    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                   LEGISLATING TO SECURE AMERICA'S WIRELESS
                                    FUTURE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 27, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-67

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                       govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                            energycommerce.house.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    47-352 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                         FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                     Chairman
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             FRED UPTON, Michigan
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           PETE OLSON, Texas
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice     BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
        Chair                            BILLY LONG, Missouri
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILL FLORES, Texas
    JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
        Massachusetts                    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    TONY CARDENAS, California            RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
    RAUL RUIZ, California                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
    DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
    ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    DARREN SOTO, Florida
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
                                     ------

                               Professional Staff

                       JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
                    TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
                    MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
                 Subcommittee on Communications and Technology

                            MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
                                     Chairman

    JERRY McNERNEY, California           ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York             Ranking Member
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia         PETE OLSON, Texas
    DARREN SOTO, Florida                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona              GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California            BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              BILLY LONG, Missouri
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    BILL FLORES, Texas
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California, Vice    SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
        Chair                            TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
    TONY CARDENAS, California
    DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
        officio)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Mike Doyle, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Robert E. Latta, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Ohio, prepared statement....................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Oregon, opening statement......................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................    10
    Hon. Adam Kinzinger, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Illinois, prepared statement................................    66

                                   Witnesses

    Bobbie Stempfley, Managing Director, Cert Division, Software
      Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, opening
      statement......................................................    11
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   127
    John Nettles, President, Pine Belt Wireless, opening statement...    21
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   129
    Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge, opening
      statement......................................................    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    35
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   133
     Dean R. Brenner, Senior Vice President, Spectrum Strategy and
      Tech Policy, Qualcomm Incorporated, opening statement..........    50
        Prepared statement...........................................    52
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   137

                               Submitted Material

    H.R. 575, the Prague Proposals...................................    67
    H.R. 2063, E-Frontier Act \1\
    H.R. 2881, the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2019 \2\
    H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of
      2019...........................................................    75
    H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act of 2019..   102
    H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act.........................................   109
    H.R. 4500, the Promoting United States Wireless Leadership Act of
      2019...........................................................   116
    Article of September 17, 2019, Zero5G.com, by Jack Derwin,
      submitted by Mr. Doyle.........................................   121
    Article on Zero Geoengineering.com, submitted by Mr. Doyle.......   122
    Letter of September 27, 2019, from Fire Chief Gary Ludwig, EMT-P,
      President and Chairman of the Board, International Association
      of Fire Chiefs, to Mr. Doyle and Mr. Latta, submitted by Mr.
      Doyle..........................................................   124

    ----------
    \1\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
      is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/
      20190927/109991/BILLS-116HR2063ih.pdf.

    \2\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
      is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/
      20190927/109991/BILLS-116HR2881ih.pdf.

                LEGISLATING TO SECURE AMERICA'S WIRELESS FUTURE

                                  ----------

                           FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2019

                      House of Representatives,
         Subcommittee on Communications and Technology,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m., in
    the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
    Hon. Mike Doyle (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Doyle, McNerney, Clarke, Veasey,
    Soto, O'Halleran, Eshoo, Butterfield, Matsui, Schrader,
    Cardenas, Pallone (ex officio), Latta (subcommittee ranking
    member), Shimkus, Kinzinger, Bilirakis, Johnson, Long, Flores,
    Walberg, Gianforte, and Walden (ex officio).
        Staff present: A. J. Brown, Counsel; Jeffrey Carroll, Staff
    Director; Parul Desai, FCC Detailee; Evan Gilbert, Deputy Press
    Secretary; Waverly Gordon, Deputy Chief Counsel; Tiffany
    Guarascio, Deputy Staff Director; Alex Hoehn-Saric, Chief
    Counsel, Communications and Consumer Protection; Jerry
    Leverich, Senior Counsel; Dan Miller, Senior Policy Analyst;
    Meghan Mullon, Staff Assistant; Phil Murphy, Policy
    Coordinator; Tim Robinson, Chief Counsel; Andrew Souvall,
    Director of Communications, Outreach and Member Services;
    Rebecca Tomilchik, Staff Assistant; Mike Bloomquist, Minority
    Staff Director; Michael Engel, Minority Detailee,
    Communications and Technology; Margaret Tucker Fogarty,
    Minority Legislative Clerk/Press Assistant; Peter Kielty,
    Minority General Counsel; Bijan Koohmaraie, Minority Deputy
    Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection and Commerce; Zack Roday,
    Minority Communications Director; and Evan Viau, Minority
    Professional Staff Member, Communications and Technology.
        Mr. Doyle. The Subcommittee on Communications and
    Technology will now come to order. The Chair recognizes himself
    for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DOYLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
             CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

        Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on
    Communications and Technology's legislative hearing on
    Legislating to Secure America's Wireless Future. Today, the
    subcommittee will consider a number of legislative proposals
    that address challenges from spectrum management to securing
    our Nation's telecommunications infrastructure. The proposals
    before the subcommittee today are H.R. 4462, the Studying How
    to Harness Airway Resources Efficiency Act, or the SHARE Act,
    which I have introduced with my good friend, Ranking Member
    Latta. This legislation would require NTIA to establish a
    spectrum-sharing strategy for Federal entities using advanced
    technologies, such as artificial intelligence, automated
    frequency coordination, and environmental sensing, to
    facilitate more efficient spectrum sharing and use by the
    Federal Government. The bill would also require the FCC to
    report to Congress on the feasibility of using existing sharing
    technologies on several important spectrum bands.
        As we look towards the future, it is necessary for every
    licensee to use spectrum more efficiently, the Federal
    Government being chief among them. We need to find ways to
    modernize how the Government uses and shares spectrum amongst
    agencies and departments, as well as with the commercial
    sector.
        The CBRS band is a great example of how sharing can
    effectively accommodate a wide range of users and a wide range
    of uses. Just yesterday, the FCC voted on an order to sell
    licenses in the CBRS band, and a few weeks ago, the band
    officially launched for commercial operations. This band will
    combine licensed, unlicensed, and Federal incumbent users in
    one band while protecting incumbents' rights and ensuring that
    the spectrum is always available for use. My hope is that the
    SHARE Act can act as a bridge to future innovative sharing
    videos like we see in the CBRS band.
        Next, we have H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information
    Sharing Act, introduced by myself and my colleague, Congressman
    Kinzinger. This legislation would establish an information-
    sharing program at the Department of Homeland Security to share
    the supply chain security risk information with the telecom
    industry. This legislation would help all providers, but most
    importantly, small and rural providers that lack the resources
    and expertise to engage here in Washington, with what has
    largely been closed-door discussions related to the threats of
    untrusted equipment vendors. Our hope is that by creating a
    program with an inclusive mandate that these providers will be
    more able in the future to avoid deploying in technologies that
    pose an outside risk to their customers and to the nation.
        After that, we have H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted
    Communications Network Act, introduced by Chairman Pallone and
    Ranking Member Walden, which would require the FCC to create a
    list of equipment and services that pose unacceptable risk to
    national security. It would authorize a fund to unable
    telecommunications carrier with unsafe equipment in their
    networks to remove it and replace it with trusted equipment and
    services. Telecom service is far too essential for any of our
    Nation's carriers to be using untrusted elements in their
    network.
        The subcommittee will also consider H.R. 2881, the Secure
    5G and Beyond Act, introduced by Representatives Spanberger,
    O'Halleran, Brooks, Rooney, and Slotkin. It would require the
    Government to work with strategic allies to secure their 5G
    networks and ensure that U.S. 5G networks are secure and work
    with industry to guard against foreign political influence.
        Next, we will consider the Promoting United States Wireless
    Leadership Act of 2019, introduced by Representatives Walberg
    and Dingell. We will also consider H.R. 2063, the E deg.ONTIER
    Act, introduced by Representatives Cardenas and Brooks. And
    finally, we will discuss House Resolution 575, expressing the
    sense of the House that all stakeholders in the deployment of
    5G should consider and adhere to the Prague proposals, which
    were introduced by Representatives Flores and Soto.
        I also want to thank all the witnesses for being here
    today. I want to recognize Ms. Stempfley for participating. She
    is currently Director of the CERT Division at the Software
    Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University in
    Pittsburgh, which is the heart of my congressional district. We
    are always glad to have someone from CMU up here on the panel.
    Previously, she served as Acting Assistant Secretary in the
    Office of Cybersecurity and Communications at the Department of
    Homeland Security, and she established and led the Department
    of Defense's computer emergency response team. So I want to
    especially thank her for appearing before the subcommittee
    today.
        So I look forward to a discussion of all of these
    proposals.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Doyle follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Doyle

