[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BALTIC SEA REGIONAL SECURITY: A FIELD
HEARING OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 2, 2019
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
ALCEE L.HASTINGS, Florida ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Chairman Co-Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARC VEASEY, Texas SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, to be appointed
Department of Commerce, to be appointed
Department of Defense, to be appointed
[ii]
BALTIC SEA REGIONAL SECURITY: A FIELD
HEARING OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
----------
July 2, 2019
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 28
OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PRESENT
Hon. John Cornyn, a Senator from Texas........................... 8
Hon. Tom Graves, a Representative from Georgia................... 10
Hon. Billy Long, a Representative from Missouri.................. 12
Hon. Andy Harris, a Representative from Maryland................. 14
Hon. Lee M. Zeldin, a Representative from New York............... 15
Hon. Jeff Duncan, a Representative from South Carolina........... 16
WITNESSES
Lieutenant General Stephen M. Twitty, Deputy Commander, United
States European Command........................................ 3
Douglas D. Jones, Deputy Permanent Representative, United States
Mission to NATO................................................ 5
Minister Raimundas Karoblis, Minister of National Defense,
Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania...... 18
Major General Krzysztof Krol, Deputy Chief of the General Staff
of the Polish Armed Forces, Republic of Poland................. 20
Permanent Secretary Kristjan Prikk, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Estonia........................................................ 24
State Secretary Jan-Olof Lind, State Secretary to the Minister
for Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Sweden...... 25
Director-General Janne Kuusela, Director-General, Defense Policy
Department, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland..... 27
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker....................... 34
Prepared statement of Lieutenant General Stephen M. Twitty....... 37
Prepared statement of Deputy Permanent Representative Douglas D.
Jones.......................................................... 42
Prepared statement of Minister Raimundas Karoblis................ 46
Prepared statement of Permanent Secretary Kristjan Prikk......... 48
Prepared statement of State Secretary Jan-Olof Lind.............. 50
Prepared statement of Director-General Janne Kuusela............. 52
BALTIC SEA REGIONAL SECURITY: A FIELD
HEARING OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
----------
July 2, 2019
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 3:00 p.m. in The Artus Court,
Gdansk, Poland, Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Co-Chairman, Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Co-Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon.
Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Other Members of Congress present: Hon. John Cornyn, a
Senator from Texas; Hon. Tom Graves, a Representative from
Georgia; Hon. Billy Long, a Representative from Missouri; Hon.
Andy Harris, a Representative from Maryland; Hon. Lee M.
Zeldin, a Representative from New York; and Hon. Jeff Duncan, a
Representative from South Carolina.
Witnesses present: Lieutenant General Stephen M. Twitty,
Deputy Commander, United States European Command; Douglas D.
Jones, Deputy Permanent Representative, United States Mission
to NATO; Minister Raimundas Karoblis, Minister of National
Defense, Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of
Lithuania; Major General Krzysztof Krol, Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Republic of Poland;
Permanent Secretary Kristjan Prikk, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Estonia; State Secretary Jan-Olof Lind, State Secretary to the
Minister for Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of
Sweden; and Director-General Janne Kuusela, Director-General,
Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense of the Republic
of Finland.
HON. ROGER F. WICKER, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Wicker. Good afternoon. This hearing of the United
States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
U.S. Helsinki Commission, will come to order. Good afternoon to
everyone. I'm delighted to see this wonderful crowd. And
welcome to today's field hearing on Baltic Sea regional
security. This event is the first time in the 43-year history
of our commission that we convene outside the United States.
We're here to learn from the incredible group of panelists who
have agreed to be with us today. But we're also here to
underscore America's commitment to security in the Baltic Sea
region, and our unwavering support for U.S. friends and allies.
I want to begin by thanking the Government of Poland, which
has been extremely gracious in working with us to organize our
event here in this extraordinary and beautiful city. Indeed, we
are especially pleased to be able to hold this event in the
historic city of Gdansk. There could be no more fitting place
for us to understand the stakes at play when we talk about
Baltic Sea regional security. After all, it was just a short
distance from here that the first shots of the Second World War
were fired, as Poland, despite a valiant defense, became one of
the first victims of Nazi Germany.
The people of Poland endured a cruel and devastating
occupation that was followed by nearly 40 years of repressive
communist rule. Through it all, they never lost their core
conviction that their nation belonged among free democracies.
Fittingly, it was also in Gdansk where the movement began to
end that terrible era, taking historic and courageous steps to
reclaim democracy. The Solidarity Movement became synonymous
with the transformative wave of protests that swept across
Eastern Europe and ended with the collapse of communism across
the region, with the end of the Soviet Union, as well as the
end of the Soviet Union's violent and illegal occupation of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Since that time, Poland has become a good friend, important
partner, and a stalwart NATO ally. It has assumed its rightful
place as a leader in a stable and prosperous transatlantic
community. We recognize that journey has not been easy, but
nothing worthwhile ever is. Poland was given another chance at
freedom, and it has not squandered that opportunity.
I also want to mention that just a few moments ago we went
to the Basilica of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in
order to pay tribute to the late Mayor Pawel Adamowicz, who was
murdered just a few months ago. We met Deputy Mayor of Gdansk
Alan Aleksandrowicz and we expressed America's deepest
condolences for the loss that this city has experienced. Poles
will undoubtably draw inspiration from Mayor Adamowicz's legacy
in public service and civic virtue.
As we sit today, less than 80 miles from Russia's border,
citizens of Gdansk are the last to need a reminder that the
Kremlin has in recent years shattered notions of a predictable,
stable regional order. With its illegal occupation of Crimea
and ongoing war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin's attempts to
stoke division and instability abroad is felt every day by our
friends in this region. Our delegation well understands that
freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Baltic region are crucial
to European and global security. This region sits at the
epicenter of Europe's new north, a unique intersection of
geography, infrastructure, education, good governance, and
high-technology industries. Eighty million people live here and
profit from the region's key role in European shipping and
transit. The region is also a focal point for Europe's energy
independence.
We hope our conversation with today's panelists will
provide a better understanding of how our collective efforts
will continue to thwart Russia's desire to undermine the peace
and security of this crucial region. We want to get a sense of
the threats we should be most concerned about as well as a
clear understanding of the ways we may best move forward
together. Moving forward together certainly includes standing
shoulder-to-shoulder with two non-NATO partners present and on
the second panel today--Finland and Sweden. Our former
Secretary of Defense General Mattis put it well recently when
he saluted, and I quote, ``both of your nations' serious
approaches to security in support of a global order that
respects all nations' sovereignty and territorial integrity,
providing a steady anchor of stability in a region grown more
tense as a result of Russia's unfortunate, unproductive, and
destabilizing choices.''
I want to be clear as I can about what our delegation is
here to say: That under no circumstances can we be divided from
our friends and allies, here or elsewhere. I was reminded of
this key principle when I participated, along with a very large
congressional delegation, in the commemoration of the 75th
anniversary of D-Day in Normandy. I'm certain all of my
colleagues are unanimous in their agreement with the sentiment
of President Trump on that occasion, and I quote, ``To all our
friends and partners, our cherished alliance was forged in the
heat of battle, tested in the trials of war, and proven in the
blessings of peace. Our bond is unbreakable,'' end quote.
Our event will proceed in two parts. First, we will hear
from a panel of officials from the United States. This panel
includes two speakers, Deputy Commander of the United States
European Command Lieutenant General Stephen M. Twitty, and the
honorable Douglas D. Jones, the deputy permanent representative
of the United States to NATO. We thank both of you gentlemen
for being here, and we would ask that we begin with Lieutenant
General Twitty. Thank you so much and you may proceed in your
own fashion.
Thank you, sir.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN M. TWITTY, DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Chairman Wicker and distinguished members
of the commission, good afternoon and thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of United
States European Command [EUCOM] Commander Tod Wolters and the
over 68,000 brave and dedicated men and women who are currently
operating in the European theater. The threats facing the U.S.
interests in the EUCOM area of responsibility are real and
growing. Our ability to counter these threats depends on a
highly motivated team of patriots who strengthen solidarity and
unity with our allies and partners as we improve the
warfighting readiness of our Joint Force.
Given our shared values, defending Europe is an essential
element of defending the United States. Knowing the military
strength of the Euro-Atlantic, Russia seeks to engage in a
conflict and competition below the level of armed conflict, as
they continue to demonstrate a willingness to violate
international treaties and disregard for the national
sovereignty of their neighbors. Russia employs a whole-of-
society approach through a wide array of tools to include
political provocateurs, information operations, economic
intimidation, cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies,
and special operations, in addition to their conventional
military forces.
In cooperation with NATO, we seek to deter Russian
adventurism and address the arc of instability building on
NATO's periphery. Alongside our European partners, the United
States is fielding an interoperable and multidomain combat-
credible force that underscores our shared deterrent mission
and demonstrates our unwavering commitment to the collective
defense from all NATO members. When the Kremlin looks to the
West, they see a cohesive alliance that has both the military
capability and the political will to defend its member nations
to increase posture, operations, and exercises. In security
assistance, we have increased our building partnership capacity
activities, special operation forces, and our vertical lift
capabilities.
EUCOM is also working a proposed 435 million [dollar]
integrated air and missile defense project to assist the Baltic
nations in the development of a robust command and control
network that will contribute to the NATO deterrent efforts and
the overall combat credibility of our combat force posture.
Operationally we have shifted significant U.S. forces in the
Baltic Sea area region by adopting changes in Operation
Atlantic Resolve. Where previously there was one U.S. company
on a 6-month rotation in the Baltic nations, we now support a
periodic exercise-based presence in the region, in addition to
undertaking lead nation responsibilities for the NATO Enhanced
Forward Presence [eFP] battle group in Poland.
This U.S. eFP Battlegroup became operational in 2007, while
the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany act as framework nations
for similar Battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
respectively. We recently concluded our annual BALTOPS [Baltic
Operations] exercise, which practiced high-end warfare,
amphibious landing capability, and interoperability in the
Baltic Sea. EUCOM also supports the NATO Baltic Air Policing
Mission in the region. EUCOM's Joint Cyber Center also works
closely with each of the Baltic nations to help buildup
integrated planning teams, central elements to refine NATO
cyberspace operations and interoperability. We continue to
enhance our intelligence sharing and our indication and
warnings capability with our NATO partners and allies.
Our Alliance is strong, and our actions prove that we stand
together in solidarity with NATO and in support of our Baltic
allies. Since 2015, Congress has authorized and appropriated
nearly 17 billion [dollars] in EDI [European Deterrence
Initiative] funds in response to Russia's aggression and malign
influence. EDI underwrites our Nation's enhanced deterrence and
our defense posture throughout the theater by prepositioning
and positioning the right capabilities in key locations in
order to respond to adversarial threats in a timely manner. As
stated in the national security strategy, the NATO Alliance of
free and sovereign states is one of our greatest advantages
over our competitors. And the United States remains committed
to our Article 5 obligations. Our bonds are strengthened by a
shared commitment to collective defense, democratic principles,
and mutual respect and national sovereignty. Ultimately, the
United States is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable.
I close by, again, thanking Congress and this commission
for your continued support, especially on sustained and
predictable EDI funding. EUCOM's future success in implementing
our National Defense Strategy, protecting our NATO allies, and
deterring Russian malign influence is only possible with
Congress' support.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you. And we will have a number of
questions. We appreciate your testimony, General Twitty.
Mr. Jones, welcome and thank you so much for coming here on
behalf of our Mission to NATO.
DOUGLAS D. JONES, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED
STATES MISSION TO NATO
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
commissioners, Members of Congress, for the opportunity to
testify here today on the topic of Baltic Sea regional
security. I'm particularly honored to be speaking on the topic
here in Gdansk, which is, as the senator mentioned, the
birthplace of the Solidary Peace Movement. I spent 3 years of
my life in my youth, from 1978 to 1981, living in Poland when
my father worked at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. And although I
was young at the time, the significance of what was happening
in those years, which were the years that Solidarity was born,
was not lost on me and my siblings, and I would frequently walk
down to Solidarity headquarters in downtown Warsaw to buy
Solidarity pins and t-shirts and bags so that we would have our
own little piece of history.
And my trip to Poland to speak here today at this hearing
is my first time back since my family departed in 1981, a few
months before the Communist government declared martial law in
an attempt to destroy Solidarity. So it's a particular honor to
be speaking here today because I believe that this hearing is,
in its essence, about how do we preserve and defend those
democratic freedoms that the people of Poland, the people of
Estonia, the people of Lithuania, and the people of Latvia
fought for and won, starting with the Solidarity Movement and
other resistance movements in the Baltic region.
Today, Western democracies, in particular those on Russia's
borders, again face a threat from an increasingly aggressive
Russia intent on dominating Europe and reasserting its global
influence. To accomplish this, Russia seeks to disrupt and
undermine Western democracies and their institutions, weaken
the United States, and divide the NATO Alliance. NATO has
played a crucial role in the spread of democracy in the Baltic
region, and in preserving it--first, by protecting Western
democracies from the reach of communism during the cold war,
and then by opening its door to the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe and providing them the protection of its
collective defense. NATO is not only a military alliance but,
more importantly, an alliance of values--of nations committed
to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the
rule of law.
The challenge posed by Russia in the Baltic Sea region is
real and concerning. Russia treats the Baltic Sea region as its
own domain, yet we must remember that six NATO countries and
two key NATO partners--in Finland and Sweden--also border the
Baltic Sea. The overall security of the Baltic Sea region is
clearly an area in which the United States and NATO must play
an important role. In response to Russia's increasing threats,
NATO took concrete steps in 2014, and 2016, and 2018 to
strengthen deterrence and defense in the Baltic region.
Foremost, NATO implemented an Enhanced Forward Presence,
consisting of multinational Battlegroups in Poland and the
three Baltic States with contributions from across the
Alliance. These Battlegroups are a visible and capable
demonstration of NATO's foundational principle that an attack
on one ally is an attack on all.
The United States continues to do its part in each of these
areas, thanks in large part to the sustained support of
Congress. Our commitment to Baltic security has been
demonstrated through the European Deterrence Initiative, which
exceeds $6 billion in 2019. EDI is an unmistakable signal of
U.S. resolve to ensure the readiness, responsiveness, and
resilience of our forces in Europe. And I'm grateful to be
joined by Lieutenant General Twitty, who's outlined these
activities from the perspective of European Command.
But the threat from Russia has evolved beyond simply a
military one. It includes hybrid attacks--as we've seen in
Ukraine and Montenegro, to name only two examples--
cyberattacks, and influence operations designed to inflame
fault lines within our societies and to weaken our democratic
institutions. To address these new and evolving threats, NATO
developed a new strategy for responding to hybrid threats and
established a mechanism to deploy counter-hybrid support teams
to support allies, and it continues to strengthen its cyber
defense and response.
In addition to these many adaptations, to be an alliance
fit for purpose, NATO must ensure it has the resources
necessary to sustain a credible deterrent and the requisite
defense capabilities. For the United States, your support in
Congress has assured that we will lead by example with defense
investments that keep our military prepared. Poland, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia are all meeting their commitments under
NATO's Wales Defense Investment Pledge to spend 2 percent of
their GDP on defense. But this approach is not shared by all
allies. In fact, sustaining our Alliance military strength and
ensuring NATO has the capabilities to maintain its deterrence
and defense will only be possible if all allies meet their
commitments under the Defense Investment Pledge.
