DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2021

HEARINGS
BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. VISCLOSKY

Mr. Visclosky. We are at the appointed hour, and I am going to call us to order and in a moment recognize my good friend, Mr. Calvert, for a motion, but because this is the first hearing we are having this year, many of us may have a new staff person, associate staff person, many of us have new fellows, and would want to make sure that everyone gets introduced, because all of the Members at the dais understand who actually does the work.

I would like to start by introducing Kyle McFarland, who is now on our staff. Many of you may have met him, but just on the chance you have not, he is the person you want to call. Additionally, and I would turn it over for a moment to Mr. Calvert, we have a new clerk on the committee as well.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to recognize our new defense clerk for the minority, Johnnie Kaberle. Most of you know Johnnie. She has been up here on the Hill for a long time working defense issues in one way or another, and so I know that she is excited to be here and we are excited to have her. So Johnnie. Here is Johnnie.

Mr. Visclosky. I have a new fellow, Major Steven Cash from the United States Air Force. If he would stand up. Great. There you go.

And, Betty, we will just, I think, go around for those Members who are here.

Mr. Calvert. You know, Mr. Chairman, if I could just for one second, I forgot to introduce my new fellow—shame on me—Major Will Hendrickson from the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. Visclosky. All right. Will, thank you. Betty.

Ms. McCollum. So I don’t have anybody new, but anybody who has ever been an intern here, I would like to introduce a former intern of mine, Ben Peterson, who now has I think, 20 years.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. I would like to introduce my fellow from the United States Army, Cody Rush. Captain Cody Rush.

Mr. Cuellar. I want to introduce my new fellow, Mr. Aguilar.
My new fellow is Major Will Chang, Air Force. Thank you for being here. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Great. Mr. Aguilar.

Mr. AGUILAR. Nobody new. Wendell White on my team behind me.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Great. Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. Well, thank God I don’t have anybody new. Maria. I live in fear of having to introduce someone. I am very lucky to have her.

Mr. WOMACK. I am delighted to have my military fellow, Natalia Gruenbaum, a West Point graduate, military police officer, and terrific soldier, terrific. Thank you, Natalia.

Mr. CARTER. My new Army fellow is Wes Dempster, Captain. Great guy.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Diaz-Ballart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALLART. I am honored to have Senior Master Sergeant Lucy Stockett, U.S. Air Force.

My fellow will take on your fellows any day.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I do not want to prolong this, but in fairness, if there are any new fellows on this side of the room, if you would just state your name and the Member you are working for, please, so we get to know you.

Mr. VINACCO. Good morning. I am Mike Vinacco. I am Ms. Kay Granger’s fellow. I am an Air Force major.

Mr. CHO. James Cho, United States Air Force, intelligence officer working for Congresswoman Bustos.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you want to sit here with the adult table or what?

Mr. CHO. I am comfortable in the back.

Ms. WALLIS. Emily Wallis, U.S. Air Force fellow for Representative Kirkpatrick.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. Great.

Ms. GAUTHIER. Liz Gauthier, I am a Navy civilian supporting Representative Lowey.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Great. Thank you. And I believe we are done. And, Admiral, thank you——

Oh.

Mr. DE LA CRUZ. Santiago De la Cruz, with Congressman Ryan.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You are not from Ohio, are you?

Mr. DE LA CRUZ. I am not from Ohio.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. That is okay.

Admiral, thanks for your indulgence. We will get started.

I would recognize Mr. Calvert for a motion.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I move that this portion of the hearing today, which involves sensitive material, be held in executive session because of the sensitivity of the material to be disclosed.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Today we welcome Admiral Charles A. Richard, the commander of the United States Strategic Command.

Admiral, thank you very much for being here. And I want to extend my thanks to you and all of the men and women who serve under your command.
You have one of the gravest responsibilities of anyone in the United States government if called upon, and we all hope that day never comes. It is your mission to execute the deployment of nuclear weapons.

The leadership of the Department of Defense has affirmed repeatedly that modernization of the strategic deterrent is the Department’s number one priority. We know that effort will be costly.

We also know that the Department has outlined an ambitious program to modernize our conventional forces to meet the needs of what is referred to as great power competition.

While the administration appears to be fully committed to modernizing our nuclear systems, I must also stress my concern that the administration has not demonstrated the same commitment when it comes to arms control.

Modernizing our strategic deterrent is part of ensuring that a nuclear war is never fought, but so are arms control efforts.

Measures such as new START Treaty help to eliminate uncertainty and thus improve stability between nuclear armed powers.

Arms control is not a product of starry-eyed idealism, but of hard learned lessons from the cold war.

To paraphrase what the late Senator Richard Lugar said when asked about his support for new START, the Senator said: “I am trying to take warheads out of Russia so they don’t hit Indiana.”

Also, I appreciate the return on investment from arms control treaties. The development, production, deployment, and maintenance of nuclear weapons is incredibly expensive. Treaties are essential to keeping those costs in check.

Arms control is not just a philosophical matter for this committee. For example, at the Department’s insistence, we have appropriated nearly $188 million in fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to recapitalize the aircraft that carry out U.S. missions under the Open Sky Treaty.

To date, very little of that money has been spent, and it is unclear whether the administration intends to abandon the treaty.

Putting aside the question of whether it would be wise to remove ourselves from Open Skies, the committee has an obvious interest in ensuring that funds are spent for the purposes for which they are appropriated.

Before I turn to Admiral Richard for his opening statement, I would like again to turn to Member Calvert for any opening statements that he would like to make.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Admiral Richard. I appreciate you taking time to come talk with us since this hearing informally begins, so let the last budget cycle, for our chairman, I want to begin by saying what an honor it has been to serve alongside him all these years. He has been a great partner and friend. I look forward to working with him in the months ahead before he rides off into the Indiana sunset.

Mr. VISCONTI. When you can see.

Mr. CALVERT. Yes. When you can see. If those steel mills are working properly, they will—never mind.
Admiral, thanks again for taking the time to discuss with us some very serious issues involving our national security.
Nothing is more critical to our defense than our ability to deter and respond to adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. I will be asking about our latest threat capability, and it has caused great concern up here, the continued development of hypersonic missiles by China and the reported fielding of them by Russia in December. As you know, these missiles are nearly impossible to shoot down with current technology.
Given that current plans don’t call for us to have such a missile operational until at least 2022, such a weapon could significantly degrade our strategic advantage over the next 2 years, especially if it is armed with a nuclear warhead.
I will also be asking about transitioning certain responsibilities to the Space Force and the impact to our readiness across both organizations. I am curious to understand how friction is being mitigated during the time of transition and what steps are in place to ensure no degradation to mission occurs.
Finally, I look forward to hearing your candid assessment of where we stand in relation to potential adversaries when it comes to our nuclear modernization efforts.
Thank you for your service, Admiral, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert. Admiral, the floor is yours.
[The written statement of Admiral Richard follows:]
UNCLASSIFIED

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF
CHARLES A. RICHARD
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
6 FEBRUARY 2020
INTRODUCTION

USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command, and I am privileged to lead the 150,000 Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians who dedicate themselves to the Department of Defense’s highest priority mission. I thank the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for their confidence in me to lead this Command and the Department’s nuclear enterprise. I also thank Congress for their continued support, which ensures USSTRATCOM has the required resources necessary to continue providing our Nation’s strategic deterrence.

Commander, USSTRATCOM, as a key enabler and contributor to Joint Force operations, is the combatant commander responsible for Strategic Deterrence; Nuclear Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; Missile Defense; Analysis and Targeting; and Missile Threat Assessment. To execute our assigned responsibilities, the men and women of this Command operate globally across all domains, to include the information environment. We work closely with the Joint Force across organizations, and with our Allies and partners to address the strategic challenges facing our Nation. Our mission: To deter strategic attack and employ forces, as directed, to guarantee the security of our Nation, our Allies, and our partners.

The Command’s priorities are: 1) above all else, we will provide strategic deterrence for the Nation and assurance of the same to our Allies and partners; 2) if deterrence fails, we are prepared to deliver a decisive response, decisive in every possible way; and 3) we will do this with a resilient, equipped, and trained combat-ready force. A powerful, ready triad; a survivable nuclear command, control, and communications (C3) system; and a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure are the foundation that enables strategic deterrence and assurance which is fundamental to our survival as a Nation, and deters adversaries from conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our Nation, our Allies, and our partners.

The dedicated professionals working for and with USSTRATCOM allow the Command to execute its operations and provide the Nation with its strategic deterrent against threats in all domains. Without the men and women of USSTRATCOM, actively performing the deterrence mission every day, we could not deter potential adversaries and guarantee the freedoms our Nation holds dear.

To be clear, nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense – our deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense.

The ability of the United States to deter threats to our Nation and our Allies is at a critical point. The contemporary security environment is the most challenging since the Cold War. In the nuclear dimension, we face a range of potential adversaries, each with different interests, objectives, and capabilities. To maintain a credible deterrent in this environment requires us to modernize and
recapitalize our strategic forces to ensure our Nation has the capability to deter any actor, at any level. Doing so requires we remain committed to modernizing and recapitalizing our strategic forces and supporting infrastructure, and that we continue to pursue the supplemental nuclear capabilities intended to address new challenges in the security environment.

A visible symbol of our commitment to nuclear modernization is the recently completed General Curtis LeMay Command and Control Facility (C2F) at USSTRATCOM. The C2F is one of the most advanced weapon systems ever constructed, and will be a critical element for the integration of global intelligence, nuclear planning, and operations with other combatant commands in coordination with our national leadership. Its modern infrastructure for Command and Control of strategic forces provides the flexibility for effective oversight and clear direction in a new era of global, integrated operations.

We must proceed with modernization. Sustainment and modernization of our nuclear forces has transitioned from something that we should do to something that we must do. Continuing to maintain the Nation’s strategic deterrent needed to meet the challenges of the global security environment and to realize Presidential and Departmental guidance defined by the National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) requires continued Congressional support, budget stability, and on-time appropriations.

GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The NDS’s prioritization of great power competition is the impetus for increasing lethality, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and reforming the Department in an increasingly complex global environment. It addresses the changing nature of threats to the United States. Competitors, such as China and Russia, are developing advanced capabilities to directly challenge our strengths across all domains. USSTRATCOM is committed to fulfilling our NDS requirements and searching out innovative ways to understand the environment and adapt to the challenges presented in the global security environment.

We understand competition does not equal conflict, and war does not have to be an inevitable conclusion in an era of great power competition. However, we must be responsive to the increasing desire for state and non-state actors to reshape the world in their favor, doing so at the expense to the security of our Nation, our Allies, and our partners, and accepted international norms and rules. We must be capable of recognizing and communicating the potential for adversarial actors who use forces in any domain to coerce, undermine, or erode the current rules-based order.

CHINA

China is advancing a comprehensive modernization program for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning all domains, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and the information environment. These initiatives increase China’s ability to project power further from their mainland and support their aspirations to impose China’s will throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing’s military modernization supports longstanding goals to establish regional hegemony, deny U.S. power projection operations in the Indo-Pacific, and supplant the U.S. as the security partner of choice.

China continues to expand and increase its strategic force capabilities. Despite maintaining a “No First Use” policy, China’s lack of transparency regarding its modernization efforts to increase regional capabilities and to expand its overall arsenal bring its motives and intent into question. Among questions about Chinese intentions is their drive to likely double the size of their nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade. The PLA’s range of new systems that complement its growing nuclear stockpile includes developing a survivable nuclear triad, counter-intervention, and power projection capabilities to deter and deny foreign regional force projection in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA’s Air Force (PLAAF) newly reassigned nuclear mission, and a deployment of a strategic bomber would provide China with its first credible nuclear triad. During the 70th Anniversary Parade in October 2019, the PLA unveiled new strategic nuclear systems, including the H-6N BADGER bomber, DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, and improved submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Other advanced systems include a range of ballistic missile defense technologies and increased anti-access/area denial operations. Finally, the PLA is developing a space-based early warning capability and more sophisticated command and control (C2) systems to safeguard the integrity of a larger, more dispersed force. Collectively, Chinese improvements to its nuclear capabilities raise troubling concerns and underscore the need to press on with modernizing our nuclear forces, including the supplemental capabilities outlined in the NPR.

Our Nation, and our Allies and partners, should not accept Chinese policies or actions that threaten the international rules-based order or undermine regional and global stability. We must remain postured to counter Chinese coercion and subversion, assure our regional Allies and partners, and protect our national security interests as international law allows.

RUSSIA

Russia seeks to regain its role as a world power and erode U.S. leadership in world affairs. Russia continues to pursue a sphere of influence over the states on its periphery and attempts to dictate the parameters of those states’ sovereignty, especially regarding matters of security or economics. Russian military doctrine emphasizes the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons and Russia fields advanced capabilities to achieve these objectives. Moreover, Russian doctrine and rhetoric
highlights a willingness to use nuclear weapons first, perhaps in an attempt to terminate a conventional conflict on terms acceptable to Russia.

Russia’s aggressive and robust military and nuclear modernization campaign across its strategic triad and dual-use systems is close to completion. To date, Russia has recapitalized 76 percent of its strategic nuclear forces with modern weapons and equipment, strengthening its overall combat potential. It is easier to list the nuclear weapons and equipment Russia has not modernized, than it is to describe their all new equipment and capabilities. Upgrades to existing strategic forces include updating the Tu-95MS BEAR strategic bomber and Kh-101/102 long-range, air-launched cruise missiles; building and deploying the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBN platform for the BULAVA SS-N-32 SLBM; replacing silo-based and mobile ICBMs with newer systems and increased warhead upload capacity; and fielding the Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle. In addition to modernization efforts, Russia is embracing new and novel technologies such as the TSIRKON hypersonic anti-ship missile, Belgorod submarine, nuclear capable Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, Kalibr land-attack cruise missile, Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and Skyfall nuclear powered intercontinental cruise missile. These advanced dual-capable systems are specifically designed to challenge U.S. and Allied deterrent structures and target our capabilities.

Over the past decade, Moscow has not only emphasized strategic forces preparedness, but also endeavored to enhance Russia’s civil defense readiness for strategic conflict, and has conducted exercises geared towards increasing interoperability between civil and military organizations in a time of war. Additionally, both Russia and China appear to be expanding their strategic partnership in the Asia/Pacific Region. Last summer, this partnership went on display through a combined out-of-area (OOA) flight. Their joint efforts continue to erode transparency and predictability, use force to achieve their goals, undermine rules-based international order, and violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors.

Russia’s nuclear forces include a range of strategic weapons, some not captured by existing arms control structures, and theater and tactical nuclear weapons entirely outside the arms control framework. Due to Russia’s refusal to submit these theater (or non-strategic) systems to arms control limits or transparency initiatives, a considerable level of uncertainty clouds judgements on the scope and disposition of Russia’s stockpile. However, Russia’s overall nuclear stockpile is likely to grow significantly over the next decade — growth driven primarily by a projected increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia’s determined pursuit of “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, together with their recent theory of nuclear rhetoric, indicates a troubling readiness to resort to nuclear weapons early in a crisis. Accordingly, our nuclear forces must include a sufficient range of capabilities such that
Russia never mistakenly perceives any advantage from using nuclear weapons, at any threshold of violence.

**NORTH KOREA AND IRAN**

North Korea continues to defy international norms and conducts malign activities to foster regional instability. North Korea has tested ICBM-class missiles designed to reach the United States and has increased the number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles in its inventory. USSTRATCOM is committed to supporting the Department’s efforts to work with like-minded regional partners to reduce military tensions and support our diplomats in achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.

Iran remains the world’s leading sponsor of terror. By arming and utilizing proxy forces with advanced conventional weapons, Iran threatens our Nation and our partners in the region. Iran relies on its missile forces as a tool for signaling, propaganda, and retaliation, as observed through violations of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and further illustrated by last month’s ballistic missile launches against airbases in Iraq. Additionally, Iran continues to retain the technological capability and capacity to develop a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so. Iran continues to ready and develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, coupled with an aggressive strategy to destabilize the Middle East; calling into question Iran’s commitment to foregoing nuclear weapons. Iran’s actions introduce greater risk to an already volatile environment and threatens global commerce, security, and stability.

We remain vigilant to the threats both North Korea and Iran pose to the United States, our Allies and partners, and support on-going international and whole-of-government approaches to reduce these threats.

**INTEGRATED STRATEGIC DETERRENCE**

The 21st century global security environment presents challenges to deterrence. Competitors are conducting subversive actions below the levels of traditional conflict across all domains. Additionally, our adversaries are integrating nuclear, conventional, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and cyber capabilities to form an unprecedented range of threats; this includes the exploitation of the potential threat of nuclear employment to shape our response to their actions.

In a new era of warfighting, traditional Cold War deterrence concepts may be insufficient to deter the full range of threats in the modern security environment. The United States must apply tailored deterrent strategies to specific adversaries, while integrating the full spectrum of our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, with all elements of U.S. national power. An integrated strategic
deterrence concept must leverage and exploit information advantage to seek long-term gains and capabilities in response to advancing threats; and fully assess the risks associated with deterrence failure.

To address 21st century challenges, integration cannot stop within our government. Building and maintaining our relationships are critical to preserving shared interests and responding to mutual threats. The Command continues to engage with Allies and partners to strengthen relationships, build trust, and set conditions across the globe.

USSTRATCOM supported seventeen senior-level international engagements in 2019, including visits to the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Canada as well as visits from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and 32 Defense Attachés through the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). Our daily interactions with our Allies and partners coupled with Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployments, submarine port-calls and visits, and cooperative missile defense activities provide unique opportunities to strengthen relationships, build trust between our senior leaders, and increase the interoperability of our forces. The Command also hosted an annual Deterrence Symposium to exchange viewpoints on security challenges; senior political, military, and academic leaders from over 13 nations attended this event.

To facilitate these interactions, Headquarters USSTRATCOM hosts permanently assigned liaison officers from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom; and our Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense hosts a liaison officer from Germany. These Foreign Liaison Officers serve as a conduit between the Command and their nations’ militaries. To the extent possible, liaison officers and their superiors participate in our Tier 1 globally integrated exercises, offering mutual benefits to our Allies and the United States. These peacetime engagements develop relationships before a crisis. This past year’s successes have included funding secure communication infrastructure compatibility, defining operational relationships, enhancing our military interoperability, improving combined capabilities across our Allies and partners, and integrating critical defense missions to assure Allies and partners of our Nation’s extended deterrence commitments and non-proliferation objectives.

**GLOBALLY INTEGRATED OPERATIONS**

Globally integrated operations remain essential to achieving defense objectives in this era of great power competition. The worldwide dispersal of friendly and adversarial forces create both opportunities and challenges. As a Joint Force, we must continue to work with our Allies and partners across geographic and warfighting boundaries to create security advantages. Additionally, the Joint Force must increase proficiency in employing global capabilities - space, cyber, and special operations forces - hand-in-hand with traditional air, land, and sea warfighting capabilities. The essence of globally
integrated operations is the alignment of the Joint Force in purpose, time, and tempo regardless of which commander is responsible for execution; this is particularly important for execution of the strategic deterrence mission where the operations and activities of combatant commanders significantly affect deterrence success. Investments in cross-combatant command coordination are vital. There is also a temporal aspect to global integration; the ability of operational commanders to gain warfighting advantages depends on enacting decisions faster than our adversaries. In the last year, the Joint Force has made enormous strides in implementing the Secretary’s vision for global integration, but we must continue on the path to defend the Nation’s interests in the 21st century.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

USSTRATCOM bears the responsibility for operating our Nation’s nuclear triad. The Nation’s nuclear triad is safe, secure, and effective; and is foundational to our survival. It remains the greatest contributor to deterring adversaries from conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our Nation, and our Allies and partners. However, the Nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future of our nuclear forces. Since the end of the Cold War, we led the world in reducing our nuclear stockpile while increasing transparency. While we reduced the number and types of nuclear weapons in our arsenal, our adversaries went in the other direction and continued to modernize and expand their strategic capabilities. We now find ourselves fielding a reduced Cold War era arsenal against a larger, more modern, and more varied Russian force and a continually improving and growing Chinese force. If we do not address 2018 NPR recommendations, this will create the potential for insufficient flexibility in the triad to impose costs and deter all potential conventional and nuclear threats in the early-2030s.

For the last three decades, we have anticipated reaching a tipping point in the nuclear weapons complex. That point is almost here. Our weapons, NC3, and triad delivery systems will soon reach retirement or require refurbishment. If we do not invest smartly and consistently in our nuclear enterprise now, we will need to rebuild from scratch the talent and infrastructure required to design the deterrent forces for our Nation’s future needs. As the foundation for deterrence for our Nation, Allies, and partners, we must continue to sustain, modernize, and recapitalize our Nation’s strategic nuclear capabilities. Previous de-emphasis on our nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure that supports it, coupled with a changing security environment, coupled with adversaries that are modernizing and creating increasingly capable forces, has led us to the point where we must modernize now to continue to maintain a viable deterrent in the future. We appreciate that Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has funded these programs. We request your continued support to modernize and sustain our Nation’s nuclear deterrent.
LAND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT

USSTRATCOM’s geographically dispersed ICBM force is the most responsive leg of the triad, continuing to deliver a highly reliable, secure deterrent capability and an overwhelming challenge to defeat. While the Minuteman has served as the backbone of our Nation’s ICBM force since 1962, its aging infrastructure, and asset attrition require a comprehensive weapon system replacement beginning in 2028. The Air Force remains focused on sustaining our ICBM force at the lowest reasonable cost. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives provided decisive analysis that continued life extension of the Minuteman III (MM III) would be more costly than a replacement system and would not address future challenges and threats to our current ICBM force. GBSD is the lowest risk, highest value decision to meet current and future military requirements.

USSTRATCOM supports the ongoing MM III sustainment programs needed to keep the weapon system viable and effective until GBSD reaches full operational capability in 2036. Smart, consistent sustainment of our current missile systems, while we modernize the ICBM force, will ensure an effective deterrent remains for many decades. GBSD is a just-in-time replacement program, and we cannot afford to have the MM III weapon system deteriorate prematurely.

The GBSD program completes the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase in FY2020 and transitions to Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) following a successful Milestone B decision this year. USSTRATCOM remains firmly committed to GBSD as the Air Force pursues mature, low-risk technologies, modularity, and open system standards to enable affordable technology insertion. On-time GBSD deployment remains a USSTRATCOM imperative; we must keep requirements stable and protect existing schedule margin or where possible, expand these schedule margins.

GBSD, when fielded, will be an affordable, modern weapon system, deployed in updated infrastructure and fully integrated into a modernized NC3 system. Our ICBMs, and prospectively the GBSD, raise the threshold of an adversary’s attack on the homeland by presenting an intractable targeting problem. Eliminating our ICBM capability, and specifically the GBSD, would be dangerously provocative, present a less credible strategic threat, and grant adversaries a vastly reduced target set – raising the risk to our Nation of a disabling first strike. Thus, USSTRATCOM strongly supports the Air Force in providing GBSD to ensure our deterrent remains effective and lethal in an ever-changing and increasingly threatening strategic environment.

AIR-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT

The bomber leg of the nuclear triad is the most flexible and visible aspect of our Nation’s nuclear forces. Through their discernable adaptability, bombers continue to provide a wide variety of deterrence
options to the President and unambiguously signal unwavering resolve to our adversaries. Additionally, their persistence and reliability of our bomber force reassures our Allies and partners. Nevertheless, current bombers and associated weapon systems are beyond or quickly approaching their intended end of service life and require sustainment to remain operational and modernization to address evolving and emerging threats.

The B-52 remains the backbone of the bomber force and will remain in service for an additional 30 years. It serves as an important hedge against delays in our future bomber programs and is a key component of the Nation’s triad. To remain effective, the B-52 must receive several critical upgrades. First, the B-52’s Commercial Engine Replacement Program will replace the existing TF-33 engines (1960s era) that are becoming increasingly unsupportable, and will also yield increased fuel efficiency resulting in greater range, longer flight times, and reduced tanker requirements. In addition to new engines, modernization plans are underway to upgrade the B-52’s radar, avionics, and NC3 systems, which must remain on schedule to meet the operational requirements of our airborne deterrent requirement.

The B-2 is the only long-range, penetrating stealth bomber in the world. It is imperative we maintain the B-2’s unique deterrent and combat capability, until replaced by the B-21. Decisions on the future bomber force structure and key enablers must be based upon strategic imperatives and combat effectiveness, ensuring no capability gaps for critical tasking across the family of operational plans (nuclear and conventional).

The future of the bomber force is the B-21 Raider. Designed to meet NDS objectives and based on firm requirements leveraging existing and mature technology, the B-21 will deliver unrivaled combat capability. It is an Air Force “Top 3” acquisition program with a planned procurement of at least 100 aircraft and is currently executing in the EMD acquisition phase. The B-21 will utilize both direct attack and standoff weapons, providing a multitude of options to the warfighter to meet national objectives. It is critical the Air Force delivers the B-21 on time and on budget to meet the Nation’s deterrence objectives and global security requirements.

In addition to the bombers, the air delivered weapon stockpile modernization is also occurring through just-in-time Life Extension Programs (LEPs). Notably, the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon coupled with the W80-4 warhead will replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and its W80-1 warhead as that system faces reliability and sustainability challenges. Likewise, the B61-12 will replace aging B61 nuclear gravity bombs deployed on strategic long-range bombers and on our Nation’s and Allies’ Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). The B61-12 life extension includes a guided tail kit assembly to improve weapon accuracy, enabling a more accurate, single gravity nuclear weapon capability that will enhance our Nation’s nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrence provided to our Allies and partners.
The success of all bomber missions depends on adequate tanker support to achieve the necessary global reach to hold strategic targets at risk. The KC-46, currently in the Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) acquisition phase, will partially replace the aging KC-135 fleet. Air Force leadership continues to engage with Boeing to ensure the new tanker will meet operational objectives.

SEA-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT

The OHIO-class SSBN with the highly capable Trident II D5 ballistic missile constitutes the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad and provides a reliable deterrent to our adversaries around the world. The SSBN’s ability to operate continuously and clandestinely sends a very clear message that our adversaries cannot benefit from a strategic attack against the U.S. or our Allies.

The OHIO-class SSBN is a marvel of technology and its robust design, along with a comprehensive maintenance program, has allowed it to be life extended from 30 to 42 years – longer than any previous submarine class in U.S. history. The Navy has never kept a single submarine in service longer than 37-years, let alone an entire class. There is no margin to extend the OHIO-class further; therefore, the COLUMBIA-class SSBN must field on time to avoid a capability gap in the triad. It is essential we maintain our technological advantage in this critical mission, and to this end, the Navy has designated COLUMBIA as the top shipbuilding priority in order to ensure its first strategic deterrent patrol in FY2031. As production begins, we must support our industrial partners’ expansion of both infrastructure and training programs to minimize risk.

Furthermore, to remain survivable, we must address anticipated security threats that could undermine our own future capabilities. Advancements in Russian submarine stealth and detection requires us to remain committed to the recapitalization of our Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) to preserve our advantage in the undersea domain.

Following the decision to extend the OHIO-class SSBN, the Navy determined the need to life-extend the Trident II D5 ballistic missile, both to address obsolescence issues and to ensure the required quantity of deployable ballistic missiles into the early 2040s. The life extension program, known as DSLE, will ultimately serve as the transition missile from OHIO to COLUMBIA. Additionally, efforts are underway to further extend the D5 missile through the life of the COLUMBIA with the D5LE2 program. D5LE2 will recapitalize the D5, using highly reliable components still in production, pull forward previously unused system margin, and provide a more cost effective design with sufficient flexibility to account for evolving threats. In order to realize these capabilities, we must revive an atrophied industrial base required to produce critical non-nuclear components employed on the DSLE2.

To enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of our nuclear forces as directed in the 2018 NPR, we will pursue two supplemental capabilities to existing U.S. nuclear forces: a low-yield SLBM warhead
(W76-2) capability and a modern nuclear sea launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address regional deterrence challenges that have resulted from increasing Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. These supplemental capabilities are necessary to correct any misperception an adversary can escalate their way to victory, and ensure our ability to provide a strategic deterrent. Russia’s increased reliance on non-treaty accountable strategic and theater nuclear weapons and evolving doctrine of limited first-use in a regional conflict, give evidence of the increased possibility of Russia’s employment of nuclear weapons. We must counter these dangerous perceptions with the supplemental capabilities the LYBM and SLCM-N will provide. An analysis of alternatives is under way for SLCM-N.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Today’s nuclear stockpile meets current operational and policy requirements. While the stockpile and its supporting infrastructure are safe, secure, reliable, and effective, both remain fragile. Many of our weapons have remained in service well beyond their original design lives, owing to the robustness of original designs and the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) continuing stockpile stewardship efforts. However, the accumulation of concurrent risks and capacity margins limit the ability to mitigate adverse impacts to the deterrent. Insufficient resourcing over the past 30+ years postponed much-needed weapon and infrastructure modernization programs, which typically require 10-15 years to execute. Directive policy changes affecting priorities and inefficient program execution across administrations have directly contributed to the related erosion in the critical capabilities and capacity of our strategic deterrent forces. As a result, many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary to ensure the deterrent’s viability have zero schedule margin and are late-to-need.

I firmly support the Secretary’s and Chairman’s public statements identifying nuclear deterrence as the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense. Our nuclear deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense. I cannot overemphasize the need to modernize our nuclear forces and recapitalize the supporting infrastructure to ensure we can maintain this deterrent in the future. I am concerned that the oft-repeated message of the need to modernize and recapitalize has lost its impact, and that collectively we have underestimated the risks associated with such a complex and time-constrained modernization and recapitalization effort. Even seemingly small issues can have a disproportionate impact on the force. We cannot afford more delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities, and must maintain a focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the associated infrastructure.

The 2018 NPR described a hedging strategy to meet future risks and unexpected challenges. The atrophy in our nuclear weapons supporting infrastructure is consuming our hedge for avoidable programmatic risk. We no longer have hedge capacity to fully account for geopolitical risk, technological
risk, or operational risk. Continued modernization and sustainment work deferral will only further exacerbate an already untenable situation as we repeatedly extend weapon lifetimes and do not invest in the diagnostic capabilities needed to ensure confidence in the viability of these systems.

To maintain military effectiveness in the future, we must execute the program of record (POR) immediately, and invest in advanced diagnostic, research, and development activities to mature emerging technologies to certify and field a modern deterrent for the 21st century. The next generation of deterrent forces must encompass responsive weapon systems, world-class personnel, resilient infrastructure, and intelligence informed decisions. We must address emerging 21st century threats that may reduce the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent force.

The NNSA took efforts in 2019 to address a gap identified in the 2018 NPR by converting a small number of W76-1s into the W76-2 low-yield variant. W76-2 deliveries to the Navy and remaining production are continuing as scheduled in FY2020. In 2019, our weapon modernization programs saw a setback when reliability issues emerged with commercial off-the-shelf non-nuclear components intended for the W88 Alteration 370 program and the B61-12 LEP. NNSA has worked closely with DoD to mitigate impacts, but correcting these issues will delay initial fielding of both systems. Finally, another just-in-time program is the W80-4 LEP, which remains in synchronized development with the LRSO delivery system. It is critical for this standoff attack capability program to remain on track.

While air-delivered weapon modernization is proceeding in the B61-12 and W80-4, we must begin efforts now to modernize ballistic missile warheads for our ICBM and SLBM force in the 2030s and 2040s. After the 2018 NPR, re-evaluation of our stockpile strategy shifted to pursue separate NEP designs for the Air Force and Navy. However, the ballistic missile end-state remains the same: address known and projected aging and performance concerns; preserve triad attributes; balance warhead types across the force; and improve inter- and intra-leg hedge capability. The Air Force is developing the MK21A/W87-I to replace the W78 ICBM warhead that will be over 50 years old when finally retired. When deployed, the W87-I will provide enhanced safety and security compared to all other ballistic missile warheads.

The Nuclear Weapons Council has established a requirement for the W93/Mk7 warhead. This warhead will provide USSTRATCOM and the Navy a means to address evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements, improve operational effectiveness, and mitigate technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-leg of the triad. This effort will also support a parallel Replacement Warhead Program in the United Kingdom whose nuclear deterrent plays an absolutely vital role in NATO’s overall defense posture. Without a coordinated, joint effort to develop and field the W93/MK7 as a system, the bulk of our day-to-day deterrent force will be at increased risk in the early 2040s due to aging legacy systems. Given the potential severity of impacts on overall deterrence from
late delivery of the W93/MK?, it is imperative the complex work to identify opportunities to accelerate the development timeline and invest in technologies to reduce schedule risk. Research and development efforts for critical national capabilities, such as fuzes and aero shells, must begin immediately to deliver a capability in the 2030s that maintains a credible at-sea deterrent through the 2050s and beyond.

Our present Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) infrastructure, which we count on to sustain our strategic deterrent, continues to atrophy and requires timely recapitalization. NNSA planned facility improvements to critical capabilities will not materialize in the near-term, yet facility age and capacities currently limit our ability to timely respond to unforeseen technical, geopolitical, programmatic, or operational developments. The non-nuclear component issue affecting the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alteration 370 program is a symptom of a fragile enterprise – a single component failure caused a disruption across multiple programs for a period of years. USSTRATCOM is able to mitigate the operational impacts today, but proposed steps to reduce accumulating further operational impacts provide a partial capability at best. The Nuclear Weapons Council Strategic Plan, NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and 2020 Requirements and Planning Document describe a path forward to enable an effective, responsive, and resilient NSE, but successful navigation of the path will only be possible through continued on-time investments.

USSTRATCOM supports NNSA’s highest infrastructure priority to reconstitute plutonium pit production. Since the closure of the Rocky Flats facility 30 years ago, no significant quantities of new pits have been added to the stockpile. The Nation must be able to produce no fewer than 30 pits per year in 2026 and produce at least 80 pits per year during 2030 to maintain stockpile effectiveness. This capacity is the minimum required to execute the POR; anything less will force difficult decisions on which modernization programs to defer, which could result in a less-capable nuclear deterrent, and accept unprecedented pit ages. The NNSA’s two-site plan to achieve plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Lab and the Savannah River Site is prudent and necessary to achieve pit production requirements rather than accept pit lifetimes that threaten the confidence in our weapons’ capabilities. Failure to accomplish these goals will place all future stockpile modernization programs at risk.

In addition to plutonium pit production, the NSE must continue to recapitalize capabilities to process uranium and lithium, produce tritium, manufacture and procure trusted radiation-hardened microelectronics, and manufacture non-nuclear components in sufficient quantities to sustain and modernize the force. Production of nuclear weapon components and the materials needed to construct them effectively stopped during the 1990s when we began to life-extend legacy systems. This includes recruiting and developing the specialized workforce and experts required to produce and maintain these systems. Maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective strategic deterrent into the future requires restoring or increasing the capacity of these material, component, and workforce capabilities.
Congressional legislation has recognized and supported the need for an effective, responsive, and resilient NSE by directing the NNSA to continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, develop, engineer, certify, and deploy nuclear weapons. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP), combined with the POR and its supporting science program, enables a process to exercise the development of nuclear weapons. I remain supportive of the program, especially activities like the rapid design-to-test experiment, which cuts time from clean-sheet design to hydrodynamic test by two-thirds.

Maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile that continues to meet its intended deterrence and assurance roles into the future will require consistent, predictable funding for weapons modernization and the supporting infrastructure over the next two decades. Failure to make this investment presents an existential risk to the Nation. Success hinges on continued coordination between DoD and NNSA as well as the consistent cooperation among all stakeholders.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY AND SECURITY

Our nuclear security standard is complete denial of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. We have worked closely with our Navy and Air Force partners to assess nuclear security requirements and adjust our force posture, training, and equipment to address current and evolving threats. While we continue to advance our security capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are necessary to maintain the high standards this mission demands.

The proliferation, ease of use, and sophisticated capabilities of small, unmanned aircraft systems (suAS) pose a threat to our operations. The Department continues to field counter suAS capabilities and are refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the developing threat. Focused leadership, vigilance, and dedicated investment are necessary to remain ahead of this challenge.

With intense advocacy from our Command and strong support from Congress, we achieved a significant ICBM security milestone with the Air Force awarding a contract to replace our Vietnam-era UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139 “Grey Wolf.” The Air Force expects delivery of the first two aircraft to Eglin AFB in 2020 for developmental testing. Delivery of subsequent aircraft to each missile wing will provide full operational capability by FY2027. With this program moving forward, we can now focus our efforts on replacing aging armored security vehicles with Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, equipped with advanced weapons and communications systems that will provide security personnel uninterrupted situational awareness anywhere they operate.

Finally, we encourage Congress to continue supporting our ICBM Transportation and Handling equipment. The Payload Transporter Replacement and Transporter Erector Replacement Programs will provide safe, secure MM III solid rocket motor (SRM) transport, removal, and emplacement, and over the coming years, these heavily tasked force enablers will facilitate the transition from MM III to GBSD. We
continue to support fully funding the weapons security programs for on-time delivery, enhancing the security of our strategic weapons and our vast ICBM complex.

NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISE

Our layered approach to providing NC3 capabilities remains reliable and effective in our current strategic environment; however, we have identified challenges in the near-term to address maintaining deterrence in the coming decades. Our posture and capabilities were adequate for the Cold War needs, especially against the Soviet-era ballistic missile and bomber threats. Now, we face improved adversarial capabilities in air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and evolving space and cyber threats. We must look beyond traditional ballistic missile profiles and understand the full spectrum of threats to NC3. We must innovate and outpace those threats to maintain our deterrent capabilities. Our continued focus is to maintain positive command and control of U.S. nuclear forces at all times, before, during, and after a nuclear attack. As we modernize our triad, we must maintain current capabilities while we address future NC3 requirements. This is one of my top priorities.

In October 2018, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, USSTRATCOM, as the NC3 Enterprise Lead responsible for NC3 enterprise operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration. Last year, USSTRATCOM established the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) and started building relationships with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). In the effort to consolidate authorities and responsibilities for the NC3 portfolio, we jointly presented the status of the NC3 Enterprise to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; this will reoccur on a continual basis as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

USD(A&S) and the Commander, USSTRATCOM, coordinated and recommended adjustments for our most pressing NC3 shortfalls. We support fully funding our approach to quantitatively assessing the NC3 enterprise. While an understandably complex and ambitious undertaking, we want to be able to model and monitor the entire enterprise. Data science is quickly proving its value to industry and we need to leverage this capability and implement it into our approach to assess the NC3 Enterprise’s mutually supportive, interdependent architecture. Additionally, in order to move forward, we must provide the necessary manpower to build enterprise level capabilities.

Last year we saw success in validating the mission need statement for the next generation NC3 architecture. We are continuing to build out processes and supporting capabilities that will be foundational to establishing an architecture that is mutually supportive and resilient to the entire spectrum of attacks. While we develop the next generation NC3 to conduct nuclear command and control (NC2) over assured communication paths, we must consider how NC2 infrastructure will align and interoperate
with the future Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) structure. Future NC3 architecture will retain elements specific to NC2 while leveraging JADC2 to maintain resilient and redundant C2 and facilitate quick decision cycles.

In order to provide continuous communications and control of nuclear forces between the President, senior advisors, and Joint Forces, we must maintain our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, paired with ground and airborne Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals (FAB-T). We continue to develop the plan for the next generation of airborne command and control aircraft, replacing the legacy E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), E-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Take Charge and Move-Out (TACAMO), and C-32 Executive Transport fleets. Existing capabilities will need to retain their current roles and may need to accept new ones as our next generation of NC3 takes shape. As we build on our airborne communication capabilities, we are evaluating the relay capabilities of ground forces to augment and enhance the survivability and endurance of our airborne layer. The Air Force’s Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (G-ASNT) gives our ground forces a multi-band communications system to maintain situational awareness and relay direction to nuclear forces not in direct contact with decision makers.

Cutting across all of these capabilities is the cyber defense of the systems themselves. Our NC2 hardware infrastructure fails if the NC3 fails due to a cyber-attack. We must continue to invest in active, persistent cyber defense of our NC3 systems, both current and future. We have collaborated with USCYBERCOM, USD(A&S), and the Services to ensure our existing NC3 systems remain free of adversary influence in real time and to protect our future NC3 acquisitions and sustainment from cyber threats. Cyber defense is not a “trade space” discussion; it is an additive necessity in today’s technology-centric world.

USSTRATCOM, as the NC3 Enterprise lead, will continue to develop the Enterprise’s future requirements and ensure a safe, secure, and reliable architecture for the future. As we move towards the next generation of NC3, we must work with industry to rapidly prototype new technologies and experiment with them to determine their effectiveness. In addition, we will continue cooperation on NATO NC3 systems that require modernization to enable appropriate consultations and effective nuclear operations, improve survivability, resilience, and flexibility. We need to move rapidly and if a new technology appears promising, acquire and field it quickly – and if our experiment shows it is not feasible, to “fail fast,” and move on. We rely on the necessary resources for sustainment and modernization of NC3 systems. We must also attract the right experience and talent needed to fulfill enterprise manpower requirements to develop the innovative NC3 solutions described in the NC3 Enterprise Center Mission Needs Statement. A combined effort between the Services and Agencies, National Labs, industry, and academia are necessary to generate innovative ideas, establish working
relationships with key stakeholders, and maintain deterrence during this transition. I am confident in the forming relationships and the direction the Department is taking to prioritize NC3 modernization.

GLOBAL STRIKE

Strategic competitors continue to invest in and rapidly develop anti-access/area denial capabilities to counter U.S. military advantages in power projection and freedom of movement. Additionally, competitors are developing hypersonic weapons as part of this counter-intervention strategy. The Department requires flexible, prompt, survivable response options for global strike. Continued investment and a commitment to fielding advanced capabilities are crucial to offset these threats and ensure our deterrence and conventional power remains strong into the future.

Offensive hypersonic strike weapons will provide conventional capabilities to ensure the Joint Force can deter aggression in contested environments short of nuclear use. They provide a highly responsive, long-range, conventional strike capability for distant, defended, or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable or not preferred. Fielding advanced hypersonic capabilities will allow us to tailor our strategies and plans with an expanded range of conventional options. While not a replacement for nuclear weapons, new classes of hypersonic weapons will complement and enhance strategic deterrence and can deliver surgical strikes to provide effects or be integrated into larger campaigns, increasing the effectiveness of our warfighting advantages.

For more than a decade, the U.S. matured its hypersonic strike technologies and successfully demonstrated their significance in future warfighters. FY2020 represents a pivotal year for hypersonic weapon development and fielding as the Department begins aggressively flight testing capabilities across multiple domains and posturing the industrial base to produce these systems at scale to allow the Services to field operational capabilities in the near-term. A flexible mix of capabilities launched from land, sea, and air will provide a constant, visible, and global presence designed to influence adversary behavior in all stages of conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold, and will provide an effective deterrent and strike capability in the near-term to address current and future threats.

MISSILE DEFENSE

As a global warfighting command, Commander, USSTRATCOM is the coordinating authority and is responsible for global missile defense planning in coordination with other combatant commands, Services, and agencies that employ our Nation’s missile defense capabilities. USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) supports missile defense operations worldwide: this means helping to identify and minimize gaps and seams in regional planning,
conducting missile defense operations support, and advocating for capabilities on behalf of all other combatant commanders.

While current missile defense capabilities ensure defense of the homeland against a rogue ballistic missile threat, a concerted U.S. effort is required to expand and improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional missile defense. Potential adversaries are improving existing missile system capabilities and capacities, blurring missile defense operations across traditional regional boundaries. Solving the trans-regional threat, increased range, and lethality requires more than just active missile defense; we must address the problem of decreased warning and adjust defensive postures appropriately. Navigating this environment requires a comprehensive approach that establishes a renewed emphasis on leveraging opportunities to negate missile threats prior to launch, during all phases of flight, and after impact, drawing on effects generated from capabilities throughout all domains.

As the warfighter advocate for missile defense, USSTRATCOM must focus developers on examining, developing, and exploiting advanced concepts and technologies. Research and development across all domains is key to ensuring we keep pace with evolving adversary threats, such as hypersonic weapons and cruise missiles. Future space-based sensors may be able to provide birth-to-death detection, tracking, and discrimination of hypersonic glide vehicle, cruise missile, and ballistic missile threats globally. These abilities cannot be fully achieved with the current or future terrestrial-based radar architecture due to the constraints of geography and characteristics of future missile threats.

Our regional missile defenses protect against missile attacks on deployed U.S., forces, Allies, and partners; assist Allies and partners in better defending themselves; preserve freedom of action; and counter adversary anti-access/area denial tactics. However, challenges remain to the Department’s efforts to fully integrate and optimize limited defense resources and architectures through Allied and partner integration and interoperability. USSTRATCOM’s NIMBLE TITAN exercise series, with participants from 24 countries and four international organizations, advances multinational collaboration through the experimentation of operational integration concepts to enhance deterrence and defense against missile attacks.

The Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) currently emplaced have the capability of defending the homeland from today’s rogue threat. Although we are pursuing development of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) to complement our GBI capability, we need to examine new approaches to defeat ICBMs in ways that repurpose existing options and are cost effective. As we address future threats, we must account for the air and missile defense assets required to defend the homeland, while simultaneously improving our regional security architectures. We continue to embrace new and developing technologies and find innovative ways to use, as well as repurposing existing technologies to strengthen and expand
current capabilities. Examples include developing an underlay for homeland defense to account for ballistic missiles and using existing sensors for tracking ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats.

The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) provided an opportunity to conduct focused reviews clarifying and optimizing missile defense roles and responsibilities across the Department. In accordance with the MDR, the Department is reviewing policy, responsibilities, and procedures for missile defense research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, operations, and sustainment. Revised improvements to the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) will meet 2019 MDR guidance, align with Department budget process and maximize warfighter input in capability development and acquisition, and seeks to deliver missile defense capabilities in a timely manner. USSTRATCOM is working with the community of interest to update the WIP and incorporate findings established in the MDR. As Commander, I will continue to advocate for missile defense requirements through continued capability and utility assessments and by ensuring operational tests and evaluations meet warfighter demands. Missile defense endures as a critical component of comprehensive U.S. strategic and tailored regional deterrence strategies and is a key element of any integrated response options.

JOINT ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM OPERATIONS (JEMSO)

The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the one physical maneuver space depended upon by forces across all warfighting domains. If we cannot achieve EMS superiority and assure access to the EMS, the joint force cannot prevail. Our adversaries have observed our use and dependence on the EMS, and have developed and organized their forces to achieve EMS superiority; it is essential we develop capabilities and appropriately organize to counter this threat. Achieving and maintaining EMS superiority is the critical enabler for successful Joint Force operations.

To address warfighter requirements, USSTRATCOM collaborates with the Secretary of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Cross Functional Team, the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee (EW EXCOM), the Services, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the joint staff, and Under Secretary of Defense offices to advocate for essential warfighter EMSO capabilities. Additionally, we engage with Australia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners to ensure compatible JEMSO doctrine, capabilities, and concepts of operation.

USSTRATCOM led the effort to create the first Joint Publication for JEMSO. Working with DoD CIO and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), USSTRATCOM provided the initial warfighter requirements for an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system to achieve EMS superiority. In coordination with the DISA Defense Spectrum Organization, USSTRATCOM is establishing the initial Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Information Analysis and Fusion capability that will provide spectrum specific data for battle management and combatant command operational cells.
Our Command also led a combatant command JEMSO cell manpower requirement validation study through the joint manpower validation process for the FY2022 Program Objective Memorandum budget. All of these warfighter requirement initiatives will require sustained investments.

CONCLUSION

USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command, actively and successfully deterring strategic attack against our Nation and our Allies. The men and women of our Command are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and effective deterrent for our Nation. If deterrence fails, our combat-ready force is prepared now to deliver a decisive response anywhere on the globe, across all domains, in coordination with geographic and global warfighting combatant commanders and our Allies and partners.

The Command is focused on integrating strategic deterrence in the 21st century, expanding the intellectual capital to educate the joint force on deterrence and nuclear policy, and ensuring our forces are prepared to meet challenges in the global security environment.

Our strategic forces provide the foundation and credibility that backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy around the world. Our triad remains the most effective way to deter adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against our Nation and our Allies and partners. Our Nation’s strength has helped deter great power war and we must continue to prioritize the capabilities that underpin our strength.

Our Nation is at a critical point in maintaining our strategic advantages and must remain committed to modernization and recapitalization programs in place. Our strategic forces are a prudent investment in the current and future security of our Nation, with some systems scheduled to operate effectively well into the 2070s and 2080s. With continued Congressional support and budget stability, we can continue to pace the threat and develop the future force necessary to guarantee the continued execution of the Department’s highest priority mission, to keep our Nation and our Allies safe.
[CLERK'S NOTE.—The complete hearing transcript could not be printed due to the classification of the material discussed.]
Wednesday, February 27, 2020.

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

WITNESS

GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN VISCLOSKY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. We will come to order. This morning the subcommittee will receive testimony and an update on U.S. military activities in the European theatre. Before we get started, I would like to recognize my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for a motion.

Mr. CALVERT. I move that those portions of the hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive session because of the classification of the material to be discussed.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So ordered. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert.

I would like also to remind our members any materials placed in front of you marked classified should be left at your chair at the conclusion of the hearing. We do welcome our sole witness, General Tod Wolters, Commander European Command and NATO Supreme Commander. General, welcome to your first appearance before the committee today. We appreciate you being here to share your expertise.

Many of the countries in your area of responsibility have been our steadfast allies for decades. From the Arctic to Israel, your area of responsibility comprises the core of our support for the past 70 years. However, to maintain even the oldest and strongest of alliances, it takes a constant effort, and even then, there will be differences of opinion.

A case in point is the past year, the 29 allies of NATO reached an historic agreement on a military strategy to address Russia and the international terrorism. Nevertheless, some important European leaders have publicly challenged that premise that a strong NATO exists, but there is an argument, and an agreement, and its effective implementation will cost money.

As we discussed yesterday, the fiscal year 2021 budget request for the European Defense Initiative is 31 percent less than at its peak in fiscal year 2019. And while that decline was forecast in prior budget requests, it comes at a time when the overall economic conditions in Europe are best described as tepid. From that vantage point, I would seek your perspective on how our allies will interpret the decrease in EDI as many of them are increasing their military budgets to meet NATO burden-sharing requirements.

I would also like you to give us an update on the threat Russia poses, not only to the United States, but to our allies, its scope, and what the United States can effectively do to manage the risk.

(27)
And finally, I would also like you to share with us the quality-of-life issues for each of our servicemembers under your command, and what we might do to better remedy the concerns they may have.

With that, again, I thank you for appearing before the committee today, and would recognize Mr. Calvert for any opening statement he has.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky.

Welcome, General, to your first appearance before this subcommittee. We appreciate your service, and that of all the men and women under your command. We are committed to working with you to ensure that EUCOM remains postured to support U.S. global operations, reassure partners and allies of our commitment to their security, and ensure that NATO can credibly deter Russia aggression.

This hearing takes place against the backdrop of a review by Secretary Esper of our combat commands, with the goal of ruthless prioritization by the Department in support of great power competition with China and Russia. In this regard, I hope you will tell us whether key readiness concerns have been addressed, such as with respect to rapid deployment in a crisis and a counter-air capability against the growing Russian air and missile threat.

Similarly, I would appreciate an assessment of our ability to deter Russia aggression in the Baltic states, including through effective crisis management, intelligence sharing, and countering Russian information warfare and hybrid attacks.

Finally, Moscow appears to be playing an increasingly active role in the Balkans, perhaps hoping to derail the region’s integration into Europe and undermine the resilience of democratic institutions in Southeastern Europe. It would be helpful to know how EUCOM, your interagency partners, and allies are working together to reduce space for Russian interference in the region.

I want to conclude my brief statement by thanking you once again for your service, look forward to your testimony.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

General, you may proceed. Your written testimony is entered into the record. It would hopefully like to give members two rounds. So if you can summarize your testimony, we would appreciate that very much. And we will get started.

[The written statement of General Wolters follows:]
STATEMENT OF

GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

FEBRUARY 27, 2020
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, on behalf of the dedicated men, women, and their families preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic, it is an honor to testify before you today. It is a privilege to serve alongside these dedicated patriots in a mission that is essential to national security. Their selfless service and tireless commitment is an inspiration. Together, with likeminded Allies and partners, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians work to defend peace and prosperity around the clock.

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) articulate how a free and prosperous Europe, defended by a capable and credible Euro-Atlantic Alliance, remains foundational to our security in an increasingly competitive strategic environment. USEUCOM’s operations, activities, and investments are aligned with our strategies to meet the challenges of great power competition from both Russia and China. Enabled by deep and meaningful Ally and partner relationships, USEUCOM is ready to fight and win against capable adversaries should deterrence fail. We are proud of the collaborative work across the Joint Force to implement these strategies and are grateful for continued Congressional interest and support.

In Europe, political uncertainty, migration, energy competition, and diffusion of disruptive technology are stressing the established democratic order. Competitors, most notably Russia, China, and Iran, seek to take advantage of these conditions through aggressive action using all instruments of national power, and are backed by increasingly capable military forces. An environment exists where adversary disinformation and destructive cyber campaigns can be amplified to foment instability. This nexus is testing national governments and multi-national institutions like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN THE USEUCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

The USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers a large and diverse geographic area. It encompasses not only nations such as Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Israel, but a diverse set of perspectives from the Arctic, Iberian Peninsula, Mediterranean Sea, and Eastern Europe.

Russia

Russia’s sizable nuclear arsenal ensures they will remain a long-term, existential threat to the United States. Russia’s vast non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and apparent misperception they could gain advantage in crisis or conflict through its use is concerning. Russia continues to engage in disruptive behavior despite widespread international disapproval and continued economic sanctions, and continues to challenge the rules-based international order and violate its obligations under international agreements. The Kremlin employs coercion and aggressive actions amid growing signs of domestic unrest. These actions suggest Russian leadership may feel compelled to take greater risks to maintain power, counter Western influence, and seize opportunities to demonstrate a perception of great power status.

Over the past twelve years, Russia has invaded two neighboring states, violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading to the treaty’s termination, developed new strategic platforms resulting in the Skyfall missile accident that killed 7 Russian scientists last year, weapons, and abrogated its responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, all at the expense of strategic stability. Russia employs a below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies and intermediary forces in an attempt to weaken, divide, and intimidate our Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute, and malign actions. These actions include information and cyber operations, election meddling, political subversion, economic intimidation, military sales, exercises, and the calculated use of force. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have attacked...
NATO member government and commercial data networks. Russian proxies continue their attempt to undermine democratic institutions through concerted election meddling against the U.S., Allies, and partners.

Beyond Europe, Russia is working to build influence in the Arctic, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. They are pursuing a partnership of convenience with China to close off the current free and open international order. By probing U.S., Allied, and partner response thresholds, Russian leadership plays a dangerous game fraught with the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

The Kremlin continues to maintain robust levels of defense spending, modernizing its forces across the board, with the intent of building a more flexible and rapidly deployable force to provide an enhanced capability to seize and maintain the initiative in both competition and conflict. Russia continues to rotate its forces through active conflicts in Syria and Ukraine to improve, test, and validate combat capabilities. Russia counts on its malign influence capabilities, conventional military, and nuclear forces to underwrite this aggressive approach. Modern Russian Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), cyber and electronic warfare systems, counter-space, and long-range precision fires capabilities are postured and employed to challenge U.S. and Allied warfighting systems, doctrine, and authorities.

Ukraine

Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and its proxies continue their campaign to destabilize Ukraine’s defense, economic, and political sectors with the intent of cementing Ukraine into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Of particular concern is the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated and stoked by Russia. Even with the implementation of the Minsk agreements, ceasefire violations occur often. Russia also continues to undermine the government of Ukraine through cyber-attacks, support of illegitimate elections in eastern Ukraine, and aggressive actions in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, including an attack on Ukrainian naval vessels. Contrary to Russian efforts, these coercive actions have energized
Ukrainian civil society and reinforced aspirations to membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions like the EU and NATO. The recent election of President Zelensky further solidified this pro-Western course. Ukraine has enhanced its commitment to fighting corruption and enacting defense reform, including by meeting the requirements of our Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

**Poland and Baltics**

Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point for both NATO and Russia. For NATO, this is the region at the greatest risk of Russian aggression and miscalculated escalation due to historical grievances and geographic position. For the Kremlin, Polish and Baltic geopolitical alignment with the West are reminders of a withered sphere of control, of the rush toward NATO’s open door, isolation of its Kaliningrad exclave, and lost access to the Baltic Sea from the Russian mainland. The Kremlin sees the region’s substantial ethnic Russian population as a potential justification for intervention. It actively targets this population with extensive propaganda and malign influence operations. While NATO forces in the region currently help deter any overt Russian attack, Russian military forces in the Western Military District and Kaliningrad hold a geographic advantage and outnumber NATO forces postured in the region. Russia is actively employing malign information and cyber operations in an attempt to weaken regional stability and Alliance resolve. Allies in the region are deepening their knowledge and expertise in the cyber and information domains to the benefit of the U.S. and the Alliance. Poland’s defense budget increases, burden-sharing basing offers with the U.S., and on-going modernization that include Patriot and F-35 acquisitions, provide significant capability enhancements in the region and demonstrate resolve to meet and exceed the 2014 Wales Summit commitments.

**South Caucasus**

The Kremlin exerts influence over countries in the South Caucasus through manipulation of regional tensions and enduring military conflicts with all instruments of national power. The
Kremlin believes chronic instability in this area is central to regional hegemony. Russia maintains leverage over Georgia through its occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including its attempts to alter the administrative boundary lines of occupied territories, interfere with the transit of people and goods within Georgia’s sovereign territory, and complicate Georgia’s NATO membership aspirations.

Russia also maintains its political influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan by playing both sides of the enduring conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, while questionably serving as a neutral mediator in the Minsk Process peace negotiations. As an example of supplying both sides of the conflict, Russia provides military grant assistance to Armenia, a Collective Security Treaty Organization member, while simultaneously selling advanced military systems and hardware to Azerbaijan. Russia also influences support of operations farther abroad, such as convincing Armenia to deploy forces to Syria as part of the Russian contingent support for Assad’s regime.

**Balkans**

The Balkans remain a strategically important region where ethnic tensions within nations and between neighbors continue to foster regional instability and are primary targets of persistent Russian malign influence. Aside from historical and cultural ties with the Balkan region, Russia views the sustainment of social and political tensions in the region as a central tenet of its goal to prevent individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path toward Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Nonetheless, Montenegro, and soon North Macedonia’s accession into NATO represent tremendous success stories in spite of Russia’s significant attempts to block and dissuade integration.

Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and several other nations have yet to recognize its status as a sovereign nation. Kosovo, and neighboring Serbia, have not yet normalized relations, but despite tensions, we continue to encourage both parties to maintain dialogue to find a peaceful solution. The principal stabilizing force in Kosovo remains NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes a small, but significant U.S. contribution.
KFOR’s presence will remain essential to stability while Serbia and Kosovo pursue a stable relationship through the planned 10-year transition of the Kosovo Security Forces.

Serbia has attempted to find a balance between Russia and the West but finds its EU ambitions impeded by internal corruption, structural and economic challenges, EU-Russia sanctions, and the requirement to normalize relations with Kosovo. China has emerged as an alternative patron, engaging in both economic and defense support matters.

Bosnia and Herzegovina remains mired in political and ethnic instability. Fueled by Russian influence, obstructionists seek greater autonomy for Republika Srpska to weaken state-level authorities and frustrate progress towards further alignment with NATO and the EU. Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions between Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to chart a path towards lasting stability.

Turkey

Acknowledging tensions and political disputes, Turkey remains a strategic U.S. Ally, critical to NATO and U.S. interests in Europe, EURASIA, and the Middle East. Home to the second largest military in NATO, Turkey borders a volatile region and is geographically located to assist in countering Russia. Turkey is also the only NATO member to share a border with Iran. Ankara continues to view the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates as their greatest security threat. From Turkey’s perspective, continued U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces remains the principal irritant to our bilateral security relationship. Turkey’s intervention into Northeast Syria to address these security concerns degraded U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and further harmed our bilateral relationship.

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian produced S-400 air defense system is incompatible with Turkish procurement of the F-35. The S-400 cannot be integrated with NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense command and control network.

Turkey’s role in countering Russia, however, is pivotal. The relationship between Moscow and Ankara remains transactional. Both nations view the Black Sea region as their natural area
of influence and they continue to clash in Libya and are in direct combat in Idlib, Syria. Both U.S. and Turkey’s long-term strategic interests are best served by continuing to work together to improve counter-Russia cooperation both bilaterally and through NATO.

Israel

Israel continues to face a complex set of evolving security challenges spanning the spectrum of conflict. Regional instability is fueled by Iran’s efforts to threaten Israel and Russia’s expanded involvement in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.

Israel’s adversaries, most notably Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese-Hezbollah, have taken advantage of this turbulence. Iran has positioned forces to threaten and attack Israel, attempted to expand its influence, and increased lethal support to regional partners.

Iran and its proxies have also made significant gains in asymmetric capabilities, including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems. Iran remains committed to modernizing its military and continues to improve the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile systems and has the region’s largest ballistic missile arsenal with the capability of striking targets 2,000 kilometers beyond its borders.

Mediterranean and Southern Flank

While migrant and refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa have decreased, steady movement of people across Turkey and through the Mediterranean continue to stress European nations and the EU. Migration remains a major security and humanitarian concern for Allies and partners across Southern Europe and consumes scarce defense and security resources.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)

VEOs remain a transregional threat with decentralized command and control, finance, and facilitation networks spanning from conflict zones into Europe. These extremists continue to take advantage of instability in North Africa, Iraq, and Syria to hide and husband resources in the face of coalition gains. VEO-inspired and organized attacks in Europe further complicate integration efforts, isolate refugee and migrant communities, and make these groups vulnerable
to recruitment. Despite the death of al-Baghdadi, ISIS and other VEOs still require persistent
global pressure to prevent a resurgence and preclude future attacks against the Homeland,
Europe, and our global partners.

China

China’s aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the USEUCOM AOR signal
Beijing’s desire to build influence in Europe to tilt the international order to its advantage.
Seventeen Central and Eastern European nations have joined the China-led, 17+1 framework
for cooperation. Many European countries, including the 17+1, are also signatories to China’s
One Belt One Road Initiative. China also pursues bilateral deals with targeted nations to build
infrastructure and secure agreements enabling cost-effective global trade. Chinese foreign
direct investment and Chinese-backed business ventures in Europe provide China an avenue to
exert influence at the expense of long-term U.S., Allied, and partner interests.

Of particular concern are China’s efforts to expand 5G networks into Europe through state-
backed firms like Huawei and ZTE. These networks place intellectual property, sensitive
technology, and private personal information at heightened risk of acquisition and exploitation
by the Chinese government. This ongoing initiative, coupled with China’s growing interest and
investment in European ports and infrastructure, complicates steady-state and contingency
operations. We continue to articulate this risk to European defense counterparts and highlight
shared values, interests, and business practices that distinguish the U.S. as a partner of choice.
We see encouraging signs from European nations as they become increasingly wary of strings
attached to Chinese capital and investment.

USEUCOM OPERATIONS, ACTIVITIES, INVESTMENTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Strategy Implementation

We confront challenges in the USEUCOM AOR by adapting our thinking and approach to
meet assigned missions as detailed in capstone strategy documents and maintain laser-sharp
focus on expanding the competitive space with Russia. USEUCOM acts as Coordinating Authority for the Russia problem set by overseeing the global coordination of day-to-day operations, activities, and investments. In this role, USEUCOM advises the Secretary of Defense on resource, force structure, and synchronization of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and curb its global malign activities.

USEUCOM tirelessly works with the U.S. interagency, Allies, and partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our adversaries. In this increasingly competitive security environment, we remain vigilant to ensure any challenge or challenger is met with a lethal, responsive, and resilient force, in all domains, in every strategic direction, and with a capable set of Allies and partners.

Support NATO’s Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area

USEUCOM’s primary mission is to deter and “posture” to respond to aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. In 2019, NATO took significant steps toward improving command and control and other military capabilities to meet the challenges and complexities of a dynamic security environment. NATO’s Military Committee approved a new NATO Military Strategy, Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response. NATO continued implementation of the adapted NATO Command Structure with the establishment of two additional NATO headquarters: Joint Forces Command Norfolk, focused on maintaining trans-Atlantic lines of communications, and the German-led, Joint Support Enabling Command, focused on rear-area security and logistics coordination. These headquarters increase our ability to command and control and will organize and enable the deployment and sustainment of NATO forces in crisis or conflict. The EU, NATO, and USEUCOM have made progress improving infrastructure and transit permissions to facilitate the rapid movement of forces and logistic support across the Euro-Atlantic. We will “leverage” and “proof” many of these advancements during the U.S. led Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring. The NATO Readiness Initiative will ensure NATO’s ability to respond to aggression rapidly by identifying 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons,
and 30 naval combat vessels, for use in 30 days. Finally, the forthcoming accession of North Macedonia as the 30th member of NATO demonstrates the vibrancy of the Alliance through its *Open Door Policy* while continuing to show the strength of purpose in defending shared values in the face of Russian malign influence.

NATO members contribute to common defense through capability investments, support to Alliance members, and continued participation in operations, missions, and exercises. Poland’s acquisition of F-35s and Patriot air defense capability, Romania’s acquisition of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long-range fires capability, and the fielding of F-35s by Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom are increasing interoperable combat power across the AOR. NATO members provide host nation support to forward-stationed U.S. forces across the region and participate in Alliance and U.S. multi-lateral exercises focused on enhancing responsiveness and interoperability. NATO members contribute forces to ongoing NATO and U.S.-led coalition missions advancing and securing our common interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. NATO members help underwrite infrastructure investments, defraying costs of U.S. military construction in theater through the NATO Security Investment Program.

As NATO fortifies its position against a resurgent Russia, ballistic missile threats from Iran, and the continued threat of international terror groups, U.S. leadership within the Alliance is critical for ongoing activities to address competition and ensure combat-credible military forces are trained and postured to deter any would-be aggressor. USEUCOM plays an important role in exercising this leadership through our support to ongoing NATO operations, missions and engagements as NATO adapts to ensure it is an Alliance fit for purpose.

USEUCOM’s participation in NATO operations and activities demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. U.S. soldiers stand ready in Poland as part of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence mission in one of four battlegroups holding the line against Russian aggression in Poland and the Baltics. U.S. aircrews fly alongside Allies as part of the Baltic Air Policing
mission, helping to safeguard the sovereignty of Baltic airspace against Russian incursions. A U.S. destroyer operates as the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group One, responding to maritime challenges in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea. The European Phased Adaptive Approach, including the Aegis Ashore in Romania and U.S. Aegis destroyer presence in the Mediterranean, provides the foundation of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense capability.

The support Congress provides through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has been critical to our deterrence and posture successes in the USEUCOM AOR. Through EDI, we have enhanced our presence in the theater to assure Allies and deter adversaries. Increases of forward-stationed and rotational forces continue to improve our posture and enable us to compete and win in a multi-domain crisis or conflict. EDI funding for exercises, training, and building partner capacity programs enhance the readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Alliance forces. EDI funds have also improved our ability to respond using prepositioned stocks and improved theater infrastructure. Together, these improvements enable the rapid deployment and sustainment of forces. Section 333-funded Security Cooperation initiatives are pivotal components to EDI. Programs such as the Black Sea Maritime Initiative and enhancing Baltic Integrated Air and Missile Defense are potent, regionally-focused, components of a resilient theater posture.

We continue to improve the infrastructure to enable swift response in any contingency. On the ground, we are establishing a U.S. armored division capability through the combination of forward-stationed and rotational forces. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Europe hold equipment and logistics for an Armored Brigade Combat Team and key enablers, facilitating increased lethality by rapidly integrating deployed units into operations. U.S. Army Europe, with extensive participation by NATO member states, will exercise this capability in the first deployment and exercise of a division echelon formation on NATO’s eastern flank since the end of the Cold War in Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 20 this spring.
In the air domain, we are improving the mix of 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft stationed in the theater along with rotational forces from the U.S. to enhance our IAMD networks and underwrite our Allies’ efforts to enhance air defense systems. The build-out of European Contingency Air Operation Sets and Deployable Air Base Sets enhance the resiliency of our forces.

In the maritime domain, we see predictable Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious presence as key elements of an agile theater posture. The reactivation of U.S. Second Fleet provides necessary maritime command and control capability in the Atlantic, while reinforcing NATO’s western flank.

In the space domain, we are building an integrated planning element to leverage the capability USSPACECOM is building to ensure our ability to plan and execute multi-domain operations.

We have leveraged the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model to re-affirm our commitment to Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities within the AOR to improve our deterrent posture, and demonstrate operational unpredictability to adversaries. DFE deployments have included posturing the HARRY S. TRUMAN strike group from the Mediterranean to the High North, deploying a Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and Romania, Bomber Task Force missions throughout the AOR, and an F-35 deployment to exercise with European Allies, demonstrating our ability to rapidly generate significant combat power across the AOR.

Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a presence on the ground in strategic locations across the theater. These forces work alongside Allies and partners to deter aggression and build host nation defense capacity, interoperability, and readiness. DFE enables us to improve posture and unit readiness simultaneously. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed
as part of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required. Rotational Marine Forces in Norway have improved an important position on NATO's northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions alongside our Norwegian allies. Additionally, the tangible improvements by individual European nations and the EU to enhance military mobility throughout Europe is increasing responsiveness and combat capability. The EU, in consultation with NATO and USEUCOM, is investing 6.5 billion euros for improvements to civilian and military dual-use transportation infrastructure across the continent.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The strategic forces of the Alliance are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies and underwrite every U.S. military operation in Europe. Since 2015, the Alliance has placed increased emphasis on the role of nuclear capabilities in its overall deterrence and defense posture, and continues to adapt its posture to ensure its nuclear capabilities remain credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to the changing environment.

USEUCOM fully supports the continued modernization and recapitalization of our nuclear forces. Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has substantially funded these programs. USEUCOM fully supports recommendations in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to deploy the W76-2 Low Yield Ballistic Missile and to pursue development of a modern, sea-launched nuclear cruise missile. These actions would address a perceived deterrence gap, raise the Russian threshold for nuclear use, and disabuse the Russian Federation of the misconception there is any path to victory through nuclear escalation.

Counter Russian Malign Influence

Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to challenge and counter Russia's below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-faceted and capable military power which underwrite its malign approach. We bring potent assets to this ongoing contest through
coordination with the U.S. interagency and multi-national partners. A key platform for competing with Russia on this front is the Russian Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to promote Whole of Government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and counter Russia malign activities. Congressional funding for information operations activities enables USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives and disinformation on a daily basis. Our SOF forces are another vital element of this approach working with European Allies and partners to enhance defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian malign attacks.

In the Cyber domain, our Cyber Component (Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber (Air Force)) and USEUCOM’s Joint Cyber Center, in coordination with USCYBERCOM, continue to mature manning, facilities, and authorities to actively counter Russian cyber attacks. Together, these elements also assist with the enhancement of Allied and partner cyber capabilities. Recognizing worldwide cyber capabilities of China, Iran, and North Korea, we work with other combatant commands and interagency partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability to impose costs on aggressive adversary behavior.

National Guard and Reserve forces maintain vibrant relationships and unique access with Allies and partners through the twenty-six-year-old State Partnership Program (SPP). With more than 500 engagements, through 22 active programs annually, the SPP provides unique opportunities to cultivate regional expertise and strengthen personal relationships to improve readiness and alignment across the AOR.

Recognizing the state of competition between Russia and the West, escalation control/management must be foundational to our approach as military forces deter and posture to defend. We make extensive use of authorized military-to-military channels for safety deconfliction and to maintain strategic stability while remaining operationally unpredictable.

Assist in the Defense of Israel
USEUCOM underwrites the U.S. commitment to Israel’s inherent right of self-defense from growing regional threats and our defense ties remain an important anchor of U.S.-Israel relations. USEUCOM conducts a robust series of exercises, activities, and senior leader engagements. We work closely with Israel’s Defense Force to help maintain their qualitative military edge over any potential competitor. This assistance demonstrates our unwavering commitment to Israel, support for stability in the Levant, and the containment of Iranian malign activity.

**Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships**

Our strong bilateral and multi-lateral ties with European Allies and partners are invaluable and enable advancement of our shared interests in Europe and further abroad. USEUCOM’s strong military-to-military relationships with defense counterparts across Europe signal continued U.S. commitment and are foundational to these national ties, particularly with countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, and our Arctic partners.

Turkey remains a key U.S. and NATO ally. Turkey’s military strength and strategic position further U.S. and NATO interests. Our military-to-military relationships remain close.

Along Russia’s border, key U.S. partners see a brighter future to the West and resist Russia’s efforts to hold them in a sphere of influence. Despite an ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence campaign, violence by Russian-sponsored forces in the Donbas region, and the purported annexation of Crimea, Ukraine continues to seek closer partnership with the United States. Security cooperation funding provided through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative enhances the capability of Ukrainian formations and EUCOM’s stated mission to deter Russian aggression. American service members on the ground in the Joint Military Training Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian forces, helping to build competence and confidence. NATO partnership mechanisms and funds reinforce these programs and present a unified and coherent approach in our collective support to Ukraine. Maintaining this positive
momentum and continued USAI funding for lethal aid are essential to enabling Ukrainian forces’ ability to defend their sovereignty against well-armed, Russian-backed forces.

In the Caucasus, where Russian forces occupy the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia continues to be a steadfast partner and contributor to global security. Georgia is the largest non-NATO contributor to Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT—NATO’s ongoing Afghanistan mission. Georgia’s commitment of 870 soldiers in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan demonstrates the enduring strength of our strategic partnership. USEUCOM assists Georgian forces in preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program. We continue to support Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity by improving their capability to generate and sustain capable defense forces through the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.

In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new opportunities for exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports Whole of Government efforts to preserve the region as a place nations act cooperatively to address shared challenges and where U.S. national interests remain secure. USEUCOM leverages its close relations with USNORTHCOM and European Arctic nations to build Arctic awareness, increase operations, and strengthen the free and open order to secure the Arctic. These bilateral and multi-lateral strategic relationships enhance Alliance efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared interests.

Enable U.S. Global Operations

Europe and the U.S. remain the foundation for upholding a free and open international order. USEUCOM’s unique geographic location is essential to enable global operations through synchronization, access, basing, and overflight permissions within Europe. From this key terrain, USEUCOM acts in support of multiple Combatant and Functional Commands, Allied, Coalition, and U.S. interagency operations. Basing, access, and overflight permissions are built upon mutual respect and trust between the U.S. and our sovereign Allies and partners, and should not be taken for granted. We work within the Whole of Government to maintain these
relationships, permissions under bilateral agreements, and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic investments. Absent these agreements, we would be unable to meet our treaty obligations or protect vital national interests. Beyond strategic position, the shared values, trust, and longstanding relationships we have in Europe, with some of our most capable and willing Allies and partners on the planet, enable the U.S. to generate coalitions for worldwide operations in support of shared national interests.

Most recently, European Allies and partners proved essential in our national efforts to deter Iranian aggression. Our Allies and partners enabled USEUCOM’s rapid posture shift of U.S. forces in response to potential contingencies in the Levant. Key partners provided indispensable access, basing, and overflight permissions that enabled our ability to protect American citizens and diplomats in harm’s way, had the security situation deteriorated. This recent example highlights the value of European support to enable U.S. global operations that preserve and defend our national interests worldwide.

Conclusion

The United States’ position in Europe is an invaluable cornerstone of national security, built by our predecessors upon the wreckage of two world wars. Today, U.S. service members in Europe continue to generate global peace and prosperity alongside our Allies and partners in the face of growing challenges. Revisionist actors, most notably Russia and China, present formidable, long-term challenges to preserving a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace.

We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your continued pledge to meet them through support, funding, and authorities...particularly potent are support for European Deterrence Initiative and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). EDI enables USEUCOM’s ability to enhance U.S. and Alliance readiness and posture to quickly respond in crisis or conflict. USAI ensures Ukraine has the resources and training to deter further Russian aggression. USEUCOM sits in a strategically significant part of the world and the dedicated
men and women of the command unceasingly strive to be good stewards of the trust our nation has placed in us. Together with the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation’s continued commitment to defend the homeland forward and preserve peace for the one billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic.
[Clerk’s Note.—The complete hearing transcript could not be printed due to the classification of the material discussed.]
Mr. VISCLOSKY. The Subcommittee on Defense will come to order.
This morning, the committee will receive testimony on the posture of the National Guard and Reserve components in their fiscal year 2020 budget request. This will be a two-panel hearing. Panel one recognizes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Panel two will recognize the Reserve component chiefs from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserves. I would encourage all members to stay for both panels.

Our witness for panel one is General Joe Lengyel, Chief of the National Guard Bureau. We are pleased to welcome the general, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General, welcome back to the subcommittee for your fourth, and I bet from your perspective, thank goodness, final hearing as chief.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. As you are retiring later this year, all of us really do wish you the best of luck and do thank you for a very good life of service to this country.

This Subcommittee has provided the Reserve component with significant resources through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account, an appropriation which is not included in the President’s budget request, as well as additional funding for the counterdrug operations, Humvee modernization, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and more. We are looking forward to hearing about the importance of this investment in the 54 States and territorial Guard organizations. However, we would like to cover all aspects of funding for the Guard and Reserve today, to include your request for funding in the military personnel and operations and maintenance accounts.

With that, again, I thank you for appearing today. We will ask you to proceed and present a summarized statement in a moment. But first, I would recognize Mr. Calvert for any statement he has.
OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky.

And I would like to welcome General Lengyel back to the subcommittee. Since this will likely be your final appearance before us prior to your retirement, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your nearly 40 years of service to our Nation. And I know you and Sally are probably looking forward to getting the heck out of here and heading back to Texas, so happy travels.

I also know that I speak for all the members and staffers who have worked with you when I say we will all miss you. You have done a fantastic job.

As we gather here today, our Nation is even more dependent on our more than 450,000 citizen airmen and soldiers more than ever.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I close my opening remarks.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

General LENGYEL. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL LENGYEL

General LENGYEL. Thank you.

And good afternoon, everyone. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here today on behalf of the men and women of the National Guard. For nearly 4 years, I have served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and I am both proud and humbled by the service of our National Guard.

Today’s 450,000 Guard members are the most professional, dedicated, and capable soldiers and airmen I have served with in my 40-year career. We do tremendous things every day to support our country in the war fight, in the homeland, and building partnerships around the world. Our men and women of the National Guard do not serve alone, and I would like to take this moment to thank the families and the employers of those who support them. I would also like to thank the members of this subcommittee for their continued support of the National Guard. This includes especially your support of the National Guard Reserve Equipment Account which helps ensure our long-term readiness, lethality. It helps modernize our force, helps fund our domestic critical duties items, and helps sustain and build the National Guard capability.

In the past year, the National Guard served on every continent, in every combatant command, in 70 countries. As we speak here today, more than 40,000 members of the National Guard are deployed or on duty somewhere at home or around the world. Our men and women of the Guard have seen combat, what we are ultimately trained and equipped and prepared for. We are an operational force providing strategic depth to the United States Army, the United States Air Force, and now the United States Space Force.

As America’s primary domestic military response force, the National Guard remains engaged here at home. On any given day, approximately 10,000 soldiers and airmen are serving homeland defense, homeland security, and domestic operations here at home. As State and local governments find themselves under attack by
cyber assailants, the National Guard’s nearly 4,000 cyber warriors are ready to respond at the request of leadership in their States. As our communities find themselves battling wildfires in California or floods in Missouri or earthquakes in Puerto Rico, the National Guard continues to live up to our motto of always ready and always there.

The National Guard supports the Department of Homeland Security along our southwest border. Today, approximately 2,500 National Guard members from 21 States are assisting our partners as they help secure the border in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.

Our success in both the warfight and the homeland is a result of our unique partnerships at all levels: international, Federal, State, and local. Key among these are the relationship we built through the State Partnership Program. These States and nation relationships facilitate security cooperation based on mutual trust and cultural appreciation. Today, with this important program, we now have 84 partnerships, with more on the way. This directly supports a key tenet of the National Defense Strategy of strengthening alliances and building partnerships.

The National Guard has accomplished much over the past year, and I am proud of our soldiers and airmen who have boldly taken on every challenge they have faced. We are truly a 21st century National Guard. We have evolved much since 1636. We have transformed even more since 9/11. We are a unit-based, unit-equipped, surge-to-war Reserve component. We must adapt, change, and prepare for the future. We must continue to make strides in readiness, investing in our people, and continuing to innovate.

Readiness means we must be competitive in every domain. Traditionally, that has meant land, air, and sea, but today, competitive domains includes space and cyberspace. Since 1995, the Air National Guard has supported the Air Force in the space domain, from monitoring missile threats to providing space intelligence. As space missions transition from the Air Force to the Space Force, it is imperative that the National Guard remain aligned with the active components we support. The Air National Guard is aligned with the Air Force, the Army Guard is aligned with the Army, and I suspect we need a Space Guard aligned with the Space Force.

Furthermore, we must continue to invest in our greatest weapon and most valuable asset: our people. We must give them the training, the equipment, the full-time support they need to seamlessly be inoperable with our active components. We must be able to recruit, retain the right people, and have the 21st century National Guard that reflects the communities where we serve. We ask much of our servicemen and -women today, and I ask for your continued support on your behalf.

Chairman Visclosky, I wish you much health and happiness in your upcoming retirement, and thank you for your years of service to our Nation. Ranking Member Calvert and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your opportunity to testify to you today. I appreciate your support of the National Guard, and I look forward to all of your questions.

[The written statement of General Lenygel follows:]
WRITTEN STATEMENT BY

GENERAL JOSEPH LENGYEL
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

SECOND SESSION, 116TH CONGRESS
ON
THE NATIONAL GUARD POSTURE HEARING

MARCH 3, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
CNGB Executive Summary

Today’s National Guard plays a vital role in the security and welfare of our nation. On any given day, approximately 30,000 Guardsmen carry out Federal missions around the world, and an additional 10,000 Guardsmen conduct State and Federal missions within the United States and its territories. National Guardsmen are part of an operational force nearly 450,000 strong that provides strategic depth to our nation’s Army and Air Force.

The National Guard brings unique relationships, authorities, and flexibility to the Joint Force. Due to the complex global security environment marked by rapid technological change, these attributes are instrumental in implementing the Department of Defense’s (DoD) National Defense Strategy (NDS). The National Guard directly supports the three tenets of the NDS: building a lethal force ready for any fight, strengthening alliances and seeking new partnerships, and reforming to improve performance and affordability.

The National Guard also represents a tremendous value to the American taxpayer. Personnel costs for our citizen-soldiers and citizen-airmen are significantly lower, when not activated, than our Active Duty counterparts. We are a force that allows for the rapid expansion of the Army and the Air Force. When we are not activated, we offset risk in capacity, allowing for modernization and recapitalization that benefits the Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces. We are the primary combat reserve of the Army and Air Force. Furthermore, National Guardsmen leverage civilian skill sets in a military capacity, and conversely bring military training and knowledge to civilian communities.

As the Joint Force faces increasing demands in all corners of the globe, and with the ever-present threat of natural disasters and other unforeseen events taking place within our borders, the National Guard supports the NDS and serves the American people at home through three core missions: Warfight, Homeland, and Partnerships.

Warfight

The warfight is a primary mission and at the heart of everything the National Guard does. Being ready to fight and win America’s wars drives our training, our equipment and maintenance requirements, and our recruitment efforts. While we are able to use our training and equipment for State missions and DoD mission support, we provide ready forces to Combatant Commanders.

Our current threat environment requires the National Guard to be prepared for complex, global operations in the most demanding conditions. With the rise of China and Russia, we have shifted our focus from counterinsurgency operations to great power competition. China and Russia are undermining the international order through various means, exploiting all domains to change the character of warfare. We remain poised to surge to augment the Joint Force for national security threats from Iran, North Korea, and non-state violent extremists.

The changing and global nature of threats shapes the warfight, and the National Guard is evolving rapidly to meet new demands. We are the principal combat reserve of the Army and Air Force, making up 20 percent of the entire Joint Force providing strategic depth in support of combatant commands. Since 9/11, more than a million Guardsmen have mobilized and deployed; many have deployed multiple times. While the model of one weekend a month and two weeks a year provides the foundation of readiness across the National Guard, dynamic
employment and global operations will require more of our service members than ever before. In order to fully leverage readiness that lives in the National Guard and to empower our Guard men and women, mobilization requirements need to be predictable. This structure, predictable in time but geographically agile, will afford the DoD greater flexibility during this period of great power competition.

This flexibility in employment also requires an enterprise approach to modernization of the Total Force in order to remain deployable, sustainable, and interoperable with the Active Components. The Guard requires parity in our training, facilities and equipment. There is only one standard for readiness, and there should be only the highest standard for our equipment. Without parity, we cannot integrate with the Active Components; if we cannot integrate, we cannot be the lethal force necessary to help deter, fight, and win America’s wars. Training, facilities, and equipment must strive for parity to keep our Guardsmen interoperable and our country competitive.

A prime example of a Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 action that supports National Guard parity is the arrival of F-35s to the Vermont Air National Guard. The presence of this cutting edge capability within the National Guard demonstrates a new commitment to the recapitalization and modernization necessary to ensure Guard readiness and interoperability.

**Homeland**

The National Guard serves a dual State and Federal role within our borders. Guardsmen can be found in nearly every county of the United States, and this proximity allows us to respond quickly to any threat that endangers our homeland. Our skills, developed for and honed through the warfight, can play an important part in a unified response during domestic emergencies, and allow Guardsmen to assist first responders in times of crises.

The United States strives to never let the fight reach our borders. However, the reality of today’s security environment makes clear our homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Cyber threats and new weapons’ technology extend the reach of our adversaries.

National Guard Missile Defenders in places such as Fort Greely, Alaska, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, protect our homeland and stand ready to support DoD’s efforts to adapt to the challenge of advancing missile threats that can reach our shores. The National Guard plays a critical role in our DoD’s cyber enterprise and are a valuable resource to the States. More than 3,900 Soldiers and Airmen make up the Guard’s cyber force. On a routine basis, these professionals directly support the U.S. Cyber Command’s Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) construct. Additionally, our National Guard cyber teams, at the direction of their States, used their expertise to respond to ransomware attacks in Texas, Louisiana, California, Colorado, and Montana.

National Guard cyber support to State and local municipalities in 2019 are an indication of the future cyber environment; and our actions demonstrate both the effectiveness and value of the Guard’s cyber capabilities.

The National Guard is often at its most visible in American communities in the aftermath of natural disasters, and 2019 was no exception. The National Guard responded to snowstorms, wildfires, and floods, and provided full-spectrum recovery and support to all those affected by Hurricane Dorian. Our collaboration with State, local, and Federal (including military)
entities helps the National Guard respond quickly and effectively in times of disaster. In addition, we are constantly training and are ready to respond to incidents in the homeland, whether natural or man-made. We are America’s military first responders in times of disaster.

The National Guard also provides support to civilian law enforcement agencies through DoD’s National Guard Counterdrug Program. Through this program, the National Guard has provided support to more than 300 Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial civilian law enforcement agencies across all 54 states and territories for more than 30 years. While Guardsmen do not conduct law enforcement missions, they provide expertise such as analysis support, communications, and linguist services to law enforcement entities. This helps law enforcement combat cartels, positively reach at-risk youth, and seize billions of dollars in illegal narcotics. This program is another way the National Guard is making a difference in the homeland.

Partnerships

The National Guard is unique in the depth and breadth of its relationships. Whether its security cooperation activities with international partners or emergency response coordination with State and local governments, or collaborating within the federal interagency process, these relationships strengthen alliances and partnerships.

Partnerships are vital to our military strength and success. Every day, our allies and partners join us in deterring war and preserving a free and open international order. By working together with our allies and partners, we share the burdens and responsibility for our common defense. These relationships also offer unique perspectives and positions that help us understand and access critical regions of the globe.

When building alliances with foreign nations, the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) is one of the premier security cooperation initiatives within DoD. The SPP is a scalable and tailored approach to security cooperation that formally links a state’s National Guard with the armed forces of a partner country. The National Guard consults and coordinates with combatant commanders, U.S. Embassies and their country teams, and host nations to understand the full range of issues they face. SPP events are led by respective state adjutants general who seek engagements on a broad array of interests that are beneficial to both nations.

Today, 84 countries around the world are partnered with the National Guard through this program. Through the SPP, we do more than conduct military-to-military engagements; we leverage whole-of-society relationships and capabilities. These partnerships also help us counter malign influence, support combat and security operations deployments, and assist with disaster response. Given the benefits of this program, consistent funding is critical to the continued success of the SPP, and the long-term advancements of our national security interests.

Owing to our role as State-controlled militias, the National Guard inherently has close relationships with state and local agencies and officials. Our skills and abilities developed for the warfight—including manpower, training, leadership, organization, logistics and communications—augment Governors’ and community partners’ emergency response strategies, ultimately responding to the needs of Americans in the homeland.
Three Priorities for the Future of the Guard

Today’s National Guard is the finest in its history. However, we must not become complacent and must continue to evolve for the threats ahead. We will be responsive to global trends and prepare for the challenges of the future by committing to three priorities: readiness, people, and innovation.

Priority #1: Readiness

Guard Soldiers and Airmen support DoD missions across every geographic combatant command and respond to disasters in communities across the nation. As an operational force, we provide strategic depth to the Army and Air Force. We must remain interoperable in light of increasing global demands, train and equip our Guardsmen, and maintain our facilities to this standard.

The National Guard needs functional facilities to accomplish critical domestic response and warfighting missions. We cannot be ready for the challenges of the future with yesterday’s training, equipment, or facilities. Like the need for cutting edge equipment, our Soldiers and Airmen deserve the best facilities while serving our communities or preparing for overseas operations.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) is committed to generating forces that are both warfighting-capable and governor-responsive. Combatant Commanders depend upon ARNG Soldiers during every phase of conflict abroad and governors depend upon them during emergencies at home.

In FY 2019, the ARNG contributed to missions in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Ukraine, Kosovo, Eastern Europe, the Horn of Africa and the Sinai Peninsula. ARNG units also conducted vital, multinational exercises and performed more than 2 million duty days while assisting communities during devastating hurricanes, floods, winter storms and wildfires.

In its Federal role, the ARNG’s primary task is to generate combat-ready forces for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force. The Army designates select ARNG formations as Army Response Forces (ARF) that are available to rapidly deploy and conduct contingency operations. Additionally, four ARNG brigade combat teams and enablers will complete decisive-action training rotations at the Army’s premier combat training centers. The ARNG’s primary focus in FY 2020 is to sustain gains in recruiting and address challenges in retention that threaten readiness. All of these activities will be overlaid with deployments and exercises for tens of thousands of our Citizen-Soldiers around the world.

Given this level of activity, ARNG leaders are managing the cumulative impacts of training and operations to ensure we keep faith with Families and civilian employers. Doing so is essential to support the people who underwrite our Soldiers’ service year after year.

The Air National Guard (ANG) commitment to readiness provides our nation and Air Force with significant flexibility. After more than two decades as a proven operational force, the ANG has become a critical component to the nation’s strategic deterrence, operational capability, and first-in capability. Furthermore, the ANG possesses strategic capacity across each of the Air Force Core Competencies: Air and Space Superiority; Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Rapid Global Mobility; Global Strike; and Command and Control.

In FY 2019, the men and women of the Air National Guard supported 14,692 deployments to 52 countries and on any given day, there are more than 5,000 Guard Airmen serving around the world in support of the combatant commands.

The Air National Guard’s focus on readiness assures dominance in air, space, and cyberspace. We do so by preparing 21st century Air Guardsmen for today’s fight, while building for tomorrow’s fight. Our objective is to provide our nation with an operational and lethal force with rapid response capability, which is fully interoperable with the United States Air Force and the Joint Force, and able to deter aggressors and defeat threats to our national interest.

In addition, the National Guard remains a valued and loyal partner to our national security space enterprise. Our National Guard space units ensure we dominate that domain as it gains prominence in warfare. Since the United States Space Force was formally established by the December 20, 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the National Guard has supported and will continue to support the newest military service. Specifically, the National Guard supplies the Department of Defense 100 percent of its unit-equipped, surge-to-war operational reserve component space force structure. To date, the National Guard provides 40 percent of the operational expeditionary space electronic warfare capabilities in the Space Force, and is rapidly growing to 60 percent with the addition of two squadrons in Guam and Hawaii.

Furthermore, the National Guard retains decades of space-related depth and expertise. For example, every day the space professionals at Clear Air Force Station Alaska monitor missile threats in the Pacific, and National Guard space intelligence experts in Ohio monitor space threats. Most recently, space electronic warfare units from California and Florida returned from overseas deployments that were critical to combatant command success. For the future success of our newest service, it is vital the National Guard’s expertise and capabilities continue to be available to the Space Force enterprise.

Readiness requires that our leaders remain focused on the mission and empower our men and women to reach our objectives.

**Priority #2: People, Families, and Employers**

No one who puts on a uniform serves alone. This is particularly true in the National Guard, where our Guardsmen balance service with civilian careers. We strive to balance the needs of both our drilling and full-time Guardsmen with the demands of the mission, and provide support to the families of our service men and women.

Our Guardsmen come from communities all across the country, bringing with them diverse cultures, experiences, and skills. Our National Guard culture values diversity and inclusion, which are fundamental to organizational readiness and help us reach and maintain the highest standards. We are at our best when we reflect the communities we serve.

To build for the future, we must recruit people with the right skills and experience. That is why focusing on active duty service members who are transitioning to civilian life is a critical piece to our recruitment. We want to ensure we capture the talent and skills of these service members and show them the benefits of continued service to their country. We must recruit the very best men and women, therefore we must also have competitive incentives—such as education
benefits. We must share our story, our history, our legacy.

We also have a responsibility to support the Guardsmen in our ranks. We are emphasizing mental health and resilience for our Soldiers and Airmen through the Suicide Prevention and Readiness Initiative, which helps Guard units identify risk factors and effective intervention techniques. Through the Warrior Resilience and Fitness Innovation Incubator, the National Guard is also taking a grassroots approach to find ways to address mental health crises at a local level.

To support our Guard members’ families, we provide family readiness programs, employment assistance programs, and ensure that families know where to turn if they need help. Family programs not only benefit service members and their families, but also have a positive effect on a unit’s morale and readiness.

#3 Innovation

We have a responsibility to improve the National Guard—to leave it better than we found it, so we can be ready for the challenges of the future. Innovation—whether in business processes, technology, partnerships, or culture—is in our DNA. We must constantly look forward, educating and empowering our Guardsmen to implement innovative measures.

Technology has radically shaped our lives, and it has radically reshaped our national defense. Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first—it goes to the country that adapts its way of fighting fastest. The National Guard continues to be a catalyst for DoD’s technological initiatives, including artificial intelligence, robotics, biotechnology, “big data,” and advanced computing.

Conclusion

The National Guard traces its lineage back 383 years. In that time, we have fought in every American war, responded to our countrymen in need, and developed partnerships that have strengthened our national defense. However, we are just getting started. With the incredible skills and talents of our men and women, we are ready for today and building for the future.

We will undoubtedly face new challenges, but our values, our vision, and our willingness to fight and secure our nation runs deep. Today and tomorrow, the National Guard is Always Ready, Always There.
BIOGRAPHY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL JOSEPH L. LENGYEL

General Joseph L. Lengyel serves as the 28th Chief of the National Guard Bureau and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he serves as a military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council and is the Department of Defense's official channel of communication to the Governors and State Adjutants General on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. He is responsible for ensuring that the more than 453,000 Army and Air National Guard personnel are accessible, capable and ready to protect the homeland and to provide combat-ready resources to the Army and Air Force.

Prior to his current assignment, General Lengyel served as the Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau.

General Lengyel was commissioned in 1981 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at University of North Texas. He served in various operational and staff assignments, primarily as an F-16 Instructor Pilot and Weapons Officer. His experience in the F-16 includes tours in Air Combat Command, Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces in Europe and the Texas Air National Guard. He has commanded a fighter squadron, operations group, air expeditionary group and the Air National Guard Readiness Center. General Lengyel is a command pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours primarily in the F-16. Additionally, General Lengyel served as the Senior United States Defense Official, Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, and Defense Attaché, Cairo, United States Central Command, Cairo, Egypt.

EDUCATION
1981 Bachelor's degree in chemistry, University of North Texas, Denton
1984 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
1986 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
1994 Air Command and Staff College, by seminar
2001 Air War College, by correspondence
2008 Fellow, National Security Management Course, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.
2009 Fellow, Capstone General and Flag Officer Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J.
McNarr, Washington, D.C.
2010 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
2011 Master of Business Administration, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
2015 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.
2016 Fellow, Pinnacle Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS
1. March 1982 - March 1983, Student, undergraduate pilot training, Laughlin AFB, Texas
2. March 1983 - May 1983, Student, fighter lead-in training, Holloman AFB, N.M.
5. April 1986 - April 1987, Instructor Pilot Flight Examiner, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea
7. June 1987 - September 1991, Instructor Pilot, and Chief of Weapons, 512th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
8. September 1991 - September 1995, Instructor Pilot Flight Examiner and Weapons Officer, 182nd Fighter Squadron, Texas Air National Guard, Kelly AFB, Texas
11. October 1998 - October 1999, Commander, 182nd Fighter Squadron, Kelly AFB, Texas
13. February 2002 - June 2004, Vice Commander, 149th Fighter Wing, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
15. September 2004 - September 2006, Air National Guard Advisor to Commander, United States Air Force in Europe
17. September 2008 - June, 2009, Deputy Director, Air National Guard, Arlington, Va., and Commander, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews AFB, Md.
22. August 2016 - present, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. June 2011 - August 2012, Senior United States Defense Official, Chief, Office of Military Cooperation and Defense Attaché, Cairo, U.S. Central Command, Cairo Egypt, as a major general
2. August 2012 - August 2016, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general
3. August 2016 - present, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., as a general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: command pilot
Flight hours: more than 3,000
Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38 and F-16
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Air Force Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Air Medal
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commandation Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with one oak leaf cluster
Combat Readiness Medal with three oak leaf clusters
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Korean Defense Service Medal
Air Force Overseas Ribbon (Short)
Air Force Overseas Ribbon (Long) with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon (with seven oak leaf clusters)
Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon with gold border
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with 1 Silver Hourglass)
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon with bronze star
Air Force Training Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
1983 Distinguished graduate, undergraduate pilot training
Multiple civilian pilot ratings, including Airline Transport Pilot

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Dec. 21, 1981
First Lieutenant Dec. 21, 1983
Captain Dec. 21, 1985
Major Dec. 13, 1994
Lieutenant Colonel Dec. 23, 1998
Colonel Sept. 18, 2002
Brigadier General Sept. 26, 2008
Major General April 1, 2011
Lieutenant General Aug. 18, 2012
General Aug. 3, 2016

(Current as of August 2016)
Mr. VISCOSKY. General, thank you very much. As I may have
told you when we met, some people inquire as to why I decided not
to run for reelection. And I told them if you are not going to be
around next year, it is not worth coming back.

General LÉNGYEL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Normally, I defer my questions, but in this in-
stance, I would like to ask the first question, and then I will turn
to Mr. Calvert, and I would have a short statement.

Congress started appropriating funding for the National Guard
and Reserve components through the National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account in 2001 as a response to the decreases in
Guard and Reserve equipment funding, even while procurement
budgets increased for the Department. For the past 19 fiscal years,
Congress added this appropriation in an attempt to ensure the
equipment needs of the Guard and Reserve components are met
and readiness levels can be achieved. Additional funding for air-
craft or vehicles has also been provided in appropriations bills with
the funding specifically noted in the bill or report for a specific
Guard or Reserve component.

Last month, no news to anyone on the committee, the entire fis-
cal year 2020 appropriations of $1.3 billion for the account funding
for the Humvee modernization, as well as funding for aircraft spe-
cifically appropriated for the Guard and Reserve, was transferred
from the Department of Defense to the Department of Homeland
Security for the purpose of building a wall. The Department did not
consult with Congress prior to this transfer.

In testimony last week to the House Armed Services Committee,
the Secretary of Defense defended the decision to use funding spe-
cifically appropriated for the Guard and Reserve by relying on his
Chair of the Joint Chiefs, General Milley, for his analysis. General
Milley said he was asked to analyze the move and concluded na-
tional security would not be severely impacted. In short, he said:
What I said was that this reprogramming of $3.8 billion was not
a significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall de-
fense of the United States. Quoting General Milley further: It is a
half percent of the overall budget, so I can’t in conscience say it is
significant.

The two problems I have with that is I think $3.8 billion is a
huge amount of money. I think $1.3 billion is a huge amount of
money. And maybe one half of 1 percent is not much out of $5. It
is a lot of money out of $700 billion. The question I would have,
essentially, is were you consulted? What programs and purchases
were intended to be procured? And what is going to be the impact
of the transfer of these funds, General?

General LÉNGYEL. Chairman, thank you for the question. It is an
important question. If I could say, was I consulted, I would tell you
the answer to that question would be no. I was not consulted prior
to the decision being made to transfer the funds. I was asked about
it prior to the funds being transferred, and the comment you re-
ferenced to General Milley there about—and we were asked do we
disagree with this statement. The Chairman said this will not seri-
ously compromise the military capability of the DOD to defend the United States at the strategic level. And when he further explained, that means we lose a war if we don't get this money.

Does anyone in this room think that taking this amount of money exceeds that threshold? I did not think that it exceeded that threshold.

But I will tell you. The NGREA account is incredibly important to the National Guard and Reserves. This year, for us, it was $790 million. That is $790 million that is less—that we will spend less on predominantly two things. In the Air Guard, we predominantly use this money to make our platforms more lethal, more modern, more survivable than they would otherwise be if we do not have the NGREA funds to do it. In the Army Guard, we buy predominantly critical dual-use equipment with NGREA money. Things that we—it is our only source of money, really, to buy things that only the National Guard does, things that buy us things for domestic operations, things like buckets for helicopters that put out fires, things like communications systems for our chemical, biological, or radiological nuclear sets that are predominantly in the Guard, things that are communication suites, test sets for men and women of the Guard to do training on. These are things that would never be bought for us, for the Army Guard, by the United States Army.

And on the air side, they are things that are done for platforms that usually the Air Force no longer has. So older model F–16s which only reside in the Guard, C–130H models which only reside in the Guard and Reserve, systems that would not meet the threshold for Air Force modernization activities.

So this money is very important to us, and over the next 3 years, between now and 2023, we have a very good history. As you, in fact, in 2001—I take NGREA back to the early 1980s, predominantly. 1983 or 4 we began getting NGREA, and it made our platform more lethal, more able to go to war, safer for men and women to fly in combat. And so this money that we don’t have, at the very best case, it gets deferred a following year. Things that we were going to do, such as modernize our threat warning systems, modernize our infrared systems on our F–15s, new avionics in C–130s, those types of things will now wait a year, at a minimum, and that assumes that this committee continues to support us further with the NGREA funds down the road.

So I was surprised that they took the money, and it is going to have a near-term materiel impact on our Air Guard for sure, and it will affect our commodities that we are going to have to deal with the domestic operations portfolio in the Army Guard for sure as well.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

Mr. Calvert.

REPROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Calvert. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, I support the border security, the so-called wall. However, this reprogramming activity is troublesome. I think that all of us, I don't care which side of the aisle that you are on, if this kind of activity is to continue, we are going to, as Members of Con-
gress, lose control of the appropriating process. And I preface this by also saying that there is money in the fiscal year 2020 and the fiscal year 2021 bill to more than adequately continue to build the border wall through this year and next year.

So I have never been really told by, you know, various folks why this had to be done in the first place. And how we found out about it, at least how I found out about it was a Wall Street Journal reporter running up behind me to let me know that this was taking place, which was not a great way to communicate. So I just wanted to let the chairman know that I agree that this kind of reprogramming has to end.

I mean, there is going to be a future President at some point, maybe President Sanders, who may want to create a national emergency and move money into Health and Human Services. Who knows? I mean, that is not for the White House to determine; that is for Congress.

So anyway, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am done with my questions.
Mr. Calvert, if you have any questions that would be fine.

GUARD AND SPACE FORCE

Mr. Calvert. No. If you are ready for questioning, I will move on to that, yes. Okay.

General, I know that we are expecting a report in a month or two detailing how the Space Force will incorporate the Reserve and the National Guard force. And as you know, the Guard has about 1,500 personnel, many of which are in my home State of California because of our interaction in space, especially in Los Angeles, El Segundo area. In many ways, I have always felt the guard complements the mission of the Space Force. And in areas where you have private industry attracting the best talent, the Guard is a great way for these patriotic folks to serve their country at the same time as staying involved in the businesses they work at. And understanding you can’t get ahead of the report, what role do you see the guardsmen playing in the space mission?

General LENGYEL. Sir, thank you for the question. I think that, you know, as I said in my remarks, the National Guard has been in the space mission for a long time. We have been doing mission in space for the United States Air Force for 25 years, since 1995. There are space units in seven States, and the territory of Guam now is standing up a space unit.

So I believe a couple of things. One is I believe that one of the things that is best about us is we are aligned, and what we do so well is we mirror the culture of our parent service. So there is only one standard to be a soldier in the Army, there is only one standard to be an airman in the Air Force, and there will be a standard to be a space warrior in the future Space Force. And I believe that it is important that the space capability currently in the Air and National Guard should move into the Space Force at the same time that all the other space capability that is in the Air Force, when it moves to the Space Force. We can’t do that unless there is a component for us to move into.

And thus, you know, for over a year, I have been advocating for the creation of a Space National Guard component. I know it is still
under discussion. General Raymond is looking at the U.S. Space Force and how to build this 21st service organization, and I support that.

But we have been looking at the Reserve component construct for a year, and the Air Force has done an internal study analysis, an Air Force A–9 that examined various options, and I believe that the creation of a Space National Guard is well postured for all the things that you say. As space moves into the commercial sector, it will posture itself, and there will be opportunity there to leverage that commercial sector and build Reserve units.

And the other thing given about the National Guard is we are the only Reserve component deployable force structure in the space business. We have units that are unit-built, unit-equipped that have deployed to the Middle East, that have deployed into the Pacific that do missions in the space domain. No other Reserve component does that.

So as I look forward to structure moving from the Air Force and the Air National Guard as well, I would like to see it move, and I think it should move, into the Space Force so that we can recruit people. They become space warriors just like all the other space folks. They can have the doctrine, the personnel, the training opportunities of all other space warriors. So that is my recommendation as we continue to discuss what the Space Force will actually finally look like.

UNFUNDED LIST FOR THE GUARD

Mr. CALVERT. Good. Thank you for that answer. One other quick question, General. I know that the Guard does not historically submit unfunded priority lists, and maybe you just want to get the money you lost on the reprogramming, but could you walk the committee through what those would be for this fiscal year, if you had your druthers?

General LENGYEL. From an equipment standpoint or personnel, I have a—you know, as you know, many of the programs in the National Guard are funded with adds from this committee. You know, I think that, you know, future requirements for C–130 platforms are there. Future requirements for advanced radars for F–16s would be on an unfunded list for us. You know, I think that as we look across other things that I have portrayed that are important, full-time support for the Army National Guard, additional money for counterdrug, additional money for FSRM to build our facilities, all of those kinds of things are on my unfunded list. And if you are asking me for an unfunded list, then I can create one and give it to you on the record, take it for the record and give a more accurate appraisal.

Mr. CALVERT. I would welcome you to do exactly that. Thank you.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The gentleman recognizes Ms. McCollum in one second. But in my introduction, I was remiss. I met with the Defense Minister from Estonia this morning, and he was very complimentary to you and the Guard for the work as far as helping with cybersecurity. Also, I hate to say it in the gentleman’s presence, he was grateful and thought it was a very strong relationship
as far as the State partnership with Maryland as well as the country of Estonia, so I do thank you for that as well. Ms. McCollum.

PFOS CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

I am going to ask you some questions for the record on groundwater remediation of PFOS chemicals and the Reserve component installation. So we know the EPA still needs to adopt a standard PFOS groundwater remediation, but the appropriators did include $127 million to the fiscal year 2020 defense bill to begin addressing PFOS chemical contamination. It includes $100 million specifically for the Air Force, as you are the largest user of firefighting foam that contains these chemicals.

So I would like to get a better idea of the scope of PFOS contamination on both the Guard, and I will be asking the same thing from the Reserve as well. So I am going to be asking you to give us an update on the scope of contamination that you have been able to record, what States are particularly impacted the most, if you are having any issues with the Air Force in terms of ensuring that the fiscal year 2020 funds for remediation are available to the Reserve component for this issue, and what you would do with additional funding if you were to receive it beyond the fiscal year 2021 for the Air Force’s environmental remediation. So I will ask you to do that for the record.

EXPANSION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS

I have two questions. I am going to give them to you both at the same time, kind of piggybacking on what the chairman was just talking about with State partnerships. This is important to many of us in this room. We care deeply about our Guard partnerships. My State of Minnesota has been partners with Croatia for over 20 years. I was there when we welcomed them to our State. It is a great relationship. The Guard also does an exchange with Norway on a regular basis. So it is important that we keep expanding State partnerships, especially into Africa, especially when the Chinese have deep engagement in that continent.

So I would like you to give us an update on the expansion of the National Guard State partner program in Africa. My understanding is Ethiopia is the next country on the list. I think that makes good sense, having spent a lot of time in Africa. So that is my first question.

NATIONAL GUARD AND CORONAVIRUS EMERGENCY

My second one is just kind of if you could give our committee a brief update on how you think the National Guard can work with us as we deal with this coronavirus emergency. We are starting to see the impacts on public health systems. Last week, in Washington State, Governor Inslee declared a state of emergency, which gives him use of the National Guard. I had a conversation with Governor Walz, a former National Guard member himself, and we were talking about, you know, if the Guard was to be able to be used, nobody does logistics better than the Guard. And as hospitals
are having to prep for ICU rooms with, you know, strained resources, no one knows how to move things and get things built. So those are my two questions, and the PFOS is for the record.

General LENGYEL. Yes, ma’am. We have been doing a lot of work on PFOS, and I am happy to give you all that data for the record, and we will get that to you ASAP.

Regarding the State Partnership Program, so it is 84 countries currently. And as you mentioned, there are a couple that are still—that are just now coming to be filled, two of them in Africa. Egypt, along with Ethiopia, will be. Africa now has, as you may know, 15 partnerships, which is up substantially over the last several years. So I think that, you know, currently, that program is funded in the budget at about $16 million, and what we need is about $29 million so we make sure we have enough activity, meaningful activity, between the States and the partnerships that are ongoing.

I just got back from a trip in the South Pacific. There is two brand new partnerships there that I just visited, Fiji and Tonga, as parts you mentioned, Chinese, and the hotel I stayed in had a Chinese flag flying over the hotel as I was there. They were thrilled to have the partnership. They were thrilled to have the engagement. The training and engagement with their State partner, which, in both cases, is the State of Nevada, is a superb tool for our engagement in the South Pacific and in the region. In Croatia and Norway, the two relationships with Minnesota, have proven over time to be extremely valuable as well.

So was there anything else on the State Partnership Program? In the near term coming up is Ethiopia. They have yet to have a partner approved, and same thing for Egypt, although that is getting close to having a partnership.

With respect to the coronavirus, the coronavirus—so obviously, we are taking that very seriously, and at the National Guard, we are doing the things that we always do. We are planning, we are coordinating, and we are communicating. So planning means we are looking internally for us across the equipment, the personal protective equipment activities that we have or the equipment just in case some units need it, and there is some, and we do have some, should some National Guard units become engaged in a contact scenario with people that happen to be infected.

The coordinating piece is working closely with the Department of Defense COVID–19 Task Force that is working with DOD, HHS, NORTHCOM, and all of the players involved in trying to assess the scope and scale of this activity and what it is going to require of us, to include looking across the enterprise for places where, should they need, there is housing available or ability to have people quarantined in States and the like. We are just looking at those things now. None are being used anymore. We just finished using a station in Camp Ashland, Nebraska, where we had 57 people there who were being held till their virus was—or their quarantine time was up.

So I think we will continue to do those kinds of things. And the coordinating piece is, as we do, is where the National Guard could be used. As you mentioned, nobody does logistics better. Nobody does command and control better. Transportation. There are many, many things that National Guards can be used for in their States
that can help governors and State and local officials deal with what might happen as a result of the COVID–19 virus.

So, yes, we are engaged. We are involved. We are communicating with the States and the Adjutant Generals. So far, Washington State is the only State that has called me and said, our governor has alerted us that said we may put people on a State Active Duty status for logistics and planning kinds of activities, but I suspect there will be more as this tends—as this unfolds.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Cole.

MC–12 MISSION

Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, General, I want to join everybody on the committee and thank you for 40 years of wonderful service to our country, but I see your wife sitting behind you, so I want to thank her for 40 years of wonderful service supporting you so you could do your mission. And your family, I know that is not possible without their help, so thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I am always pretty careful when it comes to these Guard and Reserve issues because I am sitting to the left of the Kentucky National Guardsman of the year for 1960 and a member of the Kentucky National Guard Hall of Fame, and I am sitting to the right of a 30-year guardsman who was a Colonel and Commander to our forces in the Sinai, so——

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Cole, if they were so sharp, they would have Tahiti partnership program.

Mr. Cole. I will be suitably humble in my questions.

I have got two, one parochial and one actually my good friend from Minnesota just touched on. And with some of the difficult budget decisions that you had, we have seen a cutback on the MC–12 mission, which is an ISR platform. For my friends that don’t know, there happens to be one of them located at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base in Oklahoma City, the 137th Special Operations Wing. They have done really incredible work, I mean, great work in Colombia. They just provide the capability that we can quite often give our allies that don’t have these kinds of platforms, and, you know, played an amazing role in a number of places. Some of them we can talk about publicly, some of them, quite honestly, we can’t. But we have got a lot of great pilots there. We have got a lot of great aviation support units there. We have got terrific facilities there.

So obviously, as that mission gets scaled down because the platform is being retired, we are concerned with what is going next there, if anything. So do you have any thoughts on that?

General Lengyel. Yes, sir. Well, I will tell you that I agree with everything you said about the 137th SOW. They are respected. They are a great platform. They have done incredible work in SOUTHCOM, in AFRICOM in particular, for two combatant commands that kind of beg for capability to do their jobs. The 137th SOW is an incredible platform.

I would say that I think that there are funding issues, as you mentioned. The Defense Wide Review, they do a lot of the work for Special Operations Command, and Special Operations Command
does fund the contract logistics support to maintain that aircraft. And in the course of this year's budget, they eliminated that funding for the contract logistics support. So we are in the process now of looking at going—until we can get that extended, until we find a replacement mission, because the Air Force is short of pilots, you know, and we need to retain the aviation skills of the people in that unit. So we are trying to extend to the point that we can, yet to be determined if we can. The SecDef approved that money to be gone, so we are working with the Air Force and with Special Operations Command to find a replacement mission for the 137th, if that is what it comes to.

Mr. Cole. Well, I appreciate that very much, and just want to flag that we want to work with you on that. Again, platform is one thing. The real essence of it, honestly, is the quality of the personnel in terms of the maintenance and the pilots themselves and what have you. So it is an asset, I think, from a personnel standpoint. As you point out, we are pilot short now. We don't need to be losing these kinds of capabilities.

Second question, just quickly, and you have already answered part of this, but this is more—I share my friend from Minnesota's concern with coronavirus. Because I noted from working on the supplemental, I haven't seen anybody talking about how to replace anything we expend out of these accounts on that, or your facilities are slated for backup if we were to have a problem and all the HHS facilities got up—filled up. We don't know that that would happen, but you would be pressed into service very, very rapidly.

So I am glad you are planning on it and thinking about it. I think you are very wise to be looking a little further ahead. I would just urge, Mr. Chairman, and certainly to you, General, we are going to have a supplemental at some point. I know we are negotiating it. My guess is there might be more than one at some point. These things are just hard to anticipate, given that it is a brand-new virus. Please don't be shy about getting your accounts filled back up if we end up pressing them into duty, because we don't know we need to be robbing Peter and paying Paul here. We have already done a lot of that to you, quite frankly, as my friend, the chairman, pointed out. Does not need to happen on this particular national emergency. We may well need you, but we shouldn't be taking other things from you, particularly as much as we are asking you to do.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Bustos.

NATIONAL GUARD FUNDS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

Mrs. Bustos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And really appreciate your time with us today, General. And since this is your last hearing season, I want to thank you for your stewardship of the Guard and thanks to your family as well.

Since 9/11, our Nation has asked much of your soldiers and your airmen, guardsmen deployed to support Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, Inherent Resolve, and Freedom Sentinel. Over 700 guardsmen's lives have been lost, 5,000 wounded in action. So we will continue to rely on the Guard to execute
our National Defense Strategy as we focus on near-peer competition.

To be successful, however, our Nation must ensure that our guardsmen train and deploy with the same equipment as their Active Duty counterparts, and you talked about this a little bit when Chairman Visclosky started this out. So you said that you were not notified in advance that the Department of Defense would spend over a billion dollars that Congress had already appropriated to modernize the Guard and instead divert that to the border wall construction instead, speaking of robbing Peter to pay Paul, I guess I will use that same phrase as Mr. Cole.

What worries me, and I am going to be very specific to my congressional district that I am fortunate enough to serve, but our air guardsmen maintain and fly the older C–130H models in Peoria. And those are the—as you know, those are the Vietnam war era airframes that the Active Duty Air Force doesn't fly anymore. And the NGREA funds were supposed to have provided critical survivability upgrades to those older C–130H models. On top of that, now Congress has been notified that DOD will use the money that we appropriated to acquire new C–130J models for the border wall also.

And I guess, General, the fact that you weren't notified, and I am guessing that means that folks in Peoria, this caught them by surprise as well, and I guess I am wondering, these are, you know, obviously very important people that we are lucky enough to have in our Nation and serving our country. Just kind of what message do you think would be important for me to take home the next time I meet with these folks about this? You had mentioned, at minimum, it is a 1-year delay in all of this, but kind of play that out a little bit, if you could.

General Lengyel. Yes, ma'am. You know, I will start off again by saying NGREA is a critically important source of income, money. It is our only procurement source to upgrade some of our legacy platforms. It is the only one that we have. And so what I will tell you is, you know, it is a unique source of revenue, of income for us to use because we don't have a program line for it. We only get it at the good will of the Congress year after year after year.

One of the reasons they took it was they said, well, it wasn't being obligated. It wasn't spent at certain rates that procurement money is normally spent at. We never have spent NGREA dollars at 80 percent in the first year. It is impossible for us to do it. One, we never know how much we are going to get. Two, rarely do we get it at the beginning of the year. CR, CR, CR, so it comes late in the year. So we are unable to get it on contract and spend it in time. So it is not unusual at all for us to have low levels of obligation rates.

But we spend all of it within the 3-year period. 99.95 percent is spent within 3 years. You can go back to 1994, I think, was the last time we missed it, and we just missed it by a tad, but 99 is all spent.

And that money, we have special—the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Test Center in Tucson allows us to not only buy things less expensively but innovatively. We are able to work with
industry for our platforms to make fast, quick upgrades to our systems that the Air Force, frankly, doesn’t—they can’t do. Their acquisition system isn’t built to do things like that. Only we can do it in the Guard. So all of the things that you mentioned.

And it is hard to quantify the impact of delaying it a year. I don’t know who is going to be flying a C–130 that may have needed that defensive warning system on it. These airplanes will still deploy. They will still go around the world. They will still be flown in combat and in harm’s way. And does 1 year make a difference to some airman who is going to fly in that C–130 that slipped a year to be upgraded? Nobody in this room knows that.

So I just—you know, the many things that we have done to upgrade the C–130s at Peoria or the other 13 combat-coded C–130 units that are in the Air National Guard, you know, it is a significant impact to us. And I have conveyed that to the Secretary and to the Chairman. And just to be clear, they did tell me they were going to do it 2 days before they sent the reprogramming, but I was not consulted, you know, in the decision of what pots of money to take in order to pay for the border wall.

Mrs. BUSTOS. So with 2 days advance notice on this, it is not like you could say absolutely not, this can’t happen.

General LENGYEL. Well, I don’t have the power to say absolutely not, this doesn’t happen. I don’t control the money.

Mrs. BUSTOS. And if you had, I am guessing that probably—

General LENGYEL. If I did, I would have pushed back substantially on it.

Mrs. BUSTOS. Yes.

General LENGYEL. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. BUSTOS. Thank you.

General LENGYEL. A very important pot of money, and my hope is that this was a 1-year blip. So if it is a 1-year instance, then I would tell you that we are going to be able to recover, but—it is going to hurt, but we are going to be able to recover. You know, take $800 million out of modernization, you are going to feel it. But the money came from, you know, things that were going to be important to the National Guard.

Mrs. BUSTOS. If it is 2-year blip?

General LENGYEL. It makes the materiel risk worse, you know. That is where I told the Chairman this is where I see there will be strategic impact. You know, just go back 10 years. You have given the National Guard almost $7 billion to upgrade our equipment. There is strategic combat capability in $7 billion in the equipment that we have in the National Guard. So if we were to lose it for a long period of time, I would say I might meet that threshold that the chairman gave us. So, unknown. It is a hypothetical question, but it is very important revenue for us and for our platform and for the people who fly them.

Mrs. BUSTOS. Thank you, General, and again, thanks for your 40 years of service.

General LENGYEL. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS. General, I join my colleagues in saying our profound thanks for your 40 years of service to your country, essentially your lifetime. We thank you for your dedication and your quality that you bring to this chore.

Speaking of the C–130s, as you know, I have been involved in efforts to modernize your fleet and supported the procurement of two squadrons’ worth of 130–Js over the last several fiscal years. I know that the basing process for these aircraft is being led by the Secretary of the Air Force in close consultation, supposedly, with the National Guard. Can you tell us the role that you and the Air Guard have played in the basing process for these 130–Js? And do you feel that you and the Air Guard have been appropriately consulted about that?

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir, I can. So, you know, I can’t remember the month that it was, but it was sometime, I think, in the fall. We sent out to the field, the community of interests, in the C–130 community, here is the criteria that is going to be used to look at the 13 combat-coded C–130 bases that are out there. The Air National Guard was instrumental in developing what that criteria might be in terms of creating some sort of a matrix to determine who was the most valued—or the most appropriate candidates to be looked at.

