[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
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JUNE 12, 2019
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE SENATE
ALCEE L.HASTINGS, Florida ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MARC VEASEY, Texas SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[II]
RUSSIA'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
COUNTERTERRORISM
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June 12, 2019
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Cory Gardner, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 3
Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 9
Hon. Brian Fitzpatrick, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 16
WITNESSES
Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Professor of Strategy at the United
States National War College, National Defense University....... 3
Rachel Denber, Deputy Director, Europe and Central Asia Division,
Human Rights Watch............................................. 5
Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for
Diplomacy and Global Engagement................................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Hon. Richard Hudson........................ 26
Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin.................... 28
Prepared statement of Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva................... 30
Prepared statement of Rachel Denber.............................. 39
Prepared statement of Dr. Michael Carpenter...................... 49
RUSSIA'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM
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June 12, 2019
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The hearing was held at 10:30 a.m. in Room 2255, Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Richard Hudson,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Cory
Gardner, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe; Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Brian Fitzpatrick,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Professor of
Strategy at the United States National War College, National
Defense University; Rachel Denber, Deputy Director, Europe and
Central Asia Division, Human Rights Watch; and Dr. Michael
Carpenter, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and
Global Engagement.
HON. RICHARD HUDSON, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hudson. Okay. On behalf of Chairman Alcee Hastings and
Co-Chairman Roger Wicker, I'd like to call this hearing of the
U.S. Helsinki Commission to order. [Sounds gavel.] Let me thank
our distinguished panel who have all agreed to join us to offer
their expertise and help inform our work. I want to introduce
them in a moment, but before I do, I'll offer a few of my
thoughts on this topic.
We convene this hearing to examine the Kremlin's
counterterrorism policies and practices. We want to better
understand what those practices are, how they developed over
time, whether they're effective, and to what extent they
dovetail, or not, with U.S. interests. I want to offer a couple
of illustrations of why it is so important that we maintain a
clear sense of what Russian counterterrorism practices do and
do not offer. The first reason is that Russia seeks to claim
the mantle of leadership on this issue internationally.
I'd like to quote the worldwide threat assessment of the
U.S. intelligence community provided to Congress on January
29th of this year. That document includes the following
passage: China and Russia are expanding cooperation with each
other and through international bodies to shape global rules
and standards to their benefit and present a counterweight to
the United States and other Western countries. Russia is
working to consolidate the U.N.'s counterterrorism structures
under the U.N. undersecretary general for counterterrorism, who
is a Russian. Both countries probably will use the U.N. as a
platform to emphasize sovereignty narratives that reflect their
interest and redirect discussions away from human rights,
democracy, and good governance.
And so I would ask the panelists, should we be comfortable
with Russian leadership in this area? Does the Kremlin have so-
called best practices that they can share?
Second reason we should care about Russia's
counterterrorism practices is that Russia's actions in this
space have impact far beyond Russia's borders. As regional
experts recently said at a Helsinki Commission briefing,
Russia's significant influence in Central Asia can be deeply
problematic, through cooperation on repressive measures between
security services or by the propagation of disinformation. In
addition, as one panelist put it, Russia--this is quote--``is a
particularly nefarious influence within the sphere of religious
affairs across the region,'' end quote, by painting peaceful
religious groups with the label of, quote/unquote,
``extremism,'' and repressing them ruthlessly, potentially
furthering radicalization in the process.
I'm grateful to the panelists who are with us today, and
I'd like to introduce them now. We'll first hear from Dr.
Mariya Omelicheva--is that correct?--professor of strategy at
the United States National War College at the National Defense
University. Dr. Omelicheva received her Ph.D. from Purdue
University, and also holds a J.D. in international law from
Moscow National Law Academy. She is the author of numerous
well-received research articles and volumes related to our
history today.
Next we'll hear from Rachel Denber, deputy director of the
Europe and Central Asia Division at Human Rights Watch. Ms.
Denber previously directed the Human Rights Watch's Moscow
office and has authored reports on a wide range of human rights
issues throughout the region. Thank you for being with us in
Washington for this hearing.
Finally we'll hear from Dr. Michael Carpenter, senior
director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global
Engagement. Dr. Carpenter has worked these issues as a senior
official in the prior administration, as former U.S. deputy
assistant secretary of defense for Russia, and as a former
National Security Council director for Russia. This is not Dr.
Carpenter's first appearance before a Helsinki Commission, and
I suspect given the quality of his contributions, this will not
be the last time we call on his expertise.
So thank you all for being here.
And finally, I would like to thank Chairman Hastings for
allowing me the opportunity to convene this hearing on behalf
of the commission. As a member of the United States Helsinki
Commission, I focus my engagement in a number of areas,
including combating religious persecution and anti-Semitism,
preventing human trafficking, and promoting economic
cooperation and free speech. As part of my role as a Helsinki
Commissioner, I'm regularly called upon to represent the United
States at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which facilitates
inter-Parliamentary dialog among the 57 participating States.
This assembly is a valuable forum where my congressional
colleagues and our counterparts from countries ranging from
Canada to Russia get together to have frank discussions about
the issues of the day. And we try to find common solutions that
benefit all of our citizens.
In recent years I've been really pleased to see this
assembly paying increased attention to the issue of tackling
terrorism. In July 2017, the assembly created the ad hoc
Committee on Counterterrorism. As vice chair of that committee,
I'm in regular dialog with colleagues, including from Russia,
on the very questions we'll be examining today. So I'm
particularly grateful for the information that we'll receive
from our panelists.
Now, I see my colleague, Senator Cory Gardner from the
great State of Colorado, has joined us. Would you be interested
in giving an opening statement?
HON. CORY GARDNER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, for the chance to
be here to share with the witnesses this conversation and the
important work that the Helsinki Commission continues to do.
I've introduced legislation, a number of bills, to increase
pressure on Russia, responses, considerations that we have
made, and how they respond to terrorism within Russia without
the region. So I look forward very much to this hearing. And I
thank Chairman Hastings as well, and appreciate the witnesses'
time, testimony, and commitment to this issue.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Senator. We appreciate you being
here, making the trek all the way across.
So at this point we'd love to hear from our panelists. Dr.
Omelicheva, you have the floor.
DR. MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA, PROFESSOR OF STRATEGY AT THE UNITED
STATES NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Omelicheva. Okay. Thank you so much for your kind
introduction and, of course, inviting me to testify here,
Congressman Hudson. You already know that in the past 20 years
or so fighting terrorism has become the top priority for the
Russian Government. And it is understandably so because over
those two decades the Russian authorities have been fighting
Islamist insurgency and terrorism, mostly originating from the
tumultuous North Caucasus--Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and
a number of other subjects of the Russian Federation. And since
recently, the Russian Government has been grappling with the
threats posed by international jihadist groups as well.
I do want to acknowledge the sheer complexity and magnitude
of the challenges that Moscow faces. But I also contend that,
overall, Russia's counterterrorism policy, as you already
mentioned in your introductory comments, has been both
deficient and counterproductive. And I believe that two trends
in particular have contributed to these deficiencies.
One trend has to do with the fact that Russia has always
emphasized punitive counterterrorism measures at the expense of
kind of broader preventive socioeconomic approaches targeting
the root causes of violent radicalization and terrorism.
Whether domestically in North Caucasus, or regionally in
Central Asia, or internationally in Syria or elsewhere, Russia
has used kind of that approach that was singularly focused on
the use of military force or security services operations. And
those have been counterproductive.
In North Caucasus, for example, the brutality of those
measures transformed what used to be localized struggle into
the region-wide religious war. In Central Asia, as another
example, the singular focus on military responses to
counterterrorism also diverted attention of these governments
from the root causes of terrorism. And I'm pretty sure my
colleague, Dr. Carpenter, will talk today about Russia's
efforts--counterterrorism efforts in Syria, where Russia's
backing for the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad and its
indiscriminate airstrikes have also contributed to the
radicalization of the Syrian population.
