to the character of our nation, if somehow this became one of the items to be negotiated. And I'm not claiming that it is, but certainly trying to be ahead of the curve on this.

Mr. POSNER. Well, I very much agree with your answer. Ultimately, this is a very important relationship, the U.S. and China. We've got security concerns. We have got economic concerns. We have to make sure that the human rights concerns are not subsumed by those other interests. We have to be principled; we have to stand for our values. And these issues have got to be dealt with on their own terms, and we can't compromise them for other interests.

Ms. LEHR. Just to quickly add to that, I also think U.S. leadership is so important because if we back off, especially on the technology side—we know that these technologies are being exported to other countries. And so when you just think about the world we want to live in and the role of democracy, it is just incredibly important. So maintaining a focus on human rights regardless of what happens with trade is vital.

Co-chair RUBIO. Just a final point that I would make, as my time is up. Although the clock keeps jumping around here somehow. I don't know, it's magical.

[Laughter.]

Co-chair RUBIO. But it is a home field advantage, I think.

Chair MCGOVERN. We are very liberal.

Co-chair RUBIO. The point I want to make, and just in the broader sense of it, the morality of this is clear. I think our national security and national interest in being outspoken and active on this is clear. I would just add, just if you purely analyze this from a trade and economic perspective, how can you fairly compete? You are talking about outsourcing. How could you fairly compete with

a nation who produces basically free labor, compelled free labor competing with your workers and your industries?

So it's wrong morally. It's outrageous, but it is also, I think, the ultimate violation of any sort of trade agreement you could possibly have that would be fair and balanced between two countries. So anyway, the more you learn about this, the more outrageous it is. It really is.

But thank you all for being here.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you.

Before I yield to Representative Smith for his questions, I just have a quick question.

It was reported this morning that Cotton On and Target Australia have stopped sourcing cotton from Xinjiang due to the concerns about forced labor and human rights abuses. And so I am just sitting here listening, as we all are, to the expert testimony here today on the widespread use of forced labor in Xinjiang and the difficulties in determining whether or not a particular factory is using forced labor.

I've met with American businesses. We've had these conversations and they tell me they have complied with all the rules and regulations that we have required of them and they check all the boxes. But yet I don't really feel reassured that they know for certain that they're not sourcing from places that use forced labor.

I just want to ask; do you believe that the U.S. should ban all imports from Xinjiang?

Ms. LEHR. I think that's a hard question. In terms of potentially CBP having a WRO that bans all products or all cotton from Xinjiang, it would obviously have significant, immediate economic repercussions. And I think the challenge may be—I think there's a problem with companies; Costco, for example, is quite powerful—where they really should have known.

There are situations where things will be many layers away in the supply chain and companies may incidentally and unknowingly still source. So it's never going to be a perfect system.

And I think the question is, just what's the fastest way to get us somewhere that puts pressure on the Chinese government? So bans are one approach.

Another approach would be to start putting major, some of the larger Chinese companies, on some kind of watchlist. It is going to cause them specifically to feel pain. So a lot of the companies in the pairing program that Adrian talked about would probably make it onto that watchlist. And if anyone's going to—to the extent you can put any leverage on the government, it would be them. They are big enough to do it. So I think there are different potential approaches.

Chair MCGOVERN. And I ask the question because based on some of the conversations I have had with U.S. businesses, again, they can check a box, but I don't really feel that they are trying hard enough to determine whether or not forced labor is part of what they are producing. I just throw that out there based on the news this morning.

Mr. Posner, do you——

Ms. LEHR. Could I just say very quickly—sorry, Mike.

Yeah, I think they need to really step up what they are doing. The normal way that companies try to figure out if they have forced labor in their supply chain doesn't work in Xinjiang. They have got to change how they are doing it to be taken seriously.

Chair MCGOVERN. I guess my point is that we can lecture, and we can urge, and we can tell them to do this, I just don't really feel that they are.

Mr. Posner.

Mr. POSNER. Yes, I was just going to add—I think one of the advantages, one of the benefits of the Senate bill, the passed bill, the Human Rights Policy Act, is that it requires the U.S. Government to report more fulsomely on what's going on.

And one of the things that they should and can be looking at much more ambitiously is the use of forced and slave labor. And to the extent that they make that link to companies in the United States, that's the place to start. And my sense is we need to shift the burden of proof. We need to say, if you know that things are being produced with forced labor in Xinjiang, then companies need to be absolutely sure that their products are not being produced there.

We need to make it easier to connect those dots so that companies feel the obligation—American companies and others—not to do business.

Chair MCGOVERN. Mr. Turkel.

Mr. TURKEL. Yes. I would say in one word, yes. That is necessary. We should also encourage other countries, our trade partners, to take a similar measure. This has to be a global effort. I applaud the Australian government for taking this step yesterday with those companies. They are even looking at others, such as H&M and other importers to implement similar policies.

Chair MCGOVERN. Mr. Zenz.

Mr. ZENZ. Yes, I think at a minimum the burden of proof should be shifted to the companies. That's a step that should be done. So there should be much more restrictive practice.

But I actually do believe that a general ban on low-skilled, high-labor-intensive manufacturing items from Xinjiang is actually not unfeasible. It can be done because we have such policy evidence, and we can continue to work on it, but we have such evidence that this is a systematic policy.

In relation to the mutual pairing assistance, we have evidence of the funding being put into it. We have evidence on enough levels. I think this would send a much stronger message to Beijing than anything else, including visa bans on Chen Quanguo, or policy acts, travel bans, etc. I think this would be the thing to look into and I think it can be done if done properly.

Mr. TURKEL. Can I add one more quick point?

We have been looking at very different ways to address the humanitarian crisis and to force the Chinese government to change its behavior. This is one of the ways that they may possibly change, because the Chinese government has not incurred any cost for their policies. Unless it becomes a very costly operation, I don't think that they will change their behavior. And also by banning everything, we may be able to help manufacturers to start their tooling technician life all over again.

Chair MCGOVERN. Yes, I am just curious. Target Australia—why isn't Target America doing it? It just—in any event, thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Representative SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your tremendous testimony and your leadership. Secretary Posner, great to see you again. In the 1990s, I held a series of hearings and worked very hard on the whole issue of gulag labor. And George Bush—Herbert Walker that is—and then Bill Clinton—had this weak and inadequate policy of an MOU where they said, Oh, if we suspect something is in violation of the Smoot-Hawley Act and is coming here, prison-made goods, we will then tell the Chinese to investigate. And within a certain time period, they'll give us their answer, and end of story.

I went and visited two of the Customs people in Beijing who are in charge of implementing that, and they were like the Maytag repairman. They had no work. They said, Well, we never get anything.

We have enabled, perhaps unwittingly over these decades through very feckless and weak policies, the Chinese to exploit. And why would they expect that there would be any real penalty now when the world looks away, including in many cases, the United States.

So the gulag labor issue has been with us a long time. It is now being implemented with great, horrific consequences against the Muslim Uyghurs. I say that as some background.

But we do have some tools that ought to be more aggressively—hopefully the new bill will, as Secretary Posner said, really increase that scrutiny and require a great deal of application of our laws. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act makes absolutely clear that this is in violation of U.S. law. That ought to be used.

Yes, China is already a Tier 3 country, but there's a sanctions regime that has not been imposed. It was not imposed under Obama. It was not imposed because—they were Tier 3 for one year under Obama, and it has not been imposed upon a whole lot of countries. That needs to be brushed off and those sanctions used there.

We also need, obviously, to use other tools that are at our disposal. So I say we've got to just end mere words, and rhetoric, and concern, and now use tools, laws that are at our disposal.

If any of you could give us best estimates as to how many people are in the Uyghur *laogai* or gulags? For years, some of you know this. I know, Secretary Posner, that you know this.

Since my second term in 1983, I have pushed very hard on the issue of forced abortion and coercive population control in China, which is often implemented in a way—in terms of discovery of pregnancies that were not agreed to by the government, children that were not agreed to by the government—at the factory level.

I remember John Avedon wrote a horrific piece about the rape of Tibet and talked about how it was an act of genocide, what they were doing there. When Rebiya Kadeer contacted me about a mother carrying a child, who had been rounded up by three dozen police in Xinjiang, I went to our ambassador. I went to the Chinese ambassadors and said—are you kidding? All those people to destroy one little baby and to exploit that woman? That baby got a reprieve

and was born, but the mother was in the hospital being coerced to have an abortion.

What happens in the labor camps when a woman is pregnant? Is she forcibly aborted? Does anybody know? Have we been asking those questions as well?

So I guess—I have a lot of other questions, but I don't have enough time. If you could speak to some of those issues, if you would?

Mr. ZENZ. The number of estimated detainees is, of course, of interest and relevant in terms of coercive internment labor. The problem with that is that the internment network is very multi-pronged and much of it is heavy-handed on reeducation.

We have indication that one section of detainees is now sentenced to prison terms. Another part is being kept in intensive reeducation because they apparently have not been broken yet, and apparently the ones on their best behavior are being put in vocational training which is largely reeducation. But then eventually—if they are on top behavior, they can graduate. I am actually looking into some of this, so it is a bit premature to give more details. But we are looking at multiple streams and the ones that most comply with the government are being sent into the factories for labor.

It's very important to look at all three flows of labor that I've outlined in my research paper because the involuntary or coercive labor issue goes far beyond the reeducation camps. The training of rural surplus laborers, the official policy to set up satellite factories in every other village, in every second village in Xinjiang's minority regions, the co-optation of nearly all adults, including women, into labor, means that we are looking at a scheme—depending on how we define forced labor—if we define forced labor as at least highly involuntary at a minimum, we are talking millions, millions of minority Uyghur and Kazakh adults.

If we do it more narrowly as internment camp labor taking place in or near internment camps, we are getting smaller numbers. But the problem is these people are being sent, firstly, apparently, to forced labor right on the camp compounds or nearby in industrial parks, often with police accompaniment. But then after some time if they have behaved well, they can then move on to satellite factories in their own villages or industrial parks. So it is a successive scheme. We cannot only pin this on internment camps or even prison labor, which is also happening. The prison labor is a whole separate thing in itself.

We need to track the entire development and related policies, and on a scale of coercion of labor, we are talking about a grand scheme that's encompassing basically almost the entire minority population to an extent, with the exception of the more highly educated; some of them are allowed to just remain in government jobs and whatnot.

Mr. TURKEL. There're different numbers being put out. The most recent one was by Randall Schriver, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. He stated up to 3 million.

Even if it is 1 million or 3 million, that is a significant number. Let's say it's 3 million. That is four times the size of the District of Columbia population. So this city has been four times emptied

out. That's the equivalent of that figure put out by the Pentagon. And those people have names, aspirations, and families.

So it's easy for us to say 1 million, 3 million, but the entire generation has been wiped out. They have a specific targeted age group, the people born in the 1980s and 90s. And as you may have known, they have been collecting individual information based on travel history, past teaching, like Mr. Teyip's brother, and also a social context. So the artificial intelligence gathered up these people.

So when you look at the survivors, when you look at the survivors' testimony or talk to them, some villages are completely emptied out. So the Uyghurs actually think this 3 million figure is a very conservative figure.

Ms. LEHR. I wanted to just pick up a little bit on the medical-related issues. We don't have anything very clear, specifically, on forced abortion. We have not heard very much, but we did interview a number of former detainees. And one thing we heard repeatedly that we weren't even looking for was people being subjected to repeated blood tests, repeated medical testing, often quite extensive; women being given shots that they did not really know what they were for, not consensual, which is a violation of international law, medical testing without consent. So I think that's a whole other piece that needs attention, and we just don't have enough yet to know exactly what's going on.

Representative SMITH. Are there any indications that organs may be—the way they—

Ms. LEHR. You know, there are people who suspect it, but I don't think we have heard anything that we could confirm that with. Nury, do you have anything on that?

Mr. TURKEL. No.

Mr. POSNER. Okay. If I understand the slightly broader point, and it goes back to something Senator Rubio said when he asked the question about linking trade. All of the good will and good intentions in this room, both on the part of all of you, and witnesses here, pales in comparison to the direct relationship between our President and Xi Jinping.

The Chinese Communist Party is a top-down, centrally controlled apparatus. Xi is both the president of China and the head of the Chinese Communist Party. And so on one level the thing that is the most important is that there be a clear, unequivocal message coming from the top of our own government. That's what would make the greatest difference and it's why I dwelled on it a little bit in my testimony, but there is such an obvious disconnect between what people in the State Department and these other agencies are saying and doing, and what the President is saying.

And so again, I know none of you has the ability to control the President's words or actions, but I think we need to keep our eye on that part of the relationship. It's a critical piece. And what happens at the top of the Chinese Communist Party filters down throughout the system. That's where the problem starts and we're not going to really solve this until we have a more clear and unambiguous policy coming from the top.

Representative SMITH. Thank you.

Chair MCGOVERN. Congresswoman Kaptur.

Representative KAPTUR. Yes, I want to thank our co-chairs this morning for just an excellent hearing and all of those who have come to place on the record your very important information.

The word “communism” is a very disturbing word to me. I come from a family where two great-uncles—one died in one of Stalin’s gulags, and the other was sent to two of them and survived. He got out in 1952 after Stalin’s death.

So the whole philosophy, Dr. Zenz, that you referenced, work sets you free—whether one looks at the Nazi Party or the Communist Party, this whole idea that somehow forced labor equals salvation, I would be very grateful for any additional information you have from a philosophical standpoint about where this sick idea comes from. That’s not really my question this morning, but I think that the Victims of Communism Foundation . . . you are on to something extraordinarily important that I think the new generation needs to learn.

In terms of the impact of U.S. business relations with China, I’m wondering if in terms of China’s balance of payments with any country in the world, if any of you could state with which nation China has the largest trade surplus. In other words, more purchases from that particular country come from China than China purchases from that country. Could someone state which country purchases more of their goods than any other?

Mr. POSNER. I don’t know the exact numbers, but U.S. imports from China are number one.

Representative KAPTUR. That is correct, the United States. So if one looks at half a trillion dollars or more of trade deficit annually, we are integrally woven into their practices.

I’m wondering, if you look at the purchase of U.S. debt, do any of you know which country purchases the greatest share of U.S. debt?

Mr. TURKEL. China. I believe it’s China.

Representative KAPTUR. Yes. It’s over a trillion dollars, \$1.13 trillion. So what China does is integrally woven into the functioning of our society.

Mr. TURKEL, I will do anything I can to help your family. I am sure every Member up here would. Just know that we stand ready to help families like yours. I welcome you to my district to tell your story. If you’re ever flying over Ohio, we would welcome you.

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you.

Representative KAPTUR. We have a series we call “At Freedom’s Edge.” Your family is a living example of it, globally. God bless you and God bless your parents.

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you.

Representative KAPTUR. I want to ask our witnesses, in terms of the gulags that you referenced, is there a gender difference? Are there more women working in these zones than men, or is it equal? Does anyone wish to comment on that?

Mr. ZENZ. Yes, the government has a quota for gender in minority textile manufacturing. And it’s supposed to be either 3:7 or 4:7, a ratio in favor of women. You also see that almost all the propaganda accounts in Uyghur textile manufacturing, especially connected to internment camps, show women.

Representative KAPTUR. Are you saying it is four men to seven women? Is that what you're saying?

Mr. ZENZ. Yes. Yes, for textiles and manufacturing.

Representative KAPTUR. Why is that?

Mr. ZENZ. It is, of course, for traditional reasons because traditionally Uyghur women, minority women, have engaged in traditional forms of cloth making, dress, etc.

Representative KAPTUR. All right.

I am reminded of the Triangle Shirtwaist fire in New York City which spawned the development of what was called the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in our own country, and the struggle that women have had globally, to try to earn a decent living for the work that they do, many in very unsafe conditions and exploitative conditions.

I want to ask any of you, what are the average wages? If you were to talk to an average American and just say look, this is what American workers earn, what do Chinese workers earn working in these zones?

Ms. LEHR. I can just give you a little anecdotal information about what the minimum wage is and what we are hearing people are actually being paid.

The minimum wage in Xinjiang is between 1400 and 1800 yuan per month. But in fact, what we're hearing is that some of both ex-detainees and the rural poor who are part of these poverty alleviation programs are being paid sometimes not at all, sometimes being paid maybe 300 yuan per year.

Representative KAPTUR. Okay, what does that translate to in U.S. dollars?

Ms. LEHR. A couple hundred dollars. The minimum wage should be, I believe—Nury, you will get this more correct than me—but a couple hundred dollars a month is the minimum wage.

Mr. TURKEL. That is correct.

Ms. LEHR. But what they are actually being paid is just a fraction of that. So people are being paid in a year what they should be paid in a month.

Representative KAPTUR. We don't even know that? We don't even know what workers work for there? It's that hidden?

Ms. LEHR. We know what the official minimum wage is, but there is an official government policy right now with regard to minority labor—that they do not have to be paid it.

Representative KAPTUR. None of you placed that in your testimony, I don't believe. If you could provide any refinement of that so that the American people could understand what's really going on here, I think that would be quite helpful.

I also wanted to ask a question about fentanyl. In my district this past weekend, 26 pounds of fentanyl were collected by the DEA and several individuals were arrested. We know that that comes from China. Have you ever come across this issue in your work, and where that's manufactured and how it gets here?

[The witnesses indicated "no".]

Representative KAPTUR. No? All right.

Thank you very much. That ends my questions, Mr. Chairman. Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you all for your testimony and to my colleagues from the House and Senate who are paying attention to this issue.

Mr. Posner, you mentioned that it would be so important, central, to have a message from the top. And I am concerned that we haven't succeeded in getting President Trump to speak to significant human rights abuses around the world—the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Burma, driving 700,000 Rohingya into the neighboring country of Bangladesh, 300 villages burned down, massive systematic rape, assaults. And in this case—also again a vacuum—and I think that all of us—Democrats, Republicans, House, Senate, need to try to find a way to have President Trump stand up on the international stage on both of these issues.

As I was pondering the situation in the province, I was reminded of the movie “Gattaca” from 1997. And in that movie, there is a character named Vincent Freeman who because of his DNA is assigned and categorized to be in a class that can only do menial jobs. But he is determined to travel in space. So he goes to extraordinary lengths to, basically, overcome the government's systematic testing of urine and DNA. And this is really before we had the ability to monitor DNA the way that we can now—in 1997, twenty years ago.

And now we have this province that has an additional tool that was not even dreamed of in the late 90s, of facial recognition, and Vincent Freeman would have had a very hard time overcoming that additional factor.

I am concerned that this model of a government exercising extensive massive surveillance in combination with artificial intelligence, with the data storage capabilities that exist at this moment—let alone what is to come—is a tool that is very difficult for governments to perhaps resist. We have a case of our own government just saying that they want to take a DNA record of every immigrant to the United States of America. And so you can see that we're not immune from the collection of massive amounts of personally identifying data that could be used in all kinds of ways.

As we're listening to you, I'm sensing that we don't have one clear path to be able to exercise more leverage. One of the issues that has come up is how difficult it is for U.S. companies to track where the products are originating, and getting more difficult all the time, it sounds like. How can we take that on? And if all of you can follow up with all of us, we can think about what we can do legislatively.

Senator Rubio led a bill, the Uyghur Human Rights Act, that passed on September 11th. It has a series of reports and strategies in it. It has an amendment that I submitted that called for—unless international monitors are allowed access, it would trigger the Global Magnitsky Act. I don't know where this stands in the House and if the House is prepared to take it up.

Chair MCGOVERN. We're working on it.

Senator MERKLEY. Great. That is terrific to hear because at least that would be one tool to draw attention to this situation. And I think as a result of the Senate examining this, the U.S. Government, the executive branch, has now taken action on October 7th and October 8th.

On October 7th, they set a series of export restrictions on certain products to a host of provinces in China that could be used in surveillance and so forth. On October 8th, they put in visa restrictions on officials who are complicit in the internment camps, the slave labor, and so forth.

I want to ask all of you, do you think there will be any significant impact from the actions taken on October 7th, October 8th? How would you like to see the Uyghur Human Rights Act strengthened in the House, or should we just get the Senate version passed quickly to try to get it to the floor, to get it to the Oval Office and then seek another bill as we understand more and have more defined strategies for applying leverage?

Mr. POSNER. We had a little bit of discussion of this earlier. I think both the Senate and the House bill have elements that are quite useful. The Senate bill as I understand it is more a reporting requirement for the State Department, which I think is always helpful. But I think the House bill also relates to sourcing restrictions and export controls, especially relating to technology. So elements of both of those, I think, are useful and you ought to be pursuing it.

The other thing I said in the opening is that all of those restrictions, while they're very much in the right direction, need to be enforced and that you need to have congressional oversight. The companies that are doing the surveillance you talked about in Xinjiang, in particular, are Chinese companies. Those were put on the list in early October, but they're also getting investment support from American investors. And I think that's a place where there needs to be much more attention.

This integrated joint operations platform that the Chinese are operating in Xinjiang is probably the most intrusive surveillance program in the world. And what you mentioned, facial recognition technology, is part of that. It's really important that we pay attention not only to who's doing it, but who's supporting it.

One positive thing I would say, we've talked a lot about what companies should be doing. One company that really has taken the issue of facial recognition on in an affirmative way is Microsoft. They even took down a public facial recognition technology they had up, when they realized that it was being misused in China. So there are ways to deal with this, but most companies are not doing what they need to be doing.

Mr. TURKEL. The Entity List, I think it's very significant. I never thought in my lifetime that I would see a government that would sanction the entire police department in the Uyghur region, which is very significant. And also, it's related to me. That's the police department that has been harassing and intimidating my parents, and that same police department forcibly took my parents' DNA samples in 2015. So on a personal level, it is very gratifying. In substance, as well, it is a very useful step. The visa ban is also a significant step, even though we don't know who the individuals are.

As for the bill, I think we should pass a bill for now, and then talk about the other issues, make an amendment or introduce another bill with more teeth. The Uyghur people have been waiting for this body to do something legislatively to force our executive

branch to take a coherent policy step. So it is imperative that the pending bill, H.R. 649, be finalized as soon as possible.

Mr. ZENZ. I would recommend making forced labor a separate issue and bill because it is a really, really big issue even though it's related. I think it's good to pass what you have now, so that that's passed. I really suggest that a separate forced labor bill be introduced because the implications are also, as Mr. Rubio pointed out—there are some very real business implications of making money off of oppression, undercutting prices.

I would really suggest that that would really have some teeth to scare the business community, the American business community, the Western business community, to really put sanctions on companies that have dealings with forced labor, and to make that a really strong separate package. That would be my recommendation.

Senator MERKLEY. This makes me think there's a premium on us getting the Senate and House Members together to get a strategy because so often we end up with a bill passed in one chamber and not the other, and nothing makes it to the Oval Office. Certainly I'll make myself available for any discussions of that nature.

It was mentioned earlier that China is a Tier 3 country in terms of labor practices, forced labor, and slave labor. That puts it in a small group of very abusive countries, but the real impact of that is related to foreign aid. And we don't send foreign aid to China. So how could we strengthen the Tier 3 consequences in a real substantive way so that it would have an impact on the types of practices we are seeing applied to the Uyghur community?

Mr. POSNER. Well, again, to me, the biggest issue is enforcement. We had some discussion earlier about Customs and Border Protection issuing withhold release orders on a few companies that were using prison and forced labor in the apparel sector.

The enforcement of what comes into the United States has historically been extremely weak. We don't have the resources to get at that. And there's no doubt that there are many, many products coming into the United States that are products of forced labor.

So I think part of this is really trying to figure out how we bolster that and make sure that things coming into this country are not the product of the practices that my colleagues have been describing here today.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, we've also heard from all of you on how difficult it is to sort out the sourcing. And we have in Senator Rubio's bill a provision that is trying to open the door to international inspectors. But it makes sense to me that a piece of what we have to do is to greatly increase transparency of the transactions taking place so that we can track the products and apply pressure in appropriate fashion.

I want to encourage U.S. companies to do everything they can on their own to understand their sourcing, but if they are buying bulk cotton—it sounds like it's very difficult to determine exactly all the roots of that supply chain.

Mr. TURKEL. I would like to share a story. Recently an Albanian journalist took a trip as part of the government-sponsored Potemkin village visits. In one of his interviews he asked one of the happy-faced Uyghur minority individuals if she was Muslim. She hesitatingly said that she was not Muslim.

With that kind of lack of freedom core circumstance, it is inconceivable that any worker would tell the true side of the story, the real story. So it is impossible. I think that if anyone claims, if any company claims that there is due diligence being done, that is dubious at best. It is impossible to accomplish that goal.

Senator MERKLEY. So even with inspectors or international observers gaining access, that doesn't mean that they can really tell what's going on in terms of testimony from people they are interviewing.

Mr. ZENZ. The Chinese regime, what we can see from these organized tours to Xinjiang, has now had two years, or a year and a half, to refine their shows—as I would call them—putting on a show. And these detainees know if they don't play along in the show, they're going to end up in a much worse place than they are.

I think it's extremely problematic to conduct any meaningful or reliable due diligence. I would still press for inspections because intelligent people can read between the lines. If you look at the BBC video on the camps, they did a fantastic job and made surprise visits later on and were able to record things spoken about 20, 30 feet away when the minders were chiding the head of the reeducation camp about not having the right answer at the right time.

But even so, I think it's much more necessary to look at this from what the government has said on paper. The Xinjiang government has made some very clear statements on paper. These ought to be taken seriously. I am documenting them in my research, and I think it's much more effective to come to the conclusion of declaring Xinjiang an involuntary or coercive labor zone by policy, or similarly, go on that level rather than picking apart production supply chains, try to do investigations. One can do both at the same time. But I would really recommend doing the latter as well, and not just the former.

Mr. TURKEL. Senator, the issue is much bigger than just the forced labor issue. I think we need to look at a broader industry standard. If you stop this practice in a manufacturing sector—we have—the universities are vulnerable because we already know that one famous U.S. scientist, Professor Kenneth Kidd, assisted the Chinese Public Ministry with DNA sequence sampling technologies. And also, we have the winter Olympics coming up.

So this has to be a multifaceted approach. We have to also address the CCP's insecurity. Early on, there was a question about the CCP. To the Chinese Communist Party, the Uyghur identity, the Uyghurs' religious background, in and of itself, is a threat. So they need to get rid of it.

So this has to be looked at on multiple fronts. The Australian example, I think, has a lot to do with this Entity List. So whatever happens in Washington on this particular issue has global implications.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you all. Amy, do you want to comment?

Ms. LEHR. I was going to say something on a slightly different topic, which was maybe another point of leverage that I think needs more exploration. The extent to which, maybe less than the forced labor realm, but with technology—maybe some of the large state-owned enterprises that are building some of these detention facilities and factories—are they listed or are their subsidiaries list-

ed in the U.S.? And if they are involved in crimes against humanity, should they be able to be? I just think that's another avenue we might be able to pursue some of this from.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I look forward to having my team work with all of you on strategies that could be effective in increasing our leverage. Thank you.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you.

Congresswoman Hartzler.

Representative HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to my colleagues for holding this very important hearing. And thank you to each of you for your very, very important work. I share Representative Kaptur's comments, Mr. Turkel, that we stand ready to help you, your family, in any way that we can.

I wanted to focus a little bit on Hikvision and Dahua. As you know, these Chinese companies have profited greatly from the surge in Chinese security spending, winning government contracts for large-scale surveillance projects, and they've provided much of the surveillance equipment used by officials to monitor the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

On October 7th, 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce, as we've talked about, added 28 organizations located in China to the Entity List which restricts American exports to such organizations. And these companies, including Hikvision and Dahua, were added due to their human rights violations and abuses in China's campaign targeting ethnic minorities.

Additionally in last year's National Defense Authorization Act, I included language prohibiting the Federal Government, our Federal Government, and companies that contract with our government, from purchasing Hikvision and Dahua video surveillance equipment. I have an inquiry pending with the GSA now to get a status update on the implementation of this provision.

Ms. Lehr, what additional actions should the U.S. Government and American investment firms take to ensure that they do not purchase or sell to, or invest in, companies such as Hikvision and Dahua?

Ms. LEHR. Well, I think Mike has touched indirectly on this a number of times. I think there's a lot of work to do—maybe not just in terms of purchasing, but actually who's funding. A lot of these companies are developing this technology, and the role of both venture capital and institutional investors in the U.S.—our pension funds—that are funding their work.

And so I haven't thought of exactly the right mechanism to get at that yet, but first of all, just more attention to it. I think what surprised a lot of Americans is how their money is being used. How you get at it legislatively . . . maybe Mike has some ideas.

Mr. POSNER. Well, actually, in my written testimony I mention an investment firm called AMX which specializes in high-performance computing for deep learning applications, and they've partnered with Hikvision.

One of the things I think we have to really look at is who the investment firms are, including the public pension funds, and the university endowments that have a stake in companies like Hikvision and the others that are on this Entity List that just was

added to in early October. I think that's really a place we haven't put enough attention.

And we also ought to look at university partnerships because some of this technology's being developed in conjunction with U.S. technical experts who are working hand-in-glove with Chinese companies to build surveillance technology, facial recognition, and DNA testing. So there's a lot of work to be done.

There's a company called Thermo Fisher, out of Massachusetts, which actually sold DNA sequencers directly to government authorities in Xinjiang for genetic mapping until it was publicly called out earlier this year. They stopped doing it. But how did that happen? What were they thinking? It seems to me we've got a lot of work to do just to map the field of where the investment dollars are going and how they connect to the kinds of surveillance and bad use of technology we have been talking about.

Mr. TURKEL. Divestment is one of the things that we need to look at. Hikvision makes one-third of the world's security cameras. There have been reports that the American Teachers' Union has invested in some of the technology companies in question.

I always emphasize the global effort because the Chinese government already tested out these surveillance technologies by using Uyghur lives in their homeland. And now they're exporting it. The New York Times reported that there are about 18 countries already in the process of adopting Chinese surveillance technology. The question is very simple: What kind of world do we want for the next generation?

Are we going to be dealing with this kind of surveillance technology monitoring citizens' activities even if it is the mildest of political opposition? Countries like Venezuela, countries like Sudan, Iran and others have already adopted these technologies. So I think it's a threat to the world that needs to be looked at in a much broader perspective.

Representative HARTZLER. Are you aware of any efforts at the U.N. to look at this or discuss this?

Mr. POSNER. Not meaningfully, no.

Representative HARTZLER. Okay. Anything else you want to say on the pensions investing, other than just that we need to look at it? Do you have a way to go after that? I think that's a very important point from this hearing. It's not just to target and hold companies accountable, but to hold the pension funds and the investors accountable as well, and as you bring up, the universities are complicit in this.

Mr. POSNER. One of the challenges we have in all of this—this is what I call the dark side of the moon. We're dealing with a place that has been essentially sealed off from public visibility—independent journalists, diplomats, the U.N. haven't got access.

So the first thing is we have got to find ways to get greater insight into what's actually happening there and who's involved. But then when we know, for example, on the issue of surveillance technology or forced labor, I think we need to be educating people in public pension funds, people in university endowment investment offices, and private investment firms.

We need to set a new standard that says it's not okay just to say this is one of many things we invest in and we have no idea what

they're doing. If it's a company involved in high technology that's being used for surveillance or police enforcement, security enforcement, the presumption ought to be—you've got to be assuming that it's going to be misused in a place like Xinjiang against the Uyghurs.

Ms. LEHR. I just want to add one thing. I agree with Mike that this is the dark side of the moon. It is very hard to get firsthand information. But you can get some information.

And so I think—one thing in our report is the idea of having someone, maybe more than one person, fluent in written Mandarin who's doing research in the U.S. Government and who can start actually mapping out this world. It takes a lot of work, and resources really need to be devoted to it. And then even without the access to the ground, we can still start to map this world.

Representative HARTZLER. Okay. I wanted to close—my last question, following up on something that Mr. Smith said too, because I am also deeply concerned about reports of forced abortions, forced use of contraception and sexual violence, targeting the female ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang detention camps. And there was a recent Washington Post article highlighting the story of a woman who had her unborn baby cut out of her body without the use of anesthesia. And there are reports of women being raped by Chinese guards, impregnated, and then forced to undergo an abortion while in prison.

This is nothing more than systemic torture. And as a nation that values dignity and human life, we must shed light on and work to stop these egregious acts.

You indicated earlier that none of you really have much knowledge about what is happening with these reports of forced abortion, sexual violence. Is there any more light you can shed on this, and could the forced abortion policy and birth control be part of China's plan to keep the ethnic Muslim population down? Is there any documentation that this is part of their official state policy, and what can we do, if anything, additionally, as an international community, to stop China's gross human rights violations?

Mr. TURKEL. We're speaking about millions of people being taken away, but we only have been able to speak to about five individuals who have been in those camps. At least three of those survivors have been telling us very consistent stories about sexual violence, mysterious pills that they've been given.

Last month I was one of the panelists at an event organized by the State Department, and one of my co-panelists who is a camp survivor told us that she no longer can conceive a baby because of what she was given in the prison—and also the Washington Post story that you reported also described very gruesome sexual violence. But historically Uyghur women have been sexual objects for the society.

And now forced marriage and other things on top of taking away Uyghur children; every day when you turn on social media you see a Uyghur woman forced to marry a Chinese individual. As you know, there's a large number of Chinese bachelors who are looking for wives, and the Chinese government is providing incentives: housing, cars, and employment, as part of the effort to lure Chinese bachelors to go to the Uyghur region to marry a Uyghur woman.

So it sounds like a typical—it fits the definition of cultural genocide. If a regime of government is focusing on your children and your women, I don't think—I am sitting with two lawyers here—it is pretty obvious there's cultural genocide/ethnic cleansing taking place. That, I am pretty comfortable stating.

Mr. ZENZ. Yes. I would like to add to that.

Obviously, this is a very difficult topic to investigate, and official documentation on this is basically nonexistent. However, the evidence coming out of Xinjiang, thankfully, is increasing. Just this morning, I read a new article of testimony by Mrs. Sauytbay, who was a reeducation camp educator—forced to be. She is now in asylum in Stockholm. She has testified before, but I am just reading more detailed testimony of hers that specifically gives more detail on sexual abuse and details a particularly disturbing incident where several hundred reeducation camp detainees were let into the courtyard by the security guards and then one woman was forced to undress and was raped by multiple policemen in front of all of the detainees. And, of course, Mrs. Sauytbay, being the teacher, witnessed this personally.

The purpose of this rape was to watch the responses on the faces of the reeducation camp detainees, and those who showed dismay, shock, or looked away were then taken away for further punishment. Those detainees who did not express, or who were expressionless and continued watching this horrific rape were apparently considered as having made progress in their reeducation conversion and were not punished.

Representative HARTZLER. Unbelievable. Well, we have much work to do. Thank you very much.

Chair MCGOVERN. Thank you very much.

Senator DAINES.

Senator DAINES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Some of you might know I spent over half a decade working in China and Guangzhou back in the 90s. Today I am very concerned with the ongoing erosion of human rights across the region—everywhere from Hong Kong to Urumqi.

I appreciate the work of this Commission. I believe it's critical that we address these issues going on in Xinjiang and bring more awareness to these forced labor camps, mass internment, and other atrocities going on in the region.

The U.S. has been the global leader in human rights, and we must continue to lead. The Trump Administration recently demonstrated leadership with the blacklisting of companies associated with human rights violations in Xinjiang and elsewhere across China. I'm glad we're here today so that Congress can continue to work to stop these ongoing atrocities.

Ms. Lehr, the Administration recently took steps to blacklist eight video surveillance and artificial intelligence Chinese companies, including SenseTime and Hikvision, due to their support of human rights violations in Xinjiang. Could you provide additional information about the role that technology plays in human rights suppression in China?

Ms. LEHR. That's, obviously, a significant discussion. In Xinjiang, specifically, a lot of the technology is being perfected, so it's almost like a place to experiment and fine-tune technology that's being

used for social control. And then I think what we are seeing is how that's going to seep into the rest of China and also be sold to other countries.

So the social credit system in the rest of China is sort of nascent still, but it is a way of really tracking people's lives in detail and either providing them with state benefits or denying them. Your ability to travel to another city, for example, could be influenced by who your friends are and whether they're considered problematic, whether you jaywalk. It's a level of potential social control that honestly is hard to get your mind wrapped around, but very significant.

And we know, for example, in Xinjiang that people are being tracked for how much gas they're using and whether gas usage changes because that's seen as a signal of something, whether they go in and out of their back door or their front door. It's pervasive in a way that is hard to really fully comprehend.

Senator DAINES. The Trump Administration has taken steps to blacklist eight of these video surveillance artificial intelligence companies. Are you aware of any other Chinese companies or perhaps key technologies that were not included in this blacklisting that play a critical role in human rights suppression in the region? Maybe said another way, are there any others you would add to that list of eight?

Ms. LEHR. Off the top of my head, I don't have those names for you, but there are people who are researching that in a lot of detail who probably could add some names. I imagine that was not all the companies that have been involved in developing this kind of surveillance technology in China.

Mike, I know you have been specifically focused on this.

Senator DAINES. Yes, are there a couple others that the Administration ought to consider?

Mr. Posner.

Mr. POSNER. I don't have a list of others. I would just add to what Amy said, that I think we ought to view what they're doing in Xinjiang under what they call the integrated joint operations platform as a kind of predictor of the future of the social credit index.

The government is trying to gather as much personal information—blood type, physical characteristics, and movement as they can. They have made it basically a suspicious activity to use WhatsApp or Viper, which are encrypted. They've said that if you don't carry your phone with you, that in itself is a basis for suspicion and can lead to arrest.

So what we're really seeing is a kind of laboratory experiment using the Uyghur population as the test case, or the guinea pigs, to see how much information you can gather as a means of social control. I think this is an area where we ought to be looking and I think, as Amy said, others are trying to figure out who else is involved. But we also ought to figure out which American companies are investing in this vast apparatus.

I will say one other thing. It's in my written testimony. There are several places where I think Apple, which is a big American technology company, has done things that I have concerns about. I think they need to adopt a broader human rights policy. One is—

through a partnership with a Guizhou cloud/big data company, that company has agreed to store data on servers operated by state-run China Telecom. And I think a company like Apple, a big strong company, needs to be highly careful about who it's partnering with and what their activities are.

Senator DAINES. I spent 12 years in the cloud computing business. In fact, I ran Asia-Pacific for our company for 5 years. I'd be very concerned about privacy in terms of any data that is stored on servers in China. The words "due process" do not always work over there.

Mr. POSNER. Right.

Senator DAINES. I want to ask you, Mr. Posner, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has provided some of the strongest support to the Uyghurs at the recent U.N. Council meeting, stating that, "This is China's attempt to erase its own citizens" and requesting that countries resist China's demands to repatriate the Uyghurs. How is the rest of the world responding to the U.S. lead in this area and Secretary Pompeo's request for support?

Mr. POSNER. Senator, in my opening remarks, I gave praise to Secretary Pompeo and also John Sullivan, the deputy, both of whom have been quite outspoken. Sullivan also at the U.N. General Assembly held a session on religious freedom where he went out of his way to talk about Chinese violations.

I think consistently the Secretary of State and the deputy have been very strong on this. My concern is—and I expressed it earlier—their words are compromised by the inability or failure of the President to echo a similar line. The notion that, for example, the Chinese and the people in Hong Kong can figure out what to do about Hong Kong. They don't need outside advice. Or the suggestion, which was reported by CNN and others, that he had a conversation with Xi Jinping where he said, while we are negotiating a trade deal, I am not going to talk about Hong Kong.

The world looks at the totality, and the President is the primary spokesperson for the United States. And if he's not echoing or even leading in the same direction as Secretary Pompeo, it sends at best a mixed message and it allows somebody like Xi Jinping to say, I'll listen to the guy I am talking to, the President, and I can ignore the rest.

So I commend Secretary Pompeo. The challenge now is to get a whole-of-government approach, and it needs to start at the top.

Senator DAINES. All right. Thank you very much. I am out of time here but thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chair MCGOVERN. Well, thank you. I appreciate everybody here.

I just have one final question. Senator Rubio referenced the whole NBA controversy in the beginning. And as you all know, back in 2016 the NBA worked with a Chinese state-controlled entity to open up the NBA Academy in Xinjiang.

To your knowledge has the NBA voiced any concern to their partners over the detention of Uyghur athletes? The reason why I ask is because we know that Chinese authorities detained a 19-year-old Uyghur, a rising soccer star, for 11 months for "visiting foreign countries after he trained and competed abroad." I am not sure what that is all about.

They have detained a 24-year-old aspiring professional soccer player. He was detained for being in contact with his cousin who had fled to Turkey.

I have been watching this controversy unfold in the news, and I guess the benefit of this controversy coming to the news is that we are now focused on what's happening to the Uyghurs. It shouldn't take that to be able to focus our attention, but nevertheless, do you think the NBA should even be operating a training camp there? If they were here, I'd say, What the hell are you thinking? Are you that tone deaf, or are you so interested in potential markets and making money that you're willing to ignore the mounting evidence, much of which has been made public, about the human rights atrocities going on there?

As I mentioned in my opening statement, some have described what is happening there as crimes against humanity. If anybody wants to comment—I just figured I needed to raise it because it's been bugging me. So if anyone wants to comment.

Mr. TURKEL. Yes. LeBron James said that the Rockets' manager needs education. Actually, he himself needs to be educated about what's happening. Not only the NBA, the other U.S. companies. Mackenzie was holding a summer retreat in my ancestral hometown, Kashgar, last summer. All the media is covering the mass atrocities. So this needs to be looked at in a much broader sense.

The NBA is losing its credibility. They have actual leverage. I don't want to get into the history of the NBA, but the NBA is such an important aspect of the Chinese people's daily lives in China. So if they can use that to the benefit of their own presence here in the United States or their image internationally, this can be a very effective tool.

Mr. POSNER. Just to add really quickly—press reports say 10 percent of the NBA's income is now generated in China. There are 500 million NBA fans in China. They are estimating or projecting that their income will be 20 percent in the next five or ten years.

I think for a big company or big entity like the NBA, it's critical not to—we're seeing a new normal where the Chinese government has said, Not only is what we are doing in Xinjiang or with Hong Kong right, but you're not allowed to talk about it.

Chair MCGOVERN. Right.

Mr. POSNER. And the idea that somehow we are debating whether or not a general manager of a team is allowed to issue a seven-word tweet, leaving aside the merits of what he's talking about, means that the goalpost is moving. And I think this bipartisan hearing is so important because we reaffirm the fact that these issues are very serious. They deserve attention and we are, in fact, allowed to debate and discuss them.

It's critical for American companies—if they're going to continue to do business in China, they've got to be able to recognize that what their commercial interests are is one thing, but you cannot prevent people from having a discussion about values, about interests, and that's really what the human rights issue is about.

Chair MCGOVERN. And we should point out for the record that the controversy was over a tweet about Hong Kong, not even about what was happening in the place where they have their training camp.

I don't know if anyone else has anything they want to add to that. Look, I've always felt that while our businesses certainly want to be able to take advantage of the Chinese market, there's benefit to the Chinese government as well to be able to do business with us.

And I've always been frustrated by the fact—and this is the latest case—that they felt the need to apologize for a tweet from a general manager about what has been in the international news on a daily basis about what's happening in Hong Kong. And I'll tell you if we can't—Speaker Pelosi always likes to use this line—if we're not willing to speak out about human rights in Xinjiang or in Hong Kong because we're worried about the bottom line or about money, then we really lose the moral authority to speak about human rights anywhere.

And I think one of the powerful things about what you heard today is that there is virtual unanimity—Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives and moderates all together—all are horrified by what is happening to the Uyghurs. And there's a determination to do something more than just issue a press release, more than just hold a hearing. You've all come up with the legislation that is now pending in the House—and the House has an obligation to try to move this legislation that the Senate has already passed, that Senator Rubio has championed, as quickly as possible, and other things as well.

I thank you all for being here. This has been a very important hearing. With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NURY TURKEL

The human rights and humanitarian crisis taking place in the Uyghur homeland of East Turkistan (designated by the government as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) has entered a new phase since CECC's groundbreaking hearing on the crisis in July 2018. It is now clear that Uyghurs and members of other Turkic ethnic groups are not only being detained and tormented with cruel and unusual mistreatment and abuse. They are also being swept into a vast system of forced labor. The extra-legal internment camps are only one piece of this emerging system, which involves prisons and village-based manufacturing as well. It is becoming increasingly hard to ignore the fact that goods manufactured in East Turkistan have a high likelihood of being produced with forced labor.

FORCED LABOR AS A DEEPLY EMBEDDED TOOL OF REPRESSION, PUNISHMENT, AND CONTROL

Forced labor is a deeply embedded tool of control in China. A regime of forced labor has become the fulcrum of the CCP's campaign of forced assimilation in East Turkistan. Transforming the population from one largely made up of independent farmers and traders into industrial workers, subject to regimes of surveillance and control in factories far from their hometowns, is a major part of the government's program of "stability maintenance."

The link between forced labor and "re-education" goes back decades. Despite the fact the government claimed to have abolished the re-education-through-labor or "laojiao" system in 2013, extrajudicial detention has continued under different names.

East Turkistan has been a particular locus of forced labor since the establishment of the PRC. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is powered by forced labor, serving a function similar to the Soviet Union's gulags. In addition to the XPCC prisons, there is a decades-long history of forced labor in the XUAR prison system, including in textile factories such as the Qixin Garment Company inside the Xinjiang Women's Prison in Urumchi.¹

In the Uyghur Autonomous Region, a system of forced agricultural and infrastructure construction labor known as "Hashar" was supposedly abolished in 2017, although similar forms of forced labor persist, according to the State Department's 2019 Trafficking in Persons report.²

Over a decade ago, in 2008, UHRP reported on the systematic program of coercive labor transfer that particularly targeted young women to be sent to factories in coastal Chinese provinces.³ Government cadres used a combination of deception, pressure, and threats to round up thousands of young Uyghurs against their will. Then, as now, the program had a dual effect of separating families and placing Uyghurs in involuntary factory settings far from home.

A LONG-TERM STATE PLAN TO RELOCATE THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN THE UYGHUR REGION

Today, we are seeing a confluence of the "Strike Hard" campaign of mass internment with a pre-existing state plan to relocate the textile industry in the Uyghur

¹Han, Lianchao, August 2019, "Cotton: the Fabric Full of Lies," Citizen Power Initiatives for China.

²U.S. State Department, June 20, 2019, "Trafficking in Persons Report June 2019," Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf>.

³Uyghur Human Rights Project, February 8, 2008, "Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China," http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/Transfer_Uyghur_woman.pdf.

Region. East Turkistan is the source of over 80% of the total cotton produced in China, and the crop is heavily subsidized.⁴ As documented in the new report on forced labor in the cotton industry, published by Citizen Power for China, since the mid-2010s, the Chinese government has developed plans to transfer the textile processing on a large scale to the region, including the production of cloth and finished garments. This addresses rising costs in coastal areas for land, electricity, and above all labor, but in addition, new subsidies encourage companies to shift factories to the region. Government documents outline a plan to have at least a million textile industry jobs in the region by 2023.⁵ A disturbing picture is thus emerging of the government pushing companies to use cheap or entirely unpaid Uyghur labor.

The general manager of a factory known to use detainee labor, speaking in a state TV interview released in December 2018, stated, “With the support of the government, we have already ‘recruited’ more than 600 people.” He said that since the founding of the new factory in 2017, “We have generated more than \$6 million in sales. We plan to reach 1,000 workers by the end of this year. We plan to provide jobs to 1,500 people by the end of 2019.”⁶

FROM CAMPS TO FACTORIES

It is clear that some individuals are being moved from the extra-legal prison camps where the “de-extremification” program focused on indoctrination classes, Chinese language, and indefinite detention, to factories. While some factories are inside camp compounds, others are in industrial parks, where individuals are forced to stay in on-site dormitories and allowed to leave for only short periods, if at all. One woman, Dilmur Idris, told her sister in Australia via WeChat that she had been sent from the camps to a factory and forced to work.⁷ Another woman reported being paid less than half the minimum wage, though she received far less due to expenses incurred during her stay. She was not allowed to leave, continued to endure forced indoctrination, and was threatened with being sent back to the camp if she refused to sign a contract.⁸

While some detainees are being “released” into another form of captivity in factories, others are being sentenced under absurd charges in secret trials. As of 2017, the region accounted for 21% of arrests despite making up only 1.5% of the population of China.⁹ The already massive prison system is being rapidly expanded, and disturbing reports of large numbers of people being transferred from the camps to prisons are emerging,¹⁰ including reports of people being sentenced in “open court sessions” for infractions inside the camps, such as failure to study well.¹¹ The prisons, too, have long been sites of forced labor and given unfair trials, the sentences cannot be considered legitimate.

In December 2018, the Associated Press broke the story that clothing had been exported to the U.S. by a Chinese manufacturer (Hetian Taida), in a factory in the Hotan Vocational Education and Training Center, one of the many detention camps that have been established across East Turkistan.¹² This clothing was being sold to

⁴USDA, September 6, 2018, “China: Cotton and Products Update,” USDA Foreign Agricultural Service GAIN Report, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Cotton%20and%20Products%20Update_Beijing_China%20%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_8-30-2018.pdf.

⁵Darren Byler, October 11, 2019, “How Companies Profit From Forced Labor In Xinjiang,” Living Otherwise, <https://livingotherwise.com/2019/10/11/how-companies-profit-from-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/>.

⁶Darren Byler, October 11, 2019 “How Companies Profit From Forced Labor In Xinjiang,” Living Otherwise, <https://livingotherwise.com/2019/10/11/how-companies-profit-from-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/>.

⁷McNeill, Sophie, McGregor, Jeanavive, Griffiths, Meredith, Walsh, Michael, Hui, Echo, Xiao, Bang, July 16, 2019, “Cotton On and Target investigate suppliers after forced labour of Uyghurs exposed in China’s Xinjiang,” ABC Four Corners, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-15/uyghur-forced-labour-xinjiang-china/11298750>.

⁸Byler, Darren, September 4, 2019, “How Companies Profit from Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” SupChina, <https://supchina.com/2019/09/04/how-companies-profit-from-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/>.

⁹Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 7/25/2018, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” <https://www.ncrhd.org/2018/07/criminal-arrests-in-xinjiang-account-for-21-of-chinas-total-in-2017/>.

¹⁰Xinjiang Victims Database, “List: From prolonged detention to prison, excluding victims from pre-Chen Quanguo period,” accessed October 9, 2019, <https://www.shahit.biz/export.php?list=15>.

¹¹Bunin, Gene, October 5, 2019, “From camps to prisons: Xinjiang’s next great human rights catastrophe,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, <https://livingotherwise.com/2019/10/05/from-camps-to-prisons-xinjiangs-next-great-human-rights-catastrophe-by-gene-a-bunin/>.

¹²Kang, Dake, Mendoza, Martha, and Wang, Yanan, December 19, 2018, “US sportswear traced to factory in China’s internment camps,” Associated Press, <https://www.apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb>.

U.S. supplier Badger Sportswear. Several weeks later, Badger Sportswear announced that it had ceased sourcing from the company and all companies with operations in Xinjiang, but continued to maintain that it was skeptical that the goods had been produced by forced labor. This was despite the fact that the factory and the re-education camp share an address, the fact that satellite imagery confirms that they are in the same compound, and the fact that the man of the company acknowledged that the factory was employing “trainees” and was located in the same compound.¹³

We wish to thank the CBP for issuing a withhold release order on goods produced by Hetian Taida. However, it is extremely disturbing that U.S. companies are still sourcing from the company despite clear evidence of forced labor. Baby clothes produced by the company recently went on sale at Costco; while Costco has now pulled the goods from their shelves, they should never have gotten that far in the first place, given how long this information has been public. U.S. enforcement

must be stepped up to ensure that all goods sourced from companies in the Uyghur Region receive scrutiny commensurate with the extremely high risk of forced labor in the supply chain.

ASPHYXIATING SOCIAL CONTROL FACILITATES FORCED AND INVOLUNTARY LABOR

Asphyxiating social control facilitates forced and involuntary labor. The technototalitarian system of surveillance and intimidation put in place by Xinjiang authorities means that any attempt to resist orders puts oneself and one’s family at great risk. Those “recruited” directly from their villages into factories cannot be assumed to be working of their own free will. Communist cadres have been sent to Uyghur villages by the tens of thousands. They enter Uyghur households, politically assess them, and push them towards work in the factories in the so-called “homestay” program. As in the case of the 2008 labor-transfer program to Eastern factories, Uyghurs do not have a choice. Refusing to participate in the state’s “poverty alleviation” programs can get one labeled extremist and therefore sent to the camps. The threat is often implicit, but according to some testimonies, it is explicit.¹⁴ This is the same dynamic as in the state program encouraging marriage between Han men and Uyghur women, celebrated in Party media outlets. Uyghur women’s consent to these marriages must be assumed in the vast majority of cases to be given under extreme duress. If a young woman were to decline a marriage proposal from a Han man, she and her family could be labeled “extremists” and sent to the camps. Uyghurs cannot say no.

As one Uyghur living overseas described it to the BBC, there is an atmosphere of horror where “everyone feels like they’re being watched all the time ... There is a huge sense of fear—people tell me they sleep in their clothes because no one knows whether at night they might be taken away.”¹⁵

Nor is asphyxiating social control confined to PRC borders. Uyghurs outside China are also subject to extraterritorial surveillance and coercion. UHRP’s latest report, *Repression Across Borders: the CCP’s Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans*,¹⁶ documents the ongoing and flagrant violations of federal law on U.S. soil. As one Uyghur American said about being contacted by Chinese state security agents:

They are just telling us, “We are watching you. Wherever you go, still you are a Chinese.” Even though abroad, it doesn’t mean they can’t do something to you. Because they have your friends, your relatives.

Agents of a foreign power are surveilling and terrorizing our own fellow American citizens, with threats to send their remaining family members to the camps if they speak out about what is happening in East Turkistan.

¹³ Worker’s Rights Consortium, June 24, 2019, “Worker’s Rights Consortium Factory Assessment Hetian Taida Apparel Co. Ltd. (China): Findings, Recommendations, and Status,” <https://www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WRC-Report-on-Hetian-Taida-China-June-2019.pdf>.

¹⁴ Sophie McNeill, Jeanavive McGregor, Meredith Griffiths, Michael Walsh, Echo Hui, Bang Xiao, July 16, 2019 “Cotton On and Target investigate suppliers after forced labour of Uyghurs exposed in China’s Xinjiang” ABC Four Corners <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-15/uyghur-forced-labour-xinjiang-china/11298750>.

¹⁵ Andreas Illmer, October 11, 2019, “Tashpolat Tiyp: The Uighur leading geographer who vanished in China” BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49956088>.

¹⁶ Uyghur Human Rights Project, August 2019 “Repression Across Borders: The CCP’s Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans” <https://uhrp.org/press-release/new-uyghur-human-rights-project-uhrp-report-details-how-chinese-government-engaged>.

DUE DILIGENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE UYGHUR REGION

Given this system of intimidation and terror, extended not only throughout the Uyghur region and but also abroad, corporate supply-chain due diligence is impossible. The complete secrecy surrounding the camps, and the horrific means of total control hanging over those who are not in the camps, means that the free flow of information has been cut off to an extent rarely seen in modern times. Simply put, it is impossible to conduct normal due diligence to determine whether a particular facility is producing goods with forced labor. No independent auditor or supply-chain certification process can collect reliable information from workers, factory management, or local government. No interviews can be treated as uncoerced. Recall that any Uyghur who departs from the government-dictated script faces a high risk of detention, torture, and possibly death in custody.

Because due diligence is impossible, companies cannot carry out their claims to manage their supply chains in accordance with ethical principles. By definition, no company can provide credible assurance that products sourced in Xinjiang qualify for legal import into the United States, or any country that bans the import of forced-labor products.

The evidence is now clear that all manufacturing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is taking place under inhuman and degrading conditions—under a nightmare totalitarian police state preventing free choice and the free flow of information. If existing authorities are insufficient for Customs and Border Protection to issue Withhold Release Orders (WROs) commensurate with the risk of allowing illegal goods into the U.S., Congress must act to shift the burden of proof to companies that wish to import products sourced in Xinjiang or produced with Xinjiang-sourced cotton.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the U.S. Government:

1. Congress should act urgently to pass the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, putting in place a legislative mandate for vigorous U.S. Government action to respond to the Uyghur crisis.

2. Congress should ban the importation of cotton, textiles, and garments originating from Xinjiang, until the policies of mass internment and coerced labor recruitment are ended, and the conditions necessary for due diligence have been established, including a free press and unimpeded access for international observers and diplomats.

3. Congress should pass legislation to mandate clearer transparency about suppliers and should publicly disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission and elsewhere the risk of forced labor in their supply chain, and whether they have taken measures to identify and address forced labor from Xinjiang and China in specifically.

4. The Administration must vigorously enforce international trade standards to address China's unequal subsidies to Xinjiang industries that help fuel the use of forced labor in that region.

5. Congress should increase funding for the Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia in the FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, commensurate with the scale of the crisis, to enable it to carry out adequate investigative journalism and to continue to uncover critical evidence regarding the situation on the ground.

6. The State Department and Department of Education should conduct a thorough review of all educational and cultural exchanges with the People's Republic of China. There should be no government funding of any programs involving the Chinese Ministry of Education as long as the mass internment and unfair trials of intellectuals continue, and should not resume until all educators and students are released and receive reparations. At least 77 Uyghur and Kazakh university instructors and hundreds of students are known to have been disappeared, sentenced, or arbitrarily detained, figures which are just the tip of the iceberg.¹⁷

7. USAID's program to support international religious freedom, including the new \$25 million fund to protect religious sites, announced by President Trump in September, should include—support for cultural preservation, and research and documentation regarding Uyghur mosques, shrines, and religious libraries.

¹⁷ Uyghur Human Rights Project, Oct 22, 2018, "The Persecution of the Intellectuals in the Uyghur Region: Disappeared Forever?" <https://uhrp.org/press-release/persecution-intellectuals-uyghur-region-disappeared-forever.html> and Uyghur Human Rights Project, May 21, 2019, "UHRP UPDATE: 435 Intellectuals Detained and Disappeared in the Uyghur Homeland" <https://uhrp.org/press-release/uhrp-update-435-intellectuals-detained-and-disappeared-uyghur-homeland.html>.

