[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-92]
THE ROLE OF ALLIES AND PARTNERS
IN U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY
AND OPERATIONS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 23, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-158 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Matt Rhoades, Professional Staff Member
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Colby, Elbridge A., Principal and Co-Founder, The Marathon
Initiative..................................................... 8
Hodges, LTG Ben, USA (Ret.), Center for European Policy Analysis,
Former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe (2014-2017)........ 6
Wormuth, Hon. Christine, Director, International Security and
Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation........................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Colby, Elbridge A............................................ 73
Hodges, LTG Ben.............................................. 61
Wormuth, Hon. Christine...................................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 97
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Golden................................................... 102
Mr. Keating.................................................. 101
THE ROLE OF ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND
OPERATIONS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 23, 2020.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:02 p.m., in room
200, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. All right. We will call the meeting to order.
Members will take their seats.
The full committee hearing this morning is on ``The Role of
Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations.''
First, I have what my staff has told me is a shortened
script to explain the virtual--the remote participants in our
meeting. I will point out that all of our witnesses this
morning are going to be participating remotely.
So members who are joining remotely must be visible on
screen for the purposes of identity verification, establishing
and maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
voting.
Those members must continue to use the software platform's
video function while in attendance, unless they experience
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff
for assistance.
Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
room and via the television/internet feeds. Members
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
This is actually important for all of us. Apparently if we
leave the microphones when we are not talking, it causes
feedback that we can't hear but they can hear if they are
online.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
the software platform video function on the entire time they
attend the proceedings.
Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on.
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software
platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
So as I mentioned up front, the purpose of hearing is on
``The Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and
Operations.'' We have three witnesses who will testify and then
take our questions, all of whom, as I mentioned, are
participating remotely. So they will be on the screens in front
of you.
We have the Honorable Christine Wormuth, Director,
International Security and Defense Policy Center for the RAND
Corporation; Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, retired, Center for
European Policy Analysis and former Commanding General, U.S.
Army Europe; and Mr. Elbridge Colby, principal and co-founder
of The Marathon Initiative.
I think this is an enormously important topic and one I
know many members of this committee have worked on for quite
some time.
It is incredibly important that we build the strongest
possible alliances that we can, that we form partnerships and
friendships wherever we can to help us achieve our goals,
because as has been pointed out in this committee by both
members and DOD [Department of Defense] witnesses, as well as
others testifying, we face an incredibly complex series of
threats, from a rising China to belligerent Russia, Iran, North
Korea, transnational terrorist groups.
It is a very complicated threat matrix and one which, I
would submit, we cannot possibly meet on our own. We are going
to need friends. We are going to need partners.
Now, the good news in all of this is we have about at least
75 years' worth of developing those partnerships that have been
robust and very successful for us, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] being the most obvious. But we have very strong
partnerships with South Korea and Japan and others in the Asian
region.
We have built these partnerships, and they have been to our
benefit, most notably immediately following 9/11 when NATO
stepped up and defended us. And in Afghanistan today we are
getting to the point where our partners are actually going to
have more military forces on the ground in Afghanistan than we
do.
These partnerships have undeniably worked. And when you
look at the National Defense Strategy, partnerships and
alliances are a cornerstone of that strategy. We need to figure
out how to build and strengthen those partnerships as we look
to meet the challenges that we face globally.
And going forward, we can't take that for granted. It is a
constantly shifting and changing world. Allies have their own
interests and their own pursuits. We need to work at it if we
are going build those partnerships.
Now, I believe that the United States military can be an
important part of working those partnerships and developing
them. Certainly we need to use the other tools in our toolbox,
diplomacy, development, the use of the State Department.
But as I have traveled the world, one thing that is
notable: people really appreciate the support of the U.S.
military. The partnerships that we build certainly help us in
meeting our national security objectives, but they also develop
more sustainable and long-term relationships in Africa and Asia
and Europe and elsewhere. So I think the military needs to be
part of working together on those partnerships. I think it is
crucially important that we look at it that way.
And I will say I don't think an ``American First''
philosophy actually achieves our interests. It really doesn't
get America what it really wants. If we tell the rest of the
world that we are in it for ourselves and we have no interest
in working with them or even concerning ourselves with their
objectives, in the long run it undermines our credibility.
And that is the last point that I want to make. The
President frequently talks about how the partnerships and
alliances that we have had across the world are not to our
benefit. He makes it clear that he thinks that the rest of the
world is sort of a free rider on our largess and what we have
done for them.
I don't agree with that. No country in the world has
benefited more from the global stability, peace, and prosperity
of the last 75 years than the United States of America. Those
partnerships may be helping South Korea, for instance, prevent
a war on the Korean Peninsula, prevent being invaded by North
Korea. They may be helping Japan and Taiwan protect themselves
against China or Europe protect themselves against Russia. But
they are also helping us because they are giving us a stable
world. And as the most prosperous country in the history of the
world, we benefit from that more than anybody else.
I believe these partnerships have been of mutual benefit,
and I think it is enormously important that we maintain them,
strengthen them, and look for opportunities to build new
partnerships where possible.
And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for any
open statement he has.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join in welcoming and thanking our witnesses, and
to thank you for having a hearing on what I agree is such an
important topic.
As Ms. Wormuth says in her statement, these alliances and
partnerships give us a unique comparative advantage. And I know
that General Dunford, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, would make that point repeatedly as well. Ms. Wormuth
goes on to say, ``they are the backbone of the international
order that has ensured relative peace and security since the
end of World War II.''
I think that is right. Yet in both political parties there
are doubts and questions and maybe even attacks on these
alliances and partnerships that have been so successful since
the end of World War II.
So I think it is very important for us to remind ourselves
and examine the benefits that the United States has received in
the last 75 years through this network of alliances and
partnerships, but also see how they need to be adjusted to meet
the needs of today and also tomorrow.
Of course, in thinking about World War II and alliances, I
can't resist a couple of Churchill quotes. In a secret session
in 1942 he said, ``in working with Allies, it sometimes happens
that they develop opinions of their own.''
Well, that may be part of the challenge of working with
allies. Our allies sometimes develop opinions of their own. We
don't always perhaps give those opinions the respect they
deserve.
Later, just about a month before the war ended in 1945,
Churchill said, ``there is only one thing worse than fighting
with allies, and that is fighting without them.''
Well, I hope the United States never finds itself in that
position again.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And we will now go to our witnesses, who I am counting on
the system to magically appear on the screen. We are going to
start with the Honorable Christine Wormuth.
You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to
be here and see you all again, even if it is just remotely.
As powerful as the United States is as a nation, our allies
and partners around the world are critical elements of our
National Security Strategy, as you all have indicated.
Particularly in an era of great power competition, the
network of alliances and partnerships we have developed over
the last 75 years provides us a unique comparative advantage.
The U.S. and its allies share intelligence, train and
exercise side by side, and operate compatible weapon systems on
a daily basis, coming together to create combined capabilities
that far exceed what we could bring to bear on our own.
Chairman Smith spoke to the value our allies and partners
have brought to us in the past. Today in Europe we are working
closely with our NATO allies to deter Russia, while at the same
time guarding against internal threats to freedom driven by
ethno-nationalism and illiberalism.
In Asia, our alliances with Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
South Korea, and our partnerships with many others in the
region strengthen our ability to confront a range of threats,
whether it is North Korea's growing nuclear weapons and missile
programs, China's military buildup and sweeping territorial
claims, or the continuing threat of violent extremism.
It has become almost a cliche to say that the United Sates
is at a strategic inflection point or even facing the end of
the world order as we know it. Whatever you call it, the
country is facing now significant challenges ahead, most
prominently competing successfully against a rising China while
reducing the risks of war with Beijing.
This is going to require us to change our national security
approach, a challenging assignment under any circumstances, but
it will be all the more difficult because of the inevitable
downward budgetary pressure on national security institutions
that is coming and the many other difficult domestic problems
that are going to compete for policymakers' time and attention.
Allies and partners remain critically important to this
changing landscape, but we need to adapt and strengthen our
network to better position us for the future. The U.S. needs to
shore up deterrence in Europe and Asia, while at the same time
carefully reducing its military footprint in the Middle East,
without creating more insecurity there.
Going forward, we also need our allies and partners to do
more for themselves, as well as more with the United States, in
some cases. We need our NATO allies to continue to spend more
on defense and to make good on their pledges to do so by 2024.
We need our allies and partners to continue working with us,
whether it is in the Middle East as part of the maritime
coalition to interdict weapon shipments to the Houthis, or in
the South China Sea, where Australia and Japan have joined with
the U.S. to conduct freedom of navigation operations and to
conduct naval exercises.
Developing a comprehensive plan to adapt and revitalize our
networks and alliances is an essential component of a broader
strategy for great power competition and a homework assignment
that is going to take many years.
It is also an area where DOD needs help from Congress. DOD
is going to have to make difficult decisions about the kinds of
weapon systems it buys, how it is postured overseas, and what
kinds of capabilities it is willing to sell--or not sell--to
allies and friends.
Congress is involved in all of these decisions, and without
congressional support for the tough calls ahead it is going be
much harder to make the strategic adjustments we so clearly
need to undertake.
America's network of alliances has served us well, but we
can't take these relationships for granted. Alliances are like
gardens: they don't grow overnight, you have to tend to them or
they wither if you neglect them.
While the current national strategy emphasizes the
importance of allies, I am concerned that a widening gap has
emerged between our rhetoric and the actions the United States
has taken in some cases with our closest friends and allies.
The U.S. commitment to NATO's Article 5 security guarantee has
repeatedly been called into question. Washington has accused
our European allies of taking us for granted, and President
Trump has seemed to contemplate possibly withdrawing from NATO
altogether.
The decision to withdraw as many as 12,000 troops from
Germany has been publicly messaged as a punishment and makes
little strategic sense in today's environment. The abrupt
decision to withdraw troops from Syria took our allies and
friends by surprise and left them wondering when we could be
counted on.
The U.S. and its allies need each other now more than ever.
Increasing friction and uncertainty in our relationship can
result in negative consequences. A survey released last week
showed favorable views of the United States in several
democratic countries is at an all-time low.
Ultimately, shared interests and concerns over common
threats lie at the heart of strong alliances, but nations and
their leaders, as Ranking Member Thornberry said, must balance
many competing demands and pressures to govern, so it is rare
that we will always agree.
In closing, sustaining alliances requires persuasion,
consultation, an ability to listen, and a willingness to
compromise. If we don't do a better job tending our gardens, we
may find ourselves with friends who are unwilling to take on
the hard work that we need in the days ahead.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you. It was a little broken up there,
but I think we, by and large, heard everything in that. I hope
the future connections here are better.
General Hodges, you are up now and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF LTG BEN HODGES, USA (RET.), CENTER FOR EUROPEAN
POLICY ANALYSIS, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY EUROPE
(2014-2017)
General Hodges. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I would like to address three specific topics in my opening
statement: U.S. capabilities in Europe, the importance of the
Black Sea region, and the importance of our relationship with
Turkey.
U.S. strategic interests are shifting increasingly towards
the Indo-Pacific region, but the relationship with Europe
remains vital to American security and prosperity, which in
turn depends in large part on European security and prosperity.
We need allies for support around the world, and our best and
most reliable allies come from Europe, as well as Canada and
Australia. NATO, the most successful alliance in the history of
the world, is an essential element of U.S. security efforts in
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
The current U.S. posture in Europe is understandably
significantly less than what it was at the height of the Cold
War. But given the security environment now, it is too small
and without depth. In order to carry out U.S. strategy in
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, we depend on continuous
deployments of rotational regular and reserve air, land, and
naval forces to augment the relatively small U.S. military
capabilities forward-based in Europe.
The decision to withdraw 12,500 soldiers and airmen from
Germany, as described on 29 July by the Pentagon, is a mistake
in my view. The administration's decision was not the result of
strategic analysis or a coordinated interagency process. It
appears that the planning will take months, and the execution
will take years. My estimate is that what actually ends up
happening will probably bear little resemblance to what was
initially briefed.
Russia has not improved its behavior anywhere, and in the
face of that we would be reducing capabilities essential to
effective deterrence, rapid reinforcement, and operations in
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
My sense is that the plan as briefed will have a negative
impact on readiness. But there are smart professionals in the
Pentagon and in the various headquarters in Germany who will
lay out the challenges and risks and try to come up with means
to mitigate those risks and a timeline in which to do it.
NATO is still capable of effective deterrence. The combined
militaries of 30 allies, plus partners in Europe, represent
significant potential combat power and are a key component of
effective deterrence.
However, I do believe that there are potential
vulnerabilities which undermine NATO deterrence along its
eastern flank. Those include, number one, a perceived lack of
cohesion which could lead to miscalculation by the Kremlin,
inadequate readiness levels of some allies, inadequate
integration of air and missile defense capabilities, and
shortfalls in military mobility.
The second point of emphasis regards the strategic
importance of the greater Black Sea region. I believe that
great power competition prevents great power conflict. Failure
to compete and to demonstrate interests and a willingness to
protect those interests, in all domains, can lead to power
vacuums and miscalculations, which can in turn lead to
escalation of tensions and then to actual conflicts.
This is particularly true in the greater Black Sea region
where Russia is attempting to maintain its sphere of influence.
The Black Sea region should be the place where the United
States and our NATO allies and partners hold the line.
The Black Sea should matter to the West in part because it
matters to the Kremlin. Taking the initiative away from the
Kremlin, denying it the ability to support the Assad regime in
Syria and launch operations into Libya, will reduce the flow of
refugees into Europe, what General Breedlove called the
weaponization of refugees, and limit the Kremlin's ability to
spread its corrosive influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus,
the Middle East, North Africa.
We need to change the rules of the game, develop our own
approach to hybrid warfare, and shape events by using all the
tools of national and alliance power, including diplomacy,
private investment, as well as the military, instead of always
reacting to Kremlin initiatives.
Finally, my third point of emphasis: It is time for Turkey-
USA 2.0. We must repair the relations between Turkey and the
United States and see Turkey as an essential but exposed ally
that is at the crossroads of several regions and challenges.
