[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LEGISLATING TO SECURE AMERICA'S WIRELESS
FUTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-67
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-352 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois GREG WALDEN, Oregon
ANNA G. ESHOO, California Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York FRED UPTON, Michigan
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PAUL TONKO, New York GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
Chair BILLY LONG, Missouri
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon BILL FLORES, Texas
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
Massachusetts MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TONY CARDENAS, California RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California TIM WALBERG, Michigan
SCOTT H. PETERS, California EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
DARREN SOTO, Florida
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
------
Professional Staff
JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
Chairman
JERRY McNERNEY, California ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York Ranking Member
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia PETE OLSON, Texas
DARREN SOTO, Florida ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
ANNA G. ESHOO, California BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado BILLY LONG, Missouri
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina BILL FLORES, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California, Vice SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
Chair TIM WALBERG, Michigan
PETER WELCH, Vermont GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
TONY CARDENAS, California
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Mike Doyle, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Robert E. Latta, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Ohio, prepared statement.................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, opening statement...................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Hon. Adam Kinzinger, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, prepared statement................................ 66
Witnesses
Bobbie Stempfley, Managing Director, Cert Division, Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, opening
statement...................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Answers to submitted questions............................... 127
John Nettles, President, Pine Belt Wireless, opening statement... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Answers to submitted questions............................... 129
Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge, opening
statement...................................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Answers to submitted questions............................... 133
Dean R. Brenner, Senior Vice President, Spectrum Strategy and
Tech Policy, Qualcomm Incorporated, opening statement.......... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Answers to submitted questions............................... 137
Submitted Material
H.R. 575, the Prague Proposals................................... 67
H.R. 2063, E-Frontier Act \1\
H.R. 2881, the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2019 \2\
H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of
2019........................................................... 75
H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act of 2019.. 102
H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act......................................... 109
H.R. 4500, the Promoting United States Wireless Leadership Act of
2019........................................................... 116
Article of September 17, 2019, Zero5G.com, by Jack Derwin,
submitted by Mr. Doyle......................................... 121
Article on Zero Geoengineering.com, submitted by Mr. Doyle....... 122
Letter of September 27, 2019, from Fire Chief Gary Ludwig, EMT-P,
President and Chairman of the Board, International Association
of Fire Chiefs, to Mr. Doyle and Mr. Latta, submitted by Mr.
Doyle.......................................................... 124
----------
\1\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/
20190927/109991/BILLS-116HR2063ih.pdf.
\2\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/
20190927/109991/BILLS-116HR2881ih.pdf.
LEGISLATING TO SECURE AMERICA'S WIRELESS FUTURE
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m., in
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
Hon. Mike Doyle (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Doyle, McNerney, Clarke, Veasey,
Soto, O'Halleran, Eshoo, Butterfield, Matsui, Schrader,
Cardenas, Pallone (ex officio), Latta (subcommittee ranking
member), Shimkus, Kinzinger, Bilirakis, Johnson, Long, Flores,
Walberg, Gianforte, and Walden (ex officio).
Staff present: A. J. Brown, Counsel; Jeffrey Carroll, Staff
Director; Parul Desai, FCC Detailee; Evan Gilbert, Deputy Press
Secretary; Waverly Gordon, Deputy Chief Counsel; Tiffany
Guarascio, Deputy Staff Director; Alex Hoehn-Saric, Chief
Counsel, Communications and Consumer Protection; Jerry
Leverich, Senior Counsel; Dan Miller, Senior Policy Analyst;
Meghan Mullon, Staff Assistant; Phil Murphy, Policy
Coordinator; Tim Robinson, Chief Counsel; Andrew Souvall,
Director of Communications, Outreach and Member Services;
Rebecca Tomilchik, Staff Assistant; Mike Bloomquist, Minority
Staff Director; Michael Engel, Minority Detailee,
Communications and Technology; Margaret Tucker Fogarty,
Minority Legislative Clerk/Press Assistant; Peter Kielty,
Minority General Counsel; Bijan Koohmaraie, Minority Deputy
Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection and Commerce; Zack Roday,
Minority Communications Director; and Evan Viau, Minority
Professional Staff Member, Communications and Technology.
Mr. Doyle. The Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology will now come to order. The Chair recognizes himself
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DOYLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology's legislative hearing on
Legislating to Secure America's Wireless Future. Today, the
subcommittee will consider a number of legislative proposals
that address challenges from spectrum management to securing
our Nation's telecommunications infrastructure. The proposals
before the subcommittee today are H.R. 4462, the Studying How
to Harness Airway Resources Efficiency Act, or the SHARE Act,
which I have introduced with my good friend, Ranking Member
Latta. This legislation would require NTIA to establish a
spectrum-sharing strategy for Federal entities using advanced
technologies, such as artificial intelligence, automated
frequency coordination, and environmental sensing, to
facilitate more efficient spectrum sharing and use by the
Federal Government. The bill would also require the FCC to
report to Congress on the feasibility of using existing sharing
technologies on several important spectrum bands.
As we look towards the future, it is necessary for every
licensee to use spectrum more efficiently, the Federal
Government being chief among them. We need to find ways to
modernize how the Government uses and shares spectrum amongst
agencies and departments, as well as with the commercial
sector.
The CBRS band is a great example of how sharing can
effectively accommodate a wide range of users and a wide range
of uses. Just yesterday, the FCC voted on an order to sell
licenses in the CBRS band, and a few weeks ago, the band
officially launched for commercial operations. This band will
combine licensed, unlicensed, and Federal incumbent users in
one band while protecting incumbents' rights and ensuring that
the spectrum is always available for use. My hope is that the
SHARE Act can act as a bridge to future innovative sharing
videos like we see in the CBRS band.
Next, we have H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information
Sharing Act, introduced by myself and my colleague, Congressman
Kinzinger. This legislation would establish an information-
sharing program at the Department of Homeland Security to share
the supply chain security risk information with the telecom
industry. This legislation would help all providers, but most
importantly, small and rural providers that lack the resources
and expertise to engage here in Washington, with what has
largely been closed-door discussions related to the threats of
untrusted equipment vendors. Our hope is that by creating a
program with an inclusive mandate that these providers will be
more able in the future to avoid deploying in technologies that
pose an outside risk to their customers and to the nation.
After that, we have H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted
Communications Network Act, introduced by Chairman Pallone and
Ranking Member Walden, which would require the FCC to create a
list of equipment and services that pose unacceptable risk to
national security. It would authorize a fund to unable
telecommunications carrier with unsafe equipment in their
networks to remove it and replace it with trusted equipment and
services. Telecom service is far too essential for any of our
Nation's carriers to be using untrusted elements in their
network.
The subcommittee will also consider H.R. 2881, the Secure
5G and Beyond Act, introduced by Representatives Spanberger,
O'Halleran, Brooks, Rooney, and Slotkin. It would require the
Government to work with strategic allies to secure their 5G
networks and ensure that U.S. 5G networks are secure and work
with industry to guard against foreign political influence.
Next, we will consider the Promoting United States Wireless
Leadership Act of 2019, introduced by Representatives Walberg
and Dingell. We will also consider H.R. 2063, the E deg.ONTIER
Act, introduced by Representatives Cardenas and Brooks. And
finally, we will discuss House Resolution 575, expressing the
sense of the House that all stakeholders in the deployment of
5G should consider and adhere to the Prague proposals, which
were introduced by Representatives Flores and Soto.
I also want to thank all the witnesses for being here
today. I want to recognize Ms. Stempfley for participating. She
is currently Director of the CERT Division at the Software
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University in
Pittsburgh, which is the heart of my congressional district. We
are always glad to have someone from CMU up here on the panel.
Previously, she served as Acting Assistant Secretary in the
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications at the Department of
Homeland Security, and she established and led the Department
of Defense's computer emergency response team. So I want to
especially thank her for appearing before the subcommittee
today.
So I look forward to a discussion of all of these
proposals.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Doyle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Doyle
Today, we are considering a series of bills to secure
America's wireless future. They will ensure that the Government
manages the federal and commercial spectrum more efficiently to
promote innovation and better serve all Americans. They also
will guarantee that our wireless networks are secure from
foreign adversaries that may wish to spy on Americans or do us
harm.
I applaud the work of Chairman Doyle and Ranking Member
Latta in introducing the SHARE Act. Their bill will cement the
long-standing policy that our nation's key agencies-the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)--remain
responsible for spectrum policy. These expert agencies can act
as impartial judges to balance the demands and interests of
spectrum stakeholders such as the Department of Defense, the
Federal Aviation Administration, public safety, and commercial
carriers.
At our hearing in July, we heard that the management of the
federal government spectrum requires a strong central voice at
NTIA. And I think the SHARE Act does a great deal to help NTIA
meet the mission-critical needs of government agencies in a
more efficient and modern way.