And the second trend that I would like to emphasize in my
testimony that also, in my view, explains deficiencies and
counter-productiveness of Russia's counterterrorism policy has
to do with the fact that the Kremlin instrumentalized
counterterrorism, meaning that it has deployed counterterrorism
as a tactic for accomplishing a variety of auxiliary benefits
expedient to the government--usually geopolitical purposes
which have been at counter-purpose with the very intent of
counterterrorism.
So, for example, domestically, Vladimir Putin has used, you
know, fear of terrorism and its ability to restore order and
bring stability to Russia as sort of a part of his legitimacy
narrative. In Central Asia, Russia has used the banner of
counterterrorism to reassert its influence in that region. And
of course, internationally, Russia's high-profile
counterterrorism efforts have helped Moscow to establish itself
as a much more prominent global player, which has lacked the
resources, the assets to play such a role. And it has also used
this opportunity to counteract the United States' efforts
worldwide.
So Russia has used United Nations platforms, including the
newly created U.N. Counterterrorism Office, to shape global
counterterrorism agenda. And there are risks associated with
that, including these kinds of efforts may compel the United
Nations to take a much tougher line on fighting terrorism while
downplaying human rights protections. These efforts can also
divert global efforts from measures aiming at countering
violent extremisms [CVE] and eroding internet freedoms, because
for Russia CVE erodes the very essence of counterterrorism.
Russia is fearful of engaging with civil society groups, which
are believed to be the harbingers of Western influence. So it
is really focusing on kind of this harder counterterrorism
responses domestically and worldwide.
So the two primary conclusions that follow from my recent
testimony is that Russia's counterterrorism policy raises many
concerns about its viability as a partner in counterterrorism.
Russia's political goals and associated measures unrelated to
the fight against terrorism have complicated the overall
efforts to fight terrorism worldwide. And let me say just a
couple of words about what I see the United States can do in
these circumstances.
I think the United States can do more, either directly or
through regional and global institutions like OSCE and United
Nations. So it should continue supporting these global and
regional institutions, promoting CVE measures, and work with
the United Nations Counterterrorism Office directly or through
the OSCE. And this engagement should seek building synergies
between the OSCE and U.N. Counterterrorism Office, with the
goal of promoting rule of law compliance responses to terrorism
and CVE, while engaging civil society and protecting individual
freedoms.
I also think that United States should continue providing
counterterrorism assistance to the many countries where Russia
remains to be involved, but couple this assistance with
increased funding for CVE and civil society building.
So I'll stop here.
Mr. Hudson. Ms. Denber, if you would.
MS. RACHEL DENBER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Denber. Thank you, Chairman Hudson. Thank you for
inviting me to give testimony today. And let me express Human
Rights Watch's great appreciation for the Helsinki Commission,
which is a beacon of hope for many people in our region, and a
great ally of human rights causes.
So my remarks today focus on Russia's counterextremism and
counterterrorism policies and practices. My written testimony
provides a lot of detail about Russian laws, their evolutions,
both the counterterrorism/counterextremism law itself, the
criminal code, administrative code. And I also provide some
examples of how these laws have been selectively to persecute
people who are inconvenient to the Kremlin, to persecute people
who are inconvenient to local authorities, and to persecute
particular groups.
So I will only summarize that here. I think, though, I
would also like to point out that these laws and practices are
deeply problematic. The laws themselves are quite--they're
vague, they're overly broad, their definitions are overly
broad. But I also want to emphasize that it's really important
to note that, similar to what Dr. Omelicheva noted, that
Russian authorities have also used these laws for legitimate
purposes. So there is and has been a problem with extremist
violence in Russia, hate violence in Russia. And the Russian
Government has used these laws to contend with racist violence,
anti-migrant violence, far right-wing hate violence. So I think
it's important to keep that in mind.
I think an important question is to ask why it is that the
Russian authorities have adopted and selectively enforced these
really vague and elastic anti-extremism norms? And I think that
there's several answers. But I think maybe it's best to leave
that to my written testimony. You can scroll through that. I
think that the main impact of the restrictive laws and their
selective enforcement is that many Russians now are
increasingly unsure about what the threshold is of acceptable
speech. And at the same time, are increasingly anxious about
the consequences of speaking up--speaking out, especially on
online and mobile applications.
Let me just move right now to what the problem is with
Russia's counterextremism laws and practices. And I also
strongly recommend the commission to become familiar with the
work of the SOVA Center in Russia. It's a think tank that
focuses on these issues. And they're very good.
So the main problem with Russia's counterextremism--
approach to counterextremism/counterterrorism, is that the
definitions are quite broad. The law bans any public calls for
promoting--for extremism, or extremist violence. It involves a
whole range of acts, you know, ranging from violent overthrow
of the government, committing terrorist violence, insulting the
national dignity of others, or promoting the superiority of a
particular race. It includes extremist--concepts like extremist
materials, extremist organizations, banned extremist
organizations, banned public communications, mass distribution,
things like that.
So you have the basic law, that has become more harsh over
the years, and you also have the criminal code which
criminalizes these actions. Just to pick up on what Dr.
Omelicheva pointed out, it's--this is a very punitive approach.
The criminal code has become harsher with regard to these laws.
So that now, for example, if you are declared a member of the
Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, or a leader of that
organization--which is not a terrorist organization--it can get
you a 20-year sentence, for just membership or affiliation, not
for anything else. Not for any violent act.
The counterterrorism/counterextremism laws are used as a
tool not only to legitimately address extremist violence, but
also to crack down on inconvenient people. It's one of many
tools that the Kremlin can use. And in recent years, since
2012, since President Putin returned to the Kremlin, and then
especially since the invasion--since the events in eastern
Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea--it has used these laws to
crack down on dissent about Russia's actions in eastern
Ukraine.
These laws also do things like--you know, the newer laws do
things like--under the rubric of anti-extremism and
counterterrorism--do things like increase--penalize--or,
criminal insulting Russia's military honor, criminalize certain
discussions about World War II, under the rubric of
justification of Nazism. They do things like require internet
companies to store data on Russian citizens in Russian--on
Russian services, in Russian territory. So they're really
trying to get control over the internet in the name of fighting
extremism. And there's been a whole flurry of laws in this
regard. In the years since the law was adopted, there's only
been one kind of softening of the counterextremism law, and you
can read about that in my written testimony.
So a couple of examples of, I think, the really more really
concerning examples of how these laws are abused--I think you
mentioned that one of your main interests is religious freedom
and how do these laws interact with religious freedom. Well, as
you--I'm sure the commission is aware, because you've spoken
out on it a number of times--it was as an extremist
organization that the Jehovah's Witness organization was banned
in Russia. It was banned as an extremist organization by the
Supreme Court in 2017.
And that is not an idle definition. It's not one of those
things that, oh, well, they adopted it, the Supreme Court made
that decision, and no one pays attention to it. A lot of people
are paying a lot of attention to it. Right now there are 200
people who are Jehovah's Witnesses who are facing criminal
prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist
organization. Thirty-five of them are in jail awaiting trial.
One has already been convicted and is currently serving a 6-
year prison sentence. So this is not a--this is not an idle
definition.
I think the other thing--the other thing--the other really
key way that these laws have been used against inconvenient--
or, you know, to silence criticism, has been the way they've
been used in Crimea against Crimean Tatars. Our organization
has documented how 49 people right now are facing criminal
charges, and some have been convicted, again, for membership in
this organization called Hizb ut-Tahrir. It's not an
organization I would endorse--what it promotes is something
that's anathema to human rights ideals. But it is not a
terrorist organization. And yet, these men--these 49 people are
facing very big prison sentences, because--and are targeted
especially because the Kremlin, I think, would like to tarnish,
to demonize people in Crimea who oppose--like Crimean Tatars--
who oppose Russia's occupation of Crimea. To tarnish them as
terrorists. It also uses the label of extremist and terrorist
to marginalize and demonize other people who oppose the
occupation as well.