Turkey is essential for deterrence of the Kremlin in the
Black Sea region, and it is a critical bulwark against ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and Iran. Protecting this
relationship should be a priority.
Nor do I condone or excuse several mistakes or bad choices
by the Turkish government. They are at times a very difficult
lot. But we must think long term. The current Turkish
administration will eventually change, but the strategically
important geography of Turkey will never change.
We need to reframe the relationship from its Cold War
structures. The current boundaries between U.S. European
Command and U.S. Central Command, and the Department of State
regional boundaries, currently align with the Turkish-Syrian
border. Perhaps we can find something that is more mindful of
Turkey's strategic situation and which would improve our own
strategic thinking.
In order to start rebuilding trust with Turkey, we should
respect Turkish concerns about providing weapons to the YPG
[People's Protection Units]. We should recognize that Turkey is
on the front line of the Middle East refugee crisis with more
than 3.5 million refugees in Turkey along the Syrian border. We
should offer Turkey a way out from its misguided S-400 purchase
from Russia. We should resolve the Turkey-Greece issues in the
eastern Mediterranean.
If the U.S. is not willing to make this effort, then we
should put our full weight behind Germany or the U.K. [United
Kingdom] to do it. Only the Kremlin benefits if two NATO allies
are in conflict with each other.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hodges can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And up next we have Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby, you are recognized to give your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ELBRIDGE COLBY, PRINCIPAL AND CO-FOUNDER, THE
MARATHON INITIATIVE
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thornberry, and distinguished members of this committee, for
the invitation to appear before you. It is a great honor to
testify before this body on a topic of the highest importance
to our Nation.
Allies and partners are absolutely essential for the United
States in a world increasingly defined by great power
competition, above all with China. Indeed, they lie at the very
heart of the right U.S. strategy for this era, which I believe
the Department of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy lays
out.
The importance to the United States of allies and partners
is not a platitude. To the contrary. For the first time since
the 19th century, the United States is not far and away the
world's largest economy. More than anything else, this is due
to the rise of China, and as has become very evident, Beijing
is increasingly using its growing power for coercive purposes.
At the same time, the United States faces a range of other
potential threats, including primarily from Russia against
NATO, as well as from transnational terrorists, Iran, and North
Korea.
In other words, there exist multiple challenges to U.S.
national security interests, but given their breadth and scope,
America can no longer expect to take care of them essentially
alone. Accordingly, we must address this widening shortfall
between the threats we face and the resources we have to deal
with them by a much greater role for allies and partners.
Precisely because of this, the NDS [National Defense
Strategy] identifies a new approach to U.S. allies and partners
as its critical second line of effort. This new approach is not
simply a restatement that allies and partners are important and
valued, as appropriate as that may be. Rather it is a call for
a new logic for dealing with them.
This new approach proceeds in the NDS's revised strategic
perspective. Because of China's power and wealth, the United
States simply must play a leading role in blocking Beijing's
pursuit of hegemony in Asia. This means that the U.S. defense
establishment must prioritize dealing with China and Asia, and
particularly on defending vulnerable allies and partners, such
as Taiwan and the Philippines.
Given the high demands of this requirement, it will have to
consume an increasing portion of U.S. defense effort and
attention. In particular, we will not be able to dedicate the
level of resources and effort to the Middle East and Europe
that we have in the past. We will therefore need allies and
partners to do their part, not just to help defend our
interests and enable a concentration on Asia, but to defend
themselves and their interests.
So the question is how. Let me lay out three points in this
respect.
First, the United States should seek to add new partners
and, where necessary, allies. Washington should seek to add
them to address a particular mismatch between where the
contemporary dangers to our interests present themselves and
the threat perceptions of most of our established allies. The
contemporary threats to the U.S. interests stem from China
across Asia, transnational terrorists largely in the Middle
East, Russia and Eastern Europe, the Persian Gulf area, and
North Korea and Asia.
Yet the United States traditional closest and most
significant allies are largely clustered in Western Europe and
Northeast Asia. Many of these countries, especially in Europe,
feel quite secure and are little motivated to contribute to
more distant threats. This leaves wide areas, such as South and
Southeast Asia and the Middle East, for which longstanding U.S.
alliances are of minimal help. The natural way to rectify this
is for the United States to add partners and, where necessary,
alliances to help address these gaps.
Fortunately there is plenty of opportunity to do so,
because many countries that are not our traditional close
allies share our interest in checking Chinese bid for hegemony
in Asia, resisting Russian or Iranian aggression, or combating
transnational terrorism. Facing these threats more acutely than
do our long established allies, these countries are highly
motivated to do something about the problem.
In this effort, though, we should be very careful to
distinguish between expanding our formal alliances or quasi-
alliances from expanding our partnerships. The former should be
approached conservatively, while the latter can be approached
more liberally. When we extend an alliance commitment or
something tantamount to it, as in the case of Taiwan, we tie
our credibility to that nation's fate. We should, therefore, be
chary about doing so.
In light of this, we should seek to expand our partnerships
wherever possible. In particular, we should focus on increasing
them in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, where
China otherwise might have an open field to suborn states and
add them to its pro-hegemonial coalition.
I do not see a near-term need to add any allies to the U.S.
roster, but I do think we will increasingly need to consider
this as the shadow of Chinese power darkens over the region.
Further, our effort to expand our network of allies and
partners should primarily be focused on states with shared
threat perceptions. It has become something of a commonplace
that shared values form the bedrock of our alliances. It is
true that such values help bind allies, but the most useful
alliances generally proceed from shared fears.
The best motivator to fight is self-defense. Thus, states
that have a shared interest in preventing Chinese or Russian or
Iranian hegemony themselves have a natural alignment with our
own interests. This is true whether or not they are
democracies.
Second, given the scale of challenges we face, the United
States should encourage allies and partners to assume a greater
role in handling shared security challenges. This is, of
course, a burden-sharing problem and it is a difficult one.
I do not think there is a neat solution to the burden-
sharing quandary. The fact is that most countries can only do
so much if they do not feel directly threatened by an
adversary. My view is that we should work with this reality
rather than vainly try to alter it.
Accordingly, we should focus on urging countries to
increase their efforts where they will be able to generate
sufficient political will to make an effective contribution to
shared interests.
In Asia, given the scale of the threat posed by Beijing, we
should concentrate most of our allies, like Japan, South Korea,
the Philippines, and Taiwan, on readying to defend themselves
alongside U.S. Armed Forces and provide access to U.S. forces
in the event of a contingency.
Meanwhile, we should assist partners like Vietnam,
Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia with whatever means
available to enable their defense against an ever more powerful
China, while concurrently seeking better access and logistic
support for U.S. and other allied forces.
In the Middle East, the United States should urge Israel
and Washington's Arab partner to take a greater role in
containing Iran and combating transnational terrorism.
In Europe, finally, the overall U.S. goal should be, while
preserving the fundamental U.S. commitment to NATO's defense,
to have Europeans, especially Northern and Eastern Europe,
shoulder more of the burden of defending the alliance from
Russian assault.
The reality is that, given the stakes and consequences, the
United States must prioritize Asia. The United States must
therefore economize in its second theater, Europe. The main
challenge to this revised model in Europe is Germany. The
simple fact is that, given its size and wealth, Germany's role
is critical. They can and should do much more for NATO European
defense.
Finally, the United States should act to make this
invigorated network of allies and partners more effective. In
this light we should seek to integrate our own force
development posture and war planning processes as much as
possible with allies like Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom,
and select others relevant to key scenarios.
The goal here should be to make sure our collective efforts
are as efficient as possible, reducing duplication, and getting
the most out of our efforts and money.
At the same time, we should seek whatever possible to
strengthen important partners in their ability to resist
China's coercion or aggression, or otherwise contribute to
shared goals.
Congress has already done much on this front, but we should
intensify the use of arms sales, technology transfers, and
related military and intelligence tools to build up states like
India, Vietnam, and other South and Southeast Asian states.
In this vein, though, we must fundamentally move away from
using these tools as leverage over key partners for domestic
political reform over secondary geopolitical objectives. The
United States should always, of course, stand proudly for free
government that treats its people with dignity.
We must keep our eye on the prize, though. China is the
primary challenge to our interests in the world, including our
interest in free government, both at home and abroad. Our top
priority must, therefore, be to block its gaining predominance
in Asia, which is a very real prospect. This means
strengthening states in the region against Chinese power,
whether or not they are model democracies.
In closing, this new approach to allies and partners will
involve uncomfortable changes, hard decisions and compromises,
as well as some friction with them. But the truth is that we
are much stronger with allies and partners, and our power is
magnified when we effectively align our efforts.
Done right, the end result will be a more powerful,
equitable, and sustainable coalition of states, together
standing up for the kind of world Americans want and need to be
secure, free, and prosperous.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Colby can be found in the
Appendix on page 73.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
We will now move to questions. We will take members in
order. The members in the audience can come forward when they
are called and take a seat at the desk on the right and the
left there.
I am not sure when votes are going to happen. It would be
my intention to continue the hearing through votes, since we
have roughly 40, 45 minutes of a vote. We can have the member
who is asking the question can stay here, and I think we can
shuffle back and forth reasonably well to avoid any conflict
there. So we will keep going through votes is the plan.
With that, Mr. Colby, I will start with you, building off
of what you said at the end there, and I think you perfectly
outlined the main area where alliances are so important in Asia
and the reason for it, because of China.
You mentioned arm sales as one way to build those
alliances. What are some of the other key steps, and not just
within the military realm? I think you very correctly outlined
the countries, particularly in some cases the island nations in
the South Pacific.
What can we do, what should we do, either diplomatically,
through aid, through policies? What is going to make those
countries want to ally with us and not China? What are those
key steps beyond, I think, as I said, I think you mentioned arm
sales? What else should be in our toolbox when we look at how
to deal with China by building those alliances?
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
words.
I think it is definitely a whole-of-government approach.
So, I mean, I think the economic and diplomatic pieces are
obviously going to be vital.
Arm sales are part of it, but I think the signal of
political involvement and commitment as commensurate with what
those states can sort of process is also appropriate. I think
the administration's clarification of the Mutual Defense Treaty
to Manila, that it applies to the South China Sea, and by
stating our rejection of China's claims in the South China Sea
more forthrightly, are evidences of resolve.
I mean, I think fundamentally we have an alignment of
interests because most of the states, certainly the more
powerful states in the region, like Vietnam, Indonesia, et
cetera, do not want to be dominated by China. They don't want
to be put on the spot, but I think whatever we can do to
empower them, and as I think you were suggesting, sir, the
economic piece of this is really important.
So here I commend, for instance, what the Japanese and the
Koreans, for instance, have been doing to invest more. I think
Congress played a very important role with the pull back. But,
as you say, I think it is--or indicate--I think it is a whole-
of-government approach.
The Chairman. Understood. And I think the other key point
that you made there was basically saying we need to stay
focused on the importance of those alliances because of China.
And, obviously, the conflict we always run into there is with
our values, with human rights, with democracy.
And just a couple of examples of that. I am curious how you
think we should handle it. Obviously, with the Philippines we
have problems with Duterte and the way he is doing criminal
justice amongst other things. So we have got that. You know,
with India, India is still doing arm sales back and forth with
Russia. We have seen that problem with Turkey as well.
Is it possible to get a little more specific about when
should we just say, look, we are not going to worry about your
domestic politics, we want to build the alliance, however
possible? How would we deal with extreme human rights abuses as
are alleged in the Philippines in terms of extrajudicial
killings or in the case of India and, of course, we are dealing
with this with Turkey and Europe as well, is doing the arm
sales with Russia? Should we significantly back off on our sort
of sanctions policy for those things, and if so, how do we
signal that without undermining our credibility?
Mr. Colby. Well, sir, I think you have put your finger on
it. I mean, it is a very difficult problem and I don't want to
simplify it.
I mean, I think my inclination would be that our benefit
is--we benefit as much as possible from their ability to defend
themselves from these coercions, particularly military
coercion. So I would tend to air-gap those kinds of
capabilities, for instance, in thinking about domestic,
political, or human rights abuses or engagements with Russia.
I also think, and, I mean, others would know more about
this, but, I mean, I think if you look at some of the best
examples of improvements on human rights, say, in the Cold War,
it was often from a sort of a close position.
I mean, I think if you look, for instance, at the pressure
on Taiwan or South Korea, I think in the case of the
Philippines as well, it was often from a place where they felt
quite confident in our having their backs in terms of the kind
of fundamental external threats, but also the ability to put
pressure in an appropriate way sort of more privately. And I
guess that would be one thing.
I mean, I would say I think private pressure, as I think
this was President Reagan's view and Secretary Shultz, that can
be very effective. And also maybe being--thinking ourselves,
and I don't pretend to have the answer, but it is one thing
to--or maybe think more narrowly about what are the kinds of
abuses that we particularly want to focus on in terms of
holding up the sort of crown jewels of arm sales and so forth,
versus sort of other things like improvement on democratic
[inaudible], these kinds of things that we may be able to hold
off a bit on.
So I don't pretend to have the right answer, but I do think
that we risk losing these countries, and the coming years are
going to be critical, as I think you were suggesting, because
the Chinese are so powerful and they are going to face a bit of
a crossroads. We don't want to push them in the wrong direction
at this critical juncture.
The Chairman. Understood.
I think one of the other things that we need to be careful
about is perhaps our rhetoric and the expectations that we set.
I think a lot of times, and this has happened in Democratic and
Republican administrations, admittedly not so much in this one,
is if our rhetoric is we will stand up for human rights, we
will protect anybody in the world, and then our actions don't
match that rhetoric, that undermines our credibility.
I think we should state more clearly up front the modest
goals. We have a modest ability to force other countries to act
in certain ways. I think we would be better served to
acknowledge that and then the pragmatic nature of the approach
that we will have to take.
That is all I have. I will say, as we are asking questions,
given the fact that it is virtual, it is really kind of
important for the people asking the questions to direct it to
one of our specific witnesses so that we know who to pull up on
the screen and all that as we work through it.
With that, I will yield to Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Colby, let me just inquire about
another facet of what you were just discussing, because this
has proven to be a troublesome problem for the United States in
the past.