8. Governments must jointly press for a UN-mandated independent investigation. Most such investigations involve travel to the region where mass atrocities are taking place. This will likely be impossible in the case of the Uyghur Region. In that case, there should be an official investigation even in the absence of access to Xinjiang, and the U.S. should contribute funding to this effort.

9. Governments should continue to make joint statements of condemnation.

10. Governments should jointly impose coordinated sanctions. Sanctions should include visa denials, freezing of assets, a modification of the EU-U.S. Tiananmen sanctions to add additional restrictions, suspension of government funding of educational and research exchanges, and export restrictions on textiles and on high-tech tools for surveillance and racial profiling.

11. The U.S. and like-minded countries should back United Nations action similar to the action on apartheid, including the 1960 Security Council Resolution 134 deploring the policies and actions of the South African government and calling on the government to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination; the 1963 Resolution 181 calling upon all states to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa; and the General Assembly resolution of 1968 requesting that all states and organizations “suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid.”

12. The Red Cross should be mandated to seek access to the camps. There is an urgent need to collect information now so that families can be re-united, before it is too late.

13. The silence of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation must come to an end. To mobilize support for those members of the OIC that are concerned about the Uyghur crisis, the U.S. can conduct bilateral diplomacy and make funding available to NGOs who can translate materials into relevant languages in these countries, bring witnesses, and other focused programming to educate local civil society, religious leaders, parliamentarians, lawyers, and others.

14. In countries where the government or CCP influence operations have succeeded in suppressing accurate reporting on the Uyghur crisis, the U.S. Government should provide funding to human-rights advocacy organizations to translate the available documentation, including explanation of the satellite evidence, witness testimony, and of the Chinese government’s own announced policies, designed to eliminate Islamic practices, force Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims to renounce their faith and denounce Islam, and demolish and desecrate mosques, shrines and cemeteries.

15. Conclusive evidence is rapidly emerging regarding China’s continued sourcing of transplant organs from prisoners, including both Uyghur and Falun Gong practitioners, despite the government’s continued denials. The China Tribunal, a panel of jurists and medical professionals, led by Sir Geoffrey Nice, Queen’s Counsel, issued a major report on June 17, 2019. It concluded “beyond a reasonable doubt” that China’s lucrative organ-transplant system is heavily reliant on prisoners’ organs. The voluntary-donor system is insufficient to provide a huge number of human organs needed for transplantation surgeries, and China’s organ-procurement program does not meet minimal ethics standards. All cooperation with the transplantation field in China should be suspended, including a ban on transplantation professionals from China participating in international conferences, and from publishing in international scientific and medical journals.

16. Congress should prohibit U.S. universities and companies from using federal funds for joint research or other forms of cooperation with China-based companies and government agencies building and maintaining China’s suffocating total-control police state—openly based on racial profiling and designed to commit mass atrocities against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.

17. Congress should request an update regarding U.S. Government protection of Uyghur Americans and action to investigate and deter illegal acts of coercion, threats, and reprisals by Chinese government agents, aiming to intimidate Uyghurs and prevent them from providing testimony about what is happening to their relatives in East Turkistan.

Recommendations for businesses, universities, and other private actors:

1. Companies must recognize that due diligence in the supply chain is impossible, given the conditions of total control, mass internment, widespread government-subsidized forced-labor recruitment, and large-scale government-sponsored prison/camp labor. Companies must suspend all sourcing of cotton, textiles, and garments from Xinjiang.

2. Private companies must immediately end collaboration with surveillance and racial profiling of Uyghurs, enabling arbitrary secret detention and an Orwellian system of control-by-terror.

3. Pension funds, both private-sector and government, must divest from these companies facilitating crimes against humanity, whether U.S. or foreign, including those listed on the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and New York stock exchanges.

4. Researchers must end joint projects with China-based institutions building the system of surveillance and racial profiling, including in artificial intelligence, big-data programs, and bio-engineering.

5. Scholars and universities should institute an academic boycott in response to “the crime of the century” taking place in East Turkistan. In 1965, U.S. and U.K. universities began an academic boycott of South African universities in order to ensure that they were not complicit in the system of apartheid. Scholarly collaboration, publication of research, and participation in international conferences were denied to those representing the apartheid institutions of South Africa. UHRP urges a similar approach to the cultural genocide of the Uyghurs.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL POSNER

Senator Rubio, Congressman Smith, thank you for inviting me to appear at today’s hearing, which draws much-needed attention to the plight of the embattled Uyghur community in China. At a time when core human rights principles are being tested in many places around the globe, I deeply appreciate the steadfast commitment the two of you have demonstrated, along with others on this Commission, to shining a spotlight on serious violations of human rights. When I served in the State Department during the first Obama term, I often was summoned to appear before various committees of Congress to discuss problematic countries where we needed to step up our game. While Congressional scrutiny is not a favorite pastime of State Department officials, I valued the constructive prodding during those encounters. You pushed us to do better, and you continue to play this important role.

I am now based at the New York University Stern School of Business, where I direct the Center for Business and Human Rights. I appear here this morning to offer thoughts and recommendations to the Executive Branch, to Congress, and to the business community, on the challenging questions they face in their ongoing engagements with China. I do so hoping to offer a constructive critique of current efforts to engage constructively and in a principled way with China, and to make suggestions for going forward.

First I want to offer a little context. I teach business students about human rights, and in my first class every semester, I discuss the reduction of global poverty as an important metric of human rights. According to the World Bank, in 1981, 88% of the people in China were living in extreme poverty, surviving on less than \$1.25 a day. Today, that number has dropped below 5%.¹ This dramatic progress is largely attributable to China’s impressive economic growth, about which the Chinese people are understandably proud. An important factor fueling this growth has been the government’s embrace of a market-based system and its move away from the economic orthodoxy of its past.

Unfortunately, the Chinese government has refused to show a concomitant willingness to reform its political system. The gross abuses of human rights we see today against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the efforts to crush democratic freedoms in Hong Kong are two striking examples of this resistance. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the human rights situation in China has grown worse, and in some ways dramatically so.²

Others on this panel will describe the desperate situation of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang in greater detail. They have faced systematic discrimination and persecution by the Chinese government for many years.³ Recently, the scope and scale of these violations have escalated dramatically.⁴ The imprisonment of more than a million Uyghurs today⁵ makes it the most egregious example of arbitrary detention anywhere in the world. Thousands more endure forced labor,⁶ and vir-

¹ <http://bit.ly/32ph7R3>

² <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>

³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>

⁴ <https://nyti.ms/2LihrcV>

⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-that-china-holds-million-uyghurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU>

⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uyghurs.html>

tually everyone in that community is subject to pervasive surveillance and isolation from the outside world.⁷ The response of the international community has not been commensurate with the extent of these gross human rights violations, which is why this hearing is so important.

In the last few weeks, some progress may have been made on U.S.-China trade. If a preliminary agreement is consummated, and this is still far from certain, the pact would obligate China to purchase \$40 to \$50 billion worth of American agricultural products annually. It also would strengthen Chinese protections for American intellectual property and give U.S. financial services companies greater access to Chinese markets. In exchange, the U.S. government would forgo imposing additional tariffs on \$250 billion of Chinese products being imported to the United States.

On a different track, in the last several weeks, various U.S. government agencies have imposed new sanctions on China and companies doing business there related to the government's mistreatment of the Uyghurs. On October 1st, the U.S. Commerce Department added 28 Chinese organizations to the so-called Entity List, preventing U.S. companies from selling their products without U.S. government approval.⁸ These entities were found to have been "implicated in human rights violations and abuses in China's campaign targeting Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities" in Xinjiang, and more specifically, in "China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance."⁹ The list includes both government entities and private companies that provide surveillance and artificial intelligence technology.¹⁰ According to Professor Julian Ku of Hofstra University, this may be the first time the Entity List has been used as a penalty for human rights violations.¹¹

Separately, the US Customs and Border Protection agency issued five Withhold Release Orders banning products that were produced using forced labor. One company on the list was the Hetian Taida Apparel Company in Xinjiang, which U.S. officials determined was making apparel products using prison or forced labor.¹²

Reflecting similar human rights concerns, the State Department on October 8th announced visa restrictions on unnamed Chinese government and Community Party officials "implicated in the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, or other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang."¹³ The State Department cited the Chinese government's "highly repressive campaign" against Uyghurs and other Muslim minority residents of Xinjiang, and made specific reference to the "mass detentions in internment camps; pervasive, high-tech surveillance; draconian controls on expressions of cultural and religious identities; and coercion of individuals to return from abroad to an often perilous fate in China."¹⁴ By imposing these three categories of sanctions, the U.S. government is signaling strong condemnation of the ongoing repression of the Uyghurs.

Adding rhetorical force to the administration's various actions, individual officials have spoken out about mistreatment of the Uyghurs. Secretary of State Pompeo in particular has condemned the persecution of the Uyghurs, most recently at last month's UN General Assembly. Secretary Pompeo told reporters: "I want to make clear that China's repressive campaign in Xinjiang is not about terrorism. It's about China's attempt to erase its own citizens. We call on all countries to resist China's demands to repatriate the Uyghurs."¹⁵ At a UN side event, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan condemned the Chinese government's systematic campaign "to stop its own citizens from exercising their unalienable right to religious freedom."¹⁶

But sanctions and strong public admonitions have been undermined by the administration's broader failure to prioritize human rights as a consistent element of US foreign policy. The administration's continued unwillingness to acknowledge the

⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs>

⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html>

⁹ <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-commerce-adds-28-chinese-organizations-its-entity-list>

¹⁰ <https://fortune.com/2019/10/08/china-ai-us-entity-list/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/us-to-blacklist-28-chinese-entities-over-abuses-in-xinjiang.html>

¹¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/business/china-human-rights-technology-xinjiang.html>

¹² <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-detention-orders-against-companies-suspected-using-forced>

¹³ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-officials-for-repression-in-xinjiang/>

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-un/pompeo-urges-world-to-resist-chinas-demands-to-repatriate-ethnic-uyghurs-idUSKBN1W70KX>

¹⁶ <https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-john-j-sullivan-remarks-at-the-human-rights-crisis-in-xinjiang-event/>

role of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince in the Khashoggi murder last year is one glaring example among many.¹⁷ Without a consistent commitment to promoting human rights norms, the administration is far less persuasive in its efforts to promote compliance with these international standards in China and elsewhere.

This reluctance starts at the top. Time and again, the President has resisted talking about human rights in general, and about Chinese government violations in particular. In September, CNN reported that the President had assured President Xi that he would not raise human rights issues relating to Hong Kong while trade talks are ongoing.¹⁸ The effects of this promise rippled through the administration: Kurt Tong, the then-US Consul General to Hong Kong and Macau, was directed by the State Department to cancel two speeches he planned to give in Washington discussing the human rights situation in Hong Kong.¹⁹ On August 1st, when he was asked by reporters to comment on the situation in Hong Kong, the President demurred saying only that the people of China and Hong Kong will "have to deal with that themselves. They don't need advice."²⁰

The President's cavalier and dismissive comments about human rights in China and other places are now all too familiar. At the Group of Seven summit last month, he referred to Egyptian President Sisi as "my favorite dictator,"²¹ and before their bilateral meeting in New York praised him as "a real leader" who has "done some things that are absolutely amazing."²² He recently characterized Saudi Crown Prince Salman as a "friend," saying he's done "a spectacular job."²³ He has pledged "complete support" to Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, saying he is "doing a great job for the people of Brazil ... in all respects."²⁴ He still refuses to condemn the Russian occupation of Crimea and Russia's continued interference in Ukraine's democratic system and its support of armed insurgent forces in Eastern Ukraine. He has praised Vladimir Putin as a "terrific person."²⁵ And despite their tumultuous relationship, the President has referred to Kim Jong Un as being "very talented."²⁶ The list goes on and on.

The administration also continues to turn its back on, and even undermine, multilateral approaches to human rights. The Uyghur crisis provides a salient case in point. In February, ambassadors from 22 countries signed a letter to the president of the UN Human Rights Council, calling on China to end its mass detention and surveillance of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.²⁷ Australia, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland were among the signatories, but the United States was not.²⁸ As a result of the American withdrawal from the Human Rights Council, we are unable to lead multilateral efforts under the auspices of that body. Instead, no government was the principal sponsor of this effort, a fact that no doubt weakened the effect of the statement itself. This was a missed opportunity to apply global pressure to the Chinese government, a casualty of the administration's go-it-alone approach to diplomacy. The U.S. government can and must do better, and Congress needs to pressure the administration to take more decisive action.

Congressional oversight, such as what you're doing today, can have a real effect. On May 9th of last year, Senator Rubio and Representative Smith sent a letter to the U.S. Commerce Secretary demanding answers about the sale by U.S. companies of surveillance technology used by Chinese security forces.²⁹ On August 28th of 2018, the chairs sent a bipartisan letter, signed by 17 legislators, urging swift action by the executive branch in response to the systematic discrimination and arbitrary

¹⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47182567>

¹⁸ <https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/04/politics/trump-xi-hong-kong-protests/index.html>

¹⁹ Id.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-awaiting-egyptian-counterpart-at-summit-called-out-for-my-favorite-dictator-11568403645>

²² <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-el-sisi-egypt-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/>

²³ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-praises-saudi-crown-prince-for-doing-a-spectacular-job-11561778810>

²⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment-usa/trump-pledges-complete-support-for-brazils-bolsonaro-idUSKCN1VH1OV>

²⁵ https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/g20-june-2019-intl-hnk/h_0ac0caf83fde21799a2600d58fedea54

²⁶ https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dictator-envy-trumps-praise-of-kim-jong-un-marks-embrace-of-totalitarian-leaders/2018/06/15/b9a8bbc8-70af-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html

²⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights-exclusive/exclusive-west-japan-rebuke-china-at-un-for-detention-of-uyghurs-idUSKCN1U51E1>

²⁸ <https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/11/asia/xinjiang-uyghur-un-letter-intl-hnk/index.html>

²⁹ <https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-ask-commerce-secretary-ross-about-sale-of-surveillance-technology>

detention of Turkic Muslim minorities.³⁰ Both letters were no doubt instrumental in achieving the recent sanctions and exemplify one of the ways Congress can hold the administration accountable. More recently, the Senate passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019, calling on bodies within the U.S. government to prepare reports on China's treatment of the Uyghurs.³¹ The Uyghur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act has also been introduced in the House, relating to sourcing restrictions and export controls.³² The adoption of some form of this legislation will be an important step in bringing attention to the atrocities occurring in Xinjiang and will help to ensure a thoughtful and cohesive response by the U.S. Government.

U.S. companies doing business in China also have a very important role to play with respect to human rights, but to date, their record has been uneven. The allure of doing business in and with China is obvious. According to the World Bank, the Chinese consumer market is now the third-biggest in the world after the U.S. and the EU.³³ China also continues to be the largest global manufacturer of electronics, apparel, toys, and many other products.³⁴ Given these economic realities, global companies will continue to look for opportunities to do business in China. All too often, U.S. companies have opted to pursue their economic interests, while paying insufficient attention to how their words and actions affect the broader human rights debate.

Last week's confrontation between the National Basketball Association and the Chinese government is the latest example. After Daryl Morey, general manager of the Houston Rockets, tweeted his support for human rights and democracy activists in Hong Kong,³⁵ the NBA released starkly conflicting statements. The English-language version expressed support for Moray's freedom of speech while recognizing that his tweet had offended friends and fans in China; a second statement in Mandarin, posted on the NBA's Chinese social media account, said the league was "extremely disappointed in the inappropriate comment."³⁶ NBA Commissioner Adam Silver subsequently reiterated the league's commitment to free speech.³⁷ As he did so, a Chinese e-commerce platform, a sporting goods brand, and a sports news website all suspended access to goods and coverage related to the Rockets, and Chinese Television announced it would not broadcast NBA exhibition games scheduled to be played in China.³⁸ Lost in the debate was the underlying question of how human rights in Hong Kong are being seriously undermined by the Chinese government.

There are special responsibilities for U.S. technology companies operating China. The Chinese government continues to use advanced technology to stifle dissent and to intrude on the privacy of its people. Chinese authorities have attempted to justify this mass surveillance as a tool to fight terrorism,³⁹ but most of what the system tracks has no relationship to threats of terrorism or extremism. A recent Human Rights Watch report about the Chinese government's "Strike Hard Campaign" in Xinjiang highlights the risks. In that region, the government has used what it calls the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) to perform sweeping surveillance of the Uyghurs and other members of the Turkic Muslim minority.⁴⁰ This app collects huge amounts of personal information, including blood type and other physical characteristics, education level, and religious and political affiliations. The IJOP also reports on activities the government deems suspicious, such as the use of encrypted communication tools like WhatsApp and Viber.⁴¹

³⁰ <https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-lead-bipartisan-letter-urging-administration-to-sanction-chinese>

³¹ <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/178>

³² <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1025?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22uyghur%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=5>

³³ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PRVT.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true&year_high_desc=true

³⁴ <https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-manufacturing-scorecard-how-the-us-compares-to-18-other-nations/>

³⁵ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/10/07/nba-china-tweet-daryl-morey/>

³⁶ https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-the-nbas-apology-was-different-in-china-and-the-us-2019-10-07?link=MW_latest_news

³⁷ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/10/07/nba-china-tweet-daryl-morey/>

³⁸ https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-the-nbas-apology-was-different-in-china-and-the-us-2019-10-07?link=MW_latest_news

³⁹ <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/china-terrorism-xinjiang-repression-islam.html>

⁴⁰ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass-surveillance>

⁴¹ <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2019/05/02/china-how-mass-surveillance-works-xinjiang>

The IJOP surveils and collects data on every person in Xinjiang, tracking their movements by monitoring the location of their phones, ID cards, and vehicles. Information collected through the IJOP system is used as a basis for house arrest or more formal detention. Failure to carry a smart phone can itself be a basis for detention. In some reported cases, U.S. companies and investors have played a role in this system. Until it was publicly reported in February, Massachusetts-based Thermo Fisher sold DNA sequencers directly to authorities in Xinjiang for genetic mapping.⁴² California-based Amax, which specializes in high-performance computing for deep-learning applications, partnered with Hikvision—now on the Entity List, as well. Hikvision is one of the world's largest producers of facial recognition and surveillance equipment,⁴³ and the company has won several security-related contracts from the Chinese government in Xinjiang, totaling \$260 million.⁴⁴ One contract was for a “social prevention and control system” feature on tens of thousands of cameras.⁴⁵

Some U.S. technology companies have weighed the risks of doing business in China and declined to pursue aspects of their business there. Google, for example, did the right thing in 2010 when it withdrew from China in the face of extensive government interference with free expression.⁴⁶ To date, the major internet platforms, Google,⁴⁷ Facebook⁴⁸ and Twitter have limited their businesses in China given the government's poor record on free speech and privacy.⁴⁹ Microsoft has been an industry leader in crafting safeguards relating to facial recognition.⁵⁰ The company even took down its public facial recognition database when reports surfaced that Chinese companies, including Megvii and SenseTime, both newly added to the Entity List, were using the database to train their facial recognition systems.⁵¹

But it was disappointing to see Apple remove pro-democracy songs from its Chinese music store,⁵² and Taiwan's flag from its iOS emoji library for users in Hong Kong and Macau.⁵³ Apple's Chinese iCloud partner, Guizhou-Cloud Big Data, recently made a deal to move user data to servers operated by state-run China Telecom.⁵⁴ Apple also removed the HKMap.Live app, thereby depriving Hong Kong citizens of the capacity to track online the sites of demonstrations and police actions.⁵⁵ All of these actions seem guided by the company's desire to preserve its status with the Chinese government. Apple maintains that they are simply following local law.⁵⁶ This alone is not a tenable path. Instead, Apple and other technology companies need to develop company-endorsed human rights policies that address privacy, free expression and other rights issues, using international norms as a baseline. Such policies will help businesses make these challenging decisions in a more consistent and principled manner.

Investors must also face these questions head on. A range of U.S. investors have been providing capital to Megvii and SenseTime. According to one report, among U.S.-based institutions with stakes in these two Chinese firms, “public pension funds are the largest committers of capital.”⁵⁷ Megvii representatives told BuzzFeed News that the company does not “have any access to the IJOP platform or the [Chinese] national ID database.”⁵⁸ And while the company also assured BuzzFeed that it requires clients not to use its technology for the infringement of human rights,

⁴² <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/962492-orwell-china-socialcredit-surveillance/>

⁴³ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/962492-orwell-china-socialcredit-surveillance/>

⁴⁴ <https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/chinas-blacklisted-ai-firms-what-you-should-know-doc-11b4wb1>

⁴⁵ <https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/chinas-blacklisted-ai-firms-what-you-should-know-doc-11b4wb1>

⁴⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/12/google-china-ends-censorship>

⁴⁷ <https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/location/>

⁴⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/>

⁴⁹ <https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/7/20902947/nba-rockets-daryl-morey-hong-kong-protests-tweet-internet-speech-censorship-china>

⁵⁰ <http://bit.ly/35vEzxW>

⁵¹ <https://www.ft.com/content/7d3e0d6a-87a0-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2>

⁵² <https://www.fastcompany.com/90332656/apple-removed-this-pro-democracy-music-in-china>

⁵³ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-08/apple-pulls-taiwanese-flag-emoji-from-iphones-in-hong-kong>

⁵⁴ <https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/18/17587304/apple-icloud-china-user-data-state-run-telecom-privacy-security>

⁵⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/technology/apple-hong-kong-app.html>

⁵⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/oct/10/tim-cook-apple-hong-kong-mapping-app-removal>

⁵⁷ <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/us-money-funding-facial-recognition-sensetime-megvii>

⁵⁸ *Id.*

it did not provide details of how it enforces this commitment.⁵⁹ U.S. investors need to adopt more stringent safeguards to avoid contributing capital to Chinese companies that are involved in surveillance and related data-gathering, especially in Xinjiang.

China and the U.S. compete fiercely for economic and political influence in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. But the two countries—including their companies and investors—must find ways to interact that allow for peaceful, fruitful competition and perhaps, on occasion, cooperation. As I learned in government, saying this is easy; doing it is very hard. But the U.S. government and American businesses must find ways to navigate this terrain, allowing economic and political cooperation when it is mutually beneficial, while always standing firm in support of universal human rights principles.

⁵⁹ Id.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMY K. LEHR

Chairman McGovern, Chairman Rubio, and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this important topic and offering me an opportunity to speak.

I am the Director of the Human Rights Initiative at CSIS. My program issued a report today on forced labor in Xinjiang, with a series of recommendations to address these abuses. I have worked in the field of business and human rights for over a decade, and the recommendations reflect my practical experience.

Over one million Muslim minorities in Xinjiang are believed to be held in extrajudicial detention facilities, where they are brainwashed to abandon their religion and declare loyalty to the Communist Party. The entire region of Xinjiang is covered by an unparalleled surveillance system infiltrating every aspect of inhabitants' lives. And now there are credible allegations that minorities, including those who were detained, are being subjected to forced labor, particularly in the textile industry. Today, I will focus on the issue of forced labor in Xinjiang and why it is unique and requires novel responses.

Forced labor is always abhorrent, but the situation in Xinjiang is uniquely abusive. The forced labor in Xinjiang goes beyond more typical forced labor, which usually involves migrant workers who pay fees to a recruiter and end up indebted, with their passports confiscated and their movement restricted. Forced labor is not typically a centralized, masterminded effort, where the state acts as the organizer as part of a broader effort to cut minorities off from their culture and religion at any cost. In Xinjiang's case, the Chinese state is playing this role. The Chinese authorities believe that through re-education and work, they can break the minority population's ties to religion, increase their loyalty to the state, and stabilize the region.¹ Forced labor is part of a set of government policies seeking to accomplish this. Other key elements include mass detention and what the government considers to be "poverty alleviation" for minorities, and these are all interlinked.

Forced labor in Xinjiang may rise to the level of a crime against humanity. Why do I say this? International jurisprudence defines several key elements of crimes against humanity: the act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack; the attack must be against the civilian population; and the attack must be launched on discriminatory grounds, including ethnic or religious grounds.² Such attacks in many instances are violent, but are not always.³ Enslavement—including forced labor—is enumerated as a potential crime against humanity when carried out as part of such an attack. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials after World War II found certain German industrialists guilty of crimes against humanity, including the use of forced labor associated with concentration camps.

Xinjiang appears to fit this pattern. Muslim minorities are being forced to work at a significant scale in Xinjiang based on their religion and ethnicity. It is part of a broader attack on them, including widespread detention. As a result, the Chinese companies playing a direct role in Xinjiang's state-sponsored forced labor are at risk of complicity in international crimes. Our response needs to match the gravity of the abuses.

At CSIS, our research confirmed and expanded on the work of others speaking today. Forced labor in Xinjiang takes three primary forms. First, there is traditional prison labor, which has long played a key role in cotton and textile production in Xinjiang. It is believed that increasingly large numbers of minorities are entering the formal prison system in Xinjiang, where they may be forced to work.⁴ Second, detainees and ex-detainees are being funneled into factories. Chinese government planning documents and statements from detainees suggest that this could be occurring at a significant scale. One credible source told an Associated Press journalist that 10,000 ex-detainees, or 10 or 20 percent of the population in his county, were being forced to work.⁵ The government of Kashgar, a region of Xinjiang, stated that

¹ Emily Rauhala, "China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang Violence," *Time*, August 4, 2014, <https://time.com/3078381/china-xinjiang-violence-shache-yarkand/>

² *Akayesu*, (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 595

³ "An attack may also be nonviolent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner." *Akayesu*, (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 581. See also Rutaganda (Trial Chamber), December 6, 1999. Para 70, and Musema, (Trial Chamber), January 27, 2000, para 205

⁴ *Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains* (Washington, D.C.: CPIFC)

⁵ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, "US Sportswear traced to factory in China's internment camps," Associated Press, December 19, 2018, <https://www.apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb>

it would send 100,000 “re-educated” individuals to work in factories.⁶ That is 20 percent of the entire Uyghur population of Kashgar. Even if the Chinese government did not hit its targets, the numbers are likely to be very significant. Third, there are indications that Chinese authorities are coercing rural, poor minorities to enter the formal workforce as part of the government’s poverty alleviation program, which is based on the idea that factory work will break their ties with their culture and religion.

The Chinese government’s efforts to move minorities into the workplace, willingly or not, center particularly on yarn, textiles, and apparel. Indeed, the government is offering significant subsidies to textile companies and allows factories to pay these workers much less than the minimum wage.⁷ Our interviews of ex-detainees indicate that some are paid less in a year than the legal minimum wage for a month in Xinjiang. This extraordinarily cheap labor creates significant competitive advantages for these Chinese companies.

The Chinese government helps funnel these workers to the factories. The ex-detainees we interviewed were explicitly told that if they refused to work, they’d be sent back into detention. At least some of the rural poor moving into the workforce as part of the government’s poverty alleviation program were also reportedly threatened with being sent to detention if they did not agree to the job placement. Like the ex-detainees, they were also paid a pittance.

Forced labor in Xinjiang is one part of a much larger set of human rights violations. The situation requires policy action on a number of fronts, including diplomatic pressure. However, because some of the companies potentially involved in forced labor in Xinjiang are linked to global supply chains, action in this area can be part of the solution.

To think about what leverage is available, we can consider how Xinjiang connects to brands and consumers here in the U.S. China is one of the world’s largest cotton producers, with around 20% of the world’s production.⁸ But a more apt characterization is that Xinjiang itself is one of the world’s largest cotton producers, since it alone is responsible for 84% of all of China’s cotton production.⁹ Some of that cotton is transformed into yarn and textiles in Xinjiang—indeed, the world’s self-proclaimed largest producer of colored yarn¹⁰—Huafu Fashion—has a factory in Xinjiang and is accused of using “re-educated” labor.¹¹ Our research indicates that several other large Chinese textile companies that sell to Western brands—directly and indirectly—also have factories in Xinjiang that raise red flags. Much of Xinjiang’s cotton, yarn, and textiles then are sent into the rest of China for further processing. Over 30% of U.S. apparel imports come from China,¹² and much of this is likely to be affected by Xinjiang’s forced labor several steps back in the supply chain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our foreign policy should reflect our values. We must respond with an urgency that reflects the severity and scale of these abuses.

- The Administration should apply Global Magnitsky sanctions on companies and their officers directly involved in forced labor, responsible for building detention facilities, or knowingly providing key technology for Xinjiang’s pervasive surveillance. This is an obvious and urgent step.
- A federal agency—either the Department of Labor or Department of State—should be funded to create a public watch list of companies in Xinjiang that trigger red flags indicating a risk that they use forced labor. We identify examples of those red flags in our report. This watch list would help Customs and Border Protection assist with Global Magnitsky designations, and also put companies on notice of risks in their own sourcing practices.

⁶Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” *New York Times*, December 16, 2018

⁷Wusu City: The First Apparel Manufacturing Company Starting Operations in September,” The Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180126102601/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2017/08/30/143690.html>

⁸China: Cotton and Products Annual,” USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, April 16, 2019, <https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/china-cotton-and-products-annual-3>

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰“World’s largest textile mill for coloured yarns in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, August 25, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/25/c_137418336.htm or <https://perma.cc/SV96-V2B4>

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Sheng Lu, “China’s Changing Role in the World Textile and Apparel Supply Chain,” FASH455, November 2, 2018, <https://shenglufashion.com/2018/11/02/chinas-changing-role-in-the-world-textile-and-apparel-supply-chain/>

- Customs and Border Protection should develop unique approaches to enable seizures of Xinjiang goods tainted by forced labor that reflect the fact that Xinjiang is a police state. For this authoritarian environment, Customs and Border Protection should assume that some of the red flags we identified in our report are a sufficient basis for a seizure. The aforementioned company watch list would put Western companies on notice that certain suppliers could face seizures. Customs and Border Protection should first conduct seizures on shipments coming directly from Xinjiang to the United States, because receiving companies should be on notice of the risks of their sourcing. This would provide time for companies indirectly sourcing from Xinjiang to identify red flags and adjust their sourcing practices.
- The apparel industry should consider instituting a ban on knowingly sourcing Xinjiang cotton, as they did for Uzbek cotton. This would acknowledge the severity of the problem, although given the dependence of the U.S. apparel sector on China, it will be challenging. In the meantime, individual companies should carry out the due diligence and reporting we identify in our report and shift their supply chains as appropriate. Notably, traditional factory audits are impossible to conduct credibly in Xinjiang, so companies should instead use a combination of traceability and a red flags approach. If companies do identify likely forced labor, they will not be able to directly mitigate it in the Xinjiang context and will need to change their sourcing.
- The U.S. government itself should adopt the report's red flags approach in its own procurement practices. Given the dollar value of U.S. government procurement practices, this could be impactful.
- Congress and the Administration must think more broadly regarding what can be done about companies directly involved in the centrally planned, gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Some of the technology companies knowingly contributing to the surveillance state in Xinjiang have a U.S. presence. It is suspected that large state-owned enterprises helping to build the detention facilities there also have a U.S. presence. They should be the U.S.'s primary targets whenever we can reach them.
- The U.S. should work toward building a broad coalition of international allies who are committed to removing these abuses from global supply chains. Each recommendation above, while vital, will not effect change on its own. Our allies, who also have commitments to protecting human rights, must hear from the United States that we want to work together to cut off export markets for Xinjiang's tainted goods. Strong U.S. diplomatic efforts will be essential. This work is one aspect of ensuring that the goods we keep out do not simply slip into other, lucrative supply chains.
- Finally, simply indirectly pressuring Chinese companies involved in abuses in Xinjiang will not by itself address the underlying state-led abuses. These recommendations need to be combined with a robust diplomatic effort and the use of other points of leverage.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. MCGOVERN

Good morning and welcome to today's Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing on "Forced Labor, Mass Internment, and Social Control in Xinjiang."

In the last year, Chinese authorities have expanded their network of mass internment camps, where one million or more Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims have been detained and subjected to torture, extended solitary confinement and political indoctrination, and deprived of food. Children of detainees are reportedly often placed in orphanages, welfare centers, and boarding schools. Some scholars and human rights groups argue that these practices may amount to "crimes against humanity."

Outside the camps, the Chinese government has become more efficient in the use of technology to control and suppress. Some observers have described this surveillance system as an "open air prison." Recent reports indicate that Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are increasingly sentenced to lengthy prison sentences on vague charges. One case is that of Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti who is serving a life sentence in spite of his dedication to nonviolence and reconciliation. He is a "Defending Freedoms Project" prisoner of conscience and his congressional advocate is Representative Jim Langevin of Rhode Island.

Meanwhile, the practice of Islam has also been criminalized. Mosques have been destroyed, Islamic dress has been forbidden, and fasting for Ramadan has been dis-

allowed. It is in this context that new information has come to light detailing the widespread use of a government-subsidized and large-scale system of forced labor in both mass internment camps and in factories throughout the Xinjiang region. Satellite imagery, personal testimonies, and official documents indicate that detainees in camps and some who have been released are forced to work in food, textile, and other manufacturing jobs. Products reportedly produced with forced labor include:

- Textiles, such as yarn, clothing, gloves, bedding, and carpet.
- Electronics, including cell phones and computers.
- Food products, shoes, tea, and handicrafts.

In January 2019, the U.S. company Badger Sportswear stopped importing clothing following reports that such clothing was made with forced labor by internment camp detainees.

In May 2019, the Wall Street Journal linked the supply chains of Adidas, Campbell Soup, H&M, Kraft Heinz, Coca-Cola, and Gap Inc. to forced labor.

On October 1st, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a “Withhold Release Order” on garments produced with prison or forced labor by Hetian Taida Apparel, which has exported products to Costco.

Current U.S. law prohibits the import of any product made with forced labor. Any U.S. or international company that produces or has a supply chain in Xinjiang may be complicit in forced labor and human rights violations.

In 2002 China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR affirms the rights of all peoples to self-determination and non-discrimination, to freely choose and accept work, to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, including the right to remuneration, and to take part in cultural life.

All of the policies and practices I have just described violate the ICESCR as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. China is failing to comply with international human rights obligations it freely assumed.

There is no question that the U.S. should be doing more to help the Uyghur people. In April, Senator Rubio and I, and over 40 Members called for Global Magnitsky sanctions against Chen Quanguo, the Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary, as well as Chinese officials and companies complicit in gross violations of human rights.

And last week, we expressed support when the Administration added 28 Chinese companies to the “entity list” and applied visa restrictions on some Chinese officials.

Right now, there are important bills that Congress should pass, including:

- The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act by Sen. Rubio and Rep. Suozzi and Rep. Chris Smith; and
- The Uyghur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act by Chairman Brad Sherman.

I look forward to hearing any and all recommendations about what more can and should be done—including whether it is feasible for companies to conduct reliable inspections and audits of supply chains in the region. Congress stands in solidarity with the Uyghur people, and we want to do all we can to support the full exercise of their human rights.

Finally, before we begin, I would like to recognize Nury Teyip, who is here with us today. His brother, Tashpolat Teyip, was the president of Xinjiang University and is a renowned scholar. Tashpolat Teyip was disappeared in March 2017 and was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. Last month, we learned from Amnesty International that he may be executed. I condemn his detention in the strongest possible terms and call on the Chinese government to release him immediately.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing, so thank you for convening it. It's also timely. I also want to thank all of our witnesses. Your research and your advocacy has done a lot to inform us and the world about what's happening—the atrocities being committed in the Xinjiang region by the Chinese Communist Party. Through the decades, the crimes of the Chinese Communist Party have been as consistent as they have been egregious. Yet somehow, these tyrants maintain the ability to shock the world even further with their cruelty and their callousness.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the last two years has experienced classic forms of Communist totalitarianism now combined with the application of

advanced technology. The difference between the Chinese Communist Party's crimes of the past and those of the present is the motivation. The past was about power alone. The present is about power, but also profit. Chairman Xi Jinping and his henchman, Chen Quanguo—who by the way used to oversee Chinese brutality and repression inside Tibet, so he's a specialist at this—revived collectivization to force Uyghurs into the harness of the Chinese Communist Party's state. Just as collectivization created famines that harmed millions in China, this new effort is blazing a trail of human suffering.

The problem goes much deeper than simply one million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities detained and forced to work in what can only be called concentration camps. For those able to escape the camps, the full power of the Chinese state is mobilized against them and their families inside and outside China. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Uyghur men and women have been forced, after military discipline and political reeducation, to take jobs in satellite factories.

The Chinese Communist government offers incentives for Chinese companies to exploit this labor, as the cost of doing business in coastal provinces rises. And what of the families, the children, and the elderly? The children are removed from their parents' care so the adults can work in the factories. Instead of the warm embrace of their families, the young and the elderly are forced into the stifling custody of the Chinese Communist Party. For the children this means the loss of their language, their culture, their faith, their heritage. For the elderly this means loneliness and isolation in their final years. Their children and grandchildren will never hear the stories of lives well lived, of hardships conquered, or the importance of faith and values in a brutal, communist-governed world.

Today's hearing, however, is not about this alone. It is about understanding how the Party integrates labor and social control, and the national security and moral risks for individuals and companies that deal with China. The network of detention facilities and factories has turned Xinjiang into a forced labor camp roughly the size of the states of California, Montana, Texas, and Florida combined. Millions of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities labor in textile and light manufacturing and are prohibited from practicing their faith. Simply put, this is slavery—the slavery of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Earlier this month the Trump administration announced sanctions, as the Chairman said, targeting Chinese officials as well as governmental and commercial entities for these severe human rights abuses, and I believe that these also constitute crimes against humanity. We all welcome these steps and we also believe more can and should be done to resolve one of the world's greatest ongoing tragedies and to hold its perpetrators accountable.

I hope the House will soon pass Senate bill 178, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, that the Senate passed last month. The bill would require the Administration to gather information about the situation in Xinjiang and China's efforts to suppress international awareness of it. China's efforts to silence the Uyghurs and turn the world's attention away from the ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang have included the coercion and intimidation of American citizens and residents here and abroad. This is an outrage that must be addressed.

The U.S. Government needs to do its part to ensure that Americans and the world are aware of what the Chinese government is doing in Xinjiang and have the freedom to express their views. Despite the efforts of our witnesses today, Americans—and American companies in particular—are unaware of what is taking place.

For example, the National Basketball Association maintains a residential training camp in Xinjiang, seemingly oblivious to the contradiction between speaking out about societal issues here at home, which they have the full freedom to do, and staying silent about China's oppression.

Only after the U.S. Commerce Department added the Chinese artificial intelligence company SenseTime to the Entity List last week for its role in facilitating the Chinese Communist Party's crimes in Xinjiang did MIT begin to review its relationship with the firm.

It's long overdue for Americans and the private sector to wake up and fully realize the real risks of doing business with China.

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang

Adrian Zenz

Senior Fellow in China Studies

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Written Testimony for the Hearing of the Congressional Executive Commission on China

1. Introduction

After recruiting a hundred or more thousand police forces, installing massive surveillance systems, and interning vast numbers of predominantly Turkic minority population members, many have been wondering about Beijing's next step in its so-called "war on Terror" in Xinjiang. Since the second half of 2018, limited but apparently growing numbers of detainees have been released into different forms of forced labor. In this report it is argued based on government documents that the state's long-term stability maintenance strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse and extremely intrusive combination of forced or at least involuntary training and labor, intergenerational separation and social control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of "poverty alleviation".

Below, the author identifies three distinct flow schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of adult Uyghurs and other minority populations, both men and women, into different forms of coercive or at least involuntary, labor-intensive factory work. This is achieved through a combination of internment camp workshops, large industrial parks, and village-based satellite factories. While the parents are being herded into full-time work, their children are put into full-time (at least full day-time) education and training settings. This includes children below preschool age (infants and toddlers), so that ethnic minority women are being "liberated" and "freed" to engage in full-time wage labor. Notably, both factory and educational settings are essentially state-controlled environments that facilitate ongoing political indoctrination while barring religious practices. As a result, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time. The targeted use of village work teams and village-based satellite factories means that this grand "poverty alleviation" and social re-engineering scheme penetrates into every corner of ethnic minority society with unprecedented pervasiveness.

Consequently, it is argued that Beijing's grand scheme of forced education, training and labor in Xinjiang simultaneously achieves at least five main goals in this core region of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): maintain the minority population in state-controlled environments, inhibit intergenerational cultural transmission, achieve national poverty reduction goals, promote economic growth along the BRI, and bring glory to the Party by achieving all of these four aims in a way that is ideologically consistent with the core tenets of Communist thought - using labor to transform religious minority groups towards a predominantly materialist worldview, akin to the Reform Through Labor (劳改) program. Government documents outline that the transformation of rural populations from farming to wage labor should involve not just the acquisition of new

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

skills, but also a thorough identity and worldview change in line with Party ideology. In this context, labor is hailed as a strategic means to eradicate "extremist" ideologies.

The domestic and global implications of this grand scheme, where internment camps form only one component of a society-wide coercive social re-engineering strategy, are dramatic. Through the mutual pairing assistance program, 19 cities and provinces from the nation's most developed regions are pouring billions of Chinese Yuan (RMB) into the establishment of factories in minority regions. Some of them directly involve the use of internment camp labor, while others are used to make Uyghur women leave their children in educational or day care facilities in order to engage in full time factory labor. Soon, many or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, could contain elements of involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang. Government documents blatantly boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in Xinjiang, supporting the economic growth goals of the BRI.

The findings presented below call for nothing less than a global investigation of supply chains involving Chinese products or product components, and for a greatly increased scrutiny of trade flows along China's Belt and Road. They also warrant a strong response from the international community in regards to China's intrusive coerced social re-engineering practices among Turkic minorities.

2. Winning The "War Against Poverty": Industry-Based Poverty Alleviation

2.1 Industry-Based Poverty Alleviation Through Labor-Intensive Manufacturing

In line of Xi Jinping's goal to eradicate poverty and establish a moderately prosperous society (MPS) in the entire nation by 2020, poverty alleviation has become an urgent goal in Xinjiang. According to government documents, the region's "war on poverty" (literally: "fight for poverty-alleviation", *tuofu gongjian* 脱贫攻坚) in 2019 has reached a crucial phase. The urgent aim is to achieve the complete eradication of poverty in time for 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. In all this, the central government is putting special attention to winning the war against poverty in southern Xinjiang.¹ Another report states that poverty alleviation is commensurate with a "military command", and that "the southern four regions and prefectures are the main battle field" in the war against poverty.² In this relentless "battle", every administrative level is to put pressure on each successive lower level in order to "implement the poverty alleviation responsibility with full pressure".³

Other parts of China are implementing very similar poverty alleviation schemes, and poverty alleviation through higher-income work is at first glance a positive development. The issue in Xinjiang is that this scheme is specifically targeting predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities on a massive scale, and is coupled with penetrating social control, a pervasive surveillance state, an unprecedented extrajudicial

¹ <http://www.xjrs.com.cn/zwgk/xwdt/xjyw/201903/t8a4ac70d69b93a1c0169be4c80b300c0.html> or <http://archive.is/MRBYL>

² http://f.china.com.cn/2018-02/07/content_50442241.htm or <http://archive.is/oVSbm>

³ <https://new.qq.com/omn/20190228/20190228A01BNW00>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

internment campaign, and a deeper social re-engineering intention on the side of the state that effectively amounts to targeted cultural genocide.

Poverty alleviation comes in different forms, at times through improved farming. But the main key focus in Xinjiang's ethnic minority regions has recently shifted to so-called "industry-based poverty alleviation" (*chanye fupin* 产业扶贫).⁴ Since the past few years, this has been involving a systematic training of so-called rural surplus laborers in order to place them in low-skilled factory work. Most recently, this has involved the large-scale construction of so-called "poverty alleviation workshops" (*fupin chejian* 扶贫车间), which are smaller-scale "satellite factories" (*weixing gongchang* 卫星工厂). The main purpose of satellite factories is to move as many rural dwellers into factory-based wage labor by "sending work to homes" (*gangwei song dao jia* 岗位送到家) and "letting villagers take up jobs at their home's doorstep" (*rang cunmin jia menkou jiuye* 让村民家门口就业).⁵

At least since 2018, Xinjiang's primary poverty alleviation and stability maintenance method has been to promote wage labor among all ethnic minority adults. Every household must have at least one person in stable employment, although numerous local level reports indicate that the trend is very much to also push women into factory work.⁶ Between 2016 and 2020, Xinjiang was scheduled to lift 2.61 million persons out of poverty.⁷ Of these, 1.74 million are considered able to work and are expected to "get out of poverty" through different forms of training and employment. Much of this new stable employment is to be provided in the form of labor-intensive manufacturing. The other 0.87 million will be taken care of through social welfare systems and related subsidies.

A June 2017 document published by Kashgar Prefecture provides us with a more detailed view of how the state is pursuing the poverty alleviation of every single person. Between 2015-20, this region alone was scheduled to lift 1.21m people out of poverty.⁸ Specifically, this was planned be done through five different means:

1. Production development (poverty alleviation for 529,000 persons)
2. Re-training rural surplus laborers for full-time wage employment (poverty alleviation for 217,000 persons)
3. Physical relocation to new housing developments with factory jobs (poverty alleviation for 54,900 persons)
4. Environmental protection programs (poverty alleviation for 37,400 persons)
5. Policy measures, referring to subsidies in monetary form or animals (poverty alleviation for 371,600 persons)

Poverty alleviation through job training and employment is further broken down into six different categories:⁹

1. Move laborers to other parts of Xinjiang (疆内跨地区转移就业)

⁴ <http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/11/09/152523.html> or <http://archive.is/YnQsw>

⁵ <http://www.xj-agri.gov.cn/tpgi/43407.jhtml> or <http://archive.is/Q3rUz>

⁶ <http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/01/29/147312.html> or <http://archive.is/ri3CP>

⁷ <http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0109/c188521-27501414.html>

⁸ <http://www.xj.chinanews.com/shehui/20171018/24289.shtml> or <http://archive.is/KVSDV>

⁹ <http://www.xinjiangnet.com.cn/2018/0120/2039961.shtml>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

2. Move laborers to other parts of China (转移内地就业)
3. Move laborers to XPCC locations for work (转移兵团就业)
4. Move laborers into urban industrial parks (就地就近转移城镇‘企业’园区)
5. Get laborers into satellite factories (转移卫星工厂)
6. Support small-scale self-employment (支持小微企业带动就业)

The strategy for moving vast numbers of rural minority populations into wage labor is predicated upon low-skilled, labor-intensive industries that only require a limited amount of job training. In particular, this centers around the manufacturing of textiles and garments, electronic product assembly, footwear, toys, furniture, specialty handicraft, and similar products.¹⁰

Among these, textile and garment production are the main focus. By 2023, Xinjiang wants to have 1 million workers in textile and garment industries, with 650,000 of them coming from the southern Uyghur majority regions.¹¹

2.2 Xinjiang's Fine-Grained Poverty Alleviation Scheme: Comprehensive and Essentially Involuntary

Importantly, government documents often demand that Xinjiang's poverty-alleviation efforts must be "fine-grained". "Fine-grained poverty alleviation" (精准扶贫) means that the entire scheme is all-encompassing and involves literally every single citizen.¹² Besides continually emphasizing the "fine-grained" nature of all poverty alleviation efforts, they also must achieve "full coverage" (全盖) in every respect.

The implications of this are far-reaching, because the primary goal of CCP-style poverty alleviation is social stability. All minority persons in Xinjiang are therefore now to be in care, education, training, work, approved (improved) farming, or on state subsidies (unable to work, elderly). Everyone must be in a state-designated or state-approved place. Farmers or pastoralists can only continue with their traditional livelihood mode with the consent of their local government. The default destination for the ambiguous rural dwellers who have traditionally been engaging in a mix of seasonal labor and seasonal farming is now full-time wage labor, especially labor-intensive factory work. It has been said that all of Xinjiang has become an open-air prison, with the difference of internment and non-internment being a matter of degree. It can equally be said that the entire region has become a site of involuntary labor assignments: the level of coerciveness of one's occupation may vary, but being outside a government-approved work category, or failing to comply with the state's opinion of what you in particular should be doing, is no longer an option.

Specifically, Xinjiang's 2019 government work plan mandates that everyone who is capable to work must be trained and employed.¹³ Poor households or those without employment must have at least one person in stable employment (贫困家庭每户至少一名劳动力学习掌握一门就业技能). However, the evidence

¹⁰ https://news.sina.cn/gn/2019-03-28/detail-ihxncvvh6251453.d.html?oid=5_vltx&vt=4&pos=3 or <http://archive.is/DvH1Y>

¹¹ <http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/02/148047.html> or <http://archive.is/tSU1p>

¹² <http://archive.is/G0Uii>

¹³ <http://www.xjfp.gov.cn/zzqyw/152889.jhtml> or <http://archive.is/lrnz3>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

presented below clearly indicates that the state aims to place all minority adults into full-time labor, including women.

Given the intrusiveness of this scheme and its penetration into the inner workings of every household, not everyone will want to be part of this rigid plan. The government has anticipated this and is making thought transformation an important component of the poverty alleviation scheme. According to the CCP, winning the fight against poverty requires solving ideological problems. Notably, it is said that the attitude of minority citizens must be changed from "I am asked to get rid of poverty" to "I want to get rid of poverty" (变“要我脱贫”为“我要脱贫”).¹⁴

Clearly, "industry-based poverty alleviation" is not voluntary but mandatory. Those who resist being "alleviated" from their "poverty" are subjected to ideological education so that their thinking aligns with the state's goals. After all, placing people into wage labor is not only and not even primarily an economic goal. Rather, it is very much an ideological goal. State discourses portray factory labor as "modern lifestyle" that has the power to "liberate" backwards minority populations from their traditional (and religious) lifestyles and mindsets.

Resistance to poverty alleviation and wage labor is akin to resistance to modernization, which in turn is a sign of extremism. Refusing to cooperate with this scheme is likely reason enough to be sent to a re-education facility. A pertinent media article on state-mandated employment in Xinjiang cites a local Uyghur person as saying: "If the government tells you to go work, you go".¹⁵

2.3 Summary

In sum, the author argues that Beijing's grand scheme of mandatory education or training and subsequent labor under the guise of "poverty alleviation" achieves five major goals:

1. The ethnic minority population is being moved into closed, surveilled and state-controlled training and work environments that facilitate on-going indoctrination.
2. This setup effectively inhibits the intergenerational transmission of culture, religion and language by reducing joint family times and instead drastically increasing parents' and children's exposure to state teaching and training.
3. It achieves Xi Jinping's national poverty reduction goals through (supposedly) higher incomes from wage labor.
4. It boosts Xinjiang's total GDP and income figures, which legitimizes the CCP's presence in Xinjiang and brings glory to the core region of the BRI.
5. The achievement of all of the above through labor is highly consistent with CCP ideology. Labor is imputed with a transformative power that transforms "backward" minorities and "unproductive" religious figures with their otherworldly worldviews and non-materialist (i.e. spiritual) preoccupations to "useful" members of society. Economic growth not only promotes social stability but also provides an ideological justification of a materialist worldview. As a result, the Party can claim the credit for

¹⁴ <https://www.xjwjt.gov.cn/zwgk/zdxxqztz/tpgjzxd/20190111/i133466.html>
or <http://archive.is/GOUii>

¹⁵ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-companies-get-tangled-in-chinas-muslim-clampdown-11558017472>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

improving everyone's material conditions, and rightfully demand "gratefulness" and wholehearted support from all citizens.

Powered by digital information systems and financed by central government poverty alleviation budgets, the author believes that this scheme represents Beijing's long-term solution to establish ultimate social control and in-depth generational change towards CCP ideology in this restive region. As men and women are herded into factories while their children are moved into (increasingly full-time) educational facilities, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time.

3. Chinese Terms for Vocational Training Internment Camps (VTICs)

Below, Xinjiang's "Vocational Skills Education Training Centers" (职业技能教育培训中心) are referred to as "Vocational Training Internment Camps" (VTICs).¹⁶ This terminology acknowledges that these facilities offer some form of vocational training, although this "training" only constitutes a relatively small part of the whole indoctrination package. At the same time, this terminology clarifies that these facilities function in a prison-like internment fashion.

In Chinese, VTICs are often abbreviated as "Education Training Centers" (教培中心).¹⁷ These are the only types of extrajudicial forms of internment whose existence Beijing has officially acknowledged, although it argues that they have a legal basis.

In Xinjiang, the abbreviated form "Education Training Centers" (教培中心) very consistently refers to the "Vocational Skills Education Training Centers" (职业技能教育培训中心). An alternative spelling is "Education Training Centers" with all characters spelled out (教育培训中心). Another common use is the term "Vocational Education Training Center" (职业教育培训中心) which leaves out the word "skills".¹⁸

Generally, VTICs in Xinjiang can typically be distinguished from other vocational facilities by the ending "center" (中心). If a facility or institution ends with the word "school", as in "Vocational Skills School" (职业技术学校), then it is typically not a VTIC. This distinction is for example evident from a document that lists the "Lop County Vocational Skills School" next to the "Education Training Center" (洛浦县职业技术学校 和教培中心).¹⁹ However, the term "Education Training Center" (教育培训中心) by itself is commonly used in Xinjiang and elsewhere for other types of training, including

¹⁶ Compare <http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/>

¹⁷ <http://www.alt.gov.cn/zwxx/001002/20190321/7f49da54-0cb5-47ad-b486-d07bb4060a8a.html> or <http://archive.is/QPaeI>. Compare <http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/39912/40016/40030/Document/1649854/1649854.htm> or <http://archive.is/b5j3L>

¹⁸ <http://www.akss.gov.cn/xjcms/front/s448/xxgk/20181123/i105526.html> or <http://archive.is/j2cDW>
Yet another spelling is 职业技能教培中心, e.g. in <https://web.archive.org/web/20180813115300/http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2851>

¹⁹ http://www.xjlx.gov.cn/nzcms_nzweb/nzcms_up/attached/file/20190411/20190411130965606560.pdf

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

teacher training, cadre training, or for private learning institutions. It can denote a VTIC, but this must be established from the context.

4. Flow Schemes Overview

The author has identified three major flow schemes by which minority citizens in Xinjiang are put through training and subsequent employment.

Flow 1 pertains to persons in VTICs. They are "released" into fully coercive forms of labor. Flows 2 and 3 pertain to persons in general society outside the internment camp network.

Flow 1: VTIC internment -> forced labor at camp factories or nearby industrial parks -> forced labor at local satellite factories in home regions (or other industrial sites)

The Chinese flow terminology for this is coded as:

教育培训中心+发展纺织服装等劳动密集型产业试点 (VTIC plus developing textile, garment etc. labor-intensive industry pilot [projects])

Alternative spellings for 教育培训中心+ are: 教培中心+, JP+ or 职业技能培训中心

The flow scheme can also be coded as 教培中心+ 扶贫车间.

The workers in this flow are referred to as "trainees" (培训人员) or "persons in re-education" (教转人员). These VTIC "trainees" can end up in factories on VTIC compounds, in industrial parks (产业区) which can be located near VTICs (or VTICs in them), or rural or village satellite factories (卫星工厂). The employing company also provides the training (despite the supposed "vocational" training in the camps), and receives a government subsidy in exchange. VTIC workers who are trained must also be employed. After a certain time period, they may then be transferred to their home regions, where they may be put to work in local satellite factories.

Flow 2: Rural surplus laborers -> centralized training -> employment

The Chinese flow terminology for this is often coded as:

Train a person, send off a person, employ a person, rescue a household from poverty
培训一人，输出一人；就业一人，脱贫一户

Alternative coding: Unified sending off, unified classes, enterprise, centralized training, centralized employment

统一输送、统一开班、企业冠名、集中授课、集中就业

Flow 3: Village work teams -> establish satellite factories and childcare facilities -> all who can work are put into training and work (especially women)

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

The Chinese flow terminology for this is coded as:

Company head office (or company or base) -> satellite factory
 总部+卫星工厂 or 企业+卫星工厂 or 基地+卫星工厂+贫困户 or 公司+卫星工厂+农户
 or 龙头企业+卫星工厂

While all three flow schemes operate on different levels of coercion, with flow 1 representing the highest coercion level, all of them share significant similarities. They all serve a primary stability maintenance goal by implementing "de-extremification" and transforming people's minds. All three conduct thought education, political indoctrination, and end up placing minorities into controlled, full-time labor environments. The result is greater state control, reduced family interaction and influence, and reduced intergenerational cultural, linguistic and religious transmission.

5. Flow 1: VTIC Forced Labor

5.1 Overview of VTIC Labor Policies

VTIC forced labor is not primarily about economic gain or growth, but has stability maintenance as its core focus. In a document issued by the XUAR Development and Reform Commission, the VTIC+ labor intensive manufacturing model is explicitly listed as a key component of the stability maintenance infrastructure, along with social management, surveillance systems, central control systems, peaceful city systems and network security.²⁰ Other documents likewise indicate that VTIC labor primarily serves "government social stability needs" (政府出于维稳的需求).²¹

Evidence of the widespread implementation of forced labor for VTIC "graduates" can be found at several administrative levels.

The probably most blatant admission that VTIC labor has increasingly become a major economic driver for the entire region comes from a December 2018 statement issued by the Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission on the region's economic state. To quote:

With VTICs as the carrier, [Xinjiang] has attracted a large number of coastal enterprises from the mainland to invest and build factories, which has powerfully expanded employment and promoted increased incomes.²²

This statement is apt, because Xinjiang has implemented extensive promotional policies to attract companies from other parts of China to become involved in VTIC-related manufacturing. Numerous documents indicate that the establishment of comprehensive,

²⁰ <http://www.xjdr.gov.cn/info/11460/22308.htm> or <http://archive.is/HpXVV>

²¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20190524105429/https://www.trjcn.com/topic/index/22227.html>

²² <https://web.archive.org/web/20190520143306/http://www.xjdr.gov.cn/info/9923/23516.htm> or <http://archive.is/iykV0>. Alternative site: <http://220.171.42.19/info/9923/23516.htm> or <http://archive.is/hkNdY>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

labor-intensive manufacturing sites in Xinjiang is intended to boost the economic dynamics behind the BRI.²³

For example, an April 2018 notice on promoting the textile and garment industry features its own policy section on "promoting VTIC plus developing textile and garment manufacturing".²⁴ This section states that the construction of "VTIC plus" production factories is to be supported. The key Uyghur majority population regions of Kashgar, Hotan and Kizilsu Prefectures, along with Kalping and Wushen Counties in Aksu Prefecture, are to support the "VTIC plus" development of labor-intensive industries. Specifically, local governments are mandated to invest in the construction of labor-intensive manufacturing near VTICs by granting appropriate subsidies.

