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**U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE CHANGES IN THE  
EUROPEAN THEATER**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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## **U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 30, 2020.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:01 p.m., in room 200, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. We will call the meeting to order.

I thank you all for being here this morning. And our full committee hearing is on U.S. defense posture changes in the European theater. We have two witnesses this morning, hopefully both here and present: Dr. James Anderson, who is the Acting Under Secretary for Defense for Policy for the Department of Defense; and Lieutenant General David Allvin, Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Let me un-fog my glasses here for a second.

I would like to welcome members who are joining today's markup remotely. Those members are reminded that they must be visible on screen within the software platform for the purposes of identity verification when joining the proceedings, establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and voting.

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Members are also advised that I have designated a committee staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings. Members may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues only.

Finally, remotely participating members should see a 5-minute countdown clock on the software platform's display but, if necessary, I will remind members when their time is up.

The only additional note that I would make on that is as you are asking questions, and even for the witnesses, when you are not actually speaking it is helpful to turn the microphone off because, believe it or not, with the microphone on it creates feedback up there and it gets confusing because then you have to go on and off and on and off. But, if you can do that, it is helpful.

Well, I thank the witnesses for being here today, and the members for being present. I think this is a very important discussion. As we have heard a little while back, an announcement was made of a change in our defense posture within Europe. And I want to make clear at the outset that I think it is always appropriate to reexamine our posture around the world. This is a rapidly changing world, the threat environment is dynamic, and our assets and allies are also reasonably dynamic.

There are opportunities to be found in looking at ways that we can better distribute our assets and our forces to meet those challenges. But I was concerned about the way this particular change in our posture was announced and is proposed to be implemented within Europe. There was an announcement, basically, of a need to reduce the troops in Germany by 12,000. That number did not seem to be tied to any particular requirement.

And then, in addition to that there was the requirement that we get rid of all of our headquarters in Germany. The reasons for that were far from clear. So, the number seemed to be artificial.

Certainly, as we look at our needs in Europe, and as we build and strengthen alliances with the relatively new Eastern European partners within NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], there are clearly opportunities to build on those partnerships and, potentially, station U.S. troops in those Eastern European countries to improve our posture and better meet our defense needs, particularly with regards to deterring Russian aggression in that part of the world.

I don't think this plan was particularly well thought out, and I am worried about a number of aspects of its implementation, the biggest one being the artificial number of pulling troops out of Germany. You know, where did that number from?

And, in particular, when we were briefed, a few of us on the committee were briefed a month or so ago about this, the decision to

move AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] out of Germany, which does not seem to make any sense. It is not that we couldn't have originally picked a better place in Europe, or a different place in Europe at any rate, but having picked Germany, and had AFRICOM there for the entirety of the command, the reasons for moving it don't seem to make sense. Except, as came out in the briefing, it was necessary to get to the 12,000 number.

That is not the way we should be making policy. And it is going to be very, very expensive.

Now, on the European Command decision, we do have the presence in Mons, Belgium, that we have always had with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. And an argument could potentially be made. But, nonetheless, it is very expensive to move these, these command structures. And what does it truly net us?

The second aspect of this, as you are aware, some of the forces that are being moved are, in a sense, being moved back to the U.S., and they are becoming rotational. That has an impact certainly on the members serving, but also on our presence in those countries and our ability to respond.

Now, we have dramatically reduced the number of troops that we have in the European theater. I think at the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s there was somewhere around 350,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe. And in the current environment, having 350,000 U.S. troops in Europe would not make any sense whatsoever. But, we reduced that number down, if I am correct, to roughly 62,000. So, so we have made that response.

But if we didn't take some number of them and turn them into rotational troops, what does that do to our ability to meet our national security objectives in that part of the world. Because Russia is becoming more aggressive, not less. I think that is something that there is bipartisan consensus on. Certainly, their efforts in Ukraine have been very aggressive. Their efforts to disrupt democracy in any way that they can in Europe, and the U.S., and elsewhere have grown.

So, I think our need to have a deterrence there is enormously important. And, you know, I also am concerned about the effect it has on our partnerships in Europe, because we definitely need friends and allies more than ever. And I feel very strongly that, as I think every member of this committee does, that the NATO alliance has served our country very well. And when we make these types of arbitrary decisions without working closely with our partners, that undermines that alliance.

In every partnership and every alliance difficult things have to be done that maybe the partners won't like. But there is a way to do that. I do not, for instance, disagree at all that we should try to do everything we can to get our European partners to contribute more to the defense of Europe. I think that is appropriate. But, if we do things to undermine the alliance in what appears to be a gratuitous way without working with them, without listening to them, it undermines the strength of that alliance and plays right into Russia's hands.

Because number one at the top of the list of the things that Russia wants to accomplish, reducing the power, cohesion, and

strength of Western democracies is right at the top. They want to see us divided. They want to see NATO weakened. They want to see the NATO partners disagreeing and at each other's throats. We should not play into their hands. We should work with our European partners as we put these plans in place.

So, it would certainly make sense to always have the conversation about what our posture should be in Europe. And I think the committee, in a bipartisan way, has deep concerns about the way this was done, the way it is going to be implemented, and how it is going to impact the NATO alliance, our alliances in Europe in general, and our defense posture in Europe specifically.

And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and look forward to the Q&A [questions and answers] to get greater detail on how those decisions were made going forward.

With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry, for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate having this hearing on this topic. I agree that it is important and, in addition, there are provisions in the current conference with the Senate on this year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] which touch on these issues.

And there are a lot of questions, as you point out. And I fully agree that many of these questions arise from the way that this announcement was made and has subsequently been rolled out.

I realize that the witnesses today are not going to be able to answer all of our questions about when or how much but, hopefully, they can help clarify for us and the American people what, and especially why. Some of these moves seem to make sense on their face, for example, moving EUCOM [United States European Command] to be closer to NATO headquarters, having a greater presence in the Balkans, but there needs to be an overall strategic plan that is coordinated with allies, rather than have a bunch of rationalizations after the fact.

I fully agree that NATO is the most successful alliance in history. Can it be improved? Absolutely. But we can't lose sight of what it has accomplished and what it means today for American national security. And so, however logical some of these individual moves may be, there is still the broader question of doing this in this way has some effects on the strength and unity of the NATO alliance. And what is that?

And, so I hope our witnesses can shed a little light on the consultations, on how this all fits together in the bigger picture, because it does seem to me, however much or less sense individual moves may make, the main thing is the strength of NATO, especially when dealing with an aggressive Russia. That's the main thing. And we need to have that in mind as we go through these details as well.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And with that, I yield to Dr. Anderson for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES H. ANDERSON, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Dr. ANDERSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify on recent European force structure posture realignment, alongside Lieutenant General David Allvin. He is a great partner, and it is an honor to appear beside him.

The Department continues to prioritize implementation of the National Defense Strategy, NDS, including the building of a more lethal force and strengthening alliances. One important initiative to advance the NDS and focus—and to ensure a focus on these priorities is the ongoing comprehensive review of all combatant commands. As part of U.S. European Command, USEUCOM, review, Secretary Esper directed EUCOM to develop options for repositioning our Europe-based forces to compete more effectively and respond to contingencies both within Europe and globally.

These options will be guided by Secretary Esper's five core principles: (1) enhancing deterrence of Russia; (2) strengthening NATO; (3) reassuring allies; (4) improving U.S. strategic flexibility and EUCOM's operational flexibility; and, most importantly, (5) taking care of our service members and their families.

On July 29th, Secretary Esper announced an update to the status of our U.S. European Command Force Posture review, following a decision by the President in early June to limit the number of assigned Active Duty service members in Germany to 25,000, as well as the DOD [Department of Defense] concept to reposition some of our forces within Europe and back to the United States to be better situated for great power competition.

The review yielded a concept for nearly 12,000 military personnel to be repositioned from Germany, with almost 5,600 re-stationed in other NATO countries, and approximately 6,400 returning to the United States. The realignment concept includes consolidating headquarters to strengthen operational agility, repositioning some forces in the United States to focus on readiness and to prepare for rotational deployments, and deploying rotational forces to the Black Sea region on NATO's southeastern flank to improve deterrence.

The concept consists of the following four pillars.

First, the consolidation of various U.S. headquarters in Europe outside Germany, including in some cases, collocating headquarters at the same locations as their NATO counterparts in Belgium and Italy. This would help strengthen NATO and improve operational efficiency and readiness of more than 2,000 service members in these headquarters.

Second, the nearly 4,500 members of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment would return to the United States as other Stryker units begin rotations farther east in the Black Sea region, giving us a more enduring presence to enhance deterrence and reassure allies along NATO's southeastern flank.

Third, 2,500 airmen based at the Royal Air Force Base in Mildenhall, United Kingdom, who are responsible for aerial refueling and special operations, and who had been scheduled to re-base to Germany, would remain in the U.K. [United Kingdom], thus ensuring uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of these units.

Fourth, a fighter squadron and elements of a fighter wing would be repositioned to Italy, moving them closer to the Black Sea region and rendering them more capable to conduct dynamic force employment and rotational deployments to NATO's southeastern flank.

This concept to reposition our forces in Europe constitutes a major strategic shift, wholly in line with the NDS, and consistent with other adjustments the U.S. has previously made within NATO. Over NATO's 71-year history, the size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces in Europe has changed many times. As our planning for the current realignment matures, we will be sure to communicate frequently with Congress and with our NATO allies to maintain visibility and foster cooperation.

As we continue to implement the NDS, our efforts at enhancing our Europe posture beyond EUCOM combatant command review have shown recent successes, including the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Poland in August that will enable an increased enduring U.S. rotational presence in that country of about 1,000 U.S. military personnel. These elements are in addition to the 4,500 U.S. military personnel already on rotation in Poland and includes infrastructure and logistical support provided by Poland.

Our continued efforts to streamline operations across Europe, including through modernized and new agreements with NATO allies, especially on the eastern flank, directly support our NDS principles by improving operational flexibility and enhancing deterrence. The Department is confident that these continuing efforts will help us adapt the force and optimize our force posture in Europe as we seek to deter malign actors.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Anderson can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Allvin.

**STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID W. ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General ALLVIN. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here to be with you today. As Dr. Anderson noted, the Joint Staff partners closely with our OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and U.S. European Command, or EUCOM, colleagues to provide credible military options to the Secretary of Defense and the President on U.S. military presence in Europe in support of national security objectives.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy describes the erosion in longstanding roles based on our international order which has created an increasingly complex and volatile global security environment. Russian aggression and malign influence is accelerating this decline in Europe, with cascading effects across the globe.

As General Wolters, the commander of USEUCOM, stated in testimony earlier this year, over the past 12 years Russia has invaded two neighboring states; violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading to the treaty's termination; developed new

strategic platforms; and abrogated its responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This has been done at the expense of strategic stability.

It is because of serious threats from Russia and China that this January—January 2020—Secretary Esper directed a series of combatant command reviews to focus on strategic priorities across the globe and realign forces in support of the National Defense Strategy.

Of particular relevance to Europe, the NDS calls for the joint force to maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, deter adversaries from aggression against our vital interests, and defend allies from military aggression, while bolstering partners against coercion.

These objectives are accomplished through the three distinct lines of effort: building a more lethal joint force; strengthening alliances; and reforming the Department's business practices.

Technological and geopolitical influence on the character of war necessitates the evolution, and not only the tools with which we fight, but the operational concepts and the general posture of our forces. In many ways those concepts of U.S. forces in Europe have not markedly changed since the last huge force reduction following the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as subsequent changes since.

Large formations of permanent forces can present vulnerabilities and are not best suited to flexibly respond to emerging threats across the globe and outside of their current area of operations. The current environment requires increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action.

The National Defense Strategy unveiled the concept of dynamic force employment, which prioritizes maintaining the readiness of the joint force for major combat, while providing options for proactive and scalable employment for deterrence and assurance. This concept is critical to EUCOM posture, for the EUCOM posture realignment.

Under the dynamic force employment concept, episodic introduction of forces across the region presents dilemmas to potential adversaries, while providing the Secretary and the President with the flexibility and capacity to rapidly respond to emergent threats across the globe.

Operational flexibility is equally important. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ideological border separating East from West has gradually shifted in favor of a free and open international order. New allies are joining NATO, but these gains must be reinforced. Nations along the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, for instance, are under direct and persistent military pressure from Russia. Presenting forces further east would reduce the response time and increased the deterrence to Russian aggression.

Moving forces in and out of the European theater, as is done with rotational forces, also exercises the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration capabilities, which must be sharp to support ongoing contingency plans in the region. None of this is possible without allies and partners. And over the past 75 years, the U.S. has benefitted from a growing constellation of alliances and partnerships.

These bilateral and multilateral accords, with the North Atlantic Treaty as a shining example, serve as a strategic and asymmetric advantage against revisionist powers such as Russia. The transatlantic alliance is strengthened by the complementary capabilities, unique perspectives, relationships, and regional access provided by our NATO allies. Collaborative planning is necessary to coalesce these diverse viewpoints and competencies into an interoperable force which acts together to achieve common military objectives.

