[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NOT-SO-GOOD NEIGHBORS:.
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN BELARUS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2019
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 116-1-11]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-441 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi,
Chairman Co-Chairman
JOE WILSON, North Carolina BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARC VEASEY, Texas SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, to be appointed
Department of Commerce, to be appointed
Department of Defense, to be appointed
[ii]
NOT-SO-GOOD NEIGHBORS:
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN BELARUS
----------
November 20, 2019
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Joe Wilson, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 2
WITNESSES
Andrei Yeliseyeu, Head of Monitoring Unit, International
Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS); Research
Director, EAST Center.......................................... 4
Sofya Orlosky, Senior Program Manager for Eurasia, Freedom House. 6
Franak Viacorka, Research Media Analyst (contractor), U.S. Agency
for Global Media............................................... 7
Brian Whitmore, Senior Fellow and Director of the Russia Program,
CEPA........................................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings..................... 26
Prepared statement of Hon. Joe Wilson............................ 28
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 29
Prepared statement of Andrei Yeliseyeu........................... 30
Prepared statement of Sofya Orlosky.............................. 34
Prepared statement of Franak Viacorka............................ 46
Prepared statement of Brian Whitmore............................. 51
NOT-SO-GOOD NEIGHBORS:
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN BELARUS
----------
November 20, 2019
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 9:58 a.m. in Room 210, Cannon House
Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Alcee L. Hastings,
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Joe
Wilson, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe.
Witnesses present: Andrei Yeliseyeu, Head of Monitoring
Unit, International Strategic Action Network for Security
(iSANS); Research Director, EAST Center; Sofya Orlosky, Senior
Program Manager for Eurasia, Freedom House; Franak Viacorka,
Research Media Analyst (contractor), U.S. Agency for Global
Media; and Brian Whitmore, Senior Fellow and Director of the
Russia Program, CEPA.
HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hastings. Good morning, everybody. It's 10, and I have
a bad habit of trying to start on time and end on time.
You are welcome here to the U.S. Helsinki Commission
hearing entitled ``Not-So-Good Neighbors: Russian Influence in
Belarus.'' And with that, we'll come to order and have opening
statements and then turn to you all.
This is a timely hearing coming off of the Belarusian
election, in addition to the fact that I know all of you know
that there is an ongoing proceeding that Russia is implicated
in here on the Hill that is much more popular for the moment.
We all know that the Kremlin's disinformation and political
interference reaches the shores of the United States and
elsewhere in the region of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Yet, it's easy to lose sight of the
power that Vladimir Putin's Russia wields in his own
neighborhood outside of the ongoing aggression in Ukraine and
elsewhere.
In the case of Belarus, Russia's western neighbor, the grip
of the Kremlin is no less pervasive but much less obvious.
Russia has not started a hot military conflict in Belarus as it
has in Ukraine, but rather employs economic, social, political,
and information leverage to weaken the sovereignty of Belarus
and pull the country further into its orbit.
I saw this firsthand during my last trip to Minsk for the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly annual session in July 2017.
Unfortunately, Belarus is ripe for infiltration by external
forces.
Civil society and fundamental freedoms have been stifled
under the 25-year rule of Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko, who has cultivated a strong working relationship
with Vladimir Putin. The two use similar tactics to crush
dissent in their respective countries.
Belarus is also heavily economically dependent on Russia,
with its economy propped up by discounted oil and gas from its
neighbor. The shared Soviet history of the two countries makes
it easy for Russia to appeal to the hearts and mind[s] of many
Belarusians, and the Lukashenko regime is feeling the squeeze.
And with little linguistic or cultural barriers, the Kremlin
and its partners easily operate in the media and information
sphere in Belarus, spreading pro-Russia propaganda in an effort
to keep Belarus from turning toward the West.
In this context, Lukashenko has sought to vector West for
fear of his regime. He has sought to engage with leaders of the
European Union through Eastern Partnership, and when possible
has sought meetings with U.S. leaders--although he wouldn't
meet with me when I was there, but I did meet with the then-
foreign minister--including the delegation that I told you that
I traveled with. I found that he, like other autocrats, was not
interested in the dreams of his people, but made standard
stability appeals to defend his regime.
I remember that there were three people in jail, and we
talked with them about trying to get them out. They were his
opponents in the election. And one man was very brave, as was
his wife. I wish I could remember their names.
Despite Lukashenko's lack of imagination and decades of
oppressing his people, we must not forget that Belarus is an
independent country whose sovereignty is under attack. And as
another target of Russian malign influence in the OSCE area,
proper scrutiny will prevent active conflict and empower those
oppressed voices who have waited so long for justice.
Today we will explore the complexities of the Russia-
Belarus relationship and what the United States can do to
defend Belarus, this important crossroads between Russia and
the West, against Russian attacks.
At this time I would like to acknowledge my ranking member
and good friend. We just came off of an interesting election to
Tunisia and Morocco and Israel. We learned a lot, and expect to
learn a lot here this morning.
Joe?
HON. JOE WILSON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your
leadership and insight. And indeed, it was an extraordinary
CODEL to Tunisia, to Israel, and ending up in Marrakesh,
Morocco, with the OSCE conference, and very enlightening. And
we look forward today to the expert witnesses and your input.
As we monitor Putin's malign influence on its neighbors, as
well as far and abroad, it seems we pay too little attention to
what's going on with the talented people of Belarus. Perhaps
this is because we have so much more evidence and headline-
grabbing news available when discussing the Kremlin's attempts
to meddle in our own elections and society. But just as
dramatic and concerning is Russian adventurism, whether it be
in Syria, Moldova, Ukraine--resulting in 13,000 deaths--in the
Republic of Georgia, and even in places as far-flung as the
Central African Republic.
Vladimir Putin tramples on international norms and attempts
to erode liberal democratic norms where they are just beginning
to grow, or even where they're already well-established.
Though not a military conquest, Putin's designs on Belarus
should be just as concerning to us as the above-mentioned
examples.
As the chains to the old Iron Curtain have been broken, and
democracy and the rule of law has moved steadily forward,
Belarus remains a stubborn outlier. Why is this? We know that
part of the reason is lack of sufficient and significant
structural reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union. Still
known for its collective farms, Belarus has an economy stuck in
the past. Another part of the reason is the dictatorship of
President Alexander Lukashenko, who has ruled the country for
most of the post-Soviet existence by falsifying elections and
marginalizing, even violently punishing dissenters. And
finally, Putin's tight grip on its old Soviet republic is
unrelenting, taking advantage of Belarus' weakness to create a
vassal state subject to its whims.
We know that, as longtime authoritarian leaders, Putin and
Lukashenko sadly have many things in common and many incentives
to work together. As we work--as we hope we will learn over the
course of this hearing, there are questions about how long this
cozy relationship can last. Lukashenko is a tyrant, but not a
fool. He knows that engagement with Europe and the West is not
optional in this day and age. He sees Putin's greedy fingers
have reached into Ukraine. He has been forced to make some
difficult decisions about the direction the country should
take. We can only hope that these decisions give greater
freedom to the deserving people of Belarus, who have for too
long lived without the opportunity to express themselves
without fear or repression.
The younger, globally connected generation in particular
can easily see the opportunities and freedom available in the
West. They, along with all Belarusians, deserve the opportunity
to determine their own future. A Belarus tied down by Putin is
a Belarus stuck in the failed Soviet past and subservient [to]
Moscow.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses comment on the
prospect for the Belarus future and the ways to combat Putin's
pernicious influence.
Thank you, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Representative Wilson.
We have assembled here an expert panel to discuss Belarus
in the context of Russia's malign influence.
First we have Andrei Yeliseyeu, who serves as head of the
Monitoring Unit for iSANS, which is the International Strategic
Action Network for Security, based in Warsaw, Poland. ISANS is
an international expert initiative established in 2018 and
aimed at detecting, analyzing, and countering hybrid threats
against democracy, rule of law, and the sovereignty of states
in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Our next witness is Sofya Orlosky, the senior program
manager for Eurasia of Freedom House here in Washington, where
she heads the development of engagement and advocacy strategies
for its Europe and Eurasia portfolio. And, Sofya, thank you so
much for the work you do with the Helsinki Commission.
Then we will hear from Franak Viacorka. I'm not going to
try to do that again. [Laughs.] Franak is the research media
analyst at the U.S. Agency for Global Media, where he's focused
on the digital markets of Eurasia.
And finally we have Mr. Brian Whitmore, the senior fellow
and director of the Russia Program at the Center for European
Policy Analysis here in Washington. He's also the author of the
Power Vertical Blog and host of the Power Vertical Podcast,
both of which focus on Russian affairs. Must have been real
busy here lately.
Please note that the full biographies of our witnesses can
be found in the provided materials. And I thank you to our
assembled witnesses, and I thank all of you in the audience for
being here as well. And I call on Mr. Yeliseyeu to begin his
testimony.
ANDREI YELISEYEU, HEAD OF MONITORING UNIT, INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGIC ACTION NETWORK FOR SECURITY (iSANS); RESEARCH
DIRECTOR, EAST CENTER
Mr. Yeliseyeu. Dear Mr. Chairman, Co-Chairman, thank you
for organizing this Belarus-related hearing, particularly in
this peacetime in Washington, DC, and for the opportunity to
join this distinguished panel on the threats to Belarusian
sovereignty.
Kremlin aims at putting Belarus under its complete
influence, essentially turning Belarus into a part of Soviet
Union. To achieve this goal, Kremlin applies political,
economic, and propagandistic pressure on the Belarusian
authorities and the Belarusian society. It sees Belarus as an
integral part of the so-called Russian world.
Russia wants Belarus to cede a large part of its
sovereignty toward Moscow in exchange for further economic
support. Kremlin conditions future oil and gas deals and loan
assistance to Minsk with deeper integration within the so-
called Union State. Belarus is very vulnerable to malign
Kremlin influence due to deep institutional, economic, social,
and cultural connections between the two countries' elites, and
because of short-sighted repressive policies of the Belarusian
authorities against the Belarusian language, independent media,
and civil society.
