    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                   OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT
                        THE SPREAD OF ILLICIT FENTANYL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 16, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-53

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                       govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                            energycommerce.house.gov

                                    __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    43-927 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2021

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                         FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                     Chairman
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             FRED UPTON, Michigan
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           PETE OLSON, Texas
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice     BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
        Chair                            BILLY LONG, Missouri
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILL FLORES, Texas
    JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
        Massachusetts                    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    TONY CARDENAS, California            RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
    RAUL RUIZ, California                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
    DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
    ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    DARREN SOTO, Florida
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
                                     ------

                               Professional Staff

                       JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
                    TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
                    MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
                  Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                            DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
                                      Chair
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,                 Ranking Member
        Massachusetts,Vice Chair         MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    RAUL RUIZ, California                DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida                SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York           GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
        officio)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Colorado, opening statement.................................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Brett Guthrie, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement....................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Oregon, opening statement......................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Hon. Ann Kuster, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      New Hampshire, prepared statement..............................   100

                                   Witnesses

    Kemp L. Chester, Assistant Director of The National Opioids and
      Synthetics Coordination Group White House Office of National
      Drug Control Policy............................................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    16
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   114
    Matthew Donahue, Regional Director North and Central Americas,
      Operation Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
      Department of Justice..........................................    31
        Prepared statement...........................................    33
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   122
    Thomas F. Overacker, Executive Director, Office of Field
      Operations, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................    43
        Prepared statement...........................................    45
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   137
    Gary R. Barksdale, Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Service...    53
        Prepared statement...........................................    55
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   158
    David A. Prince, Deputy Assistant Director, Transnational
      Organized Crime, Homeland Security Investigations, Immigration
      and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..    60
        Prepared statement...........................................    62
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   165
    Carol Cave, Director, Office of Enforcement and Import
      Operations, Office of Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug
      Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services...    66
        Prepared statement...........................................    68
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   175

                               Submitted Material

    Statement of Actus Foundation ``Amanda's Way'', July 16, 2018,
      submitted by Ms. DeGette.......................................   101
    Article of International Journal of Drug Policy, by Nicholas C.
      Peiper, et al., submitted by Ms. DeGette.......................   107

     OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE SPREAD OF ILLICIT FENTANYL

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2019

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
    the John D. Dingell Room 2123 Rayburn House Office Building,
    Hon. Diana DeGette [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Members present: Representatives DeGette, Schakowsky,
    Kennedy, Ruiz, Kuster, Sarbanes, Tonko, Peters, Pallone (ex
    officio), Guthrie (subcommittee ranking member), McKinley,
    Griffith, Brooks, Mullin, Duncan, and Walden (ex officio).
        Staff present: Mohammad Aslami, Counsel; Joe Banez,
    Professional Staff Member; Kevin Barstow, Chief Oversight
    Counsel; Jeffrey C. Carroll, Staff Director; Manmeet Dhindsa,
    Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, Deputy Staff Director; Chris
    Knauer, Oversight Staff Director; Jourdan Lewis, Policy
    Analyst; Kevin McAloon, Professional Staff Member; Benjamin
    Tabor, Staff Assistant; Jennifer Barblan, Minority Chief
    Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Mike Bloomquist,
    Minority Staff Director; Adam Buckalew, Minority Director of
    Coalitions and Deputy Chief Counsel, Health; Jordan Davis,
    Minority Senior Advisor; Brittany Havens, Minority Professional
    Staff, Oversight and Investigations; Peter Kielty, Minority
    General Counsel; Brannon Rains, Minority Legislative Clerk; and
    Alan Slobodin, Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight
    and Investigations.
        Ms. DeGette.  The Subcommittee on Oversight and
    Investigations will now come to order. Today, the Subcommittee
    on Oversight and Investigations is holding a hearing entitled
    ``Oversight of Federal Efforts to Combat the Spread of Illicit
    Fentanyl.''
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the increasing
    threat posed by fentanyl and the Federal Government's
    coordination and response.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for purposes of an opening
    statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

        Today, we are once again here to discuss the opioid crisis,
    an epidemic that this country has been battling for years.
    Previously, this committee has taken numerous actions to
    investigate the origins and elements of the crisis and help
    bring relief to those who are suffering.
        Today's hearing will examine the growing threat of
    synthetic opioids, which experts have called the third wave of
    the opioid epidemic.
        Our communities have already been ravaged by prescription
    opioids and then heroin. Now, unfortunately, we are seeing
    significant increases in overdose deaths involving synthetic
    opioids like fentanyl, including in my home state of Colorado.
        Fentanyl is extremely dangerous. It is 50 times more
    powerful than heroin, 100 times more powerful than morphine,
    and it is responsible for a number of growing overdose deaths
    in America.
        Fentanyl is also cheap and it's easy to produce, giving a
    high return for those who seek to profit from the destruction
    that it causes. Fentanyl can be used on its own or can be mixed
    with other drugs.
        Alarmingly, even amateur chemists can produce this highly
    dangerous drug with minimal resources and experience. It is
    often made overseas, likely in China, then shipped either
    directly to users in the United States or through
    intermediaries in other countries like Mexico.
        It can be bought anonymously on the dark web, and because
    it is so potent, small but deadly quantities of the drug can be
    shipped in packages via the U.S. mail or in private consignment
    carriers.
        Today, we have before us six agencies who play important
    roles in fighting the proliferation of fentanyl. Each is
    responsible for a piece of this effort, from guarding the
    border, to taking down drug trafficking organizations, to
    protecting the legitimate drug supply.
        These agencies will provide us with their assessment of how
    we got here, where the fentanyl threat stands right now, and
    how it has changed in recent months.
        And I want to thank each one of our witnesses for coming
    today.
        The purpose is to examine the state of fentanyl, but also
    our government's response to it. The threat is serious and
    evolving, and our response must be equally committed and
    adaptable.
        These agencies have experience enforcing our nation's drug
    laws, gathering intelligence against traffickers, and arresting
    powerful criminals, and we are thankful for their efforts.
        But fentanyl represents a unique problem, so these agencies
    need to develop new ways of attacking it. Because we have seen
    the opioid crisis evolve and take different forms, we also need
    to anticipate how fentanyl trends are likely to continue to
    change.
        I am interested to hear all of our witnesses' perspectives
    on this and how we can get ahead of the evolving threat so we
    are not caught flat-footed like we have been before,
    unfortunately.
        I am struck by the diverse missions of this panel. It is
    not every day that we have a hearing with the U.S. Postal
    Service and the DEA on the same panel.
        Every one of these witnesses represents just a piece of the
    puzzle, which means that we cannot succeed unless everybody
    comes together. The crisis is going to require a massive
    coordinated effort to overcome.
        We, frankly, need a national strategy on fentanyl response,
    and I don't mean just a white paper document or a task force
    report.
        I mean we need a coherent practical plan for how we are
    going to beat this problem. For example, the Office of National
    Drug Control Policy is supposed to formulate a strategy, bring
    all of the agencies together, and see to it that the strategy
    is implemented effectively.
        Are you coordinating the efforts of these agencies, and if
    so, how? Your mission is now more important than ever, so we
    will be looking to you for leadership and vision.
        DEA, you are on the front lines and often develop important
    leads for targeting drugs. Is that information being regularly
    shared with CBP so that it can adequately target fentanyl
    shipments when they come into the U.S.?
        FDA, suddenly, you are in the middle of this fight because
    fentanyl is increasingly being mixed with other drugs,
    including counterfeit prescription drugs.
        How are you coordinating with law enforcement to protect
    the drug supply?
        These are just a few of the questions we will explore
    today. If we are going to solve this problem, we need better
    cooperation across agencies, and we need to think differently
    than we have on past drug epidemics.
        Finally, this hearing is just one piece of oversight. This
    subcommittee will stay on this issue and ensure progress is
    being made so, as so frequently happens, unfortunately, we are
    not back next year talking about the same problems.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for their service on this
    critical issue and for coming here today, all in one panel.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Diana DeGette

        Today, we are here once again to discuss the opioid crisis,
    an epidemic this country has been battling for years.
        Previously, this Committee has taken numerous actions to
    investigate the origins and elements of the crisis and help
    bring relief to those who are suffering.
        Today's hearing will examine the growing threat of
    synthetic opioids, which experts have called the ``third wave"
    of the opioid epidemic.
        Our communities have already been ravaged by prescription
    opioids and then heroin. Now, we are seeing significant
    increases in overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids such
    as fentanyl, including in my home state of Colorado.
        Fentanyl is exceedingly dangerous. It is 50 times more
    powerful than heroin, 100 times more powerful than morphine,
    and it is responsible for a growing amount of overdose deaths
    in America.
        Fentanyl is also cheap and easy to produce, giving a high
    return for those who seek to profit from the destruction it
    causes. Fentanyl can be used on its own or can be mixed with
    other drugs. Alarmingly, even amateur chemists can produce this
    highly dangerous drug with minimal resources and expertise.
        It is often made overseas, likely in China, then shipped
    either directly to users in the United States or through
    intermediaries in other countries such as Mexico.
        It can be bought anonymously on the Dark Web, and because
    it is so potent, small but deadly quantities of the drug can be
    shipped in packages via the U.S. Mail or private consignment
    carriers.
        Today, we have before us six agencies who play important
    roles in fighting the proliferation of fentanyl. Each of them
    is responsible for a piece of this effort--from guarding the
    border, to taking down drug trafficking organizations, to
    protecting the legitimate drug supply.
        These agencies will provide us with their assessment of how
    we got here, where the fentanyl threat stands now, and how it
    has changed in recent months.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the state of
    fentanyl, but also our government's response to it. The threat
    is serious and evolving, and our response must be equally
    committed and adaptable.
        These agencies have experience enforcing our nation's drug
    laws, gathering intelligence against traffickers, and arresting
    powerful criminals. And we are thankful for their efforts. But
    fentanyl represents a unique problem, so these agencies need to
    develop new ways of attacking it.
        Because we have seen the opioid crisis evolve and take
    different forms, we also need to anticipate how fentanyl trends
    are likely to continue to change. I am interested to hear these
    witnesses' perspectives on how we can get ahead of this
    evolving threat, so we are not caught flat-footed.
        As I look at the witness panel, I am struck by their
    diverse missions. It is not every day that we have a hearing
    with the U.S. Postal Service and the DEA on the same witness
    panel.
        Each of you represents only a piece of this puzzle, which
    means we cannot succeed unless all of you come together. This
    crisis is going to require a massive, coordinated effort to
    overcome.
        We need a national strategy on our fentanyl response. And I
    don't just mean a white paper document or a task force report.
    I mean we need a coherent, practical plan for how we are going
    to beat this problem.
        For example, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP) is supposed to formulate a strategy, bring all the
    agencies together, and see to it that the strategy is
    implemented effectively. Are you coordinating the efforts of
    these agencies, and if so, how? Your mission is now more
    important than ever, so we will be looking to you for
    leadership and vision.
        DEA, you are on the front lines and often develop important
    leads for targeting drugs. Is that information being regularly
    shared with CBP so it can adequately target fentanyl shipments
    when they come into the U.S.?
        FDA, you are suddenly in the middle of this fight because
    fentanyl is increasingly being mixed with other drugs,
    including counterfeit prescription drugs. How are you
    coordinating with law enforcement to protect the drug supply?
        These are just a few of the questions we will explore
    today. If we are going to solve this problem, we need better
    cooperation across agencies, and we need to think differently
    than we have on past drug epidemics.
        Finally, this hearing is just one piece of our oversight.
    This Subcommittee will stay on this issue and ensure progress
    is being made so that we are not back here again next year
    talking about the same problems.
        I thank the witnesses for their service on this critical
    issue, and for being here today.

        Ms. DeGette. And now I recognize the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, Mr. Guthrie, for five minutes for an opening
    statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRETT GUTHRIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
               CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEATH OF KENTUCKY

        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this
    important hearing.
        The Energy and Commerce Committee has been steadfast in its
    efforts to help combat the opioid crisis with both
    investigations and legislation.
        Whether it was the committee's investigations into opioid
    distributors, patient brokering, or major opioid manufacturers,
    we have continued to ask questions and demand answers for the
    American people.
        When it comes to legislation, this committee led the way on
    passage of the 21st Century CURES Act, the Comprehensive
    Addiction and Recovery Act, and the SUPPORT Act for patients in
    communities.
        I was proud to work with these three landmark bills which
    are advancing treatment and recovery initiatives, improving
    prevention, protecting communities, and bolstering our efforts
    to fight deadly illicit synthetic drugs like fentanyl.
        Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is 80 to 100 times
    stronger than morphine and 50 times more potent than heroin.
    For many years, pharmaceutical fentanyl has been utilized as a
    powerful pain medicine to treat severe pain such as advanced
    cancer pain commonly used in the form of a patch on the skin or
    a lollipop.
        But pharmaceutical fentanyl is not why we are here today.
    We are here today because of concerns over illicit or illegally
    manufactured fentanyl. The fentanyl crisis is particularly
    dangerous because of its high potency, and the small amount
    required to potentially cause an overdose.
        It has become a powerful additive to drugs such as heroin,
    cocaine, or counterfeit pills with or without the user's
    knowledge.
        According to the CDC, in 2017 there were more than 28,000
    deaths involving synthetic opioids in the United States, which
    is more deaths than from any other type of opioid.
        Further, overdose death rates from synthetic opioids
    increased all across all demographics, county urbanization
    levels, and numerous states.
        A little bit of fentanyl goes a long way, which makes it
    harder for law enforcement to track where and how fentanyl is
    being purchased. Fentanyl can be purchased on the internet both
    in open source and on the dark web, and can be purchased pseudo
    anonymously using bitcoin or crypto currency.
        In addition to being smuggled across our borders, fentanyl
    can be mailed in small quantities through the Postal Service or
    express consignment carriers and, therefore, has a higher
    likelihood of coming into the United States undetected.
        These circumstances require a much different approach to
    intelligence, interdiction, and law enforcement compared to
    methods that may be better suited for what might be considered
    a more common drug smuggling operation.
        The threat is real, and it has been growing over the past
    few years. According to Customs and Border Protection data, in
    fiscal year 2015, 70 pounds of fentanyl were seized in the
    United States.
        In comparison, for fiscal year 2018, more than 2,000 pounds
    of fentanyl was seized. Further, for fiscal year 2019 to date,
    there have been 17,003 pounds of fentanyl seized, which is
    enough fentanyl for more than 600 million lethal doses of
    fentanyl, and we still have four more months of data to count
    before we know the total for this year.
        I want to acknowledge some of the efforts and
    accomplishments of this administration, including but not
    limited to HHS establishing an interdepartmental substance use
    disorder coordinating committee, China pledging to add fentanyl
    to its list of controlled substances, increasing shipment
    tracking responsibilities and coordination among multiple
    entities, and disruption efforts which has taken down an entire
    online black market.
        While we are already seeing new tools and resources
    provided and utilized as a result of this committee and the
    administration's work, the threat still exists, and our work is
    not done.
        I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today. I
    look forward to hearing from all of you about successes we have
    had in combating our nation's fentanyl threat but also how the
    threat has changed, what challenges remain, and what more we in
    Congress can do to be partners in this fight.
        I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Guthrie follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Brett Guthrie

        Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this important
    hearing.
        The Energy and Commerce Committee has been steadfast in its
    efforts to help combat the opioid crisis, with both
    investigations and legislation. Whether it was the Committee's
    investigations into opioid distributors, patient brokering, or
    the major opioid manufacturers--we've continued to ask
    questions and demand answers for the American public.
        When it comes to legislation, this Committee lead the way
    on passage of the 21st Century Cures Act, the Comprehensive
    Addiction and Recovery Act, and the SUPPORT for Patients and
    Communities Act. I was proud to work on these three landmark
    bills, which are advancing treatment and recovery initiatives,
    improving prevention, protecting communities, and bolstering
    our efforts to fight deadly illicit synthetic drugs like
    fentanyl.
        Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is 80 to 100 times
    stronger than morphine and 50 times more potent than heroin.
    For many years, pharmaceutical fentanyl has been utilized as a
    powerful pain medicine to treat severe pain, such as advanced
    cancer pain, commonly used in the form of a patch on the skin
    or a ``lollipop." But pharmaceutical fentanyl is not why we're
    here today--we're here today because of concerns over illicit,
    or illegally manufactured, fentanyl.
        The fentanyl crisis is particularly dangerous because of
    its high potency and the small amount required to potentially
    cause an overdose. It has become a powerful additive to drugs
    such as heroin, cocaine, or counterfeit pills--with or without
    the user's knowledge. According to the CDC, in 2017 there were
    more than 28,000 deaths involving synthetic opioids in the
    United States--which is more deaths than from any other type of
    opioid. Further, overdose death rates from synthetic opioids
    increased across all demographics, county urbanization levels,
    and numerous states.
        A little bit of fentanyl goes a long way--which makes it
    harder for law enforcement to track where and how fentanyl is
    being purchased. Fentanyl can be purchased on the internet-both
    in the open source and on the dark web-and can be purchased
    pseudo-anonymously using bitcoin or crypto currency.
        In addition to being smuggled across our borders, fentanyl
    can be mailed in small quantities through the postal service or
    express consignment carriers, and therefore has a higher
    likelihood of coming into the United States undetected. These
    circumstances require a much different approach to
    intelligence, interdiction, and law enforcement compared to
    methods that may be better suited for what might be considered
    a more common drug smuggling operation.
        The threat is real and has been growing over the past few
    years. According to Customs and Border Protection data, in
    fiscal year 2015, 70 pounds of fentanyl were seized in the
    United States. In comparison, for fiscal year 2018, more than
    2,000 pounds of fentanyl were seized. Further, for fiscal year
    2019 to date, there have been 1,703 pounds of fentanyl seized.
    That is enough fentanyl for more than 600 million lethal doses
    of fentanyl, and we still have four more months of data to
    account for before we will know the total for this year.
        I want to acknowledge some of the efforts and
    accomplishments of this Administration, including but not
    limited to HHS establishing an interdepartmental substance use
    disorder coordinating committee; China pledging to add fentanyl
    to its list of controlled substances; increasing shipment-
    tracking responsibilities and coordination among multiple
    entities; and disruption efforts such as taking down an entire
    online black market. While we are already seeing new tools and
    resources provided and utilized as a result of this Committee
    and the Administration's work--the threat still exists, and our
    work is not done.
        I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today.
    I look forward to hearing from all of you about successes we
    have had in combatting our nation's fentanyl threat, but also
    how the threat has changed, what challenges remain, and what
    more we, in Congress, can do to be partners in this fight.

        Ms. DeGette. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the
    full committee, Mr. Pallone, for five minutes for purposes of
    an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
                IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        This committee has held many hearings on the opioid crisis
    over the last several years, and with each hearing it seems the
    challenge to combat the crisis grows even more daunting.
        While opioid prescribing rates appears to have gone done,
    overdose deaths continue to climb. Communities all around the
    country are still suffering from this epidemic, now largely at
    the hands of heroin, increasingly fentanyl.
        Fentanyl is a deadly synthetic drug that is 50 times more
    powerful than heroin. Because it's relatively easy to make and
    so potent, it is tragically leading to large increases in
    overdose deaths.
        We have all heard the terrible numbers that tell the story.
    In 2017, there were over 47,000 opioid overdose deaths. Twenty-
    eight thousand of those deaths involve synthetic opioids such
    as fentanyl.
        My home state of New Jersey, for example, has seen a ten-
    fold increase in deaths involving fentanyl in the last several
    years, and fentanyl represents the third wave, as the
    chairwoman said, in the opioid crisis.
        After the country was inundated with prescription opioids,
    prescribing rates when down. But many of those who were already
    addicted then turned to heroin, and now the trend is shifting
    towards synthetic opioids like fentanyl, which pose a unique
    threat.
        These drugs are manufactured overseas in countries like
    China, oftentimes in clandestine labs. These drugs are then
    shipped into the U.S. often in small quantities that are
    difficult to detect.
        And to make matters worse, we are now seeing fentanyl
    increasingly mixed into other drugs like cocaine,
    methamphetamine, and even counterfeit prescription drugs like
    Oxycodone.
        This means that many unsuspecting people are dying at the
    hands of fentanyl when they didn't even realize they were
    taking it, and this drug represents an unprecedented threat to
    the U.S. and we have to do everything we can to stop this flow
    into our communities.
        Today, we are hearing from the key law enforcement and
    regulatory agencies on the front line of this battle. Each
    agency plays a critical part and has decades of experience in
    this fight.
        The problem, however, is that fentanyl is unlike any drug
    crisis we have faced before. All of these factors point to one
    conclusion. We have to think differently about how to counter
    the spread of fentanyl. The old approaches simply will not
    suffice.
        Finally, we have repeatedly heard from experts that we
    cannot arrest our way out of the opioid crisis and fentanyl is
    no different. Evidence-based treatment is the best hope for
    those suffering from addiction and we must support programs
    that provide that help.
        So today's hearing focuses on how to stop the flow in
    fentanyl but this is by no means the end of the conversation. I
    am committed to providing Americans suffering from opioid use
    disorder access to the quality treatment they need, and this
    committee will continue to shine a spotlight on this crisis to
    help identify solutions including in the treatment and public
    health arenas.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

        This Committee has held many hearings on the opioid crisis
    over the last several years, and with each hearing it seems the
    challenge to combat the crisis grows even more daunting.
        While opioid prescribing rates appear to have gone down,
    overdose deaths continue to climb. Communities all around the
    country are still suffering from this epidemic, now largely at
    the hands of heroin and increasingly, fentanyl.
        Fentanyl is a deadly synthetic drug that is 50 times more
    powerful than heroin. Because it is relatively easy to make and
    so potent, it is tragically leading to large increases in
    overdose deaths.
        We have all heard the terrible numbers that tell this
    story. In 2017, there were over 47,000 opioid overdose deaths,
    28,000 of those deaths involved synthetic opioids such as
    fentanyl. My home state of New Jersey, for example, has seen a
    tenfold increase in deaths involving fentanyl in the last
    several years.
        Fentanyl represents the third "wave" in the opioid crisis.
    After the country was inundated with prescription opioids,
    prescribing rates went down--but many of those who were already
    addicted then turned to heroin.
        Now the trend is shifting toward synthetic opioids like
    fentanyl, which poses a unique threat. These drugs are
    manufactured overseas in countries like China, oftentimes in
    clandestine labs. These drugs are then shipped into the United
    States, often in small quantities that are difficult to detect.
        To make matters worse, we are now seeing fentanyl
    increasingly mixed into other drugs like cocaine,
    methamphetamine, and even counterfeit prescription drugs like
    oxycodone. This means that many unsuspecting people are dying
    at the hands of fentanyl when they didn't even realize they
    were taking it.
        This drug represents an unprecedented threat to the United
    States--and we must do everything we can to stop its flow into
    our communities.
        Today we will hear from the key law enforcement and
    regulatory agencies on the front lines of this battle. Each
    agency plays a critical part and has decades of experience in
    this fight. The problem, however, is that fentanyl is unlike
    any drug crisis we have faced before.
        Just about everything about this threat is new: how easily
    it can be produced and sold, where it can be made, how it can
    be trafficked into our country, how difficult it is to detect--
    and of course, how deadly it is.
        All of these factors point to one conclusion--we have to
    think differently about how to counter the spread of fentanyl.
    The old approaches simply will not suffice.
        We need to hear from the agencies about how they are
    adapting to this new and evolving threat, how they are thinking
    of new ways to attack this problem, and especially, how they
    are collaborating.
        The fentanyl threat is so unprecedented, and so
    challenging, that no single agency can tackle it on its own.
    They must all work together.
        You simply cannot let turf wars or the competition for
    bringing cases stop you from cooperating with one another to
    help solve this problem. The stakes are too high.
        Finally, we have repeatedly heard from experts that we
    cannot arrest our way out of the opioid crisis, and fentanyl is
    no different. Evidence-based treatment is the best hope for
    those suffering from addiction, and we must support programs
    that provide that help.
        Today's hearing focuses on how to stop the flow of
    fentanyl, but this is by no means the end of the conversation.
    I am committed to providing Americans suffering from opioid use
    disorder access to the quality treatment they need. This
    Committee will continue to shine a spotlight on this crisis to
    help identify solutions, including in the treatment and public
    health arenas.
        I yield back.

        Mr. Pallone.I have about two minutes left, and I'd like to
    yield that now to the gentlewoman from New Hampshire, Ms.
    Kuster.
        Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Chairman Pallone.
        We have seen the opioid crisis evolve and take many
    different forms, as you described. But no community in this
    country has been spared. New England and New Hampshire, in
    particular, have been devastated by this crisis.
        In my home state, while we have seen the rate of
    prescription opioid and heroin overdose deaths decline, the
    rate of fentanyl--involved overdoses has not subsided.
        With the help of a coordinated approach at the local level,
    the hub and spoke model ensures that every Granite Stater has
    nearby access to treatment and recovery services.
        But this does not solve the supply problem. We know all too
    well that newer, stronger, and deadlier analogs of fentanyl
    continue to proliferate and challenge our ability to prevent
    needless premature deaths.
        I look forward to the hearing. I look forward to your
    testimony and I thank the gentlewoman chairing this
    subcommittee and the chair of the committee for their attention
    to this crisis.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you. I have about a minute. I don't know
    if anybody else wants the time. If not, I will yield back,
    Madam Chair.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, Mr. Walden, for five minutes for purposes of an
    opening statement.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                   CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

        Mr. Walden. Good morning, Madam Chair, and thank you for
    holding this really, really important hearing on getting
    illicit fentanyl off our streets.
        As you've heard, fentanyl is so deadly a piece of it, the
    size of a few grains of salt, can kill you. It reportedly led
    to 49 deaths in Oregon in 2017. So, ridding our communities of
    fentanyl is a key piece of combating the opioid crisis in
    Oregon and across the country.
        Illicit fentanyl is a tremendously difficult and dynamic
    problem. It is hard to detect and is highly potent and
    lucrative enough to be sent in small envelopes or packages, and
    while the heroin market was monopolized by large criminal
    groups, this fentanyl wave--it is harder to police.
        It is coming almost entirely from the black market on the
    dark web and clandestine labs in China and Mexico with many
    mid-level and small operators in addition to drug smuggling
    operations like the cartels.
        This subcommittee last held an oversight hearing on illicit
    fentanyl back in March of 2017. The need for fentanyl focused
    action was clear then.
        Two years later, there are numerous significant
    accomplishments. Last year the committee worked in a bipartisan
    way to enact the SUPPORT Act to bolster the fight against
    opioids such as fentanyl. This law has helped provide advanced
    electronic data of international mail shipments to help target
    and intercept illicit fentanyl.
        This act also provided the FDA with a new tool for
    deterring imports of illicit fentanyl. As you'll recall, Dr.
    Burgess went up to a mail distribution facility in New Jersey
    and learned a lot and brought that back to us.
        The Trump administration has spurred improved actions in
    the fentanyl fight. Our nation is getting at least some
    improved level of cooperation from the Chinese government on
    class-based scheduling, which helps remove an incentive for
    traffickers to introduce new substances in the fentanyl family
    for the purpose of evading controls.
        President Trump deserves credit for moving this bold
    proposal based on the longstanding work of the White House
    Office on National Drug Control Policy, the DEA, and the State
    Department.
        President Xi of China deserves some credit for agreeing to
    a commitment to crack down on fentanyl as a class. We'd like to
    see more there.
        While it's too soon to assess the impact, early indications
    are at least encouraging. And since February of 2018, DEA has
    imposed emergency scheduling of fentanyl-related substances,
    but we need to work with DEA and other federal agencies to find
    the best approach to make this scheduling permanent.
        The Stop Importation and Trafficking of Synthetic Analogs,
    or SITSA, Act, which would have given law enforcement
    additional tools they need to get illicit drugs such as
    fentanyl off our streets without compromising important public
    health and research protections, that was included in our
    House-passed version of the SUPPORT Act but, sadly, was not
    included in the final package that became law.
        Mr. Katko of New York, he sponsored this legislation. It
    would be a good place to start again and we should make it law.
        On July of 2017, the Department of Justice announced the
    seizure of AlphaBay. That's the largest criminal marketplace on
    the dark web and a major source of fentanyl linked to overdose
    deaths.
        The AlphaBay takedown was an international operation led by
    the U.S. Both DEA and CBP recently made the largest seizures of
    fentanyl in U.S. history and we thank you for that. Federal
    agents working with local police seized 50 kilos of fentanyl
    precursor in 2017.
        For the first time the Justice Department announced
    indictments of Chinese nationals for conspiracies to distribute
    large quantities of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
        May of '19, a dark net drug dealer was indicted for selling
    fentanyl online, thanks to Homeland Security's investigations,
    a year-long nationwide undercover action, and under agreement
    with the U.S. Postal Service, China Post is providing advanced
    electronic data on parcels mailed to the U.S.
        FDA and CBP signed an agreement in April of 2019 to
    maximize inspection detection capabilities to products such as
    fentanyl from entering the United States.
        So, we salute these important federal workers and agencies
    for their work. But we know big challenges remain. More work is
    needed to get better cooperation from Mexico's law enforcement
    authorities.
        We need to remain vigilant with China on its fentanyl
    commitment. Much more needs to be done to collect better data
    on fentanyl trafficking and to improve data sharing and we want
    to hear more on strategy to disrupt fentanyl trafficking.
        We will be asking questions how we can strengthen our
    efforts on what this committee can provide. The SUPPORT Act was
    a great start, but it is not enough.
        And Madam Chair, I would remind you we posted our final
    oversight investigations report on the committee's Web site and
    sent everybody a letter at the beginning of the year.
        There were some important recommendations there I hope we
    can eventually get to.
        Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to recognize
    Michael Gray. He is father of Amanda Beatrice Rose Gray. Amanda
    died of an overdose of pure fentanyl in January of 2018--pure
    fentanyl.
        Michael has been a tireless advocate fighting against the
    opioid epidemic and fentanyl. His efforts informed our work in
    the last Congress. He was incredibly helpful in that, and let
    us remember as the face of this crisis his daughter, and we
    thank you for being here and we thank you for your work.
        Madam Chair, in conclusion, the Actus Foundation--we have a
    letter we would like entered into the record that we previewed
    with you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden

        Chair DeGette, thank you for holding this hearing on
    getting illicit fentanyl off our streets.
        Fentanyl is so deadly that a piece the size of a few grains
    of salt can kill you, and reportedly led to 49 deaths in Oregon
    in 2017. Ridding our communities of fentanyl is a key piece of
    combating the opioid crisis in Oregon and across the country.
        Illicit fentanyl is a tremendously difficult and dynamic
    problem. It is hard to detect, highly potent, and lucrative
    enough to be sent in small envelopes or packages. While the
    heroin market was monopolized by large criminal groups, this
    fentanyl wave is harder to police. It is coming almost entirely
    from the black market on the dark web and clandestine labs in
    China and Mexico with many mid-level and small operators, in
    addition to drug smuggling operations like the cartels.
        This Subcommittee last held an oversight hearing on illicit
    fentanyl in March 2017. The need then for fentanyl-focused
    action was clear.
        Two years later, there are numerous significant
    accomplishments.
        Last year, this Committee worked in a bipartisan way to
    enact the SUPPORT Act to bolster the fight against opioids such
    as fentanyl. This law helped provide advance electronic data of
    international mail shipments to help target and intercept
    illicit fentanyl. This Act also provided the FDA with a new
    tool for deterring imports of illicit fentanyl.
        The Trump Administration has spurred important actions in
    the fentanyl fight. Our nation is getting cooperation from
    China on class-based scheduling, which helps remove an
    incentive for traffickers to introduce new substances in the
    fentanyl family for the purpose of evading controls. President
    Trump deserves credit for moving this bold proposal, based on
    the longstanding work of the White House Office on National
    Drug Control Policy, the DEA, and the State Department.
    President Xi of China deserves credit for agreeing to a
    commitment to crack down on fentanyl as a class. While it is
    too soon to assess the impact, early indications seem
    encouraging.
        Since February 2018, DEA has imposed emergency scheduling
    of fentanyl-related substances. We need to work with DEA and
    other federal agencies to find the best approach to make this
    scheduling permanent. The Stop the Importation & Trafficking of
    Synthetic Analogues (SITSA) Act, which would have given law
    enforcement additional tools they need to help get illicit
    synthetic drugs, like fentanyl, off our streets without
    compromising important public health and research protections
    was included in the House-passed version of the SUPPORT Act,
    but ultimately not included in the final package that became
    law. Mr. Katko's legislation is a good place to start.
        In July 2017, the Department of Justice announced the
    seizure of AlphaBay, the largest criminal marketplace on the
    dark web, and a major source of fentanyl linked to overdose
    deaths. The AlphaBay takedown was an international operation
    led by the U.S.
        Both DEA and CBP recently made the largest seizures of
    fentanyl in U.S. history. Federal agents working with local
    police seized 50 kilos of a fentanyl precursor in May 2017,
    apparently one of the largest, if not the largest, seizure of a
    precursor in the U.S.
        For the first time, the Justice Department announced
    indictments of Chinese nationals for conspiracies to distribute
    large quantities of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
        In May 2019, a darknet drug dealer was indicted for selling
    fentanyl online, thanks to Homeland Security Investigations'
    yearlong nationwide undercover actions to target vendors of
    illicit goods on the dark web.
        Under an agreement with the U.S. Postal Service, China Post
    is providing advanced electronic data on parcels mailed to the
    U.S.
        FDA and CBP signed an agreement in April 2019 to maximize
    inspection and detection capabilities to products such as
    fentanyl from entering the U.S.
        We salute the federal agencies for this work, but big
    challenges remain. More work is needed to get better
    cooperation from Mexico's law enforcement authorities. We need
    to remain vigilant with China on its fentanyl commitment. Much
    more needs to be done to collect better data on fentanyl
    trafficking and to improve data-sharing. We want to hear more
    on a strategy to disrupt fentanyl trafficking. We will be
    asking questions on how we can strengthen our efforts, and what
    help this Committee can provide.
        The SUPPORT Act was a great start. Let's continue our
    bipartisan legislative efforts to combat this crisis.
        I look forward to the testimony and thank our witnesses for
    being here today.

        Ms. DeGette. Without objection, and I would add my thanks
    to you, Mr. Gray, for all of your tireless work.
        Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back, and I now ask
    unanimous consent that the Members' written opening statements
    be made part of the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Ms. DeGette. I would now like to introduce our panel of
    witnesses for today's hearing.
        Mr. Kemp L. Chester, Assistant Director of the National
    Opioids and Synthetics Coordination Group, the White House
    Office of National Drug Control Policy. Welcome.
        Mr. Matthew Donahue, Regional Director, North and Central
    Americas Operation Division, Drug Enforcement Administration at
    the U.S. Department of Justice.
        Mr. Thomas F. Overacker, Executive Director, Office of
    Field Operations, Custom and Border Protection at the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security.
        Mr. Gary R. Barksdale, Chief Postal Inspector at the U.S.
    Postal Service,
        Mr. David A. Prince, Deputy Assistant Director,
    Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security Investigation,
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Carol Cave, Director of the Office of Enforcement and
    Import Operations, Office of Regulatory Affairs, Food and Drug
    Administration at the Department of Health and Human Services.
        Thank you all for appearing in front of the subcommittee
    today. You are aware the committee is holding an investigative
    hearing and, when doing so, has had the practice of taking
    testimony under oath.
        Do any of you have any objections to testifying under oath?
        Let the record reflect that the witnesses have responded
    no. The Chair then advises you under the rules of the House and
    the rules of the committee you're entitled to be accompanied by
    counsel.
        Do any of you desire to be accompanied by counsel today?
        Let the record reflect the witnesses have responded no. If
    you would, please rise and raise your right hand so you may be
    sworn in.
        [Witnesses were sworn.]
        Ms. DeGette. You may be seated.
        Let the record reflect the witnesses have now responded
    affirmatively and you are now under oath and subject to the
    penalties set forth in Title 18 Section 1001 of the U.S. Code.
        The Chair will now recognize the witnesses for five minutes
    summary of their written statements. In front of each of you is
    a microphone and a series of lights. The light turns yellow
    when you have a minute left and it turns red to indicate that
    your time has come to an end.
        And so let's start with you, Mr. Chester. You are now
    recognized for five minutes.

    STATEMENTS OF KEMP CHESTER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
     OPIOIDS AND SYNTHETICS COORDINATION GROUP, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
      OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; MATTHEW DONAHUE, REGIONAL
     DIRECTOR NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICAS, OPERATION DIVISION, DRUG
    ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; THOMAS
     F. OVERACKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS,
      CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
       SECURITY; GARY R. BARKSDALE, CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, U.S.
      POSTAL SERVICE; DAVID A. PRINCE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
           TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY
       INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; CAROL CAVE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
      OF ENFORCEMENT AND IMPORT OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF REGULATORY
    AFFAIRS, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
                             HUMAN SERVICES

                      STATEMENT OF KEMP L. CHESTER

        Mr. Chester. Chairwoman DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie,
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
    testify today on this critical issue.
        The Office of National Drug Control Policy, under the
    leadership of Director Jim Carroll, leads the development of
    the administration's national drug control strategy and
    oversees its implementation.
        The 2019 strategy is a comprehensive plan to address the
    president's top drug priority--the current opioid crisis--also
    focusing on the emergence of even newer synthetic opioids and
    other emerging crises such as methamphetamine use and the
    increase in cocaine availability.
        As part of the executive office of the president, ONDCP is
    uniquely positioned and has played an integral in coordinating
    a comprehensive approach to drug policy development and
    implementation.
        It has facilitated successful interagency collaboration,
    coordination, and problem resolution on myriad drug policy
    issues.
        To that end, ONDCP has led countless interagency efforts
    directly related to the illicit opioid problem set. ONDCP
    established the National Heroin Coordination Group, recently
    renamed the National Opioids and Synthetics Coordination Group,
    in the fall of 2015 to apply new thinking to the heroin and
    fentanyl problem and develop a novel approach to addressing it.
        We worked collaboratively with the interagency in 2016 to
    develop and issue the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan, or
    HARP, to guide and synchronize interagency activities against
    the available of heroin, fentanyl, and fentanyl analogs.
        To this day, the HARP is the one document that brings
    together, contextualizes, and synchronizes the Federal
    Government, activities at the federal, state, local, and tribal
    levels as well as in the international domain.
        Ten times every month our opioids and synthetics
    coordination group leads video teleconferences at all levels of
    classification and nationwide webinars where departments,
    agencies, state, local, and tribal officials and key embassies
    share information and synchronized efforts based upon a common
    understanding of the strategic trends related to the opioid
    problem set.
        This level of direct leadership has been instrumental in
    developing a better understanding of the crisis at all levels
    as well as serving as the driver for collaboration and tangible
    results both domestically and with international partners.
        Based upon our in-depth understanding of the opioid crisis,
    key issues such as the challenges of fentanyl detection, safe
    fentanyl handling, and the need for innovative public health
    approaches were brought to the forefront and are currently
    being addressed.
        Our partnership with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service has
    increased interagency understanding of the international and
    domestic mail flow into the United States, and U.S.
    vulnerabilities in disrupting the fentanyl and synthetic opioid
    supply chain.
        Our collaboration with the FBI-led Joint Criminal Opioid
    and Darknet Enforcement, or J-CODE, team, U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection's National Targeting Center, and our
    management of key international relationships with Mexico,
    Canada, China, Afghanistan, and others have brought tangible
    results in disrupting the flow of these dangerous drugs across
    our borders.
        For example, because of the interagency focus on disruptive
    the fentanyl supply chain, in the spring of 2017 CBP began to
    imprint odor of fentanyl on all narcotics detection K9s, and
    now more than 450 dogs are trained addressing a critical
    vulnerability in our detection capability.
        As the fentanyl threat grew in 2016 and 2017, the lack of
    good scientific information concerning the threat of fentanyl
    exposure had a chilling effect on U.S. law enforcement and our
    first responders.
        ONDCP initiated an interagency working group to develop and
    publish the fentanyl safe handling recommendations, and shortly
    thereafter CBP released a companion roll call video in use
    today.
        ONDCP is leading an interagency process with the
    Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services to
    schedule fentanyl analogs before the temporary action expires
    while providing a framework to address the dynamic illicit drug
    market in a more comprehensive manner and making all of these
    substances available to the research community.
        The national drug control strategy states, quote, ``While
    confronting today's drug crisis to arrest its growth and reduce
    its effects, we must also further develop the capability,
    knowledge, and infrastructure to respond to the evolving nature
    of the drug threat as we move deeper into the 21st century,''
    closed quote.
        The men and women of ONDCP are doing just that. I would
    like to thank this committee and your House colleagues for your
    foresight and leadership in addressing this critical national
    security, law enforcement, and public health challenge.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Chester follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chester.
        Mr. Donahue, you're now recognized for five minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF MATTHEW DONAHUE

        Mr. Donahue. Good morning, Chairman DeGette, Ranking Member
    Guthrie, and members of the subcommittee. It is my honor to
    appear before you today to discuss the critically important
    issue of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl like substances that
    have had a tremendous impact on the health and safety of our
    communities.
        Illicit fentanyl and other fentanyl like substances are
    especially dangerous drugs are often far more potent and deadly
    than other drugs like heroin and cocaine.
        I have had the privilege of being a DEA special agent for
    almost 30 years, having worked in South America, the Caribbean,
    and now North and Central American region.
        When I reflect on my time with DEA, the challenge we face
    with the ongoing opioid crisis, along with the sophistication,
    capacity, and global reach of Mexican poly-drug cartels is what
    worries me and deeply concerns me the most.
        As the regional director of North and Central America
    region, I see firsthand everyday the extreme lawlessness and
    other atrocities committed by Mexican cartels to maintain their
    dominant market share to provide illegal substances to
    individuals in the United States.
        The ruthlessness of these cartels, combined with their
    callous greed, is devastating families and communities,
    resulting in an increase of violent crime in the United States.
        Dangerous and highly sophisticated cartels operating in
    both Mexico and the United States have been and will continue
    to be the most significant source of illicit narcotics
    trafficked into and throughout the United States.
        When it comes to illicit fentanyl, China is the primary
    manufacturing source as well as the source of precursor
    chemicals needed to manufacture fentanyl outside of China.
        However, I would be remiss if I didn't say that China has
    taken important action to stem this manufacturing by the
    extraordinary step of controlling the entire class of fentanyl-
    based drugs.
        History has shown that when China and the United States
    have jointly controlled the drug it has drastically decreased
    its importation into the United States.
        However, Mexican cartels now have increasingly an important
    role in the fentanyl trafficking. We have witnessed a
    transition from importation of precursor chemicals for the
    production of fentanyl to the manufacturing of precursor
    chemicals and fentanyl within Mexico itself. This is a very
    alarming development.
        Fentanyl comes into the United States in three ways. It is
    shipped directly to the United States through the U.S. mail
    services, it is trafficked in through our northern border, and
    most importantly, it is trafficked over our southern border via
    Mexican cartels by various means and methods.
        In many cases, fentanyl comes in the form of counterfeit
    prescription pills. Oftentimes, people believe they may be
    ordering Hydrocodone or Oxycodone on the internet but they're
    receiving a fentanyl or a fentanyl analog, which could lead to
    deadly consequences.
        As a leader of DEA in Mexico, I can say confidently that we
    have not been a spectator in this battle. DEA has the largest
    footprint of the United States Government in Mexico. We are
    addressing this threat by focussing on efforts of identifying
    the supply chain and disrupting it. We are working bilaterally
    and judiciously targeting and dismantling the cartels.
        Through our more than 300 domestic and international field
    offices, our special operations division, which works with our
    interagency and international partners, we are conducting
    large-scale investigations and prosecuting those who seek to
    profit and are responsible for the production, transportation,
    distribution, and sale of these deadly substances.
        Perhaps one of the most notable examples of these efforts
    is the 2016 arrest of Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquin Guzman
    Loera, commonly known as El Chapo, who coincidentally is being
    sentences tomorrow in New York City.
        The DEA will continue to investigate the biggest and most
    egregious organizations that are poisoning our communities. We
    will continue to focus on targeting drug cartels and
    significant organizations operating in and outside the United
    States whose only motive is to make tremendous profits on
    unsuspecting and vulnerable populations.
        But there is more work to be done. On February 6, 2018, the
    DEA used its authority under the Controlled Substances Act to
    temporarily place all nonscheduled fentanyl like substances in
    Schedule I and it has had a significant impact.
        Let me reiterate that point. The temporary control of all
    nonscheduled fentanyl substances has had a significant positive
    impact in this fight. The class control action has
    substantially slowed the rate at which new substances are
    introduced to and encountered on the illicit market.
        However, this temporary action expires February 2020, which
    is only 206 days away. Additionally, if lawful access is not
    addressed, criminals will continue to use our own laws to evade
    detection and exploit members of our communities as technology
    advances and law enforcement is prevented from judicial
    interception and collection.
        Make no mistake--no matter the challenge, DEA will never
    stop aggressively pursuing the most dangerous and prolific
    criminals trafficking in illicit drugs in our communities.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your
    subcommittee on this important issue and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. DeGette.  Thank you so much, Mr. Donahue.
        Mr. Overacker, you are now recognized for five minutes.