More specific government implementation documents leave no doubt that this forced labor scheme explicitly pertains to "persons in re-education". In order to "thoroughly implement" the above-mentioned notice from April 2018, the prefecture (here the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture) promotes the Yili Prefecture - Jiangsu Province Textile and Garment Industrial Park as the base for the VTIC plus model, with the aim to provide employment to these "persons in re-education" (教转人员)²⁵. Another Yili Prefecture report uses similar terminology with highly incriminating potential, referring to a systematic employment provision for "VTIC persons" (教培人员).²⁶

In the same vein, a report by Ma Xiongcheng, the vice chairman of Xinjiang's Political Consultative Conference (自治区政协副主席) not only confirms that putting VTIC detainees to work in factories is a Xinjiang-wide policy, but also that this strategy explicitly fulfills political re-education goals:

All local regions are to focus on the overall goal of social stability and long-term enduring peace, and through the development of characteristic industries, the establishment of satellite factories... increase farmers' incomes and promote poverty alleviation. In particular, *satellite factories are to be built in the vocational skills education training centers*, so that people affected by terrorism and extreme thoughts can learn the nation's common language, study law, and understand the right and wrong. They can also learn skills, become able to work, and increase their incomes. All these bring hope, especially to poor families.²⁷ (emphasis added)

²³ For example <http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2019/0401/c186332-32798969.html> or <http://archive.is/6WhOU>.

²⁴ <https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601> or <http://archive.is/ZBsk8> or https://web.archive.org/web/2018*/https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601. Local level mention, e.g. Ili Prefecture: <http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/1103/139006.htm> or <http://archive.is/VmDrY>, also <https://web.archive.org/web/20190608163247/http://wap.xjyl.gov.cn/info/1086/46306.htm>

²⁵ <https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601> or <http://archive.is/ZBsk8> or https://web.archive.org/web/2018*/https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601. Local level mention, e.g. Ili Prefecture: <http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/1103/139006.htm> or <http://archive.is/VmDrY>. Also: <http://archive.is/ZboFc>, http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/xxgk_content/BB005-07_B/2018-1220001.htm or <http://archive.is/qT25W>.

²⁶ http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/xxgk_content/BB005-07_B/2018-1220001.htm or <http://archive.is/qT25W>.

²⁷ <http://www.xj-agri.gov.cn/fslj/43124.jhtml> or <http://archive.is/tn41E> or

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

Similarly, a Karakax (Moyu) County (Hotan Prefecture) government directive regarding the promotion of VTIC plus schemes emphasizes how this scheme both seeks to focus on re-education (thought transformation) and employment promotion among VTIC detainees:

Strengthening vocational skills education training, focusing on thought transformation.... Continue to expand the "VTIC plus" model, get more [VTIC] trainees to take up employment.²⁸

Several other government documents outline the precise subsidies awarded to companies that participate in the "VTIC plus" model and train and employ VTIC detainees. Besides a 5,000 RMB subsidy given over 3 years, companies that employ "persons in re-education" (教转人员) in labor-intensive industries can get a shipping cost subsidy equivalent to 4 percent of their sales volume, and receive a 1,800 RMB subsidy for each re-education worker for training them in the relevant skill.²⁹ Consequently, this and numerous other documents clearly indicate that the supposed "vocational training" implemented in the VTICs does not at all suffice to prepare the detainees for future employment. Rather, the actually needed skills training is conducted by the participating companies, which is the reason why the government offers them financial compensation for doing so.

Xinjiang's minority regions not only grant special subsidies to companies that employ VTIC detainees, but to any firms that set up labor-intensive industries in rural minority settings, provided that they meet minimum requirements. A government notice issued by Karakax (Moyu) County states that companies that employ over 100 workers for at least one year and achieve a worker to workshop floor space ratio of at least 1 worker per 10sqm are eligible to receive subsidies.³⁰ Interestingly, for those who participate in the "VTIC plus" scheme and employ VTIC detainees, the minimum employment requirement is reduced by half (50 workers).

In 2018, Kashgar Prefecture alone intended to put 100,000 VTIC graduates to labor in industrial parks.³¹ Within that quota, Kashgar's textile and garment manufacturing, with production based in industrial parks, was scheduled to employ 50,000 VTIC detainees,

<https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.xj-agri.gov.cn/fslj/43124.jhtml>

Also: <http://www.xjdaily.com.cn/c/2018-11-28/2054842.shtml> or <http://archive.is/VxCjW>

²⁸ <https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2019-02-14/doc-ihqfskcp5114821.shtml> or <http://archive.is/BRPa0>

²⁹

<https://web.archive.org/web/20190706211233/https://www.hts.gov.cn/file/upload/201806/06/184226546.doc>. Download page that also contains these quotes:

<https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601> or <http://archive.is/ZBsk8>. See also

<http://www.xjyl.gov.cn/info/1103/139006.htm> or <http://archive.is/VmDrY>, or

<http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/agri/2018-04-09/doc-ifyuwqez7329788.shtml> or

<http://archive.is/00mCy>, or

<https://web.archive.org/web/20190525124330/http://cms.dybcotton.com/archives/2827>. For similar

subsidies for employing VTIC persons, compare also <http://www.ps.gov.cn/publicity/zszy/zszc/15347> or

<http://archive.is/s3krW>.

³⁰ https://news.sina.com.cn/gn/2019-03-28/detail-ihxncvvh6251453.d.html?oid=5_vltx&vt=4&pos=3 or

<http://archive.is/DvH1Y>

³¹

<https://web.archive.org/web/20181204024839/http://kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2963>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

while related satellite factories were to employ another 20,000. For each employed detainee, the factories were to receive the standard 5,000 RMB subsidy, split over three years. For 2018, the subsidy amount was 2,000 RMB. The 2018 subsidies for textile and garment-related VTIC labor alone were expected to cost the prefecture 126 million RMB, which would translate to the employment of 63,000 trainees (just below the stated 50,000 plus 20,000). By comparison, in 2018 the prefecture received 666 million RMB in food subsidies for VTIC detainees, which could be enough to feed anywhere between 166,000 and 405,000 VTIC detainees throughout that whole year.³² This indicates that only select detainees are placed or "released" into forced labor.³³

In some instances, VTICs are directly located within industrial parks. For example, a document pertaining to the Lop County (Hotan Prefecture) Industrial Park states that the park's north campus has a vocational training camp (教培中心), and together with the vocational training school there are 7,000 persons in these two facilities.³⁴ Overall, the park hosts 155 companies. This also means that these companies very likely recruit a mix of VTIC and non-VTIC labor, representing different levels of coercion and involuntary-ness.

5.2 VTIC Forced Labor Cases

A particularly pertinent example of forced labor comes from the Xinhe County (Aksu Prefecture) Industrial Park.³⁵ In June 2018, an unnamed garment making company set up a textile vocational training camp work base (服饰教培实训基地) in the park in order to providing employment for 500 VTIC trainees. All of the company's workers are said to be from the Xinhe County VTIC (新和县教培中心), and the government provides police forces and special instructors so that the factory is run in a "semi-military style management" fashion (半军事化管理). This latter fact is highlighted in the project's description as a "project benefit", likely because it might appease the security concerns of enterprises over having to deal with hundreds of internment camp detainees.

By participating in this "stability maintenance" project, the participating company secures significant financial benefits. It gets free use of the factory for two years, and after that for half of the regular market price. Of the total investment of 15 million RMB, the local government provided 10 million. The three factories come with security and guard equipment. The government also pays the usual 1,800 RMB subsidy per VTIC worker for the training that they get at the factory, and a 5,000 RMB subsidy per employed worker (split over three years).

³² See <http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/>. Witness accounts note that VTIC meals are extremely low in quality and quantity. The lower estimate is based on the Chinese military's food allowance for ordinary soldiers of 11 RMB per person per day, assuming that local regions do not furnish any additional funds. The higher estimate assumes that detainees are on a very poor diet below common calorie intake requirements for adults, with a daily food allowance of 4.5 RMB (such as 1.5 RMB per meal with three daily meals).

³³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20181204024839/http://kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2963>

³⁴ http://www.xjlp.gov.cn/nzcms_nzweb/nzcms_up/attached/file/20190411/20190411130965606560.pdf (document removed but available from the author)

³⁵ <https://web.archive.org/web/20190524105429/https://www.trjcn.com/topic/index/22227.html>

A second example of forced VTIC labor comes from a company from Shenzhen that prides itself of having "transferred 3,000 Uyghurs from the stove to (textile making) the machine".³⁶ This slogan refers to minority women who would traditionally be responsible for running their households. The founder of Jinfuyu Clothing Corporation (金富婕服装有限公司) spent 16 years in the Xinjiang army. In his own words, this experience "in the army's large furnace" made him the man who he is today, and in 2015 he proudly returned to Xinjiang. His firm is a classic model of a military civil fusion company (军民融合典型企业) and considered a model poverty alleviation company. Overall, Jinfuyu has trained 6,000 villagers in 287 villages and established 2 satellite factories with 370 workers.

Jinfuyu is also an example of how manufacturers based in Xinjiang form strategic linkages with eastern Chinese companies that often lead to their products eventually being exported abroad. Jinfuyu has form strategic trade partnerships with Jiangsu's Guotai (江苏国泰), Shanghai's Tiankun (上海天坤), and Nanjing's Daoyu import/export companies, making it a "key enterprise for Xinjiang's textile industry".³⁷

A third example, is Meili Fashion Corporation (美丽奥服装有限公司), a company from Shenzhen that is featured in an article titled "getting 2,000 poor women from the stove to the machine".³⁸ The workers shown on photos depicting the company's workshop wear the exact same uniform as a young Uyghur woman who is featured in a VTIC propaganda video.³⁹ In article, the company's chairwoman states that she is personally witnessing "the process of how de-extremification causes workers to become born again". The Chinese term for "born again" (重生) is the exact same as in the Chinese translation of the Bible, in the well-known passage in the book of John (3:7) where Jesus says to Nicodemus: "You must be born again". The implication here is that re-education and subsequent factory labor is akin to a process of spiritual transformation and salvation, whereby the minorities are "rescued" from the brink of disaster (religious extremism) and "saved" through the Communist Party's enlightened re-education program.

Companies who participate in the government's "salvation" process receive not only significant subsidies but also substantial tax savings. A Meili Fashion Corporation spokesperson reported that the company's factory in Kashgar Prefecture enjoys a three-year tax exemption, and a 50 percent tax discount for the three years after that.⁴⁰

5.3 VTIC Plus Scheme Funding

Importantly, government-sponsored factories that utilize VTIC labor are typically funded from "poverty alleviation and development funds" (扶贫发展资金), which are

³⁶ http://www.360youtu.com/epaper/html/html/2018/10/24/02/02_44.html or <http://archive.is/DhSOZ>

³⁷ <http://www.xjfp.gov.cn/dzdt/148494.jhtml> or <http://archive.is/w3wcl>

³⁸ <http://archive.is/1qf0a> Born again terminology also found here: <http://archive.is/XZclS>

³⁹ https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2019_03_19_494248_3.shtml or <http://archive.is/eurwv>

⁴⁰ http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-10/10/content_33085809.htm

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

part of the central government's financial assistance to the region. In 2018, Beijing provided 6.9 billion RMB of such funding to the region.⁴¹

For example, the Shule County government established a 19,920sqm factory in the Shule County Industrial Park with 39.8 million RMB from such funds. This was done in order to "solve the employment problem of poor VTIC households". The project's administration involved various authorities, including the Education and training Bureau (教培中心) that oversees the VTICs, and the poverty alleviation office.⁴²

Likewise, Akto County funded the construction of seven "poverty alleviation workshops" (扶贫车间) through the "VTIC plus" model (教培中心+), all from the poverty alleviation and development fund.⁴³ With a combined 13,080sqm of floor space, the workshops were expected to provide jobs for 1,320 persons, at a total cost of 26.2 million RMB. Similarly, Pishan County's (Hotan Prefecture) 2019 poverty alleviation projects list featured a "VTIC standardized factory park" (皮山县教培中心标准化厂区).⁴⁴ This park was to be constructed directly on the VTIC compound, with the Education and Training Bureau (教培局) being the project's administrative authority. The project was budgeted to invest 46 million RMB for 16 factory buildings with a total of 31,070sqm floor space. It was expected to provide employment for 1,560 persons.

5.4 VTIC Forced Labor: Possible Final Destinations

However, VTIC factory work is apparently not necessarily the final destination for VTIC detainees. Rather, as stated in one document, they are sent by the VTIC into factories in order to "receive training" (进行实训), so that afterwards they return home and work in local village satellite factories.⁴⁵ One of the many propaganda pieces on the Hotan County VTIC actually gives a specific example for this very scenario (Figure 1).⁴⁶

⁴¹ http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/03/content_5244214.htm or https://web.archive.org/web/20190606213945/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/03/content_5244214.htm

⁴² <https://web.archive.org/web/20190706211128/http://www.shule.gov.cn/UploadFiles/file/2018/9/201809171853453606.doc>. Similar initiatives in Shule: http://www.shule.gov.cn/ShowBulletin_Content281.shtml or <http://archive.is/kXSAC>

⁴³ <https://web.archive.org/web/20190706211437/http://www.xjakt.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/GKfjb/201807/20180731115332752.xls>

. Download page <http://www.xjakt.gov.cn/P/C/4537.htm> or <http://archive.is/CVCOR>

⁴⁴ <https://web.archive.org/web/20190706211451/http://www.ps.gov.cn/Upload/main/InfoPublicity/PublicInformation/File/2018/12/25/201812252040577920.xlsx>. Download page perhaps under <http://www.ps.gov.cn/publicity/zdxx/hms/ftp>

⁴⁵ <http://www.xjbs.com.cn/news/2018-11/09/cms2117045article.shtml> or <http://archive.is/jMH13>. See also <https://www.wh-ford.com/1e67bb5/20181109A1XT2E00.html> or <http://archive.is/VjwNw>

⁴⁶ http://www.sohu.com/a/285740213_115479 or <http://archive.is/ReqCZ> same: <http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2018-12/13938755.html?agt=16361>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019



Figure 1: A Hotan County VTIC detainee now works in a satellite factory near her home region

Similarly, a 2018 Bayingolin Prefecture poverty alleviation project overview shows a cooperation between a satellite factory construction project extending over 6 villages and the local VTIC, and there are numerous similar examples from other regions.⁴⁷ This appears to be the method by which detainees are eventually "re-integrated into society". Forced VTIC factory labor could therefore be a temporary means to this end, although there is no guarantee that this will always be the case.

5.5 VTIC (Flow 1) Labor Conclusions

The wider implication of the combination of VTIC labor with satellite factories is that eventually, many or most VTIC detainees end up in a place of coercive labor alongside other workers that did not go through the region's extrajudicial internment system. Consequently, it will soon become impossible to clearly determine whether a labor-intensive manufacturing product in Xinjiang will be made with labor from former detainees or not. However, even non-VTIC labor involves different degrees of coercion. In Xinjiang's currently extremely securitized social environment, there is very limited (if any) space for voluntary choices.

6. Flow 2: The Centralized Training of Rural Surplus Laborers for What are Most Likely Involuntary Labor Assignments

6.1 Flow 2 Policy Overview

The government has detailed plans and quotas for the "training for the purpose of changing employment" (转移就业技能培训) of "poor household labor" (贫困家庭劳动力).⁴⁸ This training must follow a standardized scheme that includes "gratefulness to the party education", law, Chinese language, work discipline and military drills. All "rural surplus laborers" (农村富余劳动力), meaning those who do not have a "formal" or long-term wage labor contract but rely on a mix of farming and odd jobs, must go through this training before getting employment.⁴⁹ Companies can implement this training

⁴⁷ <http://www.xjbz.gov.cn/UploadFiles/zx/2018/7/201807131844624960.xls>

⁴⁸ [https://www.xuehua.us/2018/06/28/新疆自治区人社口制定《南疆四地州深度贫困地区/ or <http://archive.is/zMi4A>](https://www.xuehua.us/2018/06/28/新疆自治区人社口制定《南疆四地州深度贫困地区/ or http://archive.is/zMi4A)

⁴⁹ http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-03/04/c_1124192022.htm or <http://archive.is/kjuhG>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

themselves or else have it implemented by local training institutions such as vocational schools.

Overall, the process of Xinjiang's "industry-based poverty alleviation" follows this basic flow scheme that also indicates the highly schematic and essentially involuntary nature of state-mandated poverty alleviation (see figures 2 to 6 for a visual impression of what this often looks like in reality):

"Train a person, send off a person, employ a person, rescue a household from poverty" (培训一人，输出一人；就业一人，脱贫一户).⁵⁰

6.2 Centralized Training Contents and Context

A more detailed implementation document regarding this type of vocational skills training for the general rural population was published by Kashgar Prefecture.⁵¹ The document states that in order to overcome existing problems with discipline, thinking and perception, (Chinese) language communication abilities and employment skills, the prefecture will organize centralized training that includes military discipline, thought education, skills training and language study. The military training phase must last at least one month. It includes singing red songs and is intended to increase the workers' organizational discipline and to "develop standardized behavior" (行为规范养成). Thought education (思想教育), including "gratefulness to the Party education", is implemented in order to strengthen laborers' resistance against extremist religious thought. Overall, the skills training is to take place in three phases: military drill, thought education, and lastly skills training, with Chinese language teaching being implemented throughout all of them. This system shares many similarities with the re-education performed in VTICs.

⁵⁰ <http://www.china-cotton.org/app/html/2018/09/21/82620.html> or <http://archive.is/AZEAU>

⁵¹ <http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Item/38964.aspx> or <http://archive.is/Z0Mgg>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019



Figure 2: Rural surplus laborers from Yumin County are being sent to textile factory work in Shawan County after having gone through centralized skills training.⁵²



Figure 3: Rural surplus laborers from Hotan are being transferred to work in Alar City, a Han Chinese settlement.⁵³

⁵² <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-07-26/doc-ifyinryq6266783.shtml> or <http://archive.is/IMR7U>

⁵³ <http://www.zonglanxinwen.com/img/2dacba9bce0b6a1cfa6bdc0c0e3dbb8b5e4b9a5c.html> or <http://archive.is/NMt9U>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

Specifically, a document outlining the government's 5 year plan for 2016-2020 for the textile and garment industry in Aksu Prefecture states that this industry's labor needs are to be met by putting laborers through centralized classes and then centralized employment, teaching them legal regulations, Chinese language, work discipline, military drills and production safety.⁵⁴ In this process, their work attitude is to be changed from "I am wanted to work" to "I want to work" ("要我干" 转变为现在的 "我要干"). Another document discusses the establishment of centralized training centers (技能培训中心), capable of housing 1,200 vocational training students, who are trained, fed and housed (in dormitories) in a centralized and standardized fashion.⁵⁵ Both the context and the terminology of this skills training indicates that it is mostly likely not part of the VTIC or wider internment camp network. However, it is clear that the general setup and infrastructure of this type of general skills training for rural surplus laborers is not all that different from the region's internment camp system.



⁵⁴ <http://www.china-cotton.org/app/html/2018/11/09/83019.html> or <http://archive.is/LUw3I>

⁵⁵ <http://wap.xjdaily.com/xjrb/20180831/114124.html> or <http://archive.is/8PjPS>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019



Figures 4 and 5: 442 rural surplus laborers from Kashgar and Hotan are sent off to work in an industrial park in Korla in a "centralized fashion".⁵⁶



Figure 6: Rural surplus laborers from Moyu County are sent off to industrial labor in a "centralized", unified fashion (统一输送).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ http://www.lnyuebao.com/html/htmlnewstpxw2017-42511_30_07_883.html or <http://archive.is/LFoFg>, and <https://images.app.goo.gl/Pya6fXPzcQb9rmrGA>

⁵⁷ <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2017-06-19/doc-ifyhfrt4819308.shtml> or <http://archive.is/tSCxr>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

Of significant interest are also the actual working conditions of those who undergo rural surplus laborer training. A report about graduates from such centralized training sessions in Aksu Prefecture's textile manufacturing states that these newly-baked workers eat and sleep on the factory compounds, and they do so for at least several years.¹ It is unlikely that most or all of them would willingly choose to be separated from their core social and family circles and their cherished cultural environments, even if the new jobs would earn them a higher income.

6.3 Flow 2 Case Study: Eagle Textile Company

A pertinent example of the involuntary nature and intensive indoctrination components of the flow 2 scheme comes from "Eagle Textile Company" (雄鹰纺织公司), a firm that was set up in 2017 in Yarkant County as part of the Shanghai Xinjiang Mutual Pairing Assistance scheme (上海援疆).⁵⁸ In 2018, the company sent 122 surplus rural laborers to Qingdao (Shandong Province) for job training, who then returned to Yarkand to work in the company's textile factory. Currently, the company employs more than 400 local Uyghurs, including 250 from especially poor families.

In order to "ensure the normal operation of the production line", Eagle Textile states that it has a "semi-military" management. The employees are living and working in the factory and can go home for one day week. However, the company states that the "comprehensive living facilities" in the factory mean that many employees treat the factory "as their home". In the workshops, "inspiring corporate slogans" can be seen "everywhere", and the workers can hear "Chinese songs carefully selected by Hong Longzhu, the head of the company". Every morning, all workers collectively participate in "morning exercises", and during the rest day, they will supposedly "spontaneously gather to learn Chinese".

Mr. Longzhu proudly told his interviewer that thought transformation is part and parcel of the employment process. In his words, some employees still had a mindset on perennially relying on government subsidies: "they lacked the enthusiasm for labor and their awareness of making money was not strong." However, after "more than a year of subtle influence" and the employment training in Qingdao, Mr. Longzhu claims that "the majority of employees in the factory have understood that they must use their hard work to create a happy life".

6.4 Flow 2 Conclusions

Overall, the author suggests that Xinjiang's employment scheme for rural surplus laborers outside the internment system contains a significant amount of involuntary aspects. It is unclear whether this form of employment is in fact much more voluntary than that of VTIC graduates.

A major concern is the fact that labor from flows 1 and 2 are being combined, making it virtually impossible to distinguish labor involving higher coercion from that potentially involving less coercion. For example, Shache County (Kashgar Prefecture) has a cooperation between 8 different educational institutions, including the Kashgar VTIC (喀

⁵⁸ <https://wenhui.whhb.cn/third/yidian/201808/17/208696.html> or <http://archive.is/QyoxD>; <http://www.xjdrc.gov.cn/info/11855/22360.htm> or <http://archive.is/tY4MR>; <http://archive.is/dxGJV>.

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

什教育培训中心) and 4 companies or industrial sites, including the Kashgar Shenzhen Industrial Park (喀什深圳产业园).⁵⁹ Rather than keeping VTIC and non-VTIC workers strictly separate, the region's goal certainly appears to flexibly integrate them, especially once these former VTIC detainees are considered safe to work in regular work environments without extra police protection. Obviously, any of these work environments will still feature the usual surveillance and securitization features that are increasingly found in any facility in Xinjiang. This includes camera systems, security guards and other preventative measures.

7. Flow 3: Promoting Universal Factory Labor Through Village-Based Satellite Factories

7.1 Flow 3 Policy Overview

The probably most intrusive social re-engineering of Uyghur and other Turkic minority societies in Xinjiang is achieved by what is called "sending work to people's doorstep" (送工作到家门口). These so-called satellite factories may, in the long term, have the most pervasive and destructive impact on Uyghur society.

The degree of involuntariness of this form of labor is the most complex. On the one hand, village work teams "encourage" women to enter full-time factory work through various means, including changing their "thinking". This arguably represents a form of involuntary labor, but direct evidence of coercion, such as based on formalized or centralized trainings, is weaker than for flows 1 or 2.

However, the satellite factory scheme is at times closely linked to VTIC labor (flow 1). Both Xinhua and the government website Chinapeace bluntly state that Kashgar and Hotan Prefectures have established preferential policies designed to attract the construction of satellite factories in order to "help VTIC graduates find employment".⁶⁰ As stated above under "flow 1", it appears that satellite factories are one of the possible final destinations of VTIC detainees in order to "re-integrate" them into society. Direct evidence of the local implementation of this policy comes from detailed poverty alleviation planning spreadsheets. Luntai County's (Bayingolin Prefecture) 2018 poverty alleviation plan budgeted for the construction of two satellite factories to provide employment for 69 households.⁶¹ This project was to be implemented in direct cooperation with the county VTIC employment training base satellite factory (县职业技能教育培训中心实训基地卫星工厂).

According to a government document that originated from the United Front website, "fine-grained poverty alleviation" in Xinjiang involves the construction of one satellite

⁵⁹ <http://www.93.gov.cn/html/93gov/bsjs/lcyc14/zhuxi/shfzx/hd/181031146809717435.html> or <http://archive.is/grr5R>

⁶⁰ http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c53712/2018-11/08/content_11623298.shtml or <http://archive.is/pL34J>; http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2018-11/06/c_1123670018.htm or <http://archive.is/g25xT>

⁶¹ <http://www.xjbz.gov.cn/UploadFiles/zx/2018/7/201807131844624960.xls>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

factory for every two villages.⁶² By 2020, Kashgar Prefecture plans to nearly double the number of its satellite factories from 490 to 792, covering at least 70 percent of impoverished villages and creating jobs for over 60,000 poor households.⁶³ Similarly, Lop County in Hotan Prefecture expected to increase satellite factory employment from 2,630 in mid-2018 to 20,000 in 2020.⁶⁴ The scalability of these massive undertakings is ensured through highly standardized factory designs and unified management procedures. Similar to the VTIC plus model, companies from other parts of China receive a government subsidy for each satellite factory worker they train. While the training of a VTIC detainee only yields 1,800 RMB, companies receive 2,400 RMB per trained satellite factory worker.⁶⁵

7.2 Satellite Factories as Spearheads of Socio-Cultural Transformations

Specifically, the satellite factory drive is designed to bring work opportunities to those who are typically unable to leave the village in order to take up non-rural or non-farming jobs. This particularly applies to women responsible for caring for children and elderly family members. Numerous government documents testify to this fact and indicate that this campaign involves a great deal of "thought transformation" in order to convince women to participate. For example:

"We must make overall efforts to promote stability and poverty alleviation, so that farmers can be freed from their small amount of land, and go into satellite factories and enterprises for employment. We must take care of the "empty nest" old people, leverage the role of nursery schools and kindergartens to solve the worries of the employed people. ... Strengthen national language education and skills training, organize poor households to visit and study, and enable them to broaden their horizons, change their concepts, and stimulate their inner motivation."⁶⁶

Another document similarly boasts how satellite factories liberate women and combat extremism at the same time, leading Uyghur women into an acceptance of "modern culture",

"The construction of satellite factories enables many women to accept a modern enterprise culture, to obey the company management, [causing them to change from] passivity to active acceptance. Wearing work clothes has become a normal behavior for industrial workers. This is at the same time loosening the grip of extremism, letting women walk out of the courtyard [i.e. traditional

⁶² <http://www.zyztb.gov.cn/tzb2010/jjsh/201711/7ced55a64689491e8fbec3e06202ee47.shtml> or <http://archive.is/OHqVo>, or http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-11/16/c_1121966500.htm or <http://archive.is/Nl2Ql>.

⁶³ <http://www.xjbs.com.cn/zphd/2018-04/22/cms2068223article.shtml> or <http://archive.is/zbGU6>

⁶⁴ <http://archive.is/odF31> and <http://archive.is/S4jwQ>

⁶⁵ <http://www.ps.gov.cn/publicity/zsy/zszc/15347> or <http://archive.is/s3krW>, https://news.sina.cn/gn/2019-03-28/detail-ihsxncvh6251453.d.html?oid=5_yltx&vt=4&pos=3 or <http://archive.is/DvH1Y>

⁶⁶ http://www.sohu.com/a/293256189_120066835 or <http://archive.fo/40L2H>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

household duties] and integrate into modern economic and social life".⁶⁷

Numerous other documents talk about the need to "transform the thinking of women, let more of them leave the home, enter factories, increase incomes."⁶⁸ Notably, the satellite factories implement very similar training contents as the VTICs and flow 2 training facilities. Guangzhou's pairing assistance teams established five types of activities for the workers of the village satellite factory: gratefulness to the party, national language study, skills training, studying the law, and "promote new styles".⁶⁹ A report published by Xinjiang's agricultural department bluntly argues that the satellite factory drive spearheads a major rural transformation effort through which "thinking experiences major transformations, and traditional customs are being secularized".⁷⁰

7.3 Satellite Factories Promote Intergenerational Separation

Naturally, many women will not suddenly want to put their little children in state-run day care or their elderly ones in centralized elderly care. Consequently, government reports abound with the "success stories" of village work teams, who ceaselessly visit resistant families until they "agree" to work. Often, this is said to require to "transform the thinking of [the elderly] parents" until they "agree" to let their daughter go to work.⁷¹

Once people are put to work, they have entered state-controlled environments that may feature different degrees of security. Government procurement bids for rural satellite factories in Uyghur majority regions include security fences, surveillance systems and metal detectors.⁷²

The perhaps most disturbing aspect of "poverty alleviation" through rural satellite factories is that it promotes a significant degree of separation of children from their parents - at least during the work days. The establishment of satellite factories invariably involves the construction of dedicated nurseries for children below the preschool age, often in the factories themselves. For example, a report about Lop County states that a particular village's satellite factories all have nurseries for children aged 0 to 4 years where children "eat and live", so that the women can "work without having to worry".⁷³ Similar reports are found for many other minority regions. These nurseries, at times even referred to as "infant care" (婴幼儿管护), appear to play a key role for promoting women to take up factory work.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ http://wemedia.ifeng.com/39039076/wemedia.shtml?cpb_xinxiliu_xgtj or <http://archive.is/8niUT>

⁶⁸ <https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2019-02-14/doc-ihqfskcp5114821.shtml> or <http://archive.is/BRPa0>

⁶⁹ http://www.gdsgd.cn/?tbl=zgd_t6&cle=1529914941 or <http://archive.is/260s5>; compare

⁷⁰ <http://www.xj-agri.gov.cn/fslj/43124.jhtml> or <http://archive.is/tn41E>

⁷¹ <http://www.xjdrc.gov.cn/info/11388/22911.htm> or <http://archive.is/wzySf>

⁷² <http://www.bidchance.com/info.do?channel=calgg&id=22025779> and <http://archive.is/sytGt>

⁷³ http://www.sohu.com/a/251046802_100253950 or <http://archive.is/odF31>. On 2020 stats see also

<https://www.xjht.gov.cn/article/show.php?itemid=264420> or <http://archive.is/S4jwQ> or <https://web.archive.org/web/20180302231400/https://www.xjht.gov.cn/article/show.php?itemid=264420>. Overall, compare also <https://news.sina.com/gn/2018-09-03/detail-ihixyeu2690522.d.html> or <http://archive.is/b8WNG>

⁷⁴ <http://www.xjzp.gov.cn/Files/2018/1223/%E5%96%80%E4%BB%80%E5%9C%B0%E5%8C%BA%E6>

One county even refers to this scheme as the "nurseries plus satellite factory model" ("幼儿托管+卫星工厂" 模式).⁷⁵ The local village work team discovered that the village has 113 women with children who are too young to attend preschool. According to the report, these women are therefore "bound to the homes" and cannot go out to work. The solution was the establishment of factory nurseries, which in this particular case accept children from age 1 years and up.

A shocking examples of this "liberation" of women from their children and homes comes from a village that under the administration of Hotan City. There, one family has a mother with three young children, the youngest being only 13 months old, and a father who is already away due to working outside the village.⁷⁶ The report states that because the village factory has a nursery, she can now go to work. The report cites the mother as saying: "[This] solved my problem, now there are people who take care of my children, I can in peace go to work, ... very convenient." (Figure 7). However, what is being praised as progress and development is arguably an example of increasing family separation, intrusive social control, and more than likely some form of involuntary labor.



Figure 7. The small children (toddlers) of a mother of three are being kept in a nursery while the mother is being put to work in a village satellite factory.

8. Funding From Xinjiang's Mutual Pairing Assistance Scheme (对口援疆)

Particularly problematic is the fact that much of the funding for VTIC factories, industrial parks where VTIC and non-VTIC persons work, and many of the new satellite factories, is disbursed through the mutual pairing assistance scheme.⁷⁷ Eastern Chinese cities and provinces are incentivizing their local corporations to participate in Xinjiang's low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing drive, and in doing so to further their patriotic duty to promote China's BRI. Government figures show that in 2018, the total pairing

%B3%BD%E6%99%AE%E5%8E%BF2018%E5%B9%B4%E2%80%942020%E5%B9%B4%E8%84%B1%E8%B4%AB%E6%94%BB%E5%9D%9A%E9%A1%B9%E7%9B%AE%E5%BA%93.xls

⁷⁵ <http://archive.fo/1X5pU>

⁷⁶ <https://www.xjht.gov.cn/article/show.php?itemid=276088> or <http://archive.is/hgonh>

⁷⁷ <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-07-12/doc-ifyiaewh8895432.shtml> or <http://archive.is/bWVQv>

Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

assistance investment into Xinjiang amounted to 16 billion RMB.⁷⁸ In 2017, this investment stood at 15.2 billion RMB and created jobs for 500,000 surplus laborers.⁷⁹ Both of these figures represented a marked increase from the 9.7 billion RMB invested through the pairing assistance scheme in 2016.⁸⁰

For example, Shanghai's pairing assistance funding funded the construction of 382 satellite factories in four minority counties, involving 237 companies and 12,800 new jobs (in 2018).⁸¹

In a number of instances, mutual pairing assistance moneys directly promote forced labor. A Xinjiang government report describing the Guangdong Pairing Assistance Project (广东省援疆项目) noted that Guangdong Province invested 1.85 billion RMB in Xinjiang in 2018.⁸² The report states that because there are many "VTIC persons in re-education" (教培转化人员) who need employment, the Guangdong companies who participate in the pairing assistance project with Xinjiang will establish satellite factories in the VTIC, so that more students there can become self-sufficient. The plan is to provide 3,000 of such jobs.

A more specific example of how the Xinjiang mutual pairing assistance program directly supports forced detainee labor under the guise of "poverty alleviation" and "development" comes from a company from Zhejiang Province, called Zhejiang Zhuji Keshang (浙江诸暨客商). This company invested 180 million RMB to establish the Xinjiang Hengrui Textile Company (天山恒瑞纺织有限公司) with an annual production capacity of 6 million sweaters. It adopted the "industrial park plus VTIC plus satellite factory model", constructing two standardized factories with a combined floor space of 12,000sqm that provide work for 1,100 persons. From January to May 2018, Zhejiang mutual pairing assistance projects involved a total investment of 959 million RMB and established 148 factories.⁸³

Another, similar examples is the Jinfuyuan garment factory (金福源纺织厂) in Kashgar's Tashkorgan County. Set up by a company from Shenzhen through the mutual pairing assistance scheme, it can produce over a million items of clothing per year, which are exported to Europe.⁸⁴ This factory is showcased on a government website that praises the benefits of VTICs for de-extremification and combating terrorism.

Even if not all of these initiatives followed the "VTIC plus" model and involve VTIC detainee factory labor, it is evident that these 19 cities and provinces are spending billions of RMB in order to facilitate different forms of coerced labor throughout Xinjiang's Turkic minority regions.

⁷⁸ https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-01/14/content_5357805.htm

⁷⁹ https://web.archive.org/web/20190711210826/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-01/24/content_5260106.htm

⁸⁰ https://web.archive.org/web/20190711211038/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/28/content_5113051.htm

⁸¹ <http://www.xjdr.gov.cn/info/11855/23816.htm> or <http://archive.is/UHfVP>

⁸² www.xjdr.gov.cn/info/11855/22388.htm (page already removed)

⁸³ <http://yj.chinadevelopment.com.cn/toutiao/2018/07/1301768.shtml>

or <http://archive.is/8Df5Z>. Related but does not mention VTIC: <http://xj.sina.com.cn/news/b/2019-04-01/detail-ihxyzsm2288194.shtml>

⁸⁴ <https://www.ws.gov.cn/xwdt/bddt/20190119/i293954.html> or <http://archive.is/heMys>

9. Conclusion: Ethical Implications for Global Supply Chains

Xinjiang's multi-layered schemes of forced or at least involuntary labor, and the increasing blending of VTIC and non-VTIC labor, have major implications for global supply chains.

Xinjiang is the designated core region of the BRI, with ambitious future production targets for textile and garment production, along with other labor-intensive manufacturing products. Through substantial subsidies, the government is attracting major companies to establish factories in the region. Often, this takes places through the pairing assistance scheme, whereby major eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu etc. encourage their corporations to establish branches in Xinjiang. This creates close linkages between products made with Xinjiang's forced (or at least involuntary) labor, and the entire domestic Chinese market.

As a result, it is increasingly likely that products from Xinjiang will end up not only in domestic Chinese but also in global supply chains. Before long, it will be up to Chinese companies, and to China as a whole nation, to prove to other countries that their exported products do not involve any form of coerced ethnic minority labor. Until Xinjiang's extrajudicial internment camp network and related factories are not fully shut down, and all forms of skills training and related employment in the region are made completely voluntary, this will be difficult or impossible to prove.

Flow 1: Government document showing plan for Pishan County Factory Park on Grounds of Interment Camp

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	和田地区皮山县2019年扶贫资金项目计划表							
2								
3	序号	项目编号	项目名称	项目类别	建设性质	建设地点	建设期	建设规模及建设内容
4								
5								
6								
7	24	653223 2019024	皮山县教培中心标准化厂区（车间）钢结构建设项目（二期）	加工业	新建	教培中心	2019- 2019	建设标准化厂房16栋，共31069.12平方米，单体建筑面积1941.82平方米（含附属配套）；地上一层，为钢结构。总投资4600万元。其中：第二期需投资3000万元。

“Satellite Factories let villagers realize their employment dream...”



[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies

A report on forced and prison labor in
Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains

August 2019



The Citizen Power Institute

Citizen Power Initiatives for China

Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies

A report on forced and prison labor in
Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains

By: Lianchao Han

Contributors: David Wong, Amelia Dewell, Anna Chen

The Citizen Power Institute
Citizen Power Initiatives for China

August 2019



The Citizen Power Institute

WHO WE ARE

The Citizen Power Institute (CPI) is a research arm of the Citizen Power Initiatives for China (CPIFC). CPI conducts investigations and research on issues relating to human rights and democratic transition in China, and to educate the general public through its publications.

CPIFC is a grassroots movement dedicated to advancing a peaceful transition to democracy in China. Our movements are embedded with the belief that such a transition can be achieved through structural reform of the current system of government that by its very nature denies universally recognized political and social rights to its citizens. Our movement further recognizes that such reform can only be driven by the citizens of China through the application of Gong Min Li Liang (公民力量 “Citizen Power”) and through cooperative and unified action of all the diverse peoples that are under the rule of the Chinese government.

Table of Contents

The Citizen Power Institute	2
Executive Summary	4
I. Introduction	7
III. Prison Companies in Xinjiang	31
IV. How Forced Labor Products Enter Global Supply Chains	46
V. Conclusion and Recommendations	58
Appendix 1: Incomplete List of XPCC-administered Prisons	60
Appendix 2: Incomplete List of XUAR Prisons	63
Appendix 3: Incomplete List of XUAR LaborCamps/Education/ Correction/Rehab Prisons	65
Appendix 4: Incomplete List of XPCC Cotton Processing Factories	67



Executive Summary

China has created a “cotton gulag” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Xinjiang produces 84 percent of China’s cotton output, and is a primary supplier and exporter of cotton/textile/apparel products. Xinjiang is also home to a large percentage of China’s prison population and these inmates serve as a key labor force in every link of China’s cotton value chain, from cotton field reclamation to planting, harvesting, processing, and garment production.

Direct evidence from data published by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese companies, and witness testimonies shows that prisons in the region are forcing inmates to work in prison cotton farms, processing plants, and textile/garment factories. This prison-based economy is designed to meet two CCP goals: earn money for the State and “politically stabilize” Xinjiang. To conceal this practice, prison and labor camp authorities in Xinjiang have deleted online information regarding these prison companies and factories, changed the names of prison factories, and created layers of complex company ownership structures in order to disguise prison factories and farms as schools and trading companies.

Key conclusions of the report:

- Xinjiang produces 84 percent of China's cotton output, and is a primary supplier and exporter of cotton/textile/apparel products to Chinese factories in the interior of China, as well as internationally. The Xinjiang region has the largest number of prisons and labor camps in China, and it is China's long-standing policy to use prison inmates as forced labor;
- Prison inmates in Xinjiang are routinely used to reclaim land for cotton fields, and participate in other parts of the cotton value chain, up to and including work in garment factories.
- In 2014, the Chinese Government began to implement a strategy to maintain political stability in Xinjiang. Part of the strategy involves the detention of large numbers of Uyghurs in "re-education camps." Concurrently, the government encouraged the development of the vertical integration of China's garment manufacturing sector by moving textile and garment factories closer to cotton production in Xinjiang where Uyghers could be placed for employment in the cotton/textile/garment industry;
- The presence of forced labor, particularly prison labor, at many steps of the cotton supply chain means that potentially all cotton/textile/apparel products from Xinjiang are produced with forced labor, and some of these products have entered into international commerce, including the U.S. and European markets.

The XUAR has a disproportionately high concentration of prisons in comparison with the other provinces in the country. Excluding Uyghur re-education camps, there are over 70 prisons in the XUAR compared to a mere 25 in Shandong Province despite the latter having a population over four times larger. This absurd ratio underscores a system of ethnic disenfranchisement initiated by the CCP that, while being propagated as a supposed means of re-education for criminals, functions as a way to inhumanely punish inmates, eradicate the Muslim faith in China, and provide a renewable source of unethical but cheap forced labor for the cotton and textile industry. Though the exact figure is unknown, we estimate there are half a million to 800,000 prisoners incarcerated in Xinjiang and forced to work in prison enterprises in many industry sectors. In addition, a million Uyghurs are held in the "reeducation camps," and many are forced to work under Xinjiang's new textile/apparel expansion plan.

Because forced labor is used so ubiquitously throughout Xinjiang, it is very difficult to separate Xinjiang's forced labor economy from its regular economy. Based on our findings, governments, companies, and consumers should assume that any cotton products sourced from China are a product of China's cotton gulag.

Note on two key entities & two groups of forced labor

XUAR: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is a provincial-level Chinese autonomous region in the northwest. It is China's largest administrative division.

XPCC: The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is a unique government economic and paramilitary organization that operates autonomously within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The XPCC reports directly to the Communist Party of China (CPP), and it is also under the XUAR CPP's leadership. The XPCC has administrative authority over several medium-sized cities as well as settlements and farms in Xinjiang, and thus often operates parallel government and administrative institutions to the XUAR.

Judicial forced labor: this group of forced labor refers to those inmates who are incarcerated under China's judicial system.

Extrajudicial forced labor: This group of forced labor refers to those incarcerated outside of China's judicial system, but are in so-called "reeducation camps," "vocational schools," black jails and factories that are authorized by both the Chinese governmental agencies.

I. Introduction

1. Definition of Forced Labor

According to the 1930 International Labor Organization Convention on Forced Labor, “forced labor” is defined as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” This excludes compulsory military service, normal civil obligations, penalties imposed by a court action taken in an emergency, and minor communal services.¹

The Global Slavery Index defines “modern slavery” as a hypernym covering “a set of specific legal concepts including forced labor, debt bondage, forced marriage, slavery and slavery-like practices, and human trafficking.” It has stated that “although modern slavery is not defined in law, it is used as an umbrella term that focuses attention on commonalities across these legal concepts. Essentially, it refers to situations of exploitation that a person cannot refuse or leave because of threats, violence, coercion, deception, and/or abuse of power. For example, a worker’s passport may be taken away if they are in a foreign country, they may experience or be threatened with violence, or their family may be threatened.”²

All Chinese individuals who are jailed or detained in prison, labor camps, and correction centers, as well as those required working in re-education camps or required to undergo “vocational training,” falling under both categories.

2. History of Prison Labor in China

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed control of China in 1949, the party executed with impunity many counter-revolutionary “criminals” and arrested many more. The harsh treatment of the detainees became a point of contention within the CCP and in 1951, they recognized that these prisoners had untapped potential as a labor force. The following year, the government adopted a policy to integrate prison labor into the state production plan by turning prisons into production units within the overall framework of the planned economy. Since then, many factories have been set up to force inmates to work and churn out profits for the state.³

1 Global Slavery Index. (2018). Overview. Retrieved from: <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/methodology/overview/>

2 Ibid.

3 Pengxin Guozi Lushi. (2019, April 27). The Reform of Special State-Owned Enterprises - Prison enterprises: How to prevent investment liability risks. Retrieved from <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/64066401>

After China adopted a socialist market economy in the early 1980s, the nature of prison labor changed when prison enterprises were contracted out/awarded to prison guards and wardens who bid the highest or who had special relationships with their superiors. This practice caused the prison enterprises to decline in profitability and productivity due in part to their inefficiency. In 2003, the Chinese government implemented a policy to reform its prison enterprise system by separating the management of prison inmates from the management of prison production while still maintaining the same prison leadership. The prison companies are still run by the prison administration, but the revenue made by prison enterprises are sent to the State treasury. The reform clearly required the prisons to not only be more efficient but also provide a work environment to rehabilitate criminals, which in essence mandates that the prisons be profitable.⁴

China's prison law stipulates that prisons must supervise inmates according to the law and organize them to engage in productive labor according to their reform needs, with the state providing production facilities and production funds necessary for inmates to work. The law also requires that all inmates who can work must participate in production. Inmates who refuse to do so or passively boycott work by slowing down production are penalized with warnings, reprimands, or solitary confinement.⁵

In an official circular from the Chinese government entitled, "Notice on Matters Related to Support of the Prison Enterprises Growth through Government Procurement," a prison enterprise is defined as a production project or labor assignment designed for inmates by the Ministry of Justice, which belongs under the jurisdiction of the Prison Administrations and Education/Drug Addiction Correction Administrations of both central and provincial governments. Therefore, all prison companies and assets are state owned.⁶

You Huan, an apparel technician who has worked with over a dozen prison garment factories, describes these enterprises as "nothing but just a big garment factory." You Huan argues that prisoners are seen as a productive labor force. Prison laborers are divided by the length of their sentence and their age. Inmates who are younger with longer terms will be trained for work on

4 Li, Li. (2010, March 3). Prison reform is on the fast track: China has initially established a full guarantee system for prison funds. Retrieved from http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-03/03/content_3110496.htm

5 NPC Standing Committee. (2012, October 26). Prison Law of the People's Republic of China (As amended in 2012). Retrieved from <https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/dada-f93383f27905bdfb.html>

6 Treasury Ministry and Justice Ministry of PRC. (2014, June 10). Notice on Matters Related to Support of the Prison Enterprises Growth through Government Procurement. Retrieved from <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E6%94%BF%E5%BA%9C%E9%87%87%E8%B4%AD%E6%94%AF%E6%8C%81%E7%9B%91%E7%8B%B1%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E6%9C%89%E5%85%B3%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98%E7%9A%84%E9%80%9A%E7%9F%A5>

the machines as it requires them to learn a skill; while older, infirm inmates will be assigned to do support work. A prisoner's sentence may be commuted if they work diligently. A score system is set up to evaluate prisoners performance in their workplace. Money is also given as a reward, which can range from about 3 yuan to a few dozen yuan a month (equivalent to 50 cents to a few dollars).

Wang Ailing, wife of a prisoner in the XPCC's Xinhui Prison posted a request online for the prison officials that her husband serves his sentence there. Ms. Wang says, "my husband has scored 250 points, and never missed his performance evaluation, but he has a bad health and his sentence won't be able to commute. I have got cancer and if I die, no one cares for our 12 years old son. Please reform him faster, so he can get out early to take the responsibility as a husband and father."⁷

You Huan concludes that "every prison in China is a factory which is creating 'value' and 'wealth' every second, but in the name of 'confidentiality', it is entirely unknown where the wealth created by the forced labor has gone. The prison police bear the responsibility of reforming prisoners to benefit society, but it is the prison administration that consistently requires millions of inmates to work and create an enormous amount of money that no one can account for. These prison products then enter commerce, competing for profits with private enterprises."⁸




⁷ Wang, Ailing. (2012, June 13). Retrieved from: <http://www.11467.com/changji/co/5529.htm>

⁸ You, Huan. (2015, January 24). My Story with Prisons. Retrieved from <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2015/01/%E5%85%B1%E8%AF%86%E7%BD%91%E7%BD%9C%E5%B0%A4%E7%84%95%E7%BC%9A%E6%88%91%E4%B8%8E%E7%9B%91%E7%8B%B1%E7%9A%84%E6%95%85%E4%BA%8B/%E7%8B%B1%E7%9A%84%E6%95%85%E4%BA%8B/>


3. Working Conditions of Chinese Forced Labor

The working conditions in China's prison factories are very harsh. It is understood from multiple accounts that inmates must work long hours, particularly when there are large orders or rush jobs, with poor food and frequent beatings. In 2017, when Christel Wallace bought her new purse at a Walmart in the U.S., she opened a small zippered pocket deep inside the purse and found a letter written by two forced laborers in a prison in Guanxi, China. The workers, Jiang Congcong and Zhen Shaoxiong, wrote that the inmates are forced to work 14 hours per day, until midnight, with no midday break. Inmates who do not finish their work are beaten or given insufficient food. Additional money given by the external parent company to improve meals for the prisoners is used by the prison police. Prisoners are paid little to nothing, and if they fall sick, the cost of medicine is deducted from their pay. The workers conclude the letter stating that the prisoners are treated worse than animals.



In another instance of letters hidden in Chinese-made goods, Zhang Hao of Shangdong Province, who was jailed in Xuzhou Prison, hid a letter in an article of clothing that he claims was manufactured in Xuzhou Prison. Like previous accounts, Zhang claims prisoners work long hours - up to or exceeding 300 hours per month - and get paid only a modest amount monthly. The prison police torture and mistreat inmates to force them to work, often causing death and severe injuries. The prison factory works with many Chinese and Western brands. Zhang also claims that Chinese forced labor produces 10 billion articles of clothing and a huge quantity of electronic products and calls for an international investigation into the use of forced prison labor for Chinese production.

After being labeled as "rightist," Gan Cui, a college student at Renmin University in China, spent 20 years in a labor camp in Kashgar. The labor camp was a farm, adjacent to the Taklimakan Desert, where he lived in an underground hut, forced to work in extreme conditions to reclaim land for cotton fields by digging ditches to irrigate the land, leaching out salt and alkaline from the earth. The hard labor was endless. During the great three-year famine, Gan witnessed the death of an entire labor camp that was located near his camp, and Gan narrowly escaped death from



starvation himself.⁹ We believe that tens of thousands of prisoners have died in Xinjiang's prisons and labor camps. For example, 100,000 to 200,000 inmates have been moved from the interior of China to the XPCC prison system in Xinjiang between 1951 and 1975, but only 90,000 have been released. The rest are not accounted for.¹⁰

For years, Falun Gong practitioners have been documenting their mistreatment and forced labor in prisons and labor camps.¹¹ Recently Fox 11 broadcast a secretly recorded video that revealed

9 Yuan, Ling. (2014, January 16). The five famous labor camps in the Mao Zedong era. Retrieved from: <http://www.mjlsj.org/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=4568>

10 Ma, Jian Jun; Shi, Zhiheng. (2014, September). Policy Basis and Empirical Research on Implementation of Prisoners Transfer and Relocation Reform Work by the XPCC's Prisons. Journal of Legal System and Society.

11 Melugin, Bill. (2019, May 20). Undercover video reveals brutal treatment of Falun Gong prisoners inside Chinese labor camps. Retrieved from <http://www.foxla.com/news/national-news/undercover-video-reveals-brutal-treatment-of-falun-gong-prisoners-inside-chinese-labor-camps>

12 Xu, Gregory. (2005, June 22). Forced Labor in China. Retrieved from <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/roundtables/2005/CECC%20Roundtable%20Testimony%20-%20Gregory%20Xu%20-%20206.22.05.pdf>

the brutal treatment of Falun Gong prisoners inside Chinese labor camps.¹³ The Falun Gong practitioners also have evidence that Xinjiang has become the largest prison in the world and the CCP's persecution has been extended to all believers and all peoples in Xinjiang. It is known that over 100 Falun Gong practitioners in Xinjiang have been brutally persecuted.¹⁴ A Bitter Winter investigative report shows how Christian inmates are overworked, with high quotas and extra long working hours, and how they were forced to engage in dangerous work, were malnourished, tortured, and with many dying or becoming disabled while being forced to work.¹⁵

On Baidu, a Chinese website with a forum for seeking advice, an anonymous person who claimed to be a former inmate from the Xinhui Prison in Xinjiang's Manas County asked how he could sue the warden of the prison. He said that the prison guards treated the inmates like dogs and for months the inmates were denied rice. If the inmates failed to complete their production quota, the prison guards used electric prods to shock them as punishment. He exclaimed that this was "Too outrageous!"¹⁶

There are many similar reports about this type of abuse. Three of CPIFC's own staffers who were prisoners of conscience in China also confirmed this common practice of forced labor and abuse in Chinese prisons.

Chinese forced labor takes multiple forms in Xinjiang's prisons and in re-education camps. The photo below was taken and used by the Chinese government as propaganda to show how happy Uighur girls are in this re-education camp factory, as they work to make footwear. But the reality is that millions of Uighurs are suffering in the forced labor factories that are affiliated with so-called "re-education camps," "education-transformation stations," and "professional training centers" and "vocational schools," as documented by ABC.¹⁷ More and more evidence of China's brutal treatments against the Uighurs, and other ethnic peoples is surfacing now.

13 Melugin, Bill. (2019, May 24). Undercover video reveals brutal treatment of Falun Gong prisoners inside Chinese labor camps. Retrieved from: <https://www.foxla.com/news/undercover-video-reveals-brutal-treatment-of-falun-gong-prisoners-inside-chinese-labor-camps>

14 Xue, Chi. (2018, October 9). The persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in Xinjiang in the past two years. Retrieved from <http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/18/10/8/n10769900.htm>

15 Xinlu. (2019, March 7). Tortured to death in prison: Christians reveal forced labor. Retrieved from <https://zh.bitterwinter.org/tortured-to-death-in-prison-christians-tell-forced-labor/>

16 Baidu. (2010, November 9). Retrieved from: <https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/196528754.html>

17 McNeill, Sophie, et. al. (2019, July 16). Cotton On and Target investigate suppliers after forced labour of Uyghurs exposed in China's Xinjiang. Retrieved from <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-15/uyghur-forced-labour-xinjiang-china/11298750>



II. Xinjiang's Prisons and Forced Labor

1. Why Xinjiang has the largest number of prisons and largest forced labor workforce

Using the multiple accounts of prisoners involved in forced labor and data from the Chinese government itself regarding the Xinjiang region, we believe that Xinjiang has the largest number of prisons and is the largest hub for forced labor in China. The CCP's policy over the last 60 years has been to use forced labor to accelerate Xinjiang's economic growth. Because the cotton/textile/apparel industry is the primary sector in Xinjiang it has benefited greatly from the availability of forced labor.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is a provincial-level autonomous region in the northwest of China. The primary crop of the region is cotton. In 2018, Xinjiang produced 5.11 million tons of cotton, accounting for 83.9% of the national total output of 6.09 million tons in 2018, and in the same year the XUAR's export is about 109 billion RMB, equivalent to \$16 billion USD, among which textile/apparel related product export takes about 43%, ranking number one in its export, according the Xinjiang government data.¹⁸

¹⁸ XUAR Development and Reform Commission. (2019, Feb. 20). Analysis of Xinjiang's Foreign Trade Import and Export in 2018. Retrieved from:

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), is a paramilitary entity in the XUAR, which externally uses the name “China Xinjiang Xinjian (New Construction) Group Corporation.” In 2018 it produced 2.0465 million tons of cotton, accounting for 33.5% of China’s cotton output. In the same year the XPCC exported about 47.3 billion RMB, with the largest products being apparel, textile, footwear, and hats.¹⁹ The XPCC has essentially been managing the largest and longest-running judicial forced labor system in China.

Because of Xinjiang’s special status and because of the risks it posed, the CCP dispatched its most notorious enforcer to the region. Chen Quanguo, a CCP Politburo member, currently serves as the CCP party chief of the XUAR, and the first political commissar of the XPCC. Chen has implemented extremely harsh measures to repress Uighurs and other ethnic peoples in Xinjiang. Prisons and labor camps are one of the main tools used to govern Xinjiang.

As a unique paramilitary organization, which is under the dual leadership of both the Central and the XUAR government, the XPCC’s mission is “to consolidate border defense, accelerate Xinjiang’s development, and reduce the economic burden on local governments and the local people of all ethnic groups. The People’s Liberation Army units stationed in Xinjiang focus their efforts on production and construction.”

“As an important force for stability in Xinjiang and for consolidating frontier defense, the XPCC adheres to the principle of attaching equal importance to production and militia duties. It has set up in frontier areas a ‘four-in-one’ system of joint defense that links the PLA, the Armed Police, the XPCC, and the people, playing an irreplaceable special role in the past five decades in smashing and resisting internal and external separatist attempts at sabotage and infiltration, and in maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.”²⁰

In other words, the XPCC is China’s tool for colonization of the Xinjiang region by the Han Chinese. It combines the functions of production, administration, and military into one, with the goal of more effective and comprehensive control of Xinjiang. In recent years, the XPCC paramilitary force has been used to crack down and suppressing so-called “religious extremists,” separatists, terrorists, and mass protests.

The use of prison labor for economic development and making profits is a long-standing policy and practice in China, which can be traced back to the early 1950s. Xinjiang’s vast undeveloped

<http://info.texnet.com.cn/detail-736654.html>

19 China News Network. (2019, March 1). Last year Xinjiang Corps achieved a total import and export volume exceeds 55.7 billion yuan. Retrieved from: <https://www.chinanews.com/cj/2019/03-01/8768996.shtml>

20 State Council Information Office. (2014, October 5). The History and Development of Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps. Retrieved from <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/Document/1382598/1382598.htm>

land, isolation, remoteness, and sparsely populated area make it an ideal place for prison labor.