I am thinking, in addition to arm sales and the things you
and the chairman were talking about, military training and
exchanges. We have a law that says we cannot do training
sometimes for a whole unit that has been accused of certain
human rights violations.
And in my experience a lot of countries desire most some
sort of training exchanges with our military, the kinds of
countries we would like to make closer partnerships with, and
yet our own law prevents us from having that sort of thing. We
have had terrible fights in Congress for years about a military
training facility devoted to South and Central America, as
another example. The chairman mentioned the Philippines.
Help us think through. I mean, you were doing that with the
chairman, kind of the pluses and minuses. But when it comes to
military training, other sorts of contact with our military,
how does that apply in our desire to form greater partnerships
with countries that may not be our idea of an ideal democracy?
Mr. Colby. Well, sir, I fully agree with you, and thank you
for raising the training point.
I would say, I mean, if we think about the scale of the
military threat posed by the PRC [People's Republic of China]
today and going forward, and I think within the next decade or
so we will be thinking about the Philippines and South Korea
and states in Southeast Asia as potential scenarios, given
where the 2020 military defense or the military power report on
China is saying, we need to start thinking about this now.
You know, I think training is a critical part because in a
sense what we are going to need to do to leverage this greater
power of this network, you know, allies, partners, whatever
their role, is going to be interoperability, the ability to
work to different standards, to communicate with each other.
That is partially a technical problem and an equipment problem,
but a lot of it is human training and an external
organizational issue.
You know, Taiwan, I think I am very enthusiastic about the
arm sales to Taiwan, and I know one was recently reported, I
hope it goes through, because it is the kind of equipment that
we want to see, this kind of, you know, A2/AD [anti-access/area
denial] denial kind of capabilities to Taiwan.
But actually where I think, you know, would be really
valuable to move forward with them, and that is obviously a
sensitive issue, but I think this would be within the context
of our traditional policy, would personally be on training. And
that is something we could think about with Vietnam as well.
Obviously, the Indians have a very sophisticated military, but
there may be something we can offer there, too.
So I think that is a real sort of force multiplier, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. General Hodges, let me just pursue this a
little bit with regard to Turkey, which you specifically
mentioned.
I think your broad points, Turkey's geography, history,
critical role is always going to be important, is certainly
valid. And yet not only are there human rights and governance
issues, the current leader of Turkey has policies that
contradict in many ways the best interests of the United
States.
So take that specific example. We don't want to make
enemies of Turkey forever. But yet what do we do now to
preserve that future when there is a different government but
yet make clear or in some way help guide them on a better
policy path?
General Hodges. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
Well, first of all, Turkey is a maddening ally. I was
stationed in Izmir for 2 years. So I personally experienced
what it was like there. But yet at the end of the day I cannot
imagine our alliance without Turkey, and so that has got to
guide our actions.
I think that part of the problem is, you know, for decades
the boundary between Central Command and European Command has
aligned with the border between Turkey and Syria. And when you
think about the situation in the region right now, we would
never put the border, the boundary right there if we were
starting with a blank sheet of paper. And because Central
Command has been the main effort theater for the last 20 years,
what Central Command's priorities were would typically drive
the thinking.
And so I think, for example, we made a strategic error by
giving weapons to the YPG. There were benefits to it at a
tactical level but the YPG--excuse me--ISIS was never going to
be an existential threat to the United States or even to any
European countries. And so we have risked a very important
strategic partnership for what I think are tactical benefits.
So my point is how we have Turkey on the map, every NATO
map Turkey is at the bottom right-hand corner, and the thinking
is dominated by what is south of that border. I think that is
part of it.
The second part is rebuilding trust. Turkey has a very
unfortunate or bad history with Russia. I think they are 0-for-
12 or 1-in-12 in their wars with Russia, and right now they
have no confidence that the West will stick with them.
Again, I am not excusing President Erdogan's policies,
which are very, very bad for the people of Turkey. But when we
are thinking about strategic calculation, what is in our best
interest? And I think that we have got to continue to try and
reestablish trust with them, as well as hold them accountable
in the different ways that the U.S. Government is still able to
do.
Mr. Thornberry. And I think figuring that out is the
challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your all
being here.
You know, I know that, Mr. Colby, you spoke of how we need
allies and partners to do their part. And I want to ask you and
Ms. Wormuth to weigh in as well. What do you think the
appropriate cost share for our allies should be versus the
benefits gained through those alliances? Can you be as specific
as possible?
Mr. Colby. Certainly. Congresswoman, I wouldn't be able to
give you a dollar figure, but I think, I mean, I think
fundamentally, if I was going to be sort of candid about it, I
would say that Japan should strive to look more like what West
Germany looked like in the Cold War, which is not exactly the
figure but a considerably higher proportion of defense spending
largely focused on territorial defense. There may be other
scenarios in the Western Pacific than the Japanese, as I
mentioned, Taiwan should be prepared to help with, but largely
focused on maintaining the integrity of the Japanese
archipelago.
I think in Europe we have a standard, which is 2 percent,
which we should stick to. You know, obviously, there is always
reason to critique it.
But, I mean, fundamentally I think the reality is that the
United States military is not large enough and almost certainly
not large enough to fight two simultaneous wars against both
China and Russia, and because China is a priority, that means
Europe has to be prepared to do more, certainly until U.S.
forces can prudently be swung.
But I think, you know, we do have examples of allies like
Poland and actually South Korea spends a pretty solid
proportion of GDP [gross domestic product]. Taiwan is making
significant efforts to increase its defense spending. And
actually a number of our partners do very well, I mean,
Finland, India, Vietnam. I think something a little bit more
like that is kind of what we are looking for.
Mrs. Davis. Ms. Wormuth, did you want to weigh in on that?
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, and I am hoping you-all can hear me a
little bit better this time.
I would agree with everything that Mr. Colby just said and
add maybe a few thoughts.
I think, again, it is very important that the European
members of NATO continue to make progress towards the 2 percent
GDP pledge in 2024. But I think we oversimplify and sort of
focus in a myopic way on that 2 percent number. As important as
how much countries are spending is what they are spending that
money on.
So I am as interested as seeing Germany, for example, go
from, I think, about 1.2 percent of GDP to the 2 percent mark,
but I am also focused on are they spending that defense money
on the right kind of capabilities that we need to be able to
deter Russia, for example.
I would also add that in addition to the----
Mrs. Davis. Can I ask you--I was just going ask you, when
we have tried to intervene in that area and be, I guess, more
forceful in terms what we are looking for, what kind of results
have we had?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, I think in my experience the German
military and many in the Ministry of Defense are very
sympathetic, frankly, to the calls from the United States to
invest more. I think they see the challenges that Russia poses,
they see the reality of that, and they want their own country
to be able to do more.
But Germany, like all countries, like our own country, its
leaders are trying to balance a range of competing pressures.
They are looking at their domestic issues. They are looking at
the economic effects of the pandemic on their country. And so
they are sort of looking at a broader array of things and
making judgements about how to allocate their overall national
resources.
So there is work to be done, and I really think Germany in
particular needs to step up.
But I would also say that, beyond just defense spending,
alliances, countries that are part of the alliances with the
United States and who have partnerships with us bring other
things to the table as well.
So, for example, while Germany may not be doing as much as
I would like on defense, they are taking real pain in terms of
the economic sanctions against Russia. Similarly, you see
countries in Asia who are part of the sanctions regime against
North Korea.
So I think basing access, willingness to sort of take
economic losses as part of sanctions regimes, are important
contributions to our alliances as well.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
I wanted to ask General Hodges really quickly, I mean, what
is one thing you learned at the Department of Defense about the
role of alliances and how to achieve U.S. national security?
Can you give us one thing? You have about one----
The Chairman. It is going to have to be real quick, because
she is out of time. If you can do it in 5 seconds, go ahead.
General Hodges. We lose without allies.
The Chairman. I am sorry. I missed that.
General Hodges. We lose without allies.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
calling this hearing in regard to our allies and partners.
In the last year I have had the remarkable opportunity to
see the successes of President Trump around the world. I was in
Krakow, Poland, where the people are so appreciative of the
additional American troops being added there, in fact, the
deterrence to Putin's aggression. Indeed, President Duda has
indicated that the military facilities they are going to build
for the Americans could be called Fort Trump.
In Israel, in Jerusalem, I was grateful to be present at
the embassy that President Trump had the courage to move to
Jerusalem. And then we saw last week with Prime Minister
Netanyahu the extraordinary relationship the United States has
with the Jewish state.
And then I had the opportunity with India to be present
with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi and in Houston
where the people of India now appreciate that President Trump
had the courage to rename Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific
Command. They now understand what an important ally the world's
largest democracy is to the world's oldest democracy, the
United States.
And then to visit in Bahrain, to see the American naval
base there that has been so important for 70 years to provide
security in the Middle East, and for then now Bahrain to take a
lead in the Abraham Accords, which will bring peace and
prosperity opportunity to the Middle East.
And finally with Colombia, I am very grateful in South
America the South Carolina National Guard is a State partner
with the military of Colombia. We have never had a stronger
relationship to deter terrorism around the world with President
Trump.
With that, Mr. Colby, last summer the House passed a bill
that I co-led with Representative Ted Deutch, the U.S.-Israel
Cooperation Enhancement and Regional Security Act. That bill
included $3.8 billion a year in security assistance to Israel
over the next decade. It would also provide financing to
upgrade most of Israel's fighter aircraft, improve its ground
forces mobility, and strengthen its military defense systems.
What are some of the emerging threats to Israel, and how
can we target security assistance to Israel to be effective?
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Congressman.
I need to consult the bill to understand it better, but it
sounds very commendable. I think we certainly benefit.
Essentially, the stronger Israel is, the better off we are.
From things that have been happening the last couple
months, the Abraham Accords and these hopefully more steps, I
think we are seeing, hopefully, real progress in the sort of
[inaudible] cohesion and formalization of a coalition in the
region designed to check and really roll back Iranian pursuit
of dominance in the area. So I think that is very encouraging.
In terms of Israel's particular threat perceptions, I wish
I was able to speak in great detail, but I think it seems to me
that the primary threat they feel is largely Iran, Hezbollah,
obviously some of the rejectionist groups.
It seems like things are in a pretty sustainable place on
the rejectionist front. With Hezbollah, I know they learned a
lot of lessons. David Thompson, Christine Wormuth's colleague
at RAND, wrote a very important study on Israel's adaptation
that we could learn a lot from. So I would say we could learn a
lot from the Israelis. I know [inaudible] do.
But I would say I think build from this, as I mentioned in
my testimony, and really encouraging and empowering regional
partners to take a greater role. And of course that is all the
more tenable and feasible now that they are becoming more
cohesive.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
And then for General Hodges. Germany has so many important
military facilities, and in fact the Army Corps of Engineers is
building the largest military hospital, the Rhine Ordnance
Barracks Army Medical Center, near Kaiserslautern, Germany,
which is the sister city of Columbia, South Carolina, very
important to all of us.
But I am concerned that with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline
nearing completion, what steps should be taken to limit the
exposure of our strategic installations to this growing threat?
General Hodges. Well, Mr. Wilson, for sure we should keep
up the pressure on Germany to stop, to discontinue the Nord
Stream 2 construction. I think actually the poisoning of Mr.
Navalny has changed a lot of attitudes here in Germany about
how it views the Kremlin. So gives some hope there.
But I think the United States, we have got to treat Germany
as our most important ally. Instead for the last several years
we have been publicly [inaudible] treating them in a way that,
I guarantee you, I live here in Frankfurt, Germany, does not
engender any willingness to increase spending or to do the
kinds of things that we would like. So I think we need a more
sophisticated approach [inaudible] from the Germans.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by thanking our witnesses for being here
today to discuss the very important topic of our allies. It is
certainly an important and timely topic.
As I see it, the United States has allies, whereas China
has business partners, and other countries know the difference.
And previous administrations have understood that the best time
to make a friend is when you don't need one.
So I would like to first ask about our efforts to make
inroads in the South Pacific.
Ms. Wormuth and Mr. Colby, what value would partnerships
with small island nations play in deterring China, for example,
from attacking Taiwan or Guam?
And next, what role should the Department of State play in
cultivating allies and partnerships versus the role of the
Department of Defense? And are we striking the right balance?
And what are the implications of getting that wrong?
And then finally, General Hodges, as our cyber capabilities
mature and cyber becomes increasingly important as a vast
attack base, if you will, we will clearly need stronger cyber
partnerships with European partners.
Have European partners been willing to partner bilaterally
with the U.S. on joint cyber operations? And which countries
have the most interest in and could benefit most from U.S.
mentorships in developing their capabilities?
We can start with Ms. Wormuth and Mr. Colby if we have got
time.
Ms. Wormuth. Apologies, Congressman. It was a bit hard to
hear you, but I think you said start with me. So I will just
try to be very brief.
The island nations can be quite important. As Mr. Colby
said, we need to make adjustments to our posture in the region
to be able to better deal with China.
And so the announcement by Palau, for example, that it is
willing to host U.S. airfields and bases could be quite helpful
to us, even though they are relatively small. We do need to
diversify our footprint and be more balanced and not so heavily
weighted in Northeast Asia exclusively, for example.
On the balance between the military and the Department of
State, the Department of State has a very important role to
play. As much as we need to have military capabilities to deter
China, we also need to have a diplomatic effort, for example,
to push back on their sweeping territorial claims. And the
Department of State is essential to working with allies and
partners to put forward diplomatic letters, for example,
basically registering disagreement with China's sweeping
territorial claims.
We don't want to--I think there is a tendency, as big as
the U.S. military is, when you are a hammer, everything looks
like a nail. But many of the challenges China poses, the
economic challenges, for example, are better addressed with
nonmilitary tools. And I will stop there.
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Yeah, I agree with Ms. Wormuth that the Pacific islands are
really critical.
It sounds a little bit archaic, but fundamentally the
tyranny of distance, as General Hodges would know better than
I, is really significant in military affairs. And this is even
more the case now that China is not just building a [inaudible]
military, but a power projection military out beyond the first
island chain.