Mr. Chairman, for more than 70 years NATO has been at the
center of the transatlantic relationship. This year we
celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Alliance in Washington,
DC. It was a tremendous milestone. NATO has succeeded for 70
years because it has constantly adapted to meet new security
threats. Today, we are making progress, but much more remains
to be done. The state of our Alliance is strong, but we must
continue to adapt to ensure our collective security for the
next 70 years.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you very much to both of you. And,
Mr. Jones, let me pass along our appreciation to Ambassador
Hutchison, our former colleague. I have spoken to her, a number
of us, in preparation for this hearing. And so please thank her
for her support and for sending you along. General, thank you
for being here and for your career of service to the United
States, which continues.
Let me make sure we understand the view from a general
standpoint. Is this region more dangerous than it was 2 years
ago, or is it less dangerous, General? And how would you
justify your response?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes, I will tell you it's more dangerous
from the standpoint of malign influence. From the standpoint of
our deterrence capability against a Russian ground threat, I
would say it's less dangerous. Through your assistance with
EDI, it allows us to increase our capability, both from an
exercise standpoint with our Baltic partners and building
capability and capacity here in terms of infrastructure. And,
as you know, we also rotate a brigade combat team--an armored
brigade combat team and an aviation combat team in Poland that
shores up the deterrence posture in this area.
Also that's in this area is the eFP, which I spoke of. And
we've increased our exercise activities. In a year's time, we
conducted 5 major exercises in the Baltic area now--high-level
exercises--and then 10 mid-level exercises. So the focal point
for much of our operations in EUCOM has been here in the Baltic
area to ensure that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our
Baltic partners.
Mr. Wicker. So the region is more dangerous than--at least,
we can say the threat level is higher than it was a few years
ago. And our response, as far as the United States goes and our
allies, is stronger as a result of that. Is that correct?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Wicker. And a part of our response from the United
States, and part and parcel to our contribution to the European
Defense Initiative, is our increase in troop strength, in
personnel strengths here in the European region. Is that
correct?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Wicker. And including also more air strength and our--
the size of our fleet. Would that be correct?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. That's correct, sir. We've increased here
in Poland up to 4,000 U.S. military on the ground. As you know,
a couple of years ago we just had shy of 2,000 soldiers. So we
increased to 4,000. I think you're aware of the $2 billion
Polish offer which has been accepted, which will allow us to go
up to an additional 1,000 soldiers to increase the capability
here as well.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you. And this Congress has enacted as a
statutory provision that the 355-ship requirement is now the
statutory law of the United States of America. Are you going to
need a larger or a smaller fleet in the next few years here in
this region?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. We will require a larger fleet. We're
working with the Pentagon and OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] now. We're looking at two more additional destroyers
that would come to Europe to allow us to be able to operate not
only in the North Atlantic, but down through the North
Atlantic, in the Baltic Sea, in the Black Sea, and into the
East Mediterranean. If you look at the Russian maritime
capability and what they're doing now, they're operating in
those areas. And we need to be able to extend our reach into
those locations as well.
Mr. Wicker. Is it fair to say that the additional
expenditure enacted by this Congress over the past 2 years, or
the 2-year budget number that was consistent and reliable, is a
very important part of your capability to provide security?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Absolutely. Sir, without EDI we could not
progress the way that we have progressed over the last 2 to 5
years. That increased money, it has allowed us to focus on the
exercises that we require, focus on the interoperability with
our NATO partners, and to also increase the infrastructure in
this region. The further you go from west to east, there's an
immature infrastructure--things such as basing requirement,
ammunition storage facility, fuel capacity, and so forth. So
that money has allowed us to do those type things, to posture
the theater in the east.
Mr. Wicker. Sir, if we were, for some reason, not able to
agree on a budget number, and if we moved back to the practice
several years ago with continuing resolutions and uncertain
budgetary figures for you for a period of time, what would that
do to your capability of fulfilling our mission and our aim
here in the region?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes, we need sustained and predictable EDI
funding over the long haul to continue to set the posture that
is required not only to deter Russian aggression, but indeed to
defend the Baltic States and the European continent.
Mr. Wicker. Okay, thank you, very, very much. And who would
like to volunteer to ask the next question? Senator Cornyn.
HON. JOHN CORNYN, A SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Mr. Cornyn. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker. And thanks to
our two witnesses for being here today. It's an honor to be at
this historic hearing on a continent whose last century saw two
world wars take place. And obviously our goals as a Nation,
along with our allies, is to make sure we never have to fight
another war--either here, on the continent, or anywhere else,
if possible.
And I want to talk to you a little bit, General, about the
role of deterrence in a moment, but let me start with you,
Ambassador Jones. I was very impressed when you and Ambassador
Hutchison were able to work with our NATO allies and secure
support for the U.S. decision to announce that Russia had--was
in violation of the INF Treaty, the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty. And in fact, isn't it the case that they had
covertly been developing a ground-launched intermediate-range
cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. I would say NATO has had a clear and
unified position on the INF Treaty. And it was December of last
year that NATO made its first clear statement on it. And it
fully supported the U.S. assessment that Russia is in material
breach of the INF Treaty. The United States has, for years,
been talking to Russia about this violation. It started in the
Obama administration. And after repeated interactions with
Russia, we've been met only with denial and obfuscation, and no
explanation. And so all 29 allies support this finding that
Russia is violating the treaty.
And they also have fully supported the U.S. position that
if Russia does not return to compliance within a 6-month
period, that will expire on August 2d, then the United States
will withdraw from that treaty. And it has reached the
conclusion of supporting this position of the United States
because allies know that the United States has remained fully
compliant with INF throughout its entire 30 years, but a
situation where one country is complying with the treaty and
another country is violating that treaty is not sustainable.
And that's not good for security. It's not good for arms
control.
Mr. Cornyn. And, General Twitty, does Russia's development
covertly of a ground-based cruise missile--is that a
destabilizing development here in Europe?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. It absolutely is, sir. And as you know,
we're watching Russia build its capability and capacity
closely. They're on a fast-track to modernize, not just on the
ground-based systems but also their sub capability as well,
their counter-space activity as well, and many of their ground-
based platforms.
Mr. Cornyn. Well, as I believe you detailed and Ambassador
Jones talked about this as well, Russia's behavior sort of
belies their statements of a desire to--that they desire peace,
when you look at what they've done not only in Ukraine, in
Crimea, but in Georgia, when you see what they're doing in
Syria, and of course what you see them doing even in our own
elections in 2016, the sort of active measures that they've
been using to create disruption and discord in democracies, not
just in Europe but also now in the United States. This is--
strikes me as an ominous development.
But true to form, the Russians then declared they no longer
would comply with the treaty, after the United States announced
that they were in breach of the treaty, and gave them until, I
think you said, August the 2d in which to negotiate their
compliance and reenter the treaty. But the fact of the matter
is that it doesn't appear that they're serious about that at
all. And I would just ask, Mr. Jones, isn't it true that China
is not bound by the INF--they weren't a party to the INF,
correct?
Mr. Jones. That's correct, sir. I would add just also to
your comments. Russia is violating the INF Treaty. That's
received a lot of attention. But it's not the only treaty that
Russia is in violation of. It's part of a larger pattern. And
the United States and NATO have called on Russia repeatedly to
return to compliance of the INF Treaty by destroying the SSC-8
missile, the violating missile, its launchers and associated
equipment. But as you say, unfortunately there's been no
indication yet--any sign that Russia is serious about returning
to compliance to this treaty.
And so it is not--we will have to prepare for the
likelihood that we will be soon in a post-INF world. And NATO
is preparing to ensure its own deterrence and defense posture
in that environment. China, as you said, is not a party to the
INF Treaty. It's a bilateral treaty with only Russia and the
United States. There were other parties that are--no longer
hold those missiles.
Mr. Cornyn. Thank you very much. I have two other--two last
questions, General Twitty. Why would Russia want to develop
this system? And how have they deployed it? And what's the
impact on Europe?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Well, the reason why is they seek to
undermine U.S. influence in Russia--I mean, correction--in
Europe, No. 1. The second thing, they seek to be a regional
power--the regional power in Europe. And the third thing is,
they know with their systems that they can intimidate and bully
their neighbors, such as in the Baltic States. And so they can
deploy it in a myriad of ways. One is push it forward into
Kaliningrad and use Kaliningrad as a base of operations to be
able to conduct destruction inside Europe. The other one is
take a tactical nuclear approach from with inside Russia. So
there are a myriad of ways that they can do this. But they are
obviously developing capability because they want to compete
with the U.S.
Mr. Cornyn. Obviously our military is supposed to fight and
win our wars, but I think of our military as the peacekeepers,
the ones that make sure that no one risks war because they fear
the consequences, in part. What is the--what is the role of
NATO and Europe defense in deterring Russian aggression? And
could you explain how they may misinterpret our inaction as
weakness, and maybe encourage them, via provocation, for
further aggressive action?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes, sir. So every single day as one of my
missions as the deputy commander European Command is to
determine whether we're pulling the right levers to deter
Russian aggression in the European theater. We do that along
with NATO and at headquarters. So there's various capabilities
and activities that we do to act as a deterrent, mostly focused
on Russia's malign activities, particularly here in the
Baltics. We see them conducting cyber operations here in the
Baltics to intimidate the government here, to undermine the
government here. You see the propaganda and information
campaign that they're doing with the local populace in our
Baltic States.
We conduct information campaigns along with it, counter
cyber operations as well, to support our NATO partners and
members in that effort as well.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn.
Mr. Jones, what other treaties have--quickly--are the
Russian leaders violating?
Mr. Jones. I would say the Open Skies Treaty, Vienna
Document, INF come to mind.
Mr. Wicker. Okay. And if you could supplement that answer
that would be helpful.
We have Representative Tom Graves.
HON. TOM GRAVES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GEORGIA
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank
you for assembling this conversation today. I think this is a
very important topic to be discussed. And no better location to
have that discussion than this important region. So thank you
for the effort of you and your team to do this.
General Twitty, you referenced, I guess, Kaliningrad, and
that territory. Can you help us understand, what is--what is it
being used for, what do you see happening there--you know, some
of the new developments of that territory, and the strategic
positioning of that area and what it might mean to this region?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Thank you for the questions.
First of all, as you know, Kaliningrad is noncontiguous to
Russia. It is used as a forward location that can provide
significant military capability for Russia. As you look at
Kaliningrad today, they have about two brigades of infantry and
armor sitting there. They also have a significant integrated
air defense missile capability there, in the form of SA-20s and
SA-21s. In the Baltic Sea, where they have a seaport there,
they have a pretty significant naval capability there. And so
overall they have forward capability that they could use its
geographical location to its advantage.
Now, the disadvantage is, if you look at where Kaliningrad
is, it's surrounded by two NATO countries--Poland to the south
and Lithuania to the north. And just as they are positioning
capability forward, we're positioning an equal capability to be
able to counter the Kaliningrad threat that we have.
Mr. Graves. So you would consider it, in essence, a
military outpost?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. If you want to call it that. It has the
capability to be a formal outpost from which to launch
significant capability from Russia into Europe.
Mr. Graves. Do you have any concerns about nuclear weapons
in that region--to be deployed from that region at all?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. It's a possibility. As you probably have
heard, they have the Iskander that's located also in
Kaliningrad. I have no reports of whether they have nuclear-
capable cruise missiles at Kaliningrad. But that Iskander has
the capability to launch nuclear weapons.
Mr. Graves. I guess my last question about that territory,
have you seen a recent uptick or a building up of military
forces or strength in that region within the last 6 months, 8
months, 12 months?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. In the past year we've seen an increase of
bombers as well as fighters. They have approximately three
fighter units--fighter squadrons in Kaliningrad, approximately
two bombers and one fighter squadron. So we have seen an
increase in fighter capability into Kaliningrad.
Mr. Graves. Thank you. Thanks for that report. Thanks for
keeping an eye out on that territory.
Mr. Jones, we have taken action from a U.S. perspective to
enact sanctions against many leaders in Russia, and Russian
companies. Are you seeing positive impact? Is that helpful? Or
should there be more? And are other NATO countries
participating equally? Or what's your perception on that
impact? Is it helpful?
Mr. Jones. Thank you for the question. And I would say yes,
it is helpful. There have to be clear consequences for Russia
for its behavior. And that's an important part of deterrence.
They have to know that there will be repercussions for the kind
of aggressive behavior, and those repercussions can come in
different ways. But sanctions is an important element of that.
We have seen some European allies and the European Union have
also implemented sanctions, particularly in response to events
in Ukraine. And as always, we're more powerful when we act
together, can send a more unified message.
Mr. Graves. Mmm hmm. And after the aggressive acts toward
Crimea a lot of folks have similar concerns about this region
as well. Is that something that you think is a possibility, or
is this--are we overly concerned about that? Is this a
different perspective because these are NATO countries? What
would your response be to that?
Mr. Jones. Well, we are concerned about it, because we've
seen Russia is becoming increasingly aggressive and it's
using--it has sought to--it is seeking as part of a
comprehensive strategy to weaken ourselves, the United States,
our allies, and the NATO Alliance. It is different. These
countries that we're talking about today are NATO allies. And
they're under the protection of Article 5. So it would be a
very different ball game. That would be an attack on the
Alliance as a whole.
I think what we're especially concerned about is Russia's
use of hybrid warfare and its attempts to undermine the allies
and, in particular in this region, using tactics that fall
below the threshold of Article 5 in an attempt to achieve their
aims without invoking a full military response. That's the area
where NATO has built up increasing capability, but it's one
area where I think there's also more work to be done.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much, Representative Graves. And
thank you for that last question and for your response, Mr.
Jones. The Russian invasion of Crimea, the Russian invasion of
the sovereign nation of Ukraine, was a gross violation of
international law. It violated every single principle that
Russia had signed onto as a member of the OSCE. And it was an
outrage. You have stated that that action against a NATO ally
would in fact be a different ball game altogether. And I
appreciate you saying that on the behalf of the United States
of America. And I would underscore that. And I think every
member of this panel would underscore this. We have Article 5
obligations to our NATO allies. And as far as I'm concerned,
they are sacrosanct and would present a far different scenario
if anyone were to try that sort of action. So thank you for
allowing me to interject that.
We next have Representative Billy Long of Missouri.
HON. BILLY LONG, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI
Mr. Long. Thank you. And thank you all for being here today
and for participating in this historic field hearing. Really
appreciate it.
General Twitty, what's Vladimir Putin's biggest fear?
What's he afraid of?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. A couple things, I would say, sir. No. 1,
he fears NATO continues to grow on his periphery. And every day
he wakes up and looks west, and he sees a pretty credible
capability and solidarity of a NATO Alliance on his back door.
So he fears that.