The history of prison labor and the creation of the XPCC dates back to the CCP taking power in 1949, and how it moved many of the prisoners (mostly captured from the Nationalist government) from the interior of China to Xinjiang. Since Xinjiang is far away from the coastal areas of China, jailing these counter-revolutionaries in the region could cut off their ties with Taiwan and the outside world.

From 1951 to 1975, the XPCC received between 100,000 to 200,000 of these counter-revolutionaries, and other prisoners of conscious from Hubei, Henan, Zhejiang and a dozen other provinces. Forced labor was a primary workforce in the XPCC which had a total population of 170,000 in 1954. The prisoners engaged in all kinds of infrastructure construction work in Xinjiang, including field reclamation, road construction, reservoirs and irrigation system building, mining, power plants, etc.²¹

Similar to Stalin's use of gulags to both punish and banish counter-revolutionaries, the Chinese believe that hard labor can change "bad elements" or criminals and turn them into good, useful citizens. In the process, the inmates can "contribute to society" by making money for the state. Additionally, the strong presence of the XPCC in Xinjiang helps to secure China's western border. Therefore, despite political and economic upheavals over the years, Xinjiang today continues to be the recipient of large numbers of prisoners.

From 1983 to 2000, the XPCC received a total of 85,000 prisoners from 15 provinces and municipalities including Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi. The majority of prisoners had a sentence of 10 years or longer, and 24 percent had been given death sentences with a reprieve.²²

Shanghai magazine Xinmin Weekly reported that since 1983 Shanghai had sent 31 shipment of prisoners to Xinjiang as of 2002, and each shipment could consist of up to 1,000 prisoners. Before the prisoners took their 4,000 kilometer journey to Xinjiang, the police paraded them around the city with machine gun pointed at their trucks as a show of deterrence.²³

More provinces and municipalities requested to send their prisoners to Xinjiang when the Chinese government launched its Great Western Development Strategy in the 2000s. We cannot find the total number of prisoners transported to Xinjiang since then, nor the specific number of transferred prisoners the XUAR prison system received, but we assume that an equal number, if not more, of

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Xinmin Weekly. (2002, Oct. 8). Shanghai Prison Administration 9-27 Operation to Transport Inmates to Xinjiang. Retrieved from: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-10-08/1540759105.html>

prisoners were also shipped to the XUAR prisons.

It is generally believed in China that transporting prisoners to Xinjiang is a success story. Not only because Xinjiang can handle large numbers of prisoners, and the cost of building and operating a prison is 1/10 of that of the other provinces. But more importantly, the forced labor program is seen as an effective deterrent to “criminals” in China proper and “separatists” in Xinjiang. The government believes that it has reformed inmates through hard labor in the harsh desert environment, helped ease the pressure of prison crowding in the coastal provinces, and provided special labor resources and economic assistance for Xinjiang. This has allowed Xinjiang a rare opportunity to grow its prison enterprises and contributed to economic growth in the region because prison labor has built critical infrastructure and industrial and mining enterprises for Xinjiang, which has played an important role in the economic development of Xinjiang.²⁴

The photo below shows prisoners being transported from Shanghai to Xinjiang:



To clarify, the prisons and education correction centers under both the XUAR and XPCC system jail Han Chinese, Uighurs, and other ethnic peoples. All inmates are formally charged and have gone through the legal process. They are judicial forced laborers. The inmates from so called “reeducation camps,” or internment camps, are largely Uighurs and other ethnic groups and are not formally charged, therefore they are extrajudicial forced laborers that will be addressed later.

The XPCC prison system is designed to be a prison labor system. Not counting the numerous Uighur internment camps, there are more than 30 prisons and at least 3 re-education through labor

24 Ma, Jian Jun; Shi, Zhiheng. (2014, September). Policy Basis and Empirical Research on Implementation of Prisoners Transfer and Relocation Reform Work by the XPCC's Prisons. *Journal of Legal System and Society*.

camps and 15 Education Correction Centers²⁵ under the XPCC system. In parallel, the XUAR operates about 27 prisons, and 10 direct units under the Judicial Bureau's Prison Administration of the XUAR.²⁶



The total number of prisoners in Xinjiang is a highly-guarded state secret. Based on an internet post by a Chinese prison officer, he revealed that a large prison in China often holds about 10,000 inmates.²⁷ Based on that we estimate the population of prisoners in Xinjiang is at least half a million since Xinjiang prisons are large prisons.

One way to extrapolate the scale of the prison system is to use data on the Xinjiang prison authorities' recruitment efforts for employees and guards. The number of prison police officers

25 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Drug Administration. (2019). Educational Correction and Detoxification Rehabilitation Centers. Retrieved from <http://www.xjjz.gov.cn/fengcai.asp>

26 Personnel Recruitment Network. (2018, November 1). Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Prison Administration's recruitment of 1,013 public business partners in 2018. Retrieved from <http://www.rszkw.com/shengfen/xj/2018-11-01/6202.html>

27 Brant, (2016, August 8). What kind of industry is prison OEM, and can it grow stronger and bigger to cope with the increasing expenditure of public security departments? Retrieved from <https://www.zhihu.com/question/24649668/answer/115772691>

hired every year consistently increases, which leads us to assume that the number of inmates in Xinjiang continues to increase. According to a XPCC online recruiting brochure, in 2018 it recruited over a thousand new prison officers. The brochure claims that: “Prisons are generally revenue-generating units, all have production assignments, and are profitable as well, so the benefits that a prison officer receives are better than those of the average state civil servants.”²⁸



In the attached appendices there is an incomplete list of prisons and labor camps operated by the XPCC and the XUAR.

Using data from the Chinese government, Chinese human rights defenders reported that the number of ethnic minorities who have been put under criminal prosecution in the XUAR skyrocketed in 2017, with nearly 230,000 charged with the crimes of “terrorism”, “separatism”, and “religious extremism,” accounting for an alarming 21 percent of all arrests in China in 2017.



The ratio of formal arrests made in Xinjiang has increased by 306 percent in the past five years compared to the previous five-year period. Of the total number of people arrested from 2013 to 2017, nearly 70 percent of the arrests were made in the year 2017 alone.²⁹ Considering China’s over 99 percent conviction rate,


28 Luo, Chunyan. (2018, October 30). 37 units recruit 1,013 workers. Retrieved from http://k.sina.com.cn/article_6425719777_17f00b3e100100dtnf.html

29 Chinese Human Rights Defenders. (2018, July 25). Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total Arrests in 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.nchr.org/2018/07/criminal-arrests-in-xinjiang-account-for-21-of-chinas-total-in-2017/>

perhaps all those criminally charged in Xinjiang are now in prison.³⁰ Combined with the number of prisoners who were previously charged, the number of prisoners is about 330,000. Adding prisoners transferred from China proper and together with prisons in the XPCC system, the total number of inmates is likely between 500,000 to 800,000. By law, all these prisoners must work be reformed or transformed by both political re-indoctrination and hard labor.

From personal accounts, it is known that most prisoners work in cotton fields, including the reclamation of desert land to develop more cotton fields, irrigation projects, and in the processing of cotton for downstream products, or making garments for the XPCC. According to the personal accounts of prisoners, the more intensive labor is land reclamation and harvesting cotton. Prisoners³¹ are subject to a scoring system based on how well they work, which is directly linked to whether a prisoner might receive commutation or parole. The central government has given both the XUAR and XPCC a flexible criminal management policy called “combined strictness and leniency” (宽严相济的刑事政策) which allow them to commute inmates’ sentence if prisoners score high in their forced labor workplaces and perform well in their work.³²

2. Internment Camps and Extrajudicial Forced Labor



Since violent protests broke out on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi, which resulted in many deaths, the CCP began to launch a series of campaigns to suppress Uighurs. The reeducation camps or “education/transformation (教育转化) camps” are one of the measures, which is modeled after China’s effective suppression of Falun Gong practitioners since the 1990s. Many Uighurs have been forced into the camps to be brainwashed until they give up their religion and support the CCP’s policy.

This group of inmates who are detained

30 Shan, Yuxiao. (2016, March 13). The number of acquitted persons increasing China’s acquittal rate is extremely low. Retrieved from <http://topics.caixin.com/2016-03-13/100919567.html>

31 Han, Xianxu. (2018, September 28) Desert Escape. Retrieved from <http://m.duzazhi.com/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=1&id=32499>

32 Ma, Jian Jun; Shi, Zhiheng. (2014, September). Policy Basis and Empirical Research on Implementation of Prisoners Transfer and Relocation Reform Work by the XPCC’s Prisons. *Journal of Legal System and Society*.

without any legal procedure during political campaigns to weed out whomever the government deems a security risk. These extrajudicial detainees could also be in regular prisons, black jails, detention centers, and re-education camps. It is very hard to estimate how many there are.

Since Xi Jinping became Chairman of the CCP, he has orchestrated much more repressive policies in Xinjiang. A massive number of Uighurs and other ethnic groups have been sent to internment camps. Adrian Zenz, a leading researcher on China's ethnic policies, says that an estimated 1.5 million Uighurs and other Muslims could be held in re-education centers in the Xinjiang region, an increase from Zenz's earlier estimation of 1 million.³³

There may be different forms of internment camps or "re-education" camps. But many are set up to brainwash while at the same time transform Uighurs into what the state deems to be productive workers, and one focus is on creating more textile/garment workers.

This campaign began in May 2014 when the CCP decided to grow Xinjiang's textile/apparel industry as a multifaceted strategy to stabilize Xinjiang during the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum. Xi Jinping wanted to use economic performance to legitimize China's rule over the region by creating jobs to reduce "religious extremism," "separatism" and "terrorism," and to expand China's influence westward and globally under the One-Belt-One-Road Initiative. The cotton/textile/apparel industry is a labor-intensive sector and Xinjiang produces most high quality cotton in China. This sector became a natural part of the government's strategy. Based on the central government's decision, the Xinjiang government issued its Planning Outline (2014–2023) for Developing Textile and Garment Industry and Promoting Employment, which was modified later into the 2018–2023 plan.

This massive expansion plan focuses heavily on southern Xinjiang. It states, "We must promote employment as a permanent cure to maintain social stability and achieve long-lasting peace, and particularly solve the unemployment problem for people in southern Xinjiang." Southern Xinjiang is less developed economically, with a majority population of Uighurs who maintain a traditional way



³³ Nebehay, Stephanie. (2019, March 13). 1.5 million Muslims could be detained in China's Xinjiang: academic. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-rights/15-million-muslims-could-be-detained-in-chinas-xinjiang-academic-idUSKCN1QU2MQ>

of life, and this area is considered by the government to be a locus for radicals and separatists. The government's stated goal is to "create" 1 million new jobs, with nearly two-thirds of those in southern Xinjiang.

To implement the plan, Xinjiang made the "Three Cities,-Seven Parks-One Center" proposal, ("Three Cities", namely Aksu Textile Industrial City, Shihezi Textile Industrial City, Korla Textile Industrial City; "Seven Parks", namely Hami, Pakistan Chu, Alar, Shaya, Manas, Kuitun, Horgos; "One Center" means Urumqi Textile International Trade Center, all of which are located in the five textile industrial zones: Urumqi-Changji, Shihezi-Kuitun, Korle-Yuli, Aksu-Alar, and Kashgar.³⁴It is likely no coincidence that each of these textile development areas have corresponding major prisons run by either the XUAR or the XPCC. For example, Shihezi City, which is under control of the XPCC 8th Division, has 4 mega prisons, while Korla City, which is within the jurisdiction of the 2nd Division, also has 4 mega prisons, while Aral City, controlled by the 1st Division, has 8 mega prisons. These prisons have been engaging in cotton/textile production and processing and all have their own profitable prison enterprises to handle their business.

In 2010 the CCP ordered 19 provinces to "adopt" certain districts or counties in Xinjiang as a way of providing assistance to these lesser-developed areas. In some cases these provinces assisted in moving their own textile and apparel factories or to the area, or provided assistance in building the industry in the districts or counties that they were responsible for.

Even though there is plenty of surplus labor in the southern parts of Xinjiang, there is a lack of skilled textile/garment workers. The XUAR government has formed the Textile and Apparel Employment Leading Group headed by Li Pengxin, the deputy party chief of the XUAR, to carry out the strategy to increase textile/apparel workforce. Each local government in both XUAR and XPCC also created a task force to force Uighurs to take jobs in the textile and garment industry.

It appears since 2017 the Xinjiang government has launched a campaign to train the rural population and workforce to be "corrected" and "transformed" (教育转化人员) into skilled workers as part of the implementation of the above strategy. It is carried out in every county level, and there are 87 counties in XUAR, therefore there must be at least 87 re-education camps. Government documents show the training focuses on the young rural population and unemployed high school graduates. The training includes CCP indoctrination, forced learning of the Chinese language, and vocational skills.³⁵

34 Xinjiang Daily, Translated by Wu Jinying, (2015, November 26). New Prospects for the Development of Xinjiang's Textile and Garment Industry. Retrieved from : <https://www.youlin-magazine.com/story/development-of-textile-and-garment-industry-in-xinjiang-china/NDg0>

35 The Human Resource Market of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. (2017, May 3). Notice of the XUAR Organizing Technical Schools to Carry out Training for Rural Labor and Education Transformation Correctional Facilities. Retrieved from: http://www.xjggjy.com/2015_jyzx_tzgg/8a4ac4055bc91c35015bcc70851e0019.html

These types of camps are organized by multiple government agencies. Local vocational schools and colleges provide teachers and a training program; the village resident task force and local governments are responsible for getting trainees. Correction agencies provide facilities, and the Human Resources/Social Work Bureaus review and finance the program. We believe that many are coerced or forcefully taken into the camps.

The village resident task force is a key link in this operation. The task force is also known as FHJ working group (访惠聚工作队) which is a political campaign launched by the XUAR party chief Chen Quanguo a few years ago. The campaign is called “Listen to the people’s sentiment, Benefit the people’s wellbeing and Unify the people’s hearts.” The title of the campaign obfuscates the real mission which is to spy on all villagers, and to neutralize the Uighurs’ resistance to Chinese assimilation by doling out economic favors. The aim is total control of the Uighur population. At least 200,000 cadres have been dispatched to cover the entire XUAR, including 8,635 villages, 754 state-owned farm sites, and 931 key communities. These task forces identify the “extremists, or those who need to be corrected and reeducated,” and send them to camps and vocational schools.

According to Bitter Winter, Xinjiang is rapidly seeing the construction of these types of camps: “In May of this year, authorities in Xinjiang began to build a large-scale ‘transformation through education’ camp in place of a lumber mill and a market for buying and selling livestock in the city of Yining in Huocheng County. In three months, the construction of this camp was basically completed, covering an area of about 100,000 square meters.”

The Australia Broadcasting Corporation’s recent investigative report shows new evidence that China is sending Uighurs from the so-called re-education camps into factories and then forcing them to work, and that more people are being forced to work in textile and garment factories.³⁶

While China abolished the “reform through labor” (also known as Laogai 劳改) system in 2013, many forms of it still exist. The bureaus of reform-through-labor under China’s Ministry of Justice have changed their names into bureaus of education correction, with added function of compulsory drug



³⁶ McNeill, Sophie, et. al. (2019, July 16). Cotton On and Target investigate suppliers after forced labour of Uyghurs exposed in China’s Xinjiang. Retrieved from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-15/uyghur-forced-labour-xinjiang-china/11298750>



rehab. Xinjiang was the first to change its name (新疆维吾尔自治区教育矫治(戒毒)局) The “re-education through labor” or “laojiao” (劳教) system, remain in the regular judicial system and they also have vocational training schools already in place. These schools are in fact forced labor factories. The deceptive name of “schools” obfuscates the true nature of the facility and its relationship to the forced labor economy in China.


When inspecting the region in 2014, Xi Jinping instructed Xinjiang officials that the existence and development of the XPCC was a long-term strategy which must be reinforced, not weakened. Soon after, the XPCC accelerated its expansion deeper into southern Xinjiang, where Uighurs are highly concentrated. Beijing perceives this region as the “forefront of anti-terrorism.” Its strategy is to ruthlessly crackdown any dissent, while employing the soft power of economic development to win the Uighurs’ hearts, which the regime believes can be achieved by making the region a textile/apparel hub.

The “Xinjiang Textile and Apparel Industry Development Plan (2018-2023)” issued by the XUAR sets to reach 20 million spindles of cotton yarns, more than 50,000 looms, 250,000 tons of knitted fabrics, 800 million pieces of garments, and to create 1 million additional jobs, among which more than 650,000 new jobs will be created for Uighurs in southern Xinjiang.

To achieve this goal, Xinjiang needs significant number of skilled workers. This is another reason why more “vocational schools” or “reeducation camps” are set up and Uighurs are forcibly taken

into them to go through the brainwashing and skill training process.

Since 2014, Xinjiang has added nearly half a million new cotton/textile/apparel jobs under its expansion plan. These workers are essentially from these so-called “rural surplus laborers” in Southern Xinjiang. Some of them may have voluntarily participated in the program but many are the extrajudicial forced laborers. They are often trained in “vocational schools” or “professional skill training centers” with barbed wire fences, and work at garment factories that guarded as prisons as these three AP photos below show.³⁷



Li Fang, a researcher in Finland, used satellite images to discover that there are 19 prisons and 15 suspected labor camps in the Kashgar region alone. These facilities have the capacity to hold over half a million prisoners.³⁸

Kashgar is a predominantly Uighur area, and one of the new textile/apparel hubs, it is reported that in 2018 alone it aimed to send

100,000 inmates who had been through the “vocational training centers” to work in factories.³⁹

Researchers with the East Turkistan National Awakening Movement recently uncovered that 124

37 Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, & Yanan Wang, (2018, December 19). US sportswear traced to factory in China's internment camps, Associated Press. Retrieved from: <https://www.apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb>

38 Li, Fang. (2018, December 23) Observations and Statistics of 19 prisons in the Kashgar region of Xinjiang. Retrieved from <https://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2018/12/201812232204.shtml>

39 Buckley, Chris and Ramzy, Austin (2018, Dec. 16). China's Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor. NYT. Retrieved from : <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-ughurs.html>

such camps are set up over Xinjiang, where Uighurs are forcibly “reeducated.”⁴⁰ U.S. government officials also confirmed that at least 1 million people are currently in the “reeducation camps” and as many as 3 million are part of a forced “reeducation” program.⁴¹ The map the researchers come up with below show that the camps approximate the newly planned textile/apparel hubs.

However the most strong evidence that has connected the dots between the “reeducation camps” and forced labor in Xinjiang’s textile/apparel industry can be found in a speech delivered by Mr. Sun Ruizhe, vice-president of the China National Textile and Apparel Council, to senior industry representatives. In his speech, Mr. Sun said that Xinjiang planned to recruit from three main sources to increase the textile and garment sector’s workforce. These three sources include “impoverished households, relatives of the three types of people, and reeducation campers.” Three types people means those who are convicted prisoners, detainees, and the camp inmates.⁴²

Xinjiang’s poverty elevation program has aggressively targeted on the poor Uighurs in Southern Xinjiang. The CCP perceives that poverty drives Uighurs to become religious extremists. In the 22 counties of Southern Xinjiang the government has make dossiers for all individuals categorized as extremely poor and remove them from their homes and force them to enter into vocational schools, and then move them to work in other cities or districts in Xinjiang, far away from their native land. According to Xinhua New Agency, in the first half of 2018, Xinjiang arranged 62,000 rural poor people to work. Among them, 32,012 were employed in towns, enterprises and parks in the counties, 5,718 people were transferred to “satellite factories” and “township factories”, 7205 people were shipped out to other prefectures or districts to work, 5,644 people were assigned to work in the enterprises relocated to Xinjiang, and 3,173 work in the XPCC. 8281 in small businesses around the region.⁴³ Many of these jobs are in textile/apparel companies.

In the next five years, we expect increased tensions and conflicts will take place, and more internment camps and “vocational schools,” and affiliated factories will be established in the region. As a consequence, more forced labor will be used in the cotton, textile, and garment industry in South Xinjiang.

40 Gertz, Bill. (2019, July 15). Network of Chinese Concentration Camps for Uighurs Uncovered. Retrieved from: <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/network-of-chinese-concentration-camps-for-uighurs-uncovered/>

41 Ibid.

42 Mr. Sun’s speech was published on several websites but is now deleted.

43 Ayi Nuer, (2018, July 19). Xinjiang helped 62000 Impoverished People from Southern Xinjiang to find jobs in the first half of the year. Xinhua Net. Retrieved from: http://www.xinhua-net.com/fortune/2018-07/19/c_1123149866.htm

3. Xinjiang's Cotton/Textile/Apparel Economy Entangled with Forced Labor Economy

Xinjiang's prison enterprises are diversified, and they cover almost all sectors of the region's economy, including mining, machinery, cement manufacturing, truck manufacturing, and of course cotton. It is very difficult to separate Xinjiang's forced labor economy from the rest of the economy.



Because Xinjiang's key infrastructure was built by forced labor, every link of the supply chain within Xinjiang is tainted. The XPCC's practice is to use forced labor for cotton field reclamation because not only do they have a steady supply of prisoners that must be put to work, but this work is incredibly labor-intensive. It takes at least three years of field work before cotton can be planted because of the lengthy de-salt and de-alkalization process. Once the fields are planted and production begins, the XPCC also dispatches inmates to harvest cotton.



Because prison labor is not limited to cotton production, much of Xinjiang's reservoirs, irrigation systems, roads, energy infrastructure, and other general construction work is also done by prisoners. The photo below shows prisoners digging an irrigation canal in the 1970s.

For example, today's Tarim Basin is the largest cotton production hub in




Xinjiang. But in the 1960s and 1970s it was just endless desert, where inmates considered the worst place to work in Xinjiang. One former prisoner stated, “There are many labor reform camps in the vast Tarim basin, which are built in the endless Gobi desert, a place with nothing but sand. Camp inmates have been reclaiming and cultivating the Gobi all years around. The prisoners are not only isolated from the outside world, they are also isolated from each other, rarely interacting among themselves because the vast land..... Even if the prisoners complete their terms and allowed to be employed in prison enterprises, there is no hope to get out. They can only live and die there... It is almost impossible to escape. At all intersections, there are guard posts and checkpoints. You cannot get out even if you have wings on you.”⁴⁴

It was the inmates from prisons and labor camps developed the region. The first group came to build Tarim Farm, which turned into the Xayar Prison later. The prisoners first build the Qiman Reservoir, and then irrigation system with over a hundred kilometer long canal and removed several hundred million cubic meters dirt, and reclaimed tens of thousands of acre cotton fields, which lays the foundation for agricultural development of the region. It is. According to the prison officials that this irrigation system continues to play a tremendous role in the region’s agriculture production.⁴⁵

44 Xiao Long. *Incarceration Chronicle: Prison Experience during the Cultural Revolution*, Chapter 20, Most Scared to Go to Tarim. Retrieved from: <http://mjls.hkust.edu.hk/book.aspx?cid=2&tid=650&pid=3662>

45 Tang Yaozeng. (2019, Jan. 15) Nourished for 55 years, Populus Tree at Tarim Farm is



An overwhelming majority of the inmates in Xinjiang since the 1950s have been engaging in this type of work. The Kasgar Prison and Xinjiang Women's Prison built Gonggan Reservoir and Gonggan Irrigation Canal; Prisoners from the Yutian Prison built Karham Reservoir and related irrigation system; and the Bushu Prison inmates built Bangker Reservoir as showing in the photo below.

Another example, one of the major irrigation systems is called "Project 635" and it includes the construction of three dams on the Irtys river in North Xinjiang, an 890 kilometer canal, 5 reservoirs, and three power plants. The purpose is to move water from the north to the south for the Karamay oil field, and the cotton fields along the way. The total cost of the project is 14.4 billion yuan.⁴⁶ Over the past nine years, the XUAR has provided thousands of inmates to work on the

Booming in Xayar Prison. Retrieved from: <https://kknews.cc/history/6qr8nlm.html>

46 Tuyou, Xuming. (2017, Dec. 28). China's only North-to-South Water Transfer Project,

project under extreme poor conditions.⁴⁷

All of the reservoirs, power plants, and irrigation systems are currently used to produce cotton in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang's prison enterprises are incredibly diverse, and cover nearly all sectors of the region's economy, thus making it very difficult to separate the economy in Xinjiang dependent upon forced labor with the rest of the conventional economy in the Xinjiang region. For example, prison construction companies have built many cotton/textile/apparel factories, and prison enterprises such as the Wenguang Cement Company, currently under controlled by Xinjiang Urumqi Shunkangda Trading Company, provide millions tons of cements and other construction materials to build cotton/textile/apparel factories in the region.



leaving water within the country. Retrieved from: <https://kknews.cc/news/z2pgk5p.html>

⁴⁷ Xinjiang Prison Jijian, (2019, Jan 25) 60 years of climbing, a new inmates prison for continuous progress. Retrieved from: <https://read01.com/5nMeKDD.html#.XV2tG5NKhQI> 2019/01/25



The Buya Coal Mine is a Hetian Prison enterprise. The inmates developed the coal mine in the 1980s and continue to work there. Now the prison enterprise is absorbed into Xinjiang Energy Group Co., Ltd, a state-owned energy company of the XUAR. This pattern of merge is a common practice to hide the true identity of prison enterprises in many other sectors, which has made the entire Xinjiang economy tainted with the forced labor economy. The photos below show the Buya Coal Mine.



III. Prison Companies in Xinjiang

According to official XUAR government data, in 2018, the XUAR exported \$4.2 billion in apparel, \$2 billion in footwear, and \$1.06 billion in textiles, accounting for 43% of its total exports.⁴⁸⁻⁴⁹ It is hard to know exactly what percentage of prison labor contributes to this number. But since each prison is a big factory, and since apparel products are labor intensive, we believe prison labor is a significant part of Xinjiang cotton/textile/garment exports. The XPCC's export numbers for textile/apparel products are unknown.

This photo below shows Fan Kai, the XPCC's inspector, and Ning Guangxin, director of the prison enterprise division of XPCC's Prison Administration inspecting the Zhong Jia Zhuang Prison's garment factory of the 8th Division in 2016. We believe this is a major factory and part of the XPCC that supplies many products for both the Chinese domestic market and international markets.



48 Institute for Economic Research for Xinjiang Development and Reform. (2019, Feb. 20). Analysis of Xinjiang's Import and Export in 2018. Retrieved from: <http://info.texnet.com.cn/detail-736654.html>

49 Xinjiang Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission. (2019, February 20). Analysis of Xinjiang's Foreign Trade Imports and Exports in 2018. Retrieved from <http://info.texnet.com.cn/detail-736654.html>

China knows that many Western countries, including the United States, have banned forced labor products. As a result, China systematically and rigorously controls information about prison labor and prison enterprises both online and offline to effectively hide these factories and companies and avoid detection from Western law enforcement agencies, which makes finding solid evidence difficult.

However, China cannot delete everything; there are traces and clues that allow us to go deeper to prove China has been using and profiting from the large number of prison inmates in the cotton, textile and apparel industry.

1. The XUAR Prison Enterprises

Under the Prison Administration of the XUAR Judicial Bureau, there is a conglomerate responsible for all prison factories and companies under its jurisdiction. The corporation's name is Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group Co., Ltd. (新疆华新瑞安集团有限公司),⁵⁰ headquartered in the same office building of the XUAR Prison Administration located in 380 Huanghelou Rd, Ürümqi city. The head of the company is Ma Jiangguo, who is also deputy director of the Prison Administration, responsible for criminal reform through labor and production safety.⁵¹

Because the information about Huaxin Rui'an Group Co. is kept secret and is not accessible to the public, it is unknown how many subsidiaries are under this conglomerate. A search on an enterprise search site listed about 24 companies that are under the Huaxin Rui'an Group Co., including:

1. Xinjiang Qixin Garment Co., Ltd.
(新疆启新服装有限责任公司)
2. Xinjiang Xinyuan County Halabra Agriculture & Trade Co., Ltd.
(新疆新源县哈拉布拉农贸有限责任公司)
3. Xinjiang Kashgar Pailou Agriculture Co., Ltd.
(新疆喀什牌楼农场有限责任公司)
4. Xinjiang Ili Yurun Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆伊犁雨润商贸有限公司)

50 Xinjiang Corps Finance Bureau. (2016, June 7). Notice on Issues Related to the Development of Prison Enterprises by the Corps. Retrieved from <http://cwj.xjbt.gov.cn/c/2016-06-07/2451877.shtml>

51 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Prison Administration Network. (2017, May 1). Members of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Prison Administration. Retrieved from <http://jyglj.xinjiang.gov.cn/dwgk/ldjs/index.html>

5. Xinjiang Korla Rui'an Xutong Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆库尔勒瑞安旭彤商贸有限责任公司)
6. Xinjiang Hetian Yuxin Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆和田育新商贸有限责任公司)
7. Xinjiang Kuqa Xinsheng Agricultural and Livestock Co., Ltd.
(新疆库车新盛农牧有限责任公司)
8. Xinjiang Urumqi Rui'an Huimin Property Management Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌鲁木齐瑞安惠民物业管理有限责任公司)
9. Xinjiang Aksu Yuanmeng Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆阿克苏圆梦商贸有限责任公司)
10. Xinjiang Hetian Yuhe Clothing Co., Ltd.
(新疆和田玉河服饰有限责任公司)
11. Beijing Xinhui Guoxin Hotel Co., Ltd.
(北京新汇国信商务酒店有限责任公司)
12. Xinjiang Urumqi Rui'an Hongda Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌鲁木齐瑞安宏达商贸有限责任公司)
13. Xinjiang Bayingolin Bosheng Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Co., Ltd.
(新疆巴州博胜农牧有限责任公司)
14. Xinjiang Yutian Ruifeng Agriculture and Livestock Co., Ltd.
(新疆于田瑞丰农牧有限责任公司)
15. Xinjiang Wusu Zhongxin Agricultural Industry and Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌苏众鑫农工贸有限责任公司)
16. Xinjiang Altay Fuhai Agriculture Co., Ltd.
(新疆福海农场有限责任公司)
17. Xinjiang Maralbexi County Kela Keqin Agriculture & Livestock Co., Ltd.
(新疆巴楚县克拉克勤农牧有限责任公司)
18. Xinjiang Urumqi Shunkangda Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌鲁木齐顺康达商贸有限责任公司)
19. Xinjiang Awat County Ka'erdu Agriculture Co., Ltd.
(新疆阿瓦提县卡尔墩农场有限责任公司)
20. Xinjiang Xayar County Tarim Runcheng Agriculture and Livestock Co., Ltd.
(新疆沙雅塔里木润城农牧有限责任公司)

21. Xinjiang Kashigar Yuxin Industry and Trade Co., Ltd.
(新疆喀什育新工贸有限责任公司)

22. Xinjiang Urumqi Shimianlaifu Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌鲁木齐十面来福贸易有限责任公司)

23. Xinjiang Urumqi Beichen Zhongxin Traing Co., Ltd.
(新疆乌鲁木齐北宸众鑫商贸有限责任公司)

24. Xinjiang Changji Xinmao Agricultural Industrial&Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆昌吉鑫茂农工贸有限责任公司)

The chairman of the board of this conglomerate is Fan Jun, the director of the XUAR Prison Administration, which manages over 30 large prisons. Each of the above companies is owned by Rui'an, and most have cotton/textile/garment related business. Some openly market their products online. For example, four of these companies sell their cotton in an online platform called Union Cotton, one of the largest cotton e-commerce sites, with 1,000 suppliers and 3,000 buyers.⁵² One markets its product on an Alibaba platform.⁵³ Additionally, Xinjiang Qixin Garment Co., Ltd. is a large supplier of uniforms.⁵⁴

The photo below shows Xinjiang Changji Xinmao Agricultural Industrial&Trading Co., Ltd. which is located in an old office building of the Changji Prison.



52 Union Cotton. (2018). Kuche Xinsheng Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Co., Ltd. Ginning Factory. Retrieved from <https://www.unioncotton.com/web/factory/details?id=101363>

53 Alibaba Group. (2019). Xinjiang Bazhou Bosheng Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Co., Ltd. Retrieved from <https://www.1688.com/xinyong/n-652826030000274.html>

54 Wang, Tao Guo Feng. (2015, September 2). Closing Ceremony of the 4th Asia-Europe Silk Road Fashion Festival. <http://www.xjdaily.com.cn/xinjiang/002/1265646.shtml>

2. The XUAR Labor Education Correction (Laojiao) Enterprises

The other conglomerate is the Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Corporation (新疆汇通天成实业集团) which was established on June 29, 2009. This is the prison enterprise under the XUAR Education Correction Rehab Administration, formerly known as the Reform-Through-Labor Administration. The legal representative of the company is Guo Chenghao (郭承浩), who is the head of the XUAR Justice Bureau Police Inspectorate. According to Xinjiang government media, Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Corporation is responsible for providing “skill training programs” and “labor tasks positions” for labor camp detainees.⁵⁵

The company is a secondary level state-owned enterprise with 15 subsidiaries. The government media claims that the establishment of the company will “maintain stability in Xinjiang and build a harmonious society. It also marks a solid step in the reform of the labor education system in our district. The Laojiao economy (reform-through-labor 劳教经济) in Xinjiang has grown to enter a new era.”⁵⁶

This government statement, and the use of the term “laojiao economy” itself, proves again that forced labor is a critical component of Xinjiang’s economy. It is important to note that although China said it formally abolished the reform-through-labor system in 2013, many features of that program continue as part of the “Education, Correction and Drug Rehab Administration,” and certainly forced labor continues in these re-named labor camps. Together with professional vocational training schools, we suspect they have forced perhaps tens of thousands of Uyghurs into the system in the name of correction and vocational training to “de-extremify” them. However, we have not been able to gather direct evidence.

Another prison company is Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Co., Ltd.⁵⁷ which was

⁵⁵ This was originally reported by Xinjiang Daily’s reporter Cao Huiquan on July 1, 2009. The article is titled “The Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Corporation Inaugurated.” The Chinese government very recently deleted nearly all info about this company, including this article. However we retrieved the article a couple months ago. Here is the original text: 新疆汇通天成实业集团揭牌 2009-07-01 10:30:00 来源: 新疆日报

天山网讯 (记者曹慧娟报道) 6月29日, 经新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府批准, 担负着为劳教人员提供习艺项目和劳动岗位任务的新疆汇通天成实业集团揭牌成立。

据了解, 新疆汇通天成实业集团公司隶属于自治区劳动教养管理局, 属自治区国有二级企业, 注册资金1亿元, 下属全资子公司资产3亿多元。子公司分布全疆各地、州、市, 现有工农业生产、加工、商贸流通等项目, 是劳教机关充分履行职能, 提高矫治质量, 维护新疆稳定, 构建和谐社会的基础。集团公司的成立, 标志着我区劳教体制改革迈出了坚实的一步, 新疆劳教经济发展驶入了一个新时期。The above report was retrieved from <http://news.163.com/09/0701/10/5D4MR3SM000120GR.html>. However it is no longer available.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Xinjiang Corps Finance Bureau. (2016, June 7). Notice on Issues Related to the Development of Prison Enterprises by the Corps. Retrieved from <http://cwj.xjbt.gov.cn/c/2016-06-07/2451877.shtml>

established in 2009. It belongs to the XUAR Bureau of Reform Through Labor, which later changed its name to the Bureau of Drug Addicts Correction. It has more than 16 subsidiary companies. It claims that its goal is to “provide skill training programs and production tasks for inmates to reform through labor.”⁵⁸ The same report by Xinjiang Daily in 2009 revealed that it is a state-owned level II enterprise of the XUAR with a registered capital of 100 million yuan. The assets of its wholly-owned subsidiaries are more than 300 million yuan. The report boasted that “the establishment of the group company marks a solid step in the reform-through-labor system in our region, and our “reform-through-labor” economy (劳教经济) in Xinjiang has entered a new era.”⁵⁹ In other words, the “reform-through-labor” economy is a critical part of Xinjiang’s economy, and the incorporation of prison business is important for its development.

Huitong Tiancheng has 15 subsidiaries:

1. Fuhai Huitong Tiancheng Fusheng Industrial Co., Ltd.
(福海汇通天成福昕实业有限公司)
2. Aksu Huitong Tiancheng Shenghua Co., Ltd.
(阿克苏汇通天成盛华有限责任公司)
3. Korla Huitong Tiancheng Boxin Trading Co., Ltd. |
(库尔勒汇通天成博鑫商贸有限公司)
4. Urumqi Huitong Tiancheng Run’ an Trading Co., Ltd.
(乌鲁木齐汇通天成润安商贸有限公司)
5. Wusu Huitong Farm
(乌苏汇通农场)
6. Turpan Huitong Tiansheng Trading Co., Ltd.
(吐鲁番汇通天成盛商贸有限公司)
7. Wusu Huitong Tiancheng Fenghua Industrial Co., Ltd.
(乌苏汇通天成丰华实业有限公司)
8. Ili Huitong Tiancheng Tianbao Trading Co., Ltd.
(伊犁汇通天成天宝商贸有限公司)
9. Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Shengda Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆汇通天成盛达商贸有限公司)

58 Cao, Huiquan. (2019, July 1). The Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Corporation Inaugurated. <http://news.163.com/09/0701/10/5D4MR3SM000120GR.html>

59 Ibid.

10. Wusu Huitong Cotton Processing Factory
(乌苏市汇通棉花加工厂)
11. Hami Huitong Tiancheng Fengda Industrial Co., Ltd.
(哈密汇通天成丰达实业有限公司)
12. Xinjiang Huitong Zhonghui Commerce and Trade Co., Ltd.
(新疆汇通中晖商贸有限责任公司)
13. Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Anhua Trading Co., Ltd.
(新疆汇通天成安华商贸有限公司)
14. Kashigar Huitong Brilliant Commerce LLC.
(喀什汇通辉煌商贸有限责任公司)
15. Wusu Huitong Tiancheng Yuhua Industrial Co., Ltd.
(乌苏市汇通天成裕华实业有限公司)

3. The XPCC Prison Enterprises

It is difficult to find public information about the XPCC prison enterprises. However, it is known that forced labor forms the main work force under the XPCC system. In 2018 it planted 2.13 million acres of cotton, an increase of 23.1 percent.⁶⁰ Based on that, we can assume that many of the XPCC's 5,000 companies, if not all, are involved in prison enterprises or use prison labor in its "laojiao economy."

Based on research, we found that there are some Xinjiang prison enterprises whose addresses correspond with prisons. For example, Xinyu Cotton Co., Ltd. of Manas County is located in Manas Xinhui Prison; Shihezi Xin'an Cotton Processing Factory is located in the No. 1 Wing of Shihezi Xin'an Prison; and Xinjiang Fangcaohu Dzungar Cotton Co., Ltd. is located in the No. 3 Wing of Fangcaohu Prison.



⁶⁰ Bingtuan Bureau of Statistics. (2019, March 22). Statistical Bulletin of the National Economic and Social Development of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in 2018. Retrieved from <http://www.xjbt.gov.cn/c/2019-03-22/7228412.shtml>

4. Abnormal Number of Employees

The prison enterprises in Xinjiang (and also in other parts of China) rarely disclose their financial information, and do not disclose the number of the total employees. However, we are able to extrapolate some data based on social insurance filings. Chinese law requires all employees and residents in both urban and rural areas to enroll in its social insurance system. The only exception is that inmates do not pay basic old-age insurance premiums when serving their time in prison, or in re-education through labor camps. There are many prison companies that disclose billions of RMB in revenue, but which have very few employees that are paying into social security insurance. This is very suspicious and seems to indicate that they are prison enterprises that use forced labor since their workforce (the prisoners) would not be required to pay into social security. All the above-mentioned prison enterprises have either none, or very few, employees registered with social insurance.

The image of a chart, on the right, comes from China's enterprise search engine Tianyancha and shows that the Xinjiang Huaxin Rui'an Group has no employees paying social insurance. Xinjiang Lihua (Group) Industry Co., Ltd. has assets of over 8 billion RMB, and profits of 100 million RMB annually but has only 15 employees registered. Wanjia Cotton Co., Ltd. owned by the XPCC 2nd Division, has only 2 employees listed. The No. 2 Cotton Processing Factory of Lihua's subsidiary Xayar Lihua Chuangxin Cotton Co., Ltd. listed no employees paying for social insurance. This is a common feature of all prison companies: huge assets, huge profits, but only very few employees that are paying social insurance, indicating the usage of forced labor.

新疆华新瑞安集团有限公司

2017年度

对外投资信息	暂无
变更记录	暂无
社保信息	20 ^
城镇职工基本养老保险	0人
职工基本医疗保险	0人
生育保险	0人
失业保险	0人
工伤保险	0人
单位缴费基数	
单位参加城镇职工基本养老保险缴费基数	企业选择不公示
单位参加职工基本医疗保险缴费基数	企业选择不公示
单位参加生育保险缴费基数	企业选择不公示
单位参加失业保险缴费基数	企业选择不公示
单位参加工伤保险缴费基数	企业选择不公示

5. Preferential Procurement

In 2016, the XPCC issued an official document titled "XPCC Notice on Support for Prison Enterprises Through Government Procurement," in which it specifically stipulated a preference to buy apparel products from prison factories.⁶¹ It listed 5 XPCC prison enterprises that have priority in government procurement:

61 Xinjiang Corps Finance Bureau. (2016, June 7). Notice on Issues Related to the Development of Prison Enterprises by the Corps. Retrieved from <http://cwj.xjbt.gov.cn/c/2016-06-07/2451877.shtml>

1. Wujiaqu Xinxin Building Materials Factory

Address: Wujiaqu Communist Youth League Farm, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

Business Scope: Garment Processing

Warden: Tian Yinfeng 13029603333

Deputy Warden: Lan Yongming 18194890559

(五家渠新建材厂, 地址:新疆维吾尔自治区五家渠共青团农场, 经营范围:服装加工, 联系人:监狱长:田银峰 13029603333; 副监狱长:兰永明18194890559)

2. Shihezi City First Water Conservancy and Hydropower Engineering Department Garment Factory

Address: Opposite to the Xiangduoli Villa, Shihezi Shinan Road

Business Scope: Garment Processing

Warden: Liao Changxin 18209933456

Deputy Warden: Dong Shuangquan 13999335151

(石河子市第一水利水电工程处服装厂, 地址:石河子石南公路香多里别墅对经营范围:服装加工, 联系人:监狱长:廖长新18209933456, 副监狱长:董双全 13999335151)

3. Shihezi Hengsheng Garment Co., Ltd.

Address: 14th Division, 144th Regiment, 8th Division

Production Range: Garment Processing

Warden: Han Liming 13899529399

Deputy Warden: Li Yong 13519937277

(石河子市恒盛服装有限公司;地址:第八师144团14连; 生产范围:服装加工; 联系人:监狱长:韩黎明 13899529399; 副监狱长:李勇13519937277)

4. Shihezi Xin'an Cotton Processing Factory

Address: 8th Division, 142th Regiment, 8th Division

Business Scope: Garment Processing, Seed Cotton Acquisition, and Processing

Warden: He Zulong 13899501802

Deputy Warden: Qiao Hui 18709932323

(石河子新安棉花加工厂; 地址:第八师142团8连;经营范围:服装加工 籽棉收购加工; 联系人: 监狱长:何祖龙 13899501802; 副监狱长:乔辉 18709932323)

5. Urumqi Xishan Garment Factory
 Address: Xishan Prison, Urumqi
 Business Scope: Garment Processing
 Warden: Liu Shengming 15699230000
 Deputy Warden: Sun Zhengguang 18999160939
 (乌鲁木齐西山服装厂, 地址: 乌鲁木齐西山监狱, 经营范围: 服装加工, 联系人: 监狱长: 刘生铭 15699230000; 副监狱长: 孙正光 18999160939)

While the above XPCC prison garment companies are designated to have priority for government procurement, it is clear that not all XPCC prisons are included. For example, Zhong Jia Zhong Prison is a known major garment processing factory, but it is not listed. Please note that the above mentioned Shihezi Cotton Processing Factory not only process cotton but also manufactures apparel products. We believe that most XPCC's prison enterprises have capacity to provide products in the entire cotton/textile/apparel supply chains.

The XPCC's Cotton & Linen Company handles 75% of its cotton storage and transportation. It has 22 subsidiary companies, 7 cotton processing plants, 1 three-star hotel, 6 railway special lines to its warehouse that can handles 1.50 million ton cotton. It is very likely handle cotton produced by XPCC prison enterprises.

In 2018, the XPCC government disclosed the first group of its cotton processing enterprises with a total number of 108 for targeted cotton price reform. We believe many are prison enterprises or affiliated with prisons. Some directly registered their addresses in the XPCC's prisons. For example, Manas County Xinyu Cotton Co. Ltd. (玛纳斯县鑫裕棉业公司) is located in the Xinhui Prison of Manas County of Changji Prefecture, which is under control of XPCC's 6th Division. Another company, Xinjiang Junggar Cotton & Linen Co., Ltd. (新疆准葛尔棉麻有限公司) is registered at the Third Wing of the Fangcaohu Prison, which is also controlled by the 6th Division.

⁶² For more XPCC's cotton processing factories, see "**Appendix 4: Incomplete List of XPCC Cotton Processing Factories.**"

If we consider that the XPCC has a population of 3 million (equal to about 12 percent of Xinjiang's total population) and the fact that it administers at least 50 prisons and labor camps, then it should have a similar number of prison enterprises. In addition, we note that the names of the facilities are designed to obfuscate the fact that they are prison enterprises.

⁶² XPCC Development&Reform Commission. (2018, September 4). XPCCDRC's Notice on Disclosure of the First Group of Cotton Processing Factories for Targeted Cotton Price Reform. Retrieved from: <http://xinjiang.cotttech.com/btam/version/downloadMainFile2.pdf>

6. Examples of Xinjiang Prison Enterprises

Xinjiang Qixin Garment Co., Ltd.

This company is a prison enterprise under the XUAR Prison Administration. It is now one of the largest garment enterprises in Xinjiang, and each year it produces about 4 million articles of clothing. Uniform design and production is the company's specialty, and it exports goods to neighboring countries. This information was recently taken from the company's own website, but the company has now taken that information down from its website.



But Xinjiang Garment Online does have information about Xinjiang Qixin Garment Factory, on its website. This information was current as of 2011: It describes the company located at No. 1327, Dongzhan Road, New City, Urumqi, Xinjiang;

“It has a factory of about 30,000 square meters, one of the largest state-owned large-scale garment processing enterprises in Xinjiang, with fixed assets of more than 50 million yuan and production capacity is nearly 4 million sets, and the annual revenue is about 80 million yuan. The company boasts its 28 years of garment making history, strong technical force and first-class production equipment.⁶³”

“The company mainly designs and produces all kinds of standard clothing, special clothing, overalls, knitwear, underwear and bedding, etc., with the design and production of various handmade products. The company has a total of eight production plants and an independent cutting branch. The company's operations are divided into two sections: high-end garment production and garment precision manufacture. Three plants make medium and high-end suits; five plants manufacture uniforms. The company has also created many brands that sell domestically and internationally, “Qinxin” brand is one of them.”

“Zong Liang, CEO of the company, born in March 1966, male, Han nationality, member of the Communist Party of China. Mr. Zhang worked various prisons, including Bachu Prison, Changji Prison, and Turpan Prison. Since 2008 he has been the CEO of the Xinjiang Qixin Garment Factory in Xinjiang Women's Prison.⁶⁴”

63 Xinjinag Garment Online. (2011, December 7). Xinjiang Qixin Garment Company. http://www.xjfx.cn/news_view.asp?id=1374&BigClassName=%C6%F3%D2%B5%D6%AE%B4%B0&SmallClassName=%C6%F3

64 Ibid.

“Comrade Zong Liang has more than 20 years of work experience. He has been working hard in manufacturing management for a long time, diligently thinking, and daring to act. Because of his excellent performance, he was promoted to deputy warden of Turpan Prison in 2005 to be responsible for production. Under his leadership, the prison has expanded its cement production and sales, and achieved the status of a large state-owned enterprise with an annual output of 500,000 tons and revenue over 100 million yuan. Once again, this comrade was promoted to the position of CEO of the Xinjiang Women’s Prison. In his position, he led the company’s industrial restructuring and product upgrading. Through technical transformation, the company has the world’s advanced production equipment, production capacity of 1.4 million sets.”⁶⁵

Since the information was written in 2011, we can assume that company production has perhaps increased 3 to 4 times.

Xinjiang Xayar Prison Cotton Enterprise

Xinjiang Xayar Prison is located in Xayar County, Aksu District, Southern Xinjiang, which is about 1,130 kilometers away from Urumqi.

Xayar Prison is also a major cotton producer that uses prison labor. The prison guards are nicknamed the “cotton police.”⁶⁶

In 1965, more than 10 squadrons of prisoners began to reclaim the desert to build cotton fields, and more than 100,000 acres of land has been cultivated for cotton planting.⁶⁷

This prison jails political prisoners as well as Uyghurs. The majority of the inmates come from Guangdong province. Gao Zhicheng, a well-known human rights defense lawyer was jailed there for several years. Another




⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Xinjiang Prison Discipline Inspection and Supervision. (2018, October 16). The Cotton Police. Retrieved from <https://kknews.cc/essay/2b3qzlz.html>

⁶⁷ Xinjiang Prison Discipline Inspection and Supervision. (2019, January 15). After 55 years of desert reclamation efforts , Poplar Trees flourish near the Shaya Prison. Retrieved from <https://kknews.cc/zh-cn/history/6qr8nlm.html>

activist, Zhang Haitao, who published online articles critical of the government, was sentenced to 19 years in prison by the XUAR court for “inciting subversion of state power” and committing a “crime for spying and providing illegal information.” Mr. Zhang is currently serving his sentence at the Xayar Prison.

As early as 1982, the prison had set up a cotton processing factory.



Xinjiang Western Yinli Cotton Industry (Group) Co., Ltd.

This company is located in Shihezi, and is one of the primary companies that handle the XPCC cotton business. The group was formed by absorbing more than 43 cotton processing enterprises in the XPCC. This is one of largest cotton companies in Xinjiang and it sells the Yinli brand cotton domestically and internationally. It processes about 6 million “dan” of cotton with annual sales of more than 4 billion yuan. The Group boasts to have advanced high value instrument (HVI) testing equipment, and there are two dedicated railway lines directly to the warehouse. There are 180,000 square meters of warehouses, with 100 cargo spaces and more than 50-car shipping capacity per day. The company is named one of the “Top 30 Enterprises in China’s Cotton Industry.” The group has more than 10 control (shared) companies including Yinli Testing Company, Yinli Industrial Investment Guarantee Company, Yinli Machinery Cotton Picking Co., Tianyin Logistics Company, and Yinli Import and Export Trading Company. But Tianyancha shows the company has only 110 employees with social insurance. The Group official website no longer works and information about the group is scarce. Therefore we suspect that the Group has prison cotton processing components, such as Shihezhi Xinan Cotton Processing Company, which is an already known prison enterprise.

Xinjiang Lihua Group

According to its website, Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Co., Ltd. is China’s largest cotton enterprise and the only national key agricultural industrialization leading enterprise. It was established in 2004. The conglomerate has 23 companies in Xinjiang, Shanghai, Hong Kong, the United States, Tajikistan and other countries. With 1.5 million Chinese mu (250,000 acres) of cotton planting

base, 55 cotton processing plants, a cotton textile factory, and a rice processing plant and two oil processing plants. It has partnered with over 30 domestic and international companies.⁶⁸

Our research indicates that Lihua Group is likely a prison enterprise in disguise. Xayar Lihua Innovation Cotton Co., Ltd. has a processing plant located in Xayar Prison (above photo), namely the Xayar County Lihua No. 2 Cotton Processing Plant. The processing factory used to be named the Xayar County Lihua Innovation Cotton Co., Ltd., but was renamed in August 2018. Along with the name change, the number of people participating in social security at the company changed from 0 to 10.

Anhui Huamao Textile Company Limited is a large Chinese company principally engaged in dyeing, processing, manufacturing, and distributing textile products. The company operates its businesses mainly through the dyeing and processing of pure and mixed yarns of cotton, wool, linen, silk, and synthetic fiber, as well as fabric, knitted products, and apparel. The company's main products include yarn, dyed yarn, fabric, and industrial cloth. The company distributes its products in the domestic market as well as in overseas markets.

By analyzing its holding companies through its annual financial statements, we have found that in paper Huamao is the controlling company of Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Co., Ltd., but in reality it is owned by the XPCC. The ownership of Lihua is complicated, with the controlling shares (65%) owned by Huamao, and the remaining shares owned by the Second Division of the XPCC. Huamao does not fully disclose its share ownership as required by Chinese law. Lihua in turn owns 100 percent of Wanjia Cotton Industry Co., Ltd., which is wholly-owned by the XPCC's Second Division.

Wanjia Cotton Co., Ltd. only has two people who pay social insurance, and other production workers are prison laborers. They are not required to pay social insurance. There are four prisons under the Second Division of the Corps: Uruk Prison, Korla Prison, Milan Prison, and Qiemo Prison, which provide forced labor for Xinjiang Lihua. The second division controls four major cotton production hubs: Yanqi, Korla, Tarim, and Ruoyi. The Tarim Basin is the largest major cotton production hub where the Uruk Prison is located.

On April 17, 2019, the number of employees registered at Lihua abruptly rose from 15 to 150. According to this statistic, the company had previously used only 15 employees to support and generate 8 billion RMB in assets and 100 million RMB in profits. This absurd disparity in personnel indicates that forced labor is used and raises the question of just how many inmates are forced to work under the company.

Xinjiang Lihua has been actively participated in “reeducation camps” and “vocational schools”

68 Official website of Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Co. Ltd., Retrieved from: <http://www.lihuacotton.com/content/about.aspx>

programs. It boast that the company places 8000 new Uighur worker annually in the cotton/textile/apparel industry.⁶⁹ Many of the 8000 are forced to work against their will.

⁶⁹ ibid.

IV. How Forced Labor Products Enter Global Supply Chains

Xinjiang provides its cotton textile products to Chinese factories in the interior of China, as well as Global market. For example, XPCC Cotton & Linen Company has a supply network that can reach every area that uses cotton/textile products. Xinjiang uses many channels, including online platform, to supply cotton products internationally.

Since Xinjiang supplies nearly 84 percent of China's cotton, it is hard to imagine that any cotton/textile/garment products from China are not tainted with forced labor. Even allowing for the fact that some of the cotton produced by the XPCC was not directly planted by forced labor, the majority of the cotton fields used by the XPCC for cotton production have been reclaimed by forced labor.

According to Xinjiang government data, newly created textile/apparel enterprises now number 2,143, and they employ 450,000 workers as end of 2017. About 616 large textile and apparel enterprises from coastal provinces moved into Xinjiang.⁷⁰ Our research leads us to conclude that many of these workers are likely to be extrajudicial forced laborers because it is the government policy to put "reeducation camp" inmates, and the relatives of those who are jailed and detained to work in the industry.

As mentioned previously, each prison in Xinjiang and China has at least one prison enterprise that manages its production and sales to the outside world. There are several ways prison enterprise products enter international commerce:

1. Direct Sales

Raw materials such as cotton, cotton yarn, and clothes produced by prison labor are sold through e-commerce in both domestic and international markets. For example, many Xinjiang prison enterprises sell their cotton through the Unioncotton e-commerce platform. Their warehouses are scattered all over China. Below, a screenshot shows the Cotton Processing Factory of the XPCC 2nd Division Fangcaohu Prison selling its cotton online. The image also shows that the company has many cotton warehouses in multiple provinces, allowing its forced labor products to enter into the export supply chain. Strictly speaking, all cotton/textile/garment products from China are

70 Jia, Zhao. (2019, July 15). Suggestions on the development of Xinjiang textile and garment industry. Retrieved from: <http://xjyj.xjdrc.gov.cn/info/1021/5450.htm>

tainted with forced labor products since Xinjiang supplies nearly 84% of China's cotton. Even though some of the cotton produced by the XPCC was not directly planted by forced labor, the majority of the cotton fields used by the XPCC for cotton production have been reclaimed by forced labor.