And so they will be seeking to have the ability to contest
our power projection in the ocean, and we will need to have
combat-credible forward forces designed to blunt a fait
accompli or deny a China assault, say, on Taiwan, I think, sir,
as you rightly indicated.
But that is going to need to be supplied. It is going to
need to be based. It is going to need to be dispersed. I think
the Marines are thinking really at the forefront of thinking
about this. But it is a big logistics sort of requirement, and
that is where the Pacific islands really do come in, in great
importance.
So I think they sort of--it is a little bit ``Back to the
Future,'' if you will, but I think they really are critical,
and as Christine indicated, the Palau announcement is
significant.
Mr. Langevin. And, General, if you could address the cyber
question.
General Hodges. Yes, sir. Thank you.
First of all, five European allies stand out as being
leaders in cyber development and they certainly do a lot of
work: Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United
Kingdom. Those are five good partners.
Cyber protection of our critical transportation
infrastructure is essential for U.S. efforts in Europe. The
port of Bremerhaven, for example, if that is not protected from
a cyber strike, then we cannot bring in a single vehicle or a
single soldier.
So I believe cyber protection of critical transportation
infrastructure ought to count towards 2 percent. Lithuania and
Latvia do that now. I think Germany knows how to do this as
well.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My questions are going to be directed to General Hodges to
give our witnesses and the tech people a little advanced
warning.
General Hodges, good to see you again. Thank you for your
continued service in the area of national security.
You mentioned your time in service at Izmir where you were
the commander of the NATO Land Command, and, of course, you
were the commanding general of U.S. Army Europe.
During that period you saw an unbelievable shift in
Russians' aggressiveness, also our unpreparedness, and our
allies without a unified view of the effects of the need to
deter Russia.
You also saw the beginning of the European Reassurance
Initiative that evolved into the European Defense Initiative.
We have air policing in the Baltics, exercises in the Black
Sea. We have forward-deployed troops. We have even Germany
forward deploying troops in Europe.
From your experience, we are in somewhat of a different
place than we were when we first began to be aware that we
needed to take decisive action to deter Russia. But from what
you see now and where we started, what works? What doesn't? How
do we keep our allies unified on making certain that they are
prepared to see Russia as a threat and to work cooperatively
with us so that they can be deterred?
General Hodges. Thanks, Mr. Turner, and thanks for always
being so active with our European allies.
First of all, of course it is American leadership. Even
though throughout the history of the alliance we have had
disagreements and debates, serious debates with our closest
allies, there never, ever was a question of America's
commitment or of American leadership. Even our most strict
allies or our critics now still want and need American
leadership. That doesn't mean necessarily American troops, but
American leadership and commitment.
The second thing, what really works is the National Guard
and the Army Reserve. Mr. Wilson referenced the State
Partnership Program earlier. The State of Ohio, the State
Partnership Program with Serbia, for example, is one of the
best examples of where this works. And so the relationships
that were built up over the past few decades with the work in
the State Partnership Program, it pays off because of those
relationships.
And of course, thanks to the Congress' support with the ERI
[European Reassurance Initiative], now EDI [European Defense
Initiative], we are able to fill critical gaps in capability
with rotating National Guard and Reserve units.
So those really, I think, are critical. I have to say that
the congressional support is part of it. So even though our
allies are concerned about maybe what the administration has
said, they turn back to the near unanimous support of Congress
for America in the alliance.
Mr. Turner. Well, continuing with you, General, the 2
percent requirement, as Ms. Wormuth was discussing, is an
agreement from our allies. It was agreed unanimously at the
NATO Summit in Wales. It is not the United States requirement,
it is actually an agreement by the partners who are NATO
members.
This administration has made a significant push to require
that each NATO member rise to that occasion. I have spoken to
several parliamentarians who have found that pressure helpful.
They report that in their own legislative branch people used to
say: ``Why would we have to increase defense spending? We are
in NATO.'' And now they are actually debating and saying: ``We
have to increase defense spending. We are in NATO.''
Do you see that political shift happening of the
independent states having an understanding of a goal to
increase defense spending, and do you see it translating into
real additional capabilities for NATO?
General Hodges. Well, sir, in short, I would say, most
members of the alliance are moving in the right direction. They
will not all make 2 percent by the year 2024, that is for sure.
And Germany, in particular, it is inexcusable that Germany
does not spend more. So I won't try to defend that at all, and
certainly the administration's pressure has had results.
What I would say, though, instead of just constantly
clubbing people over the head about 2 percent, a bit more
sophisticated approach about what the alliance really needs I
think would be more helpful.
When I was a lieutenant in Germany about a hundred years
ago, West Germany was a frontline state. We had a huge
Bundeswehr across the border from huge Soviet forces. Today,
the front line is about a thousand kilometers to the east. We
don't need a big Bundeswehr. We need more German trains, not
more German tanks. Germany is the logistics hub, transport
[inaudible] so that we can move quickly.
I think if we encourage Germany and the Netherlands to
think in terms of improving transport, providing cyber
protection----
The Chairman. I am sorry, General, the gentleman's time has
expired. Do want to get on to other questioners. I apologize
for that. It is awkward to communicate back and forth this way,
but we do the best we can.
Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is for General Hodges. I think we have
established that the role of allies and partners in U.S.
military strategy and operations is important. I want to move
to how.
And for General Hodges, can you and have you thought
through how you see Special Operations Command [SOCOM] building
partner capacity in its role being an effective tool in the
future of our alliances and partnerships specific to great
power competition?
General Hodges. Thanks, Mr. Larsen.
Sure, Special Operations Command in Europe, and also the
NATO SOF [Special Operations Forces] headquarters in Mons, have
both made significant impact on helping the front lines improve
their--not only improve their own special forces, this is a
very tight community throughout NATO and Eastern Europe inside
the special forces.
But also, more and more nations are recognizing the
importance of resilience, the ability to resist disinformation
as well as attacks. This is an area where our special forces
have been particularly helpful in strengthening resilience of
nations along NATO's eastern flank. I would say you can never
have too much [inaudible] forces, small numbers with big
impact.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
Ms. Wormuth, the next question is for you.
Have you thought through how we see, how you view SOCOM's
global access and placement as a means to enable and support
the DOD competitive advantage and achieve objectives as
established in the NDS, again, specific to great power
competition?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Congressman.
I would echo to some degree what General Hodges said. I
think SOCOM is very focused on looking at how to adjust itself
from the focus it has had very heavily on counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency for the last 20 years to looking at the role
of special operations forces in great power competition.
And, in particular, I think, you know, there is quite a bit
that our special operations community can bring to bear in
terms of gray-zone competition, for example. So things like,
just as General Hodges talks about, the importance of building
partner capacity and helping frontline states develop
resistance forces.
RAND did an excellent study just recently looking at what
it would take to develop resistance forces in the Baltics, for
example, and that is something that the Baltic countries could
do at relatively little expense.
I think it is really going to call on SOCOM to return to
some degree to a greater focus on unconventional warfare, which
is obviously, you know, many of the hybrid threats and things
that we did during the Cold War in sort of the gray areas and
the shadows are relevant again, I think, in this area of great
power competition.
Mr. Larsen. Ma'am, thank you.
Mr. Colby, a little bit different angle on the question
about great power competition. The Brookings Institute did a
report last October titled ``Don't Make Us Choose,'' and it had
to do with the Southeast Asian countries basically making the
case: Don't make us choose between China and the U.S.
Your testimony really seems to run more counter to that,
the idea being that these countries do have to make a choice.
They are sovereign. They get to make a choice.
How do you balance the public comments from some of the
countries who are saying, ``Don't make us choose,'' to your
actually very thoughtful view about how to attract them closer
to the U.S.?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, sir, and I will be brief here
given your time.
I would say that they don't want to choose between China
and the United States. But, really, what we are asking them to
do is choose between China and their own autonomy and
sovereignty. And that is our interest is in bolstering Vietnam,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia as much as they can to defend
themselves against Chinese military or other forms of coercion.
It is not--you know, I always use the analogy of John
Foster Dulles, the so-called Pactomania of the 1950s, where
everybody had to become an alliance member.
As I think I mentioned in my testimony, we want to be very
chary about extending an alliance commitment. There might be
one or two we need to consider, but I think really what we want
to do instead is empower them to defend their own independence
and sovereignty.
Mr. Larsen. That is excellent.
Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. And I really appreciate
you ending that answer right as time expired.
Mr. Lamborn, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask all three of you to comment on Iran. As
you know, Russia and China are actively opposing U.S. efforts
to put pressure on Iran. Western European allies are doing
little or nothing. They are trying to evade sanctions to keep
up commercial ties with Iran.
We have some Middle Eastern growing relationships,
especially with the Sunni Gulf states, and they have done the
Abraham Accords with Israel, largely, I think, because of the
Iranian threat. So we have some potential allies and partners
in the Middle East, but we don't seem to have very good
partners willing to step up when it comes to Western Europe.
And I am concerned, if Joe Biden wins the election, we will
go back to the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]
program, which, in my opinion, does not prevent Iran from
getting a bomb, it just delays it by a few years.
So what should we do about Iran? I would like to hear from
all three of you.
Ms. Wormuth, could you start, please? Then General Hodges,
then Mr. Colby.
Ms. Wormuth. Sure. Thank you, Congressman.
Certainly, I would agree that Iran continues to pose a
serious threat for us, to our allies in the Middle East, and to
some extent to our allies in Europe.
So I think part of the problem that we have had in the last
few years in terms of being able to find a common approach with
our European partners, for example, towards Iran, I think the
fact that some of the schisms that I talked about in my opening
statement between our rhetoric about the importance of allies
and partners and how we actually talk about allies and
partners, publicly and privately, that experience, for example,
the Germans and how they have been treated, I think has made it
harder for them to find common ground with the current
administration in terms of how to deal with Iran.
The European country representatives that I talk to I think
also are not as clear as they would like to be on what do we
want from Iran. Certainly, the current administration has
articulated the maximum pressure campaign. But in the minds of
many European diplomats that I talk to, the kinds of things
that the administration has asked Iran to do are not realistic.
And so I think work needs to be done in articulating what
is a sort of viable pathway that we can pursue to bring the
Iranians back to the table. And I think Brian Hook at the State
Department spent quite a lot of time working with the Europeans
and it sounded like had gotten close, but ultimately were not
able to bring them together.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Wormuth. So I think we need to be clearer.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. I would like to hear from the
other two, also. But thank you.
Mr. Hodges, and then Mr. Colby.
General Hodges. Sir, thanks.
Four points.
First of all, [inaudible] bomb is not such a terrible
thing. For sure, it is better if we can stop them. But if we
delay for a few years, that is not necessarily bad.
I regret that we have pulled out of the JCPOA, primarily
because we now lose the opportunity or the vehicle with which
we could be putting more pressure on European allies to keep
the pressure on Iran. It is better if we lead instead of leave.
Number three, support for Iranian civil society. I think
the administration, our government was pretty quiet after the
execution of this Iranian wrestler, for example. We should be
going out of our way to support Iranian civil society.
Then finally, back to Turkey. Turkey is our bulwark against
Iran.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman.
Well, I think your point about the Abraham Accords
coalition in the region is the point I would like to stress,
that I think is really where the future lies, which is in a
sense it is almost a perfect example of the shared threat
driving traditionally strange bedfellows together, but now we
have them on the White House lawn, I think, if I am not
mistaken.
I think that is the real way to build going forward. And,
obviously, we have got to maintain a significant degree of
pressure on Iran to respect our interests and those of our
regional allies and partners like Israel and the Gulf states.
But I think this is what you really want to empower,
especially because we will not be able to allocate the degree
of attention and resources to CENTCOM [Central Command] that we
have in the past.
Really one of the core areas of the NDS was not just the
Middle East but having a lighter footprint, a more economical
footprint, and doing this by and through and working with
partners. And I think this political breakthrough, hopefully,
will enable us to do so in a more sort of efficient and force-
multiplying way.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
I think you are still muted there, Joe. In fact, I think
you are still muted. There we go. And yet we still cannot hear
you. You unmuted yourself, but I am not--how are we doing?
Yeah, we can't hear you, I am sorry. We will try to get
that fixed and come back to you shortly. You are unmuted, but
for some reason it is not coming through. So we will work on
that.
And we will go to Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes.
Sorry about that, Joe, we will try to get it fixed.
Oh, one other thing. Sorry. This is awkward, I know, but as
you are asking--once you have asked your question, it is better
for the member to then mute their microphone while they are
listening to the answer, because we get feedback if you don't.
I know then you got to turn it back on when you talk again. But
if you could do that on-and-off thing it would help reduce the
feedback.
And with that, Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the witnesses, thank you for very interesting and
useful and important presentations.
Out in the West, in the technology community, we often talk
about disruptive technologies. We have certainly over the last
4 years had a very disruptive leadership, one in which there
has been a very significant change from America working with
allies to a philosophy of America first. We will have another
leader, perhaps, or the same leader.
My question really goes to the large question of the
philosophy that we should proceed with in the next 4 years,
either changing President Trump's philosophy from America first
to another philosophy, or a Biden philosophy.
Just on the large scale of things, should it be America
first and the allies not so much to worry about, or should we
be looking at partnerships and making our foreign and military
partners and trade policies about partnerships? Just in the
large scope.
Let's start with Ms. Wormuth, and then go to Hodges, and
from there.
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Congressman. I will try to be
brief.
I think all of us at the witness table and many of you have
spoken to the importance and the value that alliances and
partnerships bring to the security of the United States. So I
think that those alliances need to remain at the center of our
national security strategy regardless of who is elected this
fall. And if President Trump remains in the White House, I
wouldn't expect him to dramatically change his approach.
But I think what I would emphasize is the importance,
again, of that consistent messaging and consistent and reliable
communications. I think some of the things that President Trump
wants to achieve have been made more difficult by the
disruptive communication style.
But, again, there has been a bipartisan tradition of
alliances and partnerships being valuable to the U.S., and I
think it made sense in the past, it makes sense going forward.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
General Hodges.
General Hodges. Yes, sir. Thank you.