And there are just two more examples, if I have more time.
Two more examples of how these laws have been used
illegitimately. I would ask you to think about the case of
Svetlana Prokopyeva, who is a journalist from Pskov who did a
radio discussion about an act of terrorism that took place in a
Russian city. And she was also, you know, talking about
Russia's abuse of counterterrorism policies. And the
authorities are using that discussion to justify--to ground
charges against her for justifying terrorism. And she faces a
7-year prison sentence. So it's a very convenient tool for
local officials to try to silence and intimidate inconvenient
voices.
There are many other examples in my written testimony. I
think if I would leave you with one thought, it would be--a
couple of thoughts, actually. These laws, they do migrate to
other to Central Asian countries in the OSCE region. I would
love to talk more about that in question and answer. I think
it's also a two-way migration. I think that if you look at the
history of it, I think some of the harshest practices that
we've seen since the breakup of the Soviet Union was
Uzbekistan's approach to counterterrorism and counterextremism
in the late 1990s. I think these countries take the Russian
template law on extremism and apply, in fact, much more
harshly--or, very harshly.
If there's one recommendation I would have, it would be
that for U.S. policymakers to be aware of Russia's overly broad
definition of extremism and the abuses that stem from this--
from their enforcement, and the ripple effect that these laws
have in the region. And I think that any potential
collaboration the U.S. enters into on counterextremism and
counterterrorism should not replicate or unwittingly support or
promote the abusive aspects of these laws and practices.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter, you have the floor.
DR. MICHAEL CARPENTER, SENIOR DIRECTOR, PENN BIDEN CENTER FOR
DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT
Dr. Carpenter. Chairman Hudson, Congressman Aderholt, thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today on Russia's
approach to counterterrorism and its implications for U.S.
national security.
Every so often, there are politicians or policymakers who
call on the United States to cooperate more closely with Russia
to fight terrorism. On the surface, it may not even sound far-
fetched for two big powers, both afflicted by the threat of
terrorism, to cooperate more closely on a common threat, even
when they disagree on other matters. But active cooperation
with Russia--and by active cooperation I mean any sort of joint
operations or sensitive intelligence sharing--would run
contrary to both our values and our national security
interests. Let me explain why.
The first reason is that Russia's chief geopolitical
objectives are to weaken the United States, fragment the
transatlantic community, and delegitimize international norms
of human rights. Given the opportunity, the Kremlin will
undermine the United States and the NATO alliance. Russia's
leadership does not think in win-win terms, even when we do.
Consider Russia's intervention in Syria. Though Russia claimed
to be fighting ISIS, its real goal was to prop up the Assad
regime and diminish U.S. influence in the region by
strengthening its own role and that of its key partners on the
ground--Hezbollah and Iran.
To position itself as the key power broker and
indispensable nation for solving the conflict, Russia benefits
from uncontrolled migration and the flow of extremists into
Europe. This may seem highly cynical, but Russia has no
interest in any sort of political transition to stabilize
Syria. Moscow will be happy, of course, to host dozens of
international conferences, and will periodically suggest that a
solution is within reach. But at the end of the day, its
interests are best served when Iran, Hezbollah and Assad are in
power to make mischief in the region, because that's when
Russia's influence with the Europeans, with Israel, and the
Gulf States is at its peak.
Second, let's consider Russia's actual CT strategy. This
strategy, as Dr. Omelicheva has just mentioned, is almost
entirely based on physically liquidating extremists. Russian
authorities do not try to win hearts and minds or engage in
efforts at deradicalization or social reintegration. Russian
security forces in the North Caucasus frequently apply the
principle of collective retribution--often imprisoning,
threatening, and sometimes even killing relatives of suspected
militants. While sometimes effective at the tactical level,
strategically this approach only engenders a perpetual cycle of
radicalization.
Russian counterterrorism operations also pay little regard
to civilian or, quote/unquote, ``collateral'' casualties. The
botched raids of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow or the tragic
attempt to free hostages in Beslan demonstrate a shocking
disregard for human life. Even worse, as my colleague Rachel
Denber has noted, Russian authorities often use the pretext of
fighting extremism to crackdown on dissidents. For example, a
single mother was recently imprisoned on extremism charges
because she had posted comments critical of Russia's annexation
of Crimea on her social media feed.
Third, Russia sponsors terrorist acts in foreign countries.
In Ukraine, Russia's intelligence services have carried out car
bombings in government-controlled territory to assassinate
Ukrainian military intelligence officers. One such bombing took
place in downtown Kyiv on a crowded street. The Ukrainian
Security Service, or SBU, has also accused Russia of bombing
cafes and other public venues in Odessa, Kharkiv, and Kherson.
And of course, we must not forget that Russia provided the
missiles, the launcher, the software, the training, and likely
the triggerman to shoot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17,
killing all 298 people on board. I don't see how one can
characterize these actions as anything other than state-
sponsored terrorism.
In Afghanistan, Russia has provided weapons and night
vision equipment to the Taliban to undermine U.S. and NATO
interests. In Europe, Russia has supported neo-Nazi hate groups
in Hungary, and financially supported violent protests in
Greece and North Macedonia. In the United States, as has been
revealed in the media, Russia has spread false conspiracy
theories to radicalize Americans against their immigrant
neighbors and coworkers. And in the United Kingdom, Russian
intelligence officers brazenly tried to poison a former Russian
spy using a large dose of a deadly chemical toxin.
To conclude, Russia's actions to undermine the United
States and its allies, and its direct sponsorship and
cooperation with groups that conduct terror, should preclude
any active efforts at counterterrorism cooperation.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you all for that testimony.
And before I ask my questions, I'm going to call on my
colleague from Alabama, Mr. Aderholt, for any questions you
might have.
HON. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you. It's good to be here. Sorry I was
a little late. Sort of--as you know, the schedule on Capitol
Hill is very fluid. So it's--we go from one meeting to the
other. But thanks for being here, and to discuss this issue on
the issue regarding Russia and its implications.
Dr. Carpenter, you mentioned about state-sponsored
terrorism for Russia--in Russia. And you know, I'm thinking
back to the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight over
Ukraine in 2014, which 283 people were on board. Do you
consider that state-sponsored terrorism?
Dr. Carpenter. I do. I don't see how there's any other way
to look at that incident, where Russia provided all of the--not
just the hardware, which was brought in and then
surreptitiously in the cover of night taken back into the
Russian Federation. So not just the hardware, but then also
providing the personnel and the training to be able to operate
that relatively sophisticated system, knowing there were
civilian aircraft in the skies at that time, and having
previously shot down a Ukrainian military aircraft. I don't see
how you can look at that as anything other than state-sponsored
terrorism.
Mr. Aderholt. And how do you consider the impact of such a
designation?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, Senator Gardner has--who was just
here--has introduced legislation on this and has called for
designating Russia formally as a state sponsor of terror. I
think we need to look carefully at that. It might preclude
certain areas and certain areas where we might be able to work
with Russia and other states. But as a principle, just calling
actions for what they are, I think there's no other way than to
label those acts, and others in Ukraine and other countries,
including the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in
Salisbury, as anything but attempts to spread terror.
Mr. Aderholt. And, Mrs. Denber, let me ask--Denber, let me
ask you this. The--some have suggested there is the strong
connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian
State has actually end up being--alienating Russia's more--
other traditional faiths, religious groups, including Islam.
How has Russia's Muslim population been affected by
counterterrorism or this counterextremism policy?
Ms. Denber. Thank you for the question, Mr. Aderholt.
So I think that there is a very--first, there is a very
strong connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Kremlin. It's--I think it's a mutually--it's a relationship of
mutual dependence. I think that we should avoid talking about
Muslims in Russia as a monochromatic mass. I think there are
many different kinds of Muslims in Russia, in different
regions, and who have different concerns.
I think that what alienates--I think that there are many
Muslims in Russia today who support these counterextremism
policies that basically taint groups that are non-violent--
taint religious groups that are non-violent--policies that
taint them as violent, as terrorists or as extremists.