The threat is that even deeper integration, in the form
promoted by Russia, will leave Belarus with only nominal
sovereignty, when in reality Minsk will have to agree to
virtually any domestic or foreign policy with Moscow. You all
must be aware that Ukraine remains the top target of Kremlin
propaganda. Belarus is not far behind Ukraine in terms of scale
and scope of propaganda and disinformation in the online space.
In the last 2 years, many propaganda websites, which
previously had Ukraine or Syria as their primary topics, added
Belarus as additional regular target. A dozen of new active
outlets of disinformation, which are entirely devoted to events
in Belarus, have appeared online. Their publications use
aggressive chauvinistic rhetoric, sometimes openly questioning
the existence of an independent Belarusian ethnic group or
language, discrediting and distorting the history of Belarus.
Anti-Belarusian propaganda says the Belarusians are part of a
Russian people, and that the Belarusian language was
artificially created by the hostile West.
As a disinformation researcher, I have studied thousands of
disinformation cases. Yet, occasional claims come as a surprise
even to me, as someone who's seen a lot. For example, Schengen
visa fees for Belarusians are high because the number of
homosexuals per capita in Belarus is very low, one propaganda
outlet claimed not long ago. They allege that the hostile EU
wants to give Belarusians cheaper visas only in exchange for
undermining the institution of family. Due to irresponsible
state policies and the media field, a large part of the
Belarusian population literally believes in the Russian media
space. Oddly enough, Western media corporations, such as Google
and Apple, unwittingly make Russian online media presence in
Belarus even larger.
This happens because of the absence of fully functioning
geotargeting for Belarus in their automatically generated news
services. As a result, internet users who select Belarus as
their location are still offered a lot of Russian media content
in their newsfeeds. A recent declaration by the largest Belarus
media community members calls upon all interested actors to
make Belarus an independent country on the global internet map
by recognizing the Belarusian segment of the internet as a
distinct market.
Ladies and gentlemen, a loss of Belarusian sovereignty
would be a catastrophe not only for the people of Belarus who
dreamed of a sovereign and independent country for many
generations. This tragic turn would also encourage further
Russian aggressive behavior toward its immediate neighbors and
instigate new Russian attempts to destabilize regional
security. Great attention of the international community to
developments in Belarus and urgent efforts are needed to help
promote the sovereignty of Belarus, despite the very
complicated relationship with its nondemocratic government.
On behalf of the whole iSANS team, I want to thank the U.S.
Helsinki Commission once again for holding this hearing and
placing your focus on Belarus and threats to its sovereignty.
And I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hastings. Right. Ms. Orlosky.
SOFYA ORLOSKY, SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER FOR EURASIA, FREEDOM
HOUSE
Ms. Orlosky. Thank you. Chairman Hastings, Ranking Member
Wilson, it is an honor to testify in front of you today. I ask
that my full written testimony be entered into the record.
I'll start with a vital contributing factor to Belarus'
resilience to external influence, that is strong democratic
governance. Pluralistic and fair elections, transparent and
accountable government, thriving civil society, businesses, and
independent media are key internal safeguards against economic,
political, and sociocultural encroachment on a nation's
sovereignty. Sadly, we've seen little progress in strengthening
these institutions in Belarus.
Last Sunday's elections again fell short of the OSCE
standards. The OSCE election monitoring mission summarized it
bluntly: Fundamental freedoms were disregarded, and the
integrity of the election process was not adequately
safeguarded. The resulting lower chamber of the parliament is
uniformly loyal to the incumbent government, the electoral
reform proposals offering no meaningful change.
Yes, we see fewer arrests and prison terms, which makes the
Government of Belarus look good in the eyes of the West. But
make no mistakes, this ``liberalization,'' quote/unquote, has
happened before in 2006, 2010, and 2015. And each time a thaw
was followed by a new cycle of repression. Except now, instead
of political trials, the Belarusian authorities are using a
swifter and less tractable tactic of debilitating fines.
To make things worse, Belarus now appears to be borrowing
from the Kremlin's authoritarian playbook. The 2018 amendments
to the law on mass media largely mimic those of the notorious
Russian law on bloggers by expanding the government authority
to censor the web, curtailing anonymous internet use, and
fining freelance journalists. Existing antiextremism measures
are starting to be used against ordinary internet users as
well, much like in Russia. The first prison sentence for a
social media post was handed down this year.
Moreover, the proposed amendments to the law on countering
extremism open the possibility of subjective application that
endangers initiatives promoting Belarusian cultural and
historical independence. Belarus has finally abolished the
deplorable criminal code article that prohibited working on
behalf of unregistered civic groups. However, criminal
penalties were replaced with administrative fines, and civic
groups continue having difficulty openly receiving foreign
funding, including from the U.S. embassy.
Meanwhile, Belarus appears to be effectively bullied into a
hasty implementation of the Russia-Belarus Union State
agreement. Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko are slated
to sign the updated integration plan and a series of industry-
specific roadmap documents on December 8th. Why should we be
concerned? The preparations for the integration process were
expedited last December as a condition for relief measures for
Belarus' oil industry and have been shrouded in secrecy.
Less than 3 weeks out, neither the Belarusian nor Russian
officials have presented the updated documents, only reassuring
the public that the first stage of the integration will cover
just economic policies. Moreover, the Belarusian Ministry of
Economy refused to release the initial drafts to the public,
citing concerns for national security and public order. The
alacrity around the integration process has caused concern
among Belarusian citizens, as well as political opposition,
spurring divisive rumors of impending absorption or annexation
by Russia.
The Russian Government is already using Belarus'
partnership to persecute political dissent. In the past 3 years
at least six Russian nationals were detained or deported by the
Belarusian officials at the request of the Russian authorities.
Among them, an activist, a journalist, a blogger, an elections
expert, and even a world champion in mixed martial arts. The
most recent case resulted in the activist's arrest for his
participation in this summer's protests in Moscow. Belarus also
aided the Russian authorities in arresting a Ukrainian
national, who has now been sentenced to 6 years on charges of
promoting terrorism in Russia.
Belarus will never be truly independent if its government
continues to play by the Kremlin's rules that disregard the
human dimension of our mutual security and put the premium on
the rent-seeking, law-bending behavior of the corrupt elites.
If the United States wants to help Belarus become more
resilient, it should do so, first of all, by strongly
encouraging genuine democratic reform. For example, condition
any next steps in the U.S.-Belarus engagement on the
comprehensive electoral reform and the removal of restrictions
on peaceful civic activity.
The U.S. could provide experts, technical assistance, and
conditional funding to help advance change, ensure consistent
and meaningful participation of the Belarusian civil society as
an equal party in the Belarus-U.S. human rights and democracy
dialog, such as providing a critical stakeholder assessment on
progress and achievements, continue to support U.S. public
media programming in the languages spoken in Belarus, including
through the U.S. agency for global media, the RFE/RL [Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty], as well as through independent
media initiatives.
Finally, expand foreign assistance for pro-democracy civic
initiatives while at the same time ensuring that Belarusian
Government removes regulatory obstacles for receiving such
funding.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hastings. Franak, if you would go forward.
FRANAK VIACORKA, RESEARCH MEDIA ANALYST (CONTRACTOR), U.S.
AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA
Mr. Viacorka. Mr. Chairman, members of the commission,
today I speak in my personal capacity, not as a U.S. Agency for
Global Media representative.
So the process of Russification is interdependent with the
tightening of the antidemocratic regime in Belarus. While
trying to intensify the relationship with the West and playing
geopolitical seesaw, the Belarus authorities do not make any
visible measures to prevent Russian dominance in information
and cultural space. I couldn't describe better what is Russian
soft power than Russian General Governor Muravyov from 19th
century, nicknamed ``Hangman'' for cracking down the 1863 anti-
Russian uprising in Belarus. He said: The Russian bureaucrat,
the Russian school, and the Russian priest will complete what
the Russian bayonet could not finish.
For example, endorsed by Lukashenko, Sputnik propaganda
network reached unprecedented growth in Belarus. Now it is in
the top 10 news websites, primarily due to massive support from
Russian Yandex news and many news aggregators. Russian social
media services like VK [VKontakte], Odnoklassniki, and Moi.mir
all belonging to Kremlin-tied Mail.ru, have more than 3 million
users and prevailed over Facebook and Instagram in Belarus.
These networks censor critical content about Vladimir Putin
policies, and predominantly serve as an extension of Russian
soft power and disinformation machine.
Unfortunately, there is no resilience to Russian
disinformation in this society. It targets multiple groups,
especially young people under 25 years old, born under the
current regime and raised in the Russian media space, as well
as seniors nostalgic about the Soviet past without critical
thinking. They're often targets of weaponized information,
including entertainment TV shows and explicit anti-Western
content in social media. Major TV shows from Russia Today
network are included in their obligatory social package. But
more critical, Kremlin has established many local news websites
networks like Vitbich, Sochinfo, and hundreds, hundreds of
communities, groups, and channels on social media. They are not
pro-Putin explicitly, rather anti-Western, anti-Polish, anti-
liberal, and, of course, anti-Belarusian.
In your folders you can find my analysis of Russian social
media groups, pages, networks, as well as narratives and
examples of the posts they do in order to change and manipulate
Belarusian national identity. Many of those pages belong to
neo-Nazi, pan-Slavic, or ultra-orthodox organizations. Some are
tied to the Russian Orthodox Church and so-called Cossacks.
Toxic and aggressive, Cossacks oppose Belarusian liberal and
pro-Western aspirations, organize provocations, harass pro-
democracy activists on social media, and in real life. Cossacks
are often referred as Orthodox Taliban.
It's not a secret that Russian Orthodoxy and Russian
language are major instruments of Russian universe expansion
and geopolitical revanchism. Kremlin uses them for political
pressure too. Although 67 percent of the population declared
Belarusian their native language, it was eliminated from
significant parts of public life. In the army, I was punished
by arrest for speaking in Belarusian language not in Russian.
Earlier, I was forced to study in the underground because my
lyceum with instruction in Belarusian was liquidated by
authorities.
On the other hand, the viability of the Belarusian language
is demonstrated by its presence on Wikipedia, digital
influencers, news media, a vibrant music scene. Still, there is
a lack of content in Belarusian language, especially for kids.