So one of the things that has been so helpful is the
consistent support by the Congress for the alliance and for
working with our allies. Our allies understand, by and large,
the American political system. They understand that Presidents
and administrations change. So having the consistent support
from the Congress has really been important, and I hope that
this will certainly continue.
Mr. Colby. Congressman, I would say that I think what we
want in our overall approach is one of enlightened self-
interest. And, in fact, I would say alliances and partnerships
are necessary if you are going to put America's interests
first. I mean, I think it is--I am not being cute. But actually
the way to achieve the interests of the American people is to
have these alliances and partnerships, but make sure they work.
And a good friend and predecessor of mine, Jim Thomas, put
it well, I think, a while ago, when he said we need to change
our traditional alliance from protectorates to partnerships. As
I think General Hodges was indicating, in some ways our
traditional partnerships had the aspect of protectorates
because, if we look back to World War II, we were half of
global GDP. That just isn't the case anymore.
So I actually think friction is good and valuable if it is
deliberate and intentional and achieving the results we want,
which is a more equitable coalition that is adjusting to the
reality that what we and our traditional allies have to offer
is not enough to outweigh China and what it is able to do, and
Iran and Russia and terrorists.
So I think, you know, we have to adapt, and that is going
to result in friction. I think, you know, the [inaudible] I saw
in the press just downgraded its projections of the American
economic growth over time. As Ms. Wormuth rightly pointed out,
we are going to see pressure on the defense budget.
I actually think this could be a warning signal, this is
sort of a flare. I say this to the Japanese, for instance, and
the Germans a lot, is this is going to come due at some point,
and Americans are ultimately, I mean, you would know better
than I, are going to say something isn't right here. So we need
to have more equity and something more balanced, but making the
whole thing work together better as the goal.
Mr. Garamendi. My time has expired, and I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks for the panel for a great discussion. What I am
hearing is what conforms to my perspective, that America is the
indispensable nation. It is indispensable to freedom, rule of
law, human rights, free and fair trade. But we can't do it
alone. I think that is what I am hearing as well.
China's GDP is matching ours soon. We also have Russia that
is spending much above our level of GDP. Then, of course, you
have got Iran and still terrorists--terrorism.
But my question is really to--my first question is to Ms.
Wormuth and Mr. Colby. I did serve 30 years in the Air Force, I
did a lot with NATO. Can we try to do something similar again
in the Pacific? Can we find a structure that better integrates
ourselves with Japan and Australia, New Zealand and other
countries, like we had with SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization] 30 years ago? Should we try to pursue something
along these lines?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Congressman.
You know, my sense is that it would be difficult to
establish a NATO- or SEATO-like formal alliance with the
countries that you mentioned in Asia. But we do have already
alliance mechanisms with Japan, Australia, South Korea. We have
ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. And I think
there are pieces to build on that are substantial.
The challenge is that many of the countries in the Indo-
Pacific don't want to have to choose between the United States
and China. They want to engage with China for very clear
economic interests, while most of them lean towards the United
States for security interests.
And I think they are trying to sort of thread that needle.
I think it would make it difficult because of that to establish
a formal relationship. But I think there is much more we can
do, and Mr. Colby has spoken to it eloquently, and that is
really where we need to be focusing with DOD and the State
Department in the next 10 years.
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman. Just building on what Ms.
Wormuth, I think, rightly said, about the difficulty of forming
it.
So given that, I think it is better to use our political
capital on that front to push for increased defense spending,
posture enhancements and integration, and other kinds of
preparation for a shared effort.
And I think one of the key reasons why we don't need to
push so hard is I think when you look at it practically, what
we need from each individual country is more its own self-
defense, with I think the single exception of Australia, which
is more of a collective defense model, and I commend them in
their defense strategic update over their winter, our summer.
But really Japan needs to focus primarily on its own
defense, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, et cetera.
So actually, NATO wouldn't really get us that much because
we are not going to be asking too much of the allies to do for
each other. So, again, I would rather spend that political
capital on things that would actually contribute more to
deterrence and defense in the region against China.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you for your perspective. My concern
is we have a lot of bilateral relationships there. If we had a
little more multilateral and a little more integration, it may
be more effective.
My next question is to General Hodges. I appreciate your
perspective, sir, in how we can better deter in the Baltics.
What more can we do to help preserve these countries that are
way on the front line and vulnerable? Would it help to have a
U.S.-flagged unit permanently there, such as like an air
defense unit?
Thank you.
General Hodges. Thanks, Mr. Bacon.
Actually, we don't need to have that. I think the alliance
has done a very good job responding to the threat in the Baltic
region. We probably are better there than anywhere else in the
alliance. I would favor maybe improving the transportation
logistics infrastructure there to facilitate rapid
reinforcement.
But I think in the Baltic region, we are in a good place.
Kaliningrad is a liability for the Kremlin. The geography is in
our favor in the Baltic Sea.
So keep what we are doing, maybe improve some logistics
capability, transportation capability up there. The Black Sea
is where we are on the wrong side of the equation.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will give Mr. Courtney another try. Is he up on the
screen there? Yeah, we don't seem to be making progress on that
front.
So we will go to Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here today.
I want to bring the conversation back to Turkey. I hope to
hear from General Hodges and Ms. Wormuth. Sorry?
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Ms. Wormuth. Congresswoman Gabbard, yes.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay.
Ms. Wormuth. Do you want me to address?
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
In earlier comments, General Hodges talked about some of
the issues with Turkey, one of which is the kind of arbitrary
drawing of the line between CENTCOM and EUCOM [European
Command] there between Turkey and Syria, and perhaps some
differences between the commands on priorities in the region
which drove some of the decisions being made.
I was surprised, though, to hear you, kind of the takeaway
being that the United States needs to rebuild or earn back
Turkey's trust and confidence rather than the other way around.
When you look at the laundry list of things that Turkey has
done and is continuing to do, not only that undermine U.S.
objectives, but also undermine NATO objectives, with what is
happening in the Mediterranean now, in conflicts and issues
they have had in Greece and France and so forth.
You mentioned, General Hodges, about hold it--Turkey needs
to be held accountable. What needs to be done to do that? And
when you are finished, I will ask Ms. Wormuth to answer the
same question.
General Hodges. Thank you, Congresswoman Gabbard.
This is very difficult, and I don't have a ready solution
for many of these challenges.
My point is that if we think strategically, we have got to
figure out how do we keep Turkey on the side. For sure,
distrust is a two-way thing. I certainly did not mean to imply
that the burden is on us to regain their trust, and I don't
condone much of what the Erdogan administration has done or
said.
My point is to think long term, and, fortunately, we have
not done something that causes long-term damage on our side of
this relationship.
I think we work with countries and allies around the world
where we are not happy with the policies that they have about
certain things, but we manage to keep that compartmented so
that we can focus on our security, and our security is better
when we are able to have radar, air bases in Turkey, and that
Turkey controls the straits out in the Black Sea. That all is
to our advantage.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you, General Hodges.
I think that one of the main issues that I have is that
among the differences we have with Turkey's policies, they are
not limited to their domestic policies or their interaction
with other countries. You know, we have seen indirect fire on
our troops at known American locations within northern Syria.
And really there is no recourse. Turkey acts with impunity,
as they have for so long. And I have been asking these
questions for a long time in Congress, and I am generally
responded to with a shrug of the shoulders, like, well, we
need--the basic thing is we need them more than they need us.
And so Turkey feels like they can do whatever they want.
Ms. Wormuth, I wonder if you can weigh in on this, about
some constructive actions either the United States or NATO can
take to make it so that Turkey is not in a position of acting
without any consequence whatsoever.
Ms. Wormuth. Well, Congresswoman, as General Hodges said,
there is not--you know, I am a big fan of ``The Sound of
Music.'' How do you solve a problem like Maria? Turkey is a
very challenging geostrategic problem.
You know, I was in the Obama administration when we were
fighting ISIS, and we knew there was tension between the
necessity to have partners on the ground, and the Syrian
Democratic Forces were what we had. We knew Turkey had issues
with that.
In my experience, however, the United States worked very
hard and very closely with Turkey to try to assuage their
concerns, and nothing was ever enough for them.
So we do have a challenge. They are very important in terms
of where they are located. But the authoritarianism that
Erdogan has turned to is concerning.
So I think we have to keep the dialogue open and continue
to try to keep Turkey inside the fold, but at the same time
communicate that doing whatever they want is not acceptable.
And the S-400, for example, is a key example of that.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I remain deeply concerned about China's growing economic
and military footprint in Africa and our ability to adequately
counter those activities. China is promoting not just the Belt
and Road Initiative, but also its party-army model through
training and education initiatives with African militaries.
So, Ms. Wormuth, how can the Department of Defense better
utilize security cooperation authorities to build partner
capacity so our partners in Africa understand the risk of doing
business with China? And is there a way to successfully counter
China's debt-trap diplomacy and military presence in Africa,
especially in countries with a history of corruption? And,
finally, what more should the Department of Defense be doing to
counter this threat?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Well, first, I think AFRICOM's [Africa Command's] zero-
based review, I hope, will shed light on which kinds of
activities are helping us and helping our African partners.
There is a lot you can do with building partner capacity, but
as Mr. Colby and others have indicated, we are going to have to
make some hard choices. So I think we have to look at where are
we getting the most bang for the buck with the work we are
doing with the Africans.
I think the security assistance programs we have are a
valuable tool. And a lot of what I see China doing in Africa
is, frankly, quite self-serving and exploitative, and I think
many African countries see that. So the work we do with them
isn't just about us being extractive, it helps them. So I think
we should continue to do that, but be judicious in our choices.
Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Hodges, in your testimony you talk about
the importance of U.S. leadership and resolving the rising
tension between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.
In your opinion, what can the United States do to resolve
this conflict between two NATO allies that have a history of
tensions, and what role does the Department of Defense play in
easing tensions between these two nations?
General Hodges. Congresswoman Hartzler, thank you.
If I may reference Africa, working with our allies.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure.
General Hodges. You know, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy,
Spain all have extensive efforts going on in Africa. So this is
an opportunity, once again, where we can work with allies to
achieve what our objectives are.
When it comes to Greece and Turkey in the eastern
Mediterranean, I think that the State Department's guidance to
its diplomats in the region has been to keep Germany in front,
let Germany be the lead diplomatic effort here.
I think, frankly, the United States in the past would have
been the one to do this, to get these allies together, as we
have had to do numerous times in the past. But we have got to
find a way, with these two nations in particular, find a way
for them to back down, to climb back down from where they are.
I think at the end of the day, for Turkey it is about
economic relationships with the European Union [EU]. Perhaps
Germany could find a way to offer Turkey some sort of a trade
union with the EU as a return for them backing down.
Greece, of course, is under massive pressure from the
refugees that are coming across the Mediterranean, and they are
kind of the entry point, them and Italy, for all the refugees
coming to Europe. Finding a way to help them would also be a
part of this.
Most of these refugees would not be coming across if it was
not for Russian support of the Assad regime in Syria or the
support for General Haftar in Libya.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you think Germany is doing enough to be
aggressive in reaching out and trying to resolve this issue?
General Hodges. I can't tell for sure. I have spoken with
our ambassador in Greece, one of the best diplomats I have ever
met, Ambassador Geoff Pyatt. He says that the Germans are
working hard there, but I don't think that they are approaching
it the way that maybe a senior American diplomat who had the
responsibility for doing it might be able to do that.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Last topic here. Lieutenant General
Hodges, the armed services has made great strides in providing
expanded victim services for sexual harassment, assault
response, and prevention. But I am curious if service members
who are stationed or deployed overseas are afforded the same
level of resources as service members stationed in the United
States. I have an open constituent issue on this right now as
it relates to Poland.
And so based on your previous experience as commander of
U.S. Army Europe, what should the Department of Defense along
with the State Department do, working with our allies, to
ensure U.S. military victims of sexual assault in host nations
are provided adequate resources? And do you think we should be
doing a better job?
The Chairman. Unfortunately, the gentlelady's time has
expired, and we will have to take that for the record. It is a
very important question, but I would love to get your
perspectives to Mrs. Hartzler and the committee on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 97.]
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.
Are you with us there, Ruben? You still got the little mute
sign in front of you there.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I apologize. It is always difficult
when you are trying to do these events.
The Chairman. We got you now. Go ahead.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Okay. So a few questions that have
come up. Thank you, again. This has been a great discussion so
far.
I guess in terms of our kind of further going down the
rabbit hole with Turkey to begin with, if Turkey isn't part of
NATO and we can't rely on Turkey's ability to field the large--
because they are the largest infantry in the European theater
right now for us in terms of should something ever happen with
when the balloon goes up and we would need their assistance, if
we can't necessarily rely on NATO, then where are we going to
find the kind of mass that they provide right now?
And I apologize, if we could start with Lieutenant General
Ben Hodges, and then Christine, and then Mr. Colby.
General Hodges. Thank you, sir.
Well, for sure, Turkey brings a lot of military
capability--air, land, and sea forces--to the alliance. And if
for some reason they were no longer in NATO, that would be a
gap that would have to be filled by us or the U.K. or other
allies. So that is a problem right from the start.
But more importantly is control of the straits that connect
the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. And so having a
NATO ally that has control and sovereignty over the straits----
The Chairman. I am sorry. We have lost--we seem to have
lost the general there. If you want to move on to somebody else
to answer the question.
Mr. Gallego. Yes. Ms. Wormuth. You are muted, Ms. Wormuth.
Ms. Wormuth. Okay. I think I am unmuted now.
Mr. Gallego. Yes. Go ahead.
Ms. Wormuth. I think the size of the Turkish military is
just one reason why we need to continue to work hard, as
challenging as Turkey is, to keep them in the alliance.
You know, certainly if they were outside the alliance the
U.S. has a very large ground force, but we don't want to have
to go there. And as General Hodges said, we need them from a
maritime dimension. We need them in terms of just the
geostrategic bridge they are between Europe and the Middle
East.
So it is all of those reasons why I think we have to keep
working very hard on these tough problems. I wish we had better
answers, but I think we just have to keep grinding away on it.