The FCC, likewise, must remain in the driver's seat when it
comes to commercial spectrum. For that reason, I am pleased the
SHARE Act requires the FCC to look for ways to expand and
improve the revolutionary spectrum sharing techniques being
rolled out in the Citizen's Broadband Radio Service.
When it comes to securing these networks from foreign
adversaries, I want to thank Ranking Member Walden,
Representatives Matsui, and Guthrie for partnering with me to
introduce the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
Our legislation will prohibit the spending of federal dollars
on suspect communications equipment and services that undermine
national security.
Our bill also establishes a one-billion-dollar
reimbursement program to help small carriers remove compromised
equipment and replace it with secure alternatives.
As we have heard, much of the global supply chain for
telecommunications equipment flows through China at one point
or another. And Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
providers cheaper than nearly anyone else. Although many of the
bigger carriers have avoided these threats, it still is a
significant issue for smaller and more rural carriers who built
their networks using suspect equipment.
Communications networks are interconnected, and that means
that one weak link can harm the whole system. We must help
smaller carriers remove suspect equipment for the good of the
entire country.
Representative Kinzinger and Chairman Doyle also have
legislation on this point that would help the Federal
Government better share supply chain risk information with the
communications providers.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I also want
to briefly recognize Dean Brenner, on today's panel, who is a
fellow Monmouth County, New Jersey native. Welcome.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Latta, ranking member of the
subcommittee, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. LATTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you very much for calling today's hearing; I also want to
thank our witnesses for being with us today as we discuss
legislation on our network supply chain security and management
of our spectrum resources.
There are several bipartisan bills on today's hearing that
address the challenges we face to ensure our critical
communications infrastructure is secure from vulnerabilities. I
am especially pleased to have worked with our subcommittee
chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, on H.R. 4462, the
SHARE Act, to empower our agencies to facilitate innovative
spectrum sharing strategies to more efficiently use our
airwaves.
As the executive branch agency principally responsible for
advising the President on the spectrum and telecommunication
matters, NTIA should continue to play the lead role in
directing a collective government approach to managing the
Federal Government's access to spectrum resources. This bill
helps empower NTIA to use tools to meet the challenge of
growing wireless needs into the 21st century.
Today's hearing also features several bills to address
vulnerabilities in our Nation's communication networks, such as
the inclusion of unsecured equipment. Many providers' networks
contain equipment supplied by suspect foreign carriers.
However, this is only because the provider didn't understand
the associated risks. The bill before us seeks to prevent this
type of situation from occurring on a forward-looking basis.
Understandably, these providers are in a period of uncertainty,
and although they may want to do their part to protect national
security, they may need help doing so.
The FCC has voiced concerns about the network security and
proposed prohibiting USF recipients from using controversial
equipment. So as winners of the FCC's latest Connect America
Fund II reverse auction come to grip with the buildout
requirements accompanying these funds, it is critical that we
work in a bipartisan way to ensure that they can revisit how
those conditions impact the winning bid in order to keep their
equipment free from security vulnerabilities.
Not only do we want to prevent the Federal funding to pay
for gear that may pose a national security risk, but we do not
want winners of CAF auctions to be put in an unattainable
position of not being able to meet buildout requirements now
that their cost estimates may have changed.
I want to thank, again, to our witnesses for being with us
today and for the testimony today, and I am going to yield the
rest of my time to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
The security of American communications and information
networks is paramount to national security. It is a field I
know fairly well from my time in the military. But the sword
cuts both ways. As we have seen through the years, certain
foreign adversaries have systematically coerced their equipment
manufacturers to embed back doors and other capabilities into
their products which are later purchased by American companies
and integrated into our networks. No foreign actor should have
the ability to eavesdrop on U.S. citizens or our government and
let alone use these back doors to launch cyber-attacks or
disrupt our communications.
In an effort to help the private sector avoid purchasing or
installing this dangerous equipment, I have worked with the
chairman, Chairman Doyle, to introduce H.R. 4461, the Network
Security Information Sharing Act, which will be part of the
discussion here today. So I look forward to that discussion,
and I yield back to my friend.
Mr. Latta. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Latta follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert E. Latta
Welcome to today's subcommittee hearing to discuss
legislation that seeks to address our network supply chain
security and management of our spectrum resources. Thank you to
our witness panel for being here.
There are several bipartisan bills on today's hearing that
address the challenges we face to ensure our critical
communications infrastructure is secure from vulnerabilities.
I'm especially pleased to have worked with Chairman Doyle on
H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act, to empower our agencies to facilitate
innovative spectrum sharing strategies to more efficiently
using our airwaves. As the executive branch agency principally
responsible for advising the President on spectrum and
telecommunications matters, NTIA should continue to play the
lead role in directing a collective government approach to
managing the Federal Government's access to spectrum resources.
This bill helps empower NTIA to use new tools to meet the
challenge of growing wireless needs in the 21st century.
Today's hearing also features several bills to address
vulnerabilities in our nation's communications networks, such
as the inclusion of unsecure equipment. Many providers'
networks contain gear supplied by suspect foreign carriers;
however, this is only because the provider didn't understand
the associated risks. The bills before us seek to prevent this
type of situation from occurring on a forward-looking basis.
Understandably, these providers are in a period of uncertainty,
and although they may want to do their part to protect national
security, they may need help doing so.
The FCC has also voiced concerns about network security and
proposed prohibiting USF recipients from using controversial
equipment. So, Fund II reverse auction comes to grips with the
buildout requirements accompanying these funds; it is critical
that we work in a bipartisan way to ensure they can revisit how
those conditions impact their winning bid in order to keep
their equipment free from security vulnerabilities. Not only do
we want to prevent Federal funding to pay for gear that may
pose a national security risk, but we do not want winners of
CAF auctions to be put in an unattainable position of not being
able to meet buildout requirements now that their cost
estimates may have changed.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here, and with
that, I yield the remainder of my time to my friend from
Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Pallone, chairman of the full
committee, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Doyle. Today, we are
considering a series of bills to secure America's wireless
future that will ensure that the Government manages the Federal
and commercial spectrum more efficiently to promote innovation
and better serve all Americans. It will also guarantee that our
wireless networks are secure from foreign adversaries that may
wish to spy on Americans or do us harm.
I applaud the work of Chairman Doyle and Ranking Member
Latta introducing the SHARE Act. Their bill will cement the
longstanding policy that our Nation's key agencies, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration and
the Federal Communications Commission, remain responsible for
spectrum policy. These expert agencies can act as impartial
judges to balance the demands and interests of spectrum
stakeholders such as the Department of Defense, the Federal
Aviation Administration, public safety, and commercial
carriers.
At our hearing in July, we heard that the management of the
Federal Government spectrum requires a strong central voice at
NTIA, and I think the SHARE Act does a great deal to help NTIA
meet the mission-critical needs of government agencies in a
more efficient and modern way. The FCC, likewise, must remain
in the driver's seat when it comes to commercial spectrum. And
for that reason, I am pleased the SHARE Act requires the FCC to
look for ways to expand and improve the revolutionary spectrum
sharing techniques being rolled out in the citizens' broadband
radio service.
When it comes to securing these networks from foreign
adversaries, I want to thank Ranking Member Walden and
Representatives Matsui and Guthrie for partnering with me to
introduce the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
Our legislation will prohibit the spending of Federal dollars
on suspect communications equipment and services that undermine
national security. Our bill also establishes a $1 billion
reimbursement program to help small carriers remove compromised
equipment and replace it with secure alternatives.
As we have heard, much of the global supply chain for
telecommunications equipment flows through China at one point
or another. And Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
providers cheaper than nearly everyone else. Although many of
the bigger carriers have avoided these threats, it still is a
significant issue for smaller and more rural carriers who built
their network using suspect equipment.
Communications networks are interconnected, and that means
that one weak link can harm the whole system. We must help
smaller carriers remove suspect equipment for the good of the
entire country. Representatives Kinzinger and Chairman Doyle
also have legislation on this point that would help the Federal
Government better share supply chain risk information with the
communications providers.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I also
wanted to briefly recognize or mention that Dean Brenner on
today's panel, who is a fellow Monmouth, New Jersey, native.
Glad to see you here today. Welcome.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
The topic of today's hearing is important because not only
must we ensure that we allocate our federal spectrum in ways
that match our Government's future wireless needs, but we must
also ensure that once those allocations are set, those systems
are secure. One way that we can make sure that we have
appropriately allocated our nation's airwaves to their best and
highest uses on the federal side is to keep pushing ourselves
to explore ways to use them more efficiently. Part of that
effort must be improving our sharing technologies to advance
and become more efficient and versatile.