So I think that some people support those, but I think that
there are also large numbers of Muslims in Russia who are very
alienated by these policies. There are hundreds of people today
who are either in prison or facing pretty stiff prison
sentences, Muslims mostly, for their membership in this
organization Hizb ut-Tahrir which is, as I said, anathema to
human rights norms, but not a terrorist organization.
And we need to remember that each one of those people, you
know, has a family, an extended family. And for each time
someone goes to jail for membership in a group like that, it
affects the whole--it has a ripple effect through the whole
family. It's not the only Muslim group that's been targeted.
There are also there--there are other--for example, the
followers of Said Nursi, who was a Turkish--a Turkish
theologian--you know, has a significant following among certain
Muslims in Russia. That--the Russian Government has banned as
extremists an organization that they purport exists called
Nurcular. We can--you know, I think it's a legitimate question
whether such an organization even does exist, but I think
there's no question as to the peaceful nature and non-extremist
nature of this group. It's ridiculous that it's been--that it's
been tainted as--or, found to be extremist. And every single
person who is being under criminal prosecution right now for
involvement in that grouping, why, they are definitely being--
definitely alienated, and marginalized by these practices.
Mr. Aderholt. And this doesn't apply just to Muslims, but
also, like, other traditional Christian faiths in Russia,
right?
Ms. Denber. So the--so far, the only group--the only
Christian group--Christian faith that's been branded as
extremist, or found by a court to be extremist, is the
Jehovah's Witnesses. They were banned as extremists by the
Supreme Court in 2017. They were banned by local courts before
that, local organizations were. I don't know of any other
Christian religious organization that's been banned as
extremists, but I think if I were a Baptist or a Pentecostalist
I would start to get worried.
Mr. Aderholt. Mmm hmm. And you mentioned about some of the
other former Soviet Republics that are impacted. Could you just
touch on that briefly?
Ms. Denber. Sure. So Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Belarus--all these countries have counter--have an
approach to counterextremism that is very similar to Russia's.
So they have the same broad definition of what extremism is,
right?
So it's a whole range of activities that is not--that
doesn't necessarily have anything to do with violence, right?
So it's brochures, or just meeting, or just getting together.
Or it's, you know, the promotion of some--you know, some vague
definition of ideological supremacy over somebody else. It's
very broad definitions.
And that's common to all of these--you know, the approach
in all of these countries. And in some of the countries, it's
quite harsh. So Tajikistan, for example--I'm not--I should also
preface my remarks by saying I'm not an expert on all Central
Asian countries, but I'm going to--I can still list out what
some of these practices are. So in Tajikistan, for example, you
know, you have--you know, wearing a beard could be enough to
get--to get you tagged as an extremist. Or, you know, there are
very harsh laws limiting religion, that are motivated by a
desire to--or a determination to limit extremism.
In Kyrgyzstan, until very recently simple possession of a
leaflet that was deemed--a leaflet, a brochure, or a video on
your phone that the police consider to be extremist could land
you a prison sentence. And there were dozens and dozens of
people who went to jail because of a leaflet or because of a
video on their phone. Now, Kyrgyzstan recently repealed that
part of the criminal code, so now you have to have--possession
can get you a prison sentence, but only with an intent to--
clearly an intent to distribute it massively, which is still
very, very problematic. But there are dozens and dozens of
people who went to jail just for that. And many others who were
very vulnerable to that charge.
Kazakhstan has also very harsh and vague counterterrorism/
counterextremism laws and practices. And I very strongly
encourage the commission to get familiar with a report that
just came out from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
and Counterterrorism, who just finished a visit to Kazakhstan.
She, and also Human Rights Watch, have documented extensively
how the Kazakh Government uses this concept of extremism to go
after civil society activists, to go after journalists, to go
after labor union leaders. So all over the region.
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you. Thank you for yielding.
Mr. Hudson. Absolutely. My pleasure. And welcome our
commissioner Mr. Fitzpatrick here as well. Appreciate you
joining us.
So, Dr. Omelicheva, first question to you would be, how
does the Kremlin seek to promote itself or its brand of
counterterrorism around the world? In what ways has it sought
to promote itself as a leader on counterterrorism in
international bodies, specifically the U.N. and the OSCE? And
for what purposes does the Kremlin seek to promote its
officials and its viewpoints on counterterrorism in these
international organizations?
Dr. Omelicheva. Thank you for this question. Thank you for
the question.
So Russia is a weaker partner. It doesn't really have the
assets, the resources to be able to--doesn't have the kind of
the soft power that United States has around the world. So for
it to be able to project its influence regionally, and
especially globally using platforms like the United Nations, it
usually capitalizes on the vacuum, or any kind of gaps
particularly left by the United States. So it is no secret that
the current administration has not been favoring the United
Nations, and it has withdrawn some support.
So, for example, the United Nations Counterterrorism
Office, this new institution that was stood up last year,
initially the United States pledge $2 million to support this
agency. And when the chief, the Russian who mentioned, Vladimir
Voronkov, was appointed as undersecretary general and the head
of this agency with a very, very broad mandate, and he called
for the inaugural conference, where he decided to exclude civil
society groups, nongovernmental groups from at least some of
the hearings. So the United States withdrew its pledge of
financial support, and it also lowered the status of the
representatives that took part in that inaugural conference.
So that's the situation that provided Russia with an
opportunity to kind of step and say, hey, I'm pledging $2
million for 2018, and you know, half a million each year
thereafter. So Russia has been able to capitalize on these
kinds of circumstances where the United States would be either
retrenching, or withdrawing, or kind of limiting its input or
its interests. And this is where Russia would say, hey, I'm
willing and able to say to lead, to provide financial support,
to play this leadership role. And I think this is how it was
able to really shape, you know, the way the United Nations
counterterrorism office has been shaped up, what its priorities
have been.
And so even though the language of its mandate says that
the emphasis should be on preventive measures, on CVE, so far
we've seen, again, most of the efforts aiming at preemptive
disruption and interdiction of foreign fighters, but not much
work done on CVE. So, again, I am just drawing these kinds of
associations without making any conclusions about causation.
But it seems like Russia has had a way to influence the work of
this office, either through the chief, the head of this office,
or through other diplomatic avenues.
So, you know, it uses the rhetoric of the need for tougher
counterterrorism responses. And I think it's very, very
important that there is fear around the world. And fear is a
very powerful tool when, you know, individuals who fear
terrorism, fear death, are willing to give up their liberties.
And they approve of harsher responses. Whatever it takes to
make us safe and secure. So Russia has been using this
rhetoric, this discourse, that have resonated very strongly
with many countries' leadership and peoples around the world.
So I think we need to be cognizant of the fact that in
contemporary global context, where we are witnessing lots of
turmoil, there are, you know, threats to liberal international
order as we know it, there are many competing frameworks about
how the world should operate, so this kind of uncertainty and,
you know, these claims about we need stronger states, we need
to give more tools to the governments to be able to deal with
the threats, they're very palpable. You know, they're very
compelling to many countries and leaderships around the world.
So that resonance between what Russia says and what, you know,
other countries may want is also giving Russia that push to
influence--to be able to influence international agendas.
And unfortunately, your colleague left, but I would like to
give another example. So my colleague Dr. Denber mentioned now
Russia's legal templates have been used for legislative
purposes in Central Asian republics and in countries which are
members of the CSTO, Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Those member states, they also have rosters that are put
together on the basis of the local courts' decisions about
which groups they consider to be extremists and terrorists, and
which individuals they consider to be threats to the regime.
So, you know, recently Tajikistan banned what used to be a
political party, Islamic Renaissance Movement. It was branded
extremists and now terrorist groups. So it travels both ways.
So they maintain this shared rosters of individuals and groups
that are regarded as threatening to the regime. And they're
deemed to be terrorists and extremists, in addition to a
variety of other areas--like, you know, joint counterterrorism
drills, war games. So Russia is a major supplier of weapons
supplies, troops. And so the military and security services
border security services of these republics. They still learn
about the ways of conducting those operations through those
joint exercises from Russia.