Ensuring translation and distribution of films and TV shows in
Belarusian language, like Netflix content, would be crucial for
change of its status. It is necessary to overcome the monopoly
of Russian and local nondemocratic narratives, ensure the
sustainable presence of the Russian surrogate media--such as
Radio Free Europe, Belsat TV, European Radio for Belarus, Radio
Racyja broadcasting from Poland.
This is the right moment to relaunch Voice of America
Belarus service, discontinued in 1956. Reopening the U.S.
embassy could help in building a direct dialog with Belarusian
people, not authorities, intensify projects on media literacy,
and digital journalism, as well as exchanges such as digital
communication network. Russian influence imposes a threat to
Belarus independence, but hopefully not immediate at the
moment. It rather facilitates long-term goals to Russify the
national identity of Belarusians and to prevent any potential
pro-Western and pro-democracy aspirations.
Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Williams.
BRIAN WHITMORE, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIA
PROGRAM, CEPA
Mr. Whitmore. Chairman Hastings, Ranking Member Wilson,
thank you for the opportunity to join this distinguished panel
to discuss Russian influence in Belarus, the broader
relationship between Moscow and Minsk, and the strategic
implications----
Mr. Hastings. Is your mic on, Mr. Williams?
Mr. Whitmore. It should be--ah, there we go. I'll start all
over again. [Laughs.]
Chairman Hastings, Ranking Member Wilson, thank you for the
opportunity to join this distinguished panel to discuss Russian
influence in Belarus, the broader relationship between Moscow
and Minsk, and the strategic implications for the United States
and its allies. It is truly an honor to be here.
I'd like to use my time before you today to broaden the
aperture a bit, and to take a look at the importance of Belarus
for the security of our allies and at the complex and very
nuanced relationship between Russia and Belarus, and how it is
changing. And I'd like to begin by stating something that is
obvious, but which nevertheless merits stressing: Strategically
speaking, Belarus matters a lot, and it is likely to matter a
lot more in the very near future.
Position and behavior of Alexander Lukashenko's
authoritarian regime, as distasteful as we may find that
regime, is a key factor in the security balance on NATO's
eastern flank. Bordering NATO members Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland, Belarus looms large in any Russian war plan with the
West. It would be an essential asset should Moscow seek to seal
the Suwalki Corridor and cut off the Baltic States from the
Atlantic alliance. And it could also provide a platform from
which Russia could threaten Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
Far from being a sideshow, Belarus needs to occupy a
central place in Western strategic thinking. Now, of course,
due to his abysmal record on human rights and democracy, it
would be highly problematic for Lukashenko to be an ally of the
United States. But at the same time, it is in the interest of
the United States and its allies that Belarus maintain its
independence and sovereignty, and that its economic and
military dependence on Russia be minimized. And therein lies
the paradox.
But the relationship between Moscow and Minsk is actually
much more nuanced than the stereotype suggests. This ostensibly
close partnership is actually among one of the most
dysfunctional relationships in the former Soviet space. Belarus
occupies a central space in Russian strategic thinking and an
essential part of what Moscow calls its ``strategic depth''--
that is, the existence of dependent satellite buffer states on
Russia's western border. Vladimir Putin therefore views the
relationship with Minsk as primarily imperial. He doesn't view
Belarus as a fully sovereign state, and he seeks to turn
Belarus into a de facto extension of Russia's western military
district, at the very least.
Lukashenko on the other hand, for all his faults, is not
interested in sacrificing Belarus' sovereignty. And he has
little to gain from a military standoff with the West in which
his country would be on the front line. Lukashenko, in
contrast, views the relationship between Moscow and Minsk as
purely transactional. He's happy to go through the motions of
being Russia's ally, as long as Russia pays him for the
trouble. Belarus' economy is effectively propped up by
importing heavily subsidized Russian oil and exporting refined
petroleum products.
Russia and Belarus are stuck in a strained marriage of
convenience between two wary partners whose leaders can barely
hide their disdain for each other. And this is important to
know: Lukashenko and Putin do not like each other personally.
On the one hand you have Putin, the would-be emperor. On the
other hand, you have Lukashenko, the crafty and manipulative
gamer.
Now, the founding document of the Belarusian-Russian
relationship is the 1999 union treaty, which is effectively a
grand bargain that has defined the relationship ever since. The
essence of the deal was really simple: Belarus would renounce
its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, make integration with Russia its
main foreign policy priority, and act as a buffer state as NATO
and the European Union enlarged eastward. In exchange, Russia
would provide subsidized energy, financial assistance, and
grant privileged access for Belarusian goods on the Russian
market. It was effectively an exchange of economic assistance
for geopolitical loyalty.
But since Russia's aggression in Ukraine in 2014, the grand
bargain between Moscow and Minsk began to break down. Russia's
aggression in Ukraine have led to fears on the part of
Lukashenko that much--and much of the Belarusian elite that the
country's fragile sovereignty could be in jeopardy.
And Russia, meanwhile, facing sanctions and a flailing
economy, has scaled back its subsidies and economic assistance
to Belarus. Moscow has also in this period sought to pressure
Belarus into hosting a new Russian military base on its
territory, integrating the country's armed forces more deeply
and accepting a revived integration project that would
effectively end Belarus' sovereignty.
As Lukashenko resisted these efforts--and he has resisted
these efforts--Moscow began sending not-so-subtle hints. In
2016, for example, Russia began deploying mechanized military
units near the Belarusian border. Now, Lukashenko's reacted by
flirting with the West, seeking closer ties, courting a
relationship with China, and by attempting to develop a high-
tech sector to decrease economic dependence on Russia. At the
same time, he has remained nominally open to Moscow's proposals
for deeper economic integration and the Belarusian ruling elite
remains divided between pro-Russian and pro-independence wings.
And there's more on that in my written testimony.
Lukashenko and Putin are scheduled to discuss a Russian-
supported plan for deeper integration in December, and Belarus
is planning to hold Presidential elections next August, which
could open the door for greater Russian meddling. There's also
indications that Russia's military intelligence, the GRU, and
its foreign intelligence service, the SVR, are alarmed by
Lukashenko's efforts to preserve Belarus' independence by
attempting to move it closer to the West, as tentative as these
moves may be.
Now, given the centrality of Belarus to Russia's perceived
security interest, and nobody more than--except for Ukraine
looms as large in Russia's security interest as Belarus--Moscow
will likely view Belarus as a zero-sum game and will be willing
to take risks to maintain it as a client state. Russia will
most likely continue to pressure the Lukashenko regime into
deeper economic and military integration. But if that fails, we
cannot rule out that the Kremlin could attempt regime change or
even a military solution to keep Belarus in its sphere of
influence.
Given the high priority that Moscow places on keeping Minsk
as a client, Russia clearly has escalation dominance in
Belarus. But this does not mean that the United States and its
allies are helpless. We can take steps to make sure Belarus--to
assure that Belarus becomes less dependent on Russia
economically, such as helping it develop its fledgling high-
tech sector. This would have the added benefit of changing the
political environment and changing the political economy in
Belarus, and potentially laying the groundwork for a more
pluralistic political system in the future.
We can also, as my colleague said, intensify our work with
civil society and media, which would shore up Belarus' sense of
nationhood in the face of a Russian disinformation campaign
that Belarus is not an actual nation, and make the country more
indigestible in the event of eventual Russian aggression.
And finally, we could send a clear and unambiguous signal
to Moscow that any forceful effort to violate Belarus'
sovereignty would incur costs, including but not limited to
additional sanctions. As distasteful as we may find Lukashenko,
we do regard Belarus' sovereignty as sacrosanct, and that
message needs to be sent to Moscow.
Thank you very much for your attention and I'll be happy to
answer your questions.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Williams. What we will do is
alternate between Mr. Wilson and myself. And rather than
specify when we put questions, any of you or all of you dive
in. It will be appreciated.
What we've heard from you today is both sobering and all
too familiar. The Kremlin, which has engaged in hybrid warfare
to promote its disruptive agenda, in a number of sovereign
states along the borders, now has its sights on Belarus and has
had for a protracted period of time. We know that Kremlin
playbook when it comes to disinformation and malign influence.
But it would be helpful to understand more specifically the
tactics Russia is using to promote its agenda of a Russia-
Belarus union. Is Belarusian society able to resist these
efforts? And to the extent that you can, identify who is
winning this struggle for the hearts and minds of the
Belarusian people.
Mr. Yeliseyeu. For the two last decades Lukashenko
essentially traded geopolitical loyalty and military
cooperation with Russia for Russian generosity--lower gas
prices, beneficial oil processing schemes, an open market for
Belarusian goods, and other tools of financial assistance
allowed Lukashenko to keep largely unreformed Belarusian
economy afloat. Now Russia uses this economic leverage, you
know, to condition further economic assistance with deeper
integration. It uses propagandistic pressure too, with the aim
to create an illusion that a large part of Belarusian
population actually support this radically deep integration
with Russia.
I will give you one example. Representative sociological
surveys show that just a few percent of the Belarusian
population, you know, support joining Russia. But what Russian
propaganda actors do in social media, they organize polls that
show, you know, a much higher figure, like over 30 percent for
instance. Of course, these polls are not representative.
Anyone, you know, can launch this poll in a given social media
page and everyone can vote, and trolls and bots, you know, can
contribute to the poll results. So but later on these results,
published by a range of websites, you know, creating this
illusion of big, you know, numbers of population in favor of
losing sovereignty or radical deep integration with Russia. So
this is an important tactic that is used by propaganda actors
in the media sphere.
When it comes to civil society, well, it does its best but,
of course, the conditions are very uneven. I mean, a
centralized state machine versus civil society under domestic
pressure and with a lack of external support. So a younger
generation of media activists, since independent media, they
need a larger arena for action. They need a less oppressive
environment inside the country, and larger support to continue
what they're doing nowadays.
Mr. Hastings. Is there a fear among Belarusians that their
country may suffer the similar fate of Ukraine if Putin chooses
to--or, Lukashenko chooses to pursue closer ties with either
the U.S., or the EU, or Western countries? Is that fear
pervasive in Belarus?