We have made great strides, even just this year, on
spectrum sharing. For example, we need to look no further than
the 3.5 gigahertz band, which now has a novel three-tiered
sharing system in place that allows federal and non-federal
users to share a single band, and according to the FCC, will
soon have a spectrum auction that will, for the first time,
make mid-band spectrum available for 5G.
Another great example is the TV white spaces in the 600
megahertz band, which were freed up for unlicensed use in the
Broadcast Incentive Auction. The creative thinking that went
into that innovative allocation made prime low-band spectrum
available for sharing-possibly a critical component of our 5G
future.
Today, we're going to talk about how we can do more
creative thinking on the federal side. Led by the capable folks
at NTIA, I am confident that we can continue to push the
envelope on finding new and innovative ways to share this
valuable federal resource.
As I've said before, spectrum is a bipartisan issue. The
work we are doing in this Committee today will help pave the
way to a spectrum-rich future where spectrum ``crunches'' is a
thing of the past.
But, the full measure of any progress we make in increasing
connectivity and opportunity on our airwaves can only be
realized if American consumers and businesses can count on
secure and reliable service, which is why the Committee has
been hard at work on legislation to secure the nation's
networks.
I want to thank Ranking Member Walden, Congresswoman
Matsui, and Congressman Guthrie for partnering with me to
introduce one of the bills we're discussing today, the Secure
and Trusted Communications Networks Act. This bill establishes
a reimbursement program under the FCC to help communications
providers cover the costs of removing compromised equipment
from their networks and installing more secure alternatives in
its place.
Much of the global supply chain for telecommunications
equipment and services flows through China at one point or
another, and Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
providers cheaper than anywhere else. Although some of the
larger providers have known about and avoided these threats for
some time, it remains a major issue for smaller and more rural
carriers who built their networks using Huawei equipment.
This Committee recognizes there's a premium on security and
that it's a premium worth paying. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about how our bill helps providers ensure
their networks are built with the most secure and reliable
equipment available.
I also want to commend the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, Congressman Latta, for partnering with Chairman
Doyle on another bill before us today, which aims to modernize
and expedite how the Government disseminates important security
information to trusted communications providers.
I look forward to continuing this work with my friend from
Oregon as we move ahead on these important measures, and I
thank the witnesses for being here to help us in that process.
I yield back.
And with that, I yield the balance of my time to Ms.
Matsui.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much. I am pleased that we are
considering H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications
Networks. This bill will create a new fund that provides
financial incentives to small and rural wireless providers to
replace certain equipment of Huawei and ZTE with new equipment
that includes secure hardware and software capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, we must continue to consider policies as per
U.S. leadership and innovation in the 5G race. H.R. 4459 will
help provide additional security for America's
telecommunications providers. Still, more needs to be done with
regard to America's spectrum policy. That includes smart
spectrum policies for both licensed and unlicensed use for 5G
and beyond. We must explore opportunities to option the C-band.
My bill, the WIN 5G Act, strikes the right balance by aiming to
clear at least 300 megahertz of spectrum, and is supported by a
broad range of stakeholders, including public interest groups
and industry stakeholders. I continue to work with Chairman
Doyle on this issue.
Additionally, Congressman Guthrie and I introduced the
SPECTRUM NOW Act, that can provide a pathway to make an
additional 100 megahertz of spectrum available. A balanced
approach to the introduction of wireless services is not only
critical, but necessary for expanding the use in the six
gigahertz band. I also continue to focus on resolving a 20-
year-old debate over the 5.9 gigahertz band. I'm hopeful that
the FCC will consider new rulemaking to address this band soon.
And with that, I yield back to the chairman.
Mr. Doyle. Mr. Pallone yields back. The gentleman yields
back.
It is now my pleasure to recognize who just made his grand
entrance, my good friend, Mr. Walden, ranking member of the
full committee for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On time, on budget
right here.
I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here.
Your insight will be another important input to the process we
began last Congress on how best to secure our communications
networks. Our Nation's telecommunications infrastructure
represents the lifeblood of preserving a free and open society,
as we all know, and any effort to disrupt that infrastructure
should be taken as an effort to undermine our liberties.
The bills before us today deliver on a commitment we began
last Congress. That commitment is to have a bipartisan process
to mitigate these threats and to secure this sector going
forward. Moreover, I know Chairman Pallone, and I agree that
the Energy and Commerce Committee is singularly able to speak
to these topics in the Congress. And with both sides working
together with stakeholders ranging from industry to civil
society, we can do so successfully.
Everyone in this room can agree on the importance of
securing our Nation's communications networks from vulnerable
equipment. In fact, we heard testimony over two years ago on
the vulnerabilities that exist in these networks. We also heard
of the impact on rural providers who may be more
disproportionately impacted by calls to replace existing
equipment as they seek to stay in their budgets, not to mention
within Federal programs purchasing guidance to deploy the most
effective products.
Unfortunately, our adversaries have no reservations about
one way or another subsidizing their pet companies, and thus,
they become attractive options for the budget-sensitive
providers. I have seen how small broadband providers in my own
state are trying to make a go of deploying broadband networks
and stretching limited funds to ensure they connect with the
most constituents in some of the hardest-to-reach places. You
can certainly find those in my district. Many of these
providers don't have an army of consultants with the necessary
security clearances to fully appreciate the vulnerabilities
that do exist and how to inform their purchasing decisions.
For those who receive Federal support to build out
broadband networks in unserved areas, like many of the
providers in my district, we cannot set them up for failure by
requiring them to select the lowest cost equipment option; only
then for Uncle Sam to later say Oh, by the way, well, not that
lowest cost equipment, so we need to get this right.
H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act,
would facilitate exactly the type of information sharing needed
by rural providers that have vulnerable equipment in their
networks. This was the centerpiece of our bipartisan
discussions in the last Congress, and I am pleased to see this
concept taking shape in today's hearing.
H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
Act, which I am an original co-sponsor of, would further
address this problem by setting up a reimbursement program to
rip and replace vulnerable equipment from these networks. But
we still have some details to work out on the way to markup the
program is modeled on the FCC so far successful broadcast
incentive repack reimbursement program. We need to get this
right. It is critical to our national security, but also to our
competitiveness as we start rolling out new technologies.
This brings me to another topic that I raised in our July
spectrum hearing how Russia is seeking to influence our public
discourse on the subject of deployment of next-generation
networks. I know Congresswoman Eshoo and Congresswoman DeGette
also shared my concern at that hearing. As we continue our work
to close the digital divide and lead the race to 5G, we must be
prepared to prevent threats from those seeking to diminish
America's standing in the world.
Just this past week, my staff saw this card which was
posted on a bulletin board by the Rayburn cafeteria. Now, the
details are pretty scant; who is behind this campaign and just
lists a litany of issues why 5G is supposedly bad.
It collects numerous stories around the country on things
wrong with 5G. Ironically, one of the stories is about
community health fears stopping a 5G rollout in Australia,
while at the same time, noting that the World Health
Organization stated there should not be any health risks from
5G. And that Cornell University research showed 5G networks to
be safer than previous networks.
So we have to be vigilant. We have to be vigilant about
efforts to influence our thinking in this space, and I hope the
committee will look ahead at other efforts being pursued to
stifle our internet architecture.
I look forward to hearing about the other bills put forward
by our members today, Mr. Chairman, as thoughtful approaches to
these challenges. So thanks again for having this hearing, and
I do hope the full committee, or the oversight committee, or
this committee, will do some looking into what is being pushed
out there in the public side and who is behind it. So we need
the facts.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses to
this hearing. Your insight will be another important input in
the process we began last Congress to secure our communications
networks.
Our nation's telecommunications infrastructure represents
the lifeblood of preserving a free and open society, and any
effort to disrupt that infrastructure should be taken as an
effort to undermine our liberties.
The bills before us today deliver on a commitment we began
last Congress to have a bipartisan process to mitigate these
threats and secure this sector going forward. Moreover, I know
Chairman Pallone, and I agree that the Energy and Commerce
Committee is singularly able to speak to these topics in the
Congress. And with both sides working together with
stakeholders ranging from industry to civil society, we can do
so successfully.
Everyone in this room can agree on the importance of
securing our nation's communication networks from vulnerable
equipment. In fact, we heard testimony over two years ago on
the vulnerabilities that may exist in our networks. We have
also heard of the impact on rural providers who may be more
disproportionately impacted by calls to replace existing
equipment as they seek to stay within their budgets, not to
mention within Federal programs' purchasing guidance to deploy
the most effective products. Unfortunately, our adversaries
have no reservations about subsidizing their pet companies and
thus become attractive options for the budget sensitive
providers.