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman. I actually don't--I don't
really have anything to add to what has already been said, if
you had some questions.
Mr. Gallego. I guess it is kind of a deeper dive question.
I was earlier on a call with members of the Bundestag as part
of the German Marshall Fund, and I do have conversations a lot
with a lot of European defense ministers, both NATO and non-
NATO allies. But there is a sentiment that I keep hearing that,
though Congress is very affirmative in our NATO
responsibilities and the fact that we would back up Article 5,
there is a sentiment that is still felt out there that the
Trump administration itself is not a long-term ally when it
comes to NATO.
So I guess this conversation goes to--first we will go back
to General Hodges.
Like, have you heard of that sentiment, and how deeply is
it taking root that there is some doubt whether we would uphold
our NATO commitments?
General Hodges. Well, sir, the fact that we even have to
have this discussion tells you the significance, and to imagine
we would ever be in the place where allies would wonder whether
or not the United States would ever be there, or that the
President or any President would question Article 5, certainly
not in a way like that.
Mr. Gallego. Ms. Wormuth, do you have anything to add?
Ms. Wormuth. There is very significant concern, I think, in
the conversations I have with folks from Germany, whether in
the diplomatic corps or elsewhere, as well as European
countries. And I think that is why you see what I would call
hedging behavior to some degree, when you have got Macron
talking about a European army, for example. While I think that
would be a difficult undertaking, it is reflective of the
concerns they have about our commitment right now.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses today.
I would like to acknowledge the importance that you all
pointed out to our partnerships and our alliances. And I would
like to go to the National Defense Strategy that talked about
how do we actually look at ways to improve those alliances,
especially getting them to the point where we can put them into
extended networks to make sure that we have the ability to take
decisive action, make sure we are able to deter.
And there are three elements in the plan that are of
particular interest. The first item says, upholding the
foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and
accountability. Number two, expanding regional consultative
mechanisms and collaborative planning. And number three,
deepening interoperability. And I wanted to spend a few minutes
talking about items number two and three.
As we develop our operational plans, it doesn't seem like
to me that we go in depth with our allies and partners who we
are going to rely on, especially if there is a major conflict.
Now, I understand that those operations, operational plans, are
classified, but I worry that we don't involve folks to that
level. And I want to make sure, too, we understand what our
allies can do, because that drives decisions in what we need to
do in the budgeting side, what they need to do in the policy
side, especially in developing the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] each year.
I want to make sure, too, that we understand, it seems like
to me that there is a lack of network architecture and
communications to be able to do the interoperability that we
need to do.
In fact, it was highlighted to me. I went to a RIMPAC [Rim
of the Pacific] Exercise, and I was on board an Australian
ship, and I will never forget an Australian brigadier coming
out just flaming mad that he couldn't communicate with other
folks in the exercise through the radio. So he was on the cell
phone, on his cell phone, communicating to allies and partners
in that exercise. It just goes to show some of the concerns.
And I wanted to ask this question. What are the concrete
steps that the United States military can take to make sure we
have the interoperability, the technology to where we can not
just say in concept that we have these relationships, and not
just that we practice them a few times a year and then see the
problems, but how do we get the deep and meaningful
interoperability that we need with our allies and partners if
we find ourselves in a high-level conflict? And I argue it is
also incredibly important on the deterrent side.
So, Mr. Colby, can you give me your perspective on that?
Mr. Colby. Well, Congressman, I think you put your finger
right on it. I mean, I think this whole idea--I mean,
interoperability is important. Obviously, the capability to
operate together. The phone example is really striking.
But as I mentioned in my testimony, I think we want to try
to lean on the, for instance, force development. I think Ms.
Wormuth may have started this under the last administration.
But doing much more aligned force development plans with, for
instance, the U.K. I think we could move forward on that with
the Australians.
I think we do have to be cautious, and that is where a lot
of this reluctance comes from, is that you don't know who is
going to be there in the event that the balloon goes up, as
Congressman Gallego said.
But I think given, for instance, where the Australians are
going, given what the Japanese have indicated, I think we can't
afford to be redundant. So a much deeper integration alignment
in posture, in operational planning. You know, there are ways
to build in uncertainty. But I think we should be prepared to
take more risks because I think on the other side we will get
more efficacy if we plan in a more integrated fashion.
Mr. Wittman. I would like to bring up one other point, too.
I have heard from diplomatic and military leaders that have
been involved in ASEAN about their concern about corruption. We
hear Chinese officials paying officials at the ASEAN to be able
to speak before the United States. And it seems like to me this
is emblematic of a deeper-seated problem that we have with the
Chinese clearly trying to take advantage through corruption in
these processes.
I wanted to ask, what do you think the United States can do
to combat this level of corruption, which seems to be growing
into more systematic or systemic corruption within ASEAN, and
what China does, not just in the Asia-Pacific, but around the
world?
So, Mr. Colby, I would like to get your perspective on
that.
Mr. Colby. Great. Thanks, Congressman.
Well, I think this is one of the areas where we can use our
values in our own advantage, we and the Europeans and the
Japanese, which is to say that we stand for long-term
accountability, the rule of law, and this kind of thing.
I don't think we are going to be able to match every
Chinese renminbi that they are going to throw around. But
people in the region, if they are not put under the really
coercive shadow of Chinese power and have to swallow Chinese
hegemony, they will eventually see which is the better course
to take, and I think that is where we want to be. Things like
DFC [International Development Finance Corporation] factor and
are valuable, but also our legal code and values.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And I want to thank all the witnesses for participating
today.
I want to take a minute to discuss New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty], which is set to expire in February 2021
without further action by the administration.
I know this hearing is about our alliances, but the treaty
is important in this conversation. While I understand the
administration believes that they can negotiate a trilateral
deal that includes China, my concern is that why would we put
ourselves in a situation where we have no arms control
agreement in place, especially with the U.S. withdrawing from
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty in 2019?
Our allies clearly see the value of the treaty, and NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg has urged the United States to
extend the agreement in order to provide the necessary time to
pursue a new deal.
To all the witnesses, starting with Ms. Wormuth, do you
think it is in the best interests of the United States and our
allies to allow New START to expire without a new agreement in
place?
Ms. Wormuth. No, Congressman. I very much believe that it
is in our interest to basically refresh New START and extend
it, and exactly as you said, spend that time then working with
the Russians to bring in their hypersonic weapons, the other,
you know, nuclear torpedoes, et cetera, as well as their
nonstrategic nuclear weapons into a treaty framework. And we
could certainly continue during that time to try to engage the
Chinese in conversations about their nuclear policy and their
nuclear program. But I think it would be a negative development
for the U.S. if we let New START lapse.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Hodges.
General Hodges. Thank you, sir.
I also think it would be a mistake to not extend New START
while we continue to work on refreshing it. But this, again, is
a place where we need allies. I think Germany is probably the
only country in Europe that could actually influence Kremlin
behavior. So we could be working with allies and put pressure
on the Kremlin to achieve this.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman.
I think the New START Treaty, while it has imperfections,
it is still a solid basis for strategic arms control. It is
based primarily--almost entirely derived from the framework
which was negotiated by President Reagan and then President
Bush in the early 1990s. And we would be better off with
something like New START than----
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I think we lost you. I will
proceed to my next question.
Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Thornberry both touched
on a topic I want to discuss further, which is how do we
balance security needs with political objectives when dealing
with partner countries that have documented human rights
violations and authoritarian leaders?
Ms. Wormuth, how can the Department of Defense be further
utilized as part of the whole-of-government strategy to promote
human rights and democratic values among partner countries?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, I think one of the most important
contributions the Department of Defense makes is leading by
example in terms of demonstrating adherence to the rule of law
and demonstrating the importance of human rights.
And in all of our security assistance programs, for
example, building partner capacity, we include in the curricula
courses on the rule of law and the importance of human rights.
And we have things like the Leahy law, which we discussed
earlier, that keeps us from operating with foreign country
units that are abusing human rights.
I think that is the most important contribution DOD makes.
There is a lot of action that needs to happen on the State
Department side, but that is where I think DOD has a role.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Colby, with regards to whether there is a U.S. interest
in having U.S. troops present in South Korea, President Trump
has previously said, quote, ``It can be debated. I can go
either way,'' end quote.
Do you believe it is in the U.S. national security interest
to maintain a presence in South Korea? And can you speak to the
benefits of our forward posture in South Korea?
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman.
I think our posture, our alliance with South Korea makes a
lot of sense, it is very valuable. We will need a presence
there. It does need to adapt in light of the overriding
importance on China going forward, and it needs to be
equitable.
I would also just like to say, sir, that what I said at the
end was that New START, while an imperfect agreement, is better
than nothing at all. It is a solid basis.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we are talking about the role of allies in strategy.
Strategy is often difficult because it requires us to
prioritize between what is essential and what is extraneous and
identify, if nothing else, what are the strong points for
geopolitical competition.
It seems obvious to me both geographically and
geopolitically that there is perhaps no more strategically
important piece of terrain right now in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific
Command] than Taiwan.
So my question for Mr. Colby is, what are your views on our
current policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan and
whether we need to rethink that policy and perhaps clarify it?
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congressman.
I fully agree with you, and I know you have been leading
the discussion on this. Also, I think we should move towards
more clarity on our position.
I do think under TRA [Taiwan Relations Act] and the Six
Assurances we already are effectively committed, but I think we
run into a danger of a Korea 1950 situation. Ambiguity is
tremendously perilous when the other side has the capability to
do something about it, the desire, and may think he can get
away with it, as happened in 1950. And I think that is our
danger today.
You know, Taiwan is valuable militarily in its placement in
the first island chain, because our credibility is already on
the line. Ask any of the people who talk to the Asian partners
and everybody thinks it is the canary in the coal mine or the,
you know, what-have-you.
And then, third, its status as a liberal democracy.
So I think moving towards the clarification consistent with
our One-China policy makes a lot of sense. And I do think it is
beginning to have more and more support. It is definitely
bipartisan. I would commend Richard Haass' piece in Foreign
Affairs recently. I think that clarity would be safer in a way
that is judicious and prudent diplomatically with Beijing.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. Maybe I will follow up with you,
Mr. Colby, on a different region of the world, Europe.
Obviously, there have been those on this committee, myself
included, who have asked the White House for clarification on
what exactly it intends to do with troop reductions in Germany.
You have been an outspoken, I don't know if critic is too
harsh a word, but certainly pointed to the fact that there is
more that Germany can be doing.
I would just be curious to get your views on any proposed
troop reduction in Germany and your broader views on the way we
can encourage our German allies to make more substantial
commitments to the NATO alliance in light of Russian
aggression.
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Congressman. I think your and your
colleagues' questions are important and they deserve answers.
I mean, based on what Secretary Esper and General Hyten and
General Wolters said in July, this is an ongoing discussion, so
we will see what it is like. They did say it is consistent with
the National Defense Strategy designed to deal with the
secondary threat from Russia and Europe, but over time making
us more, as you rightly said, I think, sir, prioritizing Asia.
I would also like to put this, the Germany discussion,
really in perspective and say that this friction--we can talk
about whether each move or the overall tone is appropriate. But
we do need to look at this in a couple of ways.
One, this friction is not new. I mean, President Johnson in
the balance of payments crisis literally insisted on payment
from Germany in order to retain the stationing of U.S. troops
in West Germany at the time. And, of course, the Congress, as I
understand, passed the Mansfield Amendment, I believe which was
calling for the wholesale withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Europe.
So we have been through this before. In the case of Korea,
President Carter was going to remove all forces from the
peninsula. And actually burden-sharing issues, I would say,
were more intense but also more candid and I think more
realistic during the Cold War.
The other thing I would say about Germany is, let's take
them at their word. They say they are committed to the
multilateral rules-based order. Nobody has benefited more from
NATO and the post-war order than Germany itself. Of course,
there is the sad history before that.
But as General Hodges indicated, the Bundeswehr of the Cold
War after 1955 was the most capable European military in NATO,
And in some ways, and I would defer to him, maybe more capable
than the American Army in Europe at some points.
In 1988, the West German military had 12 active divisions
on the inter-German border. That is a Germany two-thirds the
size of the current Federal Republic. I don't think they can
put one, certainly not two divisions together today.
And I disagree with General Hodges, with all due respect.
If we are going to contribute more and more to Asia, and we
have to focus on it given China's scale and scope, that means
Germany does have to play a role, and that does involve German
tanks and German artillery and German tactical aviation, as
part of NATO, of course.
But, I mean, honestly, I am befuddled with Germany. I am
actually a big fan of Germany. Like Congressman Gallego, I have
done things with the German Marshall Fund. I go there at least
once a year. But I don't understand, because on the one hand it
is either a bit obtuse and there is its massive hypocrisy, that
nobody has benefited more than they; or on the other hand it
looks quite cynical, honestly.
And I refuse to believe the Germans are so cynical. So I
think they really should meet their obligations as they claim
to want to do.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cisneros is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our panelists for being here today--or
being here virtually, I should say.
As demonstrated by the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]
pandemic, infectious diseases know no border and global health
crises are a matter of national security. In turn, it is
imperative that we work directly with the global community to
improve pandemic preparedness at home and abroad, including
through initiatives like the Global Health Security Agenda, a
network of 69 countries working to coordinate on global health
issues.
How can we elevate global health security as a key
component of our bilateral and multilateral security
relationships? And how should the military work with our
diplomats and development professionals to ensure we can
address the national security threat with all the tools in our
toolbox?
Ms. Wormuth, you want to go ahead first?
Ms. Wormuth. Sure. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you very
much. That is an issue I care a lot about. And I think we do,
before this pandemic happened, I was absolutely a proponent of
arguing that we should pay more attention to global health
security challenges and invest more as a country in our own
public health infrastructure as well as helping other countries
around the world do that.
Our military has some pretty impressive health surveillance
capabilities, some pretty impressive response capabilities that
are relevant to global health challenges. So I think that our
Defense Department has quite a bit to offer.
But really the center of gravity needs to be in the
development side of things, I would argue, and revitalizing,
for example, many of the programs that were started as part of
the Global Health Security Agenda, and going back and
allocating more to the other departments in our Federal
Government that have an important role to play, like the CDC
[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], like [Department
of] Health and Human Services, for example, and like USAID
[United States Agency for International Development].