The Air Force basing process always does that, and they will then winnow that list down to a smaller number. That list will be released sometime in the next month or two, in the relatively near term, from 13 to some lower number, seven or eight bases, most likely. And then each one of those eight bases will get a—a team will go and visit those bases and take a more detailed analysis of each location. And they will look at costs involved to transition the aircraft. They will look at ranges. They will look at training. They will look at the readiness units—of the units there. And then they will compile all of that data that will come back into the Air Force process, which we are a part of, as Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Air National Guard will be a part of that to make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force of the primary and preferred alternatives for who will get the C–130Js based in the near term.

So that is the way the process will work, and the Air National Guard is right involved with the total Air Force to do the analysis with it.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you feel like you have been treated fairly in consulting with the Air Force?

General LENGYEL. I do.

Mr. ROGERS. Now, these are Air Guard planes, right?

General LENGYEL. The planes that are to be stationed that are out there were bought for the Air National Guard by the United States Congress. They were adds.

Mr. ROGERS. And yet the Secretary of the Air Force is charged with making the decision.

General LENGYEL. Yes. Well, I think that, you know, we are still part of the Air Force. We still have to operate from the Air Force. We get our money from the United States Air Force. So it makes
sense to me that the Secretary of the Air Force has civilian control of the military and would run a process that is repeatable, defendable, and fair such that everyone can have a shot at getting the C–130s. I think it is a good process. I have watched it for many years, and I think that it keeps everybody honest throughout the system.

Mr. ROGERS. When will the decision be made?

General LENGYEL. I think the three bases that will get C–130Js in the near term should be announced sometime this summer.

Mr. ROGERS. This summer?

General LENGYEL. This summer.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Ruppersberger.

ADVANCED ELECTRONICALLY SCAN ARRAY (AESA) FOR F–16s

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First thing, I echo your comments about moving the $1.3 billion from the National Guard to the border wall. Makes no sense. Secondly, thanks for mentioning the Maryland National Guard, about 500 in Estonia. They have been there for years, and I have visited them——

Mr. VISCLOSKY. That is in your district——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, you know, it is a good thing, but you might not have voted for me, so I am not sure. Or run against me. That is even worse.

But, you know, Russia has attacked them so much, Estonia, that they are totally paperless. And as a result of being paperless, they are really working well, and Russia doesn’t have as much influence as they used to, so that is a good thing.

I am going to talk to you about—we dealt with this last year when you appeared before our committee, as far as the F–16, the advanced electronically scan array, AESA, radar upgrades as a top priority for the Air National Guard. I am pleased that Congress heard that request and added $75 million explicitly for these important upgrades.

How many Air National Guard F–16s still require these radars, and is it still a priority to fund the continued procurement of these radar upgrades, if so, and why?

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir. And I thank this committee for the $75 million that we got last year that gave us 30 more radars. Last year, I testified that we needed—that we had 261 F–16s that I thought were going to need AESA radars as we proceeded down the road. AESA radars, as you know, the initial buy was 72, which only converted a few radars, eight radars in nine different locations. It makes it difficult to manage, deploy, logistically use these aircraft with different types of radars.

So, you know, I do think that more need to be modified. With the 30 that we did last year, we are down to 231 left that don’t have AESA radars planned. Now, some of those in the end game may age out and be retired, so we wouldn’t probably want to buy all 231 radars all at once, because in the late 2020s or 2030s, some of those aircraft could be retired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yeah. They probably should.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this. How do these radars keep the homeland safe, and are the older F–16s that you addressed without this capability still viable? You said you are going to retire some.

General LENGYEL. They are viable, yes, sir. And, you know, they not only increase the capability of the platform to detect and engage threats that may be fired at the United States or fired at their own platform, but the AESA radar is a great detector. I mean, it also provides some significant defensive system capability for the platform when it has it. So it greatly enhances the combat capability of the F–16 when you put an AESA radar on it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The other question I have, my district is home to the National Security Agency and the CYBERCOM 175th Cyberspace Operation Squadron, and on a reoccurring basis I hear concerns of agency and military leaders about the recruitment, and most importantly, the retention of our cybersecurity workforce. What initiatives have you started to recruit and retain this vital skill in the Army Reserve? And maybe I should ask that question in the next round to your Army Reserve.

General LENGYEL. That is General Luckey in the Army Reserve. We are doing pretty well in our cybersecurity in the Air National Guard, as we have a large footprint of cyber warriors. But as with anything, getting and maintaining and keeping our people is getting harder to do. So the ability for us to have money to pay retention bonus, reenlistment bonuses—I asked for $100 million last year to do that—and keeping our talent is one of the hardest things that we now do in the National Guard.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome.

General LENGYEL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Good to see you. I like that term Texas associated with you.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Nobody likes what happened with the wall. Although I support it, I don’t like it being taken away. And what worries me most with my association with Fort Hood is that we are always trying to be more lethal and more ready every time we deploy. And I know that sometimes you have a shortage of either training or equipment issues that are special to the Guard and Reserve, and I want to know if there is anything that is interfering with the lethality of our force and their ability to be a deployable-ready force. And, if so, tell us what you need.

General LENGYEL. So, sir, I would tell you that the Adjutant Generals, the 54 Adjutant Generals in the States and territories tell me that the one thing that is most important to them to build and sustain readiness in their force is the appropriate level of full-time support in our formations. For 4 years, I have attempted to
raise the percentage of full-time force in our Army National Guard, and I have been patently unsuccessful.

So, you know, I will tell you that—give you an example. A company of 130 people is supposed to have four full-time people. It is supposed to have an admin, a training, a supply, and one other NCO in there that is supposed to maintain the readiness of the unit, the readiness NCO. And in most cases, we will have two of the four. And so it is—one, it is hard to get people to take those jobs because they are doing the jobs of four people. So that when that company of soldiers comes in to train for the weekend, they have the right equipment, the right range of schedule, the right training, all of the things they need to be called ready forces.

And so for 4 years, you know, we are about 11,000 full-time soldiers short in the Army National Guard to get us to 80 percent of what the Army says we need in this operational force that we are. And so I have asked for incrementally a thousand a year. So give me a thousand, and I will show you how that builds readiness, and then you can fund the next thousand. But it is not cheap. It is $100 million.

Mr. CARTER. So what are you limited to right now?

General LENGYEL. Pardon me?

Mr. CARTER. You said you need to recruit a thousand new people in the Guard this year.

General LENGYEL. I need the authorizations to hire a thousand full-time support.

Mr. CARTER. And what is your authorization for right now?

General LENGYEL. Right now, we are at about 57,000 people, 57,000.

Mr. CARTER. But if you wanted to get a thousand this year, what would we have to do? Authorize it?

General LENGYEL. Can I provide you the number? Yes, we would need to authorize it and fund it.

Mr. CARTER. The authorization bill.

General LENGYEL. Right.

Mr. CARTER. All right.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Aguilar.

FUNDING FOR UNBUDGETED ACTIVITIES

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General. General, as of this last week, we have been told over 2,500 Guard personnel are supporting Operation Guardian Support along the southwest border. We have been told that it will extend through September of 2020. However, the administration hasn’t budgeted for these activities. How long can you sustain these unbudgeted activities, and what is the plan to help the personnel accounts recover?

General LENGYEL. So, yes, sir. This is an important question. So, you know, of the reprogramming activities that have occurred thus far, one that hasn’t is the ability to put back into our personnel accounts the money we are spending on the southwest border with the National Guard troops that are there. Last year—or this year, we will spend about $320 million, currently coming out of our own
accounts, to fund the National Guard men and women who are on the southwest border.

We need reprogramming action, and we have sent to the OSD comptroller a reprogramming action to tell her we need to get $285 million of that back from some other source or the National Guard will be required to make changes to what we are doing, i.e., a drill in the Army National Guard costs $100 million. So if we don’t get that money put back into our accounts where we can use that money for training, we will have to cancel a drill weekend in September or in August or in, you know, the last 3 months of the year, if we don’t get that $300 million approximately put back into our account. So it is a—that request is with the OSD comptroller, and, you know, I am trying to get it over here before next summer, because the closer we get to the end of the year, the more I get worried that we have to no notice make abrupt changes to our training plan for the year.

Mr. AGUILAR. You heard comments from the chairman and from members of this committee about the transfer and reprogramming authority, as well as those activities, and I think we all have concerns about that. And I know last year, when military construction accounts were raided, there were concerns about backfilling those as well, and I think that this body still has concerns about backfilling and what future behavior that leads to.

What are you hearing from guardsmen and women at the border operation itself? Do they understand their mission? What is their morale like with respect to this mission at the southwest border?

General LENGYEL. So generally, I think—I have been down there. It has been about 4 months or so since I have been to Texas and seen the actual activity going on on the southwest border, but they are motivated. They find the mission meaningful. They enjoy the opportunity to contribute to the security of the southwest border. I saw no one there that—you know, and right now, we have all volunteers there. We haven’t involuntarily mobilized anyone on the border. So no one is being pulled out of school or jobs or away from family that don’t want to be there. But I found, broadly speaking, they enjoy the work, they find it meaningful, and they are glad to have the opportunity to be there.

And we have amended, thank you, the benefits that they actually get to have TRICARE activities taken care of and some 9/11 GI Bill benefits taken care of for these men and women, so it is a better situation for them than it was in the past.

Mr. AGUILAR. I appreciate it.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. VISCILOSKY. Mr. Womack.

Mr. Womack. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the hearing.

And thanks to General Lengyel for your service, for what you meant to the Guard. Our Guard is better as a result of your leadership, and I appreciate that. I am a better Congressman because of your leadership, so thank you for the relationship we have had.
I don’t want to kick too much on this whole issue of taking the money out of the Guard accounts, but I am not going to let the moment pass, because I remember the days when I was jumping off of the back of an M60A3 TTS tank when the Active Component was training on the M1 Abrams. I remember those days. I felt like a second-class soldier, because I knew if I was called up, I wasn’t going to be on an M60A3 TTS; I was going to be on an M1. And it was probably even worse back in Hal’s day. I mean, the horse cavalry, I mean, they were——

Mr. WOMACK. But there is not a person sitting in this room today, as an elected official, that doesn’t represent a National Guard unit that doesn’t remember the day when we didn’t train on what we were going to fight with and how far we have come as a country, indeed, going all the way back to 9/11 and we started plugging this National Guard and Reserve force component structure into the warfight. We made them operational soldiers, and we promised them, we promised them that you were no longer going to be treated like that. You were going to be given the equipment that you were going to fight with.

And so just count me as one of the people not real happy with the fact that we have made the National Guard a bill payer for this country at the expense—and you can say it is a year, but there is not anybody in here that can argue with a straight face that this is a 1-year deal. And this Congress ought to step up to the plate and fight it, in my opinion.

Humvee modernization. How long have we been—I mean, we are in the middle of that right now. How much more do we have to go? I mean, these vehicles have been through a lot of conflict.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOMACK. They need repairs.

General LENGYEL. They have. And, you know, we have had significant and regular adds to modernize our Humvee fleet in the Army National Guard over the past several years and certainly since I have been the Vice Chief or the Chief, and we have made enormous process—progress. So the ambulances have all been upgraded. The TOW missile variants have all been upgraded. You know, they are in the process now of, you know, continuing to modernize the fleet, the JLTV is a bit down the road, but to make sure that we have the right fleet.

All of the adds that we get, whether it is C-130s or Humvees or NGREA money, is critical to the force structure, the equipment, the things that we have to not just fight the war, but the things that we have, in many cases, to do our jobs here in the homeland as well.

Mr. WOMACK. And worse than that, in my opinion, it is the message that we are sending to our citizen soldiers in our communities, people that we go to school with, shop with, worship with, these folks that have put their hand up like everybody else and said I will go. Again, we have made a promise to them, and we robbed from that promise, I think. And the sooner we can get this money back and give some more certainty to our Guard and Reserve forces, the better off I think we will be.

I just don’t like sending a message to them that we are going to relegate them back to second-tier status, because that is not the
message we want to be sending to people that have—you know, you
go in the Rayburn foyer, and there is a whole bunch of names in
there. And I promise you, there is a whole bunch of them that came
out of the National Guard that are up there on that wall giving
their life for their country. So anyway, thanks for letting me rant
just a minute.

SPACE FORCE

I want to pivot to Space Force. I think this is another oversight.
In everything we do where the Guard is involved, we bring value
to the fight. And I would say that we probably bring as much
value, if not more value, to the potential Space Force as we do in
any of the other components. Well, we have that inherent ability
throughout the civilian sector, and obviously we have guardsmen.
In my State, as you know, I have got a——

General LENGYEL. 153rd Intel Squadron, yes.

Mr. WOMACK. Exactly. I have got an intel squadron. So in Joe
Lengyel’s perfect world, how would this Space Guard be aligned
and arranged within the Space Force?

General LENGYEL. Okay. So if you are asking my personal opin-
ion, I would tell you that, you know, I think that I spend a lot of
my time as I talk about space trying to dispel myths about what
we are trying to do. Some people think we are trying to create
something that is going to be 54 in every State, territory, and Dis-
trict of Columbia, because we have air and Army units in all 54.
That is not—there is no proposal from anybody to do that.

What I mentioned earlier was, you know, I have advocated, at no
cost, to just create a Space National Guard in law so that somebody
can be in the Space Force and the Space National Guard of the
United States and the Space National Guard of their States. That
is what we do in the National Guard. We are under the command
and control of the State leadership. So that there would be a com-
ponent created such that the space capability that currently resides
in the Air National Guard would move over and be part of now the
Space Force. I think that is important.

The Space Force is going to train, plan, doctrine. It is going to
have its own culture. It is going to have its own uniform. The men
and women who are in our space enterprise right now are worried.
They are like, hey, how come no one wants to create this compo-
nent, you know? And I say, hey, they are just trying to get it right.
Hang on, they are going to get this right in the end. But, you know,
as people decide, for whatever reason, to go work for SpaceX or
Blue Horizon or some commercial space entity, as people are prone
to do, they won’t see the Air National—or the Space National
Guard as a possibility to continue to contribute their military serv-
ice. I think that is an important part.

So ideally, when we have this component built at the same time
such that, hey, the Title X force, they are already there. There is
a Space Force, and they can just move them when the Air Force
wants to. Right now, there is not a component to move the Air Na-
tional Guard into a Space National Guard. So at some point in the
future, I think they should do that. And so that when—ideally for
me, they should go the same day. Everybody takes off Air Force,
puts on Space Force. That is about the cost of it.
I have people on my staff right now that are doing the space mission. I don’t need a bigger staff in NGB to manage this. No States need any more generals to manage this in the States. The people are there. They are funded. They are paid for. They have equipment. We just need the ability for them to be part of this new service as the Space Force stands up. I think they will get there sooner or later.

EFFECT OF A CR ON THE GUARD

Mr. Womack. I have one more quick question, and that is, while we are in the appropriations markup season now and we have all these great ideas as to how we are going to get this done and get it done real fast and get it done on time, there is probably not anybody in here that really believes that, that we are going to have a conferenced bill ready to sign before October 1. So we are going to be on a CR, and that CR probably is going to be kicked into who knows when. What effect does that have on you?

General Lengyel. The CR always has the same effect it does on us in terms of, well, we can—it devastates programs that live on congressional adds, for one thing, like State partnership programs that we are going to have events and we don’t get the money because we don’t have a budget. That hurts. It hurts our men and women who—you know, a CR, we all think it is a good idea that it ends on a Friday. Generally, they end on Fridays. Well, the men and women who were going to go to drill weekend on that Saturday, they don’t know whether to travel to their Guard unit or——

Mr. Womack. They may be en route.

General Lengyel. They may be en route. And all of a sudden, they say, sorry, we got it, or we didn’t get it. It costs us money because if we have to cancel drills or training events that we have prearranged contract to build readiness things, like medical evaluations, dental evaluations, or food support for major exercises that we were going to run, we lose all that money. And so it is money that is gone, and we don’t get it back because we can’t change it.

So it really disrupts our ability to train, and it jerks around our force. I mean, the men—you know, our most valuable weapon system are the 450,000 people that wear the uniform. And in these days with a good economy and other choices, it is getting harder and harder to make them choose to continue to serve. So I don’t like it when we don’t give them predictability. That is what they need. They need predictability.

Mr. Womack. Absolutely. Thank you, General, for your service to your country. Thank you.

General Lengyel. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Visconsky. Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

CUTS TO VITAL AIRCRAFT UPGRADES

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here. I represent Tucson and southern Arizona, and it includes part of the border. The presence of the National Guard in Arizona is really important to us. I just want you to know how much we appreciate your being there. And there are men and women who are our neighbors, and we want to make
sure that they have the resources, the equipment, everything they need to do their job.

And so I really have some concern about this plan to cut vital aircraft upgrades. My question is specific to what is this going to do to the Guard's F–16, KC–135, RC–26, and MQ fleets, especially in terms of the Guard's ability to be ready, be responsive, and its crucial contributions to our joint force mission success.

General Lengyel. So, ma'am, there is programs involved with, I believe, all of those platforms. F–16s in particular have missile warning systems that because this money is gone, will either get deferred or delayed before they put it on there. The KC–135, we are creating systems that give enhanced situational awareness to the crews in the cockpit. It gives them the ability to see planes and systems and threats that are around them. That will get delayed or deferred. Other things such as the RC–26 and MQ fleets, if I could give that—take that for the record, I could tell you what those were, but——

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. That is fine.

General Lengyel. You know, many of these things are invented at the test center in Tucson. Right there.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Yes.

General Lengyel. And the ability to identify the need to identify contractors that can take commercial, off-the-shelf things and we can integrate them into our platforms quickly, it all happens right there. So it is definitely an impact to the force.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you so much. You know, this is a personal interest of mine because of my district and our proximity to the border and how much we rely on those men and women for protection. So just know that you have got my support, and we will do everything possible to help you out in that regard. Thank you.

General Lengyel. Thank you, ma'am.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I don't know if I need to yield any time to Mr. Rogers to respond to the Colonel, but I don't think so. I think there will be later opportunities for that, right?

Mr. Womack. Consider the source.

Mr. Diaz-Balart. General, you have heard a lot of our colleagues here thank you for your service, but you know something, it is genuine and it is heartfelt, and we all feel that way.

General Lengyel. Thanks.

SPACE FORCE

Mr. Diaz-Balart. So just let me add my voice to that as well. And I believe it was the mayor who talked about Space Force, and I was going to ask you about that. You explained it, what sounded like a really logical explanation, so if it is so logical and so simple, why is it not happening?

General Lengyel. Yes. Sir, that is a good question. I mean, frankly, there is some—you know, they want to make sure they get the Space Force right. That is what I will say. I think, you know, General Raymond has got an opportunity to look here, and, you know, they are trying to investigate and see can they create some-
thing that is even better than what we have now at the 21st century National Guard. I mean, we have honed ourselves pretty well, I think, over the years. We very little resemble what we were in 1636 or pre-9/11. So I think they want to make sure that they get it right.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. Is there a lot of communication, General? Because, you know, there are a lot of folks that you have that are, in essence, you know, private sector, right, that have a lot of——

General Lengyel. There are.

Mr. Díaz-Balart [continuing]. Expertise that doesn’t potentially exist anywhere else. And so are they communicating with you? Are they aware of some of these special assets that your folks have that, frankly, nobody else may have?

General Lengyel. I think they are. I think broadly speaking, we have good support amongst the Air Force and the Space Force. And most people will tell you the phrase of “I can’t imagine the Space Force without the National Guard.” You know, I think—but they are being careful and they are going slow.

And some people—sometimes the Guard can be seen as a hard organization to work with. We have got States, and they don’t understand it as well, so it is my job to convey how this works, make them see the benefits of the dual-use nature of our force, the ability for governors to task us for COVID virus or fires or floods or earthquakes or cyber. People thought, when they created the cyber force, that you didn’t want to put it in the Guard because there was not a State mission. Well, they have used the Space Force already to fight fires and to fight floods and to expedite resources and recovery. So I think part of it is just, you know, beating the drum and making sure they understand the value of it.

125TH FIGHTER WING

Mr. Díaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just another question about the 125th Fighter Wing. It carries, I think, a unique role, and just because of its geography, right, a critical national security role. Obviously, a lot of us, you know, want to make sure that they are equipped with the most advanced fighters available. You and I have had this conversation, I think, on more than one occasion, but just your thoughts about the prospects for, you know, the latest, best fighter.

General Lengyel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. The possibilities of them being there.

General Lengyel. Right. So as you know, the F–15Cs that are there and getting old and getting older faster, and so that the Air Force is in the process of looking quickly to replace them with either F–35s or a newer version of the F–15, EX, they call it. And so the Air Force will go through a basing process, much like I talked to Chairman Rogers about in terms of the C–130H. Same sort of mentality and methodology that we will go through, and there is a lot of things that will make Jacksonville compete very strongly, I believe, for F–35s.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. Thank you, General.

General Lengyel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Ryan.
REPROGRAMMING OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Womack got me all fired up there. And I just want to say that I have been here 18 years. Many of you have been here much longer than that. This assumption of Presidential authority has been happening for the last couple of decades, and here we find ourselves in a situation where our appropriated money for our priorities that we pass through Congress and you are not even acknowledged in that process, is extremely frustrating. And we have seen the diminishment of authority that Article I created so that the people govern the country, and whether it is congressionally directed spending, whether it is what Members of Congress get paid versus the judiciary or versus the executive branch, this is consistently happening. Here is the end of the road. And like the gentleman from California said, they already have money to do the wall.

And the European Command was in here the other day and talked about 44 projects in European Command, and we are talking about battling against Russia and interference in elections and the drills that need to happen there and protecting our own equipment. Forty-four projects in the European Command are not going to get built because of this. I am upset too because in the Reserve, we have C-130Js. We put money in for four of those. Money for two of them are gone, and we are all dealing with this.

And I just wanted a little therapy session here myself. If everybody else was getting one, I figured I might as well, you know, participate in it. And it is very, very frustrating for us who sit here every single day. Mr. Chairman, we see the threats from China. We see the threats from Russia. We see the complexities around the world. We see the Iranian enrichment in Iran. We see what is happening in Syria. You know, this is what we do all day long. This is what you do. And to just have this money go out the door without any consultation to you or us is extremely frustrating.

SHORTFALL OF FIGHTER PILOTS

And so to kind of piggyback on some of the other questions here, we were talking about the Air Force and competition and keeping the talent that we need. And we know that the study that the Defense Department showed us that said the Air Force is hurting for about 800 Active Duty pilots and 1,150 Reserve pilots. The shortfall is most acute within the fighter community. An estimate from the Rand Corporation states that the Active Duty pilot deficit will grow to 1,607 by 2023. And a report by Rand concluded that increasing aviation incentive pay to increase retention was more efficient than expanding the training pipeline to sustain a given pilot inventory.

We know that there are—I think the estimate is about 30,000 pilots are going to retire from the commercial airlines in the next 6 years, and so we will be in direct competition to try to hire pilots and get them into the military.

So can you speak on how you assess giving the parity in aviation incentive pay will help and cut the long-term costs and maintain
the readiness of the force, something that we are all very, very concerned about?

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir, I can. I think the only good news for me in that story is you can be an airline pilot and a pilot in the National Guard. That allows us to retain talent and do it.

With regard to incentive pay, I would tell you this. There has been a discussion, which I support, of, you know, when you are a member of the National Guard, if you fly 1 day, you get 1 day’s worth of flight pay. This applies to the Army as well, not just the Air Force. You know, and I think that there is an argument to be made that, you know, it doesn’t matter how many times you fly in the Active Component, you don’t have to fly at all. You still get your flight pay for the full month.

So I think to retain not just our Air Force pilots but our Army helicopter, our Army aviators, we should look at the way we can, and there is a bill here, but how do we get a full month’s pay for—if you have the skill set to be an aviator or some special skill that gives you an incentive pay, we should look at the ability to give it to you for a full month as opposed to just 1 day.

Some of it is the money. Some of it is people can be incentivized with affiliation bonuses to join the Reserve component. Some of it with specialty pay and bonuses can be incentivized to stay. But no doubt in my mind that it does help, and we are seeing a lower number of people affiliate with us when they leave the Active Duty than we used to. We are seeing more people leave at the mid grade, captains and junior officers, when their term is up than there used to. I think it is just more lucrative and not required in some cases. And because we are an operational force, they are working harder.

So we have to take every avenue to look across the spectrum to see what we can do to retain our specialty, our aviators in particular.

Mr. RYAN. I appreciate that. Let me add my voice as well to thanking you for your years of service, and to your wife and your family for all of the dedication and commitment you have shown this country. You have been a delight to work with over the last few years, and continued success in your retirement.

General LENGYEL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RYAN. If you are like all the other people who were in government and now out of government, they are the ones smiling, walking around the hallways now. You can pick them from a mile away.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RYAN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Crist.

LARGER PRESENCE OF THE GUARD IN FLORIDA

Mr. CRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for holding this hearing.

And, General, thank you for your service to our country.

General LENGYEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CRIST. Forty years is a long time.

General LENGYEL. It is.

Mr. CRIST. You don’t look old enough to have served 40 years, but God bless you obviously.
General Lengyel. It is really 39. It is close to 40.

Mr. Crist. There you go. I don’t have a lot to ask you. But even though Florida, and Congressman Diaz-Balart is well aware of this as I am, we are the third largest State in America. We have almost 22 million citizens. But Florida ranks 14th in total guardsmen and 49th in guardsmen per State resident. As you know, when one serves as governor of the State, as I was privileged to do, you also serve in another role, you are the commander in chief of the Florida National Guard, in my case. And I have seen firsthand how important the guard is, you know, how treating disasters—and, you know, Congressman Diaz-Balart and I many times will be together. We started out together, in fact, in the State senate in 1992, and we have been through a lot of hurricanes in Florida and a lot of fire in the Sunshine State, and without the National Guard being able to help us protect our beautiful State, we would be in a bad place.

And that also extends to other States who will contribute, you know, some of their guardsmen and women when there is a natural—you know, huge disaster in any State in the country. It is a great partnership, and we treasure it.

And so the concern I have, I guess, is that, you know, when Florida may be recovering from a disaster of any type, there may be other governors who might be somewhat reluctant to readily dispatch their guardsmen or women, because they might have their own disaster to deal with. That is pretty understandable. So is there a way to get a 22-million populated State a justifiable number of your colleagues in a better way? Please, sir.

General Lengyel. Yes, sir. And I will tell you, we look at that all the time. We look at the ability. We have States that have a structure that they can’t recruit to.

Mr. Crist. Right.

General Lengyel. Demographics have shifted, and it is incumbent upon us to look at that to make the hard decision to move structure to where we can recruit to it. And so I can tell you that we look at that regularly, routinely. And States with excess capacity to recruit we will attract as mission comes up. So I can tell you it is something that we look at, sir, and I think it is a great point.

Mr. Crist. Thank you. I appreciate that very much.

Should the coronavirus or another large scale event require a national response, I fear governors will do what they just may do because they care about their citizens so much. So if you can help me—us, forgive me—find a way to address this, it would be greatly appreciated. And I want to extend and associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues on this committee in thanking your family, and your wife in particular, for sharing you with the United States of America.

General Lengyel. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

Mr. Visclosky. That will conclude this panel.

General, we want to thank you for your life of service. You are the kind of person that been deathly serious about your work, but you are gracious as well. God bless you. Thank you.

General Lengyel. Thank you very much. Thank you all.
Mr. CALVERT. One last comment. I suspect some of them are no longer along the southern border.

General LENGYEL. Right, they were.

Mr. CALVERT. And when I say—it is not the coronavirus, it is COVID–19, for those of us who live in the city of Corona.

REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN VISCLOSKY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I welcome our second panel, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserves.

I would encourage people to continue to participate in the hearing process.

Our second panel this morning consists of the leaders of the Reserve components, Lieutenant General Charles Luckey, Chief of the Army Reserve; Vice Admiral Luke McCollum, Chief of the Navy Reserve; Major General Bradley James, Commander, Marine Corps Reserve; and Lieutenant General Richard Scobee, yes, Chief of the Air Force Reserve. I am sorry.

We are pleased to welcome these four distinguished general officers as witnesses today, and while we thank each of you for your service, we want to especially recognize Lieutenant General Luckey and Vice Admiral McCollum for your years of service and wish both of you the very best of luck in your future endeavors.

I will recognize, first of all, Mr. Calvert for any opening remarks he has, and then would ask you to proceed with your testimony.

REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interest of time, I will keep my remarks brief, but I would like to welcome our Reserve component witnesses here today. Each of you represent thousands of men and women who serve, their families who support them, and their employers who support that effort. I look forward to hearing from each of you on current operations, training requirements, and what Congress can do to help each of your services be more lethal and ready. Thank you for your service.

And I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Calvert.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL LUCKEY

General Luckey, you may proceed.

General LUCKEY. Chairman, Ranking Member—Chairman, if I may, begin by—and I am aware of the hour and I will be brief in my remarks, but I want to, on behalf of this team, thank you for your service as well as the leader of this committee, and I appreciate the support this committee has given all of us over the last several years.

Distinguished members, thank you for this opportunity once again to sit in front of you as an extremely supportive committee of the Armed Forces of the United States and the Reserve Forces in the United States.

For the past 4 years, you have patiently given me a chance for a few precious minutes to brag about the superb team of motivated soldiers and civilians that I have the honor to lead, supported by
their families and employers at home, as we continue to press into
the future, leading America's Army Reserve down the road to awe-
some. I know you share my pride in this magnificent component of
the Army. On behalf of all of them, all of us, I want to thank you
again for your stalwart support and your genuine interest in our
soldiers, their families, and the life-balance challenges inherent in
their calling.

In the interest of time and to get briskly to your questions and
concerns, I will keep my bragging short this afternoon. I have spo-
ten to most of you many times about the improvements and readi-
ness, warrior ethos, aggressive innovation that we have sparked to-
gether over the last 4 years. Much of it is reiterated in my filed
statement, and I will not repeat it here. But more to the point, no
words can adequately express the depth of my respect or affection
for this phalanx of professionals who bring such warfighting capa-

It has been the humbling honor of a lifetime for me to have been
able to serve as the quarterback of this awesome team. As the Ser-
geant Major of the Army expresses it so wonderfully, this is my
squad and I shall miss it very, very much.

I cannot overstate the degree to which your support of our efforts
to resource key initiatives, whether it be in the advancing of mod-
erization of this squad or in the interoperability of the total Army.
It helped me as a lead sled dog for this team chart a course and
set the tone for building and sustaining the most capable combat-
ready and lethal Federal Reserve force in the history of the United
States.

Your demonstrated resolve to reinforce our initiatives to train
and field a squad of almost 200,000 soldiers, who, upon very short
notice, can deploy and fight and scale against a peer adversary has
been essential and it has been reassuring. In the end, readiness is
the essence of relevance, and it starts with our people.

In daily practice, putting people first in America's Army Reserve
will continue to mean what it has always been for us. Our strategic
challenge is to be ready enough to be relevant but not so ready that
our soldiers can't keep good, meaningful civilian jobs and healthy,
sustaining family lives. Commanders at every echelon on this team
understand that basic truth, and we will never take our eye off
that ball.

Looking to tomorrow, your Army Reserve will continue to lever-
age its Ready Force X construct is the way in which we will see
ourselves, organize ourselves, assess risks, both risks to mission
and risk to force, for the senior leadership of the Army and the Na-
tion. As the commander of this force, I assess that even though we
have dramatically increased our readiness posture over the last 4
years, we have done so in achieving a sustainable level of readiness
for the outyears over the long haul. I gauge that fact based on a
number of different factors and data, the most compelling of which
to me is that the retention rate—the attrition rate of the Army Re-
serve is the best that it has been in 19 years.

We press on in the future more ready, more lethal, more deter-
minded, determined to meet the challenges of our time to win the
Nation's wars, while also well-prepared to leverage our soldiers and
capabilities when disaster strikes in support of our fellow citizens at their time of greatest need. Building this sustainable capability and infusing this squad with a profound sense of purpose has been an awesome ride.

I thank you for your support, for supporting all of us on this journey, and I look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of General Luckey follows:]
STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES D. LUCKEY
33D CHIEF OF ARMY RESERVE AND
8TH COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 116TH CONGRESS

ON THE 2020 POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE:
AMERICA’S GLOBAL OPERATIONAL RESERVE FORCE

MARCH 3, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
The increasingly complex and volatile global security environment, the changing character of warfare, and the rapid advance of technology continue to demand increased readiness and capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. As the dedicated federal reserve of the Army, America’s Army Reserve — its units-of-action and individual Soldiers — must be ready to mobilize, deploy, fight and win as an integrated part of the Army team anywhere in the World. More to the point, it must do so quickly.

Over a long history of wars and contingency operations, as well as domestic emergencies, the Soldiers of America’s Army Reserve have never failed to answer the Nation’s call, evolving from a small corps of medical professionals to what is today a global operational reserve force. Over the past several years, the Army Reserve initiated a major shift in posture — away from a rotational model to a force with sustained levels of readiness and a renewed emphasis on the field craft necessary to deploy, fight and win against peer threats. Today, we continue to build and sustain the most capable, combat-ready and lethal Federal Reserve force in the history of the Nation. It is a large undertaking. As a community-based force with a presence in all 50 states, five U.S. territories and 30 countries, America’s Army Reserve spans the globe with over 200,000 Soldiers and Civilian employees and 2,000+ units in twenty different time zones. It comprises nearly 20 percent of the Army’s organized units and over a quarter of its mobilization base-expansion capacity. As a unique set of enabling capabilities, the Army Reserve provides half of the Army’s maneuver support and sustainment formations, including medical, fuel distribution, civil affairs, logistics, and transportation units. Put simply, America’s Army Reserve supports U.S. national security interests by providing key and essential capabilities that the Total Army and the Joint Force need to dominate on the battlefield during the opening days of conflict. Nested within
the Army’s priorities of Readiness, Modernization and Reform, our supporting lines-of-effort are to:

- Build and sustain an increasingly capable, combat-ready and lethal force ready to deploy, fight and win.
- Continue to garner and sustain the support of our Soldiers’ Employers and Families as they work to maintain balance in their lives.
- Anticipate change as we shape and scope the Future Force, and leverage our unique and pervasive connections with the Nation’s private sector.

The challenges of building and fielding such an array of ready and lethal capabilities from the ranks of a largely part-time team is no small task. However, the diversity and efficiency of the force is also its strength. Leveraging a dispersed and dynamic phalanx of Soldiers and leaders with civilian-acquired or retained skills from over 140 different career fields, America’s Army Reserve brings the brains and brawn of the Nation to bear for the Army and the Joint Warfighter — when needed.

This effort requires a balance of pragmatism, operational drive and focus, and a strategic perspective on the tough business of driving deep and abiding cultural change. Shifting our orientation from predictable, rotational and episodic readiness and employment, to large-scale and short-notice combat operations against a peer threat demands a dramatic change in our mindset and perspective. At its core, only inspired leadership at echelon — combined with boundless energy and a pervasive commitment to embrace and deliver the warrior ethos within the context of existential warfare — will harden this team’s resolve and hone the decisive edge. This is the work that we are about.
PEOPLE FIRST

Our dynamic requirement remains straightforward, but tough: This team needs to be ready enough to be relevant, but not so ready that our Soldiers cannot maintain good, meaningful civilian jobs and healthy, sustaining family lives. This challenge is exacerbated by the simple fact that we must recruit and retain our ranks where Soldiers live and work, and anticipate emerging demographics by moving force structure to not only where talent resides today, but where it will be tomorrow. This process demands agility, synchronization and integrated planning. It also relies, without exception, upon the enduring support of thousands of Employers across America as well as our Soldiers’ Families.

Put simply, this part-time force would not be possible without the support of civilian Employers around the globe. They are our essential partners in National Security — sharing the best talent in the World — as they continue the commitment and sacrifice which allows Soldiers to serve the Nation while maintaining rewarding civilian employment. America owes those employers, who are willing to trade a short-term inconvenience or disruption to the “bottom line” in exchange for a more secure common future, a deep appreciation for sharing their workplace talent with America’s Army Reserve.

As with employers, nothing would be possible for an all-volunteer force unless our Families continued to stay on the team. There is no doubt that the Army depends on its Families to support its Soldiers and to share them with us. This is doubly true in the Reserve Component where many weekends and training days are consumed in what would otherwise likely be “family time” for our Active Component brothers and sisters. Accordingly, the Army Reserve relies heavily on
our Families, and the communities that support them, as we partner with a broad range of organizations and employers who support our military families.

To that end, America’s Army Reserve is pressing hard to leverage new technologies and opportunities to better communicate with our entire Army Reserve family. We are now fielding a new “smart phone friendly” application that enables our Families to self-organize and provide mutual support where they live and work at the zip code level without regard to their Soldier’s specific unit-of-assignment or chain-of-command. This Double Eagle mobile application (app) is also designed to help leaders maintain contact with Soldiers during the periods between battle assemblies, as well as conjure supporting resources for Soldiers and family members who may be in crisis. As a command insight tool, the app creates a broadly expanded level of access and connectivity, propagating the penetration-at-echelon of timely and relevant information and key aspects of commander’s intent. Across our dispersed battle-space, it will increase our Soldiers’ bond as a team while offering their Families similar opportunities as a critical partner in this undertaking. Finally, working in close coordination with US Army Recruiting Command, the app will be optimized to support the Total Army in identifying potential recruits for the team by leveraging the entire end-strength of America’s Army Reserve as real-time recruiters, living and working across America and scouting talent for the Nation.

BUILDING THE MOST CAPABLE, COMBAT-READY AND LETHAL FEDERAL RESERVE FORCE IN THE HISTORY OF THE NATION

In preparing to meet the challenges of this new and evolving threat paradigm, your Army Reserve is training, organizing and posturing itself to be able to respond on short notice to identify early-deploying formations, aggregate additional capabilities and move quickly to accomplish post-mobilization training tasks in order to meet the Warfighter’s time-sensitive requirements.
This construct, Ready Force X (RFX), is the way in which we focus energy, optimize processes and prioritize resourcing to deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance for a major war. Early-deploying RFX units and capabilities need to be able to move quickly—in some cases in days or weeks—in order to support the Joint Force in any significant conflict or demonstration of national resolve. We do not call this “fight tonight” readiness; we call it “fight fast” capability. From a cultural perspective, RFX requires each Soldier, at the individual level, to embrace the ethos of personal readiness. While many aspects of collective readiness at the unit level can be tuned-up quickly upon mobilization, the key individual Soldier requirements of physical fitness, medical readiness, tactical discipline, professional education, and fieldcraft proficiency must be “baked in” to the entire force. Put simply, at a profound level, we are all in RFX.

As noted above, this focus on fighting fast, and in opposition to a peer adversary, is a stark and challenging departure from the progressive and rotational (or cyclic) readiness models that have evolved over the past nineteen years of sustained operations, primarily in the CENTCOM theater of operations. Not only does it drive all aspects of our training to build increasingly high levels of both individual and collective readiness, but it enables us to prioritize equipping and modernization of certain formations or capabilities with a sustained level of focus over a period of years. This is because the lead capability sets and formations inside the RFX architecture do not “rotate” arbitrarily from one year to the next. This key attribute—the ability to plan and sustain a coherent training, equipping and resourcing strategy across a number of years for the bulk of America’s Army Reserve—will deliver ever greater capability and lethality as we move into the future.

As with the other Components of the Army, your Army Reserve pushes to stress Soldiers and units with relevant scenarios that emulate the full-spectrum, all-domain, aspects of the next
fight, while simultaneously acknowledging that we continue to deploy the force into the current one. By orchestrating, rationalizing and synchronizing strenuous training exercises and activities at a wide variety of training platforms and venues across North America, and around the globe, your Army Reserve has elevated its priority on combat-readiness and fieldcraft to an unprecedented level. Working closely with the other Components of the Army and, in many cases, with close partners and allies from around the World, America’s Army Reserve continues to build and expand upon opportunities to train the way we will fight: together. Whether it be our expanded and, essentially, year-round Cold Steel gunnery operation — now well into its fourth year — or an expansion of Combat Support Training Exercises (CSTXs), routine and embedded rotations at the Army’s Combat Training Centers, or ever closer collaboration with our teammates in the Army National Guard at such training venues as Northern Strike or Golden Coyote, we continue to explore expanded options to build readiness for tomorrow.

The Army Reserve is always looking to the future, and developing the capabilities and sustained readiness necessary to deter, and if deterrence fails, win the next fight. To that end, we have already received and deployed an initial tranche of 60 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), which we will use as training and familiarization platforms, setting the conditions for fielding-at-scale in the years ahead. As the leading edge of Army Reserve modernization, these initial JLTVs will support the Army Reserve Training Strategy and accelerate Army interoperability; both in training and on the battlefield.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

Always Present. Always Ready.

With Soldiers, facilities and capabilities in more than a thousand communities across the Nation, America’s Army Reserve is well-postured to respond quickly when disaster strikes and...
our fellow Americans are in their time of greatest need. Our key responsive capabilities include search and rescue units, aviation assets, route clearance engineers, medical units, water and fuel distribution operations, water purification and communications support; many of these forces have been well-tested over the recent past. While we fully acknowledge that our first responsibility is to leverage our unique capabilities to support the Army in winning the Nation’s wars, we also embrace our opportunity and mandate to respond to need, on no-notice, in the Homeland. As America’s Army Reserve demonstrated recently in its response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, Florence and Dorian, and in ongoing support operations in response to the recent earthquakes in Puerto Rico, we cede this responsibility to no one.

The Army Reserve has been able to invest in the capacity and depth to be well-postured to move quickly and effectively to support our fellow citizens when they need our support. This is a huge benefit to the Nation, and one that informs our focus as we look to the future.

While recognizing the Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead federal agency for disaster response in the Homeland, America’s Army Reserve is enhancing the immediate response authority of our Army Reserve Regional Commands to more effectively command and control units to execute emergency response operations in support of the American people. As an example, and to that end, we have reorganized, empowered and equipped our 1st Mission Support Command, headquartered at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to be the “go-to command” to generate and integrate your Army Reserve’s immediate response operations in the Caribbean when disaster response is needed. We will continue to shape, develop and scale this capability as we move forward, ensuring that we position our units and their equipment to become ever more responsive and operationally effective, whenever and wherever needed.

SHAPE AND GROW THE FUTURE FORCE: Modernize and Transform
From its inception in 1908, leveraging the huge capacity and existing technical capability of medical professionals in the Nation’s private sector, America’s Army Reserve has always brought depth in critical technologies to the Army for a massive discount to the taxpayers. Our times are no different. Drawing now upon its diverse and dispersed professionals working in a variety of leading edge technologies across the Country, your Army Reserve will tap into the finest brains in business, industry and academia to act as a screening force for the Army and an additive to National Security. This role is in our cultural DNA.

For the past two years, your Army Reserve has been on a path of transforming its structure and procedures to seize the “digital key terrain.” This journey presses on as our 2-star Innovation Command — still headquartered in Houston, Texas and now in Direct Support of Army Futures Command in Austin — assesses and develops emerging outposts in technology hubs across the country, focusing on the harnessing of skills and talent acquired or retained in the commercial sector. The command serves as a link for operational innovation and the development of concepts and capabilities to enhance the readiness of the future force by capitalizing on extensive “civilian acquired or retained” knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience. As a screening force for the Army, we are uniquely positioned to support the Army in staying on pace with rapidly emerging trends or opportunities in the private sector, while also providing a potential pool of on-demand talent for Army Futures Command. This process is already well underway.

As it pertains to cyberspace operations, we remain steadily on glide path to establishing Cyber Protection Teams at key locations around the country, such as Camp Parks, CA (Bay Area), Adelphi, MD (DC), San Antonio, TX, Fort Devens, MA (Boston), East Point, GA (Atlanta), and Coraopolis, PA (Pittsburgh). Moreover, the Army Reserve Cyber Operations Group (ARCOG), with five Cyber Protection Centers and ten Cyber Protection Teams, provided direct support to
Army Cyber Command (ARYBER), and general support to other government agencies including DHS, NSA, FBI and DIA. Army Reserve Cyber Soldiers bring unique skills and experience to the force from their civilian occupations, drawn from over 40 corporate, financial and academic institutions. The cyber talent within the Army Reserve delivers capability, improves cyber readiness, and increases our network defense capability. To identify and cultivate cyber talent, the Army Reserve created the National Cyber Private Public Partnership in 2015. This program places Soldiers in critical Army Reserve cyber formation and provides enhanced opportunities to pursue civilian careers in the field.

As for America’s Army Reserve is committed to achieving the Secretary of the Army’s intent of increasing both the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the Total Army. As the Principal Official of this Component of the Army as well as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, I have directed my team to consolidate supporting staff operations, re-shape headquarters and drive to an integrated Army Reserve Staff that is optimized to support each independent set of responsibilities as a holistic effort. This rigorous analysis and scrutiny predates the publication of the Department of the Army Reform Initiative memorandum and is advancing on pace. Over time, this initiative will enable us to strike the right balance between staffing headquarters, providing full time support to units in the field, and cascading appropriate authorities “down echelon”. We will continue to assess and evaluate the size, consolidation and function of headquarters as we press into the future, and we will adjust with agility and speed.

CONCLUSION

We remain grateful to the Congress for passing the FY20 defense appropriations bill. The need for consistent, predictable, and timely funding is critical to Army Reserve readiness and
modernization requirements. As a result of it, your Army Reserve will continue to meet the challenges of the time. In these dynamic and challenging times, we will stay steady in the saddle as we build the most capable, combat-ready, and lethal Federal Reserve in the history of the Nation.
Mr. VISCOLOSKY. Admiral, you may proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MCCOLLUM

Admiral McCOLLUM. Chairman Visclosky, I wish you well in your retirement as well.

And, Ranking Member Calvert and distinguished members of the subcommittee, just thank you again today for the opportunity to appear before you and advocate amongst our men and women of the Navy Reserve. And it is an honor to be here with my fellow Reserve component chiefs. To do what we do together is fight and lead our men and women so they can prevail in adversity.

It is my distinct honor to report to you on the Navy Reserve. Sometimes and often we call America’s Navy Reserve. Over 100,000 members in full-time, part-time, and on-call reservists in the IRR.

With me today is my wife, Leanna, whose steadfast support through my career exemplifies what so many spouses do to support their loved ones who deploy, often with very little recognition.

Also here is my Force Master Chief of the Navy Reserve, Chris Kotz. And I would like to personally thank him today for what he has done to advocate, to lead for the men and women, our sailors, deployed around the world.

Additionally, I would like to thank the thousands of employers who give up their employees to serve our country and a little bit of their entrepreneurial space to advocate and serve their country as well.

Today marks the 105th birthday of the Navy Reserve. And on this day, like most days, our men and women are serving around the globe in some of the most austere locations. And again, I would like to emphasize my thanks for this committee for the support that you have given us.

The necessity of an on-time appropriations bill cannot be overstated because it provides predictability, and as we have met with many of you, and we know that the reservists are at their best when they can be predictable with their family, their employer, and their military obligation.

In the modernization, Navy Reserve equipment, as well as systems, is critical to ensure that the Reserve remains interoperable with the Active Component to be called to do the Nation’s bidding whenever and wherever it may so choose. This budget includes a funding request to transition the Navy Reserve pay system to a cloud-based, user-friendly and on-time pay system.

And maintaining Navy Reserve aircraft is essential to provide a lethal Reserve, Navy Reserve force. And in the fiscal year 2020 National Guard equipment report outlines Navy Reserve priorities for recapitalization efforts and upgrades in aviation, including adversary aircraft, the P-8 maritime patrol craft, and the C-130 Tango Airlift. All these are focused on providing strategic depth.

I would also like to thank you for your continued support of military childcare. This budget funds an additional 5,000 slots for men and women in their childcare that will support the Navy.

In closing, I could not be prouder of our Naval Reserve force. I know you can’t tell, but it has been an honor of a lifetime to be able to serve amongst them and with them and coming away in-
spired every time I see them, combining their military skills, their civilian skills, and with the support of their families globally.

So on behalf of the men and women of the Navy Reserve, I thank you for your support, and look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Admiral McCollum follows:]
STATEMENT OF
VICE ADMIRAL LUKE M. McCOLLUM, U.S. NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVY RESERVE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
FISCAL YEAR 2021 NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
March 3, 2020
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Vice Admiral Luke M. McCollum
Chief of Navy Reserve
Commander, Navy Reserve Force

Vice Adm. Luke McCollum is a native of Stephenville, Texas, and is the son of a WWII veteran. He is a 1983 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and is a designated surface warfare officer. McCollum holds a Master of Science in Computer Systems Management from the University of Maryland, University College and is also a graduate of Capstone, the Armed Forces Staff College Advanced Joint Professional Military Education curriculum and the Royal Australian Naval Staff College in Sydney.

At sea, McCollum served on USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), USS Kinkaid (DD 965) and USS Valley Forge (CG 50), with deployments to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf and operations off South America. Ashore, he served in the Pentagon as naval aide to the 23rd Chief of Naval Operations.

In 1993 McCollum accepted a commission in the Navy Reserve where he has since served in support of Navy and joint forces worldwide. He has commanded reserve units with U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Military Sealift Command and Naval Coastal Warfare. From 2008 to 2009, he commanded Maritime Expeditionary Squadron (MSRON) 1 and Combined Task Group 56.5 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also served as the Navy Emergency Preparedness liaison officer (NEPLO) for the state of Arkansas.

As a flag officer, McCollum has served as reserve deputy commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; vice commander, Naval Forces, Central Command, Manama, Bahrain; Reserve deputy director, Maritime Headquarters, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; and deputy commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.

McCollum became the 14th chief of Navy Reserve in September 2016. As commander, Navy Reserve Force, he leads approximately 59,000 Reserve Component personnel who support the Navy, Marine Corps and joint force.

He is the recipient of various personal decorations and campaign medals and has had the distinct honor of serving with shipmates and on teams who were awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the Navy Unit Commendation, the Meritorious Unit Award and the Navy “E” Ribbon.
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my distinct pleasure to report to you today on the unparalleled talent and capabilities provided by the United States Navy Reserve. Today, the Ready Reserve Force consists of 59,641 Selected Reserve Sailors (including 10,153 Full Time Support members) 43,754 Individual Ready Reserve members and 422 civilians. This Ready Reserve Force of over 100,000 deliver strategic depth and operational capability to the Navy and Marine Corps team and the Joint Force in times of peace and war. The Navy Reserve prides itself on being a ready, agile force that provides valuable, vital support to the Navy and the Nation.

Your continued support of key enablers of the Navy Reserve is very much appreciated. Predictable Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) funding is critical for the success of the Navy Reserve. Keeping this account funded at President’s Budget (PB) enables the Reserve Component to execute its missions to the level of performance and professionalism expected of an integrated force multiplier.

In the past, the Navy Reserve focused on providing Individual Augmentees (IAs) to backstop the Joint Force effort to counter violent extremists. Great Power Competition requirements dictate that the Navy Reserve will pivot from an IA model to a unit-centric model capable of rapidly deploying trained and ready forces. A comprehensive review is underway to ensure that force structure, resourcing, manning and mobilization processes are aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) to meet the Great Power Competition.
NAVY RESERVED FORCE

Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC)

CNRFC operates six regional headquarters and 123 Navy Operational Support Centers (NOSCs), located in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Guam. NOSCs are the readiness generation centers of the Navy Reserve that provide administrative, training and readiness support to Reservists. Additionally, NOSCs are the face of the Navy in many parts of America where access to naval units is minimal compared to fleet concentration areas such as San Diego and Norfolk. The NOSC is a vital resource to the Navy that enables access to industry, academia and associations that support the Navy while also completing a vital recruitment mission. NOSCs also provide valuable support to veteran Sailors and fulfill the solemn duty of paying final tribute to Service members who have faithfully defended the Nation by providing funeral honors. Their strategic value to the Navy Reserve cannot be overstated due to the crucial role they play in supporting Reserve Sailors, Veterans and their families.

Commander, Naval Air Forces Reserve (CNAFR)

CNAFR is composed of one Naval Air Facility, two Joint Reserve Bases one air logistics scheduling agency and three air wings. Fleet Logistics Support Wing and Tactical Support Wing both reside at Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, while Maritime Support Wing is headquartered at Naval Air Station North Island, CA. The three air wings consist of 21 squadrons with 167 aircraft assigned. In addition to these standalone commands, the Navy Reserve operates 26 Squadron Augment Units and four fleet support units which directly support various AC Navy squadrons around the country including the Navy’s newest, carrier-based platforms, the CMV-22 Osprey and F-35C Lightning. The valued skill sets of over 8,000 aviation professionals in the Navy Reserve are critical to aviation readiness and safety. An
added benefit to the Total Force is that many of these highly skilled professionals perform a similar role in a civilian capacity, bolstering the Navy’s strength through their vast knowledge and experience.

A key component of the Navy’s ability to operate forward is proficient and well-trained Naval Aviators. During a time when pilot production is a high priority, Reserve Component Aviators provide CNATRA critical support in all phases of Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard undergraduate flight training. In 2019, skilled instructors within the CNATRA Reserve Component Command continued to provide 20 percent of the total student production across five Training Air Wings, contributing more than 53,000 flight hours and almost 27,000 student events.

Commander, Naval Information Force Reserve (CNIFR)

CNIFR, based in Fort Worth, TX, is the executive agent for nine Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) located throughout the country. In partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency Joint Reserve Intelligence Program, these facilities provide fully capable intelligence and cyber warfare centers enabling wartime readiness through training and operations, and real-time intelligence support to Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, the intelligence community, and Navy fleets. There are a total of 28 JRICs located across the country, providing members of the Navy Reserve a “train as you fight” environment utilizing the same systems and tactics, techniques and procedures as the parent commands. For the last 17 years, Reserve Component Information Warfare (IW) Sailors have provided approximately 80 percent of the total IW Individual Augmentation manpower, and continues to source 551 recurring IW mobilization requirements. This has been a critical mission in the fight against violent extremists requiring an enormous commitment by Reserve Sailors. Additionally,
the Navy Reserve is poised to support space operations. Today, the Reserve Space Cadre contains approximately 125 qualified officers focused on space operations and acquisition, enhanced warfighting capabilities, and integration of space knowledge into fleet operations.

**Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)**

Headquartered at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia, NECC is comprised of Coastal Riverine and Naval Construction Forces; Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Diving and Salvage Units; and expeditionary units providing logistics capabilities. Currently, NECC is manned with more than 8,000 Sailors, 50 percent of which are Reserve Component Sailors working alongside their Active Component counterparts in the Navy and Joint Force to provide invaluable expertise based on prior service experiences. NECC Forces execute full spectrum military operations to shape the battlefield environment, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and conduct major combat operations.

**PERSONNEL**

**Civilian Skills**

The specialized skillsets that Navy Reserve Sailors possess make it an indispensable force multiplier that is leveraged on a daily basis in support of Navy and Marine Corps missions. In order to capitalize on the individual expertise of Reserve Sailors, the Navy Reserve has embarked on an initiative to enroll Selected Reservists in a Reserve Civilian Skills Database. To date, over 12,000 Selected Reservists have voluntarily reported their unique civilian skills and certifications. Capturing these skills enables the Navy to leverage the maturity and diversity of Reserve Sailors. Recent examples include Data Science, Science and Technology Researchers and Additive Manufacturing.
The Navy Reserve is also an integrated force provider that extends the unique skillsets of Reserve Sailors to provide medical and religious services to the Marine Corps, which has proven to be a combat capable and cost effective model.

**Mobilization**

On any given day, roughly 20 percent of the Selected Reserve Component is operational, delivering critical support to our forces around the globe. The Navy continues to mobilize thousands of Reservists to fill unserviced requirements of the Combatant Commanders. In 2019, Reserve Sailors provided nearly three million man-days of support to Navy missions worldwide, to include nearly 3,000 individual mobilizations. Since 2001, 65,349 Navy Reserve Sailors have executed more than 87,000 mobilizations. These Sailors support Combatant Commands around the globe, and add to the broad and diverse set of operational support missions the Navy Reserve executes on a daily basis, including, but not limited to, Expeditionary Warfare, Naval Air Warfare, Naval Special Warfare, Fleet Air Logistics, Cyber Warfare, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Strategic Sealift and Shipyard Maintenance. The high utilization of Reserve Sailors to fill gaps in the Joint Force comes at a high readiness cost to operational plans (OPLANS). While mobilized as IAs, Sailors are unavailable to their active commands and are deferred from further mobilizations during their “dwell” period after returning. Cumulatively, this takes a significant toll on the Navy Reserve’s overall OPLAN readiness. As such, the Navy Reserve continues its effort to comply with current (and past) Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) guidance of moving away from IAs in order to support OPLAN readiness.

**Distributed Mobilization (DM)**

The Reserve Component’s ability to rapidly mobilize the entire force during a large-scale contingency will be critical to mission success. Meeting the logistic and administrative demands
of a large activation requires a process change that is different from the current model which is centered on a single mobilization site. The Navy Reserve is now implementing a Distributed Mobilization model that will leverage multiple existing processing sites to meet mobilization requirements more effectively. Accelerating and expanding mobilization capacity will align the Navy Reserve with the current Total Force modernization effort in support of GPC.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Management

There are approximately 43,754 Sailors that make up the Individual Ready Reserve. As a key component of strategic depth, the IRR consists of trained Sailors who are fulfilling their minimum service requirement in an unpaid status. The Navy Reserve is developing a tiered readiness model that better tracks unique skills to make it easier to quickly employ IRR Sailors where they are needed most. Efforts to further cultivate strategic depth will support a focused engagement plan to deliver robust processes in support of seamless Reserve Component to Active Component transitions and mobilizations.

Reserve Incentive Programs

The Navy Reserve uses special incentive pays and bonuses to recruit and retain Sailors in hard-to-fill specialties while maintaining the right balance of seniority, skills and experience to meet the Navy’s mission today and in the future. The Navy Reserve is grateful for the current bonus structure that provided $31M in FY20 toward Reserve incentive programs to mitigate manning shortfalls in specific skill sets and pay grades. Your continued congressional support of RPN funding in PB21 is necessary to ensure the Navy Reserve continues to recruit, onboard, train, qualify, promote and retain the RIGHT Reserve Sailors to fill critical war-fighting capability gaps.
There are many examples of Reserve Sailors experiencing delayed or inaccurate pay as a result of outdated and ineffective systems. This directly impacts the readiness of the force and puts unnecessary stress on Reserve Sailors and families. As part of MyNavy HR Transformation, the development of Navy Personnel & Pay (NP2) will provide a modern, cloud-based, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf solution that combines personnel and pay functions into one consolidated and seamless system that improves user interface and maximizes Sailor self-service across the Active and Reserve Components. The initial NP2 capability will allow seamless transition of Navy Reserve Sailors to active duty without delays in establishing pay accounts, which is key to AC/RC permeability and the ability to smoothly perform mobilizations within the timelines established by Combatant Commanders. This is an urgent need and is a topic on the minds of Navy Reserve Sailors. The Navy Reserve encourages full support of the PB21 request for NP2, which will enable the RC to leverage modern technology to meet the expectations of a millennial workforce, promote seamless AC/RC permeability, and address Reserve Sailor pay concerns.

EQUIPMENT

Reserve Maritime Capabilities: P-3 to P-8

For the third year in a row, the P-8A is the top equipment priority of the Navy Reserve. Currently the RC operates the P-3C in Jacksonville, FL at Patrol Squadron 62 (VP-62) and in Whidbey Island, Washington at VP-69. These squadrons provide strategic depth for the AC Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Force through the planned P-3C sundown in 2023. The replacement aircraft to the P-3C, the P-8A Poseidon, a militarized version of Boeing’s 737 jetliner, provides broad area, full spectrum, anti-submarine warfare, armed anti-surface warfare,
and networked maritime Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities. Last year, congressional support of CNO’s unfunded priorities list provided P-8As for the Navy Reserve, which will facilitate the transition of VP-62 at Naval Air Station Jacksonville in FY23.

Navy Logistics: C-130 and C-40

Since World War II, the Navy has relied on aviation combat logistics to enable the forward leaning and expeditionary posture exclusive to naval operations. Operated entirely by the Navy Reserve, Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift (NUFEA) is made up of 25 C/KC-130T and 17 C-40A aircraft and remains the Navy’s only source of organic intra-theater air logistics. Last year, fleet logistics (VR) flew 22,707 flight hours and transported 111,625 passengers and 22.2 million pounds of cargo in support of Navy and Department of Defense (DoD). This was done at a cost avoidance of nearly $1.0B per year compared to alternative means of transportation.

The C/KC-130T Hercules is a medium lift aircraft used for cargo and personnel transport with an ability to operate from unprepared airfields. It is the Navy’s only transport aircraft capable of moving oversized cargo (fully-intact F-35 engines, AMRAAM and Harpoon missiles, submarine masts, etc.). Currently there are five Reserve C/KC-130 squadrons with 25 aircraft. The Navy Reserve will continue to upgrade these legacy airframes via the ongoing Avionics Obsolescence Upgrade program, NP2000 propellers, and engine performance improvements. Until recapitalization is possible, efforts will focus on sustainment and readiness, which are critical to preserving the Navy Unique Fleet Essential Airlift requirement. Ultimately,
a transition from the aging C/KC-130T to the C-130J is necessary to ensure interoperability and capitalize on the existing supply chain for these more modern aircraft.

The Navy C-40A Clipper provides the Fleet with on-demand, medium cargo airlift capability to rapidly support ongoing naval operations as a critical intra-theater logistics connector. Six squadrons with 17 aircraft provide transportation of items critical to forward-deployed naval operations, to include vital parts and personnel, and unique support for Naval Special Warfare, often at short notice, around the clock. The Navy Reserve successfully completed the transition from the C-9B Skytrains to the C-40A Clipper last year when VR-51 on Oahu, Hawaii, received its final two aircraft. These aircraft provide greater airlift capacity in the INDO-PACOM area of responsibility and are a critical asset in Great Power Competition.

Attack Fighter Aircraft

Within the next decade, most of the Navy Reserve’s adversary aircraft will reach the end of their service life. In FY19, Active Component F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets flew 18,000 hours of adversary support and added costly flight hours on inventory-limited fleet aircraft. Increasing Navy Reserve capacity and capability to support Navy adversary requirements will improve warfighting strike fighter service life.

The Navy Reserve operates legacy F/A-18C in two squadrons, VFA-204 in New Orleans and VFC-12 in Oceana, Virginia. These aircraft are some of the oldest in operation and are not interoperable with AC squadrons who are operating F/A-18E Super Hornets and the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter. The Navy’s current Master Aviation Plan shows an RC transition from the F/A-18C to the F/A-18E in 2024-2025. Recapitalizing these jets will help maintain a strategic reserve and a more robust, threat-representative adversary capability. Continued focus on this transition
is necessary to enhance lethality and preserve the operational and strategic value of these Reserve squadrons.

RESILIENCY AND QUALITY OF LIFE

The Navy and the Nation asks a great deal from Reserve sailors and their families; and, therefore, remains committed to providing the best support before, during and after their service. Unlike their active duty counterparts, Navy Reserve Sailors find themselves in the unique position of having to balance their civilian jobs, military obligations and families. Predictability is critical in enabling Reserve Sailors to achieve this balance. The Navy Reserve is focused on delivering programs that improve resiliency and quality of life for Sailors and families.

Suicide Prevention

The Navy Reserve is committed to building command climates that increase awareness and support the mental health of Sailors. The Navy Reserve is actively engaged in Cross Functional Teams charged with suicide prevention efforts and to assist with the implementation of the Defense Strategy on Suicide Prevention. The way ahead is focused on resilience-building tools such as a commander’s mitigation dashboard, which will be used along with the numerous resources provided by the 21st Century Sailor Office.

Psychological Health Outreach Program (PHOP)

The Psychological Health Outreach Program was established in 2008 to ensure that Reserve Sailors and their family members have full access to appropriate psychological health care services to increase resilience and facilitate recovery. PHOP currently has 29 locations within the continental United States, one in Puerto Rico and one in Hawaii. PHOP covers a
broad range of topics to include psychological health assessment, surveillance, resilience education as well as legal, financial and medical training. In 2019, PHOP trained and educated 33,000 Reserve Sailors and supported 8,128 service member referrals.

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Initiative Program (YRRP)

The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program is a Department of Defense-wide effort to promote the well-being of National Guard and Reserve members, their families and their communities, by connecting them with resources throughout the deployment cycle. The theme for FY-20 events is “Families, Our Home Front Warriors”. It will focus on providing more flexible program policy decisions and additional advertising campaigns will be implemented to increase attendance at Navy Returning Warrior Workshops (RWW). The RWWs use presentations and group sessions to provide insight into how Sailors and family members can be successful in reintegration with family, friends and careers following deployments. The Navy Reserve will continue to support Sailors and their families throughout all facets of their service.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Cloud Computing, Mobility Innovations and Digital Capabilities

Navy Reserve strategy for Enterprise information technology (IT) provides world-wide access to critical Navy and IT business systems for approximately 60,000 geographically dispersed Selected Reservists. The IT strategy improves efficiency and lethality through three core technological advances: Cloud Computing, Mobility Innovations and Digital Capabilities. Emphasis on access and mobility made it possible for RC Sailors to use their personal devices to access secure, encrypted email via the Ready-2-Serve (R2S) mobile website application. The ability to have remote access is essential for Reserve Sailors who are geographically dispersed
and lack permanent location to access to Navy computer systems. IT initiatives have enabled business practice modernization that better aligns to fleet and warfighting by sustaining communications and IT capabilities across the Navy Reserve Force.

OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

Shipbuilding and Surge Maintenance

The Engineering Duty Officer and Naval Sea Systems Command Reserve Component (EDO/NAVSEA RC) is a fully integrated, mission ready force of 472 Officers and 2,011 Enlisted Sailors spread across 91 units. This responsive and transformative engineering force provides leadership and advanced skillsets that support the delivery of ships and systems on-time and on-cost for the United States Navy. In FY19, the EDO/NAVSEA RC contributed an unprecedented 68,066 days of operational support (12,000 days more than FY18) and 2,553 days of Engineering Duty Officer Qualification training. Today, there are more than 100 EDO/NAVSEA Sailors on active duty supporting Navy shipbuilding and surge maintenance operations around the world.

Last year, SURGEMAIN executed 17,064 days of in support of all four Navy shipyards [Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard]. EDO/NAVSEA Sailors continue to fill critical roles supporting technical efforts in advance of the construction of COLUMBIA-class submarines, trouble shooting and system testing the USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN-78) and as part of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan. Additionally, the NAVSEA SURGEMAIN Reserve Force team ‘surged’ over 30 Sailors to USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69) resulting in the delivery of another carrier on-time from a maintenance availability at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
The average age of Reserve facilities is 43 years and over 20 percent are designated substandard. A lack of sufficient sustainment, restoration and modernization funding has a compound effect on infrastructure over time and, in turn, has a profound impact on the readiness of the Reserve Force. Both Operations and Maintenance Navy Reserve (OMNR) funding and Military Construction (MILCON) funding is critical to support Reserve structures that enable the readiness of Reserve Sailors. Your continued support of Reserve infrastructure funding through consistent investments in Reserve MILCON and OMNR will greatly improve infrastructure readiness.

CONCLUSION

The Navy Reserve remains a committed, resilient force delivering strategic depth and unique capabilities to the Joint Force. As such, Reserve Sailors stand ready to answer the Nation’s call by filling vital, strategic roles to ensure the Total Force can meet the challenges of the Great Power Competition. Looking ahead, it is clear that modernization will be vital for seamless integration of the Navy Reserve Force with the Total Force of the future.

Serving the men and women of the United States Navy Reserve Force has been the honor of my lifetime. As I travelled and met the Sailors of the Navy Reserve Force, I personally witnessed the commitment to the mission and to each other as they serve tirelessly wherever the Nation asked them to go. I am truly humbled by their service and that of their families. Thank you for your steadfast support of Navy Reserve Sailors, their families, and their employers. Your continued support is essential to preserve the lethality of the Reserve Force and to ensure the Navy Reserve operates seamlessly as part of the Total Force.
Mr. Visclosky. Admiral, thank you very much. And before you begin, General, I apologize to you. I misintroduced you. I welcome you very much, General Bellon, and you may proceed with your testimony. I apologize.

**Summary Statement of General Bellon**

General Bellon. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on behalf of the Commandant of the Marine Corps about your Marine Corps Reserve. I am honored to be here today with my fellow Reserve component Chiefs and my senior enlisted force Sergeant Major Scott Grade, who is seated behind me.

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to stand ready to augment, reinforce, and sustain the Active Component. Along with the Active Component, we have Reserve forces forward deployed, supporting combatant commands' requirements. On average, in 2019, Marine Forces Reserve provided approximately 11 percent of the forward-deployed Marines for approximately 5 percent of the Marine Corps' budget.

Over the last year, more than 2,600 Reserve Marines and sailors mobilized, supporting 45 operational requirements in each of the six geographic combatant commands. This is approximately a 19 percent increase in personnel deployed and 22 percent increase in operational requirements compared to 2018. Likewise, 9,944 reservists participated in 43 training exercises, supporting requirements in 21 countries around the globe.

Additionally, I am pleased to inform you that the morale in your Marine Corps Reserve is very high, as evident by Reserve component end strength maintaining a 99 percent of our total requirement.

Not only are we attracting new Marines, we are retaining them beyond their contractual obligation. On any drill weekend, on average, 25 percent of the Marines standing in formation are not contractually obligated to be there. These Marines are primarily our leadership. Every month, they have a decision to make, and they choose to continue to serve and lead our Marines and sailors. I am always impressed by the professionalism, competence, dedication to duty, and motivation of our Reserve Marines. Like their Active Duty sisters and brothers, they serve selflessly to protect our great Nation. They continue to answer their irrational call to serve. The way they balance family responsibilities, civilian lives, jobs, schools, and careers is nothing short of extraordinary.

I want to extend my gratitude for your efforts to provide timely appropriations, and request your continued support of the National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriation. On average, the Marine Corps Reserves only have 38 training days a year, and that places an increased importance on adequate and timely appropriations. With your continued support, I can ensure Reserve predictable and uninterrupted training schedules to maximize personnel material and training readiness.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of General Bellon follows:]
STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID G. BELLON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE
BEFORE
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
CONCERNING
THE GUARD AND RESERVE
ON
MARCH 3, 2020
Lieutenant General David G. Bellon

Lieutenant General Bellon was born in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and raised in St. Louis, Missouri. He graduated from the University of Kansas in 1987 and the University of Missouri School of Law in 1990. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1989. Bellon began service as an Infantry Officer with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment. He then served as a Judge Advocate with 1st Force Service Support Group.

In 1997, he left active duty and joined the Selected Marine Corps Reserve serving six years with 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion in a variety of positions. As a civilian, Bellon founded his own law firm in 1999 located in Oceanside, CA.

After 9/11, he returned to active duty for four combat tours in support of both OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). During OIF I, he served as Operations Officer for 4th LAR with both TASK FORCE TARAWA and TASK FORCE SCORPION. During OIF II, Bellon served as the Intelligence Officer for Regimental Combat Team 1 during its 14 month deployment in and around the City of Al Fallujah, Iraq, participating in both battles for the city. His third OIF tour was in Command of Battalion Task Force 3d Battalion, 23d Marine Regiment, in 2007-2008. The Task Force executed counter-insurgency operations in and around the city of Al Haditha, Iraq.

In 2008, Bellon was selected as the Marine Corps Reserve’s representative in a full-time student status attending Top Level School at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. While there, he was promoted to Colonel and received subsequent orders for deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Bellon deployed to Afghanistan in September 2009 with the British 6th Division. While in Afghanistan, he served as the Chief of Operations for Southern Afghanistan during NATO’s 2010 surge of forces to secure the strategically vital area in and around Kandahar City.

Bellon was promoted to Brigadier General in 2013. His assignments as a General Officer prior to his current billet include Deputy Commander (Mobilization) 1st Marine Expeditionary Force; Deputy Marine Forces Command; Director Reserve Affairs; Commander Marine Forces South; and Director of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (J5) U.S. Southern Command. He was promoted to his current rank and assumed duties as Commander, Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North on 4 September 2019.
Introduction

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is my privilege to appear before you and provide an overview on the current state of the Marine Corps Reserve.

The United States Marine Corps Reserve stands ready to augment, reinforce, and sustain the Active Component by providing forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement. Over the last year, we have been engaged around the world in theater security cooperation activities and operations, serving side-by-side with our Active Component, and have made tremendous contributions in support of every geographic Combatant Commander. While the Marine Corps Reserve is supporting current service and Combatant Command requirements, we are also participating in the service’s efforts to redesign our force and our warfighting capabilities to deter against pacing threats as prescribed by the National Defense Strategy.

I am deeply impressed by the professionalism, competence, and dedication of our Reserve Marines. Like their Active Component counterparts, they serve selflessly to protect our great Nation. I am inspired by the way they balance family responsibilities, civilian careers, and military service. They do so with humility, without fanfare, and with a sense of pride and dedication that is consistent with the great sacrifices of Marines from every generation. Without a doubt, the success of the Marine Corps hinges on the quality of our Marines.

A Total Force

As an integral part of the Total Force, the Marine Corps Reserve plays a key role in providing that national security force in readiness. Over the past year, the Marine Corps Reserve supported Combatant Commanders by providing forces focused on combat operations, crisis prevention, crisis response, and theater security cooperation. Global deployments, along with
participation in Service, Joint, and multi-national exercises, develop the depth of experience of the Reserve Force, ensuring the Marine Corps Reserve is relevant, ready, and responsive to meet Combatant Commanders’ requirements.

On average in 2019, the Marine Corps Reserve provided approximately 11 percent of the Total Force’s forward deployed forces for approximately 5 percent of the Marine Corps’ budget. In 2019, 2,624 Reserve Marines mobilized supporting 45 operational requirements in each of the six geographic Combatant Commands. This is approximately a 19 percent increase in personnel deployed and 22 percent increase in operational requirements compared to 2018. Likewise, 9,944 Reservists participated in 43 training exercises, supporting requirements in 21 countries across the globe. The Marine Corps Reserve filled 59 percent of the total service individual augment requirements. We continue to meet the increased demand for use as an operational reserve, though this has begun to challenge readiness to meet strategic requirements.

In 2020, the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to support the Combatant Commanders by mobilizing in excess of 800 Reservists supporting approximately 27 formations. Over the course of 2020, more than 8,000 Marines will support theater-specific exercises, security cooperation events, and “standing” operations across every Combatant Command. These operations and exercises greatly increase the Reserve Component’s interoperability with the Active Component, Joint Forces, our allies, and coalition partners.

The Marine Corps Reserve continues to provide daily support to Combatant Commanders in a wide range of roles that include multi-national exercises, such as Dynamic Front 20 in Latvia, New Horizons 20 in South America, and Maple Resolve 20 in Canada. I anticipate the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to deploy across the globe and to integrate with the Active Component in support of high-priority Combatant Commander requirements for the foreseeable future.
2019, 23 of the 45 formations activated were deployed to the CENTCOM AOR and in 2020, the Marine Corps Reserve will activate an additional eight Reserve formations that will deploy to the CENTCOM AOR. In 2020, the Marine Corps Reserve has also continued to deploy reconnaissance, assault amphibian, and combat engineer units to the Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility in support of III Marine Expeditionary Force’s requirements in Okinawa, Japan.

In addition, the Marine Corps Reserve has recently increased its participation in the Department of Defense’s Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) program. This program provides military training opportunity, exclusive to the United States and its territories, which delivers joint training opportunities to increase deployment readiness. Simultaneously, IRT provides key services (health care, construction, transportation, and cybersecurity) with lasting benefits for our American communities. The IRT program has allowed our units to increase deployment readiness by training to mission essential tasks, while also training with their counterparts from different services and making tangible, meaningful impacts in their communities. Utilizing $1 million from the Marine Corps and $780,000 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Marine Corps Reserve supported 7 exercises, a 50% increase from 2018. Examples include diverse construction-training that supported the Girl Scouts at Camp Pauma, Hawaii; relocating the Village of Newtok, Alaska; and repairing a remote airfield in California. With your continued support of these efforts, we look to expand to 12 exercises that will include construction, medical, and cybersecurity efforts.

In addition to participating in operational requirements across the globe, the Marine Corps Reserve supports the Total Force by dutifully executing the sensitive and crucial mission of providing casualty assistance to the families of our fallen Marines. There is no responsibility that we treat with higher regard than the solemn mission of providing casualty assistance.
Instructor and Reserve Site Support Staffs are geographically positioned to accomplish the vast majority of Marine Corps casualty assistance calls and are trained to provide compassionate and thorough assistance to families. Indeed, the majority of Marine Corps casualty notifications and follow-on assistance calls to the next of kin are made by our Marines. During Calendar Year (CY) 2019, our Instructor-Instructor and Reserve Site Support staffs performed 95 percent of the casualty calls performed by the Marine Corps.

The professionalism and compassion of our Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACOs) continues well beyond the initial notification. We ensure that our CACOs are well trained, equipped, and supported by all levels of command through the combination of in-person and online training. Once assigned, the CACO serves as the family’s central point of contact and coordinates with funeral homes, government agencies, and other organizations. They assist family members with planning the return and final resting place of their Marine and ensure the filing of appropriate documents so families receive all benefits they are entitled. In many cases, our CACOs provide a long-lasting bridge between the Marine Corps and the grieving family.

Additionally, the Marine Corps Reserve units and personnel provide significant support in the form of military funeral honors for our veterans. The Marine Corps Reserve performed 20,416 military funeral honors which represented 93 percent of all funeral honors rendered by the Marine Corps during 2019. As with casualty assistance, we place enormous emphasis on providing timely, compassionate, and professionally executed military funeral honors. Although this comes with a cost to readiness, some Marine Corps Reserve units are executing in excess of 500 funerals per year.

Finally, the Marine Corps Reserve functions as the greatest link between the Marine Corps
and communities across the Nation. We are the face of the Marine Corps to the majority of the American public. With Reserve units located across the country, the Marine Corps Reserve is uniquely positioned to interact with the American public and communicate the Marine Corps story to our fellow citizens; most of whom have little or no contact with the Marine Corps. Last year, Marine Corps Reserve personnel and units conducted more than 500 local and regional public engagement and community relations events across the country.

**Personnel**

Marines, Sailors, and our civilian Marines are the foundation of all that we do. The resources we dedicate to sustaining and developing this foundation directly contributes to the success of our institution. The vast majority of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve’s authorized end strength of 38,500 falls under the Marine Corps Reserve. The Selected Reserve is composed of Marines in four categories: Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units, Active Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and service members in initial training. Embedded with these Marines are 1,641 Active and Reserve component Sailors who serve critical roles in the operational, medical, dental, and spiritual readiness of our Reserve Force. The success of the Marine Corps Reserve would not be possible without continued support from the U.S. Navy.

In addition to the Marines and Sailors of the Selected Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve administratively controls approximately 61,000 Marines who serve in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Marine Corps Reserve continues to monitor the mobilization viability of these IRR Marines through the use of muster events at multiple locations across the country. These muster events allow the Marine Corps Reserve to ensure these IRR Marines meet the requirements for mobilization. These events also provide the opportunity to address administrative issues,
conduct mental health and post-deployment assessments, to review Reserve obligations and new opportunities, and to meet with Marine Corps recruiters. During the past year the Marine Corps Reserve conducted 25 muster events and met 5,667 IRR Marines. In addition to the musters, the Marine Corps Reserve contacted and screened 48,883 Marines telephonically.

The Marine Corps Reserve strives to retain the very best Marines capable of fulfilling our leadership and operational needs. Marines approaching the end of their current contracts, whether Active or Reserve Component, receive counseling on the tangible and intangible benefits of remaining associated with the Selected Reserve. We educate each transitioning Active Component Marine on opportunities for continued service in the Marine Corps Reserve through the Marine Corps’ transition assistance and educational outreach programs.

Recruiting, retaining, and properly aligning high quality Marines is essential to the Marine Corps’ ability to answer the call as the Nation’s Force in Readiness. Monetary incentive programs have proven to be critical enablers for the Marine Corps Reserve’s high levels of affiliation, retention, and alignment. While incentives such as occupational specialty retraining and targeted bonus payments directly support retention, the authorization for inactive duty travel reimbursement of up to $500 of actual costs for Marines who are required travel in excess of 150 miles from their residence to their drill center has proven to be particularly beneficial in ensuring that the each Marine is assigned to an appropriate billet and filling a valid requirement. In FY19, your support of incentive programs enabled us to maintain our end strength at 99.7 percent of total authorization, while ensuring over 87 percent of our Marines were serving in billets commensurate with their rank and Military Occupational Specialty. Going forward, I ask for your continued support of these incentives as they are vital to our ability to retain and most advantageously utilize the Corps’ most precious asset—the individual Marine.
Equipment

Reserve Component units remain highly interoperable with their Active Component counterparts due to the Marine Corps’ Total Force approach to equipment fielding and management. Reserve Component Forces are manned, trained, and equipped to standards that facilitate the seamless integrated employment of forces to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Our reserve units and personnel continue to be in high demand, with a similar number of exercises, missions, and operations scheduled this year, as executed last fiscal year.

This high operational tempo places a stress on our ability to maintain our equipment and replenish our deficiencies, however. Most disconcerting is our individual combat equipment deficiencies, specifically ballistic protection and load-bearing equipment. In the event of a large-scale wartime mobilization, to include any sizable call-up of the Individual Ready Reserve, individual combat equipment deficiencies may become a strategic risk to mission.

With regard to maintenance readiness, the Marine Corps Reserve has mitigated risk for many years in two ways. First, risk is mitigated by refining units’ Training Allowances, which is that portion of a unit’s full Table of Equipment located at Reserve Training Centers. Our goal is to balance the amount of equipment necessary to conduct training with the amount of equipment that can be maintained within personnel, facility, and fiscal constraints. Second, risk is mitigated by leveraging Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) dollars to buy mobile maintenance support teams that augment the limited organic maintenance capacity. Congressional support for the Marine Corps Reserve FY 2021 President’s budget request within the National Defense Authorization Act, to include OCO, is paramount to our continued success in sustaining our
Upcoming fielding of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) will provide the Reserve Component with the latest generation of combat equipment. Additionally, fielding of programs such as the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and the Ground Weapons Locating Radar (GWLR) will enhance our ability to fight and win on the modern battlefield. The top procurement priority of the Marine Corps Reserve is the KC-130J Super Hercules. The Marine Corps Reserve has been fielded 11 of 28 aircraft and will not be fully fielded until 2024. This extended fielding timeline forces the Reserve Component to simultaneously operate the KC-130J and the legacy KC-130T aircraft until 1st Quarter, FY22. These two aircraft have vastly different logistics, maintenance, and aircrew requirements, resulting in an increased outlay of resources to maintain the readiness of the Reserve Component KC-130 Squadrons.

Training

Each year and typically in the summer, the Marine Corps Reserve participates in a number of training exercises both within the United States and overseas to improve combat readiness and enhance our ability rapidly activate and integrate with the Active Component. The service-level Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) is conducted aboard Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. ITX improves combat readiness, efficiency in Total Force integration, and enables more rapid activation response times at the battalion and squadron level. The exercise consists of two infantry battalions conducting live-fire and maneuver exercises, along with other elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. This is one of the few opportunities that Reserve ground, aviation, and logistics combat elements, under the command of a regimental headquarters, are able to come together and synchronize all warfighting actions to operate as a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force under live fire and maneuver conditions.

The Reserves also took part in a CMC directed Force on Force (FoF) MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX), the first of its kind, designed to challenge the MAGTF against a peer adversary in a free-play environment. Serving as a part of the Adversary Force (ADFOR) with Higher Command responsibilities, the Division employed a Scout Platoon from 4th Tanks that participated in Unit Level Training, Collective Training and MWS.

Additionally in 2019 and in concert with Canadian Allies, Reserve Marines and Sailors participated in Sentinel Edge Vigilant Shield and conducted Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) from Home Training Center (HTC) to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cold Lake, AB to generate and sustain sorties. The exercise demonstrated Long Range Insertion of MV-22s, employment of HIMARS Rapid Infiltration and expeditionary operations with fixed and rotary wing integration.

To preserve fiscal and materiel resources, the Marine Corps Reserve uses training simulators wherever and whenever possible. Reserve units employ Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainers (ISMTs) to maintain combat marksmanship skills and to maximize the use of their most precious resource, time. The ISMTs enable onsite training and eliminate long distance travel to remote DoD areas. Additionally, units capitalize on non-traditional training methods such as online training to mitigate the limitation of 38 training days per fiscal year to complete mission essential tasks and all required DoD and Service annual training requirements. Expanding the use of simulators and online training enhances readiness and enables the Reserve Component to maximize limited training time during drill weekends.

Facilities

The Marine Corps Reserve occupies facilities in 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. These facilities include 27 owned and 131 tenant Reserve Training Centers, three family housing sites, one permanent barracks, and one General Officer Quarters. Although some sites are located on major DoD installations, most are situated within civilian communities, ranging from neighborhoods to industrial and commercial districts. We continue to improve the maintenance and security of our facilities to ensure the safety of our Marines and Sailors and to provide an effective training and mobilization location.

Fifty-seven percent of the facilities budget supports the sustainment and maintenance of existing infrastructure and day-to-day operating costs. We have improved the overall readiness of our facilities inventory through the Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) support program and maximized the impact of our budget through divestiture and demolition of excess footprint.

The Marine Corps’ Military Construction, Navy Reserve (MCNR) program focuses on providing construction for new and enduring capabilities, as well as recapitalization of our aging facilities. The construction provided by the annual authorization and appropriation of MCNR funding is an important factor in advancing our facilities support mission as we optimize our force laydown throughout the nation. Continued support for our MCNR request is essential as we divest of failing infrastructure and modernize capabilities.

Of most critical importance is the safety of our Marines and Sailors. We have ongoing efforts to improve overall force protection at all of our sites by working with our service partners and the National Guard for joint occupied facilities. Numerous protection assessments and security engineering reports have been conducted at our facilities to assist and develop designs to mitigate protection concerns, specifically physical security. These assessments identify requirements and serve to prioritize enhancements to improve facility security for our Marines and
The combined effects of our targeted consolidation, FSRM, and MCNR programs have steadily reduced the number of inadequate or substandard Reserve Training Centers and enabled better support to the Force. As our infrastructure ages, however, our operating costs have steadily increased. In addition, service level efforts to modernize our force and its infrastructure have also increased costs. Continued support to our annual funding request for our facilities program will enable us to improve the overall physical infrastructure that reinforces the operational readiness of our units.

Health Services

The Marine Corps Reserve Health Service Support (HSS) ensures the health and wellness of the Reserve Marines and Sailors remains at the forefront. We continue to improve medical readiness through a robust Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) Program within the Marine Corps Reserve and by accurate monitoring, identification, and supervision of the unit-level actions necessary to attain readiness goals. Additionally, our Health Services personnel participate in Force Readiness Assistance & Assessment Program (FRAAP) inspections and audits which provide oversight at the unit level and the ability to monitor policy adherence and readiness.

The Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP) greatly increased overall medical and dental readiness throughout the Force. This program provides support using contracted civilian medical and dental providers to work with units that do not have organic medical or dental support personnel or are not supported by a military treatment facility. During FY 2019, the RHRP performed 17,769 Periodic Health Assessments (PHAs), 205 Post-Deployment Health Re-Assessments (PDHRAs), 172 Pre-Deployment Health Assessment (PreDHA) Events, 260 Audiological examinations, and 366 Dental Events.
Between deployments, our Health Services priority is to work toward achieving the DoD’s goal of a 90 percent medically ready force. During FY 2019, our individual medical and dental readiness rates were 77.6 percent and 86 percent, respectively. The Marine Corps Reserve units rely heavily on RHRP to maintain our medical and dental readiness. Continued support of this program is imperative for maintaining readiness.

**Behavioral Health**

In addition to RHRP, the Marine Corps Reserve has implemented a robust behavioral health program, which includes Combat Operational Stress Control, Suicide Prevention, Substance Abuse Prevention and Family Advocacy programs. Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) training continues to be conducted at all levels and is provided during pre-deployment training to service members deploying for more than 90 days and all commands in garrison. This training provides the requisite knowledge, skills, and tools needed to assist commanders in preventing, identifying, and managing combat and operational stress concerns as early as possible. Each of these tools support the commander in building unit strength, resilience, and readiness as well as keeping Marines in the fight.

The Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) continues to support behavioral health through various independent contracted programs, such as the PDHRA and the Psychological Health Outreach Program (PHOP). The PDHRA places an emphasis on identifying physical, behavioral, and mental health concerns that may have emerged since returning from deployment. The PHOP addresses both post-deployment behavioral health concerns and crisis-related interventions by providing our Marines and Sailors access to local resources through a network of contracted behavioral health programs. These programs are critical to maintaining a resilient force by providing a pathway for Marines, Sailors, and families to seek behavioral health
Signs of operational and combat stress may manifest long after a service member returns home from deployment. This delayed onset of symptoms presents unique challenges to Reserve Marines who may be detached from vital medical care and the daily support network inherent in active duty Marine Corps units. Encouraging Marines to recognize and communicate mental health issues is a pervasive challenge facing our commanders. We address the stigma associated with mental health care through key programs, such as the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) and OSCAR. Further, we market all of our behavioral health initiatives and programs through our Marine Corps Reserve portal website and during key Marine Corps forums throughout the year. Your continued support of our behavioral health programs is greatly appreciated.

The Marine Corps Reserve Drug Demand Reduction Program (DDRP) continues to focus on reducing illegal drug use and prescription drug misuse within the Reserve community. The Marine Corps Reserve relies profoundly on its drug-testing program, which acts as a powerful deterrent against drug use. Each Reserve unit conducts monthly drug testing to screen our Reserve Marines for drugs as well as breathalyzer testing to screen for alcohol use while in a duty status. The DDRP staff provides quarterly and on demand education and awareness training on the dangers of misusing and abusing prescription drugs as well as information on the proper disposal of old, unused, and outdated medications. Additionally, the DDRP increases leaders’ awareness on the dangers of abusing prescription drugs through annual substance abuse supervisory level training.

We recognize that the factors contributing to suicide are numerous and complex. Risk factors can include depression, family history of suicide, and substance abuse. Common precipitating stressors include relationship challenges and legal, financial, and disciplinary assistance.
problems. Typical warning signs may include talking about suicide and expressing hopelessness. We mitigate these factors using a multi-dimensional and multi-level approach. Small unit leadership is encouraged to foster a sense of belonging for Marines. Commanders employ responsible messaging to discourage suicide-related behavior and conduct Force Preservation Councils to identify risk factors and stressors in order to provide a course of action to mitigate destructive behavior. Once a possible behavioral health issue has been identified, the command implements intervention and reintegration strategies to lower risks, encourage Marines to ask for help when needed, and restrict access to lethal means (firearms, etc.) for those at risk for suicide.

In keeping with “Protect what you’ve earned” messaging, Marines are taught coping skills. A culture shift is taking place to show that it is a sign of strength to seek/ask for help early, when problems are most manageable. Finally, all Marines are taught to recognize suicide warning signs, to get help for their fellow Marines, and that we never leave a fellow Marine behind.

The PDHRA program specifically focuses on identifying issues that emerge after our Marines and Sailors have returned home from deployment. The PHOP secures behavioral health screenings, psychological treatment referrals, and provides essential follow-up treatment to ensure our service members’ behavioral health needs are met.

Similarly, Care Management Teams focus on support through the Department of Veterans Affairs Transition Care Management Program. Our Marines are assigned a Care Manager who oversees the referrals and follow-on care of the Reserve Marine’s individual health care needs. Marine Intercept Program (MIP) is an evidence-informed targeted intervention for service members who have had an identified suicide ideation or suicide attempt. MIP includes a series of telephonic voluntary caring contacts in which a counselor reaches out to the Marine and assesses them for risk, encourages the use of a safety plan, and identifies and addresses any barriers to
services. The MIP counselors then incorporate these caring contacts into the counseling process. These services are also provided to our Reserve Marines through the PHOP.

Our Marines have proven their strength in enduring unique issues, such as frequent moves, deployments, and separations from loved ones. To help with these struggles, our Marines, Sailors, and family members are able to access behavioral health programs at Marine Corps installations through Marine Corps Community Service (MCCS) while on active-duty orders. The Marine Corps DISTRESS Line is another resource available to all Reserve Marines and family members regardless of duty status. DISTRESS is a 24/7/365, Marine-specific anonymous crisis call and support center that provides phone, chat, and video-teleconferencing for non-medical, short-term, solution-focused counseling. Additionally, we continue to be supportive of Military OneSource, which provides confidential, non-medical counseling, resources, and support to service members and their families anywhere in the world.

**Sexual Assault Prevention & Response**

Sexual assault remains a complex and challenging matter that is often interrelated with other readiness challenges, behavioral health issues, and destructive behaviors. For the Marine Corps Reserve, addressing the continuum of destructive behaviors and fostering a culture of dignity and respect are top priorities toward the goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating sexual assault within our ranks. To accomplish this goal, we execute a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) with seven full-time employees who provide supportive services across our geographically-dispersed force. In addition to the Force-level Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), each Major Subordinate Command within the Marine Corps Reserve has a SARC who serves as a Special Staff Officer to their Commanding General and manages their SAPR Program from our headquarters in New Orleans. Together with the SARCs, two
professional civilian victim advocates provide support to our Marines, Sailors and their families by
traveling to provide in-person advocacy services, training, and unit-specific program guidance as
needed. The Marine Corps Reserve continues to work diligently to improve our victim response,
outreach, and prevention.

Our SAPR staff trains up to 160 Victim Advocates each year at our headquarters in New
Orleans. After completing our 40-hour training course, these potential Victim Advocates submit
an application for credentialing through the DoD’s Sexual Assault Advocate Certification
Program. Once credentialed, the advocates are officially appointed by their commanders to serve
at their respective Reserve Training Centers. In total, the Marine Corps Reserve maintains an
active roster of more than 250 Victim Advocates across the country.

Our SAPR personnel respond to Marines, Sailors, and adult dependents who request
support services related to a report of sexual assault. Our SARC’s and SAPR Victim Advocates
screen for potential safety issues and develop individualized safety plans as needed. They offer
advocacy services and referrals and maintain a data base of nationwide resources for victims of
sexual assault who may not reside on or near a military installation.

The Marine Corps Reserve maintains a Sexual Assault Support Line that is manned by the
professional SAPR staff 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Marine Corps Reserve also actively
publicizes the DoD Safe Helpline which is an additional resource that offers crisis support services
for members of the DoD community. The DoD Safe Helpline is available 24/7 worldwide with
“click.call.text” user options and can be used anonymously for confidential support.

Our prevention strategy is holistic and integrated with other programs that work toward the
eradication effort, such as the Equal Opportunity Program, Deployment Resiliency, Safety,
Spiritual Readiness Initiatives, and Behavioral Health. The Marine Corps Reserve continues to set
the example of discipline and respect by supporting a zero-tolerance policy related to assault and a retaliation-free command climate. Leaders at every level are encouraged to actively engage with our Marines and Sailors to learn what can be done to further support a positive environment that is free from attitudes and behaviors that are incompatible with our core values. All Marines and Sailors receive SAPR training every year to ensure widespread knowledge about our program to include prevention and response.

Quality of Life

The Marine Corps Reserve remains dedicated to ensuring an appropriate balance and effective performance of our quality of life programs, which are designed to help all Marines, Sailors and their families, whether they are deployed or on the home front. Our force is dispersed throughout the country and away from traditional brick and mortar support resources available at our major bases and stations. Taking care of our Marines and their families is a key component to overall readiness and combat effectiveness. In addition to personnel, equipment, training, and facilities, we focus on other important aspects of readiness, such as family strength, education, professional development, financial health, transition assistance, and behavioral health. Our Deployment Readiness Coordinators, along with MCCS, help ensure our families get the support they need before, during and after our Marines deploy. MCCS and our Deployment Readiness Coordinators provide a vital link to ensure support reaches those who need it.

The Marine Corps Reserve tracks the submission of medical service treatment records to ensure Reserve Component Marines receive timely access to Department of Veterans’ Affairs health care services. Working across all 158 sites, we aggressively target our performance for submission timeliness to ensure our Marines are able to submit timely disability benefit claims.

Marine and Family Readiness Programs remain flexible, constantly adjusting to meet the
needs of our geographically dispersed Marines and their families. A resilient force is primarily achieved by providing robust, relevant, and standardized training to our commanders, Family Readiness Command Teams, Marines, and their families. Our Marine Corps Family Team Building (MCFTB) program enhances readiness and maintains resiliency through proactive, non-clinical, preventative education, professional training, and community building support to service members and their families throughout mission, life, and career events. MCFTB training events are delivered both, in person, and through interactive webinars, at our 158 sites. During FY 2019, the Marine Corps Reserve conducted 162 training events at which 10,422 Marines and family members received valuable information to prepare for and thrive during deployments and to achieve a positive post-deployment reintegration experience.

A key component to our quality of life and resiliency is the religious ministry support provided by 222 Religious Ministry Team (RMT) members. As Uniformed Members, RMTs support Marines and their families across the full spectrum of military life including combat and humanitarian engagements. Currently, 125 RMT personnel are embedded in 46 Marine Corps Reserve units and 97 are integrated in Navy Reserve religious support units that directly support Active Component Marine Corps units. This support includes developing the Commandant’s spiritual readiness initiatives, providing divine services across the spectrum of faith communities, advising on spiritual and ethical matters, and delivering pastoral care in a safe, confidential environment. Chaplain support is provided in numerous Funeral Honor Details for our Marines, Sailors, and families. The Chaplains provide spiritual guidance at the service and follow on care as needed, providing a source of healing for family members.

One signature program is the Chaplain Religious Enrichment Development Operations (CREDO) program. The CREDO program provides transformational workshops: the Marriage
Enrichment Retreat (MER), the Personal Resiliency Retreat (PRR), and the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) class. The MER and PRR equip Marines, Sailors, and their families with practical relationship and communication tools that strengthen marriages and individual resilience. The PRRs help Marines and Sailors set personal goals, make good decisions, deal with stress, and live lives with greater purpose and satisfaction. During FY 2019, fourteen MERs and one PRR were conducted with 665 participants. In response to suicidal events, the CREDO Program has been offering ASIST training. ASIST trains individuals on how to intervene in suicidal ideations and keep individuals safe until they can receive follow on care. 118 personnel have been trained at 8 ASIST classes since March 2019, providing commands with resources to offer positive outcomes in unit readiness.

The Marine Corps emphasizes the importance of readiness for Marines and family members in many areas of life. Personal and Professional Development programs continue to provide training and educational resources to our Marines, Sailors, and their families in a variety of areas. One key program that assists commands, Marines, and family members with readiness is the Command Financial Specialist Program (CFS). The CFS provides assistance on a wide array of financial issues to include budgeting, savings, investing, insurance, Survivor Benefit Program (SBP), Veteran benefits, retirement, and financial counseling to all members of our dispersed forces.

Our Transition Readiness Program emphasizes a proactive approach that enables Marines to formulate effective post-transition entrepreneurship, employment, and educational goals. A virtual transition readiness seminar remains available for Reserve Marines and Sailors that are unable to travel to attend an installation-based transition course. The Marine for Life Network links our Marines to employment, education, and community resources in their home town areas to
support their overall life goals. Tutor.com offers our children access to 24/7 no-cost, live tutoring services for K-12 students. Our Marines are provided with remote access to language courses through Mango Languages. This program supports over 70 languages to include English as a Second Language (ESL). Peterson’s Online Academic Skills Course helps Marines build math and verbal skills to excel on the job, pass an exam, and advance in their career or continued education.

Our Semper Fit program continues to be fully engaged in partnering with our bases and stations to provide fitness education activities that promote physical and mental readiness, develop healthy positive self-esteem, and develop healthy lifestyles. The High Intensity Tactical Training (HITT) program focuses on physical resiliency, combat readiness, and injury prevention and provides hands-on, science-based strength and conditioning courses and online physical fitness tools to include instruction on injury prevention, nutrition, and weight management. Our Marines’ and Sailors’ quality of life is also enhanced through team building and esprit de corps activities, such as unit outings and participation in competitive events. These programs are crucial to unit cohesion and camaraderie.

The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program is an invaluable part of our resiliency efforts. Since its inception in 2010, we have held more than 900 training events for more than 49,000 Marines, Sailors, and family members. In FY 2019, we conducted 19 events with 2304 participants.

Our Marines, Sailors, and their families, who sacrifice so much for our Nation’s defense, should not be asked to sacrifice quality of life. We remain a steadfast advocate for flexible Family Programs and Services that evolve and adapt to the changing needs of our Marines, Sailors, and
their families. The combined effect of these programs and services are critical to the readiness and retention of our Marines, Sailors, and their families, and your continued support is greatly appreciated.

Supporting our Wounded, Ill, or Injured Marines and their Families

The Marine Corps ensures the availability of full spectrum care to all wounded, ill, or injured (WII) service members, whether they are Active or Reserve, through the Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR). The Marine Corps Reserve ensures Reserve Marines’ unique challenges are addressed through a WWR Liaison Officer who provides subject matter expertise and special coordination with the WWR staff.

The WWR staff includes the Reserve Medical Entitlements Determinations Section, which maintains specific oversight of all Reservists requiring medical care for service-incurred and duty-limiting medical conditions. Reservists facing complex care and recovery needs have access to WWR’s network of 45 Recovery Care Coordinators who provide one-on-one transition support and resource identification for WII Reservists and families often living long distances from military installations. WWR also has medical advocates at the regimental staff who are available to assist Reservists in need of medical care coordination and advocacy. District Injured Support Coordinators dispersed throughout the country also coordinate with Reserve units to ensure we keep faith with all Marines.

The Marine Corps Reserve will not forget the sacrifices our Marines have made for this great Nation and we will continue to work with the WWR to establish resources and programs that address the unique and ongoing needs of our Reserve population.

Conclusion
The Marine Corps Reserve is manned, trained and equipped to provide individual Marines and units to the Active Component as part of the Total Force. We are forward deployed supporting Combatant Commanders’ requirements, participating in multiple exercises at our training centers and around the world, and often the face of the Marine Corps to our local communities. Along with our Active Component, we are focused on force design, readiness and manpower to maintain and enhance our ability to increase the capacity of the Service’s ability to deter against pacing threats. Given a worthy mission and a clear signal that their individual contributions are valued by the service, your Reserve Marine will continue to answer their “irrational call to service.” With your continued support, we will remain ready to augment, reinforce and sustain the Active Component. Semper Fidelis!
Mr. VISCLOSKY. General Scobee.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCOBEE

General SCOBEE. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to report on the state of America’s Air Force Reserve. And I am also going to discuss our fiscal year 2021 budget request.

I am joined today by my teammate, Chief Master Sergeant Tim White. He is the Command Chief for the Air Force Reserve Command, and he represents 75 percent of who we are, and that is our great noncommissioned officers.

The Air Force Reserve is an essential component of the total force in the Air Force that provides experience and critical capabilities for our national defense. We enable rapid response, we supply surge capability, and we maintain strategic depth for sustained major combat operations, and we do so for only 3 percent of the total department of the Air Force budget.

We are a predominantly part-time force. However, we provide full-time support to the joint force. Our personnel participate in every Active Component mission and are both operationally integrated and interchangeable with our total force partners.

The National Defense Strategy directs us to be prepared to operate in tomorrow’s battle space. So the Air Force Reserve must be able to defeat adversaries across a spectrum of conflicts and operate simultaneously in all warfighting domains. Our airmen are the foundation of these efforts, and it is essential that we provide excellent support to both our airmen and their families.

During the last year, we focused on accelerating our readiness, developing resilient airmen and leaders who can generate combat power, and reforming our organization to optimize our warfighting capabilities, and we have made significant improvements in these areas and are presently expanding our efforts to further enhance our readiness and our ability to support our airmen. We would not have been able to do this without the incredible support we have received from Congress.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment appropriations have provided essential funding for our modernization efforts, and we thank you for past years appropriations. The Air Force Reserve’s full-time manpower has improved over the last year, but it is still insufficient. This increase is largely due to the conversion of select Air Reserve technician authorizations to the Active Guard and Reserve billets and the congressional approval of the direct hire authority. That enabled us to hire over 900 full-time maintainers over this last period. We have also been able to help ourselves, and it will help us in the future, if we can expand this direct hiring authority to other career fields such as our pilots, and that would also help us in our full-time manning.

Last year, Congress authorized Air Reserve technicians to receive medical coverage through TRICARE Reserve Select. Beginning, though, in the year 2030, this is a great benefit. It is going improve healthcare for our Air Reserve technicians and their families, and it is going to increase our retention. My ask for you this year is that we consider implementing this change in a earlier date.
The Air Force Reserve is in good shape and will continue to increase our readiness, enhance our capabilities, and posture our force to meet future operational requirements. We remain focused on critical emerging and evolving missions, including nuclear deterrence, air superiority, space, and cyber. We still face challenges, but I am confident, with Congress’ continued backing, we can overcome these obstacles.

Our recent successes are a testament to your support, and your backing of key legislation has enabled us to address critical challenges, and the on-time allocation of the fiscal year 2019 budget directly facilitated our improvement and readiness.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today in front of you and for your steadfast support as we ensure your Air Force Reserve remains prepared to defend this great Nation. I look forward to taking your questions.

[The written statement of General Scobee follows:]
United States Air Force

Testimony

Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense

Guard and Reserve Hearing

Statement of
Lieutenant General Richard W. Scobee
Chief of Air Force Reserve

March 03, 2020
LIENUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD W. SCOBEE

Lt. Gen. Richard W. Scobee is the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Arlington, Va., and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. As Chief of Air Force Reserve, he serves as principal adviser on reserve matters to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff. As Commander of Air Force Reserve Command, he has full responsibility for the supervision of all Air Force Reserve units around the world.

Lt. Gen. Scobee was commissioned in 1986 as a graduate of the Air Force Academy. He earned his pilot wings as a distinguished graduate of Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot training in 1987. He has served as an F-16 Fighting Falcon Pilot, Instructor Pilot, and Flight Examiner both domestically and overseas in Germany, South Korea, and Egypt. Lt. Gen. Scobee has commanded a fighter squadron, operations group, two fighter wings, and a numbered Air Force. Additionally, he deployed as Commander of the 506th Air Expeditionary Group, Kirtland Regional Air Base, Iraq, in 2008.

Prior to his current assignment, Lt. Gen. Scobee, was the Deputy Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, where he was responsible for the daily operations of the command, consisting of approximately 70,000 Reserve Airmen and more than 300 aircraft among three numbered air forces, 34 flying wings, 10 flying groups, a space wing, a cyber wing, and an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance wing. He is a command pilot with more than 3,800 flying hours in the F-16, including 248 combat hours.

EDUCATION
1986 Bachelor of Science, Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1995 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., by correspondence
1997 Master of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia
2000 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., by correspondence
2005 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., by correspondence
2006 Air Force Accident and Safety Board President Course, Kirtland AFB, N.M.
2010 Joint Forces Reserve Officers Orientation Course, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
2010 Leadership Course, Center for Creative Learning, Greensboro, N.C.
2014 Dual Status Title 10 and 32 Joint Task Force Commander Course, Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

ASSIGNMENTS
2. August 1987 – October 1987, Student, Fighter Lead-in training, Holloman AFB, N.M.
5. November 1991 – February 1993, Operation Location Commander and Air Liaison Officer, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany
7. May 1997 – May 1998, F-16 Instructor Pilot, 80th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan AB, South Korea
13. April 2009 – October 2010, Commander, 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, Texas
16. October 2014 – May 2017, Commander, Tenth Air Force, NAS Fort Worth JRB, Texas

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: command pilot
Flight hours: more than 3,800, including 248 combat hours
Aircraft flown: F-16

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star Medal
Mentioned in Despatches Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Mentioned in Despatches Medal
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with silver oak leaf cluster

Not for publication until released by the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star
Iraq Campaign Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Korea Defense Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
Air Force Overseas Ribbon - Short with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Overseas Ribbon - Long with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon with Gold Border
Air Force Longevity Service Award with three oak leaf clusters
Armed Forces Reserve Medal with "M" device
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon with bronze star
Air Force Training Ribbon

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986
First Lieutenant May 28, 1988
Captain May 28, 1990
Major Feb. 1, 1998
Lieutenant Colonel Sept. 12, 2002
Colonel Aug. 9, 2006
Brigadier General Dec. 22, 2010
Major General March 26, 2015
Lieutenant General September 7, 2018

(Current as of November 2019)
Air Force Reserve Fiscal Year 2021 Posture Statement

As an integral component of the Total Force, the Air Force Reserve provides experienced manpower and critical capabilities for our National Defense. Our Citizen Airmen are interchangeable, interoperable, and integrated across the Total Force. We execute the full spectrum of Department of the Air Force missions, while providing daily operations at a fraction of the cost of a standing force.

Total Force operations require Total Force readiness. The Air Force Reserve must be structured, trained, and equipped for the future fight. Operational success in tomorrow’s battlespace will require an agile, modern force. We must be prepared to provide ready forces for joint operations, defend our homeland, counter violent extremist organizations and rogue nations, and deter aggression through nuclear and conventional readiness.

Because of the hard work and support of Congress, we have begun to reverse the negative effects of over a decade of operating under continuing resolutions. In the last two years, we made significant and steady advancements in readiness. This would not have been possible without the distribution of additional readiness funds in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 and the on time allocation of the FY 2019 budget. The approval of our FY 2020 budget request enables us to continue building readiness and capabilities. In addition to providing vital support through appropriations, the Congressional backing of key legislation and statutory changes aided our ability to further our readiness gains.

With the assistance of Congress, we have improved both individual and unit level readiness across the Air Force Reserve. Our nuclear deterrence forces are mission ready, and we increased our pacing unit readiness. We modernized key weapon systems and lessened critical manpower shortfalls. Through internal reforms and process improvement initiatives, we increased our organizational effectiveness and enhanced our ability to provide excellent care for our Citizen Airmen and their families.

Although our readiness has increased, we still face challenges. Our full time manpower remains below the level required to train and maintain our force. Many of our aircraft need critical system upgrades to enhance our ability to provide relevant warfighting capacity to the Total Force in order to enable joint all-domain operations. Weapon system sustainment is essential for the continued operation of legacy platforms. We have a backlog in infrastructure and facilities requirements, and we need resources, equipment, and tools to optimize our training. Our FY 2021 budget request targets the most critical of these deficiencies to further improve Air Force Reserve readiness.

In recent years, our potential adversaries have studied our vulnerabilities and employed technological advances to exploit them, thereby altering the nature of warfare and expanding conflict into new domains. The changing battlespace has given rise to new operational missions and generated a need for advanced capabilities. To ensure we are prepared for future conflict, the Air Force Reserve increased our space manpower in the FY 2021 budget, and we are enhancing our cyber defense capabilities. Our FY 2021 budget request postures our force to meet future
operational requirements, prioritize modernization, enhance critical capabilities, and align our operational assets with emerging and evolving missions.

Because we are involved in every Air Force mission set, nearly every Active Component initiative impacts the Air Force Reserve. In order to remain relevant contributors to joint operations, we must maintain interoperability as a Total Force. We optimize our operational capability when we maintain parity with our Active Component counterparts. The concurrent fielding, recapitalization, and divestment of airframes, systems, and equipment is essential to our ability to more effectively integrate within the Total Force. Associations between geographically co-located Active and Reserve component units greatly enhances this integration, providing multiple benefits to the Total Force and the American taxpayer.

Our readiness, operational capabilities, and success as an organization all depend on our Reserve Citizen Airmen. They are both the heart of our organization and its foundation. Our Reservists are incredibly talented. Their diversity and high level of experience multiplies our operational capabilities, and their dedication enables us to execute our mission. It is therefore incumbent upon us to develop our Airmen as individuals, technical experts, and leaders, ensuring they have the resources and support they require. We are absolutely committed to providing excellent care to our Citizen Airmen and their families.

Our FY 2021 budget request of $5.8 billion builds on our recent readiness gains and supports our continuing efforts to implement the National Defense Strategy. The Air Force Reserve is a cost effective force, and will continue its good stewardship of American taxpayers’ dollars. We will use the requested funds to invest in the capabilities, weapon systems, and training required to generate combat power today and tomorrow. With continued Congressional support, we will further our internal improvement efforts, provide excellent care to our Reserve Citizen Airmen and their families, and remain a ready force prepared to defend this great nation.

The Air Force Reserve in the Total Force

The Air Force Reserve is a predominantly part-time force which, when mobilized, provides full time support to the Joint Force. In addition to our daily contributions to global operations, we provide rapid surge capability and strategic depth for national defense. We now participate in every Active Component mission, operating as part of an integrated Total Force across nearly all Air Force core functional areas and weapon systems.

On average, over 6,000 Reserve Citizen Airmen contribute to worldwide operations every day. Typically, about two thirds of these Airmen are volunteers. Our personnel support all combatant commands and are deployed to every geographic area of responsibility. Last year, our Reservists provided nearly two million days of support to the Active Component and the Joint Force. This includes participating in the first F-35 combat deployment, during which a Reserve pilot dropped the first ordnance from an F-35 in combat.
In addition to supporting global military operations, the Air Force Reserve partners with and supports multiple federal and civil organizations and institutions. We routinely participate in humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts. We also support global scientific research programs and education and technology initiatives.

In 2019, the Air Force Reserve participated in approximately 60 joint and multinational exercises, increasing Joint Force integration and strengthening relationships with allies and partner nations. Additionally, over 1,000 personnel conducted Innovative Readiness Training. Airmen within the civil engineering, medical, communications, and force support and sustainment skillsets are given the opportunity to enhance their deployment readiness by providing critical services to communities in the United States. Last year, we helped Americans in eight states, contributing over $11 million in value to local communities.

Approximately 80 percent of Air Force Reserve members serve part time. In addition to their military training and experience, our part time force brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise from their civilian careers to their military service. This strengthens our capabilities, enables the integration of civil sector best practices, and facilitates beneficial partnerships with industry and other institutions. Many of our members have civilian careers similar to their military jobs, which enables Citizen Airmen to bring scope and depth to their military positions. This is particularly advantageous for emerging and evolving missions, such as cyber and space, and we actively recruit personnel with civilian experience into these career fields.

The Air Force Reserve provides the Total Force with a method to retain talent, by providing a continuity of service option for Active Component members who would otherwise separate. The Department of the Air Force understands the importance of retaining experience and talent, and seeks to leverage the value, which the Reserve Component brings to the Total Force. In addition to using Total Force partnerships to place newly trained members in units with highly experienced personnel, the Air Force is currently exploring flexible service options designed to allow members to easily transition between components of the Total Force. The Air Force Reserve fully supports these efforts, which will benefit our Airmen, our readiness, and our national defense.

Total Force Integration is exemplified by associations between geographically co-located Active Component and Reserve units. In this construct, equipment resources are officially assigned only to the lead unit, but are shared between the lead and associate unit. Associations further enhance our interoperability and give the Active Component access to the experience resident in the more seasoned Reserve force. This ensures parity in equipment and training, while providing cost savings and readiness benefits to both components.

Currently, there are 78 associations between the Reserve and the Active Component. Most of these are classic associations, in which the Active Component is the lead organization. Active associations, in which the Reserve is the lead unit, comprise a little more than ten percent of current associations. The Reserve and the Active Component have associations in nearly every major mission set, and many training units, including every undergraduate pilot training wing, pilot.
instructor training, and major aircraft formal training units. We are also the lead component for the B-52 and C-5 Formal Training Units.

Implementing the National Defense Strategy

After nearly two decades of counter-terrorism operations, great power competition has re-emerged. The return of peer and near-peer competitors to the world stage in an age of unprecedented global economic interdependence combined with the proliferation of swiftly advancing technology has created a unique and complex environment. This necessitates a rapid shift in military operational focus and capabilities. The United States must be able to combat adversaries across the spectrum of conflict and operate simultaneously in all warfighting domains. The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides the framework to ensure we can compete, deter, and win in tomorrow's battlespace, and we are diligently working to meet that intent.

Our efforts align under those of the Department of the Air Force and support the Total Force’s mandate to provide ready forces for national defense. In order to operate seamlessly in a combat environment, we must have the capability to connect with the Joint Force. The Total Force must be capable of conducting robust nuclear deterrence, homeland defense, and counter-extremism operations. Meeting this mandate in the future operational environment will require the Total Force to dominate space, generate combat power, and conduct logistics under attack. As the Airmen who execute the mission represent the most important element in this and every undertaking, the Department of the Air Force is simultaneously focused on developing and caring for our people and their families.

Air Force Reserve Strategic Priorities

In order to restore readiness rapidly and prepare for the future fight, the Air Force Reserve established three priorities. The first, prioritizing strategic depth and accelerating readiness, focuses on the requirement to prepare for future operational requirements while maintaining present-day readiness and sustaining our present level of support to the Joint Force. The second, developing resilient leaders, serves two purposes. The intents of this priority are to enhance the physical, mental and emotional fitness of all Reserve Citizen Airmen and to develop mission-focused leaders who can operate independently. Our final priority, reform the organization, aims to increase efficiency and effectiveness through internal process improvements and innovation.

The Air Force Reserve strategic priorities were developed based on the challenges outlined in the National Defense Strategy and are aligned with Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and Air Chief of Staff directives. We made significant gains in 2019, increasing overall readiness, implementing new leadership development programs, and improving our internal operations. We are in the process of expanding and accelerating these efforts, to further enhance our mission readiness and our ability to support our Citizen Airmen and their families.
Air Force Reserve Future Force Framework

To align Air Force Reserve capabilities and force structure with the National Defense Strategy and to posture our force to execute tomorrow’s missions, we developed the Air Force Reserve Future Force Framework. This will enable us to deliberately organize, train, and equip our force to meet present directives and develop operational capabilities for the future fight. This framework directs mission optimization through assessing capabilities to determine which mission sets are best suited for the Air Force Reserve and through the alignment and improvement of policy, planning and programming efforts. The framework also provides for tailored and prioritized training, which synchronizes efforts and capitalizes on technology to optimize unit training assemblies by enabling the completion of ancillary requirements through virtual methods. Finally, the Air Force Reserve will continue to leverage civilian sector strengths by capitalizing on member expertise and knowledge, developing industry partnerships, and tailoring recruitment efforts.

Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request Overview

The American people fund our readiness, therefore, we must be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. We take great care to ensure we only request the appropriations we require, and we continually seek to conserve fiscal resources through cost savings and cost avoidance efforts.

We cannot effectively manage our appropriations without the timely allocation of funds. With a predictable budget, we can deliberately plan our spending, thereby maximizing our readiness return. On time allocations allow us to execute our programmed Reserve Personnel Appropriations (RPA) and flying hour funds. Systematic infrastructure upgrades and weapon system sustainment require predictable budgets for optimal cost effectiveness and timely implementation. Our recent readiness gains, which were favorably impacted by the on time allocation of our FY 2019 budget, demonstrate the criticality of predictable budgets to national defense.

Our FY 2021 budget request of $5.8 billion is designed to further our ongoing efforts to align the Air Force Reserve with the National Defense Strategy and Air Force priorities, enhance readiness, and posture our force to meet future threats. We are requesting $2.2 billion in RPA, which funds Reserve military pay for all statuses, formal schools, training, and individual readiness requirements. Furthermore, our FY 2021 budget request includes $3.4 billion for the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation, which funds our flying hour program, operational readiness and mobilization requirements, equipment maintenance, and the salaries of our civil service personnel, including civilian pay and benefits for our Air Reserve Technician (ART) Force.

In FY 2019, we executed 99.5 percent and 98.6 percent of our RPA and O&M funding, respectively, and we are on track to fully execute our 2020 appropriations. Our FY 2021 budget request includes an RPA increase of $193.6 million, approximately 60 percent of which is driven by higher AGR authorizations. Our FY 2021 also includes an O&M increase of $123 million, which includes funding for over 81,000 peacetime flying hours and depot maintenance, Federal Aviation Administration mandated upgrades, and contractor logistic support for nearly 320 aircraft.
Maintaining and modernizing our infrastructure and facilities is critical to readiness, force protection, and ensuring a safe work environment for our Airmen. These efforts are funded through Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations, which provide for new facilities and major infrastructure projects, and with the Facility Sustainment, Repair, and Modernization (FSRM) funds included in our O&M appropriation. FSRM funds appropriations are used to repair and modernize existing facilities and to extend the service life of existing infrastructure.

In FY 2019, we were appropriated funds for seven MILCON projects, totaling $115 million, and awarded $142 million in FSRM funding for 194 projects. We have three authorized FY 2020 MILCON projects, and we have distributed over $76 million in FSRM funds so far this year. Our FSRM investments include $35 million for airfield pavement repairs. Our FY 2021 budget request includes $23.1 million in total MILCON appropriations, which will fund the construction of a new F-35 simulator facility at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas for $14.2 million, provide $5.6 million for Air Force Reserve-wide minor construction requirements and $3.2 million for Planning and Design funds of future MILCON projects. These funds, along with our requested $103 million in FSRM appropriations will assist in reducing our $890 million MILCON and $1.5 billion FSRM requirements backlogs, providing modern, efficient, and safe facilities for our Reserve Citizen Airmen.

Generating Combat Power Today and Tomorrow

The Air Force Reserve provides daily operational support to the Joint Force, while maintaining a strategic force for sustained operations during major conflict. We provide surge capacity and rapid response capabilities, enabling the Joint Force to quickly adapt to operations tempo increases and unforeseen events, such as national disasters and contingencies. We also fill Active Component manning shortfalls and provide augmentation to meet short term manpower requirements.

Our ability to meet current taskings and to supply strategic manpower are predicated on our readiness. As an operational reserve, we must maintain our readiness to support present-day missions while we align our capabilities to meet the intent of the National Defense Strategy and prepare for future requirements. Over the past two years, we increased readiness across the enterprise, improving both individual and unit readiness.

The Air Force Reserve must be able to decisively employ both traditional and emerging capabilities. In order to enhance our ability to compete, deter, and win in any environment, we remain focused on key mission sets and actively expand our capabilities in the space and cyber realms. As warfighting domains become increasingly integrated, we must be prepared to conduct joint all-domain operations, which will allow us to create decisive, asymmetrical advantages in the future fight.

Pacing Squadrons

In 2018, the Air Force identified operational squadrons that would be required at the start of a peer conflict. Several of these pacing squadrons are Air Force Reserve units, and we also support Active Component pacing squadrons through associations. Over the past year, we concentrated our
resources and efforts on these units, improving their readiness. We will continue to prioritize our pacing squadrons to ensure they meet all requirements within the specified timelines.