I've seen how small broadband providers in my own state are
trying to make a go of deploying broadband networks and
stretching limited funds to ensure they connect the most
constituents in some of the hardest to reach places. Many of
these providers don't have an army of consultants with the
necessary security clearances to understand what
vulnerabilities exist and how to inform their purchasing
decisions. For those who receive Federal support to build out
broadband networks in unserved areas-like, many of the
providers in my district-we cannot set them up for failure by
requiring them to select the lowest cost equipment option, only
then for Uncle Sam to later say, ``well, not that lowest cost
equipment.''
H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act,
would facilitate exactly the type of information sharing needed
by rural providers that have vulnerable equipment in their
networks. This was the centerpiece of our bipartisan
discussions last Congress, and I'm pleased to see this concept
at today's hearing.
H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
Act, of which I am an original cosponsor of, would further
address this problem by setting up a reimbursement program to
``rip and replace'' vulnerable equipment from those networks.
While we still have some details to work out on the way to
markup, the program is modeled on the FCC's so-far-successful
broadcast incentive repack reimbursement program. We need to
get this right; it is critical to our national security but
also our competitiveness as we start rolling out new
technologies.
This brings me to another topic that I raised at our July
spectrum hearing--of how Russia is seeking to influence our
public discourse on the subject of deployment of next
generation networks. I know Congresswoman Eshoo and
Congresswoman DeGette also shared my concern in this regard. As
we continue our work to close the digital divide and lead the
race to 5G, we must be prepared to prevent threats from those
seeking to diminish America's standing in the world. This past
week, my staff saw this card posted to a bulletin board by the
Rayburn cafeteria--details are pretty scant who is behind this
campaign that just lists a litany of issues and why 5G is
supposedly bad. It collects numerous stories around the country
on things wrong with 5G--ironically one of the stories is about
community health fears stopping a 5G rollout in Australia while
at the same time noting that the World Health Organization
stated there should not be any health risks from 5G, and that
Cornell University research showed 5G networks to be safer than
previous networks--So, we must be vigilant about efforts to
influence our thinking in this space and I hope the committee
will look ahead at other efforts are being pursued to stifle
our Internetarchitecture.
I look forward to hearing about the other bills put forward
by our members today as other thoughtful approaches to these
challenges.
Thank you again for holding this hearing today.
Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman yields
back. The Chair would like to remind Members that pursuant to
committee rules, all Members' written opening statements shall
be made part of the record.
So I would like to introduce our witnesses for today's
hearing. Ms. Bobbie Stempfley, Managing Director, CERT
Division, Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon.
Thank you for being here today. Mr. John Nettles, the president
of Pine Belt Wireless. Mr. Nettles, thank you for being here.
Mr. Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge.
Harold, thank you again. And Mr. Dean Brenner, Senior Vice
President, Spectrum Strategy and Tech Policy for Qualcomm,
Incorporated. Mr. Brenner, thank you. We want to thank all of
you for joining us today. We look forward to your testimony.
At this time, the Chair will now recognize each witness for
5 minutes to provide their opening statement. Before we begin,
I would like to explain the lighting system. In front of you is
a series of lights. The light will initially be green at the
start of your opening statement. It will turn yellow when you
have 1-minute remaining. Please begin to wrap up your remarks
at that point, and when the light turns red, we are just going
to cut your microphones off.
So Ms. Stempfley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF BOBBIE STEMPFLEY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CERT
DIVISION, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIVERSITY; JOHN NETTLES, PRESIDENT, PINE BELT WIRELESS; HAROLD
FELD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE; DEAN R. BRENNER,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, SPECTRUM STRATEGY AND TECH POLICY,
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
STATEMENT OF BOBBIE STEMPFLEY
Ms. Stempfley. Thank you.
Mr. Doyle. Hit your microphone button there.
Ms. Stempfley. There we go. One additional light. Thank you
very much.
Good morning. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, members
of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
participate in this hearing today and speak on supply chain
risks in the telecommunications industry.
As has been said, I have been a public servant working in
information technology focused on the application of
information and technology to national security and public
safety missions for more than 25 years. I am currently serving
as the managing director at the CERT Division at Carnegie
Mellon University Software Engineering Institute. We focus on
partnering with government industry, non-government
organizations, and academia doing applied research to improve
security and resilience of computer systems, information, and
networks.
The telecommunications sector is a global system made of
companies, suppliers, and users, that make communications
possible. Because the telecom industry is responsible for the
flow of information, it is inextricably linked to how we work,
play, and live, and play a central role in the fundamental
operations of society from, business to government to families.
The explosion of devices, new methods of computing, IoT devices
within the infrastructure have only increased the attack
surface; therefore, the responsibility of telecoms to
participate in the overall protection and defense efforts.
Ultimately, the supply chain for the telecommunications
industry is vital to achieving security at scale. Historically,
checks and balances in the supply chain have been largely
procedural such as licenses, warranties, regulations, legal
resources, supplier reputation and have reasonably assured
against defects and service failures.
Unfortunately, these controls are increasingly inadequate
when applied to global supply chains for the complex
information and communications technology and technology-based
services that underpin critical capabilities in this industry.
An ever-expanding supply chain means that external
dependencies must be rigorously measured and strategically
managed for an organization to remain resilient. This includes
addressing key areas in manufacturing and integration of the
supply chains, in service supply chains, and in software supply
chains. The ramifications of an attack anywhere on the
telecommunications infrastructure could spread well beyond the
point of origin and have the potential to affect entire
nations, businesses, and private citizens. We must address not
only the hardware but the software and services as well.
The bills today, including the Secure and Trusted
Communications Network Act of 2019, and the Network Security
Information Sharing Act of 2019, are a very good first step in
this security.
As the appropriate entities begin to implement supply chain
security, encouraging resilience as a criterion at every stage
of development and supply of information and communications
technology must continue to be the forward-leaning focus of the
software and supply chain assurance efforts within government
and industry.
Attacks against our supply chains unite acquirers and
suppliers in search of scalable means for securing information
about ICT risks that arise through malice or negligence.
Suppliers and acquirers need standardized methods for conveying
information about common issues related to both the hardware
and software aspects of ICT, especially regarding non-
conforming products that contain counterfeit, tainted, or
defective components and can cause subsequent harm.
Fundamentally, the outcomes and risk factors we are seeking
to manage are simple, even though the methods to accomplish
them are not. First, suppliers must follow practices that
reduce supply chain risks; second, products provided by
suppliers are acceptably secure; third, the methods of
distribution and/or transmission of the product to the
purchaser guard against tampering; and finally, the product or
service is used and sustained with acceptable security.
The acquisition security framework and the external
dependencies management element of CERT's cyber resilience
management model, which was developed and validated through
research done by CERT researchers, demonstrates that the
following practice areas are elements of a mature supply chain
risk management effort: Establishment and management of key
relationships, engineering practices, secure product operations
of sustainment, and an understanding and management of supply
chain technologies, and overall infrastructure.
As private and public functions grow ever more inseparable
from the information technology systems that support them,
healthy public/private partnerships become even more necessary.
To protect this infrastructure against growing and evolving
cyber threats requires a layered approach. The Government's
role in this effort is to share information and encourage
enhanced security and resilience while identifying and
addressing gaps not filled by the marketplace.
Information pertinent to the supply chain such as
vulnerabilities, attack factors, supplier security information
should be shared along with mitigation plans to those who need
it. Actionable and usable information sharing must recognize
the differing capabilities and roles of all participants and
are key to successful sharing programs. Lastly, we must guard
against the false choice between security and innovation. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stempfley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Nettles, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN NETTLES
Mr. Nettles. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify about securing communications networks and the support
needed to keep rural America connected.
Pine Belt is a family-owned-and-operated company
established by my father in the late 1950s. Over the years
since, we have worked hard to keep pace with technology and to
keep the company in the family. We launched our wireless
network in 1995, with three analog sites covering two counties.
We have grown that to 65 sites and now provide 4GLTE across
five counties, including many areas where ours is the only
signal present. Not only do our customers depend on our
network, but on an average day, we provide service, wireless
voice, and data connectivity to as many as 30,000 visitors,
most of whom are just passing through.
Pine Belt fully supports efforts to harden today's telecom
networks for robust cybersecurity and to protect against
potential national security threats. Yet, while the industry
buzzes with excitement of the great things that will come from
5G network buildout, we and many other small companies across
the country have been virtually frozen since early last year by
the security concerns of our currently deployed equipment.
Pine Belt's modern network was rebuilt just a few years ago
with equipment from ZTE through our participation in the
Mobility Fund Phase I process, a reverse auction in which
winning bidders were those showing the lowest cost to serve the
greatest number of road miles. Our main performance criterion
was to provide as much coverage as possible as inexpensively as
possible. We solicited quotes from five different vendors, and
ZTE's bid was by far the lowest.