        Today, we are considering a series of bills to secure
    America's wireless future. They will ensure that the Government
    manages the federal and commercial spectrum more efficiently to
    promote innovation and better serve all Americans. They also
    will guarantee that our wireless networks are secure from
    foreign adversaries that may wish to spy on Americans or do us
    harm.
        I applaud the work of Chairman Doyle and Ranking Member
    Latta in introducing the SHARE Act. Their bill will cement the
    long-standing policy that our nation's key agencies-the
    National Telecommunications and Information Administration
    (NTIA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)--remain
    responsible for spectrum policy. These expert agencies can act
    as impartial judges to balance the demands and interests of
    spectrum stakeholders such as the Department of Defense, the
    Federal Aviation Administration, public safety, and commercial
    carriers.
        At our hearing in July, we heard that the management of the
    federal government spectrum requires a strong central voice at
    NTIA. And I think the SHARE Act does a great deal to help NTIA
    meet the mission-critical needs of government agencies in a
    more efficient and modern way.
        The FCC, likewise, must remain in the driver's seat when it
    comes to commercial spectrum. For that reason, I am pleased the
    SHARE Act requires the FCC to look for ways to expand and
    improve the revolutionary spectrum sharing techniques being
    rolled out in the Citizen's Broadband Radio Service.
        When it comes to securing these networks from foreign
    adversaries, I want to thank Ranking Member Walden,
    Representatives Matsui, and Guthrie for partnering with me to
    introduce the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
    Our legislation will prohibit the spending of federal dollars
    on suspect communications equipment and services that undermine
    national security.
        Our bill also establishes a one-billion-dollar
    reimbursement program to help small carriers remove compromised
    equipment and replace it with secure alternatives.
        As we have heard, much of the global supply chain for
    telecommunications equipment flows through China at one point
    or another. And Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
    manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
    providers cheaper than nearly anyone else. Although many of the
    bigger carriers have avoided these threats, it still is a
    significant issue for smaller and more rural carriers who built
    their networks using suspect equipment.
        Communications networks are interconnected, and that means
    that one weak link can harm the whole system. We must help
    smaller carriers remove suspect equipment for the good of the
    entire country.
        Representative Kinzinger and Chairman Doyle also have
    legislation on this point that would help the Federal
    Government better share supply chain risk information with the
    communications providers.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I also want
    to briefly recognize Dean Brenner, on today's panel, who is a
    fellow Monmouth County, New Jersey native. Welcome.

        The Chair recognizes Mr. Latta, ranking member of the
    subcommittee, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. LATTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                    CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

        Mr. Latta. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you very much for calling today's hearing; I also want to
    thank our witnesses for being with us today as we discuss
    legislation on our network supply chain security and management
    of our spectrum resources.
        There are several bipartisan bills on today's hearing that
    address the challenges we face to ensure our critical
    communications infrastructure is secure from vulnerabilities. I
    am especially pleased to have worked with our subcommittee
    chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, on H.R. 4462, the
    SHARE Act, to empower our agencies to facilitate innovative
    spectrum sharing strategies to more efficiently use our
    airwaves.
        As the executive branch agency principally responsible for
    advising the President on the spectrum and telecommunication
    matters, NTIA should continue to play the lead role in
    directing a collective government approach to managing the
    Federal Government's access to spectrum resources. This bill
    helps empower NTIA to use tools to meet the challenge of
    growing wireless needs into the 21st century.
        Today's hearing also features several bills to address
    vulnerabilities in our Nation's communication networks, such as
    the inclusion of unsecured equipment. Many providers' networks
    contain equipment supplied by suspect foreign carriers.
    However, this is only because the provider didn't understand
    the associated risks. The bill before us seeks to prevent this
    type of situation from occurring on a forward-looking basis.
    Understandably, these providers are in a period of uncertainty,
    and although they may want to do their part to protect national
    security, they may need help doing so.
        The FCC has voiced concerns about the network security and
    proposed prohibiting USF recipients from using controversial
    equipment. So as winners of the FCC's latest Connect America
    Fund II reverse auction come to grip with the buildout
    requirements accompanying these funds, it is critical that we
    work in a bipartisan way to ensure that they can revisit how
    those conditions impact the winning bid in order to keep their
    equipment free from security vulnerabilities.
        Not only do we want to prevent the Federal funding to pay
    for gear that may pose a national security risk, but we do not
    want winners of CAF auctions to be put in an unattainable
    position of not being able to meet buildout requirements now
    that their cost estimates may have changed.
        I want to thank, again, to our witnesses for being with us
    today and for the testimony today, and I am going to yield the
    rest of my time to the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
    The security of American communications and information
    networks is paramount to national security. It is a field I
    know fairly well from my time in the military. But the sword
    cuts both ways. As we have seen through the years, certain
    foreign adversaries have systematically coerced their equipment
    manufacturers to embed back doors and other capabilities into
    their products which are later purchased by American companies
    and integrated into our networks. No foreign actor should have
    the ability to eavesdrop on U.S. citizens or our government and
    let alone use these back doors to launch cyber-attacks or
    disrupt our communications.
        In an effort to help the private sector avoid purchasing or
    installing this dangerous equipment, I have worked with the
    chairman, Chairman Doyle, to introduce H.R. 4461, the Network
    Security Information Sharing Act, which will be part of the
    discussion here today. So I look forward to that discussion,
    and I yield back to my friend.
        Mr. Latta. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Latta follow:]

                   Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert E. Latta

        Welcome to today's subcommittee hearing to discuss
    legislation that seeks to address our network supply chain
    security and management of our spectrum resources. Thank you to
    our witness panel for being here.
        There are several bipartisan bills on today's hearing that
    address the challenges we face to ensure our critical
    communications infrastructure is secure from vulnerabilities.
    I'm especially pleased to have worked with Chairman Doyle on
    H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act, to empower our agencies to facilitate
    innovative spectrum sharing strategies to more efficiently
    using our airwaves. As the executive branch agency principally
    responsible for advising the President on spectrum and
    telecommunications matters, NTIA should continue to play the
    lead role in directing a collective government approach to
    managing the Federal Government's access to spectrum resources.
    This bill helps empower NTIA to use new tools to meet the
    challenge of growing wireless needs in the 21st century.
        Today's hearing also features several bills to address
    vulnerabilities in our nation's communications networks, such
    as the inclusion of unsecure equipment. Many providers'
    networks contain gear supplied by suspect foreign carriers;
    however, this is only because the provider didn't understand
    the associated risks. The bills before us seek to prevent this
    type of situation from occurring on a forward-looking basis.
    Understandably, these providers are in a period of uncertainty,
    and although they may want to do their part to protect national
    security, they may need help doing so.
        The FCC has also voiced concerns about network security and
    proposed prohibiting USF recipients from using controversial
    equipment. So, Fund II reverse auction comes to grips with the
    buildout requirements accompanying these funds; it is critical
    that we work in a bipartisan way to ensure they can revisit how
    those conditions impact their winning bid in order to keep
    their equipment free from security vulnerabilities. Not only do
    we want to prevent Federal funding to pay for gear that may
    pose a national security risk, but we do not want winners of
    CAF auctions to be put in an unattainable position of not being
    able to meet buildout requirements now that their cost
    estimates may have changed.
        Thank you again to our witnesses for being here, and with
    that, I yield the remainder of my time to my friend from
    Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger.

        Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Pallone, chairman of the full
    committee, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
                IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Doyle. Today, we are
    considering a series of bills to secure America's wireless
    future that will ensure that the Government manages the Federal
    and commercial spectrum more efficiently to promote innovation
    and better serve all Americans. It will also guarantee that our
    wireless networks are secure from foreign adversaries that may
    wish to spy on Americans or do us harm.
        I applaud the work of Chairman Doyle and Ranking Member
    Latta introducing the SHARE Act. Their bill will cement the
    longstanding policy that our Nation's key agencies, the
    National Telecommunications and Information Administration and
    the Federal Communications Commission, remain responsible for
    spectrum policy. These expert agencies can act as impartial
    judges to balance the demands and interests of spectrum
    stakeholders such as the Department of Defense, the Federal
    Aviation Administration, public safety, and commercial
    carriers.
        At our hearing in July, we heard that the management of the
    Federal Government spectrum requires a strong central voice at
    NTIA, and I think the SHARE Act does a great deal to help NTIA
    meet the mission-critical needs of government agencies in a
    more efficient and modern way. The FCC, likewise, must remain
    in the driver's seat when it comes to commercial spectrum. And
    for that reason, I am pleased the SHARE Act requires the FCC to
    look for ways to expand and improve the revolutionary spectrum
    sharing techniques being rolled out in the citizens' broadband
    radio service.
        When it comes to securing these networks from foreign
    adversaries, I want to thank Ranking Member Walden and
    Representatives Matsui and Guthrie for partnering with me to
    introduce the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
    Our legislation will prohibit the spending of Federal dollars
    on suspect communications equipment and services that undermine
    national security. Our bill also establishes a $1 billion
    reimbursement program to help small carriers remove compromised
    equipment and replace it with secure alternatives.
        As we have heard, much of the global supply chain for
    telecommunications equipment flows through China at one point
    or another. And Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
    manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
    providers cheaper than nearly everyone else. Although many of
    the bigger carriers have avoided these threats, it still is a
    significant issue for smaller and more rural carriers who built
    their network using suspect equipment.
        Communications networks are interconnected, and that means
    that one weak link can harm the whole system. We must help
    smaller carriers remove suspect equipment for the good of the
    entire country. Representatives Kinzinger and Chairman Doyle
    also have legislation on this point that would help the Federal
    Government better share supply chain risk information with the
    communications providers.
        So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I also
    wanted to briefly recognize or mention that Dean Brenner on
    today's panel, who is a fellow Monmouth, New Jersey, native.
    Glad to see you here today. Welcome.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