Mr. Viacorka. I can begin answering this question, because
it's very--it's very difficult. So first of all, Ukraine was
very inspirational to all of us. Many Belarusians--young
Belarusians came to Kyiv to protest for democracy and freedom.
Some of them died, were shot at the Maidan in the downtown
Kyiv. And these protests, and even this war now in Ukraine,
it's also war for Belarus--for its identity, for its future,
for its democratic aspirations as well.
So after 2014, Belarusians are following Ukrainian events
very closely. All the political changes, all the events in the
southeastern Ukraine, occupation of Crimea. Sometimes inspired
people, sometimes scared people. Of course, nobody wants war.
But Belarus is not Ukraine. There is a very different
historical background. Belarus is much more unified in sense of
ethnicity than Ukraine. We have only 8.2 percent of Russian
ethnic populations, so compared to Ukraine, where Russians were
predominant ethnic group in southeastern part of Ukraine. So
for Russians it's very difficult to say that you have to join
Russia because you are Russians. They are not Russians. Yes,
they speak Russian, but it doesn't mean they are Russians.
So I think this is why Russia is trying to build another
story, another tactic and strategy toward Belarus. They are
trying to play with its Orthodoxy and Russian language. And
they say: Since you are Russian Orthodox, you are Russians.
Since you are Russian speakers, you are Russian. And we will
come to protect you. Lukashenko is always playing seesaw. So
he's trying to be with the West--we would joke that in summer
Lukashenko is pro-Western, in winter he is pro-Russian. And I
think even Belarusians understand this game, so nobody really
believes what he says because usually it's more the show, it's
more the comedy. So it's more--Lukashenko became a meme for a
young generation.
More important is to see what's happening. And we see that
Lukashenko and authorities are closing their eyes on the
developments inside of the society, on the development of this
pro-Russian network, of this Russian party. It's not the party,
as we used to know political parties. It's like a deep state.
It's like a hidden organization. It's something which exists in
practically all spheres of life, in every region, in every
city. It unifies officials, military people, activists. And
neither Lukashenko nor civil society today cannot resist,
cannot counter efficiently this Russian increasing dominance.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Whitmore. Yes, in answer to your question I recall a
conversation I had with a Belarusian opposition figure back in
2014. And he said: Look at the conundrum we're in right now.
Imagine we pull off the impossible. Imagine we overthrow this
dictator. Imagine we overcome this police state. What do you
think's going to be happening next? Well, then we're going to
have to face another dictator. And this kind of changed the
political dynamic. And correct me if I'm wrong, this is the
impression I was getting from Belarusians I was talking to,
this kind of changed the dynamic within the country where the
opposition began to make peace with Lukashenko because we want
our sovereignty today. We can fight for democracy tomorrow. I
think this was kind of a calculation that was made in the minds
of a lot of people.
There was also suspicion that some people who claim to be
opposition are actually Russian agents that are--that would be
used to increase Kremlin influence. So the dynamic changed
dramatically after 2014. And it makes it a lot more complicated
right now. Again, we have this paradox, where Lukashenko has
positioned himself as the last, greatest defender of Belarusian
sovereignty, while we in the West find this regime distasteful.
And what can we do in this situation? It's--I don't have an
easy answer. I wish I did.
Mr. Hastings. Ms. Orlosky, you were getting ready to say
something?
Ms. Orlosky. I think it's important to note that even
though citizens are concerned, we haven't seen much visible
action to counteract these attempts. There is a civic
initiative that was started this year called Svezhii Veter that
attempts to assemble a critical mass of citizens who are
concerned about specifically the expedited Union State
negotiations. Several political candidates ahead of the
parliamentary elections have put the item on their agenda and
have voiced it out during the public gatherings.
Mr. Hastings. But nobody in the opposition won, did they?
Ms. Orlosky. But, exactly.
Mr. Hastings. I didn't mean to cut you off, but I just----
Ms. Orlosky. But you made my point.
Mr. Hastings. Oh, okay. [Laughter.]
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. And Mr.
Yeliseyeu, your being here, your existence, is a dream come
true to me. I supported a person of Polish heritage, Barry
Goldwater, to run for president. My first visit to Washington
was for the national ``Draft Goldwater'' rally July the 4th,
1963. And so my whole life was really focused, as a teenager
on, to hopefully the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe.
I have a book behind my desk by Barry Goldwater, it cost all of
75 cents, and it was, ``Why Not Victory?'' What it meant was
the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, you. And so I'm
just so excited to be here with you.
And what a wonderful model--our family went a step further.
My oldest son married a person of Polish heritage, Jennifer
Miskowitz, obviously Polish. And she was the newscaster of the
largest television station in South Carolina. And so he's done
quite well because of her and her association with Poland. And
what a message to Belarus. Poland can point out that they've
had twenty-five years of positive economic growth. The only
country in Europe that had had--that can point to that. So what
an example.
And then, Ms. Orlosky, you and I share the heritage of
working with sister organizations, okay? National Democrat[ic]
Institute, International Republican Institute. And I had the
opportunity to be an election observer June the 10th, 1990, in
Bulgaria. And it was startling, the comparison. Before I went,
everything I read, the people in Bulgaria through pan-Slavism
were just really enthusiastic about being part of the Soviet
empire that they didn't want to be just a Soviet satellite,
they really wanted to be a Soviet Republic. I got there, nobody
felt that way. Also when I got there, I felt like I was
stepping back in the 1930s. It was pathetic. And the lifestyle
was just so anemic. And now I've gone back every 2 or 3 years,
and how exciting to see the progress of that country. And now a
member of NATO, the European Union, a very dynamic country.
I was honored to be with Prime Minister Boyko Borissov for
my birthday 2 years ago. And I found out that, Mr. Chairman,
Bulgarian wines are very good. So I----
Mr. Hastings. Yes, I know Solomon Passy, and so that speaks
for itself.
Mr. Wilson. That's right. Hey, we have shared friends in
Bulgaria, the former foreign minister. And so many--but, again,
great examples for Belarus of success, as opposed to what
apparently is going on. So again, I'm just grateful to be here
with you.
And, Ms. Orlosky, given the current authoritarian regime in
Minsk, what can the U.S. hopefully do to bolster a civil
society in Belarus and to preserve its--the Belarus
sovereignty? How can the Congress help in this effort?
Ms. Orlosky. Thank you for your question. Over the last
decade we have seen certain efforts put in place to support
civil society initiatives. And there is foreign assistance
available for civic groups, but unfortunately we can't say that
it's sufficient. Your counterparts in the European Union are
doing everything they can to provide foreign funding as well.
However, for as long as Belarusian civic groups continue to
operate in the environment where they have to register their
foreign funding and essentially apply for permission to receive
a grant, where they have to register as an organization where
they are placed under so many restrictions that compliance, so
to speak, becomes a time-consuming endeavor as opposed to
implementing the necessary initiatives to build a stronger
awareness, to support youth, to support independent media, the
efforts to provide funding are going to be met with challenges.
And most recent example, just a week ago we learned that a
civic initiative in Belarus that was hoping to develop a
program that encourages people to participate in public
discussions of laws and bills received a small grant from the
U.S. embassy--or, was awarded a small grant, which is under
$25,000. And they received denials from three different
ministries to register that grant, which usually means that any
other attempts will be met with the same fate. So what kind of
assistance can we be talking about if these restrictions
continue to exist? I think it's important to pair assistance
efforts with bilateral engagement with the government to remove
the obstacles for civil society to receive that assistance. I
think this is absolutely crucial.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And in fact, again, lighting does
strike, bipartisan cooperation here, all right? So we'll be
working together to back that up.
And Mr. Whitmore, I'm really grateful of your lecturing.
You've lectured in Odessa, Ukraine, and St. Petersburg, Russia,
and my hometown of Columbia, South Carolina. So we like the
association with St. Petersburg and Odessa. So thank you for
your lecturing.
And with that, it's been spoken there's a generational
change potential in Belarus. And how do you identify this? And
would the young people of that country want to associate with
the world of Vladimir Putin or Western civilization?
Mr. Whitmore. Well, we're witnessing the first generation
that only knows life in an independent Belarus is now coming of
age. And I think we have to capitalize on that opportunity.
They're not going to be as susceptible to the appeals to Soviet
nostalgia. And I think there are concrete things we can do. And
as my colleagues have noted, working with civil society and
seizing this moment. But I really think we need to invest in
this high-tech sector to facilitate the development of Belarus'
high-tech sector. Because in a lot of ways Russia's given us a
wonderful opportunity right now.
Between 2000 and 2015 Russian subsidies accounted for, on
average, 15 percent of Belarus' GDP. They've been cut since
2015. And now they account for approximately 5 percent,
according to IMF data. Now, this means that Russia is leaving
this gap that needs to be filled in the Belarusian economy. And
it can only be filled by the private sector--or, we would hope
that it would be filled by the private sector. And that would
change the entire political economy, entire political dynamic.
Mr. Hastings. How inviting is investing in the high tech--
--
Mr. Whitmore. Well, the authorities are saying they want
investment in high tech. They are sending delegations to
Silicon Valley. They are giving nominal tax relief and tax
incentives for this. So they're acting like they want this.
Now, I don't know if they understand the full political
implications of this, because if you develop a vibrant
Belarusian high-tech sector, that is going to change the
political economy of Belarus and change the political dynamics
and I would argue, over the long term, lay the foundation for a
more pluralist political system. So I think this is one of the
ways that we can engage this new generation.
Mr. Wilson. And I'm hopeful like you. I had the opportunity
to meet with a delegation of business leaders from Belarus in
North Augusta, South Carolina, where they were meeting with
industry leaders. And so I'm hopeful. I now yield back.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you. And I--this is an unusual
question--but I like children. And I have two granddaughters,
nine and eight. And quite frankly, they are about the most
important thing to me going at this point, to keep me going.
But what is the status of primary education, elementary
education, high school? How does that look in Belarus?