Mr. Hudson. Would any of the other panelists like to answer
that question, just in terms of Russia's involvement with the
United Nations, OSCE, other international bodies?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, I will just chime in to note that
Russia has abused Interpol and its red notice system
extensively to go after not just dissidents who are speaking
out against the Putin regime abroad, Russian dissidents, but
also international figures like Bill Browder. The notion that
Russia's applying any kind of rule of law through its
participation in these multilateral institutions is just folly,
because they're not. They're abusing the system. Once they gain
membership in an institution, whether it's the OSCE, some of
these CT bodies, or more broadly, you know, Wassenaar group on
conventional arms limitations as well. Russia hollows out these
institutions, undermines the norms, in order to advance its
particular interests, which are always those of the
authoritarian, kleptocratic regime of Vladimir Putin.
And so when we look at various CT bodies, you know,
sometimes Russia will play along and indicate that it shares
the same concerns and values as the rest of the members, but we
always have to be conscious of the fact that Russia has its own
motivations. And frequently those rub against the rest of the
members of those organizations.
Dr. Omelicheva. Just one more example. I think it's
important to pay attention to yet another area, where Russia
has been trying to influence its regional global partners. It's
in the area of internet censorship. We're heard a lot of
examples of the most recently 2016 Yarovaya package laws that
now requires telecom providers and other providers of social
media access and whatnot to retain all of the data and
metadata. It has been, you know, playing with the idea of
cutting Russia's internet off the rest of the world. And so it
really contrasts with the approach that the OSCE or the United
States has been advocating for, which is countering extremist
ideologies with counter messaging on the internet rather than
using internet censorship.
And I think this kind of conflict between whether we should
address ideology with counter-ideology but keep internet free
versus do censorship of internet is being played out at the
U.N. as well. So we need to watch and really advocate for not
allowing the U.N. and its various counterterrorism bodies to
embrace this idea that censorship is the answer.
Mr. Hudson. For Mr. Carpenter, you didn't mince words in
saying that you don't think it's productive for us to cooperate
with Russia on CT. But in your experience in the past
administration, could you maybe go a little deeper in what your
experiences were in working with Russia? And were there some
benefits? Were we able to gain best practices or was there any
value in that relationship? And maybe just expand a little bit
on your point there.
Dr. Carpenter. Sure. I will say that I do support having
the U.S. Government provide information on any active terrorist
threats that would implicate the lives of Russian citizens,
whether those be civilians, Russian diplomats, or military
service members. I think morally it's the right thing to do if
we don't jeopardize sources and methods to provide that
information. We have done that in the past. We should continue
to do so. And I'm not opposed to receiving information from
Russia that they provide voluntarily to U.S. law enforcement
agencies, but we should be very cautious with that information
because there are concerns that, for example, Russian
dissidents could be included under a list of persons suspected
of being extremists or terrorists. And we would have to scrub
any kind of information from Russia very carefully with those
sorts of concerns in mind.
I will say that I have participated in a number of efforts
to work collaboratively with Russia on counterterrorism, from
my office's oversight of the Bilateral Presidential Commission
in the Obama administration, which included a counterterrorism
working group, to a more specialized bilateral approach to
ensuring security and counterterrorism in advance of the Sochi
Winter Olympics, where I participated and led a National
Security Council delegation that liaised with Russian Security
Council members to discuss preparations for Sochi. And then a
number of other efforts where we quietly discussed exchanging
information, particularly after the Boston Marathon bombing,
where we were trying to glean more active sort of exchange of
data on potential militants and suspected terrorists.
And I will say, you know, the tone of these interactions
was always cordial. The Russians approached these
professionally. They bring professionals to the table to be
able to discuss the issues. The problem I have is at the end of
the day none of these efforts ever panned out in terms of
significant, meaningful exchange of information. Certainly not
best practices. Russia's opposed to many of the best practices
that we have been putting forth in terms of countering violent
extremism, seeking to deradicalize communities through
socioeconomic integration, so on and so forth. That's not how
they operate. And so on the best practices front, we really
achieved nothing.
On the exchange of information, there was, in fact, an
active exchange between the U.S. and Russia for a number of
years in the Obama administration but, again, that comes with
risks. It comes with risks that, A, the information is not what
it purports to be--that there are, for example, dissidents
mixed in in terrorist watch list notifications. And then also
that some of the data could be--that we could be given reams
and reams of data for the purposes--which would cause our
system to be clogged up as analysts had to verify whether in
fact those were legitimate designations or not.
In advance of the Sochi discussions, I mean, the United
States approaches any Olympic Games as the country with the
most number of athletes, the most sponsors, usually the most
viewers onsite, as well as in terms of television viewers. And
so we approach this very seriously and wanted to cooperate as
much as possible with Russian authorities to ensure that the
Sochi Olympics came off smoothly, that there were no incidents.
And obviously that was a huge concern given terrorist activity,
insurgent activity, very nearby in the North Caucasus.
And so the Russians knew this. And they entertained us with
a series of meetings and purported to want to give us
information and brief us on their security preparations. But in
fact, what we found at the end of the day was that the
briefings were always superficial, the information was minimal.
And when we pressed for more and more information, we were
essentially told: No, we've got this under control. You know,
we're not going to give you all that information that you want
and need. Trust us. And very little in terms of actionable
intelligence that law enforcement authorities could act on at
any given time. And so frankly, we were quite blind going into
the Sochi Olympics, and we had to rely on the Russians to
provide that security.
I will say, some of the practices they employed in Sochi
also gave us enormous concern at the time. For example, there
was a bombing in Volgograd just before the opening ceremonies
of the games. And Russia really used that as a pretext to take
large numbers of militants from the North Caucasus and
essentially facilitate their travel out of Russia, knowing that
most of those folks were going to Syria to participate in the
fight alongside ISIS. And we saw this sort of draining out of
the North Caucasus prior to the games for understandable, you
could say, reasons on Moscow's part. But with huge
apprehensions on our side because of the consequences of this.
And I think we have yet, in fact, to see those consequences
now that the ISIS caliphate has been decimated. You know, some
of those foreign terrorist fighters are returning not just to
Russia, but to Europe and other places. And it's thanks to that
fact that they were essentially let go and not screened at the
time in 2013 and early 2014.
Mr. Hudson. Very troubling.
At this point, I'll call on my colleague from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Fitzpatrick, who brings a broad experience and background
on this issue. And we look forward to your questions.
HON. BRIAN FITZPATRICK, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here.
In my--the majority of my time in the FBI was focused on
international terrorism. We put a lot of emphasis on the
international enforcement academies that we had throughout--
across the globe. The one in Budapest would have been the one
that covered Eurasia. We could never get Russia to participate
much at all. And that's where we had a lot of intelligence
sharing, information sharing on investigative techniques, best
practices, and fighting terrorism. We had a model at the FBI
that we put a lot of investment into as far as having cross-
agency support at the Federal level. Task forces, working with
our state and local partners, having citizens academies,
getting the public involved on how they could help. Putting a
lot of investment in intelligence gathering and information
sharing, as well as source recruitment.
We never really had a good sense, since they never really
cooperated with us, what exactly the Russian model was. How
many agencies are involved across their government? What is the
state and local interaction with the national system? How often
do they engage members of the public? We never really had that
sense, because they never really did a whole lot with us. So if
you could just let us know that, or let me know that, that
would be helpful.
Dr. Omelicheva. Let me take a stab at this question. So in
2006, Russia adopted a law titled Law Counteraction to
Terrorism. And it is still in the force, but it essentially
established the legal framework for creating kind of the
institutional infrastructure for intelligence gathering,
prevention, and then reaction to terrorist attacks. So this law
provided a foundation for executive decree that established the
National Counterterrorism Committee, which exists at the
Federal level. And its task is to coordinate counterterrorism
efforts of, like, 18 different agencies--Russia's Federal
security service, FSB, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry
of Emergency Situations and a number of others.