66165131006									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 淡黄染棉1级	长度: 28.5	强力: 28.3	马值: 4.4	含杂率: 1.2%	回潮率: 7.2%	公重: 42.673吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 山东鄞城三江物流有限公司 (北库区)					
66165131025									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 黄染棉1级	长度: 28.2	强力: 26.6	马值: 3.9	含杂率: 1.3%	回潮率: 8.4%	公重: 42.364吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 菏泽鑫海粮食购销有限公司					
66165131039									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 淡黄染棉3级	长度: 27.8	强力: 28.1	马值: 4.0	含杂率: 2.3%	回潮率: 7.4%	公重: 41.849吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 山东鄞城三江物流有限公司					
66165131049									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 黄染棉1级	长度: 28.5	强力: 27.0	马值: 3.9	含杂率: 2.4%	回潮率: 8.7%	公重: 41.816吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 安阳市首发棉业有限公司					
66165131017									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 黄染棉1级	长度: 28.0	强力: 27.0	马值: 4.0	含杂率: 1.4%	回潮率: 9.1%	公重: 43.155吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 菏泽鑫海粮食购销有限公司					
66165131031									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 淡黄染棉2级	长度: 28.4	强力: 26.1	马值: 3.8	含杂率: 2.2%	回潮率: 8.1%	公重: 42.335吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 山东鄞城三江物流有限公司 (北库区)					
66165131002									
锯齿手拷棉	颜色级: 淡黄染棉1级	长度: 28.3	强力: 28.1	马值: 4.3	含杂率: 1.3%	回潮率: 8.9%	公重: 42.428吨		
加工企业: 新疆生产建设兵团农业建设第六师芳草湖农场监狱轧花厂				仓库: 山东鄞城三江物流有限公司 (北库区)					

2. Third-Party Sales

Prison enterprises can take OEM orders directly, or solicit orders from third-party exporters or suppliers, or hire a third-party import-export company to manage their OEM orders. They usually do not directly contact foreign apparel and footwear companies that they supply.. One of these third-party companies advertised online with the eye-catching title of “Prison Garment OEM: How we work, and What are the advantages?” in which it summarizes five key advantages of using products produced by forced labor: “1. The cost is very low as prisoners do not need to be paid wages, and they only earn ‘points’ through their labor. The only cost is derived from a portion of the labor service processing fee; 2. [Prison] workers are much easier to manage than those in regular factories as the management is excellent, and utilizes a fully militarized management system; 3. The quality of our products can be guaranteed as the prisoners in the sewing line are skilled workers with several years of training; 4. Supply is stable as our workers have to stay for years and even for a lifetime in prison, unlike regular factories where workers are free to come and go; 5. Delivery is guaranteed as we are a contracted prison enterprise. Through the agreement, we can guarantee smooth and timely delivery. If you are interested, you can contact us via phone or WeChat:”⁷¹

The advertiser even attached an image of how diligent their workers are:



⁷¹ Sohu. (2017, October 16). Prisons Garment OEM: how we work, and what are the advantages? Retrieved from http://www.sohu.com/a/198252502_99919813

Below is another advertisement from a prison factory advertising that “this prison has been in garment production for years,” and that it looks for partners that can contract and manage the entire prison factory. It claims that the prison has been engaged in a variety of sewing products for many years and has more than 150 very skilled workers and is now recruiting processing partners or contractors from the public, requiring honest and trustworthy suppliers. It lists its advantages as a “guarantee of product quality, a guarantee of low cost, and fast delivery!”⁷² A picture of the prison factory is included to advertise its ideal facility and prison workforce:

本监狱长期从事多种缝纫制品多年18767901997

发表时间：2018-05-30 17:15:50 来源：义乌160加工网 浏览：5895次

监狱招合作商

本监狱长期从事多种缝纫制品多年，现面向社会招聘来料加工合作商或承包商，要求诚实守信 货源稳定。我们的优势：产品质量有保证、费用低、出货快！

现有：

熟练劳工150多名。

手工30名。

电脑花样机10台。

电脑平车50台。

电脑同步车100台。

吸风烫台10组。

生产车间设施和设备完善。

欢迎有稳定货源的加工厂或来料加工企业来电咨询！

联系电话：187 6790 1997 杨（咨询时段：早8点——下午17点）



⁷² Yiwu 160 Processing Network. (2018, May 30). The Prison Experienced with Sewing Products for Many Years. Retrieved from <https://www.yw160.com/news-id-1160.html>

While the above example is not directly related to forced labor in the Xinjiang region, it represents a common practice of Chinese prison enterprises.

Another example of this type of middleman between international markets and the Chinese prison enterprises is Hangzhou Z-shine Industrial Co., Ltd. For years the company has been taking OEM apparel orders and sending them to its contracted Chinese prison factories for processing and production, and then exporting the orders internationally. It has signed up 38 prisons with over 40,000 “apparel-processing inmates”, with a total production area of 100,000 square meters, according to the company’s advertisement retrieved by an investigative report by World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG).⁷³

The company’s contracted prison garment factories are operated within the prison systems in cities such as Hangzhou, Jinhua, Quzhou, Huzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Nanjing, Nantong, Zhuzhou, Yueyang, among others. Because of the low cost of forced laborers, the company boasts very competitive processing fees. Products are mainly exported to Africa, Asia, Central and South America, Eastern Europe and the CIS, the Middle East, North America, Oceania and Western Europe.⁷⁴

Many major western brands rely on the company to supply their products. For example, the company supplies children garment products to Disney, including items with Mickey Mouse, Winnie the Pooh, and Disney Princesses, Teletubbies, and characters from Looney Tunes.⁷⁵

The company markets towards business owners looking to expand, and promotes working with the prison system as both cost effective and reliable: “Dear business owners, if you have the ability and the channels to receive large orders, how will you handle them? You may hesitate to take these orders, due to the size of your factory and the number of employees you have. You are afraid of being unable to fulfill the orders, but you are also afraid of wasting the opportunity. What can you do? You can consider working with the prison system’s garment factories and assign the large orders to us. We will be able to complete your orders with low processing fees, high quality products and high efficiency! Our company relies on prisons for processing products, and we are able to be responsible for the production of your orders.”

The company additionally lists the advantages of the prison system’s clothing processing factories:

1. High credibility: state-owned work units with a hardworking attitude;

⁷³ World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong. (2018, April 3). Investigative Report on the Falun Dafa Practitioners’ Coerced Production of Forced Labor Products in the Chinese Communist Party’s Prisons and Labor Camps. Retrieved from <http://www.upholdjustice.org/node/393>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

2. Relatively low processing fees: due to the special system, the prices would be more competitive;

3. Quality stability: with ISO 9001:2000 quality management system certification, ERP control for the entire process, and the production is organized in strict accordance with the contracts;

4. Timely delivery: with 38 prisons and more than 40,000 processing workers, we are especially suitable for urgent and/or large orders.

The prison system's garment processing factories are unconventional, but compared with other manufacturers, we have great advantages: 1.) There are over 40,000 absolutely stable workers, and all of them have received specialized technical training; the factories implement the militarization management; there is advanced equipment, including automatic flatcars, button sewing machines, electric scissors and electric steaming machines. 2.) Since specialized technical training is provided to the workers, we can undertake the processing of down jackets, cotton-padded clothes and other outdoor sportswear.”⁷⁶

Since the release of the WOIPFG's report, Hangzhou Z-shine Industrial Co., Ltd. has deleted its websites and cleaned up its advertisements. But we have found its business permit was renewed in March 2019 and from its employees' review posts we can see that the company is still in operation today.

3. Middleman Services

Major companies like Xinjiang Tianshan Wool Tex Stock Co., Ltd. serve as the middleman between prison enterprises and outside world. Xinjiang Tianshan WoolTex Stock Co., Ltd. is a Chinese textile manufacturer. The Company is principally engaged in the manufacture and sale of cashmere yarns, cashmere sweaters, woolen sweaters, and blended sweaters. In the domestic market, the company primarily markets its products in northwestern, northeastern, northern and eastern China. The company also exports its cashmere yarns and cashmere sweaters to the United States, Europe and Japan. As of December 31, 2010, the Company had seven subsidiaries, mainly producing and distributing woolen sweaters and cashmere sweaters. It also is involved in the feeding, breeding, improving and sale of livestock; the research, development and manufacturing of clothes; the wholesale and retail of agricultural products, machinery, electronic equipment, and light industrial products.

This company is rated as the “best performance enterprise” in the country by the State Council Enterprise Evaluation Center, is listed in the top ten in the textile industry, and the first in the textile industry in Xinjiang.

76 Ibid.

Xinjiang Tianshan Woolltex Stock Co., Ltd. is one of the first joint venture enterprises in China established after the regulations concerning Sino-foreign joint venture enterprises were published. Tianshan Woolltex is a joint venture wool-textile enterprise, with joint venture capital from four companies, namely Urumqi Woolen Textile Co., Hong Kong Tianshan Woolen Textile Co., Ltd. (Which consists of Hong Kong Peninsula Knitting Co., Ltd., Dongyang (Japan) Spinning Industry Co., Ltd.), Hong Kong International Cotton Industry Co., Ltd. and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Supply and Market Cooperative.

Since 1990, Tianshan Woolltex has done business with various labor camps and prisons in Xinjiang in order to exploit the detainees' labor. They did so to lower costs and improve its ability to gain more of an international market share. Currently, the Wulabo Labor Camp, Xinjiang Women's Labor Camp, Changji Labor Camp, No. 3 Prison of Xinjiang Province and No. 5 Prison of Xinjiang Province all have workshops owned by Tianshan Woolltex on their land. The detainees at the above-mentioned locations are forced to work for Tianshan Woolltex and mass produce several types of cashmere sweaters.

4. Outside Investments Hide Ownership

External investment from non-prison enterprises help to hide ownership and add complexity to the prison enterprise structure to cover up forced labor. For example, Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Industry Co., Ltd. is in fact an XPCC 6th Division enterprise, located in Fangcaohu Prison. It mainly engages in cotton planting, processing, and textile production. It is also the largest enterprise in the domestic cotton industry and the only national key agricultural-industrial leading enterprise. The Xinjiang Zhongtai (Group) Co., Ltd., the largest state-owned enterprise in the autonomous region, and Anhui Huamao Textile Co., Ltd., a domestic listed company in China, are listed as the two major shareholders of the company.

However, our research shows that this is merely a false front. In April 2009, the company was renamed Xinjiang Lihua (Group) Co., Ltd. According to company data, Anhui Huamao owns controlling shares, accounting for 65 percent of the total equity. But this is inconsistent with the "shareholding" and unconsolidated statements publicly disclosed by Huamao. The reason is that the company is ostensibly Huamao Holdings, which is essentially owned by the XPCC Prison Administration. It appears Huamao has evaded the China's information disclosure rules, a clear violation. Instead, Huamao named "Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Industry Co., Ltd." is a joint venture. The company now controls 23 companies, including one company in the United States. Similar arrangements are made by other prison enterprises in Xinjiang.

Since the three textile industry cities – Aksu, Shihezi, and Korla are all under direct control of the XPCC, prison enterprises have changed their names to function like normal producers and trading companies.

5. Indirect or Direct Sourcing by Western Brands

Based on our research, we believe many U.S. companies and other international companies both knowingly and unknowingly source cheap cotton, textile, and garment products from both the Xinjiang region and throughout China.

Badger Sportswear

Badger Sportswear, an athletic apparel company headquartered in Statesville, North Carolina, has been found to have commercial links with Hetian Taida Apparel, a Chinese company which sources clothes made in internment camps in the Xinjiang region of China. Inside the internment camp, men and women are locked up in a compound

surrounded by barbed wire and hundreds of surveillance cameras. The massive compound, located in Xinjiang, has more than 30 dormitories, schools, warehouses and workshops. Dozens of armed officers and growling dogs stand guard outside. Behind these locked gates, men and women sew sportswear that eventually end up in the U.S., and on U.S. college campuses and sports teams. In January 2019, Badger Sportswear dropped its Chinese supplier over concerns that it was sourcing from a forced labor camp and has announced that it has terminated its relationship with the Xinjiang based Heitan Taida.⁷⁷



According to a report by Bitter Winter, their source with firsthand knowledge of the situation in China, estimated that more than 10,000 detainees are working in factories, with some detainees earning just a tenth of what they used to earn outside of prison. The source also claims that at a minimum of 10 times that year, shipping containers filled with thousands of men's, women's, and youth's polyester knitted t-shirts and pants were sent out to Badger Sportswear.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, & Yanan Wang, (2018, December 19). US sportswear traced to factory in China's internment camps, Associated Press. Retrieved from: <https://www.apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb>

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Esquel Group

The Hong Kong-based Esquel Group, supplier to many U.S. and European brands may be another company that uses forced labor. Founded in 1978, the Esquel Group is a global textile and apparel manufacturer with a vertically-integrated supply chain that straddles from cotton to retailing. As one of the world's largest producers of cotton shirts for global brands, Esquel Group manufactures over 100 million pieces of garments annually for leading brands including popular brands, such as Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger and Nike.

Esquel employs a 58,000-person multinational workforce, with manufacturing facilities in China, Malaysia, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, as well as merchandising offices servicing markets worldwide. Esquel manages 15 factories in 6 countries, producing high quality cotton woven and knit shirts. In 2017, Esquel Group earned \$1.3 billion from its business, with 41 percent coming from the US.

In the 1990s, Esquel set up several joint-ventures in Xinjiang. One of them was with the XPCC. The joint venture took 100,000 Chinese acres of XPCC land (equivalent of 17,000 acres) to grow long-fiber cotton in Turpan and Kashgar.⁷⁹ These cotton fields are likely developed by forced labor since both locations have two large-scale prisons. Esquel Group also has other joint-ventures with the XPCC.



The previously mentioned Hangzhou Z-shine Trading Co., or Z-shine Industry Group also uses prison enterprises to make products for Western brands such as Disney, as it advertises. Huaifu Fashion, a partner of Xinjiang prison enterprise Lihua Group, also utilizes prison enterprises to supply for international brands.

The New York Times reported that Adidas AG, Hennes & Mauritz AB, Kraft Heinz Co., Coca-Cola Co., and Gap Inc. are among brands whose supply chains are linked to Xinjiang forced labor.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ ChuanKuzideyuan. (2009, February 1). The world dominated by women - the most powerful Chinese woman; Esquel · Yang Minde: Control Power is big guts and big mind. Retrieved from <http://www.zhlzw.com/lzsj/jd/88864.html>

⁸⁰ Dou, Eva and Chao Deng. (2019, May 16). Western Companies Get Tangled in China's

Lutai Textile Company

Lutai Textile is another Xinjiang-based supplier that is linked to Burberry, Calvin Klein, HUGO BOSS, Armani, Gucci, OLYMP, UNIQLO and other international brands. Lutai produces over 30 million shirts a year. 70 percent of its products are sold to more than 30 countries such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan.⁸¹

Both Lutai Textile and Huaifu Fashion actively participate in the Chinese government's textile/apparel "job creation" program. For example, China's official Xinhua News Agency praised Lutai as a leader in elevating Uighurs out of poverty in southern Xinjiang. In an interview explaining why his company helped local farmers to rapidly transform into textile industrial workers through vocational pre-job training, Lutai's executive Li Keyin said that, "Our company is a labor-intensive enterprise. On the one hand, we depend on long fiber cotton in Awati County. On the other hand, there is a large surplus of labor in the local rural areas that can meet the needs of our company." Lutai has added many of these "surplus laborers" into its workforce.⁸²

Lutai Textiles is located in the Aksu Prefecture of Xinjiang. The director of the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Aksu Prefecture, Nurdong Yibula, told a reporter that since 2018 his bureau has coordinated the participation of more than 10,000 people in the "concentrated" training of workers in the textile and garment industry to promote the transformation of rural surplus labor to industrial workers. In 2018, Aksu's textile and garment enterprises added 20,000 new jobs, including more than 4,400 from impoverished households. He failed to elaborate where the other new workers came from, but we assume that they are forced laborers from the reeducation camps.

83

6. Other Unfair Trade Practices

Beyond the severe human rights issues raised by China's massive prison labor system, China also uses other means to provide preference to its local companies and distort international trade. The Chinese government provides many subsidies to support the expansion of Xinjiang's cotton/textile/apparel industry which are against WTO rules when the subsidized products enter into

Muslim Clampdown, WSJ. Retrieved from:
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-companies-get-tangled-in-chinas-muslim-clamp-down-11558017472>

81 Lutai Textile Company, About US. Retrieved from: <http://www.ltc.com.cn/stepin/>

82 Shang, Sheng. (2018, November 28). Lutai Textile Company: the "leading geese" that drive the people of southern Xinjiang out of poverty. Retrieved from: [Http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-11/28/c_1123779801.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-11/28/c_1123779801.htm)

83 *ibid.*

international market. These subsidies include:

Freight subsidy: Because Xinjiang is geographically remote from the main commerce routes in China, transportation costs could make cotton/textile/apparel products less competitive. One example of a related transportation subsidy is the provision of an 800 yuan/ton freight subsidy for yarn that is 32S and above.

Loan interest subsidy: One example of a loan interest subsidy is the provision of a 1.5% discount on fixed assets loans for enterprise textile projects, and a 3.5% discount rate for a productive liquid capital loan, etc.

Electricity subsidy: The benchmark price is 0.38 yuan/kWh, and the subsidy difference is 0.03 yuan/kWh.

Pre-job training subsidies: XUAR enterprises are given a one-time subsidy of 2,400 yuan per person for new workers in textile/apparel industry.

Social insurance subsidies: Newly recruited Xinjiang employees in the textile sector are subsidized by 50 percent of the sum of social insurance fees paid by the company. New workers in apparel industry get a full subsidy.

Domestic and foreign price difference subsidies: If the price difference between imported cotton and Xinjiang cotton exceeds 1,500 yuan/ton or more, then a 800 yuan per ton subsidy is provided.

VAT refund subsidy: The XUAR uses the VAT income paid by textile and garment enterprises to support the development of Xinjiang textile and garment enterprises.⁸⁴

For example, Xinjiang Lihua received tens of millions yuan in subsidies from the government as shown in the company's financial statement. In 2014, it received transportation subsidy of 12 million RMB, 5 million RMB for utility subsidy, and 2.5 RMB for equipment subsidy.

84 Hundun Tiancheng Research Institute. (2019, June 5). Cotton Research Series 2: The Xinjiang Textile and Garment Industry Development and Enterprise Current Status . Retrieved from: <https://www.chaosqh.com/Item/51494.aspx>

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

The International Labor Organization adopted the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which requires member countries to eliminate “all forms of forced or compulsory labor.” As an ILO member, China has instead greatly expanded its forced labor production in prisons and labor camps and mandates labor in these prisons in contravention of ILO standards on the use of prison labor. China’s use of forced labor is not only morally evil, it also violates the laws and norms of the countries who are buying these products.

The export of products made with forced labor into the U.S. violates existing law and internationally-recognized labor rights standards. In addition, companies sourcing raw materials or textiles from Xinjiang are also implicated in the horrific human rights abuses perpetrated on the Uighur people by the Chinese Government.

As China continues to shift its textile and garment industry from the coastal areas to Xinjiang, and Xinjiang implements this strategy to both stabilize the regime and contribute to so-called its anti-terrorism and religious “de-extremification” campaigns by forced labor, it will be even more difficult to distinguish products produced with forced labor from the products produced without the stain of forced labor or severe human rights abuse.

Despite China’s effort to hide information, there is clear and convincing evidence to show that cotton, textiles, and garments made in the XUAR are tainted by systematic use of forced labor throughout Xinjiang. This forced labor is part of China’s long-standing policy and practice around prison labor, as well as part of its new strategy to force millions of Uighurs into internment camps, or receive so-called vocational training, and then force them to work in the cotton, textile, and garment sector.

Recommendations for the U.S. Government:

1. Ban the importation of cotton, and textiles or garments originating from the XUAR, unless the exporters can provide evidence from independent reputable organizations to verify that the product was not manufactured, in whole or in part, by forced labor.
2. Establish a strong and effective interagency mechanism to investigate forced labor in the XUAR. Strictly enforce existing law and stop forced labor products from entering into the United States.
3. Pass legislation to require companies to become more transparent about their suppliers and to publicly disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission and elsewhere the risk

of forced labor in their supply chain, and whether they have taken measures to identify and address forced labor from Xinjiang and China in specifically.

4. Vigorously enforce international trade standards to address China's unequal subsidies to Xinjiang industries that help fuel the use of forced labor in that region.

Recommendations for all companies sourcing from China (both raw materials and finished goods):

1. Companies should recognize the very high risk of forced labor in the supply chain when sourcing from the XUAR.
2. Companies should suspend all orders of goods originating from the XUAR until a thorough audit of the supply chain is conducted and cleared of forced labor products in whole or in part.
3. Companies should closely review their due diligence practices and adjust their supply chain policies and practices for sourcing from China with a clear understanding of China's forced labor policy and practice.
4. Certification issuing organizations must do a better job in their due diligence work and hire those who have a working knowledge about forced labor in China.
5. Companies should formulate more stringent human rights standards, and more stringent due diligence requirements when sourcing goods in the XUAR to ensure compliance with existing law on the import of goods made from forced labor.
6. Companies should be transparent about their suppliers, including any third-party suppliers in the XUAR, to allow labor and human rights NGOs and law enforcement agencies to monitor and verify their compliance with the law to ensure no forced labor goods are in their supply chains.
7. Companies should express their concern to the Chinese Government about the severe human rights abuses perpetrated on workers in their supply chain and encourage the Chinese Government to abandon these practices.
8. Companies should consider pulling their entire supply chain out of the XUAR if China refuses to change its forced labor policy and practice.

Appendix 1: Incomplete List of XPCC-administered Prisons

1. XPCC - 1st Division Aral Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师阿拉尔监狱)
2. XPCC - 1st Division Huaqiao Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师花桥监狱)
3. XPCC - 1st Division Nankou Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师南口监狱)
4. XPCC - 1st Division Xing Fu Cheng (Happy City) Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师幸福城监狱)
5. XPCC - 1st Division Xinkai Ling Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师新开岭监狱)
6. XPCC - 1st Division Shahe Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师沙河监狱)
7. XPCC - 1st Division Tamen Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师塔门监狱)
8. XPCC - 1st Division Kokkule Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农一师科克库勒监狱)
9. XPCC - 2nd Division Uruk Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农二师乌鲁克监狱)
10. XPCC - 2nd Division Korla Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农二师库尔勒监狱)
11. XPCC - 2nd Division Milan Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农二师米兰监狱)
12. XPCC - 2nd Division Qiemo Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农二师且末监狱)
13. XPCC - 3rd Division Qigaimaidan Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农三师其盖麦旦监狱)
14. XPCC - 3rd Division Piqiakesongdi Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农三师皮恰克松地监狱)

15. XPCC - 3rd Division Tumxuk Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农三师图木舒克监狱)
16. XPCC - 3rd Division Gaimilike Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农三师盖米里克监狱)
17. XPCC - 3rd Division Jindun Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农三师金墩监狱)
18. XPCC - 6th Division Fangcaohu Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农六师芳草湖监狱)
19. XPCC - 6th Division Wujiagu Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农六师五家渠监狱)
20. XPCC - 6th Division Xinhui Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农六师新湖监狱)
21. XPCC - 7th Division Kuitun Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农七师奎屯监狱)
22. XPCC-7th Division Gaoquan Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农七师高泉监狱)
23. XPCC - 8th Division Shihezi Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农八师石河子监狱)
24. XPCC - 8th Division Beiye Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农八师北野监狱)
25. XPCC - 8th Division Xin' an Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农八师新安监狱)
26. XPCC - 8th Division Zhongjia Zhuan Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农八师钟家庄监狱)
27. XPCC - 12th Division Xishan Prison
(新疆生产建设兵团农十二师西山监狱)
28. XPCC - Shihezi Laojiao Education/Correction Center
(新疆生产建设兵团石河子劳动教养管理所)
29. XPCC - Jin Yinchuan Laojiao Education/Correction Center
(新疆生产建设兵团金银川劳教所)
30. XPCC - Women' s Laojiao Education/Correction Center
(新疆生产建设兵团女子劳动教养管理所)

31. XPCC - Laojiao Education/Correction Center in Public Security Ankang Hospital
(新疆生产建设兵团强制隔离戒毒所(设于新疆生产建设兵团公安安康医院))
32. XPCC - Laojiao Education/Correction Center in Public Security Shihezi Oasis Hospital
(新疆生产建设兵团强制隔离戒毒所(设于石河子绿洲医院))

Appendix 2: Incomplete List of XUAR Prisons

1. Xinjiang Women' s Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区女子监狱)
2. Xinjiang No. 1 Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区第一监狱)
3. Xinjiang No. 2Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区第二监狱)
4. Xinjiang No. 3 Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区第三监狱)
5. Xinjiang No. 4 Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区第四监狱)
6. Xinjiang No. 5 Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区第五监狱)
7. Xinjiang New Prisoner Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区新收犯监狱)
8. Xinjiang Changji Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区昌吉监狱)
9. Xinjiang Wusu Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区乌苏监狱)
10. Xinjiang Fuhai Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区福海监狱)
11. Xinjiang Xinyuan Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区鑫源监狱)
12. Xinjiang Turpan Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区吐鲁番监狱)
13. Xinjiang Bayin Guoyu Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区巴音郭楞监狱)
14. Xinjiang Kuche Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区库车监狱)

15. Xinjiang Shaya Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区沙雅监狱)
16. Xinjiang Aksu Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区阿克苏监狱)
17. Xinjiang Kashgar Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区喀什监狱)
18. Xinjiang Xinyuan Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区新源监狱)
19. Xinjiang Buchu Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区巴楚监狱)
20. Xinjiang Kashgar Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区喀什监狱)
21. Xinjiang Urumqi Juvenile Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐未成年犯管教所)
22. Xinjiang Hetian Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区和田监狱)
23. Xinjiang Yutian Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区于田监狱)
24. Xinjiang Donggebi Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区东戈壁监狱)
25. Xinjiang Urumqi Juvenile Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐未成年犯管教所)
26. Xinjiang Ili Juvenile Prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区伊犁未成年犯管教所)
27. Xinjiang Kashga Juvenile prison
(新疆维吾尔自治区喀什未成年犯管教所)


Appendix 3: Incomplete List of XUAR LaborCamps/Education/Correction/Rehab Prisons

1. Xinjiang Urumqi No. 1 Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(乌鲁木齐第一教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
2. Xinjiang No. 2 Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(乌鲁木齐第二教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
3. Xinjiang Urumqi No. 3 Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(乌鲁木齐第三教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
4. Xinjiang Urumqi No. 4 Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(乌鲁木齐第四教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
5. Xinjiang Changji Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(昌吉教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
6. Xinjiang Tacheng Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(塔城教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
7. Xinjiang Karamay Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(克拉玛依教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
8. Xinjiang Turpan Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(吐鲁番教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
9. Xinjiang Aksu Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(阿克苏教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
10. Xinjiang Korale Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(库尔勒教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
11. Xinjiang Bortala Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(博尔塔拉教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)
12. Xinjiang Ili Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(伊宁强制隔离戒毒所)
13. Xinjiang Altay Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(阿尔泰教育矫治局/强制隔离戒毒所)

14. Xinjiang Hami Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(哈密强制隔离戒毒所)

15. Xinjiang Kashgar Education/Correction/Rehab Center
(喀什强制隔离戒毒所)

Appendix 4: Incomplete List of XPCC Cotton Processing Factories



三、各师（市）要积极做好棉花加工企业的管理服务工作，督促棉花加工企业在籽棉收购点明显位置张贴本区域棉花加工企业公示名单，并安装与棉花目标价格改革信息平台相匹配的软件，确保终端、网络等硬件设施完好、畅通。

四、棉花实际种植者和棉花加工企业可在棉花目标价格改革加工企业公示系统（登录 <http://xinjiang.cottech.com/btam/>），对公示企业信息进行查询。

任何单位和个人均可对棉花加工企业公示工作中的违纪、违规行为进行举报。兵团发展改革委负责对举报事项进行受理、调查、核实。举报电话：0991-2896273（传真）电子邮箱：
btfgwjgc@xjbt.gov.cn

附件：2018 年度兵团第一批棉花目标价格改革加工企业
公示名单（103 家）

兵团发展和改革委员会
2018 年 9 月 4 日



2018年度兵团第一批棉花目标价格改革加工企业公示名单（103家）

序号	所属地区	企业名称	统一社会信用代码	加工厂地址	企业联系电话	备注
1	第一师（15家）	阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781F036W	新疆阿拉尔市十四团连队	66020	
2		新疆重治棉业有限公司	91659002MA77N6GJ5N	新疆阿拉尔市科克库勒镇	66039	
3		阿拉尔市一师棉麻棉飞棉业有限公司	91659002572446361	新疆阿拉尔市玉阿新公路1公里处	66208	
4		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781F0991	阿拉尔市玉阿新公路31公里处	66033	
5		阿拉尔市鹏达棉业有限公司	91659002MA781F7N5N	第一师沙井子灌区水利管理处胜利渠16公里处	66112	
6		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781N3H43	新疆阿拉尔市十三团红桥镇雨园路486号	66090	
7		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781N3C7Q	新疆阿拉尔市七团玛纳斯镇人民南路	66027	
8		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781U6143	新疆阿拉尔市六团及塔里木建设路以东、健康路以西、六团代电所以西、幸福路以北区域	66036	
9		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781T1F0Q	新疆阿拉尔市十一团花桥镇花桥大道南3500号	66058	
10		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781K1B30	新疆阿拉尔市三团零公里镇镇里大道（原加工厂）办公大楼二楼	66026	
11		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781F0J7F	新疆阿拉尔市八团北京南路2299号28栋1号	66025	
12		阿拉尔市鹏远棉业有限公司	91659002MA781K1E7N	新疆阿拉尔市十六团新开镇环城西路2800号	66032	
13		新疆客里木河棉业股份有限公司阿拉尔分公司	91659002748697506W	新疆阿拉尔市1号工业园区花桥路199号	66159	
14		新疆客里木河棉业股份有限公司金银川分公司	91659002560532404	新疆阿拉尔市金银川镇渠源一路（一师加工分厂）	66037	
15		新疆生产建设兵团第一师一团沙井子民康农场	91659002X6151168	新疆阿拉尔市沙井子镇	66161	

16	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司英尉犁县卡拉厂	916590067486554102	新疆巴州第二师三十一团喀里木木尔乡哈拉路西侧500米处	66171	
17	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司尉犁县英库勒二厂	916590067486554102	新疆巴州第二师三十一团棉花路与健康路交叉处北距（原三十二团蔬菜加工厂）	66211	
18	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司尉犁县英库勒一厂	916590067486554102	新疆巴州第二师三十一团建设路北400米处	66056	
19	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司英尉犁县英库二厂	91652823NA\7826282L	新疆巴州第二师三十四团原三十五团老棉路1栋	66046	
20	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司双丰二厂	916590067486554102	新疆铁门关市30团迎宾路11号	66134	
21	新疆生产建设兵团第二师三十一团英库勒种子加工厂	91652823576248981M	新疆巴州第二师三十一团九连	66038	
22	巴州恒发棉业有限公司	91659006754561058K	新疆铁门关市二十八团加工连	66092	
23	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司双丰一厂	916590067486554102	新疆铁门关市30团迎宾路11号	66030	
24	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司吾瓦二厂	91659006NA\781TM80R	新疆铁门关市29团屯垦路2号	66132	
25	铁门关东瑞供销有限公司吾瓦一厂	91659006NA\781TMD12	新疆铁门关市二十九团屯垦路南侧	66010	
26	第三师四十八团综合加工厂	916531009302454516S	新疆巴楚县四十八团创业路16号	66076	
27	图木舒克市五十一团综合加工厂	916590039302454500	新疆图木舒克市图木舒克镇（五十一团）	66120	
28	图木舒克市四十九团综合加工二厂	91659003734474774J	图木舒克市奎拉拜特镇	66088	
29	新疆生产建设兵团第三师四十二团加工厂	91653128778959095L	图木舒克市奎拉拜特镇四十二团加工厂	66085	
30	图木舒克市五十三团综合加工厂	91659003739167606F	图木舒克市五十三团	66055	
31	图木舒克市准噶尔棉业有限公司	91659003930248802C	图木舒克市其盖麦旦镇（五十四）	66084	
32	第三师四十五团棉花二厂	91653127556490797X	新疆喀什地区麦盖提县43团人民东路3号	66102	
33	图木舒克市四十九团综合加工厂	916590039302454518G	图木舒克市四十九团	66087	

34	新疆生产建设兵团总场综合加工厂	916531295548882210	伽师县阿其克镇总场	66052	
35	田木镇克市四十团中心园场齐干柳糖加工厂	916590039302454939	新疆田木镇克市齐干柳糖三建	66028	
36	新疆丰达农业有限公司	916531007108821086	新疆喀什地区英吉沙镇丰镇	66131	
37	新疆生产建设兵团第五师八十九团	91652700MA776WQ110	八十九团银海路24号	66016	
38	新疆生产建设兵团第五师八十二团联合加工厂	9165272222394302607	新疆博州精河县唐格滩八十二团建设路2号	66127	
39	新疆生产建设兵团第五师八十三团棉花厂一分厂	916527227422399340	博河县沙山子	66013	
40	新疆生产建设兵团第五师九十一团棉花厂	9165272229294306830	新疆博州精河县托托乡91团2连26号	66082	
41	新疆生产建设兵团第五师八十五团棉花厂	916527010531769070	新疆博州八十五团团部	66014	
42	双河市新赛博工农业发展有限公司	91659007MA781K4W7X	新疆双河市81团（霍热）育才街29号加工厂房	66012	
43	农五师八十六团综合加工厂	916590072294052333X	新疆博州博乐市青达拉	66015	
44	新疆生产建设兵团第五师九十团	91652700MA776DNB0J	新疆生产建设兵团第五师九十团	66081	
45	新疆准噶尔棉麻有限公司芳草湖六场分公司	91652323MA780T15M	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖六场花香路文明巷	66106	
46	新疆准噶尔棉麻有限公司新疆一棉分公司	91652323MA781A827R	新疆昌吉州玛纳斯县新疆一棉镇海路棉花厂35号	66043	
47	新疆准噶尔棉麻有限公司芳草湖二棉分公司	91652323MA780T1E90	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖二棉静宁路16号	66105	
48	新疆准噶尔棉麻有限公司一〇三团分公司	91659004MA77TH0C6C	新疆五家渠市103团胜利东街南面双号680号	66009	
49	玛纳斯县鑫裕棉业有限公司	91652324560535206W	新疆昌吉州玛纳斯县新疆总场新疆监狱	66201	
50	新疆准噶尔棉麻有限公司芳草湖五棉分公司	91652323MA780T1C4D	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖五场棉花厂	66164	
51	新疆芳草湖准噶尔棉麻有限公司	91652323MA7769C8XC	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县192团21公路处芳草湖农场监狱第三监区	66165	

52	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司新疆四场分公司	91652324MA78111X2B8	新疆玛纳斯县新疆四场场部	66004	
53	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司共青田分公司	91659004299331495G	新疆五家渠共青田农场	66107	
54	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司一〇六团分公司	91652323MA7807149L	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县一〇六团团部	66158	
55	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司新疆二场分公司	91652324MA7811PP9R	新疆昌吉州玛纳斯县新疆农场二场建设队中段	66156	
56	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司新疆七场分公司	91652324MA7811M803	新疆昌吉州玛纳斯县新疆七场场部	66203	
57	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司芳草湖三场分公司	91652323MA7807078N	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖三场札花厂	66163	
58	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司兵团分公司	91652323MA7807078N	新疆五家渠市105团团部甘泉公路南侧	66101	
59	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司一〇二团分公司	91659004MA77XEN70B	新疆五家渠市梧桐镇棉五路	66042	
60	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司芳草湖一场分公司	91652323MA78071B6J	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖一场场部	66162	
61	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司新疆六场分公司	91652324MA7811WJ0D	新疆玛纳斯县新疆六场场部	66157	
62	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司芳草湖四场分公司	91652323MA78071E03	新疆昌吉州呼图壁县芳草湖四场十连10号	66040	
63	阜康市六运湖天山棉业有限公司	916523025605066596	阜康市六运湖农场向阳路以东29米彩南路10处	66197	
64	新疆鹏飞棉业有限公司	916590047922251603E	五家渠工业园区	66168	
65	玛纳斯县旺盛农业开发有限公司	91652324060889848	玛纳斯县北五岔镇大庄付渠工地片兵团公路南侧	66199	
66	新疆准噶尔棉业有限公司新疆三场分公司	91652324MA7811P463	新疆玛纳斯县新疆农场三场场部	66008	
67	克拉玛依市乌尔禾区锦宏棉业有限公司	916501057637686327	新疆克拉玛依市乌尔禾区	66198	
68	奎屯锦宏棉业有限公司	916540037486440934	新疆伊犁州奎屯市北京东路北114区	66183	
69	克拉玛依市共青镇农工团联合企业总公司加工厂	9165010059173492J	克拉玛依市共青镇永公园路001号	66095	

70	新疆锦峰棉业股份有限公司高唐棉花加工厂	916544020722472998	新疆乌鲁木齐市南泉双河	66003	
71	新疆锦峰棉业科技股份有限公司良神加工二厂	9165420265641220F	农七师125团农一连	66111	
72	农七师南山总场综合加工厂	91654402599163729q	128团团部	66004	
73	新疆克拉玛依市五五农工商联合企业总公司棉花加工厂	91650200599161774H	新疆克拉玛依市五五新镇先锋路2号	66096	
74	农七师齐满总场加工厂	9165440259916377XU	新疆第七师127团4连	66181	
75	农七师齐满总场加工厂	91654402789882150W	第七师一二五团团部	66002	
76	新疆奎屯云森纺织有限公司	916540037129814843	新疆伊犁奎屯市天西路81号	65383	
77	奎屯锦星棉业有限公司	91654003204919849	新疆奎屯市独克公泉以西建二连区	66005	
78	农七师科克三木总场加工厂	91654402599163743E	农七师126团团部	66091	
79	新疆锦峰棉业科技股份有限公司良神加工一厂	91654402789853325L	农七师123团团部	66160	
80	奎屯惠民棉业有限公司	91654003754558414H	奎屯市北京西路156号	66114	
81	新疆明瑞棉业有限公司	91650200751676255U	第七师一二三团团部	66108	
82	车排子农工商联合企业总公司加工厂	91654402599169725P	第七师一二三团团部	66001	
83	克拉玛依市锦峰棉业有限公司	91650200MA782AEU86	新疆克拉玛依市克拉玛依区136团小拐镇阳光路金源苑小区9号楼3楼处	66144	
84	石河子市德沙棉业有限公司	91659001MA7810W231	新疆石河子市134团沙门子镇14小区4栋处	66086	
85	石河子市德沙棉业有限公司	91659001757697911J	新疆石河子市花园镇143军区基地	66176	
86	石河子市德沙棉业有限公司	91659001MA7782TP60	新疆石河子市城区下野地镇134团西二路2-9号	66196	
87	石河子市德沙棉业有限公司	91659001MA7810W982	新疆石河子市143团花园镇工业园区加工厂处	66066	

88	石河子市鸿福棉业有限公司	91659001MA775TH63E	石河子开发区东幸福路153号	66206	
89	石河子市银北棉业有限公司	91659001MA781QK80W	新疆石河子市石总场北泉镇加工厂处	66019	
90	石河子市银冠棉业有限公司	91659001MA781QKQ86	新疆石河子市147团十户镇金湾小区处	66068	
91	石河子市宏兴和棉业有限公司	916590015928083446	新疆石河子市新安镇正义农场规划区	66175	
92	石河子开发区华丰棉业有限公司	916590017223187075	石河子市152团7连	66177	
93	石河子市石城棉业有限公司	91659001751655227U	石河子镇四官村	66118	
94	石河子市新安棉花加工厂	91659001745211320C	石河子镇安镇一队区	66139	
95	新疆石大棉业有限公司	916590013977165647	新疆石河子市北泉镇望月坪小区	66024	
96	石河子市农丰良种棉原棉加工有限公司	91659001722328059G	新疆石河子市望月坪小区（农科院内）	66174	
97	新疆屯雨圣洁棉业有限公司	91654226MA7815TQ5x	新疆塔城地区托克逊县托里乡184团工兵团区	66073	
98	哈密市银顺棉业有限公司	91652200MA782B9J0B	新疆哈密市红星二场星光大道延伸段南侧	66049	
99	哈密花乡棉业有限公司	91652200MA782A996D	新疆哈密市伊州区黄田农场	66059	
100	哈密市鑫棉棉业有限公司	916522016636215611	新疆哈密市第十三师红星四场	66031	
101	哈密花乡棉业有限公司	91652200781798878Q	新疆哈密市伊州区二道湖红星一场	66054	
102	哈密市鑫棉棉业有限公司	91652201MA7829LXL	新疆哈密市伊州区塔城园子	66169	
103	哈密镇天棉业有限公司	91652200761109238C	新疆哈密市大南农场工业园区1号	66023	

CITIZEN POWER INSTITUTE
CITIZEN POWER INITIATIVES FOR CHINA





OCTOBER 2019

Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang

Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation,
and Western Supply Chains

AUTHORS

Amy K. Lehr
Mariefaye Bechrakis

A Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OCTOBER 2019

Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang

Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation,
and Western Supply Chains

AUTHORS

Amy K. Lehr

Mariefaye Bechrakis

A Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative

About CSIS

Established in Washington, D.C., over 50 years ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.

In late 2015, Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees. Mr. Pritzker succeeded former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees from 1999 to 2015. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000.

Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS is one of the world's preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional study; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and trade to global development and economic integration. For the past seven years consecutively, CSIS has been named the world's number one think tank for international security by the University of Pennsylvania's "Go To Think Tank Index."

The Center's over 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. CSIS is regularly called upon by Congress, the executive branch, the media, and others to explain the day's events and offer recommendations to improve U.S. strategy.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgments

The Human Rights Initiative of CSIS would like to thank Margaret Siu, Emily Threlkeld, Elena Tothazan, and Gulya Tlegenova for their research assistance. We would also like to thank the former detainees and their family members who shared their stories with us. This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

Center for Strategic & International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

Contents

1	Introduction
3	Methodology
3	Connections between the Economies of the United States and Xinjiang
4	Minorities and Forced Labor in Xinjiang
5	<i>Putting Minorities to Work: “Poverty Reduction” and “Reeducation”</i>
5	<i>Coerced “Poverty Reduction” for Rural Poor Minorities</i>
7	<i>Detainees and Forced Labor</i>
8	<i>Prison Labor</i>
9	<i>The Role of Chinese Companies Based Outside Xinjiang</i>
10	Identifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang: Patterns and Indicators
14	<i>Company Due Diligence for Broader China Supply Chains</i>
15	Conclusions and Recommendations
20	About the Authors
21	Annex 1: A Journey through Xinjiang’s “Reeducation” System
29	Annex 2: List of Pairing Program Participants with Counterparts
30	Annex 3: Participants in the Hundred Villages Thousand Factories Pairing Program

Introduction

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS DETAINED and “reeducated” more than one million Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic and religious minorities (“minorities”) in Xinjiang in an effort to fully secure and control the population there.¹ This repression escalated significantly in 2017. This is believed to be the largest-scale detention of religious minorities since World War II. Held without charges or trial, detainees are unable to leave or even communicate with their loved ones.² They are subjected to what the Chinese government calls “reeducation” and “vocational training,” which includes intensive Mandarin classes, praising the Chinese Communist Party, and in some instances, job training.

The government’s goal is to secularize these minority groups under the belief that this will strengthen loyalty to the Communist Party and enhance stability in the region. From China’s perspective, “reeducation” and detention at this scale are justified by government concerns about religious extremism and security, especially given periodic unrest in Xinjiang in the past.³

However, this response is obviously disproportionate to the threat and fundamentally misaligned with international norms. The “reeducation” occurs in highly coercive circumstances. Detainees are sometimes tortured⁴ and shackled for mistakes in class or for practicing their religion or culture.⁵ They are reported-

ly detained for growing a beard, international travel, WhatsApp usage, or for no known reason at all.⁶ These detentions combine with an unprecedented and all-pervasive surveillance system that permeates the lives and movements of the minorities who are not detained.⁷

Government documents and interviews with ex-detainees suggest that forced labor increasingly forms an integral part of the government's efforts to "reeducate" Muslim minorities and erase their culture and religion. The government calls for "cleansing" ethnic minorities of their extremist thoughts through not only "reeducation," but also work.⁸ The government's determination to move both ex-detainees and hundreds of thousands of poor minorities out of their traditional roles and into manufacturing positions is leading to forced labor, seemingly at a significant scale. This massive effort derives from the belief that the combination of "reeducation" and work will make minorities more like mainstream Han Chinese by detaching them from their culture and religion and strengthening their loyalty to the Communist Party. As a result, both ex-detainees and poor minorities are being forced to work in Xinjiang's factories as part of the government's efforts to eradicate minority religion and culture. Forced labor combines with widespread surveillance and detention to accomplish the government's goal of stability through the eradication of minority culture and religion.

While forced labor is always abhorrent, the use of compelled labor as part of a concerted effort to eliminate a culture and religion sets the situation in Xinjiang apart. According to the International Labor Organization, forced labor includes "all work or service that is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily." Forced labor in Xinjiang does not resemble the most common pattern of forced labor—a workforce that is in bondage due to recruitment fees. Nor is it equivalent to the seasonal use of forced labor for cotton harvesting by former Soviet Republics, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Rather, China's policies in Xinjiang, including

forced labor, target these minority groups in a manner reminiscent of World War II or the apartheid era, though there are obvious differences.


Not only is forced labor a *jus cogens* violation,⁹ but there is a significant risk that the government-engineered use of forced labor in Xinjiang is part of a concerted and widespread government attack on a population and thus would be considered a crime against humanity.¹⁰

"While forced labor is always abhorrent, the use of compelled labor as part of a concerted effort to eliminate a culture and religion sets the situation in Xinjiang apart."

A cheap and compliant minority labor force not only supports government stability" efforts but is an important element of the government's economic plans for Xinjiang. State documents indicate that the government is in the process of significantly increasing textile and apparel manufacturing in the region through a mix of company subsidies and underpaid workers. Xinjiang will then be an export hub for the Belt and Road Initiative.

This coerced labor force is connected to Western supply chains and consumers. Few products ship directly from Xinjiang to the United States. Rather, Xinjiang produces more than 80 percent of China's cotton. China, in turn, is one of the world's largest cotton producers, representing around 22 percent of the global market in 2018-19, with much of the cotton at least partially processed within China. Some of the cotton is transformed into yarn and textiles inside Xinjiang, while much is sent on for processing in other regions of China, with a smaller percentage going to neighboring countries and then shipped to the United States. More than 30 percent of U.S. apparel imports come from China. Those

China's Cotton Production in Xinjiang



including cotton most likely incorporate products from Xinjiang and thus may be affected by forced labor. Although apparel is the most obvious sector implicated, other affected products containing textiles could include automobiles, furniture, or toys. Xinjiang is also a major producer of tomato paste, lavender, and hops,^{11,12} and these require more examination to determine how they intersect with global supply chains.

The potentially widespread use of forced labor in Xinjiang and its connections to Western supply chains and consumers create both a moral imperative for action and an opportunity to use economic leverage to improve the situation in Xinjiang. This briefing focuses on what we know about forced labor in Xinjiang and how it connects to Western supply chains. We then identify actions that are most likely to improve the situation.¹³

Methodology

WE EXAMINED EXISTING, publicly available research on forced labor in Xinjiang, particularly the work of Adrian Zenz.¹⁴ We also conducted interviews with a number of detainees who were forced to work or their family members. These interviews corroborated the conclusions of research conducted by us and others using Chinese government and other online open sources. We used publicly available information in English and Mandarin to locate a number of factories suspected of using forced labor or being involved in the government's "reeducation" efforts and examined satellite imagery of them. Lastly, we examined U.S. import data to understand the volume and types of products imported from Xinjiang. In combination, this data helped us determine certain patterns potentially associated with forced labor in Xinjiang and make recommendations to address it.

Connections between the Economies of the United States and Xinjiang

XINJIANG HAS NOT HISTORICALLY BEEN a manufacturing hub. Rather, it has rich supplies of minerals and oil, which are believed to be consumed primarily within China. Xinjiang has, however, long been a major producer of cotton.¹⁵ Xinjiang produced 84 percent of China's cotton in 2018,¹⁶ and production is increasing due to government subsidies.¹⁷ China exports less than one percent of its cotton, indicating that the vast majority is consumed internally, including in the production of textiles and apparel.¹⁸

Cotton from Xinjiang is in some instances processed there into yarn or textiles or, in rarer cases, finished apparel. For example, Xinjiang is home to a factory that claims to be China's largest yarn producer that is alleged to have employed reeducated workers from vocational training centers—often a euphemism for graduates of detainment centers.¹⁹ The government is urgently seeking to grow the textile and apparel manufacturing sectors in Xinjiang, as discussed below. Currently, 43 percent of Xinjiang's exports are apparel, footwear, or textiles²⁰—although most finished products are sent to Central Asia—and this percentage is likely to increase. This growth industry is particularly concerning because research indicates that cotton ginning, apparel, and textile manufacturing in Xinjiang are increasingly at risk of being affected by forced labor, as is more thoroughly explored below.

“Xinjiang produced 84 percent of China's cotton in 2018,²¹ and production is increasing due to government subsidies.”

It is believed that more than half of the cotton, yarn, and textiles produced in China are consumed by its own apparel industry into finished products.²² This means there is a high probability that cotton-con-

taining apparel or textiles from China in fact contain cotton products from Xinjiang—and a related risk that they are affected by forced labor.

U.S. and European companies source significant quantities of apparel from China. For example, China supplies 33.7 percent of the apparel entering the United States, making it the largest exporter of apparel to the U.S. market.²³ In the past two years, the United States has received approximately 224,000 shipments of textile and garment items containing cotton, wool, or cashmere from China, with shipments continuing well after allegations of forced labor in Xinjiang emerged.²⁴

Only a small percentage of these shipments came directly from landlocked Xinjiang, but many more may have contained Chinese cotton and textiles tainted by Xinjiang's forced labor. Western companies have an opportunity to better understand and respond to the risk of such products entering their supply chains, as outlined in this report.

Minorities and Forced Labor in Xinjiang

FORCED LABOR IN XINJIANG IS NOT NEW. Nor are efforts to incorporate ethnic minorities there into “modern” work such as manufacturing through “rural poverty reduction” programs. Indeed, the Chinese government has long seen the incorporation of ethnic minorities into manufacturing as a vital method to bring ethnic minorities into the non-religious, mainstream Chinese fold (“Sinicize” them), thus diminishing the links to their culture and religion and deterring unrest.²⁵ These efforts for the most part failed because minorities showed limited interest in voluntarily joining this workforce.²⁶

Xi Jinping's top policy priority is eradicating poverty, and enormous resources are being deployed to this end.²⁷ This policy, combined with efforts to sinicize the minority population, means that government plans to move Xinjiang's minorities into manufacturing jobs are increasingly ambitious and are being unrolled at a time when minorities are being surveilled,

detained, and terrorized. The potential for coercion is enormous. Indeed, both government documents and interviews of ex-detainees and their families indicate a risk that many of the minorities moving into manufacturing are doing so under the threat of detention. Perhaps because of the urgency with which the government is pursuing secularization and security, evidence suggests that minorities are being compelled to work in unprecedented numbers as the government's "reeducation" and detention program and "rural poverty reduction programs" coincide.

Forced labor affecting ethnic minorities swept up in the effort to securitize Xinjiang falls into three main categories:

- Coerced labor by the rural poor,
- Forced labor by current or ex-detainees, and
- Forced labor by prisoners.²⁸

Putting Minorities to Work: "Poverty Reduction" and "Reeducation"

CHINESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS HIGHLIGHT a push to incorporate Muslim ethnic minorities into the workforce to accomplish multiple objectives:

- "Reeducation" to reduce their attachment to their cultural and religious heritage, make them more like the Han ethnic majority (sinicization), and increase their loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party; and
- Reducing poverty in the region, which is believed to contribute to stability and combat terrorism, especially when combined with grid system control and surveillance.

These efforts are intertwined. The government is accomplishing them by 1) creating coercive quotas for minorities to enter the workforce as part of "poverty reduction" and 2) providing financial incentives for companies to train or employ ethnic minorities, including those that have been detained and "reeducated." In some instances, the corporate training

includes elements of "reeducation."

1. Coerced "Poverty Reduction" for Rural Poor Minorities

Xinjiang is undertaking a massive effort to move hundreds of thousands of its rural, ethnic minority population into manufacturing, particularly textiles and apparel.²⁹ Researcher Adrian Zenz has examined the government's plans for poverty reduction in detail and how this coerces rural minorities. The government states that it plans to "lift 606,000 people"—mostly ethnic minorities—out of poverty in 2019.³⁰ The government has proposed quotas for the number of ethnic minorities that should join the formal workforce for at least some regions of Xinjiang,³¹ which places significant pressure on government officials to meet them. By 2023, Xinjiang aims to have 1 million workers in textile and garment industries, with 650,000 of them coming from southern Uyghur majority regions such as Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu.³² This target number is equal to the entire Uyghur population of Kashgar³³ and one-twentieth of the entire Uyghur population in Xinjiang.³⁴ It is not known whether the government is hitting its targets, but if it is even approaching them, it is possible that hundreds of thousands of minorities are being transferred to work, sometimes against their will.

It is unclear why Xinjiang's ethnic minorities, which historically have resisted the government's efforts to incorporate them in the manufacturing base, would now choose en masse to enter the workforce, particularly when they are paid below minimum wage, as discussed below. While helping people out of poverty is not objectionable, the question is whether those ethnic minorities moving into the workforce are doing so voluntarily. Given that the government has struggled for years to integrate Xinjiang's minorities into the manufacturing base, it may be difficult for regional administrators to hit their targets without some degree of coercion.

The risk of coercion is exacerbated by the heavily secured environment in Xinjiang. These minority populations are subjected to intrusive surveillance of their daily lives that the government uses to de-

termine whether they should be sent to detention facilities. Government documents indicate that these populations are being urged to work in factories,³⁵ sometimes at less than the minimum wage.³⁶ Government notices indicate that the Aksu government gathered over 4,000 residents over two years to be deradicalized and take textile-making courses under “closed-off, military-style” management. The residents were then sent off to textile factories.³⁷ According to *The Wall Street Journal*, village boards in Aksu listed poor residents’ names and often stated “transferred to work.”³⁸ This word choice suggests the local government may be forcing poor minorities to work—often in private enterprises—to play its part in the central government’s poverty alleviation plan. Private companies and state-owned enterprises are vital to the development of this industry. The government offers a range of incentives to companies to incorporate minorities, who are believed to be less efficient workers,³⁹ into their operations. The government explicitly permits companies in Xinjiang to pay minorities below the minimum wage.⁴⁰ This appears to be carried out in practice. One ex-detainee who we interviewed noted that poor civilians “recruited” to work were being paid the same as former detainees of “reeducation camps,” which ranged from 300/400 to 1,300 RMB for an entire year (the monthly minimum wage in Xinjiang varies from 1,460 to 1,820 RMB per month).⁴¹ We were told that they sometimes were not paid at all.

Some factories run their own vocational training programs as part of their efforts to support the government’s poverty alleviation and reeducation policies. The government announced plans to pay them a subsidy of 1,800 RMB per trainee.⁴² Journalists and researchers have raised concerns that minority participation in these programs may also not be entirely voluntary.⁴³ In one example, Huafu Fashion Co.—a major supplier to Western brands and one of the largest textile companies in China⁴⁴—runs a training “college” in the middle of the Aksu Industrial Park,⁴⁵ a large park built specifically to form a key element of the government’s poverty alleviation program. Its enrollees are dressed in identical camouflage uni-

forms.⁴⁶ Company accounting documents suggest the training was paid for with government subsidies.⁴⁷ The training college is next to Huafu’s factory, which has reportedly employed workers who came from training programs intended to eradicate their extremist thoughts.⁴⁸ Several other factories in the park are involved in poverty alleviation and have been featured in reporting focused on forced labor in the region. For example, COFCO Tunhe Wushi Fruit and Vegetables Products Co. Ltd. is engaged in poverty alleviation programming and some reports have suggested workers recruited through that program may have been unwilling, although the allegations are less fulsome.⁴⁹ Documents indicate that at least some company vocational training programs have a “reeducation” element, suggesting that they are part of the government’s effort to transform and Sinicize minorities.⁵⁰ Satellite imagery reveals that many of the factories in the park have abnormally high fences, around 16 feet, suggesting they are securitized. While this is not hard evidence of forced labor, company involvement in vocational training of minorities as part of the government’s poverty alleviation program deserves closer scrutiny for forced labor.

Our interviews confirm that at least some of these minorities entering the workforce through poverty alleviation programs are indeed doing so against their will. We interviewed multiple ex-detainees who were forced to work in factories that included a substantial local ethnic minority workforce. Some of the latter, who were part of the poverty alleviation effort, informed the ex-detainees that they had been told they would be sent to a detention facility if they did not agree to work in the factory. Under international law, work conducted under such a threat would likely be considered forced labor.⁵¹ In other instances, the threat of being sent to detention may simply be implied, given the overall state of repression in Xinjiang.

Minorities being moved into manufacturing may in some cases be treated similarly to ex-detainees. One of our interviews indicated that civilians who were recruited as part of poverty alleviation efforts were forced to reside in the same dormitories as former detainees if they lived more than 15 km

away from the factory. They were also often transferred to and from factories in buses along with former detainees from “reeducation centers.” Our interviews suggest that these dormitories are secured, and the inhabitants are not free to come and go. The fact that poverty alleviation program workers are required to live in secured dormitories far from home with ex-detainees suggests the arrangement may not be voluntary.

The extent to which these rural populations are coerced to work in factories is difficult to determine but given that the entire minority population of Xinjiang is under constant and ubiquitous surveillance, it may be considerable. Any factory that has employed ethnic minorities as part of the government’s efforts to “assist” the rural ethnic minority poor by moving them into the formal workforce should be closely scrutinized. Heightened scrutiny is needed if this started occurring in 2016 or after, when efforts to surveil and detain minorities substantially increased. Factories using government recruiters to secure their employees in Xinjiang also deserve heightened scrutiny.

Moreover, efforts to move minorities into the workforce are part of a government effort to cut their ties with their traditional culture and religion, as discussed by researcher Adrian Zenz.⁵² As a result, companies that are participating in the government’s poverty alleviation program are arguably linked to its broader attempts to destroy minorities as a group, which could rise to the level of an international crime. Even if it is not clear whether a company participating in the program is forcing its workers to participate, they may be complicit in these broader abuses.

2. Detainees and Forced Labor

The employment of detainees and ex-detainees, often combined with ongoing reeducation, forms another part of Xi’s “poverty alleviation” program. Their employment is a mechanism for government officials to meet their quotas and for companies to benefit from government subsidies. Government and company documents emphasize that

“reeducated” ethnic minorities—presumably many being released from detention facilities—should form part of this new manufacturing workforce as a final step in helping them join modern Chinese society.⁵³ A top official in Xinjiang stated in late 2018 that the government was preparing “job assignments” for detainees,⁵⁴ and other government documents indicate the detention facilities are connecting the detainees to workplaces.⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, some of these detainees do not enter the workforce by choice.

To incentivize companies to hire ethnic minorities out of “reeducation” centers, the government provides a significant number of subsidies. These subsidies take the form of monetary compensation or other benefits, such as tax exemptions and electricity subsidies.⁵⁶ Indeed, the government issued a promise in March 2018 to provide a subsidy of \$260 for each ex-detainee a factory trains.⁵⁷ In some instances, companies also receive shipping cost subsidies equivalent to 4 percent of their sales volumes.⁵⁸

This, plus the lower wage requirements, lowers costs and creates a competitive advantage for those companies. For example, public documents advertised an industrial textile and apparel park known to house factories using workers who went through vocational training, including in detention facilities. The publicity materials state that costs in the industrial park are 30 percent lower than in other parts of China.⁵⁹ This is surprising because manufacturing in Xinjiang has historically been prohibitively expensive⁶⁰ and the workers are half as efficient as in mainland China.⁶¹ It suggests that a combination of government subsidies and underpaid and unpaid workers—both ex-detainees and the rural minority poor—have convinced companies to locate their factories to Xinjiang, which the government believes will also contribute to long-term stability.⁶² The movement of eastern China-based companies into Xinjiang is further discussed below.