With no restrictions at the time on the use of ZTE
equipment and facing several deployment challenges, our
selection was a no-brainer. The choice we made not only enabled
us to meet our mandated MF I buildout requirements, but also
provided us with a reliable platform on which we could quickly
deploy 4G LTE and VoLTE. Despite the challenges of our low-
density footprint, we were optimistic that this experience
would allow us to provide the latest services to our community
for the balance of the current technology generation and also
provide a solid foundation for the next.
Unfortunately, as the uncertainties have grown regarding
whether we will be able to continue to use ZTE equipment, my
optimism has greatly diminished. At a time when we should be
focused on expansion plans and upgrades, we are, instead,
concerned with whether we will be able to continue to provide
any services at all. Such a fate would squander 20 years of
network expansion and over $20 million in wireless investments.
We find ourselves in this predicament more or less because
under the Mobility Fund program, we simply did our best to do
what the Government required of us, to bring service to our
neighbors.
With the news of the bills being discussed today, I can
sincerely report that my optimism is returning. I am confident
that by working with the small affected carriers, Congress and
the appropriate Federal agencies will be able to establish
reasonable and sound policies that provide the essential
financial resources needed for those carriers to secure their
networks.
The legislative efforts pending before this subcommittee
take significant steps to plot a path to the future by
establishing the Secure and Trusted Communications Network
reimbursement program, determining a list of covered
communications equipment or services, mitigating administrative
burdens on small rural carriers, targeting network risk, and
supporting information sharing. As Congress acts on these
critical issues, it is important that solutions are implemented
in a timely manner to support national security, they are
executed in the right order to maintain services, and that
sufficient resources are allocated to get it right.
With several efforts already underway, including through
the executive order and pending proceedings before the FCC to
prohibit use of covered equipment, there is no time to waste in
funding the replacement equipment. And while many have referred
to the process as rip and replace, I say that perhaps we really
need to be talking replace and then rip. Otherwise, services
will, indeed, be disrupted.
Finally, as Commissioner Starks noted in a public statement
last week, this is a national problem that deserves a national
solution, and we shouldn't expect small carriers who acted
legally and in good faith to replace their insecure equipment
on their own. It is, therefore, critical that Congress acts
swiftly to provide resources for replacement of covered
equipment, particularly for the small rural carriers who are
unable to cover the cost without assistance. I believe the
legislation before the subcommittee today accomplishes these
things goals, and I applaud your work to legislate to secure
our wireless future. I genuinely appreciate the opportunity to
share a little of the story of my family's company, and I
welcome any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Nettles follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Nettles.
Mr. Feld, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD FELD
Mr. Feld. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, thank you
for inviting me here this morning. I applaud the subcommittee
for moving forward with the set of bills designed to promote
innovation and security in 5G networks. I want to focus on the
following bills: The SHARE Act, the Network Security
Information Sharing Act, the Secure and Trusted Communications
Network Act, and the E-FRONTIER Act.
The SHARE Act. Everyone here is familiar with the problem
of our increasingly crowded airwaves. Our efforts to find
spectrum for 5G deployments have already caused conflict and
uncertainty among Federal and commercial users. Investing in
the development of spectrum sharing technology is a necessary
investment to resolving these problems going forward.
In addition to research and sharing by Federal users with
other Federal users, the study of the CBRS band will contribute
enormously to our understanding of how to create a win for all
spectrum users. The development process for CBRS balance the
interests and concerns of multiple stakeholders, and has
attracted early investment from licensed as well as unlicensed
users, all while protecting Federal interests.
To meet our spectrum needs going forward; we need to set
aside our old feuds and embrace systems that accommodate
everyone and maximize spectrum use. The CBRS process tells us
we can do it, and we should build on this success.
Importantly, we should not think about the SHARE Act as
simply a means of freeing up more federal spectrum for
commercial use. The technologies developed should be seen as
the first step in rethinking Federal spectrum management to
move from the current stale and static system of specific
assignments to a dynamic sharing system that allows the Federal
Government to leverage economies of scale and provide Federal
agencies with the spectrums they need to meet their
responsibilities.
NSIS and STCNA, these are both good ideas to address the
critical issue of supply chain security in U.S. communications
networks. With regard to the Secure and Trusted Communications
Network Act, we have suggested slight modifications that would
further clarify that there are a mechanism so covered entities
that cured their supply chain security risk can be removed from
the list. Although nothing in the statute as written prevents
development of such a process, it is always best to clarify
these things to avoid confusion.
We also suggest that the STCNA be expanded to include
purchases made after August 2018 to ensure small carriers can
be reimbursed for the purchase of equipment that was not listed
at the time of purchase. Network security is a shared
responsibility and benefits us all. These changes would
affirmatively serve the public interest and protect national
security. We look forward to continuing to work with the
committee on these issues.
E-FRONTIER. It is often repeated that the most important
rule of legislating is first, do no harm. The sweeping language
used in the statute creates potential barriers to Federal
provision of emergency communications services or ways to
leverage existing Federal assets in rural communities to
address the digital divide. A proposal does not need to
actually violate the law to cause delay or prevent needed
action.
For example, if the Federal Government were trying to make
Federal fiber available to commercial carriers in the immediate
aftermath of a natural disaster, no one would want to introduce
delay and uncertainty while legal counsel debate whether this
would be a wholesale network under the Act. There is no plan to
build a national network of any sort, nor could any future
administration do so without an appropriation from Congress.
Given that enactment of E-FRONTIER provides no additional
benefit to offset the risks of unintended consequences, we
strongly recommend that this bill not move forward.
Thank you very much. I look forward your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Feld follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brenner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DEAN R. BRENNER
Mr. Brenner. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, and
members of the subcommittee, my name is Dean Brenner, and I am
here today on behalf of Qualcomm, which was founded in a San
Diego living room but is now the world's largest supplier of
chips, an entire modem RF system for smartphones and other
wireless devices, and the world's leading inventor and licensor
of new wireless technologies.
The technologies we develop, especially 5G, and the chips
we design all depend on one key input controlled by the
Government: spectrum. As this subcommittee has recognized,
enabling a steady stream of new spectrum, low, mid, and high
band, licensed, unlicensed, and shared, is essential for the
rapid broad 5G rollout. We are working on 5G at a feverish
pace, but our work depends on the continued steady stream of
new spectrum, so thank you for continuing to make spectrum a
high priority.
5G has now launched on four continents. More than 30 5G
networks, including those of all four U.S. national operators,
have launched and are expanding. Over 20 manufacturers are
selling or developing 5G devices, more than six times as many
as in 4G's first year. Qualcomm's chips are in more than 150 5G
devices which have been or soon will be launched, including
phones, hot spots, and fixed wireless devices. Our chips
support both sub-7 gigahertz and millimeter wave, and the U.S.
was the first country to launch 5G in both sub-7 gigahertz and
millimeter wave. 5G is delivering far better mobile broadband
at a much lower cost per bit. Let me explain several 5G game
changers which will launch soon and will further accelerate the
5G rollout.
Dynamic spectrum sharing, or DSS, enables an operator to
run 5G in spectrum already in use for 4G. Instead of having to
empty a 4G spectrum band before launching 5G, which could take
10 years or more, DSS will enable a band to be used
simultaneously for both 4G and 5G. Enhanced millimeter wave
will enable 5G fixed wireless to be used for rural broadband.
Qualcomm has developed new antenna modules which enable 5G
fixed wireless service one mile away from a rural base station,
covering a much larger area than anyone thought possible.
A new version of 5G, optimized for unlicensed spectrum,
will enable 5G to be launched for ultra low latency, ultra
reliable 5G in factories, warehouses, and other venues. This
technology, along with new forms of WiFi that Qualcomm is
developing, will be deployed in new six gigahertz unlicensed
spectrum now under consideration by the FCC. Qualcomm's 5G
small cell chips will expand 5G to more people and more
locations, particularly indoors, using millimeter wave.
Last, cellular vehicle to everything or C-V2X technology,
first with 4G and then 5G, enable cars to communicate with
other cars and infrastructure with much greater range and
reliability than is possible with older DSRC technology. For C-
V2X to be it deployed, the FCC must waive or change its rules
for 5.9 gigahertz, which only allows deployment of DSRC.
Let me turn to 5G security, which has been a high priority
for Qualcomm ever since we started working on 5G even though we
don't manufacture core network equipment. Qualcomm has worked
on 5G security internally with many other companies and in the
3GPP global standards group, which sets 5G standards.
In addition, for many years now, Qualcomm has been an
active participant and leader in CSRIC, the FCC's Communication
Security Reliability & Operability Council. Most recently, we
appreciated the bipartisan May 9 letter sent from the chairman
and ranking members of this subcommittee and the full committee
to FCC Chairman Pai asking that CSRIC examine 5G security.