Collocation of the NATO headquarters with the EUCOM headquarters will enhance the NATO collaborative planning with the EUCOM staff and build upon recent enhancements to the NATO command structure.

During Secretary Esper's 29 July briefing, he affirmed that the realignment of U.S. forces in Europe plan is subject to, and likely will, change to some degree as it evolves over time. In his role as the global integrator, Chairman Milley continues to capture the views of the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs so that he may provide military advice to the Secretary and President on updates and refinements to the plan to address the strategic and operational threats at the speed of relevance.

We also acknowledge that the best plans are born through consultation with allies, and continued engagement with Congress. We are committed to this collaborative approach.

During the 29 July brief, the Vice Chairman, General Hyten, mentioned the Department's structure process required to translate this concept into action. I would like to offer some additional insight into the process and provide a bit of a roadmap going forward.

The realignment of forces outside of U.S. territory required structured engagements between the Department of Defense, the interagency, allied host nations, and international organizations, in addition to this body. These engagements generally involve a three-part process: planning, approvals, and implementation. Timelines for completion depend on the complexity, scale, and scope of the proposed change.

The planning stage has already begun as the EUCOM commander continues to iterate the posture concept with stakeholders across the Department, and will provide updates and considerations to the Secretary in the weeks and months to come. As the plan matures, the Department's Global Posture Executive Council, GPEC, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, and the Director of the Joint Staff, will support this effort through a deliberative, comprehensive process. This includes developing the requirements for manpower, infrastructure, and agreements in order to inform budgetary estimates.

The services will determine where the capacity exists to support the additional forces, along with the funding requirements for the military construction, if applicable, of operational and support facilities which they will request from Congress. These facilities can range from increases in apron parking spaces for an arriving squadron, to new barracks, family housing, school, or medical facilities.

The services must also evaluate support for service members and their families residing in and around an installation, such as morale and welfare programs, family service support, DOD schools, and child care. If an installation is expanded or closes—or closed, the services must account for impacts to our U.S. and host nation civilian workforce.

The planning stage also involves early host nation consultation. Building infrastructure requires adherence to U.S. and host nation environmental regulatory requirements, as well as negotiations with the host nation on utilities, air space management, and historical site mitigations, for example.

Simultaneously, planning is necessary for divestment of installations being closed. The approval—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, General. If you could wrap up, we do want to get to members' questions here.

General ALLVIN. Yes, sir.

Finally, we must remember that our most precious resources are our military men and women and their families. Any realignment will have an impact on our people, which is why Secretary Esper and Chairman Milley are committed to ensuring the needs of our service members and their families are paramount as we execute this realignment.

Thank you again for this opportunity. And I look forward to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Anderson, can you explain the pros and cons balance between permanent forces and rotational forces? That seems to be one of the biggest changes on the posture side that was contained in this, was to shift more towards rotational forces.

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes. The basic advantage of rotational forces is they provide additional flexibility. And they do so both at the strategic level, which is important for the President and the Secretary, and also at the operational level, which is important to the EUCOM combatant commander. That is the main advantage of rotational forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Two questions about that. One, what are the downsides? And two, flexibility to do what?

Flexibility sounds like a nice word, but it doesn't actually tell us anything. So, flexibility to do what?

And then what are the downsides of the forces being rotational instead of fully present?

General ALLVIN. So, I don't see any downsides to being rotational, but there is a cost involved in transitioning from permanent forces to rotational.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess I would ask if there are no downsides to being rotational forces, why do we have any permanent forces?

General ALLVIN. So, there are certain air bases and hubs and logistical facilities that do need to be permanent. There is virtue there, as we are able to move forces and flow forces to various contingencies around the world.

So, saying that there are benefits to rotational forces doesn't mean there is still some value in certain cases to permanent forces.

And as to your other question on flexibility to do what, it is the flexibility to meet those emerging or emergent crises or conflicts

which may arise, and the flexibility to take different forces and move them to different regions of the world, or move them within the European theater provides advantages, and it complicates adversary decision making. And that is, that is a good thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Anderson, you used the word “concept” several times. And, frankly, I am confused or not clear about where this stands. Have we given an outline of moves that we will make and now we are working through the details? Or is this a concept in a sense that if our allies say we don’t like that, we could abandon it?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, we have outlined to our allies, our NATO allies, the moves as we have described here. And it is, I describe it as a concept with planning underway because there is a great deal of that to be done going forward.

As you know, sir, the Department has very structured processes to plan. And receiving the Secretary’s guidance and the President’s direction we are proceeding along those lines.

I would also add that, as with any major plan, you know, it is subject to revisions and modifications going forward. But that is, that is how I would describe it. And as I said in my opening statement, we commit to continuing to consult with Congress going forward.

Mr. THORNBERRY. You mentioned several times in your opening statement, well, actually you both did, the National Defense Strategy. I brought the summary with me. There is a whole section, as you will recall, about strengthening alliances and attracting partners. There is a section on upholding the foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, and priorities, expanding consultative mechanisms, and so forth.

Are you aware of any consultation with allies that were, that was made before the, roughly, June 2020 announcement that we were going to remove troops from Germany?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, prior to the public rollout we did, we did speak with our NATO allies. I personally reached out to my counterparts, and I know my uniformed colleagues as well.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I am sorry to interrupt. But, the public rollout, is this Secretary Esper’s description of the specific moves or—

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. So, my question was, back in June the National Security Advisor had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. There were announce—there were at least leaks before that. Were there consultations, to your knowledge, before that was, the announcement or op-ed were made?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I was not involved in those consultations. But I do know that Secretary Esper did task our combatant commander early in—earlier this year, very early in the year, to begin some planning for force posture adjustments.

I believe that in that context it is a fair assumption that there were some discussions with close allies about different possibilities.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I met with several of either ambassadors or defense ministers, and my sense is this caught them all by surprise.

Let me just ask one other question.

Would you agree that the extent to which there is a chaos, disunity within NATO actually is of assistance to the Russians?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I, I would respectfully disagree with the characterization of chaos.

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, I am just—I am not saying this creates chaos. I am just trying to get back to my fundamental point that the unity and strength of NATO is of paramount importance when it comes to deterring Russia.

Dr. ANDERSON. And on that point I would agree wholeheartedly. Yes, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. And we can agree this—we may not agree, or I don't know, about whether individual actions may cause chaos. But my main question I wanted is that unity of NATO is an important deterrence.

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes, indeed.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Langevin is participating remotely, so give him a second to queue up. Jim, you are on.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss the need to maintain our defense posture in Europe. And I'm sure we can all agree our greatest strength in deterring Russian aggression is our allies.

So, my question, let me begin with this: a realignment plan, certainly in my view and that of many others, should fix something that isn't working. Dr. Anderson, what problems currently exist that necessitates such a costly, large-scale realignment?

And, additionally, how do you assess our existing allies, such as Germany, will view this plan?

Dr. ANDERSON. I am sorry, could somebody repeat that question? I couldn't quite hear it.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes, I will try again.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, let me—go ahead, Jim.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you hear me better now if I speak up closer?

The CHAIRMAN. We hear you fine, as near as I can tell. Go ahead.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I asked, a realignment plan should fix something that isn't working. And so, Dr. Anderson, I wanted to ask what problem currently exists that necessitates the costs of large-scale realignment?

Additionally, how do you assess our existing allies, such as Germany, will view this plan?

The CHAIRMAN. The basic question is what wasn't working, what were you trying to fix, and how do you think Germany feels about this?

Dr. ANDERSON. Thank you. So, as, you know, as mentioned and discussed earlier, we look at posture on a routine basis, how we are doing around the world. And certainly in the context of the Secretary of Defense-directed combatant command reviews, this is—and by the way which is not, wasn't just focused on EUCOM but was, is an across-the-board review of all our combatant com-

mands—we looked at how well current posture is deterring our competitors. And we looked at how efficient our disposition of troops is.

And in that context we have come up with, you know, a plan going forward to enhance that posture and to align with the five principles articulated by Secretary Esper.

So, in the case of Germany, you know, they probably, you know, they have some different ideas perhaps about what will be the ideal posture. But these are our forces, at the invitation of Germany. And I would argue that, you know, change can be hard because change is different, but we are quite confident that these changes will in fact be beneficial not only to the United States but our, all our NATO allies.

I would also note in the broader context of European NATO history, there have been multiple changes over time in terms of our force posture in—

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, let me, I am going to stop you there if I could. My time is running down.

I have to be honest with you that I am really having trouble connecting the dots where this is fixing a problem that really I don't think exists right now. I think it is going to cause more problems than anything it is going to solve.

But let me turn to this. Our approach to deterrence obviously has to be a whole-of-government approach, not solely reliant on the DOD. When deciding these realignment plans, what role does and did the State Department play? And what inputs have they provided during this process?

I think the ranking member touched on this. But I think it is important to address and expand upon that.

Dr. ANDERSON. Yeah, I am sorry. What role did? Can somebody summarize the question? I am having a hard time hearing.

Mr. LANGEVIN. The State Department, what role did they have in this and what inputs did they have in the process?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I know that I talk to my State Department colleagues all the time, and I know that Secretary Esper talks to Secretary Pompeo. And, you know, prior to the rollout we did discuss this posture realignment with our friends across the river.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. It doesn't sound like—it sounds to me then that it was ad hoc as opposed to a well thought-out State Department process and involvement.

So, with that I know my time is running down, so I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for being here today to bring us up to date on the European theater.

I am particularly grateful that President Trump has expanded the troop presence in Poland. This is a deterrence to Putin aggression. And it is special to me: I have a Polish-American daughter-in-law, and so, the recognition of how important that country is to all of us, and has been.

And then I had an opportunity to meet with President Andrzej Duda in New York and thank him for the warm welcome of Amer-

ican troops. In fact, there has been speculation that the base could be called Fort Trump. The key point is that we really appreciate and recognize the importance of Poland to deter aggression.

And, Secretary Anderson, I was an election observer in Bulgaria in 1990 for the parliamentary elections which represented the historic transition to a democratic society, a dream come true of democracy in Bulgaria. I visited our base there in Novo Selo in 2008 at its meager beginning, and now it is a world-class training facility which has been really reinforced by Prime Minister Boyko Borissov.

Additionally, I visited MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu] Air Base in Romania with Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo when it was established as a logistics hub for the global war on terrorism, but is now modernized to be the heel-to-toe rotations for our armored brigade combat teams in Europe.

What is your assessment of our relationship with NATO allies Bulgaria and Romania, including the strategic locations of Novo Selo and MK for the European Defense Initiative?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, first on Poland, we certainly agree they are a strong NATO ally. And we believe the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is going to make that partnership even stronger with our rotational, our additional rotational forces there.

Both Bulgaria and Romania are relatively new to NATO, having joined in 2004 with other countries. But they have made tremendous strides, as your question suggests, in terms of modernization and professionalization. So, we absolutely are looking to them as we reposition and move additional rotation, move additional rotational forces through those two countries.

We think that this will strengthen deterrence along NATO's southeastern flank in a very positive way. And so we are excited about this possibility.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And, Mr. Secretary, there is always going to be tensions between commitments that we have in other areas of the world, such as the INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] region, recognizing the importance now of the alliance that we have with India and how far that has come. The American security commitments to EUCOM, though obviously we need to maintain, how do we do this to be committed to our European allies, to our Asian allies?

What is the latest on the strategic gains of our military over the last year with our partners and allies in Europe?

How can we better prepare America and our strategic allies to deter adversaries?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, in the context of great power competition, which we outline in the National Defense Strategy, we are very concerned, obviously, about our competitors, both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. The United States is a European power, it is also a Pacific power. We can, and we are, and we will continue to have commitments in both regions and deter on both those fronts.

I would add that the rotational element of this current plan here gives us more flexibility both, again, at the strategic level and at the operational level. So, what that means in very practical terms is that some of the troops currently positioned in Europe that will

be coming back to the United States, and then will have the inherent flexibility to respond to any number of global contingencies. But they will still retain a keen focus on deploying back to Europe on a rotational basis.

Mr. WILSON. Excellent. Thank you.

And, General Allvin, there is no doubt that China and Russia are our main competitors and they continue malign activity in Africa. What is the Security Force Assistance Brigade [SFAB] support for AFRICOM?

The CHAIRMAN. And I do apologize, but you have about 15 seconds to answer that question.

General ALLVIN. Absolutely. I would say this is one of the great developments that the United States Army has done to be able to adapt the environment and understand it is not all about high-end combat, but sometimes you have to compete in those mil-to-mil [military-to-military] cooperation arrangements that the SFAB really primes on. It is important to be able to compete across the globe.

Mr. WILSON. Hear, hear. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen is recognized.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield my time to Representative Houlahan of Pennsylvania.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. And thank you all for coming.

Before I start with my questions I don't—I want to kind of pause for a minute on Representative Wilson's comments regarding troops in Poland and respectfully disagree. I am not certain that it is necessarily a deterrence but possibly an escalation by moving troops to Poland.

And my father is Polish-born, and so I personally have heard from him about the history of that war-torn area of our planet, and I worry about that.

But my questions are for you, Dr. Anderson. And it is my understanding that this realignment will affect our posture in Africa. And so, what is the process that the Department will be using to determine where it will be relocating AFRICOM headquarters?