It is increasingly apparent that there is a concerted government policy to move detainees into factories in Xinjiang, in some cases against their will.

However, the prevalence of forced labor by detainees or ex-detainees is difficult to determine. A credible source with first-hand knowledge of the situation estimated that more than 10,000 detainees were working in factories in his county in 2018. He stated to an Associated Press journalist that this would constitute 10 or 20 percent of the population in his county.⁶³ Assuming that other counties are moving similar percentages of the detainee population into work, these numbers suggest that at least 100,000 ex-detainees in Xinjiang would be working potentially in conditions of forced labor,⁶⁴ not including the rural poor who may also be coerced to work.

This may be a conservative estimate. The government of Kashgar stated that in 2018, it would send 100,000 ex-detainees who had gone through “vocational training” (often a euphemism for time in a detention center) to work in factories.⁶⁵ That is 20 percent of the entire Uyghur population of Kashgar, not just the Uyghurs in detention.⁶⁶ Moreover, the percentage of ex-detainees in forced labor may have increased since 2018, considering the Chinese Government’s July 2019 public announcement that it is releasing more Uyghurs from “reeducation centers” into the workforce.⁶⁷

The government targets should be understood as an approximation, as it is not known whether the local governments hit their targets. However, the prevalence of the practice is corroborated by an interview we conducted with the sister of an ex-detainee. The ex-detainee was first forced to work in a textile factory, but then was required to work in a government office processing paperwork. The ex-detainee told her sister that “everyone who is detained is sent to work after and then put under surveillance.”⁶⁸ This is almost undoubtedly an exaggeration, but, considering these data points as a whole, it is possible that hundreds of thousands of ex-detainees are being forced to work in Xinjiang. Without much greater and unfettered access to Xinjiang, a more exact estimate is not likely to be forthcoming.

3. Prison Labor

The little research available on the forced labor of minorities in Xinjiang has focused primarily on ex-detainees in extrajudicial detention facilities. Recent research, however, has highlighted the increasing risk of minorities being placed into the traditional prison system and subjected to forced labor.

Although some portions of the Xinjiang prison system are run by the provincial government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) administers its own prison system and associated factories. The XPCC is a unique paramilitary organization that provides border defense, builds and administers towns, and engages in commercial activities.⁶⁹ The XPCC has long employed prison labor at a large scale, using inmates sent to remote Xinjiang from the rest of China. The XPCC helped create Xinjiang’s cotton industry, developing most of its cotton fields using forced labor.⁷⁰ Its various business enterprises—estimated by some to number in the thousands⁷¹—produce an estimated 33.5 percent of the country’s cotton output.⁷² The XPCC’s inmates allegedly continue to work in the cotton fields, process cotton, and produce apparel.⁷³ Their brochures clarify that they are revenue-generating units that have production assignments and are profitable.⁷⁴ Some of the XPCC’s businesses, including those active in cotton and apparel production, are large, such as Xinjiang Lihua Cotton Industry Co. Ltd. and the companies it holds.⁷⁵ The XPCC has been expanding its presence in southern Xinjiang, where the government is most focused on “stabilizing” ethnic minority groups, including through detention and labor.⁷⁶ Other evidence indicates that the primary prison system also employs forced prison labor at scale under the guise of companies with ordinary sounding names.⁷⁷

Minorities are believed to constitute a rapidly growing percentage of Xinjiang’s prison population.⁷⁸ In 2017, 230,000 ethnic minorities in Xinjiang were charged with religious extremism, separatism, or terrorism, accounting for 21 percent of all arrests in China.⁷⁹ This was a five-fold increase in prose-

cutions in Xinjiang from the previous year.⁸⁰ Given China's high conviction rate, most are probably now in the prison system, including the one run by the XPCC.⁸¹ Some, in short, are likely in conditions of forced labor within China's prison system.

Prison labor in China is a long-standing concern for Western brands, and they have in place some processes to identify and address it. In practice, doing so is challenging because the Chinese government obfuscates prison labor by taking down websites and creating complex ownership structures. Some of these prison-related companies even reportedly have subsidiaries in the United States.⁸² Recent work by the Citizen Power Initiatives for China (CPIFC) identifies a number of the companies they have found to be linked to Xinjiang's prison system and the XPCC, although this is undoubtedly incomplete.⁸³ Prison companies also "wash" their products through middlemen. Companies should redouble their efforts to avoid prison labor in China, focusing particularly on Xinjiang.

The Role of Chinese Companies Based Outside Xinjiang

THE MOST COMMON WAYS IN WHICH U.S. and other Western companies are linked to forced labor in Xinjiang are not through direct relationships with factories in Xinjiang. As noted earlier, few shipments come directly to the United States from Xinjiang (such precise import data is not available for Europe, so the scope of that sourcing relationship is not known). Rather, U.S. companies buy yarn, textiles, and finished products that incorporate products from Xinjiang that may be affected by forced labor. U.S. companies may also purchase products made in Xinjiang but shipped by the parent company from an address in eastern China. Given that Xinjiang provides the vast majority of China's cotton and industry experts estimate that the majority of that cotton is further transformed into finished and semi-finished products in China, any product from China containing cotton is arguably suspect. Because of the severity of

"Because of the severity of forced labor in Xinjiang and its ties to the destruction of culture and religion, companies should exercise heightened vigilance."

forced labor in Xinjiang and its ties to the destruction of culture and religion, companies should exercise heightened vigilance.

Not only do companies in other provinces and countries purchase and process Xinjiang's cotton products, but Chinese companies may also contribute in other ways to forced labor and labor as a means to weaken minority culture and religion. The Chinese government called for other provinces to assist with efforts to move ethnic minorities in Xinjiang into the formal workforce as part of its "reeducation" and poverty alleviation efforts. The provinces then asked that local companies ("eastern companies") engage in the pairing program. It has two main components.

First, eastern companies are to invest substantially in factories in Xinjiang. They gave more than \$2 billion in the "pairing" program in 2018.⁸⁴ In some instances, eastern companies build and run factories in Xinjiang.⁸⁵ In other cases, publicly available documents suggest that they provide money to help build such factories and industrial parks as a joint venture.⁸⁶ To complement this, company employees and Party cadres are sent to Xinjiang to assist with reeducation and vocational training.

The second main element of the pairing program is called a "school + enterprise + industry" model, by which minorities from reeducation and vocational training programs are sent to work in enterprises in Xinjiang owned by the paired eastern companies. As researchers have highlighted, some of these eastern companies paid to build factories and industrial parks that were developed to incorporate "reeducated" workers and poor minorities.⁸⁷ As a result, these eastern companies provided material

support to the government's efforts to "reeducate" ethnic minorities through these factories, potentially including through forced labor.⁸⁸

We identified an example of a pairing program, the types of assistance provided, and the companies involved. The Hundred Villages and Thousand Factories program, between Zhejiang Province and the Aksu area of Xinjiang, aims to reach 100 villages in the Aksu area and build a total of about 1,000 standard factory buildings over 1 million square meters by 2020. As of 2017, a total of 129 projects have been built in 105 villages with total investments of 2.353 billion RMB, 389 factories, and the creation of more than 17,000 jobs. Among these companies, Zhejiang's established textile enterprises, including Huafu and Youngor, constructed Aksu Industrial Park and developed factories within the park. We identified a map that depicts the eastern cities (and thus their companies) that were paired with particular regions of Xinjiang.⁸⁹ An English translation of the paired cities and regions is available in Annex 2.

As of 2019, Huafu has invested 5 billion RMB in Aksu Industrial Park, resettling more than 6,000 local employees in the process.⁹⁰ As noted earlier, Huafu has also set up a vocational college in the industrial park and a factory that has been accused of employing workers who had been reeducated. Other large textile companies with factories in the Aksu Industrial Park also were historic participants in poverty alleviation programs in Xinjiang, but their degree of involvement since mass numbers of minorities started to be detained is unclear.⁹¹ Annex 3 contains a list of the Shanghai-based companies that were paired with the Aksu region of Xinjiang as an example of a specific pairing program. The potential involvement, if any, of these companies in constructing factories used for forced labor in Xinjiang requires further attention.

Identifying Forced Labor in Xinjiang: Patterns and Indicators

IDENTIFYING FORCED LABOR IN XINJIANG is challenging. Many of the traditional tools that companies

use, such as labor audits, are not effective in this context. Nor can non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or journalists conduct research there that might shed light on the situation due to government controls on their movements. Nevertheless, there are a number of red flags that emerged from our analysis that can assist in this process.

We identified almost 30 factories and industrial parks that fell into two categories of concern. The first are those facilities for which we have ex-detainee statements accusing them of employing forced labor. These allegations are small in number because so few ex-detainees have escaped Xinjiang, and even fewer of those have felt safe sharing their stories

"Identifying forced labor in Xinjiang is challenging. Many of the traditional tools that companies use, such as labor audits, are not effective in this context."

due to harassment by Chinese agents overseas. A second and larger category comprises those facilities that are using ex-detainee labor, are known to be supporting the government's "reeducation" and "vocational training" efforts, or are mentioned as assisting with the state's "rural poverty alleviation" for ethnic minorities.⁹² While forced labor does not necessarily exist in some of these situations, there is a significant risk that in many cases the detainees and rural poor are not participating by choice. For example, our interviews indicate that the ex-detainees working in factories are threatened with being returned to detention facilities.

To better understand the types of facilities allegedly involved in forced labor in Xinjiang, we examined satellite imagery and reviewed English and Mandarin documents from the government, companies, and Chinese media, including examining corporate structures and whether companies received certain government subsidies.

We reviewed satellite imagery for over a dozen factories and industrial parks suspected of connections to forced labor and/or “reeducation” based on detainee interviews, reporting, and other publicly available documents. These facilities are in 9 of Xinjiang’s 18 administrative regions, indicating that the use of forced labor is geographically widespread rather than limited to only certain regions of Xinjiang.⁹³

The physical patterns are complex. It will be extremely difficult to identify the majority of the factories employing forced labor simply by reviewing their structure through satellite imagery. Some of the factories are located inside detention facilities. Others are in separate factories located at various distances from the detention facilities, and the ex-detainees may live in secure dormitories. Often, the factories were built in roughly the same time frame as a nearby detention facility, but some factories predated the detention facilities in the area. Moreover, the factories vary widely in size, color, structure, and the extent and height of secure perimeter fencing.

Satellite imagery nevertheless can be useful, particularly when combined with other resources. For example, government documents clarify that certain industrial parks were recently built to incorporate “reeducated” religious minorities and rural poor ethnic minorities. Any factory in these industrial parks demands particular scrutiny. Satellite imagery of factories in certain industrial parks reveals abnormally high fences (approximately 16 feet) for a Chinese industrial complex.⁹⁴ It is not known whether this is a clear indicator of a coerced workforce but features such as these deserve more examination. Yet a lack of more secure fencing does not indicate a lack of forced labor. We have confirmed the existence of forced labor in industrial complexes that have entirely normal industrial park fencing.⁹⁵

The workforce in these facilities is also complex. Interviews with ex-detainees and government documents indicate that the workforce may contain only a small percentage of ex-detainees, with local ethnic minorities or possibly Han Chinese composing the majority.

According to interviews conducted with victims of forced labor and their families, detainees were paid well below the minimum wage. Some were not paid at all.⁹⁶ In one case, a detainee working in a factory had to borrow money from her family to pay for toilet paper. Others were paid around 300/400 RMB (\$41.99) per month, or 1,300 RMB (\$181) for an entire year.⁹⁷ This means that over the course of a year, they were paid less than the *monthly* minimum wage.⁹⁸ Further, they may be subjected to forced labor either during their “reeducation term” or shortly thereafter. The victims to whom we spoke spent an average of three to six months in factories before being released.

These data points have important implications for the traditional ways in which companies seek to identify forced labor at supplier sites.

There is not likely to often be an easily identifiable “smoking gun” for forced labor in Xinjiang. The example of Hetian Taida, which reportedly provided apparel to a U.S. company from a factory located within a detention facility, appears to be the exception, not the rule. In that case, a U.S. company allegedly imported directly from the Hetian Taida factory in Xinjiang, which used the detention facility’s address in its shipping information. Moreover, the factory had appeared in a Chinese news feature on the benefits of vocational training for ethnic minorities,⁹⁹ and Chinese news media showed an image of an employee from the U.S. company at the factory.¹⁰⁰ Based on this data, journalists asserted that the U.S. company was sourcing from a Hetian Taida factory in the detention facility.¹⁰¹ In October 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a withhold release order for Hetian Taida’s products on the belief that they are produced with forced labor.¹⁰² Typically, it is likely that more due diligence will be needed, and the results will not be as clear.

Adding to the challenges, traditional third-party audits are highly unlikely to be effective in identifying forced labor in Xinjiang for several reasons. First, these audits rely on interviews with workers, but the ex-detainee population is terrified, heavily surveilled,

The following images help demonstrate the wide variety of factories allegedly employing forced or ex-detainee labor.



FIGURE 1
Tacheng Internment Camp

A single building factory identified by an ex-Detainee inside a detention facility in Tacheng.



FIGURE 2
Aksu Industrial Park

This image captures the Aksu Industrial Park, where the Huafu factory and Huafu Vocational Center are located, 20 km from the nearest known detention center, with 16-foot fencing.



FIGURE 3
Factory in Korla

This image shows a factory in Korla, 6 km from the Korla Vocational Skills Education Training Center.

and also in some instances has been coached to not reveal the truth. They are unlikely to indicate they are in conditions of forced labor. Second, because audits are time-constrained, auditors often sample the workforce. If only 10 percent of the workforce are ex-detainees, the audit sample could simply miss them. And lastly, the Chinese government has reacted to news stories about forced labor in Xinjiang by preventing third-party auditors from even trying to conduct their work. In some instances, the authorities stopped independent auditors at the airport and sent them back.¹⁰⁵ In other cases, the government forced the auditors to use a government translator, which makes it even riskier for workers to speak freely.

Due to the inefficacy of audits in this context, companies should use other information sources to conduct due diligence on their suppliers. This will require them to go well beyond the due diligence they ordinarily undertake. For example, they should use Mandarin language resources online to better understand the corporate structure of their suppliers, their involvement in government subsidy or “vocational training” programs, and their workforce. They should combine this with satellite imagery and other research techniques.

The presence of any one of these is an indicator of a risk of forced labor, although some should not be considered conclusive. Companies should look not

just at a specific factory, but also at the corporate group for these indicators.

This approach will present a number of practical problems. Company due diligence is likely to identify these red flags in a number of instances, and it will be difficult or impossible to definitively ascertain whether there is in fact forced labor, given that companies cannot rely on third-party audits.

Suppliers may deny their involvement in these programs if asked. Also, public documents related to some companies with Western customers are contradictory as to whether the companies are part of these programs. We identified one large company in the textile supply chain that states it has no involvement in poverty alleviation programs in its annual reports, yet other online documents indicate it played a significant role in poverty alleviation programs.¹⁰⁹

Companies should assume that the existence of a red flag implies forced labor unless the supplier can prove otherwise. Because Xinjiang is under a constant system of control and surveillance, it is not possible to definitively prove the existence of forced labor due to lack of free access to the facilities. However, many of the indicators above suggest supplier companies are, at a minimum, working with the government in support of its efforts to transition

RED FLAGS CURRENTLY SUGGESTING A RISK OF FORCED LABOR IN XINJIANG INCLUDE:

- A factory in a detention facility,¹⁰⁴
- A factory in an industrial park that is connected to the government’s “reeducation” efforts,
- A company that is hiring workers through government recruiters,¹⁰⁵
- Language mentioning employing ethnic minority “graduates” or ex-detainees; those who were trained and cleansed of extremist thoughts; or involvement in “reskilling”
- A new factory built near a detention facility around the same time,¹⁰⁶
- A company that is receiving incentives/subsidies from the government for items such as “training supplements” for particular factories in Xinjiang; “vocational training”; or “aid to Xinjiang.”
- Participation in the government’s poverty alleviation and/or pairing
- programs in Xinjiang,¹⁰⁷
- A company with ownership linkages to a company known to be part of the system of prison labor in Xinjiang, and
- Significant company profits and manufacturing productivity despite a small number of workers enrolled in the government’s social security program.¹⁰⁸

minority populations from their traditional roles into the workplace in an effort to dilute their culture and religion, and might use forced labor.

Moreover, efforts to identify these facilities through government and company documents may become increasingly difficult. The government has taken down some documents suggesting the “reeducated” ethnic minorities will be funneled into factories, and companies that once touted their involvement in such programs will likely become more cautious as they face increasing questions from Western customers. The government also may change the euphemisms that it employs to describe the detention facilities and its reeducation efforts after Western researchers identify them. Those conducting due diligence will need to work closely with academics and others tracking this information.

Company Due Diligence for Broader China Supply Chains

COMPANIES SHOULD REEXAMINE their existing suppliers in China outside of Xinjiang to better understand their relationship to reeducation efforts and forced labor.

Companies sourcing Chinese apparel, textile, or cotton should trace their supply chains to origin so that the chain of custody is clear. Many Western brands already have made efforts to trace their cotton supply chains due to an industry ban on knowingly sourcing Uzbek cotton, and they can build on this. Tracing may nevertheless prove challenging in practice. In particular, suppliers may not be willing to share information about their own suppliers. Companies could complement this traditional chain of custody due diligence with the use of DNA markers for Xinjiang cotton (or other raw materials) to determine whether the products came from Xinjiang when that technology is fully developed.

They should also examine whether their existing eastern Chinese suppliers have built, run, or provided funding for new factories and industrial parks in Xinjiang. They can then conduct the due diligence

outlined above to identify any red flags suggesting their suppliers are linked to forced labor.

If companies identify red flags among their first-tier suppliers, companies should end the relationship. Normally, good practice is to work with suppliers to remediate forced labor and ensure workers are not placed in worse conditions than before. However, Western brands are unlikely to have sufficient free access to Xinjiang to enable them to support meaningful remediation. Moreover, remediation would be counter to the government’s policies, rendering it extremely difficult. Ending the relationship is likely to lead to the best human rights outcome.¹¹⁰

If companies find red flags several steps removed from them in their supply chains, they should insist that their direct suppliers change their sourcing programs so the sub-suppliers raising red flags are no longer in the supply chain. If their direct suppliers are unable to accomplish this in a time-bound manner, companies should end those relationships.

Some red flags will be raised with regard to the corporate parent, particularly regarding involvement in pairing, while other red flags will arise specifically in the context of their factories and subsidiaries in Xinjiang. There is a risk of commingling of products, or that products made in Xinjiang will be shipped from a company’s address in another part of China to hide their origin. It will likely be simplest and most effective to assume the whole corporate group is affected by forced labor, rather than trying to end sourcing from just one factory.

Because of the unique difficulties in identifying forced labor in Xinjiang, companies should consider instituting a ban on products from Xinjiang in their supply chains, whether or not red flags have been raised with regard to a particular direct or indirect supplier.

Conclusions and Recommendations

EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT LARGE NUMBERS of minorities in Xinjiang are being subjected to forced labor. This occurs in three ways. First, increasing numbers of minorities are being placed in the prison system, where forced labor is a long-standing practice. Second, current and ex-detainees are also forced to work in factories that are heavily subsidized to incorporate ex-detainees in their operations. Last, there is growing evidence that rural minorities are being coerced to work as part of the government's "poverty alleviation" program. Forced labor occurs as part of the government's systematic and widespread attack on minorities in Xinjiang, and the entities employing forced labor may be complicit in crimes against humanity.

The situation in Xinjiang is novel, and the closest precedents represent some of the darkest moments in modern history. The apartheid era in South Africa, while not a precise analogy, also was defined by efforts to completely control one segment of the population, including by exploiting their cheap labor in the workplace. The U.S. Congress responded aggressively to this abhorrent treatment of black South Africans, imposing a ban on new U.S. investment in South Africa, requiring that U.S. companies already operating in South Africa follow a code of conduct that undermined the apartheid system, and banning the import of products made by parastatal organizations, including not only those owned by the government, but also those subsidized by it.^{114,115,116} The policy response to apartheid cannot simply be mapped onto Xinjiang because there are important differences in the scope of the Chinese government's policies and the role and leverage of U.S. companies. Rather, the apartheid example serves as a reminder that the United States has responded strongly and effectively to the systematic subjugation of a group by a central government and should do so again.

The goal of U.S. policy on Xinjiang should be to end the mass detention, repression, and surveillance of

Crimes Against Humanity?

THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT PROBABILITY that the abuses in Xinjiang, including forced labor, rise to the level of crimes against humanity. International jurisprudence defines several key elements of crimes against humanity: a) [the underlying act] must be perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack; b) the attack must be against the civilian population; c) the attack must be launched on discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, racial, religious and political grounds.¹¹¹ Such attacks in many instances are violent, but are not necessarily so.¹¹² Forced labor is enumerated as a potential crime against humanity when carried out as part of such an attack. The attack must be either widespread or systematic.¹¹³ The systematic government policy to detain and abuse large numbers of religious minorities in Xinjiang and put them to work likely meets both criteria. It is based on discriminatory grounds, as it is aimed at civilian ethnic minority groups that are also religious minorities.

Some have claimed that the attack on minorities in Xinjiang is a form of genocide. The strength of this statement requires more legal evaluation.

minorities using a variety of policy tools. Forced labor is merely one aspect of this repressive system. Simply imposing sourcing requirements on Western companies cannot solve the problem in Xinjiang. It should form one element of a much broader and robust policy on abuses in Xinjiang, working closely with allies. Other diplomatic steps can also help address the situation in Xinjiang, such as engaging more effectively with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation so that they at a minimum cease publicly voicing support for China's treatment of its Muslim minorities. Those additional steps are beyond the scope of this report but are an important complement to economic pressure.

Nevertheless, identifying, shaming, and economically damaging Chinese companies implicated in these abuses is an important source of leverage. This is particularly the case if those companies then pressure the Chinese government to end at least some of its most abhorrent practices or cease their involvement in government projects in Xinjiang.

The U.S. government should work vigorously to encourage its allies to adopt the same measures so that the costs of such requirements are borne more equally among competitors and so that the measures collectively have a meaningful impact on the situation in Xinjiang.

Executive and Congressional Action

SEVERAL U.S. LAWS ALREADY EXIST that can be deployed in this effort.

The Trump administration should impose Global Magnitsky sanctions on companies working with the government to employ ex-detainee forced labor in Xinjiang. The Global Magnitsky regulations enable the deployment of sanctions against entities and individuals deemed to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.¹¹⁷ It may be challenging to compile sufficient evidence for such sanctions to be imposed, so use of this policy op-

tion may in practice be limited. The compilation of a company watch list, as recommended below, would help facilitate this process.

Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 enables Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to seize any shipment of goods that enters the United States that is affected by forced labor anywhere in the supply chain.¹¹⁸ This would apply to goods imported directly from Xinjiang or that include forced labor-affected components from there. Most of CBP's seizures have involved goods made with prison labor in China and exported directly to the United States.¹¹⁹ CBP will face particular enforcement challenges with regard to Xinjiang because there are so few escapees able and willing to provide first-hand accounts of forced labor there. Congress and CBP can take a number of steps to facilitate enforcement of the Tariff Act with regard to Xinjiang.

- CBP should determine that certain red flags identified in this report in fact indicate forced labor (unless companies prove otherwise), enabling a seizure. Such assumptions are necessary due to a lack of meaningful access to Xinjiang and the level of surveillance and repression there that render audits and other traditional fact-finding impossible. In some instances, a single red flag could be deemed sufficient for a seizure, while in other cases, seizures might be based on several being triggered, depending on the type of red flag.
- Congress should allocate funding to the Department of Labor or another appropriate agency to carry out due diligence to create a publicly available watch list of companies of concern. This would consist of China-based companies using forced labor or that display red flags suggesting a risk of forced labor, as well as companies funding the building of factories using forced labor in Xinjiang. The watch list would assist (although not replace) due diligence by U.S. importers and put them on notice of risks. The research could also support the Office of Foreign Assets Control's sanctions enforcement efforts. Government agencies should not have to rely on

NGOs for this research, which do not have the capacity to conduct this research in Mandarin on an ongoing basis. However, NGOs and other concerned actors should be empowered to contribute information to the list and be informed of its status and how it is formulated.

CBP enforcement actions should first target companies that are importing products directly from Xinjiang that are connected to forced labor, as the importers should already be on notice of these risks. This prioritization, combined with the aforementioned watch list, would provide time for companies sourcing indirectly from Xinjiang to change their sourcing practices as needed.

The United States should also consider measures that address the business actors more directly involved in abuses in Xinjiang, including not only companies employing forced labor, but also those building and running detention facilities or knowingly contributing technology that supports the surveillance system in Xinjiang. A potential point of leverage could include new disclosure requirements for companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges if they are directly involved in China's Xinjiang forced labor programs and other potential crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. Such involvement arguably is of material interest to investors, as those companies might be subjected to sanctions or boycotts. Such a measure would help target companies directly involved in the Chinese government's efforts if they are listed in the United States and would subject them to legal action if they lie about their involvement. This could be linked to a threat of delisting if they do not end their involvement in a time-bound manner. This would more directly place pressure on the entities intimately involved in Xinjiang's abuses, versus the efforts outlined above to place pressure on practices in Xinjiang through extended supply chains. New reporting requirements and potential delisting probably will be most effective to target companies involved in Xinjiang's surveillance state and those building and running detention facilities because those companies are believed to be more likely to be listed on U.S. ex-

changes. Our research to date suggests that few of the companies involved directly in forced labor in Xinjiang are listed on U.S. exchanges. The likely impact of this approach requires more research.

Industry Action

COMPANIES CLAIMING TO BE responsible actors must take action. Many U.S. and U.S.-listed apparel brands have made public commitments to respecting human rights, not only in their own operations but also in their supply chains, as laid out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multination-

“Companies should consider individual and collective actions consistent with and in some cases potentially beyond the baseline called for in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”

al Enterprises. Companies have also made specific public commitments to eradicate forced labor. In the decades since the corporate social responsibility movement began, companies have developed sophisticated systems to understand and manage their human rights risks. Today, their capacity to respond to grave abuses in their supply chains is heightened. Because of the gravity of the situation in Xinjiang and the challenges in mitigating the situation, companies should consider individual and collective actions consistent with and in some cases potentially beyond the baseline called for in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Options include:

- Ending the sourcing of cotton-containing products known to come from Xinjiang. This would be similar to the existing voluntary industry ban on sourcing Uzbek cotton. More than 300

companies have committed to banning Uzbek cotton in their supply chains.¹²⁰ This has proven effective over time at substantially reducing the Uzbek government's use of forced labor in its cotton fields. A similar step for Xinjiang cotton would undoubtedly prove challenging for the industry, given the importance of China as a source country, but the scale of forced labor in Xinjiang, and the role it plays in the wider repression of minorities, demands meaningful action.¹²¹ Moreover, traditional, factory-by-factory remediation is likely to be impossible, given challenges in access to the region, and the role of the state in encouraging forced labor.

- Public reporting by companies on their sourcing relationship with Xinjiang until a collective industry ban is in place. Companies sourcing cotton and textile products from China should make all reasonable efforts to determine their chain of custody to the place of origin and identify forced labor red flags,¹²² including those specific to Xinjiang where relevant. They should also report publicly on their efforts to identify the chain of custody and red flags and the limitations they encountered. They should also report on whether they source directly from Xinjiang. Although this report has focused on cotton and textiles, companies whose products contain tomato products and other goods implicated in forced labor in Xinjiang should also conduct due diligence on their supply chain links to Xinjiang and report on them. To support this work, companies should:
 - Collectively fund research on red flags in Xinjiang: Because research to identify red flags of forced labor in Xinjiang is resource intensive, businesses should consider pooling resources to support pre-competitive research focused on the red flags in this report that can underpin their due diligence.
 - Support the development of new methods for supply chain verification: This could include new technologies such as identi-

fication of DNA traits that could indicate whether a cotton-containing product contains Xinjiang cotton and thus test the veracity of supplier sourcing claims.

- Evaluate the risk of legal complicity in forced labor and other potential crimes against humanity occurring in Xinjiang and considering the implications for their sourcing. To support this work, companies should:
 - Evaluate whether companies from which they source are involved in forced labor in Xinjiang, or otherwise complicit in the system of abuses there. For example, they should consider their sourcing from companies that contribute funding to the government's "vocational training" for ethnic minorities, help fund or build industrial parks intended to absorb the ethnic minority populations, or contribute to surveillance or the building and running of detention facilities there. If a company has business dealings with a different part of the corporate group, it should nevertheless consider ending that relationship given the severity of the abuses involved and the fact that the corporate group is involved in sustaining a system of widespread abuse and attack on a civilian population.
 - Consider ending the relationship if a company sources from a supplier with a factory implicated in forced labor in Xinjiang. This is the case even if the company itself sources from the supplier's factory outside Xinjiang that is not the factory implicated in forced labor. This is for two reasons: first, as noted above, that supplier is still part of a broader system of repression and abuse; and second, there is a risk that the supplier will sub-contract internally to its own factories involved in forced labor.¹²³ Before ending the relationship, companies could, in principle, first seek to use leverage to convince the supplier to shut down its factory in Xinjiang.

Investors and the financial sector also may be able to play a role in combatting abuses in Xinjiang. Banks could expand their existing focus on combatting human trafficking to consider the indicators of forced labor in Xinjiang and whether they could diminish access of companies involved in Xinjiang's forced labor to the banking sector. Institutional investors should more proactively examine their investment portfolios to identify Chinese companies involved in forced labor in Xinjiang or other abuses there.

About the Authors

AMY K. LEHR is the director of the Human Rights Initiative (HRI) at CSIS. The HRI was launched in June 2014 and is the only program of its kind in the Washington think tank community. From this unique position, HRI brings together key actors, catalyzing creative, game-changing solutions to the globe's most pressing human rights challenges through a cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary approach. Amy came to CSIS after a decade with Foley Hoag LLP's unique corporate social responsibility (CSR) practice. In this role, she carried out groundbreaking work across sectors, engaging with international financial institutions, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and governments, to help them develop best practices and apply international law to address global human rights challenges. Her expertise includes labor rights, privacy and freedom of expression and association, security and human rights, and indigenous rights issues. Previously, Amy served as legal adviser to the UN special representative on business and human rights, John Ruggie, and in that role helped develop the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. She also served as a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative. She previously worked for development NGOs in Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. She was a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Amy received her AB from Princeton University and her JD from Harvard Law School.

EFTHIMIA MARIA ("MARIEFAYE") BECHRAKIS is a research associate and program manager for the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She studied law in the United Kingdom and France, holds an LLM in International Human Rights Law from the Georgetown University Law Center, and passed the New York State Bar (pending admission). Prior to joining CSIS, she worked for various UN agencies (UNESCO, UN Global Compact Network Canada), NGOs, as well as the private sector, covering issues relating to gender equality, business and human rights, international trade, and sanctions. Mariefaye is bilingual (English and Greek) and fluent in French.

Annex 1: A Journey through Xinjiang’s “Reeducation” System

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND SATELLITE IMAGERY REVEAL a vast network of extrajudicial detention facilities¹²⁴ spread across Xinjiang Province in which over one million Turkic Muslim minorities are incarcerated. Our knowledge about this shadowy system is primarily drawn from government documents and reports from family members. Very few ex-detainees are willing and able to speak about their experiences for a variety of reasons. Few succeed in escaping Xinjiang. If they do find refuge abroad, Chinese government operatives threaten retribution against their family members in Xinjiang if they speak out about their experiences. A handful of ethnic Kazakhs who the Chinese government released—probably because they possess dual citizenship or green cards from Kazakhstan—have added firsthand knowledge to our understanding of the abuses in Xinjiang. Almost no firsthand accounts are available from the Uyghurs, the largest group being detained, reportedly because they rarely escape and often are refugees if they manage to do so, leaving them in vulnerable positions more easily manipulated by Chinese operatives.

We carried out a series of interviews with one of the few detainees who is willing to speak about her experience in the detention facilities and in forced labor. Her experience is generally consis-

tent with what we have been able to learn from publicly available documents and statements from family members of detainees. Like other detainees, she appears to have been targeted for detention for having ties to a foreign, Muslim country. She was held in four different detention facilities, several of which were repurposed public buildings.

Her time in the forced labor system adds additional depth to our understanding and builds on existing public information. The factories that journalists initially identified were mostly located inside of detention facilities, but the detainee's narrative and our own research identifying these factories indicate that the pattern is more complex. She was forced to work in a factory several miles from any detention facility and live in a secure dormitory as a final step in her "reeducation."

We were able to confirm the locations of most of the facilities the detainee was held in. We also located the factory where she worked. These facilities were all less than five miles apart, so her experience demonstrates how the detention and forced labor systems are being implemented in one particular prefecture and town.

Entering the Detention System

The detainee was asked to make an appearance at the local police station for a 15-day educational training. When she arrived, the police accused her of having visited 1 of 26 countries considered "sensitive" by the Chinese government and having been exposed to "foreign thought." Other ethnic Kazakhs also report being interned due to foreign contacts or travel, particularly in Muslim states. The 15 days of education turned into one year and three months of detention and forced labor. Like many detainees in these facilities, she was taken away from her husband and young children and put into prolonged detention without ever being accused of any crime.

Daily Routine

The daily routines in the four facilities in which she was held were generally the same. Each day, the de-

tainees would wake when the electricity came on, sing Communist songs, and, in the words of the detainee, "say prayers to the Communist party." They would eat breakfast in seven minutes and then study Mandarin for 45 minutes. Then they would interview their classmates in Chinese and examine themselves to ensure they were not too ideological or religious. They would break for a lunch of white rice, which was eaten in the same room where they studied. They then were permitted to rest their eyes for 30 minutes. After the break, the teacher asked a series of questions to identify whether they had thoughts critical of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whether they prayed, whether they felt remorse for their pasts, and whether they were religious. They ate again in the room where they studied and then returned to the dormitory, where they studied more. Then they went to bed. Two women had to stand watch throughout the night to ensure that no one prayed.

They were given two minutes to use the bathroom in the detention facilities. If they exceeded that time period, they were hit over the head with wooden sticks. The detainee was hit on the head with sticks multiple times.

Ethnic groups were divided up, so her class included Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks.

Detention Facilities One and Two

In detention facility one, the women were all required to have blood and urine samples taken for unknown reasons. They also were given a shot, reportedly for the flu. We were unable to obtain the GPS coordinates for the first facility.

Detention facility two was a former women's hospital:

The repurposing of facilities early in the detention surge is indicative of the sheer volume of individuals suddenly being interned in this period.


Detention Facility Three



We believe this image is of the facility in which she was interred, based on the information that she provided. She was briefly detained in this school, which was turned into a detention facility while the students were on vacation. Because she was not allowed to go outside at this facility, she is not able to definitively identify the building.

Detention Facility Four

Detention facility four was the first one in which she was held that was built to purpose. Google Earth shows that in March 2016, small agricultural plots covered the area. By November 2017, the facility was





fully built, stretching one-third of a mile in length (approximately half a kilometer), which would be almost seven city blocks in Manhattan. Her daily routine was similar to that described above. She shared a room with 18 women. Video cameras were ubiquitous, even in the bathrooms. The dormitories and classrooms were connected, so the detainees rarely went outside. The detainee was able to identify the area in which she slept, ate, and studied based on her view from her window. The detainees were forced to eat pork while they were in this facility, which was against their religion.

At the end of her time in detention facility four, the detainee was informed that she would be released from detention but required to go work in a factory. If she refused, she would be forced to return to a detention facility.


The Factory

The detainee was released from detention facility four and lived briefly at her mother-in-law's house in the same village. After a week, she was told to report to work at a factory in the vicinity.

She worked at a facility within a larger apparel-making complex. The complex was built at the same time as detention facility four and appears to have been completed in the late summer of 2017.

The facility at which she worked, called Yili Zhuo Wan Garment Manufacturing Co. Ltd., produces gloves. It is inside a larger industrial park called Home Textile Park, No. 5, in Yining County, which our research indicates plays a significant role in the county government's "poverty alleviation" efforts aimed at bringing minority workers into the formal workforce. The detainee heard that the gloves were being distributed to Europe and the United States, and the company's website makes the same claim. We have not been able to trace the goods from the factory to the United States, possibly because they pass through a middleman supplier.

While subjected to forced labor, the detainee continued to be "reeducated" and her movements tightly controlled. She lived in a dormitory three kilometers from the factory. She and the other ex-detainees were bused to the factory every day. On Google Earth, she identified the buses waiting



outside the factory which took her and the other ex-detainees from her dormitory to work each day.

Armed guards accompanied them during the daily bus ride, wearing light blue official uniforms with an insignia that she associated with the military or police. Publicly available images suggest these were likely police uniforms. In a number of instances, the detainee recognized the guards at the factory from other detention facilities in which she had been held. The guards complained that they were being deployed from other regions of Xinjiang for six to eight months, indicating that they were part of China's armed services rather than guards that the factory hired privately. Guards in the same uniform provided armed security at the glove-making facility. Further underscoring the overlap of personnel between the detention facilities and the factory, one of the detainee's supervisors at the factory had been her teacher at the fourth detention facility. This indicates significant coordination between the factory and the state security apparatus running the detention facilities in this particular area of Xinjiang.

The ex-detainees were not allowed to leave the factory facility during the day, and they were required to say a prayer to the CCP and thank President Xi Jinping for their jobs at the end of every day. They ate lunch in a canteen. After dinner in their dormitories, they were forced to study Chinese for several hours. Their phones were checked by the police to surveil their communications as they entered the dormitories.

The glove-making facility held around 300 workers, around 30 of which she believes were ex-detainees living in dormitories. Others were workers from the local area. 4 or so of the 30 ex-detainees had been held with her in other detention facilities.

She worked from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. for three months in total and was paid around 260 yuan (\$37) for her first 1.5 months of work. She was never paid for the rest of her work. This does not appear to be a typical rate of payment for such a role. The detainee was a seamstress before she was detained.

In that previous role, she was paid around 3,000 yuan (\$425) per month or 100 yuan per day.

Release

A supervisor at the factory asked the detainee to sign a contract to stay another year. The supervisor noted that the government had set quotas for those successfully "reeducated," which was signified by detainees signing contracts, and that the supervisor would receive money for obtaining the detainee's signature. The detainee considered this to be a "forced contract" and was afraid that she would be required to extend it indefinitely against her will. She sent a text to her husband, asking what she should do and begging him to find a way for her to be released. Her husband had already been advocating publicly from Kazakhstan for her release, working in close coordination with a human rights organization there. The guards checked her phone according to the usual routine and saw the text messages. She was taken away in a police car to a police station and spent a night in its basement. She was interrogated for a day and told the police she would rather die than sign the contract. When she cried, they handcuffed her and put her head in cold water. The female guard accompanying her to the bathroom wore a black mask, suggesting she did not wish to be identified.

She was finally released and allowed to travel to Kazakhstan. She believes her husband's outcry was embarrassing for the Chinese government and led to her freedom. The police required her to promise to remain silent about her experiences in the detention facilities and factories and demanded that her husband stop speaking publicly about her experience. The authorities reminded her that Chinese operators in Kazakhstan could still harm her there and she should also consider the safety of her family in Xinjiang.

Forced Labor

As the International Labor Organization notes, forced labor includes "all work or service that is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself



or herself voluntarily.” The mere fact that a worker is compensated for his or her work does not mean that the labor is not forced.¹²⁵ The detainee worked—for illegally low levels of pay—because the government threatened her with a return to incarceration, with no opportunity to see her husband or small children. Her story helps us start to understand the forms of forced labor being employed in Xinjiang at scale.

Annex 2: List of Pairing Program Participants with Counterparts

Mainland	Xinjiang Counterpart
Beijing	Hetian City, Hotan County, Moyu County, Luopu County, and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Shanghai	Bachu County, Shache County, Zepu County, and Yecheng County in Kashgar
Guangdong Province	Shukang County, Jiashi County, and the Corps of Agriculture
Shenzhen	Kashgar City, Tashkurgan County
Tianjin	Minfeng, Cele, and Yutian counties in Hetian
Liaoning Province	Tacheng area
Zhejiang Province	Supporting the 1 city and 8 counties of the Aksu area and the Alar City of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Jilin Province	Altay City, Habahe County, Burqin County, and Jimunai County in Altay Region
Jiangxi Province	Akto County, Kyzyl Sukhorke Autonomous Prefecture
Heilongjiang Province	Fuhai County, Fuyun County, Qinghe County, and Xinjiang Corps Division 10 in Altay Prefecture
Anhui Province	Pisan County, Wada area
Henan Province	Counterpart support for the Hami area, the 13th Division of the Corps
Jiangsu Province	Atushi City, Wuqia County, Ishiha Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Huocheng County, Agricultural Four Division 66 Group, Yining County, Chabuchaer Xibo Autonomous County
Fujian Province	The six counties of Changji City, Manas County, Hutubi County, Qitai County, Jimsar County, and Mulei County in Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture
Shandong Province	Shule County, Yingjisha County, Megiti County, Yuepuhu County in Kashi Prefecture
Hubei Province	Bole City, Bolita Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Bole City, Jinghe County, Hot Spring County, and Bingtuan Agricultural Division
Hunan Province	Turpan area

Source: <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/28856559>

Annex 3: Participants in the Hundred Villages Thousand Factories Pairing Program

Xinjiang Tianshan Hengrui Sweater Project

新疆天山恒瑞毛衫项目暨

Zhongpu Satellite Factory

中普卫星工厂

Zhejiang Zhongpu Group

中普集团全资子公司

Awati Textile and Garment Satellite Industrial Park

阿瓦提纺织服装卫星产业

Xinjiang Tianshan Hengrui Textile Co. Ltd.

新疆天山恒瑞纺织有限公司

NOTE: MAJOR PARTICIPANT

Aksu Industrial Park

阿克苏纺织工业城

Xinjiang Ruyi Textile and Garment Co. Ltd.

新疆如意纺织服装有限公司

Xinjiang Qianhai Cotton Textile Company

新疆前海棉纺织公司

Huafu Group

华孚

List of Paired Zhejiang Cities and Factories

Hangzhou: Aksu Zhejiang Fruit Industry Co. Ltd.

杭州市:阿克苏浙疆果业有限公司

Ningbo City: Kuche Siqi Garment Co. Ltd.

宁波市:库车思琪制衣有限公司

Wenzhou City: Xinjiang Grain Yijia Agricultural Co. Ltd.

温州市:新疆粮益佳农业有限公司

Jiaxing City: Xinjiang Keliwei Clothing Co. Ltd. Nurbach Township Satellite Factory

嘉兴市:新疆科力威被服装具有限公司努尔巴克乡卫星厂

Huzhou City: Xinjiang Norton Garment Co. Ltd.

湖州市:新疆诺顿服装有限公司

Shaoxing City: Xinjiang Tianshan Hengrui Textile Co. Ltd.

绍兴市:新疆天山恒瑞纺织有限公司

Jinhua City: Xinjiang Tianxiafu Biotechnology Co. Ltd.

金华市:新疆天下福生物科技有限公司

Zhangzhou City: Wushi County Silk Road Technology Socks Co. Ltd.

衢州市:乌什县丝路科技袜业有限公司

Taizhou City: Alar City Xingmeida Printing and Dyeing Co. Ltd.

台州市:阿拉尔市兴美达印染有限公司

Lishui City: Xinhe County Dupai Clothing Co. Ltd.

丽水市:新和县都派服饰有限公司

Source: "List of Recommended '100 Villages and Thousand Plants' Project Factory," Zhejiang Online, November 8, 2018, http://vj.zjol.com.cn/yjyw/201811/t20181109_8704224.shtml.

Endnotes

- 1 The largest group is the Uyghurs, although ethnic Muslim Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities are also detained in smaller numbers.
- 2 Various interviews with former detainees.
- 3 Emily Rauhala, "China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang Violence," *Time*, August 4, 2014, <https://time.com/3078381/china-xinjiang-violence-shache-yarkand/>.
- 4 Simon Denyer, "Former inmates of China's Muslim 'reeducation' camps tell of brainwashing, torture," *Washington Post*, May 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinasmuslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fdd7aef3c_story.html?utm_term=.c95ac4da492e.
- 5 Rob Schmitz, "Ex- detainee describes torture in China's Xinjiang Re-education Camp," NPR, November 13, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/11/13/666287509/ex-detainee-describes-torture-in-chinas-xinjiang-re-education-camp>.
- 6 Various interviews with former detainees.
- 7 Human Rights Watch, *China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2019), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass-surveillance>.
- 8 The Chinese government claimed to have ended its "reeducation through labor" program in 2013, but it appears to be employed in Xinjiang. Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, *Mapping Xinjiang's 're-education' camps* (Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018), <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps>.
- 9 This means that it is a non-derogable norm from that states cannot deviate, even if they have not signed the relevant international conventions *Ferrini v Repubblica Federale di Germania*, Italian Corte di Cassazione (2004). The court accepted that deportation and forced labor are international crimes rising to the level of *jus cogens*. See: https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/ferrini_v._germany_-_italy_-_2004.pdf. Other *jus cogens* norms include prohibitions on some of the most severe international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and apartheid. Dire Tladi, *First report on jus cogens* (Geneva, Switzerland: UN International Law Commission, 2016), <http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/693>
- 10 Enslavement is a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. The treatment of the Uyghurs may also constitute a crime against humanity on several other fronts, including, at a minimum, deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other protected grounds; and enforced disappearances. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7. Whether the treatment of minorities in Xinjiang constitutes genocide is beyond the scope of this briefing.
- 11 François-Xavier Branthôme, "The 2018 season: the slowdown in Chinese production has a worldwide impact," Tomato News, April 5, 2018, http://www.tomatonews.com/en/the-2018-season-the-slowdown-in-chinese-production-has-a-worldwide-impact_2_358.htm.
- 12 "Xinjiang: Market Profile: Major economic indicators," HKTDC Research, May 20, 2019, <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Xinjiang-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVVK.htm>.
- 13 U.S. companies are likely implicated in Chinese abuses in other ways that deserve future attention. For example, U.S. companies and investors may be connected to companies constructing the detention facilities, providing surveillance equipment for them, or otherwise helping create the detention and surveillance system in Xinjiang. These additional opportunities to avoid complicity and exert economic leverage require further research.
- 14 Key resources include the work of Adrian Zenz, (particularly "Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang"), reporting by the CPIFC on prison labor in Xinjiang (*Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*), the work of the Worker Rights Consortium (*Factory Assessment - Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd: Findings, and Status*), and the excellent reporting by the many journalists who have helped shed light on the situation in Xinjiang.
- 15 It is also a major producer of lavender and hops, but whether and how those connect to U.S. supply chains is beyond

the scope of this research. “Xinjiang: Market Profile: Major economic indicators,” HKTDC Research.

- 16 China’s cotton output continues growth in 2018, China Daily, December 30, 2018, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/30/WS5c28c4a4a310d91214051ccb.html>.
- 17 “China: Cotton and Products Annual,” USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, April 16, 2019, <https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/china-cotton-and-products-annual-3>.
- 18 Numbers derived from Ibid. China imported a limited quantity of cotton in 2018/19, equaling 20 percent of the total cotton it both produced and imported.
- 19 “World’s largest textile mill for coloured yarns in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, August 25, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/25/c_137418336.htm or <https://perma.cc/SV96-V2B4> Huafu’s alleged links to “reeducated” workers are discussed in detail later in this report.
- 20 Xinjiang’s major foreign exports in 2017 were tomato paste, shoes, and textiles. “Xinjiang: Market Profile: Major economic indicators,” HKTDC Research.
- 21 China’s cotton output continues growth in 2018, China Daily, December 30, 2018, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/30/WS5c28c4a4a310d91214051ccb.html>.
- 22 Interview with an industry source. A smaller but still meaningful percentage of Chinese textiles are sold to other apparel-manufacturing countries such as Vietnam.
- 23 Sheng Lu, “China’s Changing Role in the World Textile and Apparel Supply Chain,” FASH455, November 2, 2018, <https://shenglufashion.com/2018/11/02/chinas-changing-role-in-the-world-textile-and-apparel-supply-chain/>.
- 24 Data based on import data in the Panjiva database, which identifies imports into the United States and their country of origin. Within the last two years (August 2017-August 2019), shipments peaked twice: July 2018 (with 11,926 shipments) and July 2019 (with 11,405 shipments). The timeframe for the peak of shipments is well after allegations of forced labor in the region surfaced. It is important to note that this number does not reflect the actual number of imports, as the Chinese government stopped providing import data to the United States as of March 2018, suggesting that the actual number of shipments may be higher.
- 25 Li Xiaoxia, “Study on the Development and Status of Xinjiang Minority Industrial Workers,” National Sociology Research Newsletter, <http://www.sachina.edu.cn/library/journal.php?journal=1>. Please contact the author for the source, as the website has been taken down.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Javier C. Hernández, “Xi Jinping Vows No Poverty in China by 2020. That Could Be Hard,” *New York Times*, October 31, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/world/asia/xi-jinping-poverty-china.html>.
- 28 The first two categories are consistent with the research of Adrian Zenz. Our research and interviews of detainees corroborated his findings.
- 29 The Xinjiang Textile and Apparel Industry Development Plan 2018-2023 aims to reach 20 million spindles of cotton spinning, more than 50,000 looms, 250,000 tons of knitted fabrics, and 800 million garments. Lianchao Han, David Wong, and Amelia Dewell, *Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains* (Washington, D.C.: CPIFC, 2019).
- 30 “Xinjiang: Complying Companies for the Responsibility of Minority Labor Force Recruitment Will Be Rewarded,” Asia Heart News Network, June 28, 2014, <http://news.hexun.com/2014-06-28/166133260.html> or <https://perma.cc/7VJ7-J4TU>
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 “Xinjiang Textile and Apparel Industry Development Plan (2018-2023),” The Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, March 2, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190623230756/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/02/148047.html>.
- 33 2018 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook.
- 34 Xinjiang’s total Uyghur population is between 10.5 and 11 million. Thomas Lum, *Uyghurs in China* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2019), <https://fas.org/srg/crs/row/IF10281.pdf>.
- 35 “Notice on the Implementation Rules for the Development and Management of Public Welfare Positions,” Administrative Office of Hami District, October 25, 2010, http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=340557 or <https://perma.cc/GC2L-TBLX>,

- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Eva Dou and Chao Deng, "Western Companies Get Tangled in China's Muslim Clampdown," *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-companies-get-tangled-in-chinas-muslim-clampdown-11558017472>.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Yuhui Li, *China's Assistance Program in Xinjiang: A Sociological Analysis* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2018).: https://books.google.com/books?id=OSVnDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA136&lpq=PA136&dq=xinjiang+productivity+factories&source=bl&ots=ilPiDpQJzm&sig=ACfU3U2EYib0doXDBROyYuDJCjWsTUGKJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiFwqaO_unkAhUjheAKHfGC5Q4ChDoATAJegQICRAB#v=onepage&q=less%20efficient&f=false.
- 40 "Notice on the Implementation Rules," Administrative Office of Hami District.
- 41 "Xinjiang hikes minimum wage by 10 pct," *Xinhua*, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/28/c_137072135.htm or <https://perma.cc/TUX7-HYWR>.
- 42 "Yining County Textile Industry Zone - Processing the Nation's Textiles Project," Xinjiang Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, October 17, 2018, <https://www.htqygs.com/html/ztzl.info1736141357.html> or <https://perma.cc/3BVB-VTPQ>.
- 43 Dou and Deng, "Western Companies Get Tangled."
- 44 Top 10 Textile Companies in China, *China Daily*, Oct 28, 2014, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-10/28/content_18811642_7.htm.
- 45 Longwan District of Wenzhou City Chunhui High School, "Release: The Opening of Aksu Vocational and Technical College Textile Engineering Department, Aksu Textile and Apparel Industry Training Center," http://www.697537.com/a/dang_gong_wei/gonghuihuodong/2019/0612/1854.html or <https://perma.cc/EN6C-SZBQ>. In addition, please reference: Li Zhenfeng, "The Convergence of Production and Education: Aksu Vocational Education Ushers in a New Era," *KKNews*, <https://kknews.cc/education/vlnov54.html> (Document on file with authors).
- 46 Dou and Deng, "Western Companies Get Tangled." Although this is not necessarily indicative of a coercive vocational training program, an industrial park known to employ ex-detainees and coerced poor villagers also required its trainees to wear camouflage uniforms. "Focusing on Opening a New Chapter for Employment Promotion in Yining County Textile Industrial Zone," Xinjiang Yining County People's Government Office, August 17, 2017, <http://www.xjyn.gov.cn/info/1197/24836.htm> or <https://perma.cc/L78U-YSLA>.
- 47 Huafu Fashion Co., Ltd., 2017 Annual Report (Huafu Fashion Co., Ltd., 2018), http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2018/2018-4/2018-04-26/4345963.PDF or <https://perma.cc/D6LR-9XE6>.
- 48 Dou and Deng, "Western Companies Get Tangled."
- 49 Ibid. In some instances, coercion may not be explicit on the part of the companies. COFCO Tunhe Co., China's largest tomato processor, stated that they visited a village in Aksu to recruit villagers, but they were not eager to work, and most of them ran away within days. Cofco has since stated that these events never happened. The company's annual report indicates it also made donations to Aksu's Wushi County government for vocational skills training, low-income housing, tomato industry development and a security patrol car.
- 50 China's "Rain Project" Implementation Research Summary, International Poverty Reduction Center in China (Document on file with author). See also: "Vocational Skills Education and Training in Xinjiang," Press Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-08/16/content_5421633.htm or <https://perma.cc/L3FP-WJBC>.
- 51 "What is forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking," International Labor Organization, <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm>. ("Forced labour can be understood as work that is performed **involuntarily** and **under the menace of any penalty**. It refers to situations in which persons are coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means such as manipulated debt, retention of identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration authorities.")
- 52 Adrian Zenz, "Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang," *SocArXiv*, July 12, 2019, <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/8tsk2>
- 53 "Vocational Skills Education and Training in Xinjiang," Press Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-08/16/content_5421633.htm or <https://perma.cc/L3FP-WJBC>.

- 54 Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, "China's Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor," *New York Times*, December 16, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uyghurs.html>. See also: "Interviewing Chairman of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, On Xinjiang's anti-terrorism stability and the Development of Vocational Skills Education and Training," Xinhua, October 16, 2018, http://www.chinaxinjiang.cn/zixun/xjxw/201810/t20181016_570748.htm or <https://perma.cc/N8FC-C65R>.
- 55 "A budget document this year from Yarkant, a county in Kashgar, said the camps were responsible for 'employment services.'" Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, "China's Detention Camps." See generally Adrian Zenz, *Beyond the Camps*.
- 56 "Wusu City: The First Apparel Manufacturing Company Starting Operations in September," The Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180126102601/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2017/08/30/143690.html>.
- 57 Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, "China's Detention Camps." See also: <https://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601> or <https://web.archive.org/web/20181216214048/http://www.hts.gov.cn/weininfuwu/show.php?itemid=601> (cited in Zenz, "Beyond the Camps.")
- 58 Zenz, "Beyond the Camps."
- 59 "Yining County Textile Industry Zone," Xinjiang Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture.
- 60 Xiaoxia Li, "Study on the Development and Status." (Document on file with authors.).
- 61 From January to May, the state's direct textile and garment industry is operating well. <http://archive.is/qT25W>.
- 62 "The economic structure of the autonomous region is stable and has good development," Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission, December 05, 2018, <http://archive.is/iykV0>
- 63 Dake Kang, Martha Mendoza, and Yanan Wang, "US Sportswear traced to factory in China's internment camps," Associated Press, December 19, 2018, <https://www.apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb>.
- 64 Using a conservative estimate of the population in the detention facilities, 10 percent of one million is 100,000.
- 65 Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, "China's Detention Camps."
- 66 553,840 Uyghurs reside in Kashgar; 2018 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook.
- 67 Anna Fifield, "China celebrates 'very happy lives' in Xinjiang, after detaining 1 million Uyghurs," *Washington Post*, July 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-celebrates-very-happy-lives-in-xinjiang-after-detaining-a-million-uyghurs/2019/07/30/0e07b12a-b280-11e9-acc8-1d847bacca73_story.html.
- 68 Interview with CSIS.
- 69 Han, Wong, and Dewell, Cotton: *The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*, 12.
- 70 Ibid., 31.
- 71 Ibid., 24. The diversity of the XPCC's holdings are described here: Yajun Bao, *The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, An Insider's Perspective*, (Oxford, England: University of Oxford, 2018), <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/BSG-WP-2018-023.pdf>.
- 72 Xiang Bo, "Xinjiang's major cotton base reports record output in 2018," Xinhua, February 15, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/15/c_137824104.htm or <https://perma.cc/YX7T-6VQS>.
- 73 Han, Wong, and Dewell, Cotton: *The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*, 14.
- 74 Ibid., 14.
- 75 Han, Wong, and Dewell, Cotton: *The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*, 28-29.
- 76 Ibid., 16.
- 77 Ibid., 24. For example, prison-related companies have substantial revenue but almost no employees paying into the social security system.
- 78 Gene Bunin, "From camps to prisons: Xinjiang's next great human rights catastrophe," *Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia*, October 5, 2019, <https://livingotherwise.com/2019/10/05/from-camps-to-prisons-xinjiangs-next-great-hu->

- man-rights-catastrophe-by-gene-a-bunin/?fbclid=IwAR3YjQrtv1RoDTiWfEZXCajwdYiikkV7iA9LcryeTkKOSljlplTAmH-kuA6_Y.
- 79 “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” Chinese Human Rights Defenders, July 25, 2018, <https://www.nchrd.org/2018/07/criminal-arrests-in-xinjiang-account-for-21-of-chinas-total-in-2017/>.
- 80 Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-ughurs-prisons.html>.
- 81 Han, Wong, and Dewell, *Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*, 15.
- 82 Ibid., 37.
- 83 Ibid., 19. The Xinjiang Huitong Tiancheng Industrial Group Corporation and Huaxin Rui’an Group Co. are prison-linked conglomerates that include multiple subsidiaries listed in the report.
- 84 Zenz, “Beyond the Camps.”
- 85 For more information on the pairing program, see Jiang Guanlin, “National Pairings Support Xinjiang Work Conference in Beijing,” China Youth Daily, <http://www.xjmw.gov.cn/dkhj/hjgz/2063.htm> or <https://perma.cc/T5E9-ZEUR>, “Shanghai’s Pairings in Xinjiang Achieve Amazing Results in 2018,” Office of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission, <http://archive.is/UHfVP#selection-247.204-247.243>, and “Love and Friendships Across Yuanjiang Pairings Benefits all Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang,” Xinhuanet, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2018-06/07/c_1122951063.htm or <https://perma.cc/UEF3-7GVE>.
- 86 Ibid.
- 87 Zenz, “Beyond the Camps.”
- 88 Companies operating in Xinjiang such as COFCO reportedly also make donations to government vocational skills training programs and security programs, thus providing material support for the detention system. Dou and Deng, “Western Companies Get Tangled.”
- 89 The map can be found at <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/28856559> or <https://perma.cc/T8NL-6DV4>.
- 90 See “Zhejiang Industry Aids ‘Hundred Villages and Thousand Plants’ Project Flourishes, Allowing Residents to Work Near Site,” Zhejiang Daily, November 11, 2019, http://www.agri.cn/V20/zsy/201811/t20181119_6286681.htm or <https://perma.cc/K33M-EY4M>; “Zhejiang Provides Industrial Aid to Xinjiang,” Zhejiang Daily, August 5, 2019, http://zj.ifeng.com/a/20190805/7639319_0.shtml or <https://perma.cc/9KY9-3AKD>; and Yu Liudong, “11 Million Yuan Investment in Hangzhou to Support the Construction of Aksu Industrial Park in Xinjiang,” Zhejiang Online, March 29, 2019, https://k.sina.com.cn/article_6448690335_1805f349f00100in9f.html or <https://perma.cc/TGQ2-AKKN>.
- 91 China’s “Rain Project” Implementation Research Summary, International Poverty Reduction Center in China (Document on file with author) details the involvement of a number of companies in poverty reduction programs, including incorporating workers who had been at vocational training centers prior to the surge in detention of minorities in 2017. China’s “Rural Poverty Alleviation and Development Program (2011-2020),” aims to eliminate poverty by 2020. This gave rise to the Rain Project in 2013, which proposes to eliminate poverty by focusing efforts on minority groups, namely Xinjiang’s minority groups. This proposal highlights cultural reeducation and vocational training of Muslim minorities. Moreover, the proposal suggests how the government transfers “units” of minority laborers from reeducation centers to factories. The language describing these reeducational and vocational training centers mirrors the language Adrian Zenz states are indicative of detention centers. This suggests that the current situation arose from a long-term government plan.
- 92 We focused particularly on factories involved in poverty alleviation programs that appear in the same news and propaganda articles as facilities known to use forced labor.
- 93 They include: Urumqi, Qitai, Aksu, Ili/Yili, Turpan, Changji, Karamay, Shawan, and Tacheng/Qoqek.
- 94 Aksu Industrial Park can be found on Google Earth at 41.138242,80.346274. The fences are visible on Google Earth.
- 95 See Annex 1 for an example of an industrial park with normal fencing accused of using forced labor.
- 96 Multiple ex-detainees and ex-detainee family members claimed this. Others sources confirm this (e.g., Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps”).
- 97 The Xinjiang Victims Database (<https://shahit.biz/eng/>). Interview with a former detainee who was forced to work in a factory.