Subsequently, one of our engineers, Dr. Farrokh Khatibi,
was appointed to lead the CSRIC working group on managing
security risks and emerging 5G implementations. The members of
this group include experts from DHS, a county government, a
non-profit, government contractors, network operators, tech
companies, standards groups, and a trade association. We look
forward to advancing 5G security through this group.
Finally, Qualcomm has been working on spectrum sharing for
many, many years. We have worked directly with NTIA, DoD, and
other government agencies, as well as with private sector
colleagues. Often, a spectrum band analyzed for sharing
involves multiple cabinet departments and multiple entities in
those departments.
Over the years, NTIA has played a coordinating role of
gathering technical input from government players, working with
industry, leading joint public/private technical work, and
speaking with a single voice for the executive branch to make
greater progress toward sharing. This process culminated most
recently in the initial commercial deployments in the CBRS
band, a great development to increase the amount of mid-band
spectrum for 4G and 5G.
We are very pleased with the heightened interest in sharing
across the Federal Government, and we look forward to
continuing to work through this process to enable more
intensive spectrum sharing. Thank you very much, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Brenner follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Brenner.
So we have concluded our openings. We now move to member
questions. Each member will have 5 minutes to ask questions of
our witness. I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stempfley, what risks are being posed by untrusted
equipment in our Nation's telecommunications networks, and what
kind of things can hostile foreign actors do if they have
access to that equipment?
Ms. Stempfley. I want to thank you for the question. So as
I said in my testimony, the telecommunications infrastructure
provides great interconnectivity, and actually serves as the
foundation of many other--many elements of life. It also has
cascading dependency with other physical infrastructures and,
therefore, presents a key area of focus.
The supply chain concerns are equally within that--are
difficult to identify, and could provide a great deal of access
not just to the environment, the services provided, but the
management infrastructure underneath. So I think it goes
without saying that they are of great concern for us to
understand.
Mr. Doyle. Yes. I mean, we have heard reports that hostile
foreign actors are accessing our Nation's electrical grid and
infrastructure. I mean, what other critical sectors could they
access if they accessed a carrier's network through compromised
equipment?
Ms. Stempfley. Sir, unfortunately, the work that we do at
CERT couldn't give you a clear answer to that activity. The
piece, though, that I think we all understand is the
telecommunications infrastructure, the electric sector, the
financial sector are all interdependent. I think that speaks to
the potential cascading effects.
Mr. Doyle. Mr. Feld, tell me, what are the benefits of
establishing a strategy for the Federal Government to develop
these test beds for more efficient spectrum sharing, and what
benefits do you see applying the lessons we learned in the CBRS
band and other Federal bands?
Mr. Feld. Thank you. The need for more sharing is obvious,
but the benefits of sharing go beyond simply ensuring that the
Federal Government can maintain its current functions. The
dynamic spectrum sharing and other technologies that Mr.
Brenner referred to allow the Federal Government potentially,
for the first time to act as a single spectrum user rather than
atomizing spectrum allocations in our current system.
Additionally, the CBRS band demonstrates the importance of
accommodating Federal users, licensed protected users, and
unlicensed users, which has been the holy grail of spectrum
policy. The ability to let everybody do what they need to do
and what they want to do is the ultimate goal of spectrum
policy, and these sharing technologies will make that possible.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Feld.
Mr. Nettles, how do you see the Network Security
Information Sharing Act benefiting your company going forward
and mitigating risk to your supply chain?
Mr. Nettles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It would be of
tremendous benefit to us. We are a pretty small company. We
have 50 employees to cover all lines of business, about half of
which are dedicated to our wireless network. I mean, it is
difficult, to say the least, to keep up with technology coming
out, and when it is not shared openly, you don't know what you
don't know. It is not that many crossroads, unfortunately, and
that is kind of where we found ourselves a few years back in
our ZTE selection.
Mr. Doyle. Yes. Ms. Stempfley, do you believe the Network
Security Information Sharing Act that I have introduced with
Representative Kinzinger will help our smaller telecom
providers receive important information related to supply chain
security threats, and what are the challenges that you have
seen in communicating these types of threats to companies that
don't have the resources and personnel of a tier-one carrier?
Ms. Stempfley. I think the focus on ensuring that
information is actionable and usable to all parties is a really
important part of the bill; and of any information sharing
related program. And so, the key thing that we have found, that
I have found in building these sharing activities is
recognizing the capacity that the organization has to take
action. So is it clear what they should do, and is it
communicated to them in a language and in a method they can
actually physically receive it in?
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
I am going to yield 25 seconds back as an example for the
rest of the committee. I now yield to my good friend, Mr.
Latta.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again,
thanks to our witnesses for being with us today.
Mr. Brenner, if I could start my questions with you,
please. The U.S. wireless industry has prospered due to market-
based technological innovations and policies that incentivize
growth. We have led the way with spectrum auctions in the early
1990s and, more recently, with the successful AWS 1 and 3
auctions. How important are the tools given to NTIA in the
SHARE Act for continued U.S. wireless leadership over the next
decade?
Mr. Brenner. So, thank you for that question, Congressman
Latta. The tools are vital, but I would suggest--so the list of
the tools, which is Section 106(b)(2)(b) of the bill, needs to
be added to include two more, and let me explain them.
The first we call ``look before talk.'' So today, the way
an unlicensed channel would be shared, if the four of us on
this panel were sharing, I would get to use it one-fourth of
the time, and I would have to be quiet the other three-fourths;
the same for Mr. Feld, same for Mr. Nettles, same for Ms.
Stempfley. But with 5G, we have this fast new radio, and we are
transmitting in highly directional manner, and we have
demonstrated this technology.
As long as all four of us on the panel, each is able to
detect in what direction the other is going to be using the
spectrum, all four of us could use the spectrum at once,
thereby dramatically increasing the utilization for everyone.
So we call that ``look before talk.'' The technical name for
it, I apologize, is coordinated multi-point.
The second tool that is vital is synchronization. So if we
all synchronized our watches while we were sharing the channel,
because of the time-based aspect of spectrum sharing, if we
were in sync with one another, we would minimize the amount of
time, of dead time on the channel. Again, all of us would be
able to use the channel more, which would be a benefit to
everyone.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
Ms. Stempfley, with your prior experience in the Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications at the DHS, would you discuss
how H.R. 4461 would function in the system with existing
executive branch workrooms to facilitate information sharing
with small rural providers?
Ms. Stempfley. Yes. Thank you very much. I truly appreciate
the focus on the small rural provider-related activity. It is
an important part of our Nation's infrastructure, the tier.
Within the information sharing programs that exist, sharing
typically happens between a government entity with a
consolidated group, whether it be an ISAC, or a trade
association, and then the information is further disseminated
from there. I think the way that this bill would work would be
to ensure that the complete path exists and is successful, so
that the end provider not only can receive the information, but
then can provide the feedback back into the Government that the
full set of activities has occurred, and I appreciate that in
the bill.
Mr. Latta. Thank you. Let me follow up with another
question. H.R. 4459 calls for disposal of suspect equipment. Do
you have any concerns about this equipment being resold on the
secondary market? And just also, and from a technological
perspective, could this equipment be sanitized and resold, or
should we just destroy it entirely?
Ms. Stempfley. There are many nuances within your question,
sir, so I appreciate the depth of it. There is, I think, always
a concern. If you listen to the many areas you must address in
the supply chain , from relationship management to engineering
to operations practices, there is always a concern that
equipment that is vulnerable could be used in another place,
and that should be addressed directly and so the idea of how to
either sanitize or destroy the equipment is an important
question.
It is unclear whether it will be sanitizable. It really
depends on what the risk within the supply chain that you are
dealing with. In some instances, you can do something as simple
as change software or firmware. In other instances, it can be
more profound as an engineering flaw, and that would need a
greater, a more severe response.
Mr. Latta. Let me just follow up real quickly with that,
because when you are talking about, you know, how one would be
able to do it, what would be the expertise that one would have
to have to be able to make sure that it is totally sanitized,
then?
Ms. Stempfley. I believe you would need both network
expertise, security, cybersecurity expertise, and some level of
software programming, software and hardware programming
expertise in order to ensure it.
Mr. Latta. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the last 17 seconds and also
submit my questions to the witnesses to be answered later.
Thank you.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Latta. Another good example from
the leadership of the committee.
Mr. McNerney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McNerney. I thank the chairman for his leadership here,
and I thank the witnesses.
Mr. Nettles, I represent a district that has a lot of rural
areas, and I believe that the wireless carriers would agree
with you about the need for additional resources to replace
some of this equipment. Do you think that the high-cost program
under the universal service fund has contributed to these
problems, and if so, could you explain that a little?
Mr. Nettles. I most definitely think it contributed to it.