        The topic of today's hearing is important because not only
    must we ensure that we allocate our federal spectrum in ways
    that match our Government's future wireless needs, but we must
    also ensure that once those allocations are set, those systems
    are secure. One way that we can make sure that we have
    appropriately allocated our nation's airwaves to their best and
    highest uses on the federal side is to keep pushing ourselves
    to explore ways to use them more efficiently. Part of that
    effort must be improving our sharing technologies to advance
    and become more efficient and versatile.
        We have made great strides, even just this year, on
    spectrum sharing. For example, we need to look no further than
    the 3.5 gigahertz band, which now has a novel three-tiered
    sharing system in place that allows federal and non-federal
    users to share a single band, and according to the FCC, will
    soon have a spectrum auction that will, for the first time,
    make mid-band spectrum available for 5G.
        Another great example is the TV white spaces in the 600
    megahertz band, which were freed up for unlicensed use in the
    Broadcast Incentive Auction. The creative thinking that went
    into that innovative allocation made prime low-band spectrum
    available for sharing-possibly a critical component of our 5G
    future.
        Today, we're going to talk about how we can do more
    creative thinking on the federal side. Led by the capable folks
    at NTIA, I am confident that we can continue to push the
    envelope on finding new and innovative ways to share this
    valuable federal resource.
        As I've said before, spectrum is a bipartisan issue. The
    work we are doing in this Committee today will help pave the
    way to a spectrum-rich future where spectrum ``crunches'' is a
    thing of the past.
        But, the full measure of any progress we make in increasing
    connectivity and opportunity on our airwaves can only be
    realized if American consumers and businesses can count on
    secure and reliable service, which is why the Committee has
    been hard at work on legislation to secure the nation's
    networks.
        I want to thank Ranking Member Walden, Congresswoman
    Matsui, and Congressman Guthrie for partnering with me to
    introduce one of the bills we're discussing today, the Secure
    and Trusted Communications Networks Act. This bill establishes
    a reimbursement program under the FCC to help communications
    providers cover the costs of removing compromised equipment
    from their networks and installing more secure alternatives in
    its place.
        Much of the global supply chain for telecommunications
    equipment and services flows through China at one point or
    another, and Chinese industrial policies allow state-run
    manufacturers like Huawei to sell suspect equipment to American
    providers cheaper than anywhere else. Although some of the
    larger providers have known about and avoided these threats for
    some time, it remains a major issue for smaller and more rural
    carriers who built their networks using Huawei equipment.
        This Committee recognizes there's a premium on security and
    that it's a premium worth paying. I look forward to hearing
    from our witnesses about how our bill helps providers ensure
    their networks are built with the most secure and reliable
    equipment available.
        I also want to commend the Ranking Member of the
    Subcommittee, Congressman Latta, for partnering with Chairman
    Doyle on another bill before us today, which aims to modernize
    and expedite how the Government disseminates important security
    information to trusted communications providers.
        I look forward to continuing this work with my friend from
    Oregon as we move ahead on these important measures, and I
    thank the witnesses for being here to help us in that process.
        I yield back.

        And with that, I yield the balance of my time to Ms.
    Matsui.
        Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much. I am pleased that we are
    considering H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications
    Networks. This bill will create a new fund that provides
    financial incentives to small and rural wireless providers to
    replace certain equipment of Huawei and ZTE with new equipment
    that includes secure hardware and software capabilities.
        Mr. Chairman, we must continue to consider policies as per
    U.S. leadership and innovation in the 5G race. H.R. 4459 will
    help provide additional security for America's
    telecommunications providers. Still, more needs to be done with
    regard to America's spectrum policy. That includes smart
    spectrum policies for both licensed and unlicensed use for 5G
    and beyond. We must explore opportunities to option the C-band.
    My bill, the WIN 5G Act, strikes the right balance by aiming to
    clear at least 300 megahertz of spectrum, and is supported by a
    broad range of stakeholders, including public interest groups
    and industry stakeholders. I continue to work with Chairman
    Doyle on this issue.
        Additionally, Congressman Guthrie and I introduced the
    SPECTRUM NOW Act, that can provide a pathway to make an
    additional 100 megahertz of spectrum available. A balanced
    approach to the introduction of wireless services is not only
    critical, but necessary for expanding the use in the six
    gigahertz band. I also continue to focus on resolving a 20-
    year-old debate over the 5.9 gigahertz band. I'm hopeful that
    the FCC will consider new rulemaking to address this band soon.
        And with that, I yield back to the chairman.
        Mr. Doyle. Mr. Pallone yields back. The gentleman yields
    back.
        It is now my pleasure to recognize who just made his grand
    entrance, my good friend, Mr. Walden, ranking member of the
    full committee for 5 minutes.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                   CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

        Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On time, on budget
    right here.
        I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here.
    Your insight will be another important input to the process we
    began last Congress on how best to secure our communications
    networks. Our Nation's telecommunications infrastructure
    represents the lifeblood of preserving a free and open society,
    as we all know, and any effort to disrupt that infrastructure
    should be taken as an effort to undermine our liberties.
        The bills before us today deliver on a commitment we began
    last Congress. That commitment is to have a bipartisan process
    to mitigate these threats and to secure this sector going
    forward. Moreover, I know Chairman Pallone, and I agree that
    the Energy and Commerce Committee is singularly able to speak
    to these topics in the Congress. And with both sides working
    together with stakeholders ranging from industry to civil
    society, we can do so successfully.
        Everyone in this room can agree on the importance of
    securing our Nation's communications networks from vulnerable
    equipment. In fact, we heard testimony over two years ago on
    the vulnerabilities that exist in these networks. We also heard
    of the impact on rural providers who may be more
    disproportionately impacted by calls to replace existing
    equipment as they seek to stay in their budgets, not to mention
    within Federal programs purchasing guidance to deploy the most
    effective products.
        Unfortunately, our adversaries have no reservations about
    one way or another subsidizing their pet companies, and thus,
    they become attractive options for the budget-sensitive
    providers. I have seen how small broadband providers in my own
    state are trying to make a go of deploying broadband networks
    and stretching limited funds to ensure they connect with the
    most constituents in some of the hardest-to-reach places. You
    can certainly find those in my district. Many of these
    providers don't have an army of consultants with the necessary
    security clearances to fully appreciate the vulnerabilities
    that do exist and how to inform their purchasing decisions.
        For those who receive Federal support to build out
    broadband networks in unserved areas, like many of the
    providers in my district, we cannot set them up for failure by
    requiring them to select the lowest cost equipment option; only
    then for Uncle Sam to later say Oh, by the way, well, not that
    lowest cost equipment, so we need to get this right.
        H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act,
    would facilitate exactly the type of information sharing needed
    by rural providers that have vulnerable equipment in their
    networks. This was the centerpiece of our bipartisan
    discussions in the last Congress, and I am pleased to see this
    concept taking shape in today's hearing.
        H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
    Act, which I am an original co-sponsor of, would further
    address this problem by setting up a reimbursement program to
    rip and replace vulnerable equipment from these networks. But
    we still have some details to work out on the way to markup the
    program is modeled on the FCC so far successful broadcast
    incentive repack reimbursement program. We need to get this
    right. It is critical to our national security, but also to our
    competitiveness as we start rolling out new technologies.
        This brings me to another topic that I raised in our July
    spectrum hearing how Russia is seeking to influence our public
    discourse on the subject of deployment of next-generation
    networks. I know Congresswoman Eshoo and Congresswoman DeGette
    also shared my concern at that hearing. As we continue our work
    to close the digital divide and lead the race to 5G, we must be
    prepared to prevent threats from those seeking to diminish
    America's standing in the world.
        Just this past week, my staff saw this card which was
    posted on a bulletin board by the Rayburn cafeteria. Now, the
    details are pretty scant; who is behind this campaign and just
    lists a litany of issues why 5G is supposedly bad.
        It collects numerous stories around the country on things
    wrong with 5G. Ironically, one of the stories is about
    community health fears stopping a 5G rollout in Australia,
    while at the same time, noting that the World Health
    Organization stated there should not be any health risks from
    5G. And that Cornell University research showed 5G networks to
    be safer than previous networks.
        So we have to be vigilant. We have to be vigilant about
    efforts to influence our thinking in this space, and I hope the
    committee will look ahead at other efforts being pursued to
    stifle our internet architecture.
        I look forward to hearing about the other bills put forward
    by our members today, Mr. Chairman, as thoughtful approaches to
    these challenges. So thanks again for having this hearing, and
    I do hope the full committee, or the oversight committee, or
    this committee, will do some looking into what is being pushed
    out there in the public side and who is behind it. So we need
    the facts.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses to
    this hearing. Your insight will be another important input in
    the process we began last Congress to secure our communications
    networks.
        Our nation's telecommunications infrastructure represents
    the lifeblood of preserving a free and open society, and any
    effort to disrupt that infrastructure should be taken as an
    effort to undermine our liberties.
        The bills before us today deliver on a commitment we began
    last Congress to have a bipartisan process to mitigate these
    threats and secure this sector going forward. Moreover, I know
    Chairman Pallone, and I agree that the Energy and Commerce
    Committee is singularly able to speak to these topics in the
    Congress. And with both sides working together with
    stakeholders ranging from industry to civil society, we can do
    so successfully.
        Everyone in this room can agree on the importance of
    securing our nation's communication networks from vulnerable
    equipment. In fact, we heard testimony over two years ago on
    the vulnerabilities that may exist in our networks. We have
    also heard of the impact on rural providers who may be more
    disproportionately impacted by calls to replace existing
    equipment as they seek to stay within their budgets, not to
    mention within Federal programs' purchasing guidance to deploy
    the most effective products. Unfortunately, our adversaries
    have no reservations about subsidizing their pet companies and
    thus become attractive options for the budget sensitive
    providers.
        I've seen how small broadband providers in my own state are
    trying to make a go of deploying broadband networks and
    stretching limited funds to ensure they connect the most
    constituents in some of the hardest to reach places. Many of
    these providers don't have an army of consultants with the
    necessary security clearances to understand what
    vulnerabilities exist and how to inform their purchasing
    decisions. For those who receive Federal support to build out
    broadband networks in unserved areas-like, many of the
    providers in my district-we cannot set them up for failure by
    requiring them to select the lowest cost equipment option, only
    then for Uncle Sam to later say, ``well, not that lowest cost
    equipment.''
        H.R. 4461, the Network Security Information Sharing Act,
    would facilitate exactly the type of information sharing needed
    by rural providers that have vulnerable equipment in their
    networks. This was the centerpiece of our bipartisan
    discussions last Congress, and I'm pleased to see this concept
    at today's hearing.
        H.R. 4459, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
    Act, of which I am an original cosponsor of, would further
    address this problem by setting up a reimbursement program to
    ``rip and replace'' vulnerable equipment from those networks.
    While we still have some details to work out on the way to
    markup, the program is modeled on the FCC's so-far-successful
    broadcast incentive repack reimbursement program. We need to
    get this right; it is critical to our national security but
    also our competitiveness as we start rolling out new
    technologies.
        This brings me to another topic that I raised at our July
    spectrum hearing--of how Russia is seeking to influence our
    public discourse on the subject of deployment of next
    generation networks. I know Congresswoman Eshoo and
    Congresswoman DeGette also shared my concern in this regard. As
    we continue our work to close the digital divide and lead the
    race to 5G, we must be prepared to prevent threats from those
    seeking to diminish America's standing in the world. This past
    week, my staff saw this card posted to a bulletin board by the
    Rayburn cafeteria--details are pretty scant who is behind this
    campaign that just lists a litany of issues and why 5G is
    supposedly bad. It collects numerous stories around the country
    on things wrong with 5G--ironically one of the stories is about
    community health fears stopping a 5G rollout in Australia while
    at the same time noting that the World Health Organization
    stated there should not be any health risks from 5G, and that
    Cornell University research showed 5G networks to be safer than
    previous networks--So, we must be vigilant about efforts to
    influence our thinking in this space and I hope the committee
    will look ahead at other efforts are being pursued to stifle
    our Internetarchitecture.
        I look forward to hearing about the other bills put forward
    by our members today as other thoughtful approaches to these
    challenges.
        Thank you again for holding this hearing today.

        Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman yields
    back. The Chair would like to remind Members that pursuant to
    committee rules, all Members' written opening statements shall
    be made part of the record.
        So I would like to introduce our witnesses for today's
    hearing. Ms. Bobbie Stempfley, Managing Director, CERT
    Division, Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon.
    Thank you for being here today. Mr. John Nettles, the president
    of Pine Belt Wireless. Mr. Nettles, thank you for being here.
    Mr. Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge.
    Harold, thank you again. And Mr. Dean Brenner, Senior Vice
    President, Spectrum Strategy and Tech Policy for Qualcomm,
    Incorporated. Mr. Brenner, thank you. We want to thank all of
    you for joining us today. We look forward to your testimony.
        At this time, the Chair will now recognize each witness for
    5 minutes to provide their opening statement. Before we begin,
    I would like to explain the lighting system. In front of you is
    a series of lights. The light will initially be green at the
    start of your opening statement. It will turn yellow when you
    have 1-minute remaining. Please begin to wrap up your remarks
    at that point, and when the light turns red, we are just going
    to cut your microphones off.
        So Ms. Stempfley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

        STATEMENTS OF BOBBIE STEMPFLEY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CERT
       DIVISION, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, CARNEGIE MELLON
    UNIVERSITY; JOHN NETTLES, PRESIDENT, PINE BELT WIRELESS; HAROLD
    FELD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE; DEAN R. BRENNER,
       SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, SPECTRUM STRATEGY AND TECH POLICY,
                         QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

                     STATEMENT OF BOBBIE STEMPFLEY

        Ms. Stempfley. Thank you.
        Mr. Doyle. Hit your microphone button there.
        Ms. Stempfley. There we go. One additional light. Thank you
    very much.
        Good morning. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, members
    of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
    participate in this hearing today and speak on supply chain
    risks in the telecommunications industry.
        As has been said, I have been a public servant working in
    information technology focused on the application of
    information and technology to national security and public
    safety missions for more than 25 years. I am currently serving
    as the managing director at the CERT Division at Carnegie
    Mellon University Software Engineering Institute. We focus on
    partnering with government industry, non-government
    organizations, and academia doing applied research to improve
    security and resilience of computer systems, information, and
    networks.
        The telecommunications sector is a global system made of
    companies, suppliers, and users, that make communications
    possible. Because the telecom industry is responsible for the
    flow of information, it is inextricably linked to how we work,
    play, and live, and play a central role in the fundamental
    operations of society from, business to government to families.
    The explosion of devices, new methods of computing, IoT devices
    within the infrastructure have only increased the attack
    surface; therefore, the responsibility of telecoms to
    participate in the overall protection and defense efforts.
        Ultimately, the supply chain for the telecommunications
    industry is vital to achieving security at scale. Historically,
    checks and balances in the supply chain have been largely
    procedural such as licenses, warranties, regulations, legal
    resources, supplier reputation and have reasonably assured
    against defects and service failures.
        Unfortunately, these controls are increasingly inadequate
    when applied to global supply chains for the complex
    information and communications technology and technology-based
    services that underpin critical capabilities in this industry.
        An ever-expanding supply chain means that external
    dependencies must be rigorously measured and strategically
    managed for an organization to remain resilient. This includes
    addressing key areas in manufacturing and integration of the
    supply chains, in service supply chains, and in software supply
    chains. The ramifications of an attack anywhere on the
    telecommunications infrastructure could spread well beyond the
    point of origin and have the potential to affect entire
    nations, businesses, and private citizens. We must address not
    only the hardware but the software and services as well.
        The bills today, including the Secure and Trusted
    Communications Network Act of 2019, and the Network Security
    Information Sharing Act of 2019, are a very good first step in
    this security.
        As the appropriate entities begin to implement supply chain
    security, encouraging resilience as a criterion at every stage
    of development and supply of information and communications
    technology must continue to be the forward-leaning focus of the
    software and supply chain assurance efforts within government
    and industry.
        Attacks against our supply chains unite acquirers and
    suppliers in search of scalable means for securing information
    about ICT risks that arise through malice or negligence.
    Suppliers and acquirers need standardized methods for conveying
    information about common issues related to both the hardware
    and software aspects of ICT, especially regarding non-
    conforming products that contain counterfeit, tainted, or
    defective components and can cause subsequent harm.
        Fundamentally, the outcomes and risk factors we are seeking
    to manage are simple, even though the methods to accomplish
    them are not. First, suppliers must follow practices that
    reduce supply chain risks; second, products provided by
    suppliers are acceptably secure; third, the methods of
    distribution and/or transmission of the product to the
    purchaser guard against tampering; and finally, the product or
    service is used and sustained with acceptable security.
        The acquisition security framework and the external
    dependencies management element of CERT's cyber resilience
    management model, which was developed and validated through
    research done by CERT researchers, demonstrates that the
    following practice areas are elements of a mature supply chain
    risk management effort: Establishment and management of key
    relationships, engineering practices, secure product operations
    of sustainment, and an understanding and management of supply
    chain technologies, and overall infrastructure.
        As private and public functions grow ever more inseparable
    from the information technology systems that support them,
    healthy public/private partnerships become even more necessary.
    To protect this infrastructure against growing and evolving
    cyber threats requires a layered approach. The Government's
    role in this effort is to share information and encourage
    enhanced security and resilience while identifying and
    addressing gaps not filled by the marketplace.
        Information pertinent to the supply chain such as
    vulnerabilities, attack factors, supplier security information
    should be shared along with mitigation plans to those who need
    it. Actionable and usable information sharing must recognize
    the differing capabilities and roles of all participants and
    are key to successful sharing programs. Lastly, we must guard
    against the false choice between security and innovation. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stempfley follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Nettles, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF JOHN NETTLES