The other thing that I will tell you that he fears is the
U.S. in the region. He wants to be the--Russia wants to be the
dominant regional power in the region. And he's working hard
through his malign activities to gain that.
Mr. Long. On a scale of 1 to 10, give a 1 to 10 on the
success of their buildup--military buildup over the last 10
years.
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Russia's buildup?
Mr. Long. Yes, uh-huh.
Lt. Gen. Twitty. I will tell you that Russia is growing in
capability and capacity. What has allowed them to become
better, quite frankly, is the operations that they've done in
Ukraine, and continue to do in Ukraine, the operations that are
going on in Syria. Just like U.S. forces rotating in and out of
Iraq and Afghanistan, they've gained a lot of experience by
participating in those operations.
Mr. Long. And their military buildup, as far as weaponry
and things, what----
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes. In terms of their military----
Mr. Long. Pretty successful? I mean, are they eight on a
scale of 1 to 10, or 10, or----?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. The oil money and the funding that they
received as a result of the oil money, he's used it well. In
terms of his capability and his submarine capability, he's
probably got one of the best submarine capabilities out there--
[inaudible]. He also has significant space-based capability and
counter-based space capability. He's improved his air defense
capability. The SA-21 and SA-20s are pretty good systems. And
he's also improved his land-based maneuver systems and his tank
capability, and his infantry fighting capability. And they've
gone down a pretty serious modernization path that is a pretty
capable force.
Mr. Long. Yes. It wouldn't take much to roll into the
Baltic States, would it--a few short hours?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. What I will tell you is he's got geography
at his advantage. But what he doesn't have is an alliance at
his advantage. And when you look at the capability that's in
the Baltics now, it's vastly different than the capability that
you remember from 2014. He's staring at pretty good national
defense forces, and then he's up against the eFPs that I talked
about earlier, with readiness, and capacity, and capability,
presence in this region to be able to counter the threats that
Russia poses.
Mr. Long. To paraphrase what you said earlier, you said
Russia will act below the level of combat, or contact, or
whatever, but they're precipitously close--I mean, they're so
close when you're flying jets 50 feet, or whatever, from each
other, and when you aggressively come after a ship that
obviously has the right of way and then say, Oh no, America was
in the wrong. What's his endgame there? I mean, no one wants a
shooting war. And I wouldn't think Vladimir Putin would want a
shooting war. But what's his endgame with these acts of
aggression--that type of aggression, I mean?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes. A couple of things. Again, he seeks
to intimidate his neighbors. So the way you intimidate them is
you fly in the air, you invade Lithuania's air space, and you
intimidate them. The other thing that I will tell you, if you
take a look at his flight patterns and so forth, it is my
assessment that they're probing our response time. They're
looking to see how--just how capable the U.S. and NATO are in
terms of deterring and defending Russian capability. So they've
taken the opportunity to assess us as they do these particular
operations.
Mr. Long. Well, when then--if you take Georgia, take
Crimea. I was in Ukraine shortly--I mean, it was when Putin
said he didn't have any troops there. The body bags were coming
from training exercises, so that's how early in that I was
there. But when you see those type of things that happen, and
there's no real response, doesn't that embolden Vladimir Putin
to do more of these aggressive acts, so to speak?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. It could. The difference, as you know,
Ukraine, non-NATO partner, but a partner.
Mr. Long. Right.
Lt. Gen. Twitty. And so a non-NATO partner, but a partner.
But what you have here, and we thoroughly demonstrate it by our
actions and your assistance, is we built the combat-capable
force in this region--in this region to be able to respond.
Mr. Long. Just two takeaways from what you said. The
submarine, the space force--I hope people took note of that--
and thank you, again, for being here.
I yield back.
Mr. Wicker. Let's do this--the next three on our list are
Representative Harris, Representative Zeldin, and
Representative Duncan. We need to excuse this panel at five
after the hour, if that's all right. So let's see if the next
three can divide up 13 minutes evenly. And we'll begin with
Representative Harris of Maryland.
HON. ANDY HARRIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND
Mr. Harris. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. And I will try
to be brief.
Mr. Jones, I appreciate your comments about a family
connection. My parents came from Galicia and Hungary, escaped
Russian aggression after World War II. So I can fully
appreciate, you know, what your family has seen.
General, let me follow up just briefly on Kaliningrad,
because I guess the concern would be that the Russian
capability there could, in effect, block off reinforcement of
supplies going to a Baltic conflict. Do we have the capability
now, with EDI, are we developing the capability to make sure
that doesn't happen?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes, sir. We absolutely are. First of all,
before I answer your question, I want to thank you and your
State partnership program. It's been vital to the region. It
has allowed us to build the capacity we need with cyber. You
know, Maryland does it best in terms of having a cyber force to
help us out in the region, so I want to thank you very much.
Mr. Harris. Well, you're very welcome.
And Mr. Jones, just very briefly, you know, how do we push
back against the argument that the NATO Russia Founding Act
doesn't allow us to do some of the things which we would--you
know, rotational forces, et cetera?
Mr. Jones. Well, I would say to that, that the United
States and our allies have actually remained fully compliant
with the NATO Russia Founding Act. It's not something we can
say about Russia. The NATO Russia Founding Act talks about some
important principles, like non-use of force, respect for
sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes--all of which it's
clearly violated through the actions we've talked about in
Ukraine, Georgia, and more. The United States--NATO and the
United States, through its actions in--with enhanced forward
presence, the recent decision in Poland, our assessment is
those are fully compliant with U.S. and NATO's obligations.
They are rotational and do not meet the threshold for
substantial forces.
Mr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Jones. I yield back.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you, Representative Harris.
Representative Lee Zeldin of New York.
HON. LEE M. ZELDIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK
Mr. Zeldin. Well, thank you to Chairman Wicker and to your
entire staff for setting this event up. It's an honor, as a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to be invited to
participate in this first meeting of the Helsinki Commission
outside of the United States. It's a great honor to be here in
Gdansk, Poland. And also, as someone who represents a robust
Polish American community, greetings from the east end of Long
Island, the 1st congressional district of New York.
Lieutenant General Twitty, thank you for your service. As a
former ROTC commissionee and Fort Bragg paratrooper----
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Hoo-ah.
Mr. Zeldin. I greatly admire your entire history of
service, going back now decades. And thank you, as well, to Mr.
Jones for your history of service, including your dedicated
time toward issues of strengthening alliances all throughout
the world, including the U.S.-Israel partnership, which I know
has been a big focus of your career as well.
I'm going to just ask you to comment about any one or all
of these three items in our limited amount of time. I'd love to
be able to get your thoughts on Nord Stream 2, Turk Stream, and
the discussion with regards to Turkey's acquisition of F-35s
and S-400s from both the NATO position as well as from the
EUCOM position. And feel free to take them in any order.
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Okay. So I'll take the S-400 one. I think
we've been pretty vocal based on when General Scaparrotti had
the position, and now General Wolters, sir. Our position is
that Turkey receives the S-400 then we're pretty clear that
they should not receive the F-35. I think you're aware now that
we've instituted an unwind plan, or we've stopped the training
of Turkey pilots in the U.S. until we can come to resolution
whether Turkey's going to decide to continue on with their
efforts with the S-400 or not. It appears that they're going to
go in that direction. And it was just announced in the open
press that they should be expecting delivery of that system
within days. So our view is they do not receive the F-35 if
they receive the S-400.
Mr. Jones. Briefly, I would say the Nord Stream project is
not a project that is contributing to stability in Europe. In
fact, it will weaken certainly Ukraine's position by depriving
it of important revenue. And at a time when we are confronting
Russian aggression and misbehavior, we don't believe these
types of commercial deals, to which there are alternatives, are
advisable.
On the S-400, the general has clearly laid out the position
of the United States. This is also, of course, an issue for the
Alliance. And acquisition of the S-400 would hurt
interoperability within the Alliance. And we hope that Turkey
does not take possession of this weapon system.
Mr. Wicker. Do you view Nord Stream 2 as a done deal?
Mr. Jones. I'd have to ask the Germans. I don't think so.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very, very much.
And now Representative Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
HON. JEFF DUNCAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Senator. And I would thank both of
you for being here and thank you for your service to our great
Nation. Let me just stress that the U.S. Congress will not
abdicate this responsibility to support the men and women under
your command, nor will it abdicate its responsibility to
support our NATO allies or the Baltic States allies that we
have.
General, you said in your statement that when the Kremlin
looks to the West they see a cohesive alliance that has both
the military capability and political will to defend its member
nations. You go on to say that Moscow is intent on undermining
NATO activity, seeking and exploiting fissures in Alliance
solidarity. When I think about the recent events in the
European Union--Brexit coming to mind, but also what President
Macron said yesterday--reminded his counterparts that the EU
countries give an image of Europe that's not a serious one.
So when you talk about fissures, what are we doing to shore
those fissures up, and how are we meeting them head on? Because
I don't believe we want to show any weakness to Moscow, and I
don't think we have any weakness. I think we are showing
solidarity. I think we're showing strength, and force, and
numbers, and then financing it. We're seeing NATO and Baltic
States countries increasing their spending. So how can we make
sure that you can assure us that those fissures are being
closed up and addressed?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. Yes, well, thank you, sir. I think you
know that I'm from South Carolina. And you're from the great
State as well. So it's good to see you.
Mr. Duncan. Go Tigers.
Lt. Gen. Twitty. I like your tie. [Laughter.] But anyway--
--
Mr. Wicker. Objection. [Laughter.]
Lt. Gen. Twitty. But at any rate, to answer your question,
as you know that we're in an alliance that includes 28 other
nations. And then you add on the EU there, that's 22 common
nations when you add on the EU. And as you know, EU will have
their priorities and we will have our priorities as well. You
know, one of the priorities in the EU right now, as well as
NATO, is ensuring the flow of immigration from North Africa up
into Europe--make sure that they suppress that. And that is a
priority. And in some cases, if you talk to many of our allies,
Russia is not the No. 1 priority.
So it's those type things, ensuring that we stay locked in
step with continued funding, the 2 percent increase, No. 1. And
also, that operations and activities and exercises are fully
funded as part of NATO, and they're actually participating in
these exercises. And so it's those things that we need to make
sure that we stay in lockstep and agreement and continue to
show solidarity.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. I would ask Mr. Jones to talk about
the funding, and how NATO's shoring up or solidifying those
fissures that we're talking about.
Mr. Jones. Well, as an alliance of 29 allies, we do have
disagreements. We don't make a secret of that. But what NATO
has been successful in doing is always coming together on the
important issues of deterrence and defense and building strong
unity within the Alliance. And we've always found ways to come
to unity on important questions. Defense spending is one area
where we have, I wouldn't say disagreement, but different
approaches. But the trend is positive in general. This will be
the fifth consecutive year of non-U.S. allies increasing
defense spending. But this year it's predicted that eight
allies will meet the 2 percent target, as compared to only
three in 2014. And if you look at the period from 2016 to 2020,
there'll be almost $120 billion of extra defense spending than
originally planned.
The trend is positive. It's just not sufficient. If we are
to have credible deterrent, all allies must reach that 2
percent. All allies have agreed that they have made this
commitment. And we need to continue to push them to meet that
goal.
Mr. Duncan. I think that's a great point. Senator, I just
want to remind the committee here and the CODEL that our
president has challenged our allies to step up in their defense
spending. I think they have stepped up. I think we're seeing
that commitment on NATO, from what I heard from these
gentlemen. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Wicker. And thank you. And I certainly want to say that
on my behalf I hope our Congress continues to meet its
commitment as we--as we struggle to find a budget number that's
agreeable in divided government, in two-party Congress.
Let me--let me thank each one of you, and ask you: Would
either of you or both of you like to say anything that you feel
we haven't covered, or make some last few comments in summary
that this international audience needs to hear?
General, is there anything you'd like to add?
Lt. Gen. Twitty. I would just like to say that EUCOM is
laser-focused on the Baltics. We think we've built tremendous
capacity, capability and interoperability here. And our plan is
to continue to stay focused in this area. I think you will see,
as you move about the Baltic States, new capability that has
grown within the internal national defense forces, as well as
the capability that we provided here in the way of the enhanced
forces presence and our rotational--our armor brigade combat
team and our aviation combat team. They provide tremendous
capability to this region.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. And thank you so much, General.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Senator. I would just like to restate
the ironclad commitment of the United States to Article 5,
which has been expressed not only by the president but many
senior leaders of this administration. The United States
remains committed to the NATO Alliance, and to keeping it
strong.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much to both of you. We will
excuse you at this point, and we have--our staff is going to
help us change the nameplates, and we're going to bring our
distinguished friends from the region forward. So thank you
very much, and we will stretch for 60 seconds while our friends
come forward.
[Break.]
Mr. Wicker. [Sounds gavel.] If we could convene in the next
moments, or so. If our witnesses could come forward. And, once
again, let me thank our first panel for their excellent
contributions and for the way that our members were able to get
them to enlarge on their comments. I think this is very
valuable testimony.
We now have an extraordinary set of senior officials from
this region before us today. I want to express my profound
gratitude to all five of you for taking the time to join us
here in Gdansk for this very important occasion.
Our speakers for this panel are Raimundas Karoblis,
minister of national defense from Poland--from Lithuania.
Pardon me, yes. Let me get my bifocals adjusted here.
And then--and then from Poland, Major General Krzysztof
Krol, deputy chief of defense. From Estonia, Kristjan Prikk,
permanent secretary and minister of defense.
Then from Sweden, Jan-Olof Lind, state secretary to the
minister for defense. And then from Finland, Janne Kuusela,
director-general of the Defense Policy Department in the
Ministry of Defense of Finland.
So, gentlemen, thank you very, very much for participating.
And I'll begin by calling on Minister Karoblis of Lithuania.
MINISTER RAIMUNDAS KAROBLIS, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
Min. Karoblis. Thank you very much, honorable Chairman
Wicker, members of U.S. Helsinki Commission, ladies and
gentlemen. I'm highly honored to speak in front of such
distinguished U.S. Congress delegation. Thank you very much for
traveling so long from the United States and thank you for your
keen interest in the security of the Baltic region.
This lovely, peaceful city of Gdansk is a very appropriate
place to conduct field hearings on the Baltic security. We are
just fifty miles away from Kaliningrad area, one of Russia's
Anti-Access/Area Denial, which is A2/AD, fortresses. The
missiles that are based in Kaliningrad--and there are many,
including nuclear-capable Iskander, it was described in the
previous session--are targeting NATO forces in Europe, their
ability to reinforce the Baltics in particular. Russian
intermediate-range missiles, SSC-8, which have been deployed in
violation of the INF Treaty, also seek to undermine NATO's
ability to move forces in Europe and to conduct collective
defense. This is a matter of grave concern of the countries
located in Russia's neighborhood.
For many reasons--geographic, historic, social--the Baltic
region is bound to remain the most vulnerable part of the
Alliance. It will, therefore, require special attention of NATO
military planners. Year after year, we observe Russia
exercising operations against NATO in the Baltics. The focus of
these exercises is the Suwalki corridor, a narrow strip of land
between Lithuania and Poland. It is critical for the defense of
this region. In case of conflict, Polish and Lithuanian forces
will have a special role to keep this corridor open for allied
reinforcements. To succeed, we need credible NATO military
plans, regular exercises, as well as full engagement of the
United States with its unique military capabilities.