And could you please describe what assessment you have made of how the realignment would affect our presence in Africa?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, as outlined on the 29th, the public rollout, the AFRICOM headquarters, which is currently in Stuttgart, Germany, will be moving to a different location to be determined. And there will be a number of factors involved there in making that determination, including cost and receptivity of host nations, if it is going to be based in Europe or even in Africa; or if it were to move back to the United States, which is yet another possibility, obviously, you know, the services would be involved in consultation with Congress about potential destinations.

So, cost and operational efficiency would—as applicable, any host nation permissions, those would all be among the variables that the Department would have to assess.

Ms. HOULAHAN. So, do we have that sort of data on where it currently exists so that we could compare whatever the two options or three options are?

And why would we decide just to move just to move, without any sort of information or data about where staying put would put us in terms of a cost-benefit analysis?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I don't have, I don't have those details on the current cost of maintaining that headquarters. But, I am confident that we will find operational efficiencies in moving that, and also meeting the Presidentially directed cap of our forces in Germany.

Ms. HOULAHAN. And how would you make an assessment of what the effect would be with our relationships in Africa, our presence in Africa? What sort of factors would come into play there? You mentioned specifically maybe moving to the United States, which sort of doesn't seem like a sensible solution.

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I worked in the Pentagon in the 2000s, and I remember well the vigorous debates that ensued at that time when AFRICOM was established, where it could or should be located. And it is my full expectation that we will have a similarly vigorous debate this time around on the potential destinations of AFRICOM.

And I know that General Townsend, the combatant commander for AFRICOM, is working with his staff to develop such options.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And with the remainder of my time, General Allvin, this question is probably in the classified environment, but I would like to just put it out there and potentially have a follow-up with you.

I would be interested to know if the Department has updated operation plans for various Russian-related contingencies, given the proposed changes to our posture in Europe?

General ALLVIN. Congresswoman, we can certainly go into more detail at a higher level of classification.

I will tell you that the EUCOM staff did consider those when they were developing this realignment posture and the costs of this. They were considered, both the current ones and including some of the shortfalls and the opportunities with this.

But I can go at a higher classification with you.

Ms. HOULAHAN. And would we be able to follow up with you on more details on that at a different classification level?

General ALLVIN. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Okay, thank you.

My last question is also for you. I am curious to see how EUCOM is working with allied agencies to counter Russian cyber threats, and how the proposed posture changes would affect that work.

General ALLVIN. I know that the—actually from being on the staff from 2015 to 2018 I have been heartened in the last couple years to see the actual improvement in the capabilities in the cyber realm within U.S. European Command to be able to not only address those, but also reach out to some potentially vulnerable—and that is about as much as I can go to in this classification level—partners within the region.

I would say that the assessment I would have to defer to U.S. European Command for a specific assessment. I would say in general, though, the relationships and specifically how it pertains to cyber engagements and movements on that front, I would not anticipate a big change either way on that from the current positive path that it is on.

But I would have to yield to, and we can get back to you for the record, with EUCOM for more details, if you would like, on that topic.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. I appreciate it.

I have run out of time. And thank you, Representative. And I yield back to the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to begin by stating that I share the chairman and the ranking member's skepticism concerning this plan. But I want to associate myself with the comments of Mr. Wilson.

I think it is very important for us to have forward-deployed troops. And having participated in observance of war games in Poland, I know how important our presence in Poland is in deterrence with respect to Russia.

General, I want to begin with you. You were involved in the formulation of this plan; correct?

General ALLVIN. I was not personally involved in the formulation of this plan.

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Have you reviewed the process upon which the formulation occurred? Did you have conversations with those who were putting the plan together?

General ALLVIN. I have.

Mr. TURNER. Are you aware whether or not the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 had a, had an impact in the formulation of this plan which prohibits the forward deployment of troops on a permanent basis in former Warsaw Pact countries?

General ALLVIN. I did consult with those who are developing the plan afterwards to ensure that the NATO-Russia Founding Act was taken into consideration. And they assured me that it was taken into consideration because the wording in the NATO-Russia Founding Act talks about significant forces permanently stationed rather than rotational.

Mr. TURNER. Now, Russia doesn't see it that way; right, General? I mean, Russia believes that rotational forces that are—have a continuing presence are in fact permanent. Isn't that their objection that they have made to this plan?

General ALLVIN. That is their objection. I don't know that that is what they believe in their hearts or if that is part of the competition rhetoric.

Mr. TURNER. If there wasn't the NATO-Russia Founding Act would we have approached this differently?

General ALLVIN. I would have to yield to the EUCOM staff for that. I think we look at the evolution of the strategic environment and take that into account. But I can't speak on their behalf as to whether that would have significantly altered the path.

Mr. TURNER. General, if we are in a conflict with Russia, do you believe that the Atlantic is contested space?

General ALLVIN. I do.

Mr. TURNER. Wouldn't that mean that by having rotational forces that it complicates our ability to rotate forces, to augment, supple-

ment, or to even, as Dr. Anderson was saying, to give us the flexibility as to what we have in Europe?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, to keep it at this classification level I would say that while our ability to rotate forces into the theater would be challenged, the existence of the amount of permanent presence forces there would be insignificant—would not be significant enough to successfully engage decisively the Russians in a conflict. So, one would still have to deploy significant amounts of forces in which the Atlantic would be contested, regardless.

Mr. TURNER. General, when you commit to rotational forces as opposed to permanent forces, isn't it true that rotational forces can actually have an increased cost above what permanent basing of forces would be?

General ALLVIN. I would yield to the services for that. But it is my understanding that there is an increased cost. Now, that can be, that can be mitigated through different means, whether it be keeping the equipment there or not, there are different ways that it can be mitigated. And the advantages of rotational forces can outweigh that.

I would yield to the services for that.

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Anderson, Russia has obviously been in violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They, too, had representations in the agreement, which is not a treaty and is not, therefore, binding to the United States. And their incursions both into Georgia and to Ukraine would certainly be violations of those acts, of that act.

If the Russian—if the NATO-Russia Founding Act was not being adhered to by the United States in this plan, would you have scoped it differently and would you have looked at placing permanent troops forward based?

Dr. ANDERSON. I would also have to defer to the EUCOM staff on those, on that particular question. But I would say that I would just reemphasize the value of the rotational forces. The cost is a consideration. In some cases it may go up, but in other cases with the rotational forces you don't have the costs associated with families being PCSed [permanent change of station] overseas. So, that would in fact be a cost savings, again, once you get through kind of a transition period, which is envisioned to take years.

Mr. TURNER. Well, Dr. Anderson, I am not a fan of the United States adhering to agreements that Russia continuously violates. And I do fear that in this instance we may be scoping our plans and policies by limiting ourselves to an act that is at this point meaningless.

Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and to our witnesses for being here today.

You know, one aspect of this plan which we haven't talked about which strikes me as one of the oddest part of the proposal is the scaling back of the continuous presence of our Marines in Norway. Again, last October Mr. Norcross and I spent some time in Norway, again meeting with defense officials, members of the Norwegian military. The tempo of antisubmarine warfare activity that the

U.S. is collaborating with Norway has gone through the roof in the last few years, which I am sure both witnesses are very familiar with.

And as a government and as a country they, again, for so many reasons are so critical as an ally. (A) they are the NATO member in the high north; they, again, are a whisper away from hitting their NATO GDP [gross domestic product] target in terms of defense spending. And we went through, again, the increases that they have been investing in in a whole variety of areas that are there. And they border Russia.

So, you know, the rationale about ending continuous presence of the Marine Corps in Norway, this committee has spent really the last 5 years on a bipartisan basis supporting the European Defense Initiative as a way of reassuring our allies. And that was a big part of the conversations that we were having with defense officials and government officials while we were there.

So, explain what was the rationale of doing that, again at a very critical time with a country that is obviously really hitting above its weight in the region as an ally of this country? What has been the reaction?

And, given the fact that they did the Black Sea rotations out of Norway with that Marine unit, and that purportedly is one of the things that you are focused on, how is that any—how is the newly planned rotations for the Black Sea any different than what we are already doing with those troops that are in Norway?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, a couple points. NATO, Norway remains a key, actually, a founding member of NATO, and obviously important for its geographic location, as you noted, sir.

The, you know, the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force in readiness, you know, has decided that, you know, they are going to continue to take advantage of the relationship that we have with Norway and the fact that we have pre-positioned equipment up there, but just do so in a different way, in a more rotational way that will give, provide additional flexibility, and also is very consistent with the National Defense Strategy and the emphasis on dynamic force employment.

Where we don't necessarily telegraph, you know, all our movements years in advance, you know, we can do things on short notice. We can change the schedule up in a way that is operationally unpredictable. And the Marine Corps is very capable of moving quickly. And this is something that will, as talked about earlier, provide the United States with some additional benefits.

Mr. COURTNEY. So, do they, I mean, so you're saying this actually enhances, you know, the ability to be—to have a deterrence capability in that region? That is your statement today?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yeah. Combined with the other moves described with respect to this posture realignment, yes, I do believe it is going to enhance deterrence.

Mr. COURTNEY. So, again, the question regarding the Black Sea rotations which, again, already are occurring with those Marines in Norway today, how is the newly planned rotations, what is the change there? What is the benefit for not using Norway's even as the resource?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, one of the main pieces envisioned with the posture realignment is that there will be some Stryker units that will be moving to the Black Sea region and on a rotational basis. So, that is—I am not aware that Marines that were up in Norway are necessarily moving or planning to rotate to the Black Sea region. They might.

But, I mean, again, that is part of the value of having this rotational flexibility.

Mr. COURTNEY. Yeah, they are actually doing precisely that.

And with that I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to focus, both Dr. Anderson and Lieutenant General Allvin, on the 2020 agreement that was signed with Poland setting the conditions for burden sharing and moving the troops, 1,100 more service members into Poland.

So, was there or is there any discussion about moving more of the troops from Germany into Poland instead of relocating those troops back to the United States? And is a permanent U.S. base in Poland something that you foresee may happen?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I will start on that one. You know, we do have approximately 4,500 troops on a rotational basis going through Poland. And the agreement that was signed this summer by the President and his counterpart envisions another 1,000 thereabouts being deployed on a rotational basis. And it will include elements of the 5th Corps headquarters element. And that, that will provide our Army units, clearly, in Europe with additional sort of eastward presence that they do not currently have.

And we think that, you know, on a rotational basis is the appropriate agreement with the Polish Government.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, you don't see any of the troops that are currently in Germany being moved to be part of the 1,100 over in Poland?

Dr. ANDERSON. No, ma'am. Those are, they are, I would describe the European force posture restructuring and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement as separate but complementary in their impact and their effect.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, I was in Poland last year with some of my other colleagues here at HASC [House Committee on Armed Services]. We were at Poznan, we were at Powidz Air Base there. And can attest that a lot of the training facilities are pretty austere in Poland. I understand that is one of the issues that needs to be addressed, the development of training range infrastructure. And it is my understanding that Poland has agreed to help pay for that and to construct that.

Can you tell me both the timeline of that and what is the nature of the training grounds that will need to be constructed?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement does allow for, does provide for the Polish Government to assist with these infrastructure improvements.

I would have to get back to you on the particular timing of those, ma'am.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. And switching gears to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment that is returning back to the United States, what is the process to determine where their location is going to be, their new home station?

And what is the timeline for stationing them back to the U.S.?

And along with that, what infrastructure will be needed for them to return?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, the timeline is, will take, will take some time. I mean, as we have said consistently, this is months of planning and years of execution, so that a precise timeline is to be determined. And that will be, you know, in consultation with, obviously, with Congress and also the services on where, where they may end up in the United States.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you have any idea how much infrastructure will need to be built to sustain them? Or will that be determined once you determine the location, I assume?

Dr. ANDERSON. The latter, ma'am.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you very much.

I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Is Mr. Norcross with us? I don't—Mr. Norcross, is he? He is not.

Mr. Gallego. Mr. Gallego is with us remotely.

Ruben, are you hearing me there?

Mr. GALLEGO. Yeah, I can. Thank you very much.

I apologize. I am still in shock, to begin with, in regards to—I am sorry, can you hear me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Yes, we can hear you.

Mr. GALLEGO. I am still in shock, to begin with, like, about the decision-making process that we saw going into this. And that is kind of I wanted to make sure that you all understand part of my statement here.

Many of us attended a briefing, a classified briefing, that I think a lot of us came out not very satisfied in terms of where the rationale, and not only where the rationale came from but then the method that was used to hit the goals that were set by the President. So, I just want to pick that out.

To go into other questions, though, General Allvin, have we seen a decrease in Russian military activity or a general decrease in the threat from Russia in the past couple years?

General ALLVIN. No, Congressman, we haven't.

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. And I agree.

For the NDAA, I wrote the amendment in this year's NDAA putting restrictions on troop withdrawals and moves to get rid of infrastructure in Europe. So, tell me, how do we take the troops out of Germany or Europe with all [inaudible] against Russian attacks anything other than a, you know, soft gift, in my opinion, to the Kremlin that is still actively trying to assert its influence over Europe?