                    STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. OVERACKER

        Mr. Overacker. Chairwoman DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie,
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify before you today.
        I am proud to represent the men and women of the U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection, our nation's unified border
    agency with a vital counter narcotics mission.
        On a typical day, CBP seizes more than 5,800 pounds of
    narcotics that would otherwise make their way into American
    communities. While today's hearing focusses on the opioid
    crisis and its devastating effects, CBP is committed to
    stopping all illicit drugs from crossing our borders.
        For example, last month, with our partners at Homeland
    Security investigations and the United States Coast Guard, CBP
    seized more than 19 tons of cocaine on a container ship in
    Philadelphia.
        The cocaine had an estimated street value in excess of $1.3
    billion and was the largest cocaine seizure in the combined
    230-year history of the U.S. Customs Service and CBP.
        Compared to cocaine or methamphetamine, CBP seizures of
    fentanyl are relatively low. However, these seizures have
    increased dramatically in recent years and that is cause for
    concern.
        In fiscal year 2013, CBP seized approximately two pounds of
    fentanyl. Last year, we seized over 2,100 pounds. Through June
    of this year, we have already seized as much as we did last
    year. Most of the fentanyl coming into our country does so at
    ports of entry along the Southwest border. It's brought in by
    privately owned vehicles, commercial vehicles, even
    pedestrians.
        Less frequent is fentanyl entering through international
    mail packages and express consignment environments. In those
    cases, most of the shipments originate from China.
        However, the fentanyl in the international mail and express
    environments is far more potent and pure than the fentanyl
    crossing the Southwest border. Stopping fentanyl and other
    narcotics takes a collaborative effort.
        Through CBP's national targeting center we work with our
    partners to identify and disrupt fentanyl smuggling at ports of
    entry, international mail facilities, and express consignment
    carrier facilities.
        Our partners include Homeland Security investigations, the
    United States Postal Inspection Service, the Drug Enforcement
    Administration, Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
    Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
    Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, and numerous other
    domestic and international partners.
        Based on our encounters, CBP produces intelligence products
    to help identify the tactics, techniques, and flow of drug
    trafficking. This enhances targeting efforts and supports
    investigations.
        It also provides policymakers, agency leadership, and the
    intelligence community with information that can lead to drug
    interdiction.
        Information sharing, advanced electronic data, the
    targeting of precursors and pill presses are among the many
    elements that inform our actionable intelligence and allow us
    to combat narcotics trafficking in a dynamic threat
    environment.
        In addition, CBP uses a variety of technologies and
    techniques to detect and identify illicit drugs. With the
    support of Congress, we are making significant investments and
    improvements in these capabilities, including additional
    narcotics detection K9 teams, enhanced field testing and new
    nonintrusive inspection, or NII, equipment.
        NII contributes to more than 98 percent of the number and
    total weight of seizures. Currently, CBP scans approximately
    two percent of privately-owned vehicles and 16 percent of
    commercial vehicles arriving at the Southwest border ports of
    entry.
        To enhance our capabilities, CBP has developed a new model
    port concept that prioritizes the use of drive through scanning
    equipment to streamline the inspection process and increase
    scanning rates, thereby increasing the probability of
    interdiction.
         To protect CBP personnel, who may be exposed to dangerous
    substances during the course of their duties, we have deployed
    more than 1,100 2-dose boxes of counter narcotic Naloxone to
    train personnel in the field.
        CBP was the first federal law enforcement agency to
    implement such a program and we have already administered nine
    lifesaving doses to members of the public.
        Together, CBP and its partners are focused on enhancing
    collaboration and information sharing to reduce the amounts of
    illicit opioids that cross our land, air, and sea borders.
        Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to tell our
    story. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Overacker follows:]
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        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Barksdale, you are now recognized for five minutes.

                     STATEMENT OF GARY R. BARKSDALE

        Mr. Barksdale.  Good morning, Chair DeGette, Ranking Member
    Guthrie, and members of the subcommittee.
        I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss
    efforts to combat opioids, including fentanyl.
        My name is Gary Barksdale. I am the chief postal inspector
    for the United States Postal Inspection Service, the law
    enforcement arm----
        Ms. DeGette.  Mr. Barksdale, can you move the microphone
    just a little closer? Thank you.
        Mr. Barksdale. Winning the battle against illicit drugs in
    the mail stream is one of our top priorities. Postal inspectors
    work not only to remove drugs from the mail but to investigate
    and arrest individuals and disrupt drug trafficking networks
    across the U.S.
        Internationally, the inspection service is working
    aggressively to stem the flow of illegal drugs entering the
    country.
        Due to the opioid crisis, nearly two years ago we created
    an internal team of cross-functional subject matter experts
    specifically focussed on narcotics trafficking through the
    mail.
        The Contraband Interdiction and Investigations team, or
    CII, uses enhanced investigative methods, deploys resources as
    needed, and strengthens strategic partnerships to achieve
    significant improvements in our ability to seize fentanyl and
    synthetic opioids from the mail.
        The inspection service works closely with other law
    enforcement agencies to share intelligence, coordinate cases,
    and conduct joint enforcement operations to maximize our
    resources and impact.
        Relationships with partners such as DEA, HSI, CBP, and FDA
    allow us to better advance our mission to enforce the laws that
    defend the nation's mail.
        Inspection Service personnel are assigned full time at
    ONDCP, the DEA's Special Operations Division, the National
    Fusion Center, and CBP's national targeting center.
    Internationally, the Postal Inspector is now detailed at
    Europol and the Hague.
        We also work with state and local law enforcement to share
    intelligence and conduct joint operations including several
    Inspection Service sponsored task forces. These relationships
    facilitate communication and data sharing that enable the
    identification of drug trafficking organizations which would
    not be possible without interagency cooperation.
        The Inspection Service launched cyber and analytics unit to
    enhance investigative techniques to better utilize data to
    target parcels. Due to many illicit dark web vendors aligned
    with physical delivery networks for their products, the
    Inspection Service is involved with investigations into vendors
    and the take down of their illicit marketplaces.
        The Inspection Service has also joined DHS, CBP, and ONDCP
    as a sponsor for the opioid detection challenge, which is a
    global prize competition for rapid nonintrusive detection tools
    that will help find illicit opioids in international mail.
        Postal inspectors interdict and seize thousands of illegal
    drug shipments in the mail. From fiscal year 2016 through 2018,
    we achieved a thousand percent increase in international
    synthetic opioid seizures and a 750 percent increase in
    domestic synthetic opioid seizures.
        Thus far in fiscal year 2019 we have seized 185 synthetic
    opioid parcels, 153 of which were in the domestic mail stream.
    Our current stats represent a decrease in international
    seizures while our domestic seizures are trending up.
        This shift may suggest synthetic opioids are increasingly
    entering the country through means other than international
    mail.
        In 2018, Congress enacted the STOP Act, which requires the
    Postal Service to receive advanced electronic data, or AED, on
    at least 70 percent of inbound package shipments including 100
    percent of shipments from the People's Republic of China by
    December 2018 and 100 percent of all inbound international
    shipments by December 2020.
        The volume of inbound packages with AED has improved from
    26 percent in October of 2017 to approximately 60 percent in
    May of 2019, while the volume of packages with AED from China
    has increased from 32 percent to approximately 85 percent in
    May of 2019. This represents a significant improvement within a
    relatively limited period of time.
        The Postal Service continues to collaborate with foreign
    postal operators and organizations that support international
    postal operations to work towards obtained AED on 100 percent
    of inbound packages and shipments.
        We have significantly improved coordination with CBP and
    developed processes to ensure we take action on requests to
    hold packages for inspection.
        The Postal Service currently has a 93 percent success rate
    in the capture of CBP hold requests and they will continue to
    focus on employing technology to improve interception
    capability and reach 100 percent.
        The Postal Service takes seriously its mission to protect
    the security and sanctity of the mail and is committed to
    taking all necessary actions to combat illicit drugs in the
    mail.
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Barksdale follows:]
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        Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Barksdale.
        Mr. Prince, you're now recognized for five minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF DAVID A. PRINCE

        Mr. Prince. Chairwoman DeGette, Ranking Member Guthrie, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you to discuss my agency's efforts
    in attacking the national opioid crisis impacting our
    communities.
        Homeland Security investigations is the department's
    primary criminal investigative agency and is focussed on
    disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal
    organizations.
        As the sole investigative agency with combined customs and
    immigration authorities, HSI investigates and enforces more
    than 400 federal criminal statutes that protect our nation's
    trade, travel, financial, and immigration systems.
        Today, I would like to speak about our successful efforts
    in combatting the flow of illicit fentanyl into the United
    States. In fiscal year 2018, HSI initiated 1,393 opioid related
    criminal investigations, executed 5,262 opioid related criminal
    arrests, and seized a total of 9,928 opioid--pounds of opioids,
    which consisted of 2,737 pounds of fentanyl and 7,103 pounds of
    heroin.
        Our 2019 fiscal year statistics are set to exceed 2018
    statistics in these areas. HSI has collaborated with Chinese
    authorities to address the China-sourced fentanyl threat
    through investigative information sharing. As of May 1st, 2019,
    Chinese authorities passed legislation making all fentanyl
    illegal.
        However, it is still--it still remains a threat. We are now
    urging general administration of China customs and China postal
    services to secure its mail and express consignment industry.
        Through our transnational criminal investigative units in
    Mexico, HSI works to disrupt Mexico-based opioid TCOs. TCIUs
    are multi-discipline units comprised of foreign law enforcement
    officials who ensure that shared information and operational
    activities are collaborated upon without compromise.
        HSI's customs authorities extend to the virtual border of
    the open internet and the dark net. HSI's Cyber Crime Center,
    known as C3, provides support and assistance to global cyber
    investigations targeting illicit marketplaces where fentanyl
    and opioid sales proliferate.
        Today, HSI has more than 700 open cyber crime
    investigations and more than 200 investigations specifically
    targeting criminal dark net organizations.
        Many of these investigations focus on illicit opioid
    suppliers. HSI is at the forefront of cyber investigations and
    has been successful in developing methods to track and trace
    digital crypto currency, often used as a payment system for
    online opioid transactions.
        In fiscal year 2018, HSI delivered its online international
    opioid smuggling training course to more than 4,000 local,
    state, federal, and international law enforcement partners.
        This course provides law enforcement with the technical
    knowledge and in-depth case briefings to assist criminal
    investigations involving the dark net and crypto currency-
    related crimes.
        The Border Enforcement Security Task Force, known as BEST,
    utilizes local, state, and federal agencies at land border sea
    port, international airport, and mail facility locations to
    target TCOs.
        There are currently 65 BEST teams across the United States
    and we have increased our presence at international mail
    facilities and express consignment carrier to include JFK, LAX,
    Memphis, and Louisville.
        We have also established BEST teams in areas hardest hit by
    the opioid epidemic such as Ohio and West Virginia. In fiscal
    year 2018, BEST Memphis initiated 204 narcotic control
    deliveries, executed 46 criminal arrests. It effected 149
    seizures.
        BEST Cleveland has initiated Operation Darkness Falls to
    target top dark net vendors. Darkness Falls has led to the
    disruption and dismantlement of large-scale opioid vendors to
    include the largest identified fentanyl vendor with the most
    verified transactions.
        The National Targeting Center Investigations--NTCI--
    partners with CBP and Postal Inspection Service to interdict
    illicit opioids entering the United States.
        Recently, NTCI assisted in an investigation where 171
    pounds of fentanyl was seized from a New Jersey-based TCO
    involved in the importation of opioids.
        To date, this investigation is one of the largest domestic
    seizures of fentanyl from China. HSI seeks to identify,
    disrupt, and dismantle criminal financial networks and
    leverages a multitude of investigative techniques to target
    money service businesses, all cash smuggling, and crypto
    currency.
        In fiscal year 2019 thus far, HSI seized nearly $1.9
    million in fentanyl-related digital currency and has over 268
    open investigations involving the illicit use of crypto
    currency.
        I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you to
    share HSI's efforts to combat the opioid epidemic. We will
    continue our commitment to maximize our full complement of
    authorities.
        I thank you for the support that you provide to HSI as we
    execute our mission and I look forward to any questions you
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Prince follows:]
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        Ms. DeGette.  Thank you so much, Mr. Prince.
        And Ms. Cave, you are now recognized for five minutes.