Mr. Viacorka. Thank you for this question. So education is
also the field of battle, I would say, between Russian or
imperialist ideology. But it doesn't start, of course, in
kindergarten, but in the high school and during all the history
lessons we really see the change of the narrative. When the
schoolbooks printed in 1990s, before Lukashenko came to power
and Russia built strong presence in Belarusian information
space, kids were taught true Belarusian history about our great
past, about our good times and bad times, about our unions and
our wars, about our connections with Lithuania and Poland and
Ukraine.
Now we see that the new schoolbooks are printed with the
support of Rossotrudnichestvo and other Russian-funded
foundations. And they already push another narrative. So we see
different types of heroes for these young people. And this
clash of two narratives, it happens in the school classrooms.
We also lack schoolbooks and content for kids in Belarusian
language. Basically we all discussed, like, last year Masha and
the Bear role. You know that Masha and the Bear is the third-
most popular video on YouTube ever after Gangnam Style and
Despacito. [Laughter.]
Ms. Orlosky. It's on Netflix.
Mr. Viacorka. And it's on Netflix too.
Ms. Orlosky. In English.
Mr. Viacorka. In English. No, but Masha and the Bear is in
every school, and every university, and every kindergarten, and
every embassy, on every office of Russian cultural center. And
kids are getting used to Russian content. They don't have
Belarusian content. They don't have Western content translated
into Belarusian language. So they exposed and they are
connected to these heroes, to these cartoony personages from
the very, very young age. So my proposal is also to intensify
not just investment in the tech sector, but also investments in
the exporting mass culture, entertainment content,
infotainment, education content from the U.S. to Belarus, and
translate it into Belarusian language.
Mr. Hastings. I thank you for that. Also a few years back,
maybe 3 or 4 years, one of the United States big networks, it
was either ABC or CBS, tracked the military exercise that
Russia conducted. And it was huge. Mr. Whitmore, I apologize
for calling you Mr. Williams. But these eyes without glasses
aren't the best in the world. [Laughter.] But do they conduct--
meaning Russia--do they conduct this military exercise annually
or is this an anomaly that I saw on television?
Mr. Whitmore. Well, the Zapad military exercises are
conducted regularly, not annually. But the regional exercises
rotate. You have Yug, which is the southern. You have Kavkaz,
which is the Caucasus. You have Zapad which is the west. But
they're conducted regularly. But the last Zapad military
exercises between Russia and Belarus were notable for, I
thought, how much discord there was between the Belarusian and
the Russian authorities. The Belarus in the runup to those
exercises was going out of its way to assure Belarus' neighbors
that nothing aggressive was going to happen toward them. I was
in Lithuania at the time of these exercises, and the Lithuanian
foreign minister told me that Belarus has reached out and has,
you know, been bending over backward to assure this.
Russia, on the other hand, wanted to use those exercises as
a massive PSYOP, that they might be used as some pretext for an
attack. So there was this discord between the Belarusian and
the Russian authorities. I heard information at the time, which
I have not been able to confirm but that I heard, that
Lukashenko was being iced out of the military decisionmaking
and had convened an emergency meeting with his closest advisors
because he was worried about what might happen. And I thought
it was telling that at the end of the exercises the Russian
officers did not stay for the ceremonial dinner, and instead
went back to Moscow.
So there was--those exercises, I thought, pointed out as
much of the discord in the Russian-Belarusian relationship as
the--as the unity. I would point out there are currently no
Russian bases on Belarusian territory. There are military
facilities, but not full-fledged bases.
Not full-fledged bases. And that Russia is pressuring
Belarus now into effectively integrating the Belarusian command
with the Russian command, along the lines of what they did in
the Russian-occupied areas of Georgia, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Again, Belarus is resisting this.
And, again this puts us in this conundrum that I spoke of
earlier, this paradox, of this regime we find distasteful, that
will never be our ally, but yet we want to preserve Belarusian
sovereignty and we want to assure that Belarus is not
militarily integrated with Russia, because that I think is a
security nightmare. It brings Russian power right up to the
border of our allies.
Mr. Hastings. Okay. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Viacorka. I would say that----
Mr. Hastings. Go right ahead.
Mr. Viacorka. Let me add a few words. So perhaps there are
not traditional military bases, but unfortunately our air
defense system is part of the union defense system. I used to
be a soldier in compulsory military service in Belarus. And I
was reporting about all the flights flying from the west and
from the south, from everywhere, because we had enemies
everywhere. And we reported both to Minsk, to Baranovichi, and
to Russian side. So I think the same scheme, the same operation
is working now. So basically we don't have sovereign air
defense in Belarus.
And within the Army there is no Belarusian narrative, there
is no Belarusian ideology. It's still very Soviet, very
Russian. We still were taught in military units that our main
enemy is NATO. And we were trained, and we can be waken up in
the middle of the night and asked the parameters of F-15
warplane, because we were taught that every day, perhaps
tomorrow morning, NATO is going to attack us. And this is the
way how soldiers, 40,000 soldiers in Belarus, are trained now.
They are trained to fight against the West. And this is my
concern.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Yeliseyeu,
with your Belarusian background, to what extent is Belarusian
cultural identity, including language, being promoted in
Belarus? And are there any successful movements within Belarus
to reclaim a pre-Soviet Belarusian heritage?
Mr. Yeliseyeu. Well, as Franak already said, Belarusian
language is under pressure. In Belarus, if we look at the
numbers of the pupils who are taught in Belarusian, who study
at schools with Belarusian language as the language of
instruction, then we see that in 1994 the figure was over 40
percent. Last year, it was about just 10 percent. So we can see
a fundamental, you know, decrease in the number of pupils who
are taught in Belarusian.
Nevertheless, recently we can see that there's a number of
civic initiatives which do their best to promote Belarusian
language and culture because, you know, Belarusian history and
culture are under attack of massive Russian propaganda. They
even attempt to create some sort of common history textbook.
This is of course a big threat, because already nowadays, as
Franak said, pupils are taught some conflicting narratives
which do not fully correspond to the Belarusian history.
So there's a concern that if this anti-Belarusian language
state policy continues then this will weaken the Belarusian
identity, and hence the resilience of Belarusian society will
be weakened. So it's very important, you know, to bear in mind
that these initiatives which promote Belarusian language and
culture are very important. They are a cornerstone of the
Belarusian and resilient society.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for your efforts. And Mr.
Viacorka, you've identified that there's different levels of
tension between the Putin regime and Belarus. What more are
there? And are they growing? Or what's the status of tension
and disagreement?
Mr. Viacorka. Thank you for that question, Mr. Wilson.
I think Putin honestly doesn't like Lukashenko. They always
have problems and communicate in messages. So they don't trust
each other, as often happens between dictators and
authoritarian leaders. This week we see the preparation of the
meeting on December 8th, when a wide range of treaties and
agreements must be signed by Belarus and Russian authorities.
And we see that we--and one document about this meeting was
leaked yesterday to social media, to Telegram channels. And in
these documents we can see that Russia is forcing Belarus
authorities to sign all the documents and all the treaties
according to the rules and in favor of Russian interest. So
what Russia is trying to do--they are trying to use their
political power, their military dominance, their economical
dominance in Belarus, in order to force Lukashenko authorities
to accept all the conditions they want.
So in more metaphorical sense I would say they have the
leash, and they always play with the size of the leash. So they
know that Lukashenko is under control. They know that
Belarusian economy and politics and military sphere is under
control of Kremlin. And what they do sometimes is they give
more space to Lukashenko to play his own card, sometimes
lesser. But I hope that it will not be forever like this. I
also hope that there is a new generation of officials within
Lukashenko's regime who see Belarus as independent, free, and
pro-European, and these people also influence Lukashenko's
policy in the direction of opening the country to the West.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, Mr. Whitmore.
Mr. Whitmore. I mean, you'll see things--you'll see
incidents of tension rising to the surface kind of in a very
open way, and then you see what the Russians call the battle
under the carpet, right? Lukashenko gave a very famous
interview back in 2015, I believe it was, where he was
ridiculing Russia's historic claims to Crimea, saying by using
the same logic Mongolia could claim Russia. [Laughs.] And so
this--I mean, this is a very kind of manifest example of this.
Lukashenko's comments that Belarus does not want to be part of
the Russian world, his very insincere efforts to promote the
Belarusian efforts right now--because he is making verbal
commitments to the Belarusian language although I don't see a
lot of action.
But then you see a lot of stuff below the surface going on.
The Belarusian Interior Minister Ihar Shunevich was recently
dismissed. Now, there are different interpretations of why this
happened. Mr. Shunevich was the most pro-Moscow figure in the
Belarusian elite. And dismissing him I think was a--did have
kind of political overtones, although there were rumors he was
sick. I don't know if that was true or not, or if he wanted to
spend more time with his family, although he is rumored to be
in Moscow now.
You'll see other things, such as the former Russian
ambassador Mikhail Babich, who was appointed in August 2018 but
resigned abruptly in April 2019. Now, he was meeting regularly
with Belarusian security officials, and he was seen as kind of
one of Putin's enforcers, if you will. He was used in Chechnya,
in Tatarstan, in Bashkortostan, and other Russian regions.
Now, his removal coincided with the arrest of a security
official named Andrei Vtyurin, who officially was arrested for
bribery but there were rumors he was meeting with Babich and
was suspected of being party to a coup--a potential coup. We
don't know if this is true. Again, this is what I'm told by my
sources in Minsk.
You see a Russian campaign against the sitting Foreign
Minister Vladimir Makei, who is by far the most pro-
independence-minded official in Lukashenko's inner circle. So
there's all of these little manifestations of this around in
terms of personnel moves, in terms of ambassadorial
appointments. And then you can see them as well in Lukashenko's
statements. This doesn't mean a break is about to happen. It
means there's tension and there's turbulence in the
relationship. And it's something we should keep our eye on and
potentially exploit, if we can.