- 98 As noted previously, the monthly minimum wage in Xinjiang varies from 1460 to 1820 RMB per month. “Xinjiang hikes minimum wage by 10 pct,” Xinhua.
- 99 Worker Rights Consortium, *Factory Assessment - Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd: Findings, and Status* (Washington, DC: Worker Rights Consortium, 2019), <https://www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WRC-Report-on-Hetian-Taida-China-June-2019.pdf>. See also: Kang, Mendoza, and Wang, “US Sportswear traced.”
- 100 Ibid.
- 101 Kang, Mendoza, and Wang, “US Sportswear traced.” The U.S. company has argued that it did not source from this factory after it began to receive detainee workers despite shipping records that suggest it did. See Worker Rights Consortium, *Factory Assessment*.
- 102 U.S. Customs and Border Protection “CBP Issues Detention Orders against Companies Suspected of Using Forced Labor,” Press Release, October 1, 2019, <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-detention-orders-against-companies-suspected-using-forced>.
- 103 Information based on an industry source.
- 104 The Fair Labor Association, in an alert to its corporate members, also identified this as a risk factor. Fair Labor Association, *Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China* (Washington, DC: Fair Labor Association, 2019), https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/china-forced-labor_april-2019.pdf.
- 105 The Fair Labor Association instructed its corporate members to “presume that any sourcing in which the supplier may have been provided workers through government labor agencies to be forced labor.” *Fair Labor Association, Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China*.
- 106 A new factory near a detention center is a red flag, but factories distant from known detention centers are also using forced labor.
- 107 Multiple terms in Chinese can be translated into English to mean “vocational training centers.” Adrian Zenz identifies the Chinese characters that are indicative of links to the detention centers or what the Chinese government calls “vocational training” centers and “reeducation.” Zenz, “Beyond the Camps.”
- 108 Han, Wong, and Dewell, *Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies: A report on forced labor and prison labor in Xinjiang, China, and the nexus to global supply chains*, 30. This is one of the criteria the CIPFC considers an indicator of forced prison labor, noting, for example, a large company with 100 million RMB in profits, multiple subsidiaries involved in manufacturing, but only 15 employees. However, experts on forced labor in China note that in some instances, prison enterprises pay social security for their workers.
- 109 Jiangsu Lianfa’s annual report for 2018 states, “The company has not carried out specific poverty alleviation work in the report year, and there is no follow-up specific poverty alleviation plan.” Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co., Ltd. *2018 Annual Report*. http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STO/CK/2019/2019-4/2019-04-23/5232475.PDF or <https://perma.cc/6SEL-LHBC>. However, Jiangsu Lianfa received an award for its work on poverty alleviation in 2017-2018, although it is not yet known whether that work occurred in Xinjiang. “Thirty One Companies Including Ningxia Hengfeng were awarded as National Advanced Units for Poverty Alleviation in the Textile Industry,” Ningxia News Net, August 1, 2018, website: <http://nx.people.com.cn/n2/2018/0801/c192482-31881889.html> or <https://perma.cc/RU4Y-R29W>.
- 110 According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, “the enterprise should consider ending the relationship, taking into account credible assessments of potential adverse human rights impacts of doing so.” Office of the High Commissioner, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Human Rights, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
- 111 *Akayesu*, (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 595.
- 112 “An attack may also be nonviolent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner.” *Akayesu*, (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 581. See also Rutaganda (Trial Chamber), December 6, 1999. Para 70, and Musema, (Trial Chamber), January 27, 2000, para 205.
- 113 The concept of ‘systematic’ may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of preconceived plan or policy. *Akayesu*, (Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 580. See also Semanza, (Trial Chamber) May 15, 2003, para 326

- 114 U.S. Congress, House, *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*, HR 4868, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in House May 21, 1986, Section 310, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/4868>.
- 115 Ibid. Section 208.
- 116 Ibid., Section 303 (b).
- 117 Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” *Code of Federal Regulations*, title 3 (2017), <https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=5ffcf3faa-f653e73e33789e4de2eca15&mc=true&node=pt31.3.583&rgn=div5#sp31.3.583.b>
- 118 *Tariff Act of 1930*, U.S. Code 19 1307, Section 307, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title19/pdf/USCODE-2011-title19-chap4-subtitleII-partI-sec1307.pdf>.
- 119 CBP’s website lists its historic seizures: <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-community/programs-outreach/convict-importations/detention-orders>.
- 120 Uzbek Cotton Pledge,” Responsible Sourcing Network, <https://www.sourcingtonetwork.org/uzbek-cotton-pledge>.
- 121 According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, if a company is directly linked through its business relationships to severe human rights impacts, and it cannot mitigate those impacts, it should consider ending the relationship. Mitigation is likely to be extremely challenging in the Xinjiang context. “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” Principle 19, Commentary, in United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Project, Respect and Remedy” Framework* (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
- 122 Forced labor red flags differ in Xinjiang from other contexts because of the role of the state in forced labor and the nexus of forced labor to mass detention and repression.
- 123 According to the OECD, “In such circumstances, there may also be a heightened expectation of transparency and reporting, so companies ‘know and show’ that the adverse impacts in the separate production line are not directly linked to its own products by its business relationship with the Asian supplier.”
Due diligence in the financial sector: adverse impacts directly linked to financial sector operations, products or services by a business relationship, OECD, 2014, <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/global-forum/GFRBC-2014-financial-sector-document-1.pdf>.
- 124 As Adrian Zenz has noted, the Chinese state is incarcerating ethnic and religious minorities in a number of different types of facilities, ranging from high-security prisons to what the government calls “vocational training centers.” Zenz, “Beyond the Camps.” The detainee was held in what are believed to typically be the lowest security and least abusive facilities, where vocational training purportedly occurs. Although some call these “reeducation facilities” or “vocational training centers,” little genuine education or vocational training occurs in them. They are used to heavily guard and detain mass numbers of ethnic and religious minorities, so we call them detention facilities, which is more consistent with their true nature and purpose.
- 125 “What is forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking,” International Labor Organization, <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm>.

CSIS | **CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

Repression Across Borders:

The CCP's Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans



Uyghur Americans hold a human rights demonstration despite Chinese government intimidation and harassment in the United States, April 6th 2019 © Bitter Winter

- The Chinese regime is implementing a systematic, ambitious, multi-year, well-resourced, relentless and cruel policy to inflict pain and suffering on Uyghurs abroad, preventing the Uyghur American community from enjoying their constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.
- Since its campaign of mass detention began, the Chinese government has been escalating its tactics of intimidation, including threatening Uyghur Americans with placing their family members in the camps.
- UHRP calls upon the United States government to use appropriate powers to bring an end to this illegal behavior, including through legislation and law enforcement authorities' investigation of harassment, threats and coercion.

August 2019

UHRP
UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT

A call via WeChat to a Uyghur man from an unknown contact who identified himself as a police officer in China:

The alleged police officer knew certain information about the carpenter's career, who he worked with, and even his salary in the U.S. The police officer assured the carpenter that his parents were safe but threatened that there were others who would imprison them, unless the carpenter provided information to the Chinese authorities.

A text message to a Uyghur living abroad from a police officer:

Please don't be a disaster for your loved ones. You better think more about your family members

A voicemail received by a camp survivor from her brother:

How could you do this to your parents, to us? What kind of daughter are you? You should go to the Chinese Embassy right away and denounce all the things you said about the Chinese government in the interviews you gave to the Radio Free Asia and tell them you love China. Tell them you were pressured by the Uyghur organizations in the U.S. to lie about your detention and torture in the camps and take back everything you said. Otherwise China can get you wherever you hide.

Messages received by a Uyghur Canadian:

I'm getting continuous harassing calls from police in China. Today I got a message threatening me, to detain all my relatives and asking me to cooperate instead of harming them by my activities. It's very frustrating, leading to suicide thoughts.

A student on the pressure to stay quiet:

All I wanted was to get my degree and go back to my homeland. My parents are suffering because of me. By breaking the silence, I am risking the life of my family members.

A Uyghur American student on overseas Uyghurs' fear of being reported to Chinese officials:

They are afraid of being reported by informants who could either be Uyghur or Chinese and they essentially send their names back to the Chinese government, and the Chinese government questions their family members and then detains them or sends them to camps.

A Uyghur American on being contacted by Chinese State Security agents:

They are just telling us, "We are watching you. Wherever you go, still you are a Chinese." Even though abroad, it doesn't mean they can't do something to you. Because they have your friends, your relatives.

Table of Contents

I.	Executive Summary.....	3
II.	Methodology.....	5
III.	Government Framework in the U.S. to Protect Uyghurs.....	7
	A. Legal Framework.....	7
	B. State Department.....	7
	C. Congressional Action.....	9
IV.	Chinese Government Aggression Against Uyghurs.....	13
	A. Police Harassment Through Family in East Turkestan.....	13
	B. Pressure to Inform to Chinese Authorities and Fears of Being Informed Upon..	17
	C. Uyghurs in the U.S. Increasingly Speak Out	19
	D. #MeTooUyghur Campaign.....	23
	E. Barriers to Reporting Harassment in the U.S.....	26
	F. University Students Targeted in the U.S.....	27
	G. Cyber-threats Beyond East Turkestan.....	30
V.	Conclusion.....	35
VI.	Recommendations.....	36
VII.	Acknowledgments.....	38
VIII.	Endnotes.....	39

I. Executive Summary

There are an estimated 1,500 to 5,000 Uyghur people living in the United States, primarily in northern Virginia, as well as in California and Texas. The Uyghur American community includes many brave journalists, activists and students engaged in raising awareness about the crisis of repression in their homeland, East Turkestan.¹ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is engaged in a campaign of extreme repression against Uyghurs in East Turkestan, in what has become as one of the greatest humanitarian crises of the 21st century.

The United States has provided a haven and a new home for Uyghur Americans, where they can freely live, study, work and prosper. Yet the Chinese regime is still present for the Uyghur American community, preventing enjoyment of their constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. UHRP concludes that the Chinese government is implementing a systematic, ambitious, multi-year, well-resourced, relentless and cruel policy to inflict pain and suffering on Uyghurs abroad in an attempt to control their speech. The campaign constitutes an ongoing series of crimes committed with impunity on U.S. persons.

The situation confronting the Uyghur diaspora has become increasingly severe since 2017 when the Chinese authorities began a campaign of rounding up Uyghurs and imprisoning them in so-called reeducation camps, which many observers have called concentration camps.¹ The prison camps are part of a new Strike Hard campaign, an unprecedented effort by the CCP to stifle the Uyghur identity and control Uyghurs who speak out about the oppressive conditions they experience. Ultimately, these prison camps, and other forms of coercion and forced political indoctrination, aim to eradicate the Uyghur identity itself.

“the Chinese government is implementing a systematic, ambitious, multi-year, well-resourced, relentless and cruel policy to inflict pain and suffering on Uyghurs abroad in an attempt to control their speech.”

The repression in the Uyghurs’ homeland does not stop at international borders. Virtually all Uyghurs in America have relatives or close family members detained in the prison camps, experience a high level of anxiety about their treatment and wellbeing, and live in daily fear that additional family members may be taken at any time. The Chinese government is engaged in a systematic and widespread campaign to intimidate and silence Uyghur Americans. This campaign of repression not only inflicts severe emotional and psychological pain on every family, but also constitutes a systematic and ongoing violation of Americans’ rights and freedoms by a foreign power on American soil.

Since this campaign of mass detention began, the Chinese government has been using the tactic of threatening Uyghur Americans with placing their family members in the camps. Some of the threats are vague messages to consider the welfare of their families; others are explicit threats to detain family members in the camps. Chinese officials contact Uyghurs in the United States, by

¹ The Chinese government refers to East Turkestan as Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. *Xin jiang* in Chinese means new territory, reflecting the relatively recent Chinese colonization of the Uyghur homeland.

text, chat apps, voicemail, email, and via messages delivered by third parties. Some members of the community report receiving such messages on a weekly and at-times even a near-daily basis.

Chinese officials in East Turkestan also coerce Uyghur Americans' families in East Turkestan to contact their relatives in the U.S. to make requests for information about Uyghurs in America, and to ask them to keep silent about what is happening to them. Uyghur Americans must also be wary of possible Chinese government informers among the community in the United States. Many or most of those who turn over this information do so because they themselves have been told that their families will suffer if they do not cooperate. While labor-intensive, this has been a simple and effective strategy to silence Uyghur critics and regulate the behavior of all Uyghurs, including U.S. citizens, legal residents, and students enrolled in American universities.

This campaign of harassment, surveillance and coercion is a brazen assault on the rights and freedoms of American citizens, permanent residents, and foreign students enrolled in American universities. These actions by Chinese government agents inflict severe emotional and psychological distress and pain on the targets and the entire Uyghur American community. These actions constitute crimes under federal and state law. Despite coverage of this campaign in Western media since early 2018, and attention called to it by Congressional hearings and provisions of pending legislation, the campaign continues unabated.

This campaign of harassment, surveillance and coercion is a brazen assault on the rights and freedoms of American citizens, permanent residents, and foreign students enrolled in American universities.

UHRP calls upon the United States government to use the appropriate powers and authorities to bring an end to this illegal and unacceptable pattern of crimes on American soil and take measures to bring the perpetrators to account. UHRP also calls upon the governments of other countries to take the same actions to deter and punish these crimes perpetrated against their citizens.

To prepare this report, UHRP conducted ten interviews with Uyghur Americans who have provided insight into the machinery of Chinese harassment, surveillance and coercion. In the report, these interviews are interwoven with media coverage spotlighting the voices of Uyghur Americans who have spoken publicly about their treatment by Chinese officials. In addition, the report analyzes American legislation that attempts to protect this vulnerable community.


The report details specific threats, including those received on the Chinese messaging app, WeChat; pressure on Uyghur Americans to inform on their families; the #MeTooUyghur movement online; and reprisals the Chinese government has carried out against those who have spoken out about the imprisonment of their family members in the camps. The report also covers harassment in the university context and cyberattacks on Uyghur Americans. Finally, the report outlines the legal and government framework in the U.S. defining the harassment as a crime under federal law, examines barriers to Uyghur Americans reporting these crimes, and makes concrete recommendations to the United States government, including specific recommendations for law enforcement agencies confronting harassment of local Uyghurs.

II. Methodology

The primary means by which UHRP researched this report was through telephone interviews with Uyghur Americans. UHRP conducted ten interviews for the report, with Uyghurs primarily based in Virginia, as well as one individual located in Canada whose experiences shed light on conditions broadly in North America. From these individuals, UHRP obtained five screenshots of messages sent by police officers in China to Uyghurs via WeChat, the Chinese messaging app. UHRP also obtained a three-and-a-half minute recording of two Uyghurs in Canada discussing harassment, and a number of journal entries by a Uyghur American documenting the painful experience of being targeted by Chinese security in the U.S.

Even as this report details reprisals that Uyghur Americans face for speaking out about human rights, every individual who agreed to an interview put themselves and their families at risk for the very type of reprisal this report documents. As is standard practice in UHRP's reporting, the interview subjects have been anonymized, with any identifying information about them changed or redacted. However, because only four of the interview subjects had not already spoken out in the media, only these four interviews will be cited anonymously. The report includes UHRP's interviews with Uyghurs whose names have appeared in other media outlets alongside citations to the published media.

The report highlights sample screenshots of harassing WeChat messages, but does not include all the materials reviewed. Because these screenshots are highly identifiable, they have the potential to put the recipients' families at even greater risk of reprisal if Chinese security officials identify the users. UHRP notes that multiple news outlets cited in this report have similarly withheld publication of screenshotted conversations between overseas Uyghurs and Chinese police, including the *Associated Press*,² *Foreign Policy*,³ *Buzzfeed*⁴ and the *Wall Street Journal*.⁵ *Buzzfeed News* has published one of the only un-redacted screenshots of WeChat harassment, depicting a conversation between Uyghur American activist, Tahir Imin, and a state security agent. UHRP also spoke to Imin and the image is reprinted here:



Imin's WeChat conversation with an alleged Chinese security official. © BuzzFeed

UHRP has not published any images that might reveal individuals' identities. The report provides translations of the text of two conversations, one from the Uyghur language and another from Chinese, with all identifying details redacted. Section III provides screenshots of online harassment committed by alleged Chinese agents on YouTube.

This report builds on "The Fifth Poison: China's Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas,"⁶ a 45-page UHRP report published in November 2017, which documents harassment of Uyghurs globally. "The Fifth Poison" detailed a concerted campaign by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only to monitor and harass Uyghurs overseas, but also to recruit members of the community to "carry out espionage against others, replicating the system of control that exists in their homeland." UHRP described how the Chinese government achieved this coercion: by threatening retaliation against family members still within China. Since 2017, the Chinese government has intensified its use of these tactics even as it has instituted a mass incarceration of Uyghurs in prison camps.

III. Government Framework in the U.S. to Protect Uyghurs

A. Legal Framework


Harassment is illegal in the United States. Under federal law, 47 U.S. Code section 443(a)(1)(C) makes it a crime when an individual “makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass any specific person.” In Virginia, where the U.S.-based Uyghurs interviewed for this report are situated, state law similarly criminalizes “threatening” over public airways or other methods including by “any electronically transmitted communication producing a visual or electronic message that is received or transmitted by cellular telephone or other wireless telecommunications device.” While harassment by telephone is less common, this report documents some calls and many text messages sent via the Chinese messaging app WeChat to Uyghur Americans.

However, the U.S. government is unable to exercise criminal jurisdiction over most of the perpetrators of harassment against Uyghur American citizens, since individuals based in China conduct the majority of Chinese government-sponsored harassment. In addition, the retribution exacted in connection with the threats—arbitrary imprisonment or worse of an individual’s family members in China—is not necessarily an actionable crime against the U.S. citizen, though it is both a crime against humanity and a violation of internationally recognized human rights of the targeted individual.

Under 18 U.S. Code Section 241, called “Conspiracy against rights,” it is unlawful for “two or more persons to agree to injure, threaten, or intimidate any individual anywhere in the U.S. in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same).” This section also applies to the behaviors of Chinese government agents who threaten Uyghur Americans to prevent them from engaging in constitutionally protected behaviors, particularly exercising their freedom of speech.

B. State Department

One of the most egregious examples of China targeting a Uyghur American for exercising constitutionally protected rights in the U.S. was the arrest of the aunt and uncle of U.S. activist Ferkat Jawdat days after he met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on March 27, 2019.⁷ UHRP spoke to Mr. Jawdat in February 2019; and he described his ordeal at that time. Jawdat’s mother had been unsuccessful in trying to leave East Turkestan, as she was unable to obtain a passport after Jawdat and his father fled the country. Mr. Jawdat had learned about harassment of his mother and aunt in East Turkestan as family members begged him over WeChat to stop speaking publicly, and eventually, his family stopped contacting him altogether. When he spoke to UHRP in February, Mr. Jawdat said he had plans to speak to U.S. lawmakers, although not to law enforcement, to seek protection.⁸ After Mr. Jawdat’s family members were detained in reprisal for his meeting with Secretary Pompeo, the State Department posted a picture of Jawdat on its Facebook page in April⁹ detailing his mother’s detainment since February 2018.



Ferkat Jawdat calls for help from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Twitter on May 25, 2019¹⁰

On May 17, Mr. Jawdat received a phone call out of the blue from his mother for the first time in fifteen months. During the call, lasting over an hour, she told him that she was fine and that the Chinese government was making life for Uyghurs very good. She asked him repeatedly to stop speaking with the U.S. government and media about her situation and the conditions of Uyghurs in China. A few days later, he learned indirectly that she had been taken back into detention the day after the phone call.¹¹ This call demonstrates the cruel and barbaric manipulation of family members and emotional torture inflicted on Uyghur family members both in China and in the U.S. The State Department told *Newsweek* that “this account of them releasing his mother for one day to try to convince him to be silent is especially troubling and exposes China's duplicity on this issue.”¹² The State Department stated: “We call on the Chinese government to reverse its policies in Xinjiang and immediately release Jawdat's family members and the over one million other people arbitrarily detained in this campaign.” On June 28, Mr. Jawdat announced on Twitter his mother was released at last.¹³

U.S. permanent residents have also been targeted in East Turkestan. In March 2019, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, announced at a State Department briefing that he had just received a report of a Uyghur American permanent U.S. resident was being detained in one of the camps.¹⁴ UHRP also has direct knowledge of this case. Ambassador Brownback stated:

“He had legal status being here, traveled back to Xinjiang after being here with his son in California. And then has not been heard from since. And he's deeply concerned about whether, what his treatment is. He has a number of chronic illnesses, he's a 75-year-old man and an intellectual.”

These incidents are neither isolated nor unknown to the State Department. The State Department's media website, share.america.gov, has reported on the targeting of Uyghur Americans, including threatening calls and texts.¹⁵ And at a July 2018 Congressional hearing, Acting United States Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Currie testified about attacks on Uyghur Americans:

“The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has compelled them to stop communicating with their family and friends based abroad, including in the United States, for fear of retribution by authorities. We have received reports that U.S. lawful permanent residents and family members of

U.S. citizens have been detained in these detention centers for indefinite periods. We have also received reports that U.S. citizens have been detained and interrogated while visiting Xinjiang.... This treatment of U.S. citizens, U.S. LPRs [editor's note: Lawful Permanent Residents, or green card holders], and their family members is unacceptable, and we unequivocally condemn these actions by the Chinese government.”¹⁶

UHRP has also documented instances where Chinese police have demanded Uyghur Americans return to China by threatening to hurt their families. For these Uyghurs, return to China spells a high risk of imprisonment, and even torture. Uyghurs fear that just visiting the U.S. may lead to detention, and the *South China Morning Post* recently reported on the case of Jurat Nizamidin, whose wife, Zulpiya Jalaeddin, was detained in January shortly after visiting the United States.¹⁷

Arbitrary detention and torture violate international human rights obligations, and this report's recommendations address the obligation of the U.S. government to take effective policy measures to deter violations and to protect the rights of U.S. citizens and to ensure the enjoyment of Constitutionally protected rights of all those living or staying in the U.S.

C. Congressional Action

The U.S. Congress has also initiated action to highlight the imperative to protect Uyghur Americans' rights, through the Uyghur Human Rights and Policy Act (UHRPA). First introduced in November 2018, the UHRPA¹⁸ was re-introduced by Senators Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) on January 17, 2019. One of the key provisions of the Act addresses the protection of Uyghur people living in the United States. Section 4 of the bill notes that “Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have now obtained permanent residence or citizenship in other countries, attest to receiving threats and harassment from Chinese officials.”

As a remedy, the bill would task the FBI and “appropriate United States law enforcement entities” to “track and take steps to hold accountable officials from China who harass, threaten, or intimidate United States citizens and legal permanent residents, including Turkic Muslims, Uyghur-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Chinese nationals legally studying or working in the United States.” The Act mandates that within 90 days of its passing, “the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees that outline efforts to provide information to and protect United States citizens and residents, including ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals legally studying or working temporarily in the United States who have experienced harassment.”

The UHRPA directs the FBI to protect Uyghur Americans. In fact, only one of the Uyghur Americans who spoke to UHRP for this report had ever spoken to the FBI about harassment they had faced. The bill highlights the need to conduct outreach that would raise awareness among Uyghurs in the United States about why and how to report to federal authorities the illegal threats and coercion they experience directly from agents of a foreign government. Senator Rubio and New Jersey Representative Chris Smith sent a letter to the FBI Chief in October 2018 urging the FBI to also consider establishing an anonymous tip line so that the agency could facilitate reporting by Uyghur Americans facing harassment from Chinese authorities.¹⁹

The Act also commends *Radio Free Asia's* Uyghur service reporters for working in spite of the CCP's efforts to “intimidate their reporting through threats and detention of family members

living in China.” *Radio Free Asia* is a media group funded by the United States Congress through an independent federal agency, the U.S. Agency for Global Media. RFA has been at the forefront of delivering news from East Turkestan. A March 2019 report in the *Atlantic* stated:

“The full scope and severity of the situation in Xinjiang are still unknown. But from the day China’s detention campaign began in earnest, RFA’s Uighur Service—the only Uighur-language news outlet in the world that is independent of Chinese government influence—has frequently been at the tip of the spear of coverage. From the RFA offices in Washington, D.C., its team of 12 journalists has broken hundreds of stories, sometimes bearing sole witness to China’s alarming and escalating crackdown on Uighurs and other Muslim minority groups in the country.”²⁰

Another important way that Congress has supported Uyghurs has been by holding formal Congressional hearings to provide a platform for targeted Uyghurs to speak about harassment they face. In May 2016, the year before China began the massive roundup of 1-3 million Uyghur citizens into prison camps and other coercive forms of political indoctrination and forced labor, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) held a hearing at which Uyghur American activists spoke out about the targeting of family members in reprisal for their work. Current Uyghur American Association (UAA) President Ishaq Hassan Kokbore, a Uyghur American residing in Virginia, testified: “I hope the U.S. government and U.S. Congress can understand the Chinese government’s long arm, which stretches beyond China’s borders to overseas, to threaten and harass overseas human rights activists.”

Mr. Kokbore testified about the Chinese government’s actions against his family. Chinese authorities denied Mr. Kokbore’s wife and son passports, which ultimately resulted in Kokbore and his wife divorcing, and separated Kokbore from his son for ten years. Even after the divorce, Kokbore’s ex-wife was “continually under surveillance and threats.” Police also harassed his sister, breaking into her home in the middle of the night, and detaining her for 8 to 10 months without charge.²¹ Nevertheless, Kokbore has continued to serve not only as the leader of UAA, but also as a frequent public speaker and prolific writer, publishing essays in a variety of outlets including the UHRP and UAA blogs, and on social media, tirelessly raising awareness about the Uyghur human rights crisis. He appealed directly to Congress at the hearing, “If China isn’t pressured to stop this kind of harassment, no one will be safe, regardless of where we live.”



Ilshat Hassan Kokbore testifies before CECC Chair and Co-chair Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Chris Smith on May 24, 2016. ©UHRP

Another Uyghur American who testified before Congress at the May 2016 CECC hearing was Shohret Hoshur, a journalist with the *Radio Free Asia* Uyghur language service. Prior to testifying, Hoshur had been featured across media when his brother, Tudaxun Hoshur, was sentenced to five years in prison in June 2014, in reprisal for Shohret's reporting for RFA. Slate reported, "As far as anyone can tell, China became the first government to persecute a family member of an American journalist in retaliation for his reporting."²² Shohret Hoshur testified that Chinese agents had taped his conversations with his other brothers in East Turkestan, Rexim and Shawket. Rexim and Shawket were subsequently imprisoned for speaking with him.²³

In February 2018, the *Washington Post* reported that Rexim and Shawket had been briefly released in 2015 because of US pressure, but they were detained again in the prison camps in September 2017. Several RFA Uyghur staff were being targeted by 2017. "We're very concerned about the well-being and safety of our journalists' family members, especially those in need of medical treatment," said Rohit Mahajan, director of public affairs at *Radio Free Asia* in Washington. "We're also particularly concerned about the use of detentions as a tactic by Chinese authorities to silence and intimidate independent media, as well as to inhibit RFA's mission of bringing free press to closed societies."

In 2018, the *Washington Post* reported detentions of family members of Shohret Hoshur, Gulchehra Hoja, Mamatjan Juma and Kurban Niyaz—four ethnic Uyghur journalists with *Radio Free Asia* in Washington, who are all US citizens or green card holders.²⁴ Hoja testified to Congress in July 2018 that Chinese authorities targeted her family in East Turkestan. She stated:

"I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was detained at the end of September last year. Police had taken him when he was driving my mother to a doctor's appointment, leaving her alone in a car without explanation as she waited for her son who'd never return. In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from

life-threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my mother and father, or to learn how they were doing, was almost too much to bear. Being almost 7,000 miles away, I felt helpless—even more than when my brother was taken. I tried contacting other family but could not reach them. I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their children -- more than 20 people had been swept up by authorities. I found out later that all had been detained on the same day. No one has confirmed their whereabouts... My parents, whom I later discovered were held in medical facilities in detention camps, were allowed to leave in March -- probably because of their poor health. Authorities had questioned my parents about me, my whereabouts, and my working for an organization they alleged is ‘anti-China.’”²⁵

Uyghur Human Rights Project Board Chair Nury Turkel gave a grim update before Congress in September 2018. He testified:

“In total, 24 of Gulchehra Hoja’s relatives in Urumchi and Ghulja have been detained in internment camps, including her brother Kaisar Abduqeyum who was detained in October 2017 and has since disappeared. At least nine of Shohret Hoshur’s relatives are in one of four camps located in Qorghas county.... Two of Mamatjan Juma’s brothers are in internment camps, one in Kashgar and the other in Urumchi. Seven of Jilil Kashgary’s family members are in internment camps. His nephew Nurmemet, who had studied in Egypt for two years, was detained in Ghulja. Both Kurban Niyaz, and Eset Sulaiman have lost touch with their families.”²⁶

Another bill introduced in Congress to protect the Uyghur diaspora is called the UIGHUR Act of 2019.²⁷ Introduced by Rep Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), Section 12 of the Act is titled, “Protections for Diaspora.” It would commit the US to “forcefully oppose and protest all unlawful efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to censor, monitor, or otherwise exert pressure against” Uyghurs present in the United States. Among the specific mechanisms described in the Act are creation of a confidential and encrypted website to anonymously report incidents of harassment; a plan to publicize the website; a plan for cooperation between federal agencies to prevent harassment; and development of an overall strategy to prevent harassment and surveillance. In addition, the Act would require universities report harassment to the Secretary of State.

The Global Magnitsky Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2016 should also be used to deter human rights violations and hold to account the perpetrators of human rights abuses against Uyghurs. The violations encompass targeted punishment of relatives of Uyghur Americans who exercise their free-speech rights. Under an Executive Order issued by President Trump in December 2017, the Act could be used to freeze assets, prohibit any financial dealings with, and bar or revoke visas of officials implicated in human rights abuses, which includes Chinese government officials responsible for human rights abuses against Uyghurs in East Turkestan.²⁸ The UIGHUR Act of 2019 also devotes a section to mandating application of the Magnitsky Act to perpetrators of abuses against Uyghurs. Taken as a whole, these legislative measures present a strategy the U.S. must vigorously pursue to protect Uyghurs in the United States.

IV. Chinese Government Aggression Against Uyghurs

A. Police Harassment Through Family Members in East Turkestan

The practice of imprisoning the family members of Uyghurs who themselves are safe in the United States is extremely widespread and has only grown more common since China began the mass imprisonment of Uyghurs in prison camps. Almost always, these threats are made by voice call or text message through the Chinese messaging app, WeChat. Often, the messages calls are highly coded and frequently the harassers neither identify themselves nor their threats in explicit detail. At times they come from family members or acquaintances, instead of police directly, and often in such messages, the family members will alert their overseas relatives that the police are nearby or would like to follow up shortly. The threat is clear that if the person does not talk to the police, the family member will be in danger.

In an interview with UHRP, a Uyghur man who worked as a carpenter said he received a call via WeChat from an unknown contact who identified himself as a police officer in China and had known the carpenter before he left East Turkestan for the United States. The alleged police officer knew certain information about the carpenter's career, who he worked with, and even his salary in the U.S. The police officer assured the carpenter that his parents were safe but threatened that there were others who would imprison them, *unless* the carpenter provided information to the Chinese authorities. The agent repeatedly assured him that he could keep his parents safe.²⁹



Uyghur Canadian Guly Mahsut tweets about police harassment on May 20, 2019³⁰

UHRP interviewed Guly Mahsut, a Uyghur Canadian woman who explained that authorities had continuously threatened her through her family, driving her to the point of extreme mental stress. Mahsut's family had become non-responsive on WeChat when after several months, suddenly her whole family had reached out to her and asked her to speak to a police officer in China, Kaysar.³¹ She posted on Twitter a record of his calls, which showed that he called every day and sometimes twice daily. She also posted a text message from the police officer, Kaysar, in which he threatened her family's safety:

"We are good. We should support each other well so your family and your relatives in Toqsu won't suffer because of you. Please don't be a disaster for your loved ones. You better think more about your family members."³²

A camp survivor, Mihrigul Tursun, also describes a family member calling her to pressure her to be silent. In her November 2018 Congressional testimony, she stated:

"The Chinese government must have also forced my brother to reach out to me. He left a voicemail on the cell phone I brought from China. My brother said: How could you do this to your parents, to us? What kind of daughter are you? You should go to the Chinese Embassy right away and denounce all the things you said about the Chinese government in the interviews you gave to the Radio Free Asia and tell them you love China. Tell them you were pressured by the Uyghur organizations in the U.S. to lie about your detention and torture in the camps, and take back everything you said. Otherwise China can get you wherever you hide."³³

These messages illustrate the way Chinese authorities apply pressure against Uyghurs abroad through their family members at home, adding to the extreme and intense emotional distress for all involved. In addition, UHRP obtained a recording of another Uyghur describing the types of information Chinese officials requested from her. The recording illustrates the demands levied against diaspora Uyghurs by Chinese authorities—widespread requests that are effective in creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.

In the recording, the Uyghur Canadian states that Chinese officials asked her to provide "8 or 9 types" of photographic proof, an almost absurdly vague phrase that has been used frequently by Chinese officials to surveil diaspora Uyghurs. She describes the "8 or 9 types" of proof as follows: "take a picture in front of a well-known building; take a picture in front of your house; take a picture with your classmates; take a picture when you are alone having fun outside; take a picture in front of your school." The authorities would not accept selfies, and they also required her to remove her headscarf in the photos – though she noted that luckily the weather was cold enough she was still able to wear a beanie. She was most terrified when the agents asked her to take pictures of her classmates and share information about them with the Chinese authorities.

UHRP obtained a WeChat conversation, reprinted here, between a Uyghur American woman and an individual claiming to be a Chinese security agent. Here is the conversation:

Officer: Hi, I'm the worker introduced by your father.

Officer: What's your name?

Aynura: Aynura. What about yours?

Officer: I'm with the police. Let's videochat when you have time. I'd like to see your office.

Aynura: Okay. What's your name?

Officer: Are you not at your office now? When were you hired?

Aynura: It's been nearly a year.

U.S. media have documented similar requests of Uyghur Americans since 2018. The *Daily Beast* reported in August 2018 that a Uyghur American woman, whose identity was kept anonymous, was asked by her mother to send photos of "her U.S. car license plate number, her phone number, her U.S. bank card number, and a photo of her ID card. [Her] mother said that China is creating a new ID card system that includes all Chinese, even those who are abroad."³⁴ Foreign Policy has reported a similar pattern in France.³⁵ The *Daily Beast* reported on another Uyghur American whose family requested she send pictures of a university employment contract, and a letter from an academic supervisor. "If they don't comply, these Uyghurs know that their relatives may be detained," the *Daily Beast* reported.³⁶ *DCist* also reported that DC-area Uyghurs had been asked to provide information to Chinese authorities including their address, phone numbers and passport numbers, and were asked to report about future protests and organizing activities as well as the names of other Uyghurs who had attended. Authorities making the requests reminded participants their families were safe – for now.³⁷

A July 2018 *BuzzFeed* report found that "one requirement for Uyghurs going abroad was to provide contact information for every living family member as well as contacts abroad and a letter from their employer stating the person would not misbehave while overseas." A Uyghur American told *BuzzFeed* that Chinese state security operatives began contacting him after he landed in the United States.³⁸ The *Independent* interviewed a Uyghur American who said:

"They are just telling us, 'We are watching you. Wherever you go, still you are a Chinese. Even though abroad, it doesn't mean they can't do something to you. Because they have your friends, your relatives.'"³⁹

Based on UHRP's research, Uyghur Americans are frequently kept in the dark as to who is harassing them, what their objective is, and how best to respond to keep their families safe. A recent Human Rights Watch report on a Chinese surveillance app, called IJOP or the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, may at least shed some light on why police ask Uyghur Americans for the type of information they seek.⁴⁰ IJOP is an app that "prompts government officials to collect detailed personal data from people in Xinjiang." HRW reports that IJOP is used by police officers as part of a massive surveillance system and the amount of personal information about Uyghurs in East Turkestan that officials must report is "a grueling task." HRW writes:


"One official lamented that many colleagues have "worked so hard" to meet the IJOP's appetite that "their eyes are so tired and reddened." These officials are under tremendous pressure to carry out the Strike Hard Campaign. Failure to fulfill its requirements can be dangerous, especially for cadres from ethnic minorities, because the Strike Hard Campaign also targets and detains officials thought to be disloyal. It is unclear how long Xinjiang authorities can sustain this high volume of labor-intensive investigations, though presumably authorities may be able to collect some of the personal information in a more automated manner in the future."⁴¹

The IJOP app requires police in East Turkestan to monitor Uyghurs' personal relationships, some of which are categorized as "inherently suspicious," and "demands that police officers file reports about several categories of individuals who have overseas connections." Not limited to

domestic surveillance, HRW notes that “use of mass surveillance extends beyond Xinjiang and into the Turkic Muslim diaspora as authorities pressure them to provide detailed information about themselves, including their address, phone number, and school or workplace.”

The app “instructs officers to investigate people” who have suspicious connections including foreign links. HRW explains that one suspicious category of connections is called the “Four Associations,” which refers to people with overseas contacts (the other three categories are people “linked to clues of cases,” people on the run, and people who are being especially watched). HRW writes:

“The IJOP app suggests the IJOP center sends alerts to officials about people with these problematic relationships, and prompts officials to further investigate and provide feedback on these relationships along with details about the person. The officer is also prompted to note the person’s behavior, and whether the person seems suspicious and needs to be investigated further.”⁴²



HRW’s screenshot of IJOP “Details of Overdue [i.e. Abroad too long] Person.” © Human Rights Watch

Another category subject to scrutiny are Uyghurs who have been abroad for “too long.” HRW describes a more specific procedure to report on foreign connections, which is also displayed in the screenshot of their report.

“Officials are prompted to investigate such cases by interrogating the person in question or their family members and other social relations. The app prompts the official to investigate whether this person has gone abroad, and if so, which country they went to and the reasons for the trip . . . The app then prompts officials to add the person’s contacts abroad by opening a related page. Finally, the app asks

officials to note if they think this person's activities abroad are suspicious, and to describe the reasons for their suspicion."⁴³

HRW's research sheds light on some of the more bizarre-seeming requests for photographs, though it does not explain Chinese authorities' exact intention nor even the process by which the app was created.

UHRP's interviews capture some of the psychological effects of this program on Uyghur Americans, and demonstrate that by investigating Uyghurs abroad and pressuring their family members to inform on each other, the Chinese government has created an environment of fear to prevent Uyghurs from enjoying their rights under the U.S. constitution, including to speak about human rights abuses perpetrated by the CCP. By forcing Uyghurs to provide information about friends and family members, the CCP also undermines trust within the community.

The *New York Times* reports that IJOP is only one piece of an extreme high-tech surveillance campaign targeting the Uyghur people in East Turkestan.⁴⁴ This campaign is data-intensive and intrusive. The Chinese government sends the message to Uyghurs even in the free world that it can and will track down and find them. The government knows who they are, finds them on WeChat, knows their family details, and uses high tech programs to get them. The local surveillance and Orwellian tech in China are tied to the rights of Uyghur Americans.

B. Pressure to Inform to Chinese Authorities and Fears of Being Informed Upon

UHRP interviewed a working-age Uyghur man who expressed concern that other Uyghurs would be forced to inform on him. Although he said no Uyghur could be certain who might inform, he felt especially suspicious if Chinese authorities allowed someone to travel freely to China. The interviewee was also suspicious of Uyghurs who are able to freely use the WeChat messaging app, because the chat app is heavily censored and Chinese authorities surveil and restrict Uyghurs using the site.⁴⁵ Even the exercise of basic freedom in the U.S.—chatting online with family or visiting your hometown from overseas—are suspicious because of IJOP and the Strike Hard investigations.

In January 2019, *Al Jazeera* reported that in 2012 Amat, a Uyghur man, succumbed to Chinese pressure in Turkey and informed on those around him after officials arrested and tortured his mother, “threatening to keep her in detention unless he agreed to work for them.”⁴⁶

“Amat says China is getting bolder on the international front, claiming government operatives have abducted Uyghurs abroad. Once back in China, he says, many disappear into the reeducation centres... It was while he was serving his sentence [in a reeducation camp] that he says authorities recruited him... Amat confesses he's been consumed with guilt for informing on fellow Uyghurs. ‘It's like a painful needle stabbing into me every time.’ I asked him why he's decided to share this information now. Amat says he no longer has much to lose. Most of his family have been placed in centres, in part, he says, because of his spying.”⁴⁷

Over a decade before the latest Strike Hard campaign, China pressured Uyghurs overseas to inform. In 2006, *Radio Free Asia* reported on a Uyghur American who refused to provide information to Chinese authorities. Parhat Yasin had been in the U.S. since the 1990s. In 2004 he received several phone calls from State Security Bureau officers in his hometown of Ghulja. The officials told him that they would give his wife and children passports in exchange for his passing information to Chinese officials about the identities and activities of other Uyghurs he knew, including the affairs of the Uyghur American Association. He refused. He told RFA:

“In the last 10 years, my children have been living under house arrest... and the government did not issue them passports. The secret police of the State Security Bureau have phoned me many times to work for them. They said they would let my children go if I work for them.”⁴⁸

China’s extensive use of surveillance sows distrust among the Uyghur community in the United States. “There’s a high-level sense of fear and paranoia among the exile communities,” said Maya Wang, senior China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “There’s a lot of distrust among each other...It’s much more than the Han community abroad.”⁴⁹ *DCist* reported that this uncertainty about the situation in China is a major source of stress for the Uyghur American community. “The stress among the community is insane,” said U.S.-based Uyghur Irade Kashgary to *DCist*. Other community members told *DCist* that this was the most common discussion topic among the Uyghur American community.

This widespread fear can prevent Uyghurs from participating in political activities in the U.S. In an interview with UHRP, the Uyghur carpenter stated, “There are protests, and I want to go. My soul is there. I want to go. But I can’t because I know there are spies.” When he went to the UHRP office to pick up a friend, he said he would hide his face: “I wear a hat, get glasses, I cover my face. I’m in a free country but when I go to my people’s office, I cover my face. I didn’t even cover my face in China, but I cover my face here.”

A Uyghur woman who works as a musician told UHRP that police would visit her family in China and threaten them. Her family members would then tell her, “If you go to a protest, we will never call you again.” She knew they didn’t want to say threaten her, but someone was pushing them, without revealing their identity. Nevertheless, their message was clear: “If you do this, your mother and father are in danger, so shut your mouth, don’t go to demonstrations. That’s the message that we got.”⁵⁰

UHRP Director Omer Kanat told *Buzzfeed*: “Some Uighurs choose not to live in the DC area to try to avoid the notice of the authorities. Some Uighurs in the diaspora avoid even visiting the DC area. The Chinese police ask Uighurs if they have ever traveled to Washington, DC, and they receive more questioning if they answer yes.”⁵¹ *DCist* reported that many Uyghurs wear masks or sunglasses to the Uyghur American protests to try to maintain anonymity.⁵²

Although UHRP’s research has uncovered the effects of forcing Uyghurs to inform, the internal mechanism within the CCP remain opaque. As UHRP wrote in *The Fifth Poison*:

Because espionage work is inherently obscure it is not always clear which department is conducting the work of monitoring the Uyghur community overseas. The Ministry of State Security is China’s principle civilian intelligence agency, carrying out intelligence gathering both overseas and domestically, especially concerning “security cases and issues ‘linked to foreign factors’ or ‘foreign organizations,’ including those operating inside China, or those trying to enter China.” However, it is likely not the only ministry responsible for monitoring of Uyghurs abroad.⁵³

UHRP concluded that the Ministry of Public Security is likely also involved in overseas harassment. The harassment reported here is carried out by individual Chinese police officers who target both Uyghurs overseas and their family members in East Turkestan.

C. Uyghurs in the U.S. Increasingly Speak Out

Despite China's efforts to silence the Uyghur community, more individuals are speaking out as the mass incarceration of Uyghurs in concentration camps becomes more severe. In 2018, UHRP collected testimonies from 27 North American based Uyghurs regarding 180 friends and relatives detained, sentenced, or missing in East Turkestan. UHRP documented these testimonies in the August 2018 report, "The Mass Internment of Uyghurs."⁵⁴ On November 28, 2018, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China organized a hearing on Capitol Hill in which Mihrigul Tursun spoke to Congress about her experience in detention in the internment campaign, including witnessing terrible conditions and the deaths of other Uyghur detainees.⁵⁵ A Chinese minister responded for the CCP by formally denouncing Tursun's testimony.⁵⁶




Tahir Hamut posts an image of his detained brother, Adil Hamut, on Twitter on Feb. 11, 2019⁵⁷

UHRP spoke with a number of Uyghurs who have shared their stories publicly with the media. China's attempt to limit and counteract international media coverage of the Uyghur human-rights crisis has extended beyond Uyghur journalists, to Uyghur activists who speak to the media. Tahir Hamut had had no direct contact with his family since October 2017 when he was approached by the *Wall Street Journal* for an interview in December 2017. His wife's two brothers had been sent to a reeducation camp in November. Nevertheless, Hamut accepted the interview, and the article was published in December 2017.⁵⁸ Soon afterward, Hamut's younger brother disappeared, on December 25, 2017.⁵⁹

Hamut told UHRP that when he first came to the United States in August 2017, Chinese government informants among the members of the Uyghur American community were already a major concern. He described this pattern of Chinese official behavior as widespread and said while Chinese authorities often don't explicitly vocalize threats, many Uyghur Americans are afraid to participate in human rights activities, for fear that Chinese authorities would hurt their families.⁶⁰ He told the *South China Morning Post* in September 2018 that he decided to speak to the U.S. State Department about Uyghur human rights, even though he feared that the very act of speaking may potentially put his family members back in East Turkestan in danger. He said:

“Morally, we felt awful, guilty, and burdened. But other Uyghurs, even without relatives in the US, are getting arrested all the time. So in the end, my wife and I decided that we would pass all our relatives in Xinjiang into the hands of God.”⁶¹

UHRP also spoke to Tahir Imin, a Uyghur activist who has shared his story publicly with the *New York Times*, *Al Jazeera*, *Buzzfeed* and the *Atlantic*. Mr. Imin told UHRP that he feared for his safety because he had spoken to media outlets in the US about China’s harassment of his family.⁶² Mr. Imin fled to the U.S. after spending two years in prison for writing an article titled “Uyghur Culture in Danger.” Mr. Imin reported that Chinese police officers contacted him after he arrived in the United States.



*Tahir Imin Tweeted about his separation from his daughter on April 24, 2019*⁶³

In a video for the *Atlantic*, Imin described what the officers said to him:

“You make up stories to get yourself out of here and over there you go and make a big scene. It’s because there are so many two-faced people like you that Uyghurs have come to this. They don’t trust one another; they gossip behind one another’s backs. Are you not ashamed to speak like that, Tahir? But your daughter will not turn out to be a treacherous bastard like you, that’s for sure.”⁶⁴

To *BuzzFeed*, Imin described a separate call with his daughter. She said: “Father, you’ve brought a lot of troubles to my mother and me, and you are a bad person. The police are the good people and they are helping us. You shouldn’t talk to us.” After that, Imin’s family deleted his contact on WeChat. He has not spoken to his family since April 2018 and has heard that his extended family members have been sent to the camps.⁶⁵ Imin told UHRP that he continues to check WeChat for news of his family, but he is generally reluctant to use the app.

Another Uyghur who has faced harsh reprisal for speaking out is Uyghur American activist Rushan Abbas, whose aunt and sister were detained just six days after she spoke about Uyghur human rights at the Hudson Institute in Washington in 2018.⁶⁶ Ms. Abbas published an Op-ed in the Washington Post describing what had taken place:



Rushan Abbas with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi at a Tiananmen anniversary protest, June 4, 2019⁶⁷

“My 56-year-old sister, Gulshan Abbas, lives in Urumqi ... [and h]er two daughters live in the United States. They kept in touch with their mother using WeChat, calling every few days, but starting on Sept. 11, they couldn’t get through. At first they thought her phone was broken or that she was sick. Days passed by without news. Then they started to imagine the worst: Could she have been taken to the camps? As I spoke with relatives, I learned that my aunt Mayinur Abliz, a 64-year-old housewife in Artush, about 900 miles away from Urumqi, had disappeared the same day. Six days earlier, I had participated in a panel at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, in which I had spoken about the situation in East Turkestan. Now two of my closest relatives back home had vanished.”⁶⁸

In an interview this year, Abbas described additional family members who have been targeted:

“My in-laws in Hotan city vanished: a 69- and 71-year-old farmer and his wife, three of their daughters and one daughter-in-law plus their husbands disappeared. My husband, Abdulhakim Idris, and I have not been able to find their whereabouts since April 2017. We fear that they were all taken to the infamous camps. We have no idea where my husband’s 14 nieces and nephews, aged 3 to 22, are today. They may have been sent to orphanages in inner China. We also heard that Abdurehim Idris, my brother-in-law, was sentenced to 20 years in jail.”⁶⁹

Even as Uyghurs speak out, a main objective is to identify what has happened to their family members. Uyghurs often report that their family members block them on WeChat. With this communication cut, Uyghurs have no idea whether family members are detained or even alive.

UHRP interviewed a Uyghur woman, a scientist, who said that China interrupts communication between Uyghurs on WeChat. After leaving China for Turkey six years ago, she

was able to message her family freely until 2017. After October 2017, her communication with her family was cut and she barely had access to information from them. Then one day, her mother wrote on WeChat and said the neighborhood police were going to add her and ask some questions, advising her daughter to answer. She did so, adding the alleged CCP agent on WeChat and sending pictures of her passport and other documents. Then, upon her arrival in the U.S., a new user who explicitly identified himself as police, added her immediately on WeChat, and began asking her to do the same. “I am not able to talk to my family,” she said. She would check WeChat twice weekly, in spite of the threatening government presence, for any family updates posted online.⁷⁰

In an interview with *Business Insider*, Virginia-based Bahram Sintash explained that his mother and sister blocked him on WeChat in February 2018. “Before, WeChat was the only tool that we [used to] communicate with each other,” Mr. Sintash told *BI*.⁷¹ “Almost once every two or three days we sent messages and pictures. I often sent my son’s pictures.” Seven months after his mother blocked him, Mr. Sintash heard from a contact on the ground — whom he declined to name — that his father Qurban Mamut, a 68-year-old retired editor, had gone missing. “I tried to find out the exact news, but I couldn’t get any news out because people can’t talk to outsiders,” Sintash said.⁷²

The pattern that has emerged of targeting Uyghur Americans’ family members is not new. The Chinese authorities have targeted Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer since she first arrived in the United States in 2005 to prevent her from engaging in human rights activities. An entrepreneur, Rebiya Kadeer was the fifth richest person in China before Chinese authorities arrested her in 1999 after she spoke critically of the Chinese government and collected documentation of human rights abuses against Uyghurs during the 1997 Ghulja massacre. Thanks to concerted international and diplomatic efforts on her behalf, Ms. Kadeer was released in 2005 to the U.S. on medical parole. In the U.S. she immediately began speaking out against the Chinese government’s mistreatment of Uyghurs in East Turkestan, drawing the ire of the Chinese government.⁷³



Ms. Kadeer (2nd from right), standing alongside RFA reporter Gulchehra Hoja (far right), as Sen. Marco Rubio (2nd from left), and Rep. Chris Smith (far left) release the 2018 CECC annual report (YouTube Screenshot)

Suraya Ablimit served as Ms. Kadeer's assistant from 2005 to 2006. Ablimit told UHRP that her family in East Turkestan experienced harassment as a result of her involvement with Ms. Kadeer. Her sister was denied a passport — a frequent punishment at that time for Uyghur citizens with relatives overseas. In the years since 2006, Uyghurs' passports began to be systematically confiscated, as UHRP documented in a February 2013 briefing.⁷⁴ Authorities would frequently ask Ablimit's sister in East Turkestan about Ms. Kadeer. In addition to restrictions on mobility, Ablimit's family feared for their safety and could not get jobs. Eventually, after her mother's death in 2016, her family asked her to cut off contact altogether. Now, she has no idea what has happened to them. Her family deleted her from WeChat and cut her out of their lives.⁷⁵ Losing contact with family represents a common fate for Uyghur Americans who speak up about human rights.

Ms. Kadeer's family has been targeted in shocking numbers as a means of silencing her activism. Ambassador Currie testified to Congress that "more than thirty relatives of Ms. Rebiya Kadeer have been detained or disappeared."⁷⁶ Two of Ms. Kadeer's sons, Alim Abdureyim and Kahar Abdureyim, were jailed in 2006, and her son Ablikim Abdureyim was sentenced to 9 years in prison.⁷⁷ In addition, Chinese authorities forced her family members to make false accusations against her.⁷⁸ Even Uyghurs who do not share such close proximity to Ms. Kadeer have been targeted. In 2015, the *Washington Post* reported that Chinese officials repeatedly asked Erkin Kurban, a Canada-based long-distance trucker, about Ms. Kadeer's activities in the United States.⁷⁹

Ms. Kadeer was the victim of a traffic accident while she was riding as a passenger in January 2006, just months after her release to the U.S. Both Ms. Kadeer and the vehicle's driver, Suraya Ablimit, found certain details of the accident to be extremely suspicious. Ablimit told UHRP that she was turning left, when an oncoming driver hit her vehicle. What was most suspicious was what happened next: following the collision, the driver of the oncoming vehicle looked directly at Ms. Kadeer and Ablimit, then rammed their vehicle again. After the second hit, the driver ran on foot, abandoning his vehicle.⁸⁰

Although the Fairfax County Police Department investigated the crash, they concluded it was a drunk driver. They discovered that the car's owner had lent the vehicle to an employee who did not have lawful status in the United States. Ablimit told UHRP that she was asked by the police to look through a lineup of suspects, but that the man responsible was never caught, and police told her the suspect had fled the country to Mexico. Ms. Kadeer was severely injured by the car accident, and both she and Ablimit had strong suspicions the Chinese government had masterminded this attack, especially given the driver's suspicious behavior, staring at the women, and ramming their vehicle a second time. No evidence confirms Chinese involvement and Ablimit was not aware of any further investigation; after the police lineup, no additional law enforcement agents in the U.S. spoke to her further about the collision.⁸¹

D. #MeTooUyghur Campaign

As China restricts information about who exactly is imprisoned and limits communication between East Turkestan and Uyghurs overseas, Uyghurs have gone online to publicly seek answers. Using US-based technology platforms including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, Uyghurs have spoken out using the hashtag #MeTooUyghur since February 2019, a nod to the anti-sexual harassment hashtag coined by US civil rights activist Tarana Burke. The purpose of the campaign is to request that the Chinese government inform Uyghur Americans whether their family members are healthy and if they are detained.