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you for that.
So President Trump frequently discusses our overseas force
posture in terms of financial costs without discussing the
benefit to U.S. national security.
What are the benefits to U.S. national security for having
U.S. forces forward deployed in the Indo-Pacific? And what risk
would we incur if our posture was reduced? What challenges do
the domestic political environment in the United States for
alliance management? And what about the domestic political
environment within our Nation's allies.
Mr. Colby, would you mind taking a shot that question?
Mr. Colby. Sure, Congressman.
I mean, broadly, I agree with your point that a forward,
full presence in particularly the Western Pacific is very
valuable.
I mean, I think it is dependent. I mean, we do need to
adapt that forward presence. It needs to be competent and
credible, which means designed to deny China its ability
particularly to take over or subordinate a country like Taiwan
or eventually South Korea or the Philippines.
But as I said I think earlier, I mean, the way it seems to
me to make it to America first is to do it alongside allies and
partners. And that is not--I don't mean that in a sort of
kumbaya sort of way. I mean, to be totally candid, I think they
are more akin to business partnerships than friendships. But in
business partnerships you also have to--you have to have candid
conversations. You have to read, baseline, where things are.
But I am optimistic that we are going to, maybe, if for no
other reason than the countries of Asia, they recognize they
need the United States. And one of the things the
administration has really done that I think is lasting and
important is made very clear that the United States has a keen
sense of the challenge posed by China and what is going to be
entailed to confront that challenge over the long haul.
Mr. Cisneros. General Hodges, do you want to take a shot at
that question, too?
General Hodges. Sir, thanks.
This is all about access. Without having allies and forward
basing, we can't get there. You can't defend America just from
Fort Hood, Texas, or from Norfolk Naval Air Station or Camp
Pendleton.
And so with very small numbers. If you think about 60,000
American Army and Air Force and Navy that are in Europe,
60,000, that is barely over half of the stadium that the
University of Michigan football team plays in. So a very small
investment, yet gives us access.
And same with the Republic of Korea. I spent a year there.
It gives us the chance to [inaudible] what Secretary Carter
used to call horizontal escalation. If China does something
against Taiwan, we are in a position to strike China somewhere
else.
So these bases and the alliances that we have, the
partnerships, give us multiple options. It is an important part
of deterrence.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you all for those answers.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My question, my first one, I believe would be most likely
for Ms. Wormuth.
During World War II, Allied forces cooperated extensively
in the development and manufacturing of new and existing
technologies to support military operations and intelligence
gathering during the war. We have continued that tradition with
many of our allies and partners just ongoing to today.
And as we look at today's modern warfare, evolving warfare
strategy, specifically in the realm of cyber and AI [artificial
intelligence], I believe that it still is beneficial to the
U.S. to share or collaborate on technological ideas or plans
with our allies or partner nations.
Can you comment on what do you see as the barriers to
improving the responsible collaboration with allies on new
technologies?
Ms. Wormuth. Sure, Congresswoman. Thank you for that
question.
Certainly I agree that cooperating with our allies and
partners on technology issues is an important thing that we
should be doing. In the cyber domain, for example, we have a
NATO Center of Excellence in the Baltics, for example.
I think one of the most important things we can do is along
the lines of something that Mr. Colby brought up earlier, which
is to in our planning processes, in our force development
processes, to have much more robust and detailed dialogues with
some of our closest partners, like the U.K., for example, in
Europe, or Australia, Japan in the Indo-Pacific, for example.
Not only should we be talking to them about sort of what
traditional, conventional capabilities they can bring to bear
in a potential warfight, we need to be talking with them about
AI, about cyber technologies. And in many cases those countries
are quite innovative. So that is an area I think we should work
on.
The barriers, of course, are the sort of ones we
traditionally encounter in technology transfer areas, which is
we, of course, have to be concerned about protecting our
intellectual property, we have to be confident that our allies
are going to protect any sensitive technologies that we grant
them access to.
But that is something that we sort of have a number of
mechanisms to work through and a number of agencies who help us
with that. There are barriers, but I think we could probably
take a little bit more risk, given the gravity of the
challenges we are facing today.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
And, General and Mr. Colby, do you have anything to add to
that?
General Hodges. Congresswoman Houlahan, three things.
First of all, the key to effective deterrence is rapidly
identifying what is happening, to recognize what the Kremlin or
what the Chinese might be up to, and that is going to require
intelligence sharing at the speed of light. It won't be an
American satellite that first detects the threat. It is going
to be something else. So being able to knock down the walls
that prevent information and intelligence sharing is going to
be very important.
Secondly, the infrastructure. We depend so much on
transportation infrastructure, airports and seaports, around
the world to do what we do. If those are not protected from
cyber strike, then it is the same thing as if somebody launched
Iskander missiles at the port of Bremerhaven. So investing in
cyber protection and working with allies there.
And then third, it is a specific example but I think it is
illustrative. I am an infantry soldier, but I have grown to
appreciate what maritime unmanned systems, Navy drones, how
valuable those are. And the United States is leading in this
field, sharing that with our allies in the Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea.
It is so much more cost effective for them to complement
the surface vessels that they have and would significantly
change the balance of power in the Black Sea, for example,
against the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet.
Ms. Houlahan. That is excellent. Thank you.
And, Mr. Colby, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Congresswoman.
Building on Ms. Wormuth's comments, with which I associate
myself closely, I mean, I think that is right that we need to
take more risk. I mean, I think this is an example of an area
where, to use the academic kind of term, unipolarity has kind
of put deep roots into the American defense establishment's
mindset, which is to say I think candidly, when we think about
a lot of planning and the way the American defense system went
about things, allies were nice, but a lot of it was symbolic,
with maybe the exception of the Brits and the Australians.
And I think what we need to go back to is more of a Cold
War model. The Cold War is always a dangerous analogy. I don't
mean this writ large. But I mean in the sense that I think
during the Cold War, you know, the great example, there was an
American division and then a German division, an American
division, a Belgian division, and so forth.
And that involves risk. I mean, who knows if it sort of
helps as well as the Germans or the Americans?
But I think we do need to lean forward because you leave a
lot of value on the table if you are too protective.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
I have run out of time and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, all of you, for joining this great
discussion.
And, General Hodges, good to see you virtually. I know it
is late where you are.
I would like to start with Ms. Wormuth and Mr. Colby.
The administration has announced a pretty drastic
withdrawal and rapid withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan.
We have about 12,000 troops as part of the Resolute Support
mission overall, but 5,000 of those or so are our NATO
partners, and indeed the only time when Article 5 in the
history of NATO has been invoked was after 9/11 when our NATO
partners came to our aid.
So very briefly, I would like to hear from Ms. Wormuth and
Mr. Colby what the impact on that alliance would be and the
message it would send if we were to withdraw without sufficient
coordination and consultation with our allies who are there
fulfilling their responsibilities to us under Article 5.
Ms. Wormuth, do you want to begin?
Ms. Wormuth. Congressman, thank you.
Clearly we need to work closely with our allies who are
still with us in Afghanistan to coordinate any kind of
significant withdrawal, and certainly we are clearly in a
process of drawing down there.
As you know, several of our NATO allies have served
importantly as framework nations. Many of them are still with
us there. And for a long time our philosophy has been ``in
together, out together.''
So I think as we work through the final details of what the
ultimate shape and composition of any continuing presence might
be in Afghanistan, we are going to have to work closely with
our allies to make sure that it is a coordinated effort and
that everyone understands where we are trying to go and how we
are going to get there together.
Mr. Crow. Are you seeing that happening or hearing that?
Because I am not. I am not hearing that we are going through
that process.
Ms. Wormuth. I have not been following the discussions in
Afghanistan around that very closely, but certainly we are not
communicating generally as much as I think we need to be to be
on a whole range of issues, whether it is the withdrawal of
12,000 folks from Germany or whether it is the details of how
we are going to get out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Crow. Mr. Colby, I am going to skip you because I want
to get to General Hodges for a question, given my time
constraints.
General, the European Deterrence Initiative was passed in
2014 as a way to rebolster our defenses and show our commitment
to our NATO partners and others in Europe. The administration
now has for two consecutive years reduced that budget and even
shifted funds away from critical infrastructure and logistics
investments.
What has the impact been of those reductions on our
alliances and the perception of our allies' commitment to the
Russian aggression issue?
General Hodges. Well, Mr. Crow, thank you.
First of all, the European Reassurance Initiative and then
the European Deterrence Initiative--Defense Initiative--we
considered it when I was in U.S. Army Europe as oxygen. Without
that, you could not get the rotational forces, both Active, and
even more importantly, the Guard and Reserve, you couldn't get
them in the quantity and the frequency that we needed.
So those funds were extremely important for that, and also,
of course, for improving infrastructure along NATO's eastern
flank that we needed.
And so as allies see that this is decreasing without some
sort of explanation, they begin to associate that with, okay,
is this part of the U.S. shifting away or pivoting to the
Pacific? Are we losing interest?
So the money, as well as the troops, are the two biggest
signals that they follow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, General.
And then very briefly also, General Hodges, there is the 2
percent GDP requirement, but also there is the 20 percent major
equipment requirement. But I am hearing from our allies that 20
percent requirement should be reexamined because many of our
partners there actually don't even have the personnel and the
logistics to support additional major equipment purchases, the
Belgians being one of them that are having recruiting problems,
as well as logistical supply chain problems maintaining the
equipment that they have now.
Would you recommend reexamining that 20 percent major
equipment requirement?
General Hodges. Well, I think the 20 percent of the 2
percent being for modernization is a good thing. It doesn't
have to be necessarily new equipment.
I think there are so many more ways that we could look at
investment that ensures that the nations have--what they do
have is at the right level of readiness. But there are other
things that we need.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I believe we have Mr. Keating. You are on the virtual
platform there. We don't see a picture of you, and you are
muted at the moment. So, Mr. Keating, are you with us?
It would appear that he is not. And if so, that is all the
people we have for questions.
I really want to thank our witnesses today. This is not an
easy setup, easy platform. I also really appreciate the work
that the staff has gone into this.
I mean, the reason we do this is because in the COVID
environment it is not a good idea to have a large number of
people in an enclosed space. So we take advantage of the CVC
[Capitol Visitor Center] and we take advantage of being able to
participate remotely so that they are not in the room, so that
we can have fewer people in the room and hold hearings.
I don't enjoy this anymore than anybody else does. And of
the many things that we are all looking forward to getting back
to doing, one of the big ones for me is to get back into 2118
and hold our hearings the way we normally do. We will do that
as soon as the guidance from the healthcare officials here in
the Capitol tell us that is safe to do.
In the meantime we will continue to do hearings along these
lines. We are trying to get one set up for next week.
And with that, I will yield to Mr. Thornberry.
He has no closing remarks.
Then we are adjourned. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 2:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 23, 2020
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 23, 2020
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 23, 2020
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
General Hodges. Thank you for this question. I regret that we did
not get the chance to answer it in real time during the Hearing.
First, it is important that the Congress continue to hold the
Department of Defense accountable and responsible for creating a safe
and healthy work environment for all of our Service Members and DOD
civilians.
Second, the Congress should expect and require that the Department
of Defense set an appropriate example for all of our Allies and
Partners for how every Member of our Team is respected and valued and
treated . . . and to make it clear that there is no place for sexual
assault within our formations if we are to maintain the appropriate
level of readiness and if we expect qualified, talented young Women and
Men to step forward and Serve in our Armed Forces.
Third, the Department of Defense should work closely with the NATO-
designated ``Gender Advisor'' programs in all NATO headquarters, in
order to find where there is common ground and understanding and where
we might integrate our unique programs to get the best benefit.
The United States is far ahead of most of our European Allies when
it comes to integration of Women into our Armed Forces and in taking
active measures to eliminate sexual assault. Our Scandinavian Allies
and Partners are probably at the same level or slightly ahead of us . .
. but the rest are lagging behind. Since it is now the norm that we are
task organized at the tactical level, ie company and battalion, in many
exercises and in the conduct of NATO operations, such as the enhanced
Forward Presence Battle Groups, the Department of Defense should pay
particular attention to these potential disparities to ensure that the
overall combat readiness and effectiveness of these formations is
strong, not eroded by the effects of sexual assault and sexual
harassment.
At a minimum, deployed U.S. units who are task organized with
Allied and Partner units should have the same level of support as U.S.-
only units back in CONUS and that Soldiers from Allied and Partner
nations should participate in training and education programs and
command discipline programs required to ensure the elimination/
prevention of sexual assault. Special coordination will need to be made
in the case of actual assaults and the resulting investigations and
prosecution where appropriate. This is typically best done within the
specific national chain of command.
Thank you for the opportunity to answer this question. [See page
31.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 23, 2020
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
Mr. Keating. Much of the discussion regarding our allies and
partners--specifically with regards to those in Europe--centers on the
U.S. bolstering our relationships with the elected officials of those
countries. I feel there is a fundamental problem with this approach.
Just last week, the Pew Research Center reported the results of a new,
13-nation survey that revealed, not only is America's reputation among
key allies and partners in decline, but in several of those countries
the public's image of the U.S. ``is as low as it has been at any point
since the Center began polling on this topic nearly two decades ago.''
This suggests we need to repair our image with the constituents of
those elected officials that lead those ally and partner nations. What
insights do you have on how we can best repair the reputation of the
U.S. with the public overseas in support of our long term alliances and
our development of new partnerships?
Ms. Wormuth. Leaders in the United States do need to develop and
cultivate strong relationships with elected leaders in our allied and
partner countries, but it is also important to reach out to the publics
in those countries. U.S. leaders can reach out to public overseas
through speeches, visits to important cultural landmarks, schools or
sporting events, and be taking advantage of opportunities on foreign
visits to talk to individuals other than just government officials.
People in other countries certainly pay attention to the words and
actions of U.S. leaders, and their assessments of those actions are an
important element of how overseas publics view the United States.