Taking the opportunity, I would like to thank the U.S.
Congress for your resolute support to NATO and the
transatlantic link, which is the core of our security. We would
not allow other policy issues and disagreements, be it on
trade, climate, or Middle East, damage the defense relations
between Europe and the United States.
I would also like to thank the U.S. Congress for the
assistance that your country provides to the Lithuanian armed
forces. With your support, we were able to accelerate our
capability development programs, in line with NATO priorities,
expand military infrastructure, which is also used by NATO
allies, as well as to increase our large-caliber ammunition
stockpiles.
This is an issue of beneficial operations. Since 2014, the
United States has invested nearly $80 million to support the
Lithuanian armed forces. In this same period, Lithuania has
committed more than $200 million in national funds to purchase
U.S. defense articles. This figure is likely to grow
significantly as new major projects are currently under
consideration. Mr. Chairman, esteemed Members of the Congress,
I am proud that Lithuania, together with our Baltic neighbors
in Poland, are among those allies who already spend 2 percent
or more of their GDP for defense. This shows our serious
approach to national security, as well as to our NATO
commitments.
We're determined to act as security providers and to show
solidarity with our allies. Lithuania has deployed forces to
all key operational theaters, including Afghanistan, Iraq,
Mali, and Ukraine. Our troops have served side-by-side with
American soldiers for many years now, and the cooperation
between the United States and Lithuanian special operations
forces is truly legendary. At present we are working with the
U.S. SOF [Special Operations Forces] Command Europe on a new,
very interesting project to improve situational awareness and
intelligence sharing in the Baltic region.
Also we would like to highlight our very close and
productive cooperation with the Pennsylvania National Guard.
This partnership is already more than 25 years old and is of
great value to our countries. And also was example last month--
it was the month of the partnership between Pennsylvania and
Lithuania. And this was announced by decision of the Senate--or
the Pennsylvania commonwealth.
We are also grateful to United States for leading the
process of NATO adaptation to the new security realities. There
is a substantial progress in number of areas, including overall
defense spending within the Alliance. NATO command structure
and plans will be adjusted to meet the requirements of Article
5 situations. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of
U.S. second fleet, which has just completed the first major
exercise in the Baltics, which is BALTOPS. The Alliance also
works to improve the readiness of NATO forces and to facilitate
military movement across Europe. This key stance of work is the
enduring legacy of the former U.S. Defense Secretary James
Mattis.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight two
areas which now you--will require special attention over the
coming months. One relates to the recently announced deployment
of additional U.S. forces to Poland, which we sincerely
welcome. Presence of U.S. troops changes the risk calculus in
the Kremlin, making military challenge to NATO considerably
less likely. We hope therefore that these additional U.S.
forces will be used to maximize their deterrence value for the
entire Baltic region.
The second issue is air defense. This is a critical
capability gap in Baltics which we urgently need to address
through our national and NATO efforts. The new Commander
General Tod Wolters is fully aware of the situation, and we
look forward to working closely with his staff and chief U.S.
European Command to address this critical shortfall.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to
address this--your distinguished group of U.S. Congressmen. I
am very much looking forward to our follow-on discussions. I
will be ready to answer your question to the general treaty
about are we secure or not, questions about Kaliningrad and
also, of course, Ukraine, which is keeping the southeastern
flank of NATO.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very, very much, Minister Karoblis.
We very much appreciate it.
And Major General Krol, you are next, and you're
recognized.
MAJOR GENERAL KRZYSZTOF KROL, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES,
REPUBLIC OF POLAND
Maj. Gen. Krol. Chairman Wicker, distinguished members of
the commission, thank you very much for this opportunity to
speak to you about regional perspective on Baltic Sea regional
security. On behalf of Minister of National Defense, Minister
Blaszczak, allowed me to express our gratitude for your
decision to pay a visit to Poland and convene a field hearing
in Gdansk.
We are absolutely honored that the commission took decision
to hold proceedings first time in its 43-year history in
Poland. And let me also underline that our presence here is
extremely remarkable, taking into account fact that the Second
World War outbreak took place near 80 years ago, 1st September,
1939, a few miles from this location, where armored[?]
Schleswig-Holstein opened fire from all her guns on the Polish
army debarkation point at Westerplatte.
Poland's tragic and existential--the worst possible--
experience from that period established a clear direction in
our efforts related to building safe and secure environment for
Poland and for the region. Our attention and efforts
continuously focused on Russian militarization and aggressive
behavior, which is the biggest challenge for stability in the
Baltic region. There is no doubt U.S. involvement is crucial in
all these efforts.
Let me present Polish perspective and priorities in
countering these challenges.
So, first of all, I'd like to say a few words about Russian
foreign policy concept promulgated in November 2016, where
Russia positions itself as an independent global great power.
Russia is self-
reliant in defense and participates only in Russia-centric or
Russia-led military alliances. Russia maintains a Russian-
centric economic security order in its neighborhood, claiming
its sphere of influence.
What are the Russian--Russia goals and priorities in their
foreign policy? Weaken the unity of Western policy, accelerate
inevitable although difficult U.S. adaptation to the realities
of multipolarity and a world without Western hegemony. So now
we understand why they behave as they behave.
Russia is looking forward for opportunities to challenge
and reshape the post-cold war international order, particularly
to challenge the U.S. position in areas where Russia claims its
strategic interests in its Central European neighborhood
particularly. Russia has a very limited possibility to compete
in economy for social perspective in citizens' level of life or
cultural domain. But at the same time, Russia built military
strength and capabilities to destabilize situation, stimulate
regional tensions, escalate proxy wars. There is no doubt this
military tool is the most important in Russia politics
reservoir.
Russian Federation executes massive and snap exercises
ranging from the high north through the Baltic region to the
Black Sea and Mediterranean region included.
We witness negative tendencies in the Russian military
posture. Russian western and southern military districts are
leaders in terms of modernization and new capabilities
development.
Let me provide you some figures concerning Russian State
armament program 2018-2027. So they decided to spend around 700
billion U.S. [dollars] officially. However, if--as we calculate
it, their expenditures, taking into account purchasing power in
Russian defense industry, the amount increases up to 2.5 times.
Russia remains the third-largest in the world, with much
higher percentage--I'm talking about defense spending--and
Russia has much higher percentage of its defense spending
dedicated to research and development than in most developed
European countries.
We observed that there is visible but no decisive impact of
sanctions on Russia building its capabilities. We assess that
Russia will continue to build and develop their capabilities in
A2/AD systems, electronic warfare, command control,
communication information, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, short-notice readiness, supersonic missile
systems, cyber, electronic warfare, strategic nuclear triad,
and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, plus space program.
Russia is obsessed with maintaining control over escalation
dynamics. It will seek to determine possible conflict quickly,
and the chief objectives in a very short period of time, using
all means at its disposal, conventional or nonconventional.
Threat of using nuclear weapons, asymmetric responses, hybrid
tools, use of special operations forces--such as was the
scenario, for example, of recent exercises, Zapad 2017. We are
also in front of next exercises, that will be held this fall,
Union Shield, and we will closely monitor that exercise as
well.
It should be also underlined that a large percentage of the
land component of the Russian armed forces is available at a
high readiness for short-notice contingencies. Militarization
of the Baltic Sea region by Russia has already been underlined
by my predecessor pointing out at Kaliningrad, for example.
However, let me also underline another area. Russia is
noncompliant with conventional arms-control regimes and
confidence and security-building measures. For example, the
Vienna document and Open Skies Treaty, Russia is constantly
circumventing the notification or observation commitment in
case of massive exercises; for example, exercise Zapad already
referred to.
Russia alternately increases and decreases the intensity of
international tensions. We assess that in the future, Moscow,
playing its game with the West, could try to convince us that
the regional security situation in Eastern Europe is stable
again, just like it was prior to Russia-Georgia conflict. So we
must remember that it might be another Russian test of our
solidarity and resolve.
Is Russia willing or ready for any compromise with the
West? This is another question we're asking ourselves nearly
every day. In 2017-2018, we did not see any breakthrough from
the Russian side. Russia continued its aggressive actions,
persistent violation of international law, military buildup and
political cohesion.
Concluding this part, I'd like to underline that we do not
hope that President Putin's administration will change its
attitude toward Euro-Atlantic community and reshape its policy
to Ukraine or Georgia.
I'd like to say now a few words about hybrid threat, how we
assess that, not only in a military dimension but also in other
dimensions. The military pressure is complemented by the hybrid
warfare, combining different instruments, military and
nonmilitary, the hostile intentions of below the threshold of
the recognized war.
We are targeted by cyberthreats that intensify continues to
grow. Cyberwarfare does not have a dramatic impact of a
conventional military attack but have a destructive effect that
might be even more damaging. The challenge of growing
importance remains potential interference in the political
debate of NATO and EU countries.
Allow me in this place to remind you about Russia's goal to
accelerate U.S. adaptation to the realities of multipolarity in
the world without Western hegemony. Adaptation means change of
the ruling elites. From this perspective, interfering in the
Western countries' domestic political affairs, meddling in
democratic elections, active means of disinformation, efforts
to polarize societies, as well as attempts focused on creation
and boosting internal discord with Euro-Atlantic and European
communities, including in variety of countries, is better
understood, and it requires building proper required resilience
from our side.
From Polish perspective, energy security is also important.
We highly value the cooperation between Poland and the United
States in the field of energy security; for example, LNG
[liquid natural gas] long-term contracts. It is important for
the whole Baltic Sea region, especially in the context of the
unfortunate Russia-German Nord Stream 2 project.
Facing a full spectrum of threats and challenges from the
Baltic to the Black Sea, and also from hybrid to potentially
high intensity, we need to increase the deterrence and defense
of our region.
The ongoing process of enhancing deterrence and defense has
one ultimate goal: Assure the capability of NATO to conduct, in
accordance with Article 5 of the Alliance founding treaty,
large combat operations of collective defense. Collective
defense remains, in fact, the core mission of the Alliance.
From military standpoint, the crucial objective is to
achieve the right balance between forward presence and
reinforcement for increased deterrence and defense in NATO's
eastern flank to counter Russia short-notice scenario and
political and military isolation of the conflict.
To achieve it, we would continue NATO adaptation. The most
important focus of these areas are the following: From Polish
perspective, we welcome and support comprehensive efforts to
increase NATO ability to reinforce, including full
implementation of readiness initiative, well-known
``430'' project, decided at the Brussels summit;
continuation of NATO command and force-structure adaptation;
further streamlining movement of troops across the Euro-
Atlantic area. In this domain, cooperation between NATO and
European Union, from our perspective, seems to be absolutely
important.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, U.S.
political leadership and meaningful military contribution is
and continues to be critical for deterrence and defense against
Russian threat. Therefore, we extremely value current and
planned increase of U.S. military enduring presence in Poland.
The U.S. remains the framework nation for the eFP
Battlegroup deployed to Poland. In 2017, the U.S. deployed an
Armored Brigade Combat Team and Combat Aviation Brigade in the
framework of European terrorist initiative, already highlighted
in front of this commission.
We also continue the cooperation with Washington in the
area of missile defense, including contribution of the missile-
defense site-building the missile-defense site in Redzikowo,
Poland. I'd like to underline also great cooperation and
support from Illinois National Guard for Polish armed forces
during operation in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This
cooperation is absolutely great.
Let me also underline that last month president of Poland
and U.S. signed a joint declaration on defense cooperation
regarding U.S. forces' posture in the Republic of Poland. The
joint declaration forces the establishment of the enduring U.S.
military presence in Poland and its growth by about 1,000
additional military personnel in the near term. That means that
the average U.S. personnel will amount up to 5,500 troops on
the Polish territory, available for U.S., NATO, and for
maintaining security in the region.
Mr. Chairman, commission, I'm more than--I will be more
than happy to answer any questions you provide.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.
Maj. Gen. Krol. Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Let's stay on this side of the sea before we
jump across. So Secretary Prikk, you are recognized.
PERMANENT SECRETARY KRISTJAN PRIKK, PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE
MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA
Sec. Prikk. Honorable Chairman, distinguished
commissioners, let me first thank you for this very positive
initiative to hold this field hearing in Europe, to hold it in
this distinguished city of Gdansk, and give the Estonian
Government also the opportunity to present our views.
I won't be able to cover all the issues of interest, so
I'll focus my remarks on the issue of effectiveness of NATO's
regional deterrence posture.
Let me start by saying that NATO's posture in the Baltic
region has grown much stronger since 2014, in addition to
significant development of region's home-defense forces, the
forces of our own militaries, and several counter-hybrid
efforts. We also have NATO battle groups in all Baltic States
and enhanced NATO air policing presence and more allied
maritime visits to our ports. We see an increased number of
NATO and allied live exercises in the region. The recent
announced additional presence of larger contingent of American
troops in Poland further strengthens NATO's posture regionally.
It is important that those troops also contribute to the
U.S. military footprint in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This
would significantly add credibility to NATO's deterrence in the
Baltic States. However, we all need to understand that the
current NATO presence is and was never designed to be
militarily a match to what Russia has in Kaliningrad and the
western military district and the capabilities that they can
mobilize very quickly, as we have seen during the latest large-
scale exercises.
The current NATO presence is primarily political and
intended to show that NATO and its members would be involved in
any conflict with Russia from day one. This critical but
nevertheless limited presence is intended to be complemented by
a very quick reinforcement by NATO in case of a crisis.
The problem is that the bulk of NATO forces is still far
away, and our ability to deploy forces quickly and sustain them
has important limitations. Issues such as the readiness,
availability and mobility of our forces, the preparations
required by means of detailed advance plans, live exercises,
and swift decision making need further work. Today, Russia
plans and exercises in the region exactly as they intend to
fight, and we do not.
NATO has discussed the need to improve its ability to
defend against air threats and strengthen its maritime posture
for years. Despite some steps in the right directions--some
very important steps in the right direction--we are still not
very far along.
In particular, NATO has assessed time and again that the
Russian air and missile defense and presumed strike
capabilities would mean a considerable challenge to NATO's line
of communications and reinforcement. The new SSC-8 capability
that is in breach of the INF Treaty will add another capability
into the Russian hands to attack critical targets in the whole
of European theater.
All this affects NATO's ability to guarantee the security
of this region by putting the ability to reinforce by the
allies at risk. Without real solidarity between allies, NATO
posture in itself is just an empty shell. Thus, while we are
strengthening collective defense in practice--and we are doing
it on a daily basis--we must not forget that the communication
is a critical part of deterrence. This concerns every ally, but
in particular the American commitment to the Alliance--that's
what I would state here--and its willingness to give the
ultimate guarantee to the Article 5. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance that we--we all, Europeans and North Americans
alike--use any opportunity to clearly send the message of
unwavering commitment and solidarity to each other. We
collectively have benefited so much from the Alliance. We,
individually and collectively, have so much to lose from being
alone.
That's all for mine. Thanks.
Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you, and let me just interject
that, as far as I'm concerned, our commitment to Article 5 is
absolute. And I hope we can give you that reassurance.
Let's move along then to Secretary Lind of Sweden. Thank
you very much for being with us.
STATE SECRETARY JAN-OLOF LIND, STATE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTER
FOR DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN
Sec. Lind. Thank you, Senator Wicker and distinguished
members of the commission. I would like to echo my colleagues.
Thank you for organizing this event and giving me the
opportunity to elaborate a little bit on the Swedish
perspective on the Baltic Sea security environment.
First of all, I would like to state--which has been already
done by others--that the military strategic situation in our
region has deteriorated. Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine
have shown that Russia is prepared to use military force to
change established borders in Europe. The illegal annexation of
Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, Donbass region, is
the greatest challenge to the European security order since it
was established 25 years ago. Russia is using a broad variety
and combination of methods and actions to achieve its
objectives. This is what we refer as the hybrid threats gray
zone. The Russian aggression in Ukraine is one example of
Russia's intention to coordinate relevant instruments of state
power with the use of proxy fighters to achieve political
goals.
In parallel, Russia has shown a more challenging behavior
in the Baltic Sea region, including disrespect of its
neighbors' territorial integrity as well as provocative and
unprofessional behavior in the air and on the sea. Because of
Russia's interest in the region and as it is one of the busiest
shipping areas in the world, the significance of the Baltic Sea
region to European security has increased. Freedom of
navigation and secure sea lines of communications are
essential, not only for the countries in the region, but also
for other nations.
Russian activities are not only a challenge to the
countries in its close vicinity; they are also a challenge to
the right of every country to make their own policy choices.
This is a cornerstone in the European security order and
international security order, if you will. Therefore, Russian
actions are a concern to all of us and make our response all
the more important.
The complexity and scale of challenges at hand means that
no state can face them alone. Together we need to use the
entire range of security policy instruments, enhanced national
defense capability, international cooperation, and dialog, and
confidence-building measures.
Challenges to European security must be met together, but
on the national level, every country must take their share of
responsibility. This is why Sweden is pursuing a defense policy
with two reinforcing pillars. On the one hand, we are
strengthening our national military capabilities. The Swedish
total defense concept, which includes both military and
civilian defense, is developed in order to meet an armed attack
against Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory.
On the other hand, we are deepening our security and
defense cooperation. Sweden gives priority to the cooperation
with our Nordic neighbors; with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania;
with Poland, Germany, and of course, as well as with the U.K.
and the U.S.
We are also focusing on our efforts with and within
multilateral organizations such as the EU and NATO. Regional
cooperation, like the Nordic Defence Cooperation, and the U.K.-
led Joint Expeditionary Force, are important to complement the
security network in northern Europe.
A strong transatlantic link is vital for both European and
American security. U.S. and NATO presence is necessary for the
stability in the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, we welcome
NATO's enhanced forward presence and the increased U.S.
presence in Europe through the European Deterrence Initiative.
The eDI has been instrumental for exercises and other joint
activities. Exercises in the Baltic Sea region signals shared
responsibility for the security. Maritime exercises like
BALTOPS and Baltic Protector enhances our interoperability and
strengthens our common maritime capability.
Sweden will continue to be an active partner to NATO, and
our status as Enhanced Opportunities Partner is key in this
regard. And we share this, of course, with Finland. This
relationship is crucial to the development of our
interoperability and capabilities.
Political dialog on common security challenges and how to
counter them--in particular in the Baltic Sea region--is
essential in our cooperation with NATO. We see Northern Europe
as one strategic area; that is, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic
area as well. I think they both go more or less hand in hand
today.
A crisis in the region would affect all of us, and we must
be prepared to respond to it together. Arms control as well as
confidence and security building measures are essential parts
of the European security order. Sweden strongly supports
continued and complete implementation of the Vienna Document
and Open Skies instruments.
Europe has a key role in meeting the global challenges and
threats. Our response must be guided by democratic principles
and values. It needs to be firm, clear, and long term, and it
needs to build upon European and transatlantic unity. Together
we must show that we stand up for international law and
international security order.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Mr. Wicker. And thank you very much, Secretary Lind.
And now we're delighted to recognize Director General
Kuusela.
DIRECTOR-GENERAL JANNE KUUSELA, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEFENSE
POLICY DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
FINLAND
Dir. Gen. Kuusela. Thank you, Chairman, distinguished
members of the commission.
Coming from Helsinki, I would like to first salute you for
the great name of your commission--[laughter]--and I'd also
like to thank you for taking the time and coming here to our
region. I think this--your presence here very clearly
demonstrates your commitment to the European security and
stability, and your willingness to work with your allies and
partners in this region.
A lot has already been covered by my fellow panelists, so I
will limit myself to very brief remarks from the Finnish point
of view. Seen from Finland, the U.S. and NATO's responses to
Russian annexation of Crimea have been well balanced and
tailored to meet the needs of allies and partners. The European
Deterrence Initiative, together with the decisions that NATO
has taken to enhance its defense and deterrence, including the
enhanced-forward-presence troops to the Baltic States and
Poland, they have been very positive. They have increased the
security and stability of our region, and they send the right
signal.
Finland is not a member of NATO, but we share the same
security environment with the Alliance, and we believe that
strong Finnish defense contributes also to regional security.
And I'm proud to say that Finnish defense has never been as
capable and as interoperable as it is today. This is mostly
also thanks for our partners' cooperation, and I hope this also
benefits our partners.
Since the cold war ended, many European countries
transformed their armed forces and focused attention to crisis
management and counterinsurgency. Finland never did that
change. The defense of our own territory has always been the
main task for the Finnish defense forces, and we have been--we
have kept investing into it. And these investments will
continue to the future. The ongoing replacement of our air
force's F-18 fighter aircraft fleet, and the ongoing program to
build new corvette-sized ships for the Navy, they will take our
defense spending above the 2 percent of GDP early next decade.
And in addition, we have also invested a lot of time and
effort to modernize our legislation to meet the needs of the
new security environment, including the hybrid threats. Today
no country can rely on national action alone, and for us,
cooperation with our partners is a necessity. For a small
country, that is the most effective way to build capabilities
and ensure interoperability.
And in the past years, Finland has been deepening the
defense cooperation with NATO and with those countries that
have a role in the security architecture in the Baltic Sea
region. In the case of Finland, this cooperation is not based
on treaty obligation, but on strong common interest.
Participation in NATO-led and other multinational operations,
as well as training and exercising together, are key elements.
Eastern cooperation lays the foundation for what we can do
in times of crisis, and I believe this is in line with the
United States' national defense strategy as well. A network of
alliances and partnerships supports your goal to create a
favorable regional balance of power in Europe.
And before I conclude, let me also say a couple of words
about resilience against hybrid threats. We rely on our
national Total Defence model, which we have been developing
since the Second World War, and we are confident with this
model, which is the reason why Finland made the initiative to
establish the European Centre of Excellence for Countering
Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, and we hope this center will help
all its members--EU and NATO--to build understanding and
resilience against hybrid threats.
So to conclude with, I'd like to underline that the
transatlantic relationship will continue to define European
security in the future as well, and the commitment of the
United States to NATO and its military presence in Europe
continue to be essential for the Baltic Sea's regional
security.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Director General, and
before we move to questions, let me thank you for acknowledging
the name of the Helsinki Commission. For those in the audience
who do not know where that came from, we named the United
States' role in participating in the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly the Helsinki Commission in honor of the Helsinki Final
Act, which was the founding document of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose parliamentary
assembly we'll be attending beginning tomorrow in Luxembourg.
The Helsinki Final Act includes principles that the
signatory countries agreed to impose upon themselves. The
signatory countries at the time of the founding act included
Russia and the USSR, and signed on behalf of that nation and
those nations by General Secretary Brezhnev, and signed on
behalf of the United States by President of the United States
Gerald R. Ford, and by the leaders of some 30-something
countries who signed the founding document at the time.
These are not principles that are being forced on some
foreign adversary country against our will. We voluntarily--all
of the signatories, including General Secretary Brezhnev,
including President Ford--voluntarily agreed that in the
interest of security and cooperation in Europe, we should agree
to these principles and abide by them. So thank you for giving
me that opportunity.
We're going to now have 5-minute rounds of questioning, and
I have on my list Representative Aderholt of Alabama and then
Representative Zeldin of New York.
HON. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me also
thank each of you for being here. And I think we're all
actually--as has been mentioned, we are a little bit making
history today because it is the first time that this Commission
has convened a hearing outside of the United States, and that's
in--over a 40-year history. So we're--I'm honored to be a part
of it as I know you are as well.
I want to just open it up and--anyone who wants to answer--
get your thoughts on it, regarding the Russian submarine
activity in the Baltic Sea. It's not a secret that Russian
presence in the Baltic Sea is ever present, and I guess one of
the things that I would have--wanted to know your thoughts on
is how concerned are you with Russia's activity, and also, is
there such a scenario that you could--whereby the Russian
forces would actually shut down access to the Baltic Sea and
cut off maritime supply lines to the Baltic Sea? Is such a
scenario credible? So let me just open it up, and please,
whoever would like to start--to begin.
Mr. Wicker. So who will begin? Mr. Lind, were you----
Sec. Lind. Yes.
Mr. Wicker. You had your hand up, and then General
Secretary Kuusela.
Sec. Lind. Thank you very much for that very important
question. Let me answer the question by this--in this way, that
Sweden has always put a lot of emphasis on the submarine fleet.
We still construct and build our own submarines, and it has to
be related to the threat we see in the Baltic Sea. So by that
you could answer that--from our perspective that we are
concerned. I mentioned that we are concerned with the Russian
behavior in the air, on the sea, but I think it's fair to say
under the sea level as well.
So of course it's a major concern for us as well. And I
think you have to be aware of the fact--and I mentioned that as
well--that civilian sea traffic, as you see--the vessels,
merchandise, vessels you see--it's one of the busiest areas in
the world in the Baltic Sea. So even though we might not
encounter an attack from the Russian side by military forces,
but we have to be very aware of the potential threat of an
attack which will largely damage our supply lines, if you will,
even though we have the big harbor in Gothenburg on the west
coast of Sweden, which is of great importance to many of the
Nordic nations. It has to be looked into a Baltic Sea
perspective as well because we have to secure our lines of
supplies to all the nations. So it is considered a major threat
to us as well.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Director General Kuusela.
Dir. Gen. Kuusela. Thank you, Chairman. I just shortly add
to that. It is an issue for countries in the Baltic Sea region,
and that's why many of us have developed a good set of anti-
submarine warfare capabilities, and it's also one area where we
focused and we work jointly with Finland and Sweden.
The Baltic Sea is a tricky region for maritime domain
warfare. It's shallow, rocky, it has salinity layers that make
it tricky both for submarines and the surface combatants, and
it takes some regional expertise to wage a war in that region.
And just to underline that the security of supply by
maritime routes is vital for a country like Finland. We are an
island basically when it comes to security of supply, and
that's why the freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea is a
very big issue for us.
Maj. Gen. Krol. Okay, a little bit more from military
perspective. Of course, for Baltic Sea as it was--it has
already been described, it's not so--like the depth of the huge
sea. Nevertheless, from our perspective, it's supposed to be
very easy for Russia simply to block the entire Baltic Sea and
any enforcement by the sea lines of communication won't be
possible. So at least from that perspective it is absolutely
critical to monitor all Russian capabilities developing in this
area.
From the other perspective, Baltic Sea is very narrow from
perspective of naval missile systems--200 kilometers, for
example, and we can cover entire southern and northern part of
the Baltic Sea so any surface movement of the Russian navy
could be monitored, could be targeted or countered by our own
means.
The submarines--that's another issue. It is very difficult
to monitor. It's--the only way to cover its movement, and this
is real threat in case of any operation at the sea.
Thank you.
Mr. Wicker. Minister Karoblis, would you like to----
Min. Karoblis. Yes, thank you very much. Yes, so the
submarines and possibility to--well, to block the
communications through the Baltic is certainly the big risk,
and it's of the essential importance to have these lines of
communication open.
But from our perspective, all the risks which we have
around, with the possibilities to block Baltic entrance by the
land, by the air and the sea, we assess equally very risky, and
really we need the solution starting from the defense planning,
the maritime and the air defense dimensions would be there, and
then of course capabilities. Well, these are the ways to--for
the solutions to avoid the blockage of the Baltic region so--by
Russia.
Thanks.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you very much.
Representative Zeldin.
HON. LEE M. ZELDIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we have people
back home who are watching us, so if I could--if you wouldn't
mind indulging me once again for those who might just be tuning
in, I just want to remind them who the distinguished five are
in front of us.
Raimundas Karoblis, Minister of National Defense,
Lithuania; Major General Krzysztof Krol, Deputy Chief of
Defense, Poland; Kristjan Prikk, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Defense, Estonia; Jan-Olof Lind, State Secretary to
the Minister of Defense, Sweden; and Janne Kuusela, Director-
General, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense,
Finland, thank you for being here.
And an American value and an American worldview: We want
your countries to be free, stable, secure. We have--up and down
the ranks of our military and in our government, it's in our
DNA wanting and being willing to sacrifice greatly to help
ensure that your countries are stable and free. We have service
members who would be willing to spill blood, sacrifice greatly,
even fight and die to defend your freedom, and we're here
talking about another nation where the ranks are filled with
individuals who would fight and die to take that freedom away.
And that's why I'm so proud to be here, and I'm very proud
of my own country as you all are proud of yours. And I think
it's important, if you wouldn't mind further indulging me, to
take a moment and speak to our constituents back home, to speak
to our country back home. They are several thousands of miles
away. They don't know this region like you do. They don't know
your countries like you do, so in simple terms, can you explain
briefly what our alliance between our countries mean, and a
message to them as to why this region should matter to them,
and why this American value should continue and this American
world view would continue?
Min. Karoblis. Well, thank you very much indeed, and well,
first of all I would to thank for this general question, but
also, this is the question of values, and speaking about
Lithuanian relation with United States so the--we will never
forget--the Lithuanians will never forget of the non-
recognition policy by the United States. The United States has
never recognized Lithuania or the Baltic countries as the part
of the Soviet, did not recognize the occupation and annexation.
And also, in 2000, we had the visit of the President Bush,
and we have the plate on the town hall of Lithuania that the
enemies of Lithuania also are enemies of United States, and
this is really encouraging. And yes, we are in Europe, we are
European country and so we are part of the collective defense
system which is defending the sound values, which is--I think
it's about that. And we are the part of the Alliance with the
same value, we are of the NATO, and we are of the European
Union also.
And of course relationship with United States is the
strategic one, and also, yes, we are getting a lot of
guarantees from the security guarantees so the--from the United
States also. And these guarantees of NATO and the United States
are essential--they are of essential importance for Lithuania.
So, on the other hand, I think that from my different
experiences in different positions, and remembering also 2001
September events, indeed really while, yes, Europe and Western
civilizations need the leadership of United States, but on the
other hand we understand that United States also needs the
allies, which the closest ally is Europe, and in particular of
our region. And shoulder-to-shoulder our soldiers, they
participate in the foreign operations, ensuring their security
shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. troops and other troops. And our
already long-time participation here is the reflection that
United States could really rely on Lithuanian support and
participation also where it's necessary, and the same we expect
also from others.