Mr. Wilson. Well, hey, as I conclude, I want to thank each
of you for your efforts on behalf of the Belarusian people, and
their freedom, and their continued independence. And then I
actually--I've never visited Minsk, but I look forward to going
with the chairman sometime and we'll visit. But I have been
across Russia. And I'm still hopeful for that country. I've
been from St. Petersburg to Novosibirsk. And the Russian
people, to me, were extraordinary. It's sad to me
authoritarianism has taken over. But we need to be encouraging
the people of Russia too to follow the Polish example, and
Bulgarian.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. All right. Mr. Yeliseyeu, you mentioned a
media group earlier. What impact has that had? Is it negative
or positive? And how were they received? You held up a piece of
paper that----
Mr. Yeliseyeu. Thank you. You mean the declaration I had
mentioned, right?
Mr. Hastings. Yes.
Mr. Yeliseyeu. Right. so all the major Belarus media actors
acknowledge this problem that I mentioned, that's--you know,
this automatically generated news services are increasingly
popular among the people. So people do not go to specific
websites. They usually just use these systems to get news. And
because there's no functional geotargeting for Belarus in, say,
Google News, in Apple services, then people instead of getting
media products done by Belarusian media, they get most of the
media content from Russian media. So this is a big problem.
It's--you know, it plays in favor of Russian media rather than
Belarusian state and independent media, because this way they
lose their audience plus Belarusian population gets the
information not from the national media outlets, but from
Russian ones.
So this declaration was met with a big interest and
enthusiasm by Belarus media actors. And they, and the expat
community, and the state authorities, I believe, we all hope
that soon these Western global corporations, they turn their
eye on this problem, and they recognize Belarus as a distinct
media market. And this way, we'll solve this problem and put
Belarus media community in the same conditions that Ukrainian,
Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian media communities are.
Mr. Hastings. I want to ask you, what is the likelihood
that an 18- or 19-year-old, or someone between 17 and 25 will
see the demonstrations that are going on elsewhere in the
world, through media? Do they get to see what's happening in
Hong Kong, and Chile, and Iran, and Venezuela? What's the
likelihood of them seeing that, with the clamp that seems to be
exercised against the media?
Mr. Viacorka. Mr. Chairman, that's a wonderful question
because actually protests around the world--in Venezuela, in
Hong Kong, earlier in Turkey, even events in Iran, when the
internet shutdown happened just a few days ago--actually these
events are very inspiring and inspirational to Belarusian
youth, and Belarusian civil society, and regional
organizations. We have several very popular communities and
channels on social media, especially on Telegram, talking and
informing only about protests worldwide. And I am very happy to
see how this young, nonviolent activists, protestors learn from
each other.
For example, the Hong Kong protests, they started to use
P2P technology. When the internet is shut down, which is often
happening in all authoritarian countries and sometimes happens
in Belarus too, they manage to organize thanks to mobile phones
the connectivity without being connected to the internet. They
exchange files, videos, and texts. And I hope that in case the
internet will be shut down in Belarus or in Russia, that these
activists will use the experience of the Iranian and Hong Kong
activists in order to keep going and to keep their aspirations
on the very high level.
So regarding young people, young people today in Belarus,
they're exposed to Russian disinformation, propaganda. You
know, as I mentioned in the beginning, this very, very crazy
messages. For example, in the first I saw this picture on
almost, like, 1,000 pages on VKontakte. That's world map 2020--
2030. And we see big Russia. We'll see European Union map,
which is called ``LGBT Caliphate.'' We see United States and
Canada together as one country. It's the ``Great Desert of
Tolerance.'' All of South America is Venezuela. And Australia
is this--the ``Space Station Yuzhny [Southern].'' [Laughter.]
So this is actually new exaggerated Russian vision of the
world. And this is what they want, you know. And of course, for
young people who became a consumer and user of such crazy
propaganda, this new Russian revanchism becomes very attractive
because they begin believing that you can change that map, you
can conquer enemies, you can unify America, United States,
Mexico, and Canada, in one state and make the desert of all
those three countries. So unfortunately, it works. But what we
have to do, we have to build positive alternative.
It's impossible to counter fake news. It's a big mistake to
believe that only factchecking and the traditional journalism
can win alone. No. It's a digital space. New rules. New
competition. Instead of large and powerful, Russia used small
and many. In 2013/14 they created Russia Today and Sputnik. Now
they created thousands of small Facebook, Instagram, VKontakte-
based pages and channels because it's much more efficient. It
targets smaller groups separately, but if we will see the whole
picture all together they target, and they reach much more
people aggregated.
So this is the way. And we have to realize it, to admit
this fact, and to be smarter, to be faster, to be more
efficient, and to embrace technology. Because technology is the
instrument. Technology is the solution, how to prevent Russia
from dominance in Belarus and in the region.
Mr. Hastings. Go ahead, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. One final comment from me. I have had the
opportunity to visit Latvia and Lithuania. While they're next-
door neighbors, what extraordinary societies they've developed
so quickly right next door. So what a great example to have
right next door, and particularly for the young people but for
everyone in the country.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Joe.
Ms. Orlosky, you spoke about leveraging, to the extent that
we can. The United States and Belarus have not exchanged
ambassadors for decades. And yet in 2019 Lukashenko kind of
sent a signal that maybe they would be ready to do that. Do
you, any of you, support that effort? Or how best might it be
implemented? And what can we get for that kind of recognition?
Ms. Orlosky. Thank you. In my view the withdrawal of
ambassadors back in the day primarily impacted the people of
Belarus and of the United States, because it removed a very
important cultural diplomatic link between the two nations.
And, you know, the easiest manifestation was the difficulty
with which Belarusian citizens had to receive U.S. visas, the
length of wait for appointments, the lack of cultural exchange
opportunities, and things like that.
So I think that the return of ambassadors to both countries
is a good step. But I think the first priority should be a
reinstating cultural diplomacy relations. The peer-to-peer
relations, the programs that show that it is not about
necessarily the governments and the states but it is about the
people of two countries and the goodwill of the people from the
United States and Belarus toward each other.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Whitmore, you were going to say
something.
Mr. Whitmore. Yes, no, I would concur with what Sofya said.
And I would say, I mean, we got to be there. But I also think
we got to send our ``A'' team there to engage with the
Belarusian people. And I would also concur that I would step it
up with track two diplomacy, because that's what's really going
to make the difference in a long run in developing a more
pluralistic society. And I wanted to just add a little bit to
what Franak was saying about the narratives, because I think it
is crucial that we help Belarus develop positive narratives,
whether we're talking about language, or whether we're talking
about history.
Belarus was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
This was the largest state in Europe. And it links Belarus to
Europe and not to Russia. And I think there's a usable history
here. And I think we have to help the Belarusian civil society.
And I think they're doing a good job of it themselves, but I
think we need to help them amplify these positive narratives to
counter the Russian disinformation.
Mr. Hastings. So let me give you all the last word, and
anything that you want as a takeaway for us, starting with you,
Franak, since you were about to say something regarding what
Mr. Whitmore was saying.
Mr. Viacorka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity
and for the hearing today.
So about the narrative. You know, I wanted to show you two
Belarusian heroes. So one is Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who is also
the hero of the United States and Poland, who actually
contributed a lot in building United States military forces.
But Kosciuszko is also the person who organized the first big
uprising against Russian power in 1794. And now these pro-
Russian narratives in Belarus on social media, they try to
destroy and to say that he's Polish, that he's anti-Belarusian,
he's anti-Orthodox.
And another person is very important. And he's perhaps the
hero Number 1 in Belarus, Kastus Kalinouski. He's a common hero
for Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland. And 1 year ago his
remains--his bones were found in Vilnius, capital of Lithuania.
And in 2 days, there will be a ceremony of reburial of his
bones. And thousands of Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians will
come to Vilnius.
And that's a very good sign that still we have symbols, we
have common values that can unify our countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. And I think building coalition between Poland,
Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine, also Czech Republic, Slovakia,
that's essential in order to prevent Russian influence. Because
they are winning when we are separated, when we are divided. It
will be together, it will be working together in politics, in
economy, in military, in culture, in media space, then we will
be winning.
And I also would like to say and to answer the question how
the U.S. can else help. So it's very important to include
Belarus into all programs related to Russian disinformation, to
monitoring of Russian influences in the region. Some programs
are managed and coordinated by Global Engagement Center, but
USAID. Projects like iSANS and their report, that's a fantastic
tool and amazing data that can help not only Belarus but all
the countries in the region to prevent potential Russian
interference.
Also, I believe that the projects and the initiatives, like
Belarus Democracy Act, was one of the most successful of its
time. And perhaps it can be updated somehow, because the main
idea of Belarus Democracy Act was to help Belarusian society.
And we need it as never before. So now we have a bit more space
for Belarusian civil society. The government do not arrest us
on daily basis. But let's use this moment, this window of
opportunity so much as possible.
Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. All right. Mr. Wilson had something else.
Mr. Wilson. And, Mr. Viacorka, thank you for referencing
Slovakia. That's another example for the people of Belarus. I
have been to Bratislava. I've been across the heart of Europe.
That's what Slovakia claims. A brand-new country, one that was
never imagined to exist. But it does. And it's a dynamic
democracy. And there's so many positive examples for the people
of Belarus. And I want to thank you for, again, working and
promoting freedom and democracy in Belarus.
Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Yeliseyeu.
Mr. Yeliseyeu. Thank you. I'd like to give a couple of
interesting figures to conclude. Two days ago there was a
sociological survey in the six Eastern Partnership countries
commissioned by the EU. So the survey showed that the share of
positively disposed people to the EU is the lowest among
Belarusians, 35 percent. But the situation is not as gloomy as
it may seem because, in fact, merely 6 percent of the
Belarusians have negative feeling to the EU. So more than
half--over 50 percent of the population--have a neutral feeling
to the EU, which shows us there's a big potential to enhance
the EU image.
But at the same time, almost 80 percent of Belarusians, the
same survey shows, declare that the information that they
reach, watch, or access online do not help them to have a
better understanding of the EU. Compare this with just 20
percent of Armenians. So we can see that there's a huge
potential, you know, to enhance the image of the West among the
Belarusians. But at the same time, because of the constrained
environment for the media, people are just not aware. And they
acknowledge that they do not have sufficient information.
Mr. Hastings. It brings up the point that you all raised
about Voice of America. I have been, as a person and a
congressperson, a major supporter of that effort. But there
have been cutbacks that cause them not to expand the way that
they should. The Belarus program would be the prime example.