At the same time, people overseas also form views of the United
States based on what they see happening in our country, how Americans
conduct themselves in host countries, and their own experiences if they
are able to visit or live in the United States. In addition to U.S.
leaders reaching out to members of the public in foreign countries,
American citizens can be important ambassadors for the United States
and play a role themselves in how people overseas view the United
States. For example, studies have indicated that countries hosting U.S.
military personnel and their families, for example, often have more
positive views of the United States than those that do not.
International exchange programs, both those aimed at sending Americans
overseas and bringing foreigners to the United States, are excellent
vehicles to build positive people-to-people relationships and
demonstrate the many strengths of the United States. Congress has an
important role to play in supporting international educational and
cultural exchange programs, as well as ensuring that the United States
remains a leader in hosting international students at our colleges and
universities.
Mr. Keating. Much of the discussion regarding our allies and
partners--specifically with regards to those in Europe--centers on the
U.S. bolstering our relationships with the elected officials of those
countries. I feel there is a fundamental problem with this approach.
Just last week, the Pew Research Center reported the results of a new,
13-nation survey that revealed, not only is America's reputation among
key allies and partners in decline, but in several of those countries
the public's image of the U.S. ``is as low as it has been at any point
since the Center began polling on this topic nearly two decades ago.''
This suggests we need to repair our image with the constituents of
those elected officials that lead those ally and partner nations. What
insights do you have on how we can best repair the reputation of the
U.S. with the public overseas in support of our long term alliances and
our development of new partnerships?
General Hodges. Thank you. Key to rebuilding trust and confidence
in the USA and in American Leadership requires five things:
#1 Demonstrate commitment to NATO . . . remove all doubt that the
U.S. is committed to continued leadership within the Alliance, despite
its flaws. This includes acknowledging that we benefit from NATO as
much as any of our Allies. . . . and that American access to bases and
ports and training areas in Europe benefit us for executing our
strategy in Africa and the Middle East and Eurasia as well as Europe.
#2 Understand the importance of the European Union to European
countries . . . that it is the key to their quality of life and
economic development . . . and that the USA should look for ways to
compete with the EU in the economic space but don't treat it as an
enemy. It is at the core of life for most European countries.
#3 Encourage private investment in Europe . . . especially central
and eastern Europe . . . projects that improve transportation and
telecommunications infrastructure, energy independence, education, and
health care. This is part of competing with the Chinese Communist Party
and the Kremlin.
#4 Improve the relationship with Germany, our most important Ally.
Germany is the one country that can change Kremlin behavior, due to its
economic power and its leadership within the EU and Europe. We should
still maintain high expectations of Germany fulfilling its NATO
obligations . . . but that should not hinder us working together more
closely.
#5 Expand/sustain all programs that encourage student exchanges,
cultural exchanges, sister city programs, and all other programs that
build trust and confidence and understanding. I meet older Europeans
all the time who tell me how much their experience as a young person in
America as a student gave them a positive view of America and American
ideals, even if they don't like some policies.
Mr. Keating. Much of the discussion regarding our allies and
partners--specifically with regards to those in Europe--centers on the
U.S. bolstering our relationships with the elected officials of those
countries. I feel there is a fundamental problem with this approach.
Just last week, the Pew Research Center reported the results of a new,
13-nation survey that revealed, not only is America's reputation among
key allies and partners in decline, but in several of those countries
the public's image of the U.S. ``is as low as it has been at any point
since the Center began polling on this topic nearly two decades ago.''
This suggests we need to repair our image with the constituents of
those elected officials that lead those ally and partner nations. What
insights do you have on how we can best repair the reputation of the
U.S. with the public overseas in support of our long term alliances and
our development of new partnerships?
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Keating, for the question. These results
are clearly concerning. Buy-in from elected officials and
parliamentarians and the publics they represent in allied and partner
countries is critical for enduring, stable relationships with these
states as well as their support in crises and conflicts. While the
Executive Branch naturally has the leading role in U.S. foreign
relations, this is an area where Congress can play an especially
important role by signaling strong, bipartisan support for an American
strategy along the lines of the National Defense Strategy and by
engagement with parliamentarians, officials, and key opinion-shapers
abroad. Overall, however, I remain confident in the fundamental appeal
of the United States as an ally and partner in the regions of the world
critical to our interests. Part of this, needless to say, is a result
of our continuing status as a beacon of liberty and opportunity.
Critically, though, we alone are strong enough to help states in
regions like Asia and Europe avoid falling under the sway of their most
ambitious and powerful neighbors. There is therefore a lasting
structural attractiveness to aligning with the United States among many
of the world's countries. To maintain this element of our appeal, it is
critical that we sustain a strong defense and a vital, growing economy
that underwrites it.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. I would appreciate your perspectives on a recurring and
often difficult to address issue impacting our national defense
strategy--adversary operations in the grey zone between peace and
conflict--and their impact on our relationships with allies and
partners.
The Commission on National Defense Strategy's 2018 ``Providing for
the Common Defense'' report observed that grey zone operations have
become the ``tool of choice for those who do not wish to confront U.S.
military power directly,'' and because ``grey zone challenges combine
military and paramilitary measure with economic statecraft, political
warfare, information operations, and other tools, they often occur in
the `seams' between DOD and other U.S. departments and agencies, making
them all the more difficult to address.''
Since responding to adversary grey zone operations is difficult
within our own interagency process, it is likely even more challenging
to coordinate a response to such tactics among our allies and partners.
Some of our closest allies have already begun incorporating
adversary grey zone tactics into their national defense strategies.
Australia, for example, recently released its ``2020 Defence Strategic
Update,' which stated that Australia's military must work with other
branches of its government to respond to grey zone activities, and that
such tactics are becoming ``integrated into statecraft and are being
applied in ways that challenge sovereignty and habits of cooperation''
including ``to long established and mutually beneficial security
partnerships.''
I would appreciate your views on: (1) How can DOD better coordinate
with our allies to respond in a more comprehensive manner to grey zone
operations by countries such as China and Russia? and (2) When
considering the frequent difficulty of responding to grey zone
operations, are current defense partnerships with longstanding allies
adequate or might additional agreements be required?
Ms. Wormuth. The most important step to better coordinating with
our allies in a more comprehensive manner would be to develop a
comprehensive, whole of government strategy for competition with China
and Russia; addressing gray zone challenges should be a subset of that
larger effort. Working closely with allies and partners is an essential
element of a comprehensive, proactive competitive strategy and while
gray zone challenges are certainly an agenda item in many bilateral
conversations there is a need for a more coordinated approach so that
the United States and its allies can respond to provocations more
quickly in the future. While our allies and partners may not agree with
the United States on how to react to every specific provocation,
aggressive actions by both China and Russia are raising concerns in
both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, creating an opportunity for the
United States to build coalitions to counter gray zone activity. In
addition to developing a U.S. government-wide comprehensive competitive
strategy, the Department of Defense can take some specific steps to
support and enable the broader strategy. In particular, DOD should
continue to reaffirm its commitment to allies and partners in Europe
and Asia, and back these statements with increased activity in forums
dealing with gray zone activity such as cyber-attacks and
disinformation. DOD could increase its involvement with regional
organizations like ASEAN and the European Union, and build on its
already robust exercise program to include a focus on thwarting gray
zone activity where appropriate. In most cases, existing defense
partnership agreements and alliance agreements already provide a broad
scope for DOD to deepen its focus on combating gray zone activity in
concert with allies and partners. More than a need for new
arrangements, the challenge for DOD is determining how to design
multilateral responses with partners and allies who may have different
risk tolerances than the United States when it comes addressing Russian
and Chinese behavior. Frequent conversations with allies and partners
about gray zone activity and how best to counter it in their regions
before specific situations arise would better position DOD to gain
allied and partner support quickly when confronted with a provocation.
Mr. Golden. I would appreciate your perspectives on a recurring and
often difficult to address issue impacting our national defense
strategy--adversary operations in the grey zone between peace and
conflict--and their impact on our relationships with allies and
partners.
The Commission on National Defense Strategy's 2018 ``Providing for
the Common Defense'' report observed that grey zone operations have
become the ``tool of choice for those who do not wish to confront U.S.
military power directly,'' and because ``grey zone challenges combine
military and paramilitary measure with economic statecraft, political
warfare, information operations, and other tools, they often occur in
the `seams' between DOD and other U.S. departments and agencies, making
them all the more difficult to address.''
Since responding to adversary grey zone operations is difficult
within our own interagency process, it is likely even more challenging
to coordinate a response to such tactics among our allies and partners.
Some of our closest allies have already begun incorporating
adversary grey zone tactics into their national defense strategies.
Australia, for example, recently released its ``2020 Defence Strategic
Update,' which stated that Australia's military must work with other
branches of its government to respond to grey zone activities, and that
such tactics are becoming ``integrated into statecraft and are being
applied in ways that challenge sovereignty and habits of cooperation''
including ``to long established and mutually beneficial security
partnerships.''
I would appreciate your views on: (1) How can DOD better coordinate
with our allies to respond in a more comprehensive manner to grey zone
operations by countries such as China and Russia? and (2) When
considering the frequent difficulty of responding to grey zone
operations, are current defense partnerships with longstanding allies
adequate or might additional agreements be required?
General Hodges. The key to success here is to look at this as part
of Great Power Competition and that we have to compete in all domains .
. . diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) . . . it
can't be just DOD . . . it will take most of the other departments of
the U.S. Govt . . . and to recognize that neither the Kremlin or the
Chinese Communist Party play by the same rules observed by the USA and
our Western Allies. Instead they work thru the continuum of national
power in all domains, and using illegal as well as legal means, to
achieve their aims. This also means that we have to make a focused
effort on building up societal resilience within the USA and within the
societies of our Allies and Partners. Sweden and Norway are doing a
particularly good job on this. This means taking steps to build/rebuild
confidence in the pillars of our liberal democracy (electoral process,
judicial process, media, governmental competence) in order to reduce
our vulnerability to disinformation, hardening our vulnerable
infrastructure from cyber-attacks, and reducing our reliance on foreign
energy and critical materials and medicen. The U.S. Govt needs to work
more closely with NATO, not as an afterthought or `additive' measure
but as the start-point, if we want to have coordinated efforts with the
leading nations of Europe, especially Germany, France, and UK. This
will help us achieve a common view of the threat . . . often the
hardest part since many European nations, especially in western and
southern Europe, are reluctant to be so blunt in assessing the Kremlin
or China.
Mr. Golden. I would appreciate your perspectives on a recurring and
often difficult to address issue impacting our national defense
strategy--adversary operations in the grey zone between peace and
conflict--and their impact on our relationships with allies and
partners.
The Commission on National Defense Strategy's 2018 ``Providing for
the Common Defense'' report observed that grey zone operations have
become the ``tool of choice for those who do not wish to confront U.S.
military power directly,'' and because ``grey zone challenges combine
military and paramilitary measure with economic statecraft, political
warfare, information operations, and other tools, they often occur in
the `seams' between DOD and other U.S. departments and agencies, making
them all the more difficult to address.''
Since responding to adversary grey zone operations is difficult
within our own interagency process, it is likely even more challenging
to coordinate a response to such tactics among our allies and partners.
Some of our closest allies have already begun incorporating
adversary grey zone tactics into their national defense strategies.
Australia, for example, recently released its ``2020 Defence Strategic
Update,' which stated that Australia's military must work with other
branches of its government to respond to grey zone activities, and that
such tactics are becoming ``integrated into statecraft and are being
applied in ways that challenge sovereignty and habits of cooperation''
including ``to long established and mutually beneficial security
partnerships.''
I would appreciate your views on: (1) How can DOD better coordinate
with our allies to respond in a more comprehensive manner to grey zone
operations by countries such as China and Russia? and (2) When
considering the frequent difficulty of responding to grey zone
operations, are current defense partnerships with longstanding allies
adequate or might additional agreements be required?
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Golden, for the question. By far the most
serious threat to American political interests in the world is defeat
in war; by definition provocations in the gray zone pose a far less
significant threat. Moreover, challenges in the gray zone can often be
a reflection of our success--the opponent's recognition that direct
challenges to U.S. interests are too dangerous or futile to be
countenanced. Thus, while activities under our threshold for the use of
military force may in certain contexts be concerning, I believe that
the overwhelming primary focus of the U.S. defense establishment must
be ensuring the Joint Force can prevail in the conflicts that matter to
us. This requires a clear focus on restoring the American military's
warfighting edge in light of the rise of Chinese military power in
particular. This means that gray zone challenges must be dealt with
economically, in ways that do not detract from the overriding goal of
preparing for war to deter it. This is a serious issue because
responding to gray zone provocations can eat up time, effort, and
resources that would otherwise be used by our armed forces for training
or outfitting for high-end conflict scenarios. Moreover, responding to
gray zone activities is very often a matter far more of political-
diplomatic, economic, and intelligence responses than military ones.
Thus in most circumstances other organs of the U.S. Government than the
Department of Defense should play the leading and most significant
roles in these areas.\1\ That said, the gray zone is a concern. In
addition to economically and selectively employing our armed forces to
deal with gray zone provocations, we can help address them through
encouragement of allies and partners to take on a greater role. The
most effective way to do so is to encourage allies and partners that
have the most resolve to push back on particular gray zone provocations
to lead the way in doing so. The United States can then focus largely
on being the ``cavalry'' that can swiftly ride in to ``save the day''
if needed. At the same time, we can help bolster the ability of allies
and partners to do this through arms transfers and other forms of
capacity-building, and their resolve by reassuring them of our
willingness to stand by them effectively if they are pressed by our
common adversaries. Thus, for instance, the United States is better off
aiding Japan to be the ``face'' of resistance to gray zone salami-
slicing tactics by China in the East China Sea and aiding the
Philippines, Vietnam, and other friendly claimants to do the same in
the South China Sea. The United States can retain its military forces
primarily to deter China from escalating to try to dominate these U.S.
allies and partners.
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\1\ For a valuable elaboration, see Jim Mitre and Andre Gellerman,
``Defining DOD's Role in Gray Zone Competition,'' Center for a New
American Security, August 24, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/
commentary/defining-dods-role-in-gray-zone-competition.
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