General ALLVIN. Well, Congressman, all I can really offer on that front is that as we are looking to execute the National Defense Strategy we take into account not only what Russia is doing, but we also have to take into account what China is doing.

We also have to take into account what is happening with respect to our readiness, trying to recover readiness.

We also have to take into account the fact that despite the fact that Congress has been very, very generous with the budget, we can anticipate that there will be, probably, downward pressure on the budget.

So, as we look at how we can best array the forces to deter across the globe, if we were to take Europe in isolation it is a very, very defensible argument to talk about that maybe we should have more forces in Europe. And at the same time, one might say we need to have more forces in the INDOPACOM AOR [area of responsibility] to push back on that aggression.

But as those sort of conflict with each other, the idea that we would develop a new approach to deterrence, and that approach is founded on dynamic force employment, and in order to do that some of these, these force alignments and these force reposturing enable the Secretary to have more freedom to be able to do dynamic force employment to not only deter in Europe but also to deter in the Indo-Pacific.

Now, that is going to require something though. That is going to require our ability to demonstrate that we can deploy forces in a rapid manner, in an operationally unpredictable manner, in that the new decision calculus, which is the baseline of deterrence, the new decision calculus is based on the idea that even though the forces may not be there in the way that they were before, that malign influence that is being considered is now perhaps deterred because of the idea that the forces will be there in an unpredictable manner, maybe not where they expected they would be. And it is still the costs and the risks outweighs the benefit of that malign activity.

So, it really is trying to understand, with all those conflicting pressures, how one best postures across the globe, which is why, as Dr. Anderson mentioned, the Secretary has directed the combatant commander reviews across all of the combatant commands.

Mr. GALLEGO. I reclaim my time.

First of all, thank you. But to be clear, talking to many of our European defense ministers, if we want to talk about deterrence, the best deterrence, obviously, is having a strong alliance that, you know, trusts each other and believes in each other. These moves have really made a lot of our longstanding allies question whether we are really going to be there should the balloon go up.

And speaking of just cost, Dr. Anderson, why hasn't the Department sent the committee a cost estimate; aside from actively harming our national security, in my opinion we are going to need money to make these changes. Just simply moving a combatant command headquarters like AFRICOM is going to cost us billions of dollars. Where is that money going to come from? What is the estimate for all this stuff, how much it is going to cost?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, as Secretary Esper pointed out on the 29th of July, you know, we are still formulating those cost estimates. He did, he did note that it will be in the single-digit billions, that that is rough order of magnitude at this point. But, clearly, going forward, subject to further planning and assessments, we will have a

more refined estimate that we will be able to share with the committee.

Mr. GALLEGO. Well, thank you. Thank you, Dr. Anderson.

This is just, just to be clear, we made a decision based on the President's decision to move a certain amount of troops out of Germany without any actual context of how this brings deterrence or national security. And then we have, basically, the Pentagon built a, I would say, a plan around that idea without any actual understanding—

The CHAIRMAN. If you could wrap that up quickly, Ruben.

The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you.

Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I see that you got a master's from Troy State, spent some time at Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama proudly claims you. So, glad you are here.

So, I am trying to understand some basics here. And I know you can help me. So, a total of 12,000 military personnel are being repositioned. And I think I understand that 5,600 of those will be restationed within NATO, but 6,400 will be coming back to the United States. Do I have that correct?

General ALLVIN. That approximate number, yes.

Mr. BYRNE. Are the 6,400, are all of them going to be on a rotational basis or are some of them not going to be on a rotational basis?

General ALLVIN. To my understanding, as was briefed to the Secretary and the Secretary released on the 29th, some are. Some may be back maintaining readiness as well. So, they are available.

Mr. BYRNE. When they come back on a rotational basis are they still considered to be a part of the EUCOM force?

General ALLVIN. Yes, Congressman, they are.

Mr. BYRNE. Okay. So, they are part of the EUCOM force but they are in the United States, can be brought back at the pleasure of the commander.

How do they get back?

General ALLVIN. Well, sir, there is a process that is called the Global Force Management process that I won't bore the committee with here. But, really, the combatant command, combatant commander will request on a rotating basis certain types of forces for certain types of activities, and justify it within the context of their global campaign plan and execution of the National Defense Strategy.

That makes its way into the Department. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the global integrator, will evaluate all of those requests and look at it from a global perspective in the execution of the National Defense Strategy. And that will make its way up his military advice up to OSD and up to the Secretary for decision.

So, those rotational forces will be dispersed across the globe in accordance with the National Defense Strategy priorities. And that happens year to year.

But, on any given time, if you are counting noses in the theater, I think General Wolters would say all of those, whether rotational

or assigned, those are the forces he considers as part of the U.S. European Command force posture.

Mr. BYRNE. But—make sure I understand what you are saying. Even though they are part of EUCOM, they have rotated back to the United States, they can be put into INDOPACOM if that was the decision by the Department of Defense?

General ALLVIN. That's correct, Congressman. And another unit could actually go into Europe.

Mr. BYRNE. Right. So, it does seem like, even though you are saying it is rotational, it does seem like we have a net reduction of forces in-country and available to EUCOM, but 6,400, that is the way it seems to somebody that is not in uniform. Where am I wrong about that?

General ALLVIN. Well, you are not wrong. The idea is it could be at any time up to 6,400 fewer. However, at any given time, depending on the nature of which rotational forces have been requested and where, it could be no net loss. So, there still is a variability; they are just no longer permanently with their families stationed there. But they could be, they, or other units, like units or different units, can be there doing the same mission for the combatant command.

Mr. BYRNE. But to do that you have to go through that process that you described. And I don't know whether that is a process that takes 5 minutes, 5 days, 5 weeks, or 5 months, but it takes some time to make that decision?

General ALLVIN. Those decisions are made well ahead of time. So, the decisions are going on right now for the types of forces that will be deployed in the end of fiscal year 2021 into fiscal year 2022.

So there, those, those forces are known well ahead of time so they can get trained up for the missions for which they have been designated to be allocated to the combatant commander for.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I am certainly not in a position to question someone that has your level of expertise and experience, but from a layperson's point of view it looks like we have reduced our troop presence in Europe at a time that Russia is actually becoming more of a threat. And I hope you understand, that is where some of us are coming from, we are saying this looks like we are pulling back, and we think we should be stepping forward.

I will never forget, I think it was my second month on this committee that Russia basically invaded Ukraine. And nobody had any notice. We didn't have 5 months to plan. They just did it. And I have absolutely no confidence that Putin won't do that again. In fact, I have all the confidence in the world he will do it again, particularly if he thinks that we are weakening.

And I worry, and I think some of our allies are worrying, that they are looking at this move as a weakening of American presence, a weakening of American resolve, a weakening of American capability operating with our NATO allies. So, I am just registering to you, I don't have your background and I can't question you on the details of it, but from that sort of outsider's layman's perspective, it looks like we are pulling back. And I think that bothers a lot of us.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

So, I am not sure from looking at the screen who we have here. Ms. Horn is up next.

Kendra, are you on anywhere—does not appear that way.

Mr. Cisneros. Zero for two.

Mr. Crow, I saw you. There you are, Jason. Mr. Crow is up. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CROW. Yes, I am here. Can you hear me? Great.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we got you.

Mr. CROW. I want to start with Mr. Anderson. I was quizzical, to say the least, on your comment that there are no downsides to rotational forces. I just want to flesh that out for a minute.

One is, are rotational forces, do they have as much time to train and develop relationships and interoperability with local NATO partner forces as currently stationed forces do?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, even with the rotational forces, you know, we will have a limited presence within a particular country through which their rotational forces are moving.

Mr. CROW. But the forces themselves, they will have less time than if they were permanently stationed; correct?

Dr. ANDERSON. They will have less time within the country. That is correct.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Next question. Next question, do they have as good awareness of the terrain and the surrounding area in which they will operate as a permanently based force?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, again, there will be, there will be liaisons, there will be forward elements.

Mr. CROW. Will the forces themselves? I am not concerned about the liaisons, headquarter people, people sitting back in headquarters offices; the forces themselves.

Dr. ANDERSON. So, the forces themselves will have a, I would say, a broader pers—a broader understanding of possible regions of the world that they may have to deploy to.

Mr. CROW. Okay. So you are saying that a rotational force coming from the United States that rotates for 6 to 9 months or a year will have a broader view—will have a greater or less understanding of the terrain over which they operate in if they were to be countering Russian aggression?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, they will not have the same degree of understanding as forces that—

Mr. CROW. Okay.

Dr. ANDERSON. But they will retain a keen appreciation and a focus—

Mr. CROW. I will reclaim my time, Mr. Anderson.

So, they will have less, they will have less time and less awareness of the terrain.

Secondly, will they have as much time with their families as a permanently stationed force in Europe would have?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, it depends on the nature and the frequency of the rotations.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Mr. Anderson, the answer is no to that, and you know that. They will be rotating away from their families.

Next is will they have as much time to train on ranges in critical combat skills? Because if you are forward deploying or rotating, obviously a significant amount of time is spent deploying and rede-

ploying. Will they have as much time doing critical combat skill training?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, two points. Even forces that are permanently stationed in Europe today deploy within Europe and spend—are apart from their families at certain, at certain times.

Secondly, for training, it really depends on the unit that we are talking about and the available ranges. It may in some cases actually have greater training and access in the United States, again depending on the unit.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Well, Mr. Anderson, I think you and I both know that when you are deploying and redeploying forces that takes significant time that could otherwise be spent on critical combat skills. And it strains credibility that you would try to justify it that way. And there are, indeed, many downsides for rotational forces in terms of the readiness of our troops. And I believe you know that.

So, I don't appreciate you dodging those questions.

Mr. Anderson, the Secretary of the Army, Mr. McCarthy, Secretary McCarthy on July 21st confirmed after returning from Europe that he had had no discussions with our European allies about rebasing or troop withdrawal as of July 21st. So, why would the Secretary of the Army be unaware of this plan at that point and not be consulting with our allies?

Dr. ANDERSON. I can't speak for the Secretary of the Army. I can assure you, though, that I was in contact with my counterparts at the policy level about this force structure reposturing.

Mr. CROW. Okay. General Allvin, turning to you for a moment. You have been in the military for a very long time and have been a part of a lot of discussions around repositioning and shifting of forces. Did the timeline and the process for this decision, was that consistent with the prior timelines and processes that you followed in the past?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I would say that given the timeline when the Secretary directed the combatant command to do this, which was starting in January, I would say that this is, this is not completely inconsistent. I would say that the complexity of this also is the reason why the Secretary has reserved the right to continue to make iterations as we get smarter.

But this is a 6-month review. It is consistent. And I think the devil will be in the details of the updates to it and the implementation in order to make sure we measure twice and cut once.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you.

Nobody likes to have their decisions second-guessed, but that is the drill. So, appreciate your being here this morning.

I am a CPA [certified public accountant], and I kind of approach everything from the dollar standpoint. Dr. Anderson, did I hear you say earlier that there was a rigorous cost-benefit analysis done of the overall project of what was formally proposed in June? In other words, is it going to cost more money, less money?

DOD budgets are always under pressure, given the tyranny of personnel costs, costs increasing. So, what is the bottom line: is it going to cost us more or less?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, we anticipate that this, in its totality, will as a rough magnitude cost in the single digit billions. That is the estimate at this time. And as we go forward and we refine those estimates, that number may go, go up or could be adjusted in some fashion.

Mr. CONAWAY. I understand. It would change if you changed the plan. But would you describe the process as being rigorous?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, as earlier—

Mr. CONAWAY. On the back of a napkin it seemed like.

Dr. ANDERSON. Earlier, as my colleague has pointed out, we are still in the process of developing and maturing this plan. And there, it is a complex one. There are a lot of, lot of moving pieces here, different headquarters going different places, and rotational forces, and subject to further refinement. So, we just do not have a clear—

Mr. CONAWAY. So, do you anticipate—

Dr. ANDERSON [continuing]. Estimate at this time.

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. A decision that we can't afford to do all of this, that we unwind this if it costs too much money? Or is cost not a factor?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, this is something, obviously, that is going to be a, we are going to have to—we will need congressional support, obviously, for any authorization or appropriations.

It is my view that, notwithstanding the pressure on the budget, that this is something that we will be able to afford. And the costs will be spaced out over time.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. Dr. Anderson, that, I would prefer you to have said that I've got a rigorous analysis to come to that conclusion. I know that is what you want it to be.

But let me ask you this, and this is just a bit of a real weird, odd observation. In your testimony you said the third leg would be to move 2,500 airmen from Royal Air Force Base Mildenhall to Germany, was planned to move to Germany, and that you are not going to do that.

Is there a plan someplace in the bowels of the Department that when that original decision was to move those air units, the air refueling and special ops [operations], move to Germany, was there some sort of a justification plan that was done at that point in time that would have had some lofty phrases as to why you made—why that made sense? And now we are unwinding that decision. And the only rationale you put in your statement is that they would remain in the U.K., thus ensuring uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of these units.

That leads me to believe that if we had gone through with a move to Germany that it would have in fact interrupted their readiness and responsiveness. That is not what you are telling us, is it?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I am—whatever the justification for initially having the plan to move them to Germany, I am not familiar with that. That I believe precedes my time in my current position.