But, Ms. Orlosky, what's your takeaway from it?
Ms. Orlosky. I think the potential to reinstate diplomatic
relationships, it opens the door for the United States to
really work with the Belarusian Government on its democracy and
human rights record. And no matter how strategic Belarus can be
in the fight against sprawling influence from the Russian
Government, I believe the United States cannot afford to have
another dictator friend. And the Belarusian people cannot
afford to have United States support a dictatorship in their
own country after the U.S. for decades has championed the rule
of law, democratic governance, and respect for fundamental
freedoms. So this would be my concluding remark.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Whitmore.
Mr. Whitmore. I keep forgetting to do that. When I meet my
Belarusian contacts I meet them not in Minsk but in Vilnius or
in Warsaw. And I think that this is actually largely symbolic.
I know it's necessary right now, but I think it's also
symbolic, because Belarus is effectively a European nation that
has been artificially separated from Europe by Russia. As I
stated earlier, Belarus was part of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, which included not just Poland and Lithuania but
all of what is today Belarus, all of what is today Ukraine, and
a big chunk of what is today southern Russia. This was the
superpower of Russia in its time, when Moscow was a backwater.
Just like Kyiv was a booming metropolis when Moscow was an
empty forest. So I think this is something we have to remember.
We're talking about a European nation that has been
artificially cut off from Europe.
The second thing I'd want to say is that we have a window
of opportunity right now. I agree with Sofya. We do not want to
be an ally with a dictator. But we do have a window of
opportunity right now because that dictator is desperate. He
understands that his days may be numbered. It's clear that
Russia is not happy with the current arrangement with Belarus
and would like to change it, and would like to turn Belarus
into, as I said, an extension of Russia's western military
district or annex it entirely.
There are leaks on Telegram channels that are known for
Kremlin information--not disinformation, but actual
information--[laughs]--that suggest that the plans are on the
table in the Kremlin to annex Belarus. So this dictator is
desperate. And this gives us a wonderful--it's a time of
danger, but it also gives us a wonderful window of opportunity
to work with the Belarusian people, to bring them where they
belong, in Europe.
Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. I thank you all. You--in addition to being
well-informed people, you're very courageous to take on these
responsibilities, as well as others. Be assured, just by virtue
of the fact that we scheduled this hearing, there is interest.
And don't be dissuaded because of our lack of numbers. We have
other commissioners. And this is perhaps the busiest season for
us. So they will get the word. And we will brief them. And I
thank you all so much.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing ended.]
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
Good morning and welcome. This U.S. Helsinki Commission
hearing entitled ``Not-So-Good Neighbors: Russian Influence in
Belarus'' will come to order.
We all know that the Kremlin's disinformation and political
interference reaches the shores of the United States and
elsewhere in the region of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Yet it is easy to lose sight of
the power that Putin's Russia wields in its own neighborhood,
outside of its ongoing aggression in Ukraine. In the case of
Belarus, Russia's western neighbor, the grip of the Kremlin is
no less pervasive, but much less obvious. Russia has not
started a hot military conflict in Belarus as it has in
Ukraine, but rather employs economic, social, political, and
information leverage to weaken the sovereignty of Belarus and
pull the country further into its orbit. I saw this firsthand
during my last trip to Minsk for the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Annual Session in July 2017.
Unfortunately, Belarus is ripe for infiltration by external
forces. Civil society and fundamental freedoms have been
stifled under the 25-year rule of Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko, who has cultivated a strong working
relationship with Vladimir Putin. The two use similar tactics
to crush dissent in their respective countries. Belarus is also
heavily economically dependent on Russia, with its economy
propped up by discounted oil and gas from its neighbor. The
shared Soviet history of the two countries makes it easy for
Russia to appeal to the hearts and minds of many Belarusians,
and the Lukashenko regime is feeling the squeeze. And with
little linguistic or cultural barriers, the Kremlin and its
partners easily operate in the media and information sphere in
Belarus, spreading pro-Russian propaganda in an effort to keep
Belarus from turning toward the West.
In this context, Lukashenko has sought to vector West for
fear of his regime. He has sought to engage with leaders of the
European Union through the Eastern Partnership and, when
possible, has sought meetings with U.S. leaders, including the
Congressional Delegation I traveled with in 2017. I found that
he, like other autocrats, was not interested in the dreams of
his people, but made standard stability appeals to defend his
regime.
Despite Lukashenko's lack of imagination and decades of
oppressing his people, we must not forget that Belarus is an
independent country whose sovereignty is under attack. And as
another target of Russian malign influence in the OSCE area,
proper scrutiny will prevent active conflict and empower those
oppressed voices who have waited so long for justice. Today
we'll explore the complexities of the Russia-Belarus
relationship and what the United States can do to defend
Belarus, this important crossroads between Russia and the West,
against Russian attacks.
At this time, I would like to acknowledge my fellow
Commissioners in attendance for any opening remarks they wish
to make.
* * * * * * *
We have assembled here an expert panel to discuss Belarus
in the context of Russia's malign influence:
First, we have Andrei Yeliseyeu, who serves as Head of the
Monitoring Unit for iSANS, the International Strategic Action
Network for Security, based in Warsaw, Poland. iSANS is an
international expert initiative established in 2018 and aimed
at detecting, analyzing and countering hybrid threats against
democracy, rule of law, and the sovereignty of states in
Western, Central, and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Our next witness is Sofya Orlosky, the Senior Program
Manager for Eurasia at Freedom House here in Washington, where
she leads the development of engagement and advocacy strategies
for its Europe and Eurasia portfolio.
Then we will hear from Franak Viacorka, who is a Research
Media Analyst at the US Agency for Global Media, where he
focuses on the digital markets of Eurasia.
Finally, we have Brian Whitmore, a Senior Fellow and
Director of the Russia Program at the Center for European
Policy Analysis (CEPA) here in Washington. He is also the
author of The Power Vertical Blog and host of The Power
Vertical Podcast, both of which focus on Russian affairs.
Please note that the full biographies of our witnesses can
be found in the provided materials. Thank you to our assembled
witnesses, and I call on Andrei Yeliseyeu to begin his
testimony.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Wilson, Ranking Member, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
It is curious that as we monitor Russia's malign influence
on its neighbors as well as far abroad, we pay so little
attention to what is going on in Belarus. Perhaps this is
because we have much more evident and headline-grabbing news
available when discussing the Kremlin's attempts to meddle in
our own elections and society. Just as dramatic and concerning
is Russian military adventurism--whether it be in Syria,
Ukraine, Georgia, and even places as far-flung as the Central
African Republic. Vladimir Putin tramples on international law
and attempts to erode liberal, democratic norms where they are
just beginning to grow, or even where they are already well-
established.
Though not a military conquest, Putin's designs on Belarus
should be just as concerning to us as the above-mentioned
examples. As the chains of the old Iron Curtain have been
broken, and as democracy and the rule of law have moved
steadily eastward, Belarus remains a stubborn outlier. Why is
this? We know that part of the reason is lack of significant
structural reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union. Still
known for its collective farms and state-owned enterprises,
Belarus has an economy stuck in the past. Another part of the
reason is the dictatorship of President Alexander Lukashenko,
who has ruled the country for most of its post-Soviet
existence, by falsifying elections and marginalizing, even
violently punishing, dissenters. And finally, Russia's tight
grip on its old Soviet friend is unrelenting, taking advantage
of Belarus' weaknesses to create a vassal state subject to its
whims.
We know that as longtime authoritarian leaders, Putin and
Lukashenko have many things in common and many incentives to
work together. But, as I hope we will learn over the course of
this hearing, there are questions about how long this cozy
relationship can last. Lukashenko is a tyrant but not a fool--
he knows that engagement with Europe and the West is not
optional in this day and age, and he sees how Putin's greedy
fingers have reached into Ukraine. He is being forced to make
some difficult decisions about the direction the country should
take.
We can only hope that these decisions bring greater freedom
to the people of Belarus, who for too long have lived without
the opportunity to express themselves without fear of
repression. The younger, globally-connected generations in
particular can easily see the opportunities and freedoms
available in the West. They, along with all Belarusians,
deserve the opportunity to determine their own futures. A
Belarus tied down by Putin's Russia is a Belarus stuck in the
Soviet past and subservient to Moscow. I look forward to
hearing our witnesses comment on the prospects for Belarus'
future and ways to combat Russia's pernicious influence.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
As much as the toxic relationship between Belarus and
Russia presents a challenge to liberal democracy in Eastern
Europe, it also provides opportunities for exploiting existing
fractures in the Russia-Belarus relationship. We have lately
seen that all is not well between Presidents Putin and
Lukashenko. Disputes over oil and how deep the level of
integration between the two countries should be have made
cracks in what was once a strong partnership. The strong
relationship between Belarus and Russia still exists, but
Russia's adventurism abroad over the past few years may have
planted doubts in Lukashenko's mind that the peace can last.
His need for control in his own country and his reliance on
Moscow for legitimacy place him in a precarious position.
It is in this position that the opportunity arises for
Western engagement with Belarus. In the past few years,
Lukashenko has expressed an unprecedented openness to the West
that may be a protective response to Putin's designs on
Belarusian sovereignty. After over a decade of a constricted
U.S. diplomatic presence in Belarus, and no ambassador,
Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei and U.S. Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale met and
announced that ambassadors would be exchanged once again. The
executive branch, in this administration and the previous, has
sent high-level representation to Belarus that has not been
seen for quite some time. Belarus has also sought to reach out
to the rest of the world by instituting visa-free regimes for
more countries than ever. It is clear that Russia's adventurism
in the past few years has softened Belarusian policy toward the
US and the EU.
It is important to remember, however, that Belarus is an
authoritarian state, and we must not lose sight of the human
elements when attempting to build a better working
relationship. Civil society and fundamental freedoms are
regularly repressed in the country, and its last truly free and
fair election was held 25 years ago. When it comes to human
rights, Belarus is in a post-Soviet rut that has not abated, as
it has in many of its neighbors. Lukashenko will have to
consider serious reforms, at the expense of his own personal
power, if he truly wishes for better cooperation with the West.