So I think that these are the main elements in the trade
section in which we are concentrating and we need to continue
to concentrate on once again. We are really thankful for U.S.
commitments regarding the interests and the security of Baltic
region.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you.
Mr. Harris, I believe you said you had a quick observation
that you'd like to make, and then I suppose we will close the
hearing and----
Mr. Harris. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Sec. Prikk. [Off mic.]
Mr. Wicker. Mr. Prikk, would you like to follow up and
respond?
Sec. Prikk. I think for the sake of just saving time and
giving the Congressman possibly to ask a new question I will
abstain.
Mr. Wicker. Thank you. Mr. Harris.
Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
timeliness of this hearing, 2 days before we begin the OSCE
deliberations--parliamentary assembly deliberations in
Luxembourg. And I want to thank all the members of the panel.
I want to point out that it's my feeling that energy
security is very, very, important. We discussed Nord Stream 2
on the last panel. But I firmly believe that, you know, Russian
dominance in energy markets is not stabilizing to the region.
Energy security is stabilizing. I had the opportunity to visit
Lithuania, to Klaipeda to the FSRU [floating storage
regasification unit] there. Poland, I understand, is
considering an FSRU right here in Gdansk, which I think will
greatly promote stability in the region, and I think the United
States stands ready to be an energy partner.
You know, again--you know, we heard from the general on the
last panel. Certainly our ability to project military force is
important, but the United States now has the ability to project
energy force, energy power that I think will be a great
stabilizing influence.
So Mr. Chairman, again it's a pleasure to be here in Gdansk
where we may have another facility which will import American
energy.
I yield back.
Mr. Wicker. Well, thank you very much, Representative
Harris. And let me thank each and every one of our witnesses on
this panel and also the previous panel for being with us today.
There are members of the press here who may want to speak
individually with any of you, and I hope you will feel free to
do that.
Let me just say, I'm up here with white hair. I feel quite
young, but I think I have the whitest hair and the--may be the
senior-most in terms of years lived.
This is an emotional moment for me, I have to tell you.
Growing up I never dreamed I would be in Poland at a free
hearing, in a free Poland that chooses its own leaders and
exercises freedom, and is a friend of democracies around the
region, and a part of the Atlantic Alliance.
So looking back at the ground we've covered in decades is
profound and rewarding to me. And it gives me hope for some of
our neighbors in the region who have not been so fortunate,
that events can occur, and that the hope, and dream, and
aspiration of freedom springs deep from the hearts of all
humankind.
And so I salute you all for what you've stood for, for
where you have to stand for it, for being friends of ours. And
I hope our presence today makes a strong statement to that
effect. So bless you, and thank you.
And on behalf of the United States of America and the
Helsinki Commission, I will adjourn this hearing.
Thank you so much. [Sounds gavel.]
[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the hearing ended.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Co-Chairman, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
The Commission will come to order, and good afternoon to
everybody.
Welcome to today's field hearing on ``Baltic Sea Regional
Security.''
Ladies and Gentlemen, this event is the first time in its
43-year history that our Commission convenes outside of the
United States.
We are here, of course, to learn from the incredible group
of panelists who have agreed to be with us today. But we are
also here to underscore America's commitment to security in the
Baltic Sea region and its unwavering support for U.S. friends
and allies.
Before going any further, I want to begin by thanking the
Government of Poland, which has been extremely gracious in
working with us to organize our event here in this
extraordinary city.
Indeed, we are especially pleased to be able to hold this
event in the historic city of Gdansk. There could be no more
fitting place for us to understand the stakes at play when we
talk about Baltic Sea regional security. After all, it was just
a short distance from here that the first shots of the Second
World War were fired, as Poland, despite a valiant defense,
became one of the first victims of Nazi Germany.
The people of Poland endured a cruel and devastating
occupation that was followed by nearly 40 years of repressive
Communist rule. Through it all, they never lost their core
conviction that their nation belonged among free democracies.
Fittingly, it was also in Gdansk where the movement began
to end that terrible era, taking historic and courageous steps
to reclaim democracy. I am speaking of course about the
Solidarity movement that became synonymous with the
transformative wave of protest that swept across eastern Europe
and ended with the collapse of communism across the region, and
with the end of the Soviet Union, the end of the Soviet Union's
violent and illegal occupation of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania.
Since that time, Poland has become a good friend, important
partner, and stalwart NATO ally, and has at long last assumed
its rightful place as a leader in a stable and prosperous
Transatlantic community. We recognize that journey has not been
easy, but nothing worthwhile ever is. Poland was given another
chance at freedom, and it has not squandered that opportunity.
I also want to mention that just a few moments ago we went
to the Basilica of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in
order to pay tribute to the late Mayor Pawel Adamowicz, who was
murdered just a few months ago. We met Deputy Mayor of Gdansk
Alan Aleksandrowicz and we expressed America's deepest
condolences for the loss that this city has experienced. Poles
will undoubtably draw inspiration from Mayor Adamowicz's legacy
in public service and civic virtue.
Ladies and Gentlemen, as we sit today less than 80 miles
from Russia's border, citizens of Gdansk are the last to need a
reminder that the Kremlin has in recent years shattered notions
of a predictable, stable regional order with its illegal
occupation of Crimea and ongoing war against Ukraine. Vladimir
Putin's attempts to stoke division and instability abroad is
felt every day by our friends in this region.
Our delegation well understands that freedom, peace and
prosperity in the Baltic Sea region is crucial to European and
global security. This region sits at the epicenter of Europe's
``New North''--a unique intersection of geography,
infrastructure, education, good governance, and high-technology
industries. Eighty million people live here and profit from the
region's key role in European shipping and transit; the region
is also a focal point for Europe's energy independence.
We hope that our conversation with today's panelists will
provide a better understanding of how our collective efforts
will continue to thwart Russia's desire to undermine the peace
and security of this crucial region. We want to get a sense of
the threats we should be most concerned about, as well as a
clear understanding of the ways we may best move forward
together.
Moving forward together certainly includes standing
shoulder to shoulder with the two non-NATO partners present
before us, Finland and Sweden. Our former Secretary of Defense
General Mattis put it well recently when he saluted ``both of
your nations' serious approaches to security in support of a
global order that respects all nations' sovereignty and
territorial integrity, providing a steady anchor of stability
in a region grown more tense as a result of Russia's
unfortunate, unproductive and destabilizing choices.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Transcript, ``Secretary Mattis Hosts an Armed Forces Full
Honor Arrival Welcoming Finland Minister of Defence Jussi Niinisto and
Sweden Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist to the Pentagon,'' May 8,
2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before hearing from our panelists, I want to close by being
as clear as I can about what our delegation is here to say:
that under no circumstance can we be divided from our friends
and allies, here or anywhere else. I was reminded of this key
principle when I participated in the commemoration of the 75th
anniversary of D-Day in Normandy. I am certain all of my
colleagues are unanimous in their agreement with the sentiment
President Trump expressed on that occasion: ``To all of our
friends and partners: Our cherished alliance was forged in the
heat of battle, tested in the trials of war, and proven in the
blessings of peace. Our bond is unbreakable.''
Our event will proceed in two parts: first, we will hear
from a panel of officials from the U.S. Government. This panel
features two speakers: the Deputy Commander of United States
European Command, Lt. Gen. Stephen M. Twitty, and Douglas
Jones, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States
to NATO. Thank you both for traveling from Germany and
Brussels, respectively, to be here.
We have but a short time with these distinguished panelists
and so, with their permission, I will not read their
biographies, so that we may move directly to hearing their
important presentations.
Thank you both again for being here.
[For the second panel.]
Let me again thank our first panel for their excellent
contributions. They have given us a great deal on which to
reflect, as well as provoking a number of questions we will put
to the distinguished second panel sitting before us now.
We have an extraordinary set of senior officials from this
region seated here today. I want to express my profound
gratitude to all of you for taking the time to join us here in
Gdansk--I look forward to hearing from each of you.
We now will hear from the following senior leaders:
Ambassador Cyryl Kozaczewski, Political Director, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland; Raimundas Karoblis,
Minister of National Defense, Republic of Lithuania; Janne
Kuusela, Director-General, Defense Policy Department, Ministry
of Defense of the Republic of Finland; Jan-Olof Lind, State
Secretary to the Minister for Defense, Kingdom of Sweden; and
Kristjan Prikk, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense,
Republic of Estonia.
As with the first panel, with our guests' permission, I
will skip providing their impressive biographies in the
interest of time.
Our panelists have agreed to offer 5 minutes of opening
remarks to offer their perspective on the regional security
environment before we engage in discussion together.
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Stephen M. Twitty
Introduction
Chairman Wicker and distinguished members of the Helsinki
Commission, it is my honor to testify before you today on
behalf of United States European Command (USEUCOM) Commander
GEN Wolters and the over 68,000 brave and dedicated men and
women who are currently operating in the European Theater. The
threats facing U.S. interests in the USEUCOM area of
responsibility are real and growing; our ability to counter
these threats depends on this highly motivated team of patriots
who constantly strengthen solidarity and unity with our Allies
and partners as they improve the lethality and warfighting
readiness of our Joint Force. Defending Europe is an essential
element of defending the United States given our shared values,
adherence to the rule of law, and common economic prosperity.
As stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), a strong and
free Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national
sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty is vital to our security.
As demonstrated last month in the U.S./Poland Joint
Declaration, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are a focal
point of U.S. and NATO deterrence and defense posture and
activities as Russia attempts to intimidate these nations, both
politically and militarily. Consistent with the direction of
the NDS, the United States is fielding--alongside our European
Allies and partners--an interoperable and multi-domain combat-
credible force that underscores our shared deterrent mission,
and demonstrates an unwavering commitment to the collective
defense provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty from all NATO
members. When the Kremlin looks to the West, they see a
cohesive Alliance that has both the military capability, and
political will to defend its member nations.
Knowing the military strength of the Euro-Atlantic
Alliance, Russia seeks to engage us in a competition below the
level of armed conflict in order to exploit asymmetric
advantages. We are actively engaged in that competition, and it
is one that requires all elements of our national power and
alliance structures to succeed. The Joint Force of the United
States combined with the capabilities and capacity of our NATO
Allies and partners are a powerful force of historical
proportions and continue to demonstrate to Russia the
capability and will to honor our collective security
agreements. In cooperation with our NATO partners, we seek to
deter Russian adventurism as well as address other key
challenges, including trans-national terrorists, and addressing
the arc of instability building on NATO's periphery.
Russia--the primary threat to the Euro-Atlantic Alliance
Russia is a long term, strategic competitor that wants to
advance its own objectives at the expense of Transatlantic
prosperity and security. It sees the United States and the NATO
Alliance as the principle threat to its geopolitical ambitions.
Moscow continues to demonstrate a willingness to violate
international law, to exercise malign influence, and to
threaten the Transatlantic community's shared interest in
preserving a strong and free Europestrong and. Moscow seeks
authoritative control over nations along its periphery and is
intent on undermining NATO by actively seeking and exploiting
fissures in Alliance solidarity. President Putin continues to
actively pursue global influence with aggressive foreign and
security policies concerning the sovereign countries on
Russia's periphery. Russia continues to expand its capacity for
malign influence in Europe and abroad, including in the United
States.
Russia seeks to gain advantage over the U.S. and its
European Allies through non-compliance with long-standing arms
control treaties. Its violation of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Treaty on Open Skies, and
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty allows Russia to
develop capabilities as well as posture them in an advantageous
manner due to our historical adherence to these treaties. The
capability imbalance created by Russia's violation of the INF
Treaty is especially concerning and presently holds much of
Europe at risk from systems banned by the Treaty, and is the
reason the Treaty will terminate on August 2 unless Russia
returns to full and verifiable compliance. Russia recklessly
ignores longstanding professional and safety practices in the
air and at sea, as demonstrated by the recent unprofessional
maneuvers of a Russian aircraft in the East Mediterranean and
the Russian destroyer Admiral Vinogradov's unsafe maneuver
within 50-100 feet of the USS Chancellorsville in the
Philippine Sea.
The most blatant example of Russia's willingness to use
aggression in the disregard of another nation's sovereignty is
in Russia's self-proclaimed near abroad. Russia invaded
Ukraine, seized Crimea, launched cyber-attacks against the
Baltic States and Ukraine, and most recently, unjustifiably
attacked, and then seized and detained Ukrainian vessels and
sailors in the Sea of Azov. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War,
Russia purported to recognize the independence of the Georgian
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and stationed troops on
sovereign Georgian territory. Russia currently occupies a fifth
of Georgian territory and maintains a significant military and
border security presence in and around Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Russia is committed to achieving its strategic objectives
in Europe without direct military conflict and through a
combination of military and non-military indirect actions
designed to exploit weaknesses and fissures in targeted
countries. These efforts seek to fracture political and
security institutions in Europe and discredit and subvert
democratic processes. The Kremlin employs a whole of society
approach through a wide array of tools to include political
provocateurs, information operations, economic intimidation,
cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies, special
operations, as well as conventional military forces.President
Putin's autocratic approach to governing has transformed
Russia's oligarchs into an independent and powerful societal
element with enormous influence. The oligarchs serve at the
pleasure of President Putin, and both gain and exercise
economic control for the state and for themselves. It is
estimated that just over a 100 individuals control a third of
Russia's wealth. These oligarchs provide the Kremlin with a
corrupt and de-stabilizing NGO-like influence both internal and
external to Russia.
Strengthen Allies and Attract New Partners
The ties that bind the Euro-Atlantic Alliance are knotted
with a shared belief in the value and importance of democratic
institutions. Our nations' leaders must be accountable to the
people that elected them into office. This includes checks and
balances between branches such as legislative oversight of the
executive branch and independent Court systems. Civilian
leadership of the military is essential to a balanced
government that will not imprudently seek armed conflict to
achieve national objectives. We also embrace diversity, not
only as the right thing to do, but as a central source of our
strength. We embody diversity among our respective nations, but
also within individual countries, having equal rights and
opportunities for all people regardless of their race, gender,
or sexual orientation. We also share a firm belief that the
need for prosperity is rooted in our economic value and market
based systems that continue to drive the global economy and
prosperity for all.
One of the most visible demonstrations of the commitment of
the United States government to Transatlantic security is the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Since 2015, the United
States Congress has authorized and appropriated nearly $17
Billion in EDI funds in response to Russia's aggression and
malign influence. EDI underwrites our nation's enhanced
deterrence and defense posture throughout the theater by
positioning the right capabilities, in key locations, in order
to respond to adversarial threats in a timely manner. EDI also
signals to our NATO Allies and partners of the United States'
commitment to Article 5 and the territorial integrity of all
NATO nations, and is a major source of sustaining Alliance
cohesion. Lastly, EDI increases the capability and readiness of
U.S. Forces, NATO Allies, and regional partners, allowing for a
faster response in the event of aggression by a regional
adversary against the sovereign territory of NATO nations.