        Mr. Nettles. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify about securing communications networks and the support
    needed to keep rural America connected.
        Pine Belt is a family-owned-and-operated company
    established by my father in the late 1950s. Over the years
    since, we have worked hard to keep pace with technology and to
    keep the company in the family. We launched our wireless
    network in 1995, with three analog sites covering two counties.
    We have grown that to 65 sites and now provide 4GLTE across
    five counties, including many areas where ours is the only
    signal present. Not only do our customers depend on our
    network, but on an average day, we provide service, wireless
    voice, and data connectivity to as many as 30,000 visitors,
    most of whom are just passing through.
        Pine Belt fully supports efforts to harden today's telecom
    networks for robust cybersecurity and to protect against
    potential national security threats. Yet, while the industry
    buzzes with excitement of the great things that will come from
    5G network buildout, we and many other small companies across
    the country have been virtually frozen since early last year by
    the security concerns of our currently deployed equipment.
        Pine Belt's modern network was rebuilt just a few years ago
    with equipment from ZTE through our participation in the
    Mobility Fund Phase I process, a reverse auction in which
    winning bidders were those showing the lowest cost to serve the
    greatest number of road miles. Our main performance criterion
    was to provide as much coverage as possible as inexpensively as
    possible. We solicited quotes from five different vendors, and
    ZTE's bid was by far the lowest.
        With no restrictions at the time on the use of ZTE
    equipment and facing several deployment challenges, our
    selection was a no-brainer. The choice we made not only enabled
    us to meet our mandated MF I buildout requirements, but also
    provided us with a reliable platform on which we could quickly
    deploy 4G LTE and VoLTE. Despite the challenges of our low-
    density footprint, we were optimistic that this experience
    would allow us to provide the latest services to our community
    for the balance of the current technology generation and also
    provide a solid foundation for the next.
        Unfortunately, as the uncertainties have grown regarding
    whether we will be able to continue to use ZTE equipment, my
    optimism has greatly diminished. At a time when we should be
    focused on expansion plans and upgrades, we are, instead,
    concerned with whether we will be able to continue to provide
    any services at all. Such a fate would squander 20 years of
    network expansion and over $20 million in wireless investments.
    We find ourselves in this predicament more or less because
    under the Mobility Fund program, we simply did our best to do
    what the Government required of us, to bring service to our
    neighbors.
        With the news of the bills being discussed today, I can
    sincerely report that my optimism is returning. I am confident
    that by working with the small affected carriers, Congress and
    the appropriate Federal agencies will be able to establish
    reasonable and sound policies that provide the essential
    financial resources needed for those carriers to secure their
    networks.
        The legislative efforts pending before this subcommittee
    take significant steps to plot a path to the future by
    establishing the Secure and Trusted Communications Network
    reimbursement program, determining a list of covered
    communications equipment or services, mitigating administrative
    burdens on small rural carriers, targeting network risk, and
    supporting information sharing. As Congress acts on these
    critical issues, it is important that solutions are implemented
    in a timely manner to support national security, they are
    executed in the right order to maintain services, and that
    sufficient resources are allocated to get it right.
        With several efforts already underway, including through
    the executive order and pending proceedings before the FCC to
    prohibit use of covered equipment, there is no time to waste in
    funding the replacement equipment. And while many have referred
    to the process as rip and replace, I say that perhaps we really
    need to be talking replace and then rip. Otherwise, services
    will, indeed, be disrupted.
        Finally, as Commissioner Starks noted in a public statement
    last week, this is a national problem that deserves a national
    solution, and we shouldn't expect small carriers who acted
    legally and in good faith to replace their insecure equipment
    on their own. It is, therefore, critical that Congress acts
    swiftly to provide resources for replacement of covered
    equipment, particularly for the small rural carriers who are
    unable to cover the cost without assistance. I believe the
    legislation before the subcommittee today accomplishes these
    things goals, and I applaud your work to legislate to secure
    our wireless future. I genuinely appreciate the opportunity to
    share a little of the story of my family's company, and I
    welcome any questions you may have.
        [The statement of Mr. Nettles follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Nettles.
        Mr. Feld, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                        STATEMENT OF HAROLD FELD

        Mr. Feld. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, thank you
    for inviting me here this morning. I applaud the subcommittee
    for moving forward with the set of bills designed to promote
    innovation and security in 5G networks. I want to focus on the
    following bills: The SHARE Act, the Network Security
    Information Sharing Act, the Secure and Trusted Communications
    Network Act, and the E-FRONTIER Act.
        The SHARE Act. Everyone here is familiar with the problem
    of our increasingly crowded airwaves. Our efforts to find
    spectrum for 5G deployments have already caused conflict and
    uncertainty among Federal and commercial users. Investing in
    the development of spectrum sharing technology is a necessary
    investment to resolving these problems going forward.
        In addition to research and sharing by Federal users with
    other Federal users, the study of the CBRS band will contribute
    enormously to our understanding of how to create a win for all
    spectrum users. The development process for CBRS balance the
    interests and concerns of multiple stakeholders, and has
    attracted early investment from licensed as well as unlicensed
    users, all while protecting Federal interests.
        To meet our spectrum needs going forward; we need to set
    aside our old feuds and embrace systems that accommodate
    everyone and maximize spectrum use. The CBRS process tells us
    we can do it, and we should build on this success.
        Importantly, we should not think about the SHARE Act as
    simply a means of freeing up more federal spectrum for
    commercial use. The technologies developed should be seen as
    the first step in rethinking Federal spectrum management to
    move from the current stale and static system of specific
    assignments to a dynamic sharing system that allows the Federal
    Government to leverage economies of scale and provide Federal
    agencies with the spectrums they need to meet their
    responsibilities.
        NSIS and STCNA, these are both good ideas to address the
    critical issue of supply chain security in U.S. communications
    networks. With regard to the Secure and Trusted Communications
    Network Act, we have suggested slight modifications that would
    further clarify that there are a mechanism so covered entities
    that cured their supply chain security risk can be removed from
    the list. Although nothing in the statute as written prevents
    development of such a process, it is always best to clarify
    these things to avoid confusion.
        We also suggest that the STCNA be expanded to include
    purchases made after August 2018 to ensure small carriers can
    be reimbursed for the purchase of equipment that was not listed
    at the time of purchase. Network security is a shared
    responsibility and benefits us all. These changes would
    affirmatively serve the public interest and protect national
    security. We look forward to continuing to work with the
    committee on these issues.
        E-FRONTIER. It is often repeated that the most important
    rule of legislating is first, do no harm. The sweeping language
    used in the statute creates potential barriers to Federal
    provision of emergency communications services or ways to
    leverage existing Federal assets in rural communities to
    address the digital divide. A proposal does not need to
    actually violate the law to cause delay or prevent needed
    action.
        For example, if the Federal Government were trying to make
    Federal fiber available to commercial carriers in the immediate
    aftermath of a natural disaster, no one would want to introduce
    delay and uncertainty while legal counsel debate whether this
    would be a wholesale network under the Act. There is no plan to
    build a national network of any sort, nor could any future
    administration do so without an appropriation from Congress.
    Given that enactment of E-FRONTIER provides no additional
    benefit to offset the risks of unintended consequences, we
    strongly recommend that this bill not move forward.
        Thank you very much. I look forward your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Feld follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Brenner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF DEAN R. BRENNER