The hashtag #MeTooUyghur was created by Halmurat Harri Uyghur, a Finnish Uyghur, in response to the Chinese government's release of a video of the singer Abdurehim Heyit as proof that he was alive.⁸² Uyghurs abroad began scrutinizing the video, finding slight timing differences in the audio and video components that seemed to indicate the video had been tampered with.⁸³ Harri Uyghur stated that he started the #MeTooUyghur hashtag to "highlight the point that millions of people are detained," and raise awareness. He hoped to engage Chinese authorities and apply pressure on them to prove that Uyghurs who had been detained were still living. He said this type of "communication gives hope to my fellow Uyghurs." Murat's own mother was detained in April 2017, followed by his father, and they were since released.⁸⁴ He first posted a clip on Facebook in May 2018 about his family's situation, and it was one of the earliest public accounts of the concentration camp program.

Hundreds of Uyghurs have used the hashtag #MeTooUyghur. In addition, Uyghurs from around the world are uploading information about specific missing individuals suspected of being detained to an online database called the Xinjiang Victims Database.⁸⁵ UHRP identified dozens of US-based Uyghurs who used the hashtag to report family members in the camps. Here are a few examples:



In March, the *Epoch Times* reported Uyghurs were beginning to receive proof-of-life videos in response to the online outcry. However, the videos were not pleasant. As Arlsan Hidayat told the *Epoch Times*, “Many people are receiving ‘proof of life’ video calls or videos, and it’s pretty much the same message, where family members are pledging allegiance to the CCP, saying how dare you go to the media and talk about the situation in Xinjiang. We don’t know you, we disown you.”⁸⁶

Ferkat Jawdat, a U.S. citizen and Uyghur American, organized an event at a local public library in Virginia for Uyghur community members to talk about their missing family members, inspired by the #MeTooUyghur campaign. “Personally, I don’t know if my mom is still alive,” he told UHRP. Jawdat planned to submit live testimony from the Uyghur community members about their missing family members to the U.S. State Department and the United Nations. He told UHRP: “We asked if anyone is willing to go public. If not, we ask them to give testimony anonymously.” When asked if people feared Chinese government informants at the event he said:

The people who came are the people who we know. That is one of the reasons we didn’t think the Chinese government infiltrated our event. We feel that because we are in the U.S., in DC, the CCP would not do anything stupid enough to harm our event.⁸⁷

The Associated Press reported that some participants did not know what had happened to their family members who had cut off contact entirely. Jawdat told the AP: “We want to raise awareness about what can happen to American families — many of these people here are American citizens.” Among the participants, stories included not only missing relatives in China, but also sharing threats from Chinese police. Abduwaris Ablimit, another Uyghur present at the event, shared text messages with the Associated Press “from someone who claimed to be a Chinese police officer. The person urged Ablimit to stay quiet about his family’s case.”⁸⁸



Abduwaris Ablimit points to a photo of his missing brother at the Feb. 2019 event. © Associated Press

A new online campaign, started in the wake of #MeTooUyghur, is a response to China's severe criminalization of all ordinary religious practices, such observance of Ramadan, which began on May 5, 2019 and ended on June 3, 2019. Uyghur activists online called for a boycott of Chinese products as long as the Ramadan crackdown continues.⁸⁹ These movements illustrate that although the Chinese governments campaign of extraterritorial intimidation succeeds in terrorizing many Uyghur Americans and forcing them to make the awful choice to keep silent in the hope that this will be better for their families, it is not wholly effective. The courage of those who make a difficult choice despite intense feelings of guilt and doubt.

E. Barriers to Reporting Harassment in the U.S.

Immigration status in the U.S. is not a shield against harassment by Chinese authorities. UHRP conducted interviews with Uyghurs suffering harassment who were U.S. citizens, green card holders and asylum seekers with claims currently pending before U.S. immigration authorities. James Millward, a professor of Chinese and Central Asian history at Georgetown University, stated: "I've heard about many of these cases of influence and intimidation from Chinese authorities being extended to Uyghurs abroad, whether they are students or journalists or everyday people... In many cases they are permanent residents, green card holders, or even citizens in the United States, Australia, or elsewhere."⁹⁰

In July 2018, a UHRP briefing called "Another Form of Control" documented another form of China's discrimination and persecution of Uyghurs overseas: denying access to official documents. UHRP conducted interviews with U.S.-based Uyghurs in May and June 2018 who told researchers about complications in obtaining documents, such as college transcripts and divorce decrees. "The mass-incarceration of Uyghurs in internment camps has implications that extend beyond East Turkestan. China is locking up Uyghurs because they have family members overseas. As a result, Uyghurs fear to contact their loved ones overseas just for a brief conversation let alone attempt to help them obtain documents to start new lives," said UHRP Director Omer Kanat.⁹¹

For Uyghurs navigating the American legal system to obtain lawful immigration status, this lack of documentation can prove a major challenge. The immigration process is a stressful and complicated time for Uyghurs who are in the midst of fleeing a brutal crackdown, often affecting their families. America is not the only country where Uyghurs feel this way, and similar reports have been made of Uyghurs navigating the French legal system.⁹²

In addition, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment can lead Uyghurs to feel fearful about speaking about their experiences in the United States. Lack of information and misinformation about the protection of civil rights under the law also plays a part. A working-age Uyghur man, who was in the process of applying for asylum, told UHRP:

"I don't feel safe. I'm stressed every day. I'm scared I could get deported... [American immigration officials] haven't given me an answer for four years."

When asked if he would report China's harassment, he replied:

"If I had citizenship, I might raise it. Right now, I have no country. My country is called East Turkestan, but it no longer exists, and people don't know it. I have no country right now. U.S. immigration has said nothing up until now. I'm not Chinese. So now, if I go to the U.S. to report someone has hurt me, they won't care, because I'm not a citizen. People who work for RFA, and people who go to protests have

passports; they are Americans. They feel safe. But if my parents got caught, no one would do anything.”⁹³

Tahir Imin also told UHRP that immigration status played a role in his own decision not to report harassment to law enforcement. He said:

I heard no one cares about it. I’m not an American citizen yet, and even if you’re a citizen, if it’s not a national security issue, I heard they will not help.⁹⁴

UHRP spoke with a Uyghur woman, a musician who had been a U.S. citizen for over a decade, who did report an incident of harassment to the FBI [note that all identifying information has been altered]. The woman believed her parents had been placed intermittently in a detention camp. This January, her father asked her to add the username Xiao Li on WeChat. The next day, the musician received a video call from Xiao Li’s cell phone; on the other end were her parents, at home. The musician greeted her parents and asked to see her family’s home, and when they turned the camera, she noticed alongside her parents were four Han Chinese people sitting on the sofa in their living room. Her mom said they were her colleagues but pantomimed that in fact they were not. The call did not last long. Afterwards, Xiao Li began messaging her. He told her he worked for the political branch of law enforcement. Eventually, he told her he would like to come to the U.S. so she could take him on a tour.

The musician feared that if she reported the incident to U.S. law enforcement, the authorities might kill her parents. She also feared they might ask her to choose between her parents’ safety and hurting the Uyghurs’ cause. She told UHRP: “As a Uyghur, it’s very scary, some agent contacting me. It’s an abuse of my rights. I’m a U.S. citizen, and not a Chinese citizen anymore. Someone has to say stop to China.” In April 2019, she reported the incident to the FBI. She shared her messages with Xiao Li and screen shots from her video chat. Even reporting the incident gave her a sense of relief:

I felt like I did the right thing. Every Uyghur who is threatened or has any small amount of evidence should go to the FBI. We live in a great country, with true rule of law. They can protect us. They can protect every Uyghur in the United States. We have to let all people know that in the United States, this country can protect Uyghurs.⁹⁵

These testimonies illustrate the need for more information and outreach among the Uyghur American community to correct misperceptions. They include the idea that the Chinese government will inevitably find out that a Uyghur has reported harassment perception that the Chinese government might find out if Uyghurs report threats, that non-U.S. citizens are not protected from criminal threats, and that there is nothing the U.S. government can do or is willing to do.

F. University Students Targeted in the U.S.


Chinese authorities have doubled down on harassment against Uyghurs in American universities. Authorities explicitly targeted Uyghur students in May 2017, in an official announcement made in early May that required students to return by May 20 from countries including the US, France, Australia, Egypt and Turkey. One student studying in the United States was required to return to East Turkestan but was later allowed to go back to the U.S. after speaking to the police in his hometown of Baren.⁹⁶

A government official was specially assigned to speak to the parents of Uyghur students studying abroad, telling them “to advise their children so that they don’t go astray and don’t take part in any anti-China activities.”⁹⁷ UHRP is especially concerned by this pattern, since Uyghurs forced to return risk arbitrary detention by Chinese authorities.

Another concern for Uyghur university students is supporting themselves after detention of family members in East Turkestan. In a March 2019 radio interview, Rushan Abbas stated:

“I know personally several Uyghur young girls that are supposed to be going to school at the ages of 18 and 20, in New York, Boston, California, and many other parts of the US. Because their parents are in the camps, their financial support is cut, and now they can’t pay their education tuition, so they are struggling between surviving in the United States and trying to find out what’s happening to their loved ones, to their parents.”⁹⁸

Such was the circumstances of Alfred Uyghur, a Uyghur American featured in a recent CNN broadcast, who came to the U.S. in 2015 on a student visa.⁹⁹ He lost contact with his parents in 2017, on whom he relied for tuition payments, leaving him in financial trouble as he tried to continue pursuing a degree in the United States. He posted on YouTube about his parents being sent to the detention camps. “All I wanted was to get my degree and [go] back to my homeland,” he said. My parents “are suffering because of me,” he says, tears streaming down his face. “By breaking the silence, I am risking the life of my family members.” In a January 2019 news report, an anonymous Uyghur student in Japan also described losing contact with family while studying overseas, leaving the student with an unpleasant choice between not getting to see their loved ones by remaining abroad, or risk arbitrary detention by returning to East Turkestan.¹⁰⁰



*Screenshot from Alfred Uyghur’s YouTube video about his parents’ detention*¹⁰¹

Even absent these pressures, Uyghurs can face hostility on American university campuses motivated by Chinese government aggression. Ferkat Jawdat told UHRP about an incident in which Chinese students disrupted an academic presentation on human rights in East Turkestan at George Mason University in November 2018. He also described a similar response by Chinese students at Indiana University at a previous event.¹⁰²

On January 28, 2019, at Duke University, Aydin Anwar, a Uyghur American student who was president of her school's Muslim Students' Association, organized a talk featuring concentration camp survivor Mihrigul Tursun and Anwar's father, activist Anwar Yusuf Turani, as well as University of Washington lecturer Darren Byler.¹⁰³ Radio Free Asia reported on a controversy the event generated when Chinese students in the audience laughed, argued and distributed official Chinese propaganda at the talk.¹⁰⁴

Speaking in an interview with the Muslim podcast *Mad Mamluks*, Anwar said:

"There were counter protests from Chinese international students who were essentially passing out flyers or articles claiming that everything that [Tursun] was saying was a lie and that she was detained because she was inciting ethnic hatred between ethnic Han and Uyghurs."¹⁰⁵

Anwar explained overseas Uyghurs' fear of being reported to Chinese officials:

"They are afraid of being reported by informants who could either be Uyghur or Chinese and they essentially send their names back to the Chinese government, and the Chinese government questions their family members and then detains them or sends them to camps."¹⁰⁶

She explained that even elite universities like Duke fear losing valuable cooperation agreements with China. She said:

"So when I organized this event a few weeks ago on the plight of the Uyghurs, that was my attempt to try to break that silence and to shed some light on the situation and make Duke no longer silent and make this a vital conversation. I feel like China really cares about its relationships with especially elite universities."¹⁰⁷

Radio Free Asia also reported in February 2018 that a Uyghur student who introduced his home country as East Turkestan in an English language class at an American university was threatened by his Han Chinese classmates. The classmates told the Uyghur student they would not allow him to speak about his homeland and said they would report him to the Chinese Embassy. The English teacher threatened to report the Chinese students to school administrators if they did so.¹⁰⁸

Unlike the events at Duke and George Mason, a recent incident at McMaster University in Canada presented direct evidence of involvement by the Chinese embassy. Chinese students protested when Uyghur Canadian activist, Rukiye Turdush, spoke at McMaster University in February 2019, and even threatened Turdush's son after learning that he was a student there.¹⁰⁹ A Chinese student filmed the lecture, apparently to intimidate Turdush, and questioned Turdush during the Q&A, asking repeatedly why she was speaking there, then left abruptly, cursing.¹¹⁰ The *Washington Post* noted that the students posted on WeChat that they had reached out to the Chinese Consulate and been given instructions to investigate the speech. "It offers a vivid example of how Chinese students have grown into a vocal and coordinated force on Western campuses, monitoring and pushing back against speech they deem critical of China. It is of particular note because it is unusual to find written evidence of apparent coordination with officials."¹¹¹

In the U.S., harassment of Uyghur students follows a similar pattern to the treatment of Tibetan students. Chinese students at the University of California San Diego (UCSD) staged protests when the Dalai Lama was invited to speak at the 2017 commencement ceremony.¹¹² In

2009, North Carolina State University cancelled an appearance by the Dalai Lama, following the direction of its Confucius Institute.¹¹³

On September 25, 2015, during a meeting at the White House between President Obama and Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping, a coalition of NGOs including UHRP, the International Campaign for Tibet, Initiatives for China, and others organized a protest in front of the White House, and groups of nationalist pro-CCP protesters confronted them.¹¹⁴ Pictured below are the counter-protestors, confronting Tibetan and Uyghur activists.



Photo of Chinese protestors confronting Uyghur and Tibetan activists in Washington, DC. ©UHRP

Another embodiment of CCP authority in the US academic context are Confucius Institutes, Chinese-government funded educational institutes that provide funds in exchange for education, which have been involved in silencing Uyghur issues. Georgetown University professor James Millward said in an interview that he was aware of a Uyghur-American student who had won a scholarship to study in China from her Confucius Institute-sponsored Chinese language class but was denied a visa to study in China, alone among a group of students.¹¹⁵ In a recently released report, the Government Accountability Office, a U.S. federal agency, reported that some but not all of the Confucius Institutes censored discussions around topics that the Chinese government considered to be “sensitive.”¹¹⁶

G. Cyber-threats Beyond East Turkestan

Uyghur Americans have reported harassment on a variety of digital platforms. Tahir Imin told UHRP that he was harassed while doing a Facebook live video last year, with the harasser publicly writing information about Imin’s wife and daughter in East Turkestan and accusing him of being a bad Muslim and of drinking alcohol. No one could identify the online harasser, and Imin and others suspected him of being a Chinese agent. Imin described another tactic to undermine Uyghurs on Facebook. Bots (or machine-generated users) send friend requests from fake accounts to Uyghur pages, up to a hundred each day. He said that once users accept the fake requests their Facebook accounts will be flooded with posts, so they no longer see posts from real friends.¹¹⁷

Imin also told UHRP that after he founded the Uighur Times website (www.uighurtimes.com) in May 2018, the website was hacked within a month. When he contacted the service provider, which was based in the US, the provider said the attack came from China.

Hackers have been targeting Uyghurs for many years. In a 2014 report, *Trapped in a Virtual Cage*, UHRP outlined a decade of threats, including DDoS attacks that disabled Ilham Tohti's website, Uighurbiz, a Chinese-language site hosted on an American server, as well as DDoS attacks on UHRP itself.¹¹⁸ Since then, online threats have continued to intensify, attracting the attention of cybersecurity researchers worldwide. In 2017, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that Tibetan and Uyghur activists were targeted as part of a larger cyber-espionage campaign.¹¹⁹

Imin was also the target of catfishing or mimicking of his identity to target his network. He said that someone on Facebook used his name and photo to create an account and contacted people, asking about their whereabouts and activities. When a friend alerted him to the account, he immediately contacted Facebook, which took down the account.¹²⁰ While impersonation can be a criminal offense, the criminality of such behavior online raises complex jurisdictional issues. Facebook, for its part, does have strict policies about impersonation, as well as online harassment and bullying, and a robust system for reporting them.¹²¹ In another instance, Imin himself was catfished; he received a telephone call from an individual claiming to be a Uyghur businessman in Kazakhstan. The individual offered him \$5,000-\$10,000 if he would provide his banking information, but Imin refused. Alfred Uyghur similarly discussed being catfished, with individuals copying both his Twitter and YouTube accounts.¹²²


A 7-month study released in 2016 by the cybersecurity research firm, Palo Alto Networks, found that a group of attacks labelled the "Scarlet Mimic" specifically targeted Tibetan and Uyghur activists. The researchers wrote: "Attacks from this group have been reported publicly in the past, but mostly as disparate, unconnected incidents. Based on analysis of the data and malware samples we have collected, [security firm] Unit 42 believes the attacks described herein are the work of a group or set of cooperating groups who have a single mission, collecting information on minority groups who reside in and around northwestern China."¹²³



Zumret Isaac posted about the detention of her parents on Twitter¹²⁴

In addition, Uyghurs who have posted testimony online have been contacted by Chinese authorities and ordered to stop sharing their stories.¹²⁵ Two Uyghur American sisters, Zumret and Humar Isaac, explained what happened after they posted about their parents' suspected detention in a prison camp in 2019. First, their mother asked them to remove a post from WeChat that indicated concern about their parents after they stopped communicating for four months.¹²⁶ Instead of silencing themselves, the sisters spoke out about the incident to *Foreign Policy*.¹²⁷ Humar Isaac also published a piece on Medium in which she stated she had "lost some of my Chinese social media accounts after I posted about my parents' disappearance in China's concentration camps."¹²⁸

Online trolls, whose identities are unknown but who are thought to receive payment from the Chinese government, have targeted online initiatives seeking to provide information about Uyghur human rights. In November 2018, the *Atlantic* posted a video on YouTube about Uyghur activists in the United States, which was open to public comments. It had about 1,500 comments as of March 2019. Comments on the videos illustrate the type of pushback Uyghur activists face online. At the top of the comments on YouTube was the warning:



Here are the some of the comments that followed:





TONY MG 1 month ago

I'm a chinese, personally I don't heard any of this from Chinese media or news. If it's true, I feel sorry for it. But after you watched this video, I want you guys know that the reason Chinese gov doing this. The Muslim terrorist which Chinese gov said to people they had support from isis, killed 31 innocent people and wounded 141 in Qunming train station in 2014, total of 8 terrorists were all from Xinjiang. Also there were more terrorist attacks made by them in China, you can research it if u interested like attack on police station etc. Chinese gov gives a lot of advantages to people in Xinjiang, like extra credits on national exam and many more. And they still supporting terrorist activities. I guess re-education is only solution China gov can do now

Show less

👍 6 🗨️ REPLY



黄建宗 1 month ago

Send all the scumbags to NAZI US!

👍 2 🗨️ REPLY



丁相程 3 months ago

ANTI-CHINESE PROPAGANDA

👍 9 🗨️ REPLY

View 8 replies ▾



joey sun 3 months ago

fake news

👍 14 🗨️ REPLY

View 10 replies ▾



Youe Fuke 2 months ago

Uighurs will thank us han Chinese in long-term.

Our goal is not to wiping out Uighurs people, but the Islamic in the Uighurs people. As you know, Uighurs' population is still grow fast.

It's a painful process. CCP afraid to declare war to Islam publicly and say the truth that Islam is actually a terrorism. A lot of people around the world actually know this truth, but they afraid of committing it because of the political right.

You can't expect reading Quran and believing in god to bring you a good life. The only way to gain a decent life is clear and simple, get education, learn skills, work hard. That's why China can grow so fast in the past 40 years.

Wipe out Islam just like a person get rid of drugs, you will feel the pain in the beginning and it can't be done over a single night but it is good for health in long-term. Everybody know that Uighur people will hate us for a very very long time. But it still worth to do it even if it takes hundred of years. We should get a long-term plan as we always do.

Show less

👍 12 🗨️ REPLY

While these messages illustrate some of the types of things that trolls will say, it is difficult to provide summary information on the trolls, because their comments are frequently removed by website moderators, particularly when posting on American technology platforms like Facebook, YouTube or Twitter. YouTube, for example, states that “It’s not ok to post abusive videos and comments on YouTube. If harassment crosses the line into a malicious attack it can be reported and may be removed.”¹²⁹ A 2017 Washington Post article looked at the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment on Chinese social media and concluded: “Our research found that most of these posts blame Uyghurs for ethnic unrest and violence in Xinjiang. Posters tend to stereotype Uyghurs as lazy, unreasonable and poor — and potential terrorists.”¹³⁰



This general Islamophobia extends beyond the Uyghur population. After a massacre on March 15, 2019 killed 50 worshippers in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, reporter Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian tweeted, “Really horrified by the number of Chinese-language twitter accounts defending the New Zealand terrorist attack in my mentions today.”¹³¹

Airbnb, an online marketplace that allows users to rent rooms or properties to guests, is another American company that struggles with discrimination against Uyghurs online.¹³² In a recent survey, *Wired* found 35 Airbnb posts with discriminatory language in China, mostly targeting Uyghurs and forbidding them from renting on the site, often citing official restrictions on renting rooms to Uyghurs. *Wired* wrote, “Given that almost all the Airbnb China hosts that ban Uyghurs announce the policy in a formulaic manner, and that there’s been no apparent effort from Airbnb to remove such clauses, questions remain as to whether Airbnb China has sanctioned the practice.”

Whereas Airbnb has struggled to define its policy towards Uyghurs, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube all have community guidelines that govern whether any given post is sufficiently harassing to merit being taken down. In a recent case in May 2019, two Uyghur activist Facebook pages, belonging to Talk to East Turkestan and Uyghur World Congress, were inundated with posts attributed to Chinese trolls, with hundreds of postings appearing within hours. The posts were allegedly posted by a secretive group of Chinese hackers known as the Diba group, and not directly by Chinese government officials, but Chinese state media nevertheless praised the cyber-attack in an article titled “Patriotic posts flood East Turkestan pages to fight untrue reports on Xinjiang.”¹³³ Facebook commented to AFP by email: “In this case, we have removed content and accounts that violate our policies, and will continue to investigate and take action on any abusive behaviour we find. We know our job is never done when it comes to finding and removing abuse, and we’ll continue to invest in the teams, technology, and tools required to reduce abuse on our platform.”¹³⁴

There’s a reason these platforms are targeted by trolls. Online platforms and particularly those hosted outside of the Chinese government’s reach, provide Uyghurs with an opportunity for sharing their stories, building solidarity and providing a source of information. By spreading fear and discrediting Uyghur users on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, trolls work to silence one of very few outlets where Uyghurs can speak publicly and frankly about the human rights situation in East Turkestan.

V. Conclusion

The Chinese government is implementing a systematic, ambitious, multi-year, well-resourced, relentless and cruel policy to surveil, intimidate and coerce Uyghurs abroad in an attempt to control their speech. The campaign constitutes an ongoing series of crimes committed with impunity on U.S. persons.

UHRP calls upon the United States government to use appropriate powers and authorities to bring an end to this illegal and unacceptable pattern of crimes on American soil. It is time to take action to deter and pursue accountability for these crimes. UHRP also calls upon the governments of other countries that are home to members of the Uyghur diaspora to take immediate action.

The Uyghur diaspora has long suffered Chinese government harassment and intimidation aimed at silencing testimony and criticism of its human-rights violations in the Uyghur homeland of East Turkestan. The government's unprecedented campaign since 2017 to round up Uyghurs and imprison them in so-called reeducation camps, which many observers have called concentration camps,¹³⁵ has been accompanied by an intensive effort to conceal what is happening. Virtually all Uyghurs in America have relatives or close family members detained in the prison camps, and their testimony has proven vital in alerting the world to these mass atrocities. Correspondingly, The Chinese government is engaged in a systematic and widespread campaign to intimidate and silence Uyghur Americans, to prevent them from exposing their family members' fate. This campaign of repression not only inflicts severe emotional and psychological pain on every Uyghur-American family, but also constitutes a systematic and ongoing violation of American rights and freedoms by a foreign power on American soil.

Since this campaign of mass detention began, the Chinese government has been using the tactic of threatening Uyghur Americans with placing additional family members in the camps. Some of the threats are vague messages to consider the welfare of their families; others are explicit threats to detain relatives in the camps. Chinese officials contact Uyghurs in the United States, by text, chat apps, voicemail, email, and via messages delivered by third parties. Some members of the community report receiving such messages on a weekly and at-times even a near-daily basis.

Policing Uyghur behavior abroad through systematic threats and harassment is a labor-intensive campaign that has been devastatingly effective in intimidating Uyghurs who might otherwise speak out publicly. It is only by overcoming intense guilt and fear that some Uyghurs have been able to make the decision to come forward to provide testimony.

The Chinese government's campaign of surveillance, harassment, and coercion is a brazen assault on the rights and freedoms of American citizens, permanent residents, and international students enrolled in American universities. These actions by Chinese government agents are crimes under federal and state law and inflict severe emotional and psychological distress and pain on the entire Uyghur American community. Despite coverage of this campaign by international media since early 2018, and attention called to it by Congressional hearings and the provisions of pending legislation, the campaign continues unabated.

It is time for the United States government to take appropriate measures to end these criminal actions against Americans.

VI. Recommendations

For US entities

- UHRP urges Congress to pass the Uyghur Human Rights and Policy Act and the UIGHUR Act of 2019. Under the Acts, the United States government commits itself not only to preventing attacks on Uyghur Americans, but also providing other forms of support to the Uyghur American community. This should include compiling a database of Uyghur Americans' family members who have been threatened in East Turkestan and conducting targeted advocacy urging China to release them.
- UHRP urges Congress to request detailed information regarding U.S. government protection of Uyghur Americans' Constitutional rights and freedoms, covering actions by law enforcement agencies and the State Department to investigate, deter and pursue accountability for criminal behavior targeting Uyghur American, by agents of a foreign power on U.S. soil, including efforts under the Justice Department's China Initiative.
- UHRP urges the FBI to thoroughly investigate instances of attacks on Uyghurs, regardless of any legislative changes. The FBI should also consider the proposed anonymous hotline for Uyghurs to report harassing behavior. The FBI should coordinate its response with local law enforcement agencies and with the State Department, particularly regarding protecting high profile Uyghur leaders including Rebiya Kadeer. One priority should be offering protection to individuals being coerced to inform on behalf of Chinese authorities.
- UHRP urges local law enforcement, particularly in northern Virginia where the largest Uyghur community is located, to work toward building a rapport with Uyghur residents. Such agencies should encourage Uyghurs to trust and report any incidents of harassment. Examples could include telephone harassment, or physical intimidation. Law enforcement should make clear to Uyghurs that help is available regardless of immigration status, and both citizen and non-citizen Uyghurs can safely report criminal behavior.
- UHRP urges website hosts to provide support to Uyghurs, particularly Uyghur activists whose websites suffer attacks. UHRP urges tech companies to not allow hate speech, and to employ both Uyghur and Mandarin speaking staff to help monitor aggression online. Tech companies should also work to protect Uyghurs from cyberattacks, including developing tools to identify attackers and making secure communication platforms available.

For Chinese entities

- UHRP urges the Chinese authorities to cease the practice of collecting information about Uyghurs overseas, and to release the family members of Uyghur Americans detained for the sole purpose of controlling their family overseas. China should release all Uyghurs detained without trial or due process.
- UHRP urges China to respond for any and all requests for information about detained Uyghurs and particularly the family members of Uyghur Americans.

- UHRP urges China to allow Chinese citizens to communicate freely with their Uyghur American relatives and to cease all monitoring of private civilian communications. In addition to ceasing surveillance of WeChat, China should allow its citizens to access other online messaging platforms.
- UHRP urges China to grant travel documents to Uyghurs freely and according to the same procedures as all ethnic groups in the country. Uyghur Americans should be offered the freedom to travel both to East Turkestan and the United States, and their families should not be denied passports to visit them overseas.
- UHRP urges China to enforce stronger protections against hate speech and harassment online and educate Chinese citizens not to attack Uyghurs online.

VII. Acknowledgments

UHRP is grateful to all the individuals who contributed to this report, including interviewees Suraya Ablimit, Tahir Hamut, Tahir Imin, Guly Mahsut, and Ferkat Jawdat. UHRP is also grateful to the brave Uyghur individuals who shared their experiences in the wider media despite great risks to themselves and their families.

The author would like to thank Andrea Worden for her contribution to the research for this report. He would also like to thank UHRP Director Omer Kanat, for his invaluable guidance and human rights expertise, Senior Researcher Henryk Szadziwski for research guidance and helpful suggestions throughout the revision process, UHRP Director of External Affairs Louisa Greve for extensive edits and feedback on the first draft, UHRP Chinese Outreach Coordinator Zubayra Shamseden for her instrumental Chinese and Uyghur language research support, and Nicole Morgret for assistance with research and editing.

Finally, UHRP extends a special appreciation to the National Endowment for Democracy, whose unwavering support for freedom, democracy and human rights in East Turkestan ensures that Uyghurs will always have a forum to voice their concerns and issues.

Greg Fay, Research Associate, info@uhrp.org

August 2019.

VIII. Endnotes

- ¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver used the term concentration camp in May 2019, see: *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Schriver Press Briefing on the 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China*. U.S. Department of Defense. May 3, 2019. <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1837011/assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-indo-pacific-security-affairs-schriver-press/>
- ² Christina Larson. *American families of missing Uighurs speak out at DC event*. Associated Press. Feb 25, 2019. <https://www.apnews.com/a45a11071461457cabb16bb557430793>
- ³ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *Chinese Police Are Demanding Personal Information From Uighurs in France*. Foreign Policy. March 2, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/02/chinese-police-are-secretly-demanding-personal-information-from-french-citizens-uyghurs-xinjiang/>
- ⁴ Megha Rajagopalan. *This Man's Aunt Was Jailed Days After He Met With Mike Pompeo Over China's Muslim Crackdown*. BuzzFeed News. April 9, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/uyghurs-china-mike-pompeo>
- ⁵ Eva Dou. *China's Muslim Crackdown Expands to Those Living Abroad*. Wall Street Journal. August 31, 2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-muslim-crackdown-extends-to-those-living-abroad-1535718957>
- ⁶ The Fifth Poison: The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas. Uyghur Human Rights Project Report. Nov. 28, 2017. <https://uhrp.org/docs/The-Fifth-Poison-The-Harassment-of-Uyghurs-Overseas.pdf>
- ⁷ Megha Rajagopalan. *This Man's Aunt Was Jailed Days After He Met With Mike Pompeo Over China's Muslim Crackdown*. BuzzFeed News. April 9, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/uyghurs-china-mike-pompeo>
- ⁸ Telephone Interview, Feb 28, 2019.
- ⁹ Facebook post. U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor. April 24, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/StateDRL/posts/ferkat-jawdat-hasnt-heard-from-his-mother-in-over-a-year-since-february-2018-whe/10157603531495955/>
- ¹⁰ Tweet. @ferkat_jawdat. May 25, 2019. https://twitter.com/ferkat_jawdat/status/1132297355947122688
- ¹¹ Tweet. @ferkat_jawdat. May 22, 2019. https://twitter.com/ferkat_jawdat/status/1131209756968923136
- ¹² Tara Francis Chan. *As the U.S. Targets China's 'Concentration Camps,' Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis is Only Getting Worse*. Newsweek. May 22, 2019. <https://www.newsweek.com/xinjiang-uyghur-crisis-muslim-china-1398782>
- ¹³ Tweet. @ferkat_jawdat. June 28, 2019. https://twitter.com/ferkat_jawdat/status/1144629705062146048
- ¹⁴ Michelle Kosinski and Jennifer Hansler. *State Dept. believes US legal residents are being held in Chinese detention camps*. CNN. March 29, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/politics/state-us-residents-xinjiang-detention-camps/index.html>
- ¹⁵ Leigh Hartman. *China's crackdown on Uighurs extends beyond its borders*. Share America. Feb 26, 2019. <https://share.america.gov/chinas-crackdown-on-uyghurs-extends-its-borders/>
- ¹⁶ Ambassador Kelley E. Currie. *Written Statement for the Record Presented to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hearing On "Surveillance, Suppression and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis."* July 25, 2018. <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/2018-07-26%20KEC%20at%20CECC%20Full%20Statement.pdf>
- ¹⁷ Owen Churchill. *Speaking out: Uyghurs in the United States break silence on China's crackdown*. South China Morning Post. Sept. 12, 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2163939/speaking-out-uyghurs-united-states-break-silence-chinas>
- ¹⁸ Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2018. S.3622 115th Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3622/text>
- ¹⁹ Joel Gehrke. *Rubio: Xi Jinping harassing Chinese Americans in the United States*. Washington Examiner. October 10, 2018. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/rubio-xi-jinping-harassing-chinese-americans-in-the-united-states>
- ²⁰ Andrew McCormick. *What It's Like to Report on Rights Abuses Against Your Own Family*. The Atlantic. March 1, 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/radio-free-asia-uyghur-service/583687/>
- ²¹ Ilshat Hassan Kokbore. *Written Statement for the Congressional executive Commission on China Hearing on "The Long Arm of China: Global Efforts to Silence Critics From Tiananmen to Today."* May 24, 2016.

<https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%20Long%20Arm%20-%2024May16%20-%20Ishat%20Hassan%20Kokbore.pdf>

²² Casey Michel. *China's War Against One American Journalist*. Slate. July 9, 2015. <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/07/shohret-hoshurs-brothers-are-being-disappeared-by-the-chinese-government-beijing-is-trying-to-silence-an-american-reporter-by-sentencing-his-brothers-to-chinas-gulag.html>; see also Michael Forsythe. *A Voice From China's Uighur Homeland, Reporting From the U.S.* New York Times. July 31, 2015 <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/asia/a-voice-from-chinas-uighur-homeland-reporting-from-the-united-states.html>

²³ Shohret Hoshur. *Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China Hearing "Urging China's President Xi Jinping to Stop State-Sponsored Human Rights Abuses."* September 18, 2015. <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%20Human%20Rights%20Abuses%20-%2018Sept15%20-%20Shohret%20Hoshur.pdf>

²⁴ Simon Denyer. *China Detains Relatives of U.S. Reporters in Apparent Punishment for Xinjiang Coverage*. Washington Post. Feb. 27, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-detains-relatives-of-us-reporters-in-apparent-punishment-for-xinjiang-coverage/2018/02/27/4c8d84ae-1b8c-11e8-8a2c-1a6665f59e95_story.html

²⁵ Gulchehra Hoja. *Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China Hearing "Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis."* July 26, 2018. <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/Gulchehra%20Hoja%20cecc%20testimony%20072618.docx>

²⁶ Nury Turkel. *Written Testimony for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing on "China's Repression and Internment of Uyghurs: U.S. Policy Responses."* September 26, 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20180926/108718/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-TurkelN-20180926.pdf>

²⁷ <https://www.congress.gov/bills/116/congress/house/bill/1025/text>

²⁸ *Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption*. President Donald J. Trump. December 21, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-blocking-property-persons-involved-serious-human-rights-abuse-corruption/>

²⁹ Telephone Interview, Feb 14, 2019.

³⁰ Tweet. @ferkat_jawdat. May 25, 2019. https://twitter.com/ferkat_jawdat/status/1132297355947122688

³¹ Chat Interview, February 18, 2019.

³² Tweet. @Guly780. May 20, 2019. <https://twitter.com/Guly780/status/1130529290997649409>

³³ Written testimony: Mihrigul Tursun. *Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China Hearing "The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China."* November 28, 2018. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/REVISED_Mihrigul%20Tursun%20Testimony%20for%20CECC%20Hearing%2011-28-18_0.pdf. Video is available at: *Video: In Full – Ex-Xinjiang detainee Mihrigul Tursun's full testimony at the US congressional hearing*. Hong Kong Free Press. December 8, 2018 <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/12/08/video-full-ex-xinjiang-detainee-mihrigul-tursuns-full-testimony-us-congressional-hearing/>

³⁴ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil*. The Daily Beast. August 14, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinese-police-are-spying-on-uighurson-american-soil>

³⁵ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *Chinese Police Are Demanding Personal Information From Uighurs in France*. Foreign Policy. March 2, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/02/chinese-police-are-secretly-demanding-personal-information-from-french-citizens-uighurs-xinjiang/>

³⁶ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil*. The Daily Beast. August 14, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinese-police-are-spying-on-uighurson-american-soil>

³⁷ Colm Quinn. *'We're A People That Are Grieving': Local Uighurs Have Escaped China, But Still Fear Repression*. DCist. March 14, 2019. <https://dcist.com/story/19/03/14/were-a-people-that-are-grieving-local-uighurs-have-escaped-china-but-still-fear-repression/>

³⁸ Megha Rajagopalan. *Spy For Us — Or Never Speak To Your Family Again*. BuzzFeed News. July 9, 2018. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/amphtml/meghara/china-uighur-spies-surveillance>

³⁹ Borzou Daragahi. *'We can reach you wherever you are': Uighurs abroad feel China's reach*. The Independent. Nov. 11, 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/china-uighur-repression-espionage-informants-muslim-terrorism-a8626526.html>

⁴⁰ *China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App*. Human Rights Watch. May 1, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass-surveillance>

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

- ⁴² *Ibid.*
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁴ Chris Buckley and Paul Mozur. *How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities*. New York Times. May 22, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html>
- ⁴⁵ Telephone Interview, Feb 14, 2019.
- ⁴⁶ Steve Chao. *Exposed: China's surveillance of Muslim Uighurs*. Al Jazeera. Jan. 31, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2019/01/exposed-china-surveillance-muslim-ughurs-190130011449217.html>
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ Omer Kanat. *U.S.-Based Uyghur Says Chinese Officials Pressured Him To Spy*. Radio Free Asia. Jan. 5, 2006. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/uyghur_spies-20060105.html
- ⁴⁹ Megha Rajagopalan. *Spy For Us — Or Never Speak To Your Family Again*. BuzzFeed News. July 9, 2018. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/amphml/meghara/china-uyghur-spies-surveillance>
- ⁵⁰ Telephone Interview, April 24, 2019.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² Colm Quinn. *'We're A People That Are Grieving': Local Uighurs Have Escaped China, But Still Fear Repression*. DCist. March 14, 2019. <https://dcist.com/story/19/03/14/were-a-people-that-are-grieving-local-ughurs-have-escaped-china-but-still-fear-repression/>
- ⁵³ *The Fifth Poison: The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas*. Uyghur Human Rights Project Report. Nov. 28, 2017. <https://uhrp.org/docs/The-Fifth-Poison-The-Harrassment-of-Uyghurs-Overseas.pdf>
- ⁵⁴ *The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: "We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?"* Uyghur Human Rights Project Report. Aug. 23, 2018. <https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%99Cwe-want-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%99D.html>
- ⁵⁵ Written testimony: Mihrigul Tursun. *Written Statement for the Congressional Executive Commission on China Hearing "The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China."* November 28, 2018. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/REVISED_Mihrigul%20Tursun%20Testimony%20for%20CECC%20Hearing%2011-28-18_0.pdf
- ⁵⁶ Michelle Kosinski and Jennifer Hansler. *State Dept. believes US legal residents are being held in Chinese detention camps* CNN. March 29, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/politics/state-us-residents-xinjiang-detention-camps/index.html>
- ⁵⁷ Tweet. @HamutTahir. Feb. 11, 2019. <https://twitter.com/HamutTahir/status/1095164137376751621>.
- ⁵⁸ Josh Chin and Clément Bürge. *Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life*. Wall Street Journal. Dec. 19, 2017. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355>
- ⁵⁹ Josh Chin and Clément Bürge. *Beijing Squeezes Exiles in U.S. By Detaining Family Back Home*. Wall Street Journal. March 30, 2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-squeezes-exiles-in-u-s-by-detaining-family-back-home-1522402202>
- ⁶⁰ Telephone Interview, Feb. 20, 2019.
- ⁶¹ Owen Churchill. *Speaking out: Uyghurs in the United States break silence on China's crackdown*. South China Morning Post. Sept. 12, 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2163939/speaking-out-uyghurs-united-states-break-silence-chinas>
- ⁶² Telephone Interview, Feb. 28, 2019.
- ⁶³ Tweet. @Uyghurian. April 24, 2019. <https://twitter.com/Uyghurian/status/1121063838634467328>.
- ⁶⁴ *China is Surveilling and Threatening Uighurs in the U.S.* The Atlantic. Nov. 27, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UitYvAP67k60>
- ⁶⁵ Megha Rajagopalan. *Spy For Us — Or Never Speak To Your Family Again*. BuzzFeed News. July 9, 2018. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/amphml/meghara/china-uyghur-spies-surveillance>
- ⁶⁶ *China's "War on Terrorism" and the Xinjiang Emergency*. Hudson Institute. Sept. 5, 2018. <https://www.hudson.org/events/1591-china-s-war-on-terrorism-and-the-xinjiang-emergency92018>. See also Edward Wong. *Uighur Americans Speak Against China's Internment Camps. Their Relatives Disappear*. New York Times. Oct. 18, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/asia/uyghur-muslims-china-detainment.html>
- ⁶⁷ Tweet. @Rushan614. June 4, 2019. <https://twitter.com/rushan614/status/1135999337341829120>.
- ⁶⁸ Rushan Abbas. *My Aunt and Sister in China Have Vanished, Are They Being Punished For My Activism?* Washington Post Editorial. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/10/19/my-aunt-and-sister-in-china-have-vanished-are-they-being-punished-for-my-activism/>
- ⁶⁹ Marco Respinti. *"Dozens of my In-Laws Vanished." The Other 9/11 of Rushan Abbas*. Bitter Winter. Jan 8, 2019. <https://bitterwinter.org/dozens-of-my-in-laws-vanished-the-other-9-11-of-rushan-abbas/>

- ⁷⁰ Telephone Interview, April 23, 2019.
- ⁷¹ Alexandra Ma. *Relatives of China's oppressed Muslim minority are getting blocked online by their own family members, who are terrified to even tell them how bad their lives are*. Business Insider. Feb. 16, 2019. <https://www.businessinsider.com/family-of-uyghurs-in-china-say-are-blocked-deleted-by-scared-family-2019-2>
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ Paul Mooney and David Lague. *The Price of Dissent: Holding the fate of families in its hands, China controls refugees abroad*. Reuters. Dec. 30, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-uyghur/>
- ⁷⁴ Briefing: Refusals of passports to Uyghurs and confiscations of passports held by Uyghurs indicator of second-class status in China. Uyghur Human Rights Project. February 7, 2013. <https://docs.uhrp.org/briefing-uyghur-passports.pdf>
- ⁷⁵ Telephone Interview, March 2, 2019.
- ⁷⁶ Ambassador Kelley E. Currie. *Written Statement for the Record Presented to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hearing On "Surveillance, Suppression and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis."* July 25, 2018. <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/2018-07-26%20KEC%20at%20CECC%20Full%20Statement.pdf>
- ⁷⁷ Greg Fay. *Silencing Uyghurs: A Family Affair*. Huffington Post. Jan. 26, 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-fay/chinas-harassment-of-uygh_b_6543868.html
- ⁷⁸ Family members of Rebiya Kadeer ordered out of Urumchi homes. Uyghur Human Rights Project Press Release. Aug. 19, 2009. <https://uyghuramerican.org/article/family-members-rebiya-kadeer-ordered-out-urumchi-homes.html>
- ⁷⁹ Paul Mooney and David Lague. *The Price of Dissent: Holding the fate of families in its hands, China controls refugees abroad*. Reuters. Dec. 30, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-uyghur/>
- ⁸⁰ Telephone Interview, March 2, 2019.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸² Hashtag #MeTooUyghur. <https://twitter.com/hashtag/metoouyghur>. See also Pratik Jakhar. *Uighurs ask China: 'Show me my mother and father are alive.'* BBC. Feb. 12, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-47210039>
- ⁸³ Tweet. @HalmuratU. Feb. 11, 2019. <https://twitter.com/HalmuratU/status/1094911360725647361>
- ⁸⁴ Sigal Samuel. *"Are they alive?": Uyghur Muslims demand videos of relatives in Chinese internment camps*. Vox. Feb. 12, 2019. <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/12/18221958/china-uyghur-muslim-abdurehim-hevit-internment>
- ⁸⁵ Tweet. @EylonALevy. Feb. 13, 2019. <https://twitter.com/eylonalevy/status/1095947714511233024>
- ⁸⁶ Austin Ramzy. *'Show Me That My Father Is Alive.' China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas*. New York Times. Feb. 17, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/asia/uyghurs-china-internment-camps.html> See also Xinjiang Victims Database. <https://www.shahit.biz/eng/>
- ⁸⁷ Isabel Van Brugen. *Uyghur Diaspora Receive 'Proof of Life' Calls From the 'Disappeared' in Xinjiang*. Epoch Times. April 4, 2019. https://www.theepochtimes.com/uyghur-diaspora-receive-proof-of-life-calls-from-the-disappeared-in-xinjiang_2828189.html
- ⁸⁸ Telephone Interview, Feb. 28, 2019.
- ⁸⁹ Christina Larson. *American families of missing Uyghurs speak out at DC event*. Associated Press. Feb 25, 2019. <https://www.apnews.com/a45a11071461457cabb16bb557430793>
- ⁹⁰ Tracey Shelton and Iris Zhao. *China cracks down on Ramadan fasting, prompting activist boycott of Chinese products*. ABC News. May 7, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-07/china-cracks-down-on-fasting-during-ramadan/11082244>
- ⁹¹ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil*. The Daily Beast. August 14, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinese-police-are-spying-on-uyghurson-american-soil>
- ⁹² BRIEFING: "Another Form of Control": Complications in obtaining documents from China impacts immigration processes and livelihoods for Uyghurs in the United States. Uyghur Human Rights Project. July 10, 2018. <https://uhrp.org/press-release/briefing-%E2%80%99Canother-form-control%E2%80%9D-complications-obtaining-documents-china-impacts>
- ⁹³ Fa Guang. *伸向维族侨民的北京之手* [The hand of Beijing reaches out to overseas Uyghurs]. RFI. Feb 14, 2019. <http://cn.rfi.fr/中国/20190214-伸向维族侨民的北京之手>
- ⁹⁴ Telephone Interview, Feb 14, 2019.
- ⁹⁵ Telephone Interview, Feb 28, 2019.
- ⁹⁶ Telephone Interview, April 23, 2019.

- ⁹⁶ Shohret Hoshur, Gulchehra Hoja, and Eset Sulaiman. *Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to Xinjiang Under Threat to Families*. Radio Free Asia. May 9, 2017. <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ordered-05092017155554.html>
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁸ Michael Krasny. *Uighur-American Activist Criticizes China; Her Aunt, Sister Go Missing*. KQED. March 6, 2019. <https://www.kqed.org/forum/2010101869912/uyghur-american-activist-criticizes-china-her-aunt-sister-go-missing>
- ⁹⁹ Alfred Uyghur can be seen on this clip on CNN, beginning at 5:20: Michelle Kosinski and Jennifer Hansler. *State Dept. believes US legal residents are being held in Chinese detention camps*. CNN. March 28, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/28/politics/state-us-residents-xinjiang-detention-camps/>; see also Mohani Niza. *Uighurs are persecuted in mass numbers in China. These are their stories and some information on how you can help*. Muslim World Today. Feb. 22, 2019. https://www.muslimworldtoday.org/uyghurs_are_persecuted_in_mass_numbers_in_china_these_are_their_stories_and_information_on_how_you_can_help
- ¹⁰⁰ Patrick Poon. *The impossible choice facing Uyghurs living outside of China*. Medium. Jan 23, 2019. <https://medium.com/@patrickpoon/the-impossible-choice-facing-uyghurs-living-outside-of-china-1b5a04589659>
- ¹⁰¹ YouTube Video. *Urgent and important message to UN, president Donald Trump, EU and everyone*. Sadir Palwan. Sept. 24, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCK2orBC-GE&t=2s>
- ¹⁰² Telephone Interview, Feb. 28, 2019. For details on the event see: Eventbrite. *Uyghur Muslims - The Forgotten Nation of the Islamic World*. GMU Muslim Students Association. Nov. 28, 2018. <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/uyghur-muslims-the-forgotten-nation-of-the-islamic-world-tickets-51882446795#>
- ¹⁰³ Mona Tong. *Uyghur camp survivor discusses plight in China at Monday talk*. The Chronicle. Jan 29, 2019. <https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2019/01/uyghur-china-duke-university-discussion-being-a-uyghur-is-a-crime-panel-event-promotes-awareness-and-discussion-on-the-ethnic-cleansing-of-uyghurs-in-china>
- ¹⁰⁴ Jia Ao. 杜克“请说英文”事件：种族歧视的双重标准[Duke “Please Speak English”: A double standard on racial discrimination]. Radio Free Asia. Feb. 1, 2019. <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/kejiaowen/hc-02012019101713.html>
- ¹⁰⁵ Ep 140: The Walking Dead of East Turkestan: Uyghur Muslims | Aydin Anwar. The Mad Mamluks. Feb 22, 2019. <https://thetadmamluks.com/the-walking-dead-of-east-turkestan-uyghur-muslims-aydin-anwar/>
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁸ Mihray Abdulim. *Uyghur Student in US Faces Down Chinese Threats to 'Turn Him In.'* Radio Free Asia. Feb. 27, 2018. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/threats-02272018150624.html>
- ¹⁰⁹ Tom Blackwell. *Uyghur activist who sparked Chinese-student protest at McMaster worried about message targeting her son*. National Post. Feb. 16, 2019. <https://nationalpost.com/news/uyghur-activist-who-sparked-chinese-student-protest-at-mcmaster-worried-about-message-targeting-her-son>
- ¹¹⁰ William Yang. 使馆下指导棋？中国学生新疆再教育营讲座砸场 [Is the Embassy moving chess pieces? Chinese students speaking about reeducation camps in Xinjiang have a bad episode]. Deutsche Welle. Feb. 14, 2019. <https://p.dw.com/p/3DNYD>
- ¹¹¹ Gerry Shih and Emily Rauhala. *Angry over campus speech by Uyghur activist, Chinese students in Canada contact their consulate, film presentation*. Washington Post. February 14, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/angry-over-campus-speech-by-uyghur-activist-students-in-canada-contact-chinese-consulate-film-presentation/2019/02/14/a442fbc4-306d-11e9-ac6c-14eea99d5e24_story.html
- ¹¹² Josh Horwitz. *Chinese students in the US are using “inclusion” and “diversity” to oppose a Dalai Lama graduation speech*. Quartz. Feb 15, 2017. <https://qz.com/908922/chinese-students-at-ucsd-are-evoking-diversity-to-justify-their-opposition-to-the-dalai-lamas-graduation-speech/>
- ¹¹³ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. *How China Managed to Play Censor at a Conference on U.S. Soil*. Foreign Policy. May 9, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/09/how-china-managed-to-play-censor-at-a-conference-on-u-s-soil/>
- ¹¹⁴ NGO coalition rally at White House to highlight China's human rights abuses. International Campaign for Tibet. September 24, 2015. <https://www.savetibet.org/ngo-coalition-rally-at-white-house-to-highlight-chinas-human-rights-abuses/>
- ¹¹⁵ *Alarm bells in the ivory tower: Jim Millward on the Cambridge University Press censorship fiasco*. Supchina. Sinica Podcast. Oct. 5, 2017. <http://supchina.com/podcast/alarm-bells-ivory-tower-jim-millward-cambridge-university-press-censorship-fiasco/>
- ¹¹⁶ *Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary*. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Feb. 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696859.pdf>
- ¹¹⁷ Telephone Interview, Feb. 28, 2019.

- ¹¹⁸ *Trapped in a Virtual Cage: Chinese State Repression of Uyghurs Online*. Uyghur Human Rights Project Report. Jun 16, 2014. Pages 81-83. <https://uhrp.org/press-release/trapped-virtual-cage-chinese-state-repression-uyghurs-online.html>
- ¹¹⁹ Joshua Lipes. *Hackers Target Uyghur Groups*. Radio Free Asia. Sept. 6, 2012. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/hackers-09062012153043.html>
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹²¹ Facebook Help Center. *Report an Imposter*. <https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/169486816475808> (last visited July 6, 2019).
- ¹²² Tweet. @Alfred_Uyghur. May 9, 2019. https://twitter.com/Alfred_Uyghur/status/1126605313967259648
- ¹²³ Robert Falcone and Jen Miller-Osborn. *Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists*. Unit 42. Jan. 24, 2016. <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/>; see also Jeremy Kirk. *Single group of hackers targets Uyghur, Tibetan activists*. PC World. Jan 24, 2016. <https://www.pcworld.com/article/3026112/single-group-of-hackers-targets-uyghur-tibetan-activists.html>
- ¹²⁴ Tweet. @ZumretI. March 19, 2019. <https://twitter.com/ZumretI/status/1108096049892245504>.
- ¹²⁵ *China is Surveilling and Threatening Uighurs in the U.S.* The Atlantic. Nov. 27, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UfYyAP67k60>
- ¹²⁶ Xinyan Yu. *What happened to our parents? Uyghur sisters seek answers*. South China Morning Post. May 11, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/video/scmp-films/3007923/what-happened-our-parents-uyghur-sisters-seek-answers>
- ¹²⁷ Podcast: *China's War on Uighurs*. Foreign Policy. March 1, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/01/uighur-first-person-humar-isaac/>
- ¹²⁸ Humar Isaac. *My Mother Was Caught in Between*. Medium. March 1, 2019. <https://medium.com/@humarisaac/my-mother-was-caught-in-between-7700c11dcdda>
- ¹²⁹ *Policies and Safety*. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/vt/about/policies/#community-guidelines> (last visited July 6, 2019).
- ¹³⁰ Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang. *Anti-Muslim Sentiment is on the rise in China. We Found that the Internet Fuels—and Fights—This*. Washington Post. May 12, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/12/anti-muslim-sentiment-is-on-the-rise-in-china-we-found-that-the-internet-fuels-and-fights-this/>
- ¹³¹ Tweet. @BethanyAllenEbr. March 15, 2019. <https://twitter.com/BethanyAllenEbr/status/1106714431428407296>
- ¹³² Charles Rollet. *Airbnb listings in China are littered with racist discrimination*. Wired UK. May 3, 2019. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/airbnb-china-uyghur-muslim?utm_medium
- ¹³³ Zhang Han. *Patriotic posts flood East Turkestan pages to fight untrue reports on Xinjiang*. Global Times. April 10, 2019. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1145412.shtml>
- ¹³⁴ Elizabeth Law. *China's social media troll 'army' wages war on Uighurs*. AFP. May 6, 2019. <https://news.yahoo.com/chinas-social-media-troll-army-wages-war-uighurs-023354172.html>



The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) was founded by the Uyghur American Association (UAA) in 2004 with a supporting grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). UHRP's mission is to promote human rights and democracy for the Uyghur people. In 2016, UHRP became an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit, tax-exempt organization.

UHRP works to raise the profile of the Uyghur people by:

Researching, writing and publishing commentary and reports in English and Chinese covering a broad range human rights issues involving civil and political rights, through to social cultural and economic rights; preparing briefings – either written or in person – for journalists, academics, diplomats and legislators on the human rights situation faced by the Uyghur people.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project
1602 L Street, Suite 613, Washington D.C., 20036
Tel: (202) 478-1920 Fax: (202) 478-1910
www.uhrp.org info@uhrp.org
[@UyghurProject](#) [@UHRP_Chinese](#)

[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]



**United States House of Representatives
Congressional-Executive Commission on China**

“Truth in Testimony” Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form and attach it to your written testimony and it may be made publicly available in electronic format.

1. Date of Hearing:
2. Hearing Title:
3. Your Name:
4. Organization, organizations, or government entity you are representing:
5. Position title:
6. Are you an active registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)?
_____ Yes _____ No

False Statement Certification:

Knowingly providing material false information to this commission, or knowingly concealing material information from this commission, is a crime (18 U.S.C. 1001). This form may be made part of the hearing record.

Witness Signature

Date

*Witness Biographies***Adrian Zenz, Non-resident Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and author of “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang”**

Adrian Zenz is a non-resident senior fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (Washington, DC). Dr. Zenz has done pioneering work documenting the scope of mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), including through his analysis of Chinese government procurement documents, construction bids, and domestic security budgets. Recently, he has published and contributed to groundbreaking research documenting the mass institutionalization of children whose parents have been detained in mass internment camps and the incentives offered to Chinese manufacturers to employ forced labor in the XUAR.

Nury Turkel, Washington-based attorney and Chair of the Board, Uyghur Human Rights Project

Nury Turkel is an attorney in private practice in Washington, DC, specializing in regulatory compliance, with a focus on anti-bribery investigation and enforcement, data privacy, and aviation. In addition to his law practice, Mr. Turkel serves as Chair of the Board for the Uyghur Human Rights Project, a research and advocacy organization that he co-founded in 2004. He served as Executive Director until 2006. He has published commentaries on policy and legal matters in publications such as *The Wall Street Journal* and *Foreign Policy* and has appeared on radio and television programs on CNN, BBC, Fox News, Al Jazeera, France 24, NPR, and ABC Australia, among others. Born and raised in Kashgar, Mr. Turkel received a bachelor’s degree from Northwest A&F University in Xi’an, China. Mr. Turkel has a master’s degree in International Relations and a J.D. from American University. He is the first U.S. educated Uyghur lawyer, and is a fluent speaker of Uyghur, Chinese, and Turkish.

Michael Posner, Jerome Kohlberg Professor of Ethics and Finance and Director of the Center for Business and Human Rights at NYU’s Stern School of Business, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Michael Posner is the Jerome Kohlberg Professor of Ethics and Finance at NYU’s Stern School of Business. He is the director of the Center for Business and Human Rights at the school, the first-ever human rights center at a business school. Prior to joining NYU Stern, Posner served in the Obama Administration from 2009 to 2013 as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. As a member of the White House Apparel Industry Partnership Task Force in the mid-’90s, he helped found the Fair Labor Association, an organization that brings together corporations, local leaders, universities, and NGOs to promote corporate accountability for working conditions in the apparel industry. From 1978 to 2009, he led Human Rights First, a New York-based human rights advocacy organization.

Amy K. Lehr, Director of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former legal adviser to the U.N. Special Representative on business and human rights

Amy K. Lehr is the director of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She leads the Initiative’s work on human rights around the world, with a particular focus on how technology affects human rights and labor rights, and the importance of a values-based foreign policy. Her core expertise is in the area of business and human rights. She spent a decade in private practice advising companies and international institutions on how they can respect human rights in their global operations. Previously, Lehr served as legal adviser to the UN special representative on business and human rights, John Ruggie, and in that role helped develop the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.