But what I, what we do know is that in order to meet the cap of the reduction in Germany this was a—

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So, this—

Dr. ANDERSON [continuing]. Move that makes sense.

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. This wasn't driven by mission, this was driven by the caps?

Dr. ANDERSON. Well, there is the cap and there is also the added benefit, as pointed out in the statement, that there are efficiencies to, you know, remaining in with our close British—

Mr. CONAWAY. How much money was spent in Germany on the receiving base before we unwound this decision?

Dr. ANDERSON. I don't have that detail, sir. I would have to come back to you on that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Do you have any idea when that decision was made to move that unit, those 2,500 airmen and, I assume, their families to Germany? Would we have been spending money at the receiving base in Germany at this point, or during that timeframe?

Dr. ANDERSON. I will have to save that for the record and come back to you on it, Congressman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. If you wouldn't mind doing that, I would appreciate it.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I do just have to make a comment. And I know you gentlemen are doing the job that is assigned you by the Pentagon. This is why we need an actual Under Secretary for Policy. And this is why we need the positions of the Pentagon filled.

I understand, Dr. Anderson, you are in a difficult position. You weren't here for the plans. You are in an acting position now. But there is a level of detail in a bipartisan way. This is just not acceptable from the Department of Defense that, you know, on a move of this kind, you know, whatever you guys may think of Congress, whatever you may think of this committee, it is our responsibility to exercise oversight of this.

The American people in their infinite wisdom have put us in these chairs. And we are not getting the level of insight in this decision that we should. And I don't know if it is because you are in an acting position, acting in the role of, or whatever, but, you know, I wasn't in on that, I didn't hear that, I would have to talk to this person, I would have to talk to that person.

You know, and again, you are doing what the Pentagon told you to do, and I am not taking this out on you. But for the Pentagon to send this over on a decision at this level and not tell us about here is what we did, here is the timeline, here is the person we talked to, we talked to this person, we didn't talk to that person, I mean, the level of detail that we are getting here is just not acceptable for us to exercise our oversight and for what the Pentagon should be putting in front of us.

So, I just want that on the record from my perspective. And I have the strong sense that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle would agree with me on that point.

So, on this and other decisions we just need to hear better what the hell is going on so that we can exercise our oversight.

And if you have a comment on that, you are welcome to. But that is, it is a very frustrating briefing at this point.

Dr. ANDERSON. So, Congressman, it is clearly not the case that we are not providing the details. We, at this stage of the process we don't have that level of detail. But we commit, as the plan matures and we develop those details, that we will, we will share them with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is alarming in its own right. But, but I take your point.

Okay. Next up we have Ms. Davis, recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, obviously doing your job. We totally understand that.

But I, I am taken aback as well by the language that you are developing in maturing the plan. When do you think the plan is going to be matured?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, so I would anticipate that, you know, by early 2021, early in the new year that we will have a much more mature plan to share with Congress.

Mrs. DAVIS. And, General Allvin, did you want to respond to that as well? Is that your timeframe?

General ALLVIN. I don't have any better answer than that. Quite frankly, a lot of it will depend upon what Dr. Anderson has spoken about, all of the variables that need to come together.

But to get the, as the chairman said, to get the details that would be satisfying I would imagine would be into that timeframe.

Mrs. DAVIS. And I wonder, Dr. Anderson, of the details that you are talking about, what is it that concerns you the most that you don't have a feel for, that you don't feel is cooked?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, from a policy perspective, I am very comfortable with this plan. And, in fact, I think it is going to serve the interests of the National Defense Strategy that we promulgated in January 2018. So, at that level I am very, very pleased with the approach. I think it is going to enhance deterrence, and assure allies, and provide us more flexibility.

You know, I, too, am interested in the cost details. Cost is, you know, as we think about budgets in the future, obviously a large concern. So, that is something that we will certainly be keeping an eye on.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you.

I know that in the testimony that you all presented you pointed to airmen that had been scheduled to rebase to Germany and that they would remain in the U.K. And you said that they would do so to ensure that the uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of these units would be realized.

I am wondering about other units that have been designated to be moved experiencing an interruption in their readiness and responsiveness. What can we expect on that level?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, there will be a timing and a phasing and a sequencing of all these moves. I can say with confidence they are not going to all happen at once. They will be spaced out over time. And because of that, we will be very attuned to any temporary disruption or interruptions in readiness or capabilities.

Mrs. DAVIS. And you will be planning for that?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes, indeed. And I would also note, in the broader sweep of NATO's history we have made moves, even larger moves. And we have done so without compromising our overall capabilities—

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. ANDERSON [continuing]. Or readiness.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. Thank you.

General Allvin, you mentioned, you did mention the families. And we know how critical and how important that is. The men and women who serve our country have a vote in this, and they do it often by their feet. And so I wonder what you are doing to mitigate the impact on those families? And what costs do you incur as you attempt to realign them?

General ALLVIN. Congresswoman, primarily one of the five that the Secretary laid out was take care of the service members and their families. I think that goes to, largely, the idea of planning this out ahead of time to be able to ensure that when the move happens—and, of course, as you mentioned, ma'am, the service members and their families they have to be resilient because they move here, and there, and everywhere. That is a part of life, but we don't need to make it more complicated.

So, the idea that as the moves are being contemplated the Department ensures, and the chairman is very engaged on this as well, that the landing location, wherever that will be when these moves happen, will be in, you know, full consultation with the services who are responsible for the organize, train, and equip to provide the combatant commands, as well as this body and others to ensure that, as I said before, measure twice, cut once. So, we won't—

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you have a sense that it is really important to surge personnel in order to address the needs of families? Often families feel that it takes forever for them to get the attention that they need in order to plan themselves for a move that can be detrimental in terms of the education of their children, and many other facets of this. What will be done to bring on more personnel in order to address this?

General ALLVIN. First of all, Congresswoman, I would say the way you put it is very eloquent and very accurate. I anticipate that the chairman will work with the Joint Chiefs, as well as the service, active service chiefs to ensure that as those moves, which are executed by the services, that they are doing that, as you said, surge the personnel to where you are able to communicate what is required and how they can anticipate that, so they at least have some predictability.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would just start off by congratulating General Allvin. I have had multiple assignments with him. And for him to be getting his fourth star, the Air Force is selecting the right person. So, congratulations to you.

We have a little bit of a debate up here on the forward presence of forces. And I believe that we absolutely need forward presence in Poland and the Baltics. We have seen in the past with Georgia and Ukraine how Russia responds to perceived weakness. So, I am a big supporter of making sure we have a presence. I would even prefer a permanent presence in Poland and the Baltics to make our intentions and our deterrence clear.

My first question is to Dr. Anderson, if I may. I used to be the commander at Ramstein and I was the deputy at Third Air Force. What's our plans for Spangdahlem in the long run? Because I believe both Spangdahlem and Ramstein are strategic bases that we have to preserve because of the airlift capacity.

The airlift capacity cannot go strictly on Ramstein. We know that. And it is in the perfect spot for un-air-refueled C-17s to get there and then get to the Middle East or Africa. And without Spangdahlem I think we are in trouble.

So, I was just curious your perspective.

Dr. ANDERSON. So, certainly in the context of moving to greater rotational forces there is still a role for hubs, logistics hubs and air bases that can and should be retained. So that is part of our thinking on the European force structure reposturing.

Mr. BACON. So, your intention is to retain Spangdahlem as an airlift hub?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I know that we are going to retain the hubs. I want to be a little bit—I want to caveat this a little bit because I am not familiar with the exact nature of what is being planned for that particular base.

Mr. BACON. Well, just let me put my perspective out there.

That whole capacity can't fall on Ramstein. I know it. I just know it firsthand. And both those bases are your primary conduits in the Middle East and Africa, and would be for the rest of Europe if you had troubles in Poland or in the Baltics. So, I just, I am worried about pulling out of Spangdahlem totally.

I can see some force realignment. But that airlift hub is critical.

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes. And there are defense planners who are fully aware of those, those advantages. Yes, sir.

Mr. BACON. Another question. I always was concerned about pulling out of Mildenhall. The United Kingdom, Great Britain, is our best ally in NATO. Through thick and thin they have been with us. I didn't really care for how we handled that to begin with. I am glad that we are maintaining force presence at Mildenhall.

What is the plan for Fairford, because we were talking of moving the RC-135s there?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I am not, I am not sure. I don't know if my colleague is aware of the particulars on that?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I will take that for the record because—

Mr. BACON. Fine.

General ALLVIN [continuing]. I think that having experienced Europe as you have as well, you understand that. And so I will, in the context of what General Wolters is currently pursuing, we will get, we will take that for the record and get back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

General ALLVIN. But to your point on Mildenhall, as you recall it was a European infrastructure consolidation which was made in a different time. And so Mildenhall, while not only serving as a refueling, can also help augment that critical through-flow for enabling global operations as an airlift hub as well, can help to augment those two bases you mentioned in Germany, sir.

Mr. BACON. Let me just plant this thought, too. We need to build a strong relationship with Great Britain when it comes to reconnaissance. We have sold them RC-135s. We operate out of there. I think it would be wise to have a joint base with the U.K. and ourselves doing the RC-135 operations. You get great synergy, and we both, and we both gain from it. It's a win-win. So, I am a proponent for it.

Let me just close on this. I am a little concerned about where we are going with Germany. I think we have a growing rift. They used to be on the front lines, you know, obviously in the Cold War, but now they are more of the logistics hub. And I am concerned that we are burning bridges with the populace and the political leadership there, with a country that we absolutely have to have a good rapport with if we have a conflict with Russia down the road.

Are we at threat of burning bridges too far with Germany? Because that should be a concern to us.

I defer to you, Dr. Anderson.

Dr. ANDERSON. Well, a couple points. I mean, Germany certainly plays a constructive role. They have been helpful in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and also been an outstanding partner in counterterrorism activities. All that said, the President and the Secretary are absolutely right in asserting that Germany can and should pay more in terms of its defense budget.

The Wales Pledge was agreed to unanimously in 2014 to get to 2 percent within 10 years. And Germany is currently lagging at about 1.5 percent.

They have, they do have a plan to get to 2 percent, but that is not going to happen by, by their terms, by 2030. So, we would certainly encourage Berlin to advance that timeline.

Mr. BACON. So, Mr. Chair, I will just close with this, that they are paying under 2 percent, but we still need them to have a strong alliance. So, we have to find a way to make that work. And I will just say, hey, we are going to have a great Vice Chief of Staff.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we lost you there, John. Are you still with us?

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am more and more convinced—I am. I should be, should be there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Keep going.

Yeah, if you are speaking we can no longer hear you. Appreciate that helpful insight.

Yeah, I am sorry, John, we have a connection problem here because we are not hearing you. You are moving stiltedly. So, we will see if we can fix that.

In the meantime I have—I don't see him on the screen now. Mr. Cisneros is the next one who is up.

Mr. Cisneros, you are recognized for 5 minutes if your device functions. Go ahead.

Mr. CISNEROS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. And thanks to our panel for being here today.

And I know this has been asked, but I will kind of ask it again. But based on Secretary Esper's comments, this realignment will be expensive, not to mention the impact of realignment on morale for our service members and their families.

Does the Department expect any savings or increased burden-sharing contributions from Germany as a result of the realignment that would compensate for the cost of the proposed force posture changes?

General Allvin, what is the plan for the military families of U.S. service members who are affected by this realignment?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, let me start with the question on Germany.

You know, certainly it is our hope, and it is our, indeed, our expectation that Germany will live up to the Wales Pledge going forward. And I would say even more broadly with respect to this realignment plan for European force structure we will look for opportunities where our allies can contribute in terms of the funding element of this. Because this is a, this does need to be a shared burden.

With respect to the families, and I will ask my counterpart to elaborate, but certainly this ties in directly with Secretary Esper's commitment that he stated on numerous occasions that we are going to take care of our service members and our families throughout this entire process.

And what that means in very practical terms is as the plan matures and we have timelines, we will keep them informed.

And I would also note that there are no, there are no near-term—by that, in the next couple months—PCS moves that are currently envisioned. All that will be scoped out and communicated appropriately.

General ALLVIN. And, Congressman, I will follow up with what Dr. Anderson mentioned.

The plan really for the families is, as I mentioned when I was speaking with Representative Davis, understanding the scope and the ultimate destination which has to be, has to be, 100 percent in consultation with this body as well as the services. The services who will eventually, they are the ones who do the organize, train, and equip, they will be part and parcel of understanding that particular puzzle and the right location for those service members and families to go who will be rotated back.

But, as Representative Davis said, I feel very confident that I can speak on behalf of the services on this, to say that surging ahead of time, surging the people to ensure that the families are made well aware and have a predictability, because that is—we understand families need to be resilient. The best that we can do on this is to give them the predictability so they aren't sort of whiplashing around between one eventuality and the next.

Mr. CISNEROS. Thank you.

So, Mr. Anderson, you know, there is talk about moving an F-16 squadron to Italy from Germany, also moving 2,000 troops to Belgium. But yet, you know, Belgium nor Italy meet NATO's target for defense spending, which seems to be inconsistent with the administration's reasoning of moving these troops out.