        Mr. Brenner. Chairman Doyle, Ranking Member Latta, and
    members of the subcommittee, my name is Dean Brenner, and I am
    here today on behalf of Qualcomm, which was founded in a San
    Diego living room but is now the world's largest supplier of
    chips, an entire modem RF system for smartphones and other
    wireless devices, and the world's leading inventor and licensor
    of new wireless technologies.
        The technologies we develop, especially 5G, and the chips
    we design all depend on one key input controlled by the
    Government: spectrum. As this subcommittee has recognized,
    enabling a steady stream of new spectrum, low, mid, and high
    band, licensed, unlicensed, and shared, is essential for the
    rapid broad 5G rollout. We are working on 5G at a feverish
    pace, but our work depends on the continued steady stream of
    new spectrum, so thank you for continuing to make spectrum a
    high priority.
        5G has now launched on four continents. More than 30 5G
    networks, including those of all four U.S. national operators,
    have launched and are expanding. Over 20 manufacturers are
    selling or developing 5G devices, more than six times as many
    as in 4G's first year. Qualcomm's chips are in more than 150 5G
    devices which have been or soon will be launched, including
    phones, hot spots, and fixed wireless devices. Our chips
    support both sub-7 gigahertz and millimeter wave, and the U.S.
    was the first country to launch 5G in both sub-7 gigahertz and
    millimeter wave. 5G is delivering far better mobile broadband
    at a much lower cost per bit. Let me explain several 5G game
    changers which will launch soon and will further accelerate the
    5G rollout.
        Dynamic spectrum sharing, or DSS, enables an operator to
    run 5G in spectrum already in use for 4G. Instead of having to
    empty a 4G spectrum band before launching 5G, which could take
    10 years or more, DSS will enable a band to be used
    simultaneously for both 4G and 5G. Enhanced millimeter wave
    will enable 5G fixed wireless to be used for rural broadband.
    Qualcomm has developed new antenna modules which enable 5G
    fixed wireless service one mile away from a rural base station,
    covering a much larger area than anyone thought possible.
        A new version of 5G, optimized for unlicensed spectrum,
    will enable 5G to be launched for ultra low latency, ultra
    reliable 5G in factories, warehouses, and other venues. This
    technology, along with new forms of WiFi that Qualcomm is
    developing, will be deployed in new six gigahertz unlicensed
    spectrum now under consideration by the FCC. Qualcomm's 5G
    small cell chips will expand 5G to more people and more
    locations, particularly indoors, using millimeter wave.
        Last, cellular vehicle to everything or C-V2X technology,
    first with 4G and then 5G, enable cars to communicate with
    other cars and infrastructure with much greater range and
    reliability than is possible with older DSRC technology. For C-
    V2X to be it deployed, the FCC must waive or change its rules
    for 5.9 gigahertz, which only allows deployment of DSRC.
        Let me turn to 5G security, which has been a high priority
    for Qualcomm ever since we started working on 5G even though we
    don't manufacture core network equipment. Qualcomm has worked
    on 5G security internally with many other companies and in the
    3GPP global standards group, which sets 5G standards.
        In addition, for many years now, Qualcomm has been an
    active participant and leader in CSRIC, the FCC's Communication
    Security Reliability & Operability Council. Most recently, we
    appreciated the bipartisan May 9 letter sent from the chairman
    and ranking members of this subcommittee and the full committee
    to FCC Chairman Pai asking that CSRIC examine 5G security.
        Subsequently, one of our engineers, Dr. Farrokh Khatibi,
    was appointed to lead the CSRIC working group on managing
    security risks and emerging 5G implementations. The members of
    this group include experts from DHS, a county government, a
    non-profit, government contractors, network operators, tech
    companies, standards groups, and a trade association. We look
    forward to advancing 5G security through this group.
        Finally, Qualcomm has been working on spectrum sharing for
    many, many years. We have worked directly with NTIA, DoD, and
    other government agencies, as well as with private sector
    colleagues. Often, a spectrum band analyzed for sharing
    involves multiple cabinet departments and multiple entities in
    those departments.
        Over the years, NTIA has played a coordinating role of
    gathering technical input from government players, working with
    industry, leading joint public/private technical work, and
    speaking with a single voice for the executive branch to make
    greater progress toward sharing. This process culminated most
    recently in the initial commercial deployments in the CBRS
    band, a great development to increase the amount of mid-band
    spectrum for 4G and 5G.
        We are very pleased with the heightened interest in sharing
    across the Federal Government, and we look forward to
    continuing to work through this process to enable more
    intensive spectrum sharing. Thank you very much, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Brenner follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Brenner.
        So we have concluded our openings. We now move to member
    questions. Each member will have 5 minutes to ask questions of
    our witness. I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Stempfley, what risks are being posed by untrusted
    equipment in our Nation's telecommunications networks, and what
    kind of things can hostile foreign actors do if they have
    access to that equipment?
        Ms. Stempfley. I want to thank you for the question. So as
    I said in my testimony, the telecommunications infrastructure
    provides great interconnectivity, and actually serves as the
    foundation of many other--many elements of life. It also has
    cascading dependency with other physical infrastructures and,
    therefore, presents a key area of focus.
        The supply chain concerns are equally within that--are
    difficult to identify, and could provide a great deal of access
    not just to the environment, the services provided, but the
    management infrastructure underneath. So I think it goes
    without saying that they are of great concern for us to
    understand.
        Mr. Doyle. Yes. I mean, we have heard reports that hostile
    foreign actors are accessing our Nation's electrical grid and
    infrastructure. I mean, what other critical sectors could they
    access if they accessed a carrier's network through compromised
    equipment?
        Ms. Stempfley. Sir, unfortunately, the work that we do at
    CERT couldn't give you a clear answer to that activity. The
    piece, though, that I think we all understand is the
    telecommunications infrastructure, the electric sector, the
    financial sector are all interdependent. I think that speaks to
    the potential cascading effects.
        Mr. Doyle. Mr. Feld, tell me, what are the benefits of
    establishing a strategy for the Federal Government to develop
    these test beds for more efficient spectrum sharing, and what
    benefits do you see applying the lessons we learned in the CBRS
    band and other Federal bands?
        Mr. Feld. Thank you. The need for more sharing is obvious,
    but the benefits of sharing go beyond simply ensuring that the
    Federal Government can maintain its current functions. The
    dynamic spectrum sharing and other technologies that Mr.
    Brenner referred to allow the Federal Government potentially,
    for the first time to act as a single spectrum user rather than
    atomizing spectrum allocations in our current system.
        Additionally, the CBRS band demonstrates the importance of
    accommodating Federal users, licensed protected users, and
    unlicensed users, which has been the holy grail of spectrum
    policy. The ability to let everybody do what they need to do
    and what they want to do is the ultimate goal of spectrum
    policy, and these sharing technologies will make that possible.
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Feld.
        Mr. Nettles, how do you see the Network Security
    Information Sharing Act benefiting your company going forward
    and mitigating risk to your supply chain?
        Mr. Nettles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It would be of
    tremendous benefit to us. We are a pretty small company. We
    have 50 employees to cover all lines of business, about half of
    which are dedicated to our wireless network. I mean, it is
    difficult, to say the least, to keep up with technology coming
    out, and when it is not shared openly, you don't know what you
    don't know. It is not that many crossroads, unfortunately, and
    that is kind of where we found ourselves a few years back in
    our ZTE selection.
        Mr. Doyle. Yes. Ms. Stempfley, do you believe the Network
    Security Information Sharing Act that I have introduced with
    Representative Kinzinger will help our smaller telecom
    providers receive important information related to supply chain
    security threats, and what are the challenges that you have
    seen in communicating these types of threats to companies that
    don't have the resources and personnel of a tier-one carrier?
        Ms. Stempfley. I think the focus on ensuring that
    information is actionable and usable to all parties is a really
    important part of the bill; and of any information sharing
    related program. And so, the key thing that we have found, that
    I have found in building these sharing activities is
    recognizing the capacity that the organization has to take
    action. So is it clear what they should do, and is it
    communicated to them in a language and in a method they can
    actually physically receive it in?
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.
        I am going to yield 25 seconds back as an example for the
    rest of the committee. I now yield to my good friend, Mr.
    Latta.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again,
    thanks to our witnesses for being with us today.
        Mr. Brenner, if I could start my questions with you,
    please. The U.S. wireless industry has prospered due to market-
    based technological innovations and policies that incentivize
    growth. We have led the way with spectrum auctions in the early
    1990s and, more recently, with the successful AWS 1 and 3
    auctions. How important are the tools given to NTIA in the
    SHARE Act for continued U.S. wireless leadership over the next
    decade?
        Mr. Brenner. So, thank you for that question, Congressman
    Latta. The tools are vital, but I would suggest--so the list of
    the tools, which is Section 106(b)(2)(b) of the bill, needs to
    be added to include two more, and let me explain them.
        The first we call ``look before talk.'' So today, the way
    an unlicensed channel would be shared, if the four of us on
    this panel were sharing, I would get to use it one-fourth of
    the time, and I would have to be quiet the other three-fourths;
    the same for Mr. Feld, same for Mr. Nettles, same for Ms.
    Stempfley. But with 5G, we have this fast new radio, and we are
    transmitting in highly directional manner, and we have
    demonstrated this technology.
        As long as all four of us on the panel, each is able to
    detect in what direction the other is going to be using the
    spectrum, all four of us could use the spectrum at once,
    thereby dramatically increasing the utilization for everyone.
    So we call that ``look before talk.'' The technical name for
    it, I apologize, is coordinated multi-point.
        The second tool that is vital is synchronization. So if we
    all synchronized our watches while we were sharing the channel,
    because of the time-based aspect of spectrum sharing, if we
    were in sync with one another, we would minimize the amount of
    time, of dead time on the channel. Again, all of us would be
    able to use the channel more, which would be a benefit to
    everyone.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Stempfley, with your prior experience in the Office of
    Cybersecurity and Communications at the DHS, would you discuss
    how H.R. 4461 would function in the system with existing
    executive branch workrooms to facilitate information sharing
    with small rural providers?
        Ms. Stempfley. Yes. Thank you very much. I truly appreciate
    the focus on the small rural provider-related activity. It is
    an important part of our Nation's infrastructure, the tier.
    Within the information sharing programs that exist, sharing
    typically happens between a government entity with a
    consolidated group, whether it be an ISAC, or a trade
    association, and then the information is further disseminated
    from there. I think the way that this bill would work would be
    to ensure that the complete path exists and is successful, so
    that the end provider not only can receive the information, but
    then can provide the feedback back into the Government that the