So it has a permanent secretariat. It has a leader. So it
is kind of the agency that collects all of the information from
various agencies at the Federal level. And there are republican
counterterrorism committees that are established in each and
every subject of the Russian Federation. And the operational
counterterrorism is carried out through counterterrorism
headquarters that are kind of nested within this
counterterrorism structure. So, again, there is a National
Counterterrorism Committee at the top, there's a vertical
structure with regional counterterrorism committees established
in each subject of the confederation. And within them, they
have counterterrorism headquarters.
I think they are currently led by a representative of the
FSB, the security services. So if a situation arises of a
hostage incident or another terrorist attack, the law allows
establishing counterterrorism operation situation, which is
like martial law but does not require approval by the
Parliament. So once there is counterterrorism operation
established, it allows the government to deploy a variety of
very extensive measures of cutting down a variety of individual
liberties--freedom of movement, freedom of information. It
allows for the use of the military force. So that's it, in a
nutshell.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Any idea as to why they were so reluctant
to participate with the international community in programs
like we had set up specifically to do that, given that
terrorism is an international fight, and the only way we can
really address it is through the use of our friend and allies
to be our eyes and ears across the globe? They were very, very
hesitant to do that.
Dr. Omelicheva. I do have an idea. So Russia is reluctant
to collaborate with the United States because it doesn't
believe that it is going to be able to collaborate on equal
terms. So let me take a step back.
Everyone in Russia--the government, the people--they
believe that Russia is a great power by virtue of its history,
cultural heritage, the sheer size, and many, many, many other
things. This identity of a great power that is inherent in what
Russia is, entitles it to act in certain ways regionally and
globally. So Russia has the right and responsibility to do the
kinds of things that you would expect a great power to do
internationally.
And the narrative goes that the only nation that has been
frustrating and kind of impeding Russia's effort to fully
realize its potential of a great power has been the United
States, okay? And so Russians can provide you with lots of
examples of how we've tried to collaborate with the United
States, but every time we would be looked upon as a junior
partner and not taken seriously. So Russia mistrusts the United
States. It does not believe that the United States, when it
wants to collaborate, it will come to collaboration from the
position of strength. And it will do my way or no way, and kind
of Russia's input or Russia's effort to contribute is going to
be downplayed.
And I think--so, you know, so the short answer to your
question is that fundamental belief, you know, that grievance,
if you wish, that Russia is entitled to something that it has
never received whenever it tried to engage in the relations
with the United States, and that no matter what it does--you
know, the United--so Russians believe that United States fears
having Russia as a peer to the United States, so it will do
everything in its capacity to sort of keep it from actualizing
its potential.
So that mistrust and a belief that it cannot play an equal
role in any kind of collaborative endeavors is probably going
to continue to prevent the Russians from any kind of meaningful
collaboration with the United States.
Dr. Carpenter. I don't disagree with anything that Dr.
Omelicheva has just said, but I'll be a little bit more blunt.
As I know you know, Congressman, our clandestine services are
essentially at war with each other. Russia approaches
counterterrorism from the vantage of counterintelligence.
That's why when I traveled to Sochi in 2013 to begin the
process of discussing security for this Winter Olympics, our
chief interlocutor was Russia's chief counterintelligence
official, not their chief counterterrorism official. They treat
information about the terrorist threat in Russia as secret
confidential information that they don't want the United States
or any other foreign power to get access to.
Similarly, when they want to cooperate with us, it is
primarily with a view of gaining information on our sources and
methods and our vulnerabilities. And so they approach this,
they stack a lot of the delegations that they send to discuss
counterterrorism with intelligence and counterintelligence
officials. And while Dr. Omelicheva went through the structure,
the formal structure through which Russia approaches
counterterrorism, with the National Counterterrorism Agency
sort of overseeing the process, they, like we did, also
reorganized following the Chechen wars in the 1990s to better
integrate their intelligence.
But let's be honest--the FSB calls the shots. The FSB is
the preeminent agency, Putin's former employer and now one of
the chief instruments that he uses to perpetuate power. And
they use extremism and CT as an excuse to conduct any number of
other missions that are not really CT related.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you. It's fascinating.
Ms. Denber, I'd like to maybe drill down on the youth
impact of the lack of CVE and some of the impacts of the
policies coming out of Moscow. So what are the possible effects
of the, as we said, worst practices of authoritarian regimes in
Moscow and Central Asia, specifically on potential ongoing
radicalization of Central Asian youth?
Ms. Denber. That's a great question.
I want to start by saying that there isn't--you know, there
are many different studies on the causes of radicalization and
what leads youth to become involved in violent--you know, in
violent extremism. There are--I think for as many studies there
are--just a large diversity of studies and opinions about that.
And I think that these very--as Dr. Omelicheva said, there
are--this very punitive approach to counterterrorism/
counterextremism is really one of those factors, because when
you're the target of criminal prosecution for something that
is--either excessive criminal prosecution or selective criminal
prosecution for something that probably shouldn't be a crime--
like possessing a leaflet or being part of an organization that
is not violent--that is profoundly alienating for you, for your
family. You become part of--you become, you know, involved in
the criminal justice system, which is in many of these
countries very abusive.
You become vulnerable to torture and other forms of ill
treatment. Even if you don't go to jail, especially in some of
these Central Asian countries, you and your family would
probably have to--once you, you know, get on the radar of the
anti-extremism police, you know, you become vulnerable to being
extorted for bribes, very big bribes, that cause a crisis in
your family. So that is profoundly alienating. And that that
makes the job of recruiters, for violent--you know, for violent
extremist groups--it makes their job a lot easier.
I think another factor that is often cited in these
studies--and I think is important focus on when you look at the
causes of--you know, what drives violent, you know, attraction
to extremism--extremist groups, is the experience of being a
migrant worker from Central Asia in Russia, right? Studies show
that it's not so much that Russia has repressive, you know,
policies on religion--although, in some cases, that may be the
case, the way--as I said during my testimony--the way that
these laws are used to oppress certain religious groups
wrongly.
But the experience of a migrant worker is profoundly
alienating for other reasons. It's because they're targeted--
they're targeted by police, you know, for searches, for getting
extorted for bribes. There's tremendous antipathy and hatred
and violence--and in the past, violence against migrant workers
in Russia. And they are--their conditions of work--they're
exploited quite extensively in many cases by their employers.
And that's something that our organization has documented. So
all of--you know, and really humiliating exploitation.
And so all of these factors combine to make them very
vulnerable to skilled recruiters. Also, you know, these migrant
workers and, you know, migrant worker experience shows that
they--you know, that they--you know, they form networks,
networks of migrants workers. And so that also makes the job of
recruiters probably easier.
Mr. Hudson. How susceptible are these groups to Russian
propaganda, particularly anti-West? So I guess the point is,
how concerned should we be that these folks are being
radicalized, but they're also getting the Russian propaganda
that the West is the enemy and sort of this anti-West message?
Ms. Denber. That's a really good question.
I think that they get--Russian propaganda about the West is
all over--obviously is all over the region. And I think that in
the case of these--you know, through--Russian television is
still widely watched throughout the region. Russian online
media is popular in many of these places--in many of these
countries. But I think that, you know, they definitely would
get a message--an anti-Western message--a very strong anti-
Western, anti-American message through that.
But also, I think that the--you know, the extremist groups
that are trying to recruit them already have a very strong
anti-Western message. So I think that there's a sort of double
messaging there that has an effect.
Mr. Hudson. Dr. Carpenter, you've talked some about
exporting of terrorists, about prior to the Sochi Olympics the
folks from the Caucasus were sort of helped out of the country,
maybe given passports in some instances, maybe just assisted.
But, you know, letting these would-be jihadists potentially
leave the country.