So, how can you speak towards the inconsistency of moving, the President, with all the comments that the President has made that Germany has not paid its due and not doing its part, so we are moving troops out, but yet we are moving troops into other areas of NATO that have also been—not met their part as well, their financial obligations?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, in the formulation of the concept, which is transitioning to a plan, the defense planners did not, you know, look at a scorecard of who is paying what as a determining factor on where rotationally units would go. They made these assessments based upon their best military judgment and what makes sense operationally in terms of the broader restructuring.

Mr. CISNEROS. All right. So, the President, you know, his delinquent, his comment about delinquent and they haven't paid their NATO fees, this is not the reason? We are not punishing Germany for moving these troops out?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, again, going back to an earlier point, you know, EUCOM has been thinking about force posture moves on a continuous basis, and then received specific direction from Secretary Esper in the January/February timeframe. And it is fair to say that the President's guidance did accelerate the process and has brought us to this point where we are sharing the concept.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. Gabbard is next, and is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the witnesses here.

I know earlier you briefly touched on impacts to AFRICOM. But I wonder if you can go into a little bit more detail both on where AFRICOM missions will pull their forces from with this change, given the shared troops with the Europe AOR?

And, also, how will this change impact any intel-gathering [intelligence-gathering] capabilities or other shared capabilities that currently exist between the two commands?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, with respect to AFRICOM, ma'am, there, too, the Department is undergoing a combatant command blank slate review of missions, and tasks, and deployments. And that is currently ongoing.

And when Secretary Esper makes final decisions with respect to the positioning of those forces we will, we will share those appropriately.

With respect to intelligence and warning, certainly agree with the point or the importance of that on multiple fronts, to include going back to our earlier discussion about moving rotational forces to the European continent and back to the United States. It is absolutely imperative that we have appropriate intelligence and surveillance that will provide us sufficient indications and warning time in order to make these moves.

Ms. GABBARD. And forgive me if you already talked about this. I didn't hear it. But, how will this new realignment impact the bur-

den-sharing contributions that come from Germany? And how that will impact them as well as how it will impact us?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, moving forward on this realignment we will look for opportunities where allies can contribute, you know, financially in a meaningful way. You know, some of those costs will obviously be ours, but we will look for those opportunities.

Then I would say more broadly, we continue to expect our European allies to live up and to fulfill the Wales Pledge that was unanimously agreed to in 2014.

I would also say on the cost front and the financial front that NATO has made progress. There are more countries now that are at or above the 2 percent limit. Those include not only, of course, ourselves, the United States, but Bulgaria, Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and also Poland. And there are some other countries that soon will be at that 2 percent level. So, that is a positive trajectory.

Ms. GABBARD. So, specifically with Germany, I mean, you have a very specific number of troops that will be repositioned back here in the United States. Are you not able to speak specifically to how that burden-sharing agreement will be impacted, both in Germany and the United States, because it has to be renegotiated, or you don't know?

Dr. ANDERSON. Well, with respect to the target for defense spending, Germany, as with the other NATO partners, is expected to reach the 2 percent. And they have articulated that they can get there in 2030. It is our position that they can and they should move that timeline much earlier to get to 2 percent.

And I would also say that it's, you know, we talk about the 2 percent level all the time, and for the appropriate reasons. But there is also the, you know, we have to focus on not just the number but what are actually the capabilities. And there it's, you know, there is a 20 percent target of defense spending that would be invested in actual no kidding military capabilities.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Torres Small is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both so much for being here. I really appreciate your service to our country.

Acting Under Secretary Anderson, I wanted to follow up on the conversation you had with Congressmembers Wilson and Houlahan about AFRICOM headquarters. And really appreciate your conversation mentioning the factors that you would discuss, that you would review.

So, you mentioned cost and receptivity of the host nation as factors for consideration in the relocation. Will you also consider time zone?

Dr. ANDERSON. I think I am not sure how—I don't think that would be a big consideration, ma'am.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Okay. In terms of ease of communication and coordination?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yeah. I mean, we have now, we have certain, obviously we have combatant commands that are in different time zones. And, you know, both General Allvin and myself we, we just

manage that. Right? Sometimes we have late night calls or early morning calls, depending on which combatant command we are talking about. I do not see that as a big issue in the considerations.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Okay. What about proximity to the continent?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, there, again, I don't want to get beyond the three broad possible destinations, whether it be in the European continent, or in Africa, or the United States. They all have particular advantages and disadvantages that need to be sorted out.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. And part of making that decisions process—making that decision is identifying all of those advantages and disadvantages; correct?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. So, would you consider as one of those advantages or disadvantages proximity to the continent?

Dr. ANDERSON. To—

Ms. TORRES SMALL. To Africa.

Dr. ANDERSON. To Africa. That is among the other, the other—among the considerations. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Okay. And are there any other considerations that you think are important for determining the headquarters for AFRICOM?

Dr. ANDERSON. I think the ones that we have talked about are the main ones.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. So, in your response to Congresswoman Houlihan you committed to ensuring that the decision would be made in consultation with Congress. And I deeply appreciate that, and also appreciate you reaffirming that for Chairman Smith and Congresswoman Davis regarding the entire realignment.

In regards to AFRICOM headquarters, will you commit to ensuring that DOD provides an assessment of all the factors we just identified and present them to this committee in advance of that determination?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes, I commit to that.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you. I appreciate that because it is deeply important. These are vital decisions that affect our deterrence posture, our relationship with allies, and all of our national security. Do you agree with that?

Dr. ANDERSON. Yes. The committee obviously has a tremendous role to play in this process.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you very much.

I wonder then why the decision was made to move AFRICOM headquarters in the first place without such consultation?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, part of that, as mentioned previously in the discussion, is to, is to seek operational efficiencies, and also to, to meet the directed cap of the reductions regarding Germany.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Would consultation with Congress have impacted that?

Dr. ANDERSON. I'm not sure if it would or would not have impacted that.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. So, what is the difference between now as you identify the future location and the importance of consultation with Congress at that point compared to the decision to relocate it in the first place?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, as for the actual, the consideration that came up that the EUCOM staff came up with, I cannot speak to that directly. I can say that, you know, we are, are on a bit, have been on a bit of an accelerated timeline. But now we are in a different place, and as the plan matures, as you have heard, we absolutely will consult with Congress as this plan matures.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. So there is no articulable distinction between the need for consultation to move headquarters in the first place and the final location. Both are important decisions that Congress should be part of and consulted about.

Dr. ANDERSON. And we have, we have briefed members, staff members on these proposed moves.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Keating, are you with us?

Mr. KEATING. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

Dr. Anderson, you said, quote unquote, that the decision with removing the nearly 12,000 troops in Germany was a "Presidential decision." Then you went on in your testimony to talk about the fact that Secretary Esper has been doing a review of rotations in Europe.

Now, I want to—it is important to this committee and our relationship and our decision making to understand the joinder of the two things because you didn't connect them one way or the other.

I want to ask you specifically, was that review by Secretary Esper then made concrete, did he place that on the President's desk for a decision? Or, did the President make that decision and then inform Secretary Esper? Which way was it?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, Congressman, I am not privy to discussions between the President and—

Mr. KEATING. Well, but—

Dr. ANDERSON [continuing]. The Secretary, so I can't comment on that.

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. I want to, I want to echo what the chairman said: then why are you here?

This committee deserves answers to it. That is critical to our decision making. In fact, there were about 4 or 5 days between this time that Germany informed the President, that Chancellor Merkel informed the President that she is likely not attending the G7 summit when this was announced. Do you think that is a coincidence, a mere coincidence?

Or, more importantly, since you may not know the answer to that, don't you think that creates a tension and a problem with one of our central members of one of our central alliances to our security? Don't you see the appearance of that?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, I would say it is articulated very clearly in our National Defense Strategy, Line of Effort 2, we are committed to our allies and partners—

Mr. KEATING. Answer the question. Don't you understand the problem with that appearance? Yes or no? This is the question—

Dr. ANDERSON. The problem with it, Congressman—

Mr. KEATING. Sorry?

The CHAIRMAN. If I could translate, the question basically is the appearance of, okay, Germany doesn't come to the G7 summit, which the President doesn't like. A couple days later the President announces that he is pulling 12,000 troops out of Germany.

It appeared to be a petulant response to something he didn't like that Germany did. And I guess the question—sorry, Bill, I will give you more time—would be twofold: would be, one, doesn't that appearance look bad? And, two, what did the Department do to try to make sure that that appearance didn't create the obvious problem?

Dr. ANDERSON. Well, sometimes after the fact is not because of the fact. And I would note historically, for example, that in 2004 the Bush administration decided to remove 30,000 troops from the European theater, including a lot of those from Germany. And at the time that was, there was a lot of speculation that that was because Germany did not support us in the Gulf War.

And that—

Mr. KEATING. May I reclaim my time?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, you know, I can only speak to the plan and the connection to the NDS. And that is there is a very, there is a very positive relationship there. This will improve our security.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, could I reclaim my time and just follow up?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Yes, go ahead.

So, it is, it is awkward with the back and forth on the video. But, yes, Mr. Keating, please proceed.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

Now, you also said that Secretary Esper's plan involved a lot of strategy with rotation, make sure. One of the things you cited in your testimony was the deterrence to Russia and the importance of that. And clearly, we all agree, both—everyone in this committee agrees with that.

But, at the same time, the President interceded with cutting half a billion dollars extra out of the European Deterrence Initiative [EDI] which was consistent in line with our National Defense Strategy.

Now, how does that make sense? And, again, was that the President's decision or was that part of Secretary Esper's strategic plan? Because it is in contradiction with Secretary Esper's strategic plan to be making those cuts and using them to paint the wall at the border black. Half a billion dollars.

Now, tell me where the consistency of that is and who made that decision? Was that part of a strategic decision by the Secretary?

Dr. ANDERSON. So, with respect to the European Deterrence Initiative, there have been a number of military infrastructure projects that have come to completion. And because of that the budget request has been—there is a slight, a slight decrease in that, in that funding level.

But we are very confident that the funding level is indeed appropriate, and that EDI is consistent with and will be complementary to the proposed force structure posture—

Mr. KEATING. I will say in closing I'd like—

Dr. ANDERSON [continuing]. Envisioned here.

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. I would conclude saying I will tell you what isn't consistent. What isn't consistent, given even past relationships with this committee and our defense, and our Secretary and, indeed, administrations, what is not consistent is getting a straight answer to questions and circumventing the will of this committee and Congress.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi wants to give it another shot. So, we will, we will try that.

John, you are on again.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, here I am. Hopefully it will work.

I am going to make this very, very short. This hearing has been extremely important and very [inaudible]. No justification for what is being proposed here.

This whole thing started as the proceeding that his comment— [inaudible] 6 months later with the entire Department of Defense trying to figure out how to make it happen. Bottom line is, it makes no sense whatsoever, not from beginning to end. And we can go on for a couple days about that.

Bottom line is in the National Defense Authorization Act we simply have to stop this, stop this foolishness.

I will yield back at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, John. I appreciate that.

Mr. Brown is up next. Anthony? Anthony is with us. Go ahead.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank my colleagues on the committee on both side of the aisle for their, you know, comprehensive set of questions. And I, too, am disappointed with the incompleteness and in some cases the shallowness of the responses.

Nevertheless, most of my questions have been asked. So, let me ask about some specific issues. And both of my questions go to General Allvin.

As part of the realignment plan Air Force F-16 fighters are, the proposal is to shift them from Germany to Italy. Secretary Esper stated, as many have commented today, that the changes are not meant as a punishment to Germany but are part of an effort to "strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and enhance the deterrence of Russia."

So, my question is, how does a move of F-16s southeast in a distance of less than 400 kilometers improve efforts to deter Russian aggression?

What is the cost of moving the F-16s down to Aviano?

And will updates need be made to the bases, and the hangars, and other facilities to house these additional aircraft?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I will address the last two first. And that, again, those cost estimates are ongoing. I don't have the answer to that. And I know if we go back to EUCOM they haven't finalized those cost estimates to this point.

To the question of what good does it do to move Air Force fighters from Germany to Italy—I am quoting General Wolters now, I believe in some of his earlier responses—is the idea is you are sort of broadening the attack surface.

Really, the idea that Russia is just inclined to do things in the Baltic region because that is where we first strengthened up, I

think they have perhaps designs for malign influence throughout the periphery. And so, Southeast Europe becomes as important as—so, the Black Sea becomes as important as the Baltic Sea. And the idea that we would expand down into Italy and enhance that ability in Aviano to be able to better address some of the things that are happening in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea as well.

It really, it puts another axis of approach for the EUCOM commander. And that was why General Wolters opted for that particular piece of the overall puzzle.

Mr. BROWN. Well, I appreciate that. I do appreciate that rationale and explanation.

The second question I had, again a very specific question, the 7th Army Training Command in Grafenwoehr—and that, as you know, is a very large training facility, 233 square kilometers used by both U.S. and NATO allies for major training exercises, field artillery exercises, large armor exercises—is there any intention to close Grafenwoehr?