    full set of activities has occurred, and I appreciate that in
    the bill.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you. Let me follow up with another
    question. H.R. 4459 calls for disposal of suspect equipment. Do
    you have any concerns about this equipment being resold on the
    secondary market? And just also, and from a technological
    perspective, could this equipment be sanitized and resold, or
    should we just destroy it entirely?
        Ms. Stempfley. There are many nuances within your question,
    sir, so I appreciate the depth of it. There is, I think, always
    a concern. If you listen to the many areas you must address in
    the supply chain , from relationship management to engineering
    to operations practices, there is always a concern that
    equipment that is vulnerable could be used in another place,
    and that should be addressed directly and so the idea of how to
    either sanitize or destroy the equipment is an important
    question.
        It is unclear whether it will be sanitizable. It really
    depends on what the risk within the supply chain that you are
    dealing with. In some instances, you can do something as simple
    as change software or firmware. In other instances, it can be
    more profound as an engineering flaw, and that would need a
    greater, a more severe response.
        Mr. Latta. Let me just follow up real quickly with that,
    because when you are talking about, you know, how one would be
    able to do it, what would be the expertise that one would have
    to have to be able to make sure that it is totally sanitized,
    then?
        Ms. Stempfley. I believe you would need both network
    expertise, security, cybersecurity expertise, and some level of
    software programming, software and hardware programming
    expertise in order to ensure it.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back the last 17 seconds and also
    submit my questions to the witnesses to be answered later.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Latta. Another good example from
    the leadership of the committee.
        Mr. McNerney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. McNerney. I thank the chairman for his leadership here,
    and I thank the witnesses.
        Mr. Nettles, I represent a district that has a lot of rural
    areas, and I believe that the wireless carriers would agree
    with you about the need for additional resources to replace
    some of this equipment. Do you think that the high-cost program
    under the universal service fund has contributed to these
    problems, and if so, could you explain that a little?
        Mr. Nettles. I most definitely think it contributed to it.
    The direction seems a little bit askew to the policy objectives
    of providing the most service to as many people everywhere as
    you can. These areas that are generally the least or most
    underserved, those that lack economies of scale, and so, you
    know, the abandonment of the notion of a rate of return seems a
    little bit counterintuitive or backward.
        So, you know, to say what is the least amount of money--you
    know, I want you to go serve this area that is already
    uneconomical to serve for the least amount of money that you
    will take to do it just doesn't quite add up to me.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
        Ms. Stempfley, it is clear that a major factor in the
    problems we face today is the cheapest equipment has led to the
    equipment with the weakest security, and we are just seeing
    that over and over. How do we go about ensuring that in the
    future, that equipment is more affordable, the secure equipment
    is more affordable?
        Ms. Stempfley. You have hit upon one of the most difficult
    challenges in security, and that is, trying to ensure that we
    understand what security requirements exist; we engineer them
    in from the beginning. We talk a lot about the fact that
    organizations have accepted a security debt. That debt is
    handed to them when they purchase insecure components where
    security was not considered from the beginning. So, bringing
    those requirements into the engineering and design phase is the
    most important way to increase----
        Mr. McNerney. That could make us, our equipment more
    competitive with, say, Huawei and ZTE. Thank you.
        Do you agree, Mr. Feld?
        Mr. Feld. Yes. I think the problem here is as other people
    have focused on the economies of scale and the ability of
    foreign----
        Mr. McNerney. Would you talk in the microphone a little
    bit?
        Mr. Feld. Sorry. Yes. I agree that the cost is a big
    concern. We need to make sure that security is affordable for
    everyone. If we do not take steps to try to equalize the
    playing field for countries like China that can subsidize
    insecure equipment, or have their own economies of scale,
    ultimately, it is consumers that will pay the cost either
    needing to buy higher-priced equipment or from insecure
    networks.
        Mr. McNerney. Earlier, you were singing the praises sharing
    spectrum--spectrum sharing among Federal users as well as non-
    Federal users. Are there opportunities for this model to work
    elsewhere, for example, between commercially licensed and
    unlicensed users?
        Mr. Feld. I believe there are a lot of opportunities that
    can be explored here. One of the important elements of CBRS is
    called user share, which means if the licensed provider is not
    actually using the spectrum capacity in an area, then somebody
    else can. When the licensee is ready to deploy, then the
    unlicensed equipment will stop working because of the spectrum
    access system. So the spectrum can be in productive use all the
    time, and the license provider can decide when it is
    appropriate to deploy, but we don't have to have rural areas
    captive to build out in the urban areas first. We can have
    local providers deploy using the sharing concepts.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, why isn't sharing enough spectrum for
    unlicensed services would help close the digital divide? How
    can that help close the digital divide?
        Mr. Feld. Well, we have a number of local providers who are
    small businesses, wireless ISPs, or WISPs, who use right now
    the unlicensed spectrum to provide because that equipment is
    affordable and available, and because they are in areas that
    the larger licensed carriers simply don't want to serve. They
    don't provide enough rate of return. But these guys who are
    actually part of the community and small businesses can make it
    work if we allow them to make it work. Giving them access to
    this additional spectrum capacity will be a huge boost in their
    ability to provide service in these rural areas.
        Mr. McNerney. And before I close, I just want to make a
    plug for the Digital Equity Act, which I just introduced
    yesterday, and broadband adoption.
        Mr. Feld. And which we publicly acknowledge and thank you
    very much and fully support.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
    committee, Mr. Walden.
        Mr. Walden. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thanks again to
    all of our witnesses.
        Mr. Nettles, H.R. 4459 calls for the reimbursement program
    to be completed within a year. With your staffing and the funds
    suggested in the draft, how confident are you that you could
    replace all your ZTE equipment in that timeline?
        Mr. Nettles. Mr. Walden, thank you for that question. It is
    going to be a challenge. There is no other way to put it. A
    year--you know, I guess it is sort of--in part, sort of depends
    on when is day zero in that process. You know, if we have got--
    I believe there was also a provision that gave the FCC up to a
    year to establish what was actually on the equipment. At this
    stage of the game, without knowing, you know, which of the
    components within the network actually will have to be
    replaced, it would be difficult--if it involved both the RAN
    and our core; I would say it is virtually impossible to do it
    within a year without just a concentrated effort from
    suppliers, you know, the----
        Mr. Walden. Do you think there would be equipment
    shortages, labor shortages? I mean, we have been through a
    couple of these types of transitions, you know, with the
    repack, broadcasters and all, and then you give them 39 months,
    and everybody rushes out to get it done.
        Mr. Nettles. Labor shortages would probably be the most
    probable situation.
        Mr. Walden. Right. If we aren't able to address this
    uncertainty and provide relief to providers, especially when
    they used Mobility Fund-1 money to build a network, what could
    happen? What should we be aware of? Could this lead to a loss
    in 911 coverage in some areas if providers like you are the
    only provider in that area?
        Mr. Nettles. Most definitely. I mean, if we are required to
    rip it out first and then put in the replacement equipment, I
    mean, it is--without sounding, you know, it would be like
    selling your car before you buy your new one. You are going to
    be walking.
        Mr. Walden. Got it.
        Mr. Brenner, I want to come to you with a question on
    spectrum management, H.R. 4462, the SHARE Act. As a company
    that sees every angle in this whole wireless debate, from
    licensed spectrum used in 5G to the unlicensed spectrum that
    will offload a lot of traffic to the shared spectrum of Federal
    users, how important is it that NTIA have full visibility and
    control over Federal access to spectrum in order to gain the
    most efficiencies while still meeting the missions of the
    agencies?
        Mr. Brenner. Thank you for that question, Congressman
    Walden. It is extremely important. You know, NTIA was created
    in the late 1970s because each Federal agency just had its own
    spectrum system, and there was no single coordinator. But you
    know, for sure, we would not have been able to achieve the
    success with the CBRS band without having NTIA play that role.
        Now, as you mentioned, you know, as Qualcomm, we work with
    everyone. As I mentioned in my testimony, it is great to hear
    that the Defense Department really has a revolutionary attitude
    about spectrum sharing, but these are very complicated
    situations. So in the two bands that are mentioned in the
    SHARED Act, one of them, seven gigahertz, has 8,700 Federal
    assignments of spectrum. The 3.1 to 3.5 band has 450
    assignments of spectrum. So NTIA, in August, sent a memo to the
    Federal agencies. Tell us. We have got all these assignments.
    Who is actually using the spectrum? So there has to be a single
    voice. It has to be NTIA.
        Mr. Walden. A clearinghouse. Somebody was overseeing it,
    yes. And I won't put you on the spot. I don't have to.
        You know, we are in this bit of a struggle right now where
    DoD, at least allegedly, wants to grab more control over
    management of spectrum, and some of us believe that is sort of
    an agency grab away from NTIA. We witnessed this in the last
    Congress when they wanted to avoid FDA approval of drugs and
    medical devices for battlefield needs because they were
    irritated with the slowness in one approval of one product,
    which we got resolved, but they wanted to go be their own FDA,
    and I just think it is bad public policy.
        You don't have to respond to that because you work with all
    of them. But I think we are--if there are a couple things that
    brings us together as Republicans and Democrats on this
    subcommittee, this is one of them, a couple of them, and so it
    is something we care a lot about.
        Finally, you know, Mr. Chairman, in light of the votes on
    the floor coming, I will yield back. But again, thank you to
    all of you for your testimony. It is most helpful.
        Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Veasey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I really
    appreciate it, and happy that we are here today to talk about
    this very important subject. I would like to thank our
    witnesses for coming here to share your experiences and
    expertise as we talk about this very critically important
    infrastructure, this wireless infrastructure, that is really
    important for our future.
        And I wanted to ask Ms. Stempfley, in your testimony, you
    discuss the need to manage risks across the entire global chain
    regarding wireless infrastructure, including manufacturing and
    integrated supply chains.
        Currently, the only other major suppliers of 5G networking
    equipment are Huawei, ZTE, Nokia, Ericsson, and all of those
    are foreign companies. As I understand it, there are no major
    U.S. producers of this telecom technology.
        The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act will
    mandate that no Federal funds can be used for communications
    equipment and service that pose an unacceptable risk to
    national security. Given that language and the lack of U.S.
    producers of telecom equipment, what manufacturer can we use to
    ensure that we won't face the same issue later after the risky