Baltic nations have participated and specifically
benefitted from EDI funding in improvements to posture,
enhanced training, and improved infrastructure. For example,
U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) is working with the Baltic
nations to further develop infrastructure and host nation
support at airfields such as Lielvarde Air Base in Latvia and
Amari Air Base in Estonia. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps
executes engagements and participates in bilateral and
multilateral exercises with the Baltic nations to improve
tactical combined arms integration.
Following Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea and
invasion of eastern Ukraine, the United States and NATO
immediately re-focused our engagements along the Alliance's
Eastern flank, including in the Baltic region. As former
Soviet-occupied states, the Baltics share geographic proximity
as well as historic relations with Russia. Given Russia time-
distance advantages and a communicated desire to regain control
in their former buffer states, the National Defense Strategy
makes clear that the United States will continue to improve its
lethality and combat credible forward posture to bolster our
deterrence in the region.
The Baltics are a focus area for U.S. security assistance
in Europe. In FY18, USEUCOM's Building Partnership Capacity
(BPC) activities included border security initiatives,
enhancing counter-transnational threats, and Special Operations
Forces (SOF) and vertical lift capabilities. Section 333 of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Global Train and
Equip funding is particularly helpful in applying a regional
Baltic approach to security cooperation and conducting BPC
activities across multiple warfighting functions. Lastly,
USEUCOM is working a proposed $435 million Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) project to assist Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia's development of a robust command and control network.
This new critical IAMD capability will contribute to NATO
deterrent efforts and contributes to the overall combat-
credibility of our combined force posture. Our security
cooperation efforts in the Baltics are rapidly building
capability and demonstrating alliance unity.
We have shifted significant U.S. forces in the Baltic
region by adopting changes in Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE.
Previously, there was one U.S. Company on six-month rotations
in each of the Baltic nations; we now support a periodic,
exercise-based presence in the region in addition to
undertaking lead nation responsibilities for the NATO Enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP) battle group in Poland.; The U.S. eFP
Battle Group became fully operationally capable in 2017 in
Poland, while the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany act as
framework nations for eFP Battle Groups in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania respectively. The U.S. also participates in NATO
Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in the Baltics with a small
contingent of U.S. personnel assigned to each NFIU.
The Baltic region is also a major focus area for USEUCOM
and NATO exercises. AUSTERE CHALLENGE is the Command's premiere
staff training event to address the Russian Problem Set.
AUSTERE CHALLENGE 2019 validated elements of our contingency
planning and increased Service Component specific execution in
support of major combat operations. Our Northern Exercise
series is executed every even numbered year and allows
synergistic and massed deterrent effects by linking our Joint
Exercise Program, Service Component Title 10 exercises, and
NATO and partner nation exercises. Additionally, through Naval
Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), the U.S. co-
leads (with Germany) the annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS)
exercise to practice high-end warfare and amphibious landing
capability and interoperability in the Baltic Sea.
USEUCOM and NATO continue to execute operational efforts to
ensure interoperability with our Baltic Allies, demonstrate
NATO resolve, and deter Russian aggression in the Baltic
region. USEUCOM supports NATO activities in the region
reinforcing NATO Article 3 and 5 obligations such as NATO's
Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission. The USS Gridley serves as
the Flagship for the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 providing
persistent maritime presence in the Baltic and North Sea. U.S.
Army Europe (USAREUR) is conducting operations as part of their
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise in the Baltics with
CONUS-based rotational armored forces. And USAFE maintains a
persistent aviation detachment in Lask, Poland.
Cyber defense is another key focus area for USEUCOM and
NATO. The Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA advanced cyberspace operations
and identified U.S. policy in cyberspace as ``multi-
pronged,''--building response, denial, and cost-imposition
options. USEUCOM's Joint Cyber Center (JCC), in coordination
with USCYBERCOM, is building up its Integrated Planning Teams
as a central and key element in our planning and exercises.
Both the AUSTERE CHALLENGE and GLOBAL LIGHTNING exercises
integrated cyber activities in their initial phases. Our JCC is
working with Allies to refine the NATO cyberspace operations
center standard operating procedures and doctrine to
accommodate voluntary contributions of cyberspace capabilities
in support of allied operations and movements.
To mitigate Russia's time / distance advantages, USEUCOM is
working alongside our Allies and partners to enhance our
Indications and Warnings (I&W) of any potential aggression. We
are leveraging language expertise resident in European nations
and are utilizing non-traditional ISR platforms to mitigate the
global shortage of high-demand, low-density assets. We continue
to grow our intelligence and analytical capability to meet our
steady state and contingency planning requirements.
Together, we stand in solidarity with all of NATO in
support of our Baltic Allies. Spreading the costs of this
commitment is important and the four nations in this region
have already demonstrated their willingness to contribute, by
meeting their NATO burden-sharing commitment to spend 2% of GDP
on defense.
Conclusion
EDI continues to be essential to our forward deployment of
personnel and equipment as we work with our NATO Allies to
increase our responsiveness and agility along the Eastern
flank. Fielding a combat-credible force that routinely
demonstrates its capability and willingness will remain a
pillar of our deterrence mission and to ensure Europe remains
strong and free.
We remain committed to increasing our capabilities and
demonstrating our readiness in the region through exercises
such as BALTOPs; and although we already have significant
capabilities to continue to deter Russia, we also know that we
are always stronger together.
Fortunately, we are not alone in meeting these challenges.
As stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the NATO
Alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our greatest
advantages over our competitors and the United States remains
committed to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This goes
beyond augmenting U.S. forces with enablers and force
multiplying capacity. Our bonds are strengthened by a shared
commitment to collective defense, democratic principles, and
mutual respect of national sovereignty. Ultimately, the United
States is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable and we
work on daily basis to defend our shared interests and Western
democratic values.
Prepared Statement of Deputy Permanent Representative Douglas D. Jones
Chairman Hastings, Co-Chairman Wicker, distinguished
Commissioners, and Members of Congress, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the United States Mission
to NATO. This field hearing is a timely contribution to the
discussion on the future of the transatlantic relationship and
NATO's role in deterring and defending Alliance territory and
people. I commend you for your leadership in bringing this
discussion into the Baltic Sea region where our complex and
competitive relationship with Russia plays out on a daily
basis.
For more than 70 years, NATO has stood at the center of the
transatlantic relationship. It has done its two primary jobs
well: deterring conflict and preparing to win war if necessary.
The Alliance has stood the test of time and continues to be the
political and military bulwark against the most dangerous and
complex threats facing the Transatlantic region. The United
States is more secure when Europe is strong and free. For that
reason, the U.S. commitment to NATO and to the security of our
Allies is iron-clad.
I am pleased to report to you that our Alliance remains
strong and unified. The fundamentals of NATO are sound, and
NATO has responded admirably to a quickly changing security
environment. Important adaptations for the Alliance at
consecutive NATO Summits in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels have
served to realign NATO's defensive posture, capability and
planning in light of evolving threats. But much more will be
required of Allies to meet security challenges going forward,
many of which stem from Russian attempts to undermine our
Alliance and our security.
The challenge posed by Russia in the Baltic Sea region is
serious and concerning. Russia is pursuing a comprehensive
strategy aimed at undermining NATO Allies and partners through
sowing doubt in our populations by interfering in sovereign
democratic procedures, creating security dilemmas on our
borders and globally, eroding the international security
architecture with violations of long-standing treaties, all
while pursuing a robust military modernization to include
nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities. Collectively, these
steps represent an assertive and provocative Russia that is
determined to fracture our Alliance. We know that Russia seeks
to use its instruments of power to prevent NATO from performing
its collective defense responsibilities.
The Baltic Sea region is at the heart of this Russian
strategy, where the Kaliningrad Oblast has become among the
most militarized corners of the planet. Moscow's military
build-up is buttressing its anti-access/area denial
capabilities that would seek to prevent reinforcement and
military maneuver along the eastern flank of the Alliance. It
is also using Kaliningrad as a home base for nuclear-capable
Iskander missiles in the heart of the Alliance. Russian
military jets periodically engage in unsafe and unprofessional
intercepts of U.S. and Allied flights in the skies over the
Baltic Sea. In the maritime domain, we increasingly see similar
dangerous maneuvering from Russian naval vessels in the Baltic
Sea waters. Russian jamming of Allied and partner GPS signals
during last year's NATO exercise Trident Juncture was just the
latest example of how Russia's behavior puts lives at risk and
creates tremendous tension that could have severe
ramifications.
Beyond the conventional threat, Russia also uses hybrid
tactics and schemes intended to fall below the threshold of
conflict but nonetheless create effects that provide Russia
political and military advantages. We have seen Russia coerce
neighbors through the disruption of energy exports, mount
sophisticated cyber operations, and use a chemical nerve agent
in an assassination attempt on an Ally's territory. These
hybrid actions are all meant to exploit ambiguity and conceal
the instigator's role.
Russia treats the Baltic Sea region as its own backyard,
yet we must recall that six NATO countries--and two key
partners in Finland and Sweden--border the Baltic Sea. The
overall security picture in the Baltic Sea region is clearly
one in which the United States and NATO must play an important
role. And while the focus of today's discussion is the region
specifically, these trends are also playing out in the Black
Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the high North
Atlantic. It is our responsibility to connect those dots, grow
our resilience and ensure, beyond any doubt, that our defenses
are adequate.
In response to these increasing threats, NATO took concrete
steps in 2016 and 2018 to strengthen deterrence and defense in
the Baltic region. Foremost, NATO created an enhanced Forward
Presence consisting of multinational Battlegroups in Poland and
the Baltic states with contributions from across the Alliance.
These Battlegroups are a visible and capable demonstration of
NATO's foundational principle that an attack on one is an
attack on all. NATO also continued its Baltic Air Policing
mission designed to augment the air security of the region and
show that Russian intimidation against any Ally would not
succeed in peeling them away from the Alliance. NATO also
developed a new strategy for responding to hybrid threats and
established a mechanism to deploy Counter Hybrid Support Teams
to support Allies in responding to this new, amorphous threat.
NATO continues to strengthen its cyber defense, through the
establishment of a new Cyberspace Operations Center and an
Intelligence Division. By agreeing that cyber is now an
operational domain, NATO has ensured that it incorporates cyber
into all its operations. NATO has worked in building relations
and expertise in cyber and hybrid through Centers of Excellence
in Finland and Estonia. NATO also took steps to substantially
increase high-end warfighting readiness at the 2018 Brussels
Summit at which Heads of State and Government agreed to place
an additional 30 mechanized battalions, 30 kinetic air
squadrons, and 30 combatant vessels at a level of ``ready to
employ'' within 30 days. And NATO is bolstering its
relationship with key Enhanced Opportunity Partners Finland and
Sweden through exercises and capability development. Finland
and Sweden are regular participants at NATO defense and foreign
ministerials--a sign of our enduring, close and reliable
relationships. NATO is working quickly to update and modernize
our warfighting concepts and approaches with the development of
a new Joint Air Power strategy, enhancements to our maritime
posture, and a new NATO space policy which was agreed only last
week at the Defense Ministerial. NATO is also responding to
Russia's violations of international law. At the end of 2018,
NATO Allies uniformly declared that Russia is in violation of
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty because of
its development and deployment of the SSC-8 ground-launched
intermediate-range cruise missile. NATO Allies supported the
U.S. decision to suspend its obligations under and ultimately
to withdraw from the Treaty if Russia does not return to full
and verifiable compliance. Since Russia has so far given no
sign it intends to return to compliance, our military and
defense advisors have been hard at work preparing for a world
without the INF Treaty, developing options and recommendations
for how the Alliance will adjust with respect to intelligence,
capability development, planning and exercising.
The United States continues to do its part in each of these
areas, thanks in large part to the sustained support of
Congress. Our commitment to Baltic security has been
demonstrated through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
which exceeds six billion dollars in 2019. EDI is an
unmistakable signal of U.S. resolve to ensure the readiness,
responsiveness, and resilience of our forces in Europe. Most
clear is the commitment we have shown through deployments right
here in Poland with heel-to-toe rotations for the eFP
Battlegroup located in Orzysz, not far from the Suwalki Gap.
Further, the recent joint declaration of the United States and
Poland regarding the plan to increase the number of rotational
U.S. forces stationed in Poland will complement a comprehensive
and credible warfighting presence in Europe. It will also
directly enhance the readiness and capacity of an increasingly
professional and capable Polish military, accruing multiple
benefits to the Alliance and our strategic approach to Russian
aggression. I am grateful for the opportunity to be joined by
Lt. Gen. Twitty who will be able to account for all of these
military activities from his perspective at European Command.
In addition to the many adaptations I have underscored
earlier, to be an Alliance ``fit for purpose'' we must first
and foremost ensure we have the resources necessary to sustain
a credible deterrent and the requisite defense capabilities.
For the United States, your support in Congress has assured
that we will lead by example with defense investments that keep
our military prepared. But this approach is not shared by all
Allies. In fact, sustaining our Alliance military dominance
will only be possible if all Allies meet their commitments
under the Wales Defense Investment Pledge to spend 2% of their
GDP on national defense. This is the foundation and minimum
requirement we need to sustain our warfighting edge, whether it
is through capability development, readiness, or operational
deployments.
The United States continues to call on our Allies to make
the appropriate investments, or we will either not be prepared
or we will begin to operate as an unbalanced and bifurcated
Alliance. I'd echo the sentiments of former U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates who openly expressed concerns about a
two-tier Alliance, one tier made up of those Allies willing and
able to pay the price and bear the burdens of Alliance
commitments, and another tier of Allies who enjoy the benefits
of NATO membership--be they security guarantees or headquarters
billets--but do not share the risks and the costs. Continued
underinvestment in defense by some Allies will not be durable
in the modern security environment and it will only serve to
increase the precarious situation we find in the Baltic Sea
region.
Mr. Chairman, I will finish where I started. This year we
celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Alliance in Washington,
D.C. That was a tremendous milestone. But it was not the only
anniversary. Allies also celebrated the 20th anniversary of
NATO's enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic in 1999. The vision and wisdom that led to that
decision, and thus the entire reason we are able to convene
here in Gdansk today, must continue to guide us with new
pressures mounting. We are making progress, but so much more
remains to be done. The state of the Alliance is strong, but we
must continue to adapt to ensure our collective security for
the next 70 years.
Prepared Statement of Minister Raimundus Karoblis
Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am highly honored to speak in front of such a
distinguished US Congress delegation.
Thank you very much for travelling all the way from the
United States; and for your keen interest in the security
situation of the Baltic region.
The city of Gdansk is a very appropriate place to conduct
field hearings on the Baltic security. We are just 50 miles
away from Kaliningrad, one of Russia's Anti-Access/Aria-Denial
(A2/AD) fortresses. The missiles that are based in Kaliningrad
(and there are many, including the nuclear-capable Iskander)
are targeting NATO forces in Europe,--their ability to
reinforce the Baltics in particular.
Russia's intermediate-range missiles (SSC-8), which have
been deployed in violation of the INF Treaty, also seek to
undermine NATO's ability to move forces in Europe and to
conduct collective defense. This is a matter of grave concern
to the countries located in Russia's neighborhood.