Are there intentions to open additional major training centers anywhere else in Europe?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, that is a very important question.

To my knowledge, there is not any plans to close it. But I will take that for the record. Because your point is well taken about the capabilities there. And we will take that for the record and get back to you.

At this point, my understanding of it there is not a plan to close that important training facility. But I owe you a more complete answer, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]

Mr. BROWN. And let me just finish then with this statement.

You know, we have heard a lot about dynamic force employment today. And we find that in the National Defense Strategy. That is a concept that deals, as I understand, with operational deployment to eliminate predictability. And I get a sense that we are using it in today's hearing interchangeably, and perhaps inappropriately, with rotational force presence.

We have a strategic commitment to NATO to be present in Europe, either it is rotational or it is permanent. But in many ways it is predictable because rotational force deployments or presence is heel to toe. So, I am not quite clear on how going to a more rotational force presence in Europe maintains our commitment to our strategic presence in Europe.

And you don't have time to really respond. If you could take that for the record and just tell me how we are accomplishing dynamic force employment at the same time as rotational force present in Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I have Mr. Brindisi on the list here. I don't see him on the screen anymore.

And Ms. Slotkin, is she up there somewhere? Or she is—Okay.

I am sorry. So, Mr. Golden and Mrs. Trahan are not up there either? Okay.

Ms. Escobar, you are not on the list but you are here. If you wish, you may—I yield 5 minutes to you. Let's do that.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And many thanks to our witnesses.

I would like to join in the chorus of voices that on a bipartisan basis have expressed disappointment at the lack of detail during this hearing today. But I do appreciate that you are here.

Lieutenant General Allvin, I have some questions for you. I want to drill down just a little bit more on the question of sort of cost-benefit analysis which began with the chairman's initial question.

What impacts do you foresee the realignment having on the Army's limited MFGI [Mobilization Force Generation Installation] sites like Fort Bliss?

I represent Congressional District 16 in Texas, so obviously there is a direct concern for me on that front.

General ALLVIN. Ma'am, I do have to start with that I am not familiar with that. So, I will, that is one we will take for the record because I am not, as far as site planning I am not familiar enough to give you a complete answer on the service impacts of the concept.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]

Ms. ESCOBAR. Okay. Also to be taken back and, hopefully, so that we can learn a little bit more as you learn a little bit more about this, one of the concerns that we have or that my office has and that we have expressed to different parties through leadership is that there are current infrastructure limitations that prevent units from meeting Army standards for efficiently deploying an armored brigade combat team. And so, I would like for you to please look into that as well and get back to me when possible.

And then would also like to learn more about whether there would be infrastructure improvements that could be made in order to address those deficiencies that, you know, that we may see this domino effect down the line, so would like to hear back on that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]

Ms. ESCOBAR. And then just want to say, finally, 11,900 troops strikes me as a significant cut to the force in the region. How do you expect this to impact operations? What will we have to sacrifice?

General ALLVIN. So, ma'am, to be clear, understand by saying this I don't want to diminish the point that you make but, in fact, the 11,900 in the current concept aren't all leaving the region. So, there will be about half those that will come off, half of those will be better dispersed for the region.

But your point is still a valid one in understanding how it will affect our approach to the region. And I think that gets to the point of understanding how we will execute the rotational forces.

And to the point by Representative Escobar, I believe, on difference between dynamic force employment and rotational forces, this really does—is at the heart of trying to institute this new approach to deterrence because the current understanding of deter-

rence being presence, you have to be present there, that is a way to impact adversary decision calculus on when they are anticipating, whether they have a cost-benefit analysis of, you know, proceeding with malign behavior.

But the idea that if we are trying to do this in accordance with the National Defense Strategy, with the myriad threats and adversaries that are emerging across the globe the services cannot maintain readiness and have all those forces forward. So, to try and bridge that gap is this new concept. The idea would be, through the operational unpredictability and the continued episodic presence, to be able to put doubt in the mind of an adversary who might be considering malign behavior.

Deterrence is decision calculus, decision calculus based on perception. Perception is based on experience. So, we are trying to change the experience that will still have the same perception that that will have on the calculus. So, this is arguably a new approach to deterrence rather than just a forward presence.

So, the idea would be to manage the risk throughout that transition in order to be able to have this idea of dynamic force employment yield the results of putting doubt in the minds of would-be adversaries.

Ms. ESCOBAR. I thank you, sir. And I look forward to your follow-up on those other questions.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

As far as I know, I don't think anyone else seeks time at this point, so we are finished. I don't have anything.

Mr. Thornberry, do you have anything for the good of the order?

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I appreciate that conversation, but I don't think we should pigeonhole current deterrence as presence only. It is decision making. Now, presence can be, and forward-based presence has been a fundamental part of our deterrence strategy since the end of World War II.

I take your point, you can have different ways to evoke the same result in an adversary's decision-making process, but I don't think it is fair to categorize current deterrence as presence only.

I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I do appreciate both witnesses being here and trying to answer our questions. I think the bottom line is that, as you and I know, Secretary Esper has been conducting a review of all the combatant commands. It has been going on for months. He has kept us abreast of those reviews.

What is different is that a couple staffers in the White House decided that they wanted to try to sell the President on an absolute troop cap for Germany. And if you will remember, at the beginning it had a cap on how many boots, American boots could even be on the ground at the same time, which would prevent Germany from being a transit point of our troops into the Middle East or Africa.

They clearly hadn't thought through the consequences. They didn't know how it would be implemented. And so what has happened is Secretary Esper and folks at the Pentagon are trying to put lipstick on the pig, or make lemons out of lemonade, or whatever colloquialism you want to use.

There may be some benefit to some of these moves, as I said at the beginning. My concern is, however, the underlying strength and unity of the alliance has not been a foremost consideration.

And, so all of that, plus the status of the decision making at the Pentagon I think has to inform our conference negotiations with the Senate this year, and I presume in years to come.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I just want to associate myself with you all. I completely agree with what Mr. Thornberry just said. And I do think that what Secretary Esper has done with the bottom-up review with the command by command, combatant command analysis, is a very appropriate thing to be doing. And he is trying to move our defense strategy forward.

But I also concur that the coordination between what DOD is doing and what whims come into the heads in the White House has undermined that incredibly important effort.

We just had the task force report that came out, led by Seth Moulton and Mr. Banks, sort of outlining here is the challenge we face. China and, you know, believe it or not, to some degree Russia have leapt ahead of us on certain key technologies, technologies that didn't exist, you know, 50 years ago or even 20 years ago in some cases. And we have fallen behind in our ability to meet that threat.

So, rethinking the way we meet the threats that we face within the Pentagon is enormously important. We can't keep doing things the same way we have done them to date. But that process takes thought focus. And, you know, I think we need to let the DOD do their job and not interfere with that effort. So, I certainly agree with that.

And I also agree with the point on presence, which I think is very important. I get asked all the time, you know, we are not at war with whoever, why do we have, you know, the Soviet Union broke up, why do we have troops in Europe? You know, what are they doing there?

They are there for a very important purpose. Mr. Thornberry outlined it a little bit, and we have heard it today. I think we need to make clearer to the American public why we have troops deployed in Europe, why we have troops deployed in South Korea, and Okinawa, and elsewhere. They serve an incredibly important purpose. And I think we need to make that clear so we can build support for what needs to be done to meet the threats that we face.

So, I appreciate you gentlemen being here. Appreciate this discussion. I think it has been very helpful.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

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Statement by

Dr. James Anderson

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Before the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress

Committee on Armed Services

U.S. House of Representatives

September 30, 2020

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**Introduction**

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to brief you today on the recent European force posture realignment, alongside Lt Gen David Allvin. Lt Gen Allvin is a great partner and it is an honor to appear beside him today.

**National Defense Strategy and CCMD Review**

The Department continues to prioritize implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) including the building of a more lethal force and strengthening alliances. One important initiative to advance the NDS and ensure a focus on these priorities is the ongoing comprehensive review of all the Combatant Commands. As part of U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) review, Secretary Esper directed USEUCOM to develop options for repositioning our Europe-based forces to compete more effectively and respond to contingencies both within Europe and globally.

These options will be guided by Secretary Esper's five core principles: 1) enhancing deterrence of Russia; 2) strengthening NATO; 3) reassuring Allies; 4) improving U.S. strategic flexibility and USEUCOM operational flexibility; and, most importantly, 5) taking care of our Service members and their families. On July 29, Secretary Esper announced an update to the status of our U.S. European

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Command Force Posture review, following the decision by the President in early June to limit the number of assigned active-duty Service members in Germany to 25,000 as well as the DoD Concept to reposition some of our forces within Europe and back to the United States to be better situated for Great Power Competition.

### **Realignment Details**

The review yielded a concept for nearly 12,000 military personnel to be repositioned from Germany, with almost 5,600 re-stationed in other NATO countries and approximately 6,400 returning to the United States. The realignment concept includes consolidating headquarters to strengthen operational agility, repositioning some forces in the United States to focus on readiness and prepare for rotational deployments, and deploying rotational forces in the Black Sea region on NATO's southeastern flank to improve deterrence. These force posture changes meet Secretary Esper's core principles as mentioned previously, while adapting our force posture to address national security concerns in today's dynamic environment.

The concept consists of the following four pillars. First, the consolidation of various U.S. headquarters in Europe outside Germany, including in some cases, collocating headquarters at the same locations as their NATO counterparts in Belgium and Italy. This would help strengthen NATO and improve the operational

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efficiency and readiness of more than 2,000 Service members in these headquarters. Second, the nearly 4,500 members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Regiment would return to the United States, as other Stryker units begin rotations farther east in the Black Sea region, giving us a more enduring presence to enhance deterrence and reassure Allies along NATO's southeastern flank. Third, the 2,500 airmen based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Mildenhall, United Kingdom, who are responsible for aerial refueling and special operations, and who had been scheduled to re-base to Germany, would remain in the U.K, thus ensuring the uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of these units. Fourth, a fighter squadron and elements of a fighter wing would be repositioned to Italy, moving them closer to the Black Sea region and rendering them more capable to conduct dynamic force employment and rotational deployments to NATO's southeastern flank.

#### **Importance of NATO and European Partners**

This concept to reposition our forces in Europe constitutes a major strategic shift, wholly in line with the NDS, and consistent with other adjustments the United States has previously made within NATO. Over NATO's 71-year history, the size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces in Europe have changed many times. Those posture adjustments have come as a result of changes in the threat environment, shifts in the international system, or simply because the borders between NATO countries and Russia altered as NATO welcomed new Allies. As

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we enter a new era of Great Power Competition, we are at another inflection point in NATO's history, and the Department is confident that the Alliance will be better and stronger in part because of this realignment. Now that Allies are increasing their defense spending and capability acquisition, the Alliance is much stronger than it was in 2016. As our planning for the realignment matures, we will be sure to communicate frequently with Congress and with our NATO Allies to maintain visibility and foster cooperation.

**Recent European Successes Beyond the Combatant Command Review**

As we continue to implement the NDS, efforts at enhancing our European posture beyond the USEUCOM Combatant Command review have shown recent success, including the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Poland in August that will enable an increased enduring U.S. rotational presence in that country of about 1,000 U.S. military personnel. This includes forward elements of the U.S. Army's V Corps headquarters and a Division headquarters; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; and an aerial port of debarkation. All of these additional elements are in addition to the 4,500 U.S. military personnel already on rotation in Poland and includes infrastructure and logistical support provided by Poland.

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This new Agreement comes after several years of discussions with Poland with the aim of streamlining our operations on the ground and facilitating operations by our Armed Forces in Poland. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement better supports the growing number of U.S. rotational forces operating within and through Poland and provides a legal foundation consistent with the Defense Cooperation Agreements we have with other NATO Allies.

Our continued efforts to streamline operations across Europe, including through modernized and new agreements with NATO Allies, especially on its Eastern Flank, directly support our core NDS principles by improving operational flexibility and enhancing deterrence. The Department is confident that these continuing efforts will help to adapt the force and optimize our force posture in Europe as we seek to deter malign actors.

**Conclusion**

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I appreciate your continued support to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, members of our newest service the United States Space Force, and civilians in the Department of Defense who work every day serving the American people. I look forward to your questions.

**The Honorable James H. Anderson**  
**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

The Honorable James H. Anderson was sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on June 8, 2020. He is currently serving as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In this capacity, Dr. Anderson is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy and leads the formulation and coordination of national security policy within the Department of Defense. He is responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation with U.S. friends and allies.

In August 2018, Dr. Anderson was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. Prior to this appointment, he served three years as the Vice President for Academic Affairs at the Marine Corps University. In this capacity, he supervised academic programs that educate thousands of Marines annually. From 2012 to 2015, he was Dean of Academics and Deputy Director at the Marine Corps War College. From 2009 to 2012, he worked as Professor of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, where he directed the Program in Advanced Security Studies. Dr. Anderson served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2009, where he was Director of Middle East Policy in International Security Affairs, among other positions.

In addition to his Pentagon service, Dr. Anderson worked as an Associate at DFI International, a private consulting firm; a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank; and an Associate Professor of International Relations at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University. He has also taught courses at National Defense University, George Washington University, Lasell College, and the University of Phoenix.