    equipment has been removed and replaced?
        Ms. Stempfley. Sir, I appreciate the question.
    Unfortunately, that is not really my area of expertise, and I
    could only speculate. I regret that I am not in a position to
    talk about the suppliers in the market.
        Mr. Veasey. Is there any--and anybody who can answer this
    one. Are there any U.S. producers of this telecommunications
    equipment that can pick up the slack that will be created in
    the market by prohibiting certain foreign-made products; and,
    if so, how long do you think it would take for that producer to
    create enough infrastructure to replace all the equipment that
    is contemplated being replaced?
        Mr. Nettles. If I may, I will go back to the answer I gave
    just a few minutes ago, sir. It kind of sort of depends on
    what--well, not kind of sort of. It absolutely depends on what
    we have to replace. If we have to replace the radios and the
    core, that is one order of magnitude. If it is just the core,
    that would be a little more manageable, including the ability
    to rehome our networks to, you know, existing cores that are in
    place from an infrastructure sharing standpoint.
        There are some niche vendors in the U.S. that make parts,
    you know, parts of the network. One of the challenges a small
    company like we have, you know, is when you buy components from
    different vendors, it adds a level of complexity in making
    everything work together that makes it almost unmanageable.
        It is my understanding that as far as the major vendors,
    Nokia and Ericsson, and even Samsung has been one that has been
    mentioned as one that would based on a democratic country,
    would be one that would be considered a favored equipment or
    favorable.
        Mr. Veasey. In your testimony, you discuss the challenges
    of providing wireless service to rural communities and the cost
    considerations of certain wireless equipment over others. You
    also discussed the concerns about the ability of small
    providers, and to make upgrades to facilitate next-generation
    services in rural areas.
        Could you give me your opinion regarding whether the
    provisions in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks
    Act would substantially delay 5G and other wireless deployment
    to unserved and underserved communities?
        Mr. Nettles. Would it delay? No, sir. I think it would make
    it--it would make it even more possible. Right now, I am
    looking at, you know, do I even try to stay in the business or
    do I just, you know, get what I can for it and walk away.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Johnson for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    hearing.
        Mr. Brenner, as you know, the SHARE Act calls for the
    establishment of an integrated spectrum automation enterprise
    strategy with at least one testbed to facilitate the sharing of
    spectrum by more than one Federal entity.
        Can you touch on the importance of establishing a sharing
    testbed? What are some of the potential consequences if the FCC
    and NTIA don't require this capability before Federal entities
    attempt to share the same spectrum space?
        Mr. Brenner. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. So
    at Qualcomm, we constantly, aggressively, 24/7, we have tests
    going on of new technologies all over the place, largely on our
    campus in San Diego, but also around the world.
        So our whole business is inventing new technologies and
    testing and testing and testing them, to make sure that they
    are going to work, to convince providers like Mr. Nettles that
    they are beneficial to be deployed, to convince equipment
    vendors to deploy them.
        And so that is the approach that has been successful to
    establishing United States leadership in the wireless space;
    and having that same kind of capability occur so that the
    testing can occur on the Federal side, I would say would be
    vital.
        Mr. Johnson. Well, you gave a good explanation of why it is
    important, but what happens if we don't do that? What are the
    consequences if the FCC doesn't require this capability before
    Federal entities attempt to share that same spectrum space?
        Mr. Brenner. Right. So the FCC can't require Federal
    entities to do testing. So that is point number one. Point
    number two, if no one else--the FCC, as an independent agency,
    has no authority over the executive agencies.
        But second of all, if you don't have that capability in the
    executive agencies, then what you have is what we have had for
    the last several decades, which is the Federal Government
    continues to use old legacy systems, and they don't have a
    modern wireless communications capability that we have in the
    commercial sector. That is bad in and of itself.
        And then the second thing that leads to is then when we
    want to have sharing, it becomes extremely difficult, because
    the commercial sector has state-of-the-art technology whereas
    the Federal Government has older legacy systems that were never
    designed for sharing.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Mr. Feld, do you have any thoughts on
    that?
        Mr. Feld. Yes. I completely agree with everything Mr.
    Brenner said. I also want to stress that the enormous
    opportunity here for the Federal Government to leverage its
    vast economies of scale requires that there be this focused
    central testing. Somebody has to be responsible for making it
    happen, and it can't be left to the vagaries of agencies.
        We need to understand that for most agencies, they are not
    interested in spectrum policy. They are trying to get their
    mission accomplished, and they are trying to do it within
    budgets for which upgrading of equipment or testing equipment
    is simply not an element. So there is no reason to believe that
    these things will happen without a statutory mandate to make it
    occur.
        Mr. Johnson. Ms. Stempfley, in your testimony, you talked
    about the importance of having a full view of the dependencies
    and complexities of supply chains as they change moving into
    the future. What role does or should NTIA continue to play
    coordinating a software or hardware bill of materials?
        Ms. Stempfley. I would like to commend NTIA for the work
    that they have been doing on the software bill of materials. In
    our experience in handling risks, particularly software-
    oriented risks that exist, we have found that the software bill
    of materials is possibly the most effective way to understand
    the complexities and the nested nature of all of the technology
    that exists in place.
        And it provides a foundation to integrate software bills of
    material with other hardware bills of material and multimodal
    bills of material, and would like to continue to see NTIA play
    a leadership role within the Government on this topic.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beat you, I gave
    back 35 seconds. I yield back.
        Mr. Doyle. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Soto for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Soto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has
    stated that China has, quote, ``the means, opportunity, and
    motive to use telecommunications companies for malicious
    purposes,'' unquote. By a show of hands, how many of you agree
    with that assessment? Interesting.
        Mr. Nettles. I am sorry, I missed the question.
        Mr. Soto. So the question again is: The House Permanent
    Select Committee on Intelligence has stated China has, quote,
    ``the means, opportunity, and motive to use telecommunications
    companies for malicious purposes.'' Please raise your hand if
    you agree with that statement. OK.
        It would be great to hear first from, then, Mr. Brenner on
    why you disagree with that statement.
        Mr. Brenner. Yes. Congressman, thank you. It isn't that I
    disagree with the statement or agree with the statement. I
    don't have any information about China as a country, their
    capabilities to infect our communication system. I obviously
    would think that would be a horrible thing, and I think that
    the U.S. Government should do everything at its disposal to
    make sure that doesn't happen.
        But when you say China, another reason I didn't raise my
    hand is Qualcomm, we sell chips to vendors. Some of them are
    Chinese vendors, and they are deploying our chips in phones in
    China. And I have no information--I think that is a very good
    thing for U.S. leadership.
        And I have no information, obviously, that there are any
    security issues in any of our chips, but, obviously, I
    completely share the concern. If China has a capability to harm
    the United States, I want the United States to do everything
    they can to prevent that.
        Mr. Soto. Ms. Stempfley, what is your opinion on that
    statement?
        Ms. Stempfley. I believe that there are a number of
    security risks within the infrastructure and that we should do
    everything we can to reduce them and to make it more difficult
    for anyone who has means, motive, and opportunity to take
    advantage of those.
        Mr. Soto. Thank you. There has been a growing movement
    within Congress, whether it is in the National Defense
    Authorization Act or in other major bills, to encourage
    national foundries, to encourage manufacturing of high-tech
    equipment here in the United States. In my district, we have
    the Bridge Project, which is creating tamper-proof sensors.
        Mr. Feld, how critical is it that we continue to develop
    national foundries here to develop next-generation technology
    in the telecommunications industry and beyond?
        Mr. Feld. Well, I think we in the United States have a long
    tradition of our leadership in this area. We want to maintain
    that, obviously. I think that it is very important, and that
    just as government had a role in fostering the creation of the
    internet and in fostering the development of many technologies
    in which we now have a leadership role, I think that there is a
    role for policy and encouraging these sort of foundries as
    well.
        Mr. Soto. And then, we have a bill with Congressman Flores,
    H.R. 575, which is encouraging, with the development of 5G, to
    adopt the Prague 5G security recommendations. How many you all,
    by a show of hands, agree that we should be adopting the Prague
    5G security recommendations as we develop 5G in this Nation?
    Please raise your hand. OK.
        I noticed, Ms. Stempfley, you didn't. Please give us your
    opinion on that.
        Ms. Stempfley. I am not familiar enough with the details of
    it in order to speak intelligently.
        Mr. Soto. Sure.
        I am going to yield back now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Doyle. I thank the gentleman.
        So we have multiple votes on the House floor which could
    keep us down there an hour, or maybe a little bit longer. We
    have polled the membership on both sides to see if they are
    comfortable with waiving their 5 minutes for questions.
        So if I don't hear any objections from either side, I would
    like to ask unanimous consent to enter the following documents
    into the record: An article from zero5g.com referenced earlier
    by Ranking Member Walden, a flier regarding 5G referenced
    earlier by Ranking Member Walden, a letter from the
    International Associations of Fire Chiefs. Without objection,
    so ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. Doyle. I want to thank all the witnesses for their
    participation in today's hearing. I want to remind Members
    that, pursuant to committee rules, they have ten business days
    to submit additional questions for the record to be answered by
    the witnesses who have appeared, and I would ask each witness
    to respond promptly to any such questions you may receive.
        At this time, the subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Hon. Adam Kinzinger

        I thank my friend, Mr. Latta, for yielding.
        The security of American communications and information
    networks is paramount to national security-a field I know
    fairly well from my time in the military, but this sword cuts
    both ways.
        As we have seen through the years, certain foreign
    adversaries have systematically coerced their equipment
    manufacturers to embed backdoors and other capabilities into
    their products, which are later purchased by American companies
    and integrated into our networks.
        No foreign actor should have the ability to eavesdrop on
    U.S. citizens or our government-and let alone use these
    backdoors to launch cyberattacks or disrupt our communications.
        In an effort to help the private sector avoid purchasing or
    installing this dangerous equipment, I worked with the
    Chairman, Mr. Doyle, to introduce H.R. 4461, the Network
    Security Information Sharing Act, which will be part of the
    discussion here today.
        So I look forward to the discussion today and I yield back
    to my friend.

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