The direction seems a little bit askew to the policy objectives
of providing the most service to as many people everywhere as
you can. These areas that are generally the least or most
underserved, those that lack economies of scale, and so, you
know, the abandonment of the notion of a rate of return seems a
little bit counterintuitive or backward.
So, you know, to say what is the least amount of money--you
know, I want you to go serve this area that is already
uneconomical to serve for the least amount of money that you
will take to do it just doesn't quite add up to me.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Ms. Stempfley, it is clear that a major factor in the
problems we face today is the cheapest equipment has led to the
equipment with the weakest security, and we are just seeing
that over and over. How do we go about ensuring that in the
future, that equipment is more affordable, the secure equipment
is more affordable?
Ms. Stempfley. You have hit upon one of the most difficult
challenges in security, and that is, trying to ensure that we
understand what security requirements exist; we engineer them
in from the beginning. We talk a lot about the fact that
organizations have accepted a security debt. That debt is
handed to them when they purchase insecure components where
security was not considered from the beginning. So, bringing
those requirements into the engineering and design phase is the
most important way to increase----
Mr. McNerney. That could make us, our equipment more
competitive with, say, Huawei and ZTE. Thank you.
Do you agree, Mr. Feld?
Mr. Feld. Yes. I think the problem here is as other people
have focused on the economies of scale and the ability of
foreign----
Mr. McNerney. Would you talk in the microphone a little
bit?
Mr. Feld. Sorry. Yes. I agree that the cost is a big
concern. We need to make sure that security is affordable for
everyone. If we do not take steps to try to equalize the
playing field for countries like China that can subsidize
insecure equipment, or have their own economies of scale,
ultimately, it is consumers that will pay the cost either
needing to buy higher-priced equipment or from insecure
networks.
Mr. McNerney. Earlier, you were singing the praises sharing
spectrum--spectrum sharing among Federal users as well as non-
Federal users. Are there opportunities for this model to work
elsewhere, for example, between commercially licensed and
unlicensed users?
Mr. Feld. I believe there are a lot of opportunities that
can be explored here. One of the important elements of CBRS is
called user share, which means if the licensed provider is not
actually using the spectrum capacity in an area, then somebody
else can. When the licensee is ready to deploy, then the
unlicensed equipment will stop working because of the spectrum
access system. So the spectrum can be in productive use all the
time, and the license provider can decide when it is
appropriate to deploy, but we don't have to have rural areas
captive to build out in the urban areas first. We can have
local providers deploy using the sharing concepts.
Mr. McNerney. Well, why isn't sharing enough spectrum for
unlicensed services would help close the digital divide? How
can that help close the digital divide?
Mr. Feld. Well, we have a number of local providers who are
small businesses, wireless ISPs, or WISPs, who use right now
the unlicensed spectrum to provide because that equipment is
affordable and available, and because they are in areas that
the larger licensed carriers simply don't want to serve. They
don't provide enough rate of return. But these guys who are
actually part of the community and small businesses can make it
work if we allow them to make it work. Giving them access to
this additional spectrum capacity will be a huge boost in their
ability to provide service in these rural areas.
Mr. McNerney. And before I close, I just want to make a
plug for the Digital Equity Act, which I just introduced
yesterday, and broadband adoption.
Mr. Feld. And which we publicly acknowledge and thank you
very much and fully support.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
committee, Mr. Walden.
Mr. Walden. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thanks again to
all of our witnesses.
Mr. Nettles, H.R. 4459 calls for the reimbursement program
to be completed within a year. With your staffing and the funds
suggested in the draft, how confident are you that you could
replace all your ZTE equipment in that timeline?
Mr. Nettles. Mr. Walden, thank you for that question. It is
going to be a challenge. There is no other way to put it. A
year--you know, I guess it is sort of--in part, sort of depends
on when is day zero in that process. You know, if we have got--
I believe there was also a provision that gave the FCC up to a
year to establish what was actually on the equipment. At this
stage of the game, without knowing, you know, which of the
components within the network actually will have to be
replaced, it would be difficult--if it involved both the RAN
and our core; I would say it is virtually impossible to do it
within a year without just a concentrated effort from
suppliers, you know, the----
Mr. Walden. Do you think there would be equipment
shortages, labor shortages? I mean, we have been through a
couple of these types of transitions, you know, with the
repack, broadcasters and all, and then you give them 39 months,
and everybody rushes out to get it done.
Mr. Nettles. Labor shortages would probably be the most
probable situation.
Mr. Walden. Right. If we aren't able to address this
uncertainty and provide relief to providers, especially when
they used Mobility Fund-1 money to build a network, what could
happen? What should we be aware of? Could this lead to a loss
in 911 coverage in some areas if providers like you are the
only provider in that area?
Mr. Nettles. Most definitely. I mean, if we are required to
rip it out first and then put in the replacement equipment, I
mean, it is--without sounding, you know, it would be like
selling your car before you buy your new one. You are going to
be walking.
Mr. Walden. Got it.
Mr. Brenner, I want to come to you with a question on
spectrum management, H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act. As a company
that sees every angle in this whole wireless debate, from
licensed spectrum used in 5G to the unlicensed spectrum that
will offload a lot of traffic to the shared spectrum of Federal
users, how important is it that NTIA have full visibility and
control over Federal access to spectrum in order to gain the
most efficiencies while still meeting the missions of the
agencies?
Mr. Brenner. Thank you for that question, Congressman
Walden. It is extremely important. You know, NTIA was created
in the late 1970s because each Federal agency just had its own
spectrum system, and there was no single coordinator. But you
know, for sure, we would not have been able to achieve the
success with the CBRS band without having NTIA play that role.
Now, as you mentioned, you know, as Qualcomm, we work with
everyone. As I mentioned in my testimony, it is great to hear
that the Defense Department really has a revolutionary attitude
about spectrum sharing, but these are very complicated
situations. So in the two bands that are mentioned in the
SHARED Act, one of them, seven gigahertz, has 8,700 Federal
assignments of spectrum. The 3.1 to 3.5 band has 450
assignments of spectrum. So NTIA, in August, sent a memo to the
Federal agencies. Tell us. We have got all these assignments.
Who is actually using the spectrum? So there has to be a single
voice. It has to be NTIA.
Mr. Walden. A clearinghouse. Somebody was overseeing it,
yes. And I won't put you on the spot. I don't have to.
You know, we are in this bit of a struggle right now where
DoD, at least allegedly, wants to grab more control over
management of spectrum, and some of us believe that is sort of
an agency grab away from NTIA. We witnessed this in the last
Congress when they wanted to avoid FDA approval of drugs and
medical devices for battlefield needs because they were
irritated with the slowness in one approval of one product,
which we got resolved, but they wanted to go be their own FDA,
and I just think it is bad public policy.
You don't have to respond to that because you work with all
of them. But I think we are--if there are a couple things that
brings us together as Republicans and Democrats on this
subcommittee, this is one of them, a couple of them, and so it
is something we care a lot about.
Finally, you know, Mr. Chairman, in light of the votes on
the floor coming, I will yield back. But again, thank you to
all of you for your testimony. It is most helpful.
Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Veasey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I really
appreciate it, and happy that we are here today to talk about
this very important subject. I would like to thank our
witnesses for coming here to share your experiences and
expertise as we talk about this very critically important
infrastructure, this wireless infrastructure, that is really
important for our future.
And I wanted to ask Ms. Stempfley, in your testimony, you
discuss the need to manage risks across the entire global chain
regarding wireless infrastructure, including manufacturing and
integrated supply chains.
Currently, the only other major suppliers of 5G networking
equipment are Huawei, ZTE, Nokia, Ericsson, and all of those
are foreign companies. As I understand it, there are no major
U.S. producers of this telecom technology.
The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act will
mandate that no Federal funds can be used for communications
equipment and service that pose an unacceptable risk to
national security. Given that language and the lack of U.S.
producers of telecom equipment, what manufacturer can we use to
ensure that we won't face the same issue later after the risky
equipment has been removed and replaced?
Ms. Stempfley. Sir, I appreciate the question.
Unfortunately, that is not really my area of expertise, and I
could only speculate. I regret that I am not in a position to
talk about the suppliers in the market.
Mr. Veasey. Is there any--and anybody who can answer this
one. Are there any U.S. producers of this telecommunications
equipment that can pick up the slack that will be created in
the market by prohibiting certain foreign-made products; and,
if so, how long do you think it would take for that producer to
create enough infrastructure to replace all the equipment that
is contemplated being replaced?
Mr. Nettles. If I may, I will go back to the answer I gave
just a few minutes ago, sir. It kind of sort of depends on
what--well, not kind of sort of. It absolutely depends on what
we have to replace. If we have to replace the radios and the
core, that is one order of magnitude. If it is just the core,
that would be a little more manageable, including the ability
to rehome our networks to, you know, existing cores that are in
place from an infrastructure sharing standpoint.