He is the co-author of *Leading Dynamic Seminars: A Practical Handbook for University Educators* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). He is the author of *America at Risk: The Citizen's Guide to Missile Defense* (Heritage Foundation, 1999), and has written numerous articles and op-eds on a wide range of national security topics.

Earlier in his career, Dr. Anderson served three years on active duty as an intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps, and then became a reservist in the Individual Ready Reserve. Dr. Anderson earned his Doctorate in International Relations and Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. He graduated Magna Cum Laude from Amherst College with a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy.

He is a recipient of the Department of the Army Superior Civilian Service Award (2012) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service (2009).

### **Lieutenant General David W. Allvin**

Lt. Gen. David W. Allvin is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff; and Senior Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. He provides strategic direction, policy guidance and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy. As the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, he enables the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council.

Lt. Gen. Allvin graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1986. He has commanded at the squadron and wing levels, including the 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. He has held major command staff assignments and served on the Joint Staff.

Lt. Gen. Allvin served as Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan; Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan; Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center; Director, Strategy, Concepts and Assessments; Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force and Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany. He most recently served as Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff.

Lt. Gen. Allvin is a command pilot with more than 4,600 hours in more than 30 aircraft models, including 800 flight test hours.

### **EDUCATION**

1986 Bachelor of Science, Astronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.  
 1989 Master of Science, Management, Troy State University, Troy, Ala.  
 1992 Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.  
 1998 Distinguished Graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB Ala.  
 2000 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., by correspondence  
 2004 Distinguished Graduate, Master of Science, National Security Strategy, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.  
 2006 Executive Leadership Seminar, Smeal Business College, Pennsylvania State University, College Park  
 2008 Program for Senior Managers in National Security, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.  
 2008 Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill  
 2009 Program for Senior Executive Fellows, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 2010 Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.  
 2013 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 2014 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

### **ASSIGNMENTS**

June 1986–August 1987, Student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, 82nd Student Squadron, Williams Air Force Base, Ariz.  
 November 1987–August 1990, C-12F Copilot, Aircraft Commander, Instructor Pilot and Flight Examiner, 58th Military Airlift Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany  
 August 1990–June 1993, C-141B Copilot, Aircraft Commander, Instructor Pilot and Flight Examiner, 36th Military Airlift Squadron, McChord AFB, Wash.  
 June 1993–June 1994, Student, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School, Edwards AFB, Calif.  
 June 1994–July 1997, C-17 Globemaster III and C-130J Super Hercules Experimental Test Pilot, Flight Commander, Flight Examiner and Assistant Operations Officer, 418th Flight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, Calif.  
 August 1997–June 1998, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 July 1998–June 1999, Student, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

June 1999–April 2001, Assistant Chief, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.  
 April 2001–June 2003, Commander, 905th Air Refueling Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.  
 June 2003–June 2004, Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.  
 June 2004–June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 June 2005–April 2006, Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 May 2006–July 2007, Vice Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas  
 August 2007–July 2009, Commander, 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus AFB, Okla.  
 August 2009–August 2010, Senior Air Force Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.  
 September 2010–August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan  
 September 2011–April 2012, Vice Commander, 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill.  
 April 2012–June 2013, Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center), Scott AFB, Ill.  
 June 2013–September 2014, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 October 2014–August 2015, Director, Strategy, Concepts, and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 August 2015–July 2018, Director, Strategy and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany  
 August 2018–January 2019, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 January 2019–present, Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff; and Senior Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

#### **SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

June 2004–June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va., as a lieutenant colonel then June 2005–April 2006, Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va., as a colonel  
 September 2010–August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan, as a brigadier general  
 August 2015–July 2018, Director, Strategy and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany  
 August 2018–January 2019, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.  
 January 2019–present, Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff; and Senior Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va., as a lieutenant general

#### **FLIGHT INFORMATION**

Rating: command pilot  
 Flight hours: more than 4,600  
 Aircraft flown: C-12F, C-141A/B, KC-135R/T, C-17, C-130, C-130J, C-23, F-15, F-16 and T-38

#### **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters  
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster  
 Bronze Star Medal  
 Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters  
 Air Medal with oak leaf cluster  
 Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster  
 Joint Service Commendation Medal  
 Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters

NATO Meritorious Service Medal  
Non-Article 5 NATO Medal (International Security Assistance Force)

**PUBLICATIONS**

“Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next,” Cadre Papers, Sept. 9, 2000

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986  
First Lieutenant May 28, 1988  
Captain May 28, 1990  
Major Aug. 1, 1996  
Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 2000  
Colonel July 1, 2005  
Brigadier General Sept. 2, 2010  
Major General July 26, 2013  
Lieutenant General Jan. 31, 2019

(Current as of July 2020)

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN**

General ALLVIN. The USEUCOM Joint Cyber Center (JCC) coordinates closely with NATO and Allied military organizations to counter Russian cyber threats. The JCC conducts three mutually reinforcing activities intended to enhance cyber defense of Allied and partner networks in support of USEUCOM strategic objectives. Three particular initiatives include:

(1) The USEUCOM Cyberspace Security Cooperation team builds Allied and partner cyberspace capabilities to increase partner nation cyber defenses, establishing trusted relationships with partner nation cyber defense organizations.

(2) The JCC's Information Exchange Cell shares strategic and operational reporting with Allies and partners across the theater to maintain shared situational awareness of cyber threats, to include Russian malign cyber activity.

(3) Finally, the JCC Cyber Analytics team conducts tactical and technical cyber threat research that can be rapidly disseminated between US Government, industry, and partner nation network defenders. The team possesses deep technical expertise and leverages trust-based relationships to conduct real-time coordination and technical information sharing with Allies and partners.

Posture changes would not affect this work as there is no foreseen impact to those capabilities in theater. [See page 16.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY**

Dr. ANDERSON. The decision to divest of Royal Air Force (RAF) Mildenhall was made as part of the 2013 European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) process, the purpose of which was to reduce long-term expenses through base consolidations. EIC was conducted at a time when DOD's strategic focus was shifting to the Pacific, and U.S. force presence was being reduced in Europe, including the inactivation of two U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams. After Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, the strategic environment in Europe changed significantly, with Russia re-emerging as a more immediate threat to our NATO Allies. The National Defense Strategy's (NDS) focus on Great Power Competition further influenced the choice to reverse this EIC decision in order to maintain the readiness of our special operations forces stationed at Mildenhall, and to retain the base's critical role as a refueling hub to support operations in Northern Europe.

The U.S. Air Force has spent approximately \$14 million at Spangdahlem Air Base in support of the EIC decision to close RAF Mildenhall. Congress authorized and appropriated additional funds for site preparation at Spangdahlem but these funds have not yet been expended. [See page 27.]

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#### **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON**

Dr. ANDERSON. The U.S. Air Force, with support from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), will maintain the RC-135s at RAF Mildenhall, which offers future opportunities for co-located operations with similar Royal Air Force capabilities.

The U.S. Air Force is planning for continued use of RAF Fairford as an agile basing location to support rotational missions such as the Bomber Task Force. RAF Fairford dynamically supports planned and emergent surge operations, which are critical to U.S. Air Forces Europe–Air Forces Africa's ability to deter Russia, strengthen NATO, and improve strategic and operational flexibility within USEUCOM. [See page 30.]

General ALLVIN. The Air Force plans for continued use of RAF Fairford as an agile basing location to support rotational missions such as the Bomber Task Force. RAF Fairford dynamically supports planned and emergent surge operations which is critical to U.S. Air Forces Europe–Air Forces Africa ability to deter Russia, strengthen NATO, and improve strategic and operational flexibility within U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

The Air Force, with support from USEUCOM, plans to retain the RC-135s at RAF Mildenhall at this time, which offers the future possibility for co-located operations with the Royal Air Force Airseeker mission. [See page 30.]

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#### RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN

Dr. ANDERSON. Dynamic force employment (DFE) and continuous rotational presence are not mutually exclusive. DOD currently employs a mix of enduring, heel-to-toe rotational presence in Europe and episodic, short-term DFE deployments, both to demonstrate our commitment to Allies and partners and to promote operational unpredictability to complicate adversary planning. Combined with our existing permanently stationed units, DOD continues to maintain a robust and ready force presence in Europe. [See page 39.]

General ALLVIN. There is no intention to close Grafenwoehr. Units from within Germany and throughout Europe will continue to use it for training.

We do not have plans to open additional major training centers in Europe. However, we are aware of efforts by a number of Allies and partners to enhance national training center capabilities and capacity in Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia. [See page 39.]

General ALLVIN. The NDS calls for U.S. forces to be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable. The complementary nature and utilization of rotational forces and Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) are an example of this NDS principle in action.

DFE is a concept to proactively shape the strategic environment while building and maintaining readiness. The DFE operating model provides contingency response capabilities, ensures the long-term viability of the Joint Force for major combat, and conducts strategic engagement opportunities that shape the global environment.

USEUCOM leverages the DFE model to re-affirm our commitment to Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities within the AOR to improve our deterrent posture, and demonstrate operational unpredictability to adversaries. DFE deployments have included posturing the HARRY S. TRUMAN strike group from the Mediterranean to the High North, deploying a Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and Romania, Bomber Task Force missions throughout the AOR, and an F-35 deployment to exercise with European Allies, demonstrating our ability to rapidly generate significant combat power across the AOR.

Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a presence on the ground in strategic locations across the theater. These forces work alongside Allies and partners to deter aggression and build host nation defense capacity, interoperability, and readiness. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed as part of Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required. Rotational Marine Forces in Norway have improved an important position on NATO's northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions alongside our Norwegian allies. [See page 39.]

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#### RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR

General ALLVIN. The Army just completed a Mobilization Force Generation Installation (MFGI) Assessment in March 2020, primarily focusing on those installations that could support the Army's response in a no-notice Contingency Plan activation. Fort Bliss, TX, is one of the Army's four active MFGIs which also include Fort Hood, TX, Fort Bragg, NC, and Schofield Barracks, HI. Fort Bliss, in particular brings great capacity and capability to both the Active and Reserve Component for the Army's force projection requirements around the world. Not only does it serve as one of our four active MFGIs, it is also one of the Army's Power Projection Platforms as well. The Army's MFGIs will continue to play an important role in mobilizing and generating ready Army capabilities for global employment. [See page 40.]

General ALLVIN. The Army routinely assesses deployment infrastructure capability to meet deployment goals. Through these assessments, the Army identified rail infrastructure projects needed to fully meet armored brigade combat team (ABCT) deployment goals at Fort Bliss, Fort Riley, and Fort Stewart.

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and the Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) assess rail configuration and loading capacity as Fort Bliss' most significant limitation toward meeting the Army's 96-hour ABCT deployment goal. The Army validated this assessment through the Installation Status Report (ISR) process.

A proposed rail project at Fort Bliss would construct a new mainline connection north of the Rail Deployment Complex to enable more efficient rail switching operations and consolidate operations away from the cantonment area. Additionally, the proposed project includes two loading tracks to increase the static end loading capacity and better meet ABCT deployment needs. This project is currently competing for funding in the FY 23–27 budget.

SDDC and TEA also endorse container storage and line haul facility projects at Ft. Bliss to improve general deployment readiness. These projects are also competing for funding. [See page 40.]

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**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER**

Dr. ANDERSON. The Polish Government agreed to make significant structural improvements to its primary training base, Drawsko Pomorskie, as well as other existing training areas throughout the country. These improvements are primarily focused on increasing the readiness of the Polish Armed Forces while providing opportunities for U.S. participation. In addition to upgrading Poland's ranges and maneuver areas, the Polish Government also agreed to invest in vehicle maintenance facilities, living quarters, munitions and fuel storage, and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) facilities to support U.S. force deployments to Poland. We are working with the Polish Ministry of Defence to prioritize the construction of more than one hundred identified projects and agreed-upon facilities to support the U.S. presence in Poland. [See page 20.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

SEPTEMBER 30, 2020

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL**

Mr. CARBAJAL. Has the Department been asked by the White House to study how quickly it can upload warheads if New START expires? Can you commit to sharing the outcome of this study with Congress as soon as it is finished?

Has the nuclear employment guidance changed? If so, when do you plan to brief Congress?

General Hyten told the committee in 2019 that he saw no need to alter force levels if New START expires. What reason is there to upload additional warheads?

Dr. ANDERSON. The White House has asked the Department to study how quickly it could upload warheads if the New START Treaty expires. At present, the ability of U.S. nuclear forces to deter potential adversaries is not at risk as a result of limits imposed by existing arms control treaties. However, given the disparity in stockpile quantities between the United States and the Russian Federation, ongoing nuclear modernization efforts need to continue as planned in order to ensure age-related sustainment issues do not undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If the New START Treaty expires in February 2021, the United States has the ability to make modest increases to its nuclear force structure by, among other things, uploading additional warheads onto currently deployed missiles. The dynamics of the security environment in addition to Presidential and Departmental policy would guide the specifics of any proposed nuclear force structure changes. President Trump signed new nuclear employment guidance in 2019 which is currently being implemented. Consistent with Congressional reporting requirements pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 491, DOD will brief Congress on this guidance when implementation is complete.