                        STATEMENT OF CAROL CAVE

        Ms. Cave. Good morning, Chairwoman DeGette, Ranking Member
    Guthrie, and members of the subcommittee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
    the Food and Drug Administration's role in combatting our
    nation's ongoing crisis of opioid addiction, specifically
    regarding fentanyl.
        I am Carol Cave, the director of the Office of Enforcement
    and Import Operations within FDA's Office of Regulatory
    Affairs.
        FDA, along with our partner government agencies, continue
    to work together to consider more active and creative steps to
    make inroads against this crisis.
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work we are
    doing at our nation's borders and at the international mail
    facilities, or IMFs.
        FDA plays an important role related to the interdiction
    work that takes place in IMFs and has acted to enhance our
    operations there. In the international mail environment,
    Customs and Border Protection is the leading interdicting
    authority for controlled substances including fentanyl and
    other opioids.
        As such, they examine before FDA and generally will act
    against these types of shipments without forwarding for FDA for
    review. FDA is focusing on inspecting and sometimes testing
    products that may be counterfeit or unapproved drug products.
        Last year, Congress gave FDA more tools to intercept
    illicit drugs coming through our nation's IMFs by enacting the
    SUPPORT Act. On behalf of FDA, I would like to thank the
    members of this committee for your work on these important
    authorities.
        The SUPPORT Act, specifically Section 3022(d), gives the
    FDA new authority to treat imported articles as drugs when they
    meet certain requirements, even in the absence of certain
    evidence of intended use.
        This allows FDA to apply its existing authorities to
    appropriately detain, refuse, and administratively destroy
    these subject articles.
        The implementation of this section, which began in March of
    this year, has been an unquestioned success. For articles
    determined to be under the 801(u) product specifically our
    destruction rate is, roughly, 99 percent, thus eliminating
    distribution of these products into the hands of consumers.
        Additionally, on April 4th of 2019, FDA and CBP leaders
    signed a letter of intent that addresses the areas of
    cooperation outlined in Section 3014 of the SUPPORT Act,
    including information sharing, operational coordination for
    better targeting of high-risk parcels, and collaborative
    strategies. FDA and CBP have actively been exploring ways to
    enhance collaboration and increased efficiency of operations by
    sharing existing but limited space.
        As FDA is able to increase the amount of space allocated to
    its activities in the IMS, FDA can further add staff, enabling
    the agency to expand its admissibility review of drugs shipped
    into the U.S. international mail parcels.
        The letter of intent also addresses FDA's and CBP's
    commitment to establish, expand its scientific presence at the
    IMS considered most of risk of receiving opioids and other
    illegal or dangerous drugs entering the United States.
        FDA and CBP are looking at ways to develop and refine
    laboratory-based methods to identify unapproved, counterfeit,
    and other unlawful controlled substances.
        The division of import operations managers have met several
    times with their counterparts at CBP and U.S. Postal Service to
    assess how our respective systems can be utilized to share data
    and information on actions taken by the agencies on individual
    parcels and commodities.
        All three agencies are considering the most appropriate and
    efficient means of using existing data streams to share IMS
    specific data and investigational outcomes.
        We remain committed to using our regulatory authority to
    the fullest extent to address the opioid crisis including new
    authorities granted by FDA--granted to FDA by the SUPPORT Act.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Cave follows:]
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        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Ms. Cave.
        It's now time for Members to ask you questions and the
    Chair will recognize herself for five minutes.
        Mr. Donahue, combatting fentanyl is challenging because, as
    we all know, it is cheap and easy to make. It has huge profits.
    It is hard to detect in shipments and it is deadly even in
    small amounts.
        It's also increasingly mixed into other drugs, often
    without the user's knowledge, and so that leads to more
    overdoses.
        Would you agree with me with that assessment of the
    challenge that we are facing?
        Mr. Donahue.  Yes, Congresswoman. I appreciate the question
    and it's not an easy one because with all the drugs and the
    fentanyl and the different types of drugs coming in from other
    countries we are required to have their cooperation and we
    actually investigate these cartels specifically here with the
    fentanyl coming in. We are concerned with China, sometimes
    India, sometimes Holland where the drugs are coming in----
        Ms. DeGette. Right.
        Mr. Donahue [continuing]. Directly to United States and/or
    to Mexico to produce it and send it up.
        Ms. DeGette. But it's--because of all the things I said
    it's harder to make those identifications and so working with
    the other countries is even more important. Wouldn't that be
    fair?
        Mr. Donahue. Extremely important, and with our panel
    members here as well working collectively on attacking the
    people who are actually producing the drugs and shipping the
    drugs and actually really the key is prosecutions.
        Ms. DeGette. Right.
        Mr. Donahue. We got to do something with the seizures that
    we make in the United States and bring it back to the source
    countries and gain their cooperation to attack the source of
    the drugs.
        Ms. DeGette. To do it there.
        Mr. Chester, your agency has been trying to coordinate drug
    control efforts for a long time. What are we doing to think
    outside the box in addressing the fentanyl threat that's
    different from what we've been doing with some of the previous
    illicit drug control strategies?
        Mr. Chester. Thank you for the question, ma'am. I think
    we've done a couple of things. The first 1 is we have, through
    our interagency coordination and our work with the intelligence
    community and with partner nations, we are a generation ahead
    of where we were before in understanding the problem first,
    which I don't believe we had a good grasp on what the nature of
    the problem was and we didn't have an ability----
        Ms. DeGette. When was that? When was that?
        Mr. Chester.  This was really about the 2014-2015 time
    frame, and so what this does is with this greater understanding
    we can--we can look beyond the immediate actions that we take
    and are better able to anticipate trafficker actions in
    switching to other synthetic opioids. I think that's the first
    thing.
        And then I think the second thing is we look outside of the
    bounds of one particular class of drugs to things like
    nonsynthetic opioids and things of that nature, and our
    understanding has allowed us to be able to be more--much more
    anticipatory than we have been in the past.
        Ms. DeGette. Do you think that the agency cooperation has
    been different than it was before and if so, how?
        Mr. Chester. Absolutely. I think the level of information
    sharing--the first one is in the mechanisms that we have put in
    place, and when I say ten times every single month all of the
    members of this--of this panel and the agencies and departments
    that they represent, we have mechanisms to share cooperations
    at all levels of classification.
        The ability to coordinate and the ability not only to shape
    our own actions domestically but our approach with other
    countries as well much, much better than it has been in the
    past.
        Ms. DeGette. Mr. Overacker, I would like to ask you, do you
    agree that the agencies are doing a better job of sharing data
    and working together than in the past?
        Mr. Overacker. Yes, I believe so. My experience tells me
    that when we can link up, you know, investigators with
    operators we can do a better job of basically identifying
    targets and supporting, you know, investigations in the field.
        This is something we've done at our national targeting
    center. It's been successful, and now with this fentanyl crisis
    we've really amped up our capabilities for that purpose.
        Ms. DeGette. What is it that you're doing differently now?
    Obviously, we can all agree that coordination is great. But
    what is it that you're doing differently?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, I wouldn't necessarily say it's
    different, just to say that I think what we've learned over the
    years is we have to be working on this daily.
        It has to--you know, it's a collaboration and it really is
    something you have to work on every day and I think it's just--
    the level of collaboration we have for the fentanyl crisis is
    more than what we've seen for other issues in the past.
        Ms. DeGette. And what can we do to help you do your job
    better? Is there something--is there a better way to share data
    across the agencies? Is there something that we can do to help?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, you know, we certainly appreciate your
    support--your continued support for CBP. As far as data
    sharing, we do have, you know, data sharing arrangements with
    all of these agencies, and because we work collectively at our
    national targeting center we are able to share information in a
    sort of rapid real-time format.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. Thank you.
        I yield back and recognize Mr. Guthrie for five minutes.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you very much, and I want to go down the
    panel with this question, and so be mindful I got to do that in
    five minutes and ask a couple of other questions, too. So, I am
    going to be brief.
        So, I just want each of you to say your agencies in
    fentanyl, what is your biggest accomplishment the past two
    years--your agencies.
        I know you have done a lot, but your biggest--and then what
    your biggest challenge is.
        Mr. Chester. I would say that our biggest accomplishment is
    the publishing of the National Drug Control Strategy, which
    contextualized everything the departments and agencies are
    doing in this particular regard for all drug issues, but in
    this 1 specifically.
        I would say that our biggest challenge is the rapidity with
    which new substances appear in the United States either have
    crossed our borders or are detected in post-mortem toxicology
    testing.
        That is--that is something that requires an enormous amount
    of effort.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
        Mr. Donahue?
        Mr. Donahue. I would say one of our biggest accomplishment
    is actually scheduling--emergency scheduling all analogs of the
    fentanyl, which has really greatly helped DEA in our
    investigations. One of our biggest challenges is actually
    obtaining the evidence required to enter to the Grand Jury in
    the United States to target these cartels that are producing
    and trafficking in fentanyl in the court of law in the United
    States.
        We recently established our Sensitive Investigative Units
    specifically for that reason to work with our counterparts to
    obtain evidence in the foreign countries to utilize back in the
    Grand Jury in the United States. But that's a very big
    accomplishment for us that we are going to use, going forward.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
        Mr. Overacker?
        Mr. Overacker. From a CBP perspective, I would say one is
    our detection capabilities. We now have a fully staffed 24/7
    laboratory in Springfield, Virginia, dedicated exclusively to
    fentanyl and we've also deployed detection equipment throughout
    CBP so we can identify fentanyl in a safe way.
        I would also say that our collaboration with the U.S.
    Postal Inspection Service is another big success story for us
    as we increased our level of effort with them. And also just
    through our national targeting center the partners that we work
    with there and the coordination efforts, the sort of community
    of effort that we've established through the national targeting
    center is important.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
        Mr. Barksdale?
        Mr. Barksdale. Thank you. I would say our biggest
    accomplishment, as Mr. Overacker has said, is our collaboration
    and data sharing, our embedded inspectors at the national
    targeting center and DEA's SOD. I've seen a difference in the
    type of cases we are making.
        As far as challenges, I think our biggest challenge is also
    one of our biggest successes is although we've improved in our
    capability to attack the problem, internet sales is still a
    challenge, going forward.
        As good as we are taking down one site, they will quickly
    stand up another site or a different marketplace so that will
    be a challenge, going forward.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
        Mr. Prince?
        Mr. Prince. I would say some of our things that we can--we
    can definitely say we've accomplished is our development of the
    innovation lab, which is something we bring problem sets to to
    help us expand our capability to deal with stuff like opioids
    and our expansion of the BEST initiative as well, particularly
    with our recent expansions, which we think are going to bear
    fruit.
        You know, our block chain analysis as well in the crypto
    currency space is something that we are very proud of. We
    continue to make inroads in that and it helps us develop much
    more robust target packages on our complex conspiracy
    investigations.
        Obviously, China is recalcitrant when it comes to a lot of
    these issues that we are dealing with that was part of our oral
    testimony, and I would say that's a challenge that we continue
    to deal with.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
        Ms. Cave?
        Ms. Cave. Good morning. I would say the number-one thing
    for the FDA is, clearly, the 801(u) authority that was given to
    us by the SUPPORT Act, which actually allows us to destroy
    product when it's coming in as opposed to refusing admission
    and exporting.
        So thank you very much for that. In terms of challenge, I
    would say it's just in the international mail facilities in
    terms of the volume and the sheer volume that we are dealing
    with and the advanced--you know, lack of advanced data that
    comes in, for example, on addressing those issues.
        Mr. Guthrie. A colleague of mine, a couple of them, have
    seen different targeting centers the thing you're talking about
    and just amazed at the effort that you guys are doing in
    working, and then second of all, and just also amazed at the
    volume you're dealing with.
        So, we are mindful of that. I hope to see one of those as
    well.
        Mr. Donahue, I just have less than a minute left. But the
    Wilson Center Mexico Institute reported that fentanyl is
    entering Mexico via the Ports of Manzanilla and Lazaro
    Cardenas,--we say Cardenas,, who's our colleague here--but
    Cardenas,.
        Do you agree with that finding and, if so, what level of
    cooperation is DEA getting from Mexico law enforcement
    authorities at these ports in taking and seizing fentanyl?
        And when are their--I will go ahead and ask the second
    question--you may answer them together. In an interview with
    the Wilson Center Mexico Institute, Mexico federal forces said
    that they did not believe that fentanyl was a significant part
    of the Mexican drug traffickers' criminal portfolios.
        In your opinion, what do you comment on that?
        Mr. Donahue. They are both two big ports where we see
    enormous amount of precursor chemicals coming in, not just for
    fentanyl but for methamphetamine and for production of heroin
    as well.
        We are seeing chemicals coming in through the airports as
    well from China in various forms. We are working with OFAC as
    well to take those addresses that we are getting in China,
    working with our offices in China to follow up to see what
    laboratories they're coming from.
        So you see large numbers coming in through the ports. But
    we also see them coming in through the airports and other small
    airports as well in Mexico.
        In our assessment and active investigations and
    intelligence they are synthesizing fentanyl inside of Mexico
    and we've seen pill mills with industrial size pill presses
    making fentanyl pills inside of Mexico, specifically on the
    border, and we've had seizures in the airports of pills----
        Mr. Guthrie. I didn't leave you much time to answer. My
    time has expired. So, I appreciate your answer.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for five minutes.
        Ms. Schakowsky.  I thank the Chair and ranking member and I
    thank you all for coming today to testify.
        I am really glad that you all gather together to discuss
    this critical issue and I believe it will require a broad
    government approach to tackle the spread of illicit fentanyl
    across the public health, law enforcement, and international
    relations sector.
        In particular, I am glad that in recent years both the
    legislative and executive branches appear to have realized the
    devastating failure of the previous war on drugs and have
    turned to a system of helping rather than locking up drug
    users, which has led to mass incarceration of hundreds of
    thousands of Americans, mostly brown and black.
        Recently, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar
    indicated that he would be fully in support, for example, of
    needle exchange programs as part of his agency's plan to combat
    HIV--the HIV epidemic. But needle exchanges are also critical
    responses to the opioid epidemic.
        In Illinois, Lindsay Hartman of Kane County runs a van
    every Saturday that provides clean needles, clean straws,
    Naloxone, and everything else a drug user needs to stay alive,
    and thankfully the Illinois state legislature passed a bill
    last month to ensure public health vans like Lindsay's can
    continue to run without fear of legal repercussions.
        One important item that's on that van is--are test strips
    that can detect the presence of fentanyl in drugs. A recent
    study from RTI International found that, quote, ``People who
    use illicitly made street opioids and tests them for fentanyl
    by using fentanyl test strips are 5 times more likely to engage
    in safer drug use behavior than when the test comes back
    positive,'' end quote.
        So you can imagine I was disappointed to learn that
    Assistant Secretary of Mental Health and Substance Use Dr.
    Elinore McCance-Katz has publicly come out against the use of
    these test strips, and she wrote, quote, ``Is it our goal
    simply to stop people from dying so they can continue a life of
    'safe' heroin use or should our goal be different?'' End quote.
        So Mr. Chester and Ms. Cave, and then anybody else who
    would like to respond, do you believe that fentanyl testing
    strips and other similar innovative measures are essential to--
    for preventing death and shouldn't that be an objective in
    light of the current fentanyl epidemic?
        Mr. Chester. Thank you, Congresswoman. I can't speak on
    behalf of anyone else. I can just----
        Ms. Schakowsky.  No, I am asking you.
        Mr. Chester.  Yes, I understand. So the approaches as we
    laid out in the drug control strategy is three pillars, and two
    of those three pillars are public health. One of them is to
    prevent drug use before it starts and then the second one is to
    provide treatment leading to long-term recovery. Those are our
    main efforts, and any public health interventions, and when I
    mentioned in my testimony innovative public health
    interventions there are a wide range of things that we discuss
    and that we consider. We look for their efficacy in the public
    health space, all designed to save lives and to get people on
    their path to recovery.
        That is our principle concern and that is the bulk of our
    efforts in the public health space specifically when it comes
    to opioids.
        Ms. Schakowsky. So saving lives is a goal?
        Mr. Chester. Absolutely. That is the single and, as it
    states in the strategy, the single criterion of success is to
    save American lives and stop Americans from losing their lives
    to these deadly drugs. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Schakowsky.  Thank you.
        Ms. Cave?
        Ms. Cave. So to echo that, I would say I am not a scientist
    or a physician either, and so I would--honestly, I would take
    this back to our department and have them answer as an HHS
    response in terms of what their opinion would be on this issue.
        Ms. Schakowsky.  OK. But it doesn't take a scientist, it
    seems to me, if test strips would actually show that fentanyl
    is present and prevent people--five times more people--lives
    saved because of it, that that's really a values question.
        Ms. Cave. Right. I would say safety, obviously, is number
    one.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKinley for five minutes.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to thank
    you for holding this hearing. I got to tell you, I am really
    disappointed that it's taken us seven months to have another
    hearing on this topic. Seven months.
        It looks like we are going to get started again because we
    had a hiatus from last--the last Congress. Think about it.
    During the last Congress we had H.R. 6.
        We had CARA, 21st Century CURES. We were having multiple
    hearings on this, and then it all went silent. And I thank you
    for bringing it back up again.
        I think everyone has to understand during that hiatus,
    during that period of time--seven months--215 people died
    yesterday from substance abuse. Two hundred and fifteen people
    died today. Two hundred and fifteen people are going to die
    tomorrow.
        In my state of West Virginia, the epicenter of this
    problem, we have one person dying every eight hours from a drug
    problem. I think we need to be faster with this.
        So let me question, though. The theme or the concept that I
    am still struggling with is that why, and I've had a
    conversation with NIH.
        We've had conversations with other folks. Why are--why are
    Americans turning to drugs to deal with their problems? Why is
    it that we have such a problem?
        I've got the report here that has been filed that talks
    about why America is leading the globe in the use of drugs. As
    an example, in France about 350 people died two years ago from
    drug overdose out of 66 million.
        That's a half of a person per 100,000. In Ohio, it's 35.
    Nearly 40 persons per 100,000 is dying from drugs. Why is
    France not using drugs? What are they doing right in France?
        Or take England, for example. England's ratio of death
    overdose by drugs is 4 per 100,000. In West Virginia, it's 52.
    What are we doing about--what are we actually doing?
        Some of you, like Mr. Barksdale--it's not your issue with
    the Postal--but I want to understand why are Americans turning
    to drugs so rapidly and quickly instead of finding another way
    to deal with drugs.
        Because what we are dealing in this hearing right now is
    the results. We want to chase the drug after it's come here. I
    want to understand why our kids, adults, others, are turning to
    drugs in the first place when the rest of the world isn't.
    They're finding other ways to deal with this problem.
        So I would like maybe each of you to tell me why is it that
    you think America is using drugs at such a greater rate than
    anyplace else in the world.
        Start with you, Mr. Chester.
        Mr. Chester.  Thank you for the question, Congressman. I am
    not--I am not prepared to answer why that is. I don't know just
    as you don't. I think that there are a lot of--a lot of
    variables as to why individuals choose to use drugs.
        However, I will say that we no longer speak in terms of
    supply and demand. We speak in terms of availability and use,
    because we do know and our experience has shown that the
    greater availability of drugs in a community the greater chance
    that an individual will be able to use them for the first time
    and that first use leads to chronic use very, very quickly,
    particularly with opioids.
        Mr. McKinley.  Reclaiming my time.
        Last year we had Zuckerberg in here from Facebook. We had
    Dorsey in here from Twitter. And both of them were saying how--
    thumping their chest they don't use--they don't sell--they
    don't allow that to be sold on their platforms.
        But yet, we demonstrated on both occasions that you can get
    drugs without prescriptions with Facebook, Twitter, Google, all
    these other accounts, and within hours each of them pulled it
    back down again.
        And I am here to say I am told they're back up again. So
    regardless of--we took them to task. They're back out there
    again.
        So we talk about availability. Are our social media
    platforms--are they being used and how can we structure that?
    How can we in Congress do a better job to prevent Facebook,
    Twitter, and others from selling drugs over the internet?
        Mr. Donahue?
        Mr. Donahue. Well, two things. I will get with our demand
    reduction unit in our DEA headquarters because it's an
    important question that you asked and I will get you our answer
    and our opinion that we got with DEA why people are using
    drugs.
        I know one of the things we are always pushing for is the
    ability to be able to judiciously intercept devices--Facebook,
    other things--that we currently can't do with a judicial order
    which causes a huge problem for law enforcement to infiltrate
    certain organizations, not having the ability to get into
    certain encrypted devices.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The Chair recognizes the gentle lady from New Hampshire,
    Ms. Kuster.
        Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you again for
    holding this hearing.
        As we know, the opioid epidemic continues to impact
    communities across this country. This is a crisis that knows no
    demographic and impacts urban and rural communities like mine
    alike.
        My home state of New Hampshire has been one of the hardest
    hit by the country's fentanyl crisis. This is a crisis that
    knows no border, no ocean deep enough, no continent broad
    enough to stop the flow of deadlier and deadlier fentanyl
    analogs.
        As the epidemic evolves, we must evolve our approach to
    combat it and if one thing having all of these agencies before
    us today has shown it's that there's a greater need for an even
    more coordinated approach across international, national, and
    local agencies.
        I want to start with you, Mr. Chester. As you have relayed,
    fentanyl is the biggest driver of overdose deaths, providing
    the best business model to drug traffickers, and being the
    hardest to detect.
        You told committee staff that enforcement has historically
    been focused on interdicting 20th century drug trafficking and