It is not clear he is willing to do that.
So, are friendly gestures on the part of Lukashenko sincere
or a false front? Can he navigate a foreign policy somewhere
between Russia and the West, or will Belarus find itself pulled
to one side? Our witnesses will no doubt share their expert
opinions on Lukashenko's thought processes and the prospects
for Belarus' relationship with Russia and with the West.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Andrei Yeliseyeu, Head of Monitoring Unit,
International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS); Research
Director, EAST Center
Dear Chairman and Members of the Commission,
Thank you for organizing this Belarus-related hearing,
particularly in this busy time in Washington DC, and for the
opportunity to join this distinguished panel on the threats to
Belarusian sovereignty.
Malign Kremlin influence on Belarus pursues a goal of
pulling Belarus even deeper into the Kremlin orb, essentially
turning it into a part of USSR 2.0. Kremlin sees Belarus as an
integral part of the Russian World with Russia's legitimate
right to constrain Belarusian sovereignty.
To achieve its goals regarding Belarus, Kremlin, either
directly or through its proxies, applies political, economic
and propagandistic pressure on the Belarusian authorities and
the Belarusian society. Largely the same mix of governmental,
semi-governmental and non-governmental actors stand behind the
`coercion to integration' project towards Belarus, which
meddles in the affairs of many other countries, including the
US, the CEE, Balkan, and Baltic states.
Belarus appears to be the most vulnerable to malign Kremlin
influence though, due to deep institutional, economic, social
and cultural connections between the two countries' elites and
short-sighted repressive policies of the current ruling regime
against Belarusian language, independent media and civil
society.
Anti-Belarusian propaganda and disinformation
You all must be aware that Ukraine remains top target of
Kremlin propaganda. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus is rather rarely
covered by Russian federal TV channels. However, when it comes
to online space, Belarus is already not far behind Ukraine in
terms of scale and scope of pro-Kremlin propaganda and
disinformation. In the last two years, a dozen of pro-Kremlin
websites which previously had Ukraine and/or Syria as their
primary targets, added Belarus as additional regular topic. At
least three generations of pro-Kremlin propagandistic websites
can be discerned, the third being the most aggressive and
numerous.
In the last two years, several new active outlets of
disinformation and hate speech which are entirely devoted to
events in Belarus have appeared online. Their number currently
stands at about 15. The number of online resources which
regularly publish items related to Belarus and contain
disinformation, propaganda narratives and hate speech has
increased several-fold--to about 40 fairly active sites in and
around Belarus.
A fully-fledged coordinated network of regional online
portals with regular publications containing hate speech
against various social, political, religious, and professional
groups of the Belarusian population began its activity in 2018.
Publications use aggressive, chauvinistic rhetoric, sometimes
openly questioning the existence of an independent Belarusian
ethnic group and language, discrediting and distorting the
history of Belarus, using derogatory claims about national
symbols and generally about Belarus-minded people.
Anti-Belarusian propaganda includes such preposterous claims
as:
LBelarusian people are a part of Russian people,
Belarusians are Russians;
LThe Belarusian language was artificially created
by the hostile West a hundred years ago;
LThe West's objective is to turn Belarusians into
cannon fodder by creating an ``artificial language'' and
religion for them.
Furthermore, this range of websites purposefully discredits
the West and all Belarus' neighboring countries but Russia.
They regularly present Ukraine as a puppet country, which is
governed by external actors and/or by fascists/Nazis, Poland as
a country with imperialistic dreams of taking over Belarus, and
the Baltic countries as pro-Nazi, depopulated, economically
devastated countries. On the contrary, Russia is presented as a
country morally superior to the West and as the only real
Belarus' ally which guarantees Belarus sovereignty and
protection from malign Western influences.
Belarus' localization of automatically generated
news services
Due to sustainably irresponsible state policies in the
media field, a large part of the country population literally
lives in the Russian media space. Oddly enough, Western media
corporations such as Google and Apple unwillingly make Russian
online media presence in Belarus even larger. This happens
because of the absence of fully functional geotargeting for
Belarus in the automatically generated news services. At
present a growing number of news consumers use such services on
their mobile phones without visiting any certain websites.
The launch of news aggregators based on recommendation
algorithms has had a significant impact on the Belarusian media
market. The absence of fully functional geotargeting for the
country puts Belarusian journalists in unequal position
compared to their colleagues in neighboring countries. By
placing Belarusian users into a larger Russian-speaking segment
and localizing the news content only partially, internet
corporations make the Belarusian media market weaker and hinder
its development.
Recently a declaration by the largest Belarus media
community members on this very issue was produced. It calls the
national and foreign government institutions, representatives
of global corporations to make Belarus a fully independent and
sovereign country on the global internet map by recognizing the
Belarusian segment of the internet as a distinct market.
Belarusian media should be prioritized in the ranking of
information sources proposed by automatically generated news
recommendation systems for users who choose Belarus as their
primary region.
Energy deals with Russia and economic pressure
Over the last two decades Belarus traded geopolitical
loyalty and military cooperation for Russia's generosity. Low
prices for Russian gas, beneficial schemes for Russian oil
processing, an open market for Belarusian goods, and other
forms of Russian financial assistance allowed Alexander
Lukashenko to keep the largely unreformed economy afloat. The
terms of oil supplies to Belarus was the most important
bargaining issue for Lukashenko in exchange to deepening
Eurasian integration in 2010-2011 and 2014.
Due to Russian reform in the oil sphere, export duties on
oil and oil products will be reduced to zero by 2024 and excise
taxes for the oil industry are gradually increased starting
from 2019. Belarus expects to lose around $300 million in 2019
and the total cost in the next five years is estimated at USD
10 billion from Russia's new tax policy.
Whereas oil-processing industry is one of the most
profitable sectors of Belarusian economy, the main energy
source for Belarusian enterprises and residents is Russian
natural gas. Belarus' national strategy of energy sector
development, which was adopted in 2010, set an objective to
reduce gas consumption by 6 million cubic meters and to lower
the Russia's share in Belarus' energy consumption to 57% by
2020. These objectives largely remained on paper. Belarus
consumed around 20 billion cubic meters of Russian gas in 2018,
which places Belarus in the top Russian gas importers.
The Belarus' energy security concept adopted in 2015 aims
to reduce the share of Russian energy in the total energy
import from 90% to 70% by 2035. Thanks to the launch of
Belarusian nuclear power plant (NPP) and a wider use of
renewable energy Minks plans to decrease the share of gas in
the total energy consumption from 90% to less than 50% by that
time.
The Belarusian NPP is being built with Russian technology
and money. Belarus will be dependent on the Russian import of
nuclear fuel. Hence, Belarus will hardly become less energy
dependent on Russia thanks to the launch of the NPP. Export of
electricity produced by the NPP given the current Lithuania and
Poland's positions and the lack of sufficient domestic
infrastructure to consume that big surplus of electricity will
be a serious challenge for Belarus.
Minsk has already asked Moscow to ease the payment terms of
Russian loan for NPP. However, this and many other loan items
in Belarus-Russia relations are conditioned with a deeper
integration by Kremlin. Without political will and coherent
practical steps the objectives defined by the Belarus' energy
security concept will largely remain on paper, just as it
earlier happened to previous national energy strategy.
The risks of the Union State between Belarus and Russia
Belarus expects to get Russian compensations for the losses
associated with Russia's new tax policy in oil sphere. However,
Kremlin conditions this with deepened integration within the so
called Union State. Other economic issues that Kremlin
explicitly made dependent on Belarus' further integration with
Russia include the terms for loans and gas prices for the years
to come.
In early September 2019 a bilateral action plan on
deepening integration was initialed by the two countries' prime
ministers. The plan has not been made public despite its great
importance for the country, high public interest, and requests
by parliamentarians. The whole negotiating process between the
two countries' working groups on integration is secretive.
Nevertheless it is obvious that the action plan and 31 roadmaps
to accompany it are based on the 1999 Treaty on the Union State
between Belarus and Russia. The action plan on deeper
integration likely envisages the creation of common Tax and
Civil Codes, a largely unified banking supervision, legal
approximation in virtually all spheres, etc.
Kremlin's aim is to tightly tie Belarus to Russia in
various spheres and to extract additional chunks of Belarusian
sovereignty in exchange of further economic and political
support of Lukashenko. The threat is that, in case Belarusian
authorities follow this road, Belarus can end up preserving
only nominal sovereignty, in reality finding itself completely
dependent on Moscow in virtually any Belarusian domestic or
foreign policy.
A loss of Belarusian sovereignty would be a catastrophe not
only for the people of Belarus who dreamed of a sovereign and
independent country for many generations. This tragic turn
would also encourage further Russia's aggressive behavior
towards its immediate neighbors and global democratic community
and instigate further attempts to destabilize regional
security.
Conclusions
Greater attention of the international community to
developments in Belarus and urgent efforts are needed to
preserve Belarusian sovereignty, despite very complicated
relationship with its non-democratic government. We need the
international community to promote positive changes in Belarus,
including political, social, and economic reforms in the
country, broadening of civic space and empowerment of
Belarusian civic actors, and enhancing Belarusian society's
resilience to external threats.
Important areas of actions to preserve Belarusian sovereignty
include:
LUncovering, countering, and deterring Russian
malign influence towards Belarus;
LSupport to the new generation of civil society
actors and independent media;
LStrengthening Belarusian identity by supporting
initiatives aimed at promotion of Belarusian language, culture,
and history.
LSmart assistance and engagement with the
Belarusian authorities. Belarus needs to undertake economic
reforms with international assistance clearly conditioned on
policy change, including liberalization in the media and civil
society's spheres.
I want to thank the U.S. Helsinki Commission once again for
holding this hearing and placing your focus on Belarus and
threats to its sovereignty. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Prepared Statement of Sofya Orlosky, Senior Program Manager for
Eurasia, Freedom House
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Franak Viacorka, Research Media Analyst
(contractor), U.S. Agency for Global Media
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Brian Whitmore, Senior Fellow and Director of
the Russia Program, CEPA
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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