There are some niche vendors in the U.S. that make parts,
you know, parts of the network. One of the challenges a small
company like we have, you know, is when you buy components from
different vendors, it adds a level of complexity in making
everything work together that makes it almost unmanageable.
It is my understanding that as far as the major vendors,
Nokia and Ericsson, and even Samsung has been one that has been
mentioned as one that would based on a democratic country,
would be one that would be considered a favored equipment or
favorable.
Mr. Veasey. In your testimony, you discuss the challenges
of providing wireless service to rural communities and the cost
considerations of certain wireless equipment over others. You
also discussed the concerns about the ability of small
providers, and to make upgrades to facilitate next-generation
services in rural areas.
Could you give me your opinion regarding whether the
provisions in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
Act would substantially delay 5G and other wireless deployment
to unserved and underserved communities?
Mr. Nettles. Would it delay? No, sir. I think it would make
it--it would make it even more possible. Right now, I am
looking at, you know, do I even try to stay in the business or
do I just, you know, get what I can for it and walk away.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Johnson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
hearing.
Mr. Brenner, as you know, the SHARE Act calls for the
establishment of an integrated spectrum automation enterprise
strategy with at least one testbed to facilitate the sharing of
spectrum by more than one Federal entity.
Can you touch on the importance of establishing a sharing
testbed? What are some of the potential consequences if the FCC
and NTIA don't require this capability before Federal entities
attempt to share the same spectrum space?
Mr. Brenner. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. So
at Qualcomm, we constantly, aggressively, 24/7, we have tests
going on of new technologies all over the place, largely on our
campus in San Diego, but also around the world.
So our whole business is inventing new technologies and
testing and testing and testing them, to make sure that they
are going to work, to convince providers like Mr. Nettles that
they are beneficial to be deployed, to convince equipment
vendors to deploy them.
And so that is the approach that has been successful to
establishing United States leadership in the wireless space;
and having that same kind of capability occur so that the
testing can occur on the Federal side, I would say would be
vital.
Mr. Johnson. Well, you gave a good explanation of why it is
important, but what happens if we don't do that? What are the
consequences if the FCC doesn't require this capability before
Federal entities attempt to share that same spectrum space?
Mr. Brenner. Right. So the FCC can't require Federal
entities to do testing. So that is point number one. Point
number two, if no one else--the FCC, as an independent agency,
has no authority over the executive agencies.
But second of all, if you don't have that capability in the
executive agencies, then what you have is what we have had for
the last several decades, which is the Federal Government
continues to use old legacy systems, and they don't have a
modern wireless communications capability that we have in the
commercial sector. That is bad in and of itself.
And then the second thing that leads to is then when we
want to have sharing, it becomes extremely difficult, because
the commercial sector has state-of-the-art technology whereas
the Federal Government has older legacy systems that were never
designed for sharing.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Mr. Feld, do you have any thoughts on
that?
Mr. Feld. Yes. I completely agree with everything Mr.
Brenner said. I also want to stress that the enormous
opportunity here for the Federal Government to leverage its
vast economies of scale requires that there be this focused
central testing. Somebody has to be responsible for making it
happen, and it can't be left to the vagaries of agencies.
We need to understand that for most agencies, they are not
interested in spectrum policy. They are trying to get their
mission accomplished, and they are trying to do it within
budgets for which upgrading of equipment or testing equipment
is simply not an element. So there is no reason to believe that
these things will happen without a statutory mandate to make it
occur.
Mr. Johnson. Ms. Stempfley, in your testimony, you talked
about the importance of having a full view of the dependencies
and complexities of supply chains as they change moving into
the future. What role does or should NTIA continue to play
coordinating a software or hardware bill of materials?
Ms. Stempfley. I would like to commend NTIA for the work
that they have been doing on the software bill of materials. In
our experience in handling risks, particularly software-
oriented risks that exist, we have found that the software bill
of materials is possibly the most effective way to understand
the complexities and the nested nature of all of the technology
that exists in place.
And it provides a foundation to integrate software bills of
material with other hardware bills of material and multimodal
bills of material, and would like to continue to see NTIA play
a leadership role within the Government on this topic.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beat you, I gave
back 35 seconds. I yield back.
Mr. Doyle. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Soto for 5 minutes.
Mr. Soto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has
stated that China has, quote, ``the means, opportunity, and
motive to use telecommunications companies for malicious
purposes,'' unquote. By a show of hands, how many of you agree
with that assessment? Interesting.
Mr. Nettles. I am sorry, I missed the question.
Mr. Soto. So the question again is: The House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence has stated China has, quote,
``the means, opportunity, and motive to use telecommunications
companies for malicious purposes.'' Please raise your hand if
you agree with that statement. OK.
It would be great to hear first from, then, Mr. Brenner on
why you disagree with that statement.
Mr. Brenner. Yes. Congressman, thank you. It isn't that I
disagree with the statement or agree with the statement. I
don't have any information about China as a country, their
capabilities to infect our communication system. I obviously
would think that would be a horrible thing, and I think that
the U.S. Government should do everything at its disposal to
make sure that doesn't happen.
But when you say China, another reason I didn't raise my
hand is Qualcomm, we sell chips to vendors. Some of them are
Chinese vendors, and they are deploying our chips in phones in
China. And I have no information--I think that is a very good
thing for U.S. leadership.
And I have no information, obviously, that there are any
security issues in any of our chips, but, obviously, I
completely share the concern. If China has a capability to harm
the United States, I want the United States to do everything
they can to prevent that.
Mr. Soto. Ms. Stempfley, what is your opinion on that
statement?
Ms. Stempfley. I believe that there are a number of
security risks within the infrastructure and that we should do
everything we can to reduce them and to make it more difficult
for anyone who has means, motive, and opportunity to take
advantage of those.
Mr. Soto. Thank you. There has been a growing movement
within Congress, whether it is in the National Defense
Authorization Act or in other major bills, to encourage
national foundries, to encourage manufacturing of high-tech
equipment here in the United States. In my district, we have
the Bridge Project, which is creating tamper-proof sensors.
Mr. Feld, how critical is it that we continue to develop
national foundries here to develop next-generation technology
in the telecommunications industry and beyond?
Mr. Feld. Well, I think we in the United States have a long
tradition of our leadership in this area. We want to maintain
that, obviously. I think that it is very important, and that
just as government had a role in fostering the creation of the
internet and in fostering the development of many technologies
in which we now have a leadership role, I think that there is a
role for policy and encouraging these sort of foundries as
well.
Mr. Soto. And then, we have a bill with Congressman Flores,
H.R. 575, which is encouraging, with the development of 5G, to
adopt the Prague 5G security recommendations. How many you all,
by a show of hands, agree that we should be adopting the Prague
5G security recommendations as we develop 5G in this Nation?
Please raise your hand. OK.
I noticed, Ms. Stempfley, you didn't. Please give us your
opinion on that.
Ms. Stempfley. I am not familiar enough with the details of
it in order to speak intelligently.
Mr. Soto. Sure.
I am going to yield back now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
So we have multiple votes on the House floor which could
keep us down there an hour, or maybe a little bit longer. We
have polled the membership on both sides to see if they are
comfortable with waiving their 5 minutes for questions.
So if I don't hear any objections from either side, I would
like to ask unanimous consent to enter the following documents
into the record: An article from zero5g.com referenced earlier
by Ranking Member Walden, a flier regarding 5G referenced
earlier by Ranking Member Walden, a letter from the
International Associations of Fire Chiefs. Without objection,
so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Doyle. I want to thank all the witnesses for their
participation in today's hearing. I want to remind Members
that, pursuant to committee rules, they have ten business days
to submit additional questions for the record to be answered by
the witnesses who have appeared, and I would ask each witness
to respond promptly to any such questions you may receive.
At this time, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Adam Kinzinger
I thank my friend, Mr. Latta, for yielding.
The security of American communications and information
networks is paramount to national security-a field I know
fairly well from my time in the military, but this sword cuts
both ways.
As we have seen through the years, certain foreign
adversaries have systematically coerced their equipment
manufacturers to embed backdoors and other capabilities into
their products, which are later purchased by American companies
and integrated into our networks.
No foreign actor should have the ability to eavesdrop on
U.S. citizens or our government-and let alone use these
backdoors to launch cyberattacks or disrupt our communications.
In an effort to help the private sector avoid purchasing or
installing this dangerous equipment, I worked with the
Chairman, Mr. Doyle, to introduce H.R. 4461, the Network
Security Information Sharing Act, which will be part of the
discussion here today.
So I look forward to the discussion today and I yield back
to my friend.
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