    that it has taken us awhile to develop the architecture and
    means to combat 21st century drug trafficking.
        What do you mean that fentanyl trafficking is following a
    21st century architecture and what challenges do we face in
    adapting our strategy to meet this new threat?
        Mr. Chester.  Thank you for the question, ma'am, and I do
    want to be clear about one thing. We still have a 20th century
    drug trafficking problem in the United States and that's
    principally heroin, and New Hampshire is one of our state
    partners that we hear from every single month, and we've seen
    how heroin has tapered off in New Hampshire while synthetic
    opioids like fentanyl and fentanyl analogs have continued--have
    continued to rise.
        Twentieth century drug trafficking, plant-based drugs that
    are packaged, moved across the borders through a hierarchical
    drug-trafficking organization, and that ends in a face-to-face
    cash transaction somewhere--that's what we refer to as 20th
    century drug trafficking.
        Twenty-first century drug trafficking is an individual who
    does not need to interface with a drug trafficker or a drug-
    trafficking organization. They can get on their own laptop.
        They can get on the dark web. They can go to--go to a
    vendor that will sell them the drugs. They can pay for it with
    bitcoin. It will be delivered directly to their house through
    the mail service or through express consignment. That's what we
    refer to as 21st century drug trafficking.
        Unfortunately, we have both of those models that we are
    dealing with right now and I will tell you that our law
    enforcement community and our State Department and our other
    partners have done a remarkable job in being able to take on
    the 21st century drug trafficking at the same time we are still
    dealing with the traditional model that we've dealt with for
    30-plus years of drug policy.
        Ms. Kuster.  Thank you.
        Mr. Prince, fentanyl poses unique challenges compared to
    other drugs. Cheap to make, clandestinely produced in labs,
    easily transportable and, as we know, hard to detect.
        Traffickers are increasingly mixing the drug into other
    narcotics as well as counterfeit prescription drugs. I ask you
    what is HSI doing to tackle the fentanyl epidemic that is
    uniquely different from its efforts to combatting heroin,
    cocaine, and other narcotics?
        Mr. Prince. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
        As my colleague had illustrated the 20th century versus
    21st century drug problem, I call it analog versus digital. Our
    analog methodologies haven't changed in 35 years.
        Surveillance, informant management, cultivation
    development, cooperating defendants, execution of search and
    arrest warrants, those are all our analog tools that we use
    that are always going to be relevant.
        They will be relevant a hundred years from now.
        As far as how we deal with the digital aspect of it, we
    have our innovation lab that I mentioned earlier. We have NTC
    and NTCI. NTCI is placed very squarely in NTC where there's
    information sharing.
        Many of the people here on the panel are part of NTCI or
    NTC, collaborate with us on a daily basis. We have the OCDTF
    program that shepherds large-scale federal investigations in a
    collaborative team effort, and the two meet.
        At some point the digital crypto currency space and the
    dark net activity is going to turn into something at the corner
    of what I say walk and don't walk where a drug deal is done,
    and that's where our ability to deal with the digital space
    while at the same time dealing with the analog space is going
    to bear fruit.
        In my oral testimony, I mentioned just a few cases that
    developed into some significant opioid and fentanyl seizures.
    That's a collaboration of the digital space mingling with the
    analog space and providing arrests, seizures, and significant
    results.
        Many of those investigations are ongoing. Some of those
    investigations are over. But we are moving with the digital
    transformations of the criminal enterprises. We are keeping up
    with what is going on.
        Ms. Kuster. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentle lady.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Walden,
    for five minutes.
        Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair, and again, thanks to
    the panel. We have two hearings going on simultaneously. So, I
    am kind of bouncing between all of that.
        Mr. Overacker, I was down at the Southwest border touring
    some CBP facilities in Yuma, Arizona on Sunday, and I asked CBP
    whether they had seen an uptick in fentanyl coming in from
    Mexico in the Yuma sector.
        The answer was no, they had not seen an uptick and, in
    fact, drug interdictions on the whole are down across the Yuma
    sector as the CBP checkpoints were shut down for months because
    of the humanitarian crisis on the border, and that meant CBP
    agents could not staff those checkpoints during the border
    emergency, given the huge influx of people.
        So, my question is the data show interdictions are down,
    but with those checkpoints closed I am not sure we can rely on
    those data this year.
        And are there other CBP sectors being similarly impacted by
    this humanitarian crisis at the border and is there anything
    you can tell us about the way the cartels are using and
    profiting from the humanitarian crisis to overwhelm your
    agents--our agents--and then get the drugs in along the way?
        What can you tell us about that?
        Mr. Overacker.  Thank you for the question, sir. The first
    thing I would say is that what we are tracking right now is
    overall our interdictions on the Southwest border are as much
    as we had last year.
        That includes not just what the Border Patrol does at
    checkpoints. That includes our ports of entry and, roughly, 90
    percent of what we seize is at a port of entry as opposed to
    in--between the ports by the Border Patrol.
        I understand the humanitarian crisis has impacted their
    operations. They've also impacted the operations at our ports
    of entry as we've redirected CBP officers to support the Border
    Patrol sector.
        Mr. Walden. So we were hearing.
        Mr. Overacker. As a result, we've had to close lanes at
    ports of entries, which has slowed the amount of traffic.
        But given that 90 percent of what we seize is at a port of
    entry, we are seizing just as much as we did last year overall
    as an agency.
        But with respect to the other Border Patrol sectors, I
    would gladly take that back and get you more information on
    what they are seeing as well.
        Mr. Walden. You might take another look at it because some
    data we were seeing over the weekend showed that it was down
    considerably in some categories.
        Mr. Overacker.  Some categories.
        Mr. Walden.  And so, I just want to make sure that--you
    know, we know your folks are getting overwhelmed when you go
    thousands of people coming in in a given night or hundreds
    where you had 10 or 20 or 30 in the past, and I know we've got
    colleagues that want to get rid of CBP or get rid of ICE and
    don't respect the tough conditions and what you and your folks
    are doing on things like this.
        But we keep hearing they're being pulled aside to do the
    processing of the asylum claims. I mean, there's a lot of this
    work being done. They're not out in the field doing the
    interdictions.
        And so, to what extent do you think this humanitarian
    crisis at the border is affecting the ability to interdict
    these drugs?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, like I say, it has impacted not only
    Border Patrol resources between the ports of entry. It is also
    impacting field operations at the ports of entry in terms of
    just by--just the manpower that we have to dedicate to those
    traditional interceptions.
        Mr. Walden. Right.
        Mr. Overacker.  But I think at the port of entry we've seen
    things stabilize and, of course, with the apprehension numbers
    declining now between the ports of entry, we think that the
    situation is improving.
        Mr. Walden. All right. Mr. Prince, do you have any comment
    on this from your agency's view--DHS?
        Mr. Prince.  Most of the agents that are responding to the
    border crisis are responding to human smuggling or human
    trafficking events. The border crisis at some point could
    create a tipping point for us in the investigative space.
        At this time we are not seeing that. We are deploying
    bodies, agents, to the border. Most of the agents that are
    responding are already at those special agent in charge offices
    along the Southwest border.
        I will say that it has created some opportunities for us to
    open up new portfolios in the investigative tool space, 1 of
    those being DNA testing. The DNA testing is allowing us to
    actually separate children who are being used in a human
    trafficking scheme or a smuggling scheme.
        Mr. Walden. We met with some investigators who had just
    gotten that tool and said they can turn a DNA test in 90
    minutes I think they told us.
        Mr. Prince. Right, and the DNA testing is actually
    identifying children that don't--that aren't of these
    individuals that are crossing the border with them. And so we
    are rescuing kids in this effort.
        Mr. Walden. Yes. All right.
        Madam Chair, my time has expired. Thank you all.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.
    Sarbanes, for five minutes.
        Mr. Sarbanes.  Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks to the panel
    for being here.
        Obviously, we all know well the threat that fentanyl is
    posing to the health and safety of our communities. We've been
    hearing a lot of very strong testimony on that and the
    experience in our districts clearly bears that out as well, and
    it has to be a very coordinated role, which you're trying to
    project here today. I appreciate that.
        I did, Mr. Chester, want to focus a little bit more on the
    role of ONDCP because it asserts this coordinating function
    among all the various agencies that we need leaning in to
    address this crisis and this threat in terms of how our federal
    agencies are responding.
        So tell me a little bit, to try to illustrate the
    coordinating role, what would be happening if your agency did
    not exist in terms of being able to pull the resources together
    across these agencies.
        Mr. Chester. Well, the first thing, Congressman, I think
    there would be a lack of focus and a lack of direction in
    advancing the administration's drug control priorities, and
    that's one of the more important functions that ONDCP does is
    to--is to document our priorities and lay out the lines of
    effort that we are going to--that we are going to operate on. I
    think that's the first thing.
        I think the second thing is that the day-to-day activity of
    ensuring that when departments and the agencies are doing
    things in the drug control space they're doing it for a higher
    purpose and they're doing it in--to get complementary effects
    from other departments and agencies that are working in the
    same space.
        This happens all the time in government, right. You have
    got three or four departments and agencies that are redundant.
    They are doing the same thing.
        They don't--they don't know that the other ones are
    operating and that they are doing that. The third thing is when
    it comes to the interface between what we are doing on the
    national security and law enforcement side of the house and
    what we are doing in the public health space, and we've said
    from the very beginning that we can be as productive on the
    front end of the supply chain of drugs coming in the country as
    we want to.
        But our true effectiveness has to be measured in the public
    health space, and you can--you can increase seizures and
    increase arrests and increase removals in the transit zone and
    do all of that.
        But if Americans continue to die from these drugs then
    you're not being truly effective.
        And ONDCP, by being an organization not only in the
    executive office of the president but one that has national
    security, law enforcement, and public health responsibilities,
    we are the organization that can bring both of those things
    together in a complementary fashion, unlike----
        Mr. Sarbanes.  So let me--let me follow up on that, because
    that last observation in terms of the health dimension of
    this--the public health dimension may be a rationale for why
    some of the grant programs that you have previously
    administered are being proposed to be placed in other
    agencies--the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program.
        Maybe I think it would go to DOJ and the drug-free
    community support programs at HHS.
        So maybe you could explain why that decision is being made,
    and then in terms of your emphasizing the role that the--the
    importance, the priority, that the administration gives to this
    fight and the coordinating, sort of traffic cop role that your
    agency can play in that.
        I don't, frankly, understand how the administration has
    come I think three years running in its proposed budget with a
    proposal to cut your budget by 90 percent.
        Now, we have restored in our appropriations--we recognize
    the value that your agency plays and I think we even plussed it
    up over prior years because we want you to play that role.
        But you need to help me reconcile what you just said, which
    I agree with, that this should be a priority and it should
    reflect the administration's emphasis here on coordinating the
    efforts of all these agencies--on the one hand, reconcile that
    with the fact that the president's budget keeps coming with a
    90 percent proposed cut; on the other hand, which doesn't send,
    I wouldn't think, the right message in terms of the role you
    want to play with respect to all of these agencies in terms of
    coordination.
        So I won't ask any more questions because I am out of time.
    But if you could answer that I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Chester. Thank you, Congressman.
        The discussion about those 2 particular grant programs has
    been going on for many, many years, and the Congress has
    decided where those programs would be originally placed at
    their inception and the Congress will decide where they go.
        I will tell you that both the HIDTA and the DFC program are
    critical to not only the coordination that we do across the
    federal government, and we'll talk about the HIDTA program for
    a second, but the integration of federal, state, local, and
    tribal together is incredibly important, and to ensure that
    that function is rolled into the broader efforts that ONDCP
    does is working very, very well.
        When we talk about preventing drug use before it starts. I
    would struggle to find a program more successful than the drug-
    free communities program doing just that.
        And so the placement of the HIDTA program and the DFCs
    together is a great example of what I talked about in bringing
    our national security, law enforcement, and our public health
    programs together in one place and ONDCP is glad to have those
    programs.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chester.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr.--the gentleman from Virginia,
    Mr. Griffith, for five minutes.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and
    appreciate you calling this hearing. I know how important this
    subject and other drug issues are to you, and I do appreciate
    it.
        Let me quickly say in response to the previous questioning
    that I fully support the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
    program and it's been very helpful in my district.
        Mr. Chester, in May of 2017, the Drug Enforcement
    Administration recovered 50 kilos of NPP. Now, I am going to
    botch this up, but that's N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone--if I got
    close. But NPP is what we'll call it, a fentanyl precursor
    chemical that could yield about 19 million fentanyl tablets
    with a street value of more than $570 million.
        The NPP was found in a storage locker in Northborough,
    Massachusetts. This recovery of NPP was one of the DEA's
    largest seizures of a fentanyl precursor chemical in U.S.
    history.
        It had been believed prior to that that fentanyl synthesis
    using precursor chemicals is conducted at clandestine labs in
    China or in Mexico. But this appears to call that into
    question.
        Prior to May 2017, do you recall any previous fentanyl
    precursor seizures of this size indicating possible synthesis
    occurring here in the U.S.? Yes or no.
        Mr. Chester. I do not recall a seizure of that size prior
    to that event. No, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. And given the size of the seizure that it was
    a fentanyl precursor chemical and would presumably support a
    nearby fentanyl synthesis lab in the United States, would this
    case be important enough to the Office of National Drug Control
    Policy-ONDCP--on fentanyl issues to be notified about it and
    briefed about it? Yes or no.
        Mr. Chester. Yes, it would be. But when I get the chance I
    would like to talk about its--NPP's relationship with fentanyl
    synthesis. But please finish your questions.
        Mr. Griffith. All right. Let me get--let me keep moving.
        Did the DEA report or brief you--did they either report to
    you or brief you or someone else at the Office of ONDCP about
    this situation?
        Mr. Chester. I don't remember a specific briefing. But we
    get continual reports from the DEA on drug events.
        Mr. Griffith. But you don't remember getting one on this
    one?
        Mr. Chester. This one is not particularly memorable to me.
    No, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. Even though it would have been a very large
    size. I mean, this is--this is what it looks like and it's just
    one of the precursors, and that's a picture of what they
    seized. That's a fairly significant amount of precursor when
    you realize it could be--back to my notes--19 million fentanyl
    tablets with a street value of $570 million. I would have
    thought you might remember that if you had been informed of it.
    I understand you don't. That's fine.
        In cases like this, do you believe sharing information
    would be helpful to law enforcement?
        Mr. Chester. Yes, and I will tell you that we have many,
    many, many mechanisms to be able to share information and
    intelligence information. In this particular case as a
    precursor chemical we do know a couple of things.
        The first 1 is the presence of a precursor chemical in the
    United States does not necessarily mean that there's synthesis
    going on nearby because precursor chemicals are shipped from
    the United States to other countries.
        And the second thing is about 2 months before that
    particular seizure, under United States leadership the
    international community placed controls on the two chemicals
    related to fentanyl synthesis--NPP, which was the one that was
    seized, and ANPP. So----
        Mr. Griffith. OK. In this case--let's see that picture
    again, if we could--on many of those boxes there are Chinese
    characters. It would indicate it did not come from the United
    States. It came in--the precursor came in from China to the
    United States.
        Mr. Chester. Absolutely, and it could be--although I don't
    know this, it could be that the individual was warehousing it
    for use, not turning it into someplace close by. We don't know.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. And here's my problem, and Mr. Donahue, I
    am going to ask you a question about whether or not your agency
    notified them. Here's my problem.
        If we found that precursor, it would seem to me you would
    want to at least check, see who the storage locker belonged to,
    do an investigation, and it would seem like to me there needed
    to be a lot of coordination.
        And as far as I know, that didn't happen.
        Mr. Donahue, do you know if your agency briefed other
    agencies and Mr. Chester's agency on this particular seizure of
    a large amount of precursor?
        Mr. Donahue. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to
    that. The case is currently under investigation. It's coming up
    to trial, which is a lot of times why stuff is not put out in
    the open due to the protections of the people testifying.
        We daily notify other agencies on seizures that are made.
    That specific seizure was work with state and locals as well.
    It's ongoing. It was built up, and it's still ongoing, and we
    do these daily--these types of investigations--at our
    international scale.
        So you mentioned the markings that are in Chinese. They go
    to our offices over in Beijing, which follow up on those
    companies, whether we can task a foreign country to do certain
    intel gathering for us to bring it back, to identify the source
    all the way back to where the seizure is made.
        So we do the follow up on those investigations. So
    sometimes they take a year, sometimes six months, sometimes two
    years because you're dealing with foreign countries.
        Mr. Griffith. We are already on two years and it doesn't
    look like we followed up.
        And, look, I think we need to just do a lot better job. Mr.
    Barksdale might have been liked to have known about that so he
    could check those addresses out.
        I think we do a better job if we are all working together
    and as President Reagan said, there's no limit to the amount of
    good you can do if you don't care who gets the credit.
        And I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
    Tonko, for five minutes.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        As others have stated today, the fentanyl threat is unlike
    any drug problem we have seen before and it is going to take
    the totality of the Federal Government's capabilities to fight
    it.
        Each of these agencies has unique skill sets. But they each
    only see a piece of this picture. We need them to actually come
    together and pool their resources, information, and expertise.
        Unfortunately, it does not appear that that's happening as
    much as it could. For example, committee staff visited CBP's
    National Target Center and saw how CBP is able to use
    algorithms to target shipments and packages likely to contain
    contraband.
        But that is only as good as the data that is fed into the
    system, and CBP does not receive all of the data it could from
    other agencies.
        So how do we get past this burden, Mr. Overacker? Why is
    this--why are we not getting the most that we can here? What is
    holding back the progress that we need to realize?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, I would say that, first of all, we do
    have good levels of collaboration. We do receive data that is
    required by regulation and then we fuse that data with other
    information to try to identify high risk.
        Mr. Tonko. But if I might, though--see, when we look at the
    National Target Center visit, they're saying it's not happening
    as well as it could.
        What is holding that back?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, there is room for improvement and I
    would just say that this is an example within the law
    enforcement community of where I believe that we need to have
    investigators get to a comfort level where they can share their
    case information with CBP, knowing that as law enforcement
    officers, ourselves, that we can protect those cases.
        But we can also use that information to advance those cases
    by basically giving them greater feedback and greater
    information.
        So I just think it's a question of education of the
    investigators in the field of what our capabilities are and
    what value we can add to their cases.
        Mr. Tonko. And what additional data would CBP like to
    receive from other agencies involved in this fight to feed into
    your targeting system?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, like I said, I think the case-specific
    information, that will allow us to pinpoint target and also
    provide meaningful interdictions for those agents in the field.
        Mr. Tonko. And, Mr. Donahue, I understand DEA frequently
    shares data with CBP on specific cases when DEA deems it
    appropriate. But what is stopping DEA from providing CBP with
    more data on an automatic ongoing routine basis?
        Mr. Donahue. We work with CBP daily down in Mexico City and
    various other countries. We are mandated by DOJ policy to
    provide all of our data into the Special Operations Division
    where there's over 38 foreign and domestic agencies, both
    state, local, and federal, that seize that data that can share
    it and CBP actually has officers stationed in the Special
    Operations Division, and we work a lot along the border with
    them passing information on seizures that we need them to make
    for our investigative purposes that we can use in a court of
    law in United States.
        So there's daily engagement.
        Mr. Tonko. Why then is CBP stating that they're not
    receiving all of the data that they need to?
        Mr. Donahue. You know, I don't--they're not tied in
    directly to SOD but they can see all of our data there because
    they have representatives stationed in the Special Operations
    Division that coordinate with all the other agencies there to
    include people out in the field and in foreign offices.
        Mr. Tonko. Well, let me give a specific example. If DEA
    executes a search warrant related to fentanyl and discovers
    packages containing fentanyl that include names and addresses,
    can that information automatically be sent to CBP for it to
    interdict all related shipments coming in?
        Mr. Donahue.  If they're working that investigation in
    conjunction with DEA, they would have it right then and there.
    We provide all that to our targeting over in SOD and they
    would, in turn, share it with the CBP officer there when they
    could give value add to that investigation to help identifying
    the people responsible for that seizure.
        Mr. Tonko. Well, Mr. Chester, this is one of ONDCP's
    essential missions, to make sure that these agencies are
    working together and sharing all of the information that they
    can. But, clearly, there is more that can be done in terms of
    ongoing information sharing and for there to be this
    proclamation by some of the groups saying we are not doing as
    well as we should. What are the roadblocks here?
        Mr. Chester. Clearly, there are roadblocks. There is always
    room for improvement in the ability----
        Mr. Tonko. But what are the roadblocks?
        Mr. Chester. I think some of them may be procedural. Some
    of them may be technical in nature, the ability for databases
    to speak with--to one another on a routine basis, and as those
    issues arise we absolutely are more than happy to work with the
    interagency to try and reduce them, as you pointed out.
        Mr. Tonko. But why can't we link up more of these data
    systems so that the agencies can help one another?
        Mr. Chester. Yes, sir. We would have to take a good close
    look at the reason why it's not happening and fix that problem.
    We absolutely will.
        Mr. Tonko. We have a crisis on our hands. Why are we not
    taking that closer look?