Can you confirm that this is a policy of Russia? Is this
something that's kind of a long-standing practice? And does the
Kremlin view this policy as being successful, that they've now
gotten rid of this problem and it's someone else's problem? And
what impact does this policy have on global terrorist movements
and on our interests?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, I don't think, Congressman, it's a
concerted policy that is written down anywhere. I think a lot
of Russian counterterrorism policy is very short term in terms
of its thinking. I think the motivation for this was hosting a
giant international event with close proximity to the North
Caucasus and wanting to solve the problem very quickly in the
runup to that event.
And we saw massive, by the way, air campaigns as well
targeting villages in the North Caucasus right up until the
opening ceremonies. And so Russia was really focused on sort of
cleaning out that problem, so to speak, in those few months
before the Olympics. Perhaps realizing some of the possible
implications, but more likely kicking the can down the road.
Now, I wouldn't say that this is an across-the-board policy
that they would implement in every circumstance. And I don't
even know that it was written down. We do know that there's
extensive anecdotal and reporting evidence that suggests that
this was systematic in terms of helping folks that would have--
should have tripped various tripwires in terms of their
possible belonging to extremist organizations, or having
extremist views, being given passports and even potentially
having their travel subsidized to leave the Russian Federation.
So it was a policy then. Whether it continues, it's hard to
say. Again, I don't think it's formal. But it was systematic in
that--in that period of 2013-2014 for sure.
Mr. Hudson. Appreciate that.
Dr. Omelicheva, what lessons did the Kremlin learn from
previous terrorist attacks in Russia, such as the 1999
apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities, 2002 Moscow
theater hostage crisis, the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis? How has
the Kremlin sought to apply those lessons?
Dr. Omelicheva. So both the Dubrovka Theater crisis of
2002, and of course September 1st crisis in Beslan in 2004, are
known as 9/11 in Russia. And for those of you who are not
familiar with, you know, the atrocities, in the first instance
in the hostage-taking crisis in the Dubrovka Theater in October
2002, the terrorists took 800 theater viewers in the audience
hostages. And as a result of the rescue operation, over 130 of
them died.
In the case of Beslan, the terrorists took 1,100 hostages,
mostly children. And then as a result of a rescue operation,
which was provoked by a couple of explosions, as you may
recall, one of those explosions broke a roof in the building
that killed a lot of hostages to begin with. And it was
interpreted as a kind of full signal for fleeing. The operation
was complicated by the presence of the locals. Many of them
were armed, and all of them had one or more hostages in the
school. So there was a lot of, you know, firing that was not
done by the special operation forces, which were practicing the
retaking of the school close by, outside of the town itself.
But as a result of this operation, we had 300-plus people died,
mostly children.
And there was even lesson between 2002 and 2004. So in
2002, many analysts blamed the government for acting too soon.
But I think the government was also informed by the way the
Yeltsin government prior responded to a number of hostage-
taking operations in 1995 and 1996--Kizlyar, Budyonnovsk, other
places that also resulted in lots of casualties. But the
president interfered, top officials interfered in those rescue
operations. And in the end, the government acquiesced in,
during the negotiations, letting the terrorists go. And as a
result, these same fighters later on committed other types of
terrorist attacks.
So those experiences informed the Russian Government's
responses to 2002 and 2004 incidents, in that President Putin
and other top officials, they did not interfere, letting other
counterterrorism specialists to be in charge. But in 2002,
during the Dubrovka Theater terrorist attack, the special
forces acted prematurely. Many believe that they did not
exhaust all of the nonpunitive, nonmilitary means during the
negotiations with terrorism.
What the government learned was that in both instances that
they need to be able to secure the perimeter of the
counterterrorism operation, because in both instances--in one,
media interfered with the government's ability to act secretly,
because some of the hostages shared information about
government action with the media, and it was broadcasted, and
the terrorists learned about some of the actions and acted in
anticipation of those. In the second instance, in 2004, you
know, the participation of locals armed with light weapons also
interfered with the success of the operation.
So the key lesson that the government learned was that they
have to have sufficient force to secure the perimeter of the
counterterrorism operation, that they need to be able to
constrain the freedom of movement, the freedom of mass media,
and other types of freedom. And I mentioned that 2006 law on
Counteractions for Terrorism that integrated all of these
lessons, providing legal basis for this counterterrorism
operation mandate, you know, counterterrorism headquarters, and
all of the constraints that can be imposed on the freedom of
movement, the freedom of media, and many others.
So with your permission, if I may, I had a couple of things
to the previous speakers in response to your questions on
fighters in Central Asia, as well as Russia's policy to help
the militants from North Caucasus to leave Russia, if you're
okay with that.
Mr. Hudson. Sure.
Dr. Omelicheva. So you know, it is true that it was not
Russia's policy, but it was very well thought out and
orchestrated. This so-called green corridor was open as early
as 2011 when, at that point, ISIL renewed its attacks in Iraq.
This is when the first loads of militants from North Caucasus
began departing the region, supported by the FSB agents buying
them the tickets and whatnot. And it lasted all the way through
2014 or 2015, when the green corridor was closed, but the
Russians kept the list of those who departed. And the Center
for International and Strategic Studies evaluates that the
number of those who left from Russia to Turkey can be as high
as 11,000 individuals. And at least 6,000 of those made their
way to Syria.
I do want to, you know, acknowledge how broad our
understanding of foreign fighter is. That, you know, some of
those foreign fighters are, indeed, the religious zealots who
go to foreign countries to fight for religious ideals. But
there are also many of those who are religiously ignorant, and
they just kind of buy out of the religious ideology of violence
because they are desperate, because they don't have any other
way out. And when they go there, especially if they are
assisted by, you know, the FSB, they become quickly
disillusioned and would like to return.
And there is a very large category of those who are forced
to leave, or they are deceived or trafficked. You know, some of
my research looks at terrorism and human trafficking. And there
are a lot of people who are trafficked based on deception, or
they are forced to live as wives, brides-to-be, or relatives of
the fighters. So by different estimates right now, we have 700
or so Russian citizens, women and children, in prisons in Iraq.
And so some of the things that Russian Government has been
trying to figure out what to do with, how to repatriate
children, because up until 2017 Vladimir Putin and Kadyrov, the
infamous ruler of Chechnya, they tried to bring in both the
mothers and the children.
Their fortunes varied. You know, the Dagestan courts
imprisoned many of those. The Chechen courts, they kept them
out of prison and did some--put some effort into repatriating
them into the local communities----
Mr. Hudson. Well, if I could ask you, of those 700
imprisoned in Iraq, do they pose a terrorist threat or are they
victims? Or both?
Dr. Omelicheva. So the Russian intelligence--so the reason
the Russian intelligence stopped repatriating women because
there was suspicions raised that at least some of them may pose
a threat. So I would say--and this is the danger, because we
cannot establish motivation with certainty. And many of them
are trained to say, you know, what the law enforcement
officials want to hear. But the Russians stopped bringing the
women back. But they continue trying to repatriate the
children.
But, because, again, of these complexity, and so many
categories that exist out there under the umbrella of foreign
fighters, I think caution has to be used, but we also need to
be aware that those children are not going to go anywhere, and
we should worry about who are they going to become, and kind of
that forward-looking focus, especially on the children who
probably know nothing but, you know, the war and violence.
Mr. Hudson. All right. Well, I appreciate those thoughts,
and I can tell you, today has been really illuminating for me.
I really appreciate the perspective. One of the things that
struck me early was civil society--the reason Russia is against
it is because they see it as Western influence. I'd never quite
made that connection.
Ms. Denber, you were talking about inconvenient people--you
know, that's sort of the view of terrorism. Counterterrorism is
inconvenient people--that was--I really appreciate that.
And obviously, Dr. Carpenter, you know, this concept that
Russia approaches CT as a counterintelligence exercise and they
sort of see it through that lens, those are all just a few of
the things that were very illuminating to me today. And I
really appreciate you taking the time, appreciate your written
testimonies as well, which we've all studied.