For many reasons--geographic, historic, societal--the
Baltic region is bound to remain the most vulnerable part of
the Alliance. It will therefore require special attention of
NATO military planners.
Year after year, we observe Russia exercising operations
against NATO in the Baltics. The focus of these exercises is
the Suwalki corridor--a narrow strip of land between Lithuania
and Poland. It is critical for the defense of this region.
In case of conflict, Polish and Lithuanian forces will have
a special role--to keep this corridor open for Allied
reinforcements. To succeed, we need credible NATO military
plans, regular exercises as well as full engagement of the
United States with its unique military capabilities.
Taking the opportunity, I would like to thank the US
Congress for your resolute support to NATO and to the Trans-
Atlantic link, which is at the core of our security. We should
not allow other policy issues and disagreements--be it on
trade, climate or Middle East--damage the defense relations
between Europe and the United States.
I would also like to thank the US Congress for the
assistance that your country provides to the Lithuanian Armed
Forces.
With US support we were able to accelerate our capability-
development programs in line with NATO priorities; expand
military infrastructure (which is also used by NATO Allies); as
well as to increase our large-caliber ammunition stockpiles.
This is a mutually beneficial cooperation. Since 2014, the
United States has invested nearly $80 million to support the
Lithuanian Armed Forces. In the same period, Lithuania has
committed more than $200 million in national funds to purchase
US defense articles. This figure is likely to grow as new major
projects are currently under consideration.
Mr. Chairman, esteemed members of the Congress, I am proud
that Lithuania, together with our Baltic neighbors and Poland,
are among those Allies who already spend 2 percent (or more) of
the GDP on defense. This shows our serious approach to national
security as well as to our NATO commitments.
We are determined to act as security providers and to show
solidarity with our Allies. Lithuania has deployed forces to
all key operational theaters, including Afghanistan, Iraq,
Mali, and Ukraine. Our troops have served side-by-side with
American soldiers for many years now; and the cooperation
between the US and Lithuanian Special Operations Forces is
truly legendary.
At present, we are working with the US SOF Command Europe
on a new, very interesting project to improve situational
awareness and intelligence sharing in the Baltic region.
I would also like to highlight our very close and
productive cooperation with the Pennsylvania National Guard.
This partnership is already more than 25 years old and is of
great value to our countries.
We are also grateful to the US for leading the process of
NATO adaptation to the new security realities. There is
substantial progress in a number of areas, including overall
defense spending within the Alliance.
NATO Command Structure and plans will be adjusted to meet
the requirements of Article-5 situations. In this regard, we
welcome the reestablishment of the US Second Fleet, which has
just completed its first major exercise in the Baltics.
The Alliance also works to improve the readiness of NATO
forces and to facilitate military movement across Europe. These
key strands of work is the enduring legacy of the former US
Defense Secretary James Mattis.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight two
areas, which, in our view, will require special attention over
the coming months:
One relates to the recently announced deployment of
additional US forces to Poland, which we sincerely welcome.
Presence of US troops significantly changes the risk
calculus in the Kremlin, making military challenge to NATO
considerably less likely. We hope therefore that these
additional US forces will be used to maximize their deterrence
value for the entire Baltic region.
The second issue is Air Defense. This is a critical
capability gap in the Baltics, which we urgently need to
address through our national and NATO efforts.
The new SACEUR, Gen. Tod Wolters, is fully aware of the
situation and we look forward to working closely with his staff
at SHAPE and US European Command to address this critical
shortfall.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you once again for giving me the
opportunity to address this distinguished group of US
Congressmen; and I very much look forward to our follow-on
discussions.
Prepared Statement of Permanent Secretary Kristjan Prikk
Chairman, distinguished commissioners, let me first thank
you for this very positive initiative to hold this field
hearing in Europe, to hold it in this distinguished city of
Gdansk, and inviting also Estonia to present our views.
NATO's posture in the Baltic region has grown much stronger
since 2014. We now have permanently based NATO Battlegroups in
all Baltic states, an enhanced NATO air policing presence, and
more Allied maritime visits to our ports. We see an increased
number of NATO and Allied live exercises in the region.
The recently announced additional presence of a larger
contingent of American troops in Poland further strengthens
NATO's posture regionally. It is important that those troops
also have a footprint in the Baltics. This would significantly
add credibility to NATO's deterrence in the Baltic states.
This would significantly add credibility to NATO's
deterrence in the Baltic states. However, we all need to
understand that the current NATO presence is and was never
designed to be militarily a match to what Russia has in
Kaliningrad and the western military district and the
capabilities that they can mobilize very quickly, as we have
seen during the latest large-scale exercises.
The current NATO presence is primarily political, and
intended to show that NATO and its members would be involved in
any conflict with Russia from day one.
This critical, but nevertheless limited presence, is
intended to be complemented by a very quick reinforcement by
NATO in case of a crisis. The problem is that the bulk of NATO
forces is still far away, and our ability to deploy forces
quickly and sustain them has important limitations.
Issues such as the readiness and mobility of our forces,
the preparation required by means of detailed advance plans,
live exercises and swift decision-making need further work.
Today Russia plans and exercises in this region exactly as they
fight, and we do not. After all these years in NATO we have yet
to tackle the issue of whether we are really able to treat
Russia as a potential aggressor.
NATO has discussed the need to improve its ability to
defend against air threats and strengthen its maritime posture
for years. Despite some steps in the right direction, we are
still not very far along.
In particular, NATO has assessed time and again that the
Russian air and missile defence and precision strike
capabilities would mean a considerable challenge to NATO's
lines of communications and reinforcement. The new SSC-8
capability that is in breach of the INF Treaty will add another
capability into the Russian hands to attack critical targets in
the whole of European theatre. All this affects NATO's ability
to guarantee the security of this region.
NATO's posture in itself is an empty shell without real
solidarity between Allies. And while we are strengthening
collective defence in practice, we must not forget that
communication is a critical part of deterrence.
This concerns every Ally, but in particular the American
commitment to the Alliance, and it's willingness to go to war
for maintaining Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, it is of
utmost importance that we--we all, Europeans and North
Americans alike--use any opportunity to clearly send the
message of unwavering commitment and solidarity to each other.
We collectively have benefitted so much from the alliance. We,
individually and collectively, have so much to lose from being
alone.
Thank you for listening!
Prepared Statement of State Secretary Jan-Olof Lind
The military-strategic situation in our region has
deteriorated. The region has become less secure. Let me start
by highlighting the main reason for this.
Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine, have shown that
Russia is prepared to use military force to change established
borders in Europe. The illegal annexation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine is the greatest challenge to the
European security order since it was established 25 years ago.
Russia is using a broad variety and combinations of methods
and actions to achieve its objectives. This is often referred
to as hybrid threats. The Russian aggression in Ukraine is one
example of Russia's intention to coordinate relevant
instruments of state power with the use of proxy fighters to
achieve political goals.
In parallel, Russia has showed a more challenging behaviour
in the Baltic Sea Region, including disrespect of its
neighbours' territorial integrity as well as provocative and
unprofessional behaviour in the air and on the sea. Because of
Russian interests in the region, and as it is one of the
busiest shipping-areas in the world, the significance of the
Baltic Sea Region to European security has increased. Freedom
of navigation and secure Sea Lines of Communications are
essential, not only for the countries in the region but also
for other nations.
Let me be clear, Russian activities are not only a
challenge to the countries in its close vicinity, they are a
challenge to the right of every country to make their own
policy choices. This is a cornerstone in the rules-based world
order and the European security order. Therefore, Russian
actions are a concern to us all and make our response all the
more important.
The complexity and scale of the challenges at hand means
that no state can face them alone. Together we need to use the
entire range of security policy instruments; enhanced national
defence capability, international cooperation and dialogue and
confidence-building measures.
Challenges to European security must be met together, but
on the national level, every country must take their share of
the responsibility.
This is why Sweden is pursuing a defence policy with two
reinforcing pillars. We are strengthening our national military
capability. The Swedish total defence concept is developed in
order to meet an armed attack against Sweden, including acts of
war on Swedish territory. This is part of our work to counter
hybrid threats and includes improving our psychological
defence.
We are also deepening our security and defence cooperation.
Sweden gives priority to the cooperation with our Nordic
neighbours, with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with Poland and
Germany as well as the United Kingdom and the USA. We are also
focusing our efforts with and within multilateral
organisations, the EU and NATO. Regional cooperation like the
Nordic defence cooperation and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary
are important to complement the security network in Northern
Europe.
A strong transatlantic link is important for both European
and American security. US and NATO presence is necessary for
the stability in the Baltic Sea Region.
Therefore, we welcome NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence and
the increased US presence in Europe through the European
Deterrence Initiative. The EDI has been instrumental for
exercises and other joint activities. Exercises in the Baltic
Sea region signals shared responsibility for the security.
Maritime exercises like BALTOPS and BALTIC PROTECTOR enhances
our interoperability and strengthen our common maritime
capability.
Sweden will continue to be an active partner to NATO and
our status as Enhanced Opportunities Partner is key in this
regard. This relationship is crucial to develop our
interoperability and capabilities.
Political dialogue on common security challenges and how to
counter them, in particular in the Baltic Sea region, is
essential in our cooperation with NATO. We see northern Europe
as one strategic area. A crisis in this region would affect all
of us and we must be prepared to respond to it together. This
calls for close dialogue and cooperation.
Arms control as well as confidence and security building
measures are essential parts of the European security order.
Sweden strongly supports continued and complete implementation
of the Vienna Document and Open Skies instruments.
The challenges we are facing point to long term
destabilization. Europe has a key role in meeting the global
challenges and threats. Our response must be guided by
democratic principles and values. It needs to be firm, clear
and long-term. And it needs to build upon European and
transatlantic unity. Together we must show that we stand up for
international law and the European security order.
Prepared Statement of Director-General Janne Kuusela
Response by the United States and NATO to Russian
annexation of Crimea have been well balanced and tailored to
meet the needs of Allies and Partners. European Reassurance
Initiative--now known as European Deterrence Initiative--
together with the NATO's measures to enhance its defense and
deterrence, including the deployment of troops to Baltic States
and Poland, have been very positive. They all have increased
security and stability of the Baltic Sea region. The US
commitment to European security promotes multinational
cooperation amongst Europeans as well.
Finland is not a member of NATO, and there are no US or
NATO troops in Finland. Yet, we share the same security
environment with the Alliance and benefit from the security and
stability your presence has created. In addition, bigger
footprint by the US and NATO have created more training and
exercise opportunities for the Finnish Defense Forces.
Defense cooperation has enhanced the lethality of our
capabilities and our interoperability with the most important
countries in the regional security architecture. The Finnish
defense has never before been as a capable and as interoperable
as it is today. We believe that strong Finnish defense
contributes also to regional security and benefits our
Partners.
After the Cold War ended, many European countries
transformed their armed forces and focused attention to crisis
management and counterinsurgency operations. With 1300
kilometres of land border with Russia, Finland never did that
change. The defense of our own territory has always been the
main task of Finnish Defense Forces and the main driver for
capability development, and we have kept investing into it.
These investments will continue also in the future. Replacement
of Air Force's F/A-18 Hornet fleet and procurement of new
corvette-sized ships for Navy will increase our defence
spending above 2 % of the GDP in early 2020s.
In addition to defense material procurement, we have also
invested a lot of time and effort to modernize our legislation.
In fact, during the last four years our Parliament passed
largest defence-related package of legislation since the Second
World War. The new legislation improves our readiness and
surveillance of territorial integrity; allows us to provide and
receive international military assistance during crises; and
helps us to deal with foreign ownership of land areas and real
estate. Perhaps the most important legislative issue was the
new law on intelligence, which required amending the
Constitution.
Today however, no one can rely on national action alone.
For us, cooperation with our partners is a necessity. Defence
cooperation is the most effective way to build capabilities and
ensure interoperability. Acquisition of modern capabilities
will also enhance deepening and widening of defense
cooperation. This has been our observation ever since we bought
the F/A-18 Hornets from the US. This brings me to my third
point: the security architecture of the Baltic Sea region.
In the current security environment, it is important that
we can deepen our cooperation further if needed. In the case of
Finland, this cooperation is not based on treaty obligations,
but on strong common interests. Finnish defense benefits our
Partners, and actions by the US and NATO benefit Finland.
In the past years, Finland has been significantly deepening
the defense cooperation with NATO and with those countries that
have a role in the security architecture of the Baltic Sea
region. Participation in NATO led operations as well as
training and exercising together are key elements for us.
Peacetime cooperation lays the foundation for what we can
do in times of crisis. That is why also information sharing,
consultation and deconflicting is necessary.
I believe this is in line with the US National Defense
Strategy as well: network of alliances and partnerships
supports your goal to create a favourable regional balance of
power in Europe.
Arms control, tackling hybrid threats and Finnish EU
Presidency are also issues that are relevant issues in the
context of this Commission hearing.
Finland believes that there is a need to preserve and
further advance the general arms control and disarmament
processes. We call for further progress on all aspects of
disarmament in order to enhance global security. Multisectoral
and concrete cooperation in combating these challenges in arms
control and nonproliferation is needed. Transparency,
confidence and security building measures, and risk reduction
are key elements to this end. Of course, also the United
States-Russia dialogue on arms control is of key importance to
global, European and Finland's security.
The post-INF situation presents a challenge to all of
Europe, NATO allies and partners alike, and unity in dealing
with the situation is essential. Information sharing is crucial
in ensuring that our message remains united. In terms on
responses, we support dual track approach: reinforcing defence
and deterrence in Europe, while at the same time remaining
committed to effective international arms control and open to
constructive dialogue with Russia.
When it comes to building resilience against hybrid
threats, we rely on the Finnish model of Comprehensive
Security, which we have been developing since the Second World
War. A key role is played by the Security Committee, which
assists the Government and different sectoral Ministries on
issues dealing with comprehensive security. We are confident
with our national model, which is one reason why Finland made
the initiative to establish the European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki. We hope the Centre
will help all its Members, together with EU and NATO, build
understanding and resilience against hybrid threats.
Yesterday Finland took over the rotating Presidency of the
Council of the EU. In this role, we will do our best to take
forward the EU defense agenda in support of High Representative
Mogherini. This is a time of transition in the EU, as the old
guard is leaving and new leadership is arriving. In the field
of defense, the new initiatives are mostly in place, and the
focus is now on implementation.
However, it is also time to look ahead. Only a truly
capable Europe can be an effective and reliable partner. That
is why Finland wants to focus our work for example on
digitalization and artificial intelligence in the field of
defence. We will also highlight the need to improve European
capacities to detect and understand hybrid activities. In
addition, we will do our best to promote EU-NATO cooperation,
as well as EU-US dialogue and cooperation.
To conclude with, I would like to underline that the
transatlantic relationship will continue to define European
security in the future as well. The commitment of the United
States to NATO and its military presence in Europe continue to
be essential to Baltic Sea regional security. Cooperating with
the United States, both bilaterally and within the framework of
NATO, is important for Finland's national defence.
[all]
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