        Mr. Chester. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Tonko. We could look at it. Why aren't we?
        Mr. Chester. We absolutely will look at it. This particular
    case that you raise we absolutely will take a look at why the
    information is not routinely shared and we will reduce that
    barrier and make sure that that happens.
        Mr. Tonko. Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The Chair now recognizes the gentle lady from
    Indiana, Mrs. Brooks, for five minutes.
        Mrs. Brooks.  Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this
    incredibly important hearing. I am really pleased that we are
    focusing in large part on law enforcement issues.
        I am a former U.S. attorney from '01 to '07, and so worked
    with all of your agencies. Was there when Homeland Security was
    stood up, and so just want to thank you all very, very much for
    your work.
        I think what the frustration is is we are trying to
    determine if there are any legal barriers, legal authorities,
    or anything that is keeping the agencies from sharing at the
    level that we all think you should be sharing at.
        And so my question is to any of you, and your counsels who
    might be here, are there any legal barriers that exist in law
    that are keeping you from sharing information?
        Discovery issues--is there anything? Mr. Donahue, anything
    you know of?
        Mr. Donahue. I think that depends on what the seizure is,
    if it's actually in judicial processes--is it actually
    protected information from other countries.
        But there is no legal, you know, policy or anything
    preventing us from sharing information. I could tell you what
    we've done in Mexico City in our offices. We have HSI agents
    and FBI agents sitting right in the office with DEA for that
    deconfliction purpose and for the immediate sharing of
    information.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. And do any of the other agencies know of
    any legal reasons why our law enforcement agencies aren't
    sharing or can't share anything? Or is it just operational?
        Mr. Overacker. I am not aware of any legal restriction----
        Mrs. Brooks. OK.
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. And I think our default
    position always should be we have an obligation to share.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. And I assume--is that anything different?
        Mr. Prince. Again, yes, I am not aware of any legal
    prohibitions but I think that, you know, the size of some of
    these agencies--these are large enterprises that we are talking
    about.
        But a lot of these gaps are closed through deconfliction
    houses, case coordination such as OCDTF, HIDTA. A lot of these
    things I am sure you're very much aware of, and I think it's
    not--these aren't insurmountable issues. These are issues that
    we collaborate on daily----
        Mrs. Brooks. Right.
        Mr. Prince [continuing]. With respect to the international
    space----
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. Just wanted to make sure there were no
    legal impediments because actually Mr. Donahue talked about a
    legal impediment, which I've been very concerned about for a
    long time, and that's the encrypted phones, which we have not
    resolved, have we, Mr. Donahue?
        Mr. Donahue. No, we've been pending that issue for years
    now.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. And could you very succinctly remind us
    all what that is?
        Mr. Donahue. So it's a law that's going to enable us to
    judicially intercept a device that's signed by a judge on a
    target that we can demonstrate is violating U.S. law.
        Mrs. Brooks. But then the encryption is what's keeping you
    from getting to the information in the phone. Is that correct?
        Mr. Donahue.  Correct. Certain companies don't cooperate--
    aren't obligated to cooperate to give us the technology to
    intercept the encryption.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. I want to talk about some of the
    technology challenges, and Mr. Prince, you talked about the
    dark web, and can you please share with us what--how it is that
    it's more of a law enforcement challenge than, you know, other
    issues that we've seen and whether the issues with cryptic
    currency, and I just read that Facebook is now contemplating a
    currency. Can you please talk with us about any successes or
    challenges you're having on the dark web?
        Mr. Prince. The successes are I mentioned in my oral
    testimony. The challenges are, obviously, with respect to
    crypto currency and that when we are looking at transactions
    that are occurring in the dark net and the dark net is largely
    where nefarious activities are occurring and transactions are
    happening.
        We don't necessarily know what these purchases and sales
    are unless or until we arrest an individual who is engaged in
    this criminal activity and perhaps commandeer their account, in
    which case we can see their entire wallet and what those
    transactions translate to.
        If we are looking at it from the outside in what we see is
    transactions that are occurring we can presume that those
    transactions are in fact criminal in nature because we are in
    the dark net space. But we don't know what they're selling,
    what they're buying.
        So those are some challenges. But we overcome those
    challenges through a variety of different techniques that I
    can't really get into here.
        Mrs. Brooks. Right.
        Mr. Prince. But, certainly, we do make an impact and we are
    making inroads in that space.
        Mrs. Brooks. And I would like to follow up on that further.
    But one thing that I know CBP mentioned but I would also like
    to ask you, Mr. Barksdale. Can we talk a little bit in my time
    that I have left about the Narcan availability for--I know it's
    at key facilities.
        Obviously, when we are dealing with fentanyl all the law
    enforcement--everyone who touches it it's of significant
    concern because it could kill.
        What percentage of postal and--I am curious, and I think
    we'll have to do this in written form to all the agencies--what
    percentage of your officers have access to Narcan?
        Mr. Barksdale. Well, first, as far as postal inspectors,
    every postal inspector has access to Narcan.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. Good.
        Mr. Barksdale. Those on our drug teams has access to
    Narcan.
        On the operational side, all of our key facilities does
    have Narcan distributed to them, and that would include all of
    our process and in distribution centers and other large
    facilities.
        As far as the percentage of employees that covers, I will
    have to get back to you with an exact number.
        Mrs. Brooks. OK. And I will be submitting for--written
    questions about the availability of Narcan, the percentage of
    your employees that are all covered or have access to that
    because I think this is a serious issue for law enforcement.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, for five minutes.
        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Madame Chair. Thank you for hosting
    this incredibly important hearing. Thank you for the witnesses
    to be here today and for your service to our country.
        A number of complexities that--and hot issues that been
    brought up over the course of the testimony today, and I
    appreciate your focus on that.
        I want to try to drill down on some of that, given that
    Congress has the opportunity to make some changes here and some
    investments here that I think are necessary, although we need
    to do that right.
        So, Mr. Overacker, you told us earlier that, quote, ``Most
    of the illicit fentanyl entering our country by weight does so
    at ports of entry along the Southwest border by private
    vehicles, pedestrian, and commercial vehicles,'' and that,
    quote, ``Fentanyl entering from the northern border does so by
    international mail packages and express consignment courier,''
    end quote.
        So in your opinion, sir, would a border wall at a cost of
    up to $25 billion be the most effective way to stop fentanyl
    from arriving in our country through mail and ports of entry?
        Mr. Overacker. Let me just say that I think when we talk
    about border management you have to have a comprehensive
    approach. You know, most of what we encounter is at a port of
    entry and--but we are working with--working to change our
    concept of operations at these ports so we can increase the
    scanning rates, and when we increase those scanning rates I
    think it will have an impact on the patterns of crossing and if
    we deter these drugs----
        Mr. Kennedy. Understood.
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. Deter them from coming to the
    ports they're going to go someplace else.
        Mr. Kennedy. Right. So I am going to interpret that based
    upon the phrasing in which you answered that question as a no,
    not the most effective way to spend the initial first $25
    billion.
        So if Congress was to appropriate $25 billion to the CBP to
    combat fentanyl trafficking, would you choose to spend that
    money on a border wall or, as you said, increase technology
    focused on screening cars and pedestrians at ports of entry and
    packages that are arriving through the mail?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, in the 2019 appropriation we received
    $570 million to improve our scanning capabilities at ports of
    entry----
        Mr. Kennedy. And given what you just said, we are not there
    yet in terms of trying to----
        Mr. Overacker. No, that's going to be a multi-year
    investment. But that's our first priority right there.
        Mr. Kennedy. Appreciate that, sir.
        Mr. Donahue, if given $25 billion by Congress, do you
    believe the most effective way to stop any arrival of illicit
    drugs to the United States is a border wall?
        Mr. Donahue. Again, collectively, with all different tools,
    can't say, you know, it won't help. I mean, I can't say it's
    the solution. But it would help. It's just another tool in our
    toolbox that we can actually filter certain threats to certain
    areas and we can focus on in personnel----
        Mr. Kennedy. So but the most--if you had $25 billion is the
    intervention that you would go with first a border wall?
        Mr. Donahue. It would just be part of our comprehensive
    plan on how we approach the issue.
        Mr. Kennedy. Sir, you touched on the importance of
    treatment and recovery options here in the United States as a
    way to reduce demand.
        Do you think that a $25 billion border wall would help us
    increase access to care in places like Massachusetts that would
    lead to reduced demand?
        Mr. Donahue.  I mean, again, that's part of our--we believe
    in the rehabilitation. We believe in the demand reduction and
    the enforcement, and the international focus on the sources of
    supply. So we----
        Mr. Kennedy. And so would that----
        Mr. Donahue [continuing]. We'd spread that money out, look
    at it collectively on the entire problem.
        Mr. Kennedy. And so that $25 billion could be spent on
    something like Medicaid, which is the largest payer of mental
    behavior health services in the country that accounts for more
    than 40 percent or nearly 40 percent of all adults with opioid
    addition in the country?
        Mr. Donahue. It would help that too, and our concern is to
    have less drugs and less flow into the United States, have less
    drugs addicts and less people dependent on those programs.
        Mr. Kennedy. And so if I am understanding your answer that
    that would help--expanding access to Medicaid would be a
    critically important part to ensuring that people get access to
    the treatment that's necessary.
        Mr. Donahue. The DEA doesn't run anything on--in Medicaid.
    We are targeting the cartels that are responsible for bringing
    the drugs into the country.
        Mr. Kennedy. Right. But as you said, if you're trying to
    reduce demand, getting people treated that are affected with
    addiction is probably part of that, no?
        Mr. Donahue.  Yes, it is.
        Mr. Kennedy.  OK.
        Mr. Chester, on multiple occasions the administration has
    opposed--has proposed gutting ONDCP by 95 percent. Do you
    believe that our response to this epidemic would be improved
    without a centralized agency tasked with leading that response?
        Mr. Chester. As the central EOP office for advancing the
    administration's drug control policy, ONDCP has been very
    effective in doing that role.
        Mr. Kennedy. Do you think cutting your budget by 95 percent
    would make you more effective or less effective?
        Mr. Chester. Well, clearly, cutting our budget by 95
    percent would make us less effective.
        But I will also tell you that the administration's support
    for ONDCP has been very strong and they've allowed us to do our
    jobs very, very well in this particular crisis over the last--
    --
        Mr. Kennedy. Would you characterized the proposed cut by 95
    percent as being very strong support, sir?
        Mr. Chester.  The proposed cut by 95 percent was the
    inclusion of the other two programs that were very pricey. So
    it wasn't a--it wasn't 100 people from ONDCP became five
    people.
        But what I will tell you that the relationship that we have
    with the administration they have allowed us to be able to do
    our jobs at advancing the drug policy across the federal
    government.
        Mr. Kennedy. So why do you think they'd propose cutting
    your office by 95 percent?
        Mr. Chester. I think that these were all parts of budget
    discussions in the past but we are all very glad that ONDCP
    exists and continues to do its good work to this day.
        Mr. Kennedy. Me, too. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
    fromOklahoma, Mr. Mullin.
        Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        My questions are going to be for Mr. Donahue and Mr.
    Overacker, if you could both kind of answer when you can.
        How much fentanyl is coming directly from China?
        Mr. Overacker. So the fentanyl that comes directly from
    China typically we see that in mail or express, and I can tell
    you that----
        Mr. Mullin. How much? I mean, give me--like, how much have
    we--have we stopped? How much do we estimate is entering the
    country from China directly?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, the numbers have dropped precipitously
    this year.
        Mr. Mullin. OK.
        Mr. Overacker. So we are talking about only pounds of
    fentanyl----
        Mr. Mullin. Pounds?
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. That we have encountered so far
    this year.
        Mr. Mullin. Mr. Donahue?
        Mr. Donahue.  We couldn't give you the exact number coming
    in because we only know what we know. We can give you our
    seizures numbers that----
        Mr. Mullin. Right. That's what I am looking for. How much
    have you seized?
        Mr. Donahue. So I will get those exact seizure numbers for
    you.
        Mr. Mullin. Thank you.
        Mr. Donahue. One thing we are looking for in China is
    actually the precursor chemicals coming from China actually
    utilized to produce more fentanyl.
        Mr. Mullin. How much is coming over our southern border
    that we are apprehending?
        Mr. Overacker. On the southern border, that's where,
    basically, most of what we are seeing----
        Mr. Mullin. Right.
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. And I think this year we are
    tracking at over 1,800 pounds or----
        Mr. Mullin. Eighteen hundred pounds.
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. Close to 2,000 so far. But this
    is not pure fentanyl. This is fentanyl that would be either----
        Mr. Mullin. It's laced. Right. I get it. Right.
        Mr. Overacker [continuing]. Yes, laced or cut or however
    you want to----
        Mr. Mullin. I get it. Mr. Donahue, would you agree with
    those numbers?
        Mr. Donahue. They seem accurate, and we see a lot going up
    through the corridor for Tijuana and Mexico.
        Mr. Mullin. Are we grabbing most of that at the port of
    entry?
        Mr. Overacker. Absolutely. Ninety percent of our seizures
    occur at a port of entry.
        Mr. Mullin. And if I am--if I am not mistaken we are only
    inspecting, roughly, 20 percent of the--of the vehicles. We are
    only able to inspect 20 percent of the vehicles coming across
    the port of entry. Is that correct?
        Mr. Overacker. Well, currently, our scanning rates for
    privately-owned vehicles coming across the southern border are
    around two percent and it's, roughly, 16 percent for commercial
    vehicles, and that's really a function of the volume of what's
    crossing. We have----
        Mr. Mullin. Well, the point I am trying to get to is my
    colleague that was before me was bringing up the $25 billion
    for the southern border for building the wall, and underneath
    the president's proposal he also designated a significant
    amount of money for the port of entry to scan 100 percent of
    the vehicles as they was driving through because right now we
    are only inspecting, roughly, 20 percent and we are already
    catching the largest amount but through the port of entry.
        To get back to what my colleague was referring to, would
    the wall work. Well, what the wall would do is draw more people
    to that port of entry. Is that not correct? If the wall is
    there, then they would have to look for a more--a different
    avenue to be able to enter the country through, which would be
    the legal point of entries.
        Mr. Donahue, would you like to respond to that?
        Mr. Donahue. We do a lot of great work with CBP and passing
    information when we can drive people or operations that we do
    at the port of entry where we can focus on cars and trucks.
         Mr. Mullin. It's to funnel them there to a certain point.
        Mr. Donahue. Yes.
        Mr. Mullin. So would the wall help funnel that?
        Mr. Donahue. Absolutely would.
        Mr. Mullin. Mr. Overacker, would you agree with that?
        Mr. Overacker. I would say that the port of entry is a
    controlled place.
        Mr. Mullin. Sure. Where the--where the open border isn't,
    correct?
        Mr. Overacker. And so because it's a controlled place and
    we have better opportunities to interdict.
        Mr. Mullin. OK. So my point that I am trying to drive home
    here is there's not just one thing that's going to solve this
    problem.
        But the amount that we can keep from flowing over our
    southern border, which is where the majority of the drugs are
    coming from--if we can get a better control on that and
    designate dollars specifically for those and make our southern
    border a harder target rather than right now being an easy
    target because, as we all know, the easy target is an
    opportunity for success and a harder target most criminals
    aren't going to attack.
        If we are able to make it a hard target, would that help us
    with combatting the overdoses that are taking place and the
    addiction issues that are taking place here inside the United
    States?
        Mr. Donahue. We look at all tools because, you know, we are
    speaking about fentanyl today and we are concerned with the
    enormous amount of methamphetamine that's being produced that's
    coming up----
        Mr. Mullin. Right.
        Mr. Donahue [continuing]. The enormous amount of cocaine
    and the heroin as well, which are bulky to bring in that they
    need big trucks to do it.
        So we are looking at every tool possible to identify and
    disrupt and seize those drugs that are coming in.
        Mr. Mullin. With the amount of human trafficking that's
    going on in our southern border right now--the overflow that's
    taking place--is it distracting your mission from being able
    to--being able to look directly to drug trafficking or you have
    to spend resources to the human trafficking side of it, too?
        Mr. Overacker, you want to----
        Mr. Overacker. Well, there's no question that the current
    conditions on the Southwest border have caused us to have to
    shift, you know, our personnel. So it does have some impact.
    There's no question about that.
        Mr. Mullin. See, what I am thinking is that the cartels are
    purposely flooding our southern border so that the drug routes
    can be easily accessed because they know that we having to put
    resources to the human trafficking crisis that's taking place
    and the humanitarian that's taking place.
        So the wall, to which my colleague brought up, is to help
    all the above picture, not just one single issue.
        With that, I will yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman yields back.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan for five minutes.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks for
    holding this hearing.
        I sat here a long time listening because I am concerned
    about the 28,000 deaths in the United States from synthetic
    opioids like fentanyl.
        And my colleague made a great point just now that cartels
    are going to exploit weaknesses or crises to get their product
    across. I think they are. I think walls do work and I think
    they create corridors that our law enforcement can better
    utilize the resources we give them within those corridors to
    stop the bad guys from wanting to bring these horrendous drugs
    into our cities and killing our fellow Americans.
        I've been sitting here and for--sat here for several hours
    listening to all the other questions. One of the benefits or
    challenges being last is all the groovy questions have been
    asked.
        You all have been great to answer those questions. I want
    to give you a chance to tell us what more we can do in
    Congress. We passed the SUPPORT Act last year, the SUPPORT for
    Patients and Communities Act. I want to see the implementation
    of that.
        But what I would like to do is just ask Mr. Overacker first
    what can we do in Congress to help keep our law enforcement
    officers best positioned to continue infiltrating the supply
    chain. What more can we do?
        Mr. Overacker. Thank you for that, Congressman.
        First of all, I would just like to say that we are very
    fortunate that Congress has supported us most generously over
    the last two budgets with respect to our detection
    capabilities, and so we are grateful for that, and we know we
    have a multi-year effort to improve our scanning capabilities
    on the Southwest border but also throughout CBP.
        We are also grateful for the continued support we've
    received with respect to improving our laboratory capabilities
    and also appropriations for improving our facilities.
        That's an important part, particularly what we are doing
    now to improve the international mail facilities where we
    process mail with the U.S. Postal Service.
        So that continued support is most helpful for us. So that's
    what I would say, just thank you for the support we've received
    so far.
        Mr. Duncan. Let me ask Mr. Donahue from the DEA standpoint.
    What can we do to help you disrupt the distribution process of
    opioids and what more can we do?
        Mr. Donahue. I think having hearings and meetings like this
    and keeping it to the forefront is really important, and
    inviting DEA to these meetings. We bring something specific to
    the table.
        We have extraordinary amount of resources in our overseas
    offices which is where the drugs come from--the cocaine, the
    methamphetamine, the heroin, the fentanyl. It all comes from
    international and other countries.
        So bringing this to the forefront I think is really
    important for the DEA and letting our message get out there,
    and I think having the youth and other people seeing the damage
    of the drugs that are coming in from a foreign country, just
    the damage to our cultures and our communities. It's really
    important not to do it every six months but to do it daily.
        Mr. Duncan. I've got a--my best friend from college is a
    doctor and we talked about fentanyl just this week, and we were
    talking about the smuggling efforts.
        And as you guys become more and more effective, my concern
    is the very potent fentanyl could be put into food supplies as
    part of the smuggling effort in containers and contaminate food
    supply that ultimately gets in.
        Not talking about drug users that are looking for that
    stronger high. I am talking about fentanyl get into an area
    where it contaminates food or liquids that ultimately end up on
    the digestives systems of just average Americans, and then we
    have a lot of other innocent deaths.
        I want to ask Mr. Prince with HSI--you know, as containers
    are being brought in, I know HSI is doing a great job overseas.
    Is that a reality that we should think about is fentanyl
    contaminating any other sort of food supply or liquids that are
    coming into this country?
        Mr. Prince. I think it's an abstract thought that I have
    that I will share but, you know, lack of imagination is
    something that we shouldn't have when it comes to fentanyl in
    the same sense that when you think about 9/11 and how that
    happened.
        So we should have an imagination about the various ways
    that fentanyl can be introduced into the United States as we
    put pressure on organizations. We should be creative. We should
    continue to leverage tools that we have. We should continue to
    create new tools and expand our aperture within the cyber
    space.
        And don't forget about our, as I mentioned earlier, our
    analog tool sets that allow us to also be effective.
        Mr. Duncan. Madam Chairwoman, before I came to this
    committee I was on the Homeland Security, and I was on the
    Border and Customs Border Patrol--Border and Maritime
    Subcommittee.
        We went to the ports and we looked at container security,
    and we looked at the screen for radioactive devices. We looked
    at what drug smugglers have done.
        But fentanyl being put on containers it's going to be very
    difficult for these guys to detect. That's something we ought
    to consider in future hearings.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is right. Fentanyl is really
    difficult to detect and that's 1 of the real dangers.
        I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming today. Your
    participation has been very informative and helpful.
        I do have a document that Ms. Schakowsky asked me to enter
    into the record. It's an article from the International Journal
    of Drug Policy and I would ask unanimous consent. So ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Ms. DeGette. I can assure all of you, and everyone in the
    audience, this committee does intend to stay on this issue.
    This has been a multi-year process, a bipartisan process, and
    we intend to continue to look quite closely at it, because it
    is really a national crisis.
        And I want to thank all of our witnesses for recognizing it
    as such and for increasing your cooperation between your
    agencies.
        I also want to remind Members that pursuant to committee
    rules they have 10 business days to submit additional questions
    for the record to be answered by witnesses who have appeared
    before the subcommittee.
        I would just ask if all of our witnesses would agree to
    respond promptly to any such questions if you receive any. I
    think you will be getting some from Mrs. Brooks, for example.
        And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Annie Kuster