This is important work. And you are informing us and
helping us at the OSCE to do a better job from this perspective
in dealing with Russia on the counterterrorism issue. And
certainly being on the ad hoc Committee on Counterterrorism as
a vice chair, this is really helpful to me.
So thank you for your time today. Thank you for your
excellent testimony. And with that, we will adjourn. [Sounds
gavel.]
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing ended.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
On behalf of Chairman Alcee Hastings and Co-Chairman Roger
Wicker, I'd like to call this hearing of the U.S. Helsinki
Commission to order.
Let me thank the distinguished panelists who have agreed to
join us to offer their expertise and help inform our work. I
will introduce them in a moment, but before I do, I will offer
a few thoughts on the topic of this hearing.
We convened this hearing to examine the Kremlin's
counterterrorism policies and practices. We want to better
understand what those practices are; how they developed over
time; whether they are effective; and to what extent they
dovetail, or not, with U.S. interests.
I want to offer a couple of illustrations of why it is so
important that we maintain a clear sense of what Russian
counter-terrorism practices do and do not offer:
The first reason is that Russia seeks to claim the mantle
of leadership on this issue internationally.
I'd like to quote from the Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community, provided to Congress on
January 29 of this year. That document includes the following
passage:
``China and Russia are expanding cooperation with each
other and through international bodies to shape global
rules and standards to their benefit and present a
counterweight to the United States and other Western
countries . . .
Russia is working to consolidate the UN's
counterterrorism structures under the UN Under
Secretary General for Counterterrorism, who is Russian.
. . . Both countries probably will use the UN as a
platform to emphasize sovereignty narratives that
reflect their interests and redirect discussions away
from human rights, democracy, and good governance.''
So I would ask the panelists: should we be comfortable with
Russian leadership in this area? Does the Kremlin have so-
called ``best practices'' to share?
A second reason we should care about Russia's
counterterrorism practices is that Russia's actions in this
space have impact far beyond Russia's borders.
As regional experts recently told a Helsinki Commission
briefing, Russia's significant influence in Central Asia can be
deeply problematic, through cooperation on repressive measures
between security services or by the propagation of
disinformation. In addition, as one panelist put it, ``Russia.
is a particularly nefarious influence within the sphere of
religious affairs across the region''--by painting peaceful
religious groups with the label of ``extremism'' and repressing
them ruthlessly, potentially furthering radicalization in the
process.
I'm grateful to the panelists who are with us today, and
I'd like to introduce them now.
We will first hear from Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Professor
of Strategy at the United States National War College at the
National Defense University. Dr. Omelicheva received her PhD
from Purdue University, and also holds a JD in International
Law from Moscow National Law Academy. She is the author of
numerous well-received research articles and volumes related to
our hearing today.
Next, we will hear from Rachel Denber, Deputy Director of
the Europe and Central Asia Division at Human Rights Watch. Ms.
Denber previously directed the Human Rights Watch's Moscow
Office and has authored reports on a wide range of human rights
issues throughout the region. Thank you for being with us in
Washington for this hearing, Ms. Denber.
Finally, we will hear from Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior
Director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global
Engagement. Dr. Carpenter has worked these issues as a senior
official in the prior administration, as former U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, and as a former
National Security Council Director for Russia. This is not Dr.
Carpenter's first appearance before the Helsinki Commission;
and, I suspect, given the quality of his contributions, I
suspect it is not the last time we will call on his expertise.
Thank you for being here.
Lastly, I would like to thank Chairman Hastings for
allowing me the opportunity to convene this hearing on behalf
of the Commission.
As many of you know, as a member of the United States
Helsinki Commission, I have focused my engagement in a number
of areas, including combatting religious persecution and anti-
Semitism, preventing human trafficking, and promoting economic
cooperation and free speech.
As part of my role as a Helsinki Commissioner, I am
regularly called upon to represent the United States at the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which facilitates inter-
parliamentary dialogue among the 57 participating States.
This Assembly is a valuable forum where my Congressional
colleagues and our counterparts from countries ranging from
Canada to Russia get together to have frank discussions about
the issues of the day and try to find common solutions that
benefit all of our citizens.
In recent years, I have been really pleased to see that the
Assembly been paying increasing attention to the issue of
tackling terrorism.
In July 2017, the Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee on
Countering Terrorism. As Vice-Chair of that Committee, I am in
regular dialogue with colleagues, including from Russia, on the
very questions we will be examining today. And so I am
particularly grateful for the information we will receive from
our panelists.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mr. Hudson, thank you for the opportunity to say a few
words. I would like to begin by thanking the Commission's
Chairman, Alcee Hastings, for placing this important hearing on
our calendar.
Mr. Hudson, I would also like to thank you for taking up
the gavel for this particular hearing, as well as for your
important engagement with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
Members of Congress have an important opportunity to shape
international debate through our work with the Assembly. Your
service as a Vice-Chair of the Parliamentary Assembly's
Counter-Terrorism Committee is a great example of the impact we
can and should be having through that important body.
In January 2018, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
staff released a report I had commissioned, titled ``Putin's
Asymmetrical Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe:
Implications for U.S. National Security.''
Among its many findings, that report outlined how Vladimir
Putin gained and solidified power by exploiting fears of
terrorism, empowering the State security services and employing
them to consolidate his hold on the levers of political,
social, and economic power.
Our report showed how Putin's manipulation of this threat
began even in his earliest days at the summit of Russian
politics. In 1999, Putin had been installed as prime minister,
but his ascension to the presidency of Russia to succeed Boris
Yeltsin was anything but certain. Then, in September, several
bombs tragically killed hundreds of people as they slept in
their apartments in Moscow and other Russian cities. Despite
the absence of any evidence linking the bombings to Chechen
terrorists, Putin seized this opportunity to launch a brutal
war in Chechnya; his popularity soared, assuring his election
as President.
Putin has also used counter-terrorism as a pretext to
centralize institutional power in Moscow. For instance, in
2004, claiming a supposed need for ``national cohesion'' after
the horrific Beslan terrorist attack at a school in North
Ossetia, he dispensed with the election of regional Governors
by popular vote; they would be centrally appointed instead.
Finally, the SFRC report underscored how counterterrorism
has been used to pressure groups and individuals throughout
society whose views Putin might find distasteful.
Criminal prosecutions under the flimsiest of counter-
terrorism charges have been used to silence activists and
Kremlin critics.
For example, in August 2015, Oleg Sentsov, a Ukranian
filmmaker, was convicted of a range of terrorism-related
charges and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. His offense?
Peacefully protesting against the illegal and unrecognized
Russian annexation of his native land.
In December 2016, blogger Alexey Kungurov was convicted of
inciting terrorism after criticizing Russian military actions
in Syria. He was sentenced to 2 years in a penal colony.
The religious sector has not been spared this deliberate
malpractice: the 2016 ``Yarovaya'' package of counterterrorism
laws, for example, imposed cumbersome registration processes
and administrative constraints, restrictions on proselytizing,
and expanded surveillance on non-Russian Orthodox religious
entities.
Mr. Chairman, the above examples testify to the misuse of
the counterterrorism effort by the Putin regime at home.
I could also go on at some length about the international
engagements by the Kremlin that cause me equally great concern:
from the serial violations of human rights by Russian forces in
Ukraine to the Kremlin's direct support for the regime in Syria
which is targeting civilians with chemical weapons; from
military invasions of Georgia and Ukraine to the assassinations
of political enemies both at home and abroad. These are simply
not the actions of a trustworthy partner with whom we share a
common vision.
Mr. Chairman, without a doubt, addressing the challenge of
terrorism in our societies will require deep and sustained
international cooperation to address effectively. However, the
Putin regime's troubling track record on what it calls
``counterterrorism'' undercuts any claim the Kremlin might make
on international leadership in this area. And it means that any
engagement by our government with the Kremlin on this issue
must be undertaken with clear eyes and firm convictions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our
witnesses for being here today.
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