**Nuclear Deterrence Operations**

Nuclear capability is a foundational element of our national defense, and the Air Force Reserve shares in the nuclear mission. Our Nuclear Deterrence Operations assets include nuclear strike, air refueling, and command, control, and communications capabilities. In FY 2019, we evaluated these units during four assessments and through participation in an enterprise-wide Nuclear Execution Force exercise. Our nuclear forces remain mission ready.

Ready forces require modern equipment and capabilities. To further increase our capabilities in this critical mission, our FY 2021 budget request includes funding to equip six of our seven nuclear command, control, and communications capable command posts with the new primary strategic communication system, the Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal. This system will replace the legacy terminal, which is based on 1990s technology.

**Air Superiority**

In order to defeat a peer or near-peer adversary, we must be able to generate combat power in contested environments. Last year we prioritized the readiness of our fifth-generation fighter squadrons and focused on providing realistic training to our F-22 and F-35 pilots. Our FY 2021 budget request increases the training funds for these airframes. This will enable us to expand fifth-generation fighter pilot production and to provide fully-qualified fighter aircrew with more frequent and higher value training.

The Air Force Reserve has Classic Associations in several F-35 units. We execute F-35 combat operations in our association at Hill AFB, Utah. Additional associations execute F-35 formal training at Luke AFB, Arizona and Eglin AFB, Florida, and operational test and weapons instructor course missions at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Air Force Reserve’s first unit-equipped F-35 wing will execute combat operations and be part of an Active Association. The Department of the Air Force plans to increase F-35 aircrew authorizations and our FY 2021 budget request supports this effort by adding Reserve manpower at the F-35 Formal Training to support greater Total Force student throughput.

**Aerial Refueling**

The Air Force Reserve air refueling fleet in FY21 consists of seven unit equipped wings and four associate wings. In January 2019, the first two KC-46s arrived at McConnell Air Force Base (AFB), Kansas. These aircraft were delivered to a classically associated Active and Reserve wing and are being flown by Total Force crews. In addition to one operational squadron, the Air Force Reserve has several trained instructors who support the KC-46 Formal Training Unit. The Air Force Reserve’s first unit-equipped KC-46 wing, located at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, began conversion in 2019. The first KC-46 is projected to arrive in June with the expectation that all twelve aircraft will be delivered by December 2020.
At present, we have eight wings which operate the KC-135. Six of these wings are unit-equipped, and three are tasked with an alert mission. We are focused on the readiness of our KC-135 force, with the goals of improving mission capable rates, increasing aircrew and maintenance manpower, and providing better training for our aircrew and maintenance personnel. The first Air Force Reserve aircraft will begin datalink modification with “Real Time Information in the Cockpit” (RTIC) in late summer. This modification increases the communications and information capabilities of the aircraft increasing its support capacity in a fast paced contested environment.

The Air Force Reserve has two wings who associate with the Active Component to fly and maintain the KC-10. The Air Force Reserve remains committed to this aircraft and mission as long as it remains a part of the air refueling force. As the inventory is reduced, the Air Force Reserve will work with the Department of the Air Force to convert those units and their manpower to the determined follow-on missions.

Airlift
The Air Force Reserve enables combat delivery through our strategic and tactical airlift fleets. In order to effectuate the C-5 formal training requirements, the Air Force Reserve C-5 crew ratios were adjusted to focus on balancing training capacity and resources for the Active and Reserve Component while maintaining combat readiness. The C-130H fleet was upgraded for compliance in accordance with the Aircraft Modification Program Increment 1 (AMP 1) and has begun to install new propulsion upgrades. The C-17 fleet continues to provide operational and strategic depth to the Global Reach enterprise.

Personnel Recovery
The Air Force Reserve has one wing dedicated to the no-fail mission of personnel recovery. We operate three search and rescue platforms, and our FY 2021 budget request includes funds to update mission planning capability for this high demand asset. The request also supports modernization requirements for our Guardian Angel and HC-130 aircraft.

Dominating Space
The establishment of the United States Space Force (USSF) in December 2019 underscored the importance of space to our national security. The Air Force Reserve is a major contributor to space operations. In the last year, our personnel executed approximately 26 percent of daily space missions. We added 70 space manpower authorizations in FY 2020. In addition, the Air Force Reserve has already taken steps to provide focused support to the Space Force for the near term. Our space units are aligned with and will be able to integrate effectively with USSF forces for the foreseeable future.

Cyber Defense
Digital technology permeates nearly every aspect of modern life. This technology is both pervasive and inexpensive, making the cyber realm easily accessible. The increasing integration of cyber capabilities enhances our ability to generate combat power, yet exposes us to new threats.
Therefore, the Air Force Reserve is building and expanding our foundational capabilities to conduct operations in the information environment, by evolving our cyber mission portfolio and re-purposing our cyber force to better defend against future threats.

The Air Force Reserve is home to the only Total Force wing that operates all six defensive cyber weapon systems. We provide support directly to Air Forces Cyber, Sixteenth Air Force, and United States Cyber Command. We are implementing the Cyber Squadron Initiative and standing up Mission Defense Teams on all nine Air Force Reserve host installations, as well as Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas where we are the lead Air Force unit. Our FY 2021 budget request provides additional manpower to stand up cyber flights at all our unit-equipped locations.

We are in the process of transitioning our cyber personnel from information technology support to mission assurance and defensive cyber operations. Along with our Active Component counterparts, we are replacing our internal communications network with contractor delivered information services. The shift to Enterprise Information Technology as a service will allow us to leverage modern systems and practices from civilian industry for our internal networking needs, while enabling our personnel to focus on cyber operations and defense.

The Air Force Reserve is also developing and implementing new programs to expand accessibility and better utilize data. Our goal is to shift from stove-piped service information technology systems to cloud platforms. As part of this effort, we will transition to an operating-system agnostic framework. We are extending mobile-based capabilities and implementing alternative platforms to enable increased user accessibility. These efforts allow users to connect securely to Air Force networks through virtual desktop applications, enabling access from any device and any location. We are also working with the Air Force Chief Data Office to create a mature Shared Data Environment, which will serve as a single source for information.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The Air Force Reserve ISR enterprise is uniquely designed to provide strategic depth and operational surge capacity in traditional and emerging mission sets. Tailoring of current and future missions is necessary to ensure our ISR forces are readily available for mission execution. We will develop capabilities in areas that support the Joint Force while ensuring its current mission sets are relevant to multi-domain operations and major power competition. Investments in the operational use of public access information, increase presence in battlespace characterization, and support to key capabilities such as nuclear, space, and cyber operations that are necessary to ensure we are postured to meet the needs of Joint Forces.

The Air Force Reserve continues to provide approximately 500 experienced pilots, sensor operators and intelligence Airmen to support Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operations at five associations with our counterparts in Air Combat Command and Air Force Special Operations Command. We will maintain our contribution of both steady state and surge capacity to MQ-9 combat lines, as the Total Force RPA enterprise reorganizes to a leaner and more lethal force. As
the Active Component restructures RQ-4 operations with divestment of a portion of the fleet, we will invest our associated manpower, focusing on readiness in missions supporting the National Defense Strategy.

**Command and Control (C2)**

The Air Force is preparing for the future fight by fielding new concepts and capabilities which enable Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), the Department of Defense’s top modernization priority, which is critical to executing joint all-domain operations. JADC2 is a system that uses data, machine learning and state-of-the-art software to seamlessly link “sensors to shooters” across all domains – air, land, sea, cyber and space. The Air Force Reserve’s current C2 program will maintain status quo until the development of JADC2 and the Advanced Battle Management System priority.

As part of the Air Force’s strategic initiative to strengthen joint leaders and teams, Ninth Air Force will now provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with an air-centric capability to task during crisis operations and be offered as part of the dynamic force employment model to meet the National Defense Strategy for more integrated and multi-domain operations. Our FY 2021 budget programs Air Force Reserve manpower to associate in the stand-up of the service-retained, Joint Task Force (JTF)-capable organization (9 AF, JTF Headquarters at Shaw AFB, South Carolina).

**Manning a Ready Force**

Adequate manpower is vital to readiness. Our FY 2021 budget request increases our authorized end strength from 70,100 to 70,300, adding 200 AGR authorizations to increase our full time manpower and enable our readiness.

In recent years, the Air Force Reserve has encountered multiple manning challenges. For several years, our overall manpower has hovered slightly below end strength targets. While we do have part time manning shortfalls in some locations and in certain critical career fields, our total assigned part time personnel is near the total authorized. Although there have been improvements in the past year, our full time manning remains below the authorized level.

Our full time personnel continue to do excellent work by increasing our readiness while maintaining a high operational tempo. However, because we lack sufficient manpower, our full time force is overtasked. We place too many requirements on too few Airmen. We owe it to them to reduce some of the burden.

Our full time force is a mix of ARTs and AGRs. Between 2013 and 2018, our ART manning levels dropped from 80 to 74 percent, largely due to the highly competitive civilian job market. This decrease in manpower was further exacerbated by the civil service hiring process, which prolonged vacancies and caused us to lose candidates.

Ensuring our full time personnel are fairly compensated for their work is essential to recruiting and retaining talented individuals. Therefore, we implemented several initiatives to boost our full time manpower. These efforts are producing results. At the start of FY 2019, our full time manning
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level was approximately 75 percent. By the end of the first quarter of FY 2020, our full time manpower increased to around 80 percent of authorized.

The increase in our full time manning levels is due, in part, to the conversion of a percentage of our ART billets to AGR authorizations. As a result, AGR manpower and retention rates are higher than that of the ART force, with a comparatively faster hiring process; thus AGR vacancies are of shorter duration. The ART to AGR conversion initiative is a multi-year effort, which began in FY 2018. In FY 2019, we executed over 453 conversions, and we have already completed nearly 71 percent of the over 362 conversions planned for FY 2020. Our FY 2021 budget request provides for the conversion of an additional 625 ART authorizations to AGR billets, largely in maintenance and force support specialties.

Our ART manning and overall full time manpower also benefited from Direct Hiring Authority. This authority, which Congress granted, streamlines the civil service hiring process for certain critical career fields, drastically decreasing hiring timelines. Direct Hiring Authority provided particular benefit to our full time maintenance force. This authority allowed us to hire over 600 maintainers between March and October of 2019, increasing full time maintenance manpower to approximately 80 percent. Around 75 percent of the individuals hired were new to civil service. Direct Hiring Authority enabled us to decrease our ART maintainer vacancies to their lowest level in nearly four years.

Extending this authority to additional career fields, such as pilots, would likely produce similar results. At present our overall pilot manning is approximately 85 percent of authorized levels, with full time manpower at nearly 75 percent of authorized. Overall, pilot manpower has remained steady over the last year. We are exploring new options to increase both full time and part time pilot manning, including updating pay grade determination criteria for ART aircrew members and offering additional recruitment and retention bonuses.

In addition, the Air Force Reserve took steps to improve retention in both our full time and part time force. Reducing attrition preserves readiness and provides cost savings by decreasing training requirements. We are presently targeting retention through bonuses and special salary rates, which offer a marked return on investment. A single $15,000 retention bonus results in a cost avoidance of roughly $45,000 in training funds and prevents an approximately three year readiness gap, which occurs while a replacement is trained.

We are focusing our retention efforts on Airmen with six to ten years total service, which is the group with the highest attrition rate. In addition to expanding existing programs, we are seeking new methods of increasing retention and engaging wing leaders in these efforts. We also reduced barriers to recruiting, including decreasing hiring timelines, eliminating mileage restrictions, and removing unnecessary interview requirements.

Our full time to part time force mix is based on pre-Gulf War force structure and operational tempo. In order to effectively accomplish our mission, train our force, and maintain readiness, we must increase the percentage of full time manpower in relation to our end strength. Presently, full
time uniformed military members constitute approximately 20 percent of Air Force Reserve authorizations. Based on current requirements, we need to increase this type of full time support which is essential to maintaining readiness.

**Modernizing and Improving the Air Force Reserve**

Tomorrow’s operational environment will notably evolve when compared to how we conduct operations today. The return of great power competition, combined with the rapid advancement and widespread availability of digital technology, drives the need to transform our forces so they can generate combat power effectively to win, despite contested environments established by our potential adversaries. This requires fielding new warfighting concepts and capabilities and modernizing existing platforms to meet future threats.

We implemented multiple readiness initiatives, including bolstering training, removing unnecessary requirements, and instituting internal reforms to streamline our operations and enhance support to our Reserve Citizen Airmen. We are prepared to meet both current and future requirements, and we must carry our present momentum forward into the coming years, to further optimize our force.

**Maintaining Operational Parity with the Active Component**

In order to effectively support the Active Component and connect with the Joint Force, the Air Force Reserve must modernize simultaneously as the Air Force upgrades legacy platforms, adding capabilities required for the future fight. Our operational capabilities are tied to our ability to integrate into the Total Force, therefore we must maintain parity with the Active Component whenever possible.

The concurrent fielding of new airframes, aircraft upgrades, and other equipment is critical to sustaining and improving this operational parity. The Air Force Reserve can only provide strategic depth and operational support to the Joint Force in mission areas where our personnel are trained on the required weapon systems, and we are most effective when we can operate interchangeably with our Active Component counterparts. Concurrent fielding enables our personnel to train on the same systems employed by the Active Component, facilitating interoperability within the Total Force. This maximizes the Air Force Reserve’s ability to support operational missions and enhances our integration with the Active Component, assuring we are capable of providing the Total Force with the warfighting capability necessary to achieve decisive victory against future threats and in all domains.

In addition to concurrent fielding, the Reserve must recapitalize and divest weapon systems in conjunction with the Active Component. This prevents problems which arise when the Reserve Component continues to operate a legacy system that is no longer used by our active counterparts. In this situation, the Reserve becomes responsible for all aspects associated with that particular platform, such as standardization and evaluations and safety. Furthermore, once the Active Component divests a weapon system, the Reserve is unable to hire qualified Active Component aircrew separatees for that specific airframe, increasing training costs and reducing readiness.
Weapon System Modernization and Sustainment

While addition of new platforms such as the F-35, KC-46, B-21, and F-15EX will enhance our capabilities, both the Active Component and the Reserve will continue to rely on many of the proven platforms currently in our inventory. This necessitates aircraft modernization and system upgrades, which will provide the capabilities needed for the future fight and ensure survivability if operating in a contested environment.

Key modernizations are required to keep our legacy fleet relevant in the prioritized missions outlined in the NDS. Necessary A-10 enhancements include the installation of upgraded mission computers, Helmet-Mounted Targeting, Anti-Jam Global Positioning System equipment, and missile warning systems. Our B-52 fleet requires upgrades to radar and defensive systems and the install of advanced data link equipment, and our FY 2021 budget request includes funding to install Advanced Extremely High Frequency communications capability on this aircraft. Our F-16s require active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars to more effectively support homeland defense and other priority NDS missions.

After decades of operating in a permissive environment, we must be prepared to conduct logistics under attack. The C-5 and C-17 are both vulnerable to radar guided missile threats which would be mitigated by the installation of a layered defense and awareness suite. Currently, the Radar Warning System upgrades for both aircraft are unfunded. We are presently installing the Mobility Air Forces datalink system in our C-5 fleet and to equip our KC-135 aircraft with the Real-Time in Cockpit situational awareness system. Our KC-135 fleet is also scheduled to begin Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures modifications in June 2020, and the installation of additional threat awareness and self-defense systems would provide further protection for this aircraft.

In addition to modernization, many of our airframes require upgrades, repairs, and component replacements in order to maintain airworthiness and extend service life. These weapon system sustainment actions are critical to both our mission capability and aircraft availability rates. Maintaining a mission capable aircraft fleet is essential to meeting operational taskings and training our personnel. Lack of weapon system sustainment funding can ground aircraft, hampering our ability to support global operations and degrading our readiness.

Years of continuing resolutions, lack of flexible funding, and an aging fleet have increased weapon system sustainment requirements. Historically, the Air Force Reserve has had approximately 75 percent of our share of these requirements funded. We obligated over $500 million for weapon system sustainment in FY 2019. Our FY 2020 appropriations are approximately $759 million. We’ve been authorized $345 million to date, of which 80.6 percent has been obligated. We are also on track to obligate our entire FY20 authorization, as we’re currently at 36.6 percent obligated.

Our FY 2021 budget requests $703 million in weapon system sustainment funds, which will provide needed upgrades to multiple Air Force Reserve platforms. Our current sustainment requirements include measures to extend the B-52’s service life by an additional thirty years and
to replace this platform’s engines with new, more fuel-efficient powerplants. Our A-10 fleet requires wing replacements and our C-130H aircraft need avionics and propulsion upgrades.

**Internal Improvements**

Reforming our organization through internal improvements and increasing our operational efficiency continues to be one of our major focus areas. Our intent is to increase our overall readiness and enhance our ability to support our Reserve Citizen Airmen by streamlining our internal processes and eliminating requirements, policies, and programs which either detract from or do not contribute to our readiness or provide support to our personnel.

In FY 2019, we completed a major reform of our internal medical process, and took action to fix hindrances that needed to be remedied, including a policy which placed unnecessary participation restrictions on individuals with medical profiles.

We are currently accelerating and expanding our internal reform efforts. We identified additional areas within our organization that require enhancement and are working to improve the most critical of these. One of several of these initiatives is the holistic reform of our manpower and personnel programs and processes. We are also identifying processes which create problems for our Airmen, such as pay and benefits issues.

As part of this enterprise-wide initiative, the Air Force Reserve’s Force Generation Center is presently improving our mobilization and deployment processes through automation and system upgrades. This will expedite orders approval, enabling Airmen to receive benefits earlier in the process and reducing gaps in support. These improvements will alleviate problems caused by our lengthy current process, helping our personnel, their family members, and their civilian employers' better plan and prepare for deployments.

In addition to our own internal efforts, we participate in Department of the Air Force development and reform initiatives, including the Air Force War Fighting Integration Capability team. We also support and will benefit from the Department of the Air Force’s ongoing predictive maintenance efforts and are working to acquire additive manufacturing capability. To date, four Air Force Reserve wings purchased equipment required to manufacture parts in house, which are currently being used for training and familiarization. These two initiatives will decrease aircraft repair time, ultimately improving mission capable and aircraft availability rates.

**Exercise Planning**

Operating in contested airspace requires both modernized aircraft and trained aircrew. We must ensure all Reserve Citizen Airmen receive realistic training and are fully capable of employing the systems which will be required in the future operating environment.

We are building Integrated Mission Planning Cells into our operational support squadrons. This will provide a standardized, transparent, and equitable exercise planning process for our units. The addition of dedicated mission planners will allow our wings to match resources and requirements
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with training opportunities, enabling deliberate and properly prioritized use of our centrally managed training funds.

These mission planners will be fully integrated into all phases of the exercise planning process, which will ensure learning objectives and training requirements are met. Training for joint all-domain and contested environment operations will require scheduled access to secure networks, as well as software and hardware management. Therefore, our operational support squadrons will employ dedicated datalink managers. This will ensure our aircrew are proficient on the newest systems and receive critical high-end readiness training.

Providing Excellent Care to Airmen and Families

Our Airmen are our greatest asset. They are ultimately responsible for maintaining our readiness, aligning our organization to meet future requirements, and executing our operational missions. Their success depends on our support. The Air Force Reserve is absolutely committed to providing excellent care to both our Airmen and their families. This mandates a holistic approach, and we continually seek ways to better support our personnel and enable their personal and professional success. We currently have numerous personnel support initiatives, including reducing the administrative burden on our Airmen, improving education and training, growing our resiliency programs, and providing our Airmen and their families with access to needed resources. Our ultimate goals are to improve the quality of life for our personnel and to foster an environment where people want to stay and serve.

Suicide Prevention

Recently, the Air Force Reserve has experienced an alarming spike in member suicides. Our rates are not going in the desired direction. Losing even one Airman to suicide is a horrible tragedy, with every life having its own deeply personal story.

In response to this heartbreaking trend, we expanded upon our existing support programs and are adding new leadership tools to assist with suicide prevention and intervention. Suicide is a complex interaction of factors; while there is no one “fix,” we are committed to addressing suicide comprehensively. We are conducting thorough analyses of potential common socio-demographic factors, such as age, race, relationships status, and financial security, among individuals who die by suicide, in order to develop algorithmic methods and integrated databases to identify at-risk Airmen.

Although the Air Force has found no direct link between deployments and member suicide, all personnel receive mental health screenings before, during, and after deployment and as part of their annual health assessment. These screenings assess suicide risk along with other behavioral and mental health issues. We conduct Suicide Analysis Boards, modeled after safety investigation boards, to identify the causes and contributing factors behind member suicides.

Our intent is to create protective policies and programs which will reverse this trend and bring our suicide rate to the only acceptable number: zero.
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Personal Resiliency
The personal wellness of our Airmen and their families is incredibly important. The Air Force Reserve has multiple on base entities which provide support and resources to our personnel. We employ dedicated Sexual Assault Response Coordinators in all wings and Violence Prevention Integrators on all nine Air Force Reserve host installations and at Fort Worth Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, where we are the lead Air Force wing. Furthermore, we embedded full-time Religious Support Teams within our units.

Last summer, we initiated a mental health and suicide prevention outreach and awareness campaign. We also directed all our units to conduct a resiliency tactical pause, which will be an ongoing effort to enhance connectedness among our personnel. Many of our wings and our members took an active role in these efforts, increasing their effectiveness and impact.

In addition, the Air Force Reserve promotes and provides mental health resources as part of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program. This initiative supports Reservists and their family members through pre-and post-deployment events. This program has seen an overwhelming success, with over 97 percent of attendees finding the events beneficial.

Summary
Over the past two years, the Air Force Reserve made significant gains in readiness. We enhanced our mission capabilities, bolstered our full time manning levels, and increased our organizational efficiencies. We carefully constructed our FY 2021 budget request to accelerate these efforts. This request will facilitate further modernization of our weapon systems, better posture our force to meet emerging and evolving mission requirements, and boost our ability to support our Airmen and their families. We will continue our diligent efforts to meet the intent of the National Defense Strategy, increase our interoperability within the Total Force, and further our integration within the Joint Force.

Our recent readiness gains would not have been possible without your support. The approval of our FY 2019 and 2020 budget requests enabled us to improve our readiness while maintaining robust support to global operations. Recent legislative actions, such as Direct Hiring Authority, removed barriers to success and improved the quality of life for our Citizen Airmen. The future operational environment will require a capable, modern, and combat-ready force. With your continued support, we are confident the Air Force Reserve will remain prepared to fly, fight, and win across the operational spectrum of air, space, and cyberspace.
Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, and would just ask a question of each of you as a courtesy to my colleagues. Just with some conciseness and briefness, if you could answer the question. There was $1.3 billion transfer from the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. Could each of you again just briefly but concisely give us an indication of items you were looking to procure and the impact it will have on you in fiscal year 2020?

General LUCKEY. So, Chairman, I am happy to start. I would just say that I would bend it more in terms of capabilities than I would any specific item. As you know, we execute this over a 3-year period of time, and in collaboration with this committee and the Senate, continue to make sure that we are investing that money wisely and aggressively. But command and control systems, to make sure we continue to modernize our capabilities and platforms for interoperability across the force, bulk fuel distribution systems, several different aspects of the medical capabilities that reside in the Army Reserve, simulators for training, light utility equipment, and then some fairly heavyweight engineering equipment, engineer support equipment, those sorts of things.

As you well know, we use this account fairly aggressively every year to make sure we are continuing to modernize the force. So those are some of the capabilities that we would be talking about.

Mr. Visclosky. Right.

Admiral.

Admiral MCCOLLUM. And so for the Navy Reserve, it is somewhat similar. Aircraft modernization, avionics upgrades, things that we do to modernize the capacity or the ability to be interoperable with the Active Component, as well as some of the fuel systems and distribution systems for our expeditionary combat forces that we refer to as NECC, and then upgrades for aircraft that we have that will give them more endurance capability and the ability to have a timing rhythm of the placement of the upgrades that I have suggested.

Mr. Visclosky. General Bellon.

General BELLON. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to start by thanking the committee. The Marine Corps typically gets on average about 1 percent of the total appropriation that is handed out to the services, but every bit of resource that we get is very much appreciated.

This year, to answer your question directly, probably the largest program that we will roll back a year or so is going to be an upgrade of an F-5 Aggressor Squadron, and that is typically avionics, as Admiral McCollum pointed out.

But I would like to take this opportunity to point out to the committee that what the Marine Corps could really use in NGREA is a wider flexibility on how we spend that money each year that you give to us. Specifically, my greatest shortfall is ICCE, individual combat and clothing equipment, literally the body armor that the Marines wear when they go into harm’s way. Right now, the way the rules are, I can’t spend that money on NGREA, and I have a
significant shortfall. But within two cycles, even with that 1 percent, I can make up that shortfall for the force. So I just wanted to point that out today and, again, thank you.

Mr. VISCOSKY. If I could ask on the rules, was that within the legislation we passed or is that Department regulation, just for my clarity?

General BELLON. Sir, I think it is probably a combination of both. It is the way the Department interprets the legislation, but I can give you—I can take that for the record and give you a more developed answer.

Mr. VISCOSKY. So the request would be to have some clarity to be of assistance in an issue like that.

General BELLON. Exactly, sir. Thank you.

General SCOBEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the Air Force Reserve, our fiscal year 2020 NGREA fund was intended to target our critical capability gaps across combat systems, mobility systems, personnel recovery, and special operations warfare systems, some command and control, some space modernization that we had going on, and some distributed training programs. And there were a number of modernization programs that were focused on the support for our 37 Wings and 8 Wing equivalents.

So the loss of the fiscal year 2020 NGREA funds is going to adversely affect basically all of the Air Force Reserve modernization programs and approximately—that we planned for fiscal year 2020 and about 50 percent of the current perhaps that we are working with NGREA will be delayed. So it will be—it will hurt some of our capability, but I don’t expect it to affect our readiness.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Calvert.

READINESS OF THE RESERVES

Mr. CALVERT. Kind of going on what the chairman is asking. For the past several years, we have increased our funding for the military to make up for the huge readiness shortfalls we had. And so could each of us—or each of you, can you give us a brief update on your perspective on how ready our Reserve focus, our forces are should a large-scale conflict take place?

General LUCKEY. Sir, I will start with that one. So as you know, over the last 3 1/2 years, Army Reserve has focused specifically on exactly what you are asking. In RFX construct, we have increased the readiness of our early deploying formations. Early deploying defined in those—of the tranche of forces that we would have to deploy in the ground combat operations at scale, it is about 38,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve in less than 90 days. Early deployment formations are those forces that we would have to get to in 30 days. We have increased the readiness of those formations just in the last year alone by another 9 percent.

I will tell you that while the readiness has increased, as I said in my opening statement, significantly over the last 3 1/2 years, I will tell you that I think we have reached about the achievable level of sustainable readiness over the long haul. And the reason I say that, as I articulated earlier, I continue to be very concerned about our soldiers being able to balance between their responsibilities to the soldiers, ready soldiers in the United States Army, their
responsibilities to their civilian employer, and their responsibilities to the families.

So part of this readiness equation, of course, is a function of time. But I will tell you I am very confident that we can deliver the capability required in time.

Admiral McCollum. And, sir, on the Navy Reserve side, the two dimensions of readiness that we track is personnel readiness and then readiness that is associated with their billet that they are assigned to. And one of the greatest enablers of that readiness is discretionary RPN or the training dollars allocated to Navy Reserve that is above and beyond their base entitlement when that billet was actually bought.

On the personal readiness side, we use a metric that is established by the Department, a worldwide deployability. And in that metric, the goal is 5 percent, meaning 5 percent of the force, or said another way, 95 percent of the force has to be worldwide deployable. Right now, we are tracking 4.7 percent that is not worldwide deployable for various reasons, and that is a good number. Our challenge is to keep it there.

And then on the training side of that, it is lined up as where the threat lies and how we maneuver the Reserve force commensurate with what the individual training requirement is, so—and that is consistent certainly with how the Navy is looking at its funding with readiness and wholeness.

General Bellon. Congressman, I would like to begin by again thanking the committee for the support you provide us.

You know, I think probably the most concise way I can say this is, you know, what we deliver are Marines, and sitting at 99 percent of our total capacity, our requirement, with 25 percent of that force being nonobligated, meaning that they decide every Thursday whether they are going to drill on Friday or not. If it is raining and 34 degrees, they decide they are going to drill. And so sitting at 99 percent, I would say to you that is a population that wants to be in line to go and answer the bell in the event of a crisis, and you have provided excellent support for us. We are better armed and equipped than we ever have been, and we have got better quality Marines than we have ever had.

General Scobee. Congressman, as my counterparts here have articulated, there is two pieces to this. One is our personnel readiness, and our Reserve appropriation is the thing that that is my readiness account. That is where I go to to make sure that all my folks have everything that they need to do from a training perspective. It is where I get them medically ready, and it is where I get them their Air Force skills requirements that they need. Our readiness there has improved dramatically over the last years. And in particular, the things that we are interested in has been in our pilot force, which is now at 86 percent, and then maintenance, which we were struggling with for years, now 95 percent.

So these two areas have come up quite a bit. And then the other one is the equipment, with the equipment that the Air Force flies, both in aircraft and across the gambit, including in space. The readiness there has increased dramatically, and what has really helped us with that is the NGREA that we get from Congress every
year has really helped us get the equipment readiness accounts where they need to be as well.

There is constant improvement is trying to be made in there, and what we have done is we have prioritized our pacing units that the Air Force has, and our pacing units are up on the step and they are going to meet, for the most part, the requirements of the Air Force to be ready for the high-end fight. And so all the spacing units which you have identified and we have talked about over the last year are on the step and ready to go.

And what we are doing now is continuing to prioritize those priority units and we are also bringing up all of our units along the way as we go. So readiness is at a high state, but we continue to work on that on a regular basis.

Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you.

Ms. McCollum.

DOUBLE EAGLE APP

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Gentlemen, I have the opportunity to go to welcomes home ceremonies after deployment a lot for the National Guard, but I have been at deployment ceremonies where I have seen one Army Reserve, one Marine Corps, one Navy, one Air Force deploying by themselves.

So, General Luckey, you know, we have got the yellow ribbon to support the Guard. So I was really excited about your testimony last year when you discussed the development of the smartphone-friendly application that would better assist your soldiers in maintaining contact with their units between battle assignments, provide resources for crisis support and family help, and to help members organize their lives.

Can you give us an update on the Double Eagle application and what you have heard from your soldiers and their families, how useful this tool has been, and more broadly, what strategies you are employing to reach out to soldiers and their families to ensure that they have the resources they need to be successful? Our Reserve men and women cannot be forgotten.

General L UCKEY. So I thank you for that. And I, first of all, I would tell you that we, like the Guard in many respects, have large formations that deploy as well. So while I take your point, I will address it directly. I want to assure you that we have a Yellow Ribbon Program that is—it is a DOD-wide program, but the Army Reserve has an analogous program to what you have probably seen with Guard formations and these are at scale.

There was one in about a month ago in Anaheim, California, where there was 850 combination of soldiers and family members who may be deploying. In this case, all of them were deploying, but in some cases, it is a combination of soldiers who are departing and soldiers are returning. And we have a slightly different program of instruction in that situation.

So I will tell you, first of all, I want you to be assured that they are not being left behind. This is a command responsibility that I take very seriously.
As to the app. What I will tell you is it is better than it was when I reported last year. It is still not where I want it to be. I have specifically now tasked the 75th Innovation Command in Houston, Texas, which, as you may recall, is a two-star headquarters remission about 3 years ago, to get after all things future in terms of innovation. It is in direct support to Army Futures Command, and they have access to and are now supporting this effort with some of the best app developers in the country.

As you articulated, spot-on, you know, the opportunity here for soldiers and for their family members to log into the Double Eagle app, get information, understand what is going on, and be able to communicate with other soldiers or family members in their communities where they live and work is a powerful tool, and we are beginning to exploit it and develop it rapidly.

My concern with it, frankly, is it has got to continue to stay current so it remains relevant for our younger users. I mean, whether it works for me or not is not the issue. The issue is whether or not it works for you, you know, our 18-, 19-year-old, 20-year-old soldiers and their families. So we are going to continue to stay after this one. Thank you for the question.

SUPPORT OF THE FUTURES COMMAND

Ms. McCollum. So I would like to ask the Army Reserve’s role in the support of the Futures Command with the 75th Reserve Innovation Command. As you continue to support Futures Command modernization priorities, as well as ensure that the Army’s Reserve benefits from the best talented and skills from the private sector, I would like to ask you to give the subcommittee an overview of the process in which you engage with the commercial sector.

For example, how is the Reserve taking advantage of emerging technology, how it is not just in Texas or on the coast but in the Midwest as well? And also, the Government Accountability was somewhat critical in a recent report of Futures Command about outreach to small businesses across the country. So what role does and can the Reserve and the 75th Reserve Innovation Command play in doing a better job in engaging with the small business community nationally? Because I have sat at some roundtables, and small businesses feel it is very cumbersome to be engaged and get through the paperwork and know what is going on.

And then if there is any other Reserve witnesses that could provide an update on how they are engaging with the commercial sector, on how that would be helpful, especially from what I heard you say, sir, about wanting more and better equipment for our Marines.

General Luecky. So if I may just briefly, as to the Innovation Command and where we are located, the squadron is—the two-star headquarters is in Houston, Texas, but we literally have nodes, and I am just going to list off a few of them. I got a little card here, but you won’t be able to see it. Everywhere from Boston to Seattle, as you would expect, Silicon Valley in California, Denver, Salt Lake, Chicago, Minneapolis, Saint Paul, Kansas City, Dallas, Atlanta, Huntsville, Nashville, Raleigh, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Washington, D.C., Detroit, et cetera, et cetera.
So this is a—I would say this is an ongoing effort to make sure we are not missing opportunities to remain very closely connected with the private sector.

As to your question specific—and making sure we are gaining and retaining talent that is working in the private sector or other aspects of the public sector, but also remaining connected to the Army through America’s Army Reserve.

As to your question specifically about engagement with small businesses, I will take that for action. I think I owe you a better answer than I could give you here. What I can tell you is this is—just the disbursal of this force by its very nature and the private sector jobs that these soldiers have, I think, lends itself to being able to do exactly what you are talking about. What I can't tell you today is how far that effort has matured.

General BELLON. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I can share a vignette with you. So, recently, I visited a logistics battalion, and within that battalion they realized they had a number of Marines who were university students and who worked in the technology fields and who were interested in some of the current problem sets we are facing as we look at a future force. So they created their own innovation space within the battalion.

And so I am sitting there talking to a couple of lance corporals. One was on the UC Cal Berkeley robotics team and the other one was a math teacher and data scientist by training. In the Marine Corps they are mechanics.

So in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the problem sets we consistently were confronted with was a shortage of generator mechanics. Generators everywhere, few people that can do the generator mechanic piece, and you have got to fly them all over the battlefield at risk to the crews and to the Marines. So they decided that they could fix a generator with their basic skills if they simply had a recipe on how to do it, for lack of better words.

So they went out and they bought an off-the-shelf virtual reality glasses, and they created an augmented reality program that they had me wear. I threw the glasses on, and there on the generator is an additive reality, showing the part, the belt that we were trying to replace, showed where it was, and then in the upper right corner was a YouTube video of a staff sergeant. And you click on it with your hands, you pinch it with your hands, and she would begin to tell you, now, the first thing you are going to do is take the four screws off the door, and the four screws would light up in purple through your glasses.

This was created by the Marines. But the fascinating part and the part that I think you are after is that when they did that, they invited local businesses from the region to come in and see what they really needed. Right? It was probably a 50 to 60 percent solution.

And then other units often provide opportunities for local businesses who believe they have the capability that we will need and we put them into the play of our tactical problems on drill weekend. So if you have got a drone that can deliver logistics, you know, we will work it into the play of our problem. It may be 35 degrees and raining with 20 miles-an-hour wind, and you can either do it or you can’t, but they get a good sense. Those small businesses un-
derstand, at a grassroots level, of no kidding what we need and they are able to interface with the Marines, and the young Marines bring their talents to bear and can better frame the problems of what we expect to face in the next 20 years.

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN. Thank you.

Very interesting. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. We appreciate you. We know it is difficult. I think those of us on this committee have a deep appreciation what you do day in and day out. So make sure you go back and tell all your teams how much we appreciate what you are doing.

General Scobee, good to see you.

General SCOBEE. Good to see you.

FIELDING OF TWO C–130JS

Mr. RYAN. The question I have, when we are talking about transfer authority and all that, how might the delay in fielding two of the C–130Js that were funded in fiscal year 2020 and then recently were just reprogrammed to support the border wall affect the Air Force Reserve? Now, from my vantage point, and I have an opinion on this, this is a critical safety issue. The C–130H models that my Reserve unit in Youngstown, Ohio, utilize and that they fly are old and they are falling apart.

Now, as you know, the H model line is shut down, so we can't get the parts that we need, and we are cannibalizing other aircrafts in the process. And so the real safety issue for us is that we fly the aerial spray mission, and so these planes are very, very low to the ground. And my concern as their Congressman is that we need to make sure that they have what they need to train on and to utilize.

So can you speak to that issue that we are going to deal with?

General SCOBEE. Congressman, my opinion is very similar to yours. And our airmen need to be training on the equipment that they are going to use in combat and in support of domestic operations, especially when we are supporting the American people. I think it is very important.

I would say that the readiness capabilities that we have, in particular at Youngstown, are very high. They are old C–130H models, but they are doing a great job of taking care of that equipment. In the Air Force, we are prioritizing recapitalizing some of the C–130Hs with J models, and what I have done and have support from the Air Force is that the priority will go to our Special Missions Unit.

As you know, the Air Force Reserve is the only—the only capability resides in the Air Force Reserve Command for aerial spray, also for hurricane hunting. The hurricane hunters have already changed over to J models. And the other is the firefighting mission, the MAFFS firefighting mission that we share 25 percent of that with the Air National Guard.

So those, the special units that we are looking at, we are looking at the feasibility studies for where it is going to be best to put those airplanes. I can't tell you how much I appreciate congressional support in getting those.
So if we, the four that were gifted to us from Congress, if we take two of those away, the four would be initial fielding for the units that we are aware that would be picked eventually by the Secretary of the Air Force on where those go, although I am sure she will get a lot of help in making that decision.

But also what is really important to us is that we fleet and we have to upgrade the entire unit there, which will be eight airplanes eventually. If we are—if we stop with two airplanes, it won't help us to start at all. What we will have to do is move those C–130Js into another unit that is like-equipped. Right now, that doesn't reside in the Air Force Reserve. That would be probably in the Active Component. There may be some Guard units that have the C–130J 8.1 which is what it would take.

If that had slipped, we can absolutely work in order to make sure that we field that entire unit. So if there is a slip and the two airplanes are added back later, we won't have any difficulty at all. But if there are only two airplanes, it will just create a mismatch of configurations for the aerial spray mission, which wouldn't add any capability to our organization. So we want to make sure that we get the full unit fielded eventually, whether it is aerial spray or the MAFFS, depending on how that goes. But we are happy to keep you advised of that situation and how we are doing.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Mr. Ryan. Yeah. Well, that is disappointing. I mean, obviously, this is a critical mission within the Air Force Reserve and, you know, we will stay in contact with you on it, but we appreciate your advocacy. I mean, we know that this is not necessarily something that you wanted to happen or you wouldn't have asked for four. But, you know, there is a lot of people disappointed about this and, you know, we are going continue to try to bulldog it and see what we can do to make it happen.

Another issue for the other gentlemen on the panel that we are very concerned about is really the outreach with regard to suicide prevention. I also sit on the Veterans Appropriations Subcommittee, and so if you can just within, you know, each get a minute or so, tell us what you are doing as far as—because I know you all have pretty much implemented new plans. So if you can talk a little bit about that, I would love to hear about it.

General Lucky. So I will start. So first of all, it is great to see you again, and I appreciate the question.

I want to be careful how I characterize this because I don't want to sound like I think we have solved this, because I don't think that is a fair characterization. What I will tell you is over the last 3, 4 years, the suicide rates in the Army Reserve have been declining. That doesn't mean we have solved the problem. It doesn't mean I don't watch it very carefully. It doesn't mean we don't continue to target, as best we can, those soldiers that are either unemployed or critically underemployed as best we can with our private partnership programs that really try help make sure they are able to find good, meaningful work again.

As I have said in this committee before, one of my concerns as a leader of this component is statistical analysis. Over the last several years, we have found that about 50 percent of all of our sol-
diers who either have attempted or have, in fact, successfully com-
pleted a suicide were either unemployed or massively under-
employed in terms of—so that obviously becomes an additive
stressor for them. And I would argue, and I am not a psychologist,
but I would argue that it probably increases their sense or lack
thereof of self-worth and other issues that may be resident in the
home and elsewhere. So we take it very seriously.

I would say the biggest thing from an initiative perspective that
we continue to really drill on is making sure, not only do we keep
an eye on our battle buddies inside our units—and this is where,
again, the app is going to be critical for us to be able to increase
that connectivity during the other 28 days of the month—but it
also enables us, again, to help better target how we are going to
help our soldiers find meaningful employment in their civilian jobs.

Mr. Ryan. Interesting.

Admiral McCollum. Congressman, thank you. Certainly a very
important topic, one we take an all-hands-on-deck approach. We
had 11 suicides in 2018, 7 in 2019, and we have had 2 this cal-
endar year to date. And every single one of these we study and we
try to understand, to the extent that we can. The way forward, our
conclusion, the way forward is stress navigation, as well as build-
ing resiliency tools for the member. And probably more, just as im-
portant, this sense of purpose and belonging that, as leadership,
how we evaluate our leadership methods down at the tactical level,
that we create an environment where that member feels like they
are part of the team and where they belong, and if they are feeling
stressed, that we can pick it up and offer them these resiliency
tools. So those two areas we are really investing in.

Mr. Ryan. General.

General Bellon. Congressman, thank you. For the great support
from Congress, we have been able to participate in the Psycho-
logical Health Outreach Program. And that gives us 29 full-time of-
cices around the country that is civilian contracted and then two
other offices that are part-time folks, and that has made a dif-
fence.

So since I have taken command back in September, I have looked
at the data over the last 7 years, and it is all over the board. I
don’t think you can draw conclusions. In the last 2 years, we have
had a decrease, but I don’t know that it is statistically relevant
over time yet.

So to answer your question directly, you know, I would point to
our command climate and our culture. You know, we take pride in
the fact that we have a very intimate relationship between the
leadership and the young Marines. You know, we share the same
hardships with them. They joined the Marine Corps to do hard
things. So we do hard things. And when you do that, to echo Gen-
eral Luckey and Admiral McCollum, you know, it builds their self-
esteeem and so forth, but more importantly, it creates a very inti-
mate environment where we can observe them closely. And doing
that and destigmatizing the challenges that our young Marines and
sailors face, I think, is the key in the future.
You have given us great tools, but it is really about our command climate and our culture and the destigmatization of some of the problems that they face as young people.

Mr. Ryan. Thank you so much.

I yield back.

General Scobee. Congressman Ryan——

Mr. Ryan. I was going to let you off the hook there, but go ahead.

Mr. Visclosky. He probably wants to say more good things about Youngstown.

Mr. Ryan. I will yield him an additional minute or 2 then, Mr. Chairman.

General Scobee. Congressman, and I have to say this about this entire committee, every single either staff member we met with or congressperson, they have all given me an opportunity to talk about this. To me and my command chief, Tim, behind me, we take this personal. If I was sitting here—when I was sitting here last year, we had had three suicides in the Air Force Reserve Command. There are 74,000 of us in the command. Last year, we had 16. That is devastating, and that is not success.

And what we have got to do is figure out where we have gone so far awry with our people and making sure that we can take care of them, because that is what we do. We take care of our airmen. We have been given so many capabilities from our elected officials to be able to provide care to our airmen. What has caused this dramatic increase over the last year? So we have taken a deep dive into it, and as we look at it, there are really two significant things that have happened in our airmen’s lives. Everything that my colleagues have said rings true for us as well, but it is financial issues and interpersonal relationships and relationship issues.

So as we dive into these, the command chief and I have really figured out what we have got to do to make sure that our airmen feel connected and valued. One is, part of it is education. We need to make sure that our folks understand what healthy finances look like and what healthy relationships look like. And then if they do find themselves in trouble, they understand how to get themselves out of that, because that is part of what we have inculcated in our culture about how we do things right within our command, and that is about culture.

And then the last thing is, is making sure that our airmen feel connected. 15 of the 16 were part-time reservists who were not in status. So they weren’t with the command at the time they took their lives.

What I need to make sure is that all of our airmen—and we have really tried to do this and we continue to do it at every unit visit that we have—understands that they are always part of our family. It doesn’t matter what status they are in. You have given me the ability to bring them in, get them the help that they need and the care. Some of it is mental health, but some of it is relationship problems. Whatever counseling they need, I have the ability to get them that help, and what I need to make sure is they understand that they are always connected.

And in order to do that, what I have asked for this year, is I am putting some full-time support in my organization. Some of it is at our standalone bases, and that helps with our chaplains, especially
when it comes to counseling. And then I am putting a full-time first sergeant at every one of my wing and wing equivalents. So there is somebody there that will always help shepherd our folks along, that there is always an ability to come back and contact. Because if we knew something was going wrong in their lives, we have the ability to help them. And if they know that they are connected, we can bring them back with us and try to get them that help, especially our organizations where geography is kind of the tyranny of distance between them, as my wife likes to say.

Thank you for your question.

WOMEN VETERANS AND SUICIDE

Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chair, if I could follow up on this. So I have had a few conversations in the past couple of weeks with some women veterans. They are very concerned about what they are hearing in anecdotal, and I was going to be asking to get some information on it, with the uptick of the number of women veterans committing suicide.

Could I ask you, do you have a gender breakdown of the number that you just gave us with your increase?

General SCOBEE. Madam Congresswoman, we will take that for the record and I will get that information to you. I do not have the breakdown in front of me, but I can tell you that it is—that you are absolutely correct. I do have a number. I don't know statistically if it is a significant number, but in the 16 that we have had, there are at least four or five that were female members of the command.

Ms. McCOLLUM. So that might be something we need—I think it is something we need to look at, the way that we are doing counseling and outreach. Everybody comes back with its own set of challenges. We are all individuals. But it is primarily, then, a male-dominated enterprise, serving in the military, just as I am in a male-dominated enterprise here.

But in the military, when people come home and they are dealing with issues and things, especially the women say, you know, I am supposed to kind of blend back in, and the pressures, the demands, and the expectations of what I do and how I can talk about what I witnessed, what I saw, is very different when they have a chance to talk to their peer support when they are with, but then when they are back home, they don't have the same kind of support.

So thank you very much, and I look forward to getting that information and working together with you on the issue in general but for women in particular. Thank you.

General SCOBEE. Congresswoman, I look forward to that as well. Thank you.

INNOVATIVE READINESS TRAINING PROGRAM

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could, if each of you, for those services, could provide the same breakdown—I had never thought about it quite in that context—just to see if there is something there. And also, all of us share the concern and appreciate yours, and I appreciate the emphasis on working on the culture and stigma, so people do—if you have got a problem, please, we are here to help. So I do appreciate that emphasis very much.
Just one last question for myself. I will turn to Mr. Calvert then. I would like to talk for a minute about the Innovative Readiness Training program. It is administered by the Department of Defense, provides military training, opportunity in the United States and territories to increase deployment readiness. The program also provides key services to American communities, such as healthcare, construction, transportation, and cybersecurity.

For the current year, as you probably know, we appropriated $30 million. In the budget for 2021, the Department asked for $13.1 million.

General Bellon, because you mentioned the program in your testimony, if I could ask you, you mentioned units. It allows your units to increase readiness while making tangible, meaningful impacts in their communities, if you might address that.

General Bellon. And I think this actually links a little bit to Congresswoman McCollum's question. So I will give you two vignettes. In one vignette, we were able to create a tactical scenario where the Marines and sailors went in and repaired an airfield in northern California. Huge success, and they finished something. They leave something behind for the community, and they were able to exercise their tactical tasks and they feel good about that. Right?

The second one was relocating a village in Alaska. And the depth of the rewards that that provides in our force, you know, they joined because they want to serve, and they are executing tactical tasks that fulfill their call to service.

So by providing this resource for us, you are helping us not only train the young Marines and sailors, but to develop that culture. You know, at the end of the day, our moral obligation is to return them to their families and communities as better citizens, better family members, better friends, fortified by their service, and this is the kind of thing that does it for us.

Mr. Visclosky. Any of the other panelists have a comment? Otherwise, I will turn to Mr. Calvert.

General Luckey. The only thing I would say, Chairman, is it is sort of like the Marine Corps, I find it to be a really great opportunity for our soldiers to do two things at the same time. One is develop and sustain their tactical and—their technical proficiency more than their tactical proficiency, their technical proficiency, and in addition to doing good, building a sense of confidence in themselves and their team that they are genuinely contributing back to the welfare of their fellow citizens. So I think it is a huge win from a retention perspective as well.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Calvert.

P–3 Squadrons

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an interesting subject. I always was interested if it could be a historical overview somewhat. You know, after World War II, I suspect that people didn't pay as much attention to that problem, but I suspect it was a significant problem at that time, in Korea and Vietnam and certainly now.
So I don't know if there is any comparisons because I don't know that they even kept statistics of that in those days, but it would be interesting to look at that from that perspective.

Vice Admiral McCollum, last year's appropriation bill included a reporting requirement of the Navy's plan to recapitalize its two remaining P–3 squadrons. What is the status of that report, and what is the impact of not buying any P–8s in fiscal year 2021?

Admiral McCollum. Congressman, thanks for the question. First, from a strategic depth perspective, the Navy establishes what its warfighting requirement is. In this particular aircraft, it is 138. The Navy funded 119, and then we had additional two funded for the Navy Reserve.

Last year, the Navy listed that aircraft on its unfunded priorities list, and the thought is it does two things. It closes the gap to the warfighting requirement of 138, and it can take advantage of recapitalizing these two squadrons, these two P–8 squadrons. We have one in Whidbey Island and one in Jacksonville, Florida.

There is a human capital piece of it as well. So if you think about a pilot who has been on Active Duty and chooses maybe about the 8 to 10-year point to go to the airline, we really want to get a return on the investment. We, the Navy, have placed in that to the tune of $9- to $11 million at that point. If we can give them a place to continue service while they are serving in industry—matter of fact, in the same airframe, the Boeing 737—and get tremendous amounts of hours, that is great strategic depth of value for our Navy and our Nation. And every conflict that we have studied that has been in any aspect enduring, the Navy and all the services have drawn deeply on its strategic depth.

So we need—for that purpose, that is why the Navy Reserve is focused, and I have listed it in my National Guard and Equipment report as my number one equipping priority in pursuit of closing this gap, funding recapitalizing the two squadrons, and building a human capital strategy to give the Nation strategic capability with pilots.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, we have no further questions at this time. I want to thank you very much, again, for your service and for participating today.

Admiral and General Luckey, especially yourselves, good luck to you in your future endeavors. As I told General Lengyel, as long as you are not coming back, I am not coming back.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
Mr. Visclosky. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning, the committee will receive testimony on the fiscal year 2021 budget request for the United States Navy and Marine Corps.

Our three witnesses today are the Honorable Thomas Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and General David Berger, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

This is your first time before the subcommittee, and we welcome all of you. We look forward to hearing your thoughts about the fiscal year 2021 budget request and engaging in a dialogue with us.

Normally, I like to keep my opening remarks brief. However, I have some significant concerns relative to the Department of the Navy and ask my colleagues' indulgence.

The bulk of my remarks will focus on the fleet. However, I would like to begin by highlighting my concerns about the well-being and quality of life for sailors, Marines, and their families.

Of particular interest to me is childcare. Whether it is Key West, San Diego, Camp Pendleton, or right here in the national capital region, we continually hear from sailors and Marines about the lack of available care. The committee made a significant investment in fiscal year 2020 to mitigate this issue, and I applaud the Navy for building on that investment and, obviously, looking to continue to do so in your fiscal year 2021 request.

So I just do want you to know, personally, I think, one, it is the right thing to do, but that the Navy followed up, I appreciate it very much.

Let's see. Okay. Moving on, to address the fleet, although the committee has not yet received the fiscal year 2021 shipbuilding plan, I am puzzled by the degree the fiscal year 2021 budget request deviates from the previous shipbuilding plan.

Beyond that contradiction, what is even more disturbing is the fact that the Department that chose to transfer $911 million of fiscal year 2020 shipbuilding funds to support the President's effort to build a wall on the southwest border. We hear time and again that more ships are required, but then actions like these are taken, severely undercutting the credibility of the argument.
Furthermore, I am bewildered by the Navy’s approach to the Virginia-class submarine program in the budget. The Navy removed funding for a second Virginia-class submarine, then placed that sub at the top of its massive unfunded priority list, knowing full well that Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle will advocate to find $2.8 billion needed to contract that boat.

It is clear to me that the Navy didn’t make the difficult choices required to reduce other programmatic funding to fund the second submarine and is expecting Congress to do so. Perhaps today you can make suggestions relative to reduction options that the committee could consider.

I am also interested to hear an update on ship and submarine maintenance issues. The shipyard backlogs remain high, and the shipbuilding industrial base is facing production delays and capacity challenges. Last year, we included an additional $625 million for submarine maintenance. Again, I would like to ask how you are building on that investment.

Finally, I remain concerned that the Navy may still be accepting ships with both minor and major defects which require additional cost and unscheduled maintenance. We have seen the multiple issues with the Zumwalt class of destroyers, littoral combat ships, and the late Ford-class aircraft carrier. I believe it is inexcusable if shipbuilders are delivering ships with defects. We need to understand what steps are being taken to improve this situation and to make sure that the taxpayers are not bearing the cost.

With that, I thank you again for appearing before the committee today to discuss these issues. We will ask for you to summarize your testimony in a moment but first would recognize Mr. Calvert.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome each of our witnesses: the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Modly; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gilday; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Berger.

This is the first time each of you have appeared before our subcommittee. We greatly look forward to hearing your testimony.

Our sailors and Marines play a key role in projecting power, ensuring freedom of navigation, and protecting American interests both at home and abroad. As many of us on this subcommittee have traveled to see the current demands of our fleet, we understand firsthand how important it is to ensure these sailors and Marines are properly trained and equipped to carry out their mission.

In the current threat environment, integrated naval power is what keeps our Nation safe.

Fiscal year 2021 is a critical point as we continue to rebuild our military. The investments Congress made in the past several years have allowed our Navy to increase readiness, modernize key platforms, and increase lethality. Now, in this fiscal year, I believe we must not lose sight of the return to a great-power competition laid out in the National Defense Strategy.

This budget request reflects the many difficult choices the Navy is having to make to balance current operational demand, properly
invest in its people, and increase research and development to ensure we maintain our technological and military superiority.

Many of these tough choices will be of great interest to me and other members of the subcommittee here today. There are a few items in this request which specifically I would like to hear about.

First, I would like to understand how the shipbuilding proposal aligns with the National Defense Strategy. As you all know, China is on track to reach a 420-ship Navy by 2035, and I am concerned that this request does not align with previous force structure assessments.

I would also like to get updates on our future fleet programs, including the Columbia-class submarine, frigate, and our amphibious warships, I think one of which was going to be built in Mobile, Alabama.

Additionally, I would like to update to our aircraft readiness recovery goals and how we can sustain these improvements in the future so that readiness does not suffer again due to poor planning.

I want to conclude by thanking all of you for your service, and I certainly look forward to your testimony.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, you can proceed.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MODLY

Secretary MODLY. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, Marines, civilians, and their families in the Department of the Navy.

It is an honor to be here today with Admiral Gilday and General Berger, both of whom have demonstrated great commitment to each other and to each other's respective naval service as they have worked collaboratively to lead our integrated American naval force.

Consistent with that spirit, we have taken a different approach to the written testimony this year——

Mr. CALVERT. You might want to put that mike closer to your——

Secretary MODLY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CALVERT. Thanks.

Secretary MODLY. We have taken a different approach to the written testimony this year, submitting one unified document instead of three separate documents.

Staying ahead in today's rapidly changing global strategic environment demands that our naval forces commit to unified planning, clear-eyed assessments, and sometimes, yes, some very hard choices, which you will see in our budget submission.

In this process, we must harmonize competing priorities, sustain our critical industrial base, and not allow our maritime competitive advantage to erode relative to global competitors and, more accurately stated, some very aggressive adversaries who wish to hasten our decline as a global force for liberty and for decency.

In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of the hard choices we had to make this year, but it is centrally about the safety, security, and well-being of our sailors, Marines, and their families. Ultimately, I ask that you recognize that in this submission
we could not make trades that put our sailors and Marines on platforms and with equipment that are not ready for a fight, if a fight is what is required of them.

While this budget shows our trajectory to a force of 355 or more ships, it does not arrest that trajectory. You have my personal assurance that we are still deeply committed to building that larger, more capable, more distributed naval force within a strategically relevant timeframe of no more than 10 years. I look forward to working with this committee and the entire Congress in the coming months as we develop realistic plans to do so.

Our budget also demonstrates a clear commitment to the education of our people, as we implement the recommendations of the Education for Seapower study that I led as the Under Secretary of the Navy the last 2 years. We are establishing a Naval Community College for our enlisted personnel as part of a bold and unified Naval Education Strategy that recognizes that the intellectual and ethical development of our people is critical to our success as a naval force.

We are also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn commitment to our military families through significantly more engaged oversight and accountability of the public-private venture housing program.

Finally, I would like this committee to understand that, as leaders of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and united in our determination to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment throughout our force. Every sailor, every Marine, every Navy civilian deserves individual respect, dignity, and protection from this great naval institution. We have work to do in this regard, but you have my personal commitment that we take it very, very seriously.

We are grateful to the committee for passing this year’s NDAA, which enables many of the priorities identified within this document. In passing this legislation, you have sent a strong signal of support to our people and a strong warning to our adversaries.

We also appreciate the funding stability and the predictability of the past several years. This has saved money for the American taxpayer and given our force the agility and flexibility to address emerging threats while still investing in the integrated force.

We urge the committee to do what it can to continue the stability so that we can implement the reforms and investments required to meet the great-power challenges, protect the maritime commons, and defend the United States of America.

Thank you very much for your time, and we look forward to your questions.

Mr. Visclosky. Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GILDAY

Admiral Gilday. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with Secretary Modly and General Berger. I am also joined by my wife, Linda. We are thankful for your enduring support of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
Today, as we testify, three carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready groups, along with 30 percent of our fleet, are deployed around the globe today. Our Navy-Marine Corps team needs no permission to operate at sea, and their power does not rest in any one location but, rather, in our ability to maneuver anytime in anywhere the seas reach, operating across the spectrum of military operations.

Without question, our sailors remain our most important asset. We have taken a hard look at what they need to be successful, the equipment and training they need to fight and win, and, as, Chairman, you mentioned, as well as the support required to take care of them and their families.

Over the past 8 months, we have engaged in a deep examination of these issues. Our balanced approach in our budget submission provides a Navy ready to fight today while committing to the training, the maintenance, and the modernization to provide a Navy ready to fight tomorrow.

Naval power is critical to implementing the National Defense Strategy, but naval power is not just a function of fleet size, as the Secretary mentioned. It is also a combination of readiness, lethality, and the capacity of the fleet.

Our number-one priority is the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and all it brings to our national deterrence. This request also heavily invests in readiness accounts such as ship and aircraft maintenance and modernization; manpower; spare parts; live, virtual, constructive training; as the Secretary mentioned, education; steaming days and flying hours.

It invests in new systems to make our fleet more lethal, including increasing our weapons inventory, bolstering the range and the speed of those weapons; exploring directed-energy weapons; and incorporating new technologies like hypersonics. This request grows our fleet in size, generating sustainable, capable capacity.

Importantly, naval power is not just determined by what we operate and fight with but how we operate and fight. We are pursuing an integrated approach alongside the United States Marine Corps in fleet operations, in exercises, war games, and in an experimentation. The net result, as Ranking Member Calvert mentioned, is integrated American naval power.

Thank you again for the stable and predictable funding, which has allowed us to make significant gains in readiness and lethality already. On behalf of your Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian sailors and their families who serve this Nation, your support allows us to answer the Nation’s call. On their behalf, I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. Visclosky. General Berger, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL BERGER

General Berger. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and our priorities for the future.

I will start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday’s thanks for timely funding as well as your enduring commitment to the Marines, sailors, and families through efforts such as the hurri-
cane recovery, which you provided for last year, and revisions to our public-private venture housing program. Your bipartisan support is critical to ensure we continue to prioritize people as our greatest resource.

Thanks to predictable funding over the last few years, we have made significant progress restoring both availability and readiness. We are now at an inflection point. We have to pivot now toward modernization while sustaining the readiness that this committee has resourced. This pivot, in my opinion, cannot wait until next year or the following. We must move now or risk overmatch in the future by an adversary. And that is a risk we will not take.

As the national defense directs and as Secretary Modly recently emphasized in his first vector to all hands, we must pursue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines have always sensed when it is time to move out smartly. We don't hesitate. This is that time.

Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance requires acknowledging fundamental changes in the operating environment and how we must organize, train, and equip the force. I believe most leaders recognize that significant changes are required, yet the scope and pace of necessary change is seemingly at odds with some historical resource allocations and some major acquisition programs which predate the National Defense Strategy.

This budget submission marks the beginning of a focused effort to better align resources with strategic objectives. Our future budget submissions will build on this investment strategy with informed recommendations for force design and adjustments to our programs of record.

Together in partnership with Admiral Gilday, my shipmate and battle buddy, and under the direction of Secretary Modly, we are committed to delivering the integrated naval and Fleet Marine forces our Nation requires.

As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our findings along the way and keep each of you and your staffs informed as we progress. You have my word, we will be frugal with the resources that you provide, and we will ask for no more than we need. With Congress's commitment and support, we will ensure that your Marines continue to have every advantage when we send them into harm's way.

I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The written statement of Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday and General Berger follows:]
STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. MODLY
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY,
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER,
COMMANDANT OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS

ON FISCAL YEAR 2021 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUDGET

BEFORE THE
HOUSE DEFENSE APPROPRIATION SUBCOMMITTEE

MARCH 4, 2020
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts to build the strength and readiness of our integrated naval force. As the nation’s forward-deployed, global maneuverable team, the entire Department of the Navy (DON) – Sailors, Marines and Civilians – must be ready to respond as a single unit wherever and whenever there is need. We must deliver the personnel, platforms, and operational capability necessary to secure vital sea lanes, stand by our allies, and protect the American people.

Accomplishing this in today’s global strategic environment demands planning, clear-eyed assessments, and hard choices. We must design a future integrated naval force structure, advance our intellectual capacity and ethical excellence, and accelerate the digital modernization of our force. That’s why this budget prioritizes a strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment, informed by relentless examination of our present capabilities and realities. It builds on prior investments while adjusting fire where necessary to deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness. It sustains the industrial base, and maintains our competitive advantage. Overall, this budget will deliver a more integrated, survivable, and affordable future force.

Our testimony details the combined perspectives of the DON civilian and military leadership. We begin with the challenges we face, followed by our overall strategic vision, then the specific priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the requirements of this vision and execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which remains the guidepost for all of our decisions. The Department of the Navy sustains progress along each of the NDS lines of effort through adequate
and timely funding from our partners in Congress. We are proud to work in partnership with this Committee in defense of our nation, and look forward to that work continuing.
The Global Challenge

The reemergence of long-term great power competition, the evolving character of that competition, and the accelerating advancements in technology are spurring a period of transformation in the strategic environment, requiring us to adapt our integrated naval force design and operating concepts to new realities. As the National Defense Strategy states, “there can be no complacency – we must make difficult choices and prioritize what is most important.’

Thus far this century, terrorist groups and rogue states have dominated our perception of the threat environment. These threats were lethal, but did not pose an existential threat to our national security. China and Russia present a different challenge, as each continues to develop sophisticated military capabilities backed by sizable economies. Their investments in surface, air, and undersea platforms have significantly increased the potential for kinetic conflict, while the leadership of both nations demonstrate increasing contempt for international law and the rules-based order that ensures the prosperity and security of all nations.

China’s battle fleet has grown from 262 to 335 surface ships over the last decade, and China’s commercial shipbuilding grew over 60% year over year from 2007-2017. It continues to take coercive actions against its neighbors and violate international law in the South China Sea. Russia’s irresponsible aggression continues on NATO’s eastern and northern flanks as well as the Black Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the broader Indo-Pacific. China also invests heavily in submarines with advanced stealth capabilities and the platforms and infrastructure needed to dominate the emerging Arctic.
Meanwhile, warfare has evolved to new battlefields including cyberspace. China and other dangerous actors like Iran brazenly target the command, control, and communications (C3) systems and logistics networks on which our integrated naval force depends. China’s nefarious activity also includes widespread cyber theft of intellectual property and sensitive information targeting our entire government, our allies, and our industry partners throughout the acquisition and supply chain.

As we prepare for the maturing threat of great power competition, we must remain on high alert for the actions of malign regimes such as Iran, and the continual asymmetric threat to our people, allies, and interests posed by non-state actors such as ISIS. In a recent example highlighting the impact of our integrated naval force, 5th Fleet and CTF-51/5 responded to crisis earlier this year by securing the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad with the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) and simultaneously coordinated additional naval support in theater. We stand ever-prepared to respond with every part of our integrated force to instability, terrorist threats, and rogue states throughout the world.

Our integrated naval force also has a critical role in preserving the infrastructure and access that powers the increasingly interconnected and interdependent United States and global economies. Our nation’s continued prosperity and economic growth increasingly depend on open and secure access to the sea lanes. Maritime traffic has increased four-fold over the last two decades, with 90 percent of all global goods transiting shipping lanes, including new trade routes opening through the Arctic. Meanwhile, the undersea cables that power the digital economy and the
global communications framework represent an overlooked but critical point of vulnerability for American interests at home and abroad. Overall, the maritime system is more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before – and it has never been more important.

A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of the National Defense Strategy in a changing world. But as we address these external concerns, we must also confront our business process challenges. These include a shrinking industrial base and vulnerable supply chain, inefficiencies due to legacy business operations, and antiquated acquisition processes which together result in increased costs and delays for both new development and overall maintenance. And despite the best efforts of this Committee, we must also continually prepare for the challenge posed by funding uncertainty.

Most importantly, we must never forget that our greatest resource is the men and women who wear the uniform, who comprise our civilian workforce, and the families that serve alongside them. We are committed to ensuring our Sailors, Marines, and Civilians are trained and equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that their families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and education they need.

As detailed in the following pages, our integrated naval force has made significant strides in addressing the external and internal challenges we face. But we can never be satisfied, and will always press forward with a sense of urgency to deliver the people, the platforms, and the capabilities necessary to protect the American people and our interests around the world.
To meet these challenges, the NDS requires a dominant, agile, accountable, and globally positioned integrated naval force. We will plan, resource, and execute the NDS with specific focus on the following:

**Integration**

We must transform from our present two-service model into one true expeditionary force in readiness, with the Navy and Marine Corps operating together with integrated planning, design, training, and execution at every echelon and in every domain. This priority has been emphasized in messages to the fleet and planning documents by each member of DON leadership and is a guiding principle for every aspect of our planning and resourcing.

**Velocity**

Our integrated naval force must maintain the readiness and lethality to respond anywhere at any time. We will achieve this through a global operating model that ensures the continual posture, presence, and readiness of our personnel and platforms. We will dominate the fight to get to the fight, with forward basing, distributed maritime capability, fully integrated logistics, and continual aviation readiness. We also must increase the speed at which we do everything across the Department to match the rapid changes and unpredictability of the future environment.
Collaboration

A primary line of effort in the NDS is to build and maintain a robust constellation of allies and partners. Our integrated naval force is committed to training, operating, and learning alongside our allies and partners in every part of the world through every day interaction and regular operational exercises such as Trident Juncture, Talisman Saber and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Afloat and ashore, our allies and partners are crucial force multipliers and enablers of our global reach, particularly in evolving regions such as the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. We must also break down organizational silos across our own Department and build more collaborative relationships with the other Military Departments and the Interagency to support whole of government approaches to security that will become more prominent in the future.

Visibility

While cutting edge ISR, cyber, aviation, and undersea assets ensure our global reach and awareness, there is no substitute for sustained presence and engagement. Through frequent port visits, stand-in forces, and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), we will continue to demonstrate our enduring commitment to the defense of our people and interests, as well as our readiness and will to stand alongside our allies and partners. We will also focus on increasing transparency and information sharing in order to facilitate more rapid, and informed decisions.

Innovation

We will transform the strategic space to our advantage through next generation research and development, industry partnerships, and naval education. We are embracing the challenge of next generation technology and determined to dominate the design, development and effective
deployment of major technological breakthroughs such as hypersonic weapons. We are making the key investments and forging the key partnerships to own the next “Sputnik Moment.” We will become more comfortable with trying new ways of doing business, and more forgiving of incremental failures made in support of change and progress.

Adaptability
Where we cannot change the strategic environment through innovation, we will adapt to it quickly and efficiently through agile thinking and nimble platforms. This will allow us to protect our people and interests through unpredictable shifting security environments, and ensure the broadest range of options are available to the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. We will invest in an adaptable force structure, foster adaptable approaches to problems, and nurture the development of adaptable people comfortable with uncertainty and unpredictability.

Humility
We will address our challenges with a sense of humility, taking full account of the deficiencies we have, but with confidence that they can be corrected. We will be realistic in our planning and budgeting to assure we do not trade growth for readiness. We will not allow ourselves to build a hollow force, but we will be honest with the Congress and the American people about what we see the areas in which we need their full support in order to build the integrated naval force that is required to maintain the nation’s security.
Gray Hulls: Building and Maintaining the Right Capabilities

In order to meet the many demands of the global strategic environment and ensure our warriors are always prepared to dominate the fight, we must design a future integrated naval force structure aligned to the threats we face, both today and in the future. This budget prioritizes the readiness of those platforms and systems that will enable the United States to maintain and expand its competitive edge over all adversaries while we examine ways to grow the fleet in a reasonable timeframe, all while remaining responsible stewards of American taxpayer dollars.

Divesting from 20th Century Legacy Systems

In keeping with the DoD-wide priority to modernize from low-value legacy systems to fund combat-overmatch lethality tuned to the challenge of great power competition, this budget divests from multiple legacy or surge-based capabilities that do not align with the requirements of the NDS. It shifts capabilities from a counterinsurgency focus to systems that enable our personnel to exploit positional advantage and defend key maritime terrain for persistent forward sea control and denial operations. This budget also aligns with Secretary Esper’s commitment to become more of a “fast follower” of commercial technology, and to dominate the future development and employment of artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonics funding.

Building to a 355 Navy

Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of this committee, the goal of a 355 ship Navy is now the law of the land. We will be working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a consensus perspective on this future force structure through robust analysis and wargaming and the
inclusion of expertise from our academic institutions (Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University) and independent naval experts. This process will be **iterative and continuous**. In order to meet the nation’s national security needs and remain within budget constraints, we must consider how to shift costs away from high-end platforms to a larger number of smaller, but still highly capable ships. Such a shift will allow broader presence, reduced manning, and longer reach through a significant increase in hypersonic weapons, greater stealth, and advanced anti-ISR capabilities.

We are also considering how unmanned surface and subsurface platforms should figure into our force mix. These platforms will not only allow us to distribute and conceal lethality, but to do so at a reduced cost and greater integration and interdependency with the Joint Force. While some perspectives vary on the ultimate composition of this future force mix, there is clear agreement that certain new classes of ships that currently do not exist today must be designed and built rapidly in the next ten years. The exact mix will be the subject of continuous evaluation and analysis, but it will not impede our immediate investment in the development and initial production of these new vessels.

**Fielding a Ready, Relevant, Responsive Integrated Naval Expeditionary Force**

A key aspect of our transformation will be a shift to greater naval expeditionary force capabilities and a restoration of the Fleet Marine Force. The potential for rapid change in the global environment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, demands a rebalance from the current Marine Corps force land and surge based posture to a more distributed, rapidly deployable and fully integrated force. This budget continues investment in key Marine Corps development
programs such as the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground Based Air Defense, CH-53K helicopter, and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, supporting Marine Corps efforts to enhance Long Range/Precision Fires, Protected Mobility/Enhanced Maneuver, and Air Defense.

Generating Readiness and Sustainability
This budget optimizes Marine Corps readiness to achieve 80% serviceability of reportable expeditionary equipment, and implements the Commandant’s Infrastructure Reset Strategy so our warriors are always prepared and present to defend our people, our interests, and our allies. It sustains the shipyards and supporting industrial base to maximize repair and modernization capacity and minimize turnaround and downtime. To provide continual presence and readiness for the fleet, this budget funds 58 days underway while deployed and 24 days underway while non-deployed per quarter, with an increase of 6.5% over last year for ship operations funding. Leveraging private sector best practices through the Naval Sustainment Strategy, this budget continues to invest in Aircraft Depot Maintenance to achieve the goal of 80% mission capable rates for strike fighter aircraft. This budget also increases the Flying Hour program by 5.8% and aligns the funding for air operations to the mission capable rates to ensure that all squadrons deploy combat-ready.

Producing Next Generation Superiority
The COLUMBIA-class submarine program enters the first year of incremental procurement funding for the lead ship, and this budget resources the program for on-track delivery to meet the first deployment in 2031, with a second ballistic missile submarine starting in FY24 and serial production begins in FY26, furthering the recapitalization of our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
Additionally, we continue to resource the development of the Fast Frigate, and Future Large Surface Combatant, both of which will greatly enhance our distributed capabilities and forward deployed lethality. This budget also continues advanced capabilities in the F-35B and F-35C Joint Strike Fighter for both the Navy and Marine Corps. We also maintain investment in weapons development to provide for longer range and hypersonic weapons, with increasing investments in areas like Conventional Prompt Strike and our Standard Missile family. Finally, we will look to Congress for support in our effort to expand training and testing opportunities through range expansion aboard Naval Air Station Fallon in order to fully develop and train with these lethal capabilities.
The future battlespace extends well beyond the field of kinetic action. Ensuring our warriors are the best equipped and prepared in the world starts with accelerating our digital modernization across the force, streamlining our business processes and maintaining the highest level of efficiency. Agile and accountable naval forces are impossible without agile and accountable business processes that support them. With the support of this budget submission, the following are just a few of the reforms we are implementing throughout our integrated naval force to dominate the future fight, from the E-Ring to the front lines.

**Executing the Business Operations Plan**

The President’s Budget Submission will allow us to accelerate our business process modernization across the naval enterprise through the use of advanced digital tools and technologies to substantially improve performance, speed, accuracy, and security. The DON Business Operations Plan (BOP) details the steps we are taking to transform our business operations in alignment with the NDS, with six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four month milestones to provide DON leadership the ability to better manage and monitor progress on the path to a more agile and accountable business enterprise. The plan provides clear direction for military and civilian leaders throughout the DON to maximize investments and effort in alignment with the NDS. It also provides greater transparency and oversight opportunities for our partners on this Committee as well as the American people.
Transforming the Digital Enterprise

Information management is a core strategic function of the DoN. Cyber security, data strategy and analytics, AI, and quantum computing have all combined to create massive opportunities - as well as vulnerabilities - across our entire enterprise. A critical element of mission readiness is the ability of our personnel to have access to relevant, reliable, and secure global communications and information, at every echelon and in every domain. In FY19 we consolidated information management functions in a restructured Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), driving transformation and operational capability through the following lines of effort:

- **Modernize** DON infrastructure from its current state of fragmented, non-performant, outdated, and indefensible architectures to a unified, logical, modern infrastructure capable of delivering an information advantage.
- **Innovate** operational capabilities through technologies like 5th Generation (5G) wireless and AI, and accelerate software development through Digital Innovation Centers, leveraging private sector and industry best practices to fuel our digital transformation.
- **Defend** networks and assets through continuous active monitoring across the enterprise to increase cyber situational awareness. We will institute a security culture where a personal commitment to cybersecurity is required to gain access to the network. We will transform from a compliance-centered culture to one of constant readiness, and we will work with our industry partners to secure naval information wherever it resides.
Managing Finance and Operationalizing the Audit

We have completed the second full scope financial audit of the entire DoN, revealing more opportunities to improve our financial management and business processes as well as many other aspects of our enterprise. The financial audit is the lynchpin to both monitoring and catalyzing improved business operations performance. Our senior leadership has repeatedly emphasized to all personnel that active participation in the audit process is not just a financial exercise, but a management tool that must involve the combined effort of all of our personnel in order to identify ways to improve our organization’s effectiveness and accountability.

We are on track within the next two years to achieve qualified financial audit opinion for the Marine Corps, with an unqualified opinion the following year. This will make the Marine Corps the first military service in the Defense Department to receive such an opinion in the history of the United States. Achieving this for the Navy will be more challenging, but we continue to see improvements year to year. The DON has also conducted a Zero-Based Budget review designed to ensure alignment of goals and resources, achieve full value for every taxpayer dollar, and increase transparency in our resource allocation process. Finally, we have implemented Performance-to-Plan reviews that provided a fleet-focused and data-driven approach, accelerating readiness.
Modernizing Naval Supply Chain and Logistics

Our integrated naval force requires unified logistics operations and secure, reliable supply chains in order to maintain the distributed, forward maneuverable force demanded by the global strategic environment. Through the audit and other reform efforts, we have identified multiple areas where our supply chain and logistics processes are disjointed and divided, with areas of poor visibility and accountability that impact our forward inventory and readiness.

These efforts have also revealed areas where greater integration between the services is needed and where our multiple supply chains require consolidation and optimization. We are developing a long-term strategy to address these deficiencies, beginning with a new modern vision for future integrated naval logistics and supply chain management, and will proceed with executing reforms consistent with this vision this year.
We cannot solely define American seapower by ship counts and high-end systems. In the end, our core strength will always reside in the gray matter between the ears of our people as much as it does in the gray hulls out in our fleet. Recruiting, retaining, educating and caring for the best military and civilian force possible has always been and will always be our greatest edge against all competitors. We will meet this challenge through transformative investments in education, greater connections with partners and allies, a competitive human capital strategy, a recommitment to high quality housing for our naval families, and a determination to eliminate the scourge of sexual harassment and assault throughout our total force.

Prioritizing Learning as a Strategic Advantage
As stated in the 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report, the intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine Corps team and our ability to operate as a continuous learning organization will serve as the enduring foundation of our credible deterrent to war. In the year since the E4S report was completed, we have established the office of the Chief Learning Officer (CLO) and moved quickly to introduce sweeping changes in the structure, integration, and prioritization of naval education. These changes include:

- **U.S. Naval Community College** - Our highest priority is to create a new United States Naval Community College (USNCC) that offers advanced, online technical and analytic education to our enlisted force in critical areas like IT, cyber, and data science. Free for every Sailor and Marine, the USNCC will fill a long-neglected gap in our educational continuum and provide a recruiting and retention incentive through degree-granting relationships with major four-year public and private universities across the nation.
• Naval Education Strategy 2020 – Our recently released Naval Education Strategy 2020 is the first ever comprehensive education strategy for our integrated naval force. The strategy will lay out a clear road map to develop a lifelong learning continuum for our entire force, reform our personnel systems to better recognize and reward the value of education, and invest in our schools and education programs.

• Strategic Education Requirement for Flag and General Officers – The opportunity to wargame future scenarios and technologies, study naval strategy and debate alongside peers is vital experience for the leaders who will guide our integrated force through the future strategic landscape. That is why we are now requiring in-residence strategic studies graduate education for promotion to Flag or General Officer rank.

Recruiting, Curating and Retaining the Best Talent

This budget provides the resources to fuel a new human capital strategy to better access and curate best-in-class talent for our Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian workforce. We developed this strategy leveraging leading private sector business practices designed for the new economy. Initial pilot programs in support of this strategy will begin this year. The Navy’s Sailor 2025 initiative and comparable initiatives in the Marine Corps have contributed to successful recruiting and retention in what should be a very challenging market.

Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the needs of the individual warfighter and their family, making continued service a viable and attractive option. And we are increasing avenues for civilians with prior service through the Targeted Reentry Program, and expanding opportunities to serve in
meaningful civilian capacities. We are also increasing opportunities for our personnel to learn, operate, and innovate alongside partners in the private sector, across the joint force, and alongside our partners and allies.

Setting Our People Up for Success

Through USMC Global Force Management, we will continue to field an elite Active and Reserve Marine force, maintaining a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio while working towards a necessary 1:3 ratio to preserve constant readiness and availability of personnel while also reserving time for training, refitting and family support. This budget increases funding and training for Marine Forces Pacific in support of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the NDS. The DON has also implemented over 100 of the recommendations from the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council (RROC) in order to maximize opportunities for our personnel to succeed. Among many other changes, we have increased opportunities for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while adjusting manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of life and professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway.

Standing Up for Our Military Families

Our people must be confident that their leadership will look out for their interests and advocate tirelessly for their safety and well-being. Unfortunately, as Congress correctly identified last year, we have not always lived up to that responsibility, particularly with respect to our administration and oversight of the Military Privatized Housing Initiative (MPHI) program. We are committed to making sure we assess, monitor, and remediate issues of concern quickly and effectively through active and engaged leadership and reinforced Department-level oversight to
restore the trust of our residents. Over the past year, Navy and Marine Corps leaders reached out
to all of our Sailors, Marines, and their families to inquire about on-base housing concerns and
offered home visits to better understand those concerns. We are also leveraging technologies
such as an app for residents to report issues and track their resolution and an Electronic Data
Warehouse that allows leaders at every level the opportunity to spot trends and issues quickly
and effectively. This budget also provides resources for additional personnel to advocate for
resident needs. In total, the Navy and Marine Corps housing programs are hiring 277 more
housing management specialists, housing inspectors, quality assurance specialists, and project
and business managers.

**Combating Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment**

We are each determined to eliminate the scourges of sexual assault and sexual harassment from
every part of our force. These behaviors stand as a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to
serve and of every person who wears the uniform, military and civilian. Our Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is coordinating education, outreach, care and
prevention efforts across the force. We have reached out to university presidents and other
civilian education leaders through our first annual symposium held at the U.S. Naval Academy in
April 2019, as well as regional discussions in New York City in September 2019 and in
Albuquerque, New Mexico in early February 2020. We are examining new prevention and
education efforts including a renewed focus on junior enlisted leaders and the role of alcohol in
sexual assault and harassment. We will continue to work with this Committee to pursue and
share the best practices and ideas, relentlessly pursuing a future where no Sailor, Marine, or
civilian teammate ever has to fear for their own safety while protecting us all.
Building a Robust Constellation of Partners and Allies

As extraordinary as the people of our integrated naval force are, we recognize that we cannot meet the global challenge alone. The strategic maritime defense partnerships we maintain with our partners and allies around the world extend the reach and power of our force, but more importantly they underscore the importance of cooperation and coordination in maintaining the rules-based international order that enables so much of our global prosperity and security. Our personnel regularly train and operate alongside their foreign counterparts, test the interoperability of our systems, and build our collective readiness. Operational exercises, international port calls, joint Marine force training, aviation training and other interactions all build the personal contact that generates understanding and respect across national and functional lines. Our personnel know that through their service they are front-line diplomats for our nation, promoting through their professionalism and dedication the connections that strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the message that the United States is a partner worth having.
The President’s FY21 budget request seeks nearly $160 billion for the U.S. Navy, an investment that will continue the momentum built since the release of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The competition articulated in the NDS will continue for the foreseeable future and demands purposeful action over a long time horizon. As a result, consistent, sustained, and predictable funding is critical to ensure that taxpayer investments already made in the Navy are fully realized. We are grateful for the predictable funding we have received in recent years.

We are proud of our intensely collaborative effort to deliver Integrated American Naval Power to the people we are sworn to defend. This integration will sustain the naval forces that our nation demands and our Joint Force expects. This integration will also place the United States in the best position to compete and win against the pacing threats we face.

The guiding principle of the Navy’s portion of this budget request is to deliver decisive naval power, blending readiness, lethality, and capacity together to create a naval force that is agile and ready to fight today while also committing to the training, maintenance, and modernization to ensure the Navy can fight and win tomorrow. This budget submission materially advances the efforts that fall under these three objectives.

Readiness

The CNO’s initial guidance to the Navy stated, “Mission One for every Sailor is a ready Navy…a Navy ready to fight today.” The Navy must be able to conduct prompt and sustained combat at sea, but current readiness also supports the indispensable roles the Navy performs on a daily
basis: securing American commerce, which is more heavily entwined with the seas than ever; telegraphing resolve; and deterring conflict. These roles are enduring and timeless, but they are also deeply connected to the priorities articulated in the NDS.

It is important to consider the historical context for this intense focus on readiness. The readiness landscape today differs significantly from twenty years ago. In 2000, the Navy had 318 battle force ships. Today, we have 293 after growing from a recent minimum of 271 battle force ships a few years ago. However, the number of deployed ships across the timespan from 2000 to today remained roughly constant. Today, we have 68 battle force ships deployed around the world. Sustaining this level requires many more than that number to deploy each year.

These demands for naval forces have led us to forward deploy a greater proportion of the force and significantly increase the length of rotational deployments. The extended deployment of the 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN is an example of this trend: her 294-day deployment was the longest for an aircraft carrier since the mid-1970s. While her extension was the best decision we could offer to support the demand for forces, it does not come without consequences. When ships, aircraft, and submarines are deployed longer, they require more maintenance to return to sea as ready as they were before. Moreover, our statistics show that this relationship is sometimes non-linear: “surge” deployments and heavier operational use can exponentially increase the time and cost required to recapitalize these valuable assets.
Our approach to implementing the NDS has already led us to guard readiness more carefully by ruthlessly prioritizing requests for forces. The growth of the Navy over the past several years has also increased the denominator in the readiness equation, relieving some pressure on the force.

Yet there is much more to do, and we are committed to finding and closing readiness gaps. The American taxpayer and the Congress have generously funded ships, submarines, and aircraft, and we owe it to the people we are sworn to protect and defend to be good stewards of those investments.

We are committed to funding readiness at the maximum executable level. PB-21 makes a strong commitment to current readiness, acknowledging the sustained effort required to mitigate the effects of decades of intensive use of our ships, aircraft, and submarines. The funding requested for individual accounts such as Ship Depot Maintenance and Aircraft Depot Maintenance have increased over FY20 enacted levels, reflecting purposeful choices about what we need to be ready today.

The Navy is already moving aggressively to ensure these funds are well spent. No reform is too small. Our relentless pursuit of reform has already paid dividends: our achievement of 80% mission-capable tactical aircraft this past year is one example. Acknowledging the challenges in depot-level maintenance and modernization, the CNO has directed Navy leaders to find the key levers of productivity that will allow us to deliver depot-level availabilities on time and in full. Although there is much to do, we are encouraged by the trends we are beginning to see. Our public shipyard workload has led us to increase hiring, increasing public shipyard end strength.
by 16% from 2013. We are working aggressively to improve estimates of the length of time our platforms need to be in maintenance, level-load depot-level maintenance across our network of industrial partners, better integrate different maintenance organizations within the Navy, and utilize predictive analytics. In concert with continued discipline in guarding readiness, we believe that we can deliver our platforms in maintenance on time and in full. We are also grateful for the strong support we received from Congress in our enacted 2020 budget for a pilot program for private contractor shipyard maintenance in the Pacific, and request that this pilot continue. We value our close partnership with industry and recognize that predictability on our part will help incentivize our partners to grow, providing critical capacity to complement the work in our public shipyards.

PB-21 robustly funds ship and aircraft operations, another essential element of readiness. As previously mentioned, it provides for 58 underway days per quarter per ship and bolsters flying hours for our aircraft. This directly contributes to readiness by allowing our Sailors to train to complex, high-end naval warfare scenarios at sea and creating the maritime expertise our nation expects. While there is no replacement for operating at sea, the Navy is working rapidly to integrate Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training into the mix. LVC training allows units at all stages of force generation to maximize training for high-end warfare, and prevents the degradation of key warfighting competencies when platforms are undergoing maintenance.

This budget request also recognizes the truth that we cannot neglect our shore infrastructure in favor of future force structure or other priorities without an impact to readiness. This year’s budget requests the largest amount of funds for Navy shore infrastructure in the past four years,
allowing us to create readiness at sea through increased readiness ashore. Congressional support for this request will also help the Navy meet its obligations to Sailors and their families, increasing the quality of public-private venture housing through increased oversight funded by approximately $35 million each year of the FYDP, addressing perfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination with $44 million requested for clean-up programs, and rebuilding Navy facilities in the wake of recent natural disasters.

Readiness at sea also depends land-based training ranges, especially for aviators and special warfare operators. These include the Navy’s training center in Fallon, Nevada. Expansion of this range is critical to maintaining our readiness today as newer weapons, released from distances much greater than those of just a few years ago, require a larger safety zone around target areas. Expanding this range will allow us to send our Sailors into combat fully prepared, providing realistic training and the skills they will need to win. We are committed to work with federal, state, tribal, and local partners to do so in a way that addresses the concerns of all.

Finally, a ready Navy depends on our true asymmetric advantage: our people. PB-21 increases active-duty manning to keep our human capital synchronized with our force structure, raising our end strength by 7,300 Sailors. This reduces gaps and shortfalls at sea, directly contributing to readiness. Manning ships, aircraft, and submarines at sea remains a top priority, and we will continue to operate effectively and sustainably over time as the battle fleet grows. The budget also sustains the suite of efforts under the Sailor 2025 initiative and continues to transform our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E) system to provide auditable, responsive services to our Sailors and responsibly reduce costs. It funds expanded educational
efforts to obtain warfighting advantage. Recognizing our ethical obligation to create a strong, positive environment for our Sailors, as well as the positive effect such an environment has on recruiting and retaining talent, we are committed to eliminating destructive behaviors such as sexual assault. We are focused on creating and sustaining a Culture of Excellence, where our Sailors do not merely avoid doing what is wrong, but actively pursue what is right. The Culture of Excellence program also leverages predictive analytics to intervene before destructive behaviors occur, breaking the cycle of simply responding to events.

We are witnessing very good trends in recruiting and retention. This has enabled us to fill gapped billets at sea, reducing them from 6,500 in December 2018 to 4,900 in December 2019. We met our retention goals for all zones in 2019, retaining 76% of the force. We’re reforming our recruiting efforts, saving millions of dollars by processing forms for new accessions using biometric signatures. And our recruiters are exceeding their goals: 2019 saw the Navy sign the second-largest number of active-duty contracts, 40,756 new accessions, in the last 15 years. In an environment with low unemployment levels, these statistics are encouraging and demonstrate the America’s young people see great value in joining the Navy team.

**Lethality**

Deterring our competitors from malign activity requires fielding a forward-deployed, lethal naval force. Our competitors are heavily investing in technologies aimed at our naval forces. Across the Navy’s Total Obligation Authority (TOA), the capability investments directly enhancing current and future lethality comprise approximately 21% of the Navy’s annual budget. This investment can be further sub-divided into future capability (~11%) and modernization (~10%).
Relative to the entire Navy budget, the value proposition of our modernization investments are often overlooked when compared with resources applied to major ship and aircraft procurement accounts. Each dollar is thoughtfully applied to specific key capabilities based upon a rigorous analysis of iterative wargames, exercises, and experimentation. Offensive and defensive modernization efforts enable our ships and aircraft to operate in the face of today’s advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems.

In particular, we increased our investments in directed energy and hypersonic weapons. In terms of directed energy, we request to apply $170.3 million in FY21 to our directed energy programs, which will rapidly advance our ship’s defensive capabilities. In terms of hypersonics, we request to increase our investments from $642 million in FY20 to $1.4 billion. PB-21 continues our focus on developing long-range, offensive fires launched from ships, submarines, and aircraft, including: Conventional Prompt Strike, the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range (JSOW-ER), the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and the Standard Missile- (SM-) 6. We are moving quickly to extend the range of the carrier air wing with the rapid development of the MQ-25, the Navy’s first unmanned carrier based aircraft. MQ-25 does more than extending our reach; it lays the foundation for integrating unmanned air power into our carrier fleet. The combined effects of these modernization efforts extend the lethal strike range of the CVW into denied areas while enabling the CVN to operate outside the threat ranges of adversary anti-ship missile threats.

The FY21 budget builds on the progress made in FY20 to pursue a networked fleet by investing $82 million ($395 million across the FYDP) in artificial intelligence and machine learning
technologies that improve decision quality and speed in combat. This networked fleet requires a resilient operational architecture to integrate our command and control, sensors, shooters, and weapons. To accomplish this, we will leverage our work on the Navy Tactical Grid to build the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) alongside our Joint teammates. Protecting our networked forces requires building cyber resilience and security into our platforms from the beginning. To meet this need, the Navy will fund $4.17 billion across the FYDP to protect our operations, equipment, and industrial base from intrusions and ensure we have the means to fight through and recover from cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, we will integrate our cyber forces more closely with fleet operations to deliver catastrophic cyber effects as part of an integrated all-domain naval force.

These investments all support a highly maneuverable fleet that controls the high-end fight. Nuclear powered aircraft carriers remain crucial to this effort and the Carrier Strike Group remains the cornerstone of the Navy’s forward presence, sea control, and power projection capabilities. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN), associated air wing (CVW), surface combatants, and sub-surface combatants represent the most survivable and lethal maritime fighting force in the world, providing long-range kinetic and non-kinetic effects from distributed mobile platforms at sea without the need for foreign basing rights. The CVN and embarked CVW are vital to the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operating concept, providing the flexibility and endurance to hold large swaths of land or sea at risk for extended periods of time. *GERALD R. FORD* (CVN 78) represents a generational leap in the aircraft carrier’s capacity to project power on a global scale. *FORD*-class carriers are designed to generate a 30 percent higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than a *NIMITZ* class carrier. This translates to
$4 billion savings over the life of the program generating more decisive naval power. With the successful completion of CVN 78’s Post Shakedown Availability and subsequent Independent Steaming Events, finishing our work and delivering this capability to the fleet as quickly and effectively as possible is one of DON’s highest priorities. The Navy has learned with each test and is consistently bringing each of the innovative systems online. FORD is currently undergoing final air compatibility testing, bringing the entire carrier air wing onboard and progressing towards her maiden deployment. We will continue to learn, iterate and improve, driving down cost on each subsequent ship of her class. We are grateful for the Committee’s support of the program with the historic two-carrier award for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and are confident that the FORD class will provide the foundation for highly maneuverable and lethal combat power projection well into the second half of this century.

Our naval logistics enterprise undergirds the effective employment of our forces in a dispersed, forward-deployed manner across the spectrum of conflict from daily operations into sustained major combat operations. Our logistics forces must provide forward-deployed repair and resupply as well as combat medical services to revive our forces on station. In addition, we will begin designing two new vessels, the Next Generation Medium Amphibious Ship and the Next Generation Medium Logistics Ship that will support our expeditionary forces operating in contested maritime spaces.

**Capacity**

To increase America’s naval power, we will continue to build more ships, submarines, and aircraft. There has been a long-standing consensus across the government that the Navy needs to
grow. We are focused on responsible growth, a rate of growth that ensures our ability to effectively maintain the fleet and to properly man, train, and equip that fleet.

We appreciate the strong support from Congress for naval shipbuilding, funding last year’s request for 12 ships. We reaffirm our commitment to reach the 355-ship goal in a reasonable and strategically relevant timeline, and to augment a future 355-ship Navy with developmental and unmanned vessels. The pace of growth will depend on both our ability to find savings within our own topline. While this budget request slows the growth to 355 slightly to ensure we properly maintain the fleet we have, we are seeking ways to support increased rates of growth in the coming years. The challenges extend beyond the shipbuilding accounts, as we must also consider what increases in operations and maintenance accounts will be required to continue the momentum we have built in regaining readiness. We cannot, and will not build a hollow force simply to reach the 355 ship number. Because of the rate of change in technology, we will continue to refine the required number of ships in an iterative fashion, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and as informed by wargaming and experimentation.

The FY21 budget requests $21 billion in ship construction for 8 battle force ships and plans to build 44 battle force ships (plus 17 unmanned ships) over the FYDP. This procurement includes one COLUMBIA and one VIRGINIA class submarine each, two ARLEIGH BURKE Flight III destroyer, one Guided Missile Frigate, one LPD Flight II, and two Towing, Salvage, and Rescue ships.
Deterring a nuclear attack on the homeland remains the Navy’s most sacred duty and our number one acquisition priority. PB-21 fully funds the first year of construction of the lead ship of the COLUMBIA class ballistic missile submarine. Over the FYDP, we plan to start construction on the second ship of the class in FY24 and, beyond the FYDP, to begin serial production in FY26. The COLUMBIA class guarantees the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad remains on patrol into the 2080s, ensuring the secure second-strike capability that is the foundation of strategic deterrence.

This budget request also supports one additional VIRGINIA Class submarine in FY21, continuing the Block V multiyear contract awarded in December 2019, which will then procure two per year from FY22 through the FYDP. Additionally, the Guided Missile Frigate [FFG(X)] program is proceeding well, and will provide the fleet with a lethal small surface combatant that is optimized towards distributed maritime operations. The Navy plans to award the lead ship of the class in July 2020 and the second ship of the class in FY21.

We are committed to experimenting with unmanned systems, moving them beyond their current conceptual stage, and continuously assessing how they should be counted within the battle force. While we do not count unmanned ships at present, we will continue to procure our large unmanned surface vessel, buying 10 over the FYDP. These ships are envisioned to host both sensors and weapons. This procurement will transition to SCN funding by FY23. We will also procure 6 extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles in the FYDP which will help provide solutions for specific fleet needs.
This budget also procures 277 fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including 121 F-35C) and 25 unmanned aircraft across the FYDP. We are completing the acquisition of several type/model/series aircraft and continuing to purchase essential capabilities, such as the advanced early warning provided by the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and a new, flexible logistics capability in the CMV-22 Osprey.

We in the Navy are honored to defend American prosperity and American values around the world every day. We are excited to be working closely with the Marine Corps to deliver Integrated American Naval Power to perform these critical and timeless roles. We are conscious that every tax dollar spent to increase readiness, lethality, and capacity represents more than buying power, but the trust and confidence of the American people. We do not take that trust lightly and will seek every means to spend those dollars in a deliberate, methodical, and responsible fashion, maximizing naval power to the fullest extent that those funds enable. Thank you for your strong support and continued partnership in providing and maintaining a Navy.
U.S. Marine Corps Priorities

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the Committee, this statement is my first report to Congress and represents my assessment of the current state of the Marine Corps and priorities for the future.

The future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation’s Naval Services, demands that the Marine Corps is not currently organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet. Modernizing the Marine Corps for the era of great power competition will require significant adjustments to long-term Service investments, new integrated naval warfighting organizations and concepts of employment, and better training and education for Marines; changes that only Congress can help us realize. The FY 2021 budget puts the Marine Corps on the path toward modernization, supports irreversible implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and sustains and builds our readiness to deter, fight, and win.

My top priority as Commandant is to build the Marine Corps that will define integrated American naval power in 2030, even as it must remain ready to confront the challenges of today. I seek no additional resources for this effort. It is attainable with a stable budget and sustained by the leadership and oversight of Congress. Service modernization will require several years of dedicated analysis, wargaming, and experimentation on a level that we have not experienced in recent memory. We are committed to this effort and have already begun charting a new course. The Marine Corps is grateful to the Congress for its leadership and support during previous periods of modernization and seeks its continued support today.
Before addressing the issues of force design, readiness, resourcing, and the latest FY21 budget submission, it is important that I start with a few comments on our individual Marines and the health of the Corps. I strongly believe that everything we do begins and ends with the individual Marine – the heart and soul of our institution. On any given day, the vast majority of your 225,000 Marines, representing every state and territory, serve honorably and perform their duties at home and abroad in an exemplary manner. I am extremely proud to serve alongside them, and based on my discussions with members of this committee, I know that my pride in them is shared. Regrettably, as several high profile incidents have revealed over the past several years, not all within your Marine Corps consistently adhere to our rigid standards, satisfy my expectations for professional behavior, or fulfill their obligations as Marines. Addressing the corrosive effects of misconduct and criminality by this small yet destructive minority is a top priority, and I offer the following observations:

The presence of the malignant individuals and sub-cultures within the institution produces a well-known and well-documented pattern of misogyny. A 2018 publicized report commissioned by my predecessor clearly supports these observations as facts. I have begun the process of exposing and eliminating these malignant subcultures from our ranks and will seek Congress’ continued assistance to that end.

Eradicating sexual harassment and sexual assault remains a challenge across the military and the Marine Corps. I acknowledge what many of you already suspect or know – after many years of trying, and despite our best efforts and intentions, remedial actions taken to date have not caused the desired outcomes. I seek to address this problem head on.
There are some within our ranks who remain hesitant to accept gender-integrated training at our enlisted recruit depots. I would remind those Marines that the Corps has conducted gender integrated training at Officer Candidates School for more than two decades, with outstanding results. I have every reason to believe that we can replicate that model in our enlisted recruit depots, and have already begun moving forward expeditiously, with the continued support of Congress. I understand the direction and the effort the Marine Corps must take to comply with the specified timelines for both MCRD Parris Island and MCRD San Diego in the 2020 NDAA that will meet the intent of Congress and the needs of the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. We exist for that one purpose; to fight and to win. All that we do is standards-based in order to produce a premier expeditionary warfighting force for the Nation. In some occupational specialties within our Corps, there are legitimate operationally-derived physical requirements that every Marine must meet. Marines who meet these standards, regardless of biological sex or gender, will face no artificial barriers to their service or advancement.

Appropriately addressing all of these issues becomes even more paramount as we design a future Marine Corps that is optimized to meet the challenges of 2030 and beyond. As we consider the skills, education, and capabilities required of the next generation of Marines, we must be able to recruit and sustain a force that draws from 100% of our Nation’s collective reservoir of talent, innovation, creativity, and patriotism. I take it as a personal responsibility to do everything
within my authority to ensure that the Marine Corps does not create any artificial barriers to service or advancement.

Force Design is my top priority as stated in my Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Over the next three to five months, we will continue to refine and deepen the analytical depth of our initial planning through an iterative process of wargaming, analysis, and experimentation. That work will directly support the redesign of our Corps. Our collective Fleet Marine Forces, as well as our HQMC organization and many of its processes, to include the existing Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, require a comprehensive overhaul to create the necessary level of naval integration across the Department. Naval integration with the CNO’s Staff, with the fleets, and within the Department remains a top priority for me, the CNO, and the Secretary.

Thanks to your continued support, your Marine Corps remains the Nation’s most ready force. We have made forces available for deployment to meet Combatant Commander requests around the globe, often on short notice. Those deployed Marine Units reinforce our commitment to U.S. allies and partners and serve to uphold the international rules-based order. Wherever deployed globally, your naval expeditionary forces facilitate conventional deterrence, prevent fait accompli scenarios from developing, and successfully compete against malign maritime gray zone activities to assure our allies and partners of our continued commitment. This will not change.

With your support, over the previous two years we have been able to satisfy increased global force management demands, including those made on our legacy fixed-wing aircraft squadrons,
However, we should be careful not to confuse availability with operational suitability. Readiness must be more than a mere measure of availability. True readiness, which we define as the readiness of a unit to be employed against a peer threat to achieve decisive tactical and operational outcomes, requires investment in modern capabilities commensurate with those of the threat. This will require a significant shift from our most recent FY21 budget submission. I would also respectfully submit that it may require a reassessment of our existing processes and metrics for assessing unit readiness – true readiness as described above. Within the Marine Corps, I am sustaining and reinforcing initiatives started by my predecessors that will increase the realism of pre-deployment training to more closely align with scenarios identified in the NDS. In addition, following a path that I readily acknowledge has been charted over the course of decades by the Army, we have added an extensive program of force-on-force training to our long-standing live-fire combined arms training exercise program.

With these goals in mind, over the coming months, we will make significant changes to the organization of our Training and Education Command, which will require the support and consent of civilian leadership for full implementation. Additionally, it is not lost upon me that our desert training facilities, superbly adapted as they have been to preparing for the challenges of the last three decades, are less than ideal for the kind of integrated naval training and experimentation that we need to prepare for great power competition in contested littoral environments. Identifying and developing first class littoral training areas will be one of my priorities going forward, for which I will ask your guidance and support.
Regarding this FY21 budget submission, I am well aware that our budget requests since the release of the NDS two years ago have changed only marginally year-to-year. While the cumulative impact of those marginal changes is in some cases substantial, many were budgetary actions that merely shifted funding within existing programs. This is not the kind of substantive change now needed, nor will it result in the premier naval expeditionary force required to implement the NDS and realize our evolving naval and joint concepts. In fact, our major programs of record prior to the formulation and release of the NDS – F-35, CH-53K, MV-22, ACV, and JLTV – have actually grown. As I stated in my Commandant’s Planning Guidance, these and other programs – all of which were constructed to support a long-standing but now obsolescent conception of large-scale amphibious forcible entry – require a critical review. I expect that review will likely recommend major revisions and reductions to some of our major programs. We must then reinvest those resources into capabilities more relevant to the future security and warfighting environment, many of which we are developing but have yet to procure.

This necessary divestment and subsequent reinvestment process is a complex effort, and one that prudence dictates be conducted in the most thoughtful and analytically defensible manner possible. While it may be shocking to some for a Service Chief to openly criticize existing programs and priorities, our shift to the future is in no way an indictment of previous decisions or conclusions of those who once sat at this table or of any who provided oversight in the past. The simple fact that the strategic environment has changed significantly and that we are now in an era of great power competition, mandates that we must make the necessary adjustments to our naval warfighting concepts and accompanying investment plans to create true readiness – operationally relevant and available naval forces that create overmatch over anticipated adversaries. I
understand there are both structural impediments to change as well as strong interests resisting change; however, as I stated during my confirmation – I will always provide my best military advice and ultimately defer to and support the decisions of the civilian leadership within the Department and Congress.

The timing of this FY21 budget submission coincides with an inflection point for the Marine Corps. Subsequent annual submissions will reflect that significant change in focus, and indeed I anticipate there will be opportunities even during the execution of the FY20 budget to make in-stride adjustments with the consent and support of Congress. Simply put, with peer competitors striving to supplant the role of U.S. military forces regionally and globally, we cannot afford to delay modernization when we see opportunities to make prudent adjustments from prior plans. If we are to avoid being outpaced, agility in reprogramming becomes an essential tool to apply where it makes sense to do so.

This budget also supports our assertion that Marine forces – operating as part of an integrated naval force – must seamlessly integrate into and play a complementary role within a larger joint force. Over the next few years, we must strive to reduce duplication of warfighting capabilities to only those areas that make sense tactically and operationally. Marine Corps contributions should largely be unique, complementary, and tailor to the joint mission.

Beyond the issues germane to my role as Commandant of the Marine Corps – to organize, train, and equip Marine Corps forces in support of the Fleets and Combatant Commanders – I offer the following observations as a senior naval officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Today’s environment of renewed great power competition demands a truly integrated naval force; we no longer enjoy the luxuries of internal Service focus and inefficiency that the “unipolar moment” allowed. The imperative now to accelerate naval integration is driven not by historical example nor traditional bonds between our naval Services – it is driven by the global environment described in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Our ability to operate as an integrated naval expeditionary force within contested areas provides the joint force with an asymmetric advantage, an edge that we must preserve and strengthen in this era of great power competition.

We need adequate numbers of naval platforms and surface combatants with the lethality to contribute to sea control and sea denial and appropriate defensive capabilities and sensors to operate in a distributed manner without imposing undue burdens on other platforms. Those platforms must also be affordable from both a procurement and sustainment perspective, as well as generate the kind of availability needed to meet future force generation requirements. Included in that future fleet must be adequate numbers of traditional amphibious ships as well as next generation amphibious ships that will enable the Fleet Commanders to employ the naval expeditionary force throughout a contested littoral area in a more distributed, lethal, and defensible manner.

While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that Congress expects nothing less from the Marine Corps. With your continued leadership and support, we will achieve our shared
goals and modernize our warfighting capabilities and culture to best support the Navy, the Joint Force, and the Nation.
Closing Statement

On behalf of our entire integrated naval force and every Sailor, Marine and civilian in the Department of the Navy, the three of us would like to once again thank the leadership and membership of this Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. We are also grateful to the Committee for the recent passage of the FY20 Defense Appropriation. By passing this legislation you have enabled many of the priorities identified within this document, and you’ve sent a strong signal of support to our people – and a stern warning to our adversaries.

We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability of the past several years. This has given our force the agility and flexibility necessary to address emerging threats and the needs of our integrated naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial and relevant spending. This stability has saved money for the American taxpayer. We owe it to them to ensure that every single dollar is invested in the most effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred oath.

We urge the Committee to do everything possible to ensure continued funding stability so that we may implement the needed reforms and spending priorities discussed in this document to meet the great power challenge, protect the maritime commons, and stand in defense of the United States of America. On behalf of the world’s finest Marines and Sailors, we thank you for your time and ongoing efforts, and we look forward to your questions.
Mr. Visclosky. General, thank you very much.
Mr. Calvert.

ISR

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Acting Secretary Modly, one shortfall we hear of from nearly every combatant commander is ISR. And I am concerned that all the services did not request sufficient resources this fiscal year. Do you believe the Navy's request reflects this increased demand?

Secretary Modly. Sir, I think as we were going through our budget process, we had to make trades in a variety of different areas. So, when we went through this process, we went through the service chiefs, and we asked them, are you comfortable with the cuts that we have to take in certain areas?

And the decisions we made clearly would have—there are certain ones that we would have liked to have not made if we had had more resources. But those balances were made based on what we believed was in the best interest of the safety and security of our Marines and sailors and in terms of maintaining the readiness of our fleet. And so those——

Mr. Calvert. Was ISR brought up at these meetings?
Secretary Modly. Oh, of course it was.

Mr. Calvert. And did they say they didn't need any more of it?
Secretary Modly. No, sir, I think everyone thinks they need more ISR. We need more ISR everywhere. But there were choices that had to be made based on the budget constraints that we had.

Mr. Calvert. And what was more important than the ISR?
Secretary Modly. I can give you a variety of examples of things in readiness that we have made choices over. It wasn't a binary choice between ISR and this. It was basically trying to balance across the whole budget. But I can give you an example——

Mr. Calvert. The reason I bring it up is it seems that every combatant commander I talk to, the first thing they talk about is ISR. Why is that?
Secretary Modly. Well, they recognize how important it is, and we do too.

Mr. Calvert. General, do you need more ISR out there?

General Berger. Sir, we do. MQ–9s for the last year, based on resources provided by this committee, we have employed MQ–9s in Afghanistan really effectively, down in Helmand province.

At the tactical to operational level, there is no combatant commander, I agree with you, that is ever going to be happy with the ISR, because that gives them the indications and warning that they are looking for.

Mr. Calvert. Yeah, that troubles me, because—you know, the chairman and I share our disappointment in this reprogramming. I know that is above all of your pay grade. I am sure you are probably not too happy about it yourselves.

But, nevertheless, to break the line for the development of the MQ–9 Reaper Extended Range, every single combatant command that I talk to says they need more ISR. It doesn't make sense to me.

Any comment on that, Admiral?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, a couple of comments in terms of investments that we made and have made with respect to contributing ISR to the Joint Force.

The first is the MQ–4 Triton. And so that is a great capability that will have a number of different sensors on it, that we most recently have deployed two of those out into the Indo-Pacific AOR, and we have more coming.

As you are probably——

Mr. CALVERT. How much does that cost?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I will have to get back to you on the exact price of an MQ–4 airframe and the systems that go along with it. It depends on how it is configured. I don't mean to be evasive. I just don't know the number off the top of my head.

Mr. CALVERT. Did you request the Triton this year?

Admiral GILDAY. No, sir, we did not.

Mr. CALVERT. I am concerned that we are going to shut down an affordable platform. The MQ–9 Reaper runs about $20 million per unit. And, you know, 99 percent of the world they can fly. We are not talking about the denied airspace here. And for some future capability that is unknown and a price that is unknown.

Most of the ISR we look at is 5, 6, 7, 10 times as much money as the MQ–9 Reaper. Is that what the military wants to move to, is something that is multiples more expensive that they can fly in a small part of the world?

Was that your understanding, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MODLY. No, sir, I don't think that is—I think some of those decisions were made also around survivability, being able to fly in permissive environments and not permissive environments, and also, I think——

Mr. CALVERT. The MQ–9 Reaper, is it flown in areas where they can't survive?

Secretary MODLY. Well, right now, there——

Mr. CALVERT. It can fly in all of Africa. It can fly pretty much in all of the Middle East. You can fly almost all of South America. You certainly can fly anything—or, you know, so——

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir, I agree with that. I think, as they look at—particularly as the Air Force looks at its modernization—and I don't want to speak to it, but they are thinking about more in terms of great-power competition and whether or not that platform actually would be survivable in a non-permissive environment. So that is part of the reason that some choices were made in that regard.

Mr. CALVERT. So we are going to spend five times as much to—we are going to get rid of the MQ–9 Reaper, and we are going to fly ISR that can fly in denied airspace in areas that you don't have to worry about having it shot down.

Is that the Air Force program or the Navy program?

Secretary MODLY. That has a lot more to do with the Air Force program, in terms of how those decisions were made.

Mr. CALVERT. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Mr. Kilmer.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you for being with us.

As you know, my district is home to one of our four public shipyards. And on the heels of the last question, talking about the great-power competition, obviously, maintaining a strong naval presence is going to be all the more important in the years ahead to mitigate some of the threats that we are seeing from China, from Russia, and their investments in their navies.

I think the Navy has acknowledged the importance of modernizing our shipyards and improving our public shipyards to make sure that they are equipped and able to maintain readiness of our fleet.

I know there is the SIOP, the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan. I know how important it is to have it stay on track.

And, Mr. Secretary, I was hoping you could just give us an update on the SIOP. Are you, in fact, on track? And what is the total level of funding you are dedicating to the SIOP in fiscal year 2021, and what will that accomplish?

Secretary Modly. Thank you, sir. I will speak broadly to the SIOP. It is a 20-year program to basically modernize our shipyards, our four main shipyards. It is $20-billion-plus over that 20 years.

And we are prioritizing projects in that process. I believe there are some projects that are happening in your district this year. We are putting a heavy emphasis on some of the work down in Norfolk Naval Shipyard as well. Looking at doing planning in Pearl Harbor and in Portsmouth. So there is work that is being done in all of these areas over the course of this year.

In terms of the exact dollar amount, I don’t know if the CNO might know what that is exactly, but I think it is around a billion dollars that is going into that this year.

Mr. Kilmer. Thanks.

Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, it is about $1.5 billion in MILCON. And there is more than just MILCON, but we have three projects underway this year. We will have another eight next year across the four shipyards.

And so, at the same time that we are replacing some of this equipment that—the average age of those yards is 76 years old, and some of that equipment is that old. Some of those dry docks are over 100 years old. So, at the same time, we are creating digital twins to understand each of those yards, the layouts, and how we can best invest in new infrastructure. We are also replacing things like cranes and dry docks and also some significant maintenance facilities.

We are committed to it. The public yards, including Puget Sound, are really the jewel in the crown of our deep maintenance facilities, and we know that we are past due in terms of making these investments.
And, Mr. Secretary, I would love to invite you as well. We would love to have you.

Mr. Womack came out last year. And it is a real sight to behold, and the men and women who work there are really doing a bang-up job.

I also wanted to ask about the NavalX Tech Bridge initiative, which was designed to create techie go systems around the Nation by partnering the Navy with the private sector and with startup communities and academia and nonprofit organizations.

Keyport Naval Undersea Warfare Center in my district was selected as one of the first five Tech Bridge locations in the country. Just hoping for an update on how you feel like that program is going and what we are learning from that initiative, what sort of impact you think it will have on innovation going forward in tech development across the Navy.

Secretary Modly. I think it is an absolutely critical process for us to develop these closer ties with industry, particularly in the tech areas, because of their ability to innovate quicker than we are able to innovate. So we need to learn from them; we need to partner with them.

So this is a first, sort of, really, I think, serious foray into that area. We are going to continue to do this. We are going to monitor it. I think they are experiencing some success with this, but the key is to really develop this at scale so we can have almost a whole new ecosystem in terms of how we do innovation across the Department of the Navy.

I don't know if the CNO has anything more to add on that.

Admiral Gilday. Just to echo what the Secretary said, when we first joined the Navy and the Marine Corps, the U.S. Government did 90 percent of the R&D in this country, and now it is flipped. And so, obviously, the best ideas are coming from industry.

The Congress has given us authorities so that we can turn—we can lead-turn new capabilities faster. So the stuff that we are applying, as an example, to our computer networks in terms of machine learning, AI, in terms of cyber defense, have put us in a much better position because we don't have to wait 5 or 6 years to field something. We can field it within 6 months.

So, yes, we are leveraging it, sir, and will continue to do so.

Mr. Kilmer. Super. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

Mr. Womack.

TOMAHAWKS

Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And my thanks to the witnesses this morning. Mr. Secretary, Chief Gilday, and the Commandant, thank you for your service to our country.

This first question I think I am just going to ask for the record, because I know it has some sensitivity to it, but I just want to make sure that I understand where we are, above or below our requirement on Tomahawks. I consider it to be an important piece of our arsenal. And I would like to—we don't have to get into detail here, but I sure would like an update.
Mr. WOMACK. But I would like your comments on the importance of expanding our offensive strike capability.

So, Admiral, I will yield to you.

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, thanks for your service as well.

Sir, so Tomahawk is one of those, as I mentioned in my opening statement, one of those weapons systems that gives us range and speed that we need to not only close gaps but maintain and establish overmatch against our peer competitors.

So, with respect to Tomahawk, we are investing in Tactical Tomahawk, the Block V, as you know, the maritime strike version, and also the land attack version and the upgrades that come along with that.

To directly answer your question, we are not where we need to be. The Block V comes to IOC in 2023. But we are making investments in those weapons steadily. Those numbers are coming up.

Mr. WOMACK. Quick question for the Commandant.

In your written testimony, you talked about the POM submission, which coincides with the inflection point for the Marine Corps. Yet, looking at the budget, I don’t really see a significant amount of change. So why isn’t there more change if we are at that inflection point in the PB21?

General BERGER. Sir, last July, we started probably a 7-month effort to figure out what the Marine Corps—we would need in 2030, and we finished that effort in late December, early January. Not an excuse, but that is the reason why there aren’t fundamental changes in this budget submission.

There are the initial—what we could see already last July when we began the submission process for this, what you could already see was that, if we are going to contribute to the naval fight, back to your previous question, we are going to need some tools, some capabilities we don’t have right now, if we are going to contribute to sea denial and sea control.

Our long-range strike capability for the last 30, 40 years has been Harriers and Hornets and now F–35s. And then it was a drop back in to MRLS rockets. We need the ability to reach out and touch a threat, an adversary’s naval force, from ship or from shore if we are going to be part of the integrated naval force. So you see even in this budget submission the beginning of the long-range fires that we are going to need in that regard.

Mr. WOMACK. Okay. Thank you.

You know, Mr. Chairman, on kind of a lighter note, I realize I have a couple of Naval Academy graduates sitting over here on the panel. And having been elected chairman of the board at West Point a couple of weeks ago, I just want, for the record, everybody to know that I am glad that they have moved that secret weapon that they had out to the fleet now, this quarterback by the name of Malcolm Perry.

These Army guys were running around out there last December trying to catch the wind, and he made us pay a dear price. So thank you for moving that guy on out. I think he was out of eligibility anyway. But congratulations on your victory.

And I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick.
Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral and Commandant. Thank you very much for being here and testifying today.

So I represent Tucson. I think you have a Tomahawk manufacturing plant there. A very important piece of the economy to us. You know, it is very important that our ships and their components are manufactured domestically. As I said, in my district and throughout Arizona, there are many small businesses and companies that produce components for submarines and ships. However, they are vulnerable given the volatility of budgets and production lines.

What are you going to do to help the domestic industrial base maintain relevancy and continue research and testing to give the Navy cutting-edge capabilities?

And my question is directed to you, Mr. Secretary, but I would love to hear from the other people, as well, if you have something to contribute.

Secretary MODLY. Well, thank you for the question, ma’am. I think it is a very, very important question, because as we think about how we develop a force, a new force structure, for the Navy and Marine Corps team, we are heavily dependent upon industry for us to be able to deliver that. And the industrial base that we have that supports shipbuilding, particularly, and all the components that get into it represent thousands and thousands of jobs across the country, not just in the areas where we actually build the ships. We have to make sure that that industry is healthy and that it can adapt and change as quickly as we see the threat environment changing.

So I have seen, just in the last couple years, lots of serious investment, particularly in our shipbuilding industry, to be able to be more adaptable, integrate new technologies more quickly. But it has to be a partnership with industry, particularly because when you see how our industrial base has shrunk so much over the past 20 or 30 years, we have to work with them a lot more collaboratively. And I think it is going to require a lot less adversarial type of relationships and a lot more collaborative relationships to make that work.

But it is part of our strategy. It has to be part of our strategy. Because if we are going to accelerate a path towards 355 or more ships—and a lot of those ships that we are talking about in our force structure don’t even exist right now; they are ships, platforms that we are looking at that are both manned, unmanned, lightly manned—we have to have industry with us on that. So it is a high priority for us.

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you. I think people are really surprised that southern Arizona has this industrial base regarding ships. I mean, we are not exactly a coastal State, but it is a very, very important industry to us. So I just want to make sure that you are there and stay there, and I want you to know it is a top priority of mine.

Commandant, Admiral, do you have anything to add?
Admiral GILDAY. I want to say simply that our success, in many ways, depends on a successful defense industrial base.

And so, as I just mentioned in the response to Mr. Kilmer’s question, one of the great things right now with respect to industry is that there are so many ideas and so many options, and a lot of that stuff is exciting. So, years ago, they used to be really dependent upon our requirements. Now, you know, a question that we ask is, what have you thought of that we haven’t that we could use? And a lot of that stuff has a direct application from commercial to military with a few tweaks.

And in terms of Tomahawk, you know, as I just mentioned to Representative Womack, we are very bullish on Tomahawk.

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. So are we. So thank you.

General BERGER. You mentioned predictable funding. I think that is one of the three points.

Second, I think we have to do our job in terms of predictable programming. We can’t jerk around every 2 or 3 years in a different direction.

In other words, looking back through the lens of industry, they need both. They need a predictable view on our programming—what we need, what our requirements are—and predictable funding.

I got a lesson last spring, traveling to a shipyard, on the length of the supply chain, which you allude to. And the short version of that, which I never would have understood unless they drew it on a whiteboard, was, you know, here at the big end, we could absorb some fluctuations. Down on the little end, in someplace, you know, in Iowa, or you pick the State, there are six people that produce a component of this. They can’t stop work for 6 months. Those six people have to have jobs.

So I understood, some people call it the fragility of the supply chain, but I was taken to school last spring and learned a lesson. That part is really important.

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. I agree. Maintaining that expertise at that level is so important to the long-term success of the program.

So I just want you to know, we are very proud of the collaboration that you do with the University of Arizona in Tucson. They are working on some cutting-edge technology that we think can help you, and we like to see that kind of collaboration. So, again, thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Rogers.

CHINA

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the threats posed by, quote, “great powers” and specifically highlights Russia and China, of course, as the greatest threats to our interests.

China continues to modernize its military platforms and increase its number of deployable platforms of aircraft carriers, guided missile cruisers, combat support ships, and fifth-generation stealth fighters. China has also started deploying military assets further from their coastlines. They recently deployed a surface action group
about 250 miles from Guam and are also sending their submarines further afield.

China continues to maintain its maritime claims in the South China Sea, has militarized disputed islands by deploying advanced military systems. China also uses fear, coercion, economic pressure to advance their priorities in countries throughout the world.

We, of course, have much greater capability at large than China, but our military might is spread across the world; theirs is focused on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near term and displacement of the U.S. to achieve global preeminence in the future.

My question: Speak to us about the actions of China in the vein that I have mentioned. And what do you see for the future?

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MODLY. Sir, thanks, for the prelude to that, because I think everything you said are things that I would——

Mr. ROGERS. Could you speak up?

Secretary MODLY. Sorry. Thank you for that prelude to that, because I think everything you said is something that I would echo.

It has profound implications for us as an integrated naval force because of their aggressiveness in South China Sea and other parts of the world. It requires us to think differently about the type of force structure we are going to have to be able to counter those threats. I just read an article the other day where the Chinese consider themselves a near Arctic power as well, in addition to the South China Sea. And they are being very aggressive everywhere.

I will say that what it is doing for us is it is helping us rethink how we might want to build a naval force, what we need to invest in, what those ships might look like, what presence means, how do we counter them, and in an area where it is predominantly dominated by water, as you look at the Pacific region.

And so it is there but it is also in other parts of the world where they are very, very aggressive. So we have to think about not just building a force that can fight them there, if we need to, or protect our forces or our trade in that area but also globally.

And so, from my perspective, that means we have to build a much more agile Navy, a Navy that is far less concentrated on a small number of platforms to one that is more distributed. And that feeds in very much to the strategies that the Commandant and the CNO are working on.

Mr. ROGERS. It seems like I recollect another time when a military power in the East decided to run the U.S. Navy out of the region and we had a little war. Do you see any parallels?

Secretary MODLY. Well, sir, there are some parallels, but I think our job really, in trying to build this Navy and as a Nation, is to avoid that from happening. We want to deter that from happening. We want to complicate their thinking about how difficult that might be for them to do.

But we have to remain vigilant, because they have a long-term vision. And we need to sort of match that long-term vision with some very creative thinking, I believe, and persistence to maintain
the industrial base that we have to have to be able to counter this
and to be able to adapt as the conditions change over time.

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral, General, do you care to comment?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, when you spoke, I thought about two
things.

One is, all the things you outline indicated that China has the
capability now to challenge us, and that capability is growing.

And you mentioned the South China Sea, and I think about in-
tent. And so, when you think about capability and intent—and,
right now, as you mentioned, much of their behavior in the South
China Sea is very provocative and very disruptive in a sea lane
that handles some $3 trillion of trade a year, so very disruptive.
That is only growing, with their One Belt, One Road initiative, as
you see that extend across Asia and into Europe.

And so the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps's global presence
is very important to challenge them. And so you see that on a day-
to-day, week-to-week basis, where Admiral Davidson uses naval
forces to conduct transit in the Strait of Taiwan—major exercises.
The Navy and Marine Corps's biggest exercise in a generation will
occur in both the Pacific and the Atlantic in just a couple of months
to send a message to China, in particular, that we have capability
and that we have intent to respond if challenged as well.

So, to the Secretary's points about the need for a larger Navy,
for a more distributed Navy, I think that everything that you stat-
ed is testimony to that argument, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. General.

General BERGER. I have spent about a third of my career in the
Pacific, and I still have a lot to learn about the Chinese.

Their approach—I think there are parallels to draw, some les-
ssons to learn, sir, but their approach is very different. They would
like to accomplish their goals without ever firing a shot. And we
need to understand that. In other words, their goals are everything
that you laid out, but their approach, it is very different. They will
buy or coerce their way right into the neighborhood.

Hence the importance of partners and allies and the U.S. mili-
tary and our whole-of-government approach. We have got to be the
best partner out there. Because the moment you leave a room, they
will be in that room, convincing a country that they are a better
partner than the U.S. is.

Lastly, it probably goes without saying, but they have watched
us, they are gone to school on us, they are learning from us, they
are mimicking us. They form geographic combatant commands like
us. They are copying us, in other words, to catch up to us faster.
That and stealing our technology. Combine the two, they are mov-
ing pretty fast. We should not understate that.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, gentlemen.

I yield.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Ruppersberger.

EDUCATION FOR SEAPOWER STRATEGY

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you for your service.

To begin with, I do want to acknowledge Ranking Member Cal-
vert's issue on ISR. We have to stay focused on present and future
there. I realize budgeting is about priorities, so that is what we
have to do here too. So I really think we have to keep our eye on the ball there.

I want to get into the—just this last week, the Navy released an Education for Seapower Strategy. And the naval university system consists of five learning institutions. They have a War College, the Marine Corps University, Naval Postgraduate School, United States Naval Academy, and the new United States Naval Community College.

The key focus of this system will be ensuring that each component fills a complementary role within the learning consortium and integrates fully with others in the system as appropriate and avoids, which is important, duplication of effort.

Now, I am vice chair of the board of the visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy. And I really do acknowledge that guy was really good there, Mr. Womack.

Now, getting back to the institution, in my opinion, the Naval Academy rivals any other in the country, including our Ivy League schools. With the Naval Academy’s—and I am also vice chair of the board there, so I focus a lot at the Naval Academy.

With the Naval Academy’s shift in focus over the last few years towards demands of the future, like cyber—and that new building is really tremendous, and it is going to make a big difference, I think, the cybersecurity building—can you talk about the role the Naval Academy plays now in the naval university system, this new system, and how that might change under this new strategy that came out last week?

Secretary MODLY. Sir, well, thanks for the question. This is something that I have worked on very hard for the last 2 years, in terms of the Education for Seapower study. We had a study that we launched a couple years ago to just really take a reflective look on our education system and what we are doing.

You have heard a lot today about how the technology gap is closing with our largest adversaries. And so our conclusion was that the one thing that is going to be our enduring competitive advantage is the intellectual ability of our people and their ability to be agile, to move quickly.

The Naval Academy is the cornerstone of a lot of this. It is the entry point for a lot of our military officers when they come into the naval service. And so they have done a really good job over the years.

We need to be able to think about how they become part of a broader educational system, and that is what we are looking at. Because there are a lot of—we had a lot of independent pockets of excellence across this system that were not well-integrated, and so we were not taking advantage of that throughout the process.

So, you know, one of the first steps we took was to fully fund all these institutions. Every year, they would come in, they would submit their budgets, and they would be bill payers for other things.

So we have fully funded the Naval Academy, the War College, the Postgraduate School, the Marine Corps University, and we are standing up this Naval Community College as a way to leverage all the expertise that we have and give our students, particularly our midshipmen, an opportunity to perhaps leverage expertise at
the War College or at the Postgraduate School or work on graduate programs while they are still at the Naval Academy. So I see this as all positive. And the level of investment is really not that large, given the size of the institution.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Not at all.

Secretary MODLY. So it is a tremendous investment for the future of the force, and so we are getting after this very, very seriously.

NAVAL ACADEMY

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do we have anybody in this room that attended the Naval Academy?

Oh, okay.

The other thing I want to talk about, which is—now we are on the Naval Academy. There has been so much deferred maintenance there that they have real problems. I visited Bancroft Hall maybe about 4 or 5 months ago, and we need some real focus and work. The deferred maintenance has got to stop. And I am using this forum right now to say, we really need to look at that. And I would ask that you meet with the new superintendent to make sure we start focusing.

Again, the new cyber building is fantastic, but we also have issues of the water, the flooding. You know, there are so many things that need to be looked at there. I am not sure about West Point or Air Force, but I can tell you, the Naval Academy needs work in maintenance and infrastructure. So if you could work with me and my staff on that, I really want to make sure we stay on that.

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir. Admiral Buck and I are classmates, and so we have been talking about this since he got there. And that is part of the reason—a lot of the funding that is coming in this year is to, A, start looking at the broad, long-term infrastructure plan there, do some planning around that. MacDonough Hall, I am sure you have been——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes.

Secretary MODLY [continuing]. In there. They have serious problems——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And the water levels keep rising too, so——

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER [continuing]. We have to deal with that long-term too.

Okay. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. McCollum.

SHIPBUILDING

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, everybody has been thanking you for your service, but we really mean it, so thank you once again.

I would like to ask about the Navy’s shipbuilding and the plan to grow the fleet to 355 ships by the early 2030s.

The Navy has yet to submit the fiscal year 2021 30-year shipbuilding plan, and it is reported that Secretary Esper has not signed off on the plan asking the Navy to review it.
At the same time, the Navy submitted its fiscal year 2021 budget request and proposes a $4 billion reduction in the shipbuilding account from fiscal year 2021, a reduction to two ships.

Gentlemen, I have three questions, and I will just put them out there: Why the steep reduction in the shipbuilding budget for fiscal year 2021? And when can we expect the Navy’s shipbuilding plan?

Are you concerned that the shipbuilding industrial base may be impacted by this reduction, and what manufacturing areas will be most impacted?

And, additionally, there have been cost overruns—Admiral, you spoke to them at a submarine meeting I was at—and delays on the number of ships and subs. So are you concerned that the industrial base does not currently have the capacity to handle the growing fleet to 355 ships?

And then, in some of that, as you were talking about dry docking and climate change and everything else, you mentioned the public plan for the public shipbuilding facilities, but we also have private facilities that are undergoing the same stress.

So those are my questions, gentlemen. Thank you.

Secretary MODLY. I will start, ma’am, if that is okay, and just give you some of my thoughts on this.

With respect to the shipbuilding plan, it is an unfortunate confluence of timing. As the Commandant mentioned, he and the CNO sat down around the September timeframe to look at an integrated naval force structure assessment that would then inform our shipbuilding plans going forward.

All the shipbuilding plans for the last 4 years have been based on a 2016 assessment. That 355 was the tag line for that in terms of the total number of ships. We asked them to relook at that, to look at it together, given the changes in the Defense Strategy, the strategic context. And they were working that overtime.

That was delivered to me in the latter part of January. Our budget submission for 2021 was basically already completed.

We were going to release a 30-year shipbuilding plan that coincides with the 2021 budget that would have been informed by some of this new information but not entirely all this new information, and the Secretary of Defense was just not comfortable at that point in time, having not had a chance to review it all. So he has asked us to take a little more time to walk it through with him and the Deputy Secretary so he understands it better.

So that is where we are with that. We will get a 30-year shipbuilding plan over here within the next couple months, I would say. That is the plan, at any rate.

The integrated force structure assessment that—I see a lot of questions, but the Secretary of Defense is—this is his call, and he has told us that he wants a couple of months to look at that first. So that is what we are moving out on, to inform him so he understands it better.

With respect to what this new shipbuilding plan might look like and what information will be in there, as part of this new force structure assessment, there are several categories of ships that did not exist or were not contemplated in the 2016 assessment: a new amphib, a new smaller amphib to support what the Commandant is talking about; new combat support vessels as well; unmanned
systems; the new frigate. All these are new ships that don’t exist right now. We are going to award the frigate this year. But those will then inform future plans.

So we really see, as we talk about this inflection point on the shipbuilding plan and the strategy, you are going to see that much more in the fiscal year 2022. And we want to develop that in consultation with the Congress as well—we understand this is not something we just do inside the halls of the Pentagon—as well as with industry.

So do I have concerns about industry’s ability to deliver? Not really. I think they can deliver based on the plan we have right now. I think that there are some concerns about how this year, the fiscal year 2021 budget might impact them, but I think, over the long term, the plan that we are going to submit will create a lot of opportunities for shipbuilding and the industrial base beyond our existing set of competitors in that space, because what we are asking for is a lot more innovation, different platforms, et cetera.

And I can ask the CNO or the Commandant to comment on that as well. But that is where we are with the shipbuilding plan.

Admiral Gilday. Ma’am, to give you some insights on what we did with the $5 billion that we removed from procurement since last year—and this submission reflects that cut, which ends up being fewer ships in terms of procurement.

So that $5 billion—as I spoke to in my opening statement, we really want to make sure that we have a ready, capable, lethal fleet rather than a bigger fleet that is less ready, less lethal, less capable.

And so, in that $5 billion, $3.5 billion goes to manpower and training. So, for years, we have had gaps for sailors, billets at sea that have gone unfilled. We need to make those ships whole again and keep them fully manned. And we learned lessons from that over the past few years in ways that were very, very painful.

The same thing with maintenance and modernization. We have taken $2 billion of that $5 billion and put it in maintenance and modernization. So we deferred maintenance for a long time between 2010 and 2020, and we are now catching up, including modernizing our ships as well.

We are fully funding training, our steaming days for ships, our flying hours for our pilots. We are funding ordnance, as we talked about this morning, in terms of Tomahawk and other long-range weapons, and spare parts as well.

So we are trying to make sure that our fleet is whole. And, you know, if we had more top line, we would put it to additional ships.

Ms. McCollum. Well, why didn’t you—I mean, you are cutting two ships. I understand that you are putting the money to good use, but why didn’t you just ask for the training money and the money that you just described that you have technically reprogrammed?

Admiral Gilday. So they were difficult decisions that we had to come to grips with. Do we continue to underfund those critical accounts? And I go right back to: Sailors are the most important things. And so we should be putting them on ships that are maintained well, that are——

Ms. McCollum. I don’t disagree with——
Admiral GILDAY. I don’t mean to evade your question. Maybe——
Ms. MCCOLLUM. No, and I don’t think you are.
Admiral GILDAY [continuing]. I don’t understand it.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. But by doing a reduction this way, rather than
billing it into the base that you ask us for, then we are not having
the conversation that the money needs to be appropriated in those
accounts in order for you to continue your goals. Because these
aren’t one-time things you are talking about doing, correct?
Admiral GILDAY. Correct. That is correct.
And so, to amplify what the Secretary said, as the Navy grows,
we want to make sure it is whole as well. And some of the pressur-
ization that we have right now in the shipbuilding account includes
the fact that 20 percent of our shipbuilding account right now is
dedicated to the Columbia seaborne nuclear deterrent, and that
will creep to more than 30 percent of our shipbuilding budget in
fiscal year 2026 to 2030.
The fact that we are investing in our shipyards, the fact that we
are closing these gaps with respect to ordnance and spare parts
that we can no longer ignore—and so those are the additional pres-
sures, ma’am, that we have on the top line that we are operating
under.
Mr. CALVERT. If the gentlelady would yield on that point?
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Yes.
Mr. CALVERT. Because I think you are bringing up an extremely
important issue here.
Because this budget doesn’t sustain the 2016 force structure as-
essment goal of 355 ships by 2030, let alone a plan that calls for
more ships. So, you know, I think we are dangerously—we are
down a path that we are never going to meet the goals that you
have been outlining, from my perspective.
And so I just wanted to bring that point up.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Crist.
Mr. Crist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you for being here. I appreciate your presence and your service to our country.

Admiral Gilday, if I could begin with you, in January of 2019, the Department of Defense completed their report on the impacts of climate change on the military installations. The report found that 18 Navy installations are at risk, 16 of which are currently at risk of flooding. This report did not look at foreign installations, so you would have to imagine that the actual worldwide number is higher than 16.

Can you talk about the problem of rising sea levels that are causing the Navy—and what you are doing to address climate change in general, please, sir?

Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. It is a significant concern, obviously, because we own so much waterfront property.

Mr. Crist. Right.

Admiral Gilday. And so what we are doing with the military construction projects that we have at our bases, we have to take into account at least a 2- to 3-foot buffer above the current level in order to accommodate, you know, that rising tide, which is measured—the thickness is about a nickel a year, anywhere from a nickel to three nickels a year, in terms of the rise of that water.

So, as we are slowly investing in more infrastructure and getting our bases up to par, I will tell you that we are taking that into account as part of our long-term strategic plan. But it is—

Mr. Crist. Yes, sir.

Admiral Gilday. But it is factored into our MILCON projects.

Mr. Crist. Well, thank you.

My second and last question may seem on the lighter side. It is, but it really isn’t. I saw a movie recently, a new one, called “Midway.” And I don’t know if any of the three of you have seen it yet. Have you?

Mr. Secretary, you saw it.

The reason I raise it, it impacted me. I have seen it now twice in, like, a week and found it so compelling, and the admiration you have after—you saw it, so you know what I am talking about.

My only question is—and it seemed very factual to me, especially at the end, with the documentation of what each of the individuals who were highlighted in the film, with their credentialing. And, to your knowledge—you are the Secretary of the Navy—is it factual, from what you know?

Please.

Secretary Modly. I believe the film—that we worked with them on the development of that film in terms of—

Mr. Crist. You did?

Secretary Modly. Yes. So most of those were historically based facts. In fact, we were invited to the premiere of that here at the——

Mr. Crist. Did you go?

Secretary Modly. Yes, I did.

Mr. Crist. Was that here?

Secretary Modly. It was here. It was at the Navy Memorial.
Mr. CRIST. That is wonderful. Where are you from, sir?
Secretary MODLY. I grew up in Cleveland, Ohio.
Mr. CRIST. Are you a Browns fan?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, I am afflicted with that.
Mr. CRIST. Say it again, I am sorry?
Secretary MODLY. I am afflicted with that. But it is a good affliction to have.
Mr. CRIST. Things will get better, don't worry. I am a Tampa Bay Bucs fan. They will get better too.
Secretary MODLY. Thank you.
Mr. CRIST. Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Aguilar.

Columbia Class Submarine

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know how to follow up the Browns questions. I am going to give it a shot.

Mr. Secretary, the lead Columbia-class sub has a very lean schedule to deliver the fleet simultaneously with decommissioning of the first Ohio-class submarine. What is the Navy and the industry doing to de-risk the programs and to ensure timely delivery?

Secretary MODLY. Sir, thanks for the question. I will hit some of the highlights of that, and I will ask Admiral Gilday to maybe add some more specific color to that.

You are correct, the schedule for this is very tight right now. We don’t have a lot of margin left in the schedule. And that is one of the reasons why that is our top priority in terms of our funding. We had to make sure that that submarine was funded and they were putting enough attention to it over time.

But there are lots of—this sort of goes back to the question about the industrial base. Decisions that are made in the industrial base—for example, the decision last year to buy the two carriers at once, that has implications for the industrial supply base that also supports the Columbia, because a lot of the same companies have to be around and viable to deliver the Columbia. That is because it is a very, very specialized set of equipment. The nuclear reactors, some of the other technologies that go in them are shared across this industrial base for these specific types of submarines.

So, when we make decisions, when we make budget decisions, we have to understand the second- and third-order effects. And that is one of the reasons why it is really important, particularly on these large capital projects, that we really think hard about them before we make decisions that could cause perturbations in the supply chain, et cetera, going forward.

But we are spending a lot of time to ensure that the schedule for the Columbia is tracking properly, and we can’t afford to have a slip-up there at all.

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, thank you. And if I could just add a couple of things to underscore what the Secretary said.

So it is the Navy’s number-one acquisition program because of the schedule that you mentioned.

Number two, we are fully funding the first hull. When we begin construction of that hull this fall, 83 percent of the design will be complete. And so that may not seem impressive, but if I compare it to Virginia-class submarines we are building now, only 43 per-
cent of the design was done when we began those submarines. If I go back to the 1980s when we built Ohio, the previous nuclear deterrent, 2 percent of the design was done when we began building.

So we are working very closely with Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls to ensure that we are setting ourselves up for success here right from the beginning. So the ability to be 83 percent done with design gives us the ability to better predict, you know, the parts that we are going to need, the steel that we are going to need.

And they do that work both in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and also down in Newport News, Virginia, and then, finally, up at Electric Boat. I was up at Electric Boat the week before last, and they are building a facility at Electric Boat so that they can build the Columbia-class submarine inside one building, so instead of moving pieces around a shipyard or doing work in different areas, everything is done right in that one building. It is going to be really impressive.

And, lastly, based on everything else I said, just the predictability for those companies to be able to keep sighted on what workforce requirements they are going to have over the next 10 years is really important. So that is another reason why we have to be, as you said, really focused on the schedule.

Mr. AGUILAR. Admiral, are there production delays on certain components that are impacting the schedule?

Admiral GILDAY. Not that I am aware of, sir. But I will get back to you—I will ask that question and get back to you.

Mr. AGUILAR. Okay. Missile tube production or anything like that?

Admiral GILDAY. So we just delivered missile tubes to the U.K., and my understanding is we had some initial issues but we are in a good spot right now, that Electric Boat is in a good spot.

Mr. AGUILAR. Okay.

Mr. Secretary, same?

Secretary MODLY. There was a welding problem on some of the initial tubes that were manufacturer’s, but they have corrected those.

CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE

Mr. AGUILAR. Okay. I appreciate it.

Just one more, Mr. Secretary. The entire Department has rightly focused on the resources for emerging technologies. One of the line items that caught our attention was the Conventional Prompt Strike, which has grown from $11 million in fiscal year 2019 to $1 billion in this year’s budget request.

Usually, this is the point in the hearing at which Mr. Ruppersberger asks questions about hypersonics. But can you explain to the committee how this increase for the CPS program is justified over this short period of time, but also, specifically, how you are working with the other services for this and making sure that there aren’t a duplication of efforts?

Secretary MODLY. Yes. Thank you for the question.

Conventional Prompt Strike is one of our most important programs right now for the future. We are behind our major adver-
saries in hypersonic weapons right now. And we believe that that funding number is acceptable. Several people were trying to push us to take more than that, but I think we are trying to do this in a very reasonable and measured way.

And we are doing exactly what you said, is we are trying not to duplicate efforts between the services. So, actually, about 2 years ago, Secretary McCarthy and I signed an agreement where the Army, Navy, as well as the Air Force will work together on this. So it is not a joint program office, but it is a cooperating program office, and so that has been going exceedingly well.

And so we are very excited about that program. They are making great progress. And, actually, we would love—if you are interested, we could come and give you a classified briefing on that if you are interested, in terms of how that program is progressing.

Mr. Aguilar. That would be great. Thank you. Appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUALITY OF LIFE AND MILITARY HOUSING

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

The first question I have deals with quality of life. And I assume, Mr. Secretary, it would be directed to you.

Ms. McCollum, Mr. Calvert, and I were recently in Key West for a number of meetings, and one of the things, when we asked about quality of life, housing came up, and there is a backlog of requests. Key West, very expensive place. Our understanding in conversations, there is a height limitation, so there is no growth. Everybody rents their place out for Airbnb.

And we are going back to the airport, and there is this large swath of land that is vacant. And someone pointed out to us that the United States Navy used to own it but in 2013 they sold it. Now, that was 7 years ago, but my sense was housing values and backlog for military housing was probably acute 7 years ago in Key West.

One, who makes a decision to dispose of property like that when you have a backlog for people who are working in the military who need housing that is affordable?

And if we asked the question and went around to other bases and facilities the Navy has, are we going to get the same response of, “Well, yeah, we sold that,” and now we have a backlog on possible areas for housing?

Secretary Modly. Sir——

Mr. Visclosky. Who makes——

Secretary Modly. Sir, I don’t know who made that specific decision. Those are decisions that would make their way up through the Secretariat. I assume it happened several years ago, before I was here.

We talked about this when I was in your office, and I am investigating that. And I am actually going down to Key West in about a week or so to talk to them about what the situation is.

My understanding was that that was an area that had housing on it that had to be condemned for a variety of different reasons. And so then they decided to—I am not sure if they sold it. I need to find out the true facts on that, and I will get back to you on it, sir.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. And the reason I bring it up is not so much to relive the past. You can’t get the property back. I mean, you could, but you are going to pay a lot more money for it. My understanding is there was property disposed of also near the Navy Yard some years ago. And we all realize what southeast Washington looked like along the waterfront, and now you would have to repay a gazillion dollars to get that property back for the United States Navy.

So, looking forward, I guess my point would be I hope that never happens again. And I am not the most prescient person, but for some of these disposals where there is backlog on housing, you are in expensive housing markets, I would appreciate you getting back to the committee as to who is making these decisions and what are the safeguards in place so that greater care is made in April of this year, the next time that decision has to be made.

We can’t relive the past, but it seems like there are sequentially bad decisions being made on properties that could be used effectively to control costs for military families.

Secretary MODLY. I don’t disagree with you, sir, and I will look into that. My assumption is it is either the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Environment who has the authority to do that, but I am pretty certain it would go all the way to the Secretary of the Navy for approval.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If you could, again, look into this——

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY [continuing]. So that it doesn’t happen again.

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. That is all we are looking for.

Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.

CHILDCARE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The second thing, quality of life—and, again, I do want to thank the Navy. When I became chair—and I have been on this subcommittee since 1993. Our executive assistant said I was the seventh chair. I am under no illusions that we come and go.

My goal last year was try to fix one thing out of that $700 billion budget at the Department of Defense for quality of life, and it was childcare. I appreciate the Navy heard the message. The fact is, my understanding is the wait list is currently 3,700, which is unacceptable but much better than 7,700 when we had this conversation a year ago.

I also appreciate that you have increased your request—money is not everything, but money is part of this issue—your request for the year going forward.

I guess, again, in a positive light, for the other services, if there are lessons to be learned, what happened, and how did you approach that? To what do you attribute that success in the reduction in the wait list for daycare?

Secretary MODLY. Well, I think about a year or so ago or maybe—right now, I think we are about 9,000. The demand is—we have 45,000 daycare slots across the Navy, and that is about 9,000 short of what we need. So, in this budget, I think we are adding another 5,000 to try and close that gap.
I am not sure what we did, other than apply the resources to it and taking it seriously. So I am not sure what other lessons—I don't think it is a complicated lesson, in terms of what can be imparted to the other services. But I don't know their specific situations.

I don't know if Mike has any observations.

Admiral GILDAY. Thanks, sir.

If I could just add a couple.

One of the things we are doing, in lieu of seeking additional MILCON, is we are doing pilot projects right now with some locations. And I will give you a couple of examples.

In Coronado, California, they have an elementary school that is excess capacity and they don't need. So we are going to lease that space and turn it into a childcare facility.

We are also working in some places with industry, with large companies, where they would actually build the facility and then we would lease some of the space back.

As you know, we have many spouses that work in our childcare facilities, and so that is a plus as well. And we try to pay them above what industry typically pays—not a lot, but we are above the national average. And so we would hopefully find more job opportunities for our spouses, as well, in those facilities.

But we would like to come back to the committee and give you a report on how the pilot projects work and whether or not we are able to look at additional opportunities based on that.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And appreciating, positively, that you mentioned the pay issue. Again, visiting a facility, one of the observations of ours was that the pay for daycare workers was the same as a cashier.

Now, let me tell you, I am from Gary; I want the cashier to make more money. But, also, you have somebody dealing with a person's child, a human being. We ought to pay them what we want for that quality daycare.

And we are told, well, we are limited on what we can pay. And we had asked several different services and individuals, where is the law or the regulation that says I can't? And in one case, they said, well, it kind of depends on what we are getting from the commissary too, like we are having a bake sale here.

So I appreciate, again, positively, you said, no, we know we have to pay more. Because I am deadly serious that I think one of greatest recruiting tools—let alone how you treat people, civilian and military, you couldn't find anyplace in this country with better daycare for your children. Now, that is what we ought to subscribe to.

So I appreciate your, at least implicit, there is not a pay issue here if we are determined to hire people and pay them what they deserve.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. And our turnover rate of people is about 10 percent lower than industry. So we are turning over at about 25 percent a year; industry is at about 38 percent. And so we trying to remain competitive.

The other thing we have done for our spouses is we have instituted a program where, if they need to get a new license when they move to a different State, we will pay for that.
And now we have a MyNavy Family app, and they can do that on the—they can set up childcare on the app. They can set up their housing on the app. They can read orders that spouses understand on that app as well. And so we are trying to make it easier for people.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Good. Good.

General, if I could have the same conversation with you, and it is just not going to be as happy. My understanding is that the wait list for the United States Marines in fiscal year 2019 was 783, and the estimated wait list for 2021—and it is an estimate—is 783.

I would also point out that we plussed up the Marine Corps budget about $18 million last year for daycare. The fact is, in your budget, you asked for almost a $2.6 million cut from 2019 levels and a significant cut for the investment we made to take care of childcare.

Could you explain that budget submission to us?

General BERGER. Sir, I called down this morning to Camp Lejeune to find out, today, to answer your point, what is the picture today. Because we have been stationed on both coasts multiple times and we have kids.

The wait list down there is 30 days. Needs to be better, but 30 days? Okay. Longer for DOD employees than it is for uniformed servicemembers, but for uniformed servicemembers, 30 days.

So the next question I asked was, okay, where is the chokepoint, where is the biggest bulge? And it is age 2 to 3, 4 years. That is where the biggest bubble is.

What are the challenges in hiring? And as the CNO said, licensure comes up pretty quickly, reciprocity between States, which this committee and the Department is working hard to bang out with the Governors, because that is—when our spouses move, and they are part of the labor pool, if it takes them 3 months to get relicensed in another State, that is a problem.

We have made big adjustments in flexibility of hours. That has made a huge impact. Because it was rigid before, you know, 6:00 to 6:00 and that is it. But units don’t operate, of course, 6:00 to 6:00. So you have to be—base to base, installation to installation, you have to be a lot more flexible than they have been.

Lastly, the whole Department of the Navy has gone online with applying for childcare, which you couldn’t—you had to show up in person before with your application when you got to the base and then join a wait list. Now you can do it before you ever move. You can apply and be accepted even before you leave your previous duty station.

Changes that have to happen if we are going to be providing, like you point out—and we need to—the world-class childcare that we should be providing.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Well, you pointed out another issue you have to deal with. That is, essentially, people work shift work. And, again, we are all very familiar with that concept.

But you didn’t really answer my question. How are you going to do that backlog if you are asking for less money than you had 2 years ago?

General BERGER. Part of the money is labor, and part of the money, of course, is MILCON and the infrastructure around it. We
think, right now, if—and we will need to check the rest of the, you know, places around the globe. But a 30-day wait and a 700-person backlog, what does it cost to drive that down even further? And I would be happy to get back with you. I can't answer that today.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. We want to work with you. And we are going to be putting the bill together here; in about the next 30 days, we are going to start. And you just have to—I just want to solve this problem.

And we are never going to go have a zero wait list, but I have told other people, when my 33-year-old son was born—I am a Member of Congress; his mom at the time was a Harvard law grad—it took us 9 months to find daycare. We had control of everything in our life. If I am a newly enlisted personnel, I am moving my family, I am desperate for daycare, I am going to be deployed, I can't imagine the stress on that family.

So I am absolutely deadly serious about solving this and want to work with you. But, again, in the next 30 days, really, if you can communicate with us, we have to—whoever is sitting here next year, I don't want 783 people on that list.

General BERGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Ryan?

Yes, I am looking to my left and my right.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. And we agree.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One of them.

Ms. McCOLLUM. We both agree.

SECURE LVC AIR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT (SLATE)

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Modly, thank you for being here, a fellow Ohioan and, I heard through the grapevine, a fellow Cleveland Browns fan. We can do joint therapy together. But we are excited about this year.

Thank you for being here. Thank you for your service.

I have kind of a long question that I want to ask, but I think it is relatively important because it speaks to, kind of, a broader approach that I think we need to have.

In your testimony, you mentioned live, virtual, constructive training. And the Navy has identified extensive shortfalls in current air combat, not the ships, but the air combat training requirements, highlighting the need for both encryption and advanced live, virtual, constructive capability in naval aviation air combat training.

And my staff and I have heard from aviators flying fourth- and especially fifth-generation fighters who say the current training ranges are woefully inadequate to put these planes and these aviators through the paces.

If we want aviators to train as they fight, we need to train them against the full range of threats, including against peer adversaries who are fielding state-of-the-art air defense systems and planes that approach our own in terms of performance.

And since our adversaries are not likely to lend us dozens of actual S–400 missile defense systems or provide us with foreign pilots flying foreign planes, the next best thing is to simulate those entities. And in an era of distributed, all-domain operations, uti-
lizing synthetic training environments is absolutely crucial, which I know you agree with.

Unfortunately, my understanding is that the Navy is proceeding down a path that would invest nearly a billion dollars to purchase a new training system for Navy fighters that does not have a requirement for LVC capabilities and could not handle adding those capabilities later without another a billion dollars later on to add new hardware.

And instead of leaping ahead, it looks like the Navy is doubling down, at great expense, on technologies that won’t provide the LVC capabilities Navy aviators and even Navy leaders claim that they need.

And, even worse, I understand the Navy’s next training system may not be fully fielded until 2050. That is a hell of a long time to be investing in yesterday’s technology.

So here is the kicker: The Air Force and the Navy have already flown and tested a system known as SLATE, the Secure LVC Air Training Environment, that has full live, virtual, constructive capabilities right now, today. And it is at technology readiness level 7, compared to the system the Navy is investing in, which is only at TRL 3.

The reason SLATE is farther along is because this subcommittee, at my urging, after hearing from pilots and aviators, provided funding for SLATE several years in a row, and it has paid off. SLATE exceeded expectations when it was tested on Air Force F–15Es and Naval F–18s in training exercises at Nellis.

Here is what the lead researcher was quoted in the press as saying after the test was conducted. He said, “We are not supposed to say that it was a very successful technology demonstration. That is supposed to come from our senior leaders. But it was a very successful technology demonstration. It was beyond our wildest hopes.”

And when Naval Air System Command completed a technology review board in May 2019, the SLATE program was named as the most mature, lowest-risk approach to delivering advanced LVC capability to the fleet.

And so I want to ask you, why is the Navy not investing into SLATE? And why is the subcommittee being asked to fund a program known as Tactical Combat Training System Increment II that doesn’t give naval aviators the full capability they need and won’t be fully fielded until 2050?

Secretary MODLY. Sir, so thanks for that information. And most of those details I am going to have to go back and check on because I don’t know the details of the program. However, from a high level, what you are describing, in terms of what that capability is, is exactly what we need.

So I will have to go do some investigating and get back to you in terms of what exactly happened with those two technologies and what we are doing. But this is absolutely critical to the future and the way we are going to train our pilots, so it concerns me that we made an option for something that is not going to do that. But I will have to go investigate and find out for you.

Mr. RYAN. Yeah. I would appreciate it. Like the chairman said, I mean, we only have a few weeks as we are moving forward here
to construct this bill, and there are a lot of competing interests. And, you know, we know what the National Defense Strategy has kind of told us, the major—which I think is an amazing document and a great blueprint, and everyone who had their fingerprints on it should be commended. But these are the kinds of things that drive us crazy, you know, when you are thinking a billion dollars isn’t going to get us to where we need to go or where we need to be. And we have the opportunity and the technology that seems like it is in place and ready to be scaled up.

And, you know, that is what the taxpayer wants from us. And, you know, I know you are a good Ohio kid, so you are going to understand this. And I appreciate your service, and I want to say thank you. But, please, with your team behind you—you know, we know how important our staffs are to us—please let us know in the course of how we can maybe rectify this problem.

Mr. CALVERT. Yeah, I share the gentleman’s concern on that very subject.

Mr. RYAN. I appreciate that. See? They say people don’t get along in Washington, D.C., and we do, don’t we?

Mr. CALVERT. Absolutely.

Mr. RYAN. All right.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert.

MIX OF SHIPS AND PLATFORMS

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you.

One thing that concerns me, as we go through this—and, obviously, I don’t think there is any disagreement that we have that we need more ships and we need more platforms. And, you know, we are going to have this argument, how we are going to get there. We have to grow the top line. Well, you know, unfortunately, as an appropriator, you have to deal with reality. Defense discretionary spending is shrinking, not expanding. And the same thing with nondefense discretionary spending.

And so, as we go down the appropriation line, we have to make some realistic decisions here. Because where we are at, where we are going here, this discussion about it, we are not going to a 355-ship Navy. So we have to look—but we need more platforms, we need more ships. So maybe we ought to start looking at the mix of ships we have in some serious discussions.

You know, one of your colleagues in the Army told me, well, you know, when you start making 50-year decisions on aircraft carriers, what is the survivability of an aircraft carrier? I am sure you don’t want to hear that, from the Navy’s perspective, but those are questions we have to ask. Because, as you know, $13 billion for an aircraft carrier buys a lot of ships.

And you are talking about—when the Marine Corps, for instance, is talking about smaller carriers, maybe have multiple use, be able to use those as amphibious carriers, small carriers, another kind of mix of ships to get more platforms out there, that is something we need to talk about. Because, you know, I have had a number of discussions about these various subjects but in a different setting.

But I am concerned about that, because we need more platforms. And I don’t see a path forward here from what you are laying out in your budget. I just don’t see it. Tell me I am wrong.
Secretary Modly. Well, sir, you don’t see it in the 2021 budget.
I will admit that.

Mr. Calvert. Do I ever see it?

Secretary Modly. So——

Mr. Calvert. Do I ever see it?

Secretary Modly. Well, that is my job, is to present a plan that can get us there within a reasonable timeframe. And that is what I am working on right now with the Secretary of Defense, to come up with that plan.

And as you mentioned, driving to a 355-ship fleet or more—which I believe it has to be more—is going to require a different mix than we had in the 2016 force structure assessment. Whatever that number is, it is a 30- to 40-percent bigger fleet than we had 3 or 4 years ago.

There is no realistic way that you can assume we are going to have a 30- or 40-percent higher top line to maintain that fleet. It is just not realistic. So how do we bring it in? How do we bring that number down? How do we change the mix? How do we take the average cost of our ship and take it down?

But it is less important about what the number is than it is what the capabilities are that that mix delivers at the end of the day. And that is what we are working on. I think——

Mr. Calvert. Well, I would caution, numbers do matter. Now, you have force multiplication, obviously, with our allies, whether the Japanese or the Australians or whatever. That delivers more platforms. But at the end of the day, numbers matter. I mean, that South China Sea is a lot of territory. I have been to—you know, that is—so we need——

Secretary Modly. Well, I agree with that. My point is that the debate right now within the halls of the Pentagon is not a debate between having 200 or 350. It is more like, is it 355 or 380, or 370 and 390? So that——

Mr. Calvert. So how do you get there with the top line you have?

Secretary Modly. So one of the things you have to do is you have to drive down the average cost per ship in that new mix. The $13 billion carrier, hopefully that is the last $13 billion carrier we buy. Does that mean that the next Ford class is going to be—it is going to come in less than 13, because we are learning a lot on the first one and they are going to be cheaper as we go forward on those.

Right now we have four in the budget, or we have four that are under contract. We have now a window of time, 6 to 7 years, to think about what that next carrier is after that.

Mr. Calvert. And don’t get me wrong. I love aircraft carriers. I would like to see us, you know—but, at the same time, you know, we have to defend them. And if we are going to build them, we have to have the money to build them with.

And now I am going to get to the second part of this thing, which is, if we are going to find the money to build the ships, including the aircraft carriers, we need reform within the Pentagon. And I keep harping on this subject. You guys all know what I am harping about, is that you have the highest number of civilian employees in the history of the Pentagon, relative to uniformed forces.
If you get back to the historic ratios of the Pentagon, according to The Business Council, you save $125 billion over 5 years. That would pay for the aircraft carriers, that would pay for your 355-ship Navy plus, and we would be on our way. Plus, it takes care of our procurement issues with the Air Force, the Army.

We need reforms within the operations within the Pentagon. I have mentioned this to the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary. Because, in my perspective, under the real budget reality that we are dealing with, you are not going to see growing defense budgets like I think some people believe is going to happen. Realistically, I just don't see it. So we have to get realistic about finding dollars within that operation we can put into procurement in a more efficient operation.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. Kaptur.

MENTAL HEALTHCARE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for being late. I had my own hearings this morning.

We thank you very much for your service to our country.

I wanted to ask two questions. One deals with those under your command. What can be done to help ensure better access to mental healthcare and maintaining a continuum of care for those in the Navy and those transitioning out of the military?

We understand that—at least, the information I have indicates that recent reports show that military treatment facilities will eventually only service Active Duty servicemembers, causing an increase in the use of civilian and VA medical facilities and resources, and will place an even heavier reliance on the Department of Veterans Affairs in this arena where we are so short of individuals who can perform these services, both as doctors and as advanced practice nurses.

I think the Navy may have a special responsibility in this arena. And I am just wondering if you could explain to me, what are you doing to help us better diagnose and treat individuals who do present with neurological conditions, not just PTSD but other related conditions?

Secretary MODLY. Well, thanks very much for the question, ma'am. It is a very important question for us, as we are finding that not just PTSD but all kinds of other mental health issues that our sailors and Marines experience, as well as their families.

One of my jobs is to sign condolence letters to the families of sailors and Marines who have lost their lives. And I am finding that, as I am signing these, 70 percent of them are suicide, a result of suicide. It has become a real problem, a significantly higher rate now than 5 years ago. I think last year we had 72 suicides, Active Duty members, and 5 years prior to that we were at 42.

This is a significant problem for us. We are putting a lot of resources behind it, a lot of attention to it. We are putting mental health professionals on our carriers and some of our larger ships to make sure that sailors and Marines have access to that. But it is a long-term struggle for us to get after this.

And it is not something that is isolated to the military; it is a societal problem. We are finding that our statistics are echoing
what we are seeing in society. For our demographic, we are actually lower than some of the societal rates on suicide.

So we are putting significant resources behind this. We are doing a lot of work not just with our mental health professionals but also with our own people about teaching them how to reach out, having more interpersonal reactions, being able to flag and understand when their shipmates are having struggles, and to get them to help. And it is a long-term thing, and it is something that we are going to be working on for a very long time.

Ms. Kaptur. Well, I will tell you, I think one of the ways we could help is by training of additional support personnel to work in this area, including doctors and advanced practice nurses. I would appreciate your getting back to me for the record on the best ways we might work with you to do that.

TRAINING FOR BEHAVIORAL SPECIALISTS

Ms. Kaptur. I was extremely impressed with the Intrepid Center up at Walter Reed. That is the beginning of a coherent societal response. I was very impressed when we were down with special forces and looking at how behavioral specialists had been embedded in units.

But in order to do that, you have to have the training. And I can guarantee you, when these individuals come home, the ability of our veterans system to respond is not as crisp as it should be. There simply are not the people out there with the proper training.

So I am looking for a proposal that would help us provide the funds to train. I don't quite know how to do that. I talked to the heads of all the service academies when they came before us a couple years ago, and they didn't view their job as training doctors. Well, I am thinking, well, then whose job is it? How do we do this, working with Department of Defense and the Veterans Department?

So I would really welcome your comments. I met the Admiral of the Fifth Fleet, myself, when we were down in Tampa, and a few years later he was dead. And I just feel especially compelled to push you a little bit and ask you to respond to the record on that. All creative ideas welcome.

Can you do that, Mr. Secretary?

CONTROL OF THE BLACK SEA

Ms. Kaptur. My second question is completely different, and that regards the naval presence of the Russians in the Black Sea. Can you give us a sense of your own knowledge of that region of the world and what more we can do, working with NATO, working with you, to counter Russia's control of the Black Sea region and stop her from further advancing in that region, in the sea lanes?

Any comments on that?

Admiral Gilday. So, ma'am, the best thing that we can do in the Black Sea is to be in the Black Sea.

We just had a ship leave the Turkish Straits overnight, the USS Ross, and she actually did a rescue of some Turkish fishing vessel, where the boat was on fire and they rescued the civilian mariners from that vessel. But we are doing multiple patrols in the Black Sea a year.
And so our presence there is really reassuring to countries like Ukraine that we do have a presence and to show the Russians that they don’t control that water space. And so, again, that is routinely an area where General Wolters, the European Command Commander, has us operate, as well as the eastern Mediterranean.

Ms. KAPUR. I think my time may be closing here, but I just wanted to get a sense, do you view that the Russians are sort of in a static position, or do you view the Russian Navy as pushing? Do you feel the edge more, or do you feel some step-back at this point?

Admiral GilDaiY. Definitely feel the edge more. Definitely feel the muscles flexing, with sharp elbows, in that region.

Ms. KAPUR. Thank you very much.

Mr. Visclosky. Ms. McCollum.

ARCTIC TRAINING EXERCISES

Ms. McCollum. I have been doing a little research for my next question here. I am going to ask you about Arctic operations.

The last 2 years, the Navy has had two carriers participate in Arctic training exercises. One involved the USS Harry Truman with NATO, and in 2018 the USS Theodore Roosevelt in the northern edge in Alaska last year. And the Marines have conducted several training exercises with our NATO partners in Norway since 2017.

The Navy is treating the Arctic region with the concern that I believe it warrants, given Russia and China’s increased activities in the region.

And, Mr. Secretary, you are right on; China has been calling itself a near-Arctic nation. But now they have a new tag line, and I wanted to get it right, so I looked it up. They want the Arctic to be part of the “Polar Silk Road.” So they are all in. And we know they have scientific stations in Iceland, built a new embassy in Iceland that is very expansive.

So can you let the committee know—because we are getting more involved in supporting your efforts in the Arctic, but I think a lot of our colleagues here in Congress still don’t think of China, they don’t think of the Arctic, they don’t realize Russia’s vast increase in activity in the Arctic.

Can you tell us some of the hazards of the Arctic and the impacts that you might see naval operations encountering? What kind of damage, for example, might our ships sustain due to ice buildup or sailing in heavy seas? Because the weather can turn—I am from Minnesota. The weather can turn on a dime up there. I think it turns fast here; it turns faster in the Arctic.

What are you learning—I know there has been more cooperation with NATO, even National Guard exchanges with Canada, Denmark, and Norway—about what they do with their ships? Because they are regularly in these heavy conditions.

I won’t even tell—you probably know the number of icebreakers our NATO allies have, how many we don’t have, and how many China is building and looking at even building nuclear.

But the question I would also include the Marines on is: Gear is different. Training is different. You have to train to be everywhere in the world, as Marines, and we thank you for doing that. But
there might be some investments or things we need to look at in either cold-weather research or making sure that supplies and training are available for the Marines, because they could be deployed in some very tough, tough conditions.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Secretary MODLY. Well, I absolutely agree with your conclusion about the challenges that we are going to have there. We are not really used to operating up there, as some of our adversaries might be. The Russians, for sure, are much more capable of operating in those conditions. They have a greater inventory of icebreakers than we have.

And as the climate changes and we are seeing some of that sea ice recede a little bit, it is creating more opportunities for sea lanes for transportation of good and services across the polar regions. So that is more for us to protect. And so that creates a lot of challenges for us.

Also, in terms of their proximity with respect to missile proximity, that they could launch from that area down into North America, creates challenges for us there.

We have a huge asset up in that region, and that is the State of Alaska, where we could use that probably more in terms of areas to train, to place forces, to work collaboratively with our other services.

Actually, the Secretary of Air Force and the Secretary of the Army and I decided just this week that we are going to put together a team to start thinking about that part of world and how we can do things collaboratively so that we can leverage each other in terms of creating greater presence up in that region.

I will ask the CNO to talk specifically about some of the maritime challenges, as well as the Commandant about the challenges in training Marines to function in cold climes.

Admiral GILDAY. So, ma'am, to echo some of the things you said, or to kind of underpin them, the Bering Straits will soon be considered strategic straits just like the Strait of Malacca, just like the Suez, just like the Panama Canal. Particularly with the receding ice cap, it is going to get more competitive up there in terms of natural resources, in terms of sea room to maneuver, in terms of trade routes.

And so we have seen this coming and have increased our exercises up there. The Commandant, I know, is going to speak about the amphibious exercise last fall and one that we are just finishing up right now with the Norwegians.

In the past month, I have met with my Norwegian counterpart and my Canadian counterpart to talk about additional exercises that we can do up north. We are doing ICEX right now in Alaska with two U.S. submarines and one U.K. submarine.

So our drumbeat of exercises up there has been steadily increasing, with much attention by the Secretary of Defense and his staff as well.

General BERGER. Ma'am, those of us who have trained in extreme cold weather would agree with you 100 percent, it is not just colder.

I think—I won't speak for General O'Shaughnessy, because he lays it out really straightforward. There is a homeland defense as-
pect of what you are alluding to, and then there is a keep the maritime commons open.

Ms. McCollum. Right.

General Berger. Two different——

Ms. McCollum. Missions.

General Berger [continuing]. Lenses to look through, both critically important and both, I would offer—and you confirmed, the naval force is key to both, as is the rest of the joint force.

We are going to go where the Navy goes. We need to operate wherever we are sent. It is partly a matter of gear, as you highlight, that is unique to that environment. But it is also a more basic, fundamental level of leadership under extreme conditions that you can’t simulate anywhere else. There are only a handful of places where you can get to that level of small-unit leader leadership where it makes that kind of a difference in that adverse environment.

Alaska and Norway, we do train in both. Great opportunities to train. Alaska, in fact—you get the dual advantage in Alaska of a huge airspace, a huge sea space. You can stretch the muscles of a joint force in Alaska in a way that is difficult to do in most other places.

So, absolutely, yes. We are not going to have a specialized cold-weather force, because, as you point out, we have to be able to operate wherever around the globe. But where the Navy goes we are going to go, and that includes the Arctic.

Ms. McCollum. Well, I would hope that, as ships are being deployed, the maintenance, the stress on the metal, a whole lot of things, needs to be taken into account. And I am sure you are doing that, with working with, you know, engineers and—because equipment is going to change when it is subjected to that kind of cold, and that needs to be worked into a maintenance log.

When I started working, people—Mr. Calvert was very nice to me all the time. He knew I was going to ask about icebreakers for years and years and years.

You know, it is like, “Well, no, we will pay for them. The Coast Guard can pay for them.” Well, the Coast Guard can do some of them, but I think the DOD needs to be stepping up, and we need to have some that are fully at your disposal, equipped in a way to do what you need them to do, and not just rely on Coast Guard, which is also going to have other maritime responsibilities for the commercial shipping that is taking place as well as commercial fishing in there.

So I look forward to working with all the branches of the service but with the Navy and the Marine Corps in particular to make sure that we have the training, we have the equipment, we have the ingenuity, we have the research going on. Because Alaska is either your front yard or your backyard, depending upon how you are facing. And China might want to be near the Arctic, but it is not an Arctic nation. We are. And so we need to take care of our yard.

Thank you.

ICEBREAKERS

Mr. Visclosky. If I could follow up on Ms. McCollum’s question, historically, it has been the Coast Guard for icebreakers. And given
the commentary relative to the Russians and their number of ice-breakers and the opening up of the Arctic, do you foresee—and I know there is no money in the 2021 budget—that that might change and that the Navy might have a role in that?

Admiral GILDAY. So, sir, we did make an investment—actually, a joint program office with the Coast Guard. They——

Ms. McCOLLUM. One.

Admiral GILDAY. For one. Right. Exactly, for one. The Commandant of the Coast Guard reminded me of that this week when we traveled.

But it is, presently, a Coast Guard—it is, presently, a Coast Guard mission. And that Polar Security Cutter, I think they are going to deliver it within the next 2 years.

I know that answer is unsatisfying, ma’am.

Ms. McCOLLUM. Yes.

Admiral GILDAY. But right now that is a Coast Guard mission.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would get to shipbuilding in an inverse manner from what Ms. McCollum had talked about earlier and a number of other members. We had a conversation last week about the Littoral Combat Ship, and I am not going to revisit that conversation.

But, for the record, I would like to know how much the United States Navy paid for those first four littoral combat ships that are going to be decommissioned. It has come to my attention there are going to three dock-landing ships also that are going to be decommissioned.

Also, in the 2021 budget—I assume it may be in the submission. If not, what is the cost for that decommissioning as far as providing for it in the 2021 budget?

Having said that, though, and the explanation being the cost of, if you would, refurbishing these ships, to the extent—and I am still having a very difficult time coming to grips with that we had four experimental ships before we built the fifth one, but I will give you that.

My understanding is the LCS mission modules are finishing testing, and they will complete tests on these ships and others in the fleet. Will other LCSes have to be redesigned? Will there be other testing? Will there be other changes?

And, again, kind of looking forward—okay. I am unhappy about those four. But if we are still doing testing and we are still developing modules, is this going to be a continuing saga?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, so the testing we did with those first four hulls actually informed the modifications that had to be made with the block buys we did with LCS–5 going forward so that we could put missile systems—the antisubmarine warfare package, the anti-surface warfare package, and the mine warfare package.

And so the things that we found on those first four vessels included propulsion issues, both with water jets and reduction gears that weren’t working properly. So the engineering plants were—the propulsion plants as well as the electrical plants were unreliable. And so we learned from those four vessels and have actually retrofitted the newer vessels to have modifications that have taken care of those problems.

We learned from testing that we needed increased cooling systems. We had to change out, completely change out, cooling sys-
tems in order to accommodate those modules that I just spoke to. And there were also command and control modifications that were made in order to get the most out of those new mission modules that we are putting on the LCSes.

The surface mission modules, they are already being installed. The antisubmarine warfare mission modules, they will finish their testing this year. And then the mine modules will finish their testing the following year. So we are looking at maiden deployments for these new systems within the next couple of years.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay.

There is a lot of focus on the Columbia, for good reason, but I would like to turn for a few minutes just to the nuclear weapons modernization program itself.

I am going to be at the Energy and Water Committee later today. Mr. Calvert and I are members, as well as Ms. Kaptur is chairing the committee. And the NNSA is going to come in today.

According to its agency’s 2020 stockpile stewardship management plan, they said they did not intend to ask for any more than $15.5 billion for weapons activity until the early 2030s. And, again, this is their budget submission. Yet they are now, for 2021, seeking $15.6 billion, which is 25 percent more than current-year funding. Admiral, your budget proposal talks about the development of the W93 in the 2019–2020 budget. The W93 design was not planned to begin until fiscal year 2023.

The question really is, what has changed relative to the investment in this warhead? And will this investment starting earlier affect other investments the Navy has to make?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I can’t speak in terms of comparing that investment against others. We could certainly take a look at that. But I will say that the actions that we are taking are based on the Nuclear Posture Review, as you know, in terms of the modification of some of those weapons.

I think the investments that we are making are a pretty steady glide slope and are fairly modest with respect to keeping the arsenal up to date.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay.

One final question in the same vein. According to a 2019 report by the Government Accountability Office, plans to refurbish the Navy shipyards, including those that are critical to the modernization effort, are suffering from delays and cost overruns.

With regard to our nuclear deterrence, what are the strategic risks of neglecting these refurbishment projects? And how is the Navy planning to make that investment, if I could?

Admiral GILDAY. So, sir, the strategic investment plan that we have for shipyards, our four public shipyards, if that is what you are talking about, $20 billion over 20 years. And so right now we have three MILCON projects ongoing. Another eight are requested in the budget, our budget request for 2021.

We are really committed to updating those yards. The average age, as I mentioned before, is 76 years old. The condition, relative to other infrastructure, we would rate as poor. And so it has become a priority for us.
It is an area that we have probably under-resourced for a number of years, and it has finally come to roost. In terms of being able to continue to do high-quality maintenance on those nuclear-capable ships, we have to continue to make the investment in that infrastructure.

Mr. Visclosky. Okay.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. Calvert. Just more of a comment as we are ending this hearing.

You mentioned a digital twin earlier, Admiral. That is, obviously, very exciting technology. And that came out of the Small Business Innovation Program. Can you get back to us and tell us how successful that is and how well that is doing? Or maybe you want to make a quick comment about that?

Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Absolutely. So, right now, it is very promising in terms of creating these digital twins for all four shipyards that allow us virtually to take a look at how would we streamline production lines and processes. But we will come back to you, sir, and adequately answer your questions.

Mr. Calvert. Good. Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, I think we are at the conclusion.

Mr. Aguilar mentioned the hypersonics program. Obviously, very important across the services. And from, I think, all of our perspectives—and I am sure you are cognizant, but I just feel compelled to say it—is the issue of making sure we are coordinating these investments so that we are not getting in each other’s way. Because, obviously, we are in a competition. Very important program.

Thank you for your service. Thank you very much today.

We are adjourned.
UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN

WITNESSES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID D. THOMPSON, VICE COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE FORCE
MAJOR GENERAL CLINTON E. CROSIER, DIRECTOR, SPACE FORCE PLANNING, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN VISCLOSKY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The subcommittee will come to order. This afternoon the subcommittee will receive testimony on the Department of Air Force’s plans for standing up the Space Force.

We welcome our witnesses today. General Thompson and General Crosier, welcome to your first appearance before the committee. We do appreciate you being here to share your expertise.

Recently, the Space Force was established as a new branch of the armed services. Such a significant reorganization cannot be approached lightly or haphazardly as it is critical that the foundation crafted is well constructed and provides a path to success for the service and the department as a whole.

It is essential that those forming the policies and procedures for the Space Force actively engage the Congress, particularly the Appropriations Committee, to build and sustain support for the force and its mission. This will require the Department to provide timely and complete information and transparency to ensure that there is a common understanding and expectation of what this new service will do, how it will do it, and what resources are needed.

For example, the Space Force budget projects over the next 5 years current missions and no new capabilities. So will the Space Force simply execute existing space missions but under a new organization, or is the Space Force ultimately organizing to do new substantial missions? Either way, I believe that the fiscal year 2021 budget requests and the Space Force reports provided by DOD to date leave those questions unanswered.

Finally, I understand that the Space Force aspires to minimize cost and bureaucracy and to implement a management approach that is lean and agile. The plan is to accomplish this by leveraging existing support and services from the Air Force.

This is a common-sense approach. However, some aspects of the proposal raise questions. Specifically, I am concerned that the Space Force will not have the adequate decisionmaking authority over its acquisition process, financial management, and recruiting. And as the Space Force is not properly represented in rooms where the Air Force is making resourced decisions, then I fear the Force’s interest will be subordinated to those in a much larger sister service.
I would appreciate our witnesses giving us an update on the status and the plans for the Space Force and help us understand those issues. I appreciate, again, you being here. We will have your testimony in a moment, but first would recognize my Ranking Member, Mr. Calvert, for any remarks he has.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Chairman.

Welcome, Lieutenant General Thompson, Major General Crosier, to the subcommittee. As we consider the current threat environment and how we train and equip our forces to respond, space must be a fundamental part of our planning efforts. China, Russia, non-state actors, and others are working to challenge our unimpeded access to space. That is why we must smartly build a Space Force that can provide us with the freedom of operations and security.

Last year we discussed how the Space Force will coordinate with existing commands, identify servicemembers to join the force, and how it can meet the space mission—and I share this concern with the chairman—growing into an ineffective bureaucracy.

I look forward to receiving an update on all these issues. I also look forward to hearing about the Space Force plans on leveraging private industry and guardsmen, all of whom are looking to contribute to the mission of the Space Force. I want to conclude my brief statement by thanking you, once again, for your service, and I look forward to your testimony.

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. I appreciate the special effort that our ranking member for the full committee, Ms. Granger, made to be with us this afternoon. She does have a statement as well.

REMARKS OF MS. GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I thank Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert for holding this hearing today. I would also like to welcome our first witnesses ever from the U.S. Space Force, Generals Thompson and Crosier. You have a big but necessary job in front of you. This hearing is an important step for our Nation as we consider the Space Force very first budget request.

More now than ever our Nation faces competition and aggression on every front, and space is no different. Our adversaries, especially China, are developing advanced space technologies that actively threaten our Nation’s dominance and American way of life. Our Nation’s security and prosperity relies on our unimpeded access to space.

For this very reason, I was proud to support the Trump administration’s vision for this new branch of our armed services, and I look forward to supporting its development this fiscal year. I am pleased to see the budget request reflects our needs in space. Strong investments in research and development while minimizing bureaucratic delays will grow the Space Force in the most efficient and effective way. Your comprehensive plan on the organizational structure of the U.S. Space Force provides us with your vision for
the Force's future. However, many of us still have questions relating to acquisition, organizational requirements, and how the Space Force will support our combatant commanders.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and working with members of the subcommittee on this important issue so vital to our national security.

Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, you may proceed.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMPSON**

General Thompson. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, Representative Granger, and distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to appear before you here today along with my esteemed colleague, Major General Clinton Crosier. We are privileged to be among the 16,000 men and women currently assigned to the U.S. Space Force serving under the leadership of the first chief of space operations, General Jay Raymond.

These space professionals remain the best in the world in developing, fielding, and operating space systems that maintain the combat edge of our Armed Forces and the reason they enjoy freedom of action. It is this freedom of action in space that is our asymmetric advantage.

U.S. interests in space are increasingly threatened as Russia and China develop and field weapons to hold U.S. and allied space systems at risk. For example, late last year, the Russian Government launched a satellite that is actively maneuvering near a U.S. national security satellite today. The Russian Government has characterized this as an inspector satellite, but similar actions in any other domain would be interpreted as unprofessional, dangerous, and potentially threatening behavior. These activities are very concerning.

The U.S. position is that these actions do not reflect the behavior of responsible space-faring nations. Development like these and aggressive actions by other potential adversaries are the big reason why, on December 20th, 2019, the President and Congress directed the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces. Space Force responsibilities, in addition to executing our day-to-day missions, include developing military space professionals, acquiring military space systems, maturing military documents for space power, and organizing current and future forces for combatant commanders.

The Space Force represents a monumental change in our warfighting paradigm and our ability to fight and win future conflicts. By the design, the Space Force will be an independent, 21st century military service, agile, lean, and mission-focused, while leveraging Air Force support for so many services that will minimize bureaucracy.

The fiscal year 2021 space budget requests support and provides irreversible momentum towards implementation of the national defense strategy that remains our guiding star and drives our decisionmaking. Current resources will transfer into the Space Force from the Air Force in expedition-conditional phases to best take care of our servicemembers and to avoid risk to mission.
This budget submission includes increased investment in four elements of our strategy to address the threats in space: first, to protect and defend highly capable satellite systems we depend on today; second, to field robust and resilience-based architectures that survive under attack and deliver space capabilities in all phases of conflict; third, to develop true space war fighters who are essential to winning in the domain; and, finally, to develop a broad range of options to respond if our national security is threatened and, in particular, if those in space are threatened.

Progress along these lines of effort improves our ability to address near-peer threats in space and is sustained by your support and funding, you, our partners in our Congress.

Let me close, again, by stating that we do not seek conflict in space. However, we must maintain a position of strength and develop credible warfighting capability in order, first, to deter conflict and to maintain a full range of options to ensure our national security. The Space Force is taking the lead to preserve U.S. and allied space superiority across the continuum of conflict and to defend U.S. interests and those of our partners and our allies.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify, and we look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Lieutenant General Thompson and Major General Crosier follows:]
SUBJECT: Organizational Structure of the U.S. Space Force

STATEMENT OF: Lieutenant General David D. Thompson, Vice Commander, U.S. Space Force
Major General Clinton E. Crosier, Director, Space Force Planning, Office of the Chief of Space Operations

4 March 2020
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished Members of the Committee, we are honored to appear before you today in our capacities as Vice Commander, U.S. Space Force, and Director of Space Force Planning, U.S. Space Force, respectively. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on our plans and vision for the U.S. Space Force.

Strong bipartisan work by Congress, in concert with the President, has given us increased authority, predictability and resources. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 set national defense spending levels for FY20 and FY21 at historic highs and, with the FY20 NDAA and Defense Appropriations bills passed in late December 2019, we have been able to once again pivot our space forces to face the threat. Under the leadership of Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Barbara Barrett and the Space Force’s first Chief of Space Operations (CSO), General John “Jay” Raymond, the successful standup of the Space Force is the Department of the Air Force’s top policy priority.

We are committed to creating an organization that will be lean, effective, and mission-focused, minimizing cost and bureaucracy by leveraging existing resources. The transfer of forces and missions into the Space Force will follow a deliberate, conditions-based process to minimize risk and fulfill our responsibilities as outlined in the FY20 NDAA: “(1) protect the interests of the United States in space; (2) deter aggression in, from, and to space; and (3) conduct space operations.”

Last year the Department of the Air Force worked closely with Congress to establish the Space Force as a co-equal branch of the military charged with protecting and defending U.S. interests in space. Following Congress’ decisive and bipartisan work to establish the Space Force as our sixth branch of the armed forces, we can confidently report excitement across the Department is high and the commitment from our leadership to get this right is resolute.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Space capabilities have become vital to our national security, economy, and way of life. Game-changing space capabilities such as global communications, missile warning, weather forecasting and global positioning, navigation and timing, have also provided our nation a distinct military advantage by enhancing the security and lethality of our Joint warfighters. For 60 years, the United States enjoyed unhindered freedom of action in space; but, our adversaries have taken notice and are aggressively investing in space technologies to challenge our use of and competitive advantage in space. In recognition of this new reality, in March 2018, the President formally defined space as a warfighting domain in the National Strategy for Space, acknowledging the fact that our adversaries have chosen to bring the specter of conflict into the space domain.

China is aggressively pursuing both civil and military advancements in space, fielding a robust and growing fleet of remote sensing satellites and space surveillance capabilities. The Chinese are developing sophisticated on-orbit counterspace capabilities in addition to antisatellite weapons and jammers capable of targeting reconnaissance platforms and disrupting military and civilian communications. At the same time, Russia continues to modernize its space capabilities...
as it seeks to re-establish its near-peer status with the United States. The Russians have invested in space-based surveillance and ground- and space-based antisatellite systems designed to disrupt U.S. command and control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. While they lack organic on-orbit capabilities, rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran continue to advance their own abilities in the realms of cyber-attacks, and electronic warfare with the objective of disrupting, denying, deceiving, or degrading our space capabilities and holding our national infrastructure at risk.

It is within this context that the President and Congress took historic steps to establish both the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force. In combination, these two organizations pave the way for us to advocate for, acquire, and operate the systems and develop the warfighters we need to execute the missions of defending the space domain and providing the combat effects our joint and coalition partners require and have come to rely on and expect. To maintain unfettered access and freedom to operate in space, we must be prepared to protect, defend, and, if necessary, fight in, through, and from the ultimate high ground.

**FISCAL YEAR 2020 IMPLEMENTATION**

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, and consistent with the National Defense Strategy, the Department views the establishment of the Space Force as a strategic imperative for our Nation. As noted in the *Comprehensive Plan for the Organizational Structure of the U.S. Space Force*, the Space Force elevates the role of space in national defense and represents an opportunity to transform how the Department of Defense (DoD) organizes, trains, and equips space forces to prepare for new security challenges in an era of great power competition. Building the Space Force from the ground up is a historic opportunity. We are taking a clean-sheet approach, designing a twenty-first century military service with a streamlined organizational structure.

**U.S. Space Force Standup.** With the signing of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) was redesignated as the United States Space Force and its 16,000 military members were assigned to the U.S. Space Force. These members are assigned to Space Force but remain members of the Air Force. Some of these personnel, depending on specialty skillset, will have the opportunity to voluntarily and permanently transfer into the U.S. Space Force. A deliberate, conditions-based timeline will guide transition of both mission, units, and personnel into the Space Force with Air Force units beginning to transfer in FY20. As conveyed by the SECDEF, in his 20 December 2019 Space Force Implementation Memo, it remains the long-term vision of DoD to consolidate the preponderance of space forces of all Armed Forces into the U.S. Space Force, as appropriate and authorized. DoD analysis is ongoing and will determine specific units, missions, and billets that should formally transfer from across the Army, Navy, and other DoD elements.

**Headquarters Standup.** The U.S. Space Force appreciates the $40M appropriated in FY20 for the standup of the new Armed Force, and we are methodically but expeditiously hiring personnel into the new Headquarters, referred to as the Office of the Chief of Space Operations. The DoD

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provided a total of 160 billets, all within existing DoD resources, and 40 detailees in FY29 to begin
the work of establishing the processes and procedures of the new Service Headquarters. We anticipate having all 200 positions filled by the end of March. Although we have an initial Headquarters organizational structure in place, in our commitment to innovation, we are currently exploring an end state Headquarters organizational design that could be quite different from other military headquarters. A standard Service headquarters could be over 1,000 personnel, but through innovative design we have already reduced our estimate by over 20 percent. We are working with Think Tanks and consultant firms to further build innovation into our final Headquarters design, with a goal of further reductions in the overall size, and enabling greater agility and reduced bureaucracy across our final processes.

Mission Focused Force. The Strategic Overview on the Space Force, submitted to Congress in February 2019 as part of the DoD legislative proposal, states “Where appropriate, the [Space Force] will leverage existing [Air Force] infrastructure, except in performing those functions that are unique to the space domain or that are central to the independence of the new Military Service.”

DAF is committed to ensuring the Space Force is light, lean, and mission-focused. Initially, the Space Force will be a mission-focused force comprised of uniformed military personnel and DAF civilians conducting or directly supporting space operations. The new Armed Force will create appropriate career tracks across relevant specialties, including space-specific operations, intelligence, engineering, acquisition, science, and cyber/communications. By tailoring the career fields that will be organic to the Space Force, the new Armed Force will focus resources directly on space warfighting capabilities and developing a robust cadre of space experts. The longer-term goal is to develop a cadre of more than 12,000 space professionals who will form the core of our Space Force by the end of FY25.

This mission-focused approach extends across the full range of critical support functions found in over 41 Field Operating Agencies (FOAs), Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), and Other Centralized Activities (OCAs), such as the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, the Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations, and Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency. Based on guidance to “Leverage existing Air Force infrastructure,” the Space Force will receive more than 80 percent of its FOA, DRU, and OCA support from the Air Force without incurring mission risk.

FISCAL YEAR 2021 REQUEST
The President’s FY21 budget makes key investments needed to firmly establish the Space Force, and continues the 4-year effort to field the capabilities needed to gain and maintain space superiority. The FY21 Space Force budget is approximately $15.4 billion, representing an important investment in protecting and defending highly-capable satellite systems, developing a broad range of defensive and offensive options, fielding robust and resilient space systems and capabilities necessary to succeed in the space domain.

This year’s realignment to a separate space budget catalyzes a fundamental transformation of space from a combat support domain to a warfighting domain. First, we will protect and defend the highly-capable satellite systems that are not easily replaced while designing new more resilient systems. Second, we will develop a broad range of counterspace options to respond if
our national security space capabilities or freedom of action are threatened. To ensure a credible
deterrent posture in the 21st century, we must demonstrate the capability and will to defend vital
national interests across all domains, including space. Third, the Space Force will field robust
and resilient space systems with a diverse architecture that will make it increasingly difficult for
adversaries to benefit from an attack. Fourth, we will confuse and complicate our adversaries’
decision calculus through partnerships and unpredictability. Preserving the U.S. and allied
advantage in space enhances deterrence and ensures the survivability of national security space
capabilities.

The most obvious change in the FY21 request is the major shift in moving existing Air Force
space capability funding to the newly-created Space Force appropriations. The DAF will
continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to align and unify DoD space
activities into the Space Force while using existing Air Force infrastructure and support to avoid
duplication of effort. The growth outlined in the FY21 President’s Budget brings the Service a
step closer to full operational capability and ownership of several mission sets that will transfer
from the Air Force.

**Operation and Maintenance.** The Space Force O&M request includes $2.6 billion for mission
operations and sustainment to address day-to-day operations. The Space Force will be a mission-
focused force comprised of uniformed military personnel and DAF civilians conducting or
directly supporting space operations. The organizational structure of the Space Force will differ
from that of the Air Force to present a flatter organization that will remove multiple layers of
command and leverage common support functions and infrastructure provided by the Air Force.
Air Force lawyers, doctors, civil engineers, logisticians, financial managers, and other support
functions will continue to directly support space units and missions. At the headquarters level,
the Space Force will be leveraging key Air Staff functions, such as civil engineering and
information technology.

Functional alignment and mission analysis are ongoing to develop a final organizational design
of the Space Force that takes into account DoD development of emerging space warfighting
document and space tactics, techniques, and procedures. Fielded space forces will be realigned
around a new set of mission competencies that will allow DoD to posture for space superiority
across the full spectrum of conflict and provide critical support to joint warfighting operations.
Development of a field-level organizational design is underway including billet makeup and
numbers. The creation of the field commands will come from existing resources and consolidate
the preponderance of existing military space missions, forces, and authorities in the Space Force.
These efforts will culminate with a SECAF decision on the structure of Space Force field
commands and operational units by May 1, 2020.

**Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.** The research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) appropriation is the largest appropriation in the Space Force, comprising two-thirds of
the overall budget. While a substantial portion of this is classified, the $10.3 billion FY21
allocation does include a planned increase for the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared
program, using Middle Tier of Acquisition authority to rapidly prototype more survivable
missile warning satellites, and continues the development of the Next-Generation Global
Positioning System (GPS) Operational Control System, the ground component that will allow secure command of both modernized and legacy GPS satellites. Additional investments are being made in space command and control to provide space domain awareness and battle management command and control to meet emerging threats. Finally, the Space Force is committed to the weather mission and is funding the Electro-Optical/Infrared Weather System to meet important warfighting requirements. As a combined portfolio, the Space Force’s RDT&E account invests to protect and defend our current space assets, to build more resilient and defendable architectures, and to develop offensive capabilities to challenge adversary space capabilities.

**Procurement.** The FY21 Space Force procurement appropriation will emphasize continued investment in transformational space systems at $2.4 billion. In addition, we continue to focus on our enhanced GPS III constellation, adding two satellites this year to make this capability significantly more accurate and resilient for both military and civilian users. The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program is fundamental to sustaining space capabilities for the Joint Force. Space and Missile Systems Command’s “NSSL Phase 2 Launch Service Procurement” contract will provide continued mission success and flexibility in the contested space domain. We are funding three national security space launches to assure U.S. access to space and eliminate our dependence on non-allied engines. And as we move into Phase 2 of the launch services procurement, we look to foster a commercially competitive market to make this program as cost-effective as possible in the future. Finally, this budget also includes $105 million for launch vehicle integration to replenish the Space Based Infrared System constellation as legacy satellites near end-of-life.

The Space Force continues to make significant improvements in acquisition reform in the areas of oversight and implementation of initiatives to increase the productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency of space acquisitions. In accordance with the authorities provided by Section 804 of the FY16 NDAA, 10 programs and various classified programs have utilized Middle Tier Acquisition authority and tailored acquisition approaches to cut documentation and reviews and flattened access to decision authorities producing an estimated time savings of 21 and a half years.

The Department’s effort to design the Space Force organizational structure includes the development of integrated architectures and aligns with congressional direction to streamline acquisition functions of the Space and Missile Systems Center, Space Development Agency, and Space Rapid Capabilities Office under a single authority, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration. Finally, the consolidation of acquisition oversight will significantly improve the Space Force’s ability to integrate future space programs and architectures.

**Military Personnel.** To build readiness for Space operations in an era of peer-competition, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommends developing “a space cadre that ensures an
enduring focus on space capabilities and unmatched competence in this area.”2 The FY21
budget anticipates 6,434 military authorizations into the Space Force to form the initial cadre of
our Service. Planners are actively developing specific processes and conditions that must be met
before beginning the transfer process with Air Force members transitioning first with Army and
Navy members following at a later date. A separate account for Space Force military personnel is
anticipated for FY 2023. The FY21 budget also plans for 3,545 civilians in the Space Force.

DoD and DAF have a unique opportunity to consider a clean sheet, 21st century approach to
human capital management specifically designed for the United States Space Force’s unique
mission set that develops and emphasizes a space warfighting culture. DAF has established a
working group that is developing innovative options to integrate the space functions of the
Reserve Components into the United States Space Force. While we study these options, existing
Guard and Reserve personnel remain critical to the space mission performed by the U.S. military
today. These units are aligned to support the Space Force while the Department completes our
analysis. We will provide more details as they become available.

DAF views growing and developing a cadre of space professionals as an imperative to meet the
demands of a warfighting domain. While the Space Force will leverage the Air Force’s existing
training infrastructure, we are in the process of creating space-specific training programs to
develop space intelligence and acquisition experts. The expansion of education and training
courses would fall under the proposed establishment of a Space Training and Readiness
Command as a field-level organization within the Space Force.

THE WAY AHEAD

As specified by the Secretary of Defense, it remains the long term vision of DoD to consolidate
the preponderance of space forces under the Space Force as appropriate and authorized. Analysis
is ongoing that will determine specific units, missions, and billets that should formally transfer
from Army, Navy, and other DoD elements. A deliberate, conditions-based timeline will guide
service member transition into the Space Force.

The FY21 budget builds toward the Space Force we need to win against any potential adversary.
Our request was driven by our need to invest not just in quantity and near-term capacity, but also
in quality and in the integrated Joint Force capabilities that keep the balance of future power
decidedly in the United States’ favor. But we cannot do this alone. We ask Congress and our
stakeholders to partner with us in achieving irreversible momentum as we implement the
National Defense Strategy and build the Space Force our nation needs.

We thank the Committee for your leadership and support. Together we will build a resilient and
ready Space Force that will continue to serve as the foundation for our desire to maintain our
military advantage and promote American prosperity.

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2 United States Institute of Peace, “Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of
Lieutenant General David “D.T.” Thompson  
Vice Commander, U.S. Space Force

Lt. Gen. David D. Thompson is Vice Commander, Headquarters United States Space Force. He is responsible to the Chief of Space Operations for the U.S. Space Force in carrying out space missions and integrating space policy, guidance, coordination and synchronization of space-related activities and issue resolution for the Department of the Air Force.


Lt. Gen. Thompson was commissioned in 1985 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is a career space officer with assignments in operations, research and development, acquisition and academia. He has commanded operational space units at the squadron, group and wing levels. The general is also an Olmsted Scholar, graduate of the Senior Acquisition Course and a Level III-Certified Program Manager. Prior to his assignment as Vice Commander, U.S. Space Force, Lt. Gen. Thompson was the Vice Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command.

EDUCATION
1989 Master of Science, Aeronautics and Astronautics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Ind.
1990 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
1998 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2001 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., by seminar
2005 Master of Science, National Security Industrial Policy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
General Crosier attended Iowa State University on an Air Force ROTC scholarship. He was commissioned and entered the Air Force in 1988 after receiving a degree in aerospace engineering.

General Crosier has a broad range of experience in intercontinental ballistic missile and space operations, including a deployment to the Middle East as the U.S. Central Command Director of Space Forces. He has served in staff assignments in the U.S. Senate, Secretary of the Air Force's Action Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, and Air Force Global Strike Command. His operational commands include the 2nd Space Launch Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California; 5th Operations Group, Schriever AFB, Colorado; and the 460th Space Wing, Buckley AFB, Colorado. Prior to his current assignment, Gen Crosier served as the Director, Operational Capability Requirements (J55R), Deputy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements (Dep A5) Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and as the establisher and first Director of the Air Force Warfighter Integration Capability (AFWIC).

EDUCATION
1987 Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames
1990 Master of Business Administration, Summa Cum Laude, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg
1991 Squadron Officer School, distinguished graduate, outstanding contributor, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1997 Air Command and Staff College by correspondence, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2000 Legislative Fellows Program, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
2002 Air War College, by correspondence, outstanding graduate
2004 Master of National Security Studies, highest distinction, Newport, R.I.
2004 Naval War College, distinguished graduate, Newport, R.I.
2006 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert.

CONSOLIDATING VARIOUS OFFICES

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the initial organizational chart that you released, the Space Force has outlined the goal to bring the space and missile system center, space development agency, space rapid capabilities office, and space elements so the Air Force rapid capabilities office under a single authority. I think consolidating these efforts is a good idea and an opportunity to become a leaner, more agile organization.

I know more details were coming out later this month, specifically on acquisition authority and how that will be organized. But is there anything you can share? Do you expect consolidating these offices will result in some efficiencies that will hopefully save some money?

General THOMPSON. So, Congressman Calvert, let me say, first of all, that, as you suggested, the Congress and the President have given us a tremendous opportunity. It is not just in acquisition, but it is across the Space Force. You have given us the opportunity to create a clean sheet design in many areas, one of those is specifically acquisition, by directing the establishment of the Space Force Acquisition Council and telling us to come back with a new approach.

With regard to those organizations today, we have already begun the process, even before the Space Force was established but since then, of working between the space and missile system center, the space development agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Air Force rapid capabilities and others to ensure that their acquisition activities are synchronized, complementary, and not duplicative in many senses.

In fact, as an example, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office that was established 2 years ago, we gave some very specific mission sets that hadn’t been addressed previously as a result the warfighting domain. We expect them to do that quickly. The Space Development Agency’s focus is on leveraging commercial investment and what we see there in proliferated consultations and the Space and Missile System Center has recently rearchitected itself but is still focused on those specific today warfighting capabilities that we will need today and in the future.

Consolidating them under a specific acquisition organization will further integrate their activities, ensure they are not duplicative, but make sure they create one single space architecture. I have no doubt going forward that we will find efficiencies. Right now our focus is in driving an agile and rapid response for all of them as they continue to develop space capabilities for the Nation.

Mr. CALVERT. I would ask, as this acquisition takes shape, that you leverage the talent and the institutional knowledge that you mentioned of the Space Missile Center in L.A. The intellectual capital has been built up, as you know, over a long period of time. It is one-of-a-kind that is uniquely situated to meet the challenges that the new Air Force, new Space Force is going to take on. And so I know you will give them the leadership to move in the right direction and get that done.
General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. They are a national treasure. They have provided capabilities that no one else could for more than six decades, and I am sure they will continue to do that in the future. The evidences was their own rearchitecting themselves to ensure they could meet those challenges. They have special set of capabilities, as does the space RCO at Kirkland and the SDA as we leverage——

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. McCollum.

SPACE FORCE PERSONNEL

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you. So we know, in order to be successful, not only do you need equipment; you need the personnel to operate the equipment to do the mission. So I would like to ask you a few questions about the development of Space Force personnel, including the transfer of the Air Force to the Space Force. In the fiscal year 2020 NDAA created Space Force, but it directed the Air Force to move personnel internally to populate Space Force instead of adding more personnel to the new service branch. It is my understanding that the Air Force Secretary has temporarily detailed about 16,000 airmen to Space Force.

And so, before I get into the question, I want to set the table a little bit, too. So, General Crosier, you recently stated during a presentation to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services that Space Force is working to incorporate flexible family leave and caregiver possibilities. You went on to say that we have a ground level opportunity with Space Force to ensure that the newly created military branch incorporates the culture of equality and inclusion in order to attract female candidates.

As you know, this is an area which the older branches of the military have struggled with over the years and continue to struggle with. So I have a couple of questions, but I will submit a question to the record about how Space Force cadets are going to move forward in the future.

As you know, it is our honor and privilege to nominate individuals to the military academy, and I don’t think—I don’t know if they will call them doolies their first year of the Space Force Academy.

My questions are: Can you give us an update on the process by which you are asking Air Force personnel to voluntarily join Space Force as well as the development of personnel administrative systems for Space Force? And how are you ensuring that you have the capability and the ability to pull space operators from the Army or Navy into Space Force, in other words, create even more opportunity for them and more yourselves? Do you have a timeline for no longer relying on Air Force detailees? And then, back to my question about, you know, having a more inclusive military branch here, what are some of the specific policies and regulations that face Space Force might be planning on implementing to encourage women to join and to ensure women will be retained?

General CROSIER. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the question. I appreciate that. There are a number of things there that you talked about, so let me just try to address a few of them at a time. So, on the day that the President signed the NDAA on
19 December—20 December 2019 rather, we assigned 16,000 men and women from the former Air Force base command into the U.S. Space Force.

So those people are executing the mission of the U.S. Space Force today. It is essentially the mission we had been executing all along, but with the stand-up of the Space Force, now we have men and women, as you said, assigned sort of in a—I wouldn't say temporary detail, but they are temporarily assigned in the same way that an officer or enlisted member can be assigned to a combatant command or the joint service or something like that.

Of those 16,000 people, a portion of those, probably about 6,000 people, will be offered the opportunity to formerly transfer into the U.S. Space Force. And by that we mean, the technicality of actually resigning your commission in the Air Force, Army, or Navy, or Marine Corps and then recommissioning in the Air Force or terminating your enlistment in those services and reenlisting in the Space Force. It is a very technical process that has to take place and it is part of congressional scrolling and law.

In terms of the readiness to do that, we think it will take a few months to be ready do that. All of the databases that we need to process pay and retirement and healthcare and those sorts of things, it will take us some time to do. Currently, we are looking about the 1 September timeframe to be able to transfer Air Force space operators into the Space Force, and then we will follow on with those volunteers from space intelligence, space acquisition, space communication probably a few months later.

Our plan for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps transfers has always been in the fiscal year 2022 timeframe simply because we believe it will take some time and we want to get the transition right with those Air Force members that are transitioning, and we are more similar between the Air Force and Space Force for obvious reasons. But then we want to take the appropriate amount of time to make sure when we transfer those soldiers, sailors, and marines that we have got all the right pieces of infrastructure in place to be able to do that.

Finally, very briefly, if I can just reflect on DACOWITS, I was honored to be able to speak in front of that organization yesterday. And the point that I was making is the point we will underscore throughout the hearing I hope, and that is General Raymond, our CSO, has really put an edict down for us that we have a historic opportunity.

This is the first new service that has been established in 72 years, and so we have been told by Congress, by the administration that we have a clean sheet to look at, how would a 21st century service operate? And as you look at human capital management in the 21st century, the world has changed over the last number of decades with technology and personnel needs and that sort of thing.

So we think there are opportunities to look at more flexible recruitment and retention policies, some of which you mentioned, that will make the Space Force attractive to all the men and women who might be interested in joining.

Thank you.
Ms. McCOLLUM. And then you will get back to us on the record on how you are going to handle academy appointments——
General CROSIER. Yes, ma’am. Happy to do that.
Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. VISCLOSKEY. Thank you very much.
Ms. Granger.

COMMAND AND CONTROL PROGRAM

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. After receiving several classified briefings, I am very concerned about the threats that China poses in space. Can you briefly update us on how the Space Force is dealing with these threats?

General THOMPSON. Yes, Congresswoman. Let me say, first of all, I noted not only that but the opening statement by the chairman, the need to understand that more fully. And what I would ask is to give us an opportunity to come back in a classified setting because we can give you full details in that regard. I will tell you that this fiscal year 2021 budget is the fourth in a series of budget that you all have given us that have really allowed us to turn and focus on the threat.

When we started this process back with the fiscal year 2018 budget, we started working on some of the foundational principles we needed to understand the domain deeply, space domain awareness, sensors, and fusion engines and tools associated with understanding all of what is in a domain, what its capabilities are, who owns it, and how it might pose a threat and provide indications and warning.

In subsequent years we built on that. We have built command and control tools now as well, and we continue funding a command and control program to be able to fuse that data, to develop courses of action to present them to commanders so they can make timely decisions and disseminate it out to the force. That has been part of our investment since about fiscal year 2019. And we began prototyping and demonstrating and preparing for what I will call abilities to protect and defend our assets. And we did that extensively in the budget in 2020.

In 2021, we are now taking steps to extend that across the fleet as well as look at other capabilities to be able to continue to defend those assets that we have and deny adversary use of space in conflict. We have done that over the course of 4 years. There is a tremendous amount of detail that we could provide in a classified setting, but I would tell you where 4 years ago we did not have significant sensing, command and control, defend and protect, and other capabilities in this domain, we now have established a course and, with your support and continued investment, are certainly on a course to be able to defend and protect our assets in a domain going forward.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I know we would all look forward to those classified briefings.
Thank you very much. Thank you.

PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First thing. I think you talked about historical opportunity, and this is very rare that you get an opportunity
to start from scratch. And, you know, when you are involved in management whether it is corporation, government, bureaucracy a lot of times gets in the way. So it is really important that when we—what we have to do is is space. Space and cyber are the future of tomorrow, and we are—have Russia, China, other countries that are focused there, so—and a lot of people really don't know how much space is involved in everything that we do every day and whether it is from defense or whether it is from commercial or whatever. I know Mr. Calvert talked about acquisition. I want to get into that a little bit, and one other thing I want to say, too. Since I have been here there have been two start-ups, Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence. I think Homeland Security went too quick, too fast. Thank goodness they had operations like the Coast Guard that were well managed and helped move where they needed to be. But the Director of National Intelligence took a little slower; they pulled people in; and I think it was effective on what they needed to do.

Mr. CALVERT. Would the gentleman yield on that one point?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. CALVERT. When we were having those discussions about the Director of National Intelligence, how big was that office supposed to be? About 100?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Whatever it is, it works. At least it did work until——

Mr. CALVERT. I think it was 100 going back in time. I think, what, 1,200 now?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that what it is? I haven’t kept up with it. I am just looking at the end game results.

Mr. CALVERT. And it keeps growing. It is about 1,200.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. If it works, we do it. The national intelligence is important. But getting back to the issue. I do want to get into acquisition. The Department’s effort to design a Space Force organization structure as it relates to procurement and acquisition, which can really get tied up in a lot of the bureaucracy issues that slow you down. You detail that the plan aligns with the congressional direction to streamline acquisition, functions of the Space and Missile Systems Center, Space Development Agency, and Space Rapid Capabilities Office.

Now, can you explain to this committee your recommendations on how we should evaluate this effort and what the ideal roles and responsibilities among these different entities should look like? In other words, what do SMC and SDA and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office do now, how do they differ, and how should we expect them to look a year from now?

General THOMPSON. Congressman, thanks so much.

Let me talk a little bit about that if I can. As you noted, those organizations all are involved in acquiring and filling space capabilities. We have already begun the work to make sure that they are deconflicted, starting with the Space and Missile Systems Center. When it talks about those unique what I will call unique military space capabilities that we have used for decades, things like missile warning, GPS positioning, navigation, and timing remains one of those capabilities that the military provides today, even though it is used more broadly, protected communications that in-
cludes the ability to do command and control of nuclear forces in event of nuclear war, as well as the ability to surveil the domain, understand—keep track of all the objects in the domain. Those are some unique military space capabilities that we have done for decades. Those are the things that Space and Missile Systems Center does today, does well, and is going to continue to do into the future, even as it evolves what it is and how it does those things.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. Finished?

General THOMPSON. SDA, the Space Development Agency, is focused on looking at commercial and architecture, how we can leverage it for new and evolving missions and merge those with Space Missile Systems Center. And then space RCO is focused on rapidly fielding—prototyping and fielding for us new capabilities to help defend and protect——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And the commercial was so important. That is what makes us strong as a country.

One other thing and I am finished. You mentioned the consolidation of acquisition oversight will significantly improve the Space Force’s ability to integrate future space programs and architectures. Can you speak to why you are so convinced of this and how the U.S. Space Force plans to remove to measure success in procurement?

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. There are two things I would point to. The first is the direction of Congress to provide a report back on a clean sheet design to do that. First of all, we recognize the need for transparency and the oversight of Congress. We are going to ensure that is the case, but this gives us the opportunity to do that with you in a streamlined way. It also gives us the opportunity to develop a streamlined approach to oversight inside the Department of Defense.

So that is the first thing you have given us is the opportunity to develop that and come back to you and work with you on how to implement that. The second piece is, the establishment of the Space Force Acquisition Council and the assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, who is supposed to lead that activity.

And the expectation is, under that leadership, including Space Force members and others, that group using a streamlined approach and process with the support and the—or the oversight of Congress is intended to create the new acquisition system that you will see here with the report here in a few weeks.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Mr. Carter.

SUITABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF SPACED-BASED SYSTEMS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome.

This is an exciting thing to talk about. General Thompson, according to the 2019 annual report from DOD director of operational test and evaluation which provides independent assessment of the effectiveness of DOD systems has raised concern about whether DOD’s space systems will perform adequately against potential adversaries.

Report says DOD intends to invest, at least, 100 billion in space systems over the next decade. It must thoroughly understand how
our systems will perform in space, particularly when facing man-
made threats. The report concludes the DOD currently has no real
means to assess adequately the operational effects of this suit-
ability and survivability of space-based systems against growing
threats.

What is your view of this report’s finding? Do you agree and how
will the Space Force address this issue differently than has been
addressed previously?

General THOMPSON. Congressman Carter, that report was abso-
lutely correct. For many years, because space was not a
warfighting, we focused on engineering excellence. We focused on
mission performance. We did not have to think about or develop
systems that could survive in the face of manmade threats. That
is absolutely correct. That is one of the reasons the Space Force
was created and one of the things that we have to do and are doing
and are beginning to invest in directly is a suitable testing enter-
prise and testing regime to test exactly for those sorts of threats.
It is done today in every other service, in every other domain. We
do it in the air. We do it at sea. We do it on land. We now have
to build a similar enterprise for space system to test them against
threats and representatives to those threats to ensure they can sur-
vive and function effectively throughout the domain.

Mr. CARTER. You used the term “warfighting domain,” would you
define that to us? It makes sense——

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. But there has got to be a specific thing that means.

General THOMPSON. So I would say—so I am not sure there has
been an established and approved definition, but I would tell you
the D.D. Thompson definition is: If I am operating in the domain,
somebody can threaten my ability to perform, shoot at me, whether
it is with kinetics or electronics or with cyber and have the ability
to destroy my capability or my mission or defeat my mission, that
is a warfighting domain. D.D. Thompson——

Mr. CARTER. You told us about Chinese and Russian satellite
that kind of got in on our space. Now the Navy, when somebody
gets in their space, historically puts a shot across their bow telling
them to back off. The Air Force has their way of letting them know
you are getting too close for comfort and you are about to commit
an act of aggression.

Are we going to internationally define those things, or are we
just going to be custom?

General THOMPSON. So, Congressman, it has been years that we
have not had those sorts of standards and norms of behavior or
rules of engagement in space. I hope you saw the commander of
U.S. space command, our boss, General Jay Raymond in his other
hat, specifically and publicly, called out the Russians for that activ-
ity and that domain. We are in the process now, first and foremost,
internally with the United States with our partners and allies and
friendly nations to help establish what those norms of behaviors
should be, what rules of engagement should be, and help to make
it clear going forward what they are, how we expect others to be-
have, how we will behave, and what the consequences might be if
they do not.
As you said, it took centuries to develop those at sea. It took decades to develop those in the air. We are now in the process of developing them in space.

General Crosier. Very, very quickly. I really appreciate the question, but one of the things you will see inside this fiscal year 2021 budget is resource-neutral. We have paid for it within the Department of Defense but we are actually bringing the additional billets to the table to stand up the first space doctrine center to do exactly this kind of things, develop doctrine, norms of behavior. We are also looking at robusting our space warfare center to create those tactics and TTPs that we need to deal with these threats.

And to your original question, we are actually investing to robust the space test environment and the space test center so that we can get after the space tests the same way other domains do it. We captured that and paid for resource-neutral in our budget because we agree with you: All three of those things are important to get after.

Mr. Carter. Thank you.

Mr. Vislosky. Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

Commands within the Space Force

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here this afternoon and for your testimony. I understand that the Space Force is considering standing up several systems commands, including a space training and readiness command, which you talked about, and a systems command focused on acquisition.

How many system command organizations are you considering? What will they do, and where are they going to be placed? Will they be spread throughout the country, including places like Arizona, or are they going to be concentrated in a location where there is a space mission already in place?

General Thompson. Congresswoman, let me say a few things if I can. First of all, today the organizations that will constitute commands that do operations, commands that do acquisition already exist in many places in the enterprise. We talked about some. We talked about the Space and Missile Systems Center. We talked about space RCO. We talked about the Space Development Agency. Those organizations exist today. They are actively engaged today. They are performing effectively today, as are our operational units and commands. Certainly, the original intent, once we have finalized and had an approved field command design, there is no expectation or intent that we would be looking at moving organizations around, repositioning, reposturing. It is the in-place structure to ensure they operate effectively, they perform their tasks effectively, they are integrated, and they are supporting the priorities of the Nation and the Space Force and our leadership. That is what the Space Force will do initially.

Some of the other capabilities we need and other commands will grow out over time. As General Crosier said, they are funded in the budget, and as we develop, build, and fund, and resource them, we will go through the process of establishing where they might be. We have basing processes to determine where they might be, and
we will run those processes. As those new capabilities are developed, they are ready to come online.

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Cole, please.

SPACE FORCES IN RUSSIA AND CHINA

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. I have to tell you I struggle with this, just intellectually, not from any hostility. I think this is great. Just trying to envision exactly what we are doing and where we are going, so trying to develop some frame of reference.

Let me ask you this: I am very curious since part of this is a spin-off from threats from our near-peer rivals. How do they organize their Space Forces? Do they have a separate Space Force in Russia and China?

General THOMPSON. Congressman, they do. In fact, they are recently—they have recently reorganized themselves. Since I am going to say 2014, both have created organizations. In one case, one of the organizations is a space organization itself. The other is a space organization that includes cyber and some other things, but they have strategically reorganized themselves in the last 5 years to emphasize the importance of space because they recognize—two things. First of all, they recognize what our ability to use space for our purposes has done for us, and they want to do the same thing. The second thing is, they have reorganized themselves to attempt to take away our ability to use space in conflict, and so they have created—in fact, they preceded us in creating space organizations to do exactly that.

Mr. COLE. And what about—we have obviously friends that have capabilities in space and assets in space, the British, the French. Tell me where our allies are at. What is their thinking? Is this sort of—do you see them developing along the same lines that we are and apparently the Russia and the Chinese are? Give me some assessment of their——

General CROSIER. Congressman, I think the unifying piece, whether you are talking about our potential adversaries or our allies, is we have all recognized that space is now become a contested potential warfighting domain. That is the key. The Russians and the Chinese have come to a slightly different organizational construct that we have based on their militaries and how they are organized and our allies—most of our allies, some are very capable in space, but most of them, all of them, are much smaller than we are. So they likely will come to a different conclusion about what organizational construct works for them, but what is clear across the board—and as we do our space exercises and space war games, we continue to invite allies and partners. And over the last couple of space flags and other space-related exercises, we have anywhere from 7 to 10 of our allied partners show up and do those integrated war games with us. And they are fully on board with the idea, with the understanding, that space has become a threatened environment, and if we are going to be able to operate our space assets, both in peace time and in war time, both to support our economies and our militaries, they have got to be protected and defended.
I will tell you that already, as the director of planning for the space team, I already have a formal request from one of our key allies in writing to embed several of their officers inside the Space Force planning team. We are only 75 days old as a Space Force today, and I already have, as I said, a formal request from one of our closest and most trusted allies to embed officers inside our planning team. So I think that is a good sign.

CONSOLIDATION OF CAPABILITIES IN THE SPACE FORCE

Mr. Cole. Last question. And, again, I am just struggling with this. Your testimony, the documents I have read talk about having 16,000 people or so. It is pretty small number obviously, and that is appropriate when you are at the very beginning of something. Seems a little top heavy in terms of general officers given the size of that unit for me. I would like you to address that, how you feel about that long-term? And then the second question related that I would have and, again, I recognize we are at the very beginning and I would expect things to change just as they changed—you know, there were decades before we had a separate United States Air Force whereas other countries did it differently. I mean, there was a Royal Air Force almost from the beginning of their power there. They didn’t follow the same model we did for several decades. So, again, these things are going to change and be different between countries, but I do worry about having a force where you have got a corps of 6,000 or 7,000, whatever the number is, and you have got elements of the other services that are working on the same mission in the same chain of command, I would say, how does that work? I mean, we don’t have—obviously our services cooperate; we believe in jointness. But we don’t have, you know, Marines and Army people directly in the same chain of command. As a rule, we don’t have, you know, anything like that. Again, there is not Air Force officers on aircraft carriers. So I just wonder how that—how do you manage that in the beginning and when and how do you see it conflicting? And I guess I would ask you, how do you see things in 5 years? I mean, you are clearly thinking ahead, what do you think is different in 5 years than today?

General Crosier. So what I can tell you, Congressman, is a year ago, when we brought our legislative proposal to Capitol Hill, we have been consistent ever since in saying that the Department’s intent was to consolidate space capabilities from across the Army, the Navy, the Air Force into the Space Force. The Department of Defense has said clearly that we can’t establish an Air Force Space Force for the reasons you describe. We have other services that do things in space, but if we are really going to take advantage of this historic, once-in-a-lifetime 72-years-since-we-have-done-it opportunity, then we have to look across the board. And so the Secretary of Defense on the 20th of December 2019, the day that the NDAA was signed, Secretary Esper signed out an implementation memo and part of that implementation memo was saying it continues to be the intent of the Department of Defense to consolidate space capabilities from across the services of the Department of Defense.

So we are going through a process right now—in fact, I spent a couple hours this morning. We spent the better part of the last 6 months identifying what Air Force units, missions, and people will
transition from the Air Force into the Space Force. And that has been very successful. We transferred $15.4 billion from Air Force funds, and as has been identified about 10,000 people between military and civilian. So that is working very smoothly. Now, as we have looked at the fiscal year 2022 planning timeframe, we are going through the process of identifying what units in the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, et cetera, would and should transfer into the Space Force so that we can take advantage of that unity of effort, singular leadership, and integrated strategy, vision, and architectures which we think is so important.

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Aguilar.

RELATIONSHIP WITH DARPA, NRO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you gentlemen for being here. Following up a little bit on my colleague, Mr. Cole, prior to the Space Force, there still are several agencies, as you have mentioned, that have space programs. How do we plan to intend to leverage the capabilities of space-related agencies like NRO and DARPA to make sure that there isn’t a duplication of efforts? What role will they play moving forward, and how are those conversations now?

General THOMPSON. Congressman, I will tell you that already we had a very effective relationship with those organizations before the Space Force was created. Specifically with the national recognition office, we have had a longstanding relationship with them. In fact, today they have a total staff of about 3,000, about 1,000 of those are U.S. Space Force members. So we already provide expertise and personnel to help them in their activities. The second thing is, about 5 years ago, we established with the national recognition office two forums that we use, one, on the acquisition and architecture side and the other on the operation side. The organization that was at the time Air Force space command that is now the core of U.S. Space Force, developed a common national security’s space architecture with the NRO, determined in a couple of cases where we were going to conduct joint programs. In one case, we are doing it with an on over at space surveillance system. We are collaborating on how to create systems to warn and protect our satellites together, as well as collaborating on the overall architecture. That has been in process for 5 years. That will continue in the Space Force.

On the operational side, we created a forum called the Joint Space War Fighters Forum where the U.S.-based command commander and the director of the NRO collaborate on operational issues. They are together doing planning and operation every single day in the National Space Defense Center. So there is already a well-established and very close relationship with the NRO that predated the U.S. Space Force. We will continue to do that in the future.

With DARPA and NASA and other organizations, we have routine engagements to establish priorities, areas of collaboration, whether it is in technology, whether it is in research and development, whether it is in operational concepts. All of those forums
worked relatively well in the past. Now that you have a U.S. Space Force and a service chief who can speak with authority, who can establish authorities across the broad range of activities, I can only see those relationships growing and being more effective in the future.

General Crosier. I would just add very quickly too as I like to do. We recognize very early in the planning process the value of having the national reconnaissance office, in particular, part of our planning team so we have an embedded NRO officer inside our planning team to make sure that as we do all of our planning going forward that we think about how we better integrate as a team.

Mr. Aguilar. Do you anticipate that embedded NRO individual or that type of position continuing for years? How would you formalize that within the structure?

General Crosier. Well, we can easily formalize it through what we call memorandums of understanding or agreement, but I think it likely will. I think we are going to see such benefit from having exchange officers, if you will, on each other's staffs. And as General Thompson said, we already have up to a thousand previously Air Force people from Air Force space command inside the NRO as these members now become U.S. Space Force members, you will have the U.S. Space Force serving inside the NRO day in and day out, but having NRO planners inside our team at headquarters U.S. Space Force, I think, will be very effective. And I see no reason why we wouldn't continue it long-term.

Mr. Aguilar. Appreciate it. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Rogers.

SPACE FORCE CREATION AND REDUNDANCIES

Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me talk to you briefly about what I am going to call inevitable redundancy. I am sure you have gone through this in your own minds a lot. Many of us in Congress support the Space Force, however, we do have some concern that the creation could lead to redundancy between the services since some services that have had space-related operations before you came along will still require the information and intelligence obtained through those operations that they have been experiencing. How do you deal with this?

General Thompson. Congressman, I would say, first, some of that redundancy already exists today, and I think through the creation of the Space Force and what happens naturally when you bring organizations and combine them in that regard as we will, it is a quicker and more effective mechanism for identifying and eliminating some of those redundancies. That is a measure of how effective we are in consolidating the sum total of DOD space activities inside the Space Force. And so that is the first way we will get after it is, as soon as all of those activities and organizations are inside of one service, you can very effectively with one service chief, with one leader working together with the Secretary of the Air Force, identify more quickly those redundancies, and you really only have one set of leaders that need to agree to eliminate them.

So I would say, in fact, some of those redundancies, in fact, some Members of Congress have chastised us in the past about the num-
ber of duplicate and redundant organizations we have inside of the DOD and National Security Space Enterprise. I think consolidating all of that activity under the U.S. Space Force is one means by which we can identify and eliminate those redundancies.

General CROSIER. Fully agree, Congressman. And I would just add too that as we look at Space Policy Directive 4, SPD 4, signed by the President last year, the primary mission given to the Space Force—well, two missions really, but mission number, as we call it, is enhancing the lethality of the joint force. So, even as we stand up to Space Force and as General Thompson said, the goal of the department is to consolidate and avoid duplication of effort, but even as we do that, the Space Force has a primary mission of supporting the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force in all of those things they have to know so well in terms of joint warfighting. Satellite communications, ISR, weather, missile warning, GPS, precision-guided weapons, accuracy, all those will continue to be primary missions for the Space Force.

So we look at the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps as primary customers in delivering those capabilities, and we will integrate more closely than ever before to make sure that we fully meet their warfighting needs.

General THOMPSON. I apologize, Congressman, if I could add one more thing. This does not mean there should not be space expertise in those other services. There must be space expertise inside those services so that we can work with them to effectively integrate those capabilities. What we don't want, as you said, is duplicative capabilities.

SPACE FORCE AND WEATHER PROGRAMS

Mr. ROGERS. One of your missions is weather. Navy has their own weather program, and in most cases, that type of information is very custom, very attuned to what the Navy needs, wind directions and so on; Air Force with flying and the like. Will they now just disband their space-related agencies like that when you come into being?

General THOMPSON. Sir, today with the Navy, in particular, we do a couple of things. One is their naval research lab is a very effective arm of developing the kinds of sensors that we need in space for, as you said, the very specific weather and meteorological-related things that they do today, but we work with them effectively. They often times will do experimentation and then that technology and those instruments are then translated over to what are now U.S. Space Force organizations to build into those weather systems.

So, in our relationship with the Navy today, we don't duplicate, we divide and conquer in terms of technology, development, and ultimate fielding. We anticipate that work will continue in one of two ways or probably both ways. In cases where it makes sense, those capabilities that exist today inside the Navy will move into the Space Force, but where it makes sense for them to remain, we will continue to interface and integrate with them to make sure that they are complementary and not duplicative in how we work.

We do that today in the specific example you provided, which was meteorological sensors and satellites for weather forecasting.
Mr. Rogers. Well, you have got a lot of work to do. This is going to be a little bit complicated as we go along.

General Thompson. Yes, sir.

MODEL FOR SPACE FORCE SAME AS NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

Mr. Rogers. Have you studied the creation of the U.S. Air Force out of the old Army Air Corps? Was that a good model to follow?

General Crosier. Yes, sir, we did study it. In fact, some of the language that we submitted in our legislative proposal last year—and, of course, Congress adopted their own version of the Space Force, which we are happy with and comfortable with; we like what we got out of legislation—but some of what we provided in our legislative proposal was actually translated from the initial legislative proposal from the creation of the Air Force in 1947.

We had access to those documents, and things like technical conforming amendments about how you make sure that you can pay people as they move to services. We used a lot of that. So we did. What we have also done, though, is we have really looked at our partners in the Navy and the Marine Corps because the model that we have adopted, that Congress adopted that, again, we are very comfortable with, is two separate and equal services inside a single department. And that is the same model with the Department of the Navy who has two separate and equal services in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. The same is true. One Department of the Air Force, two separate and equal services, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Space Force, but we have taken a lot of lessons from the Navy and Marine Corps about how do you apportion the budget? How do you do requirements together? How do you share a common secretariat or secretory infrastructure? And we have learned a lot and adopted a lot from that.

Mr. Rogers. Good luck.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

So we have recently been talking a lot about, and I think we had a meeting with the National Guard, and they are obviously an integral part of our defense and so what—and they also have this unique ability of—they have folks in the private sector that have, you know, special expertise. So how do you see them being incorporated without—to go to one of the previous questions without redundancy. What is the role of the National Guard? How do you see it happening? How do you see that being put together?

General Thompson. Congressman, let me say first, both the Guard and the Reserve are vital to mission execution today inside the U.S. Space Force. We simply could not execute all of our missions without the support and the capability that both of them provide today. So I would tell you already both inside of the Guard and Reserve, both in the Guard Bureau and the Air Force Reserve have already aligned themselves and their units that provides space capabilities to provide effective support to the U.S. Space Force.
So we know that they already support us today. They have already made some organizational adjustments to continue to ensure that that support is effective. One of the things that we are doing as a result of this opportunity to look at a 21st century service is to look at the Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard construct through a 21st century lens.

And so we have put a focused team together. That team includes members of guard, members of the Reserve, Active Duty, and our civilian experts to look at whether or not we think there are some changes to that approach that might be merited. We haven’t presupposed or precluded any outcome, but while we are effectively aligned today with the Guard and Reserve—they continue to support the Space Force—we are going to take a clean sheet 21st century look at this relationship, at these components, and see if changes are warranted.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. So, again, those decisions have not yet been made?

General Thompson. Correct.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. You are looking at them, which makes sense. So one of the things that when you think of the Space Force, you know, you think of protecting our military assets, but do I understand that—and I think, Judge Carter, you talked about those rules of engagement, right? One of the things obviously our military and Navy does is protect sea lanes, open sea lanes. So do you also see the role to protect civilian U.S. assets and that kind of thing?

General Thompson. Yes, sir. As you know, that is the role of our warfighting combatant commanders. In fact, with the establishment of U.S. Space Command that new space combatant command last August, that was one of the responsibilities conveyed on the combatant commander, the Commander of the U.S. Space Command is, when directed, provide protection to civil, commercial, and other interests of the United States and our allies. So we could certainly see that today and in the future.

Mr. Díaz-Balart. Great. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Aderholt.

ROLE OF ARMY’S SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks.

Thank you for being here. Could you talk about the role of the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command in Space Force, and, in particular, I am interested in what role that Huntsville, Alabama, the tech center there, would play?

General Thompson. Sir, the Army has brought tremendous space capabilities for decades—obviously, as you noted, missile defense, but Space and Missile Defense Command is the core of their space capability.

As General Crosier described, we are in the process right now—first of all, they effectively support the U.S. Space Command, the combatant command today. And as General Crosier described, we are engaged in a process with the Army and the rest of the Department in defining what parts of that command, what capabilities, what missions might, in fact, transfer into the U.S. Space Force to
continue to operate in that role and which elements will remain behind in the Army to provide effective space support.

And let me give you a couple of examples. One of the things they do today is the Army has a series of units that operates our military wide band communication satellite payloads. They do that globally for the entire Department of Defense. That is one that you might consider as a military space mission that is focused on space that might be considered for transfer. At the same time, they have a whole series of teams that they call space support teams. The sole purpose of those teams are to bring space capabilities, and facts and understandings to Army maneuver units. They exist to ensure that Army units effectively exploit space capabilities today. Those sorts of units probably don’t make sense in the U.S. Space Force. They need to stay behind in the United States Army.

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

So all of the missions of the Space and Missile Defense Command are vital today, will continue today in one way, shape, or form. The analysis that we are doing now will determine which elements might transfer to the U.S. Space Force and which will remain behind and support the United States Army.

Mr. Aderholt. Thank you. What will you be doing to ensure that combatant commanders will continue to have the access to their need for Space-based information and avoid creating levels of control and bureaucracy in the Space Force which would actually slow down the process?

General Thompson. Sir, General Raymond as the commander of U.S. Space Command, one of the first things he did when he established the command, he established what he called integration—forward integration and planning elements with every single combatant command. Their purpose it was modeled after what had been done in U.S. Cyber Command, to ensure the expertise, the capability, and ability to integrate operations and plans for all of the rest of the combatant commands was there for space as it was in the other domains. That was instead of a more traditional model and a larger resource model that created individual components in all of those commands.

The job of the U.S. Space Force will be to ensure that those planning elements and the individuals in those planning elements that are U.S. Space Force members are adequately trained, have the adequate expertise and are prepared to support U.S. Space Command and combatant command in that work that needs to be done.

Mr. Aderholt. In terms of rolling out the plans to locate the various parts of the Space Force and how it will all be supported, how are the studies going to be in terms of the cost of living and the cost of operations?

General Thompson. The Department of the Air Force has a very objective and transparent process by which we define the criteria that we need for basing decisions on a whole host of factors, assess them, develop options, and ultimately do a selection process. Our intent is to use that same process that is used for strategic basing for decisions across the Department of the Air Force at the point at which it becomes necessary and prudent in the establishment of various commands inside the Space Force.
General CROSIER. If I could just add very quickly. So in the congressional report that we submitted just a few weeks ago to this committee and to the rest of the Congress, what we said was as we looked at these organizations that are moving from the Air Force into the Space Force and potentially organizations that might move from the Army, Navy, or other DOD, we used a phrase, we said, we wanted to to the maximum extent practical keep organizations located where they are. We have said cost and maintaining cost and being careful about cost is a very important parameter for us. And, frankly, unless there was an overwhelming need to relocate something—and in most cases we don’t really see that—then it is far more effective and less expensive to continue to maintain capabilities where it is.

So, again, we will look on a case-by-case basis, but we have been very clear, unless there is an overwhelming operational need that we would much prefer leaving things where they are, at least, for the near term to midterm until the Space Force grows into its final operating capability.

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Womack, you are recognized. I think we are batting cleanup. And since we have about 20 minutes, General, I would ask and you have been very good in your answers, but I think we are looking for additional brevity because I do have a series of questions, too. But floor is yours, Mr. Womack.

Mr. WOMACK. So I am supposed to be brief?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No. You are always a gentlemen. I am not worried about you.

SPACE NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. WOMACK. Well, I will be brief.

Well, not completely satisfied with the answer on the Guard, so I am going to pushback a little bit and press a little bit. We have—in my State—I am Arkansas—we have space-focused missions already. And, frankly, I don’t understand why, because of the reporting requirements as you stand this organization up, I don’t understand why we are going to not incorporate space guard, create a Space National Guard because we have those elements, why we wouldn’t do that on the front end, while we will study it later. By not doing it now, does it make it easier just not to ever do it? I mean, in all the other services, our Guard and Reserve folks bring so much value to the process and their expertise inside the uniform and, in many cases, in their civilian occupations lend itself. And I know that part of the reporting requirements as was contained in one of the documents in the open-source information was to prevent what was called bureaucratic bloat and redundancy. It just makes sense that the space guard idea should have been part and parcel to the process from the beginning and should be incorporated. And I am not satisfied that it is not.

General THOMPSON. And Congressman, I will tell you that in many of the areas that we are looking at, in acquisition and personnel management, in a whole host of areas, there are many people who simply believe the way we do things today are effective
and we should continue to do that. And in many ways, we ultimately may do that and probably will do that. What I would suggest is, it is probably harder to create a guard and then try to uncreate a guard rather than it is to do a study and then later say the proper answer is to get guard or not a guard.

And so what we don’t want to do is put blinders on or presuppose an answer, at the same time not precluding it, just make sure we have allowed ourselves full flexibility to understand the problem, understand the solutions, understand the advantages, the pros and cons, and make the decision going forward.

Mr. WOMACK. So what is your answer to the space-focused guardsmen out there who have been—I don’t want to say overlooked, but maybe they just feel bastardized in some way? That may not be the right way to say it, but what is your answer?

General THOMPSON. What I would say is——

Mr. WOMACK. Where do we fit in this process?

General THOMPSON. All of those units that were previously aligned Air Force Space Command are now realigned to U.S. Space Force units. They continue to execute the mission. They continue to be as vital today as they were before that, and they will be as long as this construct is in place until we decide what the future looks like and we implement it. So they are just as valuable and important to us today.

Mr. WOMACK. So, from an upward mobility standpoint, how will these airmen in space-focused missions advance without a space guard? I am not real sure how——

General THOMPSON. Well, sir, they advance inside the Guard structure today. That Guard structure remains in the Air Force and in the Army, you know. I would hope and I would expect—and I know General Lengyel is a strong supporter—they would have the same advancement opportunities inside the Guard today that they have had in the past.

Mr. WOMACK. Call me skeptical with the process. We will keep an eye on it.

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOMACK. And I thank you.

SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you.

I would start by associating myself with the questions raised by Mr. Diaz-Balart as well as Mr. Womack. I did not hear the complete interchange, but would be concerned about some of the personnel suffering because they have lacked schooling or career advancement opportunity. So, again, appreciate that being raised and apologize. It has been a while since we have been interrupted by a vote. We have a prime real estate here. So we are not looking to prolong anything, but we can continue for a moment.

The space programs and other programs in the Federal Government from time to time are run overbudget and behind schedule. My concern is, because the Air Force will not relinquish authority over the acquisition decisions for several years, the Space Force is developing a proposed plan for an alternative acquisition system to streamline it. The plan is set to be before the United States Con-
gress at the end of this month, but as you know beginning in April, we are writing our bill. The question is: The commitment will be met as far as the end of March, and, as you sit here or between now and the end of March, if there is an anticipation of a substantive budget issue for 2021, I assume we have your assurances we would hear back from you on that?

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. The Space Development Agency is slated to move to the Space Force in October of 2022, more than 2 years from now. If everybody is agreed it should move, why the wait, if I could ask?

General THOMPSON. Sir, the thought inside the Department right now is, both the Space Development Agency and the U.S. Space Force are two young and immature organizations that have been given an aggressive charter and an aggressive purpose and an aggressive mission. And the thought was each one of them, understanding the ultimate end state, each one of them needs the opportunity to develop and grow and reach a level of maturity before we bring them together. I will tell you that we have already been, since the establishment of the Space Development Agency, we have been working very closely with them on ensuring that the activities of the Space Force and the SDR are complementary. We are sharing architectural ideas, requirements, and things like that. So we are working together, but the thought was, let both organizations mature a little bit and then bring them together.

LAUNCH COSTS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. On a launch cost for fiscal year 2020, Congress appropriated $1.2 billion for launches, rough approximation $310 million per launch for 2021. We are looking for three launches for a billion comes out to about 350 million per launch. Realize part of that cost is government oversight. Any reason for the continued increase in launch costs and also recognize we have got a competition going on here? The theory is all of this is supposed to be reducing that average launch cost.

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. So what I would propose. I will give you the answer and then propose we would come back to you and your staff with more detail. It is also a matter of the type of mission, the size of mission, the uniqueness of the mission, the complexity of the mission, and the missions in 2021 in that sense are a little more complex. They are going to unique orbits. They have some specific requirements that aren’t what I would call part of a typical launch.

What I would suggest to you is, we get together with you and your staff. We go through the elements of the mission and the elements of the cost, in particular, and I think what you will see is those cost differentials are based on the uniqueness of the mission. You are absolutely correct. We are in the middle of a competition. We expect to award this summer, and we fully anticipate cost savings out of that program.

COMPTROLLER

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. My understanding is you will not have your own comptroller. Are you worried about your independence?
Is there a plan at some point to house a comptroller in your organization?

General Crosier. Congressman, so already, as you know, we have submitted a separate Air Force budget from a separate Space Force budget in this budget build fiscal year 2021. In fiscal year 2022, we already have—the budget that we submitted was largely built by the Air Force with some Space Force involvement and participation, as the Space Force stood up only in December as you know. But the fiscal year 2022 budget, we are taking responsibility to build as the Space Force.

So General Raymond as the CSO has a pot of money that has been allocated to us to recommend to the Congress for appropriation, and he has control and authority over how we will recommend that money to be used. So I think he has complete autonomy within that cap, within that dollar value that we have been given within the budget bogie if you will, and I think he has complete authority to oversee that. What we have done is, because the comptroller proper is in the secretariat and we are two services and one Secretary, we will share the FM, the comptroller function in current year of execution. But what we did to make sure that we had not just appropriate representation but to ensure that they had enough manpower to manage two separate budgets now is we have invested a number of billets from the U.S. Space Force into our FM function so that we have dedicated full time people doing the Space Force budgeting mission in direct support of the Space Force.

Mr. Viscoisky. The Air Force will be executing activities on your behalf. Will they be charging you a tax for those in the coming fiscal year?

General Crosier. Congressman, I am not aware of any taxes. Obviously, we have to work out the details of exactly how we do budget allocation, one Department, two services. As I have said, we looked heavily at the Navy and Marine Corps, but, Congressman, I am not aware of any tax processes or any idea for that.

BUDGET

Mr. Viscoisky. Okay. No organization’s life is unstatic. I notice that the budget grows somewhat over the next 5 years, but not appreciably. However, recently the chief of staff of the Air Force indicated that he did not think that the current funding levels for the Space Force was sustainable and that the Nation’s needs when it comes to space capability are going to enlarge. Any sense looking out these next 4 years and the 5-year plan where we are going to hear back and there is going to be a bump?

General Thompson. Chairman, I would say, first of all, I think like many of the rest of our Armed Forces, the Space Force is probably smaller than the Nation expects. However, we have been blessed over the last several years with significant increases in the budget after what we need as a space warfighting domain, and all I would tell you going forward is, based on the guidance from the administration, based on what we do in terms of Congress, based on the resources provided, that the chief of space operations working with the Secretary and the leadership of the Nation will create the investment strategy, the best investment strategy we can to meet the challenges we face in space.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. I don't mean this in any disrespect at all, and there was an interchange earlier about the size of the National Intelligence Administration and whether it was supposed to be 100 and whether it was 1,200 there now, but it appears that the Space Force is planning to have two four-star general officers and at least three three-star general officers. You mentioned before the small size of the Space Force, a tenth of the size of the Marine Corps. Any concern that we are going to end up being top heavy with officers?

General THOMPSON. Sir, there is absolutely concern, and what we would love to do, we are finishing our analysis and our final proposal to come back and share those numbers. I will tell you two things: First of all, there has been tremendous pressure and tremendous drive from our leadership to hold down the bureaucracy of this force, and we are going through a number of initiatives—and if you would like, General Crosier will share some of those—to ensure that we are agile, we are lean, and we are mission-focused. We are using a lot of innovative approaches to ensure that is the case. The additional challenge that we have is we also have to function inside the Department of Defense and the national security enterprise. And to be effective—and we have got to be effective functioning inside that enterprise—comes with it what I will call certain things that we have to do to effectively engage in the budgeting process to effectively ensure that our—that chief space operations fulfills his role with the Joint Chiefs to do planning, programming, to do all of those things. And to sort of plug into that enterprise effectively is going to drive some things that we need. And what we would like to do is do two things: Show you how that works, number one, but also to show you the metrics we developed that we believe shows we are, in fact, relatively speaking light and lean when it comes to bureaucracy.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, I do trust your good faith, and I would appreciate also we had an exchange in our office last week relative to budget justifications, and I do appreciate that people have followed up with us and shown the committee the respect I think it deserves.

I would encourage you in that and it is hard sometimes to resist requests. We are here also to be helpful to you to manage the size so you are exactly the size you do need for our national security; no less, but no more. So we would want to participate in that as well. So thank you very much.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. One last comment. I was somewhat surprised you had an unfunded priority list already of $1 billion, and so you are learning your lesson from your parent organization. So I just thought I would point that out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert is on fire today.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chair, Ranking Member, this really isn't for you gentlemen to answer today, but we need to think about how the Space Force is going to align with NATO and our other allies as we look at Russia and China. Is the Air Force going do it? Because it took a while after World War II to develop NATO, and dif-
different NATO allies are aligned different ways. They have all been working on space. They have things done differently, and so this is going to have to be a decision and discussion that is going to have to take place. And I think it needs to take place sooner rather than later if it is happening. I think you are so busy with everything else right now and fulfilling your mission of trying to get yourself organized at the same time do the excellent job you do in space, but that is probably a luxury discussion that that takes place. But if we are going to figure out, as we patrol the seas to keep them navigable, as we do drills to make sure that things work on the ground, we will have to figure out how Space Force interacts with our allies.

General Crosier. Congresswoman, if I can just add very quickly, you are right. We do have a lot on the plate, and we are very busy, but the Air Force, the space elements within the Air Force had a pretty robust engagement with allies and partners before the Space Force was stood up, and that mission has translated. And we are paying particularly attention to that. In fact, just a few weeks from now, we have the annual space symposium out in Colorado Springs, the end of March, first week in April. And General Raymond, our CSO, is hosting his first ever space chief’s conference—international space chief’s conference at the space symposium. So he is going to have—I am not sure—10, 12, 15 foreign space chiefs, allied space chiefs that are there at the symposium with him and already starting to do the engagements to figure out how we are going to work together. So we are on a positive trend, I think. We have a lot of work to do, but I think we have got a lot of those engagements already established.

Ms. McCollum. As has been said before, good luck, and I say that as a daughter of an Army Air Corps person. Good luck.

Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You have a fascinating but very difficult challenge ahead of you. You do have our best wishes. And because it is new, it is unchartered, good things happen, problems occur. Please stay in touch and let us know. We want you to be successful here. So we are adjourned. Thank you very much.
THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2020.

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

WITNESSES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. SCOTT DINGLE, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE U.S. ARMY
REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE L. GILLINGHAM, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE U.S. NAVY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOROTHY A. HOGG, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE
THOMAS McCAFFERY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD PLACE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY
BILL TINSTON, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DEFENSE HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Opening Statement of Vice-Chair McCollum

Ms. McCollum. The Subcommittee on Defense will come to order. This morning the subcommittee will receive testimony on the defense health programs in the military health system, and we have six witnesses with us today and we welcome them: Lieutenant General R. Scott Dingle, Surgeon of the U.S. Army; Rear Admiral Bruce L. Gillingham, Surgeon of the U.S. Navy; Lieutenant General Dorothy A. Hogg, Surgeon General of the United States Air Force; Mr. McCaffery, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; and Lieutenant Ronald J. Place, Director of Defense Health Agency; and Mr. Bill Tinston, Program Executive Officer of Defense Healthcare and Management Systems. Today we have serious questions on how medical reforms have been accounted for in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2021.

As you will notice, we will have members coming in and out. We are getting briefings on COVID–19 as we speak, and there is a few other meetings going on. But your full testimony is available, and I know members had it like I did last night to read through it.

So we will get started. Across the spectrum of the military healthcare system, from military readiness to benefit care, in many cases the budget justifications lacks adequate detail for the subcommittee to make informed decisions. We hope the witnesses today can address the subcommittee’s questions and concerns.

Out of particular interest we look forward to hearing about the role of the Department in addressing or assisting other Federal agencies dealing with the epidemic or pandemic possible outbreaks, such as COVID–19, the Department’s study on reducing and eliminating certain healthcare services at many military treatment facilities, and an update on the Department’s electronic healthcare record system, MSH Genesis.
We look forward to hearing about these topics and more. And, with that, I want to once again thank you for appearing before the subcommittee. And now I want to recognize our distinguished ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his comments.

OPEN STATEMENT OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I want to thank you for referring to this horrible disease as COVID–19. I am from Corona, California, so we want to make sure that we call the disease what it is.

Ms. McCollum. I did it for you.

Mr. Calvert. And I appreciate that very much.

I want to welcome our distinguished panel. This is a critical year for the military healthcare system with a lot at stake. We are trying to keep the COVID–19 virus from impacting readiness while also going through significant structural changes to the system.

These changes include transitioning military treatment facilities from the services to the Defense Health Agency, consolidating some facilities and shifting medical specialties to focus more on operational readiness, all while continuing to implement a new electronic health records system. Currently, you have a lot on your plate.

Given that these issues will impact a broad population, to include military personnel, dependents, and retirees, I can't overstate the importance of keeping us apprised of your progress and informing us when you need help. We must ensure that health and safety are not adversely impacted as a result of these structural changes.

During my time, I will ask you to address some of these issues, starting with your preparedness and resourcing for COVID–19. We all know the impact it has globally, and I will be interested in your plans to mitigate its effect on the force. In addition, I will ask about your views on the structural changes to the military healthcare system and their potential impact on readiness. And, finally, I look forward to hearing about the progress on implementing the new electronic health record.

Thank you for your service. I look forward to your testimony.

With that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mrs. Lowey and Ms. Granger are hoping to be joining us, and we will break for any statements that they wish to make when they arrive.

As I said earlier, your full written testimony will be placed in the record, and members have copies at their seats. And I told some of you I was riveted reading last night. So we have it, and we thank you for it.

In the interest of time, however, I am going to strongly encourage each one of you to keep your summarized statement to 3 minutes or less, and I will let you know when you are at 3 minutes. I will do so gently, and then it might get a little louder with the gavel.

So, Lieutenant General Dingle, will you lead us off with the 3-minute remark.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DINGLE

General DINGLE. Thank you, Vice Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to speak before you today. The mission of the Army Medicine is to conserve the fighting strength as the Army is called upon to deploy, fight, and win wars in support of our National Defense Strategy. We accomplish this not independently but as part of a synergistic Joint Force that is represented before you today.

The Chief of Staff of the Army says: People first and winning matters because there is no second place in combat.

Like General McConville, I and everyone in Army Medicine recognize the foundational strength of our Army lies in our people, our soldiers, their families, our civilians, and our soldiers for life. They are our greatest strength and our most important asset.

My vision for Army Medicine is to ensure that we remain ready, reformed, reorganized, responsive, and relevant in this era of unprecedented global complexity, change, and uncertainty, whether in support of multidomain operations, large-scale combat operations, or pandemic emergencies. As the Army undergoes modernization to support the multidomain battlefield, we will lead through change and reorganize to remain relevant and responsive to the warfighter.

However, our unwavering commitment to save lives on the battlefield will never change. In tomorrow’s multidomain battlefield our adversaries may possess robust anti-access and aerial—area-denial capabilities that will test our ability to provide prolonged field care. Consequently, our medics will have to sustain life in austere locations. This requires changes in our doctrine, training, and material solutions.

To remain relevant in this new environment, Army Medicine must leverage 21st century digital technologies along with cutting-edge research and development in order to remain proficient. Army Medicine is assisting in the prevention, deterrence, detection, and treatment of infectious diseases.

Similar to HIV and the Ebola responses, Army Medicine is working with leading agencies and institutions to combat COVID–19. Army Medicine’s ability to prevent, detect, and treat infectious diseases depends greatly on the Army’s research, development, and public health capabilities that enable a medical ready force and a force that is medically ready.

In closing, I want to thank the committee for allowing my colleagues and I to speak before you this morning. America entrusts the military health system, Army Medicine, and the services with its most precious resources, our sons and daughters. It is imperative that we get it right, and we will. Your commitment and continued support assures the Joint Force that when a wounded soldier cries out “medic” in combat, we will be there ready to respond because Army Medicine is Army strong.

I look forward to answering your questions.

[The written statement of General Dingle follows:]
STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. SCOTT DINGLE
THE SURGEON GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

SECOND SESSION, 116TH CONGRESS

ON DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

MARCH 5, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of our Soldiers, Civilians, and Families about the state of Army Medicine. Your continued support enables us to remain ready and responsive in our demanding global security environment.

Today, over 190,900 Soldiers are engaged across the world in support of ten named contingency operations, multiple exercises and theater security cooperation activities. For 19 years, United States Army Soldiers and Civilians have served in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and many other locations performing our mission as part of the Joint Force. As the 45th Army Surgeon General and on behalf of the Army’s health professionals who conserve the fighting strength in support of our Army, I thank you for your faithful support.

The Chief of Staff of the Army says, “People First - Winning Matters”. With this foundational pillar, Army leadership priorities remain consistent: build and sustain strategic readiness; modernize the Army thereby maintaining our competitive edge; reform; protect our resources; and make better decisions. None of these priorities can be accomplished without our people. They are central to everything we do to reorganize the military health system. People also enable us to respond to worldwide contingencies with modern capabilities, operational concepts and advanced technologies, making us relevant.

As The Surgeon General, my top priority is the health, welfare and readiness of our Soldiers, their Families, our Civilians and our Soldiers for Life especially after 19 years on the battlefield. This is what we must discuss here today.

ARMY MEDICINE 2028

In my Army Medicine 2028 vision, we are operationalizing our plan to meet our strategic readiness priorities along five key objectives – Ready, Reformed, Reorganized, Responsive, and Relevant.
READY – taking care of people, our Soldiers, and our Families is paramount to readiness. We will build and sustain strategic readiness to ensure the operational force can win across all domains—land, air, sea, space and cyber, by embracing modernization efforts through emerging technologies, synthetic training and partnerships.

Army Medicine is inherently about People. Going forward we must ensure a healthy, fit force ready to deploy and fight in any environment. Once deployed, we must maintain the ability to protect the health of our people, provide life-saving care at the point of injury and throughout the evacuation process. We will accomplish this through initiatives that sustain Soldier and clinical readiness skills and for the first time, provide a system of measuring and accessing individual readiness.

As part of the Army Medical Skills Sustainment Program, Army Medicine established two programs; the Army Medicine Military-Civilian Trauma Team Training (AMCT3) and the Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Training (SMART), to allow our officers and enlisted surgical personnel to train at civilian Level 1 trauma centers. We currently have three full agreements with Camden University Health System in New Jersey, the Oregon Health and Science University, and the Medical College of Wisconsin. We expanded such partnership efforts through agreements with Vanderbilt University Hospital, Harborview Medical Center, and University of Chicago Medical College.

The Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Training (SMART) is similarly designed to build and manage skills sustainment partnerships with civilian Level 1 trauma centers. In SMART, currently in Ohio and New Jersey, our enlisted medics and medical specialists receive practical training along with their civilian healthcare counterparts in premier trauma centers and hospitals throughout the United States. We anticipate expanding this program to Oklahoma, Hawaii and Illinois.

To ensure readiness, we continue to seek out and support multiple training venues for our operational medical forces. Recently, we conducted a no-notice emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) for one of the newly designed Field Hospitals.
These exercises demonstrate the strategic and operational readiness of the military medical force to deploy, operate and survive on the battlefield. Additionally we support numerous Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETES) and theater engagement programs in support of Combatant Commands. In 2019, 313 medical professionals supported readiness exercises, including 44 Army Humanitarian/Civil Assistance missions and Global Health Engagements across the globe.

Army Medicine continues to strengthen Army readiness by investing in modernization. We are reducing our reliance on legacy technologies as we develop future systems to train to fight in the multi-domain battlespace. Working closely with Army Futures Command and Army Materiel Command, we continuously assess our ability to remain agile and adaptable across the medical force. We recently conducted a force development update to our legacy Combat Support Hospital and Forward Surgical Team. The newly designed Field Hospital (32 beds, which can expand to a 240 bed Hospital Center) and Forward Resuscitative Surgical Team (2 surgical beds capable of 10 surgeries in 24 hours) bring improved capability to the mission. Army Medicine continues to develop wartime medical doctrine and equipment to support extended patient hold times. We are investing in new technology and processes to extend lifesaving capabilities in support of the warfighter, to include innovative training for our combat medics.

Last year, we transferred over sixteen hundred medical authorizations from Army Generating Force organizations to our operating force. Assigned to the units they deploy with, these Soldiers serve with “duty at” their medical treatment facilities – a partnership between the operational and generating force that builds relationships and training readiness while sustaining clinical skills. This new approach to organizational and individual readiness is an example of innovation to ensure we are trained and mission ready. We continue to work with the Services to determine future operational medical force readiness requirements.

**REFORMED AND REORGANIZED** – Our Army remains committed to medical reform initiatives as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act, shifting from an
industrial age to an information age organization. Similarly, Army Medicine must effectively reorganize in accordance with reform requirements and Army Senior Leader directives to remain nested with the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Modernization Strategy.

To ensure our readiness goals are nested with the Army’s overall effort, Army Medicine reformed and reorganized our systems correspondingly. Last year, Army Medicine transitioned our medical treatment facilities in the United States to the Defense Health Agency as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act and at the direction of Army Senior Leaders. To ensure mission success, the Army remains in direct support of the Defense Health Agency as they continue to work towards achieving full operational capacity. During the process, we will review all medical manpower transitions to minimize impact on healthcare delivery and ensure any adjustments to medical force structure are the result of an informed process addressing risk and ensuring support to the operational force.

Army Medicine has been able to leverage public health and medical research and development capabilities in support of operating forces. Last year, our public health teams were routinely called upon for immediate response to Group A Streptococcus at training sites, mold in Army family housing, and consultations teams to mitigate hazards to the force. Our research and development assets in the United States and abroad have greatly increased the Army’s ability to respond to emerging threats with solutions that protect detect and treat to preserve human life. These capabilities have been vital to sustaining the health and the welfare of Soldiers and to meeting the National Security and Defense Strategies.

**RESPONSIVE** – For over 245 years, Army Medicine has maintained a presence on the battlefield – from Saratoga to Syria. Army Medicine will tailor our expeditionary force to support the new paradigm of multi-domain operations, synchronized as part of the Joint Health Service Enterprise.
Medical research allows us to respond to the needs of the operational force. We are the largest sponsor of trauma and injury research and development in the Nation. Army medical research spearheaded the development of a first-of-its-kind technique to control hemorrhaging from inside the blood vessel. Army infectious disease researchers played a role in development and marketing of every anti-malarial and additional drugs currently in clinical trials as part of a broader Defense Department malaria vaccine portfolio. Two years ago, Army Medicine reported to Congress that our medical research generated tremendous progress regarding traumatic brain injuries with a new blood test to evaluate brain injuries – the signature injury of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Similarly, protecting our People from infectious disease and environmental contaminants is essential to the readiness of the Army. Army public health capabilities respond to the needs of deployed forces while they support of our Soldiers and their Families at home. In previous years, the Nation has looked to Army public health to be responsive with our epidemiological consultation teams as we were responsive to a myriad of issues such as antimicrobial resistance, Zika, Ebola, and the housing and burn pit registries. Today, Army Public Health is ready to respond to the coronavirus epidemic, if needed.

The ability of Army Medicine to respond to global missions with innovative treatments and modern medical solutions ensures that we remain relevant to the needs of the Joint Force. Through continued investment, we sustain a capability that ensures strategic advantage in future and more complex operational scenarios. Without both research and public health resident in the Army, we incur substantial risk treating the injured and fielding equipping solutions and materiel to the force.

**RELEVANT** – Army Medicine must change at the speed of relevance. This includes modernization of key capabilities, technical innovations, and expanded alliances and partnerships to meet the shared challenges of our time.
Training the breadth of modern life saving and operational concepts keeps the medical force relevant for the global environment; this is true of all our healthcare professionals. To train the ready medical force, we host the largest graduate medical education platforms with the largest number of training institutions, programs, and officers in training. We currently have a first time medical board certification pass rate of 95%, well exceeding the 87% national average. Army Medicine is indeed attracting the best in the Nation.

Recruiting and retaining the appropriate number of critical wartime specialties however is a challenge to the future readiness of Army Medicine. It can take three years to have qualified nurses, eight years to have qualified psychiatrists and up to twelve years for qualified surgeons. Currently, the Army has shortages in several key surgical specialties such as orthopedic, thoracic, and general surgery across all components. We can only remain relevant to the Joint Force if we have the right people in place. The Army, like the nation, faces a shortage of healthcare providers and must compete with the civilian market to recruit medical students with the propensity and ability to be a Soldier. We are exploring increasing the number of scholarships and adjusting obligations of serving on Active Duty.

Finally, given the cost of medical education and licensure, we compete with the civilian market. There are fewer incentives to stay in service at middle and senior grades. Army bonuses remain steady over the past decade while the civilian market outpaced the Department of Defense in competitive compensation for the limited supply of medical professionals. The statutory limit established at the turn of the century prevents the Army from remaining on par with the civilian sector. The Army needs the authority to increase incentives for accession and retention bonuses for providers in critical specialties. The readiness of the force and our ability to be relevant to Combatant Commanders requires that we make a financial investment in our people as we explore retaining active component providers who wish to continue serving in the Reserves.
CONCLUSION

In closing, I want to thank the committee for their long standing support to Army and Military Medicine. Congressional support has enabled Army Medicine and advanced military medical care in support of our Nation, our Army, and the Joint Force. Your continued support ensures our Army that when a sick or wounded Soldier calls out for a medic, Army Medicine will be there to answer – just as we have for the past 245 years. Today’s modernization does not replace the traditions of the past. We are respectfully building upon the legacy of over two centuries of Army Medicine – saving lives and conserving the fighting strength.
Ms. McCollum. Sir, that was delivered with precision timing. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL GILLINGHAM

Rear Admiral Gillingham, your statement, please.

Admiral Gillingham. Good morning. Madam Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the over 60,000 men and women who comprise the mission-ready Navy Medicine team, I am pleased to be here today. I am grateful for the continued trust you place in us.

The mission of Navy Medicine is tightly linked to those we serve, the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, their ability to prevail across the range of military operations depends on their medical readiness and our capability to enhance their survival on the high-end fight.

At its core, survivability is Navy Medicine’s contribution to lethality. To this end, our one Navy Medicine priority is the people, platforms, performance, and power are strategically aligned to meet these imperatives: Well-trained people working as cohesive teams on optimized platforms demonstrating high-velocity performance that will project medical power in support of naval superiority.

I can tell you that these priorities are rapidly taking hold. On any given day, Navy Medicine personnel are deployed and operating forward in a full range of diverse missions, including damage control resuscitation and surgery teams; trauma care at the NATO Role 3 Multinational Medical Unit in Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; humanitarian assistance onboard our hospital ships; and expeditionary health service support and force health protection around the world.

There is no doubt that people are at the epicenter of everything we do, dedicated Active and Reserve personnel, Navy civilians, serving around the world in support of our mission. In order to meet current future challenges. We must recruit and retain talented medical and civilian workforce. Navy Medicine continues to focus on several key areas, both our officer and enlisted communities, including critical wartime and operational specialties, as well as mental healthcare providers.

Importantly, we are now embedding 29 percent of our uniformed mental health providers directly with fleet, Fleet Marine Force, and training commands to improve access to care and to help reduce stigma. All of us have a responsibility to do everything possible to reduce the incidents of suicide. It is important—it’s impact is devastating and affects families, shipmates, and commands.

Collectively, substantive military health system reforms directed by Congress in fiscal years 2017 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts represents an important inflection point for military medicine, catalyzed our efforts to strengthen our integrated system of readiness and health.

Navy and Marine Corps leadership recognize the tremendous opportunity we have to refocus our efforts on medical readiness while transitioning Healthcare Benefit Administration to Defense Health Agency. You would expect from a transformation of this scale, MHS
reform presents us with both challenges and opportunities. We can point to progress made to date. However, all of us recognize there is much work ahead.

In summary, the Nation depends upon our unique expeditionary medical expertise to prepare and support our naval forces. It is a privilege to care for our sailors, marines, and families. Again, thank you for your leadership, and I look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Rear Admiral Gillingham follows:]
STATEMENT OF

REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE L. GILLINGHAM
MEDICAL CORPS, UNITED STATES NAVY

SURGEON GENERAL OF THE NAVY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

OF THE

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT:

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

MARCH 5, 2020
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the mission-ready Navy Medicine team, I want to thank you for continued confidence and support. As we move forward, I want to assure you that the foundation of Navy Medicine is readiness. We will not waiver from our highest priority of keeping our Sailors and Marines healthy and ready to deploy; and, ensuring that when they are wounded or injured they get the best care possible from trained and confident providers.

**Strategic Alignment and Priorities**

The mission of Navy Medicine is inextricably linked to those we serve – the United States Navy and the United State Marine Corps. The Navy-Marine Corps team’s ability to prevail across the range of military operations depends on their medical readiness and our capability to enhance their survival in the high end fight. At its core, survivability is Navy Medicine’s contribution to lethality.

Our mission is to project medical power in support of integrated Naval superiority. These responsibilities require Navy Medicine to be fully synchronized with the strategic direction of both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in his updated order to *A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0*, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) in his Planning Guidance. To this end, our One Navy Medicine priorities of People, Platforms, Performance and Power are aligned to meet these strategic imperatives:

*Well-trained People, working as cohesive teams on optimized Platforms, demonstrating high velocity Performance that will project medical Power in support of Naval superiority.*

In January 2020, I issued my operation order (OPORD) to the men and women of Navy Medicine which indicates that we will pursue these priorities with a sense of urgency at all levels of Navy Medicine. Moving forward, they will guide our lines of effort and resource investments.
to meet our commitment to provide medical forces that are manned, trained and equipped to support current and future operations of the Naval force.

I support the President’s Budget for FY2021 and the resources it provides us to fulfill the medical missions of the Navy and Marine Corps. An important component is for us to ensure that Navy Medicine is resourced to meet our Services’ (Navy and Marine Corps) readiness mission. I want to assure you that throughout Navy Medicine we will continue to apply sound fiscal stewardship in managing the resources provided to us.

**Medical Power for Naval Superiority**

Military Health System (MHS) transformation has provided Navy Medicine an unmatched opportunity to refocus on our true mission – the reason why we have uniformed medical personnel – which is achieving maximum future life-saving capabilities and survivability along the continuum of care. When a Sailor or Marine goes into harm’s way, Navy Medicine is with them. The CNO and CMC have expressed a sense of urgency for Navy Medicine to meet the demands of the rapidly changing security environment. Our commitment: Optimizing Navy Medicine for the warfighter.

**People:** The epicenter we do is our people – dedicated active and reserve component personnel and Navy civilians – serving around the world in support of our mission. As our greatest strength, we must continue to build and sustain our military and civilian workforce, as well as ensure that our force structure is appropriately sized to meet our operational requirements. These efforts require us to be innovative in recruiting the best and brightest particularly for high demand health care specialties. While the overall manning of the Navy Medicine Department active component is good, we must ensure we have the proper specialty mix within each officer Corps (Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps,
Nurse Corps) and for our enlisted Hospital Corps. Navy Medicine continues to focus on several key areas in both our officer and enlisted communities including critical wartime and operational specialties as well as mental health care providers. This attention is particularly important in the reserve component, where recruiting and retaining Medical Corps officers is especially challenging. Navy Medicine works closely with Navy Recruiting Command to attract candidates, recognizing that the health care marketplace is very competitive. Our student accession programs are vital, considering Navy relies on the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and the Health Professions Scholarship Program for the vast majority of new Medical Corps accessions each year. I am grateful for your continued support of accession and retention incentives which have enabled us to sustain consistent overall manning levels.

Within our civilian workforce, recruiting and retaining top quality personnel is imperative. We remain keenly aware of the competition for talent in the private sector and we are continuing to leverage authorized flexibilities and hiring authorities to help meet our requirements. During this period of MHS transition during which some Navy civilians will be transitioning to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), Navy Medicine leadership, led by our Civilian Corps Chief, continues to actively communicate with our personnel to ensure they have the most current information.

Our people must have the skill sets they need to succeed and we know that training is essential to building ready and confident provider teams. Future conflicts require investments to improve our health services capability to provide optimal combat casualty care, including specialized trauma care, to enhance survivability in dynamic warfighting environments. Our provider teams must be prepared to deliver trauma care across the full range of military operations, and it is incumbent on us to ensure they have access to this clinical experience either
in our facilities or with civilian partners. The establishment of the trauma center at Naval Medical Center Camp Lejeune, along with our long-standing partnership with Los Angeles County/University of Southern California Medical Center and our new initiative with the University of Pennsylvania, allows our provider teams to get direct trauma care experience. As an orthopedic surgeon, I can attest to how vital these partnerships are and we will continue to look for opportunities to expand these relationships moving forward.

Our trauma strategy also impacts our Hospital Corpsmen, the Navy's largest enlisted rating. In FY2019, we graduated 3,432 new Hospital Corpsmen and trained over 3,500 in advanced schools. Corpsmen are vital to our medical mission and they are getting valuable experience through our trauma training course operating at three high-volume trauma centers, John H. Stroger Jr. Hospital in Chicago, Illinois and University of Florida Health Jacksonville, Florida and University Hospital Cleveland, Ohio. We have also established a new training partnership with the Cleveland Clinic, specifically for our Independent Duty Corpsmen (IDCs) to receive additional clinical experience prior to deploying with the Fleet or with Marine Forces.

These partnerships, along with readiness-centric work at military treatment facilities (MTFs), are key to ensuring our personnel have the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) to develop and sustain operationally relevant skills for expeditionary combat casualty care. Many of these skill sets are perishable, requiring innovative approaches to sustain currency. This is a priority for us moving forward as we leverage our capabilities within military medicine, Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as partnerships and cooperative agreements with civilian health systems, to ensure our personnel have the skills and training to perform their demanding mission. Our graduate medical education programs, which rank among the country's best, are vital to
military medicine. I would assert that these programs form essentially an “industrial base” to sustain our capability to meet requirements.

Platforms: Well-trained providers and optimally prepared platforms are the foundation of our ability to project medical power. On any given day, Navy Medicine personnel are deployed and operating forward in the full range of diverse missions including: austere damage control resuscitation and surgery teams in U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command, including our expeditionary medical facility forward deployed at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; trauma care at the NATO Role 3 Multinational Medical Unit in Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; humanitarian assistance onboard our hospital ships; and, expeditionary health services support and force health protection with Joint, Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces around the world.

Navy Medicine recognizes this mandate and our focus remains to provide a ready medical force and operational medical capabilities to save lives at sea and on the battlefield. Our manning, training and equipping for current and future missions must prepare our medical personnel to operate in varied operational environments including distributed maritime operations, which present unique challenges for damage control resuscitation / surgery and patient movement. Correspondingly, we need to continue to re-shape and modernize medical capabilities that are modular, scalable and distributable. Efforts are actively underway to address the validated requirements for Naval Expeditionary Health Service Support afloat and ashore. Given the importance of these efforts, we have assigned a Navy Medicine flag officer on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics as the Director of Medical Systems Integration and Combat Survivability.

Performance: Our refocus on readiness also affords us the opportunity to apply the principles of a high reliability organization (HRO) – leadership, culture of safety and robust
performance improvement - in the operational medical forces. We have made solid progress in our MTFs in improving clinical outcomes and coordination of care, enhancing access, leveraging technology and improving patient safety. We will continue to bring that same commitment to our warfighters in the operational environments. Our priority moving forward is to ensure we have an integrated system of capabilities that optimizes our ability to proactively communicate, anticipate, identify, resolve and share to solve problems that threaten warfighter readiness and battlefield survivability. HRO, along with high velocity learning, are important components in driving these changes.

Another priority is ensuring that our Sailors and Marines have ready access to behavioral health support, where and when they need it. We reinforce a “no wrong door” approach to delivering prevention, early identification and evidence-based treatment in multiple settings including mental health clinics, primary care, installation counseling centers and with the operational forces. As part of our embedded mental health program, Navy Medicine providers - psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, behavioral health nurse practitioners, clinical social workers as well as enlisted behavioral health technicians - are assigned directly in Fleet and Marine Forces units. We now have 29 percent of active duty mental health providers serving in embedded mental health billets. Embedding our personnel with the operational forces improves access to care, reduces stigma in reaching out for help, and supports commanding officers in strengthening resiliency and mental health fitness. This focus also extends to training commands including Naval Service Training Command, Marine Corps Recruit Depot and Nuclear Power Training commands.

We have also established a new walk-in mental health clinic, the Mental Health Operational Outreach Division, at Naval Station San Diego, California. Sailors benefit by the clinic's co-
location with other psychological support resources such as Fleet and Family Support Center as well as waterfront embedded mental health providers. Onboard Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, we opened a new behavioral health Intensive Outpatient Program specifically targeted for Marines and Sailors – allowing for more efficient and patient-centric treatment. In addition, our Psychological Health Outreach Program operates to help address the unique needs of our reserve component service members and their families.

Late last year, two Navy Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Teams (SPRINTs) were deployed to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii and Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida in response to the December 2019 mass casualty incidents. SPRINTs are activated to provide on-site, short-term mental health support to requesting commands immediately after operational mishaps and critical events involving loss of lives when local mental health resources are overwhelmed or do not exist. In calendar year 2019, we deployed this capability 26 times. We are keenly focused on suicide prevention efforts in partnership with our Navy and Marine Corps line leadership. All of us have a responsibility to do everything possible to reduce the incidence of suicide. Its impact is devastating and affects families, shipmates and commands.

Care for our Sailors and Marines with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) is provided through a network of TBI clinics with a range of care levels, including two Intrepid Spirit Centers, onboard Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton as well as larger multi-disciplinary programs at Naval Medical Centers Portsmouth and San Diego. These programs are specifically tailored toward front line warfighters, such as Naval Special Warfare, with an emphasis on expedited return to duty.

Our Navy Comprehensive Pain Management Program continues to demonstrate solid results as we reflect a 28 percent decrease in the number of Sailors and Marines prescribed opioids from
FY2014 – FY2019, as well as a 46 percent reduction in the total number of opioid prescriptions written to them over that same period. Through the use of Complementary Integrative Medicine, we are also working to ensure that our Navy clinicians have access to a range of alternative non-pharmacological approaches to pain management. Navy Medicine employs a comprehensive and interdisciplinary care model that balances primary care, specialty care, self-care and medication (when deemed necessary) for pain management. We are leaning forward in this important area to support the readiness, deployability and quality of life of our warfighters.

We are also working to optimize the readiness of female Sailors and Marines through our Female Force Readiness Clinical Community which works collaboratively with Navy and Marine line counterparts to improve health outcomes. Specific efforts are underway in several key areas including mental health, neuro-musculoskeletal and family planning. Additionally, we expanded the number of our full-scope walk-in contraception clinics to improve access for our service women. Our Comprehensive Multi-disciplinary Women’s Health Clinic onboard Naval Training Center, San Diego, California continues to address the unique needs of female Sailors and Marines.

Sexual assault is a traumatic event which can have long-lasting impact for the individual including career, personal, and health-related concerns. While we work on transitioning the MTF sexual assault forensic examination program to the DHA, our commitment in Navy Medicine is to provide patients who disclose a sexual assault the best trauma-related health care and forensic evidence collection, performed by our 211 skilled sexual assault medical forensic examination (SAMFE) providers serving around the world. Navy Medicine ensures every sexual assault patient is afforded an opportunity to reintegrate back into the warfighting force by addressing both physical and behavioral health care needs. Additionally, by creating
opportunities for training enhancements and new SAMFE training initiatives, Navy Medicine ensures these efforts will result in increased provider readiness and skill sustainment.

**Power:** Projecting medical power in all aspects of our enterprise will help us improve force medical readiness and medical force readiness, with the ultimate goal of increased survivability. These efforts are evident in several different areas including our Global Health Engagement (GHE) which continues to focus efforts to support operational readiness and force health protection as well as strengthen strategic partnerships and alliances. GHE activities are valued assets in supporting Combatant Commander’s priorities, including security cooperation with partner nations.

From June – November 2019, hospital ship USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) deployed to Central America, South America and the Caribbean in support of U.S. Southern Command’s mission, Enduring Promise. The crew provided medical assistance in support of regional partners as well as responding to impacts of the Venezuela political and economic crisis. This mission, along with Pacific Partnership 2019 during which USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) deployed, enhances regional stability, exercises humanitarian assistance / disaster response capabilities and improves the clinical and operational skills of our medical personnel.

Integral to our capability to project medical power is the Navy Medical Research and Development enterprise which provides cutting-edge solutions and knowledge products to enhance the readiness and health of Navy and Marine Corps warfighters. Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC), and its laboratories conduct basic research, applied research, advanced development as well as testing and evaluation. Due to the strategic location of these assets world-wide, many projects involve infectious disease surveillance and international
outbreak response, enabling better understanding of emerging global health threats to military readiness.

Similarly, the important work done by the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) and its field activities are directly supporting Combatant Commanders and Naval component commands domestically and internationally. Among their many important force health protection capabilities are four Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine Units which are strategically positioned to provide rapid operational services around the globe in industrial hygiene, entomology and environmental and occupational health in ashore, afloat and expeditionary environments. Their work - identifying, evaluating and monitoring diseases, injuries and hazards in environments – is critical to protecting the health of our deployed Naval forces.

In conjunction with Department of Defense (DoD) and interagency partners, our public health professionals, along with Navy Medicine researchers, emergency preparedness experts, and many others, represent a One Navy Medicine approach to helping confront some of our most challenging issues, including the recent global health threats presented by the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

Physiological events in tactical jet aircraft continues to be an important focus for Navy Medicine. In support of our Navy and Marine Corps aviation community, our Navy aerospace medical community is involved in all aspects of research, mitigation and treatment of physiological events. Our efforts focus on addressing key aspects of cause, prevention, evaluation and treatment. Navy Medicine has developed a standardized clinical practice guidelines for use by flight surgeons in the evaluation and treatment of our aviators involved in physiological events. In addition, NMCPHC, along with the Navy Medical Research Unit
Dayton support Naval Aviation’s top safety priority by conducting important epidemiological work and research, respectively, focused on understanding and mitigating physiological events. As an expeditionary medical force, leveraging technology will continue to be important in caring for Sailors and Marines, particularly at sea or deployed to geographically isolated areas. Many of our virtual health programs, including Tele-Critical Care, Health Experts Online Portal, and Connected Corpsmen in the Community, continue to expand in providing provider to patient and provider to provider support, irrespective of time or distance. Later this year, we will be conducting specific operational virtual health exercises during Trident Warrior 2020 to assess capabilities of connecting providers under different scenarios, including ship to ship. Our goal is to accelerate the use of virtual health so we can provide care, where and when it’s needed.

Collectively, everything we do is targeted at optimizing the readiness and health of our Sailors and Marines so we maximize their deployability. To this end, each health care encounter is an opportunity to assess a service member’s deployability. We are continuing to enhance our tracking systems and processes, including: LIMDU SMART (Limited Duty Sailor and Marine Readiness Tracking System), a web-based system that automates the processing of personnel on medically restricted duty; and, TEMPO (Temporary Limited Duty Operations) which ensures that every Sailor or Marine on limited duty receives a monthly multi-disciplinary review to ensure accuracy and optimization of diagnosis, treatment plan and duty disposition. Results show TEMPO has led to a significant reduction in the number of expired cases which helps us return warfighters back to duty more quickly. We see more opportunities to further refine our processes as we apply predictive analytic models, along with rapid cycle feedback, to better identify indicators of potential deployment limiting or temporary non-deployable condition.
Building an Integrated System of Readiness and Health

The direction to implement reforms within the MHS is reflected in several key provisions contained in the Fiscal Years (FY) 2017 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA). Collectively, this legislation represents an important inflection point for military medicine and catalyzed our efforts to strengthen our integrated system of health and readiness. Within the Department of the Navy, our leadership recognizes the tremendous opportunity we have to refocus our efforts on medical readiness while transitioning health care benefit administration to the DHA. While significant organizational change in health care is inherently complex, all of us know we have shared responsibilities to ensure that both the Services and the DHA are successful, and our efforts continue to reflect this overarching tenet as we move forward.

Integral to system-wide organizational transformation is the transfer of the MTFs to the DHA. In October 2018, Navy Medicine transitioned Naval Hospital Jacksonville to the DHA, at which point they assumed administration and management of this MTF. The following year, in October 2019, our MTFs in the continental United States (as well as Alaska and Hawaii) transitioned to the DHA as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In order to support this significant transition and to mitigate risk, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) established a memorandum of agreement with the DHA, which delineates a direct support role as DHA moves to full operating capability. This memorandum of agreement was preceded by a period during which Navy Medicine detailed both military and civilian personnel to the DHA headquarters to directly assist their organizational transition. Similarly, the direct support relationship between BUMED and the DHA provides a bridge as the DHA establishes the MHS-
wide organizational structure and acquires the necessary personnel and expertise to accomplish
the mission of directly administering and managing the MTFs.

In addition, Department of Navy personnel participated in the DoD-led efforts regarding the
assessments and recommendations of health services and infrastructure within the MHS as
required by FY2017 NDAA, section 703 (Military Medical Treatment Facilities).

Associated with the transition of MTFs to the DHA and Navy Medicine’s refocus on
readiness, Navy established 28 Navy Medicine Readiness and Training Commands (NMRTCs)
which will provide critical command and control structures to meet Navy and Marine Corps
missions. This organizational construct will – at the local MTF level – facilitate and reinforce
the mutually supportive relationship between Navy Medicine and the DHA.

NMRTCs have mission responsibilities to maintain the readiness of our assigned medical
forces, support installation and operational commanders’ requirements and provide a structure to
execute Service requirements and programs. Since we must have the agility to rapidly deploy
our Navy Medicine expeditionary medical force, NMRTCs will ensure the medical force has the
clinical and operational currency and competency to support Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces
missions and platforms, including expeditionary medical facilities and units, hospital ships, and
casualty receiving and treatment ships. To this end, MTFs remain important training platforms
for our medical personnel to gain and maintain clinical experience.

An important tool for our NMRTCs will be the Readiness Performance Plans (RPPs) which
capture key operational requirements, including medical training and readiness training support.
These plans are essential to meeting individual, unit and platform readiness metrics across Navy
Medicine. RPPs will also support the Quadruple-Aim Performance Process (QPP) between
NMRTCs and MTFs to clearly identify readiness requirements, as well as provide a mechanism

for analysis and performance improvement initiatives. We anticipate that NMRTCs will reach full operating capability by October 2020.

Consistent with our refocus on readiness, we are restructuring our BUMED headquarters to better align roles and responsibilities in providing health services support across the full spectrum of Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint operations. These efforts also extend to our three Echelon III commands: Naval Medical Forces Atlantic and Naval Medical Forces Pacific, which will have command and control of the NMRTCs, as well as our Naval Medical Forces Support Command which will have oversight of our education and training commands. This new construct provides important alignment with our Navy and Marine Corps operational forces – United States Fleet Forces and United State Pacific Fleet as well as Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. We are streamlining activities that directly impact our capabilities to support our operational requirements and ensure we have a trained and ready medical force.

For all of us in military medicine, an important component of transformation is the successful deployment of MHS GENESIS, DoD’s modernized electronic health record. MHS GENESIS will largely replace our legacy electronic health record systems and enable the application of standardized workflows, as well as improved sharing of data. It is also integral to patient safety, will help support better outcomes and assist in our efforts towards achieving high reliability. It is important to recognize that MHS GENESIS, when fully deployed, will be used not only in MTFs but operational medical settings as well, replacing the Theater Medical Information Program-Joint (TMIP-J) portfolio. For Navy, this is particularly important in areas of Fleet and Fleet Marine Force concentration such as Southern California which will begin rollout later this year. To this end, the Services continue to work with the Program Executive Office, Defense
Healthcare Management System (PEO DHMS) and the DHA in addressing important aspects related to implementation and optimization efforts.

**Moving Forward**

We are strategically aligned with the Navy and Marine Corps to provide the force medical readiness for our Sailors and Marines and medical force readiness for our Navy Medicine personnel. To meet our responsibilities to optimize Navy Medicine for the warfighter, our way ahead remains: To provide well-trained medical experts, operating as high performance teams, to project medical power in support of Naval superiority.

MHS reform presents us with both challenges and opportunities. We can point to progress made to date; however, all of us recognize there is much work ahead. Change of this scale requires careful and deliberate planning, along with ongoing assessment from our stakeholders, to ensure we are meeting the objectives to build an integrated system of readiness and health.

Once again, thank you for your support and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Hogg, please.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOGG

General Hogg. Vice Chairwoman Mc Collum, Representative Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is my distinct honor to testify on behalf of the 64,600 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen who comprise the Air Force Medical Service.

At home and abroad, Air Force medics answer the call across a broad spectrum of operational, humanitarian, and disaster response missions. From the clinic to the battlefield and even the back of an airplane, our ability to deliver life-sustaining care in the most challenging environments ensures that our warriors return home to their families.

The Air Force medical services' core competency of aerospace medicine and aeromedical evacuation focuses on the needs of air and space operators and maintainers. Since September 11, Air Force aeromedical evacuation crews have conducted more than 340,000 global patient movements, including 13,500 critical care missions.

In the deployed environment, roughly 30 percent of downrange care is trauma related, and the remaining 70 percent is disease and nonbattle injuries. These injuries range from occupational, dental, and musculoskeletal injuries. Our training and currency opportunities mirror these scenarios to produce well-rounded, flexible medics who can accomplish any mission under the most unpredictable conditions.

As the National Defense Strategy shifts focus to global conflict and peer competition, the Air Force is postured to increase lethality, strengthen alliances, and realign resources. The Air Force Medical Service is evolving in support of these national defense objectives by investing in our aeromedical evacuation platforms, ground surgical teams, and broadening every medic's skill set, preparing them to deliver care in denied environments where we may not have the access to functioning airfields or state-of-the-art equipment.

The story of senior Airman Colleen Mitchell, a young medical technician, drives home the criticality of this last point. In January, Airman Mitchell was on her first deployment when Al-Shabaab militants attacked the airfield at Manda Bay, Kenya, killing three Americans. Awakened by the chaos, she assumed the role of lead medic. Spending hours triaging and treating patients, working with limited personnel and supplies, she operated well above her pay grade and outside her comfort zone to save lives.

Airman Mitchell demonstrates the qualities that makes our medics remarkable: leadership, technical skill, and an unwavering commitment to mission and those whom we serve. As the surgeon general, my responsibility is to prepare every medic to do what Airman Mitchell did, and I do not take this task lightly. Military treatment facilities remain our primary readiness platform, but sometimes fall short of offering patient volume, diversity, and acuity needed to sustain clinical currency.
Leveraging additional training opportunities through civilian and government health organization is paramount and will inevitably grow as we rescope the direct care system. Military medicine presents unique challenges that a civilian healthcare system does not encounter. Our medics will continue to rise to those challenges.

Thank you for your continued support, and I look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Lieutenant General Hogg follows:]
United States Air Force

Presentation
Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense

Defense Health Program

Witness Statement of
Lieutenant General Dorothy Hogg
Surgeon General of the Air Force

March 5, 2020
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DOROTHY A. HOGG

Lt. Gen. Dorothy A. Hogg is the Surgeon General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Arlington, Virginia. General Hogg serves as functional manager of the U.S. Air Force Medical Service. In this capacity, she advises the Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff, as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on matters pertaining to the medical aspects of the air expeditionary force and the health of Airmen. General Hogg has authority to commit resources worldwide for the Air Force Medical Service, to make decisions affecting the delivery of medical services, and to develop plans, programs and procedures to support worldwide medical service missions. She exercises direction, guidance and technical management of a $6.1 billion, 44,000-person integrated healthcare delivery and readiness system serving 2.6 million beneficiaries at 76 military treatment facilities worldwide. Prior to her current assignment, General Hogg served as Deputy Surgeon General and Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps, Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia.

General Hogg entered the Air Force in 1984 and has commanded at the squadron and group level, and served as the deputy command surgeon for two major commands. She has deployed in support of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

EDUCATION
1981 Bachelor of Science degree in Nursing, University of Southern Maine, Portland
1986 Squadron Officer School, by correspondence
1987 Women’s Health Nurse Practitioner, School of Healthcare Sciences, Sheppard Air Force Base, TX
1992 Master of Public Administration, Troy State University, Troy, AL
1996 Air Command and Staff College, by seminar
1997 Master of Science in Nursing, Sigma Theta Tau, Medical University of South Carolina
2002 Air War College, by seminar
2007 Executive Development Intern, SDE in-residence equivalent
2010 Interagency Institute for Federal Healthcare Executives
2012 Joint Medical Executive Skills Medical Executive Skills Capstone Course
2014 Capstone, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENTS
1984 – 1986, Staff Nurse, OB/GYN Nursing Unit, U.S. Air Force Regional Hospital, Eglin AFB, FL
1986 – 1987, Nurse Practitioner Student, School of Healthcare Sciences, Sheppard AFB, TX
1987 – 1989, Women’s Health Nurse Practitioner, 410th Medical Group, K.I. Sawyer AFB, MI
1989 – 1992, Women’s Health Nurse Practitioner, 52nd Medical Group, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany
1992 – 1996, Women’s Health Nurse Practitioner, 18th Medical Group, Kadena AB, Japan
1996 – 1997, AFIT Master’s Student, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston, SC
2001 – 2002, Family Practice Flight Commander, 314th Medical Group, Little Rock AFB, AR
2004 – 2006, 22nd Medical Operations Squadron Commander/Chief Nurse Executive, McConnell AFB, KS
2008 – 2010, 5th Medical Group Commander, Beale AFB, CA
2012 – 2013, Deputy Command Surgeon, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright Patterson AFB, OH
2013 – 2014, Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps/Assistant Surgeon General, Medical Force Development, Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, VA
2015 – 2018, Deputy Surgeon General/Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps, Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, VA

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Mintorius Service Medal with silver and two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters

CURRENT NATIONAL CERTIFICATIONS
Women’s Health Nurse Practitioner National Certification Corporation

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Dec. 29, 1983
First Lieutenant Jan. 14, 1986
Captain Jan. 14, 1988
Major Aug. 1, 1995
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 2001
Colonel Nov. 1, 2006
Major General Aug. 9, 2013
Lieutenant General June 4, 2018
(Current as of February 2020)
Chairman Visclosky, Representative Calvert, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor to testify on behalf of the 54,600 active duty, guard, reserve, and civilian Airmen who comprise the Air Force Medical Service. It is a privilege to represent these Airmen who are wholeheartedly committed to our mission.

Today, Air Force medics are deployed around the world in support of wartime contingencies, natural disasters, humanitarian relief, and global health engagement with U.S. allies. These deployed medics, like those at home station, must be ready at a moment’s notice to deliver life-sustaining care under the most challenging circumstances.

Air Force medics provide a broad continuum of care and treat patients in every environment imaginable. Sometimes they have access to the full array of modern medical technology, other times they are happy to have sterile water and battery power. To prepare medics for the unknown, their training must simulate the rigors, unpredictability and stressors of combat. As the Air Force Surgeon General, my job is to prepare our warrior medics to do the job combatant commanders require, no matter the conditions.

WHY WE NEED A MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM

Recently, this responsibility was driven home by the story of a young medic, Senior Airman Colleen Mitchell. In January, Airman Mitchell was on her first deployment when Al Shabab militants attacked the airfield at Manda Bay, Kenya, taking the lives of three Americans. Airman Mitchell, a medical technician from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, was awakened by the ensuing chaos. Still in her pajamas, she immediately established a triage point. As her supervising physician assistant coordinated patient movement, Airman Mitchell
assumed the role of lead medic, spending hours triaging and treating patients. She directed a
team of fire fighters, a Staff Sergeant from the base contracting office, and contract employees
to care for the injured. Airman Mitchell and her makeshift team treated a variety of injuries,
including shrapnel wounds, severe burns, and combat stress.

As the lead medic, Airman Mitchell also monitored her care team for signs of combat
stress, shock, and dehydration. Once the attack ended and the injured had been treated and
released or evacuated, Airman Mitchell turned to the solemn task of preparing the remains of
the three Americans who lost their lives. She performed well above her paygrade and
demonstrated the very best qualities of what we value in our Airmen – skill, diligence,
innovation, and commitment to her patients and mission.

Airman Mitchell’s experience reminds me of what makes our medics so remarkable.
She did not have a hospital full of trained professionals, nor access to a fully stocked pharmacy,
or an abundant blood supply. Against all odds, Airman Mitchell stabilized her patients and
prepared them for transport to the next echelon of care. I take very seriously my responsibility
to prepare Airman Mitchell, and every other Air Force medic, to succeed along the entire
continuum of care to return service members to the fight or bring them safely home. They
must be prepared to treat patients from point of injury to rehabilitation.

Approximately 30% of the care provided in the deployed environment goes towards
trauma injuries. The other 70% tackles disease and non-battle injuries to keep our deployed
forces healthy and ready to complete their mission. These injuries include sports and
occupational injuries, dehydration, dental problems, mental health issues and anything else you

Page 5
would see in a military treatment facility. Having medics along this entire continuum, from point of injury to rehabilitation, is vital to ensure our Airmen and joint partners are fit for duty when and where needed.

Each of the three uniformed medical Services specialize in medicine that uniquely supports its operational mission. The Air Force specializes in aerospace medicine and aeromedical evacuation. Aerospace medicine focuses on the occupational health needs of crewmembers and passengers on air and space vehicles, as well as individuals who maintain those vehicles. They specialize in the physiological effects of altitude, pressure, and noise. They also understand the physical and mental requirements it takes to operate an aircraft at optimal efficiency, and know the challenges maintainers must overcome to keep our aircraft safe and ready to fly.

Because the Air Force fights originate from our bases, many of our deployments are not located inside a combat zone. Remotely piloted aircraft operators, intelligence analysts, cyber warriors, and others may be located far from the front, but execute front line operations. That means stateside aerospace medicine is synonymous with combat medicine. Many aerospace medical providers are embedded in operational units, working with crews and maintainers day-in and day-out. The specialized aerospace medicine our providers deliver is comparable to sports medicine practiced in professional sports. It is high cost, high maintenance and highly specialized, but unlike professional athletes, our Airmen have no off-season to rest and recover.

The Air Force’s other medical specialty is aeromedical evacuation, providing en route care for patients moving to higher echelons of care. Since September 11, 2001, the Air Force...
has conducted more than 340,000 global patient movements and 13,500 Critical Care Air Transport missions. We convert the back of an aircraft into a flying intensive care unit. We deliver a broad spectrum of "care in the air" and operate patient staging facilities where we hold and prepare them for transport.

Over the past 20 years, we developed a robust and variable aeromedical evacuation capability to support the evolving needs of our operational forces. Our aeromedical evacuation forces must be capable of operating anywhere air operations occur. Aeromedical evacuation crews require specialized training for each airframe, in addition to preparing them to deliver care during flight. This means we train our medics to treat patients in a loud, dark, unsteady, non-temperature controlled, high-altitude environment, and develop special equipment to mitigate these challenges. Things that providers take for granted on the ground, like verbal communication with patients and staff, are often not possible in the back of an airplane. Opportunities for training in these conditions are rare or inaccessible in the civilian medical community, but vital for Air Force Medicine to accomplish our mission.

READY MEDICAL FORCES

Our military treatment facilities remain our primary readiness platform. The scope of practice at these facilities is necessary to maintain the skills and currency across the broad spectrum of care needed to meet our requirements. However, military treatment facilities alone cannot sustain currency in every skillset. Our beneficiary population tends towards young, healthy patients, offering few complex cases to support currency of our more specialized providers. We pursue partnerships with civilian, educational, and other
government health organizations, including international partners, to keep our medics proficient. Fostering these partnerships is a critical part of getting our medics the proper caseload and patient mix needed to sustain their skills. Partnerships with major civilian trauma centers are increasingly important for preparing our surgical teams to provide damage control care at the point of injury and treat complex combat injuries. As we re-scope the direct care system, our reliance on these partnerships will be critical to the currency of all our provider types, from the trauma team to nurses, medical technicians and other medics.

The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlighted the need for advanced infectious disease control training. In 2018, the Air Force Research Laboratory established a partnership with the University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha to train Air Force medics to care for patients with infectious diseases. These diseases require expert knowledge and specialized training to safely treat patients while mitigating risk to our operations. This partnership allows medics to learn from instructors with decades of expertise in biocontainment care and research. Air Force infectious disease physicians and infection prevention specialists take courses covering disease recognition, diagnosis, treatment, patient transport, infection prevention, personal protective equipment, waste management, and communication.

The ongoing 2019 novel coronavirus health crisis drives home the importance of this partnership. The director of the C-STARS Omaha team is a member of the University of Nebraska Medical Center Biodefense team preparing to treat evacuees from China. Delivering this care in a civilian setting gives the Air Force valuable experience for future contingency operations.
In addition to our national-level focus, medical group commanders are empowered to pursue partnerships with local health facilities. This allows commanders to maintain the clinical currencies and skills appropriate for their unique missions. This is critical as we evolve our medical force and re-scope our medical treatment facilities.

MILITARY MEDICAL REFORM

Our partnership with the Defense Health Agency will be critical to our continued success. I am pleased with the collaboration between the Air Force Medical Service and the Defense Health Agency as we implement section 702 of the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. In 2019, this partnership helped us reach important milestones in transitioning authority, direction and control of military treatment facilities to the Defense Health Agency, including the transfer of all U.S.-based military treatment facilities October 1, 2019. Through a memorandum of agreement, the Air Force Medical Service is providing direct support to the Defense Health Agency while it stands up its headquarters and works toward achieving full operational capability.

Recognizing the challenges of merging four discrete health systems, we are working closely with the Defense Health Agency, Army and Navy, to maintain a highly reliable Military Health System. In 2015, Air Force Medicine began our Trusted Care journey to being a Highly Reliable Organization, with a single-minded focus on patient safety. Since then, we have achieved a 50% reduction in serious patient safety events. We will blend our Trusted Care culture with our sister Services’ and the Defense Health Agency’s patient safety cultures to take what each Service does best and apply it enterprise-wide.
In 2018 and 2019, the Air Force participated in a tri-Service working group to implement section 703 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which required a systemic review of military treatment facility readiness support requirements. Analysis of Air Force military treatment facilities encompassed a standardized process to gather and validate data developed by the working group. A critical component to “right-sizing” these facilities was the local TRICARE network’s capacity to take on more patients. Many Air Force installations are located in communities with limited health care resources. Those facilities were not considered for re-scoping.

Fiscal year 2020 will also see changes to the medical force as we convert 4,684 uniformed medical positions to meet other Air Force operational requirements. Proposed uniformed medical billet reductions were based on our Critical Operational Readiness Requirement model. Pending the report required by section 719 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, planned reductions to uniformed medical personnel will be gradual in order to minimize negative impacts to patient care and our ability to accomplish the readiness mission.

FUTURE OF AIR FORCE MEDICINE

The most significant driver of change in Air Force Medicine remains the evolving requirements of our combatant commanders. As our armed forces pivot away from small, asymmetric conflicts to global conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries, our medical capabilities must follow. This requires us to enhance our current capabilities while developing
new ones. Our current conflicts allow us to prioritize patients at greatest risk of death, leading to an unprecedented 98% survival rate for U.S. and coalition forces wounded in action.

However, in our next conflict we will face very different challenges. In a peer conflict with limited resources and casualty evacuation capability, the highest priority patients are those we can return to the fight quickest. In this mass casualty scenario, the sobering reality is that we will not be able to save every patient. It will be hard for our medical personnel to mentally adjust to this battlefield reality. To prepare for this challenge, we have begun reorienting our training doctrine to teach medics to make these hard choices.

To prepare our medical force for the next decade and beyond, we will expand our ability to operate in a denied environment, where we may not have access to functioning airfields or electronic equipment. This means growing our aeromedical evacuation capacity while broadening the baseline clinical skills of every medical Airman, including those in non-clinical roles. We are preparing for this unpredictable future while supporting today’s requirements.

We are warrior medics first and foremost. Our core mission is to deliver medical support to our operational forces, keeping them fit to fight and returning them to the fight as quickly as possible. We keep our skills current by delivering the health benefit at our military treatment facilities and through our partnerships. These activities augment our core readiness mission, but that mission takes precedence when necessary.

The talent, adaptability and dedication of Air Force medics shines through in the stories I hear every day. For example, an off-duty Tech. Sergeant from the 459th Aeromedical Staging Squadron on an international flight who treated an unconscious woman with anemia. A flight
nurse on a trans-Pacific aeromedical evacuation flight who held an oxygen mask up to a 5-year-old burn victim for seven hours, because the straps irritated her burns. A dental assistant who saw a major traffic accident and saved the life of a victim by applying a tourniquet to their severed leg. The 2019 New Horizons Medical Readiness Training Exercise where Air Force medics treated 9,575 Guyanese patients provided vital deployment skills. And of course, Senior Airmen Mitchell, going above and beyond to care for personnel injured in the Manda Bay attacks.

These are just a few examples of remarkable Air Force medics and the service and sacrifice they make every day defending our nation. They are what make military medicine irreplaceable, and they are why we will succeed in reforming military health care to meet whatever challenges the future brings.

I thank the Committee for this opportunity, your steadfast support of Air Force Medicine, and your dedication to the welfare of Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, veterans, and their families.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Place.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT PLACE

General Place, Vice Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity. I will add just a few comments to my colleagues.

The DHA’s principle mission is supporting readiness. Within that mission are two distinct responsibilities: First is to ensure that every person in uniform is medically ready to perform their job anywhere in the world. Second is to ensure our military medical personnel have the cognitive and technical skills to support the full range of military operations, which our leaders may call on us to perform.

The Defense Health Agency is accountable to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Honorable McCaffery, the combatant commands, and the military departments’ force aim. The DHA assumed responsibility for managing all military hospitals and clinics in the United States in October of last year.

Working closely with my colleagues, the service surgeon general and the Joint Staff surgeon, we continue to view our medical facilities as readiness platforms where medical professionals from the Army, Navy, and Air Force both obtain and sustain their skills from which these professionals deploy in support of military operations.

The DOD’s leadership’s recent assessment of which medical facilities best support this readiness mission provides the basis for moving forward and implementing these decisions. We intend to execute this plan in a manner that ensures our patients continue to have timely access to quality medical care.

I will highlight a few important points: First, Active Duty family members who are required to transition to civilian network providers will incur little to no additional out-of-pocket costs for their care. Second, all beneficiaries in these locations will still enjoy access to the MTF pharmacy. Finally, we will implement changes in a deliberate fashion at a pace local healthcare markets can handle.

If market capacity in a particular location is more constrained than we estimated, we will reassess our plans and potentially adjust them.

The surgeons general and I are ensuring that the proposed reduction in infrastructure and uniformed medical personnel is coordinated. This synchronization will be reflected in the Department’s medical personnel reduction plan, required by the fiscal year 2020 NDAA section 719 that is due to the Congress in June.

The DHA is scrutinizing every part of our health budget to ensure we are using the resources provided by Congress in a manner that most effectively supports our readiness mission. We have established four healthcare markets to integrate healthcare in specific regions of the country. We will be establishing additional markets throughout this year.

Local military and medical leaders will have the authority and responsibility to allocate resources in a way that improves patient care and our readiness functions. I am grateful for the opportunity to provide further detail on our efforts to standardize military med-
Thank you to the members of this committee for your commitment to the men and women of our armed forces and the families who support them.

Ms. McCollum. Mr. McCaffery, please.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY McCAFFERY

Mr. McCaffery. Vice Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, it is an honor to speak before you today representing the dedicated military and civilian professionals of the military health system who support our warfighters and care for the 9.6 million beneficiaries that our system serves.

I am pleased to present to you the defense health budget for fiscal year 2021, a budget that prioritizes the medical readiness of our military force and their readiness of our medical force while sustaining access to quality healthcare for our beneficiaries.

Our proposed fiscal year 2021 budget requests $33.1 billion for the Defense Health Program. This proposed budget reflects our continued implementation of a number of comprehensive reforms to our health system as directed by Congress and department leadership.

Some of the significant reforms are the following: consolidated administration and management of our military hospitals and clinics under the Defense Health Agency; rightsizing our military medical infrastructure to focus on readiness within our direct care system; and, finally, optimizing the size and composition of the military medical force to best meet our readiness mission.

In implementing these reforms, the Department is guided by two critical principles: first, that our military hospitals and clinics are first and foremost military facilities whose operations need to be focused on meeting military readiness requirements.

That means that our MTFs serve as the primary platform by which we ensure servicemembers are medically ready to train and deploy. It also means that our MTFs are effectively utilized as training platforms that enable our military medical personnel to acquire and maintain the clinical skills that prepare them for deployment in support of combat operations. Second, that as we reform the military health system, we continue to make good on our commitment to provide our beneficiaries with access to quality healthcare.

While we implement these changes to the health system, we also continue to pursue our other priority initiatives that have contributed to the achievement of the highest battlefield survival rates in history while providing world-class healthcare to our millions of beneficiaries.

That includes our continued deployment of our electronic health record and our ongoing operation of our cutting-edge research and development programs, which Congress and this committee have long championed. That work in that area is playing a significant role in support of the whole-of-government effort on the COVID–19 issue.
I want to thank the committee for your continued support of these efforts and to the men and women of the military health system and the millions depending on us. Your support has helped us achieve and continue to drive forward unparalleled success in building and sustaining a military health system that delivers for our servicemembers, our beneficiaries, and our Nation.

Thank you.

[The written statements of Secretary McCaffery and Lieutenant Place follow:]
Prepared Statement Of

The Honorable Thomas McCaffery
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

and

Lieutenant General (Dr) Ronald Place
Director, Defense Health Agency

REGARDING
THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM

BEFORE THE

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DEFENSE
SUBCOMMITTEE

March 5, 2020

Not for publication until released by the Committee
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense we are pleased to present the medical program funding request for fiscal year (FY) 2021. We are honored to represent the dedicated military and civilian medical professionals in the Military Health System (MHS) who provide direct support to our combatant commanders and deliver or arrange healthcare for our 9.6 million beneficiaries.

The Defense Health Program (DHP) request in the FY21 President’s Budget supports the MHS role in advancing the National Defense Strategy. The FY21 budget proposal also reflects our continued implementation of comprehensive reforms to the MHS as directed by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for FY 2017, 2019, and 2020, as well as our efforts to support initiatives developed by DoD leadership and the Military Departments. Our budget, and our programmatic plans the budget supports, prioritize resources that improve the readiness of our military force and the readiness of our medical force. It also ensures we continue to sustain access to high quality care for all beneficiaries whether that care is delivered in our direct care system or in the civilian purchased care sector.

Our proposed FY21 budget requests $33.1 billion for the DHP. A high-level view of our budget request is provided below:

**FY 2021 Budget Request Overview:**

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*Includes Congressional Special Interest Adds
Management of the Direct Care System

The Department has made significant advances in fully implementing the direction from Congress, established in the FY17 NDAA and reinforced in subsequent NDAAs, to consolidate the management and administration of military hospitals and clinics under the Defense Health Agency (DHA).

In October 2019, the Department achieved a major milestone -- formally transferring responsibility for the administration and management of all MTFs in the United States from the Military Departments (MILDEPS) to the DHA. Concurrent with this milestone, the Service Medical Departments established a “direct support” relationship with the DHA, ensuring that policy and other guidance flows seamlessly from the DHA to MTF Directors. The Department is currently transferring functions and personnel from the Military Departments to the DHA in order to support DHA’s ability to manage the direct care system. The transition of overseas MTFs is planned to occur no later than September 30, 2020. The Department is fully on track with our implementation of the MTF transition.

Through this consolidated management model, the DHA will be able to reduce unwarranted variation in both clinical and administrative functions. By standardizing approaches to quality management, the MHS will be better positioned to improve health outcomes and other patient safety priorities. This transformation helps the MHS focus on its core readiness mission while improving patient-facing services for our beneficiaries.

Medical Facility Infrastructure Reform

In the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Department to
assess our military hospitals and clinics and make recommendations for restructuring our facilities to ensure they are focused on military and force readiness.

We reviewed all facilities through the lens of their contributions to military readiness that includes ensuring that MTFs are operated to focus on getting service members medically ready to train and deploy. It also means MTFs are effectively utilized as platforms that enable our military medical personnel to acquire and maintain the clinical skills and experience that prepares them for deployment in support of operations around the world.

Last month, we submitted the required report to Congress that outlines the results of our assessment, including proposed changes in the scope of operations at select facilities across the United States. The report details the Department’s readiness focus for medical facilities, while maintaining our commitment to provide all beneficiaries with access to quality healthcare.

Our initial assessment of the 343 U.S.-based hospitals and clinics indicated that 77 MTFs warranted a detailed analysis. This detailed assessment concluded that for 21 of these MTFs, their current scope of services should remain unchanged. That is the case for a variety of reasons, but most commonly, it is because our review indicated that the local civilian healthcare market did not – and likely could not – offer our beneficiaries appropriate access to healthcare. We are leaving those facilities open to all beneficiaries because of the Department’s commitment to military and retiree families. Six MTFs are still under review.

Our analysis did demonstrate that we need to adjust operations at 50 hospitals and clinics. The majority of changes are outpatient clinics currently open to all beneficiaries that we will modify to clinics for active duty and occupational health services only. Beneficiaries currently empaneled for primary care at these MTFs will move over time into our TRICARE civilian provider networks. Active duty family members who are required to transition to civilian network providers will not incur any additional out-of-pocket costs for their care. They will still enjoy access to the MTF pharmacy, and will only incur prescription drug copayments if they elect to
obtain their prescriptions from civilian network pharmacy or our mail order system. At two MTFs – Tripler Army Medical Center (Hawaii) and Naval Medical Center Camp Lejeune (NC), we propose to recapitalize infrastructure and expand medical services in order to increase clinical readiness opportunities for our medical force.

These changes will not occur right away. Before we transition any beneficiary from one of our hospitals or clinics, we will connect them with healthcare providers in the TRICARE network. That process will take time – several years in some locations. The bottom line for our beneficiaries is that we will help guide them through every step of the enrollment change process when the time for action arrives. We will implement changes in a deliberate fashion, at a pace local healthcare markets can handle.

The importance of the MHS needing to focus our military hospitals and clinics on their core mission of military readiness is not new. It has been the subject of outside analysis, internal MHS assessment, senior civilian and uniformed leader engagement, and Congressional deliberation. At some facilities, much of our daily work, while valuable to our beneficiaries, is less relevant to supporting our readiness needs. In many other military hospitals and clinics, however, access for retirees and family members directly supports our readiness mission, and we are eager to sustain or expand the services we provide to all beneficiaries in these MTFs. We are fortunate to have robust civilian provider networks in many locations that offer timely access to quality healthcare, and a close, collaborative, relationship with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. As such, we have an obligation to focus our finite military resources on those activities with the highest readiness value while also ensuring we continue to provide access to healthcare for all our patients.

That said, if we determine market capacity in a particular location is more constrained than we estimated, we will reassess our plans and adjust as necessary.

Military Medical Manpower Reduction
Another critical initiative is the implementation of Military Department-determined uniformed medical personnel reductions. These reductions are the result of the Military Departments’ assessment of their operational medical readiness requirements. All 988 of the positions proposed for reduction in FY20 are vacant positions.

The Military Departments are working with the DHA to identify and mitigate the loss of patient care capacity resulting from the reductions of uniformed medical providers. DHA has developed the processes and models needed to assess and develop action plans required to ensure continued access to care for all beneficiaries.

Section 719 of the FY2020 NDAA directs the Department to provide a report that requires analysis and inputs from the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense before any reductions beyond limited unfilled authorizations and administrative authorizations can be taken. We will ensure that report is delivered on time and provides the data and analysis Congress has requested well in advance of FY2021.

In order to synchronize the medical personnel reductions with the planned right-sizing of MTFs, I have asked the DHA to work with the Military Departments and obtain updated medical personnel reduction plans by location and specialty. Alternatives to access to military medical personnel will include direct care in the MTF provided by civilians and contractors, the TRICARE managed care support contract, and agreements with local civilian health systems. Our budget proposal includes $334.6 million to support these mitigation efforts.

Similar to our approach to managing changes in infrastructure, our assessment will continue throughout the implementation process to ensure that any impacts to readiness or beneficiary care are identified and addressed. Prior to any reductions occurring, we will fully inform our
beneficiaries of any changes to the location of their care and support their transition as needed. We will continue to monitor the pace of the reductions to identify and address any issues as they arise.

MHS GENESIS

Another critical support component of our readiness and healthcare delivery missions is the continued rollout of our modernized Electronic Health Record (EHR) – MHS GENESIS. In 2017, we began the deployment of MHS GENESIS at four MTFs in the Pacific Northwest. We learned a great deal from this Initial Operating Capability (IOC) deployment, and re-adjusted our approach for the subsequent phased deployment across the entire MHS.

In September 2019, we initiated the first post-IOC deployment to additional MTFs in Idaho and California: Mountain AFB, ID; Travis AFB, CA; Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA; and the Army Health Clinic Presideo in Monterey, CA. The “Wave Travis” benefited from lessons learned at IOC sites. The number and complexity of trouble tickets significantly declined; the time it took to return clinic operations to their baseline productivity levels was much less; the training was refined and improved; and the transition to MHS GENESIS was significantly less disruptive for patients and staff during Wave Travis.

We are currently in the final stage of being ready to go live at 10 additional sites in June 2020. Those sites are: Nellis AFB and NAS Fallon in Nevada; 29 Palms, Beale AFB, Bridgeport Dental, Edwards AFB, Fort Irwin, Los Angeles AFB, Port Hueneme, and Vandenberg AFB in California.

MHS GENESIS has produced real benefits for patients and providers. We have reduced duplicate laboratory tests and imaging studies, observed improvements in patient safety metrics, effectively incorporated bar coding into inpatient medication administration and blood
transfusions. The MHS GENESIS Patient Portal provides near real-time access to most outpatient visit documentation and test results for laboratory and imaging studies within 72 hours. Further details on the MHS GENESIS deployment are included in the testimony from Mr. William Tinston, the Program Executive Officer.

OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MHS PORTFOLIO

While the Department is introducing changes to its medical infrastructure, it is also necessary to ensure those who work or receive care in these medical facilities have access to modern, safe, and patient-centered environments. Separately budgeted from the DHP, we also propose $504 million for MILCON capital investments, an increase of $174 million from the FY20 base—reflecting our continued requirement for advanced, state-of-the-art medical facilities for our service members and families.

We remain committed to sustaining the superb battlefield medical care we have provided to our Warfighters and the world-class treatment and rehabilitation for those who bear the wounds of past military conflicts. Our proposed budget sustains the medical research and development portfolio, allowing us to continually improve our capability to reduce mortality from wounds, injuries, and illness sustained on the battlefield, and in the execution of our readiness responsibilities.

The worldwide coronavirus outbreak has underscored the critical role our MHS research capabilities continue to play with regard to identifying and responding to infectious disease outbreaks, and in supporting the overall federal response to such developments.

The MHS is aligned under the Interagency Medical Countermeasures Task Force, led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to provide support and coordination of medical countermeasures (MCM) development activities. The Task Force is identifying
approaches to accelerate MCM products from development to FDA approval.

The value from a comprehensive medical research portfolio cannot be overstated. In addition to subject matter expertise in influenza viruses, DoD has infrastructure and competencies that can be leveraged to support a whole-of-government approach to rapid MCM development. DoD competencies include the following: biosafety level-3 containment laboratories for viral culturing, characterizing, and pre-clinical animal model testing for product safety and immunogenicity; a pilot bioproduction facility for manufacturing experimental vaccines and drugs for clinical trials; and a clinical trials center for conducting human safety studies. Furthermore, the Infectious Disease Clinical Research Program (IDCRP) at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USU) currently conducts influenza virus vaccine clinical trials at DoD military treatment facilities (MTFs) that can easily be leveraged for COVID-19 clinical trials. IDCRP also conducts clinical trials in coordination with DoD MTFs and laboratories outside the continental United States.

The FY 2021 budget represents a balanced, comprehensive strategy that aligns with the Secretary’s priorities and fulfills our ongoing requirements associated with congressionally directed reforms.

Thank you for inviting us here today to speak with you about the essential integration between readiness and health, and about our plans to further improve Military Health System in support of the National Defense Strategy and for our beneficiary population.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Tinston.

STATEMENT OF MR. TINSTON

Mr. TINSTON, Vice Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation. I represent the Program Executive Office Defense Healthcare Management Systems, also known as the PEODHMS. It is my honor to represent this team of professionals in their efforts to achieve a single common electronic health record for our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

Patient-centered care is not only an ethos we use to describe our mission, it is fundamental to our design, from capturing critical data on the battlefield to documenting care at military and veteran medical facilities, we understand the patient is our focus. Our patient-centered model highlights the broad spectrum of people who depend on MHS Genesis.

Systems do not create success; people do. Our progress depends on the hard work and talent of clinicians, engineers, and other business professionals who comprise our MHS Genesis team. I want to thank our functional champion, Major General Payne, and my VA counterpart, Mr. John Windom, for their partnership as we deliver a single, common record.

In September 2019, we completed Wave Travis at four installations across California and Idaho without any patient safety issues. The medical staff at Travis Air Force Base demonstrated confidence in MHS Genesis. On day one, when a patient arrived at the emergency room in sudden cardiac arrest 2 hours before the official go-live, the team had a choice. They chose MHS Genesis, and that was the right decision.

With every deployment, we hone our process and improve capability delivery. For instance, establishing peer-to-peer training proved very successful, so successful, in fact, that Major General Payne initiated a commanders workshop to strengthen commanders’ engagement as we move forward with deployments.

This summer, MHS Genesis will deploy to Wave Nellis, more than doubling the number of deployed sites. As we move forward we seek to industrialize our process while meeting the unique needs of each site in order to optimize delivery to the enterprise.

We have proven that MHS Genesis significantly improves the patient experience. Any time we can enhance patient care we absolutely should. As part of that process, we will continue to assess risks and ensure fiscal stewardship making every dollar count.

Critical to making every dollar count is optimizing decisions with the VA to increase efficiencies. For example, within the next few months, we will launch a joint health information exchange with the VA expanding DOD connections with private sector healthcare providers.

In closing, as the son and brother of veterans, I am truly invested in the success of this program. Spending significant time at Walter Reed with my parents, I understand the criticality of delivering patient-centered care. I am confident we have the right people in the right place to complete this mission. We value transparency, and we value you, the committee.
As the wise sentiment goes, it is amazing what can be achieved as long as we don’t care who gets the credit. The MHS Genesis team exemplifies this wisdom. Together we have the opportunity to make a tangible difference in the lives of millions of Americans.

Thank you again for your time, and I look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Mr. Tinston follows:]
STATEMENT BY

MR. WILLIAM J. TINSTON
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
DEFENSE HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
FISCAL YEAR 2021 DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM BUDGET HEARING

MARCH 05, 2020
9:00 AM
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 2359
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am proud to represent the Program Executive Office, Defense Healthcare Management Systems (PEO DHMS), and I am excited to share our achievements with you. PEO DHMS is a committed team of professionals, and it is my honor to represent their tireless efforts to achieve a single, common electronic health record for our service members, veterans, and their families.

Patient-centered care is not only an ethos we use to describe our mission, it is also at the core of our design. Each and every choice we make in the delivery of MHS GENESIS stems from this concept. From the complexities of capturing critical data on the battlefield to documenting extended care at military treatment facilities and beyond, we understand the patient is our focus.

Whenever I speak about MHS GENESIS, the patient-centered model leads the conversation. Our model serves as a blueprint—to remind people every day that behind the data and the complex IT system are people who will depend on MHS GENESIS for decades to come.

We are not clinicians or direct healthcare providers, but our system is a crucial tool that enables clinicians to deliver the best quality care. By using our patient-centered model as our guiding light, we ensure we never lose sight of the big picture.

Serving as PEO, I have witnessed significant progress during the past 12 months. I know we all agree our mission is of paramount importance and our ability to deliver a world class system is a responsibility that should never be taken lightly. I am proud to say the future is bright for MHS GENESIS, and we are poised to deliver positive, tangible results within the coming year.
MHS GENESIS TEAM

Systems do not create success, people do. Putting the right people in the right place is critical to the successful implementation of MHS GENESIS. Our progress depends on the hard work and talent of the clinicians, infrastructure architects, IT engineers, and business operations managers, fondly called our MHS GENESIS team. They collaborate daily to deliver the greatest capability to the Military Health System. Extensive cross-discipline expertise is required to ensure effective healthcare delivery, and I am convinced we have the best and the brightest coordinating to make sure our product fully meets that need. I especially want to thank our functional champion, Air Force Major General Lee Payne, and my VA counterpart, Mr. John Windom, executive director of the Office of Electronic Health Record Modernization, for their partnership as we deliver a single, common record.

As you know, we experienced challenges early in our deployment. However, this team embraced the challenges as opportunities and took the time to transform the record. We stabilized the infrastructure, standardized the workflows, and we improved our training, which all served as the foundation for our deployment to Wave TRAVIS. In September 2019, we completed Wave TRAVIS at four installations across California and Idaho, simultaneously, and without any patient safety issues. By all accounts, it was a very successful deployment.

In fact, I would like to share with the committee two assessments we received from Wave TRAVIS commanders. The first is from Captain Christopher Tepera, a doctor and Executive Officer at Naval Health Clinic – Lemoore.

“From Mr. Schaefer, CAPT Leal, CAPT Hardy, Mr. Edwards, CDR Guidry and, countless others, the willingness to work with our staff to ensure a smooth go-live was phenomenal. All were available, approachable and worked well with us.

[Your support] allowed for major workflow changes to happen… Perhaps most importantly was the request by us to use Powerchart for our Urgent Care Clinic instead of FirstNet…. [which]
simplified our processes and allowed for greater flexibility while appropriately taking care of our personnel.”

CAPT Tepera also noted that engagement with the PMO allowed us to get the right capability in place for the providers. In addition, Lemoore’s facilities were fully up and running within one month.

The largest facility involved in Wave TRAVIS was the David Grant USAF Medical Center (DGMC), at Travis Air Force Base. Colonel Kristen Beals, Commander, 60th Medical Group, shared with us:

“[PEO DHMS] bolstered my confidence that [they] trusted and valued the 60 MDG to provide honest feedback of the reality on the ground, straight from us.

Bottom line, we affirm that the support we’ve received from the PEO DHMS has significantly contributed to our success in adopting MHS GENESIS, and our willingness to identify and communicate system issues.”

The team at Travis Air Force Base demonstrated confidence in MHS GENESIS’ capabilities day one, in part because they were actively involved and engaged in the deployment process. They were so confident in the capability of this system that when a patient arrived at the emergency room in sudden cardiac arrest two hours before the official Go-Live, the team chose to document the patient’s care in MHS GENESIS rather than defaulting to a contingency. They knew using MHS GENESIS was the right move, and it would support after-care for the patient by making treatment information more readily available to clinicians in the future.

WAVE TRAVIS

It took a team of capable clinicians to save the life of a patient hours before Go-Live at Wave TRAVIS. Clinical and IT experts both in the D.C. area and in the field built the system that
supported that patient’s care. Every one of these individuals comprises the MHS GENESIS team, and the team expands by thousands each time we deploy to a new site.

As a result of our Wave TRAVIS success, we not only increased the number of users by more than 30%, we doubled the number of sites using MHS GENESIS and received fewer than half the number of trouble tickets reported during our initial fielding in the Pacific Northwest. It is important to note a majority of the trouble tickets we received during Wave TRAVIS pertained to user permissions. The tickets were not about the effectiveness of MHS GENESIS. These facts demonstrate our effectiveness in reconfiguring workflows and transforming training between our initial sites and our first Wave, proving that success depends on getting the right people in the right places, and we did.

Following the initial fielding, we capitalized on lessons learned. I credit functional champion, Maj Gen Lee Payne, and his team for their support in the evolution of our clinical workflows and training. By standardizing workflows, we transformed the training process from start to finish in advance of Wave TRAVIS. Working closely with our clinical community, we established a peer-based training system, enabling new system users to learn from colleagues who were already using MHS GENESIS. These changes made a monumental difference in the experiences of all users in the first Wave of MHS GENESIS deployment.

With every deployment, we hone our processes and improve the way we deliver capabilities to the field. The peer-to-peer training was such a success that, after Wave TRAVIS, Maj Gen Payne’s staff recommended initiating a commanders’ workshop to offer commanders a peer-to-peer engagement opportunity. Travis Air Force Base hosted the first of these workshops for commanders who will lead their staff through Wave BLISS/CARSON. The workshop proved an effective means of engaging commanders and establishing relationships as well building the MHS GENESIS team. The workshops will continue to be part of the deployment process.
GOING FORWARD

This summer, MHS GENESIS will deploy to Wave NELLIS, which includes multiple sites across southern California and Nevada. Training and preparations are on schedule, and I’m confident we’ll see a smooth and efficient Wave NELLIS Go-Live.

As the Department of Veterans Affairs prepares to go live in the Pacific Northwest, we are working with them and our vendors to configure our single, common record to meet the needs of all our clinicians and patients, regardless of the care location. Specifically, we are working with the VA to assess areas for joint decisions and increased program efficiencies. One specific example is DoD’s participation in VA’s clinical workshops which resulted in opportunities for us to improve the DoD-deployed clinical workflows. I want to thank Mr. John Windom for his leadership and partnership as we jointly deliver a secure, modern electronic health record that will follow our service members from their first day in DoD through veteran status, easing transitions from DoD to VA care. Mr. Windom served as an integral part in the delivery of this EHR to both departments, and I know he joins me in celebrating our progress.

In December 2018, my team received approval to move forward with the first six Waves of MHS GENESIS deployment. We saw an opportunity to industrialize our deployment processes in ways that allow us to accelerate delivery while remaining true to all of our safety and cybersecurity requirements. We are actively exploring ways to refine the delivery of software releases to the enterprise, further standardize training, and re-prioritize deployment sites based on synergies with the VA schedule.

Accelerating delivery of healthcare IT will enhance the patient experience for DoD and VA beneficiaries, something far too significant not to mention. Anytime we can advance capabilities and enhance patient care, we absolutely should. We can also leverage this acceleration to focus on the operational medicine community earlier than planned, delivering capabilities to our forward deployed service members, enhancing medical readiness abroad. I’m pleased to announce that our Joint Operational Medicine Information Systems (JOMIS) Program Office continues to deliver modernized operational medicine capabilities to the warfighter. The Defense
Health Agency recently stood up the Office of the Operational Medicine Functional Champion (OMFC), which will work closely with JOMIS. OMFC under the leadership of Major General Lee Payne will represent the voice of operational medicine stakeholders such as combatant commands. In the future, I look forward to reporting more about the growing and strong partnership between JOMIS and OMFC.

As we move forward with this deployment, we will continue implementing creative approaches to problem solving, and will achieve results by looking beyond the “now” to formulate strategies for future success. We continue to foster inventive and collaborative methods, anticipate risks, and prepare for contingencies, while maintaining efficient, effective fiscal stewardship, making every dollar count.

We commit to the delivery of high-quality solutions by applying acquisition best practices and innovative approaches with speed and efficiency. We focus on maintaining a high-achieving culture to deliver cost-effective, timely, customer-focused results. As you saw in the feedback from Wave TRAVIS commanders, we value transparency, and we value you, the committee. We appreciate your feedback and remain committed to honest communication with our stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

As I mentioned several times, one of the most important aspects of our success is the MHS GENESIS team. I could not do this job without them. I am honored to work with this committee to achieve the ultimate success of a single, common record. Your support is vital to our mission’s success. Thank you for your ongoing commitment to our nation’s servicemen and veterans.

In closing, as a son and brother of veterans, I remain focused on delivering patient-centered care, providing the greatest capabilities available to support the most informed clinical decision making. As the wise sentiment goes, it is amazing what can be achieved as long as we don’t care who gets the credit, and I believe the entire MHS GENESIS team exemplifies this wisdom. I’ve acknowledged some of my counterparts in leadership roles in my testimony today, but there are thousands of individuals across the country who, as we speak, are striving to secure a successful
future for DoD and VA patients. The success of MHS GENESIS is fulfilling a solemn promise to our service members, veterans, and their families. Together, we have an opportunity to make a tangible difference in the lives of millions of Americans, and I am confident we have the right people delivering on that promise.

Thank you again for your time and your attention this morning. I look forward to your questions.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

And with great humility and honor, I turn to the full chair of the Appropriations Committee, Mrs. Lowey, for her first questions.

ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS

Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. Oh, boy. Thank you. I need some healthcare, I think, at this moment. But it was all checked out. I just lost my voice. But I wanted to come to this hearing because, as you probably know, this committee and the other committee focusing on veterans has been waiting with bated breath to get a healthcare records system that works.

As you probably know, Mr. Tinston, for decades this committee has funded efforts to modernize the health system at both the VA and the Department of Defense, in particular, efforts to address electronic health records. Now, I understand because I have had briefings, hearings on this for the last 5 years at least. So I know it is difficult, but, frankly, our servicemembers and their families have been waiting for far too long, and the taxpayers have invested too much to continue with problems and delays.

I am not saying that it is all VA and that DOD is perfect, but are you learning anything by this? We had a hearing not too long ago with the VA, and the last number I looked at is the Department is requesting another billion—billion, in case anyone in the audience think I said million—another billion in fiscal year 2021. I don't get it. Maybe you can explain why this has taken so long.

If this happened in the private sector, they would probably be out of business, but you are too valuable and no way can you be out of business. But I don't understand why you can't get this done.

My colleague, Mr. Rogers, is not here. We have had closed-door hearings, open hearings, private discussions. Another billion dollars? Why can't you get this right?

Mr. Tinston. Ma’am, in September, we deployed—the DOD deployed to Wave Travis, which doubled our installed base. It was a very successful deployment. We changed the way we delivered the infrastructure. We changed the way we delivered the training. We prepared people to be effective at doing their jobs, and we found it to be a very effective deployment.

At this point, we have 66 sites underway with Wave Nellis coming up next with 10 sites. So I think we are making tremendous progress in getting MHS Genesis, the modern electronic health record, deployed to the military health system.

We also work very, very closely with the VA program because we are really deploying a joint system here. It is a single record for both departments, and so, as the VA starts to bring their sites on, we will have one instance of the record about the patient, not where the care was delivered or who delivered the care, available to any provider about the patient when it is necessary.

Mrs. Lowey. Can you give me a better explanation as to why you are still bringing on sites? Why is this so complicated?

Mr. Tinston. So when you——

Mrs. Lowey. If the VA isn't up to standards and they can't get records from a disaster incident that may have happened 2 years ago, 3 years ago, they are not getting adequate healthcare.
Mr. TINSTON. So, when you are delivering an enterprise system like an enterprise health records, electronic health record that MHS Genesis is, the IT element of it is a small piece of the transformation that has to happen in the organization. It is an organizational transformation. It is a training challenge.

So you have to work—you deliver the right capability in the record, which we have done. You then have to customize that record to meet the physical plant of the facilities that you are supporting. Then you have to train people to be effective clinically with the new workflows that you have introduced.

So it is not just a turn it on and let everyone start using it. You have to be very deliberate about bringing people up to speed so that they can be effective so that we don’t compromise the healthcare delivery as we deploy MHS Genesis.

Mrs. LOWEY. $4.6 billion. Now you want another $1 billion. I am sure that our great military has had many, many complicated missions, and, frankly, I don’t understand. I understand what you are saying, but I don’t understand why you can’t get it right. I just hope that next year you won’t ask for another $1 billion again and another $1 billion with $4.6 billion.

And the expertise that you have in the military, it would seem to me that this task could have been completed. But I have been hearing one excuse after another, year after year. And if my colleague, Mr. Rogers, was here, he would probably get even redder faced than I am because we have had public meetings, private meetings, one-to-one meetings, two-to-one meetings.

Okay, I guess we are going to have to give you another $1 billion. I could think of a lot of other things, so I sure hope you get it right this time. Can you guarantee that this is going to do it; you have finally the expertise to do it?

Mr. TINSTON. Congresswoman we have the right people in the right place to be effective at delivering MHS Genesis.

Mrs. LOWEY. I have heard this for the last 5 years, you know.

Mr. TINSTON. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. LOWEY. These people are more expert? They really understand the systems?

Mr. TINSTON. Yes.

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. Mark that down in the record.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So noted.

I recognize Mr. Calvert.

COVID–19

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And thank you again for your all being here. I would like to start off with a question on the COVID–19 since we are all aware of the significant impact it is having around the world.

I was speaking to General Townsend, the AFRICOM commander earlier this week, and he noted that a map showed the U.S. Army Africa headquarters, the part they have over in Vicenza, Italy, it was surrounded by new cases of the virus in a local community. He indicated that fortunately so far they have not—unless there is anything new this morning—they have not been affected, and that
that is a testament to the great work that people have done in their preparedness to protect our force.

As this virus continues to spread, what steps are you taking to ensure installations both overseas and in the United States are protected? And do you need additional resources beyond the fiscal year 2021 President’s budget request—or in the supplemental there may be—some assistance may be available to the military also, but to continue to safeguard for the force against COVID–19? So I don’t know where to start, so maybe we will start with the admiral or start down here at the end.

Mr. McCaffery. I would be happy to kick it off, and my colleagues can chime in, Mr. Calvert.

So, when the DOD looks at the COVID–19 issue, there is really a handful of priorities we look at: First, it is the safety and health and well-being of our servicemembers; that is very much tied to then our ability to as we deal with this issue to continue to meet mission; and third, how we, the DOD, can support the rest of the Federal Government in the all-of-government approach and strategy on the COVID–19 issue.

With regard to the guidance we are giving on that first priority around the health and well-being of our servicemembers, the Department has issued a series of force health protection guidance to our servicemembers and our commanders built largely around CDC guidance. And so things around identifying best science and CDC guidance on risks to personnel, healthcare worker protection, protocols for screening of patients and reporting any detected virus.

It is also around giving guidance to self-protection, you know, common hygiene in terms of protection against viruses. And we also are giving guidance with regard to working with the CDC and the Department of State travel guidance in terms of restriction of travel to and from select countries.

And then most recently, sir, giving guidance to installation commanders, the combatant commanders with regard to how to assess their particular situation on the ground, be it installations here or overseas, and what kind of guidance they should use in making their flexible judgments about protections to put in place on their bases, again, everything from restricted travel and access to their bases.

As the CDC issues additional guidance or things change in terms of travel advisories, we will continue to update that guidance for the field.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you for that.

Any other comments on the force itself? I was curious, since yesterday, has there been any other transmissions?

General Hogg. Not that I am aware of, sir, but for many years, we have had disease containment plans and pandemic influenza plans that we have exercised at different points in time, and so now we are using those plans to help guide and direct our actions in relationship to the CDC and Health and Human Services guidance.

Mr. Calvert. Yes.

General.

General Dingle. And, sir, from the Army perspective, we have taken a three-prong approach of prevent, detect, and treat. The
prevention is the education awareness of all the soldiers and family members within that installation commander, our senior commander's footprint. The detection piece or the screenings that we are doing as well as the testing to verify the presence to acknowledge if it is, in fact, symptomatic and those who have been identified that——

Mr. CALVERT. Well, South Korea specifically——

General DINGLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CALVERT [continuing]. You still have not had any additional transmissions you are aware of?

General DINGLE. No additional. Right now, we have one soldier, and we have two dependents right now in the treatment mode, and then that is the last phase is the treatment, where we have implemented our pandemic expansion plans or response plans, and every installation, emergency preparedness, and we are even going as far as worst-case scenarios on bed expansion plans. So we are taking a holistic approach of prevent, detect, and treat as an Army.

Mr. CALVERT. And South Korea, specifically, is it General Abrams pretty much has all the facilities shut down at this point?

General DINGLE. Sir, the prevention piece to ensure that we are not spreading and they have not implemented some of the normal activities that bring together large gatherings. So whether—if it is school, each installation commander makes that call under the guidance of General Abrams, yes, sir.

Mr. CALVERT. Okay.

Admiral, anything to add?

Admiral GILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I would just say that I would like to thank the committee for the investment that has been made over the years in the President's budget for our network, worldwide network, tri-service network of research labs.

I can specifically say for Navy, our research labs that are in NAMRU 2 in Singapore, as well as NAMRU in Sigonella, Italy are at the forefront of the global response to this emerging pandemic. But that investment in our scientists and really world-leading knowledge and research is now bearing fruit, and you are seeing that dividend in the sense that we now have 12 of 14 DOD labs actively able to do diagnostic testing around the world.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you.

Mr. McCAFFERY. And, Congressman, just DOD-wide. So we have as of last night 4 confirmed cases and 12 suspected that are being tested.

Mr. CALVERT. And where are those cases at?

Mr. McCAFFERY. I don't have that break down, so this is across the DOD, both, you know, here and——

Mr. CALVERT. Both CONUS and outside the United States?

Mr. McCAFFERY. Yes.

Mr. CALVERT. Are there any cases within the United States that you are aware of?

Mr. McCAFFERY. I do not believe DOD cases as of yet, but I can get you the updated numbers today and break it down.

Mr. CALVERT. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.
DEVELOPMENT OF A VACCINE FOR COVID–19

Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I am going to ask you to submit a report to the committee as soon as possible on the two following questions, following up on my colleague from California on COVID–19: The $3 billion of the supplemental will go towards research and development of vaccines. Considering the Department's experience in working with SARS and MERS over the past 20 years, two respiratory illnesses that are similar to COVID–19, I would like to know what the Department of Defense and the Army in particular are doing to work with our other Federal agencies and partners, the FDA, CDC, and HHS in developing a vaccine.

STOCKPILE OF CRITICAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES

The other information I would like you to share back with us as soon as possible, for example, the Federal Government maintains stockpiles of respirators, and it has come to all of our attention that a number of these respirators have been allowed to expire.

Once again, the military usually does logistics and stockpiling with great, great precision. So we would like information on the Department in how you have been maintaining your own stockpile of respirators and masks and how you would distribute them within the different branches of service, if needed.

And, also, again, with your knowledge in this area, what role should the DOD play or could play in working with our public agencies to maintain proper stockpiles of critical medical supplies so our country can be better prepared for future healthcare crisis? If you would please follow up and get that information to us.

MILITARY DOWNSIZING AND CLOSURES

My question is on military downsizing. Secretary McCaffery, as you know, the Department provided Congress with a report on February 19 for planned closing and downsizing of up to 50 DOD military treatment facilities. And I would stress the word “report” here because most of it is just a list of impacted facilities.

Some of the comments on the downsizing were there would be no out-of-pocket cost to families or soldiers or airmen and that their prescriptions wouldn’t change. But there are other things that can impact the delivery of healthcare, not only to the person wearing the uniform but the family that is behind that person, and our uniform members need to know their families are well taken care of.

So bottom line is, we still don’t have a timeline, projections of cost savings, a real plan for implementation of these downsizing and closures. Now, while I understand the Department wants to focus on increased medical readiness of our troops and medical forces, the impacts of this organization will be significant. And trust me, we will hear from the individuals that are impacted by these changes.

Some numbers I have seen indicate up to 200,000 family members and retirees across the country would be pushed away from DOD medical treatment facilities and onto civilian providers. We need to understand what that plan looks like.

So, Mr. Secretary, your office has clearly been thinking about this for a long time since you do have a list of facilities that have
been impacted. So there must be a document somewhere to back up these facilities in how they were chosen.

So, Mr. Secretary, how can you expect us to, you know, do due diligence with our appropriate, necessary funds to reorganize the military's treatment facilities when we haven’t seen a comprehensive transparent plan from the Department on what, when, or how this restructuring will be implemented.

Additionally, the report submitted on February 19 states, and I quote: Upon submission of this report, detailed implementation planning will begin with implementation beginning not less than 90 days later. We need the information. That language, to me, and to many, sounds as though the Department believes it does not require congressional approval prior to moving forward with the implementation.

Secretary McCaffery, does the Congress need to stamp its approval on the recommendation prior to the Department's moving forward with the implementation plans to do scope services at military treatment facilities?

And the final question, for now, as we await your written response as soon as possible, if you are not ready to transmit to us a comprehensive and transparent plan, why not just ask for a delay of the reorganization so we can get it right and not cause any confusion for Congress in appropriating its funds when your patients, our soldiers, airmen, and marines ask us what is happening to them and their families?

Ms. McCollum. Mr. McCaffery, we have limited time. When can we expect the followup? You seem to have made—I believe that you did due diligence in making your decisions, but we were given none of the supporting documents to follow up with them. We are being asked to make decisions in a timeframe within a matter of months. And as you said, Congress charged you with this. So when can we expect a followup and the supporting documents?
Mr. McCaffery. So I will outline that. So the report to Congress identified and shared that we did a screen of 348 U.S.-based hospitals and clinics. Out of those, the Department determined 77 needed a deep-dive examination. The report went through the methodology we used to identify those, the methodology that was used in looking at the community availability of community care healthcare. We then—out of the 77, we actually determined 21——

Ms. McCollum. Sir, so we have the report, as you pointed out. Mr. McCaffery. Yes. And——

Ms. McCollum. When is the implementation plan coming?

Mr. McCaffery. Well, and including in the report, there is for each of the 50 facilities that are being recommended for a change, there is an entire use case that goes through all of the data that we use specific to that MTF. The report very clearly says there is not going to be any immediate change to operations, that it is not a one-size-fits-all implementation timeline. It will be based upon our work with the individual MTF in that community. Some of these——

Ms. McCollum. Mr. McCaffery, our staff seems to think, and I would agree with based on what I and others have seen, that we need some more information here. So I will ask you to please follow up with the committee because I have a lot of members here who have a lot of other questions that I know you are going to want to hear about what is on the mind of other Members of Congress.

So I thank you for that, but at this point in time, I would say that the Appropriations Committee doesn’t feel that it is fully informed and ready to go.

Mr. McCaffery. We will be happy to provide you additional information.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

With that, Mr. Carter. Thank you.

TRANSITION OF MILITARY TREATMENT FACILITIES TO DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY

Mr. Carter. Thank you. I have got a voice problem too. Appreciate all of you being here.

I am trying to learn all this stuff. This gets pretty dang complicated. Lieutenant General Place, how is the transition of military treatment facilities to the DHA going? What are some of the successes you have seen? What are the biggest challenges you are facing? And while these treatment facilities transitioned to DHS this past October, the services are still supporting DHA to keep the train on the tracks. Surgeons general describes the support that you continued to provide to the military treatment facilities in DHA.

Lieutenant General Place, what is the plan to decrease reliance on support from the services? Forgive my voice.

General Place. Sir, thanks for that question. So, in terms of the first part, how is it going, I would say that I agree with you it is an extraordinarily complex and challenging transformation. That said, overall, I think we are going very smoothly according to the plan, not that everything is perfect, not that there haven’t been challenges associated with it.
But in general, as we measure the effectiveness of the care that we are delivering and measure the effectiveness of our actions to plan, we are actually making good improvements in the quality of the care, in the speed with which we are delivering the care, and the use of the resources that the Congress has been generous enough to provide.

In terms of the successes, the success we are finding actually is in a particular regional market—and I will use here in D.C., for example—our ability to utilize all the resources of each of the facilities, to include the staff, to align them more appropriately to the location where they can best provide healthcare.

Similarly, we are able to use the particular location, whether you are enrolled to this particular military medical treatment facility or another, to move patients around to achieve the best quality of care. So the standardization within a market has been a success.

In terms of the challenge, you are exactly right, and that is the reliance on the service medical departments to continue to provide direct support. The reason for that is the staffs that have been doing it for decades in the services are slowly but surely transferring into both our headquarters and into our regional markets.

As we are doing that, we are sharing responsibility for the delivery of healthcare and sharing responsibility for oversight of that staff. That plan should continue for approximately another 6 months or so. My anticipation, at the end of this summer, the majority of the staff who will need to be transferred will be transferred into the Defense Health Agency headquarters. And the reliance on the service medical departments, at least for a U.S.-based support, will be significantly diminished in almost every area.

There are some challenges that are still there for the way we do our financing, for example, because we use different financing systems in each of the different services. So we still have to collaborate on some functions, but the majority of them will have transferred.

I think I got to all your questions, sir. If I didn’t, please remind me.

Mr. Carter. Any of the other services have any comments?

General Hogg. Yes, sir. I would echo, this is a very complicated merger of four cultures, if you will. And we will get there, as long as we get there using manageable risk. What that means for me is we need to transition before we transform. So we need to be able to continue supporting the Defense Health Agency in standing up its capabilities to manage these military treatment facilities because if you remember in the past, DHA didn’t come out of that. They came out of the old Tricare management activity, and their core competency was writing and managing contracts, not managing MTFs. So we need to help them do this mission. And so I would ask that we not add additional system changes until the Defense Health Agency is standing on their own, is well established, and has been managing the market with demonstrated success for a period of time.

General Dingell. And, Mr. Carter, I would add, the complexity, as you mentioned, is extremely difficult. And from the Army perspective, you know, what we have always championed is that we cannot fail at this. We have to get this right. And in order to get
it right, the focus should be on the MTF transitions, which starts with the standup of that headquarters. If the headquarters is not up and operational and running, then it will continue to require that direct support.

After you get that headquarters stood up, then you can start transitioning the military medical treatment facilities, and then we should also be focusing in that transition on that electronic health record. From the Army perspective, we believe that is the most key thing, and anything else are just distractors that are not allowing us to get it right.

PATIENT'S SATISFACTION

Mr. Carter. Is there anything in the Department of Defense that is not complex? And the question, I guess, real question we ought to be asking, maybe we need to talk to the NCOs when they come before us, what do the patient—how are the patients feeling about the care? Are they feeling anything that is throwing them off balance or that they are not getting treated well? Because that is who I am going to hear from in Florida is the ordinary soldier, and he is going to be telling me because he is not getting what he needs.

General Place. Sir, that is a great point. We continue to track the patients' satisfaction at every location that has already transitioned into the Defense Health Agency. And the patient satisfaction scores at each of those installations are at or above—at every single location that is transitioned is at or above what they were at baseline before transition. So not perfect—not trying to tell you that it is—but improving.

Mr. Carter. Well, that is good. Any other comment?

Admiral Gillingham. Sir, I would just add that we remain committed in the Navy Medicine to creating a truly integrated system of readiness and health. Going through this transition has forced us to look very carefully at our medical readiness requirements, and I will tell you that, as we have done that, we have identified opportunities for focus.

I mentioned in my opening remarks we now have almost one-third of our mental health professionals embedded in the fleet and Fleet Marine Force. So we believe that we are seeing—as citing a success, we are seeing increased focus on the wellness and readiness of our warfighters.

Mr. Carter. Well, and not to change—take too much more time, but this morning I was thinking about the Navy because a cruise ship is coming back into the United States waters because of, once again, the virus. And I thought, my gosh, what happens if we get that on an aircraft carrier or submarine and the complications that is going to make for our naval forces?

Admiral Gillingham. Yes, sir, I appreciate that concern, and that is something that we have thought very carefully about. And as Mr. McCaffrey said, we have worked closely with the CDC, World Health Organization, NORTHCOM, and other Joint Staff to understand how to eliminate that risk. And so that is why one of the requirements that we have established in the fleet is that no ship having left port will go to another port or arrive in another port and disembark within 14 days.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Judge Carter.
Mr. Cuellar.

MODIFICATION OF CDC PROTOCOLS

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for being here. I appreciate your work.
I want to direct my question on the coronavirus and the use of bases, as you know. The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Esper, approved a request for assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services for housing support for those that had to be quarantined. One of those places is in my area in San Antonio, Lackland Air Force Base.

As you know, there was a particular situation that they released an individual. And I know that you all are providing support services, but I just want to know if you all are coordinating. They released somebody that was still pending a test. That person went to North Star Mall, went around San Antonio. Of course, that caused a problem because the second test came back. There was a protocol modification that the CDC Director sent off. Are you all familiar with this letter that got sent off on the modification of protocols? Anybody?

Mr. McCaffery. I am not sure which communication you are referring to, but——

Mr. Cuellar. Yes, just basically the modification on CDC changes, that is—there were two changes: One, that is if you have a quarantined individual, that person will only be released if that person has had two sequential negative tests within 24 hours, modification number one; modification number two, which is the most important one, where I think they messed up, was that no person will be released if there is a pending test result, and that is what we saw in the San Antonio area.

My request is that I know that you all are supporting—providing support services, but I think these modifications should be something that we should apply, whether it is in South Korea or wherever the case might be. I would ask you, if you are not familiar with this, I would ask you to please be familiar with this. Any thoughts or comments on this? And then I want to ask you a second question.

Mr. McCaffery. Sure. We will make sure that we have the same guidance. I believe we do have what you are showing us. And as you pointed out, this is a good example of where the Department is in a supporting role to the all-of-government effort.

And so the use of military installations in terms of receiving repatriated citizens, the role there was we made available our installations and then Health and Human Services and the CDC were really—once those folks were on the ground, had that responsibility in terms of managing them, providing them care, doing the testing and then any kind of referrals out into the private healthcare sector. And so we defer to them on making and managing that area, but we will take a look at——

Mr. Cuellar. Yes. And that I understand, but even if you are providing support services, if you are off abroad somewhere, let's
say South Korea, then we better be familiar with this protocol. So I would ask you to do that.

WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH

Second thing is, what I would ask you is, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research is working on a vaccine against the coronavirus. Can you give us the status on that progress, number one? And also, I think they are working on diagnostic testing kits, and how close are we on those two points on that?

Mr. McCaffery. Yes. So the Military Health System is part of the broader interagency on looking at everything from diagnostics, vaccine research, as well as antiviral therapies for, if you have the condition, how it can be treated. So, in fact, we, CDC, NIH, are all—have in progress, have research going on on a vaccine, and it has been ongoing. I believe clinical trials for that will not be for another few months, and so, in terms of a final determined FDA-approved vaccine, likely we are looking at, you know, 16 or 18 to 24 months. That is from the research that we are doing. I can't speak to similar research NIH or CDC are doing on that.

Similarly, on an antiviral therapy, we may be closer there in terms of having something that can be usable. It is actually in clinical trials right now for testing of efficacy.

Mr. Cuellar. Well, as I close, I just ask you all to—I know we are putting a lot of Federal dollars in research, and I understand that, in different areas. I just want to make sure that we are coordinating working together as we use this large amount of Federal dollars. And as you saw, the House passed the supplemental bill yesterday appropriations. So I just want to make sure we are all coordinating.

Thank you for your service all of you. Thank you.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. Womack.

TACTICAL COMBAT CASUALTY PROGRAM

Mr. Womack. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks to the entire panel.

I want to direct my question to General Dingle and Admiral Gillingham, and I am going to pivot away from all of these flavors of the month, COVID–19, et cetera, et cetera, and I want to come back to tactical medicine for just a minute.

It is my strong belief that in the last two decades, thanks to the efforts in the entire readiness scenario to better prepare our men and women in uniform to perform battlefield medicine has saved a lot of lives. There are a lot of people that have been able to go home to their families, albeit maybe banged up a lot, that in many previous wars would have died on the battlefield. And in my regiment back many years ago, we had a robust Combat Lifesaver Program, and I think that Combat Lifesaver Program was probably the reason we have done so well.

I know that the military services are transitioning from the traditional Combat Lifesaver Program to a more robust Tactical Combat Casualty program. So I would like an update. It is my understanding that that process is still evolving and that the Tier 2 TC3 program is going to become that bedrock training for our readiness
posture that in the event that we were to engage in a near-peer combat scenario more force-on-force scenario, that a much more robust combat program, combat medic program would be important.

So can you explain to me where we are in this process, how it is going, and what you see unfolding in the next year or two?

General DINGLE. Mr. Womack, first and foremost, let me thank you for recognizing the first responders. Oftentimes, the combat medic, the combat lifesaver do not get the recognition that they deserve when they are the very first responders that stop the bleeding that are enablers to the sustainment of life in combat.

With that said, you are absolutely correct, our program is going tremendously within the Army. We call it the Army Medicine Medical Skill Sustainment Program, which it involves everything from expeditionary combat medic care where we are teaching them expeditionary medicine and how to provide prolonged care in austere environments, all the way to where we are taking our trauma teams, as you mentioned, and embedded them in our civilian facilities, those trauma centers, so that they can get the touches not just as a trauma surgeon but as a trauma team.

Right now, as we expand that, we currently have three programs going on right now across the country. We are going to expand that this year in fiscal year 2020 for those trauma teams to three more, and then we have about another eight more that are right behind those.

In reference to those enlisted training, also we have what we call our Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Training. So that SMART focuses, once again, on that combat medic, not just training them in simple training environments but also pulling them out and putting them into some of those trauma centers, too, so they can get those individual critical task lists trained to proficiency so, when they are called upon, they will be ready to respond.

Bruce.

Admiral GILLINGHAM. Thank you, Congressman Womack.

As an orthopedic surgeon who served as the officer in charge of a surgical shock platoon in Fallujah in 2004, I can tell you this is of particular interest to me that we continue to get this right, particularly as the nature of our adversary potentially changes. I will tell you that, in addition to moving up in terms of the capability for our enlisted providers for TCCC, we are actually in the process of training the entirety of the ship to have those basic skills because as terrific as our independent duty corpsmen are who are responsible for the medical care on our smaller ships, they would be rapidly overwhelmed. So we are in the process of training the entire crew in fundamentals of tactical casualty care, sir.

CLOTTING MATERIAL AND TECHNIQUES

Mr. WOMACK. I have one followup question regarding new medicine, and that is that there is a lot of technology out there regarding clotting material in the application of certain bandages and this sort of thing. Are we okay with our stockpiles? Are we procuring these new technological advances in a timely way so that we can use the very best that we have? Because, you know, in that golden hour or in those first few minutes, that type of equipment is going
to be critical to helping save lives when otherwise they would be lost immediately.

Admiral GILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. I can’t speak directly to the supply that we have, but I will tell you that they are—and perhaps General Place or Mr. McCaffery can speak in greater detail, but I can tell you that there is a tremendous commitment in our research enterprise to make sure that we have absolutely the best possible, you know, equipment and technology in the hands of our first providers.

General PLACE. Yes, sir, I will add on to that.

Both in terms of quality and in terms of the quantity, the research that has been occurring within the Military Health System, specifically for intraabdominal clotting, for example, which is a problem on the battlefield, or junctional hemorrhage cases. So where extremities come into the thorax or into the abdomen, those are also important. We have cutting-edge research that has given us new clotting technologies to be able to use in those conditions. So it is not just the quantity of them, yes, sir, we have good stocks of them, but it is also new qualities of hemorrhage control capacities that we have.

Mr. WOMACK. Thank you for the service, for all of your service, and I appreciate the answers to my questions here this morning. I yield back.

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you.

I saw some of the clotting techniques that they were working on out at Fort Detrick just recently, truly amazing and will later on have application in the civilian healthcare world as well.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you to all of the panel, excuse me, for being here.

Prior to coming to Congress, I was a hospital attorney. I represented a regional hospital that had a number of smaller clinics within it and spent a great deal of my time on medical records completion. It is not easy. It is very complicated. And one of the things that I discovered was that there was a real reluctance by some members of the medical staff to use electronic medical records. So they were used to dictating their charts as they made their rounds, and then that chart would go to medical records, and then somebody would transcribe that chart in medical records so that it could be electronic. It was very cumbersome, took weeks and weeks and weeks to complete.

RECRUITMENT OF PEOPLE INTO THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM

So I want to know a couple of things. The other thing we found is that it is really difficult to attract young people to residencies in the VA, and so I would like you to address what you are doing to recruit and attract young people into the healthcare system and the delivery system, and then what has been done to improve the use of electronic records, let alone interoperability? I mean, we can’t even get to that until we actually have the electronic records in the system.
So that is an open question to anyone on the panel who feels like they can address that. Thank you.

Mr. McCaffery. Let me start with kind of the larger question that you asked and probably would defer to the military departments in terms of the specific question of things that we are doing to recruit and retain young people into—I mean, from our perspective, into the medical side of the military. But you indicated the challenge of adopting an electronic health record, and I think that is something that really—to foot stomp here for everybody. My experience in the private sector is even systems like Kaiser that have been around, very sophisticated, when they adopted a new electronic health record, it took several years for them to do for just many of the reasons you pointed out. It is not so much the technology. It is how do you train your workforce, including clinicians, on that new technology, what are the workflows you need to use to match it up, and it has changed management. And I think—and I will let Mr. Tinston weigh in with some more detail, but we purposely, when we rolled out for the Department of Defense, rolled out the here, we did it in a test way in four facilities to see what we needed to learn and informed the larger deployment, and we learned many of those things. And I think that is what has led to the most recent deployment in September went far better, and we believe we are really well positioned now as we pursue additional waves of getting it out throughout the system.

But I don’t know if you have anything to add, Mr. Tinston, on that.

Mr. Tinston. So, Mr. McCaffery, Congresswoman, we did learn a lot. We did the initial Pacific Northwest sites. We didn’t have all of the capabilities that we needed——

Ms. McCollum. Sir, if you would speak into a microphone so that it can be picked up.

Mr. Tinston. Sorry about that.


Mr. Tinston. We took some time to make sure we had the capabilities right with the record and the workflows, and we began training those workflows to get people job-ready vice teaching them how to use the IT, which is one of the mistakes we made out the gate. So we have had much better results with Wave Travis, and we anticipate continuous improvements as we proceed to wave knowledge and future waves. And as I said earlier, we have 66 sites in the deployment process at this moment.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Are you working with medical schools to train young doctors before they get to residency how to use that IT software?

General Place. Well, ma’am, most of the medical students who are on the scholarship programs that end up bringing them into our system, they do rotations in our organizations already. So, yes, they are being trained on our systems before they ever get into it.

Let me add one other comment to it. We have been using an electronic health record within the Military Health System for two decades. So the challenge that you are describing is really not a challenge that we are having. We are used to using electronic health record. The downside of it was it was homegrown. It was clunky. There were challenges with it. But our culture has changed to ac-
cepting the electronic health record. The challenges that we are having now is from our homegrown electronic health record, where we did our own workflows even locally sometimes differently, to the commercial off-the-shelf that we purchased, transitioning to that. It is not the reliance on the electronic health record that we are having the challenge with.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Are you using software you just purchase off the shelf?

General Place. Yes, ma'am. It is a commercial off-the-shelf software program.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. The other challenge we ran into was maintaining confidentiality. So when records are being transferred around to different institutions, how do you maintain the confidentiality of the medical record?

Mr. Tinston. So we are fortunate in that we are part of the Department of Defense, and so from a cyber security and a data protection perspective, we have the baseline of the Department’s cyber rules and standards to base our implementation off of. So we manage the cyber protection with the VA because it is a joint record that we are creating between the DOD and the VA to meet the DOD standards. And as far as the interoperability and exchange of data with external providers, we do that through the—there is data use agreements in place, and we do that through HL-7 standards, and we are engaged with the standards agency organizations to make sure that we have influence on how those are promulgated.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Well, it is a tremendous problem, and I appreciate your attention to it. Anything that I can do to help solve that problem, I have been working on it for decades, so feel free to call on me. Thank you.

And I yield back.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

STRATEGIC MEDICAL ASSET READINESS PROGRAM (SMART)

Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. General, thank you for being here. What you do is very important. We appreciate your competence.

I want to get into the Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Program, SMART. I know Congressman Womack dealt with it.

Lieutenant Dingle, we must ensure that we continue to take care of our American soldiers. A few weeks ago I had the privilege to accompany your Deputy Chief of Staff MG Crosland to the Baltimore Shock Trauma at the University of Maryland, and that is rated one of the top trauma centers in the world, research, development. And the Air Force has been there for many years and has a really good relationship, and we are focused right now on the Army and maybe the Navy and Marines later. In fact, that trauma center saved my life 50 years ago. And if it weren’t for their expertise and competence, I wouldn’t be here today. Maybe that is a good thing for some people.

Anyhow, during our visit we discussed the SMART program, which provides combat medics the opportunity to get hands-on training alongside their civilian counterparts. The studies show that, during the first few years of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
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we could have saved 1 in 7 troops lost if they had access to reliable trauma care.

Now, what are your plans to expand this vital program? Does the fiscal year 2021 budget support this? And as our military shifts to near-peer competition, can you explain why trauma care experience is so important to our medical corps?

General DINGLE. Thank you, Representative.

As you have experienced the great treatment from the Baltimore Shock and Trauma, one of the beauties of the SMART program is it is taking, again, that combat medic and expounding and building upon something that we have had within the Army called medical proficiency training in the old days where we were leveraging just our military medical treatment facilities. What Baltimore Shock and Trauma and then those hospitals who are those civilian trauma centers, they are exposing these medics in a 2-week rotation with the ability to put hands on trauma injuries and trauma cases. So that is exponentially increasing their skill set, their individual critical task list, and it is just priceless.

We are expanding to two programs this fiscal year this summer, with plans to expand to about six, seven more almost each year. And, again, we have not had any issues with funding as we continue to expand and are intending to expand this across the country.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. That is good.

General Hogg.

General HOGG. Yes, sir. So, as you know, we have used Baltimore for quite some time. We have other C–STARS capabilities out there with Cincinnati and University Medical Center in Nevada. What we are also looking at is embedding entire teams in civilian facilities. 24/7, 365 days a year, we are there getting the touches on a regular and consistent basis.

ORTHOPAEDIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is good. You keep it up.

All right. I want to move to the Peer Reviewed Orthopaedic Research Program.

Secretary McCaffery, I would like to ask you about this program, the Orthopaedic Research Program. I have been supporting this program for years. It is a research program which has demonstrated results enrolling more than 15,000 patients to date in military-relevant research with the potential to provide healthcare solutions for injured servicemembers, veterans, and civilians. Now, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in 5,300 deaths and 52,000 battlefield injuries among American service personnel, including more than 2,200 major limb amputations. The unique nature of these wounds, which primarily resulted from explosive glass and high velocity of gunshot, has been well documented. The Orthopaedic Research Program has been funded since 2009 and has received level funding at $30 million per year since fiscal year 2012. These funds have allowed our orthopedic docs to work miracles, stabilizing limbs, helping with tissue regeneration and even a full face transplant. Those conducting the research are asking for an increase to 35 million in work to provide stable funding for the consortiums, which includes the major extremity trauma research
consortium metric, and that is anchored at Johns Hopkins University.

Can you walk us through the history of the Orthopaedic Research Program and the consortium it works? And also do you believe the program could benefit from increased funding designated to support the services on an ongoing basis? And do you agree the services are a force multiplier that provide the greatest return on investment?

Mr. McCaffery. So thank you for the question, Congressman.

To be candid, I cannot walk you through the history of this particular research program. I would need to get back to you in terms of—

Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, I probably can more than you then because I—

Mr. McCaffery. I am not aware of the request for increased funding in this particular research program.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.

Mr. McCaffery. But I am happy to take back your questions and provide you the answers.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, I will have my staff get in contact with you or your staff today, and then I want to try and make this a priority if we can.

Mr. McCaffery. Sure.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Yield back.

Ms. McCollum. If we could have the Army follow up on that to the committee.

Mr. Crist.

STATUS OF SERVICEMEMBERS IN THE AL ASAD AIR BASE IN IRAQ

Mr. Crist. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

And thank you all for being here today. We appreciate your service to our country.

As you know, Iran launched 11 ballistic missiles at the Al Asad Air Base in Iraq. While we thought that all servicemembers were safe, over 100 servicemembers have since been diagnosed with traumatic brain injury.

What is the status of the servicemembers who were in the attack? And out of those who have returned to duty, how many are on light or restricted service? And that is for any of you who feel comfortable responding.

Mr. McCaffery. So, Congressman Crist, this may be a little dated. This is probably numbers from a couple of days ago, but my understanding, out of the roughly 100, 109 servicemembers that were identified, 75 have been reviewed, evaluated, and are actually back in duty in Iraq. The remainder I would need to go back and check in terms of what is the status with regard to their evaluation and have they been returned to duty and what type of duty. I don't have that handy, but I can get back to you on that.

Mr. Crist. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that very much.

I am concerned obviously because, even though the bunkers mostly held and had ample warning to take shelter, over 100 servicemembers were diagnosed, and that is very disconcerting obviously. That number will likely increase, too, I am told. As General Milley said, the troops in the attack will need to be monitored
for the rest of their lives. But he also said, quote, that there is nothing we could have done, end quote, because the missiles were so powerful. If we are making investments to counter Russia and China, we also need to protect our servicemembers against the powerful weapon systems, including the ballistic missiles.

What are we doing to protect servicemembers from ballistic missiles or other causes of TBI?

Mr. McCaffery. So a couple of things. One of the areas that Congress has asked the Department to work on and we are in process and that is focused especially on the implications of blast exposure.

Mr. Crist. Right.

Mr. McCaffery. And we are in the middle of doing a study on that to figure out better ways to measure it but then, more importantly, what we find out about the impacts of blast exposure on brain health that then needs to inform everything from what weapons we acquire, the training we put in place, not just in a deployed setting but training here at home, to inform what we can do to best protect our servicemembers. And then, most importantly, and I think you kind of referenced it, was what we are doing, I believe it is the Special Forces Command right now is really doing a good job at baselining all of their servicemembers with regard to their cognitive abilities and have that as the benchmark then to evaluate over time to see if any of their, you know, in training, in deployments, any potentially concussive events have affected that baseline as a way to monitor and evaluate. So those are some of the things that we are looking at.

Mr. Crist. Great. We have learned that brain injuries are a problem, and we have known that our adversaries have these weapons. So how have we not considered what would happen in an attack like this?

Mr. McCaffery. So I believe we have considered, based upon, you know, the evidence we have and what kind of protective gear, based upon research we have done, what we believe, you know, makes sense in terms of protection, and, most importantly, we do have standard across-the-board policy with regard to if a servicemember has experienced a concussive event, there are very strict protocols around reporting that, screening that servicemember, getting the evaluation and then pursuing whatever medical care is required before return to duty or something else.

STOPPING SPREAD OF COVID–19 AMONG SERVICEMEMBERS

Mr. Crist. Thank you, sir.

We have seen patches of coronavirus here at home, including in my home of Tampa Bay, home to CENTCOM and SOCOM. As you know, there are also larger outbreaks near military installations overseas.

What are you doing to stop the spread of the coronavirus in our troops?

Mr. McCaffery. So the Department has issued a series over the last 4 to 5 weeks of force health protection guidance, largely built around CDC guidance, and part of that, though, is how we apply that guidance to the military environment and guidance we give to installation commanders both here and abroad and how they can
apply that to their particular situations on the ground to inform what they want to do with their servicemembers in terms of screening, access to the installation, as part of the effort to contain any infection at their base or surrounding area.

Mr. Crist. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Just finally, do military installations have access to testing? And then I yield back.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

Mr. McCaffery. The installations it would be—it is tied to where we have the lab technology at military installations in terms of our MTFs. Right now my last information is I thought we had 9 or 10 of our military labs have the access for the testing that is approved by the CDC. We are seeking to get all of our labs, which is about 14 or 15, to have that ability.

Mr. Crist. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

If you would follow up with the committee on that, on the testing.

Mr. Ryan.

OBESITY RATES FOR ACTIVE DUTY

Mr. Ryan. Thanks, Madam Chair. Thank you for your service, thank you for being here.

I want to go on a little bit of a different direction. I am a little bit unique. I think I am the only one who sits on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the Military Construction-VA Subcommittee.

So the issue of health as it relates to all of you in Active Duty and as it connects to veterans is important. And one of the things—and I have tried to look through a lot of your testimony. It is very technical. We are talking about records and all of that. I want to talk to you about obesity rates.

From what I can gather, the obesity rates for Active Duty are going up: 15.8 percent a couple of years back and now 17.4 percent. In the Navy, it is 22 percent. Air Force is 18. Army is 17. Males between 35 and 44 years old have almost a 30 percent obesity rate. And when you look at the increase in blood pressure and diabetes and heart disease, all of this stuff, you know way better than I do, this is a problem that we are not even talking about, and it has got a relatively simple or simpler solution than everything that we have just talked about.

And for the last few years, my staff and I have been trying to dig in on the food that is being fed to our soldiers, the fact that, you know, the commissaries and cafeterias are closed and people are working late and the only thing left on the whole base is a Burger King that is open, and so they go and do that over the course of many years.

Now, we need a big strategy to reverse the obesity rates. And, I mean, I think most people would be shocked to think that we watch Tom Brady, and we see these high-performing athletes, and we look at their diets, and we look at their lifestyles, and we are spending billions of dollars to have high-performing men and women serving our country performing at peak levels in very high-
pressed situations. And for us to have an obesity rate that is creeping up to 20 percent and zero strategy on how to fix it, that is a real problem. And then you come back and you want more money for this and more money for that, and there is all kinds of research going on and reversing Type 2 diabetes with food as medicine and all kind of innovative things that are happening in the real world that we have got to make sure that it is getting into the military.

Now, here is the connection for us who sit, you know, at 30,000 feet. The diabetes rate for veterans is 1 in 5; the diabetes rate for average American is 1 in 10. So here we are blowing all of this money. I have been on ships before and you walk in, and it is all the sugary cereals. Now, look, I am not a prude on this stuff. I am an 80 percenter, right: 80 percent of the time, you do what is right. You work out; you eat healthy 80 percent of the time. But we can't have this, folks. This is unacceptable that we are going to continue.

Is there any strategy that is in place, Mr. Secretary, that is addressing this in an aggressive way?

Mr. McCAFFERY. So we have, in part working with your office, I know last year have been putting together what I would call more of a framework or a skeleton in terms of what would be the key components of the strategy. As you mentioned, part of it, in terms of on the health side, are what are the health guidelines and health recommendations that then feed into how our installations are operated and the decisions made about what types of food, access to that. And where we have not completed that is that closure, that link between the medical side and how we are operating our infrastructure, so to speak, in delivery of food.

So there is more work to be done on that, and you make very good points in terms of, you know, part of lethality is our servicemembers and their health and their ability to do their job, and this is a negative impact on that.

Mr. RYAN. Well, it is a waste of money is what it is. I mean, it is inefficient. Obviously, it goes to production. Then they go into the VA system, and they have diabetes. And then diabetes, when you look at diabetes with any other sickness, just jacks up the cost. It extends your stays in the hospital. It complicates any other issue that you may have. If you have to go to surgery or if you have got heart problem and diabetes, it just makes it that much worse. So now I will leave here, and I will go sit on another committee, the VA, and talk about how we don't have any money. And so we have got to start seeing these systems as integrated.

And the same—you know, we can have a whole discussion on K through 12 school. When I walk into a school and these kids are getting a Rice Krispies Treat and a thing of chocolate milk, and they start their day out with about 80 grams of sugar. And then they are on the Medicaid program, and they end up getting diabetes with the public money that we spent to buy them Rice Krispies Treats and chocolate milk, and then the public money we spend to take care of them on Medicaid. The American people are sick of this. This doesn't make any sense. And I want the military in the United States to be the leader in this.
So I only have probably a little bit of time left, and I would just like to give it to the Surgeon Generals if anybody—if one of you have a comment on this.

General DINGLE. Sir, I will be real quick, Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

General DINGLE. Within the Army we have a very pragmatic approach to the health of the force, and we have many programs, from Go Green, Healthy Choices, Spartan Board, that get after the eating, as well as the activity, as well as the entire life process or approach to living, and then our holistic health and fitness, going after the spiritual, physical, and mental wellbeing of our soldiers, the ACFT, APFT, the wellness centers, all designed to, one, educate our soldiers where we have got programs that have also inculcated this into the units, not just special forces, but treating every soldier as an athlete.

Admiral GILLINGHAM. I would certainly agree. Very similarly, in the Navy, we have a similar program. Certainly we understand the importance of wellness. I think, sir, one of the points you make are the social determinants of health that we really have to get after in the environments in which our sailors and marines and soldiers live. So we are working with commissaries, for example, with our dieticians to provide guidance so it is available in the commissary as individuals purchase their groceries.

So, sir, we agree with you 100 percent, and we are working very hard to get——

Mr. Ryan. We have a lot of work to do.

Admiral GILLINGHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ryan. And this committee is going to push every single one of you to make this happen.

MILITARY HEALTH PERSONNEL RESTRUCTURING

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. I think everybody has gotten the message, and I know there is more to say, but we are actually out of time for a vote.

And I do want to follow up with one question, not to be responded here today but reported back to the staff. And it goes back to the military health personnel restructuring.

The DOD, in your announcement of the plan of healthcare restructuring, roughly 18,000 uniformed health positions will be gone with no plan to replace them, yet you are talking about putting people into the marketplace. We know that there is a shortage in our healthcare system throughout this country. We are also concerned about your ability when these facilities close to be able to retain some of the docs and high specialized individuals that are serving us. You also function as teaching hospitals, and teaching hospitals are closing and limiting the number of training opportunities all across this country. We can’t afford to lose you as part of our backbone for not only our military health but for our allover U.S. healthcare system, especially when it comes to OB/GYN’s and pediatricians. And with more women serving, OB/GYN’s, I have to say I have some familiarity with them, having had an Army doctor deliver both of my children, and, you know, we can’t afford to be losing those kinds of specialties and keep and recruit and retrain women, as well as women who are family members.
So we have got some serious questions on that. We want to be helpful with you as you make that decision, but I think we need to look at a whole of healthcare. So I want to thank you so much for coming. And now this also goes to Mr. Carter's question about, you know, some of the outside treatment happening as well.

Thank you so much for being here. Thank you for your service, and thank you for getting back to us promptly because we are starting to mark up the bills.

With that, this meeting is adjourned. This hearing is adjourned.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. The committee will come to order. This morning the subcommittee will hold a hearing on the posture of the U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM.

Before we get started, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Calvert for a motion.

Mr. CALVERT. I move that those portions of the hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive session because of the classification of the material to be discussed.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So ordered. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert.

Today we will receive testimony from SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Craig Faller. Admiral, welcome back to the subcommittee, and we do look forward to your testimony. The SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility lies at the doorstep of the United States. Defense in this part of the world often has a direct impact on the United States and its allies.

In Central America, economic and security conditions continue to cost thousands to migrate north every year. In South America the mismanagement of Venezuela's economy and institutions have displaced millions, impacting that country's neighbors and countries, including the Caribbean.

Across the SOUTHCOM area, the lack of economic opportunity and law enforcement, along with continued demand, supports the flow of drugs and criminal organizations. So more broadly, great power competition is playing out in the region. China’s Belt and Road initiatives now extends to the majority of countries, including areas critical to U.S. commerce and security.

Russia's continued support of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela works across purposes to U.S. interests in the region. We do look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is postured and resourced to play its part to address these challenges.

In addition, we would like to better understand how SOUTHCOM is leveraging the assistance funding that we appropriate. Even without a significant U.S. presence, our longstanding partnerships with countries, like Colombia and Peru, can help us advance our interest.

And we look forward to hearing about how new opportunities in countries like Ecuador and Brazil are progressing. I know we have a number of committee members who follow these issues very closely, and so I am glad they were able to attend the hearing today.
Admiral, we look forward to your testimony, but first, I would recognize my friend and ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his opening comments.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Faller, welcome back to the subcommittee. I appreciate the chairman for calling this hearing. He and I recently had the opportunity to visit the Joint Interagency Task Force South and Guantanamo Naval Base, and I want to express my tremendous admiration for the professionalism and hospitality of your team.

Like other combatant commands, SOUTHCOM is the subject of ongoing review about the appropriate allocation of the U.S. global military resources to implement the 2018 National Defense Strategy. From a national interest perspective, the case per greater not lesser U.S. engagement in the region is compelling.

There are certainly no shortage of challenges facing the U.S. in the region. Political, social unrest is on the rise; corruption and transnational organized crime undermine Democratic institutions; Venezuela is a virtual failed state; and migrant flows from the Northern Triangle threaten our homeland security.

I would also like—if any comments about the oil collapse yesterday, how that is going to affect Venezuela in the short term, because, obviously, cash flow in that part of the region is extremely important.

China's footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean is expanding rapidly, and the growing diplomatic and economic reach there could enhance its military intelligence posture. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran remain a malign presence in the region, not to mention Cuba and its involvement in the drug trade.

Frankly, many of these issues principally involve our civilian agencies and broader interagency efforts to address ongoing urgent governance challenges while advancing enhanced U.S. cultural, political, and economic ties with Latin America.

But counternarcotics and homeland security issues also loom large for the U.S. Many, many people die of drugs in this country, far more than all the combatant commands combined. And here in SOUTHCOM it certainly plays a critical role.

We all know the men and women under your command have done more with less for years in carrying out their mission. Lack of ISR capability has been a persistent concern, and an absence of manned and unmanned assets for aerial detection and monitoring.

We deeply appreciate the efforts by you and the men and women who serve under your command, and all they do on behalf of the United States. I look forward to the testimony and the dialogue to follow. I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Granger, for her opening comment.

REMARKS OF MS. GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky. Admiral Faller, welcome back to the subcommittee. SOUTHCOM is a region of vital importance that is often overlooked, but the threats you face...
are just as complex as those of other combatant commands. This subcommittee understands how important your work is, and we look forward to hearing your needs and priorities.

As a former chair of the State Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I spent a lot of time on issues in the area of your responsibility. This is the region often focusing on the Northern Triangle countries, and Costa Rica and Colombia.

I would like you to update the committee on the security situation, including how these countries are working with the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies to address drug smuggling and human trafficking. These problems originate, or flow through these places and eventually reach the United States.

I am also particularly interested in hearing your thoughts about the influence of Russia and China in the region. We can’t afford to lose the strong cooperation we had with our neighbors in the south, and we must do all we can to continue this partnership.

I look forward—again, thank you for your service and look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Visclosky. Admiral, your statement is in the record, as you know. If you want to summarize and then we will proceed with questions. Go ahead. Thank you.

[The written statement of Admiral Faller follows:]
POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE 116TH CONGRESS
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
MARCH 10, 2020
Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs, we are focused on sustaining our advantages in the Western Hemisphere—the most important of which are strong partnerships founded on shared democratic values. Recent trends illustrate that the Western Hemisphere—our shared neighborhood—is critical space in the global competition—and global challenges—posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our partnerships in the Western Hemisphere strong and vibrant will allow us to achieve the NDS objective of maintaining a favorable regional balance of power that reduces security threats to the homeland.

Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the region is home to ~25% of all U.S. exports and key global infrastructure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes, and deep water ports that provide access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to our homeland in every domain—land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values—which makes any threat or encroachment in this region particularly concerning. Latin America’s strategic importance lies in its unique potential as both a vulnerability and an opportunity for our own security, prosperity, and efforts to address global challenges.1

Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese government absorbed three more Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative, bringing the regional total to 19—more than half of all countries in the region. Beijing now has 29 government exchange programs with Latin America and the Caribbean, and continues to expand offers of professional military education, equipment donations, and funding for infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our neighborhood, establishing a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying (for the first time) its most advanced nuclear-capable

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1 Evan Ellis (2016). “Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean.”
warship; and sending a research ship capable of mapping and cutting undersea cables, as well as two other naval research vessels to operate near our homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage, oppression in Venezuela is ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily arrested for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019. Between January 2018 and May 2019, regime-aligned security forces killed more than 7,000 people, and many of these killings may constitute extrajudicial killings.

These malign state actors are part of a **vicious circle of threats** that deliberately erode stability and security in the region. This **vicious circle** is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, often with weak governance and porous legal frameworks, exacerbated by a propensity towards patronage and corruption that is deliberately exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external state actors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to advance their own ends at the expense of U.S. and partner nation security. This vicious circle continues to negatively impact our homeland, most acutely in the form of illegal immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in other, more harmful ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government corruption, support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean is at its lowest levels in 15 years,\(^2\) providing further openings for malign state actors to increase their influence. A number of countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, with others sliding towards outright authoritarianism.

**Positive Trends.** These threats are real, and they demand a sense of urgency. But so do the opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru demonstrate that, while democracy may be troubled, citizens are exercising democratic rights to uphold their constitutions.

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\(^2\)2018/2019 AmericasBarometer report, funded by USAID. Available at: https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-slump-across-america-according-to-new-survey/
Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador now recognize the Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban officials, some even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador are doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular migration towards our border; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago regularly deploy to regional disaster response efforts, to include supporting the Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian; and Colombia, Brazil, and Chile continue to grow their contributions to global security.

Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of USSOUTHCOM are moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and sustain our security advantages in the Western Hemisphere. While doing so, we remain committed to making good use of every taxpayer dollar Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we undertook a detailed review of all aspects of our organization to gain efficiencies and support the Department’s reform efforts. I look forward to discussing how we are freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our top priorities: strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering threats, and building the readiness of our team.

Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and partnerships—which is exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where strengthening partnerships is the best way to counter threats, enhance our collective readiness and capability to meet global challenges, and maintain the regional balance of power in favor of the United States. We also support the interagency, including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, reinforcing the importance of leveraging all tools of national security.

We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other competitors by playing to our strengths of shared values, professionalism, and equipment built to last, and by investing in education, intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, joint operations, and security cooperation. More
than anything else. persistent presence matters in this fight. Like athletes, we have to be present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win.

**Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors.** As the Department of Defense has prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has aggressively turned its attention to the Western Hemisphere, exporting corrupt business practices and disregard for international law and standards to countries already struggling with government corruption and weak governance. The competitive space is truly global and all-domain as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the PRC and Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15 worldwide) still recognize Taiwan—a fact that has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, which is engaging in persistent (and successful) dollar diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19 Latin American and Caribbean nations now participating in the One Belt One Road Initiative and pledges of at least $150 billion in loans, the PRC is now the region’s largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of predatory financing and “no strings attached” largesse it has wielded in other parts of the world. On the defense side, this includes “gifts” of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to copy our successful military education program.

Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host Chinese infrastructure projects. Most concerning, certain investments have strategic value for future military uses. Chinese investment in numerous deep water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the Panama Canal could enable the Chinese military to threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the movement of U.S. forces. Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the sovereign rights of coastal states to conduct illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Latin American countries, while Chinese mining and infrastructure projects have created lasting environmental damage. Beijing sees immense value in South America’s strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing
additional access to regional space infrastructure. With telecommunication projects in 16 countries, Huawei and ZTE provide the backbone of commercial and government communication systems, providing a backdoor for the Chinese government to monitor or intercept official information we share with our partners. Beijing is also gaining real-time, street-level situational awareness by selling surveillance technology through its “Smart Cities” initiative—the same technology the Chinese Communist Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens.3

Russia continues to play the role of “spoiler,” seeking to sow disunity and discredit the United States within our own hemisphere. As it does across the world, Russia meddles in regional affairs by spreading false information on its media platforms and engaging in malicious cyber activity. Russia’s ability to disseminate disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En Español’s social media platforms received more views in 2019 than any other Spanish-language news source.

While Moscow denies having a military presence in the region, Russian “advisors” continue to prop up the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua provide Russia with footholds close to our homeland, giving Putin strategic options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia’s access to the Western Hemisphere, allowing Russia to collect intelligence in close proximity to the United States.

Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the Americas in the past, maintains facilitation networks and raises funds through its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah supporters cache weapons and raise funds, often via charitable donations, remittances, and sometimes through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Having a footprint in the region also allows Iran to collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible retaliatory attacks.

3 Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses and China’s National Intelligence Law, citizens living in democracies in the Western Hemisphere could have their entire digital identity under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.
against U.S. and/or Western interests.

After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for authoritarianism, an exporter of malign ideology, and an underlying driver of instability in the region. Cuban intelligence personnel support and counsel non-democratic leaders, including directly propping up the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba, Russia, and the PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to undercut U.S. initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays the thousands of Cuban medical personnel it sends as humanitarian, such aid routinely includes intelligence collection, propagation of Cuba’s failed ideology, and advancing a distinctly anti-U.S. agenda.

The final malign actors—Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela—pose one of the most direct threats to peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. Emboldened by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Cuban protection and patronage, Maduro has allowed Venezuela to become a safe haven for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and drug traffickers while the Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020 hold, the number of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian exodus. To date, nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant strain on Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and other host countries in the region. Colombia bears the brunt of this crisis and has generously stepped up to support the over 1.6 million refugees while at the same time having 7.8 million internally displaced persons of their own, the largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan crisis will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require significant support to help Venezuelans address the decades of mismanagement, widespread insecurity, and corruption of defense and other institutions in order to realize the natural richness of their resources.

What We’re Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the field to compete. And when we are on the field, our impacts are positive and long-lasting. In the absence of an enduring U.S. military presence, recurring rotations of small teams of Special Operations Forces, Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and National Guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and exchange critical expertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership Program (SPP) is uniquely positioned based on its dual military experience to provide a persistent and sustained presence to our partner nations by means of senior leader visits, exchanges, and cooperative training and exercises in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) build collective response and security capability and readiness in Army and Marine Corps Reserve Forces and partner militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru integrated into the SPMAGTF last year, building interoperability for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three partners also formed part of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT’s multinational team. The 2019 COMFORT mission delivered significant returns, providing world-class medical care to nearly 68,000 patients in 12 countries, reducing suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela, and enhancing medical readiness in the U.S. Navy, our partners, and allies. JTF-B facilitates strategic access to Central America, builds enduring relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to create regional stability and security. JTF-B provided medical care to over 20,000 partner nation patients, rapid response capability for a wide range of contingencies, and assigned forces to participate in exercises.

As directed by the NDS, we’re deepening relations with “regional countries that export military capabilities to priority regional and global security challenges.” Recently designated a Major Non-NATO ally and the newest partner in the State Partnership Program (SPP), we work closely with Brazil on a range of priority missions. Chile exports its security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and Central America, and is actively partnering with us and U.S. Army South to develop a concept for a combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise later this year. Colombia—NATO’s only global partner
in the region—seeks to share its humanitarian demining and counter IED expertise with NATO allies while also serving in South Korea as part of the United Nations Command, a legacy that stems from its participation in the Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong supporter of U.S. efforts to hold global malign actors accountable, de-flagging numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation of U.S. and international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its weight having supported coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan and applying training and equipment received via the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their current deployments to the UN Mission in Mali.

In the face of the PRC’s and Russia’s global assault on international norms, engagement on shared values is more important than ever before. As I told this Committee last year, education, training, and security cooperation efforts like the SPP and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program and the Department of State’s International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of time and money, these programs are helping us reinforce mutual understanding, shared values and culture, and doctrine. Along with IMET; our Human Rights Initiative; noncommissioned officer development; and Women, Peace, and Security programs enhance the professionalism of the region’s militaries and security forces. In particular, USSOUTHCOM’s decades-long commitment to promoting respect for human rights has become a cornerstone of our strong partnerships with like-minded militaries. These efforts are among the most effective ways we can expand competitive space and outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage our partners to hold the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of peace, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information about Beijing’s predatory
economic practices, the security risks associated with Chinese technology, and activities by Russia, Iran, and their authoritarian allies that undermine regional sovereignty and security. In addition to expanding our information sharing efforts throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with partners in the region to enhance our understanding of the security threats posed by the Venezuelan crisis, which in turn assists with multinational efforts to plan for longer term recovery and stability once free and fair democratic elections are held.

We also support the NDS’ focus on developing operational concepts to enhance Joint Force lethality while building interoperability with allied and partner forces. We leverage our science and technology portfolio in high-end multinational exercises like UNITAS and PANAMAX, providing opportunities for the Services to test new warfighting capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment. Through our Caribbean-focused TRADEWINDS exercise, we are now laying the groundwork for a combined task force that can counter a range of threats and enable sea control and denial operations. We conduct cyber training and capacity building with partners like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in an effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish shared cyber situational awareness in the region. We continue to work closely with other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure globally integrated plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and opportunities in this hemisphere.

**Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs.** As the NDS recognizes, “non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities.” TCOs engage in a wide array of illegal activities that generate approximately two trillion dollars in illicit proceeds annually, including drug and weapons trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We see these impacts directly in our homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans since 1999,\(^4\) costing

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\(^4\) [https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdfs/index.html](https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdfs/index.html). From 1999 to 2017, more than 500,000 people have died from a drug overdose.
our nation billions in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity costs – in addition to the suffering caused by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption and violence, TCOs also challenge and erode the governance of partners that we rely on to advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse decades of successful U.S. policies and security investments.

Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment facilitating opportunities for malign actors to expand influence, and VEOs leverage to move people and weapons through our hemisphere. This latter vulnerability is particularly troublesome; there is an interconnected system of pathways that spans our neighborhood, running through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our homeland, and anything can move on them—for the right price. This ongoing threat was illustrated in 2019 by several successful U.S. law enforcement operations against human smuggling networks, which continue to enable the movement of individuals with terrorist links, many of whom attempt to enter the U.S. homeland illegally.

**What We’re Doing.** We’re strengthening partnerships with countries that contribute military capabilities to regional security and beyond, with a focus on enabling combined operations and building interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to the U.S. homeland, reduce the effectiveness of priority TCOs, and prevent VEOs from leveraging regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.

Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared responsibility, and one in which they are sacrificing blood and treasure to meet their commitment to halve cocaine production by 2023. Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to conduct maritime counterdrug operations while working closely with Panama and Costa Rica to seize drugs headed to the U.S. In 2019, Colombia also manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of almost 600 police and military killed or wounded, largely due to IEDs emplaced to protect the coca fields. Inside of Colombia, their security forces also disrupted and destroyed over 300 cocaine-producing labs, preventing over 400 metric tons of
cocaine from ever leaving the country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America’s security challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six Central American countries through the U.S. Colombia Action Plan program since the program’s inception in FY13. We continue to enable Colombian operations against priority narco-terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents, yielding significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.

In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our capacity-building efforts on improving border security, drug interdiction rates, and institutional effectiveness. Jamaica has now integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into Joint Interagency Task Force South counterdrug operations, enhancing our operational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training by Naval Special Warfare teams, Guatemala’s Fuerzas Especiales Navales (FEN) is now entirely self-sufficient and responsible for more than 80% of Guatemala’s drug seizures. Like Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador are applying U.S.-provided training and equipment to regularly interdict drug shipments more than 100 miles from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across America from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are leveraging our Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian Assistance Program to better address factors driving violence and migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a force multiplier across the hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the strategic level and reinforce accountability and transparency in defense institutions.

In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on modest investment. Last year, the international and interagency “team of teams” at JIATF-South helped keep 280 metric tons of cocaine off U.S. streets. JIATF-South-led interdictions at sea account for almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times larger than the United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF-South continue to be among
the best investments in the U.S. government.

In FY20, thanks to congressional support, we are filling detection and monitoring (D&M) capability gaps through innovative solutions like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). Having only recently deployed, the MMSV already has supported the disruption of over 3000 kilograms of cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping a low profile vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a capacity-building platform in the Dominican Republic, a key transit point for cocaine trafficking into major U.S. cities like Washington D.C., Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying commercially-available technology like unmanned aircraft systems to increase the MMSV’s ability to conduct D&M and provide information to partner nations who are conducting the interdictions. In addition to the MMSV, we now have one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the region that will provide needed naval capabilities and technological advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deployments – these will be game changers.

On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM, and support the work of our interagency partners to stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism who are attempting to exploit the region’s weak border security to move into the U.S. homeland. We deepened counter threat finance collaboration with the Treasury Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based member of al-Qa’ida last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging the DOD Rewards Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for minimal investment; in 2019, we paid $1.2 million for 72 rewards (information) that led to the neutralization of 97 terrorists, the seizure of 80 weapons caches, and the destruction of 22 drug labs.

In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago continues to pay dividends for international efforts targeting extremist networks supporting ISIS and other dangerous groups. Our
biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and stop known or suspected terrorists last year, while we deepened collaboration with Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious activities by supporters of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.

Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) support the global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the battlefield. As we take proactive steps to address infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations, the JTF-GTMO team remains the epitome of professionalism, conducting safe, legal, and humane detention operations that protect our homeland and U.S. troops serving in harm’s way.

Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our homeland’s defense, we are focused on building an effective, efficient, and resilient team.

For decades, USSOUTHCOM’s modest budget and small footprint have encouraged us to embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches. Over the last five years, we absorbed 25% cuts to our personnel, a 10% reduction to our Exercise program, and a steady decline in available assets and forces needed to support our mission. We’ve tried to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to minimize operational impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies, improve performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.

With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the Department’s current reform efforts. Our revised campaign plan drove a review of all FY20 operations, activities, and investments. We eliminated over 200 lower priority events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic partners. We’ve also revised our joint exercise program to make it more effective and more relevant. In 2019, we sharpened our emphasis on building readiness of U.S. forces and supporting Joint Force experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exercises to more directly support the global competition with the PRC and Russia. Other areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF-
GTMO manning, contracts, and theater posture.

At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved support to military and civilian families, and enhanced our training and professional development programs to build a more ready, results-oriented organization. We continue to work closely with the Department of the Army and local South Florida community to address housing and high living costs impacting our men and women. At JTF-GTMO, we undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine long-term requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. We are also taking steps to improve quality of life and resiliency of JTF-South’s headquarters building at Naval Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in the continental United States, NAS Key West has significant strategic value in defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I look forward to working with the Congress on our housing issues in the year ahead to ensure our men and women get the support they need.

**Congressional Support.** I’d like to repeat last year’s invitation to members of this Committee to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that we value this region and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood safe. Your presence, attention, and engagement, along with that of other key leaders, matters. I also want to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel. Confidence in stable, predictable budgets will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable security partners.

Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our competitive edge: persistent presence and engagement. We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that have streamlined security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of choice. Your continued support to these security cooperation programs and capabilities like IMET and the Perry Center allow us to build trust and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow.
contributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly, support for analytic initiatives focused on open source/publicly available information helps mitigate reduced intelligence resources and provides a steady stream of useful information (especially about malign state actors) that we can share with partners.

As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the counterdrug mission, we still only enabled the successful interdiction of about nine percent of known drug movement. That is a small increase over previous years, but still significantly below where we need to be. We appreciate your continued support to creative solutions like the MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the security of the Western Hemisphere. Each additional force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable ship, embarked helicopter, and law enforcement detachment) enables the disruption of 35 more metric tons of cocaine. Grey hulls, in particular, still serve as a powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our competitors, and a reassuring one to our friends. They can also yield multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while participating in our UNITAS exercise last year, the USS MICHAEL MURPHY supported the interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine, simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of intelligence, demonstrating rules-based maritime behavior, and providing coalition training opportunities for the U.S. Navy.

Conclusion. I’d like to close as I began: with a note of caution, and one of hope.

Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends on the security of our borders and the stability of our hemisphere – both of which are under assault. Likewise, our ability to
advance diplomatic and economic goals depends on the strength of both our partnerships and our shared values. We’ve seen what happens when we ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In the past decade, we’ve seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs, increased presence of malign actors, and negative trends in democracy.

We’re now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security threats we face now and in the near future, and the significant opportunities that await only with our initiative and engagement in the hemisphere. There is no other region we depend upon more for our prosperity and security, and with which we are more closely tied through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for our shared values. As I hope I’ve conveyed, the right, focused attention and modest investments go a long way in this part of the world, paying significant security dividends to both our global efforts and to our homeland’s defense. When we don’t engage in our neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our homeland security pays the price. When we do engage, we reduce threats to the homeland and limit opportunities for adversaries to operate in close proximity to us. And there is no better return on investment than that.

Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the US SOUTHCOM team and their families. I look forward to your questions.
[Clerk’s Note.—The complete hearing transcript could not be printed due to the classification of the material discussed.]
Mr. VISCLOSKY. The subcommittee will come to order. This afternoon, subcommittee will receive testimony on the posture of the United States Army and the fiscal year 2021 budget request for the Army. Our two witnesses are the Honorable Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary of the Army, and General James C. McConville, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Both gentlemen have long and distinguished careers. They were appointed to their current positions within the last year. So this will be the first time testifying before us. Thank you very much for being here.

We recognize that this is an extraordinary time for the United States Army. Our Nation presently has over 187,000 soldiers deployed in 140 countries around the world. These soldiers are the Army's most critical resource. We will talk today about training, equipment, and resources needed to give our soldiers the skills and tools needed to accomplish their missions. But we would also like you to know that the members of this committee care deeply about the welfare and quality of life of our men and women in uniform, and we want to make sure that we take care of their needs as well.

We are keenly aware of the need to modernize the Army of today in order to meet potential great power competition in the future. That process began with last year's budget request, and I think you will agree that the subcommittee struck a balance between supporting your strategy and assuring that successful ongoing programs continue to receive an appropriate level of resources.

The Army's fiscal year 2021 budget request continues to focus on resourcing the National Defense Strategy. To achieve this goal, the Army continues to conduct night court sessions to review the necessity of existing programs. This process has led to the proposed reduction or cancellation of more than 240 programs in fiscal years 2020 and 2021. Many of these programs are on time and on budget and bring essential capabilities to our soldiers of today. We do want to be your partner in executing the strategy but not at the expense of key enablers that lead to success on the battlefield today.

I support the idea of reviewing your existing programs to determine if there is excess funding, but I do not support funding future programs in which the requirements have not been fully thought out. One example is the recently cancelled optionally manned fight-
ing vehicle. This the Army's third attempt at replacing the Bradley fighting vehicle. One month after Congress appropriated $205 million for this program, the Army announced its intention to cancel the solicitation. As a result, the optionally manned fighting vehicle program will now be at least 2 years behind schedule, and the funding we appropriated towards it could have been used to continue supporting one of the fiscal year 2020 programs that were reduced or eliminated.

This gives us great pause when evaluating the requests before us to once again cancel or reduce 80 programs in the fiscal 2021 budget. We have been told time and again that this time it is different, yet the Army has a long history of canceling high-profile programs after significant investment of taxpayers' dollars due to the incomplete requirement process.

We supported the Army's Futures Command as a way for the Army to consolidate its modernization process under one roof, but the first large acquisition program that has come out of the Army Futures Command has fallen flat. You do need to convince this committee today that our continued support of modernization will eventually be a good investment.

I would also like to highlight my concerns about the well-being and quality of life of Army soldiers and their families. Of particular interest to me, as you know, is childcare. We continually hear about soldiers lacking available childcare. The committee has made significant investments in fiscal year 2020 to mitigate this issue. I would like to know what the Army is doing about it.

Gentlemen, I have seen the unfunded needs of the Army and across the services, including readiness, improved facilities, and your stated goal of modernizing the force. This committee wants to be your partner in achieving the goals, but it is imperative that we are investing wisely, and please assure us today that your budget request prioritizes quality of life.

With that, before we hear your testimony, I will want to turn to Mr. Calvert for any opening comments he has, but I would also just suggest because both will potentially start in the middle of this hearing that, given our prime location, we will simply continue the hearing and each of us exit, go vote, and please come back.

And, with that, Mr. Calvert, you are recognized.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Secretary, General McConville, welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come talk to us. The fiscal year 2021 budget request continues the second year of the Army's bold modernization transformation. While I fully support the Army's efforts to focus on near-peer threats, I have concerns with implementation of your modernization enterprise thus far.

As you have noted, Mr. Secretary, the Army's modernization plans assumes flat budgets. We cannot, therefore, afford costly mistakes like those that have plagued the Army acquisition in the past, nor can we afford excessive delays. So the chairman and I are basically on the same page already. We have discovered that the Russians, for instance, they fielded a hypersonic weapon while we
are still trying to develop one. What was that? The Chinese have
hacked in.

Mr. Ryan. I have Huawei on my phone.

Mr. Calvert. There you go. So failing is not an option, and fail-
ing early is even a bad option, a worse option. But I share the
chairman's concern about this Army modernization effort, specifi-
cally the optionally manned fighting vehicle, the OMFV, and I
would be interested in what lessons you have learned thus far and
what you think you can do to improve the process. And so that will
certainly be in my questions and I think the chairman's questions
also.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Granger.

OPENING REMARKS OF MS. GRANGER

Ms. Granger. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.

Our Nation faces unprecedented threats from near-peer adver-
saries, such as Russia and China, and continued harassment from
the rogue regimes of North Korea and Iran. Because of this, our
soldiers need the absolute best equipment to defend our Nation and
the American way of life. I am interested to hear how your modern-
izing the Army in the way that leverages our industry partners and
gives our soldiers and their families the support they need and de-
serve.

While I wholly support the reasons we need to modernize, I do
have concerns that the Futures Command is trying to do too much
too quickly. I hope you will explain today how the Futures Com-
mand plans to execute this bold strategy while assuring that the
Guard and Reserve are at the same level of readiness as the Active
Duty Army. Thank you both. I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

And with the indulgence of the members, I would want to assure
Mr. Calvert that I would usually recognize Mr. Ryan first for ques-
tions so that he can leave, if that would be all right.

So, in that event, I would recognize Secretary and General for
your testimony.

Secretary McCarthy. Am I recognized, sir?

General McConville. Yes. Go ahead.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MCCARTHY

Secretary McCarthy. Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member
Calvert, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
your continued support to the Army and our people. In 2018, the
National Defense Strategy outlined the current and future threat
picture, drastically changing the Army's focus. The strategy out-
lined great power competition, specifically Russia and China, who
are rapidly investing to modernize their formations.

In order to achieve national objectives laid out in the defense
strategy, including deterrence, the Army with the support of Con-
gress developed three distinct priorities: readiness, modernization,
and reform, and aligned our budget against the same. Two and a
half years into our modernization efforts, we are here to finish
what we collectively started.
This budget request rests upon the funding and authorities that Congress provided over the last 2 years. Together, we are creating irreversible momentum towards a ready, modernized, multidomain Army capable of meeting future demands highlighted in the NDS. Our fiscal year 2021 budget request is $178 billion; 60 percent of that top line is invested in our people and towards operations and maintenance, with the remainder of our available budget aligned towards our modernization priorities.

Despite a fixed top line and a flat budget, demand for Army forces continues to rise. The Army currently fulfills 60 percent of the overall combatant commanders’ demands with no projected decrease in COCOM demand. Demand, paired with the need to bring new systems online, will require us to grow the budget 3 to 5 percent real growth in the outyears.

Readiness remains the Army’s top one priority. We remain ready today, capable of dynamic force projection. Take, for example, this year on New Year’s Eve. We pushed a brigade size element on a no-notice, cold-start emergency deployment. Within hours, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division went from holiday parties to wheels up on a C–17. Within a day, soldiers were operating in the Middle East. Nearly half of our brigade combat teams are at the highest levels of readiness, pulling us from a readiness trough to a readiness peak over the last 3 years.

On modernization, we are rapidly developing new technologies across six modernization priorities and 31 signature systems, all geared towards meeting the demands of the future battlefields. The creation of Army Futures Command has allowed us to combine the stakeholders together and rapidly increase the speed of the modernization process. We are seeing real results. Prototypes that began in fiscal year 2018 and 2019 are maturing with real capability that will land in 2021 and 2022.

In this fiscal year, we will increase soldier touch points, test shots, capability demonstrations, and the fielding of our formations. The Army is investing $800 million across the next 5 years towards cloud computing, which is central to our modernization effort. Long-range fires, including ERCA, PrSM, hypersonic missiles flying further and hitting their targets and increasing our reach in lethality, essential deterrence in the joint fight. We have invested $1.3 billion towards these efforts, and continued funding will allow the Army to field a road-mobile battery and hypersonics in fiscal year 2023.

New aircraft in our Future Vertical Lift portfolio are flying hundreds of test hours as we fly before we buy. We have seen great advances in our soldier lethality portfolio for individual kit with Integrated Visual Augmentation System that links multiple sensors to multiple shooters and multiple command-and-control notes, ultimately increasing lethality and survivability for our men and women.

The demand for Army, forces, paired against a flat budget, has forced tough fiscal decisions. In-depth program reviews will continue in fiscal year 2021 with the total target of $9.1 billion in programs that will be delayed, reduced, or eliminated.

The Army will continue to show fiscal responsibility with taxpayer dollars. We view every dollar as we do with ammunition.
Each bullet matters and is aimed at a target. With Congress’ steadfast support, we are here to finish what we collectively started.

I would like to share the floor with my teammate, General McConville, and I look forward to your questions.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MCCONVILLE

General McConville. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, distinguished members of the committee, I also want to thank you for the opportunity to be here today and for the support you all continue to give the Army and our people, our soldiers, our families, our civilians, and our soldiers for life, our retirees and veterans.

As of this morning, the Army has over 189,000 soldiers deployed in 140 countries around the world. Those soldiers form the leading edge of an Army that stands ready to fight and win whenever and wherever it is called. We are currently demonstrating Army readiness with our Defender 20 exercise in Europe, the largest of its kind in 25 years, and we will do the same in the Pacific in the fall on a smaller scale. Both exercises will further strengthen not only our readiness to deploy U.S. Army forces but to also increase our ability to fight alongside our allies and partners and deter those nations or groups who wish America harm.

Going forward, we will sustain the tactical readiness of our units while at the same time ensuring we are strategically ready to mobilize, deploy, and sustain our combat forces in a way that supports how we will fight in the future. To ensure that the Army will be ready and can win the future, we must also modernize, as the Secretary and I have discussed with many of you. The National Defense Strategy has focused us on great power competition, but great power competition does not have to mean great power conflict. A ready, modern, and multidomain Army provides the Nation’s strategic leaders with flexible options to compete below the threshold of armed conflict while maximizing deterrence. With timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained funding, we will deliver an Army that will never be outranged, outgunned, or outmatched.

But to get to the Army we need in the future requires transformational change, not incremental improvements. Our fiscal year 2021 budget requests supports that transformational change. It aligns resources with the National Defense Strategy and our Army priorities. It also balances the demands for readiness now and allows us to invest in the future.

Our budget request maintains 58 brigade combat teams, 23 aviation brigades, and 6 security force assistance brigades across the regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves. It enables 24 combat training center rotations, including 4 for the National Guard. It funds strategic readiness, including dynamic force employments to Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and maintains the maintenance of key prepositioned stocks and ammunition. It provides modest end-strength growth to meet the expanding operational requirements and promotes interoperability with allies and partners through combined exercises with countries around the world.
In terms of modernization, our request supports the continued development of the Army’s multidomain operation concept which will inform our contributions to the emerging joint warfighting concept. Our request funds multidomain task forces in Europe and the Pacific to increase Army capabilities in both competition and conflict. Our budget supports critical steps in research and development that allow us to deliver key systems across our six modernization priorities.

Finally, our budget helps us win the war for talent by funding key quality-of-life initiatives and moving us from an industrial age personnel management system to a 21st century talent management system with the continued implementation of the integrated personnel and pay system and initiatives like talent-based branching, the Army talent alignment process, and the Battalion Commander Assessment Program.

Thank you for your time and support of the Army. We look forward to your questions.

[The written statement of Secretary McCarthy and General McConville follows:]
STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE RYAN D. MCCARTHY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL JAMES P. MCCONVILLE
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 116TH CONGRESS

ON THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

MARCH 10, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE
Finishing What We Started

Two and a half years ago, Army Senior Leaders developed the priorities of Readiness, Modernization, and Reform with the support of Congress. Today, the Army’s senior leadership has changed, but our priorities have not, and it is people who are our foundation. This budget request builds upon the funding that Congress has generously provided over the past three years to continue our irreversible momentum towards a ready, modernized, multi-domain Army. We are building strategic readiness while sustaining tactical readiness. We are modernizing to ensure future readiness. And we continue to reform our systems to optimize resources.

To date, the strategic environment remains dynamic and great power competitors continue to invest significant resources to modernize their militaries. The Army must maintain a ready force to meet today’s challenges, while implementing a transformational modernization effort to ensure the Army is prepared for future threats. The only way in which the Army can achieve our objectives is through our People. People – our Soldiers, Families, Army Civilians, and Soldiers For Life – our Retirees and Veterans – are the foundation of everything we do and are the greatest strength of our Army. We rely on their talent, initiative, innovation, and teamwork to drive the Army forward into the next great era of U.S. Army power-projection dominance.

We are grateful to Congress for the strong support provided to the Army in Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20). With this funding, the Army continues to build readiness to complete missions required by our national leaders, across the globe and with little notice, while taking actions to help our country compete with and deter near-peer competitors. At the same time, the Army continued aggressive modernization efforts to drive the transformational change necessary to ensure America’s Army will also be able to win in the future against Great Power Competitors. Consistent funding levels and the continued support of the Congress are critical to achieve modernization. With Congress’ steadfast support, we are here to finish what we collectively started.

The Army’s FY21 Budget request totals $178B. FY21 BASE requirement totals $153.1B. FY21 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requirement totals $24.9B. This budget proposal continues to align resources in accordance with the National
Defense Strategy, provide substantial support to the Joint Force, and reinforce our Army priorities of Readiness, Modernization, and Reform. Moreover, it keeps the Army on a path to be ready today AND in a future where we will be contested in every domain – land, sea, air, space, and cyber space. Through continued timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained budgetary support, the United States Army will remain ready today as we transform for the future.

**Strategic Environment**

The National Defense Strategy made clear that the world is complex and dangerous, requiring the Army be prepared against a range of current and potential military challenges. In particular, Russia and China are investing heavily in advanced military capabilities and seek to change the current global balance of power. Russia has the greatest capability to challenge U.S. interests today and is expected to deliver modern capabilities to its forces through the mid to late 2020s. China is our nation’s greatest long-term challenge. By 2030, China is expected to be the world’s largest investor in research and development, and field a fully modernized force by 2035: investing in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, energy storage, 5G networks, quantum information systems and biotechnology.

Great Power competition does not have to mean Great Power conflict. In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, the Army recognizes it must be able to compete below the level of armed conflict as well as fight and win against a near-peer competitor. Even if we may not confront Russia or China directly, we are likely to face their systems and methods of warfare as they spread military capabilities to others.

Additionally, regional state adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran, present significant challenges as they pursue advanced capabilities and weapons of mass destruction to gain regional influence and ensure regime survival. Moreover, transnational terrorist organizations continue to threaten our homeland and interests, as well those of our allies and partners. The Army must and will be prepared to defeat and deter highly capable adversaries while disrupting violent extremist organizations and simultaneously defending the homeland.
Today, the Army contributes to achieving objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy by providing Combatant Commanders over 180,000 Soldiers in more than 140 countries. Army forces comprise 60 percent of Combatant Commander’s requirements. This includes over 27,500 Soldiers supporting operations in the Middle East; over 10,000 Soldiers supporting operations in Afghanistan; 32,500 Soldiers in Europe supporting NATO and the European Deterrence Initiative; and over 21,000 Soldiers providing a forward American presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Fortunately, the Army does not fight alone. Warfighting is a human endeavor and establishing and maintaining relationships is critical to what the Army does. We rely on our allies and partners to posture ourselves for future threats, project power, deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries. This partnership allows costly and complex problems to be distributed and helps protect the industrial base through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Having close partnerships enable faster innovation and cost-sharing towards change to our modernization priorities. In addition, partnerships create a shared understanding of the threat picture, and ensures interoperability so that the current delicate balance of power and relative global peace may continue. The Army must continue to compete for and retain allies and partners, as our adversaries will attempt to do the same.

Ultimately, America’s Army remains prepared today to respond to other contingency operations, both abroad and at home. However, global demand continues to rise. In response to an increasingly uncertain global picture, the Army is investing in the research and development of the next generation of weapons and equipment needed to stay ahead of our adversaries. Through a disciplined prioritization of resources, the Army will remain postured to defend the Nation.

Readiness

Readiness remains the Army’s top priority. We are evolving the way we approach and measure readiness in order to continue to complete missions outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Over the past two years of diligent focus across all three components, Army leaders have successfully rebuilt tactical readiness – the ability of Army units at the
division level and below to fight and meet the demands of their assigned missions. Over the last year, 74% of Active Component Brigade Combat Teams have been at the highest levels of tactical readiness.

In FY21, the Army will continue to focus readiness at the individual, squad/crew, and platoon levels increasing multiple repetitions in order to build upon the basic blocks of lethality. This focus, increasing lethality at the point of ground contact with the enemy, will thereby improve overall BCT readiness. The Army will continue to conduct habitual training using the Combat Training Centers (CTC) such as National Training Center (NTC), and no-notice Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE). Our forces must and will remain lethal and ready.

As the Nation’s understanding of the global threat picture evolves, the Army must evolve with it. Tactical readiness prepares our forces to address the current host of adversaries as the last nearly two decades of combat demonstrates. Tactical readiness, however, is not enough to prepare us for competition and conflict against Great Power competitors. The Army must strike a balance between tactical readiness and strategic readiness and establish the logistical footprint needed to accomplish both.

While preparing for the future fight, we will increase our efforts toward achieving Strategic Readiness. Strategic Readiness provides an advantage over our adversaries by demonstrating the Army’s ability to rapidly mobilize, deploy, and sustain combat forces. Strategic Readiness will focus on the testing of new concepts, experimenting with new formations and understanding the logistical framework needed to sustain our forces.

Today, the Army is investing in Strategic Readiness by experimenting with new concepts and formations: Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), and institutionalizing lessons learned during irregular warfare by employing Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). The Multi-Domain Operations Concept supports the emerging Joint Warfighting Concept. In FY20, the DEFENDER exercises in Europe and the Indo-Pacific will further test and demonstrate our power projection capabilities with our allies and partners. FY21 exercises will expand to the Pacific.

We have institutionalized the lessons we learned during irregular warfare by employing Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). SFABs continue to prove their
worth as an economy of force capability to meet the objectives of the National Defense Strategy by strengthening alliances and attracting new partners while competing globally and freeing conventional brigade combat teams to prepare for Large Scale Combat Operations. Last year, the Army activated the final SFAB, bringing the total to five active duty SFABs and one Army National Guard SFAB. The Army’s goal is six fully manned, trained and equipped SFABs.

Additional key components to Strategic Readiness are systems of critical infrastructure that includes installation facilities – motor pools, maintenance bays and Supply Support Activities – and Strategic Power Projection platforms – the ports, roads, airfields and railheads – that move our troops and equipment from the installation to the battlefield. To test and assess our Strategic Readiness capabilities and support Dynamic Force Employment, we are conducting the DEFENDER series of exercises in both the Pacific and European theaters of operation to a size and scale not seen in decades. Additionally, the Army recently deployed one Battalion in 21 hours and one Brigade Combat Team in 122 hours to Iraq.

In order to overcome the logistical issue of equipping forces, while maintaining speed, the forward positioning of logistics becomes critical. The forward positioning of equipment, munitions and materiel enables Strategic Readiness for three key purposes: speed troops to the frontlines; ease strategic air and sea lift requirements for units deploying from the U.S.; and reassure allies and partners while deterring adversaries. Through a concerted effort, we have significantly improved the condition of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), configured-for-combat sets of equipment that are sized and constructed to meet theater requirements, and we work closely with the Combatant Commands to ensure APS are positioned and located where they can best achieve their desired effects.

In addition, we have also strengthened munitions readiness, ensuring munitions stockpiles are strategically positioned in the U.S. and abroad to enable flexibility and speed. We consistently and continuously assess forward-positioned equipment and stockpiles as the global environment changes to bolster our capacity and capabilities, and to meet COCOM requirements.
Moreover, the Army’s Organic Industrial Base (OIB) – 26 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants – manufacture, repair, upgrade and modernize the Army’s equipment, and are absolutely critical to both Strategic and Tactical Readiness. We are optimizing the OIB to three primary end states: support current unit readiness across the force; maintain the ability to meet wartime surge requirements; and modernize and retool to sustain the next generation of Army equipment. Through implementation of Repair Cycle Float, a new methodology that links OIB production and workload to Army readiness, we will fundamentally change and improve the way we resource and manage these critical facilities.

Tactical and Strategic readiness, combined with the logistical framework necessary for sustainment, are what enable the Army to remain ready today while simultaneously preparing for the future fight. Although the Army is still experimenting with concepts and doctrine, our new capabilities are very much real. FY21 strategic DEFENDER exercises in Europe and the Indo-Pacific will serve as our testing grounds as we continue to develop new methodologies for the future of warfare and modernize our Army to meet future great-power competition.

Modernization

The Army is two years into its most transformational change in four decades. Large-scale modernization takes time and patience. We have continued to prioritize the Army budget towards our 6 modernization priorities and 31+3 signature systems, ranging from hypersonic missiles, new squad-level weapons, to aircraft. Prototypes that began in FY18/19 are maturing, with real capability landing in FY21/22. In this fiscal year, we will increase Soldier touch points, test shots, capability demonstrations and the fielding of our formations.

Cloud technology is the foundation for the entire modernization endeavor. Because of the Cloud’s importance, we are investing $800M over the next five fiscal years into Cloud Architecture. Cloud investments will enable the inventory of data, migration of the data to the Cloud, and software development. Artificial Intelligence (AI) enables linking all sensors to all shooters and all Command and Control (C2) nodes. AI-enabled operations
turn information into actionable intelligence and understanding of the threat environment. The Army is making incredible strides with Cloud technology as well as our Six Modernization Priorities:

**Long Range Precision Fires** - We will improve the range and lethality of cannon artillery and increase missile ranges and capabilities to ensure overmatch. We will invest over $800M in hypersonic to accelerate our strategic fire capabilities to neutralize and dis-integrate adversary formations and A2/AD networks, from extended ranges, to create windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to exploit. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery is on schedule for delivery in FY23. It will protect and support maneuver forces in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with an extended range out to 70km. The Precision Strike Missile is on schedule to conduct its maximum range test in 3QFY21 and deliver 30 missiles in FY23. It will realize greater range, lethality and survivability at a lower cost than ATACMS. The Army has requested $1.7B for Long Range Precision Fires in the FY21 President's Budget to accelerate prototyping and initial fielding.

**Next Generation of Combat Vehicles** - The Army will develop the next generation of combat vehicles through technology development, experimentation, and rapid prototyping to ensure overmatch against near-peer competitors. These vehicles will employ greater firepower, mobility, and protection to successfully maneuver on more lethal battlefields. The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) will provide manned-unmanned teaming options with Robotic Combat Vehicles and other platforms to maneuver Soldiers to a point of positional advantage to engage in close combat and deliver decisive lethality during the execution of combined arms maneuver, while simultaneously controlling maneuver robotics and semi-autonomous systems. The OMFV is being designed with an emphasis on supporting weight, architecture, power, and cooling growth to enable spiraled capability as technologies mature. The Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCV) will support decisive mobility, lethality, survivability, increased situational awareness, and formation overmatch with unmanned platforms making contact with the enemy before our Soldiers, while delivering overmatch against future threats. The final RCV capability will be refined by three increasingly complex experiments and capability
demonstrations, displaying both government and industry platforms, between FY20-24 with a decision to procure or reassess NLT FY24.

The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles with a modern and more survivable general-purpose, mortar carrier, medical evacuation, medical treatment, and mission command vehicles that can move at the pace of current and future combat vehicles and is able to incorporate future technologies. The first unit equipped with AMPV will be in FY22. Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) is an armored vehicle that provides precise, large caliber, long-range direct fires for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. The first unit equipped with MPF will be in FY25. We requested $425M in the FY21 President's Budget to deliver these capabilities.

**Future Vertical Lift (FVL)** - We will increase our competitive aviation advantage with next generation aircraft designed to penetrate contested airspace and support independent maneuver from greater distances through extended range, endurance and lifting capacity. The most important FVL investments in-progress are the Army's development of the Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA), designed to address the gap left by retirement of the Kiowa; and the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) to replace the venerable UH-60 platform. The FARA prototype fly off will begin in FY23. Initial FLRAA prototypes are expected in FY25. FARA and FLRAA will both conduct first unit equipping in FY30. Over $800M is included in the FY21 President's Budget to develop initial designs and unmanned demonstration systems.

**Network** - The Army Network supports mission command and the continuous integration of combined arms and Joint capabilities. We will deliver a resilient and secure tactical communications network effective in the most challenging contested and congested electromagnetic spectrum and cyber environments starting in FY21. This network includes advanced information technology, hardware and software, and a reduced electromagnetic signature. We will deliver this network by fielding new capability sets, on a two year basis, that build off of each other and that are infused with commercial solutions and informed by Soldier-led experimentation. Inserting technology in two-year capability sets provides flexibility to augment and integrates IT capability as it emerges from industry. Capability Set 21 will be fielded to four Infantry Brigade Combat Teams in
FY21. We have allocated $2.198 in the FY21 budget to build our integrated tactical network as part of our network restructuring.

**Air and Missile Defense (AMD)** - Advanced air and missile defense will protect our forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones to enable joint operations. This includes both theater systems and short-range air defense, like the Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD), which will employ directed energy technologies. M-SHORAD is on schedule to deliver four battalions by FY23 equipped with missiles and cannons. Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) will defend fixed and semi-fixed assets primarily against sub-sonic cruise missiles and Unmanned Aerial threats with a residual capability against fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Thanks to Congressional support, an interim IFPC capability will be fielded in FY22 that will inform the enduring capability. The Lower-Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will deliver the next generation sensor that fully leverages the capabilities of the Patriot Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE) that is fully integrated into the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD). The AIAMD initial operational capability is 3QFY22 with fielding to one battalion. The FY21 budget includes $396M to rapidly deliver an initial AIAMD capability by FY22. An integral part of the AIAMD, the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), which is a revolutionary command-and-control system that streamlines sensor to shooter capabilities for air and missile defense engagements. This enhanced tracking system delivers an unambiguous view of the operating environment, allowing commanders and air defenders to make critical decisions within seconds.

**Soldier Lethality (SL)** - We will equip and train Soldiers to extend overmatch through increased lethality, mobility and survivability against emerging threats. This includes improved weapons, sensors, body armor and training. The FY21 budget includes $1.4B for rapid prototyping, development, and procurement of the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Rifle and Automatic Rifle, Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG), Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) - Heads-Up Display (HUD) 3.0, and the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). IVAS is our best example of a departure from the traditional requirements process. We are working with non-traditional partners, like Microsoft, in three month sprints, using Soldier Touch Points during each sprint to refine
the product - to make sure we get it right. Funding enables a first unit equipped with IVAS in 4QFY21 and a first unit equipped with the NGSW Rifle, NGSW Automatic Rifle, and General Purpose Ammo in 4QFY22. We equipped the first unit with ENVGB in 1QFY20.

We remain committed to our six modernization priorities and 31+3 signature systems as they will be the next generation of weaponry for the U.S. Army to win decisively in the future fight. As we move forward with Army modernization, we will increasingly emphasize integration across our Cross-Functional Teams. As we work on all these efforts, we will conduct regular touch points with Soldiers – to make sure that we develop the right solutions for our force. As we modernize, we are committed to working closely with industry to explore and learn what’s feasible in terms of innovation, integration, manufacturing, and production. One key to getting modernization right is integrating concepts, force design, capabilities development, and S&T. Army Futures Command, which reached full operational capability this past year, was created to orchestrate that integration.

The Army’s transformational modernization efforts continue to build on consistent priorities and a ruthlessly aligned budget. To help ensure the Army has the resources to support this transformational modernization, reform becomes a critical step in that process.

Reform – Transforming an Industrial Age Army to the Information Age

The demand for Army forces, paired against a flat budget since FY 2018, forced tough fiscal decisions in our FY21 budget. In order to build and maintain readiness, continue transformational modernization, and support operations, the Army conducted in-depth program reviews, now known as “night-courts.” For the FY21 budget, ensuring success across the modernization portfolio puts further pressure on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, driving the Army even harder to aggressively pursue necessary reforms at every level and make tougher resourcing choices. In-depth program reviews continued in FY21, with an additional $9.0B in programs reduced or eliminated.

- FY20-24 Deep Dive #1: eliminated 93 programs; reduced 93 programs.
- FY21-25 Deep Dive #2: eliminated 41 programs, reduced 39 programs.
Command Accountability and Execution Review (CAER) is an Army Senior Leader led fiscal stewardship program that has netted remarkable results. After 1 full year of implementation, the effort has reduced Operations & Maintenance (O&M) de-obligations (lost purchasing power) by 37% compared to historical norms and 50% compared to FY13. We anticipate continued improvements in CAER’s second year of operation. These improvements help mitigate the loss of real purchasing power and allow the Army Senior Leaders to continue to prioritize towards modernization. CAER’s progress has also resulted in a sharp reduction of Congressional marks due to unobligations.

While reform is critical to support the Army’s modernization effort, the Army must also focus on its greatest strength...its People.

People

The greatest strength of the U.S. Army comes from our people—Soldiers, Families, Army Civilians and Soldiers for Life—our Retirees and Veterans. They represent the best our Nation has to offer. The Army People Strategy (APS) captures our People First philosophy and “winning matters” attitude. The APS guides how we will Acquire, Develop, Employ and Retain our future talent. Accordingly, taking care of our Soldiers and their families is key to Army readiness, modernization, and reform. Army culture is grounded in our enduring values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. These values are time-tested and provide a rock solid foundation. Building on this foundation, “This is my squad” concept emphasizes the positive behaviors that build cohesive teams. We will rely on strong leadership and cohesive teams to combat sexual assault and sexual harassment that tear the fabric of our organization. Furthermore, we must use cohesive teams and increase resiliency to stop the suicide epidemic plaguing our ranks. Every person matters.

We recognize that the force should have the best quality of life possible and Army Senior Leaders are constantly improving the way in which we care for our people. One example of investments into our people are the five focused Quality of Life priorities, which include housing, both family and barracks, transforming healthcare, improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth Services (FY21 Request: $475M); improving
Spouse Employment opportunities and minimizing the impact of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves. We have experienced significant shortfalls in these areas; and, therefore, are refocusing our attention and increasing our efforts. We brought Army leadership back into the housing equation, empowering tenants and holding partners accountable. Our people deserve safe, high quality housing. We are closely examining the healthcare transfer to Defense Health Agency (DHA). It is our duty to provide world-class healthcare to our force and families who sacrifice so much for the Nation.

The Army can no longer be an Industrial Age Army in the Information Age. We are shifting from simply distributing personnel to more deliberately managing our Soldiers and Civilians’ talents. The Army Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF) is currently prototyping, piloting, or implementing 39 total talent management initiatives with the goal of implementing most of these initiatives by December 2020. Of these initiatives, the ATMTF is focused on seven major initiatives during FY20: The Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP), Army Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP), brevet promotions, merit-based promotions, flexible career paths (opt-into/opt-out of promotion boards), direct commissioning, and non-commissioned officer talent management. Army Senior Leaders approved each of these initiatives, and the ATMTF is working with all key stakeholders toward full implementation. Each of these initiatives bridges the gap between the Army’s current centrally-directed, data-poor personnel management toward a 21st century data-rich talent management system which best leverages unique individual talents. The Army is working aggressively using the authorities granted by Congress to gain irreversible momentum towards implementation of a talent-based approach for the Total Force. To date, Congressional authorities have enabled us to direct commission seven cyber officers, approve 225 positions for brevet promotion, release the first merit-based promotion list (FY20 ACC MAJ), and establish a framework to adjust the effective date of rank for certain ARNG officers when Federal recognition of promotion was administratively delayed.

Another part of our shift to a 21st century talent-based personnel system is evolving our human resources information technology to improve the active-duty officer management and assignment process and reduce talent management gaps that were
limited by the legacy systems and processes. Notably, the Assignment Interactive Module 2 (AIM2) is a web-based information system designed to fundamentally transform the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the officer assignment process by facilitating communication directly between Soldiers, the units with requirements, and the Officer Personnel Management Director (OPMD). AIM2, which bridges the technology gap until full Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A) Release 3 fielding, enables the Army to accomplish a significant and historic milestone with the implementation of the new ATAP. For the first time, ~14,000 Active Duty Officers were afforded complete transparency of all available assignments. The first ATAP Cycle using the AIM2 interface saw nearly all eligible officers and units participate, collaborating throughout a 2-month open market window in October and November. This two-way collaboration resulted in 55% of officers and units receiving their first choice and roughly 80% of officers and units receiving one of their top 10% of preferences.

However, achieving a truly 21st century talent-based system requires the integration of all components and all Soldiers onto one data-rich environment. In this Information Age approach, we are fielding a new Web-based HR system known as IPPS-A. IPPS-A integrates personnel, pay, and talent management functions and will provide the Army with a data-rich environment to understand their entire Soldier population across every component. IPPS-A will take the lessons learned from AIM2 and apply them across component and across all populations. To date, we have fielded IPPS-A to the Army National Guards of over 30 states and will finish fielding to all 54 states and territories by April of this year. Moreover, in December, the Army will field IPPS-A to all components and provide all components greatly enhanced talent management capabilities.

In light of increasing demand for forces, the Army will stay on a trajectory of modest growth across all of the Components in order to meet the increasing demand for forces across the combatant commands. We are an all-volunteer force that must attract and retain talent, which means recruiting remains crucial. The Army People Strategy established four lines of effort to win talent and keep it: acquire, develop, employ, and retain talent. The Vision: Cohesive Teams...professional, diverse, integrated and ready to Win.
Finally, the Army has overhauled its Recruiting and Marketing enterprise, exceeding revised end strength goals in FY19, while simultaneously retaining quality Soldiers. We introduced our new recruiting campaign and accompanying advertisement of “What’s Your Warrior?” The campaign showcases the 150 different career opportunities that the Army has to offer. We have modernized the way in which we approach recruiting, leveraging technologies like hyper-local, location-based recruiting to help find America’s best and brightest who may be interested in joining our ranks. Using our Priority 22 Cities as a framework, the U.S. Army will continue seeking talent from every corner of our Nation.

Closing

The Army remains committed to our priorities of Readiness, Modernization and Reform. People are the strength and foundation of the organization. The FY21 budget request provides the necessary funding to achieve our modernization endeavor goals and fully support the NDS. We continue to ruthlessly align every dollar towards our priorities in order to keep the Army a modern, lethal force capable of defending the Nation today and in the future. The Army thanks Congress and the American people for their continued strong support, which enables our ability to accomplish our mission. By providing timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained funding, Congress will ensure America’s Army remains the most capable and lethal ground combat force in the world. Together with Congress, we are here to finish what we collectively started.
Mr. Visclosky. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Mr. Calvert.

ARMY FUTURES COMMAND

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In 2018, the Army embarked on an ambitious modernization effort by establishing Army Futures Command while shifting the Army’s focus from counterinsurgency to near-peer threats. One of the primary benefits of Army Futures Command, we were told, was that it would bring together all relevant stakeholders, including industry, at earlier points in the requirements in the development process. This would allow the Army to provide capabilities to soldiers more quickly and more cost effectively. Yet 2 months ago, the Army withdrew its solicitation for the optionally manned fighting vehicle, or OMFV, and decided to restart the program because it admitted its own requirements were too stringent for industry. It is now going back to square one.

Then, last month, we learned that the Army had decided to defer a decision on selecting a system for its indirect fire protection capability program, even though it said last year that it would make a decision by the second quarter of this year.

I have to tell you, gentlemen, that these decisions have produced significant concern in Congress, obviously from both sides of the aisle, and industry regarding the Army’s modernization process.

Looking specifically at the optionally manned vehicle decision, I have two questions. First, I understand you all conducted an after-action review to understand what went wrong with the process. VAE pulled out early due to conflicting requirements. Why didn’t you stop then and reassess? Why should we have confidence at this time that you will get it right, especially when it seems you are returning to the normal Army acquisition process?

And, secondly, the fielding for the OMFV was scheduled for 2026. As the chairman mentioned, he mentioned delay, but are you still planning for a 2026 fielding, and if so, how can you get there given that you have got to restart this whole program?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, I will say a few things. If I could pass also to General McConville, I would appreciate that.

With respect to the RFP, we did have a competitor in the process that could bend the metal and develop a prototype in the process. What the team learned as they went through the whole process of RFP was that, in this case, they fell short of the requirements that was in the RFP. And we took a step back from the table, making the judicious decision not to keep going down the path and spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a system that would never be able to achieve the outcomes we were looking for.

So, from that standpoint, if you look at us historically, we would have kept going, and we would have spent billions of dollars. We think that the way that we are organized against the problem now by fusing all of the stakeholders together, we are getting the best, most informed recommendations from the Army modernization enterprise.

General McConville. If I could add, I think we learned early on in this program, and what we learned was there was confusion over the requirements. And so we just came out with the character-
istics of what we want in this vehicle because we don't want to get to our requirements until we actually see what the prototype is going to be. And by doing this, we will come out with the nine characteristics that we would like to see in this vehicle.

And what we will do is go out to industry. We are working with industry right now. We will go to industry and nontraditional industry to see what type of technology they would like to see in this vehicle. They will come back to us with a design, and we will pick five designers for the build—that come up with the best designs and also five technologies that we look at inserting into the vehicle. From that, we will refine the characteristics. We will go to a detailed design and then do the same thing and go to prototype.

Once we get the prototype and see what they can actually produce, not in Power Point, but actually what they can do so we can drive, we will refine the requirements, and then we will have the competition. We think we can save time up front, and we can get the vehicle we need before we invest a lot of money in it and have requirements that we know that industry can meet.

Mr. Calvert. Well, I mean, you know, that sounds great, General, but I wonder why we didn't start this process, you know, a long time ago. I thought we were going to move down this. What happened?

General McConville. I think what happened, Congressman, is we have learned. We are learning with industry. We are learning with our acquisition folks who are used to doing it the old way where we spent a lot of time, 5 to 7 years developing requirements and then 5 to 7 years developing a system, and then investing a lot of money in it and finding out at the end we didn't get what we wanted. So we are stopping early, and we are redefining the way we do the process to encourage innovation.

Mr. Calvert. Fine. Just one comment. I used to be in the construction business. Usually the happiest day of my life was when somebody asked for a redesign or, you know, some kind of change order that I would understand would be more profitability on my side of the transaction. So I would hope that whatever you come up with, and hopefully it is soon, that you get a set of plans, and you go to bid on those set of plans, in effect, get the contractors to come forward and stick with it because these changes can only cost the United States Government money and time, which you don't have either one.

So that is my comment, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ryan.

FOOD MODERNIZATION EFFORTS

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the indulgence here and want to associate myself with the gentleman from California's line of questioning.

Mr. Secretary, I am going to switch gears here a little bit, but there is some correlation. We know that the enlisted soldiers are only using about half of their meal entitlement, basic daily food allowance funds per day, and that is roughly $170 unspent every month. Obviously, none of us want to see an already cash-strapped soldier leave 170 bucks a month on the table, let alone spend addi-
tional money out of their pocket to eat. We also know that the reason soldiers so often fail to eat in dining facilities is because those soldiers may not be able to get to the dining facility in time for breakfast, lunch, or dinner, given their training and the other demands that they have.

That is why I have been pleased with the Army’s commitment to move to a campus-style dining concept whereby soldiers will be able to use their full meal entitlement not just in the dining facilities but in the AAFES facilities, MWR facilities, and even someday at off-base establishments that offer a healthier menu, essentially a system similar to that which most colleges and universities have had for decades.

I understand that this is a work in progress, and it will take time to work out the kinks, but I want to put a marker down before the Army goes too far down any particular planning path. The Army should expand where soldiers are allowed to spend basic daily food allowance funds. The Army should not seek alternative funding to be used to buy meals in nondining facilities unless those funds are being requested for technology or facility upgrades that are necessary to make the campus-style dining concept work better.

And if there is a DOD policy that you believe prevents the Army from using DDFA funding for the full cost of a meal, outside dining facilities, or otherwise limits the ability of the Army to create an efficient and well-integrated campus-style dining model, I encourage you to pursue such a waiver, similar to what the Air Force was granted when the Air Force began its food transformation initiative, which included a campus dining model. We want to work with you to get this right because if we do it correctly, we can save soldiers money, greatly improve their health and mission performance, and save the U.S. taxpayer money.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Sir, I can tell you a specific example from just the first week of February. I was out at Fort Wainwright, and they are doing that in the barracks there, developing, constructing a very similar concept like you just mentioned. It has been a challenge because we have seen the lack of participation in large volumes in the chow halls. There have been a lot of investments that have been made in the chow halls to also change the menus, putting dieticians down at unit level. So we made a lot of investments with holistic health and fitness to address this, and to your point, configuring the barracks in the case of Fort Wainwright, to do just that. We could also provide more information on how we are doing this comprehensively across the Army to the committee.

Mr. RYAN. I just want you to know this is something that I feel very, very strongly about. One of the other committees I sit on in the Appropriations Subcommittees is the Veterans Affairs, the VA. And when you look at, you know, what we want from a performance level, obviously there is a money issue here of leaving this money on the table, and I have one followup question to that.

But we have got to make sure, when you are looking at the obesity rates in the Army, Navy, Air Force, it is unacceptable. I mean, it really is unacceptable that we are spending this much money,
and the number one and best investment we could make is into the men and women who serve, and to making sure that, as you said, they have dieticians nutritionists, making sure that they are functioning at a very, very high level. I mean, you look at these peak athletes and what they do to make sure they are performing at the highest level. Well, it is the same thing here, and I want us to start adopting that mentality.

So we are going to work with you. We want to stay on this issue and continue to try to drive down the cost because then, on the other end, I will leave here, and I will go to a VA subcommittee hearing and look at how much we are spending on VA healthcare around diabetes and obesity and all these things that started when they were Active Duty. And then we go to the taxpayer and say we need more money. The taxpayer thinks we are crazy. So we need to figure out how to make this happen.

**BUDGET FOR FEEDING SOLDIERS**

So one followup question. I know when you as the Army put together the budget for feeding soldiers, my understanding is that it uses a simple calculation of number of soldiers entitled to meals times the basic daily food allowance per soldier, and so now soldiers are leaving approximately $170 spent every month. That adds up to hundreds of millions of dollars over the course of a year that is unaccounted for. Either the Army dining facilities are purchasing and preparing three meals a day per soldier and then wasting half the food, or the money is not being spent on the soldiers' food, and it is being spent on something it wasn't appropriated for. So I am not really sure what is worse, but if you could, Mr. Secretary, share with us maybe where these unspent funds are going.

Secretary McCarthy. Congressman, I would have to check with our finance folks and get back to the committee on that.

Mr. Ryan. Okay. I mean, these are the kind of things that I think we—I sit here and listen to my Republican colleagues talk about this. The Democrats are talking about this. We are spending a ton of money on these programs, and this is just one example around food, that there is 170 bucks, hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. Chairman, we don't know where it is going.

And I understand, Mr. Secretary, you have got a lot of interests and a lot of things and a lot of programming that you have got to keep your eye on, but here is a perfect example of how we can save money in the military. And you know, we are talking about cutting SNAP programs and cutting other programs. And you look at the budget for the next year, only 2 and a half billion dollars to spread over—nondefense discretionary money to spread across 11 other subcommittees: 2 and a half billion dollars. And you are talking about near-peer competition with China and Russia, and we don't have the resources to invest into STEM and education and research and infrastructure and all these things that are a core component to our competition with them.

We only have 330 million people in the country. So we better all be at our best, and I want it to start with the men and women in the military. I want to know where this money is going so that we can find out how to repurpose it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would associate myself with Mr. Ryan’s concerns and assume that you will get back to the committee in detail, okay.

Ms. Granger.

FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT PROGRAM

Ms. GRANGER. The Future Vertical Lift program is the first major aviation modernization program in years and the Army’s number three modernization priority. Can you please update us on the progress of the program and tell us if it remains on schedule?

Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, Congresswoman Granger. We are trying to bring on two platforms into the formation, an attack reconnaissance version as well as a long-range assault aircraft. At present, we are looking at the down select in the competition for both platforms, looking to do that later this month, which will get us down to—I think it is what, two competitors. Two competitors for the lift. There is two competitors for the assault platform and then one on the long-range assault platform that will build prototypes. So that down select, they will go out and produce full up prototype variants for us to test, and then we will continue to ramp the investment. We have over a billion dollars invested in vertical lift platform this year.

So we are making some very big decisions here and continue to work with and really yield the benefit of industry who is investing about $4 to $1 with their development dollars. So we have harnessed a lot of good—the positive industry from the industry and bringing the capabilities into formation.

General MCCONNIVLE. We are very excited about what industry is doing because they are investing a lot of their own money. They are showing us that they can actually fly and demonstrate for us that capability, you know. There is two major competitors out there we are seeing right now that have very innovative capabilities that are going to provide us a significant overmatch in the future.

So the fact that we can see what they are doing, this goes along the line that we are trying to get to. If we can see what they can do when we write the actual requirements from the prototyping, we know they can do this. We won’t be investing in a program that is unattainable because we asked for something that they can’t do.

Ms. GRANGER. Good. Thank you very much.

ARMY FUTURES COMMAND

Ms. McCOLLUM. Thank you, gentleman. I am going to go back to Army Futures Command. So for the Army to achieve its modernization goals, the Army Futures Command is going to need some help from industry, small business, not just in Texas—and I like Texas; I can actually sing the State song—or on the coast, but from all over the country. Now, I live in a State where we don’t have a large military presence, and because of our business community that is located there, it is often overlooked by the Department of Defense. And I can tell you that States like Minnesota and our commercial sector have a lot to offer the Army. I can just think of healthcare, personal protection, equipment, engineering, computing, a whole host of things.
You know, my region, other regions like mine, we want to help you find the best solutions for your requirements, but it is going to take engagement from the Army to build those relationships.

Now, you are well aware the GAO report last summer was critical of Army Futures Command’s small business engagement. So can you tell the committee what changes have been made to Army’s future outreach to small businesses since then, particularly in the area of research and development? And how is Army Futures Command ensuring that they reach business communities across the Nation, including areas in which the Army normally doesn’t do much business because there aren’t bases located there, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t great ideas and great opportunities.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, Congresswoman. We established a footprint in an accelerator hub in Austin, Texas, which will provide us a venue to work with small businesses in particular, which is attracting a great deal of attention, very similar to an accelerator hub that I saw in Minneapolis as well when we were conducting the due diligence for where we were going to put the headquarters. So what the accelerator hub is, it provides an opportunity for Army leaders to sit there and talk about what are the types of capabilities that we need. It creates a venue for small business to learn about where the opportunities lie for Army.

Some of the things that we need to improve upon to the point of the report is just the business practices of how we can get contracts written quickly and to get people start funding flowing because small business’s greatest challenge is usually cash flow. How can we get our contract writers to embrace a lot of the authorities that we have been granted from Congress over the past 3 years so that they can get small businesses on contract very quickly. So procuring this capability, develop prototypes, and then ultimately turn this into a program of record. So we are getting better, but a lot of it came to just developing that platform to do business differently and attract more attention.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACCOUNT

Ms. McCollum. And I think this will be a rather quick question. In 2021, the Army budget request $44 million cut to the Army’s environmental restoration account. This is a 17-percent decrease overall from the fiscal year 2020 enacted level which is an 18-percent reduction to remedial actions specifically. Congress has prioritized environmental remediation very clearly in the last appropriations bill for the services. It is particularly important given the emerging threat of PFOS chemicals, given the scope of remediation issues facing Army. In addition to facilities across the country that still need remediation work, how can a 17-percent reduction possibly be adequate to fund the work that the Army needs to do—

Secretary McCarthy. Congresswoman, I am not up to speed on the issue. If I could take that for the record and get back to the committee, I would appreciate that.

Ms. McCollum. That is a 70-percent reduction (off mic) has there been less pollution and that PFOS, so could you please get back to us on why that is there? Maybe we can fix that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I was absent during Ms. McCollum's question, but in fact, it was a question I was going to ask about small business, and I would, one, associate myself with her concerns. In fact, I was going to quote from the GAO report. And while I appreciate it, I assume the answer was that you are creating a venue and addressing the issue of small business. I would point out the Army's Futures Command has been existence for 18 months, and we are—creating a venue to address small business is not acceptable.

Secretary MCCARTHY. No, sir. It does exist. We have had it in place about a year, and then what we have learned in the process is just really it is the contractual mechanisms which discourages, in most cases, small businesses from doing business with the Department of Defense because of the span time required to go through an RFP and to go back and forth and ultimately get on contract to where the funding flows. We have started to use more of the OTA authority that has been granted to us by Congress. And it has been able to get us more businesses involved, in many cases, as subs on other existing contractual mechanisms. But we have been able to get more attention from small business community and get more of them involved with our programs.

General MCCONVILLE. And, Chairman, one of the things we discussed, we found out with industry is these industry days where we lay out some of the problem sets, and I talked about the characteristics of a problem rather than going to a requirements document, which allows them to participate, which allows them to bring in their technologies and do it at a beginning level where it is just an idea where we can bring in ideas. We can give them a little money for their idea, and they can develop that idea. As they compete, they have chance to grow in that process.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would encourage you. I will not be here for next year's hearing, and I would hope it is a more positive message. I just having, been on this subcommittee since 1993, do not believe the Department of Defense has done an adequate job by any measure in engaging small business people. So I would really encourage you to step on the gas here.

Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. Did you call on me, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes.

PIM INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much. I wasn't quite sure.

I want to associate myself very much with the remarks of the chairman and the ranking member on concerns just about the procurement process and, you know, constantly making maybe perfect the enemy of the good. I have been on this committee long—well, I have been in Congress long enough, I should say, to have gotten here just after Crusader. I represent Fort Sill. Then lived through the future combat system, which was billions of dollars down the drain for nothing, no fieldable, then the NLOC debacle. And now we finally seem to get something going with PIM integrated management, had some rough spots, but starting to move. If I under-
stand the fiscal year 2020 budget, we allocated enough money for 53 units, and you only procured 48. Can you tell me why?

Secretary McCarthy. With respect to pellet and PIM, sir?

Mr. Cole. Yes, sir.

Secretary McCarthy. There were some issues with the production line for pellet and PIM. Over the last 6 months, they are getting on track, and that is why we made the—ultimately made the full rate decision. But there were issues with the manufacturer getting the tack time down so they could produce the quantities that were on contract.

Mr. Cole. So they couldn’t have produced the 53?

Secretary McCarthy. To get to that point, yes, sir. But we are on track now and have confidence that——

Mr. Cole. And can you tell me what you are asking for in the 2021 budget?

Secretary McCarthy. What is that, sir?

Mr. Cole. How many units are you asking for in 2021?

Secretary McCarthy. I don’t have the exact number off the top of my head.

Mr. Cole. I think it is, like, 30, so it is, like, way down, and I am wondering why that big a disparity. I mean, we have got a real problem here where we are outgunned, quite frankly, by our peer competitors. Made some progress here, and I am wondering why we are that dramatically slashing the acquisition and slowing down the program.

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, the challenge that we had with the manufacture was just getting the quantities produced on time. We couldn’t reach the tack times and hit them every month, so Dr. Jette was up there personally getting involved with the manufacturer, went up there three or four times last year alone. We have been about five for five for the last 5 months. So we are starting to ramp those quantities back up, but we had to work with the manufacturer on their processes, working with them to make appropriate investments tooling so that we could decrease those span times so we could make the products faster.

Mr. Cole. So, if we are back up, again, why that big a disparity between 48 and 30?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, we had challenges hitting the targets, you know. I would refer to Dr. Jette ultimately, but when we went through this process, it was about can we hit the targets that we put on contract.

Mr. Cole. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

HYPersonics

Mr. Ruppersberger. First thing. I have been here for a while. I think Mr. Cole and I came in the same class. In the very beginning on Armed Services, I was really concerned about a lot of issues involving the Army, but I think from what I have seen, you have come a long way, and I think first under General Milley and Esper and then you two that are taking over now, I have confidence that you are going to do the job. You do have to understand that our job is oversight, and in oversight, we need to ask you hard
questions and to make sure that, you know, you are directing and that we are spending money the right way. Judge Carter and I are co-chair of the Army caucus. We work very closely with you, and you know, we want you to keep doing what you are doing.

Anything involving contracts and those type of issues, there always seem to be issues. You have bidding, who has the right person, and we try to do the best there, but there are issues there, and we have always got to stay on top of that issue.

I want to get into hypersonics. I know especially you, Mr. Secretary, when you were Deputy Secretary or whatever your former job was, we have talked a lot about hypersonic weapons. Other than nuclear weapons and maybe cyber security, it is probably, in my opinion, one of the most dangerous issues we deal with. And, unfortunately, Russia and China are ahead of us because of our crazy shutdowns of government and those types of things. But now we are together, we are on a roll, and I am going to ask you this question.

Again, I said I am very concerned about the hypersonic missile development, and our adversaries are developing hypersonic weapons at a rapid pace. President Putin recently claimed to have developed a hypersonic weapon, and news outlets have shown images of China displaying its platforms during a military parade marking China's 70th anniversary.

At last month's Army caucus breakfast, I was encouraged by the progress Lieutenant General Thurgood and his team at Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office have made to develop and test our systems and also working very closely with Secretary Griffin at the Pentagon. Can you explain the importance of the Rapid Capabilities Critical Technology Office to our strategic modernization efforts and how its role is different from that of cross functional teams and Army Futures Command. And can you explain the role the Army as playing in the development of a common hypersonic glide body? Did you get that? Okay.

And I also have concerns that inefficient government shutdowns have put us behind our adversaries in hypersonic development, and many believe we are 2 years behind. Do you agree with that? The Army has requested $800 million in this year's budget to support hypersonic missile testing and prototyping. When do you expect to transition from prototypes to production, and does this funding also support development of defensive hypersonic measures?

General McConville. And, Congressman, I will go ahead and take that and just talk a little about what General Thurgood is doing. As you saw and we demonstrated, the hypersonics program is moving out extremely quickly. We are going to be announcing very soon the capability to actually test that system and demonstrate that capability. We can talk about that in another venue and how soon that is going to happen.

Not only are they doing hypersonics and moving out very aggressively, that is a joint team that is doing that. We are working very, very closely with the Navy. We anticipate having a battery, a mobile battery capability in fiscal year 2023. We are also aggressively moving out on directed energy. We have that capability at the 50 KW range and looking at the 300 capability on directed energy. And then we are working with our integrated battle command sys-
tem that is bringing sensors to shooters together. So what he is doing is taking critical technologies and bringing them together, working very closely with our Futures Command and bringing these very, very important top priority systems into being very, very quickly.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Could you discuss where you are on offense and defense?

General McConville. Well, we are much better on the offense right now, and the defense—we have some work to do on the defense.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And do you agree we are 2 and a half, at least 2 and a half years behind China and Russia?

General McConville. I am not sure that we are 2 and a half years behind as far as in capability. We will know more in a short period of time where we are in relationship to them.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is the funding that we have in this year’s budget enough for you to move forward to do what you need to do?

General McConville. Yes, it is.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Womack.

MODERNIZATION INITIATIVES

Mr. WOMACK. Thank you. I thank both the gentleman for their testimony here today.

I want to go back to the modernization initiatives. And, man, I know all of them are important. I mean, all you have got to do is read the list. But as has been said before, in comparing it to a menu, a lot of entrees here, but you can't eat it all. And we can't have all of these things, but I still know we have to have a prioritization list. So two questions about it.

One, what are the absolute gotta-haves in these initiatives? And then my second question is, given the discussion that is already happened on the Bradley replacement, how has that shifted the priorities, if they have shifted at all?

General McConville. Well, Congressman, I will start. You know, the number one priority is long-range precision fires, and I would say within long-range precision fires, the number one priority is hypersonics because we have talked about that, and that has got to happen. Within that portfolio also, we have a precision strike missile system, which is going to go out past 500 kilometers. That is going to give us ability to penetrate competitors' anti-access/area-denial capability and hold their ships at risk in the future. We have got to have that.

When it comes to extended range cannon, what we call ERCA, that is the ability—you know, we are basically improving what we have, and we have got to have that. The optionally manned fighting vehicle, I think we need to have, you know. Right now, with the Bradley fighting vehicle, it is coming up on 40 years. We have incrementally improved it. We need to get a new vehicle. We have got to get that right, and I think we are going to make that happen.

As far as our aircraft, the Future Vertical Lift, the future attack reconnaissance aircraft, and the future long-range assault aircraft,
we need them both. Again, we are looking over the next 40 to 50 years. These are the systems that we are going to have to have.

The network we are putting together, we are going to tie in on air and missile defense. The future on air and missile defense is sensors to shooters. We are going to use artificial intelligence. We are going to use an integrated battle command system. Every radar is a sensor. We are going to have different types of shooters, whether it is directed energy, whether it is Patriot missiles, whether it is THAAD. We will pick the right arrow, depending on the system that we are having, but there is multiple threats that we are dealing with from hypersonic missiles to theater ballistic missiles to swarming unmanned aerial systems to rockets to mortars. We have got to have that capability.

And certainly last, but very important on the soldier lethality side, we are giving our soldiers, our combat soldiers who take most of the casualties, what they need, and that is an Integrated Visual Augmentation System. It is also new rifle, a new SAR. And these programs are setting us up for the next 40 to 50 years so we will have the overmass that we need in the future.

Secretary McCarthy. The only thing I would add, sir, is cloud architecture. So we have to be able to capture data and be able to put it into a standard protocol to be able to pass information seamlessly between our Navy and Air Force counterparts to truly weaponize data and to move at the speed of relevance in the future.

SOLDIER LETHALITY PORTFOLIO

Mr. Womack. General McConville, you did a pretty good job of articulating the needs for really all of the initiatives in your discussion. Noteworthy to me is the fact that, when you look at the lower priorities that have been outlined, still needs but down on the priority list, I see soldier lethality, 400 percent increase. That is the request? But for your long-range precision fires, a 4-percent increase. So help me understand the request for increases versus the prioritized list that you have outlined here today. I know there is a good answer for it. It is just that I am looking at the math and thinking, man, there is something not right here.

General McConville. One of our most transformational programs within the soldier lethality portfolio is the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, which is going to fundamentally change the way our soldiers operate. The other thing is, as we talked about, working with small businesses and working with non-traditional defense partners and going ahead and working this new acquisition process. This thing is moving very, very quickly, and it is transformational in nature for our soldiers. That is why you are seeing the large increased investment in this portfolio because it is happening very, very quickly.

Secretary McCarthy. It is a 26-percent increase year over year for the entire modernization effort, sir. But to your point about some portfolios moving faster than the others, that is largely the mature of the technology and how quickly we can integrate into a soldier or air formation.

Mr. Womack. Thank you. Go Army.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Kilmer.
CHINOOK BLOCK II UPGRADE

Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to you both for being with us.
Mr. Secretary, I have some questions about the Chinook Block II upgrade, which the committee talked about at length last year. In 2017, General Milley determined that the Block II was necessary to fill critical capability gaps such as moving more people, more material, heavier vehicles around the battlefield, and since that time, Congress has been supportive of the program. Yet, you decided to continue to delay the program, even though both the House and the Senate included funding and report language in fiscal year 2020 which was intended to keep the program on schedule. Can you tell me the plan for the Block II upgrade of the Chinook helicopter and why the program can continue to be delayed without loss of capability to the warfighter?
Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir. So the aviation portfolio, we are bringing in two new platforms into the entire fleet, the future attack reconnaissance as well as long-range assault platform. When looking at the determination of the overall health of the aviation portfolio, the Chinook is on average about 8 to 10 years old. It has north of 20 years left on the lifecycle for that platform.
Over the course of the last 2 years, Army leadership has worked to develop additional foreign military sales to the United Kingdom, the UAE, as well as the Afghan national security forces to keep the line warm until fiscal year 2026 and to be able to keep flexibility in the outyears. We are also procuring G models for our Army special operations aviation platform. So we believe we have flexibility in the outyears as well as the health of the youngest helicopter in the formation.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HUMVEE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Mr. Kilmer. I also want to ask about the Army National Guard Humvee modernization program. That has had an immediate positive impact on readiness in the Army National Guard units, including the Guard in the State of Washington. However, there is a significant shortfall that remains. More than half of the National Guard Humvees currently are beyond their expected useful lives. The Army didn’t request funding for the program. Rather, Congress has added funding of about $100 million in the past several years to ensure the program’s success. Recently, the $100 million appropriated in fiscal year 2020 was part of the funding reprogrammed to build the border wall. Can you describe the benefit provided to the Army by the Army National Guard Humvee modernization program, and why doesn’t the Army request funding in the budget for it?
Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir. The program has performed well, working antilock brakes, reconfiguring the ambulances, the Humvee ambulances. Right now, Dr. Jette and General Murray are conducting a vehicle study for the entire track-wheeled portfolio for the Army. We have about 50,000 Humvees in the portfolio or in the program of record for JLTVs, over 49,000. It is, like, a thousand in the program of record for the infantry fighting vehicle. We just need to make sure that we are right sizing what vehicles we have
in the formation. So we are taking a hard look at that. It will be reflected in the investments of all of those programs that I mentioned, and we should be able to report that out to Congress in the near future.

CMAT CONCEPT

Mr. Kilmer. I just have one other quick question. I am very interested in the continuation and expansion of the cyber mission assurance team concept in the Army and Air National Guard. I think it is helpful to address these cyber vulnerabilities.

General, can I just get your thought on the CMAT concept? Are there cyber vulnerabilities faced by the Army that can be addressed through this program?

General McConville. Well, as you know, Congressman, we have got tremendous talent in the Guard and Reserve that does cyber. We are doing a lot of innovative programs. One of the biggest things that we are looking at on talent management is, first of all, how we bring these folks in, how we keep them. There is tremendous opportunities in the Guard and Reserve because there are civilian jobs to bring them together and work those type of things. So I think there are possibilities in that area, but I am a firm believer in a talent management system where we can recognize those with these cyber capabilities so we get them in the right place at the right time.

Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Carter.

RECAPITALIZING OLDER COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, both of you.

We talked about the Bradley replacement. You gave us briefly some lessons learned because what we have created is an interesting thing, and we are really excited about it. Speed and accuracy is what we are trying to do in procurement, and that is interesting and challenging. When you look at the history of the military, it is very challenging. You learned some stuff from the Bradley, and if you apply it to anything else you are working on, it is going to be a learning process no matter what you do because a lot of things are going to be new. But the most important thing is to apply the learning process to the next project.

And I think something my colleague to the right was thinking about when he was asking his questions, there is an awful lot here. Are you thinking to make sure that it is not all going to drop on our plate the same year? We have to fund all that as a completion project because there is a lot here. And are you thinking in terms of phasing it as it comes to us to fund because I would hate to think that all those things came to fruition in 1 year. It would be pretty tough for us to be able to finance it.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, Congressman. You kind of referring to a potential bow wave of capability that could land. Obviously, it would be a good problem to have, but ultimately what we are looking at is a flat fiscal environment. Would that force us into some, first, major decisions of flattening end strength, or do you get a budgetary increase? So the balance sheet, yes, we look very hard
at that. This is where Dr. Jette and General Murray would then turn to the chief and I and make recommendations. Do you cycle them in based off of the priorities, and then would you tier them into certain units over time? There is a lot of that work underway right now, but that is an environment that we will probably face in the 2023–2024 timeframe.

General McConville. One of the things that we are seeing with even some of our older combat systems. You get to a certain point, you are going to have to recapitalize them. Really, when you start recapitalizing, you almost take them down to the bare bones, and you almost spend just as much money as if you had to purchase a new system. So the intent will be as the new systems get ready, we will have to divest of all systems, of the older systems.

Mr. Carter. Right.

General McConville. That is what we are trying to work our way through right now.

INTEGRATED VISUAL AUGMENTATION SYSTEM

Mr. Carter. While I still have some time, tell us about the new night vision capability.

General McConville. Well, you know, the night vision capability which, as you know, Congressman, is the Integrated Visual Augmentation System. And the difference with that is that is not only improving the night vision capability, which is the track we were on. We are taking our night vision systems, which started without a PVS–5, and then we went to a PVS–6 which gave us better night capability. And then we integrated a thermal capability in a night vision system together. The difference with this, we are going to be able to bring in the ability to train in virtual reality in these systems. So the future will be when our soldiers go to a target, they will be actually trained in the mission in virtual reality, do it 50 times, flick a switch, go off and do the mission. And they will have night vision capability, thermal capability, and also be able to see the type of information they need for the mission.

Mr. Carter. Fantastic. Thank you.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

SYNTHETIC TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for your service. Obviously, training is a hugely important part of what makes our military the best in the world. I would like to understand, or if you can actually help me understand this next generation training system under the STE, the synthetic training environment. If you can describe the program briefly, why it is important, and, you know, does it work? Just help me understand it.

General McConville. If I could take that, Congressman. You know, we always have a war. The synthetic training environment, what that allows us to do is really to conduct deep practice before we actually go ahead or rehearsals before we actually have to go do it on the combat battlefield. And so these systems that we have today that are coming on board, these trainers are not—you know, back in the day we used broomsticks. You know, soldiers during World War II didn't have weapons. So they ran around with broom-
sticks. These simulators, these rehearsal platforms, these virtual reality capabilities are cutting edge. We can put our soldiers or our pilots or our artillery men into situations where they get an opportunity to rehearse a mission 50 times before they actually have to go out there and do it in combat and do it live. I think it is extremely important.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And, General, so correct me if I am wrong. So are they, in essence, training with actual, for example, what it is going to look like there, whether it is buildings, fields, whatever it may be?

General McCONVILLE. Absolutely. And the system that I was talking to Congressman Carter about is you will be in that. In fact, the Secretary and I have actually done it and gone through a virtual reality shooting house with a scenario that we set up, and it is as real as you can get. You can get all the training that you need, plus you have the ability to see what soldiers are doing during the actual rehearsal. And then you come back and do a very good after-action review and get lessons learned and go back and do it again.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If I may follow up on that, Mr. Chairman. So my understanding is that—what is it, $33 million? Is that the part of the unfunded request, I believe?

General McCONVILLE. I think that was on the UFR. That was actually on the UFR, yes.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. So those funds would be for what?

General McCONVILLE. Those funds——

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. To expand or to do what? I mean——

General McCONVILLE. Well, those funds are for prototyping. One was on the MILES system, which we use to work our way through, you know, actual combat so, when people are shooting laser-type things at each other, but it is the ability to conduct training exercises without actually using live bullets.

The other one is on the virtual trainers that I talked about, you know, to go ahead and to begin the development of those trainers that our soldiers will use for rehearsals, whether it is fire or driving or those type of things.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And so those are—is that an effective way to train folks?

General McCONVILLE. Oh, absolutely. And it is—really, it is a lot cheaper way, too. It is a lot less expensive than actually doing it with a real——

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. So cheaper and potentially even more effective because you are actually able to be in theater almost, right?

General McCONVILLE. That is right. That is right. You can do it at home station, and you know, a lot of people don’t have—you know, if you are in the National Guard, the Reserves, you are in an armory or something like that, or you have access to that training, you get a chance before you actually go and do it. I think it is valuable.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Secretary, you had a memo recently that became public, in which you expressed your concerns regarding the transfer of the Army’s medical research to the Defense Health Agency while they were undergoing reorganization at the military treatment facilities. I too have some concerns. Can you share with us what your specific concerns are with the transferring of Army medical research to the Defense Health Agency?

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, Congresswoman. This whole process is like a massive merger where we are divesting assets to the Defense Health Agency. And, ultimately, what it comes down to is how do you break apart the readiness piece of medicine to what we—the home station—and understanding the operating model of how the Defense Health Agency is going to work, how do did they budget, how do we recruit people and develop professionals career tracks and, you know, recruit and retain our personnel. It is not altogether clear how it works.

And so, ultimately, I reached out to my colleague Deputy Secretary Norquist and told him that the pacing of the changeover was of concern, as well as the moving the Medical Research and Development Command to Defense Health Agency, MRDC, who has been instrumental in the work that we are doing to combat COVID–19 in particular. So I just put in the request to slow the pacing of this merger until we had greater fidelity of just how all of it is going to work.

If you want to answer, General.

Ms. McCollum. Yes, please.

General McConville. I was just going to add that, you know, the Army is a people business, you know. Our soldiers, families, civilians, they depend on those medical treatment facilities. We have a sacred obligation to provide them quality healthcare. We just want to make sure we are able to do that. And this is a very important endeavor, and we just want to make sure that we can take care of people while it is going on.

Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you, gentlemen. And as I shared with you, I too, have some concerns, and I brought those up when we were talking to the different military service health sectors and that on there. So do you know if you are thinking of asking Congress for a delay on this transfer at all?

Secretary McCarthy. No. Congresswoman, we are trying to work it internally. When Matt Donovan was the acting, I know he went through confirmation today, but we have been working with him about these very specific challenges. In many cases, our installations are in some very rural locations around the country, and how are we going to be in a position to ask our soldiers and their families to go get healthcare on the local economy, which may not be in a position to absorb thousands of people. So, for an example, how do you work through these relationships to ensure that we can work together and get the support that they need. In many cases, these local communities rely on us.
Ms. McCollum. Right. Well, I have a lot of concerns about the way that this is moving forward. And for medical doctor training to what you said about rural communities and to tell me that you can—you know, there won't be any change in prescriptions because we can do them over the mail is not an answer.

You mentioned COVID–19. The Army has suspended travel for soldiers and families from South Korea over the weekend because of outbreak of COVID–19 in the country. Can you give us an update on where you are and what U.S. Forces is telling soldiers and families? And then I think what has been on a lot of our minds, and you know, whether it is in the States or looking at the DOD family, do you have the kits that you need to even find out what is going on?

Secretary McCarthy. So, ma'am, first, your question with respect to the PCS decision on Friday that we made. That was a 60-day delay to the PCS decisions, and it is to see, will the flu season burn out? Will this actually reduce our risk? We don't know, but we want to buy some time. So we made this decision Friday night because we have got thousands of people moving to these locations all the time. So we, you know, saw the President put the guidance out about South Korea and Italy in particular. We followed suit.

With respect to test kits, the Army has been organized for about last month against three lines of effort, which are prevent, detect, and treat. So, on the prevent standpoint, we have General Martin. The vice chief every day does a meeting and looks at where every soldier, civil servant, and family member is moving around the earth. And we are looking at risk-based decisions about TDY and PCS, all of these related decisions.

The Medical Research and Development Command is working with the CDC and NIH on vaccines. We are testing mice right now on one of our own solutions. So a lot of great work going there. Many of our people are former colleagues and proteges of an Anthony Fauci and Dr. Redfield at CDC, so wonderful relationships there and folks that have worked together for decades.

Ms. McCollum. Getting back to the kits, if I may.

Secretary McCarthy. Yeah. I was going to get there, ma'am, the kits.

Ms. McCollum. Okay. Because you can't prevent if you haven't detected.

Secretary McCarthy. I was going to get to detect. On the detect line of effort, nine of the Army labs are validated to build the test kits. We put in a request for more funding so we can open up our capacity to produce thousands a day. We are working through that funding right now from the supplemental that was granted by Congress last week.

Ms. McCollum. In South Korea, do you have test kits was the more specific question?

Secretary McCarthy. We are buying those. I believe General Abrams is buying those off of the local economy as well as has some on hand as well.

Ms. McCollum. And you can get the lab results how soon?

Secretary McCarthy. I don't know the answer to that.
Ms. McCollum. Would you get back to us with that——

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. McCollum [continuing]. Because some places are having to send them. Other places are being able to do it.

General McConville. That is one of the things, ma'am, we are working on is we've got these master testers that have done it for other type of diseases or viruses, and we need to ramp that up. It was, like, 50 or 60 a day. We have got to get up to thousands so we can actually get this——

Ms. McCollum. So I would assume as part of prevent, you are telling others stationed in Germany to stay home, use abundance of precaution, not be moving around a lot?

Secretary McCarthy. We have been putting these protocols in place, and they are developing additional CONOPS as the risk continues to grow.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Rogers.

NEAR-PEER ADVERSARY AND TACTICAL READINESS

Mr. Rogers. Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

After of two decades of focusing on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the Army needs to refocus on preparations to oppose a near-peer adversary. The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the threats posed by, quote, great powers and specifically highlights Russia and China as the greatest threats to our interests.

China, naturally at the forefront of many of our minds, whether it is their military modernization and mobilization, economic pressure on countries in the region, or continuing to militarize the South China Sea, it is clear that they seek to increase their influence in the region and, indeed, the world. Similarly, Russia continues to expand it is global influence, conducting mass misinformation campaigns, inserting itself into the domestic policies of foreign nations.

I understand one of the Army's top priorities in the upcoming fiscal year is improving its tactical readiness when it comes to the near-peer adversary which will be critical after 2 decades of fighting in the Middle East. When it comes to training from the team and squad level all the way to brigade and higher, how are you preparing for potential combat or opposition against a near-peer adversary like China or Russia? Are there any specific training-related areas in which we could improve upon to ensure we are ready for this kind of a world? Lastly, is there anything we as a committee can do to help you achieve maximum tactical readiness levels?

General McConville. If I could, Congressman, again, we are going through a major change for a lot of our officers, NCOs, as you said, prosecuting wars of what we would call irregular warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and we are going back to what many of us grew up with when we came in the Army in the 1980s, which was really large scale, ground combat-type operations, although the difference now is we believe we will be contested in every single domain. Not only will we have large forma-
tions that will have to fight various advanced equipment—and when we start talking about armored-type vehicles, we are talking about artillery, mass type artillery—we are also going to be contested from the air, you know. The last time we lost an American soldier from the air is April 15, 1953, and that is why somewhere in our request, we are starting to develop the mobile short-range artillery capability. We are going to be contested on the sea, which we are going to have to think our way through how that works, and also contested in space and contested in cyber.

So a lot of—you know, we are hardening a lot of our communications, you know. We are making sure that we have the ability to use the systems that may be affected from those areas. And so we go out to the national training center. We go to the joint readiness center. We are taking these—our threat forces, exercise these capabilities, and then we are training our soldiers and our officers and units how to fight against them.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Having the maxed-out number of CTC rotations with these changed scenarios is greatly enhancing their ability. Those repetitions are key. If you look at—I mean, whenever I talk with General McConville or the other four stars, many of them had had eight or nine repetitions at the CTC rotations before they hit the berm in Iraq or the invasion of Afghanistan. So when you get repetitions of these large collective exercises, that is really what makes the change.

But the investments that have been made in the CTCs have made a dramatic difference in fighting against real scenarios for near-peer competitors.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I yield.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

FAMILY READINESS

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

My district is home to Fort Huachuca. The fort is home to more than a thousand servicemembers and their families and has about 1,100 housing units. More than 6,000 enlisted individuals serve at Fort Huachuca.

Family readiness is essential to our military’s mission readiness. The military families’ ability to maintain a stable home front is imperative for our troops to keep their eyes on the mission.

Childcare is a necessary tool, essential to a military family’s quality of life. Once again, the Army is not investing funds in childcare activities.

So I have three questions about that. Could you please give the committee a justification for the lack of attention to these vital programs? How is that possibly going to help with retention and quality of life? And what is the Army budgeting for these programs in future years?

As a source of stress for military families, I would think this would be an easy problem to attack.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Congresswoman, we have grown the budget over the last couple of years. We have brought down the backlog from over 7,000 down to just under—just over 3,000 for the Active
uniform personnel. Secretary Esper just released a Department of Defense-wide memorandum to prioritize military families first and availability for the childcare opportunities that exist on the installations.

But clearly we need to do more. And we are developing a plan to how do we get to buy down this whole—burn down this whole backlog and to get it done in the next 2 to 3 years. General McConville has requests also on his UFR list for additional locations for some of the more—

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Secretary, I am having a very hard time hearing you.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Can you hear me now, sir?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. If you could continue where you referenced the General was going to have remarks. No, I am not interrupting. I just couldn't hear you.

Secretary McCarthy. Oh. Sorry. General McConville also has a request on his UFR list as well for additional—

Mr. VISCLOSKY. On the unfunded?

Secretary McCarthy. On the unfunded, yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I heard that right.

Secretary McCarthy. For three additional CDCs. I believe it is two in Hawaii and one in Fort Wainwright, right?

General McConville. That is correct. There is also the ability to—there is some other money in there.

Congressman, like you said, we need to do more on that, and here is why. Eighty-eight percent of our sergeants have families. And we have a lot of dual families. And the Secretary and I have talked about this, and I put—I think it is $190 million in my unfunded requirement list. We need to work with the committee to make sure we can get that funded.

We have got about 4,000 folks on the waiting list and they shouldn't be waiting, and we just need to get after that, and I hope we can work with the committee to do better on that. We need to do better on that in the future.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Well, I can't stress it enough. My district in Arizona is largely a military district, so we have Fort Huachuca Army Base, but we also have an Air Force base, Davis-Monthan, and then five of the major defense contractors are in Tucson. So it is a huge segment of our economy.

And also, because of our proximity to the border, it is really important to maintain those bases and make sure they have got the resources that they need.

So thank you for your attention to that.

I yield back.

BUDGETING FOR CHILD CARE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Well, I would like to follow up on the gentlewoman's questions as well as the answers from the panel.

But, first of all, Mr. Secretary, you said we have grown the budget for childcare over the last several years, and the numbers would prove you correct. In fiscal year 2019, the Army had $326.6 million for childcare programs. In fiscal year 2020, our current year, it is $371.5 million.
I would point out that is because we added the money. I would point out that the request for the Army for 2021 is a reduction of $36.8 million from current year levels. Your request for this year is $334.7 million. That is a cut in funding for childcare of $36.8 million.

I would note, and you are correct, Mr. Secretary, that you have reduced the backlog. The backlog figures from the Department of the Army for fiscal year 2019 were 5,561 children. Those are people. The backlog for the current year is estimated to be, it is not done, 5,350. So there is a reduction of 211 people.

It is interesting that despite the fact that you have asked to cut the budget for childcare by $36.8 million, and you estimate you will have 900 more people in the United States Army next year, that your estimate for backlog for childcare is exactly the same number for this year, so you are making no progress.

The second point I would make, as far as budgeting, we received notice from the Department of the Army this past week that relative to certain procurement programs—and the budget was just introduced to the Congress in the second week of February—that there are $145.4 million of assets identified that are over budget that will not be required.

That is a huge amount of money that now is not going to be needed but was requested in the budget submission a month ago. But we cut daycare. I don’t know who is doing the budgeting here.

And I would also point out, and you are correct in your testimony, there are two unfunded requests for additional money for daycare. I want to be fair with you. One is for $171 million. The other is for $150 million. I would point out they are unfunded. That means you didn’t ask for them in this budget.

Mr. Aguilar.

PRESENT AND FUTURE THREATS AND RECRUITMENT

Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, as you know, when we talk about workforce, the U.S. workforce and our ability to stay competitive from a technological environment is important.

Looking at present and future threats, I think cyber, hypersonics, and directed energy are at the forefront of those changes. Specifically, what is the Army doing to develop military and civilian workforce in those areas?

Secretary McCarthy. General McConville started a talent management effort when he was the G1 about 5 years ago, and we have matured over time with our ability to recruit and retain really unique skill sets, like you mentioned, with the STEM talent.

We have also enhanced our relationships with academia and business and using direct hire authorities to find individuals like data scientists that have very unique capabilities and educational experience in particular.

This is a challenge. With a lot of opportunity, with 3.5 percent unemployment, we have worked this very hard even at our level of getting involved and personally recruiting people to join the Army. But it has been a difficult challenge not only getting them but retaining them. The compensation is just very competitive.
Mr. AgUILAR. What more can we do? What more needs to be done at your level and at our level to address some of those challenges?

Secretary McCarthy. Well, some of the things we are looking at is on the compensation side, you know. We will never really achieve Silicon Valley kind of money, but are there ways that we can compensate people differently, different hiring authorities related to that.

So we may need to come back to that next year, but right now we have developed these platforms to recruit people, and we brought them into ASOL and Futures Command like organizations to help us with the development of weapon systems in particular. We have been able to hire some very talented civil servants to help us with our cloud efforts.

It may require a change with how we compensate people in the future.

Mr. AgUILAR. Anything to offer, General?

General McCONVILLE. I just think that we have some very highly talented people that want to come into the Army, especially young people today. They seem to be motivated by purpose, being part of a team, and that is what we offer them, and they can do things that they can't do anywhere else.

I have seen some amazing people who want to join the Army, both as civilians and the military, so we are very proud of their service.

WORKING AND INTEGRATING WITH THE SPACE FORCE

Mr. AgUILAR. Another question, gentleman, on space operations. Can you talk to me a little bit about the Army’s space forces that are employed, and how do you anticipate them working and integrating with the Space Force in the future?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, I would defer to the chief as well here. But we are going through the process of the joint warfighting concept, which is largely driven in the Tank with the Chiefs, and that is how will this change the operating model of the entire Department of Defense.

What you will see over the next couple of years is the divestiture of some space assets from the Army. But ultimately it is finding where is that line of demarcation between Army responsibilities and the Space Force, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps.

So a lot of that will unfold over the next 24 months. But we have done some—we have made a lot of investments with low Earth orbit, satellite architecture in particular. This is a key capability that we are going to need to have that very resilient COMs as well as position navigation and timing so that we can have a unique capability for targeting at lower echelons.

The speed of combat is continually getting tougher, and to have that capability at lower echelons to be able to help improve our targeting will be necessary. We are the largest consumer of space in the Department of Defense.

Chief.

General McCONVILLE. I absolutely agree with what the Secretary said. We use space. Every single vehicle has something that is derived from space, whether it is a global positioning satellite or it
is a long range communication or it is early warning. So we have
got to keep those mechanisms in place, and we will work with the
Space Force.
We do some things with satellites that probably will go to Space
Force. We don’t need to be actually operating in space. But we need
to keep the capabilities on the ground that we draw from space,
and they will be with our soldiers that are forward in the battle-
field. So we are working on that right now.
Mr. Aguilar. Appreciate it, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Crist.

SYNTHETIC TRAINING ENVIRONMENT CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAM

Mr. Crist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Appreciate your service to
our country.
As you know, the Synthetic Training Environment Cross Func-
tional Team in my State of Florida is working to modernize train-
ing. Can you talk about the timeline for incorporating some of the
things the Army is developing out of Orlando and into the force?
I think Congressman Diaz-Balart had a similar question.
General McConville. One of the things that, Congressman, we
did talk about was the Integrated Visual Augmentation System,
which we think is the most transformational system we have going.
That came together because of the Synthetic Training Environment
Team worked with the Soldier Lethality Team, and this is what
made that whole program transformational, the fact that soldiers
will be able to train on missions in virtual reality before they actu-
ally get to do that.
And one of the things that the synthetic training environment is
developing is what we call One World Terrain. So you can go any-
where in the world eventually and be able to rehearse and practice
on that terrain.
And so, we talked a little bit this before, that the capability of
training today in simulation is unbelievable, whether it is flying an
aircraft or it is driving vehicles or it is shooting weapons systems.
We can do it a lot faster. We can do it a lot quicker. We can do
multiple rehearsals without expending all the money that you
would do if you were shooting live ammunition.
Mr. Crist. Do you have anything to add, sir?
Secretary McCarthy. Sir, looking at fiscal year 2022 for fielding
event capability, to the point that the Chief made, is that it will
spiral additional applications over time, day/night sights, as well as
pumping synthetic training scenarios like room clearing and others,
as well as the maps.
So once the actual goggle is fielded over time, more implications
can be squirted in there because it is an open system architecture.

COVID–19 VACCINE

Mr. Crist. All right. Thank you.
Can you provide an update on the Army’s effort to develop a
COVID–19 vaccine? And are you working in coordination with any
outside organizations, like National Institute of Health, American
universities, or foreign governments?
Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir. We met with our experts. We meet with them every week. It depends on the day. We met with them last night.

Right now, we are developing additional test kits, and we are looking at increasing the capacity of our test kits to thousands a day. We are working within the Vice President's task force to request additional funding over the course of the next couple of days.

With respect to the vaccine, the Army has a vaccine that it is testing on mice right now, and we believe we are less than a couple months away from starting to test human specimens.

There are about four or five total that are on different tracks. This is all being driven by the CDC. Our scientists, in particular, our lead scientists are proteges of Dr. Fauci. They have wonderful relationships. They all worked together over decades.

We have, in particular, Dr. Modjarrad, who is one of three people on the Earth that has ever published on coronavirus. He works for us in Army Medical Research and Development Command, and he is the point man on this. He was a key figure in the Zika vaccine.

So we feel very confident in our people. We just need to keep pushing the resources to them. But they are working really hard, and we are going to have options here very soon.

Mr. Crist. Thank you for that.

How many testing kits do you have available? How many testing sites are available for Army personnel? And do spouses and dependents have access to testing, particularly overseas?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, we have nine validated labs that can build test kits.

Mr. Crist. Right.

Secretary McCarthy. Right now, the quantities are very low, 50, 60 a day. We are moving the funding, and they can get to thousands a day once we get the funding in place and start cranking this through.

So it is a matter of weeks where we will be getting this going. We have just got to get the funding in place. But we are confident in our team's ability to start cranking more capacity.

With respect to the quantities that are available to soldiers and their families around the globe, I would have to get back to you on the specifics of that, sir.

Ms. McCollum. Mr. Crist, if you would yield?

Mr. Crist. Of course.

Ms. McCollum. You said, sir, 50 or 60 kits a day being manufactured. Is that total? Or is that 50 or 60 kits per day per—

Secretary McCarthy. I will get you a paper, Congresswoman, but I believe that is per lab. So we will get you the specifics.

Ms. McCollum. And then you said you were getting money from the supplemental for tests?

Secretary McCarthy. We are looking for additional funding internally to the executive branch.

Ms. McCollum. Internally.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes.

Ms. McCollum. Because there is no DOD language in the supplemental.
Secretary McCarthy. That is right. So we would have to go to either HHS or other entities within the Department of Defense. We are working that internally right now.

Ms. McCollum. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Crist.

Mr. Crist. Of course. Of course.

So you mentioned about the funding. What is the issue there? You don't have the money?

Secretary McCarthy. The MRDC—I am sorry, sir—the MRDC is on a——

Mr. Crist. I was trying to be polite. I am sorry.

Secretary McCarthy. MRDC is on a reimbursable model.

Mr. Crist. Yeah. Yes, sir.

Secretary McCarthy. So CDC, your NIH, and other government entities would turn to them and say, do you have the scientific capability here to do the work? In this case, we do.

But we are moving to a different model where it will be on rate boards where we have budgets that you can lay into. But the current operating model of how we would do business is on a reimbursable basis. So someone has to come with the funding to say, can you do this? We are capable of doing this. We are working this out internally to turn on additional funding.

Mr. Crist. So who would be the one who would come to you with the money?

Secretary McCarthy. CDC, NIH, other entities within the U.S. Government.

Mr. Crist. Have you sought it out?

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Crist. How does it look?

Secretary McCarthy. I could probably tell you here in a couple days, sir.

Mr. Crist. Perfect. Thank you very much.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Cuellar.

Reduction or Elimination of Existing Programs

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.

Good seeing you all again.

Can I ask you a little bit on the Army's Night Court review that have led to reduction or elimination of 240 existing programs and ask you, I think in fiscal year 2020, you all proposed to eliminate or delay or cancel 186 programs, and Congress pretty much supported what you all did.

Fiscal year 2021, you are again proposing to reduce or eliminate an additional 80 programs, which will shift another $2.4 billion this year and $13.5 billion across the 5-year program.

Is this going to be an annual review that you all are going to be doing? Can we turn a little bit more. And again, I am one of those big believers in getting rid of any duplication, elimination of anything that has been done, so I appreciate this type of work, but give us a little bit more of your thought process on this.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir. The Army's balance sheet of $178 billion, if we get this budget through, is over half of it, north of 60 percent of it is people and operations and maintenance. So we are
fixed with the number of dollars we have to modernize the force because you have got almost 190,000 people deployed worldwide.

So readiness is our number one priority. We have to continue to grow the force because we have about a 1 to 1 dwell between boots on the ground and deployments and dwell time boots on the ground. So we need more people to meet global demand and not wear people out.

So when you look at the modernization effort, the research and development and acquisition dollars, we are fixed. We have to divest if we want to continue to modernize our formation. So we have made some very hard choices over the last 24 months in particular, and I think more of that will come in the future.

But to the points that we have had in the discussion today, it is going to get much harder. The divestiture of systems that have served the Nation very well for 40, 50 years are going to come to an end as long as we have weapon systems that go through the development process, that have the maturity. So some very difficult decisions are in front of us.

Mr. Cuellar. Is this your idea? How did these reviews come about?

Secretary McCarthy. Well, I think it is really the four of us, Secretary Esper, General Milley, General McConville, and I. We looked at just the realities we face. We had to meet national objectives. We had to have units that could deploy and be ready to go. But we wanted to modernize the force. We knew we had to do this.

So, you know, the four of us came together, took the blood oath, and we have taken this on. And that is why General McConville and I have maintained the same priorities, just putting greater emphasis on people, and we are going to pursue this for as long as we are in the seat.

WORK WITH HOSPITALS ON THE BORDER

Mr. Cuellar. Well, I have to congratulate you. Mr. Carter, this kind of reminds me of the John Sharp performance review that we went over the State government in Texas. And they did all of this, and it saved the State of Texas billions of dollars. So this kind of reminds me of what we did in Texas. I know you have spent a little bit of time in Texas also.

But I just have to say that I really appreciate this type of exercise that you all are doing.

Can I ask you one last question quickly? Your folks in San Antonio are going to start doing some work with hospitals on the border. We changed the language to allow them to do that in the NDAA. And I think sometime in June, I think some of your folks will be going down there to the border.

That works out for areas that don’t have trauma one, tier one, trauma one. That helps the community. But at the same time, it helps I have men and women to give them that type of training. So I highly encourage you that you continue doing that, not only for the border, but other parts of the country.

And I would ask you as you do that training that is beneficial not only for areas that don’t have—I think our area has about a tier three and not a tier one like in San Antonio—that if you have any surplus equipment or anything you can help some of those
communities that don’t have the resources, I ask you to look at that possibility.
But it is a win-win situation for communities that don’t have that type of capacity. And then your men and women, so when they go abroad, will have that training there. So I just want to say thank you for that.
Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir. We will look at that very closely. As we mentioned earlier, we are in the midst of a merger inside the Department with the Defense Health Agency, so we will have to see what the implications are. Whether or not we have the authorities depends upon the organization in question.
But this is great training, it is great opportunities to work with local communities, and those sorts of things we continue to pursue all over the country.
Mr. Cuellar. Well, thank you for bringing an innovative—and I am not talking only about this project, but I am talking about the—I will call it a performance review evaluation and getting rid of any duplication and unnecessary programs on that. Thank you, both of you.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mrs. Bustos.

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL ADVANCED MANUFACTURING CENTER

Mrs. Bustos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very much for being here. You know, Mr. Secretary, every time we have a chance to talk, we talk about the Rock Island Arsenal. We are very proud of the advanced manufacturing center that we have there. We really appreciate when you visited there along with me and Senator Durbin.
With that in mind, you released an advanced manufacturing policy, and so I want to ask if you can elaborate how you see our center of advance manufacturing, center of excellence, supporting your strategy moving forward.
Secretary McCarthy. This is a capability that we need to have from an expeditionary standpoint. So as much as having the technology to be able to produce parts is that they are going to have to help us figure out how to make it expeditionary in nature, so you can put these 3D printing machines in a ConEx and forward deploy it with a formation. Because that is where you will be able to quickly get a part produced, put it into a combat vehicle or a helicopter so they can get it back up, and keep those OR rates very high.
So this is a very strategic priority of ours. The challenge that we think we are going to face with that on the manufacturing, we are working hard with industry because this is a place where intellectual property with a part is something where we have general purpose rights on everything, but it is how we write this into contracts so that over time we can produce them.
So what we see the challenges ahead is going to take a lot of communication in particular, but this is something that we are going to have in all of our platforms in the future, along with predictive maintenance as well, so we can make those right calls before the part breaks while you are in the middle of an operation.
Mrs. Bustos. General.
General McConville. I absolutely agree, Congresswoman. This is transformational for how we do logistics in the field. Rather than carrying around thousands of parts, if we can make them.

Mrs. Bustos. Right.

General McConville. It keeps kids off the roads. They don't have to drive trucks. I mean, it saves money. We never quite get right which part we may need, so we have to carry them all, and it can take weeks to get them. So I think this is the future.

Mrs. Bustos. So how can the center help with establishing a database of spare parts?

General McConville. Well, I think the way it can help, and the Secretary mentioned that, is as we contract in the future, you can probably see this in the contract. We want to be able to manufacture so much of these parts.

It may not be all of them because we will still have a logistics chain, but we will have to get a little more finesse in how we can get the intellectual capital to do these type of things. Because that is how industry makes money. They make money on the logistics and the sustainment. That is going to be all part of the deal as we move into the future.

Secretary McCarthy. And with the older platforms, Congresswoman, we are going to have to get really college students who go to graduate engineering programs so that we can convert these old drawings into digital drawings. Because that is how you perfect the tensile strength, so when you reproduce it, it is within the percentage of being 100 percent accurate to the drawing that was written 30 or 40 years ago.

So we are going to have a lot of these platforms in the formation for a long time, so it is perfecting that. We have relationships with Northwestern University, with Wichita State and others around the country, and they are helping us, looking at these old drawings of these weapon systems, turning them into digital drawings so you can—a machine can produce the part in real-time.

Mrs. Bustos. So are you looking at the center that we have at the arsenal to help be the test bed for new concepts in advanced and additive manufacturing that can help fulfill the strategy?

Secretary McCarthy. Absolutely.

Mrs. Bustos. Okay. General, anything else to add?

General McConville. I just think it is really important transformational work. It is what we are going to be doing in the future. And that is going to be, like, a center of excellence, and we need to move in the future. We need to get in the information age. That is what it is all about.

Mrs. Bustos. Very good.

Mr. Secretary, we would love to have you back there. Come visit us again.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. Bustos. All right. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

ARMY FUTURES COMMAND

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, the Army Futures Command was created about 18 months ago, and each command is different. The Space Force was in last week and said that they aim to be agile.

I would note, after 18 months, there are 404 people connected with the Army Futures Command, and in your budget request for 2021, you ask for an additional 150 people. That is a 37 percent increase in personnel. Could you explain that increase?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, Army Futures Command is about—you are talking about just the headquarters element? Because there are 36,000 people in Army Futures Command. They have the lab networks. They have Futures and Concepts Division. They have cross-functional teams.

With respect to the, I believe, the 150——

Mr. Vislosky. I am having a hard time hearing you. I am sorry.

Secretary McCarthy. Sorry, sir. I am looking right into this. Can you hear me now?

Sir, the 100—you said 100 and how many again, I am sorry?

Mr. Vislosky. We have a request for 150 new FTEs for the Army Futures Command.

Secretary McCarthy. So Army Futures Command is about 36,000 people. It has the Futures and Concepts Division, combat development, combat systems, it has cross-functional teams.

And so you are referring directly to the headquarters element in Texas? Is that——

Mr. Vislosky. If I can back you up, you are asking for the headquarters.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes. I thought you said Futures Command was only 400 people. I am sorry.

Mr. Vislosky. For the headquarters. I am sorry. I will correct it.

My understanding is there are 404 people at the headquarters for Army Futures Command.

Secretary McCarthy. And we want it to be around 500.

Mr. Vislosky. You asked for an additional 150 people.

Secretary McCarthy. And we want it to be around 500 people. That was intent from its inception, sir.

Mr. Vislosky. Why do you need those people?

Secretary McCarthy. They are managing an organization of about 36,000 people. So it is the support that General Murray needs to run his command, sir.

Mr. Vislosky. Okay. At this point, the committee knows you want 150 more people. We have no justification as to what each of those individuals are going to be doing and why they are required to help manage 36,000 other people. So if you could supply that for the committee, I would appreciate it very much.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir.

END STRENGTH

Mr. Vislosky. On the good news front, the Army’s estimated end strength for this current year is 485,000. It would also appear that there then would be a shortfall of about $400 million to pay for that increase. I think it is terrific that recruiting is going well. Could you explain to the committee how you are going to meet that shortfall?
General McConville. Well, Chairman, the way that we plan to meet that shortfall is the way that recruiting works over the year. It won’t be for the entire year. We will meet end strength at the end of the year.

So it basically goes through cycles. It comes down, then it comes back up as we bring more people in. That is how we plan to meet the request.

Mr. Visclosky. So there will be savings on average to cover the 400. Is that what you are saying?

General McConville. No. What I am saying is as far as how we manage the end strength during the year, it varies during the year and tends to come down and then come up at the end as far as how do we manage——

Mr. Visclosky. So you will not have a shortfall of $400 million.

General McConville. I will have to check and take that for the record then.

AFGHAN SPECIAL MISSION WING

Mr. Visclosky. Okay. There was earlier conversation about the Block II upgrade for the Chinook. I would like to continue the conversation about the Chinook and plans for the Afghan Special Mission Wing. It is my understanding there are discussions about transferring older models of the Chinook to the Afghans Special Mission Wing. Is that true?

Secretary McCarthy. The specific mechanics of what type of platform that would get to the—you know, I would defer to the commander, but I think that they have looked at options of moving what would be the Block I variant to the Afghan Special, yes, that is correct.

Mr. Visclosky. My understanding is they would be older models of the Chinook that would be transferred.

Secretary McCarthy. They would be Block I, yes, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. If I could ask, what is the strategy if we are drawing down? I mean, why are we going to provide a helicopter that has never, my understanding, been provided to the Afghans before? Why are we going to give it to them now?

General McConville. I would defer that question to the commander in the field. But I mean, the aircraft is—the CH–47 Fox is a very good aircraft there. It is for the Special Mission Wing. I think it is the right aircraft. The CH–47 is a great aircraft. And that provides the capability that they think they need, and they are working through how they are going to purchase that and make that happen, and I think it is a good recommendation.

Mr. Visclosky. When you say they need, are you talking about our command or the Afghans?

General McConville. In order to give the Afghan Special Mission Wing the capability.

Mr. Visclosky. They would buy it from the Army.

General McConville. They would—there will be some type of purchase agreement. I will defer——

Secretary McCarthy. With foreign military financing or some relationship like that, yes, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. But the moneys would go to United States Army.
Secretary McCarthy. The platforms would go—well, you mean how would they cycle the funding through the Department and then ultimately provide them to the Afghans, sir? Is that what you are asking?

Mr. Visclosky. It is my understanding that if you transfer those assets, the Afghans would have money from somewhere to pay for that, but the money would be transferred back to the United States Army.

Secretary McCarthy. On the sale itself?

Mr. Visclosky. Yes.

Secretary McCarthy. It would presumably go through DSCA and then ultimately to the Afghan National Security Forces, sir. You are talking about the actual transfer, the transaction?

Mr. Visclosky. My understanding—

Ms. McCollum. They buy it; we take the money.

Mr. Visclosky. The Army would get the proceeds from the sale of these helicopters from the Army. Is that correct?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, the specifics to the transaction, I would get a technical expert to give you all of the specifics, sir.

Sorry, sir, can you hear me?

Mr. Visclosky. So as you testify here before us today, Mr. Secretary, you have no anticipation that there is going to be a transfer of old Chinooks to the Afghan forces?

Secretary McCarthy. That is the option we are looking at, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. You are looking at that option. So if you are looking at that option, it would also be your assumption, if that option is exercised, there would be a transfer of money.

Secretary McCarthy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. Okay. If there is that transfer of money and you are looking at that option, the conclusion of the option is the Army has more money.

Secretary McCarthy. If the transaction went that way, yes, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. They are short helicopters. They have got money, right?

Secretary McCarthy. Theoretically, yes, sir.

Mr. Visclosky. Okay. What is the Army’s plans as you are looking at the option? What would be the Army’s option as to what they are going to do with that money?

Secretary McCarthy. Sir, I would have to get back to you with specifics.

Mr. Visclosky. I would appreciate it if you would, Mr. Secretary. I might also just ask that my impression, and I stand to be corrected here today, that the Afghans have had a very difficult time for 19 years maintaining any aircraft, the most recent ones, the helicopters they have. They have not dealt with the Chinooks. And, General, I would absolutely agree that they are terrific aircraft.

What assurance after 19 years of failure in our drawdown that they are going to be able to do this? And are we going to end up having to pay someone else to stay in Afghanistan and maintain these if that option is exercised? Have people thought about who is going to maintain these as part of that option?

Secretary McCarthy. That would be part of what we would come back with you on, sir, yes.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Calvert.
Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think what they are trying to do is take money out of one pocket and put it in the other pocket, because the Afghans don't have the money to buy the helicopters in the first place, I suspect. But we will get into that later.

You know, I think I have told you the story, my favorite procurement story of all time was Kelly Johnson, who was a renowned aircraft designer at the Skunk Works, you know. At the beginning of World War II, we were losing, and he went to a bar in El Segundo with a couple engineers, and with cocktail napkins he laid out the P–38. Nine months later it came across the assembly line.

They asked him at the end of his life how come you did it that quickly? He said, because we were going to lose the war.

And today we are having a discussion about various systems that we can't seem to get to for years, including the hypersonics, which is obvious. But, obviously, the replacement for the Bradley isn't all that technical, it seems to me, and these delays and delays and delays is remarkable to me.

And now I get a memo the other day that Secretary Esper, in his former role as Secretary of the Army, approved a waiver for the use of a compound called HNS–2, an organic compound, from a prohibited source. That source was a Chinese military company. Apparently, the Army didn't realize that the manufacturers of our Abrams active protection system used a compound that nobody else could provide. Nobody else could provide it.

The waiver notification indicated that the manufacturers are working on qualifying two nonprohibited sources, but that would take 18 to 24 months.

So I thought it was kind of the ultimate irony that Kelly Johnson designed the P–38 aircraft in 9 months—I mean, not designed it, it was coming across the assembly line in 9 months—and we can't get a waiver to take away a critical resource for the Chinese military that provides protection for the Abrams tank. We have got a problem, and we have got to fix this problem in our procurement process.

This gets to my comment, is program managers. I don't know who the program manager is on the Abram modernization program or the program manager for the Bradley replacement or the program manager—I know the program manager for the hypersonic. That would be Mike Griffin. Mike is on that full time, I think. At least that is what he tells me.

Do we have program management on this, or are we changing these people out too often? That is the question I have got.

Secretary MCCARTHY. With respect to the program manager for Abrams, we have had—we have a PEO, a two-star general that falls under him, Jeff Cummings. I think we are looking at about 24, 36 months on station for these program managers.

Mr. CALVERT: How come it takes 18 to 24 months to get a signoff to take away ordering this prohibited—this material from the Chinese? I mean, we shouldn't be doing it in the first place, but you think they could—somebody could go upstairs and knock this thing out right away.
Secretary McCarthy. Yes. It is entirely too long, very bureaucratic, going through different entities within the Department of Defense and other government agencies.

Mr. Calvert. Don't you think it is a little bit ironic that we are buying this from the Chinese military? I mean, that is—whooa.

But anyway, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

**MATERIALS IN EXTREME DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS PROGRAM**

Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to talk to you about the Materials in Extreme Dynamic Environments program.

General McConville, today, about the Materials in Extreme Dynamic, it is called MEDE, I believe it is, program led by the Army Research Lab and Johns Hopkins University at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Through this program, Army scientists and engineers partner with industry and academia to test and develop advanced body armor ceramic blends and innovative manufacturing techniques. This research has already paid dividends, resulting in a significant 16 percent reduction in the way that body armor used in the Army's next generation Personal Protective Equipment system.

While 16 percent doesn't sound like a lot, I am told when you are jumping out of a C–130 it makes a hell of a difference.

In my opinion, this is program is an example of a successful Army research partnership and one that directly affects our frontline troops on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the MEDE program is in the last year of funding. Are there plans to extend this program into the future? And as we work to modernize our Army, how important are Army research programs like MEDE to the advancement of new armor materials for our soldiers and equipment?

General McConville. Yes, Congressman. As you said, this is some incredible work that was done. It is cutting edge technology as far as what it has done for body armor.

As I understand, this has reached the end of a 10-year contract, and we will come back to you with some more details. But I believe they are going through the process of doing another contract. I am not sure exactly where the details are on that.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. I yield back.

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Womack.

**TRAINING GROUND AT CAMP BUCKNER**

Mr. Womack. Thank you, from a different vantage point.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Look where you are sitting?

Mr. Womack. I kind of like this seat. Just kidding.

Secretary McCarthy, I know you would think I would be a remiss if I didn't throw a West Point question into our discussion today given the fact that everybody that sits at this dais has young men and women that they have nominated and ultimately had appointments to the U.S. Military Academy.

And now, having the benefit of serving on that board since 2017, and now as chair for the fourth straight year, I just want to put in a plug for the proactive nature in which our West Point leadership is approaching the modernization of the post.

As you know, that has got some age on it, and it has some stressors, notably Camp Buckner, where a lot of very important
and critical training takes place. We have done a very good job with and still doing a good job with the Barracks Improvement Program, the beautiful Davis Barracks, the Academic Improvement Program.

So down the road, how are we going to address and is it going to be the intention of our Army to pay some attention to the training ground out of Camp Buckner and Camp Natural Bridge?

Secretary McCarthy. Congressman, we have put the initial request into this budget for the refit of the Buckner site. We put the request in this year on Buckner and we are starting the process. But that is something that is way overdue.

Mr. Womack. Yeah. General McConville, you have obviously trained there. Hasn’t changed much since you were there, Camp Buckner, so you probably have at least a little bit of parochial interest in that training ground, do you not?

General McConville. I certainly think that it needs to be replaced, and we have had that discussion. I have talked to the superintendent. We also support the engineering facility. That also needs to get done. So those are out there, and those are—we want those in the program.

I know with Buckner, we have talked about that. That is in the future. I just want to give you exactly where that sits.

BATTALION COMMANDER ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

Mr. Womack. Sure. But you know General Williams would drop me for pushups if I didn’t throw that subject out on the table.

One other question. This is for General McConville.

Your work as a G1 was noteworthy, and I really appreciate and admire the strategy behind the talent management piece of what we are trying to do with people. I personally think it is long overdue, but particularly in the area of the Battalion Commander Assessment Program. And I want to give you a chance here for the committee to articulate the need for a process that was conducted in January and February that was designed to better identify those officers who should be commanding at the battalion level.

And a follow-up question to that is, do you sense, given what you have been through in January and February, that we could see this thing also applied to the brigade command selection process, even the sergeants major process? So just a few random thoughts on it.

General McConville. Yes, Congressman. And we took an assessment, and we started at the battalion command level, and we believe—I personally believe the battalion command is the most consequential command position in the United States Army because they deal with our new soldiers, new officers. And based on that experience, a lot of soldiers and officers decide whether they are going to stay in the Army or get out of the Army.

They are also our future leaders. We pick 435 battalion commanders. We pick about 450 colonels. It is not the one to one. But that is where our future leaders are going to come from.

And we took a look at the way we are assessing these very important leaders, and we are basically looking at their evaluation reports for about 2.5 minutes during the board, and we decided that we should give them some more time. So we set up a 5-day assess-
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ment that looks at a lot of knowledge, skills, and attributes that we think they should have, and we got some good results.

And we are going to look at doing the same thing both for command sergeant majors and brigade commanders. One size doesn’t fit all. But these assessments, I think, are extremely important.

Mr. WOMACK. Thank you for your work in this particular regard because I agree. I think it is one of the threshold—probably the threshold command that has as much of an impact on the success of our Army as about anything.

And in order to get a rise out of Dutch, I am going to end by saying beat Navy.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The gentleman from Maryland?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Nope. I wasn’t listening.

Mr. WOMACK. That, I know. I said——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What did you say?

Mr. WOMACK. I said beat Navy.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, you know, I am Army Caucus. I don’t watch Army-Navy games.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT ACCOUNT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, there was a transfer of money from the National Guard and Reserve equipment account totaling about $1.3 billion. We won’t get into the details, except for the Army Reserve $205 million were involved, and for the Army National Guard there was $395 million involved. That is a loss of $600 million for those accounts.

Do you have any plans or thoughts as to how you will proceed in 2020 given that loss of $600 million?

Secretary MCCARTHY. Sir, we are going to have to look back and reevaluate how we are going to be able to adjust. But those were program funds that we did not program for, so we will have to go back and look at how we could adjust to that.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would acknowledge to you it is a congressional add, and we do it annually. Was there any anticipation by the Army that we wouldn’t do it again? I mean, the money was there.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

GRAY EAGLES

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually will be brief.

So the Gray Eagle, was it MQ–1C, which is an enduring component, frankly, of future force structure of the Army, and then I noticed that there was a report commissioned by the Army that recommended procurement of 14 aircraft per year as a minimum just to sustain the industrial base.

And yet my understanding is the Army now has, in essence, zeroed out that airplane, that drone, whatever you want to call it, for fiscal year 2021.

So again, if the report says that just to—forget about anything else—just to keep the industrial base alive it requires 14 aircraft, how do we then zero it out overnight?

General McCONVILLE. I think—and we have got to—I will get you the exact details, but the way I understand it is we met our
acquisition objectives. We bought all the Gray Eagles that we required to fill our organizations, and now we are starting to look at what is the future of our unmanned aerial systems that manufacturing and others can compete for so we keep the base going.

But as we talked, in the future—first of all, these aircraft have done great things for us in the environment we are in. But we are moving to great power competition where the airspace will be contested, so that is going to drive the type of aircraft that we are going to need in the future.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No. I get that, General. I am just concerned that we don’t destroy the industrial, because again, when that report talks about 14 aircraft per year minimum to sustain the industrial base, I think that is something that we have to also look at. So I would just be interested to kind of follow up on how that is going to look, how do we make sure that we don’t jeopardize the possibility that some of those that are providing these amazing platforms, that we don’t jeopardize them. So I would like to follow up with you.

General MCCONVILLE. Sure.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The next question I would have is on the dynamic of force employment. The Army has requested 500——

General MCCONVILLE. 588, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY [continuing]. $588 million for the force. And the question I have is about the justification that has been submitted. I would, again, in all fairness, indicate that we do have four pieces of paper from the Department of the Army justifying $588 million. I would point out that for $458 million we have one piece of paper with three sentences. The three sentences are repeated on each of the other three sheets.

In an effort to find out more detail, our committee has requested information about these forces, how they will be deployed, how long the deployments will be, how large of the contingencies, and other details, recognizing that you want some flexibility for this force, and to date, we have received no information.

So you might, if you could, Mr. Secretary, explain to me why the details have been lacking and why your office has not responded to our request for information.

Secretary MCCARTHY. Sir, we will get the G3 up here to explain.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. When will you do that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MCCARTHY. As soon as possible, sir. As soon as you are ready we will bring them up here. That is unexcusable. We should get you the information.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay.

Ms. McCollum.

MERGER OF THE HEALTHCARE PROGRAM

Ms. McCollum. I want to go back to our discussion earlier about the merger of the healthcare programs. 171 doctors on average graduate every year from our military schools. We graduate highly proficient nurses, master’s, dentists. And of the 171 doctors that
graduate, we are still short in the military 15 to 18 percent, and that is with the 7-year enlistment.

That is a great opportunity to get your medical school paid for. Many of us in this room probably don’t even know it, but our doctors—one of my doctors, my gynecologist, was an Army doctor. That is how a poor kid from South St. Paul was able to go to school.

We have a shortage of physicians and doctors in this country. And so, Mr. Chair, I think we need to work with the staff to really figure out if we know where this is heading, because if this isn’t done right, we are heading to compound a physician, nurse, and possibly even a dental shortage in this country, not only for ourselves, but for our military men and women.

And you don’t know when you are going to get called in to fight the battle. And these doctors and nurses and techs and radiologists and everybody else that comes with the finest in the world, do some of the most advanced healthcare in the world, they are working with military families and soldiers, airmen, and marines, and their families, keeping their skills fresh and learning all the time to be better healthcare professionals.

Ms. McCollum. And I am very concerned that we are not thinking this out thoughtfully and about not only what we are doing to the research side, but the healthcare delivery side. And if we don’t get this right, it will mean less people either, you know, re-upping to stay in the military service part of it, the military core, or families walking with their feet if there is a shortage of pediatricians and gynecologists, which are the two that I have seen that they really want to scale down.

And what that signals to women, that we are trying to keep and retain and move through rank and do the important jobs in the military, is we don’t care about your healthcare. Now, I know that is not what you gentlemen are about, but that is what I am becoming very, very concerned about.

So, Mr. Chair, with your permission, you know, I am ready to slow this down and do a deep dive and do some research because I think this has repercussions that we don’t even realize, not only in the military healthcare but in civilian healthcare, and I am very concerned about it.

I am not saying we can’t do it, but all the articles I am reading, everybody is like nobody has proved that this isn’t going to cause a shortage.

And so that—Mr. Chair, we are going to have to—you know, based on the previous hearing—and you were at a very important meeting while that was taking place. I have become more alarmed over the last week about—that we are rushing into this.

And so I appreciate what Secretary McCarthy said about him having concerns, but he is not asking for a delay, Mr. Chair. I might be looking to work with you to talk about how we make sure all our ducks are in a row before we do this because it could have severe consequences to our healthcare.

General McConville. Can I just stress the importance of the military medical education? Just like you said, all the doctors that graduate with military education, that is how we get folks to serve in the Army, and we really appreciate that.
Ms. McCollum. We can be short people when we need them the most.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Visclosky. We are close to the end.

Mr. Secretary, General, a number of questions have been left for the record, and additional information is to be supplied. We would expect that that would be done in detail and promptly. Again, we would reiterate the request of the chair for some detail about those additional 150 people for the headquarters at Futures Command.

Additionally, I just would make the observation that I felt all of the answers for the Chinook questions were lacking.

And I would close on childcare. The Department of the Army left this brochure for us. You know, the five initiatives that are highlighted in your brochure—initiatives—is childcare, which you propose cutting by over $36 million. So I wouldn’t want to characterize what I think of that, but I will simply say this hearing is adjourned.

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

WITNESS

GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN VISCLOSKY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The committee will come to order. This morning the subcommittee will hold a hearing on the posture of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM.

Before we start, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Calvert for a motion.

Mr. CALVERT. I move those portions of the hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive session because of the classification of the material to be discussed.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Calvert.

I would like to remind members that any material placed in front of you marked “classified” should be left at your chair at the conclusion of the hearing.

General, before I begin, I do understand that you lost two Marines in Iraq on Sunday. And all of us obviously send our condolences to their family and understand we all have responsibility we do everything we can to make sure people are as safe as they can be.

Today we will hear and receive testimony from our witness, Central Command General Kenneth McKenzie. General, we do welcome you to your first hearing before the subcommittee.

Less than 2 weeks ago, the United States signed a peace agreement with the Taliban. The U.S. has agreed to withdraw all U.S. and coalition forces within 14 months in exchange for the Taliban cutting ties with Al Qaeda. While the Afghan Government is not a party to this agreement. talks between the government and the Taliban are imminent, as I understand it. According to the administration, these intra-Afghan negotiations will lead to a ceasefire and the prospect for peace after two decades of war.

Administration officials also argue that protections for Afghan women are likely to continue because the Afghan of today is different from that of two decades ago, and the Taliban wants support from the international community. I believe that our Nation’s military operations in Afghanistan should wind down. Unfortunately, I remain deeply skeptical that this agreement will enable the United States to depart Afghanistan in a responsible fashion.

The agreement does not contain a ceasefire. It does not contain verifiable metrics to ensure the Taliban is holding up their end of the bargain. It does not include serious timeline or end date for the intra-Afghan talks, and the agreement makes no mention of democ-
racy nor includes any protections for human rights or women's rights. Moreover, it is hard to understand how we can continue our counterterrorism mission or train and equip Afghan forces if we pull out all of our forces within 14 months.

The administration has recognized some of these shortcomings, and their response has been to state that our withdrawal is conditions based. Unfortunately, this is not reassuring since there appears to be no common understanding of what those conditions are or what is or not acceptable under the agreement.

Meanwhile, since the agreement was signed, the Taliban has resumed attacks against the Afghan Security Forces, and the United States has responded with air strikes. It is in this environment of uncertainty that the committee must review the administration's budget request, which is now dated—through no fault of your own, General.

General, we do need your best assessment of the situation as it is today. With respect to plans for U.S. troop withdrawals, the committee needs to understand which bases are closing, which of our units are coming out and when. We need to know the cost attributable to the drawdown and where the money will come from. This is made more problematic since the administration has used nearly all of the transfer authority to build a wall.

With respect to the billions of funding requested to support the Afghan Security Forces, we also need to understand what is absolutely necessary and what can wait. After nearly two decades, I do not believe now is the time to make major investments or to start new programs. Instead, we should be focusing on making sure that what we have already provided is being used and maintained properly.

General, I hope we can get your best advice. I have a lengthy opening statement. I will enter the rest of it into the record and would now recognize Mr. Calvert.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky.

And welcome, General McKenzie, to your first appearance before this subcommittee. We are committed to helping ensure the readiness and capability of your command and supporting our men and women in uniform with the tools they need to accomplish their mission. From political uprisings to ongoing civil wars and an expanding Russia and Chinese footprint in the region, there is no shortage of issues to discuss with you today.

The big picture context involves implementation of the National Defense Strategy and what our realignment of global military resources to better counter China and Russia means for CENTCOM and our other combatant commands.

Iranian aggression and attacks against Americans and our partners in the region have helped drive our current force posture. Perhaps not all my colleagues would agree, but in my view, the strike on General Soleimani was appropriate and helped strengthen deterrence. However, further Iranian miscalculation cannot be ruled out.
I also, as a side note, would be interested in hearing about the Iranian outbreak of the COVID–19 and how that is affecting their leadership chains of command.

One spillover of the strike on Soleimani has been its impact on our relationship with Iraq and on the counter-ISIS campaign. I hope you will be able to manage these difficulties in a way that supports Iraqi sovereignty and against Iranian interference and prevents an ISIS resurgence.

In addition to a host of other pressing issues, there is, of course, the future of U.S. and coalition efforts against terrorist threats in Afghanistan and prospects of a durable political settlement with the Taliban.

We are eager for your assessment of the situation on the ground, the conditionality and verification relating to a proposed U.S. and NATO drawdown and its impact on Afghan security. I want to conclude by thanking you once again for your service and look forward to your testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert.

General, if you want to proceed, your entire statement will be entered into the record.

[The written statement of General McKenzie follows:]
POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR.,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
11 MARCH 2020
Introduction

When United States Central Command (CENTCOM) formed in the 1980s, the U.S. military trained and equipped to fight high-end warfare against the Soviet Union under conditions of limited communications and the routine employment of nuclear weapons. Times changed; the wall fell. The U.S. welcomed change in Russia while retooling heavy conventional forces to fight an 18-year protracted global counterterror campaign. Simultaneously the Islamic Republic of Iran, emerging from its 1979 revolution, embarked on a deliberate and extended campaign of terror and violence across the Middle East, directly engaging or sponsoring partners in a 40-year-long struggle against the U.S. and our allies.

Today the rise, fall, and rise again of Russia; the continuing asymmetric campaign of violence and coercion by Iran; and the emergence of China as our pre-eminent economic and military power competitor signal that while the nature of war is unchanging, the character of war has evolved. CENTCOM acknowledges our nation does not have the luxury of a single strategic focus. The Joint Force must posture globally with the ability to balance multiple priorities and tasks, from combat with peer competitors to expeditionary counterterrorism operations, understanding that the nation’s top defense priority must relentlessly focus on adversarial great powers that possess the power and means to destroy our country.

While Iran lacks the capability to destroy us, its regime’s hatred of the U.S and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber reach, and depth and breadth of its terror networks clearly position it as a priority, although clearly and inarguably not the main one. The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the U.S. to work with partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon and neutralize Iranian malign activity. While this is only one aspect of
the NDS, it is directive for the Department of Defense and a key task for both CENTCOM and EUCOM.

The current U.S. policy of maximum pressure against Iran is supported by the deterrence provided by our U.S. force presence, which helps to stabilize the region and acts as a counterbalance against the Iranian regime’s overt and covert military responses. The ramifications of this policy have led to direct and indirect Iranian military threats and actions against U.S. interests in the region, and similar threats to U.S. national security interests globally. Iran’s lack of effective economic or diplomatic levers to counter the U.S. maximum pressure campaign has caused it to resort to pursuing overt and covert military options against the U.S. and our partners. The Iranian regime’s strategy seeks to undermine international and regional support for U.S. policies with attacks and threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners and allies.

CENTCOM plans and executes missions across its area of responsibility (AOR), but embraces a global planning perspective supporting national objectives and the execution of global military campaigns. Adjustments in U.S. global force posture to support the NDS compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR. We recognize significant future conflicts will be trans-regional, cutting across multiple global combatant commands, and involving multiple domains. The ongoing global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) provides a stark example of this threat.

As CENTCOM approaches its missions, acknowledging priorities outlined in the NDS, we also remain keenly aware that our adversaries in the region retain a willingness to contest our actions. Iran’s regime is not a peer competitor to the U.S., but it does possess the ability to
negatively affect global commerce, trade, and the world’s energy supply. These malign actions, while not posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, significantly threaten our national interests abroad, those of our allies and partners, and negatively affects the U.S. military’s long-term posture as we react to immediate threats. During my year in command, I have observed multiple Congressional engagements to the CENTCOM AOR. Your oversight, partnership and advocacy, based on first-hand knowledge, lays the foundation for enduring success.

**CENTCOM Priorities**

**Deterring Iran.** The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime’s quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threats to the United States and its regional partners have been consistent elements of its policy for decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing activities in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is CENTCOM’s top priority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran decides to be a responsible member of the international community, CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain military deterrence with Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic and diplomatic maximum pressure campaign.

Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked U.S. interests dozens of times and conducted scores of unmanned aerial system (UAS) reconnaissance flights near U.S. and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases. The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks by Houthi forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to attack Israel, supported the Assad regime’s brutal conflict against its own people, and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS attack in September against Saudi oil facilities that
destabilized international energy markets. In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile attack, in response to the U.S. killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold compared to previous “grey-zone” attacks and may set a lower bar for future actions by the regime. While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence exists indicating the Iranian regime’s desire to continue malign operations that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations, and threaten freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies, and the global economy.

CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to apply diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force must be postured to deter Iran from using the military element of power to counter our actions. While our steady-state posture does not require offensive forces in theater to achieve overmatch or unintentionally provoke Iran’s regime, our presence sends a clear and unambiguous signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend partners and U.S. national interests. This exemplifies the concept of deterrence.

Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent. Deterrence can be contested – Iran’s regime retains the ability to interfere with our efforts to deter. Historically, Iran has never doubted the U.S. capability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing on deniable, hard to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata’ib Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly demonstrated U.S. will. Our posture – the bases, forces, and activities that we undertake – maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability.
Reduction of U.S. forces in the AOR combined with a perception of U.S. disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the U.S. was no longer committed to defending our national interests in the region. That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that crested in January 2020. In order to maintain the contested deterrence our recent military actions have re-established, Iran’s regime must continue to see the U.S. has enough forward-deployed forces for a credible military capability, that we are willing to employ that capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction, and any decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome.

Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to maintain. CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously, scattered across the breadth and depth of the region, all in areas suffused with Iranian-backed forces continuing their decades-long struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and maintaining deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of forces required to fight in full-scale conflict; the failure of deterrence. CENTCOM’s objective is therefore to posture forces with operational depth in the region to achieve a sustained state of deterrence against Iran’s regime without undue provocation, and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats while the U.S. maximum pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of deterrence is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). While presence can fluctuate based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR is necessary to identify subtle changes that shape posture and ensure we align our presence appropriately.

Negotiated Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan. All wars must have a political end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan represents the best option for bringing the 18-year-long fight in Afghanistan to a favorable
conclusion, while meeting long-term U.S. security requirements. CENTCOM efforts support the U.S. South Asia Strategy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our overriding national interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a counterterrorism platform under any of the multiple political eventualities that may take shape. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan continues to examine efficiencies in force structure to reduce our military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterterrorism pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the future. We also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces develop and refine their force generation processes for campaign sustainability. Without continued pressure, groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) will regain the ability to mount or sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Funding, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, Coalition Support Fund, and others have remained paramount during this transition.

Maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq. Similar to Afghanistan, most of the U.S. intelligence community predicts that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the U.S. to neutralize it without a capable, partnered ground force. Syria remains a dynamic situation with multiple parties and agendas involved. The Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are seeing this play out in northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian, and Iranian campaign of violence has escalated since
December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons, innumerable people injured or killed, with many more in critical need of assistance, and dangerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian regime. We likewise see the Assad regime continuing its use of chemical weapons in blatant violation of its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention – deterring this use in the future remains a CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, U.S. and Coalition forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve assist with ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding energy sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation. Moving forward, we must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and our D-ISJS partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while maintaining deconfliction with Russia, which, along with the Assad regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission in various ways.

Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing networks; assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security forces; and extending its influence in rural areas throughout eastern Syria and Iraq.

Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is key human and geographic terrain. We remain in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq (GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS. Hindering our ability to work with the ISF toward this objective are rogue elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces more beholden to Iran’s regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but to undermine existing security and threaten U.S. and Coalition forces partnered with the GoI. Given ISIS’ demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus from the D-ISJS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not mean...
the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external assistance.

Counteracting the UAS Threat. In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air dominance across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to counter the growing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive and easy to proliferate, UASs provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and partner facilities, providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale, critical infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while affording deniability and a disproportionately high return on investment.

CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and enable U.S. forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed by UASs, coupled with our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to counter them is the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM AOR since the rise of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Just as the IED threat galvanized operational, industrial and scientific communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching a juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat. Your support and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our success in the Great Power Competition.

Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees. The manipulation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to gain a political, military, or economic advantage is not historically uncommon. However, in vast swaths of Syria and Iraq the systematic indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations who are hostages to the receipt
of ISIS ideology is an alarming development with potentially generational implications.

There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for hard-core ISIS believers. This radicalized population currently numbers in the thousands and preys on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and refugee populations already highly susceptible to extremist indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps, the more likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military solution for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for stability and security necessary for these populations to return to their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees presents a challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term stabilization can take root.

Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF detention facilities in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist fighters (FTFs). While CENTCOM and our coalition partners are working to address and mitigate security challenges at the facilities, this serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solution. The United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure. Ultimately, the best way to alleviate this problem is to reduce the numbers of detainees through repatriation. The ISIS detainee and IDP populations represent more than 60 nations. While some countries have made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution requires a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This problem will not go away by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by the international community working together to accept its shared responsibilities.

As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-radicalization and repatriation.
of FTFs. They are international problems requiring international solutions. The longer these conditions persist; the IDP population becomes more and more ensconced in ISIS philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists. Action now by the international community is imperative to protect our homeland and our allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with the potential to spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction of the physical caliphate we and our allies and partners have worked so hard to accomplish. Your support to increase Special Immigrant Visas in Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much appreciated by me, our troops, and our partners.

**Basing and Posture in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)**

Fragile security environments across the AOR reflect a variety of contributing factors, including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, economic uncertainty, weak or corrupt governance, and exploitation by VEOs which have clearly indicated their desire and intent to attack the homeland, U.S. interests abroad, and the interests of our partners and allies. At the same time, the AOR is growing increasingly crowded with external nation-states, such as a resurgent Russia and expansionist China, pursuing their own interests and attempting to shift historical alliances. These dynamics necessitate that CENTCOM explore options with regional partners to posture itself in depth across our AOR to create efficiencies, and increase strategic depth, resiliency and operational agility. With the enactment of the FY20 NDAA, Section 1263, I look forward to the posture review and reporting back to Congress with the findings.

Over the past year, CENTCOM has re-evaluated its posture, taking action to close, consolidate, or in some cases expand some of its air, land, and sea bases; as well as access, basing, and overflight rights with our partners. Some of these actions represent immediate, near-
term adjustments for survivability and to improve our deterrence capabilities – like the buildup
of Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Other decisions are driven by long-
term efforts to achieve cost savings, and increase interoperability or partner burden sharing – like
the establishment of CENTCOM Forward-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This forward deployed
element assesses requirements and integrates U.S. forces into an international collective defense
effort.

The Western Sustainment Network is a newly-created logistics system extending from the
Red Sea and Mediterranean Ports to the Arabian Gulf, designed to mitigate the potential impact
of chokepoint closures at the Bab Al Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. To build sustainment depth
over the last year, CENTCOM has increased deployment and redeployment traffic across the
Arabian Peninsula, shipped ammunition to Kuwait from the Red Sea, negotiated movement of
material and supplies across borders affected by the Gulf Rift, and developed the port of Duqm
in Oman. Developing this operational depth enhances protection of critical infrastructure while
providing reduced cost options for deployment and obviating the need to transit potentially
contested maritime chokepoints. This network increases our agility, enables Dynamic Force
Employment, and reduces deployment timelines in the event of a contingency, thereby reducing
risk and providing additional strategic options. Taken together, the result is a tailored, responsive
basing network, connected by dependable lines of communication with AOR-wide reach,
supported by prepositioned equipment and supplies to facilitate the rapid movement and
employment, of U.S., allied, and partner forces.

Armed with the knowledge that resources are at a premium, and a pragmatic appreciation
that each country is working through its own challenges with economic and social reforms,
CENTCOM supports initiatives that approach defense from a cooperative perspective. This is the

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
only practical way to approach the problem. The reality on the ground is that every partner country cannot afford to have their own Patriot battalion, nor should they; just like every U.S. combatant commander cannot retain their own heel-to-toe carrier strike group.

The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which achieved initial operating capability in November 2019 and full operating capability in January 2020, provides an instructive example of this kind of regional cooperative effort. Participating nations include the U.S., U.K., Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, working together to support freedom of navigation and maritime domain awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and assist in attribution of malign actions in these vital waters. The vessels and aircraft of IMSC member nations provide vigilance, surveillance, and assurance, supporting the free flow of commerce through the critical choke points of the region.

In the air domain, CENTCOM operates in an environment where our partners possess and operate the majority of air and ballistic missile defense capabilities in the theater. This compels CENTCOM to lead efforts to establish a framework to coalesce and optimize each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nation’s individual ballistic missile defense capabilities into a regional, integrated air and missile defense construct to defend against the shared threat posed by Iran and the proxies it controls. Our GCC partners contribute to interoperability through purchase and use of Patriot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and the development of the GCC Ballistic Missile Early Warning System – a collective system of systems across the Arabian Peninsula designed to establish an effective early warning and supporting architecture to benefit all GCC Partners. The Link-16 system provides a combined, integrated air picture through a shared network of sensors and systems across the AOR to receive, populate, and share information among partners. CENTCOM builds confidence and proficiency among our partners.
through combined, distributive IAMD exercises that leverage virtual and simulated technologies to bridge the geographic distances across the region.

As we work with our partners along collaborative lines of effort to safeguard our mutual interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger together, and our strategic strength has never rested on the volume of materiel we bring to the fight, but the partnerships and whole-of-government efforts no other country in the world can match. Key to building and maintaining these partnerships in the region is the enduring authorization, funding, and combined employment of the Department of State’s (State) security assistance (SA) and DoD security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) programs. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the Department of State’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, with our partners’ capabilities, interoperability, and burden sharing. Foreign Military Sales in CENTCOM totaled nearly $23 billion in 2019, accounting for more than 42 percent of all FMS globally. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) cultivates relationships and improves interoperability with six nations across the CENTCOM AOR currently, with more considering entry.

CENTCOM supports the execution of over $2 billion annually in SA funds, consisting of $1.7 billion in Department of State Foreign Military Financing to obtain articles, services, or training; $265 million in Department of Defense Section 333 funds authorizing the U.S. to help partner nations build capacity; $17 million in Department of State International Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve interoperability and establish relationships with future leaders; $4 million for the Counter Threat and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program; and $3.6 million for the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). Taken together, these State and DoD programs help maintain U.S. influence, improve our posture and interoperability with partners, and create
opportunities to advance U.S. objectives. The State IMET, and DoD WIF and SPP programs in particular often yield a far greater return on investment compared to the resources allocated against them. On average, over 5,500 students receive U.S. military education and training through our SA and SC programs annually.

Conclusion

The U.S. must posture itself globally to contend with an array of security challenges detailed in the NDS. While Iran represents but one of those national security challenges, deterring the Iranian regime is the primary security challenge for CENTCOM and critical for ensuring the Department can focus on near peer competition rather than an expansion of conflict in the Middle East. The rapid escalation from grey-zone conflict to open, kinetic strikes between the U.S. and Iran in January of this year underscores the immediacy of this threat, and the need for vigilance paired with the proper capabilities on hand necessary to deter the Iranian regime.

Readiness and capabilities allocated toward this mission are supportive of the NDS not only with regard to Iran, but also in the context of supporting great power competition as it manifests itself in the Middle East. As the U.S. reorients itself globally, our leadership, presence, and demonstration of commitment to our allies and partners in the region are crucial, now more than ever. We have an opportunity at this moment in history to establish the foundations of collective, effective collaborative security apparatuses throughout the region with the U.S. serving not as the core member, but a contributing member in a burden-sharing construct.

For more than 37 years, the men and women of CENTCOM – about 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong today – have devoted themselves to securing U.S. national interests in the Middle East that help protect the homeland. They operate in real time, against real
enemies. Across 18 years of extended combat operations, the missions they have executed yielded tangible results. The steadfastness and sacrifice of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, Civilians – and their respective families – is both humbling and inspirational. Public support for our mission, troops, and families is precious and not taken for granted. Your communication with your constituents is key in maintaining public support that serves as the bedrock and fosters morale, enabling the mission going forward.

As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its ongoing missions, we appreciate the efforts of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and thank the members of Congress and their staffs, without whose consistent and timely support we would be unable to accomplish our mission.
[Clerk's Note.—The complete hearing transcript could not be printed due to the classification of the material discussed.]
Mr. Visclosky. The subcommittee will come to order. This afternoon, the subcommittee will hold a hearing on the posture of U.S. Africa Commander, AFRICOM.

Before we get started, I would like to recognize Mr. Calvert for a motion.

Mr. Calvert. I move that those portions of the hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive session because of the classification of the material to be discussed.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Calvert. So ordered. I would remind members that any material placed in front of you marked classified should be left at your chair at the conclusion of the hearing.

Today, we will receive testimony from our witness, AFRICOM Commander Stephen Townsend.

General, we welcome you to your first hearing before the subcommittee. This hearing takes place at an important time for U.S. foreign policy and our military presence around the world. As those in the room are aware, the 2018 and National Defense Strategy emphasizes competition between great powers as a greater long-term challenge to U.S. national security than the threat of terrorism.

Over the past two decades, China has deepened its reach in Africa, financing large infrastructure projects, opening up a base in Africa, and deploying peacekeepers and spreading its culture and language by funding Confucius Institutes across the continent. Further, as you will note in your testimony, Russia has aggressively increased its activity in Africa and is the continent’s top arms dealer. Not only does AFRICOM contend with the growing presence of China and Russia, but also, as our intelligence officials point out, the threat to our national security from terrorism and violent extremism continues to be substantial.

Despite these troubling data points, the Defense Secretary is weighing proposals for a major reduction in American forces from West Africa as one phase of reviewing global deployments that could reschedule thousands of troops around the world. I assume AFRICOM has been making the case that its bases and missions run from them are integral to U.S. interests. We would appreciate hearing these details today.
As I have said in our COCOM hearings, all of this brings me to our oversight responsibilities. First, as long as we have troops in the region in harm’s way, we should make sure they receive the best training and equipment and are not left exposed.

Second, we need to make sure that the funds we appropriate to carry out programs in the region are executed efficiently and effectively.

And finally, if the administration is going to change our posture in the region, we need to look at the tradeoffs and how such changes would affect our national security and, very important to us, the fiscal year 2021 budget. In that context, I hope we can discuss several of these issues today.

But, General, before we turn to your testimony, I would turn to Mr. Calvert, our ranking member, for any statement he would have.

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. CALVERT

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, General Townsend, for your first appearance before the subcommittee. The macro level backdrop for this hearing is Secretary Esper’s ongoing review of all combatant commands, with a goal of realigning our military resources in line with the National Defense Strategy.

We all understand that competition with China and Russia extends to the African continent and that terrorist threats pose significant, perhaps growing, threats to the stability of both East and West Africa. We have seen firsthand the deadly attacks on U.S. and Kenyan personnel by al-Shabaab earlier this year and by what one official has called an unprecedented rise in terrorism across the Sahel and West Africa.

In other words, for these and many other reasons, the United States needs more rather than less engagement across the full range of our interests in Africa, including on security. The challenge is determining what issues are best addressed by our civilian agencies, whether our allies can contribute more, assessing where the Department’s unique assets are critical to the national security.

I want to conclude my brief statement by thanking you and the men and women under your command for your service, and I look forward to your testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Calvert.

General, your entire statement will be entered in the record, as you know. You may summarize and then we will get into questions. Thank you so much. Go ahead.

[The written statement of General Townsend follows:]
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

11 MARCH 2020

A secure and stable Africa
is an enduring American interest
INTRODUCTION

A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: I am honored and privileged to represent the members of U.S. Africa Command, an exceptional team dedicated to protecting our nation and advancing our interests. U.S. Africa Command has been engaged in a “blank slate review” since I took command in July last year, an effort which has accelerated since I provided my initial assessment to the Secretary of Defense in October. In concert with the Department of Defense, we have developed a prioritized list of objectives and actions to protect the Homeland, secure our strategic interests in Africa, and focus the American taxpayer’s investment in the right areas. We are further refocusing U.S. Africa Command’s approach on the objectives of the National Security, Defense, and Military Strategies. These foundational documents acknowledge the strategic importance of Africa and guide our mission: U.S. Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces and responds to crises in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security and stability.

Africa is home to the fastest growing economies and populations in the world, sits at crossroads of international commerce and trade, and watches over the world’s most important sea lines of communication. The U.S. plays a unique role in ensuring these strategic routes remain open to all. The international order we have helped create gives people everywhere the best hope for safe, secure, and prosperous lives. Africans recognize this and continue to look to the U.S. for leadership. Our future security, prosperity, and strategic access in times of crisis rest on free, open, and secure sea and air lines of communication around Africa. Simply put, a secure and stable Africa is essential for America’s security.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A Vast Continent. The land mass of Africa is larger than the United States, China, India, Japan, and all of Europe combined. This vast continent of opportunity and promise also includes strategic challenges from malign competitors and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Of the 1.3 billion people who live in Africa, over two-thirds live in conditions of astonishing poverty.\(^1\) Poverty and food insecurity are exacerbated by natural resource degradation, shifting weather patterns, climate impact, infectious disease outbreaks, and conflict. Lack of economic opportunities and a search for a better life leads to internal displacement and refugees, which creates new challenges and conflicts over increasingly scarce resources. These factors and others have led to an uptick in migration to Europe in recent years, under dangerous conditions in many cases, and feed a lucrative market for VEOs and criminal networks.

These challenges will be amplified as Africa’s population continues to grow. By 2050, Africa’s population is projected to double, and more than a quarter of the world’s inhabitants will reside on the continent. By 2100, Africa’s population is projected to almost double again.\(^2\) At that point, almost 1 in 3 people on the planet will live in Africa. This massive population growth will further strain resources, require job creation, potentially lead to surges in migration to Europe and beyond, and will increase political instability, communal conflict, trans-regional terrorism, and further marginalization of already vulnerable populations.

Nonetheless, Africa is also a land of opportunity. Over half of the world’s farming land is in Africa, and when effectively managed, Africa’s population growth and rich natural resources drive progress. Of note, 26 African nations hold reserves of minerals determined to be critical to the U.S.

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\(^1\) 85% of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day, World Bank October 2019
\(^2\) United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision
economy and national security. For 2020, the World Bank projects six of the world’s fastest growing economies to be in Africa, with Rwanda identified as the second fastest growing economy in the world (after Guyana) with 8.1% GDP growth. In conditions that promote a healthy business climate, these burgeoning markets present opportunities for U.S. trade and investment.

**Africa and National Security.** Located at the crossroads of the world, Africa watches over strategic choke points and sea lines of communication, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar on NATO’s southern flank, the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These strategic pathways are essential to global commerce and critical to the operations of most of our Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands. These corridors facilitate one-third of the world’s shipping, and are key to the movement of Africa’s vast natural resources including energy and strategic mineral. African, U.S., and global prosperity depend on unhindered access to these waters.

**Global Power Competition.** China and Russia have long recognized the strategic and economic importance of Africa, and continue to seize opportunities to expand their influence across the continent. The National Defense Strategy directs us to prioritize great power competition with China and Russia due to the “magnitude of the threats they post to U.S. security and prosperity today and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.” The U.S. encourages constructive partners helping to develop Africa’s economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors to the benefit of all Africans. However, malign actors, unencumbered by international norms and professional military standards, leverage speed of action and access to economic and security arenas

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3 Executive Order 13817, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, December 20, 2017

4 I use “global” rather than “great” because China and Russia are “global powers” but they are not “great powers” in the way the U.S. is. Further, calling Russia “great” plays right into the Russian’s hands as their dream is for Russia to be considered great like the U.S. and they are far from it.
in many parts of the continent. Their coercive and exploitative activities undermine and threaten many African countries’ stability. China is outpacing all of its competitors in Africa, where, with the construction of a military port and helicopter landing pads, it is converting its first overseas military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform. We know they seek to open more bases and their unprofitable seaport investments in East Africa and Southern Africa track closely with involvement by Chinese military forces. These Chinese seaports are not genuine commercial ports; these investments are geo-economic tools to increase the PRC’s geopolitical influence throughout the continent. China continues to invest heavily in African infrastructure and currently maintains 52 embassies in Africa – three more than the U.S. and a 24% increase since 2012. China also leads its G20 partners in head of state and senior leadership visits to the continent over the last decade. In the last seven years, China has sold over two billion USD in arms to African partners. During the same period, Russia increased access agreements by 200% and remains the top arms dealer for the entire continent, selling nearly nine billion USD in arms to African partners. Russian private military companies (PMCs) have a highly destabilizing influence in Africa, as they are frequently employed to secure Russian investments at the expense of Africans, to prop up corrupt regimes and establish a broader Russian military footprint globally. In Libya, Russian PMCs almost certainly downed a U.S. unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a sophisticated Russian air defense system. From the 7th Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018 where China pledged over 60 billion USD in investments, to the October 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi where all 54 African countries attended with over 43 Heads of State, it is clear that China prioritizes Africa and Russia sees an opportunity to gain a strong position on NATO’s southern flank. China and Russia’s corrupt and exploitative investment and security assistance often prioritize their own gains rather than building long-term African security capacity, and their activities often undermine transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights. Importantly,
they erode U.S. influence and access over time.

**VEOs Remain a Reality.** Violent extremist networks are expanding in Africa at a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and disenfranchised populations while employing violence to exacerbate despair and hopelessness. They undermine public trust in local governments and militaries, eventually filling - via illegitimate means - security and public service voids while expanding their radical ideology. In general, African governments view VEOs as near-term threats to their capacity to govern effectively, protect their populations, and improve their economies. They also pose threats to U.S. interests. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the U.S. in the region, and many aspire to strike the U.S. Homeland. U.S. Africa Command prioritizes efforts on the most capable VEOs today. In East Africa, we focus on al-Qa’ida’s al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is the largest and most kinetically active al-Qa’ida network in the world. After a series of complex attacks targeting Somali and U.S. bases last year, in November al-Shabaab’s leadership publicly identified Americans and U.S. interests worldwide as priority targets – mirroring Usama bin Laden’s declaration of war on the U.S. in 1996. The latest manifestation of this threat was the 5 January 2020 attack by al-Shabaab on U.S. forces at the Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay, which killed three Americans and clearly demonstrated al-Shabaab’s willingness and capability to attack the U.S. outside of Somalia.

While al-Shabaab is most dangerous to U.S. interests today, ISIS is rapidly franchising VEOs in all corners of Africa and may become a pre-eminent threat to U.S. interests, as it did until western intervention in Iraq and Syria. In West Africa, the primary VEO threats are al-Qa’ida’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Unlike we have seen elsewhere, in this region, both al-Qa’ida and ISIS networks are working together to exploit under-governed regions, disenfranchised populations, and porous borders and threaten the security and stability of our African partners, our allies, U.S. commercial
and security interests, and U.S. citizens. Kidnapping for ransom remains a pervasive threat throughout Africa where Americans and other Western partners are often targeted by VEOs to raise revenue or exact other concessions from Western countries. Left unchecked, this threat will continue to expand across Africa.

Africa is a complex continent with a unique environment. There are numerous big challenges, but its potential is enormous. Today our African partners are under siege from new agents coming to strip them of their natural resources, trap them in unpayable debt, and undermine the international order. Chinese investment has brought some benefit to the continent through infrastructure projects that have improved roads and connected markets to transportation hubs. However, the United States offers a unique partnership, as we believe in investing in and fortifying our African partners to enable “African solutions to African problems” – the bedrock of long-term self-sufficiency, security, and development.

**U.S. AFRICA COMMAND STRATEGIC APPROACH**

*U.S. Africa Command’s operations are a bargain for America... an “ounce of prevention” that is just pennies on the defense dollar.*

The United States must continue to advance our national interests in Africa within the international order that underwrites global security and prosperity. Following our national strategic guidance to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, U.S. Africa Command applies a partner-centric, interagency-based approach dating back to the inception of the command in 2007. In an era of global power competition, the combined efforts of the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the broader interagency, American businesses, and the charitable generosity of the American people are critical to achieving our objectives in the National Defense Strategy. This whole-of-government model defines U.S. Africa Command’s strategic approach across three themes: we partner for success, compete to win, and...
maintain pressure on malign networks.

First, we understand Africa’s challenges cannot be resolved solely through the use of U.S. military power. U.S. Africa Command must Partner for Success with a diverse network that includes African nations, strategic allies, U.S. government agencies and departments, and multinational coalitions to prevent, address and mitigate conflict in Africa. We emphasize military support to diplomacy and development as our security activities directly complement Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread of harmful ideologies, strengthen governments to protect their citizens, and promote stability and security, good governance, and economic successes. Security is a key enabler of U.S. whole-of-government and whole-of-society efforts - a minimum security threshold must be met for diplomacy to work, economies to flourish, and development efforts to take root. On the other side, development and diplomatic engagement are necessary to consolidate military and other security gains. U.S. Africa Command helps African partners create this operational space in Africa to build the governance and economic growth necessary for them to repel malign actors and VEO influences.

Second, we Compete to Win. We conduct our security activities to safeguard U.S. interests. We seek areas where our interests align with those of our allies and partners as we work together to achieve shared objectives. This is particularly true where we see unhelpful activities and pressure exerted by malign actors. Chinese, Russian and VEO activities on the continent are destabilizing and promote a disregard for human rights and inclusive economic growth that will upend the progress the continent has seen in the last ten years. U.S. Africa Command must continue to find ways to expand the competitive space and outpace Chinese and Russian influence to maintain our strategic access in Africa. America’s values, our high standards of professionalism, our direct focus and commitment to addressing partner security needs, and our high-quality equipment and niche capabilities give us a qualitative advantage over these competitors in
Africa...which our African partners actively seek.

Most importantly, in order to counter potential threats to the U.S. and our core interests, we work closely with allies and partners to apply persistent pressure on the Malign Networks of global and regional competitors, VEOs, and transnational criminal organizations. Our principal means for applying pressure is working with our African and international partners, increasing African security capabilities, information operations, and, only when necessary, using military force. Ultimately, in countries like Somalia that have seen progress over the course of a decade of investment, our use of force in Africa directly supports host government, African, and international partner efforts to provide the security required for development activities to bring about long-term stability and prosperity.

This strategic approach allows us to protect our citizens and interests at home and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support allies and partners overseas so they become more self-reliant and less dependent on U.S. security assistance.

PRIORITIES, PARTNERS, AND COMPETITORS

U.S. Africa Command advances U.S. strategic objectives by focusing on global power competition to maintain strategic access, by prioritizing efforts that protect the Homeland and U.S. personnel on the continent, and by responding to regional crises across our area of responsibility. U.S. security cooperation with African partners builds professional, capable militaries that can provide security which sets the conditions for economic growth and development. We achieve and maintain influence with our African partners through security cooperation, exercises, engagements, operations, and “setting the theater” or maturing infrastructure on the continent.

Protecting U.S. personnel and facilities remains U.S. Africa Command’s number one responsibility. Our mission to protect U.S. embassies and forces in Africa is central to our force posture. The Department of State has designated 32 diplomatic facilities worldwide as High Threat,
High Risk posts - 15 are in our area of responsibility, spread across an area 3.5 times the size of the United States. This critical mission requires heightened readiness and vigilance. Additionally, on any given day there are approximately 6,000 Department of Defense personnel across the continent supporting U.S. interests, addressing global security challenges, and maintaining strategic access and influence. Even if the numbers of at-risk diplomatic posts and military personnel are reduced, the remainder will still require the backing and protection of the Department of Defense. Al-Shabaab’s capability to reach outside the borders of Somalia to strike Americans in locations we once considered beyond their reach highlights the growing threat to our interests. After the 5 January attack in Kenya, we have taken swift measures to increase our force protection posture and harden our location at Manda Bay, while pursuing the attackers and their network. We are also taking a hard look at all our locations across the continent in light of this expanded threat.

We benefit greatly from close coordination with a variety of U.S. and international partners. There are currently 28 representatives from 13 different U.S. government departments holding key positions on my staff. All U.S. Africa Command activities are closely coordinated with Defense Attachés and Chiefs of Security Cooperation in our embassies across Africa. In addition, U.S. Africa Command collaborates with the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), where 15 African countries are paired with U.S. National Guard units. The SPP creates enduring bonds between Americans and Africans, and we are encouraged as more African countries apply to the program every year. Furthermore, foreign liaison officers representing 18 countries and multinational organizations are assigned to U.S. Africa Command headquarters providing key reach back capability within their Ministries of Defense and General Staffs. Outside the command, we regularly work with the African Union, European Union, NATO, United Nations, and the Regional Economic Communities in Africa on operations, exercises, engagements, security cooperation, and maturing the theater activities.
In Africa, Counter-VEO is Global Power Competition. U.S. Africa Command prioritizes global power competition, even while we remain engaged in counter-VEO (C-VEO) operations. At AFRICOM, we recognize the strategic environment is changing and the Joint Force must orient the bulk of our efforts against China and Russia even as we counter VEOs that threaten America. In Africa, the C-VEO fight is a key component of global power competition as these efforts are not mutually exclusive. Our experience, training, equipment, advice, and other unique capabilities to support C-VEO efforts led by our allies and partners addresses immediate partner needs, builds relationships for the future, and is a distinct U.S. advantage that our competitors cannot match. Al-Qa’ida and ISIS influence is growing in Africa and al-Shabaab’s capability to threaten American interests in East Africa and the Homeland is on a dangerous trajectory. The international community is not making durable progress to contain priority VEOs in Africa, mainly because military activities remain insufficiently coordinated and lack a “whole of coalition” balance between military and non-military investments. Outside of arms sales that they leverage to their own benefit, China and Russia do little to counter violent extremist groups seeking to destabilize Africa. However, as one African leader recently shared, “a drowning man will accept any hand.” In the absence of even limited U.S. C-VEO assistance, African partners are turning to our competitors to fill the void, including by accepting training and other military engagement opportunities overseas. In our highest priority countries, where U.S. interests are greatest, C-VEO assistance is a key tool in our global power competition toolkit.

In Africa, Building Partner Capability is Global Power Competition. Building partner capability is also an important tool in global power competition, reinforcing the U.S. role as the world’s elite professional fighting force and furthering American values, respect for human rights, and adherence to obligations and commitments. We have learned that we cannot surge trust. The enduring relationships built while we develop partner capabilities provide us with the long-term
strategic alliances we need to address future challenges.

U.S. Africa Command and its component commands conduct engagements and exercises throughout the region designed to strengthen key partnerships and improve partner capabilities in basic military skills, maritime security, C-VEO efforts, counter-trafficking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and control of key infectious diseases. U.S. Africa Command leverages an interagency toolkit and coordinates a broad group of programs to complement our capability-building efforts such as, among others, the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and the Women, Peace & Security Initiative. These programs help professionalize partner military and security forces and strengthen defense institutions through training on human rights, the rule of law, and prevention of violence against women.

U.S.-facilitated exercises offer some of the best return on investment by advancing our force readiness and providing our African partners with exposure to American values, expertise, and professionalism. Our exercise program improves partners’ capabilities, encourages self-sufficiency, and develops opportunities for burden sharing over the long-term. U.S. Naval Forces Africa completed Exercise Cutlass Express in November, combining for the first time with U.S. Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise, creating the second largest maritime exercise in the world for little in the way of additional resources. This exercise also allowed U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command to practice cross-boundary operations along our seam. The ability to attract large coalitions of partners and allies to exercises addressing shared security concerns is a unique U.S. advantage that sends a strong message to our partners and competitors.

Another U.S. Africa Command niche capability with long-term and high return on investment is U.S. professional military education and training. In 2019, African partners sent 763 of their best and brightest military leaders for training at professional military schools in the U.S.
through Department of State’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In addition, in August, U.S. Africa Command’s Senior Enlisted Leader hosted the third annual and largest African Senior Enlisted Leader Conference with over 67 African partners from 29 countries. These are important stakeholders that our competitors dismiss - strong officer and enlisted leadership is a bedrock of responsible defense institutions and our African partners look to U.S. forces as a model.

U.S. Africa Command engages partners to establish the security environment required for economic opportunity and trade to flourish. With a whole-of-government approach, enhanced security fosters development and investment with U.S. initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Prosper Africa, and the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. Efforts like these open doors for U.S. companies to compete overseas and respond to China’s increased economic engagement in Africa.

REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

In East Africa, we see opportunity in several countries and strong partners in others. Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya are the top African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributors and some of our strongest African partners in the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Djibouti also contributes troops to AMISOM and hosts our largest presence on the continent at Camp Lemonnier, home to more than 3,000 Americans supporting multiple U.S. combatant commands and other organizations. Thanks to our collective security and whole-of-government efforts, we have seen real and tangible progress in Somalia over more than a decade, albeit slower than we would like. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made gains in al-Shabaab strongholds in the south, holding territory and establishing outposts. Gains are fragile, though, and at risk of stalling, so there is much work to be done. Al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab is a very real threat to Somalia, the region, the international community, and even the U.S. Homeland,
but political friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Federal Member States threatens to distract Mogadishu from the fight. Somalia’s Prime Minister Khayre called 2019 Somalia’s “Year of Action,” and has led encouraging security sector reforms replacing corrupt leaders with reform-minded officers. U.S.-trained “Danab” SNA units, along with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, are important to maintain momentum and secure hard-fought gains. Importantly, the European Union continues to fund AMISOM stipends at over 200M EUR per year. Underscoring the importance and urgency of the international effort, al-Shabaab’s 5 January Manda Bay attack – the group’s first ever attack on a military base inside Kenya – demonstrates their intent and capability to strike outside Somalia. It is critical that AMISOM remain in the fight, as the SNA requires more time and international support before they are able to counter al-Shabaab themselves. In the next six months, I intend to review U.S. military operations in Somalia in detail to assess our progress and the way ahead.

North Africa is home to some of our oldest friends and newest democratic partners. Morocco was the first country to recognize our new nation in 1777 and remains by our side through exercises, training programs, foreign military sales, and counterterrorism cooperation. We’d like to strengthen our security cooperation with Algeria as it enters a new era under its first new president in twenty years. Tunisia just completed its second free and fair presidential election since its 2011 revolution. The Tunisians are strong partners in the fight against ISIS-Libya and complement our security cooperation investment dollars with national funds. However, much of the international community remains paralyzed in Libya as we watch a civil war play out with no real progress toward a political solution. As we continue to support the United Nations action plan, Turkey and Russia are weighing in heavily on opposing sides. Notably, Russia continues to harvest benefits from the instability in Libya - its military meddling has prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties and humanitarian suffering. Moscow continues to deny any Russian involvement in the
conflict, but its private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group with strong links to
the Kremlin, are leading the fight for the self-styled “Libyan National Army” against the UN-
hacked and U.S.-recognized Government of National Accord. Turkey’s recent deployment of
troops and hardware to counter Russian PMCs risks a significant escalation, as both Russia and
Turkey are attempting to tip the scales in their favor. A potential bad outcome for both the U.S. and
NATO is Russia gaining access to oil and military bases with long-range anti-access area denial
(A2AD) capabilities on NATO’s southern flank. Despite these frictions, U.S. Africa Command
continues to keep pressure on ISIS and other VEOs as they seek to take advantage of the security
vacuum created by the civil war in Libya. Our persistent focus on ISIS-Libya, in coordination with
our interagency and African partners and at low cost in Department of Defense resources, continues
to disrupt ISIS freedom of action as a regional terrorist threat. We will remain vigilant to counter
VEO reconstitution efforts.

In West Africa, we see functioning democracies, peaceful transfers of power, and an
engaged regional organization in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Senegal remains a stalwart, fully functioning democracy, focused on bolstering their defense
institutions. Ghana hosts our West Africa Logistics Network, a unique shared-expense logistics hub
that supports U.S., African, and European partners across the continent. However, we also see a
serious regional threat from VEOs emanating from the Sahel. Security is deteriorating rapidly, with
a 250% increase in VEO violence since 2018 in Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger. Having
quickly spread from northern Mali, al-Qaeda’s JNIM, ISIS-aligned groups, and other VEOs are
now operating throughout the Sahel region. They are taking advantage of porous borders, weak
governments, under-resourced and overextended militaries, and disenfranchised populations, and
are now even threatening Gulf of Guinea countries. Our African partners are trying to help address
this growing regional threat themselves through the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Accra Initiative and
various ECOWAS initiatives. However, despite U.S. bilateral security assistance and generous pledges of support from the international community coordinated by the European Union, they cannot effectively control their own borders or address security and related governance challenges in the region without substantive external assistance from their Western partners. We praise our French partners who are assisting this African-led effort in a significant way with over 4,400 French troops deployed as part of Operation Barkhane. In our view, African and European partners must do more to roll back the VEO threat and there must be a better synchronization of efforts in West Africa. The window of opportunity to dig a firebreak and prevent the further spread of VEOs is months, not years. We applaud emerging plans by the French and Germans to develop new structures to improve coordination, synchronization, and effectiveness of international assistance, and improve African partner fighting capabilities. We encourage all approaches that will allow regional partners to be more self-sufficient.

In Central and Southern Africa, we again see some strong partnerships and a few opportunities. Botswana is a bright spot with its enduring democracy, continued stability, professional military and good relations with the U.S. In 2019, Rwanda became the 15th African nation to join the SPP, establishing their partnership with the Nebraska National Guard in December. South Africa is the second-largest economy in Africa and the largest U.S. trade partner on the continent. There is enormous potential for Mozambique, where the U.S., France, and other partners have invested in an 11 billion USD liquid natural gas project that is located in the same areas as an increasingly violent group that has claimed links to ISIS. In addition, U.S. Africa Command support to USAID for Cyclone Idai relief and recovery efforts have opened a door with Mozambique for future security cooperation opportunities.

China and Russia are in a position of advantage in central and southern Africa. Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in the Central African Republic, where they are deploying
PMCs, extracting minerals, and attempting to buy influence. In Mozambique, Moscow provided second-rate counterterrorism assistance in the hopes of buying oil and gas concessions. Russia also deployed strategic bombers to South Africa, and participated in the first-ever trilateral Chinese-Russian-South African naval exercise MOSI in November 2019. ISIS and other spoilers look to exploit long-simmering grievances and gaps in governance in the region. We are exploring renewed military-to-military outreach in South Africa.

**ECONOMY OF FORCE**

U.S. Africa Command continues to assess and implement reform efforts to maximize value from our precious resources. For example, we prioritize the warfighting readiness of assigned and allocated forces through refinement of our exercise program. We are committed to optimizing the effectiveness of our security cooperation assistance and activities and we must be innovative in how we use our assets in support of our strategic objectives. Honest assessments and prudent investments ensure the U.S. maximizes the impact of every taxpayer dollar while remaining the premier security partner for priority African governments.

U.S. foreign assistance should serve America’s interests and should support countries that help us to advance our foreign policy goals. U.S. Africa Command’s efforts are focused on priority nations and strategic objectives that are sustainable, consistent with our national-level guidance, maintain our strategic access and protect the Homeland and U.S. personnel on the continent.

It is a commander’s responsibility to ensure our world-class troops have the resources they need. We must protect our forces when we move them into uncertain environments. The pace of improved base defense capabilities against emerging threats has been too slow. We need to accelerate C-UAS technologies to Africa to improve local domain awareness and provide an additional layer of warning and force protection while also improving capabilities across the joint force. As previously mentioned, our exercises hone partner capabilities and encourage self-
sufficiency and burden sharing. This small investment in relationships and the human capital of our partners can make a difference in a crisis. With the continued support of Congress, U.S. Africa Command can best provide our troops the protection they deserve while enabling engagements critical to war-winning activities in any theater.

CONCLUSION

_A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest._

U.S. Africa Command remains ready to protect U.S. citizens, interests, strategic access, and respond to crises in our area of responsibility. The men and women of U.S. Africa Command, our partners on the continent, and our broad collection of stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy and security environment. Strategic access to Africa, its airspace, and its surrounding waters is vital to U.S. national security. As outlined in our governing strategies, long-term global power competition with China and Russia and the need to limit the harmful influence of malign actors in the region is of utmost importance.

In my first six months of command, and through our ongoing “blank slate review” process, I have learned that small investments in Africa go a long way. A few bucks and a few troops can make a significant difference and have proven to be the cornerstone of multinational efforts in the region. What U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent 3.5 times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the American taxpayer. That said, U.S. Africa Command is diligently working to make our operations even more efficient and adjusting our posture and activities to ensure U.S. strategic access for today and tomorrow.

Africa is key terrain for competition with China and Russia, and our support to C-VEO operations is necessary. While we can and will grow more efficient to contribute to higher NDS priorities, if the U.S. steps back from Africa too far, China and Russia will fill the void to our detriment. Violent extremist organizations will be able to grow unchecked, some will ultimately threaten the
Homeland, and we will lose opportunities for increased trade and investments with some of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Finally, it remains my honor to lead the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and families of U.S. Africa Command. Our efforts have made the U.S. safer and advanced American interests while helping Africans do more for themselves. U.S. Africa Command is an investment in America’s, Africa’s, and the world’s future.

Thank you.
[Clerk's Note.—The complete hearing transcript could not be printed due to the classification of the material discussed.]
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

TESTIMONY OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN VISCLOSKY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. The committee will come to order.

Today, we will be hearing testimony from our colleagues in the House of Representatives relative to their concerns. We would like to learn from them and their experiences, also to potentially help with any needs that they see, whether it be in their district, State, or the Nation.

Before we begin with our friend and colleague Mr. Williams from Texas, I would point out for the record that three of our colleagues have submitted written testimony for the record: Congressman Ron Estes from Kansas; Congressman Buddy Carter from Georgia, who usually is able to join us; as well as Congressman Tom Suozzi from the State of New York.

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. ROGER WILLIAMS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Williams, the floor is yours. Welcome to the committee.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAMS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member and my friend, my colleague from Texas. I will be brief today. I know there is a lot going on. But, Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee and for all that you do for our men and women in uniform.

Today, I would like to take this opportunity to talk about Fort Hood, about the military's readiness and what is needed to continue America's superiority in the future.

Fort Hood we know as the “Great Place,” as it is commonly known, is home to over 36,000 soldiers and airmen, with thousands of troops currently deployed in South Korea, Europe, Afghanistan, and the Middle East in support of global combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Our soldiers bring to central Texas over 48,000 family members, making Fort Hood one of the largest and most populous military installations in the world. Its economic contributions are also significant, delivering roughly $25 billion to the Texas economy last year.
And I also would like to call attention to North Fort Hood, home to the First Army Division West and a staple in my district. Division West serves a critical function in the pre-, post-, and de-mobilization operations, a mission that has likely affected your States’ U.S. Army Reserve or National Guard units in some way.

I encourage this committee to make every possible dollar available to support this critical mission. As the DOD and FORSCOM continue to rely on the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units to supplement manpower shortages, we must ensure that we are providing the training, funding, and resources available to maintain their effectiveness and lethality on the battlefield.

The modernization of our force is pivotal in our ability to develop the force of the future, and I remain supportive of every effort to build the most lethal and modern fighting force on the planet.

With that said, if there were an opportunity to identify specific defense accounts that don’t require an increase this year but are projected to have one, I hope that, instead of returning the entirety to the defense account, the full committee would consider providing a reasonable percentage towards MILCON projects that have been pending or underfunded far too long.

Fort Hood’s top priorities continue to be improvements to barracks, motor pools, and aircraft hangars. Each one of these infrastructure types are critical for the health and welfare of the soldiers as well as their professional ability to carry out their assigned duties.

And I hope when 302(b) levels are determined that there will be significant plus-ups in the MILCON account for these projects in the same way that I hope that there will be practical increases in the subcommittee’s jurisdiction.

Lastly, I trust this committee will continue to prioritize the overall modernization and readiness of the total force and, most importantly, to not sacrifice one for the other.

Last year, the Army Futures Command stood up in Austin, Texas. In their own words, Army Futures Command, or AFC, is on a quest to modernize the way the Army does business by creating a space of endless possibilities to explore, develop, and test new methods, organizations, and technologies. Above all else, we want to make sure soldiers have what they need before they need it to protect tomorrow today.

These innovations within the DOD are essential to modernizing the force and utilizing the expertise and solutions that will put combat enablers on the field of battle in less time and at a better cost. I hope the utmost of consideration will be given to AFC and that our defense committees will ensure that they have the talent and the resources necessary to achieve their mission.

In order do that, we must guarantee that they can hire top talent through already-existing, streamlined hiring processes that provide competitive compensation and long-term retention strategies. There are countless Americans who are excited for the opportunity to serve their country in this innovative field. It is our future. Our goal should be to welcome these talents, not create barriers to entry.

In May of 2018, I had the privilege of traveling to Iraq and Kuwait with my colleague and the ranking member of the MILCON—
VA Subcommittee, Chairman John Carter, who I am honored to represent Fort Hood with him. During our travels, I enjoyed spending time with our III Corps soldiers deployed to the region as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. The experience is one that I will never forget, I will always treasure, and reaffirms why our tireless advocacy for the military in this body is so vitally important.

America's adversaries are working every day to defeat us, and if we are tested, we must be prepared to deliver a resounding response of America's strength and resolve. We cannot afford to put Band-Aids on a problem and hope that we can keep a helicopter, a plane, a ship, or a tank in use for another day past its prime.

The investment in our modernization is key not only to maintaining a competitive edge against our near-peers and terrorists but to guarantee the safety of our servicemembers, who so selflessly volunteer to get behind the stick of that helicopter or the wheel of that ship.

We have a longstanding bipartisan tradition of coming together to provide the Pentagon with the resources necessary to fight and win in any domain, and I am committed to continuing that cooperation.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for providing me the opportunity to discuss the defense priorities on Fort Hood and throughout the DOD. Your steadfast support for our servicemen and -women does not go unnoticed.

The United States of America has the greatest military the world has ever known, and it is the honor of my lifetime to represent our servicemembers in Congress.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. I yield my time back.

Mr. VisClosky. Mr. Williams, thank you very much for your testimony.

I certainly hear a clear bill here on the military construction accounts. We share that concern. And, also, the investment as far as the mobilization platforms I think are critical, because you want to make sure everyone is as safe and as effective as they can be. So we certainly appreciate that.

As I think I asked last year, though, are you still showing Judge Carter the way?

Mr. Williams. Oh, that is part of the hardest thing I do in Congress, but I am still at it.

Mr. Calvert. Well, I want to thank the gentleman. I have been to Fort Hood. It is a wonderful facility. And the men and women who serve there are fabulous, and I am sure you are very proud of them, as the rest of the country is. And go, Dodgers. Thank you.

Mr. Williams. You are with a winner. Thank you. God bless.

Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Secretary, I also want to thank you for what you and John Carter do to represent that area. So thank you so much.

Mr. Williams. Thank you.

Mr. VisClosky. Mr. Williams, thank you so much.

Mr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The written statement of Congressman Williams follows:]
Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert- I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee and want to thank you both for all that you do for our men and women in uniform. Today I would like to take this opportunity to talk about Fort Hood. “The great place” as it is commonly known, is home to over 36 thousand Soldiers and Airmen, with more than 9,800 troops currently deployed in South Korea, Europe, Afghanistan and the middle East in support of global combat, peace-keeping, and humanitarian operations. Our Soldiers bring to Central Texas over 48,000 family members, making Fort Hood one of the largest and most populous military installations in the world, and delivering $24.6 billion to the TX economy last year.

In May of 2018, I had the privilege of traveling to Iraq and Kuwait, spending time with our III Corps Soldiers deployed to the region as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. The experience is one that I will forever treasure and reaffirmed why our tireless advocacy for servicemembers and our military is so vitally important.
The modernization of our force is pivotal in our ability to develop the force of the future and I remain supportive of every effort to build the most lethal and modern fighting force on this planet. With that said, if there were an opportunity to identify specific defense accounts that don’t require an increase the year, but are projected to have one, I hope that instead of returning that entirely to the defense top-line, the full committee would consider providing a reasonable percentage towards MILCON projects that have been pending or underfunded for far too long. Fort Hood’s top priorities continue to be improvements to barracks, motor pools, and aircraft hangars. Each one of these infrastructure types are critical for the health and welfare of the Soldiers, as well as their professional ability to carry out their assigned duties. I hope that when 302B levels are determined, that there will be significant plus ups in the MILCON account for these projects, in the same way that I hope there will be practical increases in this subcommittee’s jurisdiction.
I would like to also call attention to North Fort Hood, home to the First Army Division West and a staple in my district. Division West serves a critical function in the pre, post, and de-mobilization operations- a mission that has likely affected your State’s U.S. Army Reserve or National guard units in some way. I encourage this committee to make every possible dollar available support this critical mission. As the DOD and FORSCOM continue to rely on the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units to supplement manpower shortages, we must ensure that we are providing the training, funding and resources available to maintain their effectiveness and lethality on the battlefield.

Lastly, I trust this committee will continue to prioritize the overall modernization and readiness of the total force, and most importantly to not sacrifice one for the other. America’s adversaries are working everyday to defeat us, and if we’re tested we must be prepared to deliver a resounding message of American strength and resolve. We cannot afford to put bandaids on a problem and hope that we can keep a helicopter, plane, ship or tank in use for another day past it’s prime. The
investment in our modernization is key not only to maintaining a competitive edge against our near-peers and terrorists, but to guarantee the safety of our servicemembers who so selflessly volunteer to get behind the stick of that helicopter or the wheel of that ship. We have a longstanding bipartisan tradition of coming together to provide the Pentagon with the resources necessary to fight and win in any domain, and I am committed to continuing that cooperation.

Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert- Thank you again for providing me the opportunity to discuss the defense priorities on Fort Hood and throughout the DoD. Your steadfast support for our service men and women does not go unnoticed. It is my hope that this Congress will continue to provide necessary funding to our armed forces and ensure that they have the tools they need to remain the finest military the world has ever seen.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and I yield back.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. McGovern.

Mr. McGovern. Thank you very much. I am sorry I am late. We are in Rules Committee——

Mr. Visclosky. You are on time.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN MCGOVERN

Mr. McGovern [continuing]. And we are hold on right now.

But I want to thank you, Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, for giving me the opportunity to talk about a few of my priorities for the Fiscal Year 2021 Defense Appropriations Act.

First, I respectfully ask the committee to honor the service of a specific cohort of former members of the Armed Forces who were exposed to radiation during the years following World War II, known collectively as the atomic veterans. Specifically, I ask the committee to provide $4 million for the creation and distribution of an atomic veterans service medal.

You know, year after year, House-passed language to create this medal has been stripped from the NDAA final conference reports. This is particularly galling when the provision has received overwhelming bipartisan support in the House for years.

For 5 years, my good friend and Republican colleague, Tom Emmer, and I have offered this provision as an amendment, receiving unanimous votes in the House. And, last year, the provision was included in the base text of the House NDAA. And so, in light of this, I respectfully ask the committee to take the lead and provide the necessary funding to honor these veterans with a service medal.

As you know, between 1945 and 1962, about 225,000 members of our Armed Forces participated in hundreds of nuclear weapons tests. Thousands of other GIs were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation as part of the U.S. military occupation forces in Japan and those who were POWs in and around Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

All were sworn to secrecy, unable to talk to their doctors about their exposure to radiation. And the Pentagon stubbornly refuses to honor their service, arguing that it would somehow diminish other military personnel tasked with dangerous missions. Mr. Chair and members of this committee, that is just ridiculous, and it is offensive.

So this is a unique group of veterans. No other cohort has been recognized for specialized testing and treatment by the Department of Veterans Affairs. No other cohort has been recognized by three former Presidents for their unique service. President Reagan designated July 16, 1983, as Atomic Veterans Day. President George H.W. Bush recognized them as a discrete cohort of American veterans eligible for compensation under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990. And President Clinton issued a public apology in 1995 following the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments’ landmark report.
So it is beyond comprehension for the Pentagon to assert that these veterans are just like any other veteran who faced hazardous duty. They are not.

In 2007, our allies Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia awarded such medals to their atomic veterans who served alongside our GIs. There is no reason for us not to do the same.

Tragically, upwards of 80 percent of American atomic veterans have already passed away, never having received this recognition.

So, Mr. Chairman, we can’t wait any longer to honor them. Please recognize this unique group of veterans, their sacrifice and selfless service. Please fund and create an atomic veterans service medal, please, before they all pass away. Time is running out.

Second, I want to thank you for your consistent support of the Wounded Warriors Service Dog Grants Program. Since fiscal year 2015, this committee has led the way in creating and funding this program that provides grants to qualified nonprofits to offset the cost of training service dogs for our veterans. I ask that you continue funding this program at $11 million, the same as last year.

And, finally, I would like to thank the committee for recognizing the importance of prioritizing research to address enteric disease, or ETEC, in last year’s bill. For fiscal year 2021, I ask the committee to provide $10 million under Navy RDT&E Medical Development to support ETEC research.

Among our servicemembers deployed around the world, ETEC is the leading cause of bacterial diarrhea. It results in millions of days of diminished readiness. It incapacitates a servicemember for 3 to 5 days, and half of all affected report decreased job performance afterwards. So 1 in 10 will develop post-infection bowel problems.

So the Navy, DARPA, and academic partners have made significant progress in developing effective countermeasures, but without further funding, the antibodies developed will not go on to the next stages of development and testing. So it is urgent that the committee advance this research, which will benefit literally tens of thousands of our uniformed men and women deployed abroad.

So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you. I appreciate your hard work. And that concludes my testimony.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. McGovern, thank you very much for your testimony and your concerns.

I would point out that we will do our very best to maintain the funding for the military service dogs.

Mr. McGovern. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You were an advocate last year.

And we did provide some funds for the atomic veterans service medal, but, as you know—and I know you are working with the authorization committee too—we still have to solve that particular part, but would want to stay in touch with that committee as well as yourselves——

Mr. McGovern. We will.

Mr. VISCLOSKY [continuing]. To see if we can have some success.

So, again, realize you have a full plate, and appreciate you taking the time to be down here.

Mr. Calvert.
Mr. CALVERT. I thank the gentleman for his testimony and, certainly, concern about the atomic veterans. I knew one myself. Unfortunately, he is no longer with us, like most of them. But they certainly should be recognized.

And, certainly, the dogs that go to service are necessary in times of war, and they should be treated properly. So I appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. CUÉLLAR. Yes. And I just wanted to say, certainly, on the military dogs, that is something that we support, and we will work with you on that. Thank you for pointing that out.

Mr. McGOVERN. And I should just say, the support that you have provided over the years, in terms of grant assistance to help train these dogs, benefited countless veterans. And it literally changed their lives, I would argue even saved their lives. So thank you for your great work. Appreciate it.

Mr. CUÉLLAR. Thank you for your leadership.

Mr. McGOVERN. Thank you.

Mr. VISCOSKY. Thank you very much.

[The written statement of Congressman McGovern follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert, for giving me this opportunity to talk to you about a few of my priorities for the FY 2021 Defense Appropriations Act.

I respectfully ask the Committee to honor the service of a specific cohort of retired and former members of the Armed Forces who were exposed to radiation during the years following the end of World War II, known collectively as the Atomic Veterans. Specifically, I ask that the Committee provide $4 million for the creation and distribution of an Atomic Veterans Service Medal.

Year after year, House-passed language to create this Medal has been stripped from the NDAA final Conference Report. This is particularly galling when the provision has received overwhelming bi-partisan support in the House for years. My good friend and Republican colleague, Tom Emmer, and I have offered this provision as an amendment for five years, receiving unanimous votes in the House. Last year, the provision was included in the base text of the House NDAA. In light of this, I respectfully ask this Committee to provide the necessary funding to honor these veterans and create this service medal.

Between 1945 and 1962, about 225,000 members of our Armed Forces participated in hundreds of nuclear weapons tests. Thousands of other GI's were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation as a part of the U.S. military occupation forces during World War II in Japan, and those who were held as POWs in and around Hiroshima and Nagasaki before 1946. All were sworn to secrecy, unable to even talk to their doctors about their past exposure to radiation.

Regrettably, the Pentagon refuses to honor their service, arguing that doing so would somehow diminish the service of other military personnel tasked with dangerous missions. Mr. Chairman, this is ridiculous.

It is vital to note the unique nature of this group of Atomic Veterans and the urgent need to recognize their service. No other cohort has been recognized as eligible for specialized testing and treatment by the Department of Veteran Affairs. No other cohort but this group has been recognized by three former presidents for their unique service: President Reagan designated July 16, 1983 as National Atomic Veterans' Day; President Bush recognized this group as a discrete cohort of American veterans who are eligible for compensation under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990; and President Clinton issued a public apology in 1995 following the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments' landmark report.
It is disingenuous for the Pentagon to assert that these veterans are just like any other veteran who faced hazardous duty. They are not. If they were, a national commission and the engagement of these three presidents, the Justice Department and the Veterans Affairs Department would not have been warranted.

Nor is it too onerous a task for the Defense Department to present such a service medal to our Atomic Veterans. In 2007, our allies Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia authorized and awarded such medals to their Atomic Veterans who served alongside our own Atomic Veterans. There’s no reason for us not to follow their example.

Tragically, upwards of 80 percent of American Atomic Veterans have already passed away, never having received this recognition. Mr. Chairman, we can’t wait any longer to honor these veterans. I ask that the Committee recognize this unique group of veterans’ duty, honor, sacrifice, and selfless service to our nation with the creation of an Atomic Veterans Service Medal. Time is running out.

I would also like to take a moment to thank the Committee for consistent support for the Wounded Warrior Service Dog grants program. Since FY 2015, this Committee has led the way in creating and funding this program that provides grants to qualified non-profits to offset the costs of training service dogs for our veterans. I respectfully ask that you continue funding this program at $11 million, which is the same level as last year.

Finally, I would like to thank the Committee for recognizing the importance of prioritizing research to address Enteric Disease – or ETEC – in last year’s bill. For FY 2021, I ask the Committee to provide $10 million under Navy RDT&E Medical Development to support ETEC research.

Among our servicemembers deployed around the world, ETEC has been the leading cause of bacterial diarrhea that has resulted in millions of days of diminished readiness. It can incapacitate a service member for 3-to-5 days, and half of all infected report decreased job performance after such an attack. One in ten will develop post-infection bowel problems. I would also like to point out that ETEC is the same infection that kills more than 800,000 children annually in the developing world.

The Navy, DARPA and academic partners have made significant progress in research and development of effective countermeasures. But without further funding, the antibodies developed will not be able to go on to the next stages of development and testing. It is urgent that this Committee advance this research that will benefit literally tens of thousands of our uniformed men and women deployed and stationed abroad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m happy to hear any comments and take any questions you might have for me.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. RICHARD HUDSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Hudson, welcome to the committee. You may proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN HUDSON

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the pressing needs of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the surrounding community.

As many of you know, Fort Bragg is a very special and unique place. Fondly referred to as the “epicenter of the universe,” it is not only home to the Airborne and Special Operation Forces but also our Nation’s largest military installation in terms of personnel, which is a fight I had with Judge Carter, who has the largest base, I believe, by land mass.

Each of these commands and their subordinate units are specifically designed to meet the most unique challenges facing our Nation. Simply put, when a President calls 911, the phone rings at Fort Bragg, as they are the tip of the spear.

One of these units, the 82nd Airborne Division, has the unique designation as the immediate response force, in which they must be able to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours. Combine this with increased reliance on Special Operations Forces over the last 20 years, and it is clear that Fort Bragg deploys more personnel to more countries on shorter notice than anyone else.

Maintaining such a capability requires investments in not only lethality and modernization but also in the infrastructure to make it all work, which has not been sufficiently funded. Our men and women in uniform cannot win the next fight if they can’t get there quickly and safely.

Fort Bragg is at a critical juncture. Our primary and alternative airfields, rail systems, roads, training areas, maintenance facilities, and infrastructure are in desperate need.

The roads that connect Fort Bragg with neighboring communities and serve a disproportionately high concentration of our Special Operations Forces and their families are in utter disrepair. The roads are so bad they cost Fort Bragg $2.5 million annually in accident and death payments alone.

The State of North Carolina wants to take over maintenance of these roads but needs the Army to first raise them to State standards. That alone would cost approximately $43 million.

Unfortunately, conventional forces at Fort Bragg, including the 82nd, have suffered from a lack of MILCON funding, receiving only one project since 2010. With this in mind, the command has been forced to try to mitigate the effects of this financial drought by utilizing Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization, FSRM, funding.
This applies to barracks that had their roofs ripped off during recent hurricanes, motor pools that can't physically fit modern vehicles, and an airfield that desperately needs resurfacing.

The fact is, we are dangerously close to losing the capabilities that our Nation relies on. During the recent rapid deployment of the 82nd on New Year's Eve, the lights on the runway that have been there since 1938 actually failed.

One of the most concerning issues to me is that the Department of Defense won't even request what it has identified as true needs. For years, they have been forced to undercut themselves and request less than 100 percent of their requirement. This year, that request has come to 81 percent of the actual need.

I urge the committee to see what effect this is having on the force. I understand we have limited resources to fund competing priorities and acknowledge that members of this committee have done an exceptional job at finding that very tough balance. Yet, as Fort Bragg's Congressman, I am here to tell you, these decisions have a cost that is jeopardizing the safety of our men and women in uniform. With this in mind, I would ask that the committee fund the FSRM budget for the Army at the highest levels possible.

Additionally, I would like to bring your attention to a program within USSOCOM known as the Preservation of the Force and Family, or POTFF. POTFF was established to create a holistic approach to address pressures on the force and increased stress on operators' families. This program touches all aspects of the operator—physical, mental, social, and spiritual.

The success of POTFF is demonstrated through a notable decrease in the rate of physical and emotional injuries from all causes, significantly accelerating return to duty times, increasing retention, and improving overall morale of the force, to include their families. POTFF is the embodiment of the SOF truth that people are our most valuable asset.

As you know, it takes years to build a special forces operator. The demands of SOF continue throughout their career and are compounded by a high deployment-to-dwell ratio. Simply put, the demand is there, and the job isn't getting any easier. Thankfully, programs like POTFF are exactly what we need to be able to maintain a ready force.

I ask this committee to fund the POTFF program as robustly as possible.

Finally, I would like to highlight a relatively small but extremely valuable program from the Department of Defense. As you know, the Department of Education administers the Impact Aid program to provide financial assistance to compensate for the lost tax revenue for school districts that contain Federal property. Similarly, the Department of Defense Education Activity administers a supplemental DOD Impact Aid program.

As you can imagine, each of the counties surrounding Fort Bragg are recipients of Impact Aid, which serves as a critical lifeline to school districts that would otherwise lose funding they desperately need.

In fiscal year 2020, the Department of Defense included $40 billion of supplemental funding for the program and a separate $10 million for additional funding for children with severe disabilities.
Fort Bragg is one of the few installations across the country that has an Exceptional Family Member Program for children with special needs. As such, families from across the country are stationed here solely based on the fact that their children need access to these resources. Because not all of these children are in schools on post, the DOD Impact Aid for children with severe disabilities is increasingly important for our communities.

With this in mind, I would ask that you continue to build on the progress made in last year's defense appropriations bill and further increase both the DOD Impact Aid supplemental and DOD Impact Aid for children with severe disabilities when looking at fiscal year 2021.

Again, I would like to thank you, Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert, for allowing me to testify today, and I stand ready to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Hudson, thank you very much for taking the time to appear. Do appreciate your commitment, one, to national defense, as well as the United States Army, and attentive to the needs in your district.

Would point out—and I am an infrastructure guy; I am from Gary, Indiana—that for Facilities Sustainment, Repair, and Maintenance in fiscal year 2020, we increased the budget by $600 million for the Army’s line, to a total of $4.1 billion. I regret that the administration only asked for 3.5, not that that is not a lot of money, but it is a cut. So we are aware of that. Appreciate your concern.

Also share your concern, we all do, on Impact Aid. I don’t have that particular issue in my district, but it is immediately across the line, and deal with people who have that issue. And, again, would just point out that, in this year’s bill, we increased Impact Aid from the Department by $50 million.

And also—and you mentioned, I appreciate—that children with disabilities, we increased that account this year for $20 million. No one knows what the future holds, but obviously we will do our very best.

Mr. HUDSON. Well, I really appreciate that.

And, again, you know, the requests that end up in front of you don't represent the totality of the need. And you don’t have enough money to cover all the need that even is presented to the committee. And so you guys have a tough job, you men and women here, and I appreciate the job you do. But keep in mind that you are not even seeing all the need that is out there. And a place like Fort Bragg that hasn’t had a MILCON since 2010, the place is crumbling.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is that near where you live, Fort Bragg?

Mr. HUDSON. Well, pretty close, pretty close. Yes, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. Well, the men and women that serve at Fort Bragg are at the point of the spear, and we should certainly support them as much as we can, any way we can. And I will be working with the chairman to do exactly that. And we will stay in touch to see what we can do under the constraints we have on the appropriations process.

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you.
Mr. CALVERT. Thank you.
Mr. VISCOSKY. Thank you very much.
Mr. HUDSON. All right. Thank you.
[The written statement of Congressman Hudson follows:]
Defense Member Day Testimony
Rep. Richard Hudson

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss pressing needs for the units stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the surrounding community. My name is Richard Hudson and I have the distinct privilege of representing North Carolina’s eighth congressional district.

As many of you know, Fort Bragg is a very special and unique place. Fondly referred to as the “Epicenter of the Universe,” it is not only home to the Airborne and Special Operations Forces, but it is also our nation’s largest military installation in terms of personnel. Fort Bragg is the home of the 82nd Airborne Division, the nation’s Immediate Response Force, the XVIII Airborne Corps, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). If you can think of any major military operation in the last century, there is a good chance that a unit or command from Fort Bragg was involved.

Each of these commands and their subordinate units are specially designed to meet the most unique challenges that we as a nation have, and will ever face. Simply put, when the President calls 9-1-1, the phone rings at Fort Bragg. They are the tip of the spear.

With the 82nd Airborne Division’s unique requirement as the Immediate Response Force (IRF), they have a standing requirement to be able to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours. Combine this with the increased reliance on Special Operations Forces over the last twenty years and it is clear that Fort Bragg deploys more personnel, to more countries, on shorter notice than anywhere else in the entire military and does so on an extremely compressed timeline.

Maintaining such a capability requires investment in not only lethality and modernization priorities, which I feel this committee has accomplished, but also in the infrastructure to make it all work, which I believe this committee has not sufficiently funded.

Our men and women in uniform cannot win the next fight if they can’t get there quickly and safely. Fort Bragg is at a critical juncture. Our primary and alternate airfields, rail systems, roads, training areas, maintenance facilities, and infrastructure are in desperate need. Without these we are challenged to get to the fight.

The system of roads that connects Fort Bragg with neighboring communities - roads that serve a disproportionately high concentration of our Special Operations Forces and their families - are in utter disrepair. The roads are so bad that they costs Fort Bragg $2.5 million annually in accident and death payments alone. The state of North Carolina wants to take over maintenance for these roads but needs the Army to first raise it to state standards. This alone would cost approximately $43 million.

Unfortunately, conventional forces at Fort Bragg, to include the 82nd, have suffered from a lack of MILCON funding, receiving only one project since 2010. With this in mind the command has been forced to try to mitigate the effects of this drought by utilizing Facility Sustainment
Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) funding. This applies to barracks that had their roofs ripped off during recent hurricanes, motor pools that can’t physically fit modern vehicles, and an airfield that desperately needs resurfacing.

The fact is that we are dangerously close to losing the capabilities that our nation relies on. During the recent rapid deployment of the 82nd on New Year’s Eve, the lights on the runway that have been there since 1938, actually failed as they deployed.

One of the most concerning issues to me is that the Department of Defense won’t even request what it has identified as the true need. For years they have been forced to undercut themselves and request less than 100% of the requirement. This year that request has come in at 81% of the actual need. Historically it has struggled to get above 65%.

I urge the committee to see what effect this is having on the force. I understand we have limited resources to fund competing priorities and acknowledge that the members of this committee have done an exceptional job at finding that balance. However, there are some Members of Congress that prefer to waste billions on projects that never come to fruition and refuse to cut bureaucratic waste at the Pentagon.

I’m here to tell you that these decisions have a cost - a real cost that is jeopardizing the safety of our men and women in uniform and Fort Bragg is the epicenter of this issue. With this in mind, I would ask that the committee fund the FSRM budget for the Army at the highest levels possible.

Additionally, I’d like to bring your attention to a program within USSOCOM known as the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF). POTFF was first established as a pilot program in FY 2014 to “build and implement a superior holistic approach to address the pressure on the force and also the increased stress on operators’ families.” This program touches all aspects of the operator: physical, mental, social, and spiritual capacity.

I cannot underscore enough that POTFF is more than just an enhanced workout facility. Instead, POTFF is responsible for the integration of mental health professionals into the force and combating the stigma behind seeking assistance. POTFF creates stronger families and better operators.

The successes of POTFF are demonstrated through a notable decrease in the rate of physical and emotional injuries from all causes, significantly accelerating return to duty times, increasing retention, and improving overall morale of the force to include their families. POTFF is the embodiment of the SOF truth that people are our most valuable asset.

As you all know, it takes years to “build” a SOF operator. Assessment and selection courses are the gauntlet that faces anyone who wishes to join these units, but that is only the beginning. The demands of SOF continue throughout their career and are compounded by a high deployment to dwell ratio. Simply put, the demand is there, and the job isn’t getting any easier. Thankfully programs like POTFF are exactly what we need to be able to maintain a ready force. I ask that this committee fund the POTFF program as robustly as possible.
Finally, I would like to highlight a relatively small, but extremely valuable program from Department of Defense used to supplement the Impact Aid program form the Department of Education. As you know, the Department of Education administers the Impact Aid program to provide financial assistance to eligible school districts to compensate for the lost local tax base to school districts imposed upon by federal property. Additionally, the Department of Defense Education Activity administers a supplemental DOD Impact Aid program.

As you can imagine, each of the counties surrounding Fort Bragg are recipients of Impact Aid. Due to the sheer size of the installation and amount of personnel stationed there, Impact Aid is a critical lifeline to school districts that would otherwise lose funding they so desperately need.

While the program is primarily funded through the Department of Education, in FY 20 the Department of Defense included $40 million of supplemental funding for the program and a separate $10 million of additional funding for Children with Severe disabilities.

Fort Bragg is one of the few installations across the country that has an Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) for children with special needs or disabilities. As such, families from across the country are stationed here solely based on the fact that their children are in this program and need access to these resources. Because not all of these children are in schools on post, the DOD Impact Aid for children with Severe Disabilities is increasingly important for our communities. With this in mind I would ask that you continue to build off of the progress made in last year’s defense appropriations bill and further increase both the DOD Impact Aid Supplemental and DOD Impact Aid for Children with Severe Disabilities in FY 2021.

Again, I'd like to thank Chairwoman Visclolsky and Ranking Member Calvert for allowing me to testify today and I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. BRIAN FITZPATRICK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Fitzpatrick, welcome. You may proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN FITZPATRICK

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, members of the committee. Thank you for hosting today’s hearing and giving me the opportunity to discuss two priorities that are very, very important to this subcommittee for fiscal year 2021 appropriations.

First, as co-chair of the bipartisan Congressional Ukraine Caucus, I come here today in strong support of robust funding levels for Ukraine in the fiscal year 2021. At a minimum, we ask that this committee appropriate funds for Ukraine-related programs at currently enacted levels, but I strongly encourage that these programs receive an increase in funding.

It is in our national interest to help Ukraine succeed as a democratic, independent, and prosperous nation and by strengthening the security of our Central and Eastern European allies in the face of increasing Russian aggression. Our support for Ukraine also stems from our shared values of sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law.

These funds are essential to support Ukraine’s democratic progress, military readiness to combat Russian aggression, its civil society capacity to combat corruption, which I personally worked with and experienced over there as my time as an FBI agent, and also efforts to care for Ukraine’s veterans, and efforts to boost economic development in key fields such as agriculture and small business.

Robust American support remains critical to Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty. We especially encourage strong support in the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is directed by the Department of Defense.

Moreover, I would like to express my support for funding programs that promote transparency and accountability to end corruption, especially programs that strengthen the parliament, judiciary, media, and civil society in Ukraine; also, to help Ukraine defend its territorial borders and its territorial sovereignty from outside aggression—Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea must never be recognized—alleviate human suffering, especially in eastern Ukraine, including hundreds of thousands of children who have been displaced.

These challenges require comprehensive and bipartisan support, and the United States must continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Ukraine and provide robust funding for our strategic ally in the region. And I urge the committee to ensure that the necessary funds are appropriated to assist our friends in Ukraine.

Secondly, I would like to turn to an issue that is much closer to home. For several years, I have been working very hard to address
the contamination of our drinking water by toxic PFAS chemicals, because I believe these chemicals represent one of the most widespread public health crises we as a Nation face, so much so that myself and my friend and colleague Dan Kildee from Michigan co-led and are co-leading a bipartisan PFAS Task Force to unite all the area Members of Congress whose districts have been impacted.

Advisory levels—a high percentage, exceedingly high percentage, of our drinking water throughout the Nation, particularly in some of our districts, contain an exceedingly high percentage of PFOS and PFOA chemicals that exceed the EPA’s current lifetime health advisory level of 70 parts per trillion of combined PFOA and PFOS. However, toxicological profiles of these chemicals released by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry suggest that tens of millions more Americans than previously thought are drinking water with harmful levels of these chemicals.

An example of how my constituents have been impacted by this issue is in West Rockhill Township. In 1986, a team of firefighters from the former naval air station in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, and also the Naval Air Development Center in Warminster use AFFF-spraying trucks to assist firefighting in a massive tire fire. And the AFFF foam is a firefighting foam made up of PFAS chemicals. And now the water supply for many households in West Rockhill Township test at some of the highest levels of PFOA and PFOS in the entire Nation.

The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection first started sending notices to affected households in 2016. That means that for 30 years many were drinking water and bathing their children in water that was poisoned by these highly toxic chemicals with no idea of the harm they were being exposed to and through no fault of their own.

Last July, the Congressional PFAS Task Force led a bipartisan group of lawmakers in sending a letter to the Defense Department Inspector General, asking the office to examine the Defense Department’s use of PFAS at military locations. The IG’s office responded that they will be launching a review of the Defense Department’s use of PFAS at military sites in Michigan and around the country.

It is unacceptable that the Defense Department put the health of families in Pennsylvania and around the Nation at risk with these chemicals. Whether it was intended or unintended, every American has the right to clean drinking water. And the Federal Government created this health crisis, and it is important that the government now start to take responsibility for that.

Our citizens have the right to this. And, moreover, the more we learn about these chemicals, the clearer the danger becomes. And as the co-chair of the PFAS Task Force, it is my firm belief that this committee must appropriate the necessary funds to remediate and clean up contamination from these PFAS chemicals.

I thank the committee for their time and attention to these two very important matters, and I am happy to answer any questions.

Mr. Visclosky. Well, I thank the gentleman very much. Both primary issues you have touched on, Ukraine as well as the environmental, are very close to our hearts.
Mr. Calvert and I have been to Ukraine, and whether we have been or not, a very, very serious issue. As you probably know, we did include $250 million this year. There is no guarantee for the future, but very alert and very concerned about Ukraine. So do appreciate your position.

Additionally, particularly Ms. McCollum has been very, very active on this, as the issue of the water quality issue and the cleanups. Met with the Secretary of the Air Force yesterday, as a matter fact. It is unclear how much the administration really is looking for. I would point out for the record that for fiscal year 2020 they asked for $79 million, which I thought was completely inadequate. The committee added 172 above that.

At least two of us, Mr. Calvert and I, serve on Energy and Water. I tell people, environmental management is always a bill payer, it is always last. But people drink that water, whether they are at a base, whether they are in a community. And it is a priority for us, and we will be very attentive to it. So appreciate your concern.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. I thank the gentleman.

And, as you pointed out, I worked with the gentlelady on my prior job but that she has now, the jurisdiction over the Environmental Protection Agency. And DOD certainly has a responsibility. This PFAS issue is nationwide. It is a difficult issue to approach. We have programs within EPA like WIFIA and certainly the Department of Defense grant programs, but we need to take this on. And it is a big, big problem.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, we agree. I have been a big believer in lethal aid to Ukraine to get Russia’s attention. I am fearful this summer they may try something provocative, so we need to make sure that we are in a good position.

So, with that, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCOSKY. I thank you.

Betty.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Just on the PFAS, we have an all-of-government approach that I have been working on with the team in Michigan. And I thank you for the task force that has been—it has made a difference in getting people’s attention on this.

So we are waiting for the EPA to set a standard. They have been slow to do so. But that standard might not be the final standard. We might have to lower the levels again even after we have that because of what we are finding out.

I have a municipality that since 2006 has been filtering water. So it is a problem all across. But the Department of Defense needs to step up, and they need to take responsibility and work with you to remediate this problem. So I look forward to working with you on this.

Mr. Calvert. If the gentlelady would yield, too, on that, I just would point out, technology has changed. And I may just point to you and others that there are technologies that work and are much more effective and, you know, it gets the cleanup quicker. And I hope the EPA and the Department of Defense and others will pay attention to these new technologies and get it out there.
Ms. McCollum. Well, that is true, but it can be in surface water, it can be in groundwater, it can be in wells, so the technology is all where it is.

And my municipalities, we are filtering the waters, but the—I have been in a—so if you set this room upright, one of these filters, it is a little smaller than the circumference of this room. But then that has all the nasty stuff in it. And then what do we do? We landfill it.

So we need research. And as the gentleman from California put out, you know, there are lots of different ways to address this. We have to address it. We can't wait for the perfect way to do it. We need to do something right now.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. And the filtration issue, as you pointed out, is a separate issue in and of itself, because what do you do with the filters after they are filled? Because there is no safe way that we have been aware of to dispose of these chemicals.

Ms. McCollum. So we need research, we need standards. But we need the Department of Defense to stand up in doing research, in setting safe standards, and in cleaning up these plumes so that they don't spread any farther.

So it is a serious problem. And thank you for, you know, the fight, because it is making a difference. But I was just shocked when the President, after—you know, this is bipartisan, bicameral—when the President's budget came out and—I won't say ignored it but, you know, didn't give it the due diligence it deserved.

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, and please do stay in touch. We will continue to work on it.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The written statement of Congressman Fitzpatrick follows:]
Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, Members of the committee, thank you for
hosting today’s hearing and giving me the opportunity to discuss two of my priorities for FY
2021 appropriations.
As Co-Chair of the bipartisan Congressional Ukraine Caucus, I come here today in strong
support of robust funding levels for Ukraine in FY21. At minimum, I ask that this Committee
appropriate funds for Ukraine-related programs at currently enacted levels, but I strongly
courage you that these programs receive increased funding.
It is in our national interest to help Ukraine succeed as a democratic, independent, and
prosperous nation, and by strengthening the security of our central and eastern European allies in
the face of increasing Russian aggression. Our support for Ukraine also stems from our shared
values for sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law. These funds are essential to support
Ukraine’s democratic progress, military readiness to combat Russian aggression, its civil
society’s capacity to combat corruption, efforts to care for Ukraine’s veterans, and efforts to
boost economic development in key fields such as agriculture and small business.
Robust American support remains critical to Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty. We
especially encourage strong support in the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is
directed by the Department of Defense.
Additionally, I would like to express my support for funding programs that:
- Promote transparency and accountability to end corruption, especially programs that strengthen the parliament, judiciary, media, and civil society
- Help Ukraine defend its territorial sovereignty from outside aggression
  - Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea must never be recognized
- Alleviate human suffering especially in Eastern Ukraine
  - Hundreds of thousands of children have been displaced
  - Millions of people are in desperate need of food, health, and shelter

These challenges require comprehensive and bipartisan support. The United States should continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Ukraine and provide robust funding for our strategic ally. I urge the Committee to ensure that the necessary funds are appropriated to assist our friends in Ukraine.

I’d now like to turn to an issue that is much closer to home. For several years, I have been working tirelessly to address the contamination of our drinking water by toxic PFAS chemicals because I believe that these chemicals represent one of the most widespread public health crises we, as a nation, currently face. Nationally, 1.3 percent of our drinking water contains more than the EPA’s current Lifetime Health Advisory level of 70 parts per trillion combined PFOA and PFOS. However, a toxicological profile of these chemicals released by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry suggests that tens of millions more Americans than we previously thought are drinking water with harmful levels of these chemicals.

An example of how my constituents are impacted by this issue is in West Rockhill Township. In 1986, a team of firefighters from the former Naval Air Station Willow Grove and Naval Air Development Center Warminster used AFFF-spraying trucks to assist in fighting a massive tire fire. AFFF foam is a firefighting foam made from PFAS chemicals and now, the water supply for
many households in West Rockhill Township tests at some of the highest levels of PFOA and PFOS in the country. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection first started sending notices to affected households in 2016. That means for 30 years my constituents were drinking water and bathing their children in water poisoned by these chemicals with no idea of the harm they were being exposed to, through no fault of their own.

Last July, the Congressional PFAS Task Force led a bipartisan group of lawmakers in sending a letter to the Defense Department Inspector General asking the office to examine the Defense Department’s use of PFAS at military sites. The Inspector General’s office responded that they will be launching a review of the Defense Department’s use of PFAS at military sites in Michigan and around the country.

It is unacceptable that the Defense Department put the health of Pennsylvania families at risk with these chemicals, whether it was intended or unintended. Every American has a right to clean drinking water. The federal government created this health crisis and it is important that the government is starting to take responsibility.

Our constituents have a right to clean drinking water. The more we learn about these chemicals, the clearer the danger becomes. As Co-Chair of the PFAS Task Force, it is my firm belief that this Committee must appropriate the necessary funds to remediate and clean up contamination from PFAS chemicals which has put Americans across the country at risk.

Thank you again for holding today’s hearing. I yield back.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. THOMAS SUOZZI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Visclosky. The gentleman from New York. I am so happy to see you. We were told you were not going to appear and simply submit written testimony, and it darkened our day.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN SUOZZI

Mr. Suozzi. Oh. Well, I am happy to be here myself. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Visclosky. You may proceed.

Mr. Suozzi. Thank you for that warm welcome.

Mr. Ranking Member, other members of the committee, I really appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.

You know, you all have reputations of being concerned about environmental restoration. We were just talking about PFAS. I am here to talk to you today about a groundwater plume on Long Island that has contaminated our sole-source drinking water aquifer for over 40 years. We have known about it for 40 years. And the Navy is the responsible party, and they can't get out of their way to actually clean it up.

So I am here to advocate for a monumental but necessary $500 million increase in funding in the Environmental Restoration Program in the Department of the Navy. This is a big thing I am asking for. I am asking us to really look at something that our community has struggled with for over 40 years.

So this money that we are looking for is to remediate environmental degradation stemming from defense-related activities. Congressman Peter King joins me in this bipartisan request. He can't be here today because he has a function for St. Patrick's Day at the White House.

This funding is essential for the cleanup of contamination of the defense manufacturing site in my district that, again, we have known about for over 40 years and other similar sites across the country.

Mr. Suozzi. During World War II and throughout the 1980s, Long Island was a defense industry manufacturing hub. Long Islanders produced the aircraft that helped lead the allies to victory during World War II. We helped develop the propulsion technology that carried Americans into space and built the lunar module that landed on the moon.

We are proud of our contributions to the Nation's defense and space exploration, but for over 40 years—again, over 40 years—the pollution that was left behind has contaminated our drinking water. It is spreading rapidly. It has decreased property values, and it has spread fear throughout our communities.

The United States Navy and the Grumman Corporation have long been deemed officially to be the responsible parties. We know they are the responsible parties for this contamination, and they are liable for the cleanup.
Mr. Chairman, Newsday is our local daily newspaper on Long Island. And I would like to submit for the record a recent Newsday investigative report entitled “The Grumman Plume: Decades of Deceit.”

The excellent reporting, in frustrating detail—this is relatively recent that this report came out. This excellent reporting, in frustrating detail, outlines decades of finger-pointing, bureaucratic delays, high-priced lawyers and engineers, and misdirection, which have resulted in a four-decade-old problem that is a long way from actual remediation.

Recently, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation released a new plan to contain further spread of an underground plume of contamination before it destroys additional drinking water supplies, again, in our sole-source aquifer.

Instead of a new round of finger-pointing between lawyers and engineers, Congressman King and I are advocating that the U.S. Navy and Grumman stick to their defense-related expertise and instead write a significant check, each of them, the Navy and Grumman, write significant checks to the New York State DEC and the Bethpage Water District so they can implement on a more timely remediation of the spreading underground blight before it further harms our island and our people. That is why this additional funding is essential.

This plume, which is one of the most complicated in the country, is currently 2.1 miles wide, 4.3 miles long, and goes as much as 900 feet deep and has contaminated the sole-source aquifer drinking water for millions of people on Long Island.

To date, the remediation of the Navy-Grumman plume has concentrated on cleaning up hotspots and treating drinking water at the wellhead. There has been no plan in place to fully remediate the site, much less contain the plume. Hence, it has continued to spread.

The DEC, the Department of Environmental Conservation, of New York State’s bold plan, which includes construction of 16 wells along the southern perimeter of the plume, is estimated to cost $585 million over the next 30 years and hundreds of millions of dollars more of the existing record of decision to fund the current remediation.

The Navy and Grumman are going to have to pay this money. They are going to have to do it. And I am saying, instead of going through the bureaucratic mess that the Navy has to go through because they are not experts in environmental remediation, the previous Secretary of the Navy agreed with me, let’s just have them write a check to the local authorities so they can cut through the bureaucracy and get this site cleaned up.

The Environmental Restoration Program is a Department of the Navy program initiative to, quote, “identify, investigate, and clean up former waste disposal sites on military property.”

According to a Department of Defense report, the DOD anticipates that 1,852 sites will still not have achieved resolution complete by the end of fiscal year 2021, the fiscal year we are currently budgeting for, and will still require billions more to address the existing sites.
Despite the present backlog, the President’s budget proposal cuts this funding by $50 million to the lowest level in 4 years. That cut is unacceptable, as I am sure you agree, especially when considering that emerging contaminants are already leading to additional sites and growing cost.

I am not going to talk about PFAS. I know other speakers have already spoken about it. But I want to advocate, again, how important it is for these chemical contaminants to be cleaned up.

Emerging contaminants pose a significant risk to the funding for existing sites. As the DOD writes, quote, “Because the DOD could not plan, program, or budget for the unanticipated costs as part of the typical budget cycle, it used funding that was originally programmed for cleanup activities at other sites,” like mine, “that will likely lead it to delays in achieving response complete at some of those deferred sites.”

This report goes on to state that the list of sites is not static and will grow by an average of 150 sites a year, and, therefore, it is unlikely the DOD will achieve a response.

We cannot—we must not—cut funding at this time. In fact, we need a dramatic, new solution. We need your help. The people on Long Island are begging for your help.

This is a bipartisan request. It is well-documented; it has gone on for 40 years. And only your help can help resolve this very dramatic problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I feel the gentleman’s frustration, and I share it. I would suggest there is probably not another Member in the House who has more Superfund sites, more contaminated waterways, and other environmental problems than the First District of Indiana. I live in Gary, Indiana.

We have the Grand Calumet River, which is not grand, but it is a river. And for 100 years, 90 percent of the water in that river was industrial discharge from five refineries and four integrated steel mills. As a member of congressional staff for 6 years and as a Member for 36 years, we have been trying to just clean up that one site. We have made progress, but we still have four reaches of the river to go. And I absolutely appreciate your frustration.

I also appreciate your activity because you had an amendment that was adopted in House, and we were able to retain fiscal year 2018 on this issue. And would point out—and it is of little consolation to you at this moment—that for the current fiscal year we increased the administration’s request for that account by $49 million.

These are problems, as you point out on page 5, the movement of money because we can’t plan and we are going to take money from your account—just isn’t going to solve the problem you have.

So I can’t—none of us can promise you anything, but—

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Chairman, let me just say very clearly, I appreciate—

Mr. VISCLOSKY [continuing]. Committed to trying to push the Department to clean it up.

Mr. SUOZZI. I appreciate so much how much you know about this and how passionate you are about this idea of cleanup as well. One of my staffers is one of your former staffers. They have told me
about your commitment to this. I have read about your commitment to this. And we are so grateful for the great work that you have done throughout your career on environmental remediation.

I just want to point out one thing. The responsible parties here are, one, one of the major contractors in America, the Grumman Corporation, that we send contracts to on a regular basis, and, number two, the United States of America Department of the Navy. They are the responsible party for this cleanup.

It has been there for 40 years. And it is not a question of the technology. It is a question of going through the bureaucracy of just getting this thing approved. I want to get it off of the Navy's back, write a check to the local authorities, and have them just go clean it up. Because you know as well as I do how awful the bureaucracy of the Federal Government is, not because people are bad, not because they are incompetent, not because they are mean-spirited, not because they don't care. It is just an awful, terrible bureaucracy they have to go through.

And if we could just get this money and give it to the local authorities, they could get this done, and more people would not suffer from this site for which the country is responsible.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. Well, I certainly hear the gentleman's passion on this issue. Unfortunately, we have hundreds of these sites, legacy sites, primarily from World War II, that have various pollutants. We certainly have them in California. We have them across the Nation. And it is going to cost us billions and billions of dollars.

We had a hearing yesterday in Energy and Water on sites in Idaho and the State of Washington where we, you know—when we did the Manhattan Project, we were in a hurry. And we have remediation we are doing in various locations that is going to cost a significant amount of resources.

I would just bring up the other issue, too, on technology. A lot of these sites, we use pump and treat, pump and treat, pump and treat. It takes 30 years, like you just pointed out. We are using microbial technology now in certain areas. It had been hugely successful. I would encourage to look at those types of technologies. I don't know the site specifically, so I can't opine on that, but it has worked. It cleans it up rapidly.

And so that is what we need to do. We need to change our mindset to get these sites cleaned up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SUOZZI. Congressman, let me just point out one thing, if I can, just to make a distinction here. Unlike a lot of the other sites throughout the Nation, this is the sole-source drinking water supply for this area, because we take our drinking water straight from the groundwater.

And it is a heavily populated area. So it is not a remote facility. It is in the middle of people's neighborhoods. Literally, one of the sites was a park that was closed down.

And this is where we drill right into the ground that is contaminated and pull the water out of there. And this has been going on—we have known about it for 40 years. And I know we have known about other sites for 40 years. But this is, again, in the middle of densely populated areas with drinking water right there.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. We will do our very best.
Mr. SUOZZI. I appreciate it so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.
Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you so much.
[The written statement of Congressman Suozzi follows:]
Prepared Remarks: Congressman Thomas R. Suozzi  
House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Member Day  
Tuesday, March 12, 2020

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert and Members of the committee, thank you the opportunity to testify. I’m here to advocate for a monumental, but necessary, 500 million dollar increase in funding to remediate environmental degradation stemming from defense related activities.

Congressman Peter King joins me in this bipartisan request. This funding is essential to cleanup 40-year-old contamination at a defense manufacturing site in my district and at others similar sites across the county.

During World War II, and through the 1980’s, Long Island was a defense industry manufacturing hub. Long Islanders produced the aircraft that helped lead the Allies to victory and
developed the propulsion technology that carried Americans into space and built the lunar model that landed on the moon. We are proud of our contributions to the nation’s defense and space exploration, but for over 40 years the pollution that was left behind has contaminated our drinking water, decreased property values and spread fear throughout our communities.

The United States Navy and the Grumman Corporation have long been deemed the Responsible Parties for this contamination and are liable for its cleanup. Decades of finger pointing, bureaucratic delays, high priced lawyers and engineers and misdirection have resulted in a four-decade old problem that is a long way from actual remediation.

Recently, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation released a new plan to contain further spread of an underground plume of contamination before it destroys
additional drinking water supplies. Instead of a new round of finger pointing between lawyers and engineers, Congressman King and I have advocated that the U.S. Navy and Grumman stick to their defense related areas of expertise, and, instead, write significant checks to the New York DEC and the Bethpage Water District so that they can implement a more timely remediation of this spreading, underground blight before it further harms our island. That’s why increased funding is essential.

This plume, which is one of the most complicated in the country, is currently 2.1 miles wide, 4.3 miles long, and goes as much as 900 feet deep and has contaminated the sole source of drinking water for millions of people on Long Island. To date, remediation of the Navy/Grumman Plume has concentrated on cleaning up hot spots and treating drinking water at the
wellhead. There has been no plan in place to fully remediate the site, much less contain the plume; hence, it has continued to grow. The DEC’s bold plan, which includes construction of 16 wells along the southern perimeter of the plume, is estimated to cost $585 million over the next 30 years and hundreds of millions more to continue funding the current remediation.

The Environmental Restoration Program is a Department of the Navy, “initiative to identify, investigate and clean up former waste disposal sites on military property.” According to a Department of Defense report, the DoD anticipates that 1,852 sites will still not have achieved “resolution complete” by the end of FY2021, the fiscal year we are currently budgeting for, and will still require billions more to address the existing sites. Despite the present backlog, the President’s budget proposes
cutting this important funding by $50 million, to the lowest level in four years.

That cut is simply unacceptable, especially when considering that emerging containments are already leading to additional sites and growing costs for the Navy and the Department. As the DoD’s own report states, “DoD may also be required to reevaluate completed cleanup sites or create new sites” due to emerging contaminants, such as PFOS and PFOA or 1,4 dioxane, which I’m sure the committee is also rightfully concerned with.

Emerging containments pose a significant risk to funding for existing sites. As the DoD writes, “because the DoD could not plan, program or budget for the unanticipated cost[s...] as part of the typical budget cycle, it used funding that was originally programmed for cleanup activities at other sites;
this will likely lead to delays in achieving complete at some of those deferred sites.” Such as ours on Long Island.

The report goes on to state that DoD that the list of sites is not “static,” will likely grow by an average of 150 sites a year and, therefore, “it is unlikely that DoD will achieve complete...” We cannot not, we must not, cut funding at a time that new sites are already diverting funding resources from those that have waited years, even decades, for full remediation.

Thank you for your time today and I look forward to working with you on achieving this urgent need for our constituents.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. We are now happy to recognize our colleague, Mr. Thompson. You are free to proceed.

**SUMMARY STATEMENTS OF CONGRESSMAN THOMPSON**

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Well, good morning, Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and all the members of the subcommittee. Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to share my priorities for fiscal year 2021 defense appropriations.

As Members of Congress, meeting the needs of our servicemen and -women must remain one of our highest priorities. As the father of a wounded warrior, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to be here today and to share my priorities for fiscal year 2021.

I recognize the challenge placed before the subcommittee and appreciate your ongoing commitment to our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen, even when difficult choices must be made. Despite these tough choices, you recognize that troops are on the front lines, in danger, defending the freedoms that we all hold so dear.

It is imperative our country always maintain the lethality and the strategic edge it has had for decades. Our military should never be engaged in a fair fight. It is for these reasons we must maintain and ensure robust funding for the defense of our Nation. The United States military has always had a dominating presence, and maintaining our readiness plays a significant role. Keeping an edge requires our military technologies be a step ahead of our adversaries.

At a time when we face unprecedented challenge from near-peer actors who are making strides in the development of hypersonic weapons and other new programs, we must invest in our own advanced technologies—specifically, additive manufacturing to support low-cost, optimized precision fires.

Additive manufacturing will reduce manufacturing times by 60 percent at an affordable cost. This requirement is necessary to reduce the weight of the missile systems and optimize the manufacturing process to ensure that the parts in the missiles can be manufactured fast enough without defects at a cost structure that meets the overall U.S. Army missile performance requirements. Additive manufacturing is crucial to our missile defense.

As we continue to prepare for the future by optimizing our missile systems, we must also ensure our Navy remains at the tip of the spear by rebuilding and maintaining its capabilities. Our sailors regularly face aggressive actions when navigating our world’s waters.

The U.S. Navy is making investments into programs ensuring the freedom of navigation for all. Now, some of these programs being invested in and needing continued support include an evolutionary update to the MK 48 Mod 7 Heavyweight Torpedo, which will maintain its capabilities while improving range and payload.
Additionally, the lightweight torpedo program designs, integrates, and tests the Lightweight MK 54 Torpedo to make it more effective in shallow water. Continuing to support these programs gives our sailors the edge that they need to face our adversaries.

As a former healthcare professional, I request we continue to support and fund vital Department of Defense research programs. These include research programs for multiple sclerosis, ALS, burn pit exposure, breast and ovarian cancer, as well as the Peer-Reviewed Orthopedic Research Program. I strongly believe making critical investments in medical research at the Federal level will improve the well-being of our Nation.

Finally, we must keep in mind the more than 80,000 American citizens who served in the Vietnam War, Korean War, and World War II and are still missing in action. The families and friends of these American heroes deserve no less than our greatest efforts to bring their loved ones home. Therefore, I respectfully request the subcommittee support robust funding for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency in the fiscal year 2020.

I want to thank the chairman and ranking member and all the members of this subcommittee for your continued dedication to the matters within the jurisdiction of the subcommittee and the committee as a whole. I would really appreciate your consideration of these priorities, and I look forward to working together in the future.

Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I thank the gentleman very much for taking the time to appear. And we share a number of your priorities. I would point out that one of our members who is unable to attend, Mr. Ryan from Ohio, is particularly vocal on a number of things but particularly additive manufacturing.

And I will just repeat myself again. I am from Gary, Indiana. I like to make stuff. And if we don’t make those kinds of investments, we are going to be a stupid country because you aren’t going to have to be more efficient next year, you are not going to have to research, all of that. So, absolutely, I support it.

I appreciate your emphasis on some of the health programs. And, also, you did mention the Defense POW/MIA Account, and we increased that, the current fiscal year, $24 million.

Interestingly enough, a good friend of mine, grew up in the same neighborhood and former U.S. attorney, had an uncle killed in World War II—missing, missing, in World War II in Italy. And they think they have found him and his comrade with two British soldiers. And but for his diligence and the moneys available to expand their work, would never have happened. And for that family, the closure is just so incredibly important. So do appreciate your emphasis on that.

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Chairman, I appreciate your support for that too. It is closure for the family, but it is also fulfilling that promise that we made to leave no soldier behind.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

Mr. CALVERT. I thank the gentleman.

It is heartening to see some of the manufacturing industries coming back to the United States, and we hope that continues.
And I have been with those teams that go out and look for people who are missing in action in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia a number of years ago. And they do a fabulous job in searching the remains, as you say, to leave no man behind. And they are fulfilling that pledge, and we will need to make sure we fund those efforts. So I thank the gentleman.

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Thank you very much, Chairman.

[The written statement of Congressman Thompson follows:]
The Honorable Glenn ‘GT’ Thompson (PA-15)
Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Member Hearing on
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2021
Thursday, March 12, 2020

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and members of the Subcommittee:

Good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to share my priorities for Fiscal Year 2021 Defense appropriations. As a Member of Congress, I strive to meet the needs of our servicemen and women. As the father of a wounded warrior, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to be here today and share my priorities for Fiscal Year 2021.

I recognize the challenges placed before the Subcommittee and appreciate your ongoing commitment to our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen even when difficult choices must be made. Despite these tough choices, you recognize the troops are on the front lines, in danger, defending the freedoms we all hold so dear. It is imperative our country always maintains the lethality and strategic edge it has had for decades. Our military should never be engaged in a fair fight. It is for these reasons we must maintain and ensure robust funding for the defense of our nation.

The United States military has always had a dominating presence and maintaining our readiness plays a significant role. Maintaining an edge requires our military technologies be a step ahead of our adversaries. In a time when we face unprecedented challenges from near-peer actors who are making strides in the development of hypersonic weapons and other new programs, we must invest in our own advanced technologies. Specifically, the Additive Manufacturing to support low-cost optimized precision fires. Additive Manufacturing will reduce manufacturing times by 60% at an affordable cost. This requirement is needed to reduce weight of the missile systems and optimize the manufacturing process to ensure parts and missiles can be manufactured fast enough without defects at a cost structure that meets overall U.S. Army missile performance requirements. Additive Manufacturing is crucial to our missile defense.

As we continue to prepare for the future by optimizing our missile systems, we must also ensure our Navy remains the tip of the spear by rebuilding and maintaining its capabilities. Our sailors regularly face aggressive action when navigating our world’s waters. The U.S. Navy is making investments into programs ensuring the freedom of navigation for all. Some of these programs being invested in and needing continued support include an evolutionary update to the MK 48 MOD 7 Heavyweight Torpedo, which will maintain its capabilities while improving range and payload. Additionally, the lightweight torpedo program designs, integrates, and tests the LWT MK 54 torpedo to make it more effective in shallow water. Continuing to support these programs gives our sailors the edge they need to face our adversaries.

As former health care professional, I request we continue to support and fund vital Department of Defense research programs. These include research programs for Multiple Sclerosis, ALS, Breast and Ovarian Cancer, as well as the Peer Reviewed Orthopaedic Research Program. I strongly believe making critical investments in medical research at the federal level will improve the well-being of our nation.
Finally, we must keep in mind more than 80,000 American citizens who served in the Vietnam War, Korean War, and World War II are still missing in action. The families and friends of these American heroes deserve no less than our greatest efforts to bring their loved ones home. Therefore, I respectfully request the Subcommittee supports robust funding for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency in Fiscal Year 2020.

I want to thank Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and the members of this Subcommittee for your continued dedication to the matters within the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee and the Committee as a whole. I appreciate your consideration of these priorities and look forward to working together in the future.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. DENNY HECK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Heck, who has already been very helpful this morning, is recognized.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN HECK

Mr. Heck. Thank you, Chairman Visclosky, very much and Ranking Member Calvert and esteemed members of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.

I first wanted to say how thankful I am, genuinely so, for the funding for the Defense Community Infrastructure Program, known as DCIP, which was included in the final fiscal year 2020 defense appropriations budget. I thank you for that. I thank you for all the essential work that you and your staff do.

I am indeed here testifying today in support of the Defense Community Infrastructure Program and asking that this vital program be funded at $100 million in the fiscal year defense appropriations bill.

DCIP is a grant program for the Federal Government to assist State and local governments in addressing defense community infrastructure projects. Grants are meant to support military installations and include a 30-percent matching requirement for the community.

Let’s put this in perspective. Over 100 years ago, there were a lot of installations that were developed around this country in what were then rural areas. As time has passed, they have found themselves in the midst of urban areas. And as a consequence of two-thirds to three-fourths of all civilian and military personnel living off-base, they have added to the problems, stressed the infrastructure in the surrounding communities.

I have the privilege, for example, to represent Joint Base Lewis McChord, the largest force projection base in the western United States. Fifty-five-thousand people per day report to work there, and the overwhelming majority live in the surrounding communities. So the purpose of DCIP is to help those local communities with infrastructure that assist the base themselves.

As a matter of fact, at the end of the day, DCIP is a readiness program that requires significant participation by local communities. It is intended to help those bases and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and their families who serve there.

This program began when I first entered Congress under title of another name, COMMUTE Act. It has been my highest priority in the appropriations process since I have arrived. Every year, I have advocated for this. And I cannot tell you the sense of gratitude and gratification that we first were able to get it authorized and then funded. And my humble request here today is that we take that next step, continue to support it more robustly.

I am very proud to have been joined by 51 of my colleagues in a letter of support to you all, including my co-leads, Congressman Chris Smith, Elaine Luria, Don Young, and Jason Crow. They all
represent communities that have been heavily impacted, and readiness has been compromised. This is a solution to that.

I look forward to working with the subcommittee and, once again, extend to you my deepest appreciation for all your work, your past support of this program, and hopefully your future support of this program.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Heck, thank you very much.

One, appreciate your advocacy and the fact that you had the program authorized. Some people come to us, as you can imagine, and need appropriations and lack the authorization, so that hurdle has been cleared.

Also appreciate your advocacy for the fiscal year 2020, because the administration asked for no money for the account, and we were able to add $50 million, which I know, from your perspective, isn’t adequate. It was the best we could do. I do understand you would like to see it plussed up.

And I would just note for the record, it is my understanding that for this year’s money, for that $50 million, the memo for distribution for the fiscal year 2020 funding is on the Secretary of Defense’s desk, awaiting for signature. We do not know what the elements of that is, but we will very soon know what that will be. So I would ask that you please stay in touch with us, and we will do our best.

Mr. Heck. Thank you. And, again, thank you for your support.

Mr. CALVERT. Just going to point out, I have been to LewisMcChord many occasions. It is a great base. And we love the C–17s, the tankers that are located there, the United States Army that deploy out of that wonderful facility. So we will do everything we can to help.

Thank you.

Mr. Heck. Thank you, sir. We are very proud of the people who work there and serve there.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much.

[The written statement of Congressman Heck follows:]
Testimony of Representative Denny Heck (WA-01)
Fiscal Year 2021 Defense Appropriations Act
March 12, 2020

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert and esteemed members of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.

I first want to say how very thankful I am that funding for the Defense Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) was included in the final FY20 Defense Appropriations Bill. I would also like to thank you all for the essential work this committee and its staff performs.

I am here testifying before this subcommittee today in support of the Defense Community Infrastructure Program and am calling for this vital program to be funded at $100 million in the FY21 Defense Appropriations Bill.

The Defense Community Infrastructure Program is a grant program for the Federal Government to assist state and local governments in addressing defense community infrastructure projects. Grants are meant to support military installations and include a 30% match requirement from the community. It was first authorized in the FY19 NDAA and funds were appropriated for the first time in the FY20 Defense Appropriations bill.

As the Member of Congress for the 10th District of Washington, I represent Joint Base Lewis-McChord, one of the largest military installations
in the country. Infrastructure in and surrounding military installations play an important role in preserving military readiness. Our armed forces need to mobilize quickly, and we need functional and resilient infrastructure in order to do that. The same is true for every other infrastructure supporting defense communities where our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines live and raise their families.

My very first term in Congress, I introduced the COMMUTE Act to help address infrastructure resiliency issues on military installations. I’ve been working on the problem ever since. In FY19, both the House and Senate authorizing committees acknowledged this need by creating the Defense Community Infrastructure Program. This program builds off the COMMUTE Act and encourages infrastructure projects near military installations.

Aging and overburdened infrastructure is a problem in this country, but when it affects our servicemembers’ ability to train and organize, it becomes a national security threat. I am proud to be joined by over 40 of my colleagues in supporting this request and especially want to acknowledge my co-leads on this initiative, Reps. Chris Smith, Elaine Luria, Don Young & Jason Crow.

I look forward to working with this Subcommittee on supporting the DCIP and building a legacy of success for this new but vital program.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. JODEY ARRINGTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Arrington, please.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN ARRINGTON

Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee.

Thank you for your leadership and your diligence on this very, and possibly most, important responsibility, to ensure that our armed services have the resources to provide for our Nation’s defense. And we appreciate all your hard work, and we appreciate you letting us, your colleagues, especially those who have military assets in their districts, provide input into this process.

I hail from west Texas and represent 29 counties—

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is that better than east Texas?

Mr. ARRINGTON. Sir, it is better than north, south, and east Texas.

Mr. CUELLAR. Don’t say south Texas. Do not say——

Mr. ARRINGTON. With the exception of Laredo——

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. There you go.

Mr. ARRINGTON [continuing]. Which is connected by I–27 and the Ports-to-Plains.

No, listen, bragging is more than a sport, Mr. Chairman, it is a way of life in Texas. But my mama always told me that it ain’t bragging if it’s true, son. And, listen, we have the food, fuel, and fiber—we are the food, fuel, and fiber epicenter of the world in west Texas. No one produces more ag and energy.

And from a national security perspective, I just want to make one quick point: Food security and energy independence is national security.

But, you know, we have another component to national security that we preserve and promote and protect in west Texas, and that is the freedom fighters of Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas. That is the largest B–1 bomber base in the country. It is the training base; it is the operational squadron; it is the classic associate Reserve unit. And it is critical to the Air Force air power and air arsenal for the United States defense.

So it has also been referred to by the Air Force as the backbone of our Air Force. And its long-range bomber capabilities played a critical role in the Afghanistan-Iraq fight against ISIS. And it presented strength and deterrence, American strength and deterrence, in the Korean Peninsula, and on and on.

I think you get the point. Dyess Air Force Base and the B–1 bomber is critical to this Nation’s defense.

Now, here is the latest, sir. There has been a fatigue testing done, a stress test, on these birds, and the Air Force has determined that 17 of the 62 B–1 bombers should be retired based on structural deficiencies.

That is a lot of planes for a squadron that provides so much strength and important deterrence and force for the United States
defense and the Air Force. And so my request to you and my colleagues is to really dig in to this.

Look, my first commitment is to the defense of the American people. My second is to—and I would say second—another priority is the safety of the airmen. So we can’t compromise our mission, and we can’t compromise the safety of our airmen. And that takes precedence over everything. I am not just a single Member district guy; I am an American first. And those are my priorities.

However, we have to be very diligent to determine if the number 17 is the right number. And I haven’t seen the data. Doesn’t mean I don’t trust my leadership at the Air Force. I do. And I do believe there are serious integrity issues.

But the question is, can we mitigate that number of 17 down to 10? What is the magic threshold for saying that they should be retired? Should we put them in the Boneyard and strip them of their parts? Or should we park them, in the event that we need them, and then rebuild them and fix them so that they can fly if needed? These are just the important questions I know you guys are thinking about.

And I just want to reinforce again the importance of really analyzing and scrutinizing the data that is coming off of the fatigue testing. Again, if the data suggests that that is what we need to do and 17 is the right number, I will stand and salute, and I will be a good soldier with you and your colleagues and our friends on HASC. But until I look at those numbers and until I have my colleagues who are experts really dig in, I am going to maintain that we need to—I am not willing to accept that final number, if that makes sense.

So I think that is pretty much what is in my remarks, without reading them word for word.

Again, very proud of our airmen. Abilene and the Dyess Air Force is part of the Global Strike Command. And they have a competition every year between the communities that host these Air Force bases in Global Strike Command. Abilene, Texas, has won it so many times, they changed the award to the stinking Abilene Trophy.

So these guys love their airmen, they love our veterans, they want to continue to support them. And, oh, by the way, the B–21 bomber, that is the next-generation bomber, the Raider. And we just need to get from here to there, from the B–1 and a seamless transition and retirement of the B–1, to the ramping up of the B–21, the most capable bomber the world has ever seen.

And I just plead with you to really dig in with me, and let’s analyze this, and let’s make sure that whatever that final number is is the right number as we exercise our oversight responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, thanks for indulging me with my comments this morning and my input.

Mr. Calvert, thank you as well. Enjoy working with you.

And my dear friend Mr. Cuellar, connected by I–27 and the Ports-to-Plains Corridor, and we are proud of you and your leadership.

So thank you, sir.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you for the time to testify, and do appreciate your concern about making sure we take an in-depth look not just at the B–1 and other programs.

I have said, as recently as yesterday, that Congress writ large is one of the problems, because from time to time we do have to make judgments and eliminate programs so we can spend on new technology and new programs. But we ought to be very deliberate about it.

Your timing is impeccable, because the Air Force will be in for their hearing before this committee the week after we come back from recess. So, again, we will make sure we are attentive and draw them out on the issues.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CALVERT. I was going to make the same point the chairman made; your timing is good. As you know, the Air Force is relooking at the inventory of the United States bomber fleet. We are going to be flying B–52s until they are 100 years old. And that is something.

But the B–1s, obviously, are going to be replaced by the B–21, and we need to quicken that process up so we can send those B–21s to Texas. And——

Mr. ARRINGTON. Amen and amen.

Mr. CALVERT [continuing]. Hopefully, we can have a smooth transition.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Yes.

Mr. CALVERT. And I know that is what you are concerned about——

Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. CALVERT [continuing]. For the men and women that serve at that base, and they do a wonderful job. So we are certainly going to keep a good eye on it.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you. Thank you for your comments. You know, the B–1 is a victim of its own success. They used it so much, because it was so needed and its capabilities were so critical, that they say they flew the wings off of it. And I understand we need to be careful to make the right decision.

Ms. McCollum, I enjoyed being with you at West Point and enjoyed our visit there and to get to know you. Thank you for your leadership as well.

Again, God bless you guys in your endeavors. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Cuellar would like the last word.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Yes.

Mr. CUELLAR. I just want to say thank you. I have been to the Dyess Air Force Base there in Abilene with Dr. Bob Hunter some years ago.

Mr. ARRINGTON. Yes.

Mr. CUELLAR. Appreciate your—I think your timing is right. I certainly agree with the chairman and the ranking member and the rest of the committee. We have to look at this inventory and look at the transition.

But really appreciate your work on this. We want to continue working with you. But this is the right timing to take this in-depth look at it. So thank you very much.
Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you. And you will not hold the comments about “west Texas is the best Texas” against me, will you?

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, you said “with the exception of Laredo,” so——

Mr. ARRINGTON. Thank you. Yes, sir. I am glad you kept—for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VISCIOSKY. Thank you very much.

[The written statement of Congressman Arrington follows:]
Testimony of Congressman Jodey Arrington (TX-19)
House Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee
FY 2021 Appropriations
March 3, 2020

Chairman Pete Visclosky and Ranking Member Kevin Calvert, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on the national defense priorities of Texas’ 19th Congressional District. We are the proud home of Dyess Air Force Base, located in the City of Abilene. The base has 5,100 dedicated military and civilian personnel and is under Global Strike Command. Dyess serves as the home for the Air Force’s 7th Bomb Wing, which has 33 of our Nation’s 62 B-1B bombers. Dyess is the B-1B Training Base and has a B-1B Operational Squadron, a B-1B Training Squadron, and a new B-1B Classic Associate Reserve Unit. Dyess’ missions also include two Active Duty C-130J squadrons with a total of 27 of these new, highly-capable aircraft.

Since 2001, the B-1B has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and Iraq and, more recently, in the fight against ISIL. The B-1B has been able to do this because Congress provided funding in prior years that improved the aircraft’s capabilities to drop a variety of weapons with increasing accuracy.

Chairman and Ranking Member, I appreciate the Committee’s longstanding support and funding for B-1 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation and B-1 Procurement and I request the Committee’s continued support for these essential B-1 programs as it considers the FY 2021 defense appropriations bill.

In addition to improving the B-1’s capabilities, the Air Force is proceeding with the development of a new long-range strike aircraft, the B-21 Raider. I appreciate that the Committee has been supportive of this important program and request continued support to keep the B-21 program on track.

And in closing, I’d add that, in fact, Dyess is such an exceptional base and Abilene is such an exceptional community that the Air Mobility Command Community Support Award now even bears the community’s name, as “The Abilene Trophy.”

I would like to thank you again, Chairman and Ranking Member, for the opportunity to testify before you today.
Mr. Visclosky. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN WENSTRUP

Mr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much, Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert, Ms. McCollum and Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much.

I am here to advocate for military medicine and voice my concern about some certain decisions that have and could be made that may diminish our capabilities to accomplish our three main goals in military medicine, which are, one, to have a medically ready force, a ready medical force, and the ability to care for our beneficiaries. And I am engaging here today to make sure that our funding decisions align with these needs.

You have all heard from the surgeons general last week, and I share some of their concerns. I have met personally with each of the surgeons general as well as General Place of the Defense Health Agency.

So a little bit of a bio. I am an Army Reservist still. I have been in for 22 years. I was chief of surgery for a combat support hospital, stationed at Abu Ghraib prison in 2005–2006. Currently I still serve at Walter Reed, and a medical policy advisor for the Chief of the Army Reserve. So I am speaking from the heart when I am talking to you today about some of the issues that I am concerned about.

One, I want to make sure that we continue to support our military-civilian partnerships. To give you an example, we created a partnership in Cincinnati with the Army, and expanded it to joint, where we embed our medical personnel into our civilian hospitals.

And to give you some idea of how that works, we had an Air Force medic from Wright-Patt, the largest Air Force base, who spent 2 weeks in Cincinnati, who said, “I did more in 2 weeks in Cincinnati than I have done in 6 years of Active Duty at Wright-Patt.” Why? Because he was on air care, he was in ambulances, he was in a Level 1 trauma center in the emergency room.

These are the types of relationships we have to continue to develop. And so that is why I want to make sure that we are focused on making sure those programs can continue.

I also want to speak for a moment on how I support the notion and the creation of a defense health command. I think that Congress had good intentions when we developed the Defense Health Agency, and I think the Defense Health Agency mission could continue, but I would like to see that under the auspices of a defense health command. The defense health command would consist of a Defense Health Agency director.

In my mind, congressional intent with the DHA was to make our stateside and facilities like Landstuhl more efficient and more effective, more streamlined, to decide how much care we need where,
whether we can use community care or not. These are some of the things that we were looking into.

So the defense health command, as you will see on the chart, would consist of Defense Health Agency director, the surgeons general, and also regional representation, which would give us flexibility.

Included in that chart are some of the training opportunities that we would have. I will be frank with you when I say, if you are a Reservist and you are a Reserve general surgeon in a Level 1 trauma center, you are good to go for the combat mission. If you are Active Duty, you may be on a base or a post where the speed limit is 15 and there really isn't much trauma. So we need to have these types of relationships to build upon.

The Air Force has C–STARS, Center for the Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills, a very effective program. I have participated in that. We have Operation SMART, which I just described before, Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Training. We have the AMCT3, the Army Military-Civilian Trauma Training Teams.

These are great training opportunities that we need to expand, expand jointly, and, in my mind, should be under the management of the surgeons general. And they can all work together under the structure of a defense health command.

So there is a lot there. I have presented a lot to you. I would be more than happy to sit with you one-on-one or whatever the case may be to go into more detail about where I think the future of our military medicine should be.

I never want our military medicine to be seen as a vulnerability by our enemies. And so we want to do everything we can to have a structure in place that is well-defined, that we can have troops ready to go out the door at a moment’s notice, and, at the same time, making sure that we are taking care of all of our military families and the military themselves. So I will engage with you on that.

I also have a bill that I will be presenting to HASC for retention, especially in critical specialties. For example, in the Army Reserve right now, we are only at 9 percent of orthopedic surgeons. That is not a good number. And the same ones get deployed over and over again.

At the same time, if you are Active Duty, you have done 20 years and you are getting out, eligible for a pension, you may be 45 years old, but if you join the Reserve, your pension is penalized. That makes no sense. We should be able to allow people to get the pension that they have earned and go into the Army Reserve.

And you bring someone who has already been in uniform, already skilled. And that could be pilots, surgeons. And the way the bill is presented, it has to be identified by the Secretary as a critical shortage of a critical need.

So I ask you to take these things into consideration when it comes to appropriations, and I will be glad to take any questions.

Mr. Visclosky. Appreciate, again, you taking the time and your concern, as well as, one, the experience and knowledge you bring. We may follow up. The committee has a lot of concerns about the
transition that is taking place, and Mr. Calvert may have some comments. I know Ms. McCollum certainly does.

Mr. CALVERT. Yeah.

You are here at the right time. We are getting a lot of—as you know, Brad, we are getting a lot of pushback from the various services on this defense agency issue. And so it is appropriate to be here.

And I just want to say something personally, that if it wasn't for Brad Wenstrup, we would have lost our colleague, Steve Scalise. You know, I believe in miracles. You just happened to be right next to him when Steve was shot and saved his life, so God bless you. Thank you very much, and——

Mr. WENSTRUP. Thank you.

Mr. CALVERT [continuing]. Thanks for your service. And we will certainly take a good look at this.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Also appreciate your emphasis on families, as far as how this works out.

Mr. WENSTRUP. Absolutely.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

I think it is important, every once in a while, to step back, review, and look and see what is happening. But I have a lot of questions about the way that the plan has been presented in moving forward.

We are losing our teaching hospitals, because of reimbursements and healthcare restructuring and a whole lot of factors, at a great rate. And medical school bills are huge when people graduate, whether it is dental, even advanced practice nursing and that. So one of the ways in which we can encourage people to go into medicine and then, you know, maybe go Reserve or Guard or maybe make a career of it in the military is to, you know, if they are talented, is to go into military medicine.

So I don't think we have had that big conversation on how that is going to impact. And then we also have a shortage of rural healthcare, you know, where some of our bases are located. That becomes a question for families.

So we have questions. Reform and change is difficult. Doesn't mean you shouldn't do it, but I think a little more due diligence needs to happen, from my comfort level, to make sure that we have adequate response in rural communities where we are posting that.

But I think you bring up an interesting thing that I haven't heard anybody talk about, and maybe we can talk about this some more later: burn units. We have a trauma Level 1 burn unit in the Twin Cities. There are others throughout the United States. They are great to have.

Maybe between these relationships, even—we don't have any bases in Minnesota—maybe, you know, working into rotations and conferences and really hands-on experience in working on a lot of these issues would be helpful.

And that is another way that you can have relationships to keep people's skills fresh. Because I appreciate what you are saying about that. Sometimes maternity hospitals have to close because enough babies aren't being born. And I get that when they talk about removing obstetrics and gynecology. But if we are still going
to serve families and if we want to retain women in the military, we also have to be addressing the family’s healthcare needs, not only the child’s but my gender, women’s healthcare.

So we have a lot of questions. And, you know, this seems like it is kind of steamrolling without thinking about some of the ripple effects. So I appreciate your comments. And, you know, it is refreshing to hear somebody say, this might not be perfect but we need to look at doing something different.

Mr. WENSTRUP. No, I appreciate everything that you just said. You know, we put people through medical school to join the military as a payback. You don’t know what specialty they are going to be in, yet our families need every specialty, right? So why do we want to take people out of uniform unnecessarily, in my opinion? And it is a great opportunity in a lot of ways.

I am suggesting right now, if I look at Puerto Rico, Centro Medico, they have a very—they have one trauma center, and it is Centro Medico in San Juan. And they are very short on personnel. If you are an ICU nurse, if you are a surgeon, your opportunities are better in the continental United States than they are in Puerto Rico. But what a great opportunity for our military personnel to be down to the Level 1 trauma center and provide the care for the community in the same way that Brooke Army Medical Center does for the community.

So these opportunities—you mention a burn center. You know, believe me, I served in Iraq, we treat a lot of burns. There is no reason why we can’t put some of our medical personnel into that burn center for training and for continued training and become the greater experts.

And not only that, this is a great opportunity with what is going on with coronavirus. The more we build the military-civilian relationships, the better prepared we can be.

Mr. WENSTRUP. If there is a natural disaster, an attack on our country, something of that magnitude, this is the way to develop it, when there is not a crisis and we are more prepared.

You are spot-on, ma’am, and I look forward to talking to you one-on-one or whatever the case may be. Thank you.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. WENSTRUP. You bet.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. Appreciate it.

Mr. WENSTRUP. Thank you.

[The written statement of Congressman Wenstrup follows:]
Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert,

Thank you for holding this Member Day hearing; it is an honor to speak before you today. As you approach funding decisions for our nation’s military, I would like to highlight several important topics related to military health and the readiness of our Armed Forces: (1) military-civilian readiness training platforms, (2) optimizing the organization of the Military Health System (MHS), and (3) retaining critical wartime specialties.

My interest and efforts in each of these areas is informed by the experiences and opportunities of my background—as a private citizen with a background in podiatric medicine; as a Colonel in the Army Reserve, having deployed as a Combat Surgeon in Iraq; as a Medical Policy Advisor for the Chief of the Army Reserve; and as a Member of Congress, where I have previously served on Armed Services and Veterans Affairs, Chairing VA Health, and presently serve on Ways and Means and Intelligence, where I Chair the Subcommittee on Defense Intelligence and Warfighter Support.

First, military-civilian (mil-civ) readiness training platforms are critical to ensuring that we have a truly ready medical force. Last year, multiple news articles brought attention to a shocking gap between the skills training and repetition opportunities available to military health personnel within the MHS as compared to the training available to civilians on the outside, especially regarding trauma. This gap makes sense when you think about the medical servicemember stationed on-base where the speed limit is 15 mph. Mil-civ partnership programs across the Services, along with updated capability requirements, are the solution to ensuring medical Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) are honed for readiness.

Further, mil-civ partnerships don’t just benefit military medical personnel—they benefit the warfighter, the civilian medical teams and patients at partner locations, and they establish critical homeland security relationships for natural disaster or mass-event response. I would like to thank the Service Surgeons General and Military Health leadership for their efforts in this area so far and ask this committee to maintain energetic support for program expansion across the board and for new and more ways to establish these relationships for the readiness of our medical forces.

With regard to our medical forces in general, at a time of national provider shortages we must be cautious of reducing or eliminating health care billets in uniform. We also need to ensure—in addition to providing stateside care for our troops, their families, and retirees—that our deployment readiness for medical missions is both combat- and humanitarian-related.

Next, I’d like to discuss the organization of the Military Health System. I commend the hardworking members of the Military Health System (MHS) for their efforts to implement the DHA as a combat support agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to work with separate Service Departments to achieve the understandings needed for the
complexities of the MHS transformation, which is what Congress has asked them to do. However, I am concerned about the need for greater clarity in command structure and responsibility at all levels. This can be accomplished through a reorganization of the MHS into a Joint Defense Health Command structure that includes the DHA Director; the Surgeons General with AC, Reserve, National Guard representation; and regional representation.

This structure would permit:

- The Service Surgeons General to focus on readiness and developing war plans, capabilities, mission requirements, mil-civ readiness training platforms, and KSAs, in order to meet the capabilities needed for deployment;
- The DHA to focus on managing MTFs and community-based care in order to provide the best possible service to beneficiaries, and to integrate service-owned training platforms where possible;
- Regional representatives to plan for varying needs, including operational efficiencies, training, and care opportunities across geographical areas, and to assist in building military-civilian relationships;
- A Commander with order authority to maintain the personnel flexibility across Services and MTFs.

While I understand it is difficult to consider change during an ongoing transition, I believe this structure will make our servicemembers safer, optimize system clarity, and foster mil-civ partnership opportunities, too. I ask members to support the creation of a Joint Defense Health Command, and to meet with me if you would like to discuss further.

Third, I would like to bring your attention to a problem that our Ready Reserve components are facing: significant shortages across dozens of critical wartime specialty positions, which threaten our ability to meet combat-ready wartime mission requirements. These shortages are not minor—in some cases, inventory is below 50 percent, and in an extreme case, below 10%, of the strength required to meet mission requirements. At the same time we are unable to fill these Reserve Component critical specialties, qualified personnel are retiring out of active duty and actively being disincentivized from continuing service as a Reservist; current law restricts a retiree from collecting their earned pension if they choose to continue service in the Reserve Component. So, we have critical shortages, and we have members trained, ready, and willing to fill them, but the current structure guides them to fully retire instead.

To solve this problem, I am introducing a bill to expand the Service Secretaries’ authority and ability to fill critical wartime specialty positions in the Reserve Component when needed by permitting qualifying retired servicemembers to continue service in the Ready Reserve Component while not being penalized from collecting their earned pension. Please let me know if you’d like to discuss this effort. I ask members to cosponsor this bill when I introduce it, and to tell your colleagues, in order to help us get it into this year’s NDAA.

In conclusion, existing issues in any of these domains—ineffective skills training, lack of clarity within the MHS, or the inability to fill Reserve positions critical to mission requirements—are vulnerabilities to our national security and to the warfighter. As you craft this year’s spending, I urge you to ensure the strength of our military medicine and protect against diminishing our military provider capacity.
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020.

WITNESS

HON. JENNIFER GONZÁLEZ-COLON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE TERRITORY OF PUERTO RICO

Mr. Visclosky. The gentlewoman from Puerto Rico.
Mr. Wenstrup. I didn’t even know she was sitting there.
Mr. Visclosky. You planned this out. I know you planned this out.
Mr. Wenstrup. Perfect timing.
Mr. Visclosky. You got something going for you. You are welcome to the committee. Please proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN GONZÁLEZ-COLON

Miss González-Colón. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member and members of the committee.
And I will pick up where he left it. He went to the Centro Medico in Puerto Rico, and we worked that idea he is bringing with the VA Committee in the last term. And I truly support it from—I mean, we do have three medical schools on the island as well, so there are many options to have that training on-site and on American soil.

Having said that, I want to say thank you for giving me the opportunity to actually come in here to present what should be some of the priorities on the island.

As being the only Representative for Puerto Rico in Congress, one of our main issues is the Fisher House. We have one VA hospital and a network of outpatient clinics to care for close to 84,000 veterans that rely on extended care in increasing numbers. The VA hospital in San Juan cares for veterans from the entire island but also for the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Elderly veterans attending the hospital for extended procedures often need the company of family members for support, and these family members incur additional expenses for transportation and lodging. Many of them cannot bear the cost of lodging.

And that is the reason I do and I am pleased that both the VA and the Fisher House Foundation have acknowledged the need and are working to make this project a reality on my island. Therefore, supporting the Fisher House is critical now, more than ever, for us.

Another area: According to the U.S. Department of Education, one-third of all Puerto Rican students drop out of high school. The National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program at Fort Allen Juana Diaz reaches individuals who have separated from the educational system and connects them with mentors for 17 months at no cost for their families.

According to the National Guard Youth Foundation, more than 6,000 individuals have completed the program in Puerto Rico, including almost 200 participants who graduated in March of this year.

Funding for the program at $210 million will provide for the Fort Allen Juana Diaz program and 42 other National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Programs and 5 current Job ChalleNGe Programs across the Nation to function.
Another area: The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program is responsible for more than 220,000 direct jobs and indirect jobs nationwide, including 200 of them in Puerto Rico, where my constituents help construct control system software for the F–35. Through one supplier on the island, this program has an economic impact of $17.8 million—of course, critical to the island’s economy but as well of our national security.

In other areas, I support the request of $56.2 million for funding for the Civil Air Patrol. I never knew how important this organization was until we suffered Hurricanes Irma and Maria. In the wake of those hurricanes, the Civil Air Patrol were instrumental in assessing damage through aerial photography, and FEMA utilized their photos and their information and data to provide faster assessments to areas isolated by disaster damage while saving a lot of money overall.

The other area that I want to include is the request that the baseline funding to the Department of Defense Innovative Readiness Training Program should be $30 million.

In 1 year, the First Mission Support Command, the U.S. Army Reserve in the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rican soldiers joined different DOD components in an IRT mission that provided medical services to over 9,000 patients, delivered over 2,000 eyeglasses, and completed over 10,000 medical procedures. Participating units increased readiness and obtained valuable hands-on training and experience while at the same time helping thousands in Puerto Rico.

Another area that this committee has been working in the last years—and I ask that the ordnance cleanup on Vieques and Culebra remain a priority of the Appropriations Committee and again be included in the report language. I will ask that any steps to accelerate the cleanup currently slated to finish in 2030 be taken.

Lastly, I would also like to note my support for the Department of Defense role in healthcare research, including funding for endometriosis, ovarian cancer, breast cancer research, tuberous sclerosis complex, and Gulf War illness treatment. Research on these health issues are vitally important and will have a broad range of effects across the economy and the country. These conditions often lack essential research and funding, while individuals seeking relief must rely on the capabilities of the Department of Defense to find effective treatments.

And, in that end, and with the situation with the coronavirus, there are more than 90 critical medical devices and drugs that are being made and manufactured in Puerto Rico. Forty-four percent of our economy is just pharmaceutical and medical devices.

Having said that, I think it is an issue of national security to maintain and expand the current research and production of drugs on the island that could be made. And we already have a large footprint of pharmaceutical industry that are working on U.S. soil instead of having many of them made abroad.

In that sense, I think we should expand the pharmaceutical industry and the footprint on the island. We do have the capabilities of making vaccines, of having the medical devices as well as drugs being made on the island, as well as the research. We are the main
exporter of drugs from any other State. Puerto Rico is the first one, then California.

Having said that, I think we should have a great opportunity to bring a lot of those productions of pharmaceutical and critically needed capabilities on U.S. soil.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Mr. ViscoSKY. Thank you very much for appearing, for your commitment.

I would point out—and, certainly, we agree with your support for Fisher House—that the committee added—I shouldn't say "added," but included $11 million from each of the operation and maintenance accounts for the services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—for the current year, as well as $10 million in the overall bill for $43 million.

Also, your emphasis on the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program, we increased that program, as you may know—and I am sure you advocated for it last year—by $50 million to a total of $200 million. No guarantee going forward, but certainly appreciate the importance of these and your advocacy very much.

Mr. Calvert. We all remember our former chairman fondly, Bill Young. And Bill certainly was a champion for Fisher House, as the gentleman remembers, and gentlelady, and he would be very supportive, as we are, of trying to help you.

I have been to Puerto Rico a number of times. It is a beautiful place. But, obviously, it has some challenges there, and we need to assist. And I am all for having more pharmaceutical development within the United States and its territories, because, you know, 95 percent of all vaccines right now are coming out of China. So we need to get more of this domestic capability back within our own control. So I support the gentlelady’s efforts on that.

Miss González-Colón. Thank you.

Mr. Calvert. Thank you.

Miss González-Colón. And, again, we do have the capabilities. You have a large footprint of those pharmaceuticals on the island. I think this is the right time to bring them back.

I thank you.

Mr. ViscoSKY. Thank you very much.

Miss González-Colón. Thank you.

[The written statement of Congresswoman González-Colón follows:]

The written statement of Congresswoman González-Colón follows:
Chairman Visclosky and Ranking Member Calvert, and members of this subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to present my FY 21 Defense Appropriations priorities with you here today.

Mr. Chairman, advocating for a Fisher House in Puerto Rico has remained one of my top priorities since being elected as Puerto Rico’s Representative in Congress. We have one VA hospital and a network of Outpatient Clinics to care for close to 84,000 veterans, 1 that rely on extended care in increasing numbers.

The VA Hospital in San Juan, cares for veterans from the entire Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. When elderly veterans attend the hospital for extended procedures or lengthier appointments, they often need the company of family members for support.

These family members incur additional expenses of transportation and lodging.

Many of my constituents have had to sleep in their cars, as their veteran family member receives extended medical attention in the hospital, because they cannot bear the cost of lodging.

It is my understanding that negotiations for securing our very first Fisher House are underway. I am pleased that both the VA and the Fisher House Foundation have acknowledged the need and are working to make this project a reality on the Island. Therefore, supporting funding for the Fisher House is critical now more than ever.

I am proud to co-lead a request that will safeguard funding for these houses on behalf of veterans in Puerto Rico and across our Nation, and I look forward to working together to allow this project to flourish for our heroes and their families.

Next, I’d like to discuss my support for the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program (NGYCP).
• Each year, according to the U.S. Department of Education, one-third of all Puerto Rican students drop out of high school causing significant impacts in the lives of these students and in our communities.

• The National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program (NGYCP) at Fort Allen, Juana Diaz was established in 1999, reaches these individuals who have become separated from an educational system and connects them with mentors who are connected for 17.5 months at no cost to the individual or their family.

• In total, according to the National Guard Youth Foundation, 6,349 individuals have completed the program in Puerto Rico, including almost 200 participants who graduated on March 4th of this year.

• Funding the program at $210 million would provide for the Fort Allen Juana Diaz program, 42 other NGYCPs, and the five current Job ChalleNGe Programs (JCPs).

• Another funding priority of mine is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. The program itself is responsible for more than 220,000 direct and indirect jobs nationally, including 200 in Puerto Rico, where my constituents help construct control system software for the F-35.

• Through one supplier on the Island, this program has an economic impact of $17,800,000, critical to the Island’s economy.

• Lastly, I would also like to note my support for the Department of Defense’s role in health care research including funding for the following issues: endometriosis, ovarian cancer, breast cancer research, tuberous sclerosis complex, and Gulf War Illness treatment.

• Research on these, and other health issues, is vitally important and will have broad ranging effects across the country. These conditions often lack essential, or even adequate research and funding, while individuals seeking relief must rely on the capabilities of the Department of Defense to find effective treatments.

• Thank you for considering my requests.
Ms. Jackson Lee, your statement in its entirety will be entered into the record. If you could summarize, we are 20 minutes over our time already, so we would appreciate that. You are recognized.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN JACKSON LEE

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Good morning to everyone.

I just wanted to make a few points of the importance of this committee and the importance of this committee, of course, to the Nation’s security. Let me recognize both the chairman and the ranking member of this committee.

And I know the timeframe was not specifically directed to me, but I will try to rush as quickly as I can to ensure that I do not contribute to the 20 minutes over time.

The coronavirus is something that we have been told by our health professionals that is not at the end; it is at the beginning and surging. I want to emphasize the importance of the Defense Department and its ability to be innovative.

So I have a particular university, Baylor College of Medicine, that has vaccination research ready to go and needs a partner. And I would encourage—I know that this is the next year’s fiscal budget, but I am hoping that the Defense Approps can look at the opportunities for partnering with the civilian government and making a difference in the lives of civilians.

And so Baylor College of Medicine has a vaccination protocol ready to go, and I would hope that there would be some opportunities in the funding for this to go forward.

I would also like to promote in the Defense—these are things that I have not noted in my statement—is the issue of soft power. Now that there has been an agreement, which some of us are concerned about, with the Taliban, the importance of schools for girls, the importance of working with the Afghan Government on the issues of soft power, of educating individuals against violence, against succumbing to any of the old attitudes of the Taliban, I think would be particularly helpful to our remaining troops and to the safety and security of the Afghan people.

I have supported consistently funding for PTSD. And I want to thank the Approps Committee for its resources. I always look for increasing that number. It seems that every time in my district, which has a large number of veterans, that PTSD continues to grow.

You have also helped me in the past with triple-negative breast cancer in terms of the research. I would like and hope that I could get that focused on in this coming appropriations in terms of the impact it has on military women.

I also want to emphasize my support, as well, for the National Guard ChalleNGe Program.
Then I would like to just speak generally to programs dealing with the research that you do on cancer, and that is the Peer-Reviewed Cancer Research Program, which I believe is important; the Peer-Reviewed Pancreatic Cancer Research Program, knowing of the surge of pancreatic cancer; the support for the $18 million for kidney cancer research in the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program; research for ovarian cancer; $18 million for neurofibromatosis research; research or supporting the money for medical care of suicide prevention, which is enormous and growing, and I know there is a way for us to prevent that; $18 million for multiple sclerosis research; $96 million for Department of Defense prostate cancer research and TBI/PTSD research. I think it has been noted of the increase in the veterans and Active Duty military with those concerns.

Peer-reviewed money for Parkinson’s disease; autism research; and then $8 million for service dogs for servicemembers and veterans—I am a strong supporter of service dogs, seen them work. Thank you for that support.

And I support the robust funding for the GPS III space segment in Air Force procurement, making sure that modern weapons systems, including precise strike munitions, are getting precise navigation.

$36 million for Procurement Technical Assistance Program, the PTAP; and the $22 million—let me thank you—for the Sexual Assault Prevention Program; and then the $33 million for the national trauma clinical research.

I would like to join in my predecessor who was here before talking about stronger relationships between the military and civilian population. The military and defense are overall admired, and there are many opportunities for collaboration.

And I would close by saying, certainly the coronavirus now raises its head and asks the question, how many in the military structure can be helpful as this virus continues to grow? And I know that it depends upon the funding that this committee, this important committee, has offered in terms of flexibility and how they can be utilized. But, obviously, they are very important, not only in our national security, our overseas efforts, but they are certainly important, as well, to the efforts here in helping out civilians in the domestic life.

So I thank you. I would like to close by just reemphasizing the soft power, which I think is so greatly needed in our efforts around the world.

I yield back.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much for your advocacy, particularly on the health programs.

I would note that you have joined our colleague Mr. McGovern from Massachusetts in your advocacy for the service dog program, which is very vital.

And, again, appreciate your appearance.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. I thank the gentlelady. I know that Houston has some of the greatest medical institutions in the world, and would be happy to assist and help in any way we can. Thank you.
Ms. JACkSON LEE. Thank you. I will pursue that. Baylor is sitting there with 20,000 vials of a potential workable vaccine for the coronavirus. They just need to get that partner to get into the lab to be able to do the clinicals. And we are trying to work proactively now, and I know we are in the budget for next year, but proactively now to see if we can get those clinicals done. We would be very interested.

Thank you.

Mr. ViscloskY. Thank you very much.

We are adjourned.

Mr. CuEllar. Thank you.

[The written statement of Congresswoman Jackson Lee follows:]
Chairman Vislosky, Ranking Member Calvert and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:

- I offer my appreciation and thanks to Chairman Vislosky and Ranking Member Calvert for the difficult work and choices that must be made to produce a truly bipartisan Defense spending bill, and for their commitment to producing a bill that fairly reflects the interests and priorities of the American people.
- Mr. Chairman, I understand that my entire statement will be made part of the record so I will keep my remarks brief.
- Mr. Chairman, there is no higher priority than the safety, security, health and wellbeing of the American people.
- All Americans are concerned about the Coronavirus, it is evolving into a global epidemic that is quickly spreading.
- Reports of outbreaks in relation to the coronavirus are emerging from different countries abroad and multiple states within the U.S.
- It is imperative that we fund research programs dedicated to improving health outcomes and life for all citizens.
- The medical research, healthcare initiatives and other proactive measures that we take now are crucial to combatting this epidemic.
- By taking collective action to combat this pandemic, we can impede the Coronavirus abroad, protect the health and wellbeing of the people and ensure the safety of our nation.
In the few minutes allotted I wish to highlight the medical research and defense programs which warrant the Committee’s continuing attention and support.

MEDICAL RESEARCH

**I support $172.5 million for Peer Reviewed Cancer Research Program**

The Peer-Reviewed Cancer Research Program fosters groundbreaking cancer research relevant to service members and their families. Cancers eligible to compete for funding under this program since its inception have included melanoma, pediatric brain tumors, kidney cancer, colorectal cancer, pancreatic cancer, stomach cancer, lymphoma, and mesothelioma.

**I support $7.8 million for Peer Reviewed Pancreatic Cancer Research**

Pancreatic cancer is the 4th leading cause of cancer deaths and has a 5 year survival rate of just 6 percent. Continued inclusion of pancreatic cancer in the PRCRP is crucial to advancing diagnostic tools and treatment options for members of the military family who face the devastating diagnosis of pancreatic cancer.

**I support $18 million for Kidney Cancer in Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program (CDMRP)**

In 2015, kidney cancer will lead to an estimated 14,080 and 61,560 new diagnoses, making it the ninth most common cancer in the United States. Given the disease burden in the U.S. veteran population, it is appropriate to have the Department of Defense provide research funding necessary to develop innovative treatment options to combat this deadly disease.

**I support $23 million for Ovarian Cancer Research Program in Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs.**

Advances in the treatment and diagnosis of ovarian cancer through the DoD Ovarian Cancer Research Program will not only enhance the health and well-being of uniformed service personnel, their families, and the veteran population, but also the civilian Americans they serve and protect.

**I support $18 million for Neurofibromatosis Research Program**

Neurofibromatosis research addresses areas of great clinical need directly affecting the health of our soldiers. The genetic information learned from Neurofibromatosis research holds the key to understanding a number of health issues that benefit the war fighter, as well as the general population, including cancer, bone fracture and repair,
I support $165.6 million for Medical Care—Suicide Prevention.
I request $165.6 million in the “Medical Care” account within the Defense Health Program budget for suicide prevention and outreach efforts.

I support $18 million for Multiple Sclerosis Research Programs
The MS program in the CDMRP is a unique partnership among Congress, the public, and the military supporting untapped research opportunities to encourage innovation and ingenuity in biomedical science. Hallmarks of the CDMRP include investing in groundbreaking research; supporting the next generation of researchers as well as established scientists; and funding clinical research to prevent, detect, diagnose, and treat MS.

I support 896 million for Department of Defense Prostate Cancer Research
Prostate cancer, the most prevalent type in men, and second most diagnosed cancer in the nation kills over thirty thousand people per year. Veterans, especially those exposed to defoliants have been identified as being more prone to this disease. Research on prostate cancer will lead to better early diagnostic tools as well as better treatments and improvements to quality of life for prostate cancer survivors.

I support 899 million for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and PTSD Research
Psychological disorders and brain injuries are the signature wounds of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent research has linked concussive and subconcussive brain trauma to accelerated cognitive degeneration in the civilian population. The same may also happen to our current generation of military barring major advancement in this area of research.

I support 818.4 million for Peer-Reviewed Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Parkinson’s Research
Our active duty service personnel are routinely exposed to a wide range of toxins and other external stressors that may lead to the development of Parkinson’s disease. The U.S. Army Peer-Reviewed NETPR grants identify the effects of environmental and operational hazards and provide the basis for strategies to sustain and enhance the health and performance of active duty soldiers and veterans. In addition, any research breakthroughs may be immediately applied to the civilian population.
I support $12 million for Autism Research
Many DoD families are touched by autism and military life is particularly difficult for children with autism and their families. The impact of autism also extends to the performance and readiness of service members, potentially affecting readiness. The results of this research will directly serve the interests of DoD families touched by autism as well as the medical, educational, healthcare and service professionals who serve the needs of the autism community within and beyond the DoD.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

I support $5 million for Service Dogs for Servicemembers and Veterans.
Provide $5 million for competitive grant programs that support nonprofit organizations committed to connecting service dogs with service members and veterans. Due to financial constraints, many nonprofit organizations that train service dogs are limited in their ability to connect service dogs with veterans and service members with physical and mental health disabilities. Grant funding for these nonprofits is critical to providing service members and veterans with the care they deserve.

I support robust funding for GPS III Space Segment in Air Force Procurement
Modern weapons systems, including precision strike munitions and our maneuvering combat forces depend on the precise navigation and timing provided continuously by GPS satellites. Moreover, millions of Americans benefit from GPS on a daily basis. Continued R&D efforts to improve the capabilities of GPS III are needed for future enhancement and longevity of the program.

I support $36 million for Procurement Technical Assistance Program
PTAP is one of the most successful federal programs to assist small businesses. In 2013, PTACs provided an average of 3,560 counseling sessions a week for over 70,000 active clients.

I support $22 million for Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is tasked with implementing a comprehensive policy to ensure the safety, dignity and well-being of all members of the armed forces by eradicating military sexual assault. SAPRO focuses on preventing sexual assault through education and training campaigns at all levels,
improving victims access to services and the quality of those services received, and proper handling and resolution of a sexual assault case.

I support 833 million for National Trauma Clinical Research Program
This program would provide funds for research on the highest priority medical concerns of the Department, such as hemorrhage control. Several studies dating as far back as 50 years demonstrate how inadequate our government’s commitment has been to finding better treatment for traumatic injury. We believe the addition of funds as we have requested constitutes a highly valuable investment which will benefit our soldiers in future combat missions, as well as pay enormous benefit to our civilian population.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Ranking Member for your leadership and for extending me this opportunity to share my major priorities with the Subcommittee.
[No public hearings were held, but statements are provided for the record:]
Testimony of the Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR)
Prepared by John Latini, Chairman, CNSR
Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives

Defense Science & Technology (S&T) Program and Basic Research Funding for FY 2021

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert and distinguished Members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to submit public witness testimony as you begin to craft the fiscal year (FY) 2021 Defense Appropriations bill. The Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR) (https://cnsr4research.org/) is a broad-based alliance of more than 100 members from industry, academia, scientific and professional associations, and non-profits conducting vital scientific research to create new and improve existing technologies and capabilities to support the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) operations.

As you would expect, CNSR members are diligently working to help combat the COVID-19 pandemic. From conducting research on vaccines and other therapeutics, 3D printing personal protective equipment, and creating emergency ventilators, we are working to support the federal response and our local communities. In many cases, prior DoD-sponsored research has helped create the expertise and capabilities we are now utilizing during the global pandemic. We thank the subcommittee for its role in providing supplemental appropriations to fight the pandemic including the funds provided to the Defense Health Program. CNSR is eager to work with the subcommittee on future supplemental appropriations bills to provide emergency support to the nation’s research enterprise not only to combat the pandemic, but to ensure that negative impacts to existing national security relevant research and workforce are minimal.

Going forward, as hopefully the pandemic subsides, CNSR urges the subcommittee to provide robust support for the Defense Science and Technology (S&T) program in the FY 2021 Defense Appropriations bill. As noted in the Ronald Reagan Institute’s The Contest for Innovation, generational technological advances, including developing military-relevant technologies, require federal investments in basic and applied research; private-sector research and development (R&D) is an inadequate replacement. Consequently, it is absolutely essential that Congress provides not only robust funding for Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) but specifically for the Defense S&T program as near-peer competitor nations, such as China and Russia, vie for dominance in military technologies.

FY 2021 Budget Request for the Defense S&T Program

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) lays out numerous defense objectives and goals for the U.S. to remain as the preeminent military power in the world. Investing in the Defense S&T program is not only consistent with the NDS, it is critical to its successful implementation. The Defense S&T program serves as the foundation of the DoD’s mission to meet the NDS’s objectives of deterring adversaries, sustaining Joint Force military advantages, establishing an unmatched twenty-first century National Security Innovation Base (NSIB), and continuously improving and developing military technologies and capabilities that provide technological

1 https://www.reaganfoundation.org/program-institute/centers/peace-through-strength/reagan-institute/task-force/
overmatch while anticipating the future needs of our Armed Forces. Simply put, you cannot fight tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons and technologies.

Unfortunately, the FY 2021 budget request fails to provide the resources to meet the objectives of the NDS. While the budget includes the largest RDT&E top line request ever, it simultaneously calls for cutting Defense S&T funding within the larger portfolio by more than $2 billion including defense basic research by approximately $285 million compared to FY 2020 enacted levels. In fact, according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the FY 2021 budget request would result in a cut of 7 percent to the Defense R&D portfolio, producing an 11 percent cut for basic research and a 12 percent cut to applied research compared to the previous year. With China likely to become the world’s top R&D performer in the near future, now is not the time to cut funding for the Defense S&T program designed to create the new technologies and capabilities – as well as help train the next generation workforce – to ensure the U.S. military maintains its global dominance.

The FY 2021 budget proposes to do more than just cut funding below FY 2020 congressionally enacted levels; it proposes to cut funding below the levels DoD requested in FY 2020. FY 2021 resources for the following are proposed to be cut below the FY 2020 budget request:

- Overall Defense S&T Program
- Overall 6.1 basic research
- Overall Navy basic research
- Navy Defense Research Sciences
- Navy University Research Initiatives
- Overall Air Force basic research
- Air Force Defense Research Sciences
- DTRA Basic Research Initiatives
- Defense-Wide Basic Research Initiatives

CNSR urges Congress to reject these cuts and increase Defense S&T funding consistent with recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission and the more than 500 leading organizations from American industry, higher education, and science and engineering.

**Defense Basic Research Program Element (PE) Recommendations**

For decades, the defense basic research programs have provided the scientific breakthroughs to give the warfighter the weapons and equipment needed to succeed. Capabilities that help ensure our national security – such as stealth technology, night vision, near-real-time delivery of battlefield information, GPS, communication and weather satellites, laser technology, nuclear propulsion, counter-stealth technology, and precision munitions – all derive from defense basic research. If we want to succeed in future global competition, we cannot underinvest in the long-term basic research that will provide the military with new transformational capabilities. Defense basic research is currently exploring future military capabilities in many areas of interest to DoD, such as quantum materials, biologically enhanced sensing and computing, autonomous reasoning, and adaptive materials. The FY 2021 budget undermines the DoD-NSfB partnership

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3 https://presssec.gov/pubs/budget2021
5 https://imperialist-imperative.terrsrupp.com/index.html
to develop future military capabilities and maintain American global preeminence by proposing to slash the defense basic research PEs.

Furthermore, the FY 2021 budget harms DoD’s ability to build capacity in its research programs and workforce by proposing to eliminate funding for efforts such as Defense Established Programs to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR). DoD often relies on scientists and engineers on an as needed basis and not supporting communities in states that typically are not involved in defense research could slow innovation efforts. In addition, in order to meet the scientific workforce needs of the future, DoD should be seeking to develop talent in every state in the nation. As such, CNSR supports Congress restoring funding for DEPSCoR.

**University Research Initiatives (URIs)**

University Research Initiatives (URIs) would be absolutely devastated from funding levels proposed in the FY 2021 budget. Overall URI funding would be funded at levels below FY 2010 in real dollars. Compared to FY 2020 enacted levels, Army URI is proposed to be cut by more than 23 percent, Navy URI by 30 percent and Air Force URI by almost 10 percent. We are concerned that cuts of this magnitude would harm fundamental technological developments critical to maintain our military superiority across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains.

Within the URI programs, the FY 2021 budget proposes to fund the Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program and Defense University Research Instrumentation Program (DURIP) below FY 2010 levels in real dollars. The MURI program regularly sponsors university basic research that produces revolutionary new military technologies. Drones, nanotechnology, biological detection capabilities and stealth detection sensors all stem from MURI-sponsored scientific research. DURIP helps ensure universities have the appropriate equipment needed to conduct cutting edge research of importance to DoD. The FY 2021 request for these programs would only exacerbate the problem that both are dramatically underfunded. In FY 2020, 339 MURI proposals were unfunded and DURIP received proposals requesting $295 million but was only able to award $49 million, which is less than FY 2019. It seems unlikely that competitor nations are underfunding scientific research programs in a similar way.

Given the NDS priority of not fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons, we respectfully request that you increase each URI PE and require that the additional dollars be used to support the MURI & DURIP programs. We request that these increases not come at the expense of the other initiatives funded under these PEs. We strongly encourage you to direct DoD to maintain and grow funding for both programs in the Future Years Defense Program.

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4 https://www.ish.org/3dmmedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/DA...STD/V5281.pdf
5 Ibid
6 https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2099273/fiscal-year-2020-university-research-funding...
7 https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2021537/dod-awards-189-million-to-universities-for-major...


Minerva Research Initiative

The FY 2021 budget proposes to eliminate Defense-Wide funding for Minerva, which is housed within the Basic Research Initiatives PE. In addition, the FY 2021 budget proposes to cancel 23 ongoing Minerva projects being conducted by more than 30 universities.

The Minerva Research Initiative is the Department’s signature social science basic research program that funds university-led teams to address problems of strategic importance to U.S. national security. Minerva has aligned its research with the NDS in support of Department-wide priorities. Recently funded Minerva projects, such as “Russian Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns” and “Empirical Analysis for Meeting Great Power Challenges” have given DOD unique insights that help shape future national security policies and better position the warfighter in a complex global environment. In FY 2018, Minerva only funded 12 projects but received approximately 175 applications[10]. As noted by DoD officials, many of the challenges we face are social or have social elements to them and Minerva research is an important source of new ideas to better understand social, behavioral, cultural, and political aspects that are inherent to our security and stability. By only funding 7 percent of applications, we are missing out on new ideas that will enable us to maintain U.S. superiority with competitor nations and more astutely predict and deter the precursors of conflict. CNSR urges Congress to restore Defense-Wide funding for Minerva and increase its overall budget to $17 million.

Finally, below please find the remainder of CNSR’s basic research PE recommendations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PE Number</th>
<th>Agency/RDT&amp;E</th>
<th>Program Element</th>
<th>FY 21 Request (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>601102A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Defense Research Sciences</td>
<td>$375,749</td>
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<tr>
<td>601103A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>University Research Initiatives</td>
<td>$93,129</td>
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<td>601104A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>University and Industry Research Centers</td>
<td>$134,794</td>
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<td>601103A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Cyber Collaborative Research Alliance</td>
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<td>601103N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>University Research Initiatives</td>
<td>$177,921</td>
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<tr>
<td>601153N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Defense Research Sciences</td>
<td>$491,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601102F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Defense Research Sciences</td>
<td>$377,473</td>
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<td>601103F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>University Research Initiatives</td>
<td>$189,591</td>
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<td>601108F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>High Energy Laser Research Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>601100BR</td>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>DTRA Basic Research Initiatives</td>
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<td>601110D8Z</td>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>Basic Research Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>601120D8Z</td>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>National Defense Education Program</td>
<td>$152,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense Applied Research PE Recommendations

Basic scientific research is just the first step in creating new military technologies. Researchers and scientists must apply the fundamental knowledge learned from basic research in order to solve military problems and develop the systems and components for potential solutions. To that end, we would like to highlight the success of the Defense-Wide Manufacturing Science & Technology PE, which provides resources for DoD’s contribution to the Manufacturing USA Network. The Network’s institutes form public-private partnerships that help move discoveries

from the nation’s universities and research laboratories to the defense industrial base while enhancing the workforce. For example, Manufacturing USA created technologies and solutions for reducing weight in aerospace parts by up to 40 percent, built light-based communications systems enabling more effective and safe clandestine operations, developed cybersecurity awareness and compliance tools targeted at securing small- and medium-sized manufacturers and universities, and provided workforce training opportunities for more than 200,000 individuals in FY 2018. The NDS says, “Support for a vibrant domestic manufacturing sector, a solid defense industrial base, and resilient supply chains is a national priority.” The Manufacturing USA Network is an example of a program consistent with the NDS in support of domestic manufacturing and the defense industrial base.

Below please find CNSR’s applied research PE recommendations along with DARPA and priority medical research programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PE Number</th>
<th>Agency/RDT&amp;E</th>
<th>Program Element</th>
<th>FY 21 Request (Thousands)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>602143A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Soldier Lethality Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602144A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Ground Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602145A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Next Generation Combat Vehicle Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603461A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>High Performance Computing Modernization</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602131M</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Marine Corps Land Force Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602335N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Common Picture Applied Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602336N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Wargame Sustainment Applied Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>602271N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Systems Applied Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<td>602435N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Ocean Warfighting Environmental Applied Research</td>
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<td>602759N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Future Naval Capabilities Applied Research</td>
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<td>603689N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Manufacturing Technology Program</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>604586N</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Advanced Undersea Prototyping</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>602102F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602201F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Human Effectiveness Applied Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>602304F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Aeronautic Sensors</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>602696F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Directed Energy Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602788F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Dominant Information Sciences and Methods</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602890F</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>High Energy Laser Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602698BDEZ</td>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>Cyber Security Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<td>602698DDEZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>603933DDEZ</td>
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<td>Engineering Science and Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>DARPA Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>602788A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Medical Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<td>603022A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Medical Advanced Technology</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>603807A</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Medical Systems Advanced Development</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHP</td>
<td>Research, Development, and Test and Evaluation Research</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHP</td>
<td>Exploratory Development</td>
<td>General Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHP</td>
<td>CDMRP</td>
<td>$1,712,536</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Again, thank you for the opportunity to submit public witness testimony as you develop the FY 21 Defense Appropriations bill. Please do not hesitate to contact me if we can be of any service to you.
## Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI clause 2(g)(5)*, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form electronically by filling in the provided blanks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Appropriations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Date</td>
<td>April 9, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Title</td>
<td>Public witness testimony for the record for fiscal year 2021.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Witness Name:** John Latini
**Position/Title:** Chairman
**Witness Type:** Governmental • Non-governmental

Are you representing yourself or an organization? ○ Self • Organization

If you are representing an organization, please list what entity or entities you are representing:

The Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR) is a broad-based alliance of more than 100 organizations including industry, academia, scientific and professional organizations and nonprofits. Full membership list can be found at cnsr4research.org.

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

Coalition members conducted $5.8 billion in DoD-sponsored research.

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contract or payment. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.
False Statements Certification

Knowingly providing material false information to this committee/subcommittee, or knowingly concealing material information from this committee/subcommittee, is a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This form will be made part of the hearing record.

John Latini
Witness signature

Date

4/8/20

If you are a non-governmental witness, please ensure that you attach the following documents to this disclosure. Check both boxes to acknowledge that you have done so.

☐ Written statement of proposed testimony
☐ Curriculum vitae or biography

*Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5), of the U.S. House of Representatives provides:

(B) In the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of any Federal grants or contracts, or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current calendar year or either of the two previous calendar years by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing.

(C) The disclosure referred to in subdivision (B) shall include—

(i) the amount and source of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) related to the subject matter of the hearing; and

(ii) the amount and country of origin of any payment or contract related to the subject matter of the hearing originating with a foreign government.

(D) Such statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the privacy or security of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness appears.
The Defense Science and Technology (S&T) program invests in and develops capabilities that advance the technical superiority of the U.S. military to counter new and emerging threats. Whether it is developing weapon systems, defensive countermeasures or technologies used to heal the wounded, the Defense S&T program is how the U.S. maintains worldwide military technical supremacy.

Among its various components, the Defense S&T program funds the Department of Defense’s (DoD) basic research programs. Basic research enables discoveries that can ultimately be turned into new military capabilities. If the U.S. is to maintain its technical advantage, we must invest in the basic research that will provide the military with the capabilities to overmatch our adversaries.

CNSR advocates robust funding at 4% growth for the Defense S&T program across all branches of the military, including basic research programs such as University Research Initiatives, University and Industry Research Centers and Basic Research Initiatives.

CNSR also advocates for the important work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in funding high-risk, high-reward research that has led to significant technological advances.

It is vital to the health of the overall industrial base that DoD support innovative manufacturing research and education. Consequently, the coalition supports strong funding levels for the National Defense Education Program (NDEP), Defense-Wide Manufacturing Science and Technology (S&T) Program and Manufacturing Engineering Education Program (MEEP).

To learn more about CNSR, including authorization and appropriations priorities, please visit: cnsr4research.org.

COALITION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH
The Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR) is a broad-based alliance of industry, academia, scientific and professional organizations, and non-profits committed to advocating for a strong Defense Science and Technology enterprise.

NUMBERS OF NOTE

69% Approx. 69% of DoD RDT&E is conducted extramurally.

Industry performs about 61% of DoD-sponsored RDT&E

Academia & non-profits perform about 60% of DoD-sponsored basic research.

Academia performs about 26% of all DoD-sponsored basic and applied research.

DoD relies on more than 400 universities & colleges to conduct defense R&D.

OFFENCE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (S&T)
Enabled Military Capabilities

-Jet Engines
-Stealth Technology
-Military Drones
-Semiconductor Innovations
-Advances in Quantum Computing
-Military Armor
## Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR) Membership List

- Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
- American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
- American Chemical Society (ACS)
- American Institute of Medical and Biological Engineering
- American Mathematical Society (AMS)
- American Psychological Association (APA)
- American Society for Engineering Education
- Arizona State University
- ASME
- Association of American Universities (AAU)
- Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU)
- Battelle
- Boston University
- Brown University
- California Institute of Technology
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Columbia University
- Computing Research Association
- Consortium for Ocean Leadership
- Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSA)
- Cornell University
- Duke University
- DuPont
- Energetics, Inc.
- Federation of Associations in Behavioral & Brain Sciences (FABB)
- Federation of Materials Societies
- Florida International University
- Florida State University
- George Mason University
- Georgia Institute of Technology
- Harvard University
- IEEE-USA
- Indiana University
- Lehigh University
- Louisiana State University
- Louisiana Tech University
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Materials Research Society
- Michigan State University
- Michigan Technological University
- New Mexico State University
- Northeastern University
- Northern Illinois University
- Northwestern University
- Oak Ridge Associated Universities
- Ohio State University
- Oregon Health and Science University
- Oregon State University
- OSA-The Optical Society
- Pace University
- Penn State University
- Princeton University
- Purdue University
- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
- Scripps Institution of Oceanography
- Semiconductor Industry Association
- Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
- SPIE, the international society for optics and photonics
- SRM International
- Temple University
- Texas A&M University
- The Catholic University of America
- The George Washington University
- The Johns Hopkins University
- The State University of New York
- University of Arizona
- University of California System
- University of California, Davis
- University of California, Irvine
- University of California, Los Angeles
- University of California, Riverside
- University of California, San Diego
- University of Central Florida
- University of Chicago
- University of Cincinnati
- University of Colorado Boulder
- University of Delaware
- University of Florida
- University of Houston
- University of Illinois System
- University of Iowa
- University of Kansas
- University of Maryland at College Park
- University of Michigan
- University of Missouri System
- University of Nebraska
- University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
- University of North Carolina System
- University of Oklahoma
- University of Pennsylvania
- University of Pittsburgh
- University of Rhode Island
- University of Rochester
- University of South Florida
- University of Southern California
- University of Tennessee
- University of Texas at San Antonio
- University of Texas System
- University of Virginia
- University of Washington
- University of Wisconsin - Madison
- Vanderbilt University
- Virginia Commonwealth University
- Washington State University
- West Virginia University
- Williams & Mary
- Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
- Yale University
The Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s Research (MJFF) appreciates the opportunity to comment on Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 appropriations for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Our comments focus on the importance of federal investments in biomedical research through the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP). MJFF supports an appropriation of at least $25 million to the CDMRP the Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Parkinson’s (NETP). At its peak, the program received $27 million, but funding has decreased and has been constant at $16 million for the last seven years. Adjusting for medical inflation, the Parkinson’s Research Program has lost 63% of its value since 2007. This is a disservice to the service members in our country’s armed forces. Reinstating funding will ensure scientific progress of importance to our nation’s service members can continue.

As the world’s largest nonprofit funder of Parkinson’s disease (PD) research, MJFF is dedicated to accelerating a cure for Parkinson’s and developing improved therapies for those living with the disease today. In funding more than $900 million in PD research to date, the Foundation has fundamentally altered the trajectory of progress toward a cure. However, MJFF investments are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, federally funded research. With critically needed Parkinson’s breakthroughs on the horizon, robust and reliable federal funding is imperative to drive progress. Currently, there is no therapy to slow, stop or reverse the progression of PD. Additionally, existing treatments are limited in their abilities to address patients’ medical needs and remain effective over time.

Parkinson’s is a chronic, progressive neurological disorder with no treatment to slow, stop or reverse its progression. It is estimated that approximately one million people and 110,000 veterans in the United States are living with Parkinson’s disease. And Parkinson’s disease costs the United States $52 billion every year. The federal government shoulders more than $25 billion of that cost every year in Medicare, Supplemental Security Income and Social Security Disability Insurance costs.

Military service members are exposed to unique toxins and other external stressors, such as traumatic brain injury, burn pits and various pesticides. Research has correlated these exposures with an increased risk of Parkinson’s, but more research is needed. The Department of Defense the NETP is the only government-funded research program specifically dedicated to PD and the service-related causes of the disease. It aims to identify and understand service-associated PD risk factors to prevent or delay the onset of symptoms, as well as advance the development of new treatments. Funds from this forward-looking grant program provide the DoD with innovations in
material design, avoidance protocols for unnecessary harmful exposures and pathways to develop treatments to prevent damage from occurring.

Over the past 20 years, this program has conducted research into head injury biomarkers, advanced knowledge of the biochemical basis of service member depression and provided greater understanding of neurodegenerative disease risk as a consequence of military service. As a result, Veterans Affairs recognizes the link between some of these stressors and the onset of Parkinson’s, now deeming PD a service-connected disease when a veteran was exposed to certain toxicants or suffered a traumatic brain injury during their time in the military. This a significant return on investment, and a sign that the NETP program is worth increased investment.

Additionally, findings from many of the studies funded through the NETP are applicable to the general population as well, leveraging DoD investments to help a greater number of people with this disease and their loved ones.

Predicting Parkinson’s to Intervene before Symptoms Arise

As scientists develop therapies to slow or stop progression of Parkinson’s, these tools are likely more effective if tested and used in the earliest stages of the disease. The Parkinson’s Associated Risk Study aims to develop tools to predict who will develop Parkinson’s disease for earlier intervention. Initial analysis of data from 280 individuals showed 30% of patients with smell loss and a dopamine deficit shown on brain scans at the beginning of the study were diagnosed with PD within two years and 67% within four years. These findings point to potential predictive factors that could lead to closer monitoring for disease and inform design of trials testing new therapies. Researchers are currently analyzing six-year update data. Increasing investment in the DoD NETP program will help them complete this work and move closer to predictive tools.

Better tools to monitor PD risk and enroll individuals — including veterans — in clinical trials could help them manage their disease and potentially stop it in its early days.

Understanding Risk Factors to Implement Policies and Develop Interventions

Of course, better than detecting and stopping Parkinson’s after pathology starts would be preventing it altogether. The CDMRP’s Parkinson’s Research Program aims to identify and understand Parkinson’s risk factors (such as chemical exposures, psychological stress and traumatic brain injury) to develop strategies to mitigate those risks and therapies to intervene in the pathological cascade. These developments could help both the armed forces, veterans and civilians.

For example, the NETP has supported a range of studies on chemical exposures to identify hazards in the line of duty. Service members can be exposed to chemicals through many means, including during deployments and through contact with military materials such as jet fuel and permethrin-impregnated uniforms. DoD-funded studies have found strong associations between organochlorine pesticides and neurodegenerative disease. Scientists and advocacy
organizations such as ours are now calling for bans on these pesticides to lessen the risk of brain disease.

**CDMRP: Unique Research with Reach Beyond the Military**

The research portfolio supported by the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs fuels scientific discovery by propelling exploration of revolutionary ideas and concepts with the potential to support and treat members of the military and the greater national population. The CDMRP funds highly innovative projects — for which support is typically limited or unavailable — from research teams at top universities and medical centers.

It is important to note, Department of Defense programs neither duplicate nor supplant National Institutes of Health (NIH) research programs, but rather enhance those efforts. NIH-funded basic research serves as a foundation for groundbreaking, disorder-targeted research at the DoD. NIH and DoD program officers meet and communicate regularly to ensure collaboration and prevent duplication.

The well-executed and efficient programs within the defense health research programs demonstrate responsible government stewardship of taxpayer dollars and benefit current and former military service members, the general patient population and our nation’s economy. DoD’s biomedical research funding has led to many significant breakthroughs and achievements, contributing to national security and the health and welfare of U.S. Armed Forces personnel and their dependents.

Please continue to invest in Americans’ health and well-being by allocating $25 million dollars for the Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Parkinson’s Program in FY 2021 and supporting CDMRP programs generally.
Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5)*, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form electronically by filling in the provided blanks.

Position/Title: Todd Sherer

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information. NONE

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contract or payment. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

NONE

False Statements Certification

Knowingly providing material false information to this committee/subcommittee, or knowingly concealing material information from this committee/subcommittee, is a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This form will be made part of the hearing record.

Witness signature /s/ Todd Sherer Date 04/08/20

If you are a non-governmental witness, please ensure that you attach the following documents to this disclosure. Check both boxes to acknowledge that you have done so.

Written statement of proposed testimony
Curriculum vitae or biography
Kel McClanahan, Executive Director
National Security Counselors
Testimony Before the House of Representatives
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
8 April 2020

Chairman Visclosky, Ranking Member Calvert, and members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written testimony.

The Government Accountability Office plays a critical role in Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch. Unfortunately, that role may be stymied when it comes to the Intelligence Community (“IC”). Despite the fact that, by statute, GAO already has the purview to conduct oversight of all federal agencies1 and has since its creation in 1921,2 the IC has, with a few exceptions, insisted that it is not subject to such audits since its inception. This effectively deprives Congress of one of the most effective tools in its arsenal, especially at a time when the activities of the IC present some of the most pressing needs for robust oversight in the Executive Branch. I respectfully recommend that Congress take steps to conclusively validate GAO’s jurisdiction in such matters.

In response to the IC’s recalcitrance, some Members of Congress have periodically attempted to resolve the matter over the past few decades. For instance, then-Congressman Leon Panetta introduced a bill in 1987 called the CIA Accountability Act to officially clarify GAO’s authority vis-à-vis the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and the IC as a whole.3 Unfortunately, it was not enacted. In 1988, GAO attempted to conduct an investigation “[i]n order to evaluate whether ‘information about illegal activities by high level officials of other nations may not be adequately considered in U.S. foreign policy decisions,’” leading the National Security Council to request an opinion from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel which has been cited ever since:

We therefore conclude based on the nature of the GAO request that the subject of the GAO investigation is the Executive’s discharge of its constitutional foreign policy responsibilities, not its statutory responsibilities. The subject is thus not “a program or activity the Government carries out under existing law,” and it is beyond GAO’s authority under 31 U.S.C. § 717(b). . . .

In addition to the infirmity in GAO’s statutory authority to pursue this investigation, we believe that GAO is specifically precluded by statute from access to intelligence information. In establishing by law the oversight relationship between the intelligence committees and the executive branch, Congress indicated that such oversight would be the exclusive means for

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1 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 712, 717, 3523(a) (GAO has authority to investigate each “department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.”).

2 Budget and Accounting Act, Pub. L. 67-13, 42 Stat. 26, June 10, 1921 (“All departments and establishments shall furnish to the Comptroller General such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective offices as he may from time to time require of them.”).

Congress to gain access to confidential intelligence information in the possession of the executive branch.

This intelligence oversight system has been codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413. That section sets forth requirements for the Director of Central Intelligence, the heads of all other federal agencies involved in intelligence activities, and the President to inform the Congress through the intelligence committees (and in some circumstances the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate) of intelligence activities. Over two decades later, this fight was still underway. When an amendment to the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (“IAA”) sought to reaffirm GAO authority, it prompted a veto threat in the form of a letter from Director of the Office of Management and Budget Peter Orszag, which Acting Comptroller General Gene Dodaro thoroughly refuted, demonstrating that “[n]either the language of section 413 nor its legislative history provides support for this position” and that the IC’s resistance “has greatly impeded GAO’s work for the intelligence committees and also jeopardizes some of GAO’s work for other committees of jurisdiction, including Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Foreign Relations, among others.”

Despite Mr. Dodaro’s testimony, the enacted law took a middle-of-the-road approach, stating that clarification was necessary but deferring to the Executive for that clarification, instructing the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to “issue a written directive governing the access of the Comptroller General to information in the possession of an element of the intelligence community.” The DNI, for his part, issued Intelligence Community Directive 114 the following year, which reluctantly admitted that GAO had some authority to investigate the IC, but adopted a severely restrictive interpretation of the scope of that authority:

Information that falls within the purview of the congressional intelligence oversight committees generally shall not be made available to GAO to support a GAO audit or review of core national intelligence capabilities and activities, which include intelligence collection operations, intelligence analyses and analytical techniques, counterintelligence operations, and intelligence funding. IC elements may on a case-by-case basis provide information in response to any

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GAO requests not related to GAO audits or reviews of core national intelligence capabilities and activities.\(^8\)

In other words, GAO can investigate anything involving the IC that the Intelligence Committees cannot, which amounts to basically nothing. Moreover, this is not an academic dispute: in response to a question about this matter from Congressman Yoder in 2018, Mr. Dodaro explained that this remained an ongoing controversy, although the situation is minimally better than it was before 2010:

Mr. YODER. Do you need additional support from Congress—
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. YODER [continuing]. Or direction to the intel agencies to make sure they are aware that this is an authority you have?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, that would be helpful.\(^9\)

When Mr. Dodaro testified before the Legislative Branch Subcommittee last year regarding GAO’s FY2020 budget, Congressman Ryan again asked him about this matter, and Mr. Dodaro again remarked that GAO needs “the cooperation of the Intelligence Community” because GAO “has more difficulties when the request comes from non-intelligence committees,” concluding, “I think we could do more, particularly in the management area, and in the investments that are made, in that area, whether there’s good return on the investments in all cases.”\(^10\)

And in his most recent testimony before that Subcommittee this year, Mr. Dodaro testified, “It’s the same status as it was last year. Congress could work with the Intelligence Committees to provide better direction to the intelligence agencies to cooperate with us.”\(^11\)

In fact, however, even the involvement of the Intelligence Committees is not sufficient to overcome the IC’s reliance on ICD 114 to obstruct meaningful GAO access. In a meeting last year with staffers from this Subcommittee and the Legislative Branch Subcommittee, a member of this Subcommittee’s staff dismissed the need for reform, arguing that IC components do not refuse GAO requests for information if GAO was acting pursuant to an intelligence Committee request. That presumption is unfortunately false. One need only consider the example of AR 13-5, the internal CIA regulation which implements ICD 114. This regulation directly addresses the question of how the Agency should respond to a GAO request for information when GAO is acting under the direction of an Intelligence Committee:

As a general rule, if GAO makes a request on behalf of or to obtain information responsive to a tasking by an intelligence oversight committee, the [Point of

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\(^9\) Legislative Branch Appropriations for 2019: Part 2, Fiscal Year 2019 Legislative Branch Appropriations Requests, Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Legislative Branch of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (Apr. 25, 2018) (testimony of Comp. Gen. Gene Dodaro) (testifying that GAO has been able to investigate peripheral matters in the IC such as “a facilities area” and contract management in the last few years).

\(^10\) Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJ3WU2aZMyk.

\(^11\) Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uaR6D62qsn4.
Contact ("POC") will ensure that the CIA response to GAO does not contain information prohibited in paragraph b. (2)(c)(3) above. The response to GAO shall indicate that information responsive to the tasking, but not authorized for release to GAO under the provisions of ICD 114, shall be made directly available to the requesting intelligence oversight committee. The POC shall prepare an additional response for the intelligence oversight committee that contains information responsive to the committee request, but not authorized for GAO access.

In other words, if GAO asks CIA for any information which would fall under the jurisdiction of an Intelligence Committee, CIA will simply refuse to cooperate, but if an Intelligence Committee tasks GAO to make the request, CIA will still refuse to provide the information to GAO, but instead will send the information directly to the relevant Intelligence Committee. In neither situation does GAO receive the requested information.

GAO possesses significantly more resources and institutional expertise in certain kinds of Executive Branch investigations than even the most robust committee staff and there is frankly no reason for this arbitrary restriction on its authority. Congress gave the Executive Branch a chance to establish reasonable limitations which balanced the Executive’s legitimate interests with one of the most important functions of Congress—effective oversight. Instead of crafting a reasonable policy, the DNI memorialized the IC’s original hard-line position.

I recommend this Subcommittee include language to remove any doubt concerning GAO’s audit power over the IC by advancing a measure that restates Section 335 of the FY2010 IAA, as engrossed by the House of Representatives in February 2010.

Not only would taking such a measure resolve a longstanding problem, but it would be revenue neutral, since it would not require GAO to take on any more responsibilities than it already has; it would only open the universe of matters it may investigate. When one considers the fact that the number of GAO employees with Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information ("TS/SCI") clearances is higher than the combined number of staffers employed by both Intelligence Committees, it is clear that these artificial restrictions on GAO’s authority are causing Congress to expend more financial and manpower resources to accomplish less oversight over a significant portion of the Executive Branch. In a time of crisis, when

\[ \text{That paragraph reads:} \]

Information that falls within the purview of the congressional intelligence oversight committees generally shall not be made available to GAO to support an audit or review of intelligence collection operations; covert action; intelligence capabilities related to national intelligence activities; counterintelligence operations; intelligence analysis and analytical techniques; intelligence sources and methods; or intelligence budgets or funding; (including records or expenditures made under the authority of 22 U.S.C. 2396(a)(8) or 10 U.S.C. 127, 7231 and 50 U.S.C. 403(b)).

\[ \text{CIA, AR 13-5: Controller General Access to Information in the Possession of the CIA, § (b)(3) (copy attached). I was unable to provide this information last year because I only recently obtained this regulation through litigation.} \]

\[ \text{Available at } \text{https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2701ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr2701ih.pdf.} \]
agencies across the Government are spending vast amounts of time, money, and resources to combat a once-in-a-century threat, it is more important than ever that GAO be able to investigate allegations of governmental waste, fraud, abuse, and violations of law wherever they may be found. It is time for Congress to assert its prerogatives to protect its oversight capabilities over all agencies.
Kcl McClanahan Biography

Kcl McClanahan is the Executive Director of National Security Counselors, a Washington-area non-profit public interest law firm which specializes in national security law and information and privacy law. Before chartering National Security Counselors with his fellow directors, he served as Director of FOIA Operations for the James Madison Project and Of Counsel to the Law Office of Mark S. Zaid, PC. He is an adjunct professor at the George Washington University Law School and the American University Washington College of Law, where he teaches various topics in national security law. He sits on the Board of Directors of the National Military Intelligence Foundation, the Board of Directors of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, and the Steering Committee of the Make It Safe Coalition, and he is a charter member of the Security Clearance Lawyers Association.

He received his Master of Arts cum laude in Security Studies from the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, his Juris Doctorate from the American University Washington College of Law, and his Master of Laws in National Security Law from the Georgetown University Law Center.

He belongs to the bars of New York, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court, and several other federal courts.
Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5)*, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form electronically by filling in the provided blanks.

Committee: Appropriations
Subcommittee: Defense
Hearing Date: April 8, 2020
Hearing Subject:
FY21 Budget

Witness Name: Kel McClanahan
Position/Title: Executive Director
Witness Type: ○ Governmental ● Non-governmental
Are you representing yourself or an organization? ○ Self ● Organization
If you are representing an organization, please list what entity or entities you are representing:
National Security Counselors

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

none

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contract or payment. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

none
False Statements Certification

Knowingly providing material false information to this committee/subcommittee, or knowingly concealing material information from this committee/subcommittee, is a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This form will be made part of the hearing record.

[Signature]

Witness signature

Date

4/8/20

If you are a non-governmental witness, please ensure that you attach the following documents to this disclosure. Check both boxes to acknowledge that you have done so.

☐ Written statement of proposed testimony

☐ Curriculum vitae

*Rule XI, clause 2(g), of the U.S. House of Representatives provides:

(Rule XI, clause 2(g), of the U.S. House of Representatives provides:

(A) Each committee shall, to the greatest extent practicable, require witnesses who appear before it to submit in advance written statements of proposed testimony and to limit their initial presentations to the committee to brief summaries thereof.

(B) In the case of a witness appearing in a non-governmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of any Federal grants or contracts, or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current calendar year or either of the two previous calendar years by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing.

(C) The disclosure referred to in subdivision (B) shall include—

(i) the amount and source of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) related to the subject matter of the hearing; and

(ii) the amount and country of origin of any payment or contract related to the subject matter of the hearing originating with a foreign government.

(D) Such statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the privacy or security of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness appears.
EXPERIENCE (LITIGATION/ADVOCACY)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSELORS
Executive Director
• Co-founder, CEO of a non-profit organization dedicated to educating the public about national security issues, influencing relevant legislation, and providing assistance to people involved in security-related legal or administrative proceedings.
• Act as primary counsel for legal assistance projects.
• Specialize in cases involving national security issues, including whistleblowers, security clearances, prepublication review, and FOIA/PA litigation.
• Represent whistleblower clients with agency Inspectors General and Congressional committees.
• Interact with Congressional and Executive branch officials regarding proposed changes to laws and/or regulations.
• Litigate cases before the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals; the Merit Systems Protection Board; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; the U.S. District Courts of D.C., Vermont, Southern District of New York, Eastern District of California, and Northern District of Texas; and the U.S. Circuit Courts of the D.C. Circuit, 9th Circuit, and 2nd Circuit.

NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER
Counsel to the National Security Program
• Served as legal adviser to a program advocating greater whistleblower protections for national security employees.

KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO, LLP
Of Counsel
• Litigated whistleblower reprisal and FOIA/PA cases before the DOJ Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management and the U.S. District Court of D.C.

LAW OFFICE OF MARK S. ZAID, P.C.
Of Counsel
• Specialized in cases involving national security issues, including whistleblowers, security clearances, prepublication review, and FOIA/PA litigation.
• Litigated cases before the U.S. District Courts of D.C. and the Eastern District of Virginia.

JAMES MADISON PROJECT
Director of FOIA Operations
• Managed all FOIA-related business, including administrative requests, litigation, outreach, and press relations.
EXPERIENCE (TEACHING)

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL of LAW
Adjunct Professor, Washington, DC
- Teach a legal seminar in Law of Secrecy.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE of LAW
Adjunct Professor, Washington, DC
- Teach a legal seminar in National Security Law and Practice.

POINT PARK UNIVERSITY
Adjunct Professor, Pittsburgh, PA
- Taught an undergraduate seminar in National Intelligence Authorities.

UNIVERSITY of the DISTRICT of COLUMBIA
Adjunct Professor, Washington, DC
- Taught an undergraduate seminar in National Security Law, Policy, and Objectives.

EDUCATION

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Master of Laws – National Security Law, Washington, DC
- Study Abroad: International Law and Security – Florence, Italy (Summer 2009).

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE of LAW
Juris Doctor (includes a semester at Boston University School of Law), Washington, DC

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Master of Arts Cum Laude – Security Studies, Washington, DC

SCHOLARSHIP

Public Appearances (Non-Media):
- Panelist at Congressional Oversight Training: Working with Insiders and Whistleblowers, Project on Government Oversight, Apr. 9, 2019.
Panelist at Representation of Intelligence Community Whistleblowers, Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association, Dec. 12, 2017.


Panelist at FOIA Requester/Agency Town Hall, U.S. Department of Justice, Mar. 17, 2011.


Delegate at Hostage to Terrorism: Governmental and Non-Governmental Response Strategies, University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group, Apr. 3-5, 2005.


Published Scholarship:


“How one secretive Justice Department office can sway the whole government” in Washington Post, 2019.


“Q&A on Whistleblower Complaint Being Withheld from Congressional Intelligence Committees” in Just Security, 2019.


• “Not All Security Clearance Fights Are Political” in Politico, 2018.
• “Jeff Sessions’ Attack on the Media Is Worse Than You Think” in Politico, 2017.
• “The Need for a Perception-Based Model of Comparing Intelligence Communities: An Historical Case Study” in American Intelligence Journal, 2007.
• “Point-Counterpoint for House Leadership Intelligence Reform Bills,” handout for ABA panel, 2004.

Leadership

• Board of Directors, Bar Association of the District of Columbia, June 2018-present.
• Board of Directors, National Military Intelligence Foundation, July 2015-present.
• Board of Directors, National Military Intelligence Association, Nov. 2010-Apr. 2015.
• Delegate to the American Swiss Foundation Young Leaders Conference, May 2006.
• Charter member, Security Clearance Lawyers Association.
Written Statement

On Behalf of the Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance and the Society of Gynecologic Oncology
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
Department of Defense Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program
Ovarian Cancer Research Program
April 8, 2020

The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance (OCRA) and the Society of Gynecologic Oncology (SGO) thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit comments for the record regarding our funding recommendations for the Department of Defense Ovarian Cancer Research Program, which is under the Department of Defense Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program. We respectfully request a funding level of $35 million for the Department of Defense Ovarian Cancer Research Program in Fiscal Year 2021. We believe that maintaining the Ovarian Cancer Research Program’s current funding level in Fiscal Year 2021 is critical to ensure that important ovarian cancer research initiatives continue, and that advances can be made to help reduce and prevent suffering from ovarian cancer.

The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance (OCRA) works every day to fund cures, foster community, further conversations and, ultimately, the cause. OCRA is the oldest and largest global organization dedicated to fighting ovarian cancer. We advance research to prevent, treat and defeat ovarian cancer. We support women and their families before, during and beyond diagnosis. And we work with all levels of government to ensure that eradicating ovarian cancer is a priority.

The Society of Gynecologic Oncology is a national medical specialty organization of physicians who are trained in the comprehensive management of women with malignancies of the reproductive tract. Its purpose is to improve the care of women with gynecologic cancer by encouraging research, disseminating knowledge which will raise the standards of practice in the prevention and treatment of gynecologic malignancies and cooperating with other organizations interested in women’s health care, oncology and related fields.

Ovarian Cancer’s Deadly Statistics

Ovarian cancer is the fifth leading cause of cancer-related death in women and the deadliest gynecologic cancer. The American Cancer Society estimates that in 2020, about 22,000 women in the U.S. will receive a new diagnosis of ovarian cancer and approximately 14,000 women will die from the disease. Nearly 25 percent of women diagnosed with ovarian cancer will die within a year, and less than 50 percent will survive five years. There is currently no early detection test for ovarian cancer so more than 85 percent of women are diagnosed at late stage when survival is significantly decreased. When women experience a disease recurrence there are limited treatment options with life altering side effects and suboptimal efficacy.
Ovarian Cancer's Impact on the Military

Of the 850,000 female service members, wives of active duty military and adult daughters of active duty military, approximately 11,800 will be diagnosed with ovarian cancer over the course of their lifetimes. Over the last five years alone, nearly 2,600 members of our military or their families have been hospitalized for ovarian cancer or suspected ovarian cancer. It is clear that the cost of ovarian cancer to our military is great, not only in terms of troop readiness, but also in terms of cancer care costs: treating all of these cases of ovarian cancer over these patients' lifetimes could cost TRICARE an estimated $971.2 million. Therefore, it is imperative that the Department of Defense pursues the scientific discoveries that help readiness and address both the personal and economic costs of ovarian cancer.

DoD OCRP: A Program That Complements Non-Defense Ovarian Cancer Research

The Department of Defense Ovarian Cancer Research Program (DoD OCRP) was initiated in Fiscal Year 1997 to support high-impact, cutting-edge research that fills unmet needs. The DoD OCRP establishes priorities to target the most critical needs along the research development pipeline from basic to translational to clinical research, including clinical trials, and to push the field of ovarian cancer forward through its vision to “eliminate ovarian cancer”.

The DoD OCRP complements but does not duplicate the important ovarian cancer research carried out by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). First, the DoD OCRP funds innovative, high risk, high reward research which many large, non-DoD Federal research agencies do not have the flexibility to engage in. For ovarian cancer research, we believe that the DoD OCRP is the sole funding source for innovative, groundbreaking research with an emphasis on promoting readiness for military members and their families as well as the overall health of citizens of the United States and the world.

Second, the DoD OCRP is designed to prevent funding research that overlaps with other ovarian cancer research that has been funded by the NCI, other agencies, or private foundations. Before funding an award, DoD OCRP grant managers at the DoD are required to thoroughly check all sources of information to determine if a proposal is redundant of a previous DoD OCRP grant or a grant awarded by another federal agency such as the NCI or by a private foundation.

Third, the DoD OCRP pushes investigators to make rapid progress in their research by requiring them to reapply every funding cycle. Because proposal reviews conducted by the DoD OCRP are double blinded by investigator and research institution, an investigator's progress is evaluated on its own merit and must have sufficient new findings, data or ideas to warrant new funding.

Cancer research performed by the DoD has been responsible for fundamentally changing the way cancer research is conducted. Many innovative practices and methods created by the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs have been adopted by the
The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance and The Society of Gynecologic Oncology

other research agencies, such as the use of cancer patients as consumer reviewers in the proposal review process.

Also, the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program has created funding mechanisms to incentivize research, such as the Idea Award, that fills voids in our understanding of cancer. Additionally, large ovarian cancer research teams do not exist in many academic medical or research centers. In order to provide much needed mentoring, networking and a peer group for young ovarian cancer researchers, the DoD OCRP created an Ovarian Cancer Academy award in Fiscal Year 2009. The DoD OCRP Ovarian Cancer Academy is growing and meeting its potential of developing a unique, interactive virtual academy that provides intensive mentoring, national networking, and a peer group for junior faculty. The overarching goal of this award is to develop young scientists into the next generation of successful and highly productive ovarian cancer researchers within a collaborative and interactive research training environment including collaboration with research conducted at military healthcare institutions.

Discoveries and Advancements in Ovarian Cancer

From Fiscal Year 1997– Fiscal Year 2018, the DoD OCRP has received $316.5 million in Congressional appropriations. Through Fiscal Year 2018, the DoD OCRP has funded 427 research awards, resulting in over 1,583 peer-reviewed publications and 103 patent applications. The DoD OCRP has funded key studies that have led to several new discoveries and advancements in the treatment and understanding of ovarian cancer. These advancements have spanned treatment with FDA approval of Rucaparib, an oral therapy for treatment of advanced ovarian cancer, to OVA1, a blood test combined with imaging that can better identify patients at high risk for malignant ovarian cancer. The studies have also served as the basis for the universal ovarian cancer patient genetic testing recommendations. Some of the tremendous breakthroughs and notable products in the fight against ovarian cancer that have evolved from DoD OCRP-funded research include the following:

Prevention, Detection, and Diagnosis

• RAD51D Genetic Testing Kit
• mAGIC App to Encourage Genetic Counseling
• OVA1™ Diagnostic Index Test
• Genetic Testing Guidelines for Ovarian Cancer
• A Computational Approach to Diagnosing Precursor Lesions to Ovarian Cancer
• Ovarian Cancer Risk-Reducing Surgery: A Decision-Making Resource
The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance and The Society of Gynecologic Oncology

Treatment

• Using NSAIDs to Treat Ovarian Cancer
• Using Statins to Treat Ovarian Cancer
• Targeting Tumor Vasculature to Eliminate Ovarian Cancer Cells
• Using MSC1 Immunotherapy to Create an Anti-Tumor Response
• Using Viruses to Deliver Toxins to Treat Ovarian Cancer Tumors
• National Comprehensive Cancer Network-endorsed recommendation to offer genetic testing to all women with ovarian cancer
• Margaret Dyson Family Risk Assessment Program, a community-based network of healthcare providers who offer risk assessment and counseling to women with a family history of ovarian or breast cancer

New Research Tools

• New Model to Study the Effect of BRCA1 on Ovarian Cancer
• The Effect of Two Oncogenes on the Development of Ovarian Leiomyosarcoma
• Using Animal Proteins to Predict Ovarian Cancer Risk in Humans
• The Ovarian Cancer Research Academy: Recruiting and Retaining Outstanding Scientists

Future Direction and Strategic Goals in Ovarian Cancer Research

The DoD OCRP’s Strategic Plan is centered around the scope of the ovarian cancer problem affecting military and veteran populations and all women affected by the disease, as well as the pressing research gaps faced by the ovarian cancer community. The DoD OCRP’s ultimate goal is to prevent, detect, treat, and cure ovarian cancer. The following research goals identified in the DoD OCRP Strategic Plan are critically important to improving patient care and winning the war against this deadly disease:

• Promote readiness for military members and their families as well as the overall health of citizens of the United States and the world
• Utilize precision medicine approaches that identify individual tumor characteristics to optimize patient care and outcomes
• Enhance the pool of ovarian cancer scientists
The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance and The Society of Gynecologic Oncology

• Promote the detection, education, mentorship, and development of young investigators in the field of ovarian cancer research
• Promote research that will improve access to quality care, and the physical and psychosocial well-being of those diagnosed with ovarian cancer
• Develop or improve performance and reliability of screening and diagnostic approaches
• Understand the precursor lesion/stem cell, microenvironment, and pathogenesis/progression of all types of ovarian cancer, including rare subtypes
• Develop and validate models to study initiation, progression, metastasis, and recurrence of ovarian cancer
• Promote research that focuses on cancer risk and primary prevention
• Investigate tumor response to therapy, including tumor survival, dormancy, cell death, clonal evolution, and resistance
• Reduce the incidence of ovarian cancer and improving outcomes

Conclusion

The Ovarian Cancer Research Alliance and the Society of Gynecologic Oncology maintain a long-standing commitment to work with Congress, the Administration, and other policymakers and stakeholders to improve the survival rate from ovarian cancer through education, public policy, research, and communication. Please know that we appreciate and understand that our nation faces many challenges and that Congress has limited resources to allocate; however, we owe it to those who bravely served our country to pursue promising research that will improve treatments for ovarian cancer and improve the survival rate from this deadly disease. If the current robust funding for the DoD OCRP in Fiscal Year 2020 is not maintained in Fiscal Year 2021, we are concerned that a cut in funding will impede promising research initiatives that may provide hope and relief to women suffering from this deadly disease.

On behalf of the entire ovarian cancer community – patients, family members, clinicians and researchers – we thank you for your leadership and support for federal programs that seek to reduce and prevent suffering from ovarian cancer. **Thank you in advance for your support for $35 million in FY 2021 funding for the Department of Defense Ovarian Cancer Research Program.**
Testimony of RADM Jonathan White, USN (Ret.)
President and CEO of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership
House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense
U.S. Navy Science and Technology Capabilities
8 April 2020

On behalf of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership (COL), which represents our nation’s leading ocean science, research, and technology organizations from academia, industry, and the larger nonprofit sector (to include philanthropy, associations, and aquariums), I appreciate the opportunity to submit for the record our fiscal year (FY) 2021 funding priorities for the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Defense Appropriations Act.

The ongoing global crisis surrounding COVID-19, given its likely link to wildlife, has made the connection between the environment and human health abundantly clear. This environment includes our ocean, most of which remains unknown and unexplored, and which has so much potential to be either the cause or the solution to our next global health crisis. Now, more than ever, there’s an enhanced need for investment in ocean science and technology. As a maritime nation, not just our health but our national, homeland, energy, food, water, and economic securities depend on a healthy ocean—which in turn depends on ocean science and technology. I refer to this concept as “ocean security,” the understanding of which enables us to safely operate autonomous vehicles, to know if the weather will be appropriate for Navy SEALs to carry out their mission, to collect acoustic data for defense purposes, to make informed decisions about military infrastructure based on sea level rise projections, and so much more.

As we rightfully focus on mitigation of the impacts of COVID-19 on our DOD and military forces, we must also keep our eye on the ball of decaying, global maritime superiority in the face of peer competition, especially in warfare areas that rely heavily on scientific and technological advantages. For the last 30 years, the United States has remained dominant in the ocean environment. In fact, the late Admiral James D. Watkins, chief of naval operations from 1982-1986, used to attribute our victory in the Cold War to oceanography — our superior knowledge of the undersea domain gave the United States the needed competitive advantage. This uncontested science- and technology-induced dominance is eroding and being ceded to countries such as China, India, and Russia. In fact, DOD leaders have testified that competitor nation states are meeting and beating the United States in innovative and strategic capabilities, and DOD has conceded to the attrition of our competitive military advantage in air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The Navy acknowledges the U.S. competitive advantage in ocean sciences has eroded and established Task Force Ocean (TFO) to remediate this erosion.

I hope as the subcommittee makes funding decisions for FY 2021, you will provide the needed support for programs that advance our nation’s ocean security, especially given the critical need to invest in ocean science and technology in light of the COVID-19 crisis. Ensuring our nation remains the dominant maritime power, economically competitive, and scientifically literate while staying secure in our access to food, water, and energy all while recovering from and preventing another global pandemic, is of utmost importance. I respectfully request the subcommittee provide the Department of Defense with no less than the funding levels enacted in the FY 2020 spending bill, which were $2.6 billion for basic research, $6.1 billion for applied research, and
$7.4 billion for advanced technology development. To ensure that our nation can maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly unstable world, I respectfully request the subcommittee provide the Navy with no less than the science and technology funding levels appropriated in the FY 2020 spending bill, which were $651 million for basic research (6.1), $1.2 billion for applied research (6.2), and $807 million for advanced technology development (6.3).

We must act now to address immediate and future threats to our knowledge advantage and remain ahead of our peer and near-peer competitors in maritime power competition. DOD’s science and technology program does just this, balancing basic research to respond to future threats through emerging science and technologies with applied research to enable successful, rapid transition of suitable scientific and technological capabilities to maintain our near-term warfighting advantage over potential adversaries. Below are some key areas of investment to ensure our nation maintains its knowledge-based maritime superiority across the world ocean.

Task Force Ocean
Navy’s Task Force Ocean (TFO) was established in 2017 to bolster the Navy’s commitment to ocean science and technology. TFO focuses on observing the ocean environment, processing data into useful products, and strengthening the Navy’s ocean science technical workforce while advancing partnerships with academia and the private sector. I appreciate funding increases in the 6.2 account to implement TFO’s at-sea research priorities (Ocean Warfighting Environment Applied Research), and it is crucial that these investments be maintained in coming years, especially as fiscal decisions related to COVID-based mitigation and recovery might be viewed as causing vulnerabilities in the current and future readiness of our Navy.

Education
Education initiatives are crucial to further our understanding of the impact of ocean science on national security. This includes support for programs like the Navy’s University Research Initiatives (URI) Program, which advances multidisciplinary scientific research and the transition of basic research to practical applications and the related Defense University Research Instrumentation Program (DURIP), which helps academic institutions acquire national security-relevant research capabilities to train the next generation. I respectfully request you increase each URI PE and require additional dollars support DURIP, though not at the expense of other initiatives funded under these PEs.

Giving the next generation the tools to solidify our superior ocean knowledge isn’t just about training those who have already chosen a career in the ocean sciences. It’s also about providing those in the K-12 realm, who have yet to choose a career path, information about what job options exist. It’s crucially important for the Office of Naval Research to continue supporting programs like the National Ocean Sciences Bowl (NOSB). In its 23-year history, the NOSB, a quiz-bowl style ocean science competition for high schoolers, has introduced tens of thousands of students to the possibility of a career in ocean science at a time when most high school curriculums don’t include any oceanography courses.
National Oceanographic Partnership Program

DOD isn’t the only federal agency tasked with understanding our ocean, and federal agencies aren’t the only ones endeavoring to do so. There are more than 600 businesses engaged in ocean observation and forecasting; over 400 postsecondary institutions that provide ocean-related certificates or degrees; and in excess of 45,000 nonprofits focused on ocean and coastal activities. To share information, observations, technology, and best practices, cross-sector and interagency collaboration are necessary. To this end, the National Oceanographic Partnership Program (NOPP), a congressionally mandated program established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, is an ideal vehicle to advance collaborative efforts and already has been involved with funding projects such as the Integrated Ocean Observing System, the Argo Project, and the JASON project. NOPP-supported projects help build our understanding of the world’s ocean, giving the United States a better understanding of strategic bathymetric and natural processes essential to advanced ocean combat and security activities, particularly with respect to China’s growing interest in ocean domination. NOPP also brings together unique partnerships between civilian government agencies, the private sector, universities, and the Department of Defense, enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests. The program also significantly contributes to the buildout and modernization of the National Security Innovation Base. I strongly appreciate the Navy’s support for this program and respectfully request an addition $8.7 million above the FY 2020 enacted level for a total of $17.5 million.

In closing, our nation’s position as the unequivocal maritime security power is eroding, but prioritizing investments in science and technology can help us maintain our superiority despite advancements by other nations. As pointed out in the 2018 Office of Net Assessment report, Maritime Environment 2050: Implications for U.S. National Security, ocean research and “accelerated mapping and associated observations and data science” can offset general transparency that is eroding surprise and stealth. As the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated, the link between environmental, including ocean, and human health must be better understood. Investing in ocean science and technology will do more than ensure our maritime dominance; it will ensure the health of our nation and its people.

As you work to provide funding for these critical programs, I know you face difficult decisions that involve offsets and divestments to achieve a balanced budget. COI and our members stand ready to engage in discussion to help establish priorities around the ocean security framework to support these difficult decisions. Thank you for your exemplary leadership and dedicated work and for the opportunity to provide input into FY 2021 appropriations.
COL Member Institutions: Alaska Ocean Observing System • Alaska SeaLife Center • Aquarium of the Pacific • ARCUS • ASV Global, LLC • Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences • Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences • Chevron USA • College of William & Mary • Consumer Energy Alliance • Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences • Dalhousie University • Dauphin Island Sea Lab • Duke University • Earth2Ocean • East Carolina University • Eastman Chemical Company • Esri • Estuary & Ocean Science Center, San Francisco State University • Exoctus • FAU Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institute • Florida Institute of Oceanography • Harte Research Institute • Hubbs-SeaWorld Research Institute • IEEE Oceanic Engineering Society • Institute for Global Environmental Strategies • Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies (UTAS) • JASCO • Johns Hopkins University APL • L-3 MariPro, Inc. • Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory • Liquid Robotics, Inc. • Louisiana State University • Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium • MARACOOS • Marine Technology Society • Massachusetts Institute of Technology • MBARI • MIST Cluster program • Monmouth University Urban Coast Institute • Moore Foundation • Moss Landing Marine Laboratories • Mote Marine Laboratory • Mystic Aquarium • National Aquarium • NERACOOS • New England Aquarium • NOIA • North Carolina State University • North Pacific Research Board • Nova Southeastern University • Old Dominion University • Oregon State University • Pennsylvania State University • Rutgers University • Saildrone • Savannah State University • Sea-Bird Scientific • Severn Marine Technologies, LLC • Shell • Skidaway Institute of Oceanography of UGA • Sonardyne, Inc. • South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium • Stanford University • Stony Brook University • SURA • Teledyne CARIS • Texas A&M University • The IOOS Association • U.S. Arctic Research Commission • U.S. Naval Postgraduate School • UCSD Scripps Institution of Oceanography • University of Alaska Fairbanks • University of California, Davis • University of California, Santa Barbara • University of California, Santa Cruz • University of Delaware • University of Florida • University of Hawaii • University of Maine • University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science • University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth • University of Miami • University of New Hampshire • University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill • University of North Carolina, Wilmington • University of Rhode Island • University of South Carolina • University of South Florida • University of Southwestern Oklahoma • University of Southern Mississippi • University of Texas at Austin • University of Washington • University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee • Vulcan, Inc. • Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
The American Psychological Association (APA) is the largest scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the U.S., numbering over 121,000 researchers, educators, clinicians, consultants and students. For decades, psychologists have played vital roles within the Department of Defense (DoD), as providers of clinical services to military personnel and their families, and as scientific researchers investigating mission-targeted issues, such as counter-terrorism, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Today, psychologists continue to bring unique and critical expertise that is essential to meeting the needs of the military and its personnel.

APA urges Congress to provide the following funding levels for programs within the Department of Defense (DoD) in FY21.

**Defense Science & Technology (S&T) Program**

In addition to providing essential clinical services to our military service members and their families, psychological scientists within DoD conduct cutting-edge, mission-specific research critical to our national defense. Psychological scientists address a broad range of important issues and problems vital to our national defense, including expertise in conflict prevention and resolution; promoting non-discriminatory and evidence-based recruitment and retention; modeling behavior of individuals and groups; as well as understanding and optimizing cognitive functioning, perceptual awareness, complex decision-making, stress resilience, and human-systems interactions.

Within DoD, the majority of behavioral, cognitive and social science is funded through the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL); the Office of Naval Research (ONR); and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), with additional, smaller human systems research programs funded through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
The military service laboratories provide a stable, mission-oriented focus for behavioral and social science, conducting and sponsoring basic (6.1), applied/exploratory development (6.2) and advanced development (6.3) research. All of the services fund human-related research in the broad categories of personnel, training and leader development; warfighter protection, sustainment and physical performance; and system interfaces and cognitive processing.

DoD funding for psychological research has supported a number of major medical advancements, including the use of Virtual Reality (VR) as a clinical, evidence-based tool to address the assessment, prevention, and treatment of PTSD. Bravemind, for example, is a virtual Iraq/Afghanistan exposure therapy tool that is currently used in approximately 100 sites around the U.S., including VA hospitals, military bases and university centers. While traditional prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD involves the gradual reliving of a traumatic event in the patient’s imagination under a clinician’s care, Bravemind allows clinicians to gradually immerse patients into virtual combat scenarios that reflect their specific traumatic experiences in a controlled, stepwise fashion. Clinicians are then able to monitor the intensity of the patients’ stress responses through brain imaging and psychophysiological assessment techniques. Literature has shown that patients with PTSD who were unresponsive to traditional prolonged exposure therapy using their imaginations often responded successfully to Bravemind therapy using Virtual Reality.

Continued support for this research is essential to improving mental and behavioral health outcomes for our nation’s veterans and servicemembers.

APA joins the Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR) in urging Congress to increase FY21 Defense S&T funding consistent with recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission.

Minerva Research Initiative

Launched in 2008, the Minerva Research Initiative is the Department’s signature social science basic research program that funds university-led teams which conduct social science research in areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. Housed within the Basic Research Initiatives PE, Minerva provides critical access to expertise to help the military better understand how social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces impact security and stability in regions significant to America’s interests abroad. Across the behavioral and social sciences, approximately 10 percent of all Minerva grants have been awarded to support psychological science. Recent Minerva-supported psychological research includes, Bio-Markers and Counter-Messages: Measuring Individual Differences in the Influence of Extremist Propaganda and Counter-Messages (2017) and Autonomy Refugee Psychology and Its Potential for Refugee Radicalization (2016). Research like this provides the DoD with unique insights that help shape national security policies and better position the U.S. in a complex global environment.

APA joins CNSR in urging Congress to restore Defense-Wide funding for Minerva and increase its overall budget to $17 million in FY21.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Psychological research from all disciplines of psychology has supported advancements in AI since its inception, including cognitive, personality, social, neuropsychology, developmental, clinical, and experimental psychology. Each discipline of the field provides a unique perspective and contribution to the ongoing development of AI. APA urges continued investments in AI research, including effective methods for human-AI collaboration. Human/AI cooperation is one area which illustrates the unique contributions of psychological science. As experts in human behavior, psychologists work to examine how subtle behaviors that are vital to cognitive processes and action, such as eye contact, apply in the context of human-AI interaction, such as autonomous vehicles and social robotics.

APA strongly urges continued support for the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, which is charged by Congress to examine AI through the lens of national competitiveness, the means to sustain technological advantage, trends in international cooperation and competitiveness, ways to foster greater investment in basic and advanced research, workforce and training, potential risks of military use, ethical concerns, establishment of data standards, and the future evolution of AI. APA urges Congress to prioritize funding aligned with the recommendations outlined by the Commission’s 2019 Interim Report, which identifies five fundamental lines of effort that are necessary to preserve U.S. advantages. These recommendations include: (1) invest in AI research and development; (2) apply AI to national security missions; (3) train and recruit AI talent; (4) protect and build upon U.S. technology advantages; and (5) marshal global AI cooperation.

Defense Health Programs and Medical Research

In order to maintain a strong military, it is imperative that Congress continues to prioritize the health, including mental and behavioral health, of our nation’s servicemembers. APA urges Congress to provide robust funding for the Defense Health Agency (DHA), including increased funding for telehealth services within the DoD system. While suicide and suicidal ideation continues to be a major concern for all veterans, servicemembers, and their families, those living in rural communities with limited access to care remain particularly at risk. Increased funding for telehealth services within the DoD system is critical to ensuring this population receives the evidence-based mental and behavioral health care they need.

APA also encourages Congress to expand the Defense Suicide Prevention Office’s (DSPO) efforts to address military suicide prevention. Within the DSPO, we urge Congress to provide funding for REACH-MIL, a pilot program on suicide prevention in the military health care system based on the predictive analytics suicide prevention program REACH-VET within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Using the REACH-VET model, REACH-MIL would analyze existing data from health records of members of the military serving on active duty to identify members who are at a statistically elevated risk for suicide in order to provide preemptive care and support for servicemembers before they have or express suicidal thoughts to clinicians.
Finally, APA joins the Defense Health Research Consortium in urging Congress to increase funding for Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRPs) in FY21 by five percent plus inflation. APA is deeply grateful for the Subcommittee’s leadership in ensuring that these CDMRP research programs are continued in mission-critical areas such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). We encourage Congress to maintain funding for this highly innovative research portfolio that fuels scientific discovery by funding critical research not sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) or other federal agencies.
Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5)*, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form electronically by filling in the provided blanks.

Committee: Appropriations
Subcommittee: Defense
Hearing Date: April 8, 2020
Hearing Subject:

Department of Defense Budget Request for FY2021 - Written Testimony Only

Witness Name: Katherine Brunett McGuire
Position/Title: Chief Advocacy Officer
Witness Type: Governmental • Non-governmental
Are you representing yourself or an organization? ○ Self • Organization
If you are representing an organization, please list what entity or entities you are representing:

American Psychological Association, American Psychological Association Services Inc.

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing's subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

None

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing's subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contract or payment. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

None
False Statements Certification

Knowingly providing material false information to this committee/subcommittee, or knowingly concealing material information from this committee/subcommittee, is a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This form will be made part of the hearing record.

[Signature]

Date: 4/8/20

(If you are a non-governmental witness, please ensure that you attach the following documents to this disclosure. Check both boxes to acknowledge that you have done so.

☒ Written statement of proposed testimony
☐ Curriculum vitae or biography

*Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5), of the U.S. House of Representatives provides:

(A) Each committee shall, to the greatest extent practicable, require witnesses who appear before it to submit in advance written statements of proposed testimony and to limit their initial presentations to the committee to brief summaries thereof.

(B) In the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of any Federal grants or contracts, or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current calendar year or either of the two previous calendar years by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing.

(C) The disclosure referred to in subdivision (B) shall include—

(i) the amount and source of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) related to the subject matter of the hearing; and

(ii) the amount and country of origin of any payment or contract related to the subject matter of the hearing originating with a foreign government.

(D) Such statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the privacy or security of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness appears.)
Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form

In accordance with Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5)*, of the Rules of the House of Representatives, witnesses are asked to disclose the following information. Please complete this form electronically by filling in the provided blanks.

Committee: Appropriations

Subcommittee: Defense

Hearing Date: April 8, 2020

Hearing Subject:

Department of Defense Budget Request for FY2021 - Written Testimony Only

Witness Name: Russell D. Shilling

Position/Title: Chief Scientific Officer

Witness Type: 0 Governmental ● Non-governmental

Are you representing yourself or an organization? 0 Self ● Organization

If you are representing an organization, please list what entity or entities you are representing:

American Psychological Association, American Psychological Association Services Inc.

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current calendar year and previous two calendar years. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

None

If you are a non-governmental witness, please list any contracts or payments originating with a foreign government and related to the hearing’s subject matter that you or the organization(s) you represent at this hearing received in the current year and previous two calendar years. Include the amount and country of origin of each contract or payment. If necessary, attach additional sheet(s) to provide more information.

None
False Statements Certification

Knowingly providing material false information to this committee/subcommittee, or knowingly concealing material information from this committee/subcommittee, is a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1001). This form will be made part of the hearing record.

Witness signature

[Signature]

Date

[8 APR 2020]

If you are a non-governmental witness, please ensure that you attach the following documents to this disclosure. Check both boxes to acknowledge that you have done so.

☐ Written statement of proposed testimony

☐ Curriculum vitae or biography

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(D) Such statements, with appropriate reductions to protect the privacy or security of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness appears.
Russell D. Shilling, PhD

APA’s Chief Scientific Officer

Russell D. Shilling, PhD, an experimental psychologist, was appointed chief scientific officer for the American Psychological Association in December 2018. Shilling has wide-ranging scientific, policy and administrative experience, including positions within education, the federal government and private industry. He is a retired Navy Captain, having served for 22 years as a Navy aerospace experimental psychologist conducting and managing a wide range of basic and applied research projects and programs in training, education and psychological health.

Before joining APA, Shilling was senior innovation fellow for education research and development with Digital Promise Global, a position funded by the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative to develop innovative funding and program management strategies to foster breakthrough advances in education. Immediately before that, he spent three years as executive director of the Office of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) in the U.S. Department of Education.

From 2010 to 2014, Shilling was a program manager at the federal Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, where he oversaw teams exploring the use of artificial intelligence to promote the psychological health of service members and the use of advanced analytics in educational games.

Shilling also spent six years as a program manager for Sesame Street/Electric Company Military Child Resilience Programs and three years as executive director for science and technology with the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. In 2005, Shilling created the first military-sponsored program focused on using virtual reality to enhance therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder.

Shilling holds a PhD and a master’s degree in experimental psychology (psychoacoustics/neuroscience) from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. He has a bachelor’s degree in psychology from Wake Forest University.
APA’s Chief Advocacy Officer

Katherine B. McGuire is APA’s first chief advocacy officer, responsible for implementing a unified, strategic vision for the association’s government relations efforts and coordinating APA’s broader advocacy initiatives in nongovernmental sectors. She leads a staff of 25 government relations experts representing the interests of the broad discipline of psychology and ensures that APA speaks with one voice before Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the Executive Branch.

With more than 25 years of senior-level policy experience in Congress, the executive branch and the private sector, McGuire was most recently assistant secretary for congressional and intergovernmental affairs at the U.S. Department of Labor. In that post, she focused on appropriations, budget priorities and regulatory matters. She was responsible for all external communications to Congress, governors and interdepartmental stakeholders and for providing technical assistance on issues ranging from workplace rules and regulations to prison re-entry programs. She has also been actively engaged in federal policy solutions to address the opioid epidemic since initiating the first congressional public health model opioid roundtable in the Chicago region in 2015.

Before joining the Department of Labor in January 2018, McGuire served for five years as chief of staff to Rep. Randy Hultgren, R-Ill., advising on financial services, and science and technology issues. Prior to that, she spent five years as vice president for government affairs at the Business Software Alliance, an international technology trade group representing the interests of the world’s leading software companies, including Apple and Microsoft.

She served almost 18 years in the U.S. Senate where she held numerous senior leadership roles, including Republican Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions where led legislative efforts and perfected the art of legislating through the mentoring and leadership of Sen. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo., and then-Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass. She also previously served as staff director for two subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and as legislative director for Sen. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo. She first honed her bipartisan legislating skills working for Senator Alan K. Simpson and Senator Richard Lugar earlier in her career.

McGuire’s ability to successfully work with members of both parties has been widely recognized.

Education
McGuire holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree in international economics from the University of Wyoming. She also received a certificate in executive leadership from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
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