        We have seen the opioid crisis evolve and take many
    different forms. No community in this country has been spared,
    but New England and New Hampshire in particular have been
    devastated by this crisis.
        That is why it is imperative that we anticipate how the
    fentanyl crisis will continue to evolve. We need to get ahead
    of this ever-changing threat, so we are not caught flat-footed.
        As I look at the witness panel, I am struck by their
    diverse missions. It is not every day that we have a hearing
    with the U.S. Postal Service and the DEA on the same witness
    panel.
        We need a national strategy on our fentanyl response. And I
    don't just mean a white paper document or a task force report.
    I mean we need a coherent, practical plan for how we are going
    to beat this problem.
        For example, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP) is supposed to formulate a strategy, bring all the
    agencies together, and see to it that the strategy is
    implemented effectively.
        DEA, you are on the front lines and often develop important
    leads for targeting drugs. And FDA is suddenly in the middle of
    this fight because fentanyl is increasingly being mixed with
    other drugs, including counterfeit prescription drugs.
        These are just a few of the issues we will explore today.
    If we are going to solve this problem, we need better
    cooperation across agencies, and we need to think differently
    than we have on past drug epidemics.
        Finally, this hearing is just one piece of our oversight.
    This Subcommittee will stay on this issue and ensure progress
    is being made so that we are not back here again next year
    talking about the same problems.
        I thank the witnesses for their service on this critical
    issue, and for being here today.
